Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century Strategic Planning, Policy and Predictions [English ed.] 2019019707, 9780367244699, 9780429282645

Citation preview

Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century

This book analyses China’s maritime strategy for the 21st century, integrating strategic planning, policy thinking and strategic prediction. It explains the construction and application of China’s military, political, economic and diplomatic means for building maritime power and predicts the future of China’s maritime power by 2049, as well as development trends in global maritime politics. It explores both the strengths and the limitations of President Xi’s ‘Maritime Dream’ and provides a candid assessment of the likely future balance at sea between China and the United States. This volume explains and discusses China’s claims and intentions in the East and South China Seas, and makes some recommendations for China’s future policy that will lessen the chance of conflict with the United States and its closer neighbors. This book will be of much interest to students of maritime strategy, naval studies, Chinese politics and International Relations in general. Hu Bo is a senior researcher at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University, China.

Cass Series: Naval Policy and History Series Editor: Geoffrey Till ISSN 1366-9478

This series consists primarily of original manuscripts by research scholars in the general area of naval policy and history, without national or chronological limitations. It will from time to time also include collections of important articles as well as reprints of classic works. 59 US Naval Strategy and National Security The Evolution of American Maritime Power Sebastian Bruns 60 Modern Maritime Piracy Genesis, Evolution and Responses Robert C. McCabe 61 Seapower A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Fourth Edition) Geoffrey Till 62 Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial Theory and Practice Milan Vego 63 India-China Maritime Competition The Security Dilemma at Sea Edited by Rajesh Basrur, Anit Mukherjee, and TV Paul 64 Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century Strategic Planning, Policy and Predictions Hu Bo

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Cass-Series-Naval-Policy-and-History/book-series/CSNPH

Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century Strategic Planning, Policy and Predictions

Hu Bo Translated by Zhang Yanpei Edited and Preface by Geoffrey Till

First published in English 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business 2049 年的中国海上权力 Originally Published in Chinese by Chinese Development Press © 2016 China Development Press © 2020 Routledge Translated by Zhang Yanpei All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hu, Bo, 1981– author. | Yanpei, Zhang, translator. | Till, Geoffrey, editor, writer of preface. Title: Chinese maritime power in the 21st century : strategic planning, policy and predictions / Hu Bo ; translated by Zhang Yanpei ; edited and preface by Geoffrey Till. Other titles: 2049 nian de Zhongguo hai shang quan li. English Description: London ; New York, NY : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2020. | Series: Cass series : naval policy and history, 1366-9478 ; 64 | “Originally Published in Chinese by Chinese Development Press © 2016”— Title verso. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019019707 Subjects: LCSH: Sea-power—China. | Naval strategy. | East China Sea—Strategic aspects. | South China Sea—Strategic aspects. | China—Foreign relations—21st century. Classification: LCC VA633 .H7313 2020 | DDC 359/.030951—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019019707 ISBN: 978-0-367-24469-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-28264-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgments

vii ix xi xvii

1 Three major systematic objectives of Chinese maritime power 1 2 The connotation and characteristics of Chinese maritime power 29 3 China’s coastal geostrategy 47 4 China’s exterior line strategy at sea 61 5 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and the Demarcation of the East China Sea 79 6 A solution to tensions in the South China Sea 95 7 Promoting peaceful power transition between China and the United States 126 8 Maritime relations with Japan, ASEAN, India, Australia and Russia 165 9 Deterrence is preferable to fighting 216

vi Contents

10 Tridents beyond armed force 226 11 Conclusion and expectation: China’s maritime power in the year 2049 253 Index

263

List of figures

3.1 The First and Second Island Chains 5.1 Contested Lines in the East China Sea 6.1 The South China Sea and the Nine Dash Line

57 83 99

List of tables

3.1 Maritime Disputes between China and Its Neighboring Countries on Sovereignty of Island and Reefs and Maritime Demarcation 47 10.1 Major differences in the ways agrarian civilizations and maritime civilizations approach foreign relations 234

Preface

One of the most obvious aspects of today’s world is that it is changing fast, not least in the maritime domain – and that is a domain that many people think is in itself likely to grow in importance as the 21st Century develops. Increasingly, countries around the world are taking the maritime future more seriously than they did before, in all of its many aspects. The extent to which the ‘blue’ part of their national economies is increasingly being more thought about and better regulated and managed is an indication of the sea’s value as a source of resources – oil, gas, fish and who knows what else in the future – and as an advantageous way of transporting goods around the world. Marine environmentalists are likewise more obviously stepping into the discussion by pointing out the role of the sea as a symptom and a regulator of the world’s climate and the imperative need for its greater protection. Contemporary strategists, on the other hand, tend to stress the continuing strategic significance of seapower. Another aspect of current maritime change that is attracting a great deal of sometimes alarmed attention is the growth of specifically Chinese maritime power and its possible effects on a global maritime order that emerged from the Second World War but which is now facing the prospect of transformative change. Uncertain futures make people nervous, and the sheer scale of China’s actual and potential maritime rise makes calculations about its possible future impact particularly hazardous. In these circumstances, the world needs to watch what China is doing and assess its likely consequences. The problem is that much of this is still ambiguous both in terms of what is actually happening and more especially in what it might mean for everyone else. As a result, there is huge diversity in Western interpretations of both these things. ‘Dragon-slayers’ tend to take a bleak view of both matters. For them, China is engaged in a deliberate and conscious plan to wrest strategic dominance away from the United States; it even said to have a target date in mind, 2049, the hundredth anniversary of the final victory and establishment of the People’s Republic of China.1 Chinese thinking, it is claimed, is based on its own hard-won strategic culture, not least of the ‘warring-states period,’ and is comprehensive in scope, integrating soft power and hard power, political and legal pressure, and all the

xii Preface advantages of economic growth; China has, they say, a marked inclination to break the rules by exploiting its advantages, say in digital technology,2 and an emphasis on the rapid expansion of its military power together with an increasing readiness to use it. Others, and not necessarily mere ‘panda-huggers,’ dispute the scale of the challenge and point out the many hurdles ahead for China even if it did aim at maritime dominance. The notion, for example, that the growth of the Chinese economy will be sustained at the very high rate it enjoyed at the start of the 21st century is now widely disputed by Western experts; this, combined with the country’s depressing demographic trajectory and its great environmental problems, is likely to be an increasingly worrying preoccupation of the Chinese government, which, such people think, seems likely to take its mind off world leadership even if it ever had such aspirations in the first place. Another group of Western skeptics, however, accept much of the argument that a significant shift in the balance of power particularly between China and the United States is indeed likely to take place and many indeed would go further proposing that the level of challenge to the existing world order is much greater than that posed by the Soviet Union in Cold War days because it is so much more comprehensive and is based on a degree of industrial and economic strength that Moscow never enjoyed. More importantly perhaps, China is integrated into the world economy and its corresponding political order in a way that Russia never was, and so there are very real disincentives for the Chinese leadership to threaten ‘the system.’ Economic interdependence, in short, will constrain political adventurism just as the Manchester School said it would in the 19th Century. The only thing that might turn China into an enemy is to treat it as one. Instead, its rise should be seen less as a threat and more as an opportunity to adjust the current order into more realistic, sustainable and perhaps even ‘fairer’ directions.3 This pulls us into that most contentious of areas, the assessment of not only what another country is doing but what this shows (or perhaps doesn’t) about what the intentions of its leaders are. This task requires some familiarity with the thought processes of the people on the ‘other side of the hill.’ Empathy of this sort has always been difficult even among Europeans who share much culture and historical experience, as Basil Liddell Hart discovered when he interviewed senior German military officers shortly after the Second World War and was sometimes surprised by their views.4 How much more difficult, then, for Westerners to fully understand the outlook of a large and powerful country on the other side of the world with 5,000 years of rich and largely separated experience behind it? Given this problem, it is perhaps understandable that onlookers should sometimes unconsciously make the further assumption that there is only one Chinese outlook that they need to get to grips with, because that would seem to flow naturally from a regime that appears to many democratic Westerners to be distinctly autocratic and authoritarian in its control of

Preface  xiii opinion. Justifying this, they would point to the regime’s policing of the Internet and its one-party rule. But, in fact there is more variety of thought than sometimes appears to the outside world. It is certainly true that China has its hawks, but their views can be given undue prominence by the Western media not least because they sometimes seem to provide such a striking contrast to the official narrative of China’s maritime rise being essentially peaceful both in aspiration and in preferred outcome.5 For this reason, there is a very real need for the outside world to have the chance of reading more substantial first-hand Chinese accounts of the extent and the consequences of China’s maritime rise. Professor Hu Bo has provided just such an account, although its readers should probably take to heart that this is a Chinese view, if a very authoritative one, not the Chinese view. The more exposure Western observers have to the varying views of Chinese scholars, officials and military officers, the less the chance of both sides colliding in a fog of mutual incomprehension – just as they did in 1793, as Professor Hu points out, when Lord Macartney first encountered the Qianlong emperor. Professor Hu, a Research Professor at the Institute of Ocean Research at the prestigious Peking University, directs its Centre for Maritime Strategy Research. As such he specializes in maritime strategy, international security and Chinese diplomacy. He is the author of several books and a large number of chapters and articles on issues relating to China’s maritime strategy and policy. He is widely considered to have extensive influence in China’s academia and maritime policy circles, and has spoken at a number of leading colleges and think tanks in the United States. In short, Professor Hu is a leading expert on China’s maritime power, and his views should be available to a wider audience in the West. Unfortunately, examples of such in-depth analysis remain few and far between, and the appearance of this book is to be welcomed. As subsequent chapters will show, the work is comprehensive both in the sea-related subjects that it covers and in the depth of its analysis of, first, the aspirations behind China’s maritime rise and, second, its consequences for the Indo-Pacific region and the wider world order. The book is strikingly realistic in discussing the hurdles that must be overcome before China can become a real maritime power perhaps by the middle of this century. In China itself, and in the community of China-watchers,6 there is also an important second level of debate going on about the extent to which China should be seeking to turn itself into a full-fledged maritime power. Many would argue that historically China was, and its strategic circumstances dictate that it remains, essentially a continental power and that this requires more modest maritime aims. This is indeed a long-running debate, specifically about the strategic identity of the country and whether it is naturally ‘continental’ or ‘maritime.’ Some have argued that it has been a maritime power and perhaps might be again. Such was the proposition of Professor Lo Jung-pang (1912–1981)

xiv Preface who assisted Joseph Needham in his seminal works on China and its history and who ended up teaching at the University of California at Davis. Professor Lo argued that in the Northern Song, Yuan and early Ming periods, China was ‘more of a sea power than a land power.’ If ultimately these impulses failed or petered out, there is still much to be learned from them.7 Continual public references to the ‘rejuvenation’ or ‘revitalization’ of Chinese seapower and, indeed, the major use now made of the remarkable 15th-century exploits of Admiral Zheng He strongly suggest the need for care when suggesting that China’s maritime rise should be seen essentially as a new departure.8 In this book, however, the author argues that the United States, given its geo-strategic location, can afford to devote a higher proportion of its resources to the maritime endeavor, and so China’s trying to match, still less surpass, the United States as the dominant global maritime power in the foreseeable future would be far too demanding. But just because China should not aspire to be the maritime power should not mean that it gives up on being a maritime power. Professor Hu argues that China’s economic strength and local strategic interests in the South and East China Seas require it to develop real maritime power. Although its more distant interests in terms of markets, supplies and its willingness to accept more responsibility in defending the international system against such threats as piracy and international terrorism will also require China to have an expeditionary capability to be effective further afield, it will remain an essentially regional rather than a global maritime power like the United States. Nonetheless, this will demand a process of ‘stepping out’, which is well underway. However, even this represents a major shift in China’s ideas and perceptions of itself that needs noting. In this ‘stepping out’ process, he argues, China faces four sets of very considerable challenges. The first is the willingness and ability of China to make the necessary effort given all its other pre-occupations, despite the fact that such a policy of maritime stepping out has the highest level of political support. Success in this endeavor will require a holistic approach that takes in and properly integrates all aspects of the maritime domain, not just the naval and military ones. The second set of challenges are the military-technical and operational demands of such ‘far-sea’ ambitions in terms of naval capabilities and access to facilities in the wider world. Certainly, China has impressed the world with its carrier program and other such advances, but there is a world of difference between having the equipment and exploiting it to maximum effectiveness. Moreover, China conspicuously lacks, though is fast accumulating, the 24/7 operational experience of the Indian, and still less of the US navies. The third and perhaps most obvious set of challenges are the constraints of geography, most obviously China’s limited access to the open ocean given the existence of the first and second island chains, and the ‘temporary separation’ of Taiwan. The importance of Taiwan not only as unfinished

Preface  xv business from civil war and revolutionary days but also as ‘the cork in the bottle’ of China’s maritime aspirations is given some prominence in Professor Hu’s book. China’s attitudes toward the island disputes that sometimes convulse the South and East China Seas are articulated too, and in some detail. The interesting point is made here that these disputes are to be seen as an obstacle in China’s pursuit of maritime power rather than a cause of it. The fourth, related, set of challenges are the attitudes toward China’s rise exhibited by China’s neighbors, near and far. Accordingly, Professor Hu analyzes the attitudes and actions of Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Australia and India, drawing sometimes uncompromising conclusions about their differing responses to China’s rise and the need for some accommodation on both sides. This verdict applies most strongly, of course, to the response on the United States and on the degree of its willingness to accept that there can be ‘two tigers on the same mountain.’ Despite the fact that times are changing and the prospects of major inter-state war might currently seem remote, the alarmist views of at least some influential circles in many of these countries to China’s rise mean that China must recognize the abiding need for traditional deterrence through strength, on the same principle as that articulated by US Navy’s recently reconstituted 2nd Fleet in the Atlantic: ‘Preparing to Fight So We Don’t Have To.’9 For all concerned, Professor Hu argues, there is a need to ‘steady the ship’, because, objectively, threats of such conflict do exist. In this, the need for China to take a holistic all-round approach is given some emphasis. There is the suggestion that an effective Chinese foreign policy should, by dealing with such problems objectively, facilitate the development of maritime power rather than simply and crudely make use of it. Whatever their reaction to the detailed analysis in this book, and it would not be surprising if it elicits a fair amount of disagreement, Western readers are sure to find this relatively rare in-depth Chinese analysis of the country’s maritime future both illuminating and challenging. The book repays close attention and detailed reading because it is rich in argument, authoritative in approach and far from being simply a restatement of well-known and official Chinese government views. Both the author and the Series Editor are grateful to its hard-working translator and to the two anonymous but highly regarded external reviewers of the original manuscript for their detailed comments and suggestions, which have proved extremely helpful in preparing this book for publication. Geoffrey Till

Notes 1 Such, for example, is the view expressed in Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2016).

xvi Preface 2 “US Accuses a Chinese Giant of Tech Theft,” New York Times, 29 Jan 2019; Dan Strumpf, “Huwai Sees Years to Address UK Concerns Over Software,’ Wall Street Journal, 9–10 February 2019. 3 For an example of this kind of assessment, see Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Carlton, VIC: Black Inc. Publishers, 2012). 4 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London: Cassell and Co., 1948). 5 One such flurry was caused by the reports of Major General Luo Yuan, a retired academic at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing giving a speech in Shenzhen in which he reportedly claimed that sinking two US Navy aircraft carriers would resolve any disputes in the East or South China Sea. James Seidel, “‘Sink Two Aircraft Carriers’: Chinese Admiral’s Chilling Recipe to Dominate the South China Sea”. News Corp Australia Network, 2 January 2019. 6 Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009) is a good example of this. 7 For an account of Professor Lo’s views, see Lo Jung-pang, China as a Sea Power, 1127–1368, edited and with commentary by Bruce A. Elleman (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012). 8 Chia Lin Sien and Sally K. Church, eds., Zheng He and the Afro-Asian World (Melaka, Malyasia: PERZIM, 2012) is a good example of the Zheng He narrative. 9 Vice-Adm Andrew L. Lewis, Commander 2nd Fleet cited in Susan McFarland “Navy Relaunches Atlantic Fleet to Eye Russia” UPI 25 August 2018.

Acknowledgments

The term ‘maritime power’ has been used ubiquitously and clamorously in China in recent years. More than an insistent appeal by the masses and the elites, it is by now a national strategic goal set by the government. Although in terms of geography China has always been a land–sea combination state, in ancient times China also had notable maritime activities. However, this is the first time in the Chinese history that the nation as a whole is orientating toward the sea. It tends to be very difficult for China, as such a large country, to make a concerted effort to unite on a single task, but building maritime power is no doubt a huge exception to this. Since its proposal, this strategy has received widespread attention, support and participation from various sectors of society. As a result, China’s maritime practices are currently undergoing dynamic development in politics, economics, military affairs, diplomacy, culture and so on. Obviously, China has already made great strides in the building of maritime power. Chinese navy’s modernization achievements are evident and are accelerating progress toward a comprehensive ‘Blue Water’ navy: the ‘Liaoning’ aircraft carrier has formed some fighting capacity, and two other domestic made aircraft carriers are being built; 052D advanced destroyers and new world-class 055 destroyers, both of which have comparatively strong regional air-defense and long-distance ocean combat capabilities, are being ordered and going into commission in bulk. After two important reforms, respectively, in 2013 and 2018, China’s maritime law enforcement forces have been integrated and strengthened into the China Coast Guard (CCG), marking the end to the period of ‘Five Dragons Governing the Seas’. On the issues of Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, China has changed from its previous passive stance to continuously and actively experiment with a policy of ‘throwing down the gauntlet.’ It has established the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), has undertaken construction projects in the South China Sea, and displayed impulsive determination in protection of its rights and great comprehensive strength. Furthermore, China’s ability to control situations is rapidly increasing in both the East and South China Seas. Beyond its offshore areas, China is actively moving toward the deep seas and oceans, participating in north and south polar affairs, while

xviii Acknowledgments also taking part in global marine governance like antipiracy, search and rescue, and marine environmental protection. Not surprisingly, China’s maritime ascendency has attracted wide world concerns, countermeasures and overreactions. The United States has assumed China as the largest maritime strategic competitor and conducted strategic responses like its Rebalance to Asia Pacific and Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiatives. In order to check China’s rising power, the United States uses maritime disputes involving China to play the security card, thereby taking advantage of the situation by adding military deployments in the Western Pacific on a large scale, adding more and more strategic pressure on China. While incidents of ‘unscripted’ and ’dangerously close’ encounters between Chinese vessels and aircrafts and their American counterparts are occurring increasingly frequently, the risk of exchange of fire is also escalating sharply. With the excuse of Chinese maritime threat, Japanese military attention is accelerating its shift toward the ‘south west’, deploying advanced military equipment on a large scale to Okinawa, which lies next to the East China Sea. The concerns and doubts of India, Australia and other countries outside of the East Asia region toward China’s maritime strategy are intensifying, as some of them even following the example of the United States to take action against China. From China’s perspective, many diverse vertical and horizontal alliances are forming against it. From 2009 to 2016, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and some other neighboring countries had engaged in many serious maritime confrontations with China, using almost all the tools and means of politics, diplomacy, economy, the law and the military. Examples include Scarborough Shoal Incident (2012), the Japanese purchase of the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) (2012), the South China Sea Arbitration (2013–2016) and the Zhong Jiannan Incident (2014). Although the situations in both the East and South China Seas are cooling down since 2017, the disputed issues and conflicts have not yet been solved. Meanwhile, as to the Chinese people, the situation of near seas is frustrating, and China is far away from being a genuine maritime power from any point of view. Dreams and reality still appear to be at opposite ends of the earth. A beautiful dream and a brutal reality make it all the more difficult for the Chinese people to conceal the discontent and anxiety in their hearts. Can or cannot China become a maritime power? When can a dream dating back over a century be realized? In the 2012 report of 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (NCCCP), China formally put forward the plan of constructing itself as a maritime power; in the 2017 report of 19th NCCCP, Chinese leaders further emphasized the accelerating construction of maritime power. It is a good start for national policy propaganda, while in the academic level there are a series of questions left: what are China’s reasonable maritime power objectives? What type of maritime power would it become? How would China utilize its various steadily mounting forces and what type of

Acknowledgments  xix path would it take in its pursuit of becoming a maritime power? How should China cope with its maritime relationships between neighbor countries and major powers like the United States in the construction of maritime power? The more means of action available, the greater the outside world’s attention and backlash. How best to coordinate the utilization of enhanced capacity and methods, relieve pressure from the outside world and counter hostile actions in order to better pursue China’s own interests? Clarifying these basic questions is not only essential for China’s strategic planning and practice, but also essential for the world’s rational understanding of China’s peaceful rise, particularly the fundamentals of its maritime rise. China’s maritime rise may be the largest geopolitical event in the 21st century, though facing severe challenges and difficulties. I am very fortunate to experience a period of unprecedented transformation in China’s maritime activities, to have the opportunity to embrace an era even more exciting than when Zheng He explored the Indian Ocean. With such a magnificent historic backdrop, proactively participating in the course of China’s emergence as a maritime power, through my own modest abilities, is my lifelong wish. This book has strived to describe the maritime situation that China is facing comprehensively and objectively, and to answer the above-mentioned questions in a balanced way: considering both feasibility and necessity; examining both the objectives and means; and exploring the meanings of maritime power with comprehensive angles of military, politics and economics. I sincerely hope that this book can inspire and expand the thought processes of policymakers and officials, can be a starting point to elicit further ideas for related intellectual research, can offer positive energy for pertinent public opinion propaganda and guidance related to the sea, and can attract more citizens to offer themselves to the planning and construction of a maritime power. The process and outcome of China’s pursuit of maritime power not only depends on China’s choices, but also the reactions of the international community, especially the United States and China’s maritime neighbors. In this book, I also want to provide the readers outside China with a Chinese perspective to understand China’s maritime rise, promoting better maritime interactions between China and the international community. The publication of this book is inseparable from the efforts of Routledge Press, especially senior editor Andrew Humphrys, and it is also great honor to be included in the series edited by Prof. Geoffrey Till. Geoff has read the manuscript of this book carefully and given very detailed suggestions for modification, and the big favor of writing the Preface, which clarifies my arguments and made this book much easier to read for our Western readers. This book has been revised on the basis of my Chinese book ‘2049 年的中 国海上权力’ published in 2015. Ms. Zhang Yanpei at London School of Economics translated the original Chinese version into English, and Dr. Lian Chenchao at King’s College London assisted in revising and supplementing

xx Acknowledgments some information and annotations for Chapter 8. I have also benefited much from the comments of two anonymous reviewers arranged by Routledge Press. In the process of revision and publication, Toshi Yoshihara at the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Lyle J. Goldstein at US Naval War College, Øystein Tunsjø at Norwegian Defense University College, Madame Fu Ying and General Yao Yunzhu have given many insightful comments and enthusiastic proposals. Finally, I should acknowledge Peking University Institute of Ocean Research, which sponsored this research and the translation fee, but the institute’s greatest favor is to give me a comfortable research environment.

1 Three major systematic objectives of Chinese maritime power1

From 1840 onward, becoming a maritime power has been the dream and pursuit of generations of Chinese elites. Since the turn of the 21st century, China has extensively accelerated its maritime focus and efforts for the construction of maritime power. Official maritime policies and plans also continue to be introduced. In May 2003, the State Council’s National Maritime Economic Development Program announced unequivocally for the first time the strategic goal of ‘the gradual construction of China into a maritime power.’ In November 2012, it was formally declared in the report of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to ‘increase development in marine resource potential, develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecosystems and the ocean environment, resolutely safeguard national maritime interests, and construct a maritime power.’2 The topic of maritime power has since then officially risen as an important part of China’s national strategy. However, this strategy remains highly theoretical and abstract, especially without a clear systematic objective. On China’s goals as a maritime power, domestic academic debates have in fact continued for more than ten years. The former director of the State Oceanic Administration, Wang Shuguang, once pointed out that China’s aims as a maritime power ought to be an advanced marine economy with output value equivalent to above 10 per cent of GDP; strong offshore defense forces, capable of effectively safeguarding national maritime interests; distinct status as a major maritime nation, able to play an important role in terms of international maritime affairs.3 Liu Zhongmin believes the wider strategy of China’s maritime development should be grasped from these three levels. First, it should include both international and domestic strategic levels. On the international level, China’s grand maritime strategy needs to build and peacefully develop an international environment. Domestically, it should serve sustainable development and the establishment of a harmonious society. Second, it is a systematic strategic entity that includes the marine economy, maritime politics, oceanic

2  Three major systematic objectives management, maritime law and other sub-strategies. Third, it needs to echo the three main requirements of China’s over-arching strategy, namely development needs, sovereignty needs and responsibility requirements.4 These are two very comprehensive frameworks for the development of maritime strategies which cover maritime development, the expansion of sea power and other elements. Although these assertions stem from a strategically advantageous position, they nevertheless appear too macroscopic and abstract. Many officials and scholars have also proposed China’s specific objectives as a maritime power. Admiral Liu Huaqing had once suggested a coastal defense strategy for the Chinese PLA Navy, defining the boundaries of Chinese naval defense.5 Zhang Wenmu pointed out that the Chinese Navy ‘is a naval force that can cover territorial waters 120 to 125 degrees longitude East … China’s sea power is merely a limited power as yet. Its coverage scope is mainly limited to Taiwan, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, and other sea areas within Chinese sovereignty and jurisdiction.’6 These propositions and research findings from their respective professional fields, such as the military and economic development, propose aims and directions. They present important reference value in China’s construction of a maritime power, but they generally tend to lack considerations on strategy as a whole. Ideas and plans concerning the road to a maritime power have gradually evolved into two polarized extremes: either to overemphasize the building of sea power and sea control, in pursuit of Mahan-style sea power; or to overstress the unique nature of China’s maritime experiences, while sparing no effort to avoid ‘power,’ declaring that ‘China’s experience as a maritime power is one of peaceful development and win-win cooperation.’7 It appears from this second perspective that China’s maritime claims concern only issues of just deserved rights and national maritime security, and it seems as if China in fact harbors no interest whatsoever in the expansion of power. At its most fundamental, the question of maritime power concerns how much power is wielded in the field of international maritime politics, that is to say, maritime power has always been a relative concept, a point long neglected by most Chinese scholars. When evaluating a maritime power, not only is it essential to compare with oneself, it is of even greater necessity to contrast with other countries, because there are no strong without the weak. When discussing maritime powers, it is impossible to avoid the issue of power distribution. This is because regardless of how China develops in its own strength, one must also take into account power dynamics and relationships with other maritime nations. Evidently, defining China’s maritime power objectives from a perspective of power has more rational and pragmatic values. Power objectives are among the first severe problems to be encountered in China’s path to becoming a maritime power and ought to be cautiously prepared for. Moreover, we cannot only discuss ‘rights’ while shunning the subject of ‘power.’8 When defining the concept of maritime power, it is necessary to contemplate the impacts of the qualities of time

Three major systematic objectives  3 and space, appreciating that maritime power encompasses not only military might, political power, economic power, etc., but it is also necessary to confront the essence of ‘power,’ and not to use concepts like ‘rights,’ ‘interests’ and other concepts in international law to replace power politics itself. As to the objectives, China should not only take into account its own needs but also consider the rationality and feasibility of its targets, and international maritime patterns. Based on the above considerations, and comprehensively taking into account trends in Chinese interests, China’s geographic characteristics, its own strengths and its overall development requirements together with its international environment, China’s objectives as a maritime power in my view should and could be categorized into three aspects as following.

The No. 2 world sea power Sea power and sea control had been criticized for a long time in China as tools of imperialism and hegemonism, which makes it a little difficult for Chinese elites to understand the basic points of sea power and sea control. Even now, some Chinese officers and scholars still take this conception for granted and deem that China should neither mention nor pursue sea power. Besides, though the study of sea power has risen as a prominent discipline in China over the past two decades, many of these studies are missing the core points of sea power, while paying too much attention in the pursuit of Chinese characteristics like the rights mode of sea power.9 However, the practice of sea power and sea control can be dated back to the beginning of human civilization, which in fact has nothing to do with Alfred Thayer Mahan and imperialism. The most basic function of international politics is to influence or direct the distribution of land power through the control of the seas. Of course, no one can occupy the seas, even a small piece. In Mahan’s times and before, sea control mainly meant command of critical sea access, while when we talk about sea power and sea control in the current times, it just means relative influence and comparative advantage in some maritime areas, because today’s sea power is definitely an inclusive system rather than exclusive one.10 Therefore, China needs to pursue sea control in some certain sea area and needs to gain a strategic advantage in areas where core interests are at stake. In this respect, there are no fundamental differences when compared to other maritime powers in the world. The planning and practice of military strategies still remain the foremost important issues to focus on when building a maritime power. From the perspective of sea control, the world’s sea powers can be broadly divided into three categories: coastal navies, regional sea powers and global maritime hegemonies. Coastal navies indicate that the scope of a military force’s activities is mainly limited to the offshore. They lack large-scale power projection platforms for the open seas and are unable to carry out

4  Three major systematic objectives substantial oceangoing combat missions. The vast majority of the world’s national navies belongs to this category. Regional sea powers signify those whose effective control and activity zone far exceeds beyond the near seas, to the extent of the distant seas and oceans. They possess a certain degree of oceangoing combat capability, normally with a focused regional deployment as its trademark, which are different from coastal naval varieties, as well as worldwide naval varieties distributed globally. Classic examples of regional sea powers include the British, French and Russian navies. Global maritime hegemony indicates a military force’s global distribution and global reach, with the goal of influencing all of the world’s key channel waters, as well as directing the international maritime order. Until now, only the US Navy has achieved this feat. As to the Chinese sea power, China’s domestic experts ordinarily tend to highlight China’s maritime military strategy of ‘coastal defense, open sea protection.’ In contrast, foreign observers are more specific in their analysis. Many hold positions that China’s objective as a maritime power is to establish some kind of hegemonic power, or at least regional advantage. In particular, the eminent American bestseller Robert Kaplan foresees that ‘the South and East China Seas can unlock a vast naval footprint for China in the navigable, southern Rimland of Eurasia – from the Horn of Africa to the Sea of Japan.’11 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes contend that China will not be able to develop a naval force comparable in might to that of the United States. The use of onshore ‘Anti-Access’ technology requires the US Navy to stay far away from China’s coastal waters. However, China will nevertheless rely on an ever-strengthening comprehensive range of powers to constantly seek to erode the US maritime advantage, first of all in the First Island Chain and then the Second.12 From a US standpoint, some strategy analysts who follow a realist zero-sum game doctrine believe that China’s long-term goal of maritime power is to in fact challenge the United States and seize the leading position in the Pacific region. Those who uphold these viewpoints include Aaron L. Friedberg, Robert J. Art, and John J. Mearsheimer, among other renowned scholars. In fact, none of these arguments are novel. Realist theories in international relations are often based on the fact that intentions are unreliable. A country’s foreign strategic objectives are mainly determined by strength and power structures. The so-called power determines interests. The greater the power, the grander the objectives. I do not deny that this view has some explanatory power. The problem is that in the current international system, absolute power is almost nonexistent. Almost all exercise of power is limited, and a pure law of the jungle era has not existed for a long while. Even for a superpower like the United States, its authority cannot be compared to that of Genghis Khan and similar conquerors of the ancient world. In other words, in the existing international system, the powers of every major nation are insufficiently great, to completely divorce them from the constraining effects of the international system and to fully overcome geographic

Three major systematic objectives  5 circumstances, natural endowments, the international environment, and other conditions and limitations. Moreover, the role of technology in military strategy is increasingly important, while any sophisticated weapons technology would soon spread internationally. This would cause the success of any major nation to be easily susceptible to duplication and hedging by other powers. By contrast, the success of the Mongols depends on their distinctive ethnic characteristics and advantages as horsemen. This type of success was often difficult to mimic since the Mongols had maintained military hegemonic power for a very long period of time. Thus, when we plan China’s maritime military strategic objectives, we ought to consider that there will be certain shifts in China’s interests along with increases in its power. To a certain extent, it is rational that power determines interests. At the same time, it is necessary to consider restrictions on the expansion of power, because there always exist certain boundaries on power expansion. Interests cannot grow unchecked. Successful strategies are often always constrained strategies. What type of sea power China ought to pursue largely depends on China’s interests. What kind of sea power China can seek is determined accordingly by geographical conditions, natural endowments, the international environment and other factors. According to spatial distances, from the near to the remote, the duties of China’ sea power varied. Offshore control Sovereignty, security, political and economic interests mean that China must gain a strategic advantage in the seas of East Asia, which can be regarded as the strategic bottom line of China’s maritime power. Regarding the definition of near-sea boundaries, China officially has two popular explanations: Admiral Liu Huaqing once noted that the main realms of China’s near seas consist of ‘the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, the South China Sea, waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and Okinawa island chain, as well as waters of the northern Pacific’13; the 1997 edition of China People’s Liberation Army Military Terms says: ‘The People’s Republic of China’s near seas include Bohai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and partial waters east of Taiwan.’14 According to these two interpretations, China’s near seas cover the four major continental marginal seas in addition to some parts of the Northern Pacific Ocean. It is not a legal concept such as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but instead a geographic theory. The range is larger: a region of 3 million square kilometers is claimed by China to be within its jurisdiction based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international law. All world powers are first and foremost regional powers, and their periphery frequently does not easily allow others to meddle with the limits of their strategic advantage. The role of the Americas to the United States, and the

6  Three major systematic objectives Commonwealth of Independent States to Russia are examples of this. It is not difficult to accept, by taking just a fleeting look at the map or by relying on general knowledge, that the coastal strategic situation affects China’s strategic safety and development security. Most of China’s core and major maritime interests are concentrated in the offshore areas, and the importance of the East China Sea offshore to China is self-evident. First, only through gaining a strategic advantage in coastal areas, can China defend the reunification of Taiwan and Mainland China, sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and Spratly Islands, and other core and crucial interests. For China, the current situation of the Taiwan Strait, the Diaoyu Islands dispute and the South China Sea issue are largely related to the loss of control and voice over the East Asian coastal waters since modern times. Taiwan’s role in China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is related to China’s reunification and involves China’s major political interests. Unification of Taiwan is a major factor in the development of China’s sea power, no matter how highly advanced China’s sea power and how strong its maritime power, but if China still cannot decide Taiwan’s future, then any sea power ambitions eventually amount to foam. In the future, whether Taiwan can reunify with Mainland China according to China’s own wishes is also an indication of whether China can ultimately become a maritime power. As for China, Taiwan forms a natural barrier to shield the mainland coastline and is an ideal focal point for the protection of maritime transportation lanes. It represents a key for the Chinese Navy to breach the island chain blockade and expand into the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its strategic position is therefore extremely important. Once Taiwan falls under adversary control, future prospects for China’s construction of a strong navy would be ever bleaker. ‘In naval terms, the island’s location not only threatens to prevent Chinese fleets based to its north and south from concentrating… it is also the most conspicuous barrier to unified military action beyond the first island chain.’15 Consequently, Taiwan is also concerned with issues of security and development of China’s oceangoing navy. If China genuinely desires to break through the First Island Chain, it must take advantage of momentum to search for a seaport and supply base on the First Island Chain. Almost all islands and straits of the First Island Chain are controlled by the United States, Japan and the United States’ allies and partners. In times of war, by the advantage of deploying military forces along the island chain, enemy forces can easily block China’s entry passage from coastal waters to the distant ocean. If China cannot obtain a focal point on the First Island Chain, it will be unable to control any strategic passage and therefore will be unable to awaken to threats originating from the open seas until it is too late. Active defense measures would become all but meaningless chatter. As Taiwan has been part of legitimate Chinese territory from ancient times, it has also become the best opportunity for China to gain a strategic hub and corridor in the First Island Chain.

Three major systematic objectives  7 The Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of Chinese territory. Historically, Chinese were the first to discover, give name to, and exploit the Diaoyu Islands. Besides, the Diaoyu Islands are not just some rocks, but are related to China’s sovereignty, security and the demarcation of the East China Sea. I will explain it in further detail in Chapter 5. The South China Sea is the largest marginal sea in the Western Pacific, which covers a total area of about 3.5 million square kilometers, including 2 million square kilometers of sea area within the dotted line. Owing to its extremely important geographical location and rich resources, the South China Sea is the core or major interest of China’s politics, security, economy and other fields. Regardless of whether it is officially identified as a core interest, China’s interests in the South China Sea are critical, complex and diverse. So far, neither the Chinese government nor academia has elaborated China’s main interests in the South China Sea from a comprehensive perspective. Although the Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea16 issued on 12 July 2016 clarifies China’s sovereignty and sovereignty rights, it does not include all of China’s important interests in the South China Sea. On the other hand, most of the international analyses focus more on the geopolitical aspects and are exaggerated; many people even think that China will turn the South China Sea into its own ‘inner lake.’17 Taking into account the possible appeals of China on the security, development and honor in the South China Sea for a period of time in the future, and rationally considering the complex reality of the current geopolitical pattern, I identified in 2017 China’s five main interests in the South China Sea, in priority order, as sovereignty over islands and reefs, sea lane security, strategic space, peace and stability, and marine resources.18 Second, offshore security and China’s continental security are intimately connected. Access to offshore strategic advantages ensures key demands of China’s national security. During confrontation between a land power and a maritime power, land power would be at a strategically disadvantageous position on both offensive and defensive fronts. Historical experience demonstrates that as long as China’s coastal waters are controlled by hostile countries, China’s national security situation would become unacceptably vulnerable. Hostile rivals could take advantage of this region and threaten Mainland China’s security at any point on its coastline, stretching for thousands of kilometers. This maritime region was once been controlled for extended periods of time by both Japan, following the Sino-­Japanese War, and the United States, following the Second World War, bringing enormous threats to China’s national security. Consequently, China’s coastal waters act as a buffer zone between China and the United States, Japan and other maritime powers, and are a must-win strategic maritime space for China.

8  Three major systematic objectives In particular, China faces severe realistic security pressures on maritime issues and potential security threats: the United States, Japan and other countries control virtually all important isles in the Western Pacific. Furthermore, they are using these islands as staging areas for the construction of substantial land, naval and airborne leverage advantages to deter and check China. Strategically, China is in a defensive position. On the eastern coastal regions lie China’s economic, political and cultural heartlands, so when faced with maritime threats, China lacks necessary strategic depth. Moreover, security and stability are a type of psychological requirement, whereas national security is a kind of sentiment. This is especially true for China, which once suffered from long-term foreign aggression. If China is unable to guarantee its offshore security and stability, it will lose ground in the contest against its rivals. It is also highly likely that external forces could exacerbate China’s sense of unease through superior maritime power, thereby forcing China into compromise and harming the country’s political, economic and other national interests. Third, coastal marine resources are an essential pillar of China’s future economic development and sorely need to be protected. Although China has already become the world’s second largest economy, average income per capita is still below the world standard. The task of economic development remains very arduous. At present, China’s continental resources are insufficient to support China’s national economic development. Furthermore, many crucial resources and energy production output levels are declining sharply, while foreign dependency levels are rising with each passing day. In future, marine resources will gradually replace continental resources as the mainstay of China’s economic development. The exploitation of marine resources pertains to China’s sustainable development, while international law decrees that interests within Chinese sovereignty are concentrated exclusively in East Asian coastal waters. Due to the existence of long-term shortcomings in China’s maritime forces and administrative loopholes, currently almost half of all marine resources have been misappropriated by surrounding countries. As to the feasibility, China has some specific advantages, mainly manifested through the complementary characteristics of its land power and sea power, coupled with technical edge such as its Anti-Access (A2) and Anti-Denial (AD) capabilities. Whether presiding in global geopolitical ‘core’ or located on its ‘periphery,’ it is a land power. Furthermore, territorial cohesion is conducive for centralized administrative control.19 In this way, strong land power can become an effective buttress for the development of China’s sea power. In its coastal waters, China’s sea power has been sheltered under the protection of its land power, and the geographic effect of radiation means that China does not even need to counter the threat of armed forces on oceanic fronts. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army can take full advantage of the Chinese Mainland’s extensive strategic depth and lie in wait, prepared for a fatigued opponent. It waits for the enemy to enter

Three major systematic objectives  9 into the range of its weapons and then fights under conditions favorable to China’s geopolitical and military situation. Beijing can throw its resources, planning, and forces into achieving objectives from the geographical and technical standpoints. The less demanding requirements China has imposed on its military permit the PLA to build up forces dedicated to a few core competencies. Specialization promises major qualitative leaps in capability and doctrine.20 Although in the overall balance of power, China is in a position of absolute disadvantage. However, in specific maritime regions of East Asia and even Asia Pacific, China may seize a certain degree of initiative. It is definitely not true that China stands no chance at all. In recent years, the relative balance of power in East Asia’s offshore waters is shifting in favor of China. This is the case with China’s accelerated military modernization and improvements in the military’s combat efficiency; even if the US Navy is able to maintain a fleet size of 355 vessels21 to achieve the updated target of 60 percent of vessel deployments in the Pacific Ocean, as well as successfully appeasing Japan, the Philippines and other allied nations, the Chinese Navy is supported by strong onshore power (land-based missiles and air force). This will cause any strategic advantage, currently maintained by the United States in East Asian waters, to become increasingly tenuous. The differing natures of key concerns of Sino-US interests herein (China: territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights; the United States: freedom of navigation, regional stability) and the diverse extents to which resources are invested (China: it is possible to supply large amounts of excellent military resources; United States: it is very difficult to even fully and timely invest in the forces administrated by the Indo-Pacific Command) contribute further to the power transition from the United States to China. In the next 10–15 years, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to protect Taiwan and honor defense commitments to Japan, the Philippines and other allied nations in the Asia Pacific. Japan is the greatest external challenge China will face in the foreseeable future, and Sino-Japanese maritime conflicts will almost be impossible to mediate. In spite of this, with deterrence from China’s steadily strengthening military force, the likelihood of preemptive Japanese provocation to Chinese military affairs is very small. Most likely is that, with the passage of time, there will be a substantial shift in the balance of power in China’s favor. Japan will ultimately be forced to acquiesce in China’s advantageous position. Although the Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, would tend to cause China political and diplomatic problems in the South China Sea, it is unlikely that they would pose a military challenge to China. Of course, the premise for the above-mentioned trends is that China is able to maintain political stability and the impetus for continued rapid growth in national power.

10  Three major systematic objectives Regional presence National security and sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) require China to maintain an effective military presence in the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans, as this forms the strategic foundation to build a maritime power. The so-called effective presence indicates a level of existence that cannot be overlooked and of power that cannot be defeated with ease. Whether it is possible to shape and construct a favorable international environment is a sign of whether a country can become a global power. The security of global powers not only involves immediate domestic threats but also deals with the preventative measures of having a certain buffer belt, thus being able to eliminate threats beyond its borders. Furthermore, it requires a certain deterrent capability, for when an enemy opposition threatens its security, it will have the ability to carry out the required counterattack. Moreover, it will mean that the international community acknowledges its status and steadily increasing power. On the one hand, the best way for a major nation with room for development and border interests to maintain and defend these interests is not to construct a ‘Maritime Great Wall,’ but rather to foray beyond these frontiers. It should actively launch political, economic and military initiatives outside the borders of its core interests in order to defuse, contain and deter external hostile matters as well as to alleviate and eliminate potential threats. Historical experience and geopolitical theory have proven time and again that if China’s sea power is only localized within coastal waters of the First Island Chain, it would stand at a highly disadvantaged position in its contest with foreign rivals. China must endeavor to build a certain buffer belt in the Western Pacific and the North Indian Ocean beyond the First Island Chain, as the main maritime threats China faces will come chiefly from these two major fronts. On the other hand, the security of sea lanes has increasingly become an issue of critical emphasis for China. Eighty five percent of China’s total trade in goods is transported through sea. Nineteen percent of the world’s shipping market’s bulk cargo is transported to China. Twenty-two percent of export containers originate from China. China’s merchant shipping fleet’s trajectories are spread across over 12,000 ports globally. China has already become an export-oriented economic power reliant on sea lanes. The Chinese economy has become completely export-oriented. To this day, foreign trade remains one of the most important driving forces of China’s economic development. This kind of economy is undoubtedly highly fragile and extremely vulnerable to external influence. The obstruction of maritime transportation would have an impact on domestic economic development. Economic security has already exceeded the boundaries of state sovereignty. Using the example of crude oil, the statistical data of 2005 have shown that China always imports more than 90 percent of its oil needs through sea, and 80 per cent of oil tankers must pass through the Strait of Malacca,

Three major systematic objectives  11 accounting for one in six of the vessels traveling through the Strait of Malacca each day.22 Until today, this kind of situation has not been changed much. The Strait of Malacca’s transportation security issues have received widespread attention. China’s maritime transportation security research has already coined the term the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ or the ‘Malacca Predicament,’ although there are some scholars who believe these views are somewhat exaggerated even alarmist.23 In fact, the transportation security problem in the Strait of Malacca is only the tip of the iceberg for China’s maritime transportation security. Various points along maritime transportation routes in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea could all suffer from the threats of potential opponents. The maritime arteries connecting China’s economy with the outside world are almost constantly under deterrence and intimidation by other maritime powers. The United States could at any time impose a blockade on China, which would cause China’s foreign trade and oil imports to come to a complete standstill. Other regional powers such as India and Japan could also exploit China’s fragilities in its maritime transportation routes in an attempt to gain compromises in other areas. India’s Ministry of Defense published naval combat guidelines, highlighting that India is in a position to exercise significant influence on maritime transportation security in the Indian Ocean. The strategic focus of Indian naval control is to play a role in bargaining between international rivalries. If necessary, the use of military force is still an inevitable reality.24 Undoubtedly, in today’s age of high global economic interdependence, freedom of maritime navigation has already become a common interest of every major power. The United States, India and other countries would not easily use this kind of ace in the hole toward China, because unimpeded trade normally presents a win–win situation and is mutually reinforcing for all concerned. But at the same time, we must see that the global economic war just so happens to mobilize countries in sacrificing short-term trade interests in order to achieve the strategic intention of transforming long-term patterns of international balances of power. Other than the direct use of military force, there are many other methods of trade-off to be considered, such as blockades and intimidation, restrictions on China’s emerging resources imports, hindrances to China’s economic growth, or limitations on China’s trade corridors in certain directions, which are additions to the cost of economic development. It should be noted, in open international waters, that no opponent can wholly obstruct China’s maritime transportation routes. However, even sporadic disruption is enough to upset China’s energy and resource security. The Chinese ‘Galaxy’ Cargo Ship, gratuitously accused of carrying chemical weapons, was intercepted and detained for three weeks by US warships in the high seas of the Indian Ocean in 1993, which has already sounded alarm bells for China’s maritime transportation security.

12  Three major systematic objectives Nontraditional security threats such as terrorism and piracy have also made it imperative for China to maintain its power presence. China’s beleaguered SLOCs have also suffered from threats of and disruption from piracy and armed criminal activities. The Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, East Africa, Indian territorial waters, the Bay of Bengal and the vast region of South East Asia are all among the world’s most active areas for rampant pirate activities. According to the International Maritime Bureau’s 2016 data on piracy and armed robberies of ships (not including incomplete statistics from unreported cases), no fewer than 89 cases of piracy occurred in the South China Sea and waters close to the Malacca Strait (including acts already committed or unsuccessful attempts); in the Red Sea, waters surrounding Somalia, and the Gulf of Aden, there were more than 62 cases; and more than 35 cases occurred in the Indian Ocean. In these regions, the total number of cases has surpassed 186, and it is estimated to account for 84 per cent of the total global annual cases of 221 in 2016.25 These piracy activities and armed robberies against ships just happen to be precisely concentrated upon China’s most important SLOCs. Data show that although the international community has taken strong measures, such as escorting ships, patrolling and monitoring, piracy and armed criminal activities have not been effectively contained in the Indian Ocean and its surrounding regions. On the blue-sea navy’s own development, the Western Pacific and Northern regions of the Indian Ocean represent the basic boundaries of the Chinese Navy’s external strategy. Navies have always engaged in combat externally, choosing a fundamentally offensive strategy. Whether a junk boat navy, steam ship navy or information-based navy, the key to victory lies in defeating and annihilating the enemy’s maritime forces in the boundless ocean, while not relying on adhering stubbornly to specified positions on the waters. During peacetime, blue-sea navies are important as a deterrent. As nuclear weapons are far too destructive, conventional deterrence has risen to a position of prominence during nuclear deadlock situations. Naval vessels that have special features of flexible mobility in wider oceans are better suited for deterrent duties. A naval presence in wider oceans can both act as a force to deter potential enemies, as well as be useful to gather intelligence and provide remote warnings. This is crucial to prevailing in conflict and wars. The purpose of a navy’s existence is not merely to do combat with the enemy. Navies also are often used to execute other assignments, for example power projection far from home, and onshore firepower support.26 Evidently, no matter the circumstances, a wider ocean strategy is essential for the navy of a maritime power. Moreover, it is also of immediate and visible use. China’s unfavorable geopolitical conditions in the Western Pacific mean that if China’s navy is merely confined to activities in the coastal waters of the First Island Chain, through the establishment of an offshore line of defense to protect national security, it would nevertheless be a continuation of the army’s strategy. The navy’s role and characteristics have far from been

Three major systematic objectives  13 fulfilled. China still needs to pursue a defensive national security strategy, but tactically it undoubtedly needs to be more aggressive. Today, the origins and forms of external threats have all undergone major transformation. Building a navy unquestionably cannot be a continuation of an army mentality. Relying solely on coastal defenses and offshore patrols is already inadequate for confronting the modern state of affairs. China must escape the trap of onshore tactical mindsets, trigger the navy’s mobility advantage, proactively prepare to eliminate sources of danger in the ocean’s depths and in addition stun our opponents, in order to ultimately guarantee China’s offshore and mainland coastal security. At present, the geopolitics of the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans are complex, inappropriate for control, but suitable to mapping layouts. All powers without exception, including the United States, are unable to completely command these two great regions. There will be no fundamental political or diplomatic obstacles for China’s attainment of power presence. China must tirelessly strive to maintain an aircraft carrier combat group as well as several reconnaissance support and early warning positions in each of these two major regions, in order to realize effective power presence. China is situated at the intersection of the Eurasian continent and Pacific Ocean, adjacent to Central, Northeast and Southeast Asia, with land and sea on either side. This is exactly Spykman’s so-called Inner or Marginal Crescent,27 with distinctive characteristics of a continental–maritime complex and is ‘an object of desire for both land powers and sea powers alike.’28 As far as geopolitical attributes are concerned, China enjoys dual status as a major land power and an important sea power. It is the only major nation to connect the ‘Heartland’ and the ‘Inner or Marginal Crescent,’29 and its strategic location is vital. China is naturally situated in the middle of Asia, benefiting from exceptionally favorable natural geographic, economic and cultural ties with Northeast, Southeast and Central Asia. Unlike Japan, India and other countries, it is very easy for China to play an important role in Asia. This kind of influence will at the very least bring a highly positive significance to China’s expansion of sea power in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans: fortifying geoeconomic, political and military ties with neighboring countries may indirectly play a role in maritime affairs. For instance, if China proves able to utilize its cordial cooperation with Southeast Asian countries and South Asian countries to safeguard the security of the Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean–Malacca Strait maritime channel, and even earn the support of some countries, it would be able to achieve a long-term military presence in the Indian Ocean. Global influence In other global maritime regions, Chinese power still needs to exert more important influence. This is a necessary requirement in order to protect overseas interests and fulfill the responsibilities of a global power.

14  Three major systematic objectives The development of China’s interests and responsibilities requires China to be able to project power in the world’s seas. This is first to safeguard the country’s overseas interests. China’s foreign interests have already become globalized. China’s overseas interests refer to those interests created by the Chinese government, corporations, societal organizations and citizens through global communications. These national interests exist outside of China’s sovereign jurisdiction and mainly present themselves through the form of international agreements. Through economic globalization, the scope of overseas interests has become increasingly broad; they include national overseas political interests, foreign economic interests, cultural interests and citizens’ rights. It ought to be noted that national interests are undoubtedly in a dynamic state of development. With ever-growing national power, the depth and breadth of overseas interests will continue to expand. In recent years, China has amassed increasing types of overseas national interests, and their numbers are also rising. According to the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China’s 2016 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, as of the end of 2016, 24,400 domestic Chinese investors established 37,200 foreign direct investment enterprises abroad; these are distributed internationally in 190 countries and regions; China’s net foreign direct investment (capital stock) reached USD 1357.39 billion.30 According to statistics from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Counselor Affairs Department, the number of Chinese exiting across national borders in 2014 has reached 100 million. It is predicted that in 2020, the number of departures made by Chinese citizens will reach 0.15 billion. China’s foreign interests generally include four major aspects: personnel safety, asset security, resource provision and overseas market expansion. To conclude, there are two major categories: first economic interests, and second the interests of overseas citizens. As China pursues a principle of not exporting political systems and values, China has therefore not many exclusive political or cultural interests overseas. In the course of China’s regular economic, societal and cultural interactions with the world, numerous types of dilemmas and conflicts are inevitable. In some turbulent countries or unstable regions, China’s overseas interests are often impacted by traditional security issues, such as regime changes, conflicts, war, as well as nontraditional security threats such as terrorism and organized crime. In these situations, China must employ strong responses to urgently safeguard its overseas economic interests and citizens’ rights. The ocean acts as a central connector to link these interests with the Chinese Mainland. As a result, the question of how to utilize sea power to better protect the interests of Chinese companies and various organizations, in addition to the safety of their employees, has become one that Chinese policymakers must consider. Furthermore, China needs to maintain international military influence, as well as perform the responsibilities and duties required of a major nation. Geoffrey Till held that the navies of China and the United States were a

Three major systematic objectives  15 mixture of ‘modern navy’ and ‘post-modern navy.’ The former’s mission is more traditional – the contention of the command of the seas is characterized with exclusiveness and competitiveness – while the latter’s priority is not to compete with opponents for command of the seas, but to maintain overall maritime security by ensuring a good maritime order.31 China’s international responsibilities are becoming more globalized. Today’s maritime system is becoming more chaotic and urgently needs to be reorganized. This would only be possible if major powers bear international responsibility and contribute global public goods. Maintenance of the world’s oceans’ universality, openness, and free navigation, deterrence and containment of piracy, and safeguard of a good maritime order are all defined as maritime public goods. The international community needs providers of maritime public goods.32 The United States was previously the major provider of these maritime public goods. However, due to its relative decline in economic might, in addition to the mounting diversification and growing complexity of modern maritime security threats, it is increasingly difficult for the United States to tolerate the costs of being a world leader. The provision of international public goods such as freedom of navigation and maritime security is therefore becoming ever more problematic. It urgently falls on other maritime powers to assume more responsibilities and obligations. With the rise in China’s maritime power, the country will be progressively duty bound to do so. ‘Only Chinese sea power can be the driving force that defines the world order. The ultimate value of China’s sea power’s development will be decisively established.’33 But it is not necessary for, nor is it highly probable that China will replace the United States to become a ‘globally distributed, global defensive’ world maritime hegemon. From China’s perspective, becoming a global maritime hegemon is not only unnecessary, but indeed China also lacks the basic requirements. Experiences prior to the Second World War demonstrate that, due to the oceans’ connectivity, during wartime it is essential to be the world’s greatest power in order to have absolute naval supremacy. This is unless opponents have similar levels of sea power, when problems cannot be resolved. Historically, France and the German Reich have both possessed ‘the world’s second best’ navy, but as soon as they entered into battle with Great Britain, the world’s preeminent sea power, they still could not escape defeat. From the navy’s perspective of its strategic objective and mission, when matched against the world’s ‘best’ naval force, the world’s ‘second best’ ultimately are little different from the ‘twelfth best’ or ‘fiftieth best’ navies.34 However, developments in military technology in recent decades have somewhat changed this situation. The application and impacts of navies have undergone a great deal of change. With the development of land-based weaponry such as missiles and long-range fighter jets, in addition to acceleration in the construction of space technology, a country with a weaker

16  Three major systematic objectives navy, but with support from mighty land-based ‘Anti- Access’ (A2) or ‘Area Denial’ (AD) forces, one can self-protect even when faced by a world-class navy and even gain authority over near seas along its homeland. China is a large country of ‘one land, one ocean,’ while the United States is a sizeable country of ‘two oceans, one continent.’ The geographic importance of the Eurasian continent far exceeds that of the American continent. With the rise of China, it is highly likely that Chinese political, economic and military influence in Eurasia will overtake that of the United States, while the United States’ strategic advantage in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is very difficult to exceed. Several years later, China, depending on excellent continental advantage and relatively weak maritime power, and the United States, relying on first-class maritime power and second-rate land power, would strike a stable strategic balance. The Chinese Navy need not overtake the US Navy to become the world’s number one to be able to admirably safeguard its own interests as well as direct the perpetuation of world peace and stability. China’s path of peaceful development and the nature of its overseas interests also render it unnecessary for China to mimic the United States’ maritime hegemony. Various factors, such as the expansion in overseas interests and security of maritime transportation routes, stimulate the development of China’s oceangoing navy and military presence around the world. However, the Chinese Navy’s main objectives in waters beyond the Pacific and Indian Oceans are as follows: first, the protection of economic rights and responses to piracy and other non-traditional threats,35 and second, to uphold the world’s freedom of navigation, disaster-relief and other non-war military operations, so as to contribute Chinese responsibilities for the peace and prosperity of the world’s oceans. The majority of China’s overseas interests are originally from friendly economic cooperation, unlike the United States’ hegemonic interests as well as the colonial interests pursued during the rise of other maritime powers in history. Concerning the preservation of ­China’s overseas interests, sea power is mostly leveraged as diplomatic backup support or as a tool. The special features of China’s overseas interests and the objective conditions faced imply that for China, unlike the United States and certain other countries, it is neither necessary nor possible for ‘warships to go wherever interests lie.’36 The Chinese Navy needs to demonstrate its strength at the right place at the right time, present a psychological deterrence to potential adversaries and effectively cooperate to promote diplomacy, but in fact, it need not possess the capability to conduct large- and medium-scale warfare in global maritime spaces like the United States. China has already many world ‘firsts’; it is also highly probable that China’s comprehensive national strength will step into the global forefront. But unless military technology undergoes a revolutionary upheaval, it would be very difficult for China to become the foremost sea power, based on Chinese geographic situation, natural endowments, contemporary themes, military technology and other key factors.

Three major systematic objectives  17 China is confronted by a complex geopolitical environment that other global maritime powers do not face. It is situated in East Asia, where the major world powers are concentrated. Furthermore, China faces enormous challenges on both inland and offshore fronts, which makes it very difficult to strike a balance between land and sea. Since modern times, China has frequently suffered significant double jeopardy from both land and sea. Although China has nowadays eliminated the risk of a large-scale enemy invasion into the heart of the Mainland, the inland security situation is far from assured. The ‘Xinjiang Independence’ and ‘Free Tibet’ movements are always ready to start wriggling, endangering the security of China’s western frontier. Notwithstanding improvements in Sino-Indian relations, border disputes are nonetheless bitter that both parties still tussle over practicalities of control and negotiations. As today’s only remaining ‘relic’ of the Cold War, the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula is ever more dynamic and volatile with the emergence of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The complexities of China’s surrounding security situation have determined that it will never have the same geographic advantages as the United States, which virtually never needs to consider land-based threats and can concentrate its attention and resources on accumulating its naval force and expanding maritime influence. From the perspective of sea control, China’s coastal geographical conditions present more drawbacks than advantages for Chinese naval combat operations. China has a long coastline north to south, but short east to west, which separates the Pacific Ocean from its links in surrounding seas by way of islands, reefs and channels, forming features of semienclosed marine areas. During wartime, these areas are vulnerable to blockade and division by enemy troops. US, Russian, Japanese, ASEAN and other strategic sea powers encircle Chinese coastal areas, and as a result, the access of Chinese naval forces to the oceans is easily dictated by others. The strategic depths of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea are relatively shallower, causing the activities of Chinese naval forces to be severely restricted in this maritime sphere.37 Although China possesses an extensive coastline, but except for Taiwan’s eastern coast, it lacks passages that directly lead to the oceans. The ‘First Island Chain’ and the ‘Second Island Chain’ in the Western Pacific Ocean have become obstacles to the Chinese military forces’ access to the oceans from coastal waters. Furthermore, the United States, Japan and other countries retain the control of almost all key islands on the island chains and important waters in their vicinity with a wary stance on China’s construction of a maritime power. In times of war, if the Chinese Navy passes through channels in the island chains, it would be directly subject to their control. On a spiritual level, China lacks vital maritime intellectual and cultural reserves. Historically, China has over long periods possessed dominant land-based power, but mighty rivals have also long existed on the continent. The Huns, Xianbei, Rouran, Turks, Jurchen, Mongols and other political

18  Three major systematic objectives powers of nomadic peoples posed a menace to northern China one after another. Throughout confrontations with them, the Zhongyuan Dynasty was by and large positioned at a disadvantage. In recent history, the expansion of Tsarist Russia and the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union also once posed huge pressures for China’s northern regions. In order to cope with these threats, China had long adopted a tradition of ‘emphasizing the land, neglecting the sea.’ What is more, the several millennia of agricultural civilization that have conferred an inward-looking national temperament and deep-rooted ‘petty peasant mentality’ are nonetheless a spiritual yoke for China’s march toward the sea. These factors have contributed to China’s lack of naval tradition, understanding and awareness of maritime power, and awareness of the sea. There is a considerable gap compared to Western maritime powers with regard to intellectual reserves and accumulation related to the comprehension, exploitation and control of the sea. The discrepancy in this type of maritime ‘soft power’ is very difficult to effectively correct in the short run. China’s maritime emergence also faces numerous extremely powerful competitors, who treat China with suspicion. Other than the United States’ commanding presence and influence in the Western Pacific Ocean, the geographic positions and capabilities of Japan, Australia, India, Vietnam and Indonesia, among other countries, are not to be underestimated. As for China’s development as a maritime power, it is possible that these countries would resort to various forms of checks and balances to drastically restrict China’s maritime aspirations.38 The negative attitudes of these rivals in response to China’s sea power and China’s unfavorable geographic situation in the Western Pacific constitute the greatest external environment for the development of China’s sea power. Other than containment and isolation by the two great maritime nations, the United States and Japan, other neighboring countries would not bear significant goodwill when confronted with the development of China’s sea power due to historical suspicion and practical considerations. India and Australia are extremely cautious when faced with advancements in China’s sea power and may possibly join US–Japanese lines of defense directed against China. Several Southeast Asian countries are locked in maritime disputes with China, so they naturally would not welcome increases in Chinese sea power. Consequently, it is improbable that the Chinese Navy will become the world’s dominant maritime force. Nor is it likely to challenge the American hegemonic power on the world’s oceans. In view of China’s continental–­ maritime geographic complex, in addition to its relatively unfavorable maritime geographical situation, China is unlikely to develop as a sea power for the purposes of global combat deployment. Technologically, the Chinese Navy is short of tools for power projection and has comparatively weaker capabilities for sustained large-scale oceangoing operations. In aspects such as command systems (C4ISR), air defense and anti-submarine defense,

Three major systematic objectives  19 China lags across-the-board and cannot compete with the US Navy in the open seas. Even assuming that in future China is able to make up for the technological gap, it is nevertheless difficult for it to enjoy the good times of US maritime hegemony due to the two World Wars, geographical convenience (the United States’ own geographic advantage and ubiquitous military bases worldwide) and international cohesion (an alliance system and international mobilization capabilities). The development of China’s sea power has not only suffered limitations as a result of circumstances in the modern era (increasing difficulties in using military force and its falling efficacy in international politics) and geographic conditions (after breaking through the First Island Chain, China’s sea power will be confronted with a shortage of offshore bases and supply constraints; furthermore, it will enter into serious competition with the United States, Japan, India and other powers). In addition, the complexities of China’s developmental path, pressures for economic growth, domestic security concerns and other issues all serve to hamper China’s maritime ambitions. Moreover, the United States’ maritime hegemony, already in a state of continual decline, is destined to become a historical artifact. Since the end of the Second World War, the extent of US control over the world’s seas has followed a downward trend. Even if in future the United States is able to still maintain its superpower status and dominant naval power, it is nevertheless impossible to reverse this kind of decline. In other words, American-style maritime hegemony shall become increasingly a thing of the past. The crux of modern sea power is characterized by sea powers being unable to pursue unipolar global hegemony and order. In contrast to steadily emerging space and combination aerospace forces, the golden age of sea power is already history. Even for countries with absolute naval advantages, it is not possible to attain self-interest in international policy simply through leveraging naval advantages.39 This is not only due to developments in economic globalization and complex interdependencies, leading to sharp escalations in costs of and tumbles in effectiveness of naval arms. At the same time, technological change has accelerated the decentralization of sea power. As land power is also relying on anti-intervention technology and space forces to begin extending toward the ocean, it is increasingly difficult to construct and maintain traditional maritime hegemonies. However, contrary to the situation in development, international maritime issues happen to be ever more numerous, and we also face ever more substantial security challenges at sea. Any country that wishes to go it alone and promote peace under hegemony would not be able to endure the burden. International cooperation, particularly maritime coordination among major nations, will be the only way to maintain freedom and security at sea. Maritime hegemons will eventually become a thing of the past. Whether the United States or China, any country that continues to seek hegemony at sea will find itself progressively weak and impractical.

20  Three major systematic objectives On the whole, based on the prerequisite that China can continue its rise, it is feasible for China to possess a world sea power just second to that of the United States, which can control its offshore waters, deter its adjacent two oceans and have an impact on the world. This ‘No. 2 sea power’ would still be a regional sea power focusing on certain sea areas, compared with the US version of globally distributed and global defensive sea power.

International political maritime power A peaceful and agreeable regional environment provides the foundation for China to become a maritime power. One of the essential goals pursued for the development of China’s maritime power is to gain required international political support and the international status it deserves. Whether China can become a maritime power does not only hinge upon possessing a strong navy, showing a certain deterrent ability, but also whether China, as one of the region’s major nations, can persuade numerous neighboring countries and the world’s major powers, through economic, diplomatic, and other measures of gaining sufficient political influence or vocal power, to recognize China’s successes, accept the development of China’s maritime power’ objectives, and the consequences of its rise. Moreover, whether the majority of the world’s maritime nations appreciates the role that China, as a steadily internationalizing power, plays in and its contributions to the international maritime order and recognizes China’s merited position in international maritime politics is another key indicator of whether it can succeed as a maritime power. With the implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international maritime order has ushered in a new chapter in its development. Currently in its formative stages, the comprehensive establishment of the new maritime order still faces arduous barriers and a long road ahead. At the same time, UNCLOS itself has many problems: first, UNCLOS is a product of compromise and concession. There exist myriad imprecise and contradictory areas, inciting territorial disputes over numerous islands and maritime delimitation worldwide; second, the working procedures of maritime management and arbitration institutions such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) also must be clearly defined. Finally, many countries are currently abusing the regulations of the UNCLOS, and the connections between UNCLOS and other international laws and maritime mechanisms ought to be further clarified. China faces a complex and intricate maritime security situation. On issues such as maritime delimitation and territorial disputes over islands, the country encounters unprecedented conflicts and challenges. When China tackles and resolves the problems it faces, it must take into account its interests and positions as well as consider constraints of the existing maritime order and also the ‘negative feedback’ and influences on the maritime

Three major systematic objectives  21 order due to China’s actions. Chinese methods of solving problems and the Chinese paradigm of developing maritime power will inevitably have significant impacts on the international maritime order. China’s resolution of maritime disputes will be synchronized with the creation of the new international maritime order. The scale of China’s gains will ultimately depend on the degree to which China can influence the direction of the international maritime order’s development and the formation of regulations. As a result, in the process of the international maritime order’s transformation, China ought to insist on making its own voice heard. This would allow the new maritime order to incorporate China’s interests, values and political ideologies. China should also embrace worldwide beliefs and sentiments, proactively contributing its own strengths and rich maritime public goods for the freedom, security and prosperity of the world’s seas, striving to become a global political maritime power. Since the 16th century, the world’s maritime order has been dominated by Western powers. Over the past 500 years of rivalry, in the 16th century Portugal, in the 17th century the Netherlands, from the 18th to 19th centuries Great Britain, and in the 20th century United States have distinguished themselves, become maritime hegemons one after the other, and dictated the international maritime order. Such an international maritime order, which pursues wealth and vies for maritime hegemony as its basis, carries distinctive features of power politics. Once these maritime powers become hegemons, they vigorously promote a set of international standards most favorable to them. Like sea power, the international maritime order has thus become one of the tools of hegemonic powers to maintain their hegemony despite the opposition of other countries. Large-scale military combat is already not the principal means of seeking maritime interests in the present era. China cannot emulate the Great Britain and United States of the past, which chiefly rely on wars to rapidly rise at sea. In modern times, China’s main demands have been all centered on independence and survival. Before the question of survival was fundamentally resolved, becoming a maritime power was but a dream. When China finally has the will to face the sea, the times would have already undergone momentous changes, which has long differed from that of Mahan’s period. Acts of freelance gunboat diplomacy are increasingly restricted by international mechanisms, global norms and worldwide public opinions. Although peace and development, the topic of the times, are controversial, influence of global norms, rapid expansion of international mechanisms, and the world economy’s high degree of mutual dependency and other phenomena are nevertheless today’s defining characteristics. As a result of economic globalization and the development of interdependency, the use of military force has not only declined in prevalence, but also in efficacy. Under such circumstances, China is realizing a maritime rise and magnificent national rejuvenation, naturally attracting more constraints than historical powers on international laws, organizations and treaties, undermined by a globally

22  Three major systematic objectives interdependent situation more unified than the then European international system, and affected by unprecedented global crises. Consequently, China is unable to ‘go it alone’ in diplomacy like certain European powers were able to historically, nor can it imitate American-style isolationism, and it is impossible to establish its own colonies and carve out spheres of influence.40 What is more, it is impossible to count on a certain number of expansionary wars and China cannot expect effortlessly to profit from the outbreak of a new World War. Peaceful competition is the status quo for major nations, making a nonviolent rise possible. Nuclear deterrence, economic globalization, development of interdependence, and the reinforcement of global norms and peaceful forces have made peaceful competition among major powers a reality. Although there is still much conflict in the world, thanks to mutual restraint and checks and balances between powers, peace is preserved overall. Since its reform and opening up, China has adapted to the times and, on a path of peaceful development, created the Chinese Miracle. In an era of market economic integration, China can obtain the resources, raw materials and other factors of production that it desires through overseas cooperation; simultaneously, it can also access overseas markets for its own products through foreign economic cooperation. On the whole, all elements in China’s economic development can be obtained through non-military means. Thus, China neither has the pressure nor the motivation to follow the same ruinous road as the Germany and Japan’s military ascendancies in the first half of the 20th century. Furthermore, other powers, above all the hegemonic United States, are also subject to constraints of present circumstances, interdependency, and the international order. The chances of these countries launching a preemptive strike to guarantee a position of authority toward China will plummet. Overall, such a background and circumstances will allow China the possibility of stepping out as a peaceful maritime power. Following the Second World War, with the widespread political rise of Third World Countries and through the incessant efforts of developing countries in general, UNCLOS was signed in 1982 and finally gave legal foundation to the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, sought by developing countries. Overall, the international maritime order is heading in a fairer and more just direction. For the first time, an international maritime order was formed through negotiation and cooperation rather than through battle at sea. Undoubtedly, peaceful competition is beginning to materialize. ‘In the future, the structure of international maritime politics will be partly disjointed with the balance of military force. Diplomatic tussles and legal struggles are becoming the main form of gaining power, interests and discourse, and the main content of international maritime politics.’41 In this contest, by virtue of China’s progressively growing overall national strength and powerful political and economic influence, China can also become a leader in the international maritime order through political, economic, diplomatic and other non-military means. Many years later, even if China’s

Three major systematic objectives  23 naval strength still trails the United States, it is nevertheless possible that China political influence at sea could overtake that of the United States.

World marine economic power Target setting for the world’s marine economic powers similarly depends on a balanced assessment of necessity and feasibility. In terms of necessity, pressures of development and natural marine endowments mean that China must expand its horizons to the whole world. Crucial strategic resources required to support China’s economic development are in severe short supply, and it is faced with the risk of exhaustion. Since 1993, China has been a net importer of crude oil. With China’s rapid economic development, China reliance on imported oil has escalated sharply. In 2014, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest oil importer. With a rapid growth of demand driven by China’s refinery capacity, in addition to maturing technology in hydraulic fracturing and steadily decreasing US reliance on foreign oil supplies, China will considerably widen the gap with the United States on oil imports. In 45 of China’s major minerals, demand can be guaranteed in only 24 cases by 2020. Supplies of iron, copper, aluminum, etc. will be critically short.42 China is a highly populous country, but at the same time relatively scarce in marine resources with a concentration of marine resources low per capita. Thus, in accordance with UNCLOS, proactive development and utilization of resources in high seas and ‘the international seabed’ become exceptionally important. On the basis of UNCLOS’s related regulations and China’s persistent assertions, China possesses approximately 3 million square kilometers of jurisdiction waters, including territorial waters, inland waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelf. Compared to China’s land area and population size, this appears miniscule. As for resource sovereignty that China enjoys, per capita maritime area is less than 3,000 square meters, only a tenth of the world average, 8 percent of the Japanese per capita area, ranked 122nd in the world.43 Moreover, widespread delimitation disputes exist between China and its maritime neighbors. In practice, maritime waters under Chinese effective administration at present are only approximately 1.5 million square kilometers in area. The marine economy has already become one of the main means of competing in maritime capability. Powerful capacity and influence to develop and manage the seas and oceans are prerequisites or hallmarks of maritime powers. On the one hand, due to economic development needs, every country would view its maritime realms and economic waters as strategic areas, even as its nation’s underlying foundation. This is why they relentlessly formulate maritime development strategies, support competitive industries, and accelerate exploration in and exploitation of marine resources. On the other hand, for the maintenance of maritime sovereignty and maritime space

24  Three major systematic objectives expansion needs, countries are continuously increasing economic activity in disputed waters. They attempt to embolden themselves by increasing their economic presence in diplomatic games. Political clashes on conflicts of maritime rights gradually evolve into economic means of competition such as prospecting surveys, exploitation and exploration. At the same time, the development of economic globalization has established ever more intimate links for global economic cooperative division of labor. Optimization of the allocation of factors of production on an international scale has become a necessity. This is particularly the case for the marine economy. The production, transportation and sale of marine products are for the world. All major nations’ maritime strategies have broad outlooks, actively expanding toward the high seas, international seabed areas and the North and South Poles. They try to seize international public areas and resources, enthusiastically cooperating with other coastal states and earning the right to develop and manage resources in foreign maritime areas. China possesses certain maritime space and comparatively abundant marine resources, which form the basis for China’s ascent as a global maritime power. China ought to endeavor purposefully to develop marine technology, nurture marine talent and accumulate experience in marine exploration; economic globalization’s background and the present maritime order’s open characteristics thus have provided China the opportunity to expand the world’s maritime space and augment ocean interests through peaceful competition. First, resources and maritime space within China’s jurisdiction form the foundation to China’s ascendancy as a world maritime power. China has excellent maritime conditions and rich resources. The country’s vast seas span across tropical, subtropical and temperate belts, and have an extensive coastline of 32,000 kilometers, of which 18,000 kilometers is mainland coastline and 14,000 is island coastline. It owns 11,000 islands, with a total surface area of 76,800 square kilometers.44 China has four offshore areas of the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea. In addition to the Pacific Ocean to the east of Taiwan, there are five maritime regions. The Bohai Sea is China’s inland sea. A majority of the waters of the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea belong to China’s sovereign administrative waters. The surface area of these four seas is total of 472 square kilometers, of which approximately 300 square kilometers within China’s jurisdiction. China possesses a multitude of varieties marine resources, marine organisms, oil and gas reserves, solid minerals, renewable energy reserves, coastal tourism and other rich resources. The potential for development is enormous. This includes over 20,000 species of marine organisms, 3,000 species of marine fish, approximately 24 billion tons of offshore oil reserves, 1.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, 3.1 billion tons of placer deposits, theoretical offshore renewable energy reserves of 630 million kilowatts, 1,500 coastal tourist attraction sites, over 400 kilometers of deepwater coastline and 60 deepwater harbors, 3.8 million hectares of mudflats, and 124,000 square kilometers of shallow sea areas with a water

Three major systematic objectives  25 45

depth between 0 and 15 meters. China’s extensive east coast is the engine of the Chinese economy. The eastern region’s political, economic and cultural advantages are very easily disseminated through the sea. Furthermore, ­China’s sea areas are all situated in warm waters of tropical, subtropical and temperate regions. Located in the center of the Asia Pacific, it has many high-quality harbors. These are advantages that continental–maritime complex countries such as France and Russia cannot compete with. Second, globalization of the marine economy and present maritime mechanisms pave the way for China’s exploration and exploitation of global maritime areas and resources. Marine resources or marine assets are mostly characterized by mobility and uniformity. It is impossible for any country to wholly possess a maritime area, no matter how small in size, due to dynamic features of maritime resources. Every coastal state shares a common interest in the protection of marine ecosystems, the exploration and exploitation of marine resources among other issues. The introduction of UNCLOS recognized from a legal and institutional perspective each nation’s flexibility on marine assets. For instance, the scale of a country’s gains in its territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf in addition to the vast high seas and international seabed areas, entirely depends on the country’s capabilities to explore and exploit the ocean. Even greater opportunities exist in maritime space beyond spheres of sovereignty. High seas account for approximately two-thirds of the world’s oceans and there are 251.7 million square kilometers of international seabed areas in total, in which reserves of renewable and nonrenewable resources are in abundance. The key to maximizing effectiveness and feasibility of maritime power under the framework of international law is in actuality a country’s ability to achieve gains from the sea.46 For mankind, the sea still holds too many unknowns. The risks of maritime development, particularly deep-sea development, are huge, and it is extremely demanding in terms of capital, technology, human resources, and other factors of production. The vast majority of countries worldwide are unable to independently conduct maritime development systematically. Even traditional maritime powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan are unable to be entirely self-reliant in this matter. Therefore, cooperative development of marine resources is an unmistakable trend. The breadth and depth of each country’s participation in international maritime development is directly related to the size of their own maritime space and is furthermore intimately connected to their comprehensive national strength, technological ability, and economic stature. China’s marine economic activities have long expanded worldwide. As described above, although China does not have the necessary conditions to establish a global maritime empire, it has the chance to become a global maritime economic power. Economic globalization and widespread intensification of international economic cooperation have created favorable conditions for China’s export of surplus capital and human resources. The new international maritime order has thus provided China with an opportunity

26  Three major systematic objectives to expand its maritime space and augment its maritime interests through peaceful competition. Through friendly cooperation with the world’s major maritime states, China can integrate its use of global marine resources by learning from the experiences of other countries; China can also advance economic activities in international maritime areas. Known as ‘the father of sea power,’ Mahan was the first to explicitly and systematically suggest the theory of ‘sea power,’ at whose core is the combination of a strong naval force and merchant service. He developed a broad system of sea power theories, providing a conceptual guide for the United States to transition from focusing on governing in North America to march toward global maritime hegemony. Considering China’s overall natural endowments, geographical conditions, historical background, maritime interests and strategic needs, China as a maritime power in the new era is destined to surpass the ‘sea power’ as described by Mahan. First, China’s intrinsic natural endowments and geographic conditions mean that it cannot imitate the United States’ maritime ascendency, not can it become a global maritime hegemon; second, the substance of today’s competitive is increasingly diverse and intense, as naval power and the military are merely one aspect, for diplomacy, the marine economy and other measures have ever greater potential. The world ranking of maritime power will certainly take into account levels of marine economic development, diplomatic capability, in addition to expertise in applying international law, and other nonmilitary factors. In summary, we can condense China’s maritime power objectives into three categories: first, effective management, control, and deterrence in certain sea areas and impact waters worldwide to become a dominant regional power; second, vast maritime diplomatic power to be able to wield strong political influence on the international maritime order as well as regional and global maritime affairs; and third, reasonably and effectively to utilize resources and waters within and beyond its jurisdiction to become an international economic marine power.

Notes 1 Originally published in Pacific Journal, No. 4, 2014, with edits. 2 Hu Jintao, “Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects,” http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094–19612151.html 3 Wang Shuguang, A Discussion on China’s Oceanic Management (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2004), p. 12. 4 Liu Zhongmin, “China’s Maritime Security Strategy under the Background of the Changing International Maritime Situation,” Guoji Guacha, No. 3, 2011, pp. 4–5. 5 As Liu Huaqing therefore once pointed out, the realms of China’s neighboring seas mainly encompass “the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, the South China Sea, territorial waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and Okinawa island chain, as well as waters of the northern Pacific.” Refer to Liu Huaqing, The Liu Huaqing Memoirs (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 2004), p. 434.

Three major systematic objectives  27 6 Zhang Wenmu, “Economic Globalization and Chinese Sea Power,” Zhanlue Yu Guanli, No. 1, 2003. 7 For perspectives emphasizing China’s unique attributes as a maritime power, refer to Zhang Haiwen, “Additional Discussions on China’s Experiences as a Maritime Power,” Zhongguo Haiyang Bao, March 6, 2013; Wan Yiwei, “Chinese Dreams of a Maritime Power Will Not Follow Past Western Roads,” People’s Daily Overseas Edition, January 17, 2013. 8 For these types of definitions, it is possible to refer to Zhang Wenmu, “China’s Sea Power, a Type of Subordination to China’s Sovereign Maritime Rights Instead of Ocean Power, Let Alone Maritime Hegemony.”; Zhang Wenmu, “On China’s Sea Power,” World Economics and Politics (Shijie Jinji Yu Zhengzhi), No. 10, 2002. 9 Ibid. 10 Hu Bo, “No One Lost the South China Sea (And No One Will Win)”, August 20, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-one-lost-south-china-sea-and-noone-will-win-29337 11 Robert D. Kaplan, “China’s Budding Ocean Empire,” http://nationalinterest. org/feature/chinas-budding-ocean-empire-10603 12 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, Zhong Feiteng et  al. as translators, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), pp. 51, 132. 13 Liu Huaqing, The Liu Huaqing Memoirs (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 2004), p. 434. 14 Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, China People’s Liberation Army Military Terms (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 1997), p. 440. 15 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st ­Century: The Turn to Mahan (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 54. 16 Chinese Foreign Ministry, “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea,” www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/ t1379493.shtml 17 Robert S. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014); James R. Holmes, “The South China Sea, ‘Lake Beijing’”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/ the-south-china-sea-lake-beijing/ 18 Hu Bo, “China’s Main Interests and the Order of Priorities in the South China Sea”, in Su Ge, ed., China’s Initiatives: Responses to an Uncertain World (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2017), pp. 193–200. 19 Shen Weilie and Lu Junyuan. The Geography of China’s National Security (­Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2001), p. 342. 20 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 103. 21 This figure is a US Navy’s estimate of the fleet size required to maintain its global maritime advantage. On 15 December 2016, the US Navy proposed a 355-vessel fleet (US Navy, Executive Summary of 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA), December 15, 2016, p. 3). Currently, the number of American naval vessels on active duty is fewer than 290. 22 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, International Strategic Resources Research (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2005), pp. 60–61. 23 Xue Li, “Analysis of the Connotations of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and China’s Response,” World Economics and Politics (Shijie Jinji Yu Zhengzhi), No. 10, 2011, pp. 139–140. 24 Ministry of Defense (Navy), Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR, New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, April 25, 2004, p. 63.

28  Three major systematic objectives 25 International Maritime Organization, “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,” p.  2, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/ Documents/PiracyReports/245%20Annual%202016.pdf 26 Tim Benhow, “Maritime Power in the 1990–91 Gulf War and the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Andrew Dorman, Mike Lawrence Smith, and Matthew R. H. Uttley, eds., The Changing Face of Maritime Power (New York: St. ­Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 107. 27 This refers to coastal regions far from the hinterlands of Eurasia, primarily encompassing coastal areas in Europe and East Asia. Controlling these “Inner or Marginal Crescents” is key to controlling the world (Nicholas J. Spykman, 1944), because it is both possible to rapidly enter the “Heartland” and can easily threaten maritime civilizations. After the war, the policy of limitation and isolation employed by the United States in Western Europe and East Asia toward the Soviet Union and China was heavily influenced by this theory. 28 Shen Weilie, Editor in Chief, An Introduction to Geopolitics (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2005), p. 468. 29 Ibid. 30 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, “2016 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/ article/tjsj/tjgb/201709/20170902653690.shtml 31 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 6–19. 32 Joseph Nye, Zheng Zhiguo et al., translator, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2002), p. 154. 33 Shi Xiaoqin, On Sea Power and Sino-US Relations (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 291. 34 Xu Qiyu, “Misunderstandings and Reflections on Sea Power,” Zhanlue Yu Guanli, No. 5, 2003. 35 Thomas J. Bickford, Heidi A. Holz, and Frederic Vellucci Jr, Uncertain Waters: Thinking about China’s Emergence as a Maritime Power (Alexandria, VA: CNA China Studies, September 15, 2011), p. 73. 36 This argument is quoted from Zhang Wenmu, “Economic Globalization and China’s Sea Power,” Zhanlue Yu Guanli, No. 1, 2003. 37 Shen Wenzhou, Editor in Chief, China’s Coastal Maritime Space (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2006), p. 178. 38 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US-China Security Relationship,” Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2011, p. 91. 39 Zhang Qian, “Sea Power and the Maritime Silk Road,” Jingji Guancha Bao, No. 698, December 8, 2014. 40 Guo Shuyong, Logic in the Development of Great Powers: A Socio-Political Analysis of the Rise of Western Powers (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), pp. 23–24. 41 Hu Bo, “Trends of International Maritime Politics and China’s Strategic Choices”, China International Studies, Vol. 64, May/June 2017, p. 121. 42 Global Strategic Resources Review, p. 8. 43 He Chuantian, “The State of China’s Maritime Territories and Thoughts on Tactical Defense of Maritime Rights,” Southeast Asian Studies (Dongnanya Yanjiu), No. 2, 2001. 44 State Oceanic Administration, 2015 Survey Bulletin for Maritime Islands, www. soa.gov.cn/zwgk/hygb/hdtjdc/201612/t20161227_54241.html 45 State Oceanic Administration, National Marine Economic Development Program Outline, www.soa.gov.cn/hyjww/hyjj/2007/03/16/1174008941719037.htm 46 Kong Zhiguo, Sea Power, Competitive Property Right and the Mode of Sea Exploitation (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2011), p. 40.

2 The connotation and characteristics of Chinese maritime power

The main goal of China’s path of peaceful maritime development is not to seek global maritime hegemony, nor does it view power struggles at sea as the main way of acquiring interests. It would be very difficult for China to build US-style maritime dominance. However, China can nevertheless carve a new path. For targets of effective ocean exploitation and exploration, China will chiefly rely on diplomatic and economic measures to expand its interests at sea. Deterrence by mighty military forces, brilliant diplomatic strategy, excellent abilities to formulate international regulations, and a strong marine economy and ocean management facility are the main approaches of expanding this type of maritime power. In China’s 5,000 years of civilization, this represents a new course of development; in view of the rise and fall of great world powers in history, this is also an entirely new development in maritime power.

The ‘variable’ vs. ‘invariable’ rise1 The pursuit of any maritime power is the choice made in a certain era, under specific conditions and based on their own natural endowments. In history, there have never been two identical maritime powers; even the United States and Britain are quite different in their paths to become maritime powers and the composition of their powers. It has already been recognized by Chinese decision makers and the vast majority of serious scholars that ‘China’s dreams of maritime power will not tread in the West’s footsteps.’ Indeed, compared to the rise of modern Western maritime powers, China’s dreams of maritime power are situated in entirely different time and space dynamics, geographic attributes and cultural background. Naturally China must follow a different path from that of traditional Western experiences. Since the end of the Second World War, with the emergence of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, growth of economic globalization and interdependence, powerful worldwide anti-war and peace movements, peace and development have gradually become major themes of the times. The nation-state system, consolidated continuously, leads to a world that is now

30  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power virtually without vacuum zones, or ungoverned spaces. The principles of sovereignty are met with more and more challenges, but they continue to garner public support. Space–time dynamics have changed fundamentally, and it would be difficult for any country to become a dual maritime power based on trade or expansion of its ‘sphere of influence’ and ‘command of the seas’ as described by Mahan. This is not only a concern for a rising maritime country like China, but will also be important tests for traditional maritime powers such as the United States and Great Britain. China cannot be militaristic in its expansion but simply pave a primarily peaceful maritime road. Since China is a land–sea complex country, it must consider balanced strategic focuses on land and sea and maintain coordinated development; although China has relatively abundant marine resources, but compared to world maritime powers is nevertheless insufficient; maritime space is narrow and obstructed by island chains. Its marine geography is furthermore at a relative disadvantage. Under these geographic circumstances, China cannot possibly achieve the kind of maritime hegemony attained by the United States and Great Britain. China should rely on its own natural endowments, objectively plan its own strategic objectives and approaches and not blindly hope to emulate the historical experiences of the United States and Great Britain and follow the road they once took to hegemony. The ‘dog eat dog’ laws in the jungle of today’s international community are not entirely outdated, the naval arms race still burns robustly and the role of armaments as a supporting solution of disputes remains vital, although peaceful settlement of disputes has indeed gradually become the mainstream. Since the Second World War, there have rarely been cases of territory successfully changing hands through military force. In particular, since the establishment of the international maritime order based on the ­UNCLOS, calls for maritime dispute resolution through peaceful negotiations have been on the rise. More notably, today’s international maritime mechanisms and order provide alternative modes of competition, in which, in addition to sea power, economics, diplomacy, international law and other factors play an increasingly important role. Brilliant diplomatic strategies and tactics, competitive marine industries and skilled international legal expertise may be able to circumvent the restrictions of traditional maritime spaces, have great influence and acquire considerable interests beyond its sovereign scope. While China builds strong sea power, it should also strengthen the construction and application of diplomatic and economic measures. However, China should also not overemphasize its distinctions so as to not appear arrogant and imperious. The extensive course of humanity’s maritime civilization does not lack in somewhat constant laws and experiences; in practice, for each of today’s various global maritime nations, there exist more or less universal values. First, a maritime power must possess a certain degree of power status at sea. Maritime authority forms the material foundation for China. No maritime power can ignore the means to gaining and maintaining power,

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  31 because the rights and interests conferred by the international laws alone are far from enough, not to mention the fact that the international law is also dynamically developing. Major nations have powerful status, which China should neither flinch from talking about nor have to sidestep. China is not pursuing maritime hegemony, but it does need secure strategic space at sea, international political status and effective sea power. Second, maritime powers are naturally supported by marine civilization. Civilizational transformation is a defense of society and culture on China’s journey to becoming a maritime power. Western civilization as the archetypal representation of mankind’s marine civilization, and the depth and breadth of its maritime practices are by and large unparalleled. While tainted by the vestiges of heinous colonial expansion and hegemonic war, it has also amassed a great deal of human civilization’s essence. China has deep-rooted genetic codes in continental civilization, and China’s geopolitical characteristics as a land–sea complex imply that it cannot fully complete the transformation from a continental civilization to a maritime civilization. It will ultimately retain its own cultural distinctions, but also inherit and promote Western civilization’s understanding of the sea, ability and awareness to utilize and control the sea, and study Western civilization’s outstanding experiences in maritime law, diplomacy, applications of sea power and other matters that are forever relevant for China. Third, the spirit of contracts and system of conventions are the cornerstone of the international maritime order and also ought to be the main framework by which China participates in maritime politics. Along with power transition in maritime hegemonies and evaluation of maritime means of force, the spirit of contracts and system of convention in Western tradition have gradually evolved into the intrinsic basis of the maritime order and have been universally accepted around the world. During China’s participation in maritime politics, it will of course have its own stances and proposals and would inevitably lead to various sorts of tension with other countries. However, this should not hinder China’s respect for the spirit of contracts and adherence to the system of conventions. Like the majority of countries in the world, China should engage in rivalry and cooperation under the guidance of the spirit of contracts and within the system of conventions. Consequently, on China’s road to becoming a maritime power, if it overemphasizes its own distinctiveness, hunting for ‘change’ and ‘originality,’ even reinventing the wheel, or, alternatively, if it overaccentuates modern Western traditions, in particular blindly mimicking and mechanically copying Western practices and experiences, both approaches would be counterproductive, futile and furthermore a threat to the rejuvenation of the nation and magnificent rise of China. China’s road to maritime power combines its natural endowments with circumstances of the times, renouncing ways to the success of Western maritime traditions. Both heedlessly discrediting and overstating the impact of Western experiences are unscientific, unrealistic and imprecise attitudes.

32  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power

The path of peace and revolutionary uprising In candid terms, the emergence of any significant maritime power would certainly drastically alter maritime power structures as well as to some extent reshape the international maritime order. It is impossible that China will not change the status quo in some way. The difference is that China’s main path is a peaceful one. The time when military might dictate all is already past. Sea control is merely one means, rather than the ultimate goal of the majority of the countries in the world. Besides, maritime development and maritime governance issues are emerging into two other themes of international politics. Since the end of the Second World War, maritime development and maritime economic interest has become a major topic of international politics. Due to the rapid development of maritime science and technology in early decades of the 21st century, mankind is entering a stage of comprehensive utilization of the oceans, especially in exploration of the deep sea, which will soon witness substantial breakthroughs. The exploration and exploitation of maritime spaces will increasingly become the focus of every country’s maritime strategy. With the focus of maritime activities shifting from offshore areas to the deep sea and from waters under jurisdiction to the high seas, many global challenges such as maritime environmental degradation and natural or manmade disasters will further ferment and attract more attention, and the humanistic emotions and solicitude of mankind for the ocean will also become more stereoscopic and abundant. The governance of maritime commons has placed the demands of shouldering necessary responsibilities and obligations on maritime countries, especially major powers. In this context, a country is not likely to survive without strong defense, but it is more and more difficult to work only by force. If a country like China were to follow these historical trends, it surely would launch, under new conditions, a new path to maritime power. Ever since the Chinese Communist Party 18th National Congress report officially proposed its maritime power initiative, China’s maritime power strategy has gradually become a hot topic, open to diverse interpretations by numerous foreign and domestic media, scholars and officials. However, the keynote speech by General Secretary Xi Jinping on 30 July 2013 at the 8th CCP Politburo collective study session is regarded as the most authoritative and systematic elucidation to date. He stressed the need ‘for greater marine stewardship, awareness and governance of the seas, encouragement to continuously achieve new accomplishments in the constructing a maritime power,’ in addition to elaborating upon the role and purpose of maritime strategy, the chosen route to becoming a maritime power, resource development, environment protection, maritime rights and other concerns.2 Carefully analyzing the speeches of Xi Jinping, connecting the international environment, contemporary situation and historical mission faced by China as a maritime power, it is not difficult to identify two prominent aspects of China’s experiences as a maritime power.

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  33 First, harmony. It means that China expands sea power and maritime interests through the ways of ‘peace, development, cooperation, and mutual gain.’ The core defining feature is the pursuit of ascendency at sea through peaceful means. Historically, the rise of all maritime powers was accompanied without exception by large-scale war. As a rule, Great Britain, the United States, Japan and other nations cemented their status as maritime powers through naval battles. There exist varying degrees of maritime disputes between China and virtually all of its maritime neighboring nations, the majority of whom are far weaker than China. However, China is committed to settling maritime disputes through dialogues and negotiation. In this regard, Chinese President Xi Jinping has in speeches on maritime power repeatedly emphasized ‘adherence to peaceful, negotiation-based dispute resolution and endeavors to maintain peace and stability’ and demonstrated the Chinese leadership’s unwavering stance on peaceful dispute settlement. The essence of ‘harmony’ is China’s restraint in the use of force at sea and its quest of a peaceful environment. Why does Chinese maritime power have these characteristics? First and foremost, it is intimately connected with China’s grand strategy for peaceful development. Maritime strategy is a key component of China’s strategy for peaceful development, and the road to maritime power naturally cannot contravene overall peaceful development. China’s path of peaceful development is not to illustrate the distinctiveness particularities of China; it is to show China’s intelligent decisions in line with current trends. In other words, under current circumstances, even if China wished to rise by virtue of military strength, it would lack such opportunities. Moreover, the preference for peace has also benefited from the relatively open nature of the present international maritime order. Due to developments in economic globalization and interdependence, international public goods such as worldwide SLOCs and freedom of navigation on high seas will increasingly depend on joint global efforts, in particular those of major nations. No country, not even the United States, can single-handedly maintain the international maritime order. It is possible for China to acquire certain stature in maritime power through providing international public goods and undertaking global obligations. In addition, the modern international maritime order, based on the UNCLOS, has conferred upon coastal nations worldwide a relatively equal opportunity to participate in international maritime politics. This has created the necessary conditions for and expanded the influence of promoting dispute resolution by all countries through diplomacy and international law. China’s proposed Maritime Silk Road is irrefutably not a publicity stunt to court global goodwill or for the purpose of colonial establishment or hegemony, but is based on notions of impartial cooperation and collective development, and a major venture for China’s peaceful maritime rise. On 23 June 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, while attending the China-­ Greece Maritime Cooperation Forum, gave a speech entitled ‘For Peace,

34  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power Cooperation and Harmony in the Ocean,’ clarifying China’s perspectives on the sea and emphasizing features of ‘harmony’ on China’s journey as a maritime power. Engagements with the ocean leads to prosperity and that isolation from the ocean leads to decline. Cooperation in developing the oceans brings development to all countries while war fought over the ocean inflicts disasters to mankind…China firmly safeguards its national sovereignty and territorial integrity and commits itself to maintaining regional peace and order.3 Second, ‘innovation.’ It applies beyond sea control, and further focusing on the pursuit of exploration, exploitation and management of the seas. The rise of any power always stems from the combination of material pursuit and social motivations. China has unique geographical characteristics and cultural qualities, facing unprecedented and demanding developmental responsibilities, additionally being in the midst of a new and evolving maritime order. Under both internal and external effects, it is highly probable that China will create a new path. In reality, China is active in the process of exploring practices and will highlight development and utilization of the sea. Based on its jurisdictional maritime space, relying on the high seas, the international seabed area and other public maritime spaces, China robustly develops its marine economy. The Chinese Navy in fact does not have a global presence, whereas China’s marine economic activities are by now located all over the world’s major oceans and seas. When discussing maritime powers, Xi Jingping also places greater emphasis on the theme of effective exploitation and exploration of the seas. He proposes increasing the efficiency and quality of the marine economy, transitioning the development model and protecting the environment, striving to develop marine science and technology and unequivocally reiterates China’s distinctive new path as a maritime power. This new path will be based on objectives of effective exploitation and exploration of the seas, mainly relying on diplomatic, technological and economic measures to expand maritime interests through fair competition, international cooperation and negotiation. ‘Harmony’ is an organic component of ‘innovation’; ‘innovation’ is the crucial foundation of ‘harmony.’ It is precisely because China’s decision makers use China’s natural endowments, contemporary circumstances, international environment and other objective conditions as a foundation, and believe that while China cannot become a maritime hegemony like the United States, it can nevertheless achieve success through economics, technology, diplomacy, military deterrence and other forms of comprehensive power. Thus, only a development model of peace, cooperation and mutual gain will be sustainable in the long run, whereas the peaceful approach itself evidently is a key important reason for the innovation of China’s experience as a maritime power.

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  35 Of course, whether this new path proves ultimately successful, and whether China can secure the requisite maritime space peacefully and attain maritime power commensurate with its national strength, depends not only on China’s own efforts but also on reactions from the international community. In particular, this depends on whether the world’s hegemonic power – the United States – recognizes and understands Chinese fundamental maritime interests and the ‘harmony’ strategy. China undoubtedly needs to exercise restraint and control in its actions for global reassurance; meanwhile, the world needs to afford the most basic respect for China’s security and core interests.

The global vision of the maritime power dream In a world of rapid economic globalization and rising interdependency, ‘China belongs to the world, the world also belongs to China.’ The Chinese dream of a maritime power requires global participation. For China, it is of critical importance to take advantage of global perspectives. In recent years, China has demonstrably boosted management, development and efforts to safeguard rights in its jurisdictional waters. But for maritime power to become a reality, merely making the most of maritime space within China’s sovereignty and jurisdiction is by far insufficient. China as a maritime power is global in scope. Only through global optimization of resources distribution can the maritime power’s targets be achieved. As mentioned before, China’s jurisdictional maritime space is quite inadequate. According to relevant regulations of the UNCLOS and China’s consistent assertions, China possesses 3 million square kilometers of sea areas under its jurisdiction and partial rights to the outer continental shelf. Relative to other international maritime powers, China’s jurisdictional sea areas are extremely limited and wholly insufficient to satisfy China’s maritime development needs. As a relatively disadvantaged country in terms of maritime geography, a major nation with onerous development tasks and a power with many international responsibilities, if China were satisfied with only maintaining and managing its own maritime space, it would be very difficult to become a global maritime power as well as unbefitting the image of any responsible power. China ought to build itself into a maritime power with a global outlook, using the world maritime space as a platform. While strengthening the development and utilization of the jurisdictional waters, it should actively expand international public maritime space and cooperation with other coastal countries, reinforcing the layout of sea areas beyond sovereign jurisdiction. Public maritime spaces include high seas and the international seabed area. Of which, high seas, where nations enjoy freedoms of fishing, economic development and scientific research, refer to all sea areas excluding each nations’ exclusive economic zones, territorial waters, inland waters and archipelagic waters for archipelago nations. The UNCLOS defines seabed

36  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power and subsoil, beyond the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf of coastal nations, as the international seabed, which is jointly owned by all of mankind and is rich in all kinds of resources. In depths of 4,000–6,000 meters below the sea level in every ocean worldwide, polymetallic oceanic nodules of manganese full of copper, cobalt, nickel, iron and over 70 other elements are widely distributed. Additionally, there are deposits such as ­cobalt-rich crusts, volcanogenic massive sulfide ore, natural gas hydrates, as well as deep-sea biological resources, with excellent prospects for scientific and commercial application. The deep sea will become a strategic development base for various natural resources in the 21st century. There would be many sectors such as deep sea mining, biotechnology and technological equipment manufacturing in deep sea industries. According to the UNCLOS, the international seabed area is explored and developed by each nation under international mechanisms established by the UNCLOS. The International Seabed Authority manages the international seabed area and its resources on behalf of all of mankind. For every country worldwide, this part of the space is entirely dynamic. The size of the area a country may take advantage of international public maritime space depends entirely on its own exploration and exploitation capacities. To date, China has already achieved a certain degree of progress in the development of the international seabed area: Chinese institutions have won two block deep seabed minerals of polymetallic nodules deposit respectively in 2001 and 2017. In 2011, the China Ocean Mineral Resources R & D Association (COMRA) won exclusive exploration rights to a region 10,000 square kilometers in size of polymetal sulfide deposits in the South West Indian Ocean international seabed area. In April 2014, COMRA also earned the contract of ferromanganese crusts in the Western Pacific Ocean.4 Maritime spaces of collaborative development, according to mutual agreements and contracts, are mainly subject to cooperation spaces in the jurisdictional waters of other coastal states, which are normally in other countries’ exclusive economic zones or continental shelves. Due to imbalances in maritime nations’ marine industrial development and large discrepancies in their marine resources, international marine economic cooperation is now extremely widespread. Not only third world countries are attracting investment, foreign human capital and advanced technology. Some developed countries with abundant maritime resources such as the United States, Canada and Australia have also focused on appealing to foreign countries to develop their marine economies. China has considerable economic strength, substantial human resources and rapidly rising technological ability. In terms of marine economic cooperation, there is enormous potential for cooperation for ocean fishing, offshore oil and gas extraction, and marine tourism and other industries. China’s ocean fishing industry has already spread all over jurisdictional waters of over 40 countries along the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Coast. In recent years, the three big enterprises of PetroChina, Sinopec and China National Petroleum Corporation have won development rights and

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  37 interests in many offshore oil and gas fields in areas such as Africa, South America and the Middle East through overseas cooperation and acquisitions. The Chinese coastal tourism industry is also actively ‘stepping forward,’ with the personnel turnover and capital investment growing rapidly. While China’s maritime interests have inevitably expanded globally, its responsibilities at sea also need to gravitate toward global development. A country only has the vision of maritime power when it wields influence in Antarctic scientific research, Arctic exploration, protection of Pacific fishing resources, survival of small island nations, maritime counter-terrorism and other matters seemingly ‘unrelated’ to its development of seapower; furthermore, it needs to play important roles in maritime fair trade, responses to financial crises, international peacekeeping and other such matters.5 In fact, China’s maritime activities are already found all over the world. At the policy level, China should take greater initiatives to initiate planning, in order to better guide, integrate and advance the depth and breadth of China’s steps toward the world’s seas. If China’s maritime power strategy were overly restricted to its jurisdictional maritime space, or treated sea areas simply as an extension of continental space, this would not at all help to realize its dream of becoming a maritime power. While if the rest of the world persists in observing China’s maritime pursuits with a prejudiced eye or from a colonial perspective, this would hinder seizing the opportunities provided by China’s maritime renaissance, and would make maintaining good relations with China more difficult. Therefore both China and the world should not concentrate their attentions on China’s 3 million square kilometers of ‘private land,’ but should instead look to activities in the vast expanses of global maritime space. Foreign countries also should not focus only on the buildup of China’s sea power, but comprehensively weigh Chinese maritime values and mentalities, marine technologies and economic activities, maritime diplomatic capabilities and other improvements. Thus, can China progress more assuredly toward a maritime power and the world more fully recognize China as a rising star of the sea.

Potential maritime meaning of the belt and road initiative In October 2013, during a visit to Indonesia, President Xi Jinping addressed the Indonesian parliament, pointing out China’s commitment to strengthening interconnectivities with ASEAN countries and initiating the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. He promoted good maritime cooperative partnerships with ASEAN countries to jointly construct the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road.’ This was the first time that a Chinese leader presented this initiative. The key construction direction of the Maritime Silk Road will shift south from Chinese coastal ports, past the South China Sea, through the Malacca Strait, by the Lombok and Sunda Straits, along the north Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and other

38  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power waters. It is attracting support by ASEAN and its member countries, influencing the neighboring and South Asian region, even extending to the Middle East, East Africa, and Europe.6 Furthermore, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is not isolated. It is intimately connected with the Silk Road Economic Belt, complementing and enhancing one another. In Chinese governmental plans, the Silk Road Economic Belt coupled with the Maritime Silk Road are abbreviated as ‘the Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI). China hopes to explore the special values and doctrines of the Ancient Silk Road by adopting the BRI, additionally inserting connotations from a new era, actively and enthusiastically forging economic partnerships with nations along the routes. The BRI promotes what can be described as the Chinese leadership’s insights into the development trends of the times. Drawing lessons from historical experiences and combining both foreign and domestic economic environments, it is a great pioneering venture. Chinese and international academic circles have conducted a considerable evaluation on the motivations and aims of the Chinese government’s initiation of the BRI. There is a multitude of opinions, interpretations and viewpoints on the initiative. In my opinion, no matter what argument is maintained, it is near impossible to depart from the following three main analysis perspectives. First, the BRI is intended to support China’s reform and opening up in addition to the advanced objective requirements of an economic ‘stepping out.’ It is necessary for China’s peaceful development. China is already the world’s largest trading power; globally, it has now become the largest trading partner of over 120 countries and the principal export market for over 70 countries or regions. However, behind the rapid economic growth and flourishing trade lies a severe crisis. The great engine of China’s economic development – large-scale investment – has perilously come to a dead end. Traditional industries such as Chinese steel, cement and automobiles already have serious production overcapacity. Another major driver – export growth – has also suffered a bottleneck. In recent years, profit margins from Chinese foreign trade have plummeted significantly. Myriad coastal manufacturing commercial enterprises have closed down. In these circumstances, China’s accumulated capital and production capacity are in urgent need of large markets and wide channels. China needs a new strategy to support and promote economic ‘stepping out.’ In this respect, Xi Jinping has clearly advocated the BRI as conducive to expanding and enhancing China’s opening up to the outside world. In the course of over 40 years of reform and opening up, China’s economy is currently undergoing a significant revolution from ‘leading in’ to ‘going out.’ New highly integrated foreign prospects of markets, energy resources and investments have already emerged. Only by insisting on opening up to the outside world and by deeply embracing the global economy can China achieve sustainable development.

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  39 Next, to cope with the new state of affairs in international economic competition, China has to expand across an even wider strategic space. Presently, economic globalization and free trade have suffered obstacles unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. The WTO Doha round of negotiations has yet to produce any headway; reform of the International Monetary Fund has come to a complete standstill. At the same time, trends against globalization, economic integration and collectivism have grown more obvious, while negotiations in many types of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements are ever more popular, and the world has already been shaped into the three main economic spheres of North America, Europe and Asia Pacific. In response to this complex situation, the United States, Europe and other Western countries, particularly the United States, were the first to attempt to ‘make a fresh start’ while at the same time continuing to urge the adjustment of the international economic order. For instance, the United States launched negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), which were attempting to take unilateral action, formulate new trade rules together with its allies and partners, control the new future economic world order and eventually force the majority of countries in the world to ‘enter world trade system a second time.’ In an increasingly competitive economic environment, China needs to consolidate the diverse types of cooperation that is currently in progress so that they are interconnected and mutually inspiring. This would result in systematic effects and an indomitable position in possible future competition. However, a trend of ‘Rising East, Declining West’ has materialized in global economic patterns. With China’s share of world economy rising, its extensive responsibilities in driving international economic development are unprecedented. Many countries in Asia, Europe and Africa hope to hitch an ‘express train ride’ on China’s development. They anxiously wait to strengthen economic cooperation with China, as trade in goods or services of an ordinary nature already do not adequately suffice. To this end, China also requires a complete strategic or policy framework to better consolidate resources, in order to be greater and stronger together. Of course, the practice of the BRI would inevitably create to a certain degree political and security spillover effects. Notwithstanding that China is a large trading power and ‘the world’s factory,’ there is still a notable discrepancy when compared to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, other Western countries, and even Russia, with regard to political influence over and understanding of its surroundings and the outside world. The BRI is distinct from ordinary economic cooperation. Interconnectivity and intercommunications of infrastructure frequently necessitate high mutual trust in politics. Cooperation in this respect would directly reduce the psychological distance for both sides. If this initiative were successfully implemented, it would surely tremendously benefit in elevating China’s international status and influence. Besides, China’s relationship with the vast

40  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power majority of its neighboring countries has demonstrated a peculiar and contradictory situation in economics and security. On the one hand, economic connections continue to increase; on the other hand, mutual suspicion and vigilance on security matters nevertheless also rapidly intensify. China urgently needs a balanced and coordinated strategic framework to accommodate neighboring countries. In this sense, even if China does not wish to confer too much strategic significance to the BRI, the implementation of these two key initiatives help to increase China’s strategic space for maneuver, change the passive situation facing the United States and hedge against negative effects of ‘Asia Pacific Rebalancing’ to China.7 Furthermore, the BRI will also improve the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for China’s overseas trade and communications. Lastly, the BRI is an important component of China’s neighboring diplomatic strategy and the foundation for China’s peripheral diplomatic strategy on both the continental and maritime sides. From beginning to end, the BRI has connections with China’s neighboring diplomacy. While visiting Kazakhstan and Indonesia, Xi Jinping raised the topics of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road respectively. They are extremely meaningful in their own right, because the Central Asia and South East Asia regions are key pivot points for the BRI and are also its most important partners. Launching the BRI as a part of the work of Chinese peripheral diplomacy has already been included in a series of documents on neighboring diplomatic policies. More importantly, the term ‘peripheral’ itself is a very imprecise concept. The peripheral areas of major nations will continue to expand with boosts to national power. Additionally, with greater conveniences in telecommunications and transportation, boundaries of peripheral spaces will be more and more blurred. With increases in China’s national strength and international influence, the connotations and extensions of China’s peripheral diplomacy broaden relentlessly. The scope of China’s surroundings will no longer be confined to contiguous nations or those across local seas, but developing in the direction of regions further afield. What is certain is that the BRI will very possibly become the chief strategic framework that China promotes in its greater peripheral diplomacy in several future decades. However, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt have differences after all. This is not merely due to disparities in continental and maritime spaces. Moreover, China is traditionally a landbased power; its practices and experiences of operating the continental Ancient Silk Road are far richer than of that of the maritime Ancient Silk Road. In ancient times, the continental Silk Road was conferred strategic significance from its very inception. Zhang Qian’s unprecedented exploration in the Western Regions is a part of the national strategy, in order to connect every Western realm to resist the Huns. From the Han dynasty onward, the Silk Road has on numerous occasions been obstructed by the chaos of war, and many times been re-opened through the support of national strength.

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  41 All along the route of the Ancient Silk Road there were many official outposts as a symbol of China’s national power and influence. By contrast, the maritime Ancient Silk Road was characterized by distinctive natural crossovers. This was the spontaneous economic action of coastal ancestors. Except in China’s coastal regions, participation of the Chinese government and for a majority of inland residents was virtually negligible and may be disregarded. Although the Treasure Voyages of Zheng He through the Western Ocean were momentous and prominent, its lack of support and motivation from maritime trade and the marine economy meant it was ultimately short-lived. However, the scope of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and flexibility of its connotations will by far excel those of the Silk Road Economic Belt. The development potential of the two projects and their overall global impact as a whole cannot be compared in the same breath. The ocean worldwide is entirely interconnected. The success of coastal experiences in Europe, Asia and Africa could very easily be transplanted to waters in other parts of the world, whereas continental routes will eventually terminate on the Eurasian continent. If the Silk Road Economic Belt wants to extend its influence to other areas of the world, it must rely on support from maritime routes. As for interactivity, connections between various points along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road inevitably become distribution networks, whereas no matter how we may build a dense Eurasian land bridge, the Silk Road Economic Belt still cannot free itself from the constraints of linear distribution. At present, China is advancing toward the sea and building maritime power on a wide and far-reaching scale for the first time in Chinese history. Consequently, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’s practices will be destined to bring to China more important values and more profound impacts. In addition to augmenting and reinforcing China’s economic cooperation with other coastal states, and enhancing China’s international political influence, it is a maritime power’s most important component and practice initiative. It must also shape China’s oceanography outlook, as well as directly expedite the conception of Chinese versions of maritime assertions and regulations. By interpreting the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’s vision, combined with China’s traditional ideals and the current international trends, we have reason to believe that if the initiative is effectively implemented and marketed, the principles that China advocates, such as interconnectivity, cooperation and mutual gain, openness and inclusivity will possibly develop into the core values of the international maritime order and be recognized as standard for the vast majority by the world’s coastal countries. Interconnectivity Interconnectivity is the inevitable outcome of economic globalization at a certain stage of development. Maritime interconnectivity and freedom of

42  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power navigation achieve the same goals through different means. Whereas the former not only far exceeds the latter in richness of its connotations, it is also more in tune with current times. Xi Jinping pointed out, to build interconnectivity, the three features of infrastructure, rules and regulations, interpersonal exchange should be merged into one. The five central domains of policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds should also advance together.8 Freedom of navigation is a mandatory requirement for interconnectivity at sea, or one of its major connotations. In reality, freedom of navigation at sea forms the foundation of American maritime hegemony, its essence to maintain the US Navy’s free entry and exit in the world’s oceans and seas. Although theoretically all countries worldwide have the same rights universally as the United States, but due to inequities in the development of capability, legal equality often leads to de facto imbalances. The naval forces of the vast majority of coastal nations are only active in contiguous waters. Freedom of navigation in the world’s oceans is not of substantial relevance to these countries. Freedom of navigation initiatives have a proactive side, but are nevertheless the game of a hegemon or superpower. Under the promotion world order of democracy, egalitarianism and freedom, its impact and attraction are already greatly reduced. On the contrary, interconnectivity has increasingly become a buzzword in the international community. The United States, European Union, Russia, ASEAN and other powers all have proposed various versions of interconnectivity. These include the American ‘New Silk Road’ initiative, the EU’s ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. At many multilateral conferences, interconnectivity has also received a high degree of priority. The 2013 APEC Leaders’ Declaration clearly set out hardware, software and interpersonal communication as the three main pillars of interconnectivity and a goal of all-round interconnectivity, and integration. The APEC Connectivity Blueprint, published at the 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing, is determined to achieve its mutually established initiatives and targets by 2025. It will reinforce interconnectivity between hardware, software and personnel to realize a long-term target of seamless and comprehensive connectivity and an integrated Asia Pacific. The theme of the 10th Asia-­ Europe Meeting was also interconnectivity held on 16–17 October 2014. Interconnectivity represents a new round of economic globalization and vital requirements for regional integration. Presently, every power’s focus is concentrated on the construction of interconnectivity on Eurasian continent. From a long-term perspective, after Eurasia becomes a major integrated market, it is inevitably necessary to bolster exchange of needed goods and services with Africa, the Americas and other parts of the world, which objectively demands the global improvement of maritime transportation. Maritime interconnectivity brings in a new age for maritime navigation. All coastal nations, regardless of their size or strength, can become key hubs or play central roles. All countries will have the conditions to fully

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  43 demonstrate the comparative advantages of their natural endowments and industries. They would also play an indispensable role and work hard on bearing responsibilities on maritime issues such as SLOCs, maritime security and marine development. In the process of completing the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, China should strengthen its understanding and research into maritime interconnectivity and its values and rules. Further to actively enhancing coastal nations’ infrastructure construction and maritime economic cooperation, China needs to consider interconnectivity and its ties with the new international maritime order from the perspective of the entire world and the whole of mankind. Win–win cooperation The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road inherits the spirit and ideas of building a shared destiny and emphasizes the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration. The goal is to hope for joint development and joint prosperity with all countries along the Road. Concepts of mutually beneficial cooperation are rooted in China’s own path of peaceful development. Over more than 40 years of reform and opening up, China has not taken the old road of expansion and domination of previous rising powers, while it has instead corresponded with the world through equal economic and mutually beneficial economic cooperation with great success. Therein lies the experience of the Chinese Miracle. The aim of China’s proposed Maritime Silk Road is to attain even greater accomplishments, to proudly spread and celebrate these development experiences and to promote the joint establishment of common interests and a common destiny with various countries on the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, not limited to mutual economic cooperation. The construction of the BRI will exceed joint economic gains and more heavily focus on achieving comprehensive mutual successes with partner nations in multiple fields and all-round aspects, creating a community of shared development prosperity. This marks quite a notable change from prominent past Chinese foreign policy objectives of mutual economic benefit.9 ‘Win–win cooperation’ is the best model by which mankind can explore, utilize and develop the oceans. The oceans differ from land territory. Other than for Antarctica, all land globally has already been carved and consumed by various countries worldwide, whereas almost 70 percent of ocean space belongs to all of mankind as a public asset and as ‘common land.’ Even if a small section of maritime space carries sovereign characteristics, due to the ocean’s fluidity, coastal nations cannot exclusively occupy and enjoy maritime areas, even its shoreline. Ever since the Age of Exploration, the essence of maritime hegemony is in fact to strip or limit other nations of their right to use the seas. Maritime hegemons such as Great Britain and the United States have never controlled the entire ocean. Thus, although military utilizations of the seas are restrictive, on a political, economic and

44  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power cultural level, the development and management of the ocean are based on mutually beneficial cooperation from the very beginning of the world system, which is starkly different from land-based empires that control almost everything in their spheres of influence. Construction of every-day fibre-­ optic cables on the seabed, marine meteorological forecasts, marine search and rescue, in addition to other maritime affairs all require a global concerted effort of coastal nations to cooperate. Even when nations were warring with each other, these kinds of cooperation still develop regardless. Mutually beneficial cooperation is also a natural requirement for the development of global maritime politics. Viewed from a global context, the center of mankind’s development has principally begun to shift from the land to the sea. The 21st Century is the maritime century, when humanity steps toward the sea on a grand scale. At the same time, numerous natural disasters, environmental deterioration, global maritime security and other issues have become increasingly apparent. In this global maritime environment, going it alone is fruitless and unproductive. The maritime space, relative to continental space, has yet far more unknowns. Mankind’s future scientific and technological capabilities in the long run still cannot fully overcome diverse obstacles in maritime space. When facing the ocean, any person, institution or individual country is totally insignificant. Without cooperation there is no prospect for success. China’s leaders are keen to discuss win-win cooperation internationally, and emphatically do not speak with deception or fraud, instead with profound philosophical sources or traditions. Ancient Chinese philosophy devotes attention to the interactive synergy and progress between Yin (阴) and Yang (阳) (bipolar opposition), so all things in the world are interconnected; it does not only pay attention to objects’ differences and contradictions. Instead, for more prominent are the likeness and interdependence of things. Therefore, unlike the classical philosophy of Western international relations, Chinese politicians often do not regard international relations as a ‘zero-sum game’ and argue for common growth and shared prosperity. Once China’s excellent cultural tradition connects organically with the greater trend of global maritime collective cooperation, it will surely shine at the center of international maritime politics. Openness and inclusivity Openness and inclusivity are the most important characteristics of maritime civilization. Yet, due to human interference because of selfish interests and desire for power, this type of openness and inclusivity has always been incomplete, with distinctly narrow traits. The Age of Exploration’s practices directly begot the formation of the global system. In recent eras, Western countries relied on strong sea power for control over the world’s oceans, while extensive regions in Asia, Africa and South America were reduced to colonies thanks to the connectivity provided by the oceans. Since Mahan systematically created sea power theory, the pursuit of sea control has

Characteristics of Chinese maritime power  45 always been a maritime power’s main mission. Even to this day, the United States still professes control over 16 of the world’s maritime choke points and important straits. With today’s intensifying developments in economic globalization and complex interdependence, sea power has become progressively decentralized, and controlling the sea has gradually given way to sharing the sea. Openness and inclusivity in international maritime politics is both an inherent requirement for mankind’s progress, and also an objective reality that all the world’s major powers must accept. Now is time for human maritime behavior to return to the sea as ‘all rivers lead to the sea,’ the origin of openness and inclusivity. On the issue of openness, there have been repeated setbacks and difficulties in the course of Chinese history, perhaps not skillfully dealt with; but concerning inclusivity, China arguably is the power the best qualified to speak in the world. In China’s history, there has never been a religious war, moreover nor a dark ‘Middle Ages’ akin to that of Europe. Since ancient times, the main part of Chinese civilization has always been tolerant toward foreign ethnicities and cultures. The Chinese people are secular, unshackled by religion, unbound by history and without exclusionist genes. The Chinese nation itself is a huge melting pot, the development of the Chinese civilization constantly drawing upon the fruits of other civilizations. Looking around at various powers worldwide, China is the only country yet not to be dominated by monotheism, thus is also the most developed of ‘secular rational’ power in the world. The so-called secular rationality is not in fact to abandon faith, nor does it renounce the importance of values and morality. Instead, it does not render absolute the so-called dogma or value, and does not treat their promotion or export as a realistic objective.10 In China’s process of ‘stepping out,’ it had neither the ambition of lecturing nor the impulse of changing the world. Exactly as Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui stated, ‘the BRI is a collaborative initiative, about which China does not have any particular strategic geopolitical intentions, and does not intend to become the dominant authority in regional affairs, operate its sphere of influence, or interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.’11 The Maritime Silk Road is not a self-confined group and would not hinder existing regional cooperation mechanisms. The construction of the Maritime Silk Road is by no means China’s one-man show and would not exist without the participation of various global powers. China not only needs to cooperate with countries along the Silk Road, but also collaborate with major world political powers such as the United States and Europe. The ultimate goal of the Maritime Silk Road is to drive the construction of global interconnectivity and intercommunication, greater convenience in utilizing the oceans, development and protection of the oceans. Neither South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa nor other regions all will be the ‘terminus’ of the Silk Road. The Maritime Silk Road truly adheres to a spirit of openness and inclusivity. Any willing country, economic entity or enterprise, and individual could partake equally, not limited to national borders, or types of

46  Characteristics of Chinese maritime power actors, or ideology and culture. The Maritime Silk Road passes through areas of international strategic and political sensitivity, where geopolitical relations are intricate and complicated. Every country differs greatly in terms of national scale, level of development, historical traditions, ethnicities and religions, language and culture, interests and pursuits. This objective situation requires the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to be built based upon the aforementioned differences, inclusive of difference countries’ differing needs. As every national policy has its own priorities, innovation and cooperation models need to identify where interests concur, reinforcing the foundations of cooperation. The survival of the Maritime Silk Road depends on attracting more and more coastal nations to participate. This is not only China’s own conception, but also a common cause for all countries. Ideas and awareness stem from practice. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road may be this century’s most magnificent cooperative practice at sea. Its promotion and implementation will not only drive the world’s economic globalization and greater integration, bringing prosperity to countries worldwide and people at large. It will also develop new beliefs and rules, directly changing the modern international maritime political landscape. The three major proposals described above certainly do not tell the full story, but it would be a good beginning.

Notes 1 Originally published with additions in the Huanqiu Globe Magazine, No. 6, 2013. 2 Xi Jing ping, “Continue to Make New Achievements in Further Understanding the Ocean, Managing the Ocean, and Promoting the Construction of Maritime Power”, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c64094-22402107.html 3 Li Keqiang, “For Peace, Cooperation and Harmony in the Ocean,” www.fmprc. gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1171451.shtml 4 See at www.isa.org.jm/mineral-resources/55 5 Li Yaqiang, “The Significance of a Maritime Power,” Strategy and Management (Zhanlue Yu Guanli), No. 3, 2014. 6 Liu Cigui, “Development of Marine Cooperative Partnerships: Several Reflections on the Development of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” International Studies, No.4, 2014, p. 2. 7 Xue Li, “China’s Diplomatic Risks Reflecting on The Belt and Road,” Financial Times, December 30, 2014; Wang Yong, The Belt and Road and the Development of China’s New Strategy for International Economics (Beijing: Peking University School of International Studies WeChat Platform, December 19, 2014). 8 Xi Jinping, “Connectivity Leads to Development, Partners to Focus on Cooperation,” http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1109/c64094-25997795.html 9 Sun Xuefeng, “The Belt and Road Guides China’s Foreign Strategic Transformation,” The Paper, January 2, 2015. 10 Zhang Shengjun, “Chinese Thought Helps International Politics Exit ‘the Middle Ages’,” Peipai News, January 13, 2015. 11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Speaks at a Panel Session during a Top-Level Forum in China-- – Building the Continental and Maritime Silk Road,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjbxw_602253/ t1140481.shtml

3 China’s coastal geostrategy

China is a country of relatively unfavorable marine geography. Its marine geographic environment is extremely complex and there exist, to varying extents, maritime disputes with almost all its maritime neighbors with opposite or adjacent coasts (Table 3.1). Since 2009, the situation in the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea has deteriorated dramatically. Contradictions at sea between China and ­Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries have rapidly intensified; with China’s progressive steps toward the sea, neighboring countries have accelerated development of their maritime strategies. Despite the easing of

Table 3.1  Maritime Disputes between China and Its Neighboring Countries on Sovereignty of Island and Reefs and Maritime Demarcation Country

Dispute details

Current situation

North Korea Dispute over territorial (DPRK) waters of the north Yellow Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf demarcation. South Korea (ROK)

Japan

Not yet demarcated. The China–DPRK Governmental Agreement on the Joint Development of Offshore Oil Resources signed on 24 December2004. Not yet demarcated. 1. Dispute over Exclusive The China–Korea Agreement Economic Zone and on Fisheries signed on 30 continental shelf demarcation June 30 2001. in the south Yellow Sea and South Korea has constructed East China Sea. artificial installations on 2. Disputes over the Suyan Suyan Rock. (Socotra) Rock and Rixiang (Gageo) Reef. Not yet demarcated. 1. Dispute over Exclusive The China–Japan Agreement Economic Zone and on Fisheries signed on 1 continental shelf demarcation June 2000. China and Japan in the East China Sea. ‘co-administrate’ the Diaoyu 2. Territorial dispute over the Islands. Diaoyu Islands. (Continued)

48  China’s coastal geostrategy Country

Dispute details

Vietnam

The Beibu Gulf Agreement 1. Dispute over Exclusive on Fisheries, Agreement on Economic Zone and Exclusive Economic Zones continental shelf demarcation and Continental Shelves in the South China Sea. signed in 2000. 2. Sovereignty dispute over the Other waters not yet Nansha Islands. demarcated. Vietnam occupies 29 of the Nansha Islands. Not yet demarcated. 1. Dispute over Exclusive The Philippines occupies eight Economic Zone and of the Nansha Islands. continental shelf demarcation in the South China Sea. 2. Dispute over the Nansha Islands. Not yet demarcated. 1. Dispute over Exclusive Malaysia occupies five of the Economic Zone and Nansha Islands. continental shelf demarcation in the South China Sea. 2. Sovereignty dispute over a section of the Nansha Islands. Dispute over Exclusive Not yet demarcated. Economic Zone and There exist no territorial or continental shelf demarcation sovereignty disputes between in the South China Sea. Indonesia and China. Dispute over Exclusive Not yet demarcated. Brunei Economic Zone and demands sovereignty rights to continental shelf demarcation Nantong Jiao (Louisa Reef). in the South China Sea.

Philippines

Malaysia

Indonesia

Brunei

Current situation

Source: State Oceanic Administration Strategic Development Research Institute, China’s Maritime Development Report (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2007), p. 16. (Author has partial supplements).

the situations in the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea since 2016, Conflicts and skirmishes that China faces at sea are still complex and heated. Under these circumstances, China urgently needs a comprehensive coastal geo-strategy to coordinate and cope with all types of maritime disputes and potential crises. This would better assist China’s progress to be a maritime power. On the whole, China must pursue an overall strategy of ‘Stabilizing the North’ (Wei Bei 稳北), ‘Harmonizing the South’ (He Nan 和南), and ‘Contesting the East’ (Zheng Dong 争东). More specifically this means to pursue ‘stability’ in the Yellow Sea, keep ‘harmony’ in the South China Sea and strengthen ‘contest’ in the East China Sea.

‘Stabilizing the North’ Stabilizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula and surrounding Yellow Sea, while developing good relations with the two Koreas.

China’s coastal geostrategy  49 The maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is an intrinsic requirement for China’s national security. Historically, the Korean Peninsula has always been a critical strategic site for maritime and continental powers to hedge and compete. It is a strategic pivot point for China to project its continental power to the sea, and also a ‘stepping stone’ for the United States, Japan and other maritime nations to assault the Mainland. Since the beginnings of the Sui and Tang dynasties, all incidents of turmoil on the Peninsula have invariably brought disasters to the Chinese Mainland. In fact, China has never been able to disconnect itself from the Peninsula. The late Qing government, although it was difficult to ensure even its own survival, was determined to participate in the war against Japan in 1894 and attempted to maintain its traditional influence over the Korean Peninsula. In reality, a cordial relationship with the two Koreas contributes greatly to China’s influence and role in the Peninsula. It is also an important foundation for the extension of Chinese sea power toward the Sea of Japan and even toward the northern Pacific. Furthermore, the Yellow Sea envelops and protects China’s capital and its environs and is an offshore barrier for northern China. Once its situation deteriorates, it would severely restrict China’s power projecting and expansion ability in other directions, and limit Chinese sea power’s deserved accomplishments and aspirations. Therefore, the stability of the Peninsula and its surrounding waters, and good relations with the two Koreas would create a favorable flank and rear environment for China’s maritime power. Disputes over the demarcation of the northern Yellow Sea exist between China and North Korea. Between China and South Korea there are demarcation disputes over the southern Yellow Sea and northern East China Sea, in addition to disputes over Suyan Rock and Rixiang Reef. Thus far, maritime demarcation disputes have mainly focused on conflict over fisheries. In recent years, Chinese fishermen have engaged in clashes with the two Koreas, in particular frequent confrontations with South Korea. This has triggered diplomatic tension between China and South Korea as well as civil antagonism, enhancing mutual security precautions. Nevertheless, these contradictions between China and North Korea, and China and South Korea are still manageable. They are in essence disputes of marine economic rights and involve to a minor extent maritime security concerns. Additionally, the two Koreas are willing to solve problems peacefully with China through negotiation. With regard to strategic intent, although there may be competition between China and North Korea, and China and South Korea, but this is very far from rivalry. This situation is quite different from that in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea. North Korea ought to focus on containing threats from the south and the east. Although it frequently carries out small actions, it has still not yet presented a major direct challenge to China in the Yellow Sea. South Korea and China’s military competition in the Yellow Sea and conflicts over fisheries intensifies with time, but there is no big intent for

50  China’s coastal geostrategy confrontation. Moreover, there is no fundamental conflict between the maritime strategies of China and South Korea in general. There are important mutual interests at sea, particularly in the oceans and high sea areas. South Korea’s main strategic directions at sea are southward and eastward. With South Korea’s acceleration in implementing autonomous, oceanic and holistic maritime security concepts,1 and increasingly forceful advances toward the ocean, China and South Korea’s room for cooperation in areas such as the protection of critical SLOCs in the Asia Pacific, safeguard of maritime security and joint development of marine resources will correspondingly grow. China is hopeful of resolving disputes and differences with the two Koreas through negotiations within the framework of traditional friendly relations between China and North Korea and strategic cooperative partnership between China and South Korea. As matters stand, China and South Korea have already reached a consensus on the legal validities of Suyan Rock and Rixiang Reef, specifically that the disputed reefs have no Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf rights, and do not affect maritime demarcation. China and South Korea have already held multiple rounds of negotiations on demarcation. In their many meetings, Chinese and South Korean leaders have all agreed to continue negotiations on maritime demarcation, support both the collaboration and the mechanisms of fisheries, reinforce communication and cooperation, and accordingly deal with issues related to the domain of fisheries. The possible ‘hard landing’ of the Korean Peninsula situation is another major challenge that faces China. Chinese, American, Japanese, Russian and other powers’ interests and forces are tangled and concentrated on the Peninsula, as the last geographical relic of the Cold War. The North Korean nuclear issue continues to cause disquiet while escalating South Korean unification movements have enhanced the risk of regional upheavals in the present state of affairs. After the Incheon Winter Olympics 2018, DPRK–ROK (North–South Korea) relations and DPRK–US relations have improved greatly. North Korea has shown willingness to abandon nuclear weapons, while the ROK and the United States have agreed to solve the conflict through negotiations. Up to now (March 2019), relevant parties still maintain a positive momentum of interaction, but considering the long-term mutual precautions characterizing DPRK–ROK and DPRK–US relations, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the creation of a peace mechanism for the Korean Peninsula would be a long-term and arduous task and also needs the great contribution of China. Strategic rivalry and strategic ‘mutual suspicion’ between China and the United States have meant that the North Korean nuclear and Korean Peninsula issues have no solution for the time being. However, at the same time, this structure has also restricted the freedom of movement of the United States, South Korea and Japan. It is difficult for these countries to take measures to change the status quo; North Korea had even taken ‘embrace nuclear’ as a national policy and constantly been on the ‘brink of war.’

China’s coastal geostrategy  51 However, behind North Korea’s insanity lies a certain degree of rationality, for its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles are simply to ensure national security and gain more bargaining chips in negotiations with the United States, South Korea and other parties. That is why we can see some flexibility of DPRK’s policy toward nuclear issues recently. As long as the political situation remains stable, external provocation using missiles and nuclear weapons is entirely out of the question for North Korea and would only backfire. Due to northeast Asia’s geographic patterns, the United States is for the time being discouraged and short of measures to remove North Korea’s nuclear arms by force; whereas even if North Korea does become a nuclear country, it still cannot change its adverse security environment, external sanctions and isolation. Ultimately, the United States, North Korea and other parties have no choice but to return to the negotiating table as the Korean Peninsula’s bizarre cycle of ‘tension – reconciliation – tension …’ continues. Considering that each of the parties has no desire or motivation in general to ‘break the deadlock,’ large-scale hot wars can yet be avoided; though the risks and challenges are extremely severe, but China, as a peaceful force, has growing strength and influence, and there still exists space for skilled diplomatic and political maneuver. China has for a long time been committed to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and has also made great contributions. In future, it should continue to wield regional influence and fulfill the major power responsibilities. In view of significant shifts in the situation in Northeast Asia, China may wish to clarify its own policies. China should increase its support as required and must have the courage to take responsibilities with regard to North Korea’s reasonable demands for its people’s livelihoods and national safety; as for North Korea’s opportunistic disturbances, it intends to contrive China’s abduction, therefore strong resistance and opposition measures against this should be taken. In short, what should be supported should be strongly supported; what should be opposed should be resolutely opposed. Specifically, China should be dead against DPRK’s nuclear issue, actively cooperating with the United States and ROK on it, but should respect and somehow support DPRK’s regime and sovereignty, not permitting the United States and ROK to implement forced subversion. There should be robust support for the ROK’s endeavors to promote denuclearization and the reconciliation process on the Korean Peninsula. As China continues to strengthen its strategic cooperation and partnership with the ROK, at the appropriate moment, it may wish to unequivocally express its support for the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula; while the ROK’s misrepresentations of the DPRK’s concerns, encouragement of American armed forces buildup, reinforcement of various military exercises provoke security instability in the region, consequently these activities must be curbed. In addition to improving communication with stakeholders and coordinating correctly, it is necessary to take the initiative

52  China’s coastal geostrategy to plan in order to take a leading role in the constructing regional security mechanisms. This means that China should drive relevant parties to conduct a round of dialogue or negotiations on the nuclear issue, Korean Peninsula peace mechanisms, the US alliance system and other topics of discussion, taking advantage of an ideal opportunity to build a regional security mechanism on the basis of a system similar to the ‘Six Party Talks,’ so as to mitigate each party’s ‘security dilemma’ and security concerns and spur the situation toward peace and stability.

‘Harmonizing the South’ Skillfully managing the South China Sea dispute and actively building a framework for peace in South East Asia. China has multiple strategic interests in the South China Sea and its surrounding waters. First, this sea area, which connects to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, is a vital center of international shipping, guarding China’s most important maritime lifelines. Second, the Bashi Strait, Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait and Longmu (Lombok) Strait are strategic channels for China’s sea power to extend toward the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Particularly in the case where eastern oceanward channels suffer from close American and Japanese surveillance and armed deterrence, these channels around the South China Sea are even more valuable. Third, fish, oil and gas, and other resources are plentiful in the South China Sea, where strategic depth is comparatively greater than the East China Sea and Yellow Sea and is a mainstay of the Chinese marine economy’s development. Nevertheless, there are three reasons why China should not be overly aggressive in this region. First, the South China Sea is the intersection point of the influences and interests of major nations, which are all interrelated and interdependent, so it would be very difficult for any country or group to gain an absolute advantage here. If China’s actions in this region were too bold, it would unquestionably lead to joint resistance by ASEAN and other powers. Second, more and more of the world’s chief maritime transportation arteries are situated in the South China Sea, which is significant for almost all the major trading nations for the security of sea lanes, and any conflict or disputes would be of serious concern for the international community and lead to intervention by the forces of major powers. Third, China’s overall maritime situation, whether in terms of forward presence, or strength of alliances and political relationships, compared to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia is a relative fault line for the United States, Japan and other countries’ countermeasure against China. This is also the main reason why South East Asia has been the first priority of the United States’ ‘pivot to Asia’ and its ‘rebalancing’ strategy. Accordingly, for China to henceforth ensure a relatively benign political atmosphere would be of huge benefit to the overall expansion of China’s sea power. Of course, more important is that China does not need to apply too much military force to

China’s coastal geostrategy  53 realize its strategic objectives, for in reality, since 2012, China has already been driving the situation in a direction advantageous to China’s development through reinforcement of power presence, land reclamation, drilling and other peaceful measures without intense conflict and war, which could be called peaceful coercion. However, American observers label these tactics ‘salami slicing,’ that is to say, slowly and incessantly taking small actions that on their own would be insufficient to trigger war, but this series of small actions would through accumulation lead to major strategic changes within a certain period of time.2 This is true to some degree, but actually, it is normally a passive reaction to other parties’ provocations rather than some active operations to change the status quo. In fact, China still maintains considerable restraint in its policy toward the South China Sea, despite its power being much greater than it used to be. Following the end of the Cold War, China has championed a principle of ‘bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors,’ improving ties with every country in Southeast Asia though concessions in economic interests, mutual trust in politics, restraint in using force and other measures. These policies have resulted in enormous success, as China has rapidly developed its relations with various Southeast Asian countries as well as ASEAN over the past 20 years, constantly rising to new heights. However, the South China Sea issue and the outside power factor have now become bottlenecks to further improvement in relations between China and ASEAN countries and have brought growing disquiet. Vietnam, the Philippines and other disputant parties in the South China Sea intensify maritime conflicts with China, while Singapore and other non-dispute parties are also very anxious that China will adopt an offensive strategy in this region following its increases in strength. In the modern era, Southeast Asia has always been an arena of rivalry for major powers, while manipulation of the ‘balance of power’ has long been standard practice of self-preservation for Southeast Asian countries. Some ASEAN countries, which take advantage of the United States, India and other nations to contain China’s rise, have their own reasonable motivations. Moreover, there is the United States’ ‘pivot to Asia’ and pursuit of the ‘rebalancing’ strategy, which may be abandoned in name but in essence survives as the Indo-Pacific strategy during the Trump administration and its successors. Japan’s advances southward and attempts to use the South China Sea issue to restrain China, India’s advances to the east to seek economic interests and strategically balance on China and other external factors over the South China Sea have objectively created conditions for ASEAN countries to counter China with the support of powers from outside of the region. In this regard, China ought to have strategic confidence, in particular considering its unprecedented power development. First, there is the disparity in national strength between China and Vietnam, the Philippines and other ASEAN nations. Vietnam and the Philippines are fully aware that China has forever possessed measures and opportunities to retaliate, and

54  China’s coastal geostrategy consequently in recent years have always avoided provoking China; second, China is economically a development opportunity for Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries in Southeast Asia, and to break connections with China would not correspond with their overall interests; third, although the South China Sea issue is increasingly internationalized, and ASEAN, the United States, India and other non-dispute parties are ever more interventionist, nevertheless the majority of ASEAN countries in addition to outside powers such as the United States and India would not readily take undue risks for countries like Vietnam and the Philippines.3 As a result, no matter how perilous the state of affairs in the South China Sea, no matter how arrogant Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries are in their reliance on American resistance against China, they would all refrain from becoming China’s enemies, because they neither can fundamentally prevent China’s growth in maritime power, nor can they count on excessive assistance from countries such as the United States and Japan in times of conflict and war. At present, the South China Sea contest is primarily concentrated in public opinion, diplomacy, economic development and other aspects. Dispute stakeholders, including Vietnam and the Philippines, all hope to maintain a ‘fight without breaking’ situation; as for the United States, Japan and powers outside the region, they are increasingly intervening on all areas of the South China Sea issue, though have to keep basic restraint on armed conflict, and focus more on public opinion warfare and diplomatic perspective. Other than bringing China a certain degree of international pressure, this in fact does not constitute any substantive constraints. Under these circumstances, China has ever more capabilities and resources for conducting diplomacy based on good-neighborliness, in addition to endorsing a ‘soft landing’ for the South China Sea dispute. Concerning the South China Sea issue, China should endeavor to resolve the dispute through economics, diplomacy, international law and other measures, under the premise of maintaining effective deterrence. China’s strategic objectives on this subject should be to safeguard the security of SLOCs and win rights to the utilization of marine resources, and unless China is preemptively provoked and compelled by circumstantial pressure, it would otherwise not easily make ‘seize islands and occupy reefs’ its principal objective in the South China Sea. In economics, China should improve its deep-sea exploration capacities, create appropriate legal systems and steadily boost both its economic and social presence in the South China Sea; in diplomacy, China should pursue the understanding and support of the international community, contribute its own initiatives and views on co-development issues, and work hard to promote joint development; in international jurisprudence, China should provide a reasonable explanation of the ‘Dashed Line,’ meanwhile resolutely refuting actions of countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which misinterpret or violate provisions of UNCLOS.

China’s coastal geostrategy  55 In reality, none of the parties wishes to be directly in breach of The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and bear responsibility for ‘drawing first blood.’ The price of recovering occupied islands and reefs in the South China Sea by force relative to their significance are heavily disproportionate, while the actual control and effective utilization of the South China Sea are also in fact not dictated by the ability to resume more islands and reefs. Islands and reefs in the South China Sea themselves are not of great actual importance, while the focus is on the maritime areas surrounding them. As long as China’s military, economic and social presence can freely access these waters, occupation of the islands and reefs by Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants will become increasingly unsustainable. With the ever-expanding presence of Chinese forces in waters surrounding Ren’ai Jiao (Second Thomas Reef), it is already progressively impractical for the Philippines to base its position on ships run aground. At the same time, on the peaceful development and management of the South China Sea, China should appropriately respond to ASEAN countries to construct orders and norms such as South China Sea code of conduct (COC) as positive diplomatic gestures, additionally to emphasize support for bilateral communication and coordination mechanisms, and establish security and mutual trust through joint law enforcement, joint exercises and other activities. As to the ASEAN countries’ balancing tactics of ‘befriending the far and attacking the near,’ China can relax the tensions stemming from its rise and ease the innate terror felt by weaker countries when facing stronger neighbors, by promoting the creation of a certain form of security community through institutional arrangements. China has already joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia (TAC) and has signed the DOC, in addition to actively participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and other ASEAN mechanisms. In fact, it has already to some extent forsaken the right to willingly initiate large-scale war in this region. China’s commitment to security in the region is earnest and responsible. To continue to implement an ‘assurance’ policy, China should continue to enhance cooperation with ASEAN countries on security, military affairs and other high political issues. It should facilitate multilateral security collaboration mechanisms in the region to convincingly progress toward binding regional norms by establishing trust measures, with the ultimate ideal aim of forming a regional security community with no mutual military threats.

‘Contesting the East’ To guarantee the unity of Taiwan and Mainland China, to defend the territorial sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, to vie for sea control in the East China Sea and to ensure a secure passage from the east to the Pacific Ocean.

56  China’s coastal geostrategy Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea are situated on the eastern front of China’s maritime geopolitics and are China’s three most prominent coastal predicaments. China’s challenges facing in this direction mainly originate from Japan and the United States. Unlike China’s conflicts with North Korea, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, clashes at sea between China and Japan and the United States are relatively more incisive in structure: China pursues maritime power and defends its own lawful maritime rights, whereas the United States does not acknowledge China’s deserved rights and is unwilling to abandon its regional hegemony; there also exists to a certain degree a zero sum game in the sea power relationship between China and Japan, as Japan would not freely allow China to develop from a land power to a maritime power, and confrontation between China and Japan’s long-term maritime strategies is already inevitable. Regardless of how future Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations develop on the whole, Sino-Japanese disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and demarcation of the East China Sea, and Sino-US struggles over Taiwan and strategic advantages in the East Asia both would not readily subside. Both Japan and the United States also would not willingly relinquish their power and influence in offshore East Asia to China. Maritime competitions with Japan and the United States are the principal problem facing China’s maritime development at present and also for a considerable period of time in the future. It is furthermore a major obligatory test for China as its sea power develops. US-Japanese military deployment in Okinawa and elsewhere along the First Island Chain can entirely block Chinese naval access to maritime channels from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean in wartime. Before Taiwan is reunified with the Chinese Mainland, this situation severely restricts the Chinese Navy’s oceangoing capabilities; China’s growing sea power will certainly also rattle Japan’s maritime superiority in the East China Sea and will inevitably incur Japanese precautions and pressure; on Taiwan and other issues, the United States and China have long oscillated between intense games of ‘intervention’ and ‘anti-intervention.’ If China wishes to become a maritime power, it must directly confront these structural contradictions; when necessary, it also has no choice but to engage in struggle and requires the determination and courage to use various methods, including military operations, to oppose hostile actions (Figure 3.1). China is also gradually acquiring the strength and foundation for game playing. In the East China Sea, the gap in strength between China, the United States and Japan is narrowing with continuous modernization advances in China’s military and improvements in military efficiency. Under the projected influence of China’s mighty continental power, Sino-Japanese and Sino-US power transitions in the East China Sea are already inevitable. Japan will be compelled to recognize China’s favorable position, while the United States faces pressure to acquiesce in China’s defense of its lawful maritime rights and due position. In the case of Taiwan for instance, RAND

China’s coastal geostrategy  57

Figure 3.1  T  he First and Second Island Chains.

Corporation claims in its 2015 report on the evolving balance of power between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait, that in 2017 and beyond, the United States would be in a disadvantageous position coded by most of the military scorecards. Confronted by China’s military force of land-based air power, short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and rising sea power, the United States would no longer be able to defend the Taiwan region in most scenarios.4 Moreover, the sensitivities of these concerns to each of the three sides, China, the United States and Japan, are somewhat different. For China, these issues are no doubt core and substantial interests, and China’s main aim is to recover its rightful status of power; Japan’s main goal is to occupy, validate and expand illicitly acquired gains, and impede progress of China’s sea power; whereas the United States’ main objective in the East China sea is to maintain freedom of navigation and regional stability, and safeguard the US-led maritime order. This kind of difference on interest types, in addition to varying geographic distances from each other’s mainland, has led China to gain more advantages in the motivation and determination to fight. On the surface, Sino-Japanese confrontations over the Diaoyu Islands and East China Sea have for the moment already eclipsed Sino-US maritime contradictions, forming a pattern of conflict to ‘pressure Japan first, and compel the US second’; behind this, Sino-US maritime geopolitical competition is more and more intense, toward the status quo of Taiwan and Diaoyu Islands. The United States is more considering the strategic

58  China’s coastal geostrategy consequences of the possible changes rather than the security commitments to Taiwan and Japan. Every Japanese provocation and US containment operation will act as an opportunity for continued expansion of successful achievements and serve as a ‘strategic whetstone’ for China’s rise, comprehensively developing the capabilities of China’s international mobilization, public communications, jurisprudent battles and military deterrence. The fight should be for better negotiation and compromise. It is unlikely that China will expel the US military existence from the Western Pacific through armed force, and also overpowering Japan by military force may in fact not be the best option for China. The optimal outcome is to ‘seek status by virtue of strength’ instead of conquering adversaries and their armies through war and force Japan and the United States to respect China’s core interests and entitled maritime rights–based displays of strengths and establishment of capabilities. In order to avoid losing control of the situation during strategic confrontation, when simultaneous to enhancement of military deterrence, diplomatic negotiation, legal struggle, and other approaches, it is necessary to make full preparations for the two eventualities. On the one hand, preparations for a worst-case scenario should be made to increase the ability to control conflicts and win wars. Currently, Japan’s reinforcement of its so-called defense of the south west happens to coincide with the American desire for its allies to bear greater responsibility. Japan and the United States are intensifying their consolidation of power and military drills, such as counter missile exercises, directed at China’s perceived antagonistic island seizures, are increasingly frequent. With considerable developments in China’s sea power, Japanese and American hostility will continue to escalate. In the future, further exacerbation of conflict, relentless friction and intense struggle will be present in the East China Sea situation. To this end, China must improve its ability to control conflict and win wars, and be constantly ready to respond to outbreaks of conflict or crisis in the East China Sea. Only with improvements in China’s maritime deterrence capabilities, is it possible to maintain a basic balance in dynamic trends and have space for bargaining. Even the best negotiation techniques and diplomatic performances, if not supported by strength, cannot win opponents’ respect. If China possesses specific maritime deterrence capabilities in the East China Sea, supported by land-based air and missile forces, these would act as certain constraint on the US and Japan’s mighty sea and air power. The United States and Japan, when implementing containment, armed intimidation and battle plans, would have no choice but to reconsider more before proceeding. Besides capacity building, considering that ‘the likelihood of limited war and instability is higher in a new U.S.-China bipolar system in the twenty-first century even compared to the old U.S.-Soviet Union bipolar system of the twentieth century,’5 and the increasingly fierce war rhetoric of the United States,6 China should more resolutely demonstrate

China’s coastal geostrategy  59 and maintain its policy bottom lines on Taiwan and other issues, pursuing a more active deterrent. On the other hand, the establishment of an effective crisis management mechanism should be promoted to circumvent possible conflicts and crisis. Chinese, American and Japanese strengths have become more and more comparable, leading as anticipated to an intensification of power struggles. Their military departments’ preparations based on worst-case scenarios raise the possibility of conflict erupting on its own accord. In particular, the mounted certain offensive weaponry or platform are even more likely to directly lead to conflict. It is highly probably that the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) deployed by the United States, due to its speed and strike accuracy, would in times of crisis exacerbate the pessimism of Chinese policymakers and result in measures that further worsen the crisis. As maritime disputes intensify in East Asia, the United States continues to emphasize and even augment its security commitments to countries such as Japan and the Philippines, which increases the risk of strategic misjudgment between China and the United States due to third party factors. With the degree of strategic mutual suspicion and confrontation on the rise, American and Japanese reconnaissance and Chinese anti-reconnaissance struggles in the waters of East Asia are serious with confrontation incidents between warships and aircrafts frequently occurring. Some of them have been in public and attracted worldwide attention. For instance, on 5 December 2013, the American cruiser USS Cowpens trespassed into the training waters of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning. As the warnings were ineffective, a Chinese vessel responsible for alerts in the formation of the Liaoning rushed to intercept the route of the USS Cowpens, forcing the latter to implement emergency evasion measures. On 19 August 2014, a US P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft, flying 220 kilometers east of Hainan, was intercepted by a PLA Naval Air Force J-11B (Shenyang J-11B) jet fighter for close-range investigation and verification. American media speculated that there was less than 30 feet of space between the two aircrafts’ wings, and the Chinese jet even performed a ‘barrel roll’ aerial acrobatic stunt. In future, similar incidents will be infinite in number. In the event of friction or on-site mismanagement, misjudgments and communication barriers may lead to escalations in crises or conflict. Therefore, it is absolutely essential to build an effective crisis prevention and management mechanism and prevent unnecessary misjudgments and unanticipated conflicts. ‘The north is the rear, the south is the foundation, the east is the core.’ Each direction has a different strategic role and faces different contradictions, so response tactics must also vary. The significance of the strategy ‘Stabilizing the North, Harmonizing the South, Contesting the East’ is to clarify the strategic focus and grand plan of response for China’s three main maritime directions, creating a coordinated complete strategy. Of course, in any direction, there exists the application of ‘stabilizing, harmonizing,

60  China’s coastal geostrategy contesting’ tactics and measures, but it is only a matter of difference in the extent of their importance, strategic focus and priority.

Notes 1 Feng Liang and Fang Xiuyu, “Korean Maritime Security Policy: History and Reality,” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi Luntan, No. 1, 2012, p. 113. 2 Robert-Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” https://foreignpolicy. com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/ 3 Hu Bo, China’s Sea Power Strategy: Diplomacy, the Marine Economy and Sea Power (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2012), p. 163. 4 Heginbotham, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), www. rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html, Summary xxix. 5 Øystein Tunsjø, “Another Long Peace?” The National Interest, 17 October 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/another-long-peace-33726 6 Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, “China Will Control the South China Sea If Short of War with the United States”, USN Expected Nominee for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, p. 18, www.armed-services.senate. gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_APQs_04–17–18.pdf; Harry Harris, “Make No Mistake, Our 27-year Holiday from History Is Over. Great Power Competition Is Back,” https://news.usni.org/2018/05/30/adm-davidson-takes-over-newly-namedindo-pacific-command-in-ceremony-marked-by-great-power-competition-talk

4 China’s exterior line strategy at sea

The greatest differences between sea and land are the former’s fluidity and openness. If China wishes to truly safeguard its national security and interests, it cannot confine its defenses to the coast; an important characteristic of powerful countries, as opposed to weak countries, is globalization and the consequent internationalization of their responsibility. In addition to managing one’s own affairs and engaging in self-defense, it is also necessary for major powers to provide public goods for international security, so as to shape and maintain the international order. China’s military forces must have their own exterior line strategy and be prepared to build and distribute power on a global scale, whether in the interests of self-defense or to promote international justice.

The ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces The so-called stepping out of military force refers to a country’s military deployment operations and maneuvers outside its territory and coastal areas. This is inevitably required as major countries develop and is also a genuine necessity as they safeguard overseas interests, wield political influence and assume responsibilities of great powers. Traditional military powers such as the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia have long ably maintained military presences overseas, while frequently conducting overseas military operations; India, Japan and other emerging military powers are also actively planning to foray overseas. China does not yet have any systematic preparations and designs for its military forces to ‘step out.’ Nevertheless, whether escorting vessels in Gulf of Aden, evacuating Chinese nationals from Libya, or conducting search and rescue activities for Malaysia Airlines MH370 and other overseas operations, the ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces has in practice already far exceeded theory and strategic planning. In order to wholeheartedly safeguard national security and citizens’ interests, more clearly communicate strategic intentions to the international community, build a peaceful and structured international order, and better

62  China’s exterior line strategy at sea direct the process of ‘stepping out’ by military forces, China ought to explore a realistic and effective general plan. Necessity: why is it essential to ‘step out’? National interests are the main driver behind a country’s overseas activities. The ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces is first and foremost necessary to safeguard and expand interests. For any country, as its economic power advances worldwide, its military might will likewise ‘step out.’ China is no exception, as the Chinese economy’s ‘stepping out’ has naturally led to the Chinese military forces to ‘follow suit.’ China already has interests dispersed across the world, and it is possible that any signs of disorder or turbulence in whichever part of the world may be closely linked to the country itself. Around the world, violence, terrorist attacks, armed conflict and regional turmoil frequently threaten overseas Chinese interests and the property and lives of Chinese citizens. However, China still lacks compelling methods of protecting overseas interests. In most situations, not only is it not feasible to rely on military ‘hard power’ when confronted by large-scale terrorist groups or organized encroachment by hostile countries, it is also not possible to effectively respond to the aggressive actions of even individual or small groups. Without a stable surrounding security environment, the rise of any power would be vulnerable. The safeguarding of national security and expansion of strategic space also require military forces to ‘step out.’ As mentioned before, a power must have designated space for development and border interests. The best way to maintain and defend these interests is not to construct a ‘maritime Great Wall,’ but to break out from the bounds of core interests to actively launch political, economic and military operations, in order to defuse, contain and deter adversarial external influences, alleviate and eliminate potential threats, and maintain regional peace and stability. Continental–maritime complex countries, such as China, have intrinsic disadvantages in maritime defense. Historical experience and geopolitical theory have also repeatedly proven that if Chinese military forces were to remain confined to their own territory and coastal areas in the vicinity of the First Island Chain, China would be situated in an extremely unfavorable position in strategic contests with foreign forces. China must endeavor to maintain an effective presence of forces in the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans beyond the First Island Chain, in order to safeguard the security of strategic SLOCs, and furthermore contain any potentially hostile activities that strategic rivals may initiate. In addition, as wars become rarer and the age of staking out turf and large-scale clashes between warships has long passed. For a rising maritime star such as China, military exercises and non-warfare military operations at sea will become the main means of promoting combat effectiveness in the armed forces. In other words, the Chinese army needs to ‘step out’ to train its troops.

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  63 Moreover, Chinese military forces’ ‘stepping out’ also provides regional and global ‘public goods.’ Due to a decline in recent years in the United States’ relative capability and a decrease in its will to assume global responsibility, and as other Western powers have widely suffered from economic crises and struggles in development, demand in international public goods has far outstripped supply. The international order has approached a state of ‘chaos,’ while problems with terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, smuggling of narcotics, piracy, the marine environment and natural disasters have frequently arisen. Critical duties such as maintaining worldwide peace and stability, guaranteeing maritime security, in addition to freedom of navigation sorely need a power such as China to step forward. China has consistently attached great importance to preserving world peace, actively providing human, material and financial resources for UN Peacekeeping Operations, as well as various forms of unconditional aid for international disaster relief. However, in comparison with the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries, China has by far not offered sufficient ‘hard power,’ as its overseas military capabilities are severely incommensurate with its national strength. Furthermore, military forces dispatched by China are for the most part composed of medical, engineering, communications and other noncombat divisions. As China’s national strength progressively grows, such deficits in responsibility are increasingly criticized by the international community, and it has even been described as a ‘free rider.’ As China’s military force ‘steps out,’ it will compensate for this imbalance and fulfill international obligations and duties in proportion to its national strength. Feasibility: is it possible to ‘step out’? To a certain extent, China has already begun to possess overseas power projection capacities. This forms the material basis of its military forces’ ‘stepping out.’ In naval aspects, the large-scale active service of type 052D destroyers, type 054A frigates, the ‘Weishanhu’ and other large oceangoing supply vessels allows China certain capabilities for oceangoing operations and power projection, and have been preliminarily formed into organized formations consisting of one to two guided missile destroyers, one to two frigates and one oceangoing supply vessel; in future, as China’s aircraft carrier formations become combat effective, the Chinese Navy’s power projection platforms will become stronger and more extensive. In the air force, air-freighter formations, composed mainly of the domestically produced Y-8 and Russian-made Ilyushin IL-76, are basically capable of rapid intercontinental airborne delivery of troops on a regiment or brigade scale. Test flights of the Y-20 large airfreighter indicate that the Chinese Air Force will gradually gain strategic capabilities in air transportation. The Chinese armed forces have accumulated essential knowledge and experience through joint military exercises, overseas disaster relief, antipiracy

64  China’s exterior line strategy at sea and other operations, building an excellent intellectual foundation upon which to ‘step out’ on a grand scale. From 2009, the Chinese Navy has successively dispatched formations on close to 30 occasions (typically formations formed of one guided missile destroyer, one frigate and one supply vessel) to carry out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. Over nine years of escort operations have allowed the Chinese armed forces to accumulate firsthand information, intelligence and experience in areas such as overseas deployment, international military communication and operational command; from 2010 onward, China’s three major fleets have frequently conducted oceangoing training exercises and joint navy–air force drills in waters between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, greatly enhancing the Chinese military’s joint combat capabilities and promoting collaboration between various branches and divisions within the navy. Moreover, over the past five years, the Chinese military has also cooperated with successive foreign militaries to transport chemical weapons from Syria and perform search and rescue duties for flight MH370. Furthermore, it has on multiple occasions participated in Sino-Russian joint military drills, ‘Cobra Gold’ multinational warfare exercises, Exercise RIMPAC (the Rim of the Pacific) and other operations, gradually possessing the requisite international vision and fundamental skills to ‘step out.’ China’s burgeoning comprehensive national strength and international influence have provided a good strategic opportunity for Chinese military forces to ‘step out.’ As contemporary global themes of peace and development become ever more important, nontraditional security threats more conspicuous and ‘adversaries’ or rivals more complex and multifarious in countries’ national security strategies, the pertinence of overseas bases has notably decreased. Although for all countries, the construction and exercise of military forces will inevitably aggravate neighboring countries and other powers, levels of sensitivity are much lower than those before the end of the Cold War. Djibouti, for instance, intends to build a ‘multinational’ base complex, by virtue of its unique geographic location. Troops and militia from countries such as the United States, France and Japan are now stationed in Djibouti, whose government also intends to provide docks and ports to armed forces from Russia, China and other countries. From this it can be seen that although there exist mutual suspicion and precaution between various powers in overseas deployment and application of force, this is not necessarily a ‘zero sum game,’ a situation in which by venturing out, China would force others out of the picture. Moreover, the United States and other Western powers are unable to adequately ensure maritime security in addition to world prosperity and stability. For the sake of sharing responsibility, traditional military powers such as the United States, United Kingdom and France have also strategic interests to endorse Chinese power to robustly ‘step out.’ China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and has long pursued foreign policies of independence and self-­ determination. In addition to making enormous contributions to economic

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  65 growth and prosperity worldwide, China has played an increasingly vital role in recent years, becoming even more indispensable as its global influence continues to expand. In such an international political environment, Chinese military force has the possibility to gain access to observation sites and communications relay stations abroad, in addition to supply points. There exist no obvious political obstacles against China assuming a greater role in peacekeeping, escort duties, disaster relief and other international operations. On the morning of 1 August 2017, the ceremony in which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stationed in Djibouti safeguarded base troops stationed in the base camp was held. This marks the completion and put into use of Chinese first overseas security base. Strategy: how to ‘step out’ In reality, in recent years, the Chinese military forces have been rapid and remarkable in their pace as they ‘step out.’ However, Chinese actions are mostly responses to emergencies, such as piracy, natural disasters and other unforeseen circumstances, lacking a system of strategic co-ordination and advanced theoretical guidance. In the future what methods will China chiefly employ to ‘step out,’ on what scale and how far-reaching in scope? These are all questions that China must urgently consider, explore and find clear answers to. They do not only need to outline in practice the strategic requirements of ‘stepping out,’ but moreover must clarify to the world the practical demands of ‘China’s future path,’ which are worthy of emphasis and in-depth discussion by Chinese leaders, decision-making departments and scholars. I believe that ‘stepping out’ by military forces is an organic component of China’s active national defense strategy and in general should serve China’s greater strategy of peaceful development. Its main goal is neither territorial expansion, nor the pursuit of global hegemony, but rather to maintain China’s overseas interests, national security and the international order. It should be noted that under China’s strategy of peaceful development, China does not in fact have any exclusive overseas political and cultural interests. Moreover, the majority of conflicts of interest can be resolved through politics, economics, diplomacy and with other approaches. As a result, China simply does not need to ‘send warships to follow developments in its interests.’ In comparison with the United States, ‘stepping out’ by China’s military powers is both relatively limited in scale and scope. China needs to clearly recognize this and adhere to this overall guiding principle in the long term. With regard to scope, China’s overall strategy ought to ‘emphasize distribution in the Asia-Pacific, exert influence globally’: building a constant effective military presence in the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans, while retaining military influences in other areas of the world through warship visits, peacekeeping missions, escort operations and joint  drills.

66  China’s exterior line strategy at sea In terms of scale, China’s strategic delivery forces should be able to meet the demands of wars of moderate intensity in areas adjacent to its ­territory – the naval aviation power of one to two aircraft carrier formations, or the infantry strength of a division to an army group, would furthermore have the capacity to provide reinforcements at any moment; in regions outside of Asia, the Western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, China should have the ability to respond to low-intensity wars or nontraditional security threats, which may require rapid arrival and timely deployments of land, sea and air forces, and should at the very least include the following capabilities: an oceangoing combat formation composed of approximately two warships, army combat forces at the battalion or regiment levels, in addition to aerial deterrence and reinforcement support at the squadron level. As China’s military power ‘steps out,’ there also exist enormous differences in its methods and avenues in comparison to those of the United States, Great Britain, France and other countries. China will ‘step out’ principally using methods of amiable cooperation, diplomatic negotiation, equality and mutual gain, as opposed to relying on warfare or the establishment of military blocs. This is distinct from the experiences of other great powers, as throughout history, ‘stepping out’ by military forces has often been the result of colonization and large-scale war, or depended upon connections with colonial overlords or relations with allies. For instance, British and French overseas bases are mostly remnants from the colonial period, whereas the United States’ vast overseas military bases are profiting from post–Second World War arrangements and hegemonic interference in the Third World. In the process of ‘stepping out,’ it is necessary to pay particular attention to the concepts of ‘reasonability,’ ‘legitimacy,’ and ‘synergy.’ ‘Reasonability’, that is, to not to exert pressure, and to convince others with morality in the spirit of principles of equality and negotiation; ‘legitimacy’ is namely to conform to the UN system of legal standards and prevailing international norms, as well as to acquire its general recognition and respect, reflecting both changes in the international community’s mainstream values in a timely manner; ‘synergy’ refers to taking advantage of opportunities as they arise. The ‘stepping out’ strategy should adapt to international trends and needs of the international community, combine the safeguarding of one’s own interests with the provision of international public goods and connect the pursuit of power with the fulfillment of international responsibility, one classic example being escort operations in the Gulf of Aden. However, ‘stepping out’ by military forces is not synonymous with the ‘stepping out’ by the economy. The former has a relatively high degree of sensitivity, and despite China’s endeavors, it is impossible to entirely eliminate some of the entrenched suspicion, friction and even conflict that might result. When contradictions and disagreements emerge, it is necessary to adopt a pragmatic, confident and candid attitude in communications with the international community, not seeking the outside world’s complete understanding and support, but striving to encourage related countries to have an unobscured

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  67 understanding of China’s position and principles and form comparatively stable strategic expectations with regard to Chinese foreign conduct.

Aircraft carriers and China’s two-ocean strategy On 25 September 2012, China’s first aircraft carrier, ‘Liaoning,’ was officially commissioned into the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and on 24 November, J-15 fighters successfully completed test flights, taking-off and landing onboard. On 26 November 2013, the ‘Liaoning’ set sail for the South China Sea from a military port in Qingdao, escorted by two guided missile destroyers and two missile frigates, to conduct oceangoing formation training exercises. The Chinese people’s dream of an aircraft carrier was finally realized. This both demonstrated that China’s defense industry had advanced in leaps and bounds and that China would persevere in its progress toward blue oceans with the construction of an oceangoing navy. Nonetheless, this is only the first step in a long journey, and in the future, there remain arduous trials ahead. Planning and construction of Chinese aircraft carriers ‘Liaoning’ is only the beginning, for its usefulness as a test case by far surpasses its actual combat abilities. The construction of aircraft carriers, in addition to their incorporation into the military and formation of combat capabilities, is an exceptionally difficult and complex process, requiring the unremitting hard work of several generations. At present, China’s aircraft carrier program is still simultaneously positioned in stages of practice, study and exploration, with considerable distance remaining before ultimate deployment and utilization in high-intensity combat. In the construction process, China should draw extensively on experiences or lessons from countries such as the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia. Considering that China has a relatively brief history of engagement and use of aircraft carriers and a shortage of experience, the need to conduct test demonstrations using the ‘Varyag’ aircraft carrier as a platform was evidently imperative. Through the ‘Varyag’ aircraft carrier, China has initiated assessments of its own plans and programs, and is able to provide data and evidence on a firsthand basis for final decision-making. The metamorphosis from the ‘Varyag’ to ‘­Liaoning’ has proven that this experiment has already attained initial results. Aircraft carriers are a systemic project, an immense system of combat platforms. There remains a long way to go from construction of the aircraft carrier platform itself and the successful take-off and landing of carrier-­ borne aircraft to the aircraft carrier’s formal incorporation into the military and combat readiness. A relatively long period of time is required to test carrier-related software, conduct trials of weapons systems and troubleshoot combat command systems. After the internal systems are properly integrated, the carrier also needs to collaborate and conduct joint training

68  China’s exterior line strategy at sea drills with destroyers, frigates, submarines and other members of future formations, because the aircraft carrier never ‘fight alone.’ This stage involves contact and coordination of communication, command, intelligence and other systems between the different platforms, while the process will be even more intricate and protracted. For now, it seems that China’s aircraft carrier project is progressing extraordinary smoothly. According to open resources, China is currently constructing two domestically made aircraft carriers in Dalian and Shanghai, respectively. On the morning of 26 April 2017, the first Chinese domestically made aircraft carrier was launched in Dalian. Almost simultaneously, PLA Daily declared that ‘The construction of domestic aircraft carriers shows that China has fully mastered technology and management experience in relation with the carrier.’1 The situation is highly promising, but I believe that construction of worldclass aircraft carriers cannot rely on political resolve, economic investment and sheer tenacity alone. China must yet remain calm, as a scientific attitude, pragmatic outlook, enterprising spirit and systematic mindset are also vital for success. In future, China’s plans for and construction of aircraft carriers first should adhere to a scientific attitude. The aircraft carrier program involves myriad departments, and it is typically very difficult to consolidate knowledge and opinions of various stakeholders. In the USSR, diverging views within departments and leadership resulted in repeated indecision within the aircraft carrier program and frequent repairs after it was launched in haste; as a result, by the dissolution of the USSR, only the Kuznetsov-class represented a success. It is furthermore necessary to mention that the political leadership ought to respect the recommendations of scientists and experts in the policymaking process, rather than allow personal preferences to impact decisions. In over 30 years, the USSR produced at least nine aircraft carriers of four different classes but was ultimately unable to form an effective combat force. To a large extent, this was related to its leaders’ ‘impulsive’ decision-making. Therefore, extreme caution is essential when formulating plans, selecting programs, demonstrating technology and making decisions. It is necessary to comprehensively evaluate China’s national strength, the domestic and international environments, operational needs and technical capacities. Relatively scientific, long-term and enduring plans for aircraft carrier construction were finally formed following repeated investigation and trials. Second, a pragmatic outlook is required. With the introduction of the ‘Liaoning’ into active service and two other domestically made aircraft carriers in sea trials and in the shipyard respectively, the Chinese people’s self-esteem and sense of pride will unquestionably soar. Every functional department and decision-making bureau should seek a realistic and pragmatic outlook, striving to avoid impractical goals and pursuits. With regard to scale, it is necessary to comprehensively consider China’s maritime natural

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  69 endowments, geographical environment, national strength and other circumstances. China’s aircraft carrier program cannot realistically compare to that of the United States, but should focus on consulting British, French and other regional sea powers to devise a somewhat restrained aircraft carrier program. In terms of application, Chinese aircraft carriers will maintain an effective presence in regions of the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans, effectively containing forces that seek to blockade China from exterior lines, fully demonstrating the navy’s characteristics of mobility, and strongly deterring adversarial forces, so as to ensure the relative security of China’s coastal waters; at the same time, they will play a role in diplomacy, maritime search and rescue, crisis management and other nonmilitary issues on a global scale. China’s aircraft carriers simply cannot parallel those of the United States in terms of scale, practical experience and levels of sophistication. Chinese, particularly policymakers, need to clearly understand that it will also be very difficult for Chinese aircraft carrier formations to directly contest those of American carriers in the foreseeable future. Unless this is realized, any strategic designs may be very dangerous. Finally, an enterprising spirit is essential. China should observe principles of gradual and steady progress but must also have a high starting point. In comparison with the USSR, China benefits from a better international political and economic environment, with more advanced and elaborate basic industrial systems, enormous economic strength and more opportunities to share other countries’ experiences of success and failure. China can even utilize computer simulation, reverse experimentation and other measures in the place of many specific practical processes. Therefore, in its construction of aircraft carriers, China ought to aim to be a global vanguard, boldly imagine and meticulously verify. In addition, the construction and operation of China’s aircraft carrier should focus particular attention on systematic concepts and the construction of weapons systems. The results of several wars following the Cold War demonstrate that modern warfare is often a confrontation of coherent weapons systems, intelligence systems and command systems between countries. Detriments in any single weapons system would not significantly impact the situation on the battlefield, while intimate coordination between different branches of the armed forces and various weapons systems can generate a huge advantage in battle. War is by now a confrontation of systems, in which the reasoned use of combinations can greatly improve overall combat effectiveness, whereas unreasonable combinations would likely lead to an exponential decrease in performance. Active service of the ‘Liaoning’ and subsequent aircraft carriers will not rapidly overhaul the Chinese ­Navy’s overall combat capacity and capabilities. If it is not possible to swiftly improve relevant complementary equipment and systems, and accumulate the necessary combat experiences and command capabilities, these aircraft carriers will likely become a liability for the PLAN rather than a tool for victory.

70  China’s exterior line strategy at sea Principal duties of China’s aircraft carriers The history of modern naval developments following the Second World War demonstrates that aircraft carriers have become standard equipment for oceangoing navies and are often at the core of the fleet. It is impossible to build an oceangoing navy without developing aircraft carriers. This is particularly true for countries, such as China, which lack substantial support in the distant oceans. As a result, oceangoing fleets must rely on their own strength to win regional air control and defend air space, while aircraft carriers are mobile airfields and an indispensable means of seizing air supremacy at sea. Experiences of countries such as the United States and Great Britain show that overseas operations are still heavily dependent on carrier-based aircraft to enable air strikes, offer tactical cover and provide support for control, even in situations where a multitude of overseas bases and allied support are available. For instance, during ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in December 2001, aircraft carriers were responsible for 75 percent of the air assault mission.2 At the same time, aircraft carrier formations are integrated maritime combat platforms, combining functions such as intelligence collection, projection of military strength, firepower support, in addition to command and control operations. They are able to fully carry out air defense, antisubmarine, onshore, and ant-iship strikes and combat missions. As the most important component of the fleet, aircraft carriers are very effective at thwarting enemy attacks both onshore or at sea, helping to safeguard our sea power. Meanwhile, they play a key role while securing air supremacy in addition to ensuring offensive power on the ground. In fact, if not for its two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, the British military would have certainly been unable to recover the Falklands Islands (Islas Malvinas) in 1982. With increasingly sophisticated modern refueling tankers and innovative combat weaponry, the operational radius of aircraft carriers has expanded further. It is conventional belief that carrier-borne attack aircraft in large aircraft carrier formations can reach surface and onshore targets within an attack radius of 1,000 nautical miles; in defense, air defenses can reach up to 300 nautical miles in depth, while antisubmarine defenses extend more than 200 nautical miles in depth.3 In the future, with improvements in sensor technology and advancements in the operational radius of weaponry, the effectiveness of aircraft carriers as an invaluable platform will also be better reflected. In addition to numerous military functions, modern aircraft carriers are responsible for a growing variety of nonmilitary assignments and play an increasingly important role in the fields of nontraditional security. Aircraft carriers are a vital tool for disaster relief, medical assistance and other areas of humanitarian aid. In the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, impressive vertical air transportation capabilities of the aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, played a key role in disaster relief efforts. In times of crisis, aircraft

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  71 carriers are also a powerful means of personnel relocation. During the ­Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 2006, the United Kingdom dispatched multiple ships, led by the HMS Illustrious, to engage in the evacuation of nationals. It is only natural that a major power such as China ought to possess aircraft carriers. China’s uses of aircraft carriers will not differ greatly from those of the United Kingdom and the United States. Nevertheless, the emergence of China’s aircraft carriers has astonished a number of countries, attracting an onslaught of wide-ranging speculation, which includes two highly representative arguments. The first claims that they will be used to settle maritime disputes in the South China Sea and other waters in China’s vicinity, while the second asserts that they are to challenge the United States for maritime hegemony. However, even those with the slightest trace of common sense should understand that China’s main motive for its development of aircraft carriers is certainly not the settlement of maritime disputes with neighboring countries, as China pursues a policy of peaceful dispute resolution. Moreover, even if Chinese policymakers were determined to utilize armed force or forceful measures to resolve maritime disputes with Japan and some Southeast Asian countries, aircraft carriers would not act as the main combat platform. First, with comprehensive progress in China’s military modernization, China has an ever growing number of alternative policy options from which to select. At present, the Chinese Air Force and Naval Air Force are equipped mainly with combat aircraft consisting of Shenyang J-10, J-11, Sukhoi Su-27, Su-30 and other third-generation combat fleets, all of which have operational radiuses of approximately 1,500 kilometers or above. This is no longer the era that was spearheaded by the limited J-6 and J-7; therefore, no matter whether the Diaoyu Islands or the Nansha Islands, both are within the effective radius of China’s land-based fighter jets. In the future, as China’s fourth-generation aircraft like J-20 enter active service in large numbers, maintaining the advantages of air supremacy in the East China Sea and the South China Sea will be a foregone conclusion. With regard to missiles, China has formed an overwhelming advantage over its neighboring countries. China’s land-launched cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles can deter adversaries through saturation attacks in certain waters. Whereas along China’s coast, hydro-acoustic conditions are complex and marine geography unique, offering an ideal situation for the activities of China’s silent running submarines, such as the Kilo-class, Yuan-class and Song-class. China can use these submarines to effectively check and contain opponents’ surface vessels. Furthermore, the combat capacity and versatility of Chinese surface vessels are growing stronger. Domestically made destroyers, such as the 052B and 052C models, and four modern destroyers introduced from Russia have relatively strong overall operational capacities, including air defense, antisubmarine and anti-ship capabilities, and are able to retaliate, blockade, provide firepower and carry out other combat

72  China’s exterior line strategy at sea missions in coastal waters. As for 052D destroyers, which are beginning to be mass produced, they harbor greater overall maritime combat capability, in particular its regional air defense system has been lauded as the Chinese version of ‘Aegis.’ As China has so many choices in its arsenal, what need is there to bother with aircraft carriers? Second, as aircraft carriers are unsuited for coastal operations, their value in resolving maritime disputes is extremely low. Aircraft carriers are combat platforms and instruments that operate principally on the high seas, whereas due to space restrictions, it is difficult to fully demonstrate the combat effectiveness of aircraft carriers in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and other coastal areas. Moreover, in comparison to China’s and its opponents’ large fleets of land-based fighter jets, the dozens of carrier-borne aircrafts play only a very minor role. On the other hand, aircraft carriers operating in coastal waters face immense risks. Aircraft carriers are extremely vulnerable to being monitored and tracked from shore-based radar surveillance, electronic interception and reconnaissance aircraft in coastal waters, such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They are also susceptible to attacks from ground-based aircraft, cruise missiles, submarines and other Anti-­ Access/Area Denial weapons. In times of war, not only would aircraft carriers not be of great assistance in coastal areas, they could easily be ‘taken hostage.’ It is likewise unthinkable that the mission of China’s aircraft carriers is to compete with the United States for maritime hegemony. Disregarding the fact that China has no such strategic intentions, even if China wished to challenge the US Navy in the high seas, it is extremely foolish to assume that it would use aircraft carriers and large-scale formations to engage in battle. With regard to the construction and distribution of sea power, US strength will continue to exceed that of China for a long time to come. If China attempted to initiate a symmetrical contest with the United States in the high seas, pitting aircraft carriers against aircraft carriers, it would be very difficult for China to gain the upper hand. In terms of aircraft carrier technology, there are generations of differences between China and the United States. The Liaoning is less advanced that even the USS Enterprise-class aircraft carrier, which was launched in the 1960s; from the perspective of combat experience, China is starting virtually from scratch, whereas the United States already has almost a century’s worth of abundant practice. We can be optimistic that China will be able to rapidly compensate for this gap in experience and technological skill by developing in leaps and bounds. However, even if this is the case, the geographic characteristics of China’s continental-maritime complex mean that in the long run, China cannot continue to invest a large proportion of its resources in the navy and in aircraft carriers in a way similar to the United States. On this issue, the interpretation of Andrew Erickson, professor at US Naval War College, is in comparison rational and objective. He believes that Chinese aircraft carriers will mainly be responsible for four tasks: protection of SLOCs, naval diplomacy, regional deterrence, in addition to humanitarian aid and disaster relief.4

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  73 Development of aircraft carriers is one part of China’s oceangoing strategy and represents a cornerstone of China’s progress toward blue water, international responsibility and a global power, while it is not a counterweight to be used for the escalation of contests with neighboring countries or with the United States. Coastal waters should not be the theater of China’s aircraft carriers, which in fact ought to make their mark in the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans, adjacent to China. In view of China’s increasingly diverse range of combat platforms and options in the management of maritime disputes, some countries, which are engaged in disputes with China, unthinkingly criticize and condemn, while plainly grossly underestimating China’s ambitions with regard to aircraft carriers. Of course, China’s aircraft carrier program is unavoidably becoming the focus of speculation on ‘the China Threat theory.’ The two-ocean deployment of Chinese aircraft carriers The narrow ribbons of water within the First Island Chain are similar to a large pond. Therefore, this is not the site that Chinese aircraft carriers can maneuver for prolonged periods of time. Chinese aircraft carriers are destined to advance toward the high seas, as well as undertake combat duties in the Western Pacific and Northern Indian Oceans. For China, the first purpose of aircraft carriers is to resolve issues of longrange projection of military power and oceangoing operations. China’s current oceangoing formations, composed of destroyers and frigates, are lacking in essential logistical safeguards and intelligence support, with no offshore air supremacy or requisite antisubmarine capabilities. They can only perform a number of noncombat assignments on the high seas, such as antipiracy and counterterrorism missions, while it is difficult to form effective combat capabilities. Once an aircraft carrier is deployed on the high seas, its various types of carrier-borne aircraft can provide a certain degree of reconnaissance, early warning and air cover to the formation at sea. In addition, they can function as a command platform to fully coordinate other forces in the formation. Second, China’s aircraft carriers act as a deterrent to adversaries on the exterior line. China’s unfavorable geopolitical conditions in the Western Pacific imply that if the Chinese Navy were to remain confined to coastal activities within the First Island Chain, safeguarding national security by establishing a line of defense in coastal waters, this would simply be an extension of the army’s onshore strategy, while the navy’s purpose and unique characteristics are far from being exploited. China must break the mold by thinking beyond ground warfare, demonstrating the navy’s advantages of mobility, eliminating sources of danger or containing and deterring opponents in the ocean’s depths, so as to ultimately ensure the security of China’s coastal waters and even the coastal mainland. In future, the main zones of activity for China’s oceangoing navy will first be the waters of the Western Pacific Ocean beyond First Island Chain, and

74  China’s exterior line strategy at sea second the waters of the Northern Indian Ocean from the Middle East and the coast of East Africa to the Malacca Strait. In order to achieve an effective military presence in both oceans, China should consider deploying two oceangoing fleets, centered around aircraft carriers – the Pacific fleet and the Indian Ocean fleet. Among them, the main purpose of the Pacific fleet is to achieve an effective presence for the Chinese Navy in the Western Pacific Ocean beyond the First Island Chain, to reverse the inordinate imbalance of power in the Western Pacific, and to enforce containment and deterrence against the naval and aviation forces of countries deployed in the Western Pacific, such as the United States and Japan. In wartime, it will offer effective early warning and a certain amount of armed support against the offensive operations of enemy fleets and bases, while delaying or impeding adversaries’ offensive or intervention measures targeted at China’s coastline. Only with such a force would it be possible to realize the proactive defensive battle concepts of Admiral Liu Huaqing: ‘while the enemy can attack our coastal area, we too are capable of attacking its rear area.’5 The Indian Ocean fleet will be based on key islands in the South China Sea or ports of any amicable countries, concentrating on the northern Indian Ocean as its focal zone of activity. Its principal mission is to cooperate with the naval forces of India, the United States and other countries to combat piracy, oppose maritime terrorism and protect SLOCs. At the same time, by maintaining a certain military presence in the Indian Ocean, it will prevent adversaries from paralyzing China’s operational resolve by means of sabotage, blockade or restriction of China’s SLOCs. In addition, as an important force, it will also prevent adversaries from using the Indian Ocean to intrude in or attack China’s inner heartlands using seabased cruise missiles and carrier-borne aircraft. Furthermore, it will be able to considerably contain foreign maritime forces that intend on interfering with Chinese affairs in the South China Sea.

Nonwarfare operations of China’s naval force On 25 November 2013, Peace Ark, a PLAN hospital ship, set sail for disaster areas in the Philippines, devastated by Typhoon Haiyan, to carry out humanitarian relief and medical assistance duties. This was the first time that China had dispatched a vessel to overseas disaster zones to perform such tasks. In recent years, the Chinese Navy has repeatedly made advances toward blue water and stepped toward the world, by participating in escort groups, evacuation of personnel, search and rescue, port visits and joint UN exercises. As the Chinese Navy’s combat capabilities at sea have rapidly increased, nonwarfare military operations have simultaneously also grown ever more prominent and remarkable. Unlike the army, air force and other branches of the military, the navy represents mobile homeland. Other than engaging in contests with foreign

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  75 armed forces, it also combines two other major functions of diplomacy and law enforcement. During peacetime, the navy’s chief purpose is to protect the global trade system, which is centered on ocean and sea, through both direct and indirect means. In the same way, managing global maritime crises and responding to interstate conflict have already become major focal points in countries’ maritime defense considerations. In the context of maintaining peace between powers, at least on a superficial level, non-­warfare military operations of navies far exceed their use in combat. The navy will represent an important platform for China as it fulfills international obligations, assumes international responsibility and promotes military cooperation between states. As issues such as terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, drugs smuggling, piracy, deterioration of the marine environment and natural disasters loom ever larger, military forces must respond to a series of nontraditional security threats on a global scale, in addition to dealing with traditional security threats. Non-warfare applications of military power are increasingly becoming one of the principal functions of the armed forces in all countries. Among these, non-­warfare military operations of the navy are particularly impressive. Geoffrey Till has listed five major functions of modern navies: preventing conflict, maintaining sea control and freedom of navigation, safeguarding the maritime order, projecting armed forces overseas and engaging in necessary international cooperation. The undertaking of noncombat military operations is the main method of fulfilling the abovementioned duties for each of the world’s major navies.6 In specific terms, a strong naval force is a leading instrument in the management of nontraditional security threats and demonstration of leadership by major powers. It is a vital platform or tool in defense diplomacy, international cooperation and coercive diplomacy, while it also acts as robust support for civilian sea power and law enforcement at sea. The Chinese Navy will naturally not be an exception, for as its strength grows, its applications and capacities in these non-combat fields will be enriched, with more extensive scope, considerably greater depth and dramatically increased frequency. Responding to nontraditional security threats and safeguarding freedom of navigation It is undeniable that the joint efforts of coastal states worldwide, especially the great powers, are genuinely required in order to respond to a range of maritime crises and to maintain the international maritime order. China is by now the world’s second largest economy and a global political power. The Chinese Navy is an important platform, measure and tool for China as it fulfills international obligations, assumes international responsibilities and provides international public goods. In non-warfare military fields, it ought to make an even greater difference.

76  China’s exterior line strategy at sea First is to protect freedom of navigation. The Chinese Navy’s most important oceangoing duties in the future are to maintain the security of vital strategic maritime channels and the high seas, as well as to prevent certain countries, organizations or groups from blockading international waterways or plundering international public marine resources. From December 2008 to the present, the Chinese Navy has already established regular deployments in in the Gulf of Aden, continuing to carry out escort missions. In future, it is highly probable that these types of duties will extend and expand to other waters. Second is to participate international search and rescue. Representing the nation, the navy force can be sent to the disaster areas of tsunamis, earthquakes, typhoons, geological hazards and shipwrecks and the scenes of other major maritime emergencies as soon as possible. From the perspective of victims and the international community, not only would this offer strength and trust, but in practice, this would also play a role and create an impact in rescue efforts, which cannot be substituted by financial aid and material assistance. This is exactly the significance of operations such as those of the Peace Ark. Third is international peacekeeping. For a long time, restricted by inadequacies in its long-range power projection capacity, China’s contribution to international peacekeeping activities have mainly been the provision of manpower and supplies. Improvements in China’s naval capabilities and expansion in its sphere of activity have been conducive to transforming this situation, so that China may wield a greater amount of influence. The Chinese Navy, as a force dedicated to justice, will also be an important channel for the international community as it responds to humanitarian crises, provides food and medical assistance and evacuates personnel in areas of war or conflict. Initiating military diplomacy and international cooperation The navy is the most internationalized branch of the military and a critical platform for military diplomacy. The navy’s mobility and flexibility make it a unique and highly useful tool in foreign policy. The application of socalled naval diplomacy, that is, a series of preplanned and targeted actions implemented by the navy under the guidance of national foreign policy, including naval aid, visits by naval vessels, military exercises at sea, mutual visits by naval leaders and other exchanges by personnel in the navy. Navy diplomacy encourages the promotion of communication, improvements in mutual trust and support for cooperation. Close contact between two naval forces is also an important symbol of intimate and mature bilateral military and national relations. With substantial increases in the Chinese Navy’s capacity to ‘step out’ and to ‘bring in,’ the navy’s opportunities for mutual visits and exchanges with its counterparts continue to flourish. Joint exercises with the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and

China’s exterior line strategy at sea  77 other major sea powers are becoming increasingly commonplace, while their subjects and scope also favor practical warfare. For instance, the ­Sino-Russian ‘Joint Sea 2013’ drills covered joint air defense, strikes against maritime targets and other standard warfare maneuvers. Since 2007, the Chinese Navy has participated in multilateral drills with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and furthermore was officially involved in the 2014 and 2016 RIMPAC joint exercises. However, in comparison with the world’s leading maritime powers, the depth and breadth of China’s naval diplomacy still need to be bolstered. Mature navy diplomacy represents an indispensable lesson for China as it advances toward blue water. For sovereign states, the navy is also a key instrument in coercive diplomacy. The navy benefits from powerful strategic mobility, while the oceans’ connectivity allows any country with a naval force to disseminate its national influence and volition to every corner of the world using the navy. Compared to other branches of the military, the navy appears to be more flexible and more agile. Therefore, in the event of a regional or international crisis, relevant powers would always lose no time in dispatching naval vessels to waters close to the scene of the incident, in order to deter opponents and defend their own interests. For instance, during the Syrian crisis, both the United States and Russia deployed a number of warships to the Mediterranean to act as pressure during diplomatic tensions or struggles. At present, China’s overseas interests have appeared to reach a ‘blowout,’ in which turmoil or conflict in any part of the world may be intimately connected to China’s interests. Following its rise, Chinese Navy will make more frequent appearances in crisis waters, like the United States, Russia and other countries, in coordination with China’s foreign policy and also to protect various overseas interests. Supporting the Chinese Coast Guard’s law enforcement activities and building an integrated system of management and defense at sea Maritime law enforcement is applied based on how a sovereign state’s relevant national laws administer activities within its jurisdictional maritime space. This includes customs inspections, anti-smuggling operations, protection of fisheries and declarations on sovereignty, which was originally once one of the most important functions of the navy. Nowadays, the coast guard and maritime police force play an increasingly vital role for various countries, while distinctions between the functions of law enforcement, military forces and paramilitary forces are now also clearer. The navy is increasingly focused on sea control and maritime warfare, whereas the Coast Guard (CCG), maritime police force and other civil or paramilitary forces are beginning to shoulder more responsibility for law enforcement and management of maritime spaces such as inland waters, territorial waters, contiguous zones and Exclusive Economic Zones. Under normal circumstances, law enforcement forces are commanded by civil authorities, while

78  China’s exterior line strategy at sea the national navy mainly provides them with intelligence support, professional training and coaching, and even on-site reinforcement assistance; during wartime, these forces belong to the military, as the navy, by mobilizing relevant mechanisms, will integrate law enforcement forces into a series of maritime combat operations, to utilize as a part of comprehensive plans. In coastal control and in response to maritime disputes, such as the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, the CCG is often placed on the front lines as the chief force for sovereignty claims and law enforcement. To provide strong backup support for the CCG, the Chinese Navy ought to possess the capability to offer intelligence, logistical guarantees and even combat support to the CCG at all times. In waters where disputes are more intense, it must also be capable of joint deployment with the CCG, in order to deter opponents and ensure that they do not interfere in the CCG’s activities. Depending on the situation, they need to establish a joint emergency center or combat center if necessary to unify and coordinate command. In an era of very few naval battles worldwide, it will become increasingly common for countries to use their naval forces for non-warfare purposes. China’s emergent navy will not only be a formidable and awe-inspiring force for war but should also be an important global power that assumes a plethora of noncombat duties and obligations. Its function can be found therein, but it also has national responsibilities and a global calling. In observing the growth and development of the Chinese Navy, we also require such a perspective.

Notes 1 PlA Daily, “Move towards the Construction of the World’s First Class Navy,” www.81.cn/dblj/2017-04/20/content_7569154_3.htm 2 Terry Kraft, trans. Han Peng, Wan Zhiqiang, and Sun Xueguan, “Naval Aviation and Diversification in Flight Require Aircraft Carriers,” Haijun Yiwen, No. 2, 2010, p. 21. 3 The Editorial Committee of the Encyclopedia of the Chinese Navy, Encyclopedia of the Chinese Navy (Beijing: Haichao Press, 1999), p. 824. 4 Andrew Erickson, “A Work in Progress: China’s Development of Carrier Strike,” Jane’s Navy International, July/August 2014. 5 Liu Huaqing, The Liu Huaqing Memoirs (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, 2004), p. 437. 6 Geoffrey Till, “Making Waves – Naval Power Evolves for the 21st Century”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 2009, www.janes.com/news/security/­ terrorism/jir/jir091117_1_n.shtml

5 Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and the Demarcation of the East China Sea

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and demarcation of the East China Sea have become focal points of Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation, as they steadily overshadow historical issues. In fact, both the historical and the legal principles of the Diaoyu Islands and East China Sea demarcation are very clear, while Japan’s sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Islands and ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line,’ concocted in the East China Sea, have no credibility at all. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China and Japan have been in dispute over these two key matters. A complex background and a myriad of reasons led to a sudden escalation of the dispute in 2012. We ought to rationally regard the situation and explore plans of response, having comprehensively understood China’s interests and completely identified Japan’s actions and motivations.

Why China cannot compromise over the Diaoyu Islands The Diaoyu Islands are an archipelago, not in fact an individual island, with a total of 71 islands that are named by the China Oceanic Administration (COA). The eight comparatively larger islands and reefs are Diaoyu Dao (Uotsuri-shima), Nanxiao Dao (Minami-kojima), Beixiao Dao (Kita-­ kojima), Chiwei Yu (Taisho-to), Huangwei Yu (Kuba-shima), Bei Yu (Okino-Kita-iwa), Nan Yu (Oki-no-Minami-iwa) and Feilan Dao (Tobise), with a total area of 6.374 square kilometers. Of these, Diaoyu Dao is the largest island, with a surface area of 4.3 square kilometers. Following the rapid downturn in Sino-Japanese relations due to Japan’s ‘island purchase’ incident in 2012, how much importance do the Diaoyu Islands carry exactly in Sino-Japanese relations, and in particular what is their value to China? Such questions have elicited reflection and interpretation from distinguished individuals, both domestically and overseas. According to The New York Times and other Western media, the Diaoyu Islands are but a few rocks and reefs in the East China Sea. The US government also believes that China is somewhat making a mountain out of a molehill, while some Chinese domestic experts and independent social scholars point out

80  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands that the Diaoyu Islands represent merely a local issue, so a complete deterioration in relations with Japan for the sake of the Diaoyu Islands is rather unjustifiable. Is this the truth? The answer palpably is no. China is not an ‘aggressive fighting cock’ and is even less prone to act on impulse and emotion. The reason the Chinese government is so resolute is because the Diaoyu Islands are indeed connected to both China’s core and critical interests, and Japan has already breached China’s ‘bottom line.’ The Diaoyu Islands issue is first and foremost a matter of sovereignty. China has abundant legal grounds and irrefutable evidence, which is also widely recognized in international public opinion, for its sovereign possession of the Diaoyu Islands. Even in the United States, which professes to defend Japan’s administrative rights over the Diaoyu Islands, many scholars and mainstream public opinion are inclined to recognize Chinese sovereignty over these islands. The most socially influential among them, the prominent American director Chris D. Nebe directed the documentary Diaoyu Islands: The Truth. By tracing back through history and cataloging significant illustrations, this work proves that ‘the Diaoyu Islands all belonged to China since several centuries ago.’1 In today’s world, sovereign states are still the most important actors and the principle of sovereignty remains the central pillar of the international order. As long as matters of sovereignty are concerned, they certainly would not be minor issues. With the breakneck speed of economic globalization and developments in the information technology, the formerly clandestine world of diplomacy is gradually becoming more accessible. Diplomatic decision-making is becoming democratized and socialized; as the general public’s influence on diplomacy grows, select social elite will further become one of the main actors in diplomatic activities. In this context, traditional secret diplomacy and private compromise are increasingly impractical, especially in foreign affairs concerning sovereignty. The exercise of sovereign rights is no longer the prerogative of professional diplomats, kings, monarchs or leaders, and is no longer the business of the ruling party itself. On issues such as the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, in addition to widespread involvement from the social elite and the general public, China has no alternative but to diametrically oppose Japan as it is very difficult to make further concessions, since Japan has already abandoned mutual acknowledgment or tacit agreement to suspend the Sino-Japanese dispute. This is not nearly as simple as purely an interest calculation, as it is not merely related to national interests, but is also linked to the national regime’s authority and legitimacy. Simultaneously, the strategic location of the Diaoyu Islands is also of great importance. If reunified with China, they will be the easternmost point of Chinese territory in the East Sea; if forever captured by Japan, they would be the westernmost extremity of Japanese territory. Japan believes

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  81 that by occupying the Diaoyu Islands, the depth of its defense can be driven forward by over 300 kilometers in the southwest, and that the Diaoyu Islands can also be used as a base for close-range reconnaissance and surveillance on military deployment and operations in Taiwanese and Chinese coastal regions. They could even be used as an early warning position to defend against missile threats from China. For China, the Diaoyu Islands are an excellent forward base, as Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands represent strategic support for China to make a substantial breakthrough in the First Island Chain. The recovery of the Diaoyu Islands would greatly empower China’s sea power to progress toward a blue-water navy. Finally, the Diaoyu Islands issue also concerns notable marine economic interests. Waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands enjoy a wealth of petroleum and fisheries resources: there are 3–7 billion tons in oil reserves as per estimates, and the annual catch of fisheries reaches up to 150,000 tons of stocks. The importance of the Diaoyu Islands absolutely cannot be underestimated, because they are not merely a stepping stone in Japan’s race for oil and natural gas resources on the East China Sea continental shelf, but also a key location in East Asia’s regional strategic security and peace.2 To this day, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (­U NCLOS) has not clearly specified what types of island can support a 200-­nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), but it is highly likely that the Diaoyu Islands possess the basic conditions to establish an EEZ. If Japan occupies the Diaoyu Islands, the baseline of Japan’s territorial waters in the East China Sea will lean sharply westward, which would allow Japan to benefit from a favorable position in the EEZ delimitation between China and Japan, obtaining at least an extra 60,000 square kilometers of EEZ waters. Behind the dispute over island ownership lay maritime delimitation and economic interests, which are also important reasons why Japan has significantly tightened control over the Diaoyu Islands, the Chongzhiniao Jiao (Okinotorishima) and other ‘outlying islands’ over recent years. Those who deem the Diaoyu Islands issue inconsequential belong to only two factions. First, there is the ‘dishonest’ international faction. The US government and some sections of the Western media undoubtedly cannot empathize with China on this issue, because it does not concern their own vital interests, so they make light of a matter of principle. Second, there is the ‘naïve’ domestic faction, which believes that through its own tolerance and restraint, China can in exchange acquire a thaw and improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. They say that continuing to ‘lock horns’ over the Diaoyu Islands issue is not beneficial to China’s national interests. On the

82  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands contrary, China’s firm display provides Japan’s right-wing sects an excuse and helps the Japanese right wing to gain prominence and legitimacy. This argument also represents the views of a considerable proportion of Japanese, while in Sino-Japanese exchanges, Japan often applies such viewpoints when making appeals to China. In fact, the Diaoyu Islands issue is purely symbolic, for it is simply a microcosm of Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation. The dispute between the two sides, China and Japan, is certainly not limited to the Diaoyu Islands themselves. As long as there is no alleviation in Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation, there can be no de-escalation in the Diaoyu Islands issue. Even if the Diaoyu Islands issue is forcibly shelved, new problems and contradictions will arise. Essential differences exist between Sino-Japanese maritime disputes and Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine disagreements at sea. The latter focus on competition for maritime space, whereas the former do not only center on rivalry for maritime space but also represent a clash between national strategies. This kind of collision is inevitable in the current Asia-Pacific situation and cannot be mitigated through China’s goodwill and unilateral concessions alone. On 11 September 2012, the Japanese Noda Yoshihiko government announced its ‘purchase of the islands.’ The original tacit agreement between China and Japan to shelve the issue of the Diaoyu Islands dispute was broken, and China immediately adopted a series of political, legal, diplomatic, military and other measures in opposition. Japan too did not show any weakness, consistently not recognizing the presence of any dispute over the Diaoyu Islands whatsoever. The Diaoyu Islands case had already escalated from their previous deferred state into a full-blown dispute: the Chinese Coast Guard and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) had created a situation of coexistence and co-governance in waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, but now the two countries’ military forces are actively preparing for conflict and war against each other. Japan has incessantly speculated on China’s radar illumination and the excessive proximity of its military aircraft. On the Diaoyu Islands issue, even if China would like to relent, Japan would provide it with neither the conditions nor the opportunities to do so. For Japan, a country sensitive only to strength, the balance of power is key. Only through rapid augmentation of its own strength and intense longterm competition can China compel Japan to clearly recognize the reality. The game in process concerning the Diaoyu Islands conflict may be protracted with many twists and turns, and also may be somewhat dangerous. In this regard, China needs to maintain strategic tenacity and fortify strategic patience. Strategically, China must not proceed rashly due to anxiety, and moreover must not compromise and concede without reason due to timidity and overcautiousness (Figure 5.1).

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  83

Figure 5.1  C  ontested Lines in the East China Sea.

The truths and falsehoods of demarcation in the East China Sea The Sino-Japanese demarcation in the East China Sea covers two main issues: first is the demarcation of EEZ, and second is the delimitation of the continental shelf. There are indeed overlaps between the concepts of the EEZ and the continental shelf, but the two concepts themselves and their extended connotations are not one and the same. To clarify the principles of Sino-Japanese demarcation in the East China Sea, it is necessary to first understand these two concepts and their bilateral relationship. The EEZ system as specified in UNCLOS is measured from the baseline from which the breadth of territorial waters is calculated and should not exceed 200 nautical miles. As the name suggests, the interests of coastal states in EEZs are predominantly economic rights. As UNCLOS Article 56 stipulates, the core economic rights of the coastal state in its EEZ are: Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.

84  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands This also includes ‘The establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine scientific research; the protection and preservation of the marine environment.’3 The EEZ outer limit of 200 nautical miles is for ideal situations free of dispute. In reality, the depth and breadth of waters between many of the world’s opposite coasts and adjacent states are limited. As a consequence, it is very difficult to fulfill the 200 nautical mile demarcation requirement. Waters between China and Japan are indeed less than 400 nautical miles wide, at only 360 nautical miles at their widest point. A Sino-Japanese dispute is thus created. On this matter, China advocates a principle of fairness, taking into account coastline directions on the same latitude and relative length, demography and other factors. This is also the trend in international maritime delimitation, whereas Japan does not contemplate at all the fair and equitable development of the maritime order, stubbornly adhering to the ‘Median Line’ principle. It is important to note that UNCLOS does indeed have a ‘principle of fairness’ and a ‘median line principle’ on issues of maritime demarcation between opposite coasts or adjacent states. Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS, respectively, indicate delimitation of EEZ and continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts: enacted in the International Court of Justice (ICIJ), Article 38 indicates that demarcation agreements, based on international law, may assist in reaching equitable resolutions. However, at the same time, it recommends that before each party in the dispute reaches a settlement agreement, it first determines a provisional ‘Median Line.’ Article 15 of UNCLOS concerns ‘Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts,’ that is, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.4 Nevertheless, both parties must agree to the Median Line. The continental shelf system was first established in the 1958 Convention in the Continental Shelf and reaffirmed in the 1982 UNCLOS. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance… shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  85 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. Those within 200 nautical miles are termed the ‘inner continental shelf,’ whereas those beyond 200 nautical miles are named the ‘outer continental shelf.’ The inner continental shelf is delimited independently by each state under UNCLOS provisions (except where disputes exist). In contrast, the outer continental shelf requires coastal states to apply to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and then delimit the outer continental shelf based on the Commission’s recommendations. The continental shelf system confers upon coastal states the right to explore the continental shelf and exploit natural resources. This refers to The natural resources … [that] consist of the mineral and other non-­ living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.5 Interests of the continental shelf within 200 nautical miles often coincide with interests of the EEZ as the two share the same external boundary. Since EEZs are at most only 200 nautical miles wide, whereas continental shelves can extend to a maximum of 350 nautical miles, coastal states do not enjoy overlying waters and above water airspace rights in the outer continental shelf. It is evident that delimitation of the continental shelf should be based principally upon the seabed geological structure, as both the continental shelf and continental margin have clear geological definitions. When discussing demarcation of the East China Sea continental shelf, it is essential to discuss the Okinawa Trough. The Okinawa Trough is located on the margins of the East China Sea continental shelf, in a long and narrow curved depression between the outer edges of the East China Sea continental shelf and the Ryukyu Arc. Situated on the margins of the East China Sea continental shelf, between the Ryukyu Islands and China’s Diaoyu Islands, the curved depression was formed due to Ryukyu Trench’s expanding lithosphere. The majority of the Trench exceeds 1,000 meters in depth, with a maximum depth of 2,716 meters. Most parts of the East China Sea seabed have the structure of a classic continental shelf and is a natural maritime extension of the Chinese mainland, thus the Okinawa Trough naturally becomes the demarcation frontier between the two countries’ continental shelves. For this purpose, on 14 December 2012, the Chinese government has already tendered to the CLCS a partial submission on the boundaries of the outer continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the East China Sea, formally expressing its own intentions to the international community. However,

86  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands Japan believes that China and Japan share the joint Sino-Okinawan continental shelf, and that the Okinawa Trough is simply an incidental pitfall in the two countries’ natural connection, and that the continuity of the East China Sea continental shelf cannot be interrupted. In view of this, Japan urges demarcation of East China Sea to ignore legal consequences of the Okinawa Trough, while the specific demarcation method should determine delimitation boundaries according to distance standards and the ‘Median Line,’ rather than the natural extension of the continental shelf. In this way, according to the EEZ and continental shelf systems’ differing connotations and demarcation methods, in theory China and Japan have two entirely different maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, at close to 100 nautical miles apart at their furthest point. If China is to develop the East China Sea’s outer continental shelf, it may be necessary to conduct operations in Japan’s EEZ, which may lead to many difficulties. In practice, for the convenience of delimitation, development and management, after the EEZ system came into effect, the development trend of worldwide maritime delimitation is to draw a common line for the boundaries of EEZs and Continental Shelves, provided that all parties in dispute can reach a consensus on the boundaries of EEZs and continental shelves, and subsequently make reciprocal and mutual adjustments on this basis. Unfortunately, Japan has not allowed any space for negotiation. Japan proposed numerous times to China, beginning as early as 1982, its hope to formally define the Median Line as the demarcation boundary between the two countries’ maritime EEZ. At that time, the Chinese side adopted an evasive stance on this issue and did not give a clear response to the Japanese side in order to protect overall Sino-Japanese relations, whereas the Japanese government misunderstood that to mean that ‘China acquiesced in the Median Line principle.’ In June 1996, the Japanese Parliament officially concocted the so-called ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ through the ‘Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Law.’ This Median Line is highly problematic, both from a technical and legal perspective: first, huge problems exist in Japan’s delimitation method from the baseline of its territorial waters. A large number of base points in Japan’s territorial waters are located on outlying islands distant from its mainland, leading to a severe deviation in Japan’s territorial waters baseline from normal coastal trends. Japan is in fact not a typical archipelagic state, as its coastline neither cuts deeply inland, nor is there a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, it does not fulfill UNCLOS Article 7(1) on the two specific geographic characteristics required for the exploitation of straight baselines. In spite of this, Japan still employs a large number of coastlines that do not meet standard regulations, allowing its territorial waters baseline to shift substantially toward the Chinese side. Second, the Median Line completely disregards the extension of the East China Sea continental shelf and in fact does not take into account the matter of continental shelf delimitation. According to Japan, there is only EEZ delimitation, and no continental shelf

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  87 demarcation in the East China Sea. This is clearly contrary to basic facts and international justice. Naturally it is difficult for China to agree with Japan’s unilateral conduct, and the Chinese government has never recognized the so-called Sino-­Japanese Median Line. However, over a long period of time and in consideration of the overall state of Sino-Japanese relations, China has exercised restraint on this issue, proposing to ‘shelve disputes, jointly develop’ in the disputed region. China has even opened the door to negotiations on the question of resource development on the Chinese side of the so-called Median Line. The objective is to transform the East China Sea into a sea of ‘friendship and cooperation’ through Sino-Japanese collaboration to develop the East China Sea continental shelf and the establishment of an excellent atmosphere for cordial Sino-Japanese cooperation. All the same, Japan is not yet satisfied and instead makes much ado about nothing, pursuing the so-called drinking straw effect devised by Iraq against Kuwait in 1989.6 This is not just sensationalization by the Japanese media, for the Japanese government is also complicit. At the ‘ASEAN 10+3’ Energy Ministers’ Conference held in Manila on 9 June 2004, the former Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry at the time, Nakagawa Shoichi, drank fruit juice using a straw to protest to Zhang Guobao, the then deputy director of the Chinese National Reform and Development Commission, and proposed the so-called drinking straw effect. Nakagawa stressed that if China were to begin oil extraction in waters near the ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line,’ resources belonging to Japan would be inevitably ‘siphoned’ away as if through a straw. Furthermore, he demanded that China provides relevant extraction statistics to Japan. In technical terms, the absurdity of Japan’s position goes beyond even Iraq’s claims in 1989, for the majority of Iraqi terrain is higher elevated than that of Kuwait, whereas the topography of the East China Sea continental shelf is higher in the west and lower in the east. If there is indeed a ‘drinking straw effect’, it means resources would flow from the western side of the ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ toward the east. However, not only does Japan verbally protest to China, it also dispatches naval vessels and reconnaissance aircrafts for surveillance, disrupting China’s operations and at its oil and gas fields around the ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ such as the Chunxiao gas field. On the issue of demarcation of the East China Sea, China promotes principles of fairness and natural extension of the continental shelf, which correspond to the reality of the East China Sea, and therefore ought to be respected. In future diplomatic and legal battles, China needs to widely research what content the fairness principle encompasses and uphold the legal status of the Okinawa Trough. China can also consider reasons to integrate the delimitation boundaries of its EEZ and continental shelf, to draw one unified frontier, but under the premise of fairness. If a common boundary is drawn, China should adhere to principles of fairness on the basis of comprehensive consideration of the continental shelf’s natural extension, features

88  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands of seabed geological structures, coastline length and trends, in addition to historical, cultural and other situations.

The effects of establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone On 23 November 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Defense officially declared the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), whose area covers the Diaoyu Islands and their surrounding waters, traverses Japan’s contended ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ and extends as far as the vicinity of the Okinawa Trench. Overlaps between China’s East China Sea ADIZ and Japan’s ADIZ encompass virtually half of the East China Sea’s airspace, and there is also a small area of overlap between China’s ADIZ and South Korea’s ADIZ near the Suyan Reef. According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense’s statement, any aircraft located in this airspace must circulate its flight plans to the relevant Chinese authorities, as well as promptly and accurately answer any Chinese inquiries. Some countries such as the United States and Japan immediately responded in a frenzy of indignation, with public opinion in an uproar, as their statesmen, media, and experts all expressed strong opposition or censure. The United States, Japan and South Korea initially also dispatched military aircrafts purposely into to this ADIZ to demonstrate their resolve. Taking stock of the United States, Japan, South Korea and other countries’ responses since the establishment of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea, it would appear that the losses have outweighed the gains for China. By some observations, American and Japanese military aircraft continue to break into China’s ADIZ, whereas China has not adopted ‘defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions’ as per its announcement, and the ADIZ exists in name only; on the other hand, China has paid a heavy diplomatic price. Even South Korea and Australia, which ordinarily maintain good relations and are averse to confrontation with China, have bandwagoned vociferously with the United States on this issue against China. It is obviously true that some aspects of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea, such as area scope, regulations, diplomatic skill and crisis anticipation do have details that need to be refined and lessons to be learned. For instance, since this initiative is primarily targeted at Japan, there is no need to incite animosity from all directions. Prior to the release of the statement, it would be wise to offer the United States, Australia, South Korea, and other parties information and explanation, to at least partially assuage the discontent of these countries; as another illustration, ADIZ rules are to some degree imprecise and distinctions could set based on ‘aircraft that approach territorial airspace with intent’ or ‘aircraft that only pass by or through the ADIZ as normal’; in addition, prior to its public announcement, it is possible that the Chinese government underestimated the rest of the world’s

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  89 radical reaction, as diplomatic, military, media, public relations and other kinds of precautionary measures were somewhat insufficient. Nonetheless, we cannot deny the strategic significance of the establishment of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea due to tactical flaws. The legal status of the ADIZ is very different from those of territorial airspace. These are autonomous actions of the sovereign state, not protected by international law, and perceived very differently by various countries worldwide. States all have extremely diverse views and understandings on whether its own aircraft should comply with foreign regulations when entering other states’ ADIZs, as well as on how to supervise foreign aircraft entering their own ADIZ. Consequently, there is great operational flexibility in regard to what the ADIZ means. No countries would relinquish military freedom of movement within foreign ADIZs, counting on other countries’ military aircraft to unconditionally concede that its ADIZ was a wild dream all along as far as they were concerned. Even the American ADIZ routinely suffers from ‘brazen incursions’ by Russia’s and other countries’ military aircraft. Of course, every country’s civil aircraft would typically comply with others’ ADIZs out of safety concerns. China emphatically was not so naïve as to believe that reliance on its ADIZ alone could pacify the United States, Japan and other countries and lead to their abandonment of close-range reconnaissance and mid-air provocation targeting China, nor did it expect American and Japanese military aircraft to abide by relevant rules. In fact, the reason China has set up an ‘ADIZ’, despite international pressure, is partly to combat Japan’s exploitation of its own ADIZ to create tension, but moreover due to the inherent requirements of its own power and capacity building. On the one hand, the ADIZ can advance the construction of a strong early warning air defense system, allowing the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) and other aerial forces have confidence in laws and regulations to follow when confronted with foreign aircraft, achieving better division of labor and integration of strength. For a long time, the construction of China’s military forces has been piecemeal and intermittent. The coordination and cooperation mentality between the various forces were relatively weak and it was difficult to form a concerted effort. Defending the ADIZ became a major mission and will be extremely favorable to the development and refinement of China’s early warning air defense system. On the other hand, it may be born out of the need to train troops and enhance military capabilities. In recent years, China’s military modernization has accelerated with a diverse range of advanced equipment and weaponry entering active service in large quantities. However, it still lacks in areas such as experience, software and cooperation. Since Chairman Xi Jinping took over control of the military, he has vigorously stressed that the armed forces should ‘be able to fight battles, to win battles’ and has elevated military conflict preparations to a high degree of importance. Following

90  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands the establishment of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea, the games of ‘cat and mouse’ between Chinese military aircraft and American and Japanese military aircraft within China’s ADIZ will certainly become more frequent, which will greatly test China’s air force capabilities. It is clear that the ADIZ makes higher demands of the Chinese army and serves as an excellent training platform. Although the Chinese army need not take action on every foreign aircraft entering its ADIZ, it needs to thoroughly examine the trajectories and whereabouts of every aircraft entering the ADIZ, with the ability to take measures at any moment should that be necessary. From a long-run perspective, the contest over the ADIZ is merely a microcosm of the Sino-Japanese and Sino-US strategic game. As Chinese maritime and aerial force rapidly increase, the strategic balance in East Asia’s coastal waters is currently advancing in a direction favorable to China. Under the projection of China’s land power, if the PLAN, PLAAF and PLA Rocket Force are able to form a joint force, and it would only be a matter of time before China is able to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and Japan in East Asia’s coastal waters. Perhaps the Chinese military does not have the capability to win worldwide supremacy, but as long as China can maintain the momentum of its rise, there is no doubting its strength to build a strategic advantage in East Asia’s coastal waters within and around the First Island Chain. In this region, China is able to concentrate practically all of its advantageous power, whereas mobilization and accumulation of resources and power here is ultimately limited for the United States due to geographical constraints. The current American advantage in East Asia’s coastal waters is abnormal, owing to long-term degradation of China’s naval and air forces. This will change as the gap between China and the United States’ overall military power closes. In future, China’s overall military capability may still be unable to contend with that of the United States. However, thanks to geographical and technological reasons, changes will occur in the Sino-US strategic balance in East Asia. The United States cannot win in this region for it is situated on China’s doorstep, just as it was unable to form a military advantage in Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union decades ago. In future, it is foreseeable that Chinese military aircraft activities will become livelier above the East China Sea. Japanese and American military aircraft certainly will not disappear from China’s ADIZ, but their number, frequency and prominence will all be gradually surpassed by those of China. This is a ‘battle of endurance’ and also a test of willpower, a circular game and also an on-going contest, for a fleeting advantage may be of little avail, with one-off gains and losses also unable to transform greater trends in the shift of power. How to seize these strategic opportunities for shifts in relative power? It is key for China to do well in its own affairs, to persevere untiringly in efforts to prepare for military conflict, to be cautious but not fearful of war and to leverage the East China Sea military conflict to promote a ‘strong military

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  91 dream’ and ‘strong national dream.’ In this process, China should strive to enhance its strategic planning ability, tactical operations and coordination capacity. In the face of momentary setbacks or impediments, it is necessary to maintain strategic tenacity. In any case, blunders and flaws can hardly all be avoided. Modesty and prudence are critical, earnestly learning lessons from experience is the right answer, though not to be overly mindful of gains and losses and so anxious as to move in the other extreme and come to a standstill.

Commitment to the security of sea lanes in the East China Sea7 When discussing the security of China’s sea lanes, people invariably refer to the Malacca Strait or the ‘Malacca dilemma,’ scrutinizing routes in the South China Sea and in the west. Rarely mentioned are the Gonggu Strait (Miyako Kaikyo), Dayu Strait (Osumi Kaikyo) and other easterly SLOCs. It is little known that this eastward maritime lifeline is even more fragile and that its importance is increasing with each passing day. There are four main maritime routes for China’s international trade, split into the four directions of north, south, east and west. Of these, the eastward route heads east in the direction of the Pacific Ocean east coast, passing via Japan, and the East and West Coasts of the both American continents, while the Gonggu Strait and Dayu Strait on the periphery of Japan happen to be important channels for China’s eastward route. The Gonggu Strait, also known as the Gonggu Waterway, is a route in between Japan’s Okinawa and Gonggu Islands (Miyako Retto), measuring approximately 300 kilometers in width, and is the main route through which China crosses the Pacific Ocean to regions such as Central America and South America. Furthermore, the Gonggu Strait is an important supplement to southward routes as China hereby has a direct route to access ports in northeastern Australia and various island nations in the south Pacific Ocean. The Dayu Strait is situated between Dayu peninsula (Osumi Hanto) on the southern tip of Japan’s Jiuzhou Island (Kyushu) and Dayu archipelago (Osumi Shoto). Measuring 33 kilometers wide, it is an important channel from the East China Sea, Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan to access the northwest Pacific Ocean. In accordance with UNCLOS and Japan’s relevant rules on ‘specially designated waters’ for three nautical miles of territorial sea, foreign vessels and aircrafts can all have free passage, without mandatory observance of the principle of ‘innocent passage.’ In addition, between various Japanese islands, there remain more than 20 straits or channels, connecting the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Prior to Taiwan’s reunification with Mainland China, these straits or channels are the swiftest ways for China to access the open ocean. As the shale gas revolution and international energy supply creates a situation of ‘rise in

92  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands the west, fall in the east,’ and with the expansion of trade between China and the Americas, the importance of these lanes will grow substantially. In accordance with UNCLOS’ principle of fairness and spirit of impartiality, states with relatively favorable marine geography should show consideration toward states with relatively unfavorable marine geography on legitimate maritime rights such as resource development, navigation at sea and other areas. Numerous Japanese islands surround the East China Sea, creating a semi-enclosed sea. Japan is in fact duty bound to afford China freedom of passage or passage transit convenience through these straits. Moreover, most of the ships entering and exiting these channels are associated with China’s trade and security. As an interested stakeholder, China needs measures to safeguard the security of these lanes, in addition to voicing a powerful message. Yet, not only do Japan and other countries disregard China’s legitimate rights and interests, they also view these international sea lanes as platforms for containment and suppression of China’s strengths by deploying large numbers of troops close to straits or waterways, closely monitoring each and every Chinese naval vessel, merchant ship and aircraft that passes through the straits, and at times even defying the principle of freedom of navigation to overtly provoke and impede the normal navigation of Chinese vessels and aircraft in international waterways. To oppose the ever more frequent entry and exit of Chinese naval vessels through the First Island Chain, Japan has brazenly deployed anti-ship missiles in proximity of these waterways. In 2013 Japan initially deployed Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles on Gonggu Island and additional new style surface-to-ship missiles in Xiongbenxian (Kumamoto Prefecture) in 2016. Relative to the South China Sea or the Malacca Strait, it would be far simpler for the Japan and the United States to block China’s maritime lifelines in waterways surrounding the East China Sea during wartime. Consequently, the security of sea lanes in the East China Sea, the Diaoyu Islands dispute and the Taiwan issue have become the three most pressing easterly concerns which must be resolved as China emerges as a maritime power; at the same time, they are major interests that China must fight for. In this aspect, China requires decisive and resolute political will. In order to safeguard China’s legitimate interests in the Gonggu Strait and other strategic channels of the East China Sea and maintain the security of maritime lifelines, it is imperative that China builds more agile military deterrence capabilities, applies more targeted diplomatic pressure on Japan and fortifies its strategic foundation to progress eastward toward the Pacific Ocean through long-term, resolute and forceful cold confrontation. China’s strong strategic deterrence with regard to Japan is indisputable. In theory, if Japan blocked SLOCs used by China, China could utilize a range of land-based missiles to strike Japanese coastal bases. However, whether this type of strategic deterrence can prove effective in practice is highly questionable. First, the outbreak and escalation of friction and

Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands  93 conflict is a gradual process. Before a total ‘rupture in the status quo,’ missile deterrence would not help resolve matters and does not carry a precise focus; moreover, the political costs and sacrifices required for provocation, containment and other measures are dwarfed by those required for missile strikes. So long as Japan sustains a certain degree of moderation, it would be difficult for China to make such a decision. This disconnect between strategic deterrence and tactical deterrence has meant China, with no alternative for decades other than to be subject to the mercy of Japan and the United States in the Gonggu waterway and other international channels, has been unable put its strong national power and strategic deterrence into practice. In recent years, with comprehensive development in China’s aerial and sea power, Chinese aircraft and naval vessels are appearing with increasing regularity in the relevant waters, their effective quantity and quality markedly growing, China will progressively possess the capacity to compete with Japan and the United States in these strategic channels. Construction of power is a prerequisite for all strategies. As only China can remain in an indomitable position at the site of friction and conflict, Japan and other countries would not readily dare to threaten the security of China’s maritime channels. Over the years, Japan has already become accustomed to ‘covering up its tracks by shifting blame to others’ on issues of freedom of navigation, liberally discrediting China and confounding international perceptions. In reality, Japan has damaged China’s lawful freedom of navigation, even as it defiles normal Chinese navigation as ‘invasion’ or slanders China as a ‘danger to navigational security.’ In response, China should strengthen its battle in diplomacy and international public opinion warfare. First, it needs to focus on obtaining evidence and then, based on relevant international law, methodically and cogently refute Japan’s ludicrous lies through iron facts, and if necessary inviting the involvement of international judicial mechanisms. Second, China can directly raise issues concerning transparency of the jurisdiction over international channels such as the Gongu Waterway to Japan. Justifiably, Japan has management rights over adjacent straits or waterways, while, as the largest user of these channels, China also has the right to demand that Japan comply with relevant international standards and China’s legitimate rights. Third, China should formally broach the matter of Japan’s damage to Chinese freedom of navigation at the UN, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and other relevant international and regional institutions, proactively presenting to the international community principles of truth and fiction.

Notes 1 Chris D. Nebe, Diaoyu Islands: The Truth, 2015, www.imdb.com/title/tt3231886/ 2 Fu, Kuncheng, “Methods and Issues in Continental Shelf Delimitation in China’s Periphery,” Periodical of Ocean University of China (Zhongguo Haiyang Daxue Xuebao), No 3, 2014. p. 7.

94  Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands 3 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, http://www. un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm 4 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm 5 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm 6 At the time when Iraqi tanks crossed the border to invade Kuwait, one of the reasons Saddam Hussein gave the international community was that, by drilling wells, Kuwait had “siphoned away” petroleum that belonged to Iraq. 7 Originally published in The Global Times, 27 December 2013, with edits.

6 A solution to tensions in the South China Sea

South China Sea issues include two categories of affairs: disputed and non-disputed. The South China Sea dispute incorporates two major subject matters: first are island sovereignty disputes. The four countries of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have partially occupied islands and reefs belonging to China’s Nansha (Spratly) Islands. Among them, Vietnam occupies 29 islands and reefs and declares sovereignty over the entire Nansha Islands; the Philippines holds eight islands and reefs, and proclaims sovereignty over the so-called Kalayaan Islands in the Nansha Islands1; Malaysia holds five isles and reefs, while Brunei has claimed sovereignty over the Nantong Jiao (Louisa Reefs). In addition, Vietnam and the Philippines have, respectively, demanded sovereignty rights over China’s Xisha (Paracel) Islands and Zhongsha Islands. Second are disputes over maritime delimitation. After UNCLOS took effect, the countries just mentioned all promptly established their own EEZ, even submitting applications to the CLCS for the South China Sea outer continental shelf. The boundaries of their claimed EEZ and continental shelf are substantially entrenched within the South China Sea’s ‘Dash Line.’ Without first engaging China in amicable consultations, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries have long carried out large-scale resource exploitation activities in waters within China’s Dash Line. Outside these issues are issues such as freedom of navigation, maritime security and geopolitical competition. In the past couple of years, as the United States has stepped to the fore, assertively intervening in South China Sea issues, the Sino-US geopolitical contest or power rivalry in the South China Sea has become ever more prominent.

An accurate understanding of the situation in the South China Sea At present, the so-called South China Sea arbitration case has ended. The US military is boosting its conspicuous firepower in the South China Sea, where the situation remains tense, triggering intense domestic and international public concern. For China, the top priority is to objectively and accurately understand the situation in the South China Sea, and then correspondingly devise realistic strategies and response tactics.

96  Solution to South China Sea tensions First, it is highly possible that tensions in the South China Sea will endure for a long time to come. One, the South China Sea has already become the United States’ major offensive and competitive arena to contain China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific, replacing the Taiwan issue as the matter of greatest geopolitical importance between China and the United States. Besides, the South China Sea has already become a hyper politicized topic in the United States, and no leader and military officer dare to show weakness. The US military clearly views the South China Sea as a region of strategic advantage and current geopolitical vulnerability for China. Now, the US military would carry out hundreds of military exercises and thousands of close reconnaissance missions in the South China Sea every year. Just from May 2017 to September 2018, US warships have entered the 12 nautical miles zones of islands and reefs occupied by China more than ten times already, conducting a series of provocations like high-speed zigzag and electronic jamming, which poses a huge threat to the sovereignty and security of China and Chinese people on these islands and reefs. So long as the United States does not alter China’s judgments on its greatest strategic rival, American provocations in the South China Sea will only rise and not decline. Second, the South China Sea dispute is complex and intricate, including the sovereignty and legality of archipelagos in the open oceans, maritime delimitation of semi-enclosed seas, historical interests and other thorny subjects that cover almost all intentionally ambiguous aspects of previous UNCLOS negotiations. Before the abovementioned ambiguous stipulations are clearly defined, it would be very difficult to formulate a solution that is recognized by all parties. Furthermore, exaggerated by battles of diplomacy, law and public opinion, these disputes spread broadly to the populace and to public opinion, further reducing opportunities for negotiation and compromise. Third, there have been rapid changes in the balance of power in the South China Sea, with all parties, particularly China and the United States, needing time for strategic adjustment to reach a new equilibrium. In other words, both China and the United States need to adapt to new roles: on the one hand, the United States needs to acknowledge China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and the reality of Chinese growing power in the South China Sea, while granting China the necessary space and power; on the other hand, throughout its maritime rise, China also needs to find a reasonable and solicitous plan to accommodate the United States’ legitimate interests in the South China Sea. During this process, frequent mutual strategic and policy probing will become the norm, while a certain degree of conflict and competition is also unavoidable. How long exactly will such tension last? It is very difficult to give a precise estimate. Needless to say, the current direction of trends in the South China Sea situation mainly hinges on China and the United States. In light of the history of Sino-US interaction following the Taiwan Strait Crisis, it is possible to attain an approximate estimate. The current state of affairs will

Solution to South China Sea tensions  97 continue for at least around five years or so. There are two main factors in deciding the length of time: on the one hand, tangible shifts in the balance of power lay the foundation for stability, provided that China can build sufficiently great power in the South China Sea which the United States is unable to ignore; on the other hand, the quality of interaction between the two countries, the willpower and determination of decision makers, the wisdom of policy departments and other nonmaterial factors also play an important role, as they may either slash or elongate the time China and the United States take to find a new equilibrium. However, the likelihood of loss of control over the South China Sea situation or even an outbreak of war is not high. First, although various sides take an unusually hard-line attitude and the dispute can seem very fierce, above all there is no intention to provoke armed conflict or war. In a situation where the strengths of all South East Asian disputant parties are far inferior to that of China, armed provocation would be equivalent to self-­destruction. Despite the United States’ recent saber-rattling, its main purpose is to increase the cost of China’s actions. Through military, diplomatic and international legal measures, the United States forces China to withdraw in the face of opposition, rather than limit China’s operations in the South China Sea through battles. Second, national decision makers and policy departments are generally more rational than the media and public opinion and will endeavor to quarantine confrontation and friction within local confines. This is exactly the reason why South China Sea crisis management mechanisms are synchronized to receive support concurrently as disputes intensify. Overall, tension in the South China Sea cannot be uprooted, but it can be managed as required. Irrefutably, tension in the South China will inevitably have important impacts on the arrangement of China’s foreign strategy. China is also sure to pay a certain price for its purposeful actions in the South China Sea. In this regard, China must be patient and confident, and be sure not to be excessively impulsive, eager to settle the dispute or keen to alleviate the situation. China must persist in defending its sovereignty and expanding the presence of its forces, proactively preparing for all possibilities. China must fight, negotiate and cooperate with some of the disputant parties, as well as with the United States, for these actions go hand in hand. China must thoroughly understand the balance between conflict, negotiation and cooperation to promote a gradual ease in the South China Sea situation.

New opportunities and implications of China’s South China Sea strategy Since the end of the Cold War, China has long pursued a policy of ‘Chinese sovereignty, shelving disputes, and seeking joint development’ (主权属我、搁置 争议、共同开发) on the South China Sea issue, in reality maintaining strategic

98  Solution to South China Sea tensions patience and restraint. Although ‘Chinese sovereignty’ and ‘seeking joint development’ have essentially been reduced to empty rhetoric, prior to 2009 ‘shelving disputes’ was more or less accepted by Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Since China and ASEAN countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, disputes in the South China Sea had been under basic control. While confrontations still regularly occurred, they usually would quickly subside. During this time, China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, developed rapidly, and the South China Sea dispute was in fact often not a pressing dominant challenge. However, from 2009 onward, a series of intertwining factors has caused countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines to take the lead in disrupting the relatively calm status quo. First of all, China’s ever-growing strength elicits Vietnamese and Philippine strategic anxiety. Believing that ‘there is no time like the present,’ they try to seize more fait accompli and resources while China’ strength is still insufficiently strong. Next, the worldwide practice of the EEZ and continental shelf systems inspire Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants to accelerate their legal offensive. For instance, they set various islands as the basepoints of territorial waters, bolstered the administrative jurisdiction of disputed islands and reefs, strengthened maritime law enforcement and presented to the CLCS a submission on delimitation of the outer continental shelf before its deadline (May 13, 2009). Finally, the United States’ ‘Pivot to Asia’ and promotion of the ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalancing’ strategy enthused and roused some countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which hoped to take advantage of the American ‘Pivot’ to provoke China. Coerced by the situation, China has no choice but to begin asserting its rights. In its countermeasures, China has shown formidable strength and unyielding determination, which exceeded the expectations of the relevant countries. Following numerous contests, there has been a dramatic transformation in the situation. First, there has been a radical swing in the balance of power. While there are still difficulties in China’s control of the South China Sea, Chinese capability is no longer what it was before, hence it is already difficult for Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants to contend with China. Furthermore, it will be more difficult for in situ provocation by them to succeed. The cases of Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) (2012) and the standoff over Zhongjian Nan (2014) symbolize the rapid expansion in China’s control and development capacity in the South China Sea. As China’s offensive and defensive power has grown, the US-Philippine version of ‘shelving disputes’ has been introduced, whether the American proposal to ‘freeze’2 or the Philippine ‘Triple Action Plan’,3 both essentially retreat to advance, seeking through these diplomatic approaches to offset Chinese advantages in strength and diminish China’s ever more influential actions to safeguard its development rights in the South China Sea.

Solution to South China Sea tensions  99 Second, debate over legal principles and rules has already become a focal point in the game. Compelled by the balance of power situation, V ­ ietnam, the Philippines and other claimants have started to change tactics in the South China Sea conflict, demonstrating more caution and restraint in ‘armed conflict’, while greatly promoting its ‘non-violent attack.’ These countries are ever more antipathetic to China in the realms of diplomacy and international law, and furthermore work hard to encourage the multilateralization and internationalization of the South China Sea issue. Although the Rodrigo Duterte administration has made a big change of Philippine’s policy towards South China Sea, this kind of adjustment is just on the tactics rather than general positions of the disputes. To advance its ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalancing’ strategy and strengthen the geopolitical competition with China, the United States has steadily abandoned the so-called take no side and take no position approach, to comprehensively and prominently intervene in the South China Sea issue. Japan, Britain, France, ­India, Australia, the European Union and other major powers outside of the region have also all significantly concentrated their attentions on the South China Sea issue. Consequently, future diplomatic and legal warfare will gradually replace military contests as the main form of the game in the South China Sea. China’s ability to uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea has increased dramatically, and furthermore it is time to take the initiative and realize its propositions and aspirations (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1  The South China Sea and the Nine Dash Line.

100  Solution to South China Sea tensions Trends in the unfolding South China Sea situation once again prove that strength is a condition and prerequisite in negotiations. Only when China’s strength is sufficiently great, may the South China Sea situation develop as per China’s vision. Regardless of how the United States, the Philippines and other countries may use glib and artful words, China cannot forsake the protection of its rights and development in the South China Sea. Strength here includes the three major competences of military and law enforcement, resource development, administration and social management. On the basis of consolidating control over the Xisha Islands, China should expand its power presence in the Nansha Islands and its surrounding waters, making sure to react in a timely manner to crises that emerge in waters within its jurisdiction, with the military power to respond at any time to conflict of a moderate scale. On resource development, it is necessary to considerably expand the presence of fisheries in the South China Sea, particularly in disputed waters; achieve breakthroughs in the development of oil and gas in the central and southern parts of the South China Sea as soon as possible; and launch the tourism industry as appropriate. On administration and social management, China should accelerate the ‘solidification’ of Sansha City, which should fulfill its role as an administrative pioneer and leader, and elevate China’s status and duty in international cooperation, such as on sea lane management and disaster relief in the South China Sea. The questions that immediately follow are: what are China’s strategic objectives and will China use these growing capabilities to seize islands and capture reefs, in addition to controlling the entire South China Sea? In truth, China’s actions are not to renounce ‘shelving disputes,’ but to promote peace through strength, to advance negotiations through strength. On 30 July 2013, while presiding over a Politburo study session, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, once again emphasized adherence to the guiding principles of ‘Chinese sovereignty, shelving disputes, and seeking joint development.’ If previously ‘shelving disputes’ was associated with myriad frustrated, passive decisions, then in the future ‘shelving disputes’ must have richer connotations of active choices. In my observations, the 12 Chinese characters (主权属我、搁置争议、共同 开发) in the guiding principle above have offered conciliation in China, and the overall reasoning is feasible. The South China Sea dispute is only one part of China’s ever-closer relationship with South East Asian countries, and the universal spirit of peaceful dispute settlement is perpetually applicable. Policy design is not the problem for China’s current policy predicament in the South China Sea; instead, it is caused by the gap in strength and capability. At present, China certainly has no need to start from scratch, while it should continue to enrich the principles in the 12 characters with new content and new connotations, so that reputation and honor may follow from true merit and real achievements.

Solution to South China Sea tensions  101 Professed ‘Chinese sovereignty’ (主权属我) will be actual policy supported by formidable strength, pledging or enjoying specific political, military, economic, and political actions, rather than merely a catchphrase; so-called shelving disputes (搁置争议) is both a sincere commitment to the international community, and a solemn warning against trespass upon this principle. With the capability and determination to fight against acts of provocation, China will not close its eyes as it did before. The so-called joint development (共同开发) means that instead of remonstrating time and time again, China will attract relevant countries to cooperate on resource development through various economic initiatives and exceptional development and operational capabilities. In short, actions speak louder than words, and tangible achievements are far more important than extravagant proposals. As for the South China Sea strategy under the new circumstances, a thorough understanding of the 12 characters guiding principle is quite inadequate, but truly it is an important foundation for success.

Intelligently navigating complex relations in the South China Sea4 In recent years, China’s capabilities of commanding situations in the South China Sea have steadily increased. However, at the same time, Vietnam, the Philippines and other related countries increasingly unite against China, leveraging America, Japan and other outside powers to check China, while attention on and unease over the South China Sea from other countries in the region and major global powers swell. Diplomatically, China faces heavy encirclement and enormous pressure. Vietnam, the Philippines and other related countries are currently engineering ‘He Zong’5 toward China. Vietnam has always gone to great lengths to separate the South China Sea issue from the overall Sino-Vietnamese relationship, concentrating on an unrelenting, long-term conflict, while highlighting tactics and flexibility. One side stresses a revolutionary friendship of ‘comrades and brothers,’ developing robust relations with China’s party, government and military; bolstering economic and trade cooperation; and preventing a ‘rupture’ in Sino-Vietnamese relations from endangering the greater environment of its reform and opening up. The other side does not hesitate to prepare for political, diplomatic, legal and military struggles and conflicts with China. During Benigno S. Aquino III’s presidency, the Philippines readily posed as the ‘vanguard’ in opposition to China in the South China Sea, first stoking the case of Huangyan Dao, followed by the Renai Jiao incident, and also taking legal action against China in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Since Dutterte’s government came into power, it has adopted the policy of shelving disputes in the South China Sea but has not abandoned Philippine basic positions including the arbitration ruling and the reef sovereignties on the South China Sea issue, and

102  Solution to South China Sea tensions there are also frequent murmurs on harsh measures to be taken toward China in the Philippines. Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia have always advocated negotiations with China to resolve differences and oppose intervention by the United States and other external powers, although they all welcome the United States playing a greater role in non-disputed issues. For them, the South China Sea dispute has never been a major concern in their relations with China, but they still harbor doubts over what kind of South China Sea policies China will pursue after its rise. Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and other non-claimant sides are both concerned over how aggravation in the South China Sea dispute will cause ASEAN to ‘disintegrate’ but also do not wish to ‘fall foul’ of China due to this issue. Therefore they encourage claimant countries to engage in negotiations and willingly act as mediators. ASEAN has no specific position on the South China Sea dispute. Put another way, there is no sovereignty dispute whatsoever between China and ASEAN, as ASEAN’s aim is to establish a certain consensus between claimant states and non-claimant states, in addition to seeking a certain role in implementation of DOC and the COC negotiations process. Because every ASEAN member state has a different stance on the South China Sea issue, it is very difficult for ASEAN to play a collectivizing role in specific disputed issues. This fact was already clearly revealed at the 2012 ASEAN foreign ministers meeting held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in which, for the first time in its 45-year history, ASEAN’s foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communiqué following their annual meeting because of divergence on South China Sea issues.6 In addition, with the Asia-Pacific region’s rising clout in global political and economic framework, the strategic location of the South China Sea appears increasingly important, as all of the world’s major powers are actively forging strategic fulcrums here. Besides the United States, Japan is also strengthening its intervention in the South China Sea issue. It is no overstatement to claim that on the nondisputant side, Japan would be most pleased to see China ensnared in the South China Sea issue, as Japan views Vietnam, the Philippines and other ASEAN countries as the most important potential allies other than the United States to check and balance China. Under the backdrop of a protracted, fierce dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Japan proactively calls on all countries in South East Asia, sensationalizing ‘China’s maritime threat,’ seeking linkages between the South China Sea and the East China Sea, and hunting extensively for allies and partners to oppose China. Japan has upped its military and economic assistance to Vietnam and the Philippines to boost diplomatic interaction with these countries on maritime issues, to best exploit any rifts or contradictions involving China in order to build a maritime security mechanism or alliance against China. India, Australia, Britain, the European Union, Russia and other countries have notably fixated their attention on the South China Sea situation, appealing for peaceful dispute settlement and publishing policies linked to

Solution to South China Sea tensions  103 the South China Sea. Out of consideration for the balance of power, these countries are genuinely averse to seeing China’s prosperous development in this region. The pattern of mutual checks and balances between powers and economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region makes the cost of war in the South China Sea excessively expensive, while China’s ever-growing power presence leaves Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants with no alternative but to reform policy and start afresh, turning to economic, legal, diplomatic and other means of ‘non-violent attack.’ As all parties develop military strength, strengthen law enforcement and prepare for all eventualities, competition over resources development, international law and the regional order will spread like wildfire. Here are some details: •

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First, resource development is already a major source of friction and conflict. Deterred by China’s growing military and law enforcement forces, Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants gradually discontinued the seizure of new islands and reefs, turning instead to intensify competition for resources in the South China Sea. This tactic both captures economic interests, and also results in fait accompli, which create favorable conditions for sovereignty claims. At present there are approximately 200 multinational oil companies that have petroleum charter rights and engage in oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the South China Sea, where more than 1,000 oil and gas wells are being drilled. Their main partners are countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. In recent years, these countries have cooperated with foreign oil companies to a greater extent, brazen in laying new wells and have become increasingly reckless in their actions. As regards friction in fisheries, detainment and expulsion of Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese fisherman by Vietnam, the Philippines, and other ASEAN countries have at times occurred. Dispute over fisheries, colored by the various parties’ internal nationalist sentiments among all parties, grows more passionate and vehement. On the whole, the scramble for resources has now become a leading incentive for new conflict in the South China Sea. However, one thing that must to be noted is that China is no longer the main focal point of contradictions over fishery disputes in the South China Sea, and that there is more and more friction occurring between Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam in waters adjacent to the Natuna Islands and southwestern fishing grounds. In hot spot areas south of waters surrounding the Xisha Islands, China maintains only a few hundred fishing boats while those of Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam all number at least in the thousands there. Second, contentions in international law explanation and public opinion have steadily created a ‘second battlefield.’ Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries depend on UNCLOS with great fanfare, focusing on surveys of geological structures and situation awareness

104  Solution to South China Sea tensions

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in the South China Sea, aggressively collecting legal support for their claims. In addition to campaigning for the ‘sympathy vote,’ they are at all times prepared to ‘reason’ with China or to ‘settle in court,’ with the Philippines speculating from January 2013 that arbitration on the South China Sea issue has set a precedent. Some officials and scholars in the United States and the West also actively provoke in fields of diplomacy and public opinion, publicly accusing proposals and actions linked to China as non-compatible with the provisions and spirit of UNCLOS. These countries focus their attack on China’s position on the ‘Dash Line,’ forcefully utilizing tools such as diplomacy and public opinion to repeatedly call into question Chinese legality. Due to various reasons, China has neither scrupulously prepared for legal battles in response, nor has it formed a set of systematic strategies, so in this respect is comparatively passive. Third, great-power politics have made the issue even more complex and challenging. The United States in particular intends to establish a new front in the South China Sea in the strategic contest with China. The power competition between China and the United States also constitutes the greatest external dispute in the South China Sea environment, which is becoming more and more a deciding factor to the situation of South China Sea. The United States’ attraction of allies and partners by exploiting the South China Sea dispute will naturally be perceived by China as encirclement for containment by the United States, whereas increasingly confident steps by China to protect its rights in the South China Sea and its rising power will also be viewed by the United States as ‘subversion’ of the US-led maritime order. With a rising degree of American intervention, the development of Chinese sea power, and the consequently narrowing gap between Chinese and American overall strength, negative Sino-US general interaction will inevitably impact the direction of the South China Sea issue. If the overall manner of ­Sino-US competition intensifies, South East Asian countries will have no choice but to ‘pick a side.’ The South China Sea will become the focal region of China’s and the United States’ strategic struggles, and never will there be days of peace.

The situation in the South China Sea, the security environment in South East Asia and even the entire Asia-Pacific power structure have undergone vast changes. While China has been constructing a prominent military deterrence system, its legal contest, resources development and diplomatic conflict approaches must be promptly coordinated and redressed. China needs to show ‘muscle’ but moreover needs a comprehensive strategy. It is vital to reinforce the interpretative power of international law, as well as the ability to mold international maritime mechanisms, to solidify the legal basis of China’s claim positions. It is irrefutable that UNCLOS’ ambiguities on maritime delimitation, legitimacy of islands and reefs, historical

Solution to South China Sea tensions  105 entitlements and other issues have objectively elevated the fervor of global maritime disputes, while the intensification of these global disputes will inexorably lead to retroactions in the further evolution and development of international maritime institutions. Although UNCLOS’ appointed adjudication mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Court of Arbitration, do not have any binding power on settling issues of sovereignty disputes, but they could in theory reinterpret some of UNCLOS’ ambiguous articles according to various countries’ new maritime practices and situations worldwide. This both poses a challenge and presents an opportunity to China to safeguard its own interests in the South China Sea by enhancing its aptitude in interpreting relevant international legal provisions, or re-molding maritime mechanisms to demonstrate its own standpoint. Key to breakthrough is the effective promotion of joint resource development in the South China Sea to increase trust and reduce friction. Considering the sensitive and difficulty of joint development, for instance, disputed countries have distinctly contrasting views on maritime disputes and delimitation, China should devote major efforts to studying all kinds of programs for joint development, adopt an open attitude to all forms of economic partnership and achieve ultimate bilateral political solutions through concrete economic and security cooperation. China must sustain sufficient patience, take steps gradually and steadily and untiringly promote the joint development of the South China Sea. In this process, China must strengthen its capacity to raise good proposals, demonstrate adroit deterrence strength and actions that embody strategic will. Through a comprehensive strategy of ‘initiative + strength + action,’ the case of ‘shelving disputes and joint development’ may exist in reality as well as on paper. A prerequisite for success is both soft- and hard-handed management to deal with the internationalization of the South China Sea dispute in order to ‘cool’ and ‘extinguish’ the dispute. The majority of the non-­claimant parties have their reasons for concern over the South China Sea issue; therefore, China should fully respect and understand each sides’ attention on freedom of navigation, regional security and other factors in the South China Sea; improve the transparency of relevant policies; and broaden and deepen communication and cooperation. China can narrate its South China Sea policy through diverse bilateral dialogue mechanisms, multilateral platforms within the ASEAN framework and other international arenas. Among these, it is necessary to distinguish between the disputes over islands and reefs in the South China Sea, maritime delimitation and other issues concerning the South China Sea, such as freedom of navigation and regional security. On these, China may hold consultations with any country or organization at any time and place, and engage in many kinds of cooperation. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi echoed the ‘two-track’ approach proposed by Brunei,

106  Solution to South China Sea tensions to handle the South China Sea issue, where disputant countries directly seek, through amicable negotiations, a peaceful resolution to the relevant disputes, while principles of peace and stability in the South China Sea are jointly protected by China and ASEAN countries. This has been a highly successful diplomatic venture. Since its introduction, this initiative has been widely lauded, receiving the support and recognition of most ASEAN countries. Through such ‘softer’ hands, China has won understanding from a majority of countries and organizations worldwide, as far as possible building an international public opinion and environment in favor of China. Up to now, China and ASEAN countries have made great achievements under the ‘two-track’ approach, of which, the fast advancing negotiation of COC is a typical example. As for a number of countries that intend to ‘profit from trouble’ by leveraging the South China Sea issue, and even engage in hostile actions, China needs to convey to them the unequivocal point that security in the South China Sea is connected to important interests of parties globally, but the South China Sea dispute is irrevocably linked to China’s sovereign rights and sovereign interests. To this end, China should not hesitate to tie these countries’ conduct on issues in the South China Sea and their bilateral relations with China and set a certain ‘red line’ for bilateral political, diplomatic and military retaliation may not be spared. Through a ‘harder’ hand, it should obstruct and limit collusion between certain powers outside of the region and a number of claimant parties.

In defense of legal principles in the South China Sea As everyone knows, on 22 January 2013, the Philippines initiated the South China Sea arbitration procedure, professing in accordance with provisions Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS. The South China Sea arbitration case filed by the Philippines marked the South China Sea dispute’s game beginning to focus on softer contests in international law and global public opinion following hard confrontations such as showdowns between ships, military deterrence, demonstrations of power and social protest. Additionally, the Philippines is in fact not the sole disputant party in the South China Sea dispute that wishes to file a lawsuit against China, as Vietnam and other claimants are currently deliberating and actively preparing their involvement. In future, with further development of China’s law enforcement and improvements in management and control of the South China Sea’s waters, the Philippines, Vietnam and other claimants will suffer greater losses with military means or paramilitary methods in a decisive ‘do or die’ battle with China over strength and courage in the South China Sea, so international legal battles will gradually become the main form of their contests with China. When filing for arbitration, the Philippines asserted that consultation and negotiations with China had reached an impasse. In fact, the Philippine side

Solution to South China Sea tensions  107 had consistently been refusing to engage in any serious dialogue with China since the Huangyan Dao incident, much less negotiations. It is true disputes indeed exist between China and the Philippines over the Nansha Islands and parts of its waters; however, there has never been any Sino-­Philippine communication in reference to the arbitration’s purported issues on the interpretation and application of UNCLOS. The Philippines has never formally raised the aforementioned issues with China. Put another way, the Philippines was filing a lawsuit on the matter of A, when actually discussing the subject of B. The Philippines disregarded the fact that it had never entered any negotiations with China on arbitral affairs, concealing the truth, inventing fictitious disputes and failing to execute Article 283 of UNCLOS on the obligation to exchange views on dispute settlement approaches. Of the 15 complaint submissions in the arbitration case filed by the Philippines, the 3 main submissions were as follows: first, the arbitral tribunal was required to clarify that China’s claim for maritime rights based on the ‘Dash Line’ (or ‘9 Dash Line’) were contrary to UNCLOS. Second, the arbitral tribunal must declare that China’s Meiji Jiao (Mischief Reef), Ximen Jiao (Mckennan Reef), Nanxun Jiao (Graven Reef) and Zhubi Jiao (Subi Reef) were merely ‘low tide elevations’ that could generate no maritime zones of their own; Yongshu Jiao, Huayang Jiao, Chigua Jiao (Johnson South Reef) and Huangyan Dao were ‘rocks’ and had no entitlement to 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone rights. Third, the arbitral tribunal was requested to determine that China was ‘infringing’ upon the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf rights as asserted under UNCLOS and furthermore adopt ‘temporary measures,’ pressing China to end such acts. The purpose of these demands was to fundamentally diminish the legal basis of China’s claims in the South China Sea, limiting China’s maritime interests in the South China Sea to a few scattered islands, reefs, and their surrounding waters. The Philippines of course understood the immunity China enjoys under Article 298 of UNCLOS.7 As a result, content of its arbitration request was clearly meticulously designed to as far as possible circumvent the sovereignty dispute underlying the South China Sea issue. On the surface, these arbitration submissions were a legal debate and a request for the arbitral tribunal to determine that China’s position and actions did not comply with UNCLOS, in place of a demand by the Philippines for the tribunal to settle its island sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes with China. This attempted to circumvent China’s immunity, through a ‘technical’ and ‘lawful’ litigation request, which promoted the Philippine case and allowed it to initiate the arbitration procedure. In spite of this, the Philippines’ arbitration request cannot evade suspicions of edging around codes of conduct and concealing the truth. According to a Chinese official statement: ‘The core of the Philippine file for arbitration is the matter of territorial sovereignty over particular islands and reefs in the South China Sea. It does not concern the interpretation or

108  Solution to South China Sea tensions application of UNCLOS.’8 Moreover, UNCLOS is purposely ambiguous on historical rights, the legal status of islands and reefs, and other issues. To some extent, the arbitral tribunal’s rulings and recommendations have an inclination to possibly undermine UNCLOS’ legal foundation, which seeks the highest common factor through ‘ambiguous compromise.’ However, on 12 July 2016, more unexpectedly, the arbitral tribunal issued the award of this case and made a series of bold and impertinent declarations: ‘the ‘Nine Dash Line’ is contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that it exceeds the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention.’ ‘The Convention superseded any historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed therein.’ As for the status of features in the South China Sea, ‘none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands, in their natural condition, are capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own within the meaning of Article 121(3) of the Convention.’ So, none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands generate entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.9 Obviously, this award is too audacious and unprofessional, which is short of the basic checks and balances required of an international case. If all the declarations made by the tribunal were tenable, China would have nothing but a group of insular features in the South China Sea. For this arbitration, China has always adopted a policy of non-participation, non-acceptance and non-recognition. As to this case, over 70 countries and international and regional organizations, and more than 230 political parties from 90 countries have made statements showing their understanding of and support for China’s position of settling disputes through negotiations10 and do not recognize the dispute resolution approach of the Philippines and the arbitral tribunal. These statistics may be controversial in the Western world, but it is no doubt that the arbitration procedure and its award have not won the general recognition of the international community. Thus, regardless of the outcome, the case itself does not constitute an overwhelming challenge to the China’s legal claims in the South China Sea. The problem is that the case has set a bad precedent, with the possibility of tearing apart the entire international community and swaying the maritime order based on UNCLOS. In the future, conflict will intensify over concerns such as the international community’s means of dispute resolution and the importance of UNCLOS. These conflicts will naturally impact the situation in the South China Sea, as the Philippines, the United States and other countries will inevitably demand China to comply with arbitration rulings, relying on these outcomes to strengthen their authority and moral high ground in the game against China in the South China Sea. There also exist many variables that determine whether Vietnam and other disputant parties will mimic the Philippine example. It should be noted that the South China Sea dispute is a strategic and comprehensive contest, in which legal warfare need to sufficiently consider

Solution to South China Sea tensions  109 maritime strategy, policy enforcement, military deterrence, and other situations at a higher level, broader scope and wider frontier. First, in order to respond to such legal disputes with self-confidence and professionalism, it is necessary to boost research into international maritime law and interaction with relevant international mechanisms. Ideas in the underlying principles of international law, in particular maritime law, originate from customary law shaped in the process of interaction among Western countries. In modern times, China has been learning constantly to catch up. Today, China is still a distance away from world class in the research field of international law, which includes international maritime law. On specific issues, such as the South China Sea, China’s research also appears to be relatively rudimentary, for the most part ending with the repetition and interpretation of official positions. In jurisprudential, empirical and other aspects, there is very little of value in diplomatic legal contentions. In order to achieve true victory in legal battles, China must advance this area of research and lay a solid foundation for its legal claims. On 7 December 2014, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the ‘Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,’11 incisively identifying inconsistencies and contradictions in the Philippines’ arbitration case through incontrovertible evidence and exhaustive logic. It fully demonstrates the Chinese position and reflects China’s marked progress in areas such as its aptitude for legal research and skill in diplomatic battle in recent years. At the same time, China should strive to participate in the development and operation of international mechanisms. Chinese citizens hold a number of positions in mechanisms such as CLCS and ITLOS, which are based on UNCLOS to exercise jurisdiction on the behalf of virtually all of mankind and whose impartiality and authority are widely recognized by the international community. China should appropriate steer domestic public opinion to avoid speculation on various kinds of ‘conspiracy theories.’ As for the Philippine arbitration case, China must approach it rationally, present its position to the international community and illustrate its experiences of injustice. However, it is inadvisable to vent its fury and sentiment toward the Philippines to ITLOS or the arbitral tribunal at will. Second, it is necessary to comprehensively weigh interest gains against interest losses in strategic international maritime legal battles. The legal battle in the South China Sea is the result of various conflicting beliefs and interests, creating huge pressure against the evolution and development of UNCLOS as the ‘maritime charter’ as well as challenging China’s principles of maritime law and maritime strategies. The signature and implementation of UNCLOS is the result of compromise, which features tactful ambiguity or evasion on myriad major issues such as the status of islands and reefs. These less than explicit articles reflect differences in the legal views and interest definitions of coastal states. The South China Sea issue has in particular

110  Solution to South China Sea tensions highlighted the inadequacies of UNCLOS stipulations on maritime delimitation principles, status of features, historical rights and other issues. An ultimate settlement in the South China Sea dispute has to accompany the evolution of international maritime law, and the resolution process is certain to impact upon developments in international maritime law. China needs to comprehensively scrutinize gains and losses in its entire sovereign maritime space, including the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, in accordance with the underlying spirit of international maritime law, practical experience, development trends, and other factors. In light of this consideration, China next should form relevant regulation proposals. Third, it is necessary to strengthen coordination between domestic departments and institutions, so that diplomatic, economic, military and other policy tools can act in concert together to support the legal warfare. There is a certain degree of flexibility in international law as the arbitral court and other international mechanisms do not award rulings in a vacuum entirely free of international politics. The trial process, final result and even jurisdiction of this case will be subject to the interference or influence of the international situation and public opinion. Consequently, this is unquestionably not merely a simple legal battle, but an integrated and all-encompassing contest of diplomacy, military affairs, international law and public opinion, presenting a test for China’s comprehensive strategic strength at sea. As for China, it is imperative to prevent the international community from forming an unfavorable final verdict on the laws relevant to the South China Sea. In addition to strengthening the construction and interpretation of its own legal system, it is necessary to resolutely suppress any provocative behavior akin to the Philippine arbitration case. In diplomacy, China should adjust its mentality as deliberate evasion in unnecessary, actively voice its stance at international events and in so far as possible unveil the ‘sympathy vote’ of the Philippines and other countries in light of inevitable of internationalization of the South China Sea issue; militarily, China still needs to continue reinforcing its construction and application of force, elevate the effectiveness of deterrence and prevent the emergence of further disadvantages to China; economically, China should proactively conduct scientific investigation and maintain economic presence in the disputed areas, in addition to initiating appropriate oil and gas resource exploitation measures to promote genuine ‘joint development’ by way of independent development through advantages in technology, capital and other areas in the southern and central South China Sea.

Debate over the South China Sea ‘Dash Line’12 Since 2009, China’s position over the South China Sea ‘Dash Line’ (also sometimes known as ‘the Nine Dash Line’) has become a focal point of the South China Sea legal conflict, as not only does the Philippine arbitration farce point directly at the ‘Dash Line,’ but Vietnam, Malaysia and other

Solution to South China Sea tensions  111 countries are in practice also opposed to the ‘Dash Line.’ Even more noteworthy is that the United States has started to cheer its support openly for the Philippines as US Assistant Secretary of State Russell demanded China clarify the ‘Nine Dash Line’ at a US congressional committee hearing on 5 February 2014.13 Subsequently, more and more American senior officers have made repeated accusations of Chinese violations of UNCLOS, insisting that China explain its ‘Nine Dash Line’ request. There are also some other countries within the region and beyond that more or less believe that the ‘Dash Line’ is noncompliant with the UNCLOS essence, in which ‘land dominates the sea.’ For a time, it seemed as if China’s ‘Dash Line’ position was perpetually incompatible with UNCLOS and had become a target of unrestricted censure. However, the truth is not as it appears. First, China’s position on the ‘Dash Line’ does not contravene any UNCLOS articles. China’s claims on the ‘Dash Line,’ which includes island sovereignty and the historical interests of waters within the Line, are mainly founded upon the enduring historical practices of Chinese ancestors in the South China Sea. China began sailing and fishing activities in the South China Sea as early as in the Han Dynasty, while accounts related to the South China Sea appeared in Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign Matters) in the Eastern Han Dynasty. Since the Tang Dynasty, China has encompassed the Nansha Islands into Chinese domain, while in the Song and Yuan Dynasties, the many islands and waters of the South China Sea were named, administered and controlled, tentatively establishing the beginnings of maritime territory in the South China Sea. In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the scope and domain of China’s activities in the South China Sea were further outlined as the four major archipelagos and their neighboring waters progressively become traditional areas of operation for Chinese fishermen. Based on the above, after over ten years of investigation and verification, in 1947 the government of the Republic of China finally mapped China’s traditional territory in the South China Sea through the form of the ‘Dash Line.’ Following its founding, the People’s Republic of China inherited and committed to the ‘Dash Line’ claims. With the formation of the Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelf systems, original legal facts on the ‘Dash Line’ have evolved into three broad categories: first is the sovereignty of islands and their territorial waters; second is the Exclusive Economic Zones of islands in light of UNCLOS assertions; and third are the lawful rights of traditional waters, which are yet to be determined, that is, historical rights or interests that are also a focus of current disputes. The ‘Dash Line’ is in fact not a territorial demarcation line, nor has the Chinese government ever defined it as such. This is a legal fact that the current maritime legal system is unable to interpret. Serving as basic international maritime law, UNCLOS has not made any provisions on such traditional territories or interests based on historical practice, nor has it provided clarification on existing legal facts. Although UNCLOS refers to

112  Solution to South China Sea tensions historic title and historic bay in Article 15 and Article 298, expressing that UNCLOS acknowledges historic rights, but does not include articles specifying what constitutes historic rights. It is unavoidable that there exists a degree of ambiguity in China’s ‘Dash Line’ claims because there is in fact no consensus on the concept and connotations of historical rights in the field of international jurisprudence. The legal system established by UNCLOS in reality cannot explain or define historic rights. In the part of Preamble, ­UNCLOS is ‘Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.’14 Without clear-cut standards and regulations, it is hard to understand what ‘violation’ could mean. Second, related countries clearly have hidden motives for exploiting ­UNCLOS to attack China’s ‘Dash Line’ position. Work on the general survey and design of the ‘Dash Line’ map began on 1933, completed in 1947 and was released to the public in 1948. In the following several decades until the early 1970s, the ‘Dash Line’ position received the international community’s widespread approval and recognition. In this period, South East Asian countries including Vietnam and the Philippines designed and published maps, which labeled without exception the Nansha, Xisha, Dongsha, Zhongsha Islands and other archipelagos within the ‘Dash Line’ as belonging to China. Western countries such as France and Spain even published maps that used ‘Dash Line’ to mark China’s maritime territorial boundary in the South China Sea without the slightest objection from any of the parties in the South China Sea dispute today. Some countries now discount their former silence and acquiescence, accusing the ‘Dash Line’ position of compromising UNCLOS, while in fact they violate the diplomatic principle of equitable estoppel, if only for immediate interests. Due to economic interests and strategic interests, the Philippines, Vietnam and other claimants wish to not only secure their occupied islands, reefs, and other vested interests, but also continue to expand their gains; the United States, Japan and other countries help to muddy the waters with ulterior motives at heart, principally to create inconvenience for China and to contain China at sea. If international morality and international law are disregarded due to these countries’ selfish interests, then surely this is a breach in the underlying spirit of fairness and justice in international law? Finally, the use of UNCLOS to forcibly adjudicate of the ‘Dash Line’ position contradicts inter-temporal law and other legal principles or conventions. Inter-temporal law ‘resolves conflict between laws, and furthermore determines a suitable legal time scale. That is, legal facts must be judged based upon contemporary law, instead of according to law while the dispute is in progress or as it is settled.’ In other words, we can judge neither the conduct of our predecessors in accordance to modern laws, nor whether descendants’ inheritance of ancestors’ legal facts is ‘lawful.’ UNCLOS was not signed until 30 years after the establishment of the ‘Dash Line’ position, and only officially enforced over ten years after that; even in comparison with

Solution to South China Sea tensions  113 the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, ‘Dash Line’ claims originated more than ten years earlier. Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf rights derive from the modern maritime legal system centered upon UNCLOS, while China’s ‘Dash Line’ position originates from international legal conventions at and before that time. The legal origins of the two matters are entirely different. Condemning the ‘Dash Line’ position as noncompliant with UNCLOS stipulations, surely is to allow UNCLOS to traverse retrospectively through time and space? In addition, the blind expansion of any UNCLOS article’s jurisdiction and the exaggeration of its interpretive power may raise the problem of coherence for UNCLOS articles as the whole, as well as lead to contradictions between UNCLOS and other principles in international law, directly creating a ‘legitimacy’ crisis for UNCLOS in the general international legal system. Thus, according to jurisprudence and relevant historical support, ­UNCLOS articles and practices all cannot refute China’s ‘Dash Line’ position. In accordance with prevailing international legal principles, as a new legal system, UNCLOS and its practices, cannot conflict with existing international law and existing legal facts. The Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf systems established by UNCLOS also cannot challenge China’s existing rights obtained on the basis of other legal systems. UNCLOS is the foundation of modern maritime law and the maritime order, and its spirit of fairness, justice and authority is generally recognized by the international community. However, international maritime law is in a state of constant dynamic development, while UNCLOS itself is far from perfect. It is a product of concession and compromise, with numerous ambiguous articles that need distilling and a wide range of marine practices that need to be included. The apparently fierce contraction between China’s ‘Dash Line’ position and UNCLOS is actually due in large to UNCLOS’ areas of deficiency the jurisprudence of historic rights. To be sure, in future China needs to make fresh efforts through its national practices. However, the international community, all coastal states included, also should conscientiously promote the enhancements and refinements in UNCLOS through sustained communication and negotiation, so as to provide a more comprehensive, just, reasonable and clear legal reference or guide for the settlement of various major global maritime disputes, such as the South China Sea dispute.

Thoughts on the land reclamation of the Spratly Islands15 At the end of 2013, China launched a construction project to garrison sections of the Nansha Islands. In April 2014, a photo of China reclaiming land in the Chigua Jiao was widely shared in various major media. At the scene, the photo merely showed a number of Chinese large tonnage vessels working in the vicinity of the Chigua Jiao, having reclaimed 0.1 square kilometers of

114  Solution to South China Sea tensions artificial island. The then Philippine President Aquino III declared, several Chinese vessels equipped with land reclamation facilities were discovered in waters of the Nanxun Jiao and Huayang Jiao. They could be used for land reclamation and island building in the South China Sea. In response, at a routine press conference on 15 May 2014, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated, ‘China has indisputable sovereignty over Nansha Islands including Chigua Reef and the contiguous waters. Whatever construction China carries out in the Chigua Reef is completely within China’s sovereignty.’16 On 9 June, with regard to the news of airport construction on the Yongshu Jiao, Hua Chunying again expressed a similar position. Based on past experience, this attitude showed that China had already indirectly acknowledged rumors of land reclamation. At a press conference on 9 April 2015, Hua Chunying delivered a more detailed explanation, noting that the Chinese government has been carrying out maintenance and construction work on some of the garrisoned Nansha Islands and reefs with the main purposes of optimizing their functions, improving the living and working conditions of personnel stationed there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as better performing China’s international responsibility and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, navigation safety, fishery production service and other matters.17 The relevant construction is well within China’s sovereignty, and it neither impacts nor targets any country. According to conjecture from satellite photo at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States, the accumulated surface area of expansions to islands and reef is over 13 square kilometers. Three super long aircraft runways (each approximately 3,000 meters in length) have been built on the Yongshu, Zhubi and Meiji Jiao.18 China’s project to construct islands and reefs has enormously improved livelihoods on the Nansha Islands, and has also markedly advanced China’s power presence in the Nansha Islands. At the same time, this progress has also prompted a high degree of concern from the international community especially the United States,19 which exploits the opportunity to sensationalize, exert pressure upon China with language such as supposed ‘too much, too quick’20 and alleged ‘militarization of islands and reefs’, and which increases the extent of their intervention in the South China Sea issue, and heightens Sino-US tension on the matter. In reality, with the new situation in the South China Sea, China had truly no choice except to reclaim land in the Nansha Islands, for the following reasons. First, this is to remedy historic gaps in infrastructure investment and to bolster the power presence in the Nansha Islands. For long periods of time, Vietnam and the Philippines have continued operations on occupied islands

Solution to South China Sea tensions  115 and reefs, promoting some islands as military bases. Vietnam has stationed from dozens to hundreds of troops on the medium and relatively larger sized islands and reefs, such as Hongxiu (Namyit) Island, Nanwei (Spratly) Island, Jingxiong (Sin Cowe) Island, Nanzi Island (Southwest Cay), Zhong Jiao (Central Reef) and has more than 2,000 military personnel garrisoned throughout the entire Nansha Islands in total. In particular, there are reconnaissance positions, docks and an airfield built; cannons and other heavy weaponry deployed; and approximately 550 troops stationed on the Nanwei Island. On its occupied islands and reefs, the Philippines has constructed two small-scale military airbases and on three of these islands and reefs created army bases, including an airstrip on Zhongye (Pag-Asa) Island that can even host large C-130 air freighters. In stark contrast, installations on islands and reefs controlled by China in the Nansha Islands are the most rudimentary. They were reinforced concrete huts on stilts built by soldiers, who were stationed on the reefs in the 1990s. Having suffered from the high-­temperature, high-humidity and high-salinity environments of the South China Sea for over 20 years, these facilities are now in urgent need of repair and development. Since contending parties such as Vietnam and the Philippines have seized all the islands with the best conditions, peaceful and prudent management of the few islands and reefs under China’s control has become the foundation upon which to secure its presence in the Nansha Islands. Second, it is to ‘teach Vietnam and the Philippines a lesson’ in order to quell their hubris. In the past, to counter the seizure of islands and reefs by countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as their actions that incessantly disrupt the status quo, China chiefly pressurized or condemned these sides through approaches in diplomacy or public opinion, appealing to these countries to stop their provocative behavior and restart to bilateral negotiations as soon as possible. However, diplomacy that is not supported by strength and practical action will always come to nothing. Vietnam and the Philippines not only turned a deaf ear to China’s objections, but stepped up their aggravations, completely viewing relevant international norms and the DOC signed in 2002, as irrelevant, and accelerated them to further their military, social, political and economic presence on occupied islands and reefs, speculated publicly on the ‘China threat’ and advocated the internationalization and multilateralization of the South China Sea dispute. Above all, as their unease intensifies in the foreseeable future, Vietnam and the Philippines are anxious lest the situation develop in an increasingly unfavorable direction and count on the unprecedented tendency of countries outside of the region to meddle in the South China Sea. Under these circumstances, reciprocal action by China is fully within reason. China needs to act so that the Philippines can discern the reality, indirectly check and balance its expansion and safeguard the peaceful order of the South China Sea. In view of China’s present comprehensive national strength, once there is an outbreak of action over the Nansha Islands, whether it is an arms race or an infrastructural competition, China would

116  Solution to South China Sea tensions tower over both Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s construction on the Nansha Islands would deal Vietnam and the Philippines a head-on blow, helping to compel Vietnam and the Philippines to refrain from unilateral action and to return to the negotiating table. Last, it is to cast a chess piece in the distant seas and the open oceans, to develop islands and reefs under control in the South China Sea into bases upon which to move forward. As China steps toward the distant seas and the open oceans, China is in ever-greater need to acquire indispensable bases in the central and southern parts of the South China Sea for reconnaissance and early warning in addition to logistical support. The Nansha Islands happen to be situated in a critical location and can project upon the entire southern part of the South China Sea, compensating for any shortfalls or deficits in China’s reconnaissance or early warning in this area, furthermore acting as a multiplier in projecting power, and increasing the capability of Chinese sea power to extend to the southern part of the South China Sea and even to the Indian Ocean. For China’s deep-sea strategy, the importance of the Nansha Islands even exceeds that of the Xisha Islands. However, the distance between the Nansha Islands and both the Xisha Islands and the Chinese Mainland is considerable. The closest distance from the Nansha Islands to the Xisha Islands is approximately 550 kilometers, while the effects of projection from heavy forces present on Hainan Island and the Xisha Island bases decline sharply by the time the Nansha Islands are reached; moreover, islands and reefs presently under Chinese control in the Nansha Islands had no airfields and no large-scale docks before. In the event of catastrophe, even Chinese power would find it very difficult to proceed with rapid relief and rescue. At the same time, China also lacks necessary the self-defense capabilities herein. A number of the somewhat larger islands and shoals have already been completely carved up and divided between Vietnam, the Philippines and other parties, while the few islands and reefs controlled by China are practically enclosed by islands and reefs occupied by Vietnam and the Philippines. Furthermore, in geomorphology, these islands and reefs were mostly atolls or platform reefs, with relatively poor natural conditions and unable to deploy heavy equipment or garrison a large number of personnel. The garrison capability of these islands and reefs was at most squads of light weaponry and small arms. Under the present circumstances, islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands were not only unable to serve as a powerful springboard for the extension of Chinese power but were likely to become a liability for the Chinese government and military in times of armed conflict. To change this situation, land reclamation in the Nansha Islands can be accepted as a peaceful yet effective strategic measure. To satisfactorily execute the abovementioned intentions, these islands and reefs reclaimed by China should at the very least meet the two following major functional requirements. First, as a vital power presence, the forces garrisoned on these islands and reefs must be able to self-defend in times

Solution to South China Sea tensions  117 of skirmishes, and not be ‘held hostage’ by Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries, or be the object of those who ‘fish in muddy waters.’ This requires China to increase its total armed forces in these areas to at least the battalion level or even to the regiment scale, and furthermore boost its anti-reconnaissance facilities, so as to strike a basic equilibrium in power in the Nansha Islands with Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Second, as forward bases, these islands and reefs must support a comparatively larger airfield and larger docks, with strong logistical capacities. This all requires a certain amount of space. Before Chinese reclamation, islands with airfield runways greater than 1 kilometer in length in the Nansha Islands were the two largest of the Nansha Islands, namely Taiping Island and Zhongye Island, with surface areas of 0.432 and 0.37 square kilometers, respectively, whereas Malaysia has built an artificial island on Danwan Jiao (Swallow Reef), whose area reaches 0.35 square kilometers, with a runway exceeding 1 kilometer long. It is evident that a large-scale military presence and the functions of a forward base all specify that the islands areas cannot be too small. Taking into account livelihood issues and socialization activities, these islands and reefs require even greater areas. The United States’ alleged ‘too quick, too much’ is purely unsubstantiated as globally there have never been standards for such measurements. In view of the Chinese government’s consistently high efficiency in infrastructure construction, the scale of island and reef expansion is all the more straightforward to comprehend. It is essential to note that completely denying the military role and significance of China’s island building in the Nansha Islands would appear deceitful, however, to unduly examine China’s behavior from a military perspective alone would be rather too constricted. In fact, the potential role of island and reef expansion in the Nansha Islands in stimulating socioeconomic livelihoods, launching international cooperation and assuming the responsibility of a great power should not be overlooked. It is common knowledge that China historically once long assumed overwhelming advantages in its socioeconomic presence in close proximity of the Nansha Islands. However, following the end of the Second World War, especially since the 1970s, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines seized numerous islands and reefs one by one in China’s Nansha Islands. Chinese fishing boats and merchant ships thus lost traditional supply depositories and transit centers, as the capacity and scope of their operations diminished day by day, while China comprehensively fell behind Vietnam, the Philippines and other disputant parties in the development of resources in the Nansha Islands, such as that of fisheries, oil and gas, and tourism. Out of considerations to accelerate economic development in the South China Sea and improve livelihoods of Chinese citizens, under a backdrop of peaceful dispute resolution, China must best manage and exploit islands and reefs currently under its control. As these islands and reefs have extremely small surface areas and very poor basic conditions, China has no alterative other

118  Solution to South China Sea tensions than land reclamation and island building. In the context of China accelerating its support of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and cooperation around the South China Sea, the need for island building is even more acute. There is a severe imbalance in the supply of international public goods in the South China Sea region. The Nansha Islands also remain a key platform for China to expand global cooperation and undertake international responsibility. We only know that piracy is rampant in the Gulf of Aden, whereas it is unobserved there are also areas severely affected by piracy on the margins of the South China Sea, where incident outbreaks are next only to those of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden in frequency and at times even the highest in the world. The hydrology of the South China Sea is complex, with myriad sunken reefs and shoals, hectic transportation routes and ships often running aground against reefs. For instance, on 11 July 2012, a PLAN frigate became inadvertently stranded while carrying out routine patrol duties in waters close surrounding the Banyue Jiao (Half Moon Shoal) in the Nansha Islands; on 17 January 2013, the USS Guardian minesweeper ran aground and stranded in the Philippine Tubbataha Reefs. Additionally, the South China Sea and its peripheral regions are vulnerable to countless typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis, while marine search and rescue missions are extremely arduous and hazardous. Impeded by maritime disputes and restricted by their national strength, ASEAN countries are simply unable to assume the abovementioned responsibilities. Although China has considerable strength, these issues were beyond its reach. China’s forces in the Nansha Islands were limited to the defense of islands by troops, as it was impossible to deploy large-scale military or civilian facilities on a permanent basis on the Yongshu Jiao and other islands and reefs given their the intrinsic conditions; search and rescue forces must be dispatched from the distant Xisha Islands or even Hainan Island, and were unable to arrive in time at the scene in central and southern parts of the South China Sea. Under these circumstances, there was an enormous gap in the supply of international public goods in the South China Sea. As the largest coastal state along the South China Sea, China naturally has an unshirkable responsibility. Responsible great powers do not only indulge in empty rhetoric; moreover, the assumption of international duties should begin from the periphery. Specifically, to central and southern parts of the South China Sea, China must have solid logistical support, hence the need to expand islands and reefs under its control in the Nansha Islands. Following their completion, the islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands will become comprehensive bases to safeguard China’s participation in international cooperation and contribution in maritime public goods. These islands and reefs will not only allow China’s various forces to more agilely reach the Nansha Islands, rapidly operate on the periphery of the South China Sea, but also help all countries’ vessels and aircraft that navigate in the vicinity of the Nansha Islands. The islands will become some powerful

Solution to South China Sea tensions  119 points to support China’s drive for prosperous development and peaceful stability in the South China Sea.

The debut display of ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ and its future maneuvers In early May 2014, the Chinese deep-water drilling rig, Haiyang Shiyou (Ocean Petroleum) 981, was deployed in the waters of the Xisha Islands to engage in drilling and exploration duties. The China Maritime Bureau issued the navigational alert ‘Hainan Navigation Warning No. 0033,’ announcing that ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ drilling platform will conduct drilling work between 2 May and 15 August in an area within one nautical mile radius of 15-29.58N 111-12.06E, with other unauthorized vessels prohibited from entry. Nonetheless, Vietnam paid no heed to this navigation warning, instead dispatching a large fleet of vessels to cause severe disruption to China’s drilling operations. Vietnam sent combat divers and in addition released considerable quantities of fishing nets and bulky obstacles in the water in acts of blatant provocation, which ‘constitute a security threat to the facilities and personnel of Chinese vessels, as well as posing a hazard to the security of normal navigation.’ Chinese ships had no choice but to resort to measures such as ramming ships and spraying water cannon to resist Vietnamese vessels. Thereupon Chinese escort ships engaged Vietnamese ships seeking to interfere in intense confrontation in the proximity of 17 nautical miles south of Zhongjian (Triton) Island. During the standoff, fierce conflicts unfolded between the two parties on fronts such as military affairs, diplomacy and public opinion. At the peak of the conflict, there were close to 200 vessels of various types at the scene between the two sides. The confrontation south of Zhongjian Island also attracted a high degree of global attention. As for responses to its actions, China has received a mix of positive and negative reaction domestically and internationally. Supporters argue that execution of the Zhongjiannan initiative is an excellent demonstration of China’s determination in maintaining its rights and constitutes a powerful deterrence of the states concerned; in contrast, critics point out that the Zhongjiannan project is worthless as this block’s value to yield oil and gas is not high, while worsening relations with Vietnam and deepening a sense of vigilance in other countries surrounding the South China Sea. On the operational level, it is difficult to comprehend for some sections of public opinion on the ‘Coming too hastily and leaving also in a hurry’ actions targeting ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981,’ equating critical political and military affairs with child’s play. In particular, the early pull back carried the suspicion of acquiescence to external pressure. On 15 July, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL) unexpectedly issued an announcement that ‘Haiyang Shiyou

120  Solution to South China Sea tensions 981’ rig platform had successfully completed drilling and exploration operations in waters surrounding Zhongjian Island in the Xisha Islands and would shift sites, as planned, to waters near Hainan Lingshui to continue work, which was one month in advance of schedule. At the time the United States frequently pressured China in respect to the Zhongjiannan project: for instance, on 10 July the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations demanded in resolution 412 that China withdraw drilling rig 981. As a result, this transition has inevitably led to all kinds of conjecture from observers globally and media of whether what happened was a routine transference or rather a strategic retreat for diplomatic ‘pacification’? However, the story of pressure leading to such a compromise is not very credible. For more than two months since the launch of the Zhongjiannan project, Vietnam has persisted in disrupting China’s drilling and exploration operations at the site, continuously pressurizing China and seeking international support; at the same time, it was clear that the United States ‘supported Vietnam, suppressed China’ in aspects such as diplomacy and public opinion, repeatedly criticizing China for the initiative. Yet, these attempts have been in vain. Vietnam lacked forceful measures to coerce China to withdraw, whereas the United States had no strong political will for coercive intervention. At the scene, Vietnam was in an increasingly unfavorable position since early May, while its open speculation on the Sino-­Vietnamese confrontation event was exactly to compensate for its deficiencies in strength; in diplomacy, Vietnam has gained also only the verbal sympathy and support of countries such as the United States and Japan, rather than gaining anything of substance. Even the intercessions by the then US President Barack Obama, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and other senior officials have been unable to resolve the issue. How could a nonbinding resolution with no legal effect in the slightest, passed by 20 odd members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, result in a positive turnaround? From an objective perspective, an early withdrawal did indeed help to alleviate regional tensions and mitigate Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-US relations, but it was certainly not a major consideration for the transfer of the rig. In view of information from all sides overall, it is highly probable that the early fulfillment of its targets is the reason at root for the drawback. Deep-sea oil and gas development is an incredibly complex economic activity, as at least it must pass through multiple steps such as on site surveying and exploration, data analysis, test drilling, in addition to formal extraction. Previously, only simple 3D seabed seismic measurements, which yet lacked the support of precise and detailed data, were carried out in the Zhongjiannan block to ascertain drilling location. This time in launching the initiative, the 981 drilling rig did not conduct detailed research or economic calculations, as its main economic objective is to obtain submarine geological data, as a basis for follow up decision making, with strong features of test drilling. As relevant information and plans are short in detail, drilling and exploration cycles cannot be devised so rigorously and accurately, with a large

Solution to South China Sea tensions  121 degree of flexibility in the original three months period. Having established two rigs and obtained essential information and statistics, before such data are comprehensively analyzed and commercially assessed, for drilling rig 981 to remain at the site would be to make much ado about nothing. ‘The relevant companies will research and formulate the next step in the scheme of operation on the basis of analysis and assessment of geological material.’21 Comments such as this by the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not simply government rhetoric and clichés, as this is likely the truth, albeit this stage in drilling rig 981’s operations has indeed concluded. Of course, the Zhongjiannan initiative is also drilling a ‘political well,’ for political motivations are also important reasons behind the launch of this project. This conflict and game is an exceptional demonstration of China’s powerful strength and determination, as well as a declaration of the intention to defend its sovereignty through actual action. At the same time, it has appraised and tested the positions and bottom lines of neighboring countries and those of countries outside of the region such as the United States. Typhoon and other meteorological concerns are direct factors for the transfer. The South China Sea began to enter the typhoon season in midto late July 2014, No. 9 typhoon ‘Rammasun’ formed on the afternoon of 12 July on the ocean surface of the Northwest Pacific Ocean, ferocious and merciless in its intensity, and was predicted to impact the Xisha and Hainan Islands on around 18 July. Although drilling rig 981 can withstand typhoons, the capacity of its surrounding escort, provisions, and services vessels to endure typhoons is far less optimistic. As goals had been reached and the weather was subject to sudden change, to begin to withdraw from the site before the advent of typhoons was undoubtedly a wise move. Following the Zhongjiannan incident, both China and Vietnam proclaimed momentous victories, while a range of interpretations and narratives emerged in domestic Chinese public opinion. In reality, notwithstanding any apparent irrespective gains and losses, the Zhongjiannan initiative undeniably marks a major breakthrough for China. Its economic and strategic role and significance to China in the South China Sea will far outweigh the project itself. First, the most direct understanding possible has been conceived of geological structures in waters surrounding the Xisha Islands to the benefit of follow-up research and development work. Unlike ordinary, indirect surveying equipment, drilling rig 981 directly explored and laid wells, acquiring firsthand seabed geological specimens from the Zhongjian Depression. According to information released by CNPC, drilling and exploration works have on this occasion discovered signs of oil and gas in the targeted layers. From results of preliminary analysis of data and geological materials gathered, the Zhongjian Depression has the essential conditions required for oil and gas deposits, and to some extent, potential for oil and gas exploration. Second, China has accumulated a wealth of management and conflict experience for operations in sensitive waters. The Zhongjiannan initiative

122  Solution to South China Sea tensions is the first time China has engaged in operations in distant seas far from the continent, in especially complicated and sensitive waters. During this period, China has engaged in a sweeping head-to-head contest with Vietnam at the scene and beyond to ensure the normal operations of the rig, fulfilling all tasks to satisfaction and gaining rich experience in fields such as politics, diplomacy, law enforcement, military affairs and public opinion. It goes without saying these experiences will provide valuable lessons and references for China in its future exploration and development of other sensitive waters of the South China Sea. Third, China has dealt a stunning blow to the arrogance and audacity of countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and moreover changed the configuration of oil and gas development in the South China Sea. As for other parties in the South China Sea dispute, the influence of the by drilling rig ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ far outstrips that of an aircraft carrier, as China has become the only South China Sea disputant to independently possess deep-sea drilling equipment and technology. With increasing escalations in the South China Sea dispute, oil companies from outside the region, which prioritize economic benefits and are confronted with growing security risks and cost uncertainties, have no choice but to be more cautious when collaborating with Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. In contrast, China, relying on its own equipment and technology and strongly supported by national determination, will gradually become the leader in developing oil and gas resources in the South China Sea. After Drilling Rig 981 commenced drilling south of the Zhongjian Islands, Vietnam, the Philippines and other ASEAN countries grew ever more alarmed and agitated, anxious that China will initiate drilling and in the even more sensitive waters of the Nansha Islands. It can be expected that Vietnam, the Philippines and others will have to show restraint on issues of oil and gas development from now onward lest they provide additional leverage for China, resulting in its use of drilling rig 981 for retaliatory development. Thus, this platform can at least check the momentum of countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines in oil and gas development, and play a role in cooling the South China Sea dispute. The Zhongjiannan initiative is only the initial appearance of drilling rig 981 and the first demonstration of its capabilities. The regions in which it can truly prove its superior capabilities are the central and southern parts of the South China Sea, south of the Xisha Islands. In fact, the region surrounding the Xisha Islands is actually not rich in oil and gas deposits. Although the depression area in the waters surrounding the Xisha Islands (that is, the location of the Zhongjiannan initiative) possesses geological conditions for the formation of oil and gas deposits, such as occurrence of oil, reservoir strata, cap rocks, traps, migration and later stage storage, with certain prospects for development, but cannot be compared with waters surrounding the Nansha Islands. Judging from the development layouts of all disputant

Solution to South China Sea tensions  123 parties in the South China Sea, the vast majority of wells are concentrated on the coast of the South China Sea continental shelf and around the sedimentary basins of the Nansha Islands. Whether ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ will revisit the Xisha Islands predominantly depends on CNPC’s and other companies’ analysis and evaluation results from data and material collected on this occasion. The key is to see whether this region has any commercial development value, and on this foundation to plan and arrange exact tasks for the next phase. But, in any case, the Xisha Islands will not be at the heart of China’s oil and gas development in future. Gradual progress toward the Nansha Islands is the true import of ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’, but this will be a protracted and onerous process. Difficulties in supplying the Nansha Islands far exceed those of the Xisha Islands, while the Nansha Islands’ geopolitical environment is also more complex. Mainland China is currently placed at an absolute disadvantage, with highly limited capacity for action in the vicinity of the Nansha Islands and subject to many handicaps. The crucial bottleneck is China’s lack of a substantial provisions and defense base around the Nansha Islands and is therefore unable to provide various basic guarantees to such a huge platform. All of the islands and reefs under Chinese control are slender table reefs, the majority of whose area is submerged during high tide, typically with areas above water partitioned into multiple segments. Surface area available is extremely limited and facilities on the islands and reefs are also very poorly equipped houses on stilts constructed from reinforced concrete. Issues of self-defense remain problematic for these islands and reefs, let alone the provision of support for drilling rigs. To transform this situation, the only current feasible solution is land reclamation. China has already started work on this front, and once construction is complete on the forward base in the Nansha Islands, ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981,’ next drill will have basic material conditions there. Exploring and surveying the seabed in waters surrounding the Nansha Islands are other relatively thorny but imperative tasks. Without abundant geological data as groundwork and prior to commercial evaluation, it would be impossible for China to mobilize the imposing drilling rig 981 to the Nansha Islands. While ‘political wells’ should be drilled, they cannot be drilled too often. Financial accounts should also be calculated, as to extract deep-sea oil and gas as soon as possible, breakeven and to create a virtuous cycle are the long-term core business operations of drilling rig 981. With China’s steadily strengthening military deterrence, oil and gas development in addition to land reclamation in the South China Sea will increasingly become its two most practical strategic means of maintaining its rights and expanding its maritime space in the South China Sea. ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ simultaneously harbors the dual qualities as a production platform and strategic tool, while its activities and role destined to become major points of observation in future contests and games in the South China Sea.

124  Solution to South China Sea tensions

Notes 1 The Kalayaan Islands is the name given by the Philippines for the part of the Nansha Islands over which it claims sovereignty. The Kalayaan Islands is comprised of 54 islands, reefs and shoals, covering a maritime area of 64,000 square miles. In addition to the eight islands and reefs occupied by the Philippines, seven occupied by Mainland China, there are another six situated within the scope of these islands. They are Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross Reef), Huayang Jiao (Cuarteron). 2 “Remarks at the East Asia Summit Ministerial Intervention,” John Kerry, Secretary of State, Naypyitaw, Burma, August 10, 2014. www.state.gov/secretary/ remarks/2014/08/230471.htm 3 “DFA statement on the Philippine proposal ‘Triple Action Plan,’ ” Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, August 1, 2014. http://www. dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013–06–27-21–50-36/dfa-releases/3729-dfa-statementon-the-philippine-proposal-triple-action-plan. 4 Originally published in Phoenix Weekly, Issue 33, 2013, with edits. 5 “He Zong” (合纵) means that a group of weak countries unite to confront a strong power in the system, and “Lian Hen” (连横) means that a big power aligns with some weak countries to challenge another weaker country. The allusions of “He Zong” and “Lian Hen” originate from the Warring States period of ancient China. 6 Luke Hunt, ASEAN Summit Fallout Continues, 20 July 2012, https://­thediplomat. com/2012/07/asean-summit-fallout-continues-on/ 7 In accordance with special article 298 of UNCLOS, the ways in which treaty signatory states can submit a declaration to the Secretary General of the UN to exclude compulsory arbitration procedures. It is chiefly applicable to maritime disputes such as territorial sovereignty, maritime delimitation, historical rights, and military issues. As early as 25 August 2006, China delivered to the UN Secretary General a statement in writing, which specifically noted that China excluded disputes concerning, among others, sea boundary delimitations, historic bays or entitlements, military and law enforcement activities from the dispute settlement procedures provided in part XV of UNCLOS (Articles 297, 298 and 299). 8 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, https://www.fmprc. gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm. 9 The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, pp. 473–474. 10 Yang Jiechi Gives Interview to State Media on the So-called Award by the Arbitral Tribunal for the South China Sea Arbitration, 15 July 2016, www.fmprc.gov. cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/t1382712.htm; Xinhua Agency, More than 230 political parties from more than 90 countries have expressed their support for China’s South China Sea position, www.xinhuanet.com//world/2016–07/12/c_129139756. htm 11 Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm 12 Originally published in Oriental Morning Post, 1 April 1st, 2014. 13 Daniel R. Russel, Statement at the Hearing of “America’s Future in Asia: From Rebalancing to Managing Sovereignty Disputes” before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 113 Congress, February 5, 2014.

Solution to South China Sea tensions  125 14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, www.un.org/Depts/los/­ convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf, p. 25. 15 Originally published in Phoenix Weekly, Issue 19, 2014. 16 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on 15 May 2014, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1156451. shtml 17 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on 9 April 2015, www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cefi/eng/fyrth/t1253488.htm 18 See details at https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/chinese-occupied-features/ 19 Congressional Research Service, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, 18 June 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R44072.pdf 20 US Calls for Land Reclamation ‘Halt’ in South China Sea, 30 May 2015, www. bbc.com/news/world-asia-32941829 21 Yi Xianliang, Deputy Director of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Held a Briefing on the China-Jiannan Project, 14 June 2014, www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/sjxw_674887/t1165600. shtml

7 Promoting peaceful power transition between China and the United States

The United States is the most important country China must face in its quest for maritime power. As the sole superpower, the global political, military and economic presence of the United States, in particular its forward military presence in the Western Pacific region, constitutes the most significant external variable as China develops into a maritime power. It is an indisputable fact that there has been relative deterioration in American strength, nonetheless, this will be a protracted process by virtue of the county’s considerable capacity to restore and adjust. As a result, China has no alternative but to make long-term preparations to pursue maritime power under the shadow of American maritime hegemony or superiority and carefully scrutinize the strategic positions of both countries at sea. A path carrying aspects of both competition and cooperation, as well as peaceful interaction, appears to be necessary.

Sino-US maritime competitive posture in the next 30 years1 Needless to say, China and the United States have each marked the other as its greatest strategic rival. Although China and the United States each have their own weaknesses and challenges in national strength, the gap between other global powers and China and the United States is growing ever larger, for the relationship between China and the United States has already become that of the world’s two foremost leading powers. Military and security confrontations between the two countries center on the Western Pacific, as the strategic rivalry here between the two sides will practically determine the overall evolution of the global Sino-US maritime military contest. The Sino-US relationship is the most important set of bilateral relations influencing future global peace and development. As the difference in Chinese and American strength steadily recedes, this relationship will approach equilibrium, at least in the Western Pacific region. This is not to say that China will ultimately supersede the United States as the global hegemon, but China’s rise will nevertheless reform, to some extent, the power structure between China and the United States, and the state of Sino-US relations.

Power transition between China and the US  127 Following the end of the Cold War, a strategic situation formed between China and the United States, broadly described by Robert S. Ross as ‘the two countries each possess geopolitical advantages in Asia Pacific, for China has substantial advantages in land power, while the US has significant advantages in sea power, thus producing a bipolar structure or strategic balance.’ This state of affairs allows both China and the United States to have certain defensive advantages in their respective areas of dominance, consequently causing the two sides to allow some leeway in confrontations with one another.2 China and the United States vividly illustrated this balance during the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–1996), the Lingshui ‘collision incident’ (2001) and other confrontations, in which both sides maintained crucial restraint. However, such a military equilibrium, formed along China’s territorial border or coastline, is highly atypical, for it is predicated on inordinate shortcomings in the Chinese armed forces’ capacity to project power overseas, especially in maritime and aerial power. This balance is also destined to be unstable, at least in the Western Pacific region. With expansion in its comprehensive strength and accelerated pace of military modernization, China is resolutely stepping toward the oceans and beginning to project its power toward the open sea. China will also become more determined to defend its national unity and territorial integrity, and safeguard maritime interests. Shifts in the balance of power will force the United States to reexamine its professed ‘responsibilities’ or commitments on matters such as the Taiwan issue and the Diaoyu Islands, in addition to military policies within China’s EEZ as well as in Chinese adjacent waters. The process of revising or reshaping this balance will be a time of turbulence and uncertainty, full of crises. For China, the defense of territorial sovereignty, maintenance of maritime rights and interests and resistance against external interference are among its fundamental rights, while the pursuit of power and position commensurate with its national strength in coastal spaces is an essential part of building maritime power. As for the United States, the long-time commander of the Western Pacific, it is extremely sensitive and insecure with regard to growing Chinese power. The United States already identifies China as its greatest long-term future strategic competitor, accordingly initiating anticipatory measures against the rise of China, such as routinely accusing China of engaging in maritime ‘expansion,’ beginning to change its ambiguous ‘no position’ policy of neutrality on the Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea issues, promoting its ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ strategy and the more recent Indo-Pacific concept. China’s anti-intervention strategy and the United States’ offensive deterrence concepts, such as Air-Sea Battle (ASB) or the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC),3 represent an ever greater challenge. Overall, both countries’ military strategies require further refinement and their contents also need to be enriched, but their directions

128  Power transition between China and the US will not change. China is wary of American interposition in the Taiwan issue and disputes in seas surrounding China; in contrast, the United States is concerned that China’s growing confidence will go on to threaten the United States’ military and security dominance in the Asia-Pacific. Such a strategic divergence is the decisive factor restricting developments in strategic mutual trust between the two countries. With further evolution in both Chinese and American military strategies and deployment of various advanced weapons systems, this strategic contest will enter a different stage and a new balance will emerge as a result. It is worth remaining vigilant for even as China and the United States are trying to build a new type of great-power relationship for ‘no conflict, no confrontation,’ risks of strategic military conflict between China and the United States are escalating. To circumvent these risks, we should carry out objective comparative analyses and hypothetical deductions on both militaries’ ‘worst case scenario’ strategic and operational preparations, in order to help relevant decision makers and departments of both sides to gage rational general expectations for future situations, thereby more sensibly and peacefully engaging in strategic contests. The shifting strategic balance between China and the United States Based on current development trends, even with somewhat slower economic growth rates, it will only be a matter of time before China’s aggregate economic output overtakes that of the United States. A range of international economic institutions and experts in strategic forecasting virtually all concur that China’s aggregate output will surpass that of the United States in the first half of the 21st century. China’s GDP is around 60 percent of that of the United States in 2017, while both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank now rate China as the world’s largest economy based on purchasing power parity (PPP).4 And it won’t be too long before China’s economy surpasses the United States by other measures like GDP, too. The Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) predicts it will happen in 2029.5 In comparison, predictions regarding China’s comprehensive national strength are more conservative. The US National Intelligence Council speculates that China will have worldwide power similar to that of the United States in 2030, based on the four major indicators of GDP, population size, military expenditure and technological innovation; if three further key indicators of health, education and governance are added, China’s comprehensive national strength will be comparable to the United States by approximately 2045.6 It is possible for China’s economic strength to match that of the US, but in contrast it would be very difficult for China’s military strength and cultural strength to reach the levels of the US. The gap in Chinese and American comprehensive strength can only be reduced to achieve parity, but it is not possible for China to fully catch up to the US.7

Power transition between China and the US  129 In terms of military capability, China will not yet be able to contend with the United States on a global scale in the foreseeable future; nonetheless, it has steadily gained the confidence to act independently and serve as the United States’ equal in the Western Pacific region. The RAND Corporation estimates that in 2025, the value of Chinese defense spending will be slightly more than half of American defense expenditure. In the 2014 Military Balance, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London on 5 February 2014, China’s defense spending may catch up with the United States in the 2030s.8 Even if China’s economic and defense spending growth rates were to stagnate, and even if the United States were to improve its fiscal situation and curtail reductions in defense expenditure, considerable reductions of the gap between Chinese and American defense spending are inevitable. Moreover, practically all of China’s defense spending is concentrated in the Western Pacific, whereas the United States is only able to focus part of its spending in this region, despite its best efforts to ‘rebalance.’ Consequently, China will soon possess more abundant financial resources than the United States here. Nevertheless, military expenditure is only one of many important indicators used to gauge the strength of military capability. The United States continues to lead in aspects such as military theory, scientific research and development, equipment standards, combat efficiency and overseas political support. It is important to note that, relative to military expenditure, equipment and other forms of hard power, it will still be a long time before the Chinese military is able to match the US military in terms of experience and traditions. Comprehensive evaluation of factors such as economic strength; capacity in military technology, equipment, and industry; military strategy and theory; military expenditure, various strategic reports and assessments have also widely concluded that there will be material changes in the ­Sino-US strategic position in the Western Pacific in the next 10–20 years. A report from the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observes that gaps between China’s and the United States’ economic and military strengths will narrow over the next 15–20 years, as China’s military advantages in its surrounding waters pose an ever greater challenge to the US– Japanese alliance. The United States’ position of dominance will also be subject to pressure, resulting in a type of ‘balance erosion.’9 The most likely potential challenge to the alliance over the next 15 to 20 years does not involve full-scale military conflict between China and Japan or the United State originating, for example, from Chinese efforts to expel Washington from the region. Instead, Beijing is likely to gradually erode Japan’s security interests through peaceful means instead of resolving disputes through military offensives. An assessment report from the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) estimates that China and the United States will have more or less equal numbers

130  Power transition between China and the US of major military vessels (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, etc.) in the Pacific Ocean by 2020, with each side retaining approximately 100 vessels.10 There is undeniably still a chasm in capability and quality between China and the United States, but due to asymmetries within the sphere of Sino-US operations, the Chinese Navy will undoubtedly benefit from quantity advantages in East Asian coastal areas, compensating, to some extent, for qualitative differences. Coupled with China’s vast land-based aerial power and the involvement of missile forces, the balance of power is sure to lean in favor of China. There is widespread belief among US naval analysts that both the United States’ active and passive defenses may be insufficient to respond to the increasingly precarious operational environment within the First Island Chain, especially within Mainland China’s coastal waters.11 In fact, there is already a disequilibrium in the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait. China will furthermore attain maritime and aerial military supremacy over Japan in the East China Sea by approximately 2020, when the United States will lose space in the offshore balance and have no choice but to directly face China in strategic confrontation.12 The Carnegie report also notes that, ‘over time, China will be able to steadily refine its established ‘anti-access/area denial’ (A2/AD) advantages, expanding them to regions in Northeast Asia and eventually to Southeast Asia.’ The RAND Corporation’s 2011 report also believes that in future decades, the United States’ ability to protect its allies and friends in proximity of China will slowly deteriorate.13 In light of this, the United States is attempting to take precautionary measures by aggressively advancing its strategies of ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ and its Indo-Pacific concept, adjusting military disposition in the Asia-Pacific, redesigning regional security structures, implementing the AirSea Battle combat doctrine to counter an imminently more powerful China. In order to better respond to anti-access and other threats from powers such as China and maintain American military superiority under circumstances of fiscal austerity, the Pentagon launched in September 2014 its third ‘Offset Strategy’, which tries to focus defense investment on critical fields of disruptive technology in the future so as to overcome any opponents’ increasingly numerous challenges. The reality is that in recent years, growth in Chinese power has led to certain consequences and is to some extent changing the ‘status quo’ and balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. China’s coast guard and powers of law enforcement are beginning to exert effective control over China’s EEZ, in addition to maintaining a habitual presence in waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, Nansha Islands and other disputed islands and reefs; the density of Chinese naval and air force patrols on the coast has soared sharply, while the establishment of the ADIZ in the East China Sea is a demonstration of China’s mounting confidence in its own power, In sum, there has been rapid development in China’s sea power, simultaneously strengthening its coastal

Power transition between China and the US  131 presence while robustly stepping toward the open oceans. The Chinese Navy has accelerated its ‘emergence’ from the First Island Chain to lay the groundwork for an oceangoing navy and to routinely dispatch large-scale flotillas to the Northwestern Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean to conduct distant ocean training exercises. Anti-access vs. AirSea Battle Suffering from a severe lack of trust, the military-to-military relationship has long been the most significant weak link in the overall Sino-US relations. Rivalry/enmity between the two parties is gradually intensifying, with each side increasingly perceiving the other as its main (potential) competitor. Moreover, from the perspective of realist interests and strategic needs, it would appear that both Chinese and American military forces have no alternative but to prepare for the worst. China does not only need to build a credible deterrence against ‘Taiwanese interdependence,’ safeguard its own sovereignty and interests in coastal areas, but also needs to develop an oceangoing navy, maintain certain long-range power projection capabilities in the Western Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean, and uphold an effective presence in order to maintain national security and access to sea lanes. Whereas the United States views China’s relentlessly expanding coastal ‘A2/AD’ capabilities as possibly undermining important American interests, in particular the US military’s ‘freedom of navigation’ or ‘freedom of entry and exit’ in these waters, endangering the viability of American security commitments to its allies in the region, and thereby jeopardizing US military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese Navy’s rapid development, albeit from a lower starting point, will likewise impact US military influence in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, the US military must invest in capabilities to ensure effective operations in ‘A2/AD’ environments. ‘This will include implementing the ‘Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.’14 Both China and the United States have striven to uncover weaknesses in the one another’s military forces, taking full advantage of important opportunities from technological revolutions in missiles, ships, aircraft, aerospace, telecommunications and other areas. Both adapt to circumstances as required and endeavor to exercise their individual strengths, while targeting the other side’s weaknesses, so as to acquire an advantage in the strategic contest and snatch victory in potential local conflicts. In the early 1990s, Andrew F. Krepinevich et al. from the US Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) authored a report on the Revolution in Military Affairs, noting that as Third World Countries control a certain number of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, high-performance aircraft and other long-range weapons systems, US forward bases worldwide

132  Power transition between China and the US will face rigorous challenges. In times of conflict or crisis, not only can these bases no longer offer reassurance to their allies, on the contrary they will become a source of unease or hardship for the United States. In the 2003 report ‘Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge,’ Andrew F. Krepinevich et al. formally introduced the concept of ‘A2/AD.’15 The so-called Anti-Access concept (A2) refers to anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, high-performance fighter aircraft, stateof-the-art naval mines, quiet submarines, anti-satellite weaponry, cyber warfare and other means of coercing the US military to distance its activities from the Chinese Mainland or from beyond the effective projection range of these weapons, and thereby to relinquish the ability to intervene in China’s coastal crises. ‘Area Denial’ (AD) is the second-choice alternative, for in the event that the US military cannot be obstructed from free entry in wartime, the abovementioned forces should delay the US military’s access or reduce the efficiency of their operations by inflicting damage. The concept of A2/AD was subsequently frequently applied in American observers’ discussions and various US military reports. Although a principal threat was not identified in early documents, in truth their greatest target has all long been China.16 It should be noted that the Chinese government does not in fact use the terminology ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial,’ as this is only an interpretation of China’s military strategy and policy which is used in American strategic and military circles. It is obvious that China has no intention of disrupting freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific, nor does it plan to expel the US forces from the Western Pacific. The essence of China’s military strategy, arms development and power disposition aimed at the US military is ‘anti-interference and anti-aggression,’ that is to say, resistance against powerful enemy interposition. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, deterrence of powerful enemy interference in China’s sovereignty has become the most important duty of the Chinese armed forces. It has always been necessary to guard against the United States, whether in regard to Taiwanese reunification, or to the protection of the Diaoyu Islands’ and the Nansha Islands’ sovereign rights. US intervention is a decisive variable that China must take seriously. Following the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, the United States maintains military and political ties with the Taiwanese authorities through the Taiwan Relations Act, continues to peddle arms to Taiwan, opposes the Chinese government’s recapturing of Taiwan by force and even threatens to resort to armed conflict if necessary. During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, the United States dispatched two aircraft carriers, with great pomp and circumstance, to waters neighboring Taiwan as deterrence against China. The United States and Japan have signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between them. Following escalation in the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, the United States has on multiple occasions declared that the Diaoyu Islands is encapsulated within this treaty and that the United States opposes any unilateral changes to Japan’s ‘administrative jurisdiction’ over

Power transition between China and the US  133 the Diaoyu Islands. The United States also signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines in 1951, and has in recent years been heavily reinforcing military deployments in Southeast Asia and intervening prominently in the South China Sea dispute, in the name of promoting the ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ and ‘Indo-Pacific.’ From a military perspective, the United States’ extensive array of defensive commitments in the Asia-­Pacific has caused the US military to become the greatest impediment to the safeguard of Chinese sovereignty, while any of China’s military operations in this region may be subject to limitation or even interference from the United States. Therefore, prevention of US military interposition in China’s coastal military activities has steadily become an important test that the Chinese armed forces must overcome. China’s military pays close attention to the highly integrated, information-based and modernized combat capabilities of the US military, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, Kosovo War and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while winning local wars under conditions of ‘informationization’ has emerged as the chief mission of the Chinese armed forces. In December 2004, China published a new version of the national defense white paper, which states that it will be necessary in future to ‘win local wars in informationized conditions.’17 Throughout the past decade, the Chinese military’s top priority has been to win ‘local wars under advanced technological conditions.’ The 2013 version of the ‘National Defense White Paper’ continued to expand upon this concept, stating that China’s armed forces firmly base their military preparedness on winning local wars under the conditions of informationization, make overall and coordinated plans to promote military preparedness in all strategic directions, intensify the joint employment of different services and arms, and enhance warfighting capabilities based on information systems. China’s armed forces ‘intensify scenario-oriented exercises and drills, conduct well-organized border, coastal and territorial air patrols and duties for combat readiness, and handle appropriately various crises and major emergencies.’ The Chinese military views the safeguard of national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, in addition to the protection of peaceful national development, as its principal duty. China’s armed forces unswervingly implement the military strategy of active defense, guard against and resist aggression, contain separatist forces, safeguard border, coastal and territorial air security, and protect national maritime rights and interests and national security interests in outer space and cyber space. “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” Following this principle, China will resolutely take all necessary measures to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.18

134  Power transition between China and the US In consideration of the wide range of US military and security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region, China must make adequate preparations to respond to American interference if it is to maintain its sovereign rights. Over the past 20 years, the Chinese armed forces have accelerated drives for military modernization, concentrating on building missiles, quiet submarines, stealth fighters and other ‘trump card’ weaponry. Furthermore, information technology is utilized to develop sensors and command networks, optimized navigational platforms and guided weapons, comprehensively elevating the target detection and strike power of missiles, fighter aircraft, surface combat ships, submarines and cyber attacks. Among these, the most eye-catching and emblematic of the ‘trump card’ arms is surely the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, similarly the DF-26 missile. According to a US Department of Defense report, the DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.19 It is more difficult to intercept than ordinary ballistic missiles due to its active homing and trajectory adjustment or correction capabilities following reentry into the atmosphere, while some observers even believe that this is a game changer that will transform the outlook or balance of the strategic contest.20 To this day, the Chinese government has not yet publicized specific details on this missile, but it certainly exists. At the 9/3 parade in 2015, DF-21D was first officially presented to the world. The reason China has adopted a projectile-centric strategy for power projection, aggressively developing forces such as missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, is to a large extent due to a shortage of alternative options as China responds to the formidable power projection capacities of the United States and its allies. There remains a sizeable difference in the Chinese military’s maritime and aerial platform technologies in comparison with those of the US military. At present, the core objective in US strategic doctrine aimed at China is to impede its transformation, in particular preventing it from changing the status quo of the Asia-Pacific by force. This includes hampering China’s realization of cross-strait reunification and safeguard of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea, either by means of force or with the threat of force. US policymakers and analysts adhere faithfully to the principle of strength to ensure peace, believing that the cornerstone or foundation for the peaceful coexistence of China and the United States in the Pacific is whether the United States can sufficiently demonstrate its capability to China, build sufficient deterrent capability and prevent China from using force or the

Power transition between China and the US  135 threat of force as a means of settling maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific region. Due to shifts in the balance of power in East Asia, the United States may find itself forced to turn from defensive deterrence to retaliatory deterrence in order to preserve the status quo: the former is predicated on the United States’ capacity to directly defend its interests and its allies, whereas the latter is based on the effectiveness of counterattacks against China by employing long-range weapons and platforms better suited for survival if threatened by escalatory situations. Put another way, ‘both preparations for battle and intensifications in conflict prevent war,’ while undue fear of war or of intensification in the situation would severely damage American interests, instead fostering Chinese ‘ambitions.’ Preparations for war and the dogged buildup of deterrence are precisely the reasons for the introduction of AirSea Battle doctrine as well as the focus of its efforts.21 AirSea Battle, as the name suggests, is the integration of coordinated aerial and maritime operations. In July 2009, then US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, directed the navy and air force to introduce the new combat concept of AirSea Battle. In September of the same year, General Norton A. Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, and General Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, signed a classified memorandum to jointly examine the concept of AirSea Battle. Joint development of the AirSea Battle doctrine between the air force and the navy was first raised in the 2010 edition of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), in order to overpower adversaries in a series of military operations.22 In November 2011, the US Department of Defense officially established a cross-service AirSea Battle office to implement and assess this doctrine. In January 2012, the US Department of Defense proposed the closely related Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Henceforth, AirSea Battle had started to enter the stages of substantive demonstration and practical verification. Since its appearance, the concept of AirSea Battle has received fervent support from senior US military officials. In February 2012, Schwarz and Jonathan W. Greenert, the then Chief of Naval Operations, co-authored the article ‘Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,’ presenting AirSea Battle’s three core characteristics of ‘Networked, Integrated, Attack-in-Depth’.23 Subsequently Greenert issued multiple additional publications in support of the AirSea Battle concept. According to his arguments, the operational duties of AirSea Battle are first to ‘blind,’ rapidly paralyzing an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, which are the seven most notable subsystems in the organization of modern military integration, namely the C4ISR system; second, to attack the opponent’s important local ‘A2/AD’ resources, for instance by destroying airfields and missiles launchers; and third is to launch attacks against adversaries’ in-flight aircraft, missiles and networks.24 Strictly speaking, AirSea Battle can only be regarded as a combat doctrine, rather than a strategy. The United States’ proposal and enhancement

136  Power transition between China and the US of AirSea Battle unmistakably derive from the dual pressures of technology and reality, while its first aim is to precipitate US forces to surmount operational spaces and boundaries between military branches such as the army, navy, air force and cyber warfare to optimize consolidation and better execute joint operational missions. This is exactly as highlighted by Schwartz, who stressed that the true value of AirSea Battle is to provide a unified means of coordination for the various military services to respond to operational challenges faced by joint forces. Its second aim is to counteract the ever more formidable ‘A2/AD’ capacities of China and other countries, so as to guarantee US military freedom to access the oceans, aerospace, outer space, cyberspace, and other ‘global commons.’ The US military estimated that in the next 10–20 years, the Chinese PLA will possess the capacity to restrict the US military’s access to waters and limit its freedom of operations in the First Island Chain and even the Second Island Chain. The PLA will be able to strike the US military’s forward bases and troops, undermine its C4ISR information systems, attack its logistical support frameworks, delay its entry into combat zones and ultimately cause the US military to surrender its strategic and operational initiative, as a result offering it little alternative other than to compromise with China.25 Confronted by China’s considerable ‘A2/AD’ capabilities, the reliability of the US military’s forward bases and major air-sea combat platforms will face severe tests in wartime. While the US Air Force and Navy, accustomed to initiating attacks in combat zones close to densely distributed bases and from invulnerable aircraft carriers, have had to make adjustments. Incontrovertibly, the greatest target of AirSea Battle is China. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept opens by highlighting AirSea Battle’s purposes, as the United States’ development and implementation of this combat doctrine is predominantly to counter China’s ever-strengthening ‘A2/AD’ capabilities, prevent China from destabilizing US hegemony in the Western Pacific, and gain victory in possible conflicts with China.26 For these reasons, the US military is actively adjusting its deployment of armed forces in the Asia-Pacific: while withdrawing from other parts of the world, it proceeds with reinforcements in this region; within the Asia-Pacific, it ‘strengthens the north, fortifies the south,’ continues to accelerate US-Japanese allied military cooperation, emphasizes building new power presences around South East Asia and Australia and furthermore disperses and retracts its troops, enhancing the strategic status of Guam and other bases in the Second Island Chain. In equipment development, it mainly concentrates on reconnaissance, early warning, missiles, satellite communications and other support systems, focusing on constructing a new generation of stealth bombers, unmanned air vehicles designed for aircraft carrier-based operations, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), new types of submarines and other long-range, rapid, stealth reconnaissance and combat forces.

Power transition between China and the US  137 However, the concept of AirSea Battle has led to various disputes, even within the US military and also has its own share of critics. Some observers question the strategic qualities and functions of AirSea Battle, arguing that it cannot provide an effective path for the US military to respond to Chinese armed forces. Seth Cropsey, a senior researcher at the Hudson Institute in the United States, comments that AirSea Battle does not include essential elements of military strategy, is extremely unfocused and is more akin to a plan to boost cooperation between various arms and services of the US military, rather than a military strategy aimed at China. It adds little significance to US responses against China’s ‘A2/AD’ and would only serve to amplify Chinese suspicion, wariness and antagonism.27 Dr. Thomas X. Hammes, a researcher at the National Defense University in the United States, claims that it is the very popularity of AirSea Battle that precisely demonstrates the United States’ lack of a strong military strategy to support its national strategy.28 Yet there is another view that criticizes AirSea Battle for its excessively grand and unwieldy plans, for which the United States has neither the resources nor the capacity to execute it while its defense budget is under rising pressure. There are in fact also no detailed budgets in connection to ‘AirSea Battle’. James Randy Forbes, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee, previously expressed such hesitations in a letter to then US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta.29 The most common objections stem from concerns and fear of a large-scale war. A section of the US military elite and some analysts worry that the implementation of AirSea Battle could provoke war, even a large-scale nuclear war, between China and the United States. Professor Amitai Etzioni of George Washington University has made the following famous comments on this subject: Air-Sea Battle is ‘inherently escalatory, and could even precipitate a nuclear war.’30 In order to break the ‘kill chain’ of China’s ‘A2/AD’ forces, as described in the words of Greenert, the optimal approach is to attack command and control centers, missile launchers and airfields on the Chinese Mainland, but this will unquestionably incur vehement Chinese retaliation, and may even cause China to take ‘preemptive strikes.’ There will be swift escalations in conflict, even leading to the outbreak of nuclear war, results that the United States would truly be unable to endure, as after all, China is not the same as Iraq, Libya or Iran. In addition to AirSea Battle, US strategists and analysts are also contemplating alternative options, such as the Offshore Control Strategy, as proposed by Dr. Hammas. This strategy believes that ‘no operations would penetrate Chinese airspace. Prohibiting penetration is intended to reduce the possibility of nuclear escalation and to make war termination easier.’ The United States can coerce China into compromise by blockading distant oceans outside the sphere of China’s ‘A2/AD’ influence, instead of directly striking onshore targets, and ultimately waging ‘a war of economic attrition to bring about a stalemate and cessation of conflict with a return to a modified version of the status quo.’31 The greatest issue with this strategy is

138  Power transition between China and the US whether it would work. A blockade of distant oceans or economic war does not only intrinsically carry the risk of conflict expansion, but in this vibrant business world, these practices are also extremely problematic and appear practically impossible in the long-term. Even if the United States is able to overcome fiscal difficulties and economic pressures to successfully realize an ocean blockade, it cannot triumph over China on this basis alone. On this matter, critical comments by the US Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)’s Elbridge Colby are the most typical. Colby notes that the conflict between China and the United States is long-term and strategic in nature, with both sides devoting sufficient patience and harboring great resolve. Evidently, a distant blockade is inadequate to compel China to yield and accept American conditions. ‘It didn’t work in World War II, in World War I, or against Napoleon. It was important to victory – but it wasn’t anywhere near sufficient.’32 Perhaps distant blockades may be of use to the United States, but as for the United States’ allies, but American support is equally ‘distant,’ with aid too remote to fulfil immediate needs. Without direct American assistance, it will be increasingly impractical for the United States’ allies to contend with China. What is even more difficult for US policymakers to accept is the possibility that the United States may have to relinquish its current military and security advantages or powers in Chinese coastal waters to China due to such ‘ostrich policies.’ The US government will find it truly difficult to bear the risks and pressures associated with these actions, regardless of their efficacy. There is also an argument in favor of ‘responding in kind’ and the pursuit of Deterrence by Denial. A principal proponent of this strategy is the US Naval War College’s Andrew S. Erickson, who claims that, as China’s ultimate goal in the settlement of maritime disputes is the occupation and long-term control of islands in question, the United States does not necessarily need to defeat China, instead simply stopping it from achieving its objectives. The United States needs to prevent China from occupying or controlling the relevant islands by displaying its potent destructive force. To this end, the United States should develop its own anti-access or area denial capabilities, focusing on the deployment of submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes and other military hardware.33 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich raise a similar point, claiming ‘the A2/AD threat at the heart of this debate is real, but limited with limitations on future reach about 400–600 kilometers from a friendly coast.’ Thus, if the West responds appropriately, A2/AD-imposed Finlandization would not present a realistic danger, even without ASB.34 This is a relatively passive defense strategy, which implies that the United States must in part recognize China’s power and furthermore withstand pressure from domestic sources and its allies. Before the United States accepts the end of its hegemony in the Western Pacific, it is unlikely that the US military will adopt this policy recommendation.

Power transition between China and the US  139 On the whole, AirSea Battle clearly better befits the current overall US strategy, while Offshore Control, Deterrence by Denial or even ‘Proxy War’ all do not correspond with the United States’ strategic vision. Confronted with China’s maritime rise and military modernization, maintaining a strong forward presence in the Western Pacific remains a cornerstone of US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific. US military strategy against China is based on two major premises. First, the United States anticipates that the balance of power in the Western Pacific region is presently being broken. Over the next ten years, as Japan and other US allies will no longer be able to ‘resist’ China, the United States must prepare to ‘step up to the challenge,’ lest China should ‘triumph’; second, the United States can neither accept withdrawal from the Western Pacific, nor does it wish to share maritime power with China. The US military still aspires to retain maritime hegemony in this region and maintain its superior strength over China. The concept of AirSea Battle is formulated based on these precise reasons, while programs such as Offshore Control and Area Denial are inconsistent with US strategy on the whole and would be highly questionable selections for American policymakers. In general, the US military’s strategies in response to China’s growing A2/ AD capabilities tend to contradict one another. On the one hand, the United States indeed recognizes that the Sino-US balance of power, from Chinese coastal waters to the Western Pacific, is leaning increasingly in China’s favor, while the United States cannot for the time being identify good countermeasures due to geographical constraints, technological limitations and budgetary reductions. On the other hand, the United States is still unwilling to renounce its power and influence in East Asia and is currently attempting to adopt more offensive methods of deterrence to reconfigure its strategy on China. Therefore, although the concept of AirSea Battle has numerous flaws and is yet to be perfected, its essence will be the fundamental future doctrine adopted by the US military against China’s so-called A2/AD strategy. Unless there is overwhelming change in US policy toward China, with a desire to thoroughly reform relations and share sea power in the Western Pacific, the US military would otherwise further intensify implementation of the AirSea Battle doctrine. On 8 January 2015, David L. Goldfein, the then Director of the Joint Staff in the US Department of Defense, issued a memorandum, officially changing the name of the AirSea Battle (ASB) combat doctrine to the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), now incorporated into the marine corps and army thinking, and moreover enriching connotations of AirSea Battle. While the concept may have been updated, the principal target remains A2/AD.35 In order to meet the challenges of A2/AD and support JAM-GC, the US Navy has also developed the concept of ‘Distributed Lethality’, which is achieved by increasing the offensive and defensive capabilities of

140  Power transition between China and the US individual warships, employing them in dispersed formations across wide geographic expanses and generating distributed fires.36 Who will prevail? China or the United States? The military contest between China and the United States is a sweeping game between two types of platforms and two kinds of strategies. Although various military branches of both countries’ armed forces are generally very extensive and well-developed overall, when comparing their construction of forces and characteristics, the two countries have many differences in the Western Pacific, particularly in East Asian waters. The Chinese military is a force that chiefly relies on the land, concentrating heavily on the development of anti-naval technologies, while at the same time developing a distant ocean navy; in contrast, the core strength of the US military is its maritime platform, relying on the ocean to consolidate internal and allied resources and strengthen power projection capabilities through air-sea platforms. On the whole, the US and Chinese militaries each have their own strengths and weaknesses. The two sides’ military games and competitions are exceptionally complex, but it is possible to broadly determine which side has greater chances of success within different spaces by comprehensively analyzing the three competing assessments of the results of the interactions of the key factors of technology, geography and reliability of the military system. Of course, preconditions are that both parties will reasonably utilize their own advantages and regularly demonstrate their capabilities. It is possible for China to attain strategic supremacy within the First Island Chain and its surrounding waters First, technological progress has started to greatly favor continental countries in their near seas. For China, this includes the waters within and surrounding the First Island Chain. In confrontations between land powers and sea powers, land powers have long been positioned at a considerable disadvantage, whether offensively or defensively. Maritime powers can fully utilize the flexibility of sea power, swiftly assembling military strength, allowing land powers to deliver critical strikes at specific points. In contrast, it is difficult to rapidly amass land power. Even if it were possible to form potent offensive force, the vast insulating oceans will frustrate and significantly diminish strike efficiency. For instance, in conflicts with the late Qing dynasty, though Great Britain, France and other imperialist powers may have had fewer numbers of troops, but by leveraging their navies’ exceptional mobility, it was nevertheless possible to form local advantages in military strength and firepower against the Chinese army by scouting far and wide for combat opportunities along thousands of kilometers of coastline; in contrast, while the late Qing government’s army was ostensibly immense, it was consistently incapable

Power transition between China and the US  141 of assembling on time and was inactive in all respects. Such offensive and defensive superiority was a key reason why the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, the United States and other maritime powers were able to carve up the world and claim global dominance, and also formed the technical basis for Mahan’s theory that ‘Whoever rules the waves, rules the world.’ However, following the end of the Second World War, with rapid developments in missile, aerospace and information technologies, certain changes have started to occur as land powers attain powerful means of locating and striking targets at sea. With regard to pinpointing and tracking objects, continental states can locate targets at sea by employing satellites, early warning aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems and other reconnaissance tools. Reconnaissance satellites can acquire intelligence on the navigation of large surface vessels on a global scale; short-wave direction finders and OTH radar systems can provide dynamic information on relatively remote offshore targets, and while it may be unable to offer accurate target information, it can nevertheless play an early warning role; early warning aircraft can pinpoint offshore targets hundreds of kilometers at sea in real-time. For instance, the US’ E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft can identify ships over 360 kilometers away. According to analysis by Kanwa Defense Review and Jane’s Defence Weekly, China’s KJ2000 has similar specifications. However, due to impacts of the Earth’s curvature, improvements in exploration capabilities of onshore and shipborne radars have been stagnant for ultra-low altitude and surface targets, as effective detection distances have long stuttered at between tens of kilometers to approximately 100 kilometers, and even within visual range.37 Some experts speculate that in future, China’s potential long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will be primarily composed of platforms such as space-based reconnaissance satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, and electronic reconnaissance ships.38 Land powers have achieved even greater technological progress in terms of offensive measures and are able to rely on land-based fighter aircraft and missiles to strike adversarial forces thousands of kilometers away at sea and deep inland. With the Chinese military equipped with DF-21D missiles, quiet submarines, in addition to the large-scale modernization of surface vessels and fighter aircraft at sea, the US military increasingly faces a multidimensional obstacle to power projection of the ‘final 1000 nautical miles’ in the Western Pacific. In particular, in the balance between offensive missiles and defensive missiles, the offensive side inherently has a technological advantage. Defense experts widely believe that, although the United States and its allies have deployed interceptor installations (chiefly the ground-based Patriot series and the ship-based Standard series of interceptor missiles) in response to the offensive features of China’s sophisticated missile systems, their chances of success are not high. Moreover, these devices are extremely expensive, and so cannot be installed on a large scale, further limiting their protective functions.39

142  Power transition between China and the US In this situation, it is very easy to track and locate the movements of large ships, especially flotillas of surface vessels. Under the threat of countless landbased attack measures, the presence and effectiveness of sea power become fragile, particularly in waters close to the continent. In this way, land powers have formed a certain natural strategic advantage relative to maritime powers within specific regions. Some experts on sea power have termed such maritime power of continental states as ‘land-based sea power.’ This theory argues that weapons such as land-based fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles can permit coastal states to subdue enemy forces without the need of a strong fleet at sea.40 From a geographic perspective, China likewise enjoys an advantage in this region. China’s sea power is shielded by its land power along coastal waters. James R. Holmes once noted that China’s potent land power and effect of geographic radiation allow it to respond to foreign threats in distant oceans, even without resorting to armed force. For instance, during outbreaks of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, China can utilize geographic advantages to construct its land-based target tracking and surveillance system, the world’s largest integrated air defense system and advanced underground tunnel systems to allow missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and other projection devices to strike opponents in relatively safety. Whereas in the Western Pacific, US military assets that may interpose in Asia-Pacific affairs are heavily concentrated around the First Island Chain, mainly in Japan’s Okinawa and Sasebo, with the majority of bases and ancillary facilities distributed on several isolated islands, easily vulnerable to pinpoint attacks or obliteration by opponents in wartime. In recent years, the US military has adjusted its disposition and formed the new concept of distributed lethality, intending to employ forces in dispersed formations across wide geographic expanses, and distributing fire between them.41 With this mentality, the United States is withdrawing its assets to islands distant from Mainland China, such as Guam; doing so enhances security but loses efficiency. During wartime, if the US military were to project power toward China’s coast from Guam or from even more remote locations, to stage an exhaustive attack against China would be impossible. As for aircraft carriers and other maritime forces, deterred by China’s ‘A2/AD’ threat, they can only play a role from beyond the radius of Chinese missiles. There remain great differences between the two sides’ delivery distances within the First Island Chain. The US military must transport necessary materials over thousands of kilometers in order to support combat operations, whereas China is operating in its own ‘front yard.’ US military bases in Guam and Hawaii are insufficient to guarantee the US Navy’s strategic influence on East Asian coasts, so it must depend on considerable support from regional allies and partners. The situation faced by the US military is even more complex when accounting for the generally ambivalent and hesitant attitudes of US allies involved in wars with China, and unpredictable factors in these countries such as possible domestic political barriers.

Power transition between China and the US  143 In addition, in the event of conflict in this region, China’s operational systems have a higher degree of reliability. Modern warfare represents systematic conflict, as operational systems are composed of numerous command, weaponry and network systems. As the level of complexity increases, there will be inevitably more loopholes and substantially greater uncertainty. These are challenges and difficulties that anti-enemy intervention strategies and AirSea Battle will both encounter, but in coastal spaces in close proximity to the mainland, the Chinese military’s operational systems are much less complicated and more reliable than those of the US military. China will primarily depend on ISR systems composed of shore-based radars, early warning aircraft, reconnaissance satellites and other technology to track and lock onto targets, subsequently supplying dynamic information to the command system and transferring detailed relevant parameters to the weapons system. The command system then needs to direct a range of instructions to the ISR system and weapons system as required. The transmission and interaction of the majority of data produced in this entire process are completed through reliable wired networks or systems onshore. In contrast, the US military has no alternative but to depend heavily on spacebased satellites and maritime platforms for reconnaissance and early warning, while predominantly relying on space-based communication satellites to relay data. In its several recent local wars, 100 percent of the US military’s navigation and positioning and over 90 percent of its communications were accomplished by relying on satellites.42 However, the bandwidth resources of space-based satellites tend to be highly limited. Once under strain in times of war, there will be an explosive increase in the quantity of data, easily leading to congestion in channels of communication and a collapse in the C4ISR system. To avoid such a situation, the US military has had to rent a large number of communication satellites from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the US military intervenes in conflicts with a major power like China, deficiencies in US military’s bandwidth resources will undoubtedly exacerbate. Coupled with data injections or network interference carried out by the opponent, consequences could be even more catastrophic. The opposition does not even need to employ anti-­satellite weapons (ASAT) to attack US communications satellites, resulting in paralysis of the US military’s C4ISR system. The US military will perpetuate its maritime hegemony in distant waters Once outside of the First Island Chain and continuing to penetrate into distant oceans, there is a radical transformation in the situation. First, technology is increasingly favorable to the United States. In distant oceans, technological advancements are ever more advantageous for mobile air-sea platforms; on the contrary, there is a steep decline in the efficiency of one-off

144  Power transition between China and the US delivery devices centered on continental platforms. With greater distances from the mainland, precision positioning, tracking and attacks from landbased platforms all become more difficult. The functions of ground-based radars, unmanned aerial vehicles and other means of tracking and positioning are restricted at sea, where target information gathering mainly relies on space-based remote sensing and digital reconnaissance satellites. Today, world-class naval vessels have very large spheres of maritime activity and unpredictable changes in trajectory. It is very difficult for fixed-orbit satellites to continuously track mobile targets at sea. Although the use of multiple satellites can, in theory, significantly reduce tracking time intervals, costs and efficiency would be completely insupportable. Even if it is possible to capture signals of enemy ships and aircraft in real time, and obtain their precise locations, strike accuracy will decline with substantial increases in delivery radiuses. At the same time, due to prolonged early warning times, efficiency in the interception of incoming missiles and attacking aircraft by adversary maritime forces will improve accordingly. If the protection and convenience offered by the continent are lost, China will face operating in domains or with technologies where the US military is most adept and will have to mainly rely on its own less-than-mature sea power to compete with the most powerful naval force in the world – that of the United States. The US Navy remains the world’s strongest, most disciplined and most professional sea power. Regardless of what vessels and aircraft are used to engage in direct battle, US surface combat formations can still gain an overwhelming advantage over those of any adversaries. The US Navy is the only global force, which is distributed worldwide and has undergone a complete information revolution. With the support of unrivalled target tracking and homing systems in addition to operational networks, US warships far outperform their opponents in terms of both strike range and durability, especially when remote from enemy heartlands and deep into the oceans. China has obvious drawbacks in its marine geography. The amplification effect of land power through technology is limited and does not, at its core, change the unfavorable marine geographic environment that China faces. While China may have an extensive coastline, it however lacks channels that directly connect to the ocean, with the exception of Taiwan’s east coast. The First and Second Island Chains in the Western Pacific Ocean have become obstacles to the entry and exit of Chinese military forces from the coast to the ocean, while strategic maritime channels eastward to the Pacific Ocean are all controlled by the United States and its allies. In wartime, survival conditions will dramatically deteriorate for the PLAN outside of the First Island Chain, with the freedom and efficiency of its activities set to decline sharply. In diametric contrast, the United States will be able to more easily access operational support and logistical supplies from various bases in the First and Second Island Chains, fully exploiting its geographical advantages. More importantly, China is positioned at an absolute disadvantage relative to the United States in terms of its network of allies and overseas bases,

Power transition between China and the US  145 with effective redress implausible for a long period of time yet. In the absence of overseas bases and military and political support from allies, it is very difficult for Chinese power to make an impression far away from the mainland. In the foreseeable future, unless China can form a long-term alliance with the United States, Japan and other maritime powers, it would be very difficult to fundamentally change unfavorable conditions in its marine geography. Moreover, it would be near impossible to acquire strategic advantages in the entire Western Pacific, or even in waters worldwide. Although the operational radiuses of China’s medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range stealth fighter aircraft far transcend the First Island Chain and have established combat capabilities, but during the relatively long flight across the island chain they may suffer interception from concentrated air defenses and anti-missile forces, greatly reducing their combat effectiveness. In particular, due to their comparatively low flight speed, anti-ship cruise missiles are unlikely to cause any substantial damage to opposition warships, other than consuming the other side’s air defense resources; long-range stealth fighter aircraft and bombers not only risk interception, but also face arduous challenges in tracking and locating targets; only anti-ship ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles are able to constitute any consequential threat to enemy warships and forward bases. However, due to high production costs, they are relatively limited in number. Furthermore, with interception by missiles, such as the ground-based Patriot series and ship-based Standard series, it is very difficult to launch an uninterrupted attack on US military targets. It should not be overlooked that although ISR systems are developing rapidly, the speed of their progress is far outpaced by that of strike devices. As described above, there exist various problems with ISR systems in the open oceans, with the exception of satellites, which can provide information on discontinuous targets on a large scale. Maritime targets are beyond the reach of shore-based systems, while air-based and sea-based systems must advance into the ocean to be effective. Without control of the air and seas, security itself would become uncertain, let alone expectations of triumph. Inadequacies in ISR capabilities have become a major bottleneck in the Chinese military’s execution of naval combat missions. In its AirSea Battle combat doctrine, the US military construes the ‘China threat,’ based purely on the theoretical operational radiuses and other physical perceptions of the DF21D, H-6 and Su-30MKK, completely disregarding the abovementioned constraints in geography and limited reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, undeniably exaggerating China’s future potential capacity. As for the stability and security of the two sides’ operational systems in distant oceans, the United States also holds an overall advantage, as China is unable to rival the United States entirely, both in experience and in resources. As long as China maintains the momentum of its rapid rise, it will only be a matter of time before China develops and acquires the fundamental hardware required for oceangoing operations. In spite of this, the

146  Power transition between China and the US development and refinement of software such as data collection and reconciliation, power consolidation and coordination, oceangoing deployment, and operational experience are much more difficult. The more distant Chinese military operations are from Chinese coasts, the lower their levels of safety and efficiency, with the rate of efficiency decrease far outstripping that of American counterparts.43 In resource matters, China has a shortage of essential support in distant oceans. China’s oceangoing ISR systems lack information from reconnaissance measures other than reconnaissance satellites and are easily subject to the US military’s disruption and deception. China’s C4ISR systems will become ever more vulnerable with China’s growing dependence on offshore platforms and space-based platforms in regions far from the continent. In contrast, the US military relies on forward bases scattered worldwide, and on allies’ onshore or offshore reconnaissance, communications and other resources, effectively offsetting deficiencies in space-based reconnaissance and communication capabilities, with much greater reliability in its entire C4ISR system operations. Reluctant compromise and desperate balance In the Western Pacific, China is naturally a land power, while the United States remains a maritime hegemon. As a result of the combined impacts of geopolitical conditions, military technology and military systems, there incontrovertibly exists a strategic equilibrium between China and the United States. Some similarities are present between these circumstances and the strategic confrontation in ancient China between the Zhongyuan dynasty and nomadic tribes in the north along the Great Wall of China or annual 400-millimeter precipitation line. The Zhongyuan dynasty and nomadic regimes had each maintained their own strategic advantages on the southern and northern sides of the equilibrium line respectively. Of course, such a balance is not indestructible with sufficient manpower, while disparities in the efficiency of military systems would also bring about enormous changes. As was the case in the time of the Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, armies in the Zhongyuan dynasty pursued adversaries in the Gobi desert and frequently prevailed, whereas the Mongol, Later Jin and other ethnic minority regimes also established long-term rule in the south. Nonetheless, in a situation where both parties can utilize their own technological and geographical advantages as usual, it would be very difficult to shatter this equilibrium. Similarly, there are certain effective radiuses and scopes of dominance in China’s ‘from land to sea’ and the United States’ ‘from sea to land’ power projection methods. In the next 10–20 years, as China concludes the first stage of its military modernization, it will gradually achieve strategic supremacy within the First Island Chain and its neighboring waters. In view of China’s geographic superiority in these areas, vast air defense systems, and land-based reconnaissance and early warning measures, it is unlikely

Power transition between China and the US  147 that some doctrine like AirSea Battle will succeed in its vision of attacking deep into Mainland China. It will only trigger ill-advised conflict escalation or Chinese retaliation. Moreover, there are huge divergences in Chinese and American core interests in the East China Sea and the South China Sea respectively. For China, the importance of its interests and the extent of its concern over these issues cannot be compared to those of the United States. The United States lacks credibility in this region when engaging in threatening measures to present an offensive deterrence against China. At the same time, the general trend, from a strategic perspective, is for the United States to ‘back off’ on Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea and other issues, while any actions attempting to reverse this tendency would become both futile and highly perilous. Although the United States is unable to achieve victory over China in coastal regions contiguous to China, it can nevertheless hold an absolute advantage in open waters distant from the Chinese Mainland and effortlessly maintain denial capabilities within most waters. It is exactly as Hugh White remarks, to dominate China, the United States needs to sustain sea command; but to check and balance China, the United States simply needs to uphold sea denial, which is certainly feasible.44 If China disregards flaws in its natural endowments, deficiencies in its capabilities and relatively weak overseas political influence, and pursues spheres of influence and superior power in the entire Western Pacific region or even in maritime spaces worldwide, it would still be unable to radically change the Sino-US strategic equilibrium, regardless of how great its aspiration and investment. The Sino-US strategic equilibrium is upheld broadly in waters surrounding the First Island Chain. Prior to a profound revolution in military technology, this equilibrium is the boundary of where onshore technology extends toward the ocean, and the limit of where offshore technology advances toward the continent. In a situation where both the Chinese and US militaries are fully utilizing thriving military technologies and exploiting their respective geographic advantages, it would be very difficult for the United States to overcome China in Chinese coastal waters, whereas it would be unlikely for China to emerge victorious in a confrontation with the United States in the distant oceans. This strategic equilibrium is not static, but dynamic, with a certain degree of flexibility in its scope. First, technological advancement may not be symmetrical. Land-based reconnaissance, delivery and combat technologies are in development, while corresponding technologies of maritime platforms are also constantly improving. The importance of identical technologies is often not the same for the two parties, thus some technological innovations may marginally adjust the strategic balance. Second, war or strategic confrontation today is completely different from the infantry and cavalry warfare that was waged on either side of the Great Wall and is a systemic conflict comprising thousands of assembled constituents and systems. The actual combat capabilities of both China and the United States

148  Power transition between China and the US are determined largely by the extent to which military power is integrated and the efficiency of the two sides’ joint operations. This is relatively difficult to accurately assess and there exists a definite degree of uncertainty. In addition, the level of support from foreign allies is another major variable that must be computed. With the democratization of international relations and the thriving development of civil society in various countries, military operations of overseas garrisons will be met with opposition due to intensifying political and public opinion, which will undoubtedly increase flexibility in the strategic equilibrium. Finally, it must be stressed that there are conspicuous differences between this demarcation line of strategic advantages and the ‘Great Wall Line’ of ancient times, for it is intangible and porous, rather than palpably divided by a physical barrier. Both Chinese and American military forces have freedom of navigation within one another’s sphere of dominance, even during times of war. This is because no country can command even a small offshore area in the same way control is exercised onshore, so neither China nor the United States can entirely deny access to the other side within their respective scopes of dominance. Moreover, China does not in fact need to expel the US military from East Asia or even from the Western Pacific to gain a strategic advantage along China’s coast, while the United States likewise does not need to deprive China of its rights to explore and exploit distant ocean spaces in order to maintain its global maritime supremacy.

The possibility of maintaining peace at sea between China and the United States Undoubtedly, maritime geopolitical competition has already become one of the major issues in Sino-US relations. To a great extent, whether China and the United States will fall into the Thucydides trap depends on the maritime interaction between them. In this regard, many experts and scholars believe that Sino-US maritime conflicts cannot be reconciled. Some even equate Sino-US maritime competition with pre–First World War German–British relations and Cold War era Soviet–US relations. In this case, is it possible for China and the United States to uphold peace at sea? Sino-US power rivalries grow progressively fiercer but are somewhat reconcilable With China’s resolute strength in stepping ‘from land to sea,’ and the United States’ maritime strategy of accelerating ‘from sea to land,’ reversing from the wider oceans in the direction of the coast, antagonism between maritime military strategies of both sides is already an indisputable reality. China and the United States are engaging in political, economic, military and other expansive contests near East Asian coastal waters. The United States is concerned that the ultimate goal of China’s development of sea power is

Power transition between China and the US  149 to expel the United States from East Asia and even to challenge the United States’ global hegemony. While the countermeasures of the United States to contain and suppress China, in addition to acts to enhance military deployment in the Asia-Pacific, it also causes China to become more insecure. The Sino-US security dilemma thus arises.45 China’s efforts to develop sea power and safeguard its maritime interests happen to be in intense strategic conflict with the United States’ promotion of the ‘Rebalance to the Asia Pacific’ and Indo-Pacific strategy or similar actions to augment various forms of its regional presence. The essence of this rivalry and conflict is the contradiction between China, a regional maritime power, in pursuit of its own legitimate rights and a commensurate position of power, and the United States, which seeks to maintain its maritime hegemony and consolidate its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to divergences in strategy, there still exist numerous practical conflicts between China and the United States. Differences exist between the two sides on the Taiwan issue, which are difficult to reconcile for the time being, fundamentally restricting the two countries’ maritime strategies and mutual trust in policies. Differences of awareness exist between the two countries’ recognition of maritime norms and rules, such as the military jurisdiction of EEZs and of Innocent Passage, affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of communication. On issues, such as the East China Sea and South China Sea, Chinese actions to safeguard its sovereignty are increasingly incomprehensible for the United States. The United States believes that China is transforming the ‘status quo’ of the Asia-Pacific region by virtue of its steadily rising strength and fears that this would eventually subvert the US-led Asia-Pacific security system. It therefore attempts to conduct preventative diplomacy vis-à-vis China. All kinds of resounding censure and criticism grow day by day, with intentions to use the Diaoyu Islands, South China Sea and other issues to check China ever more apparent. While the United States piles pressure on China with more and more of its forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific, it takes an unfair position on the Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea issues, while it is one-sided in its suppression of China and support for the actions of Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and other claimants, all which also leaves China somewhat indignant, with no choice but to make a range of preparations for American intervention in maritime disputes involving China. However, this rivalry between China and the United States is in truth not entirely irreconcilable, for the nature of the Sino-US maritime game is completely different from the German-British competition for sea power and ­Soviet-US contest for hegemony. The present military technology is unable yet to entirely transform the impacts of geographic distance, and so there is a huge buffer space between China and the United States. Regardless of how China’s sea power develops, the Sino-US contest still carries the distinctive features of a classic match between a land power and a sea power. China is a regional maritime power, and its most important maritime

150  Power transition between China and the US interests are concentrated in East Asian waters, whereas the United States is a global maritime hegemon, and East Asian waters are merely one key part. As a consequence, the focal interests of China and the United States in these waters are quite different. Adjustments in power and influence in East Asian waters would not produce an underlying impact on China’s and the United States’ global positions of power. China has the means to win dignity, while the United States certainly also has ways to maintain respect. This is far from comparable to the competition for sea power between Germany and Great Britain during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.46 In this regard, Chairman Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that ‘the Pacific is sufficiently large to accommodate both the US and China.’47 Specifically, although there is fierce conflict between the two parties’ pursuit of interests, there is nevertheless room for compromise and concession: the United States’ two most important interests in these waters are to ensure freedom of navigation and to maintain regional peace and stability. There exists no fundamental contradiction between China and the United States on these two subjects, even though the United States uses freedom of navigation to carry out close-range coastal surveillance and maritime deterrence, which poses a certain security threat to China, and the United States’ widespread opposition to the use of military force to change the status quo has also constituted a certain restriction on China’s use of force to uphold its rights. In essence, China also concurs in principle with the values and concepts of freedom of navigation and regional peace and stability. Furthermore, with expansion in the sphere of activity of China’s sea power and steady increases in its regional interests, Sino-US common interests on these two major issues will continue to magnify. The Taiwan issue and maritime disputes involving China concern core and vital Chinese interests and are an extension of Chinese sovereignty or sovereign rights, so it is very difficult for China to make concessions; whereas the United States’ major consideration on these issues is how to fulfill its commitments to its allies and contain China’s maritime rise. These are also very important, but for freedom of navigation, regional security and global strategic plans, these two interests are in fact not wholly indispensable. In reality, in terms of the strategic situation, existing international circumstances ought to permit both China and the United States to safeguard their core interests, without one presenting a major threat to the other. The strategic width and depth of the Pacific Ocean cannot be compared to the North Sea. It is sufficiently large to accommodate both China and the United States, and it is possible that these geographic differences would allow Sino-US competition to extricate itself from the tragedy of historic German-British conflict. Overall interdependence will restrict the fomentation of conflict However, mere strategic balance is far from sufficient. While it helps to contain large-scale wars, it cannot prevent small-scale battles, and all large-scale

Power transition between China and the US  151 wars originate from small-scale battles or even skirmishes. Peace between China and the United States still must benefit from the ‘you are among us, we are among you’ composite interdependence that has formed between the two countries. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) regarding the eradication of nuclear deterrents, restrictions on a high degree of economic interdependence, in addition to Sino-US interdependence in global governance and maritime security, are three key positive elements for peace. The first step is to ensure a joint purge of powerful deterrents in nuclear era circumstances. Against a backdrop of nuclear terror, direct conflict or war between major powers is becoming inconceivable, for any escalation in conflict could be catastrophic. Although it is difficult to compare China’s nuclear arsenal with that of the Soviet Union or Russia, its minimum nuclear deterrence measures are nevertheless sufficient to dissuade the United States from potential hostile actions. With the ever-increasing sophistication, perfection and innovation in China’s nuclear arms and their means of delivery, credibility of MAD between China and the United States is also greatly enhanced and an overall state of peace can be expected. The second step is economic interdependence. As China steadily integrates into the international system, its reliance on US-led international mechanisms is increasing and common interests with the United States are also expanding. China will gradually discover the value of complying with regulations, thus renouncing armed challenges. In reality, the accomplishments of China’s reform and opening up are in a process of synchronizing with and integrating into the international system. Sino-US trade war and economic decoupling initiated by the Trump administration may cast a great shadow on this interdependent relationship, but in longer term, is doomed to be unsuccessful since they are against the trend of economic development. The United States will come to discover that a policy of confrontation and containment both proves ineffective and is ever more difficult to manage. Besides deep trade complementarity, there is also intense division of labor between China and the United States in traditional manufacturing, information technology and other industries. Although economic friction is growing, economic interdependence is also increasing. To some degree, intimate economic ties in fact already act as deterrence, because both countries have measures to paralyze and even destroy one another’s economy. An allout trade war between the two countries purports both sides’ simultaneous ruin and means that even the relatively stronger United States would be unable to afford the cost of large-scale economic retaliation from China. The third is the pressure of global governance. The two sides’ common interests in nonproliferation, development promotion, regional security and other issues are steadily growing. Any significant problem in the world would be very difficult to resolve without Sino-US cooperation. For instance, the US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, issued by the two

152  Power transition between China and the US countries on 12 November 2014, has been hailed as an underlying transformation in the global politics of climate change. The urgency of global governance will also precipitate genuine Sino-US strategic partnership. Maritime competitions are very important to both sides, but it is only one piece of the complex relationship between China and the United States. With China’s rise, the United States’ relative decline, and the rapid growth in common interests, both sides would, as far as possible, avoid a ‘deadlock’ in the overall Sino-US relationship due to maritime frictions. As blows are traded over maritime issues as mentioned above, at the same time, the stability and development of Sino-US relations are also actively boosted. China’s leaders have proposed an initiative to build a new type of power relations in addition to a new type of military relations. The maintenance of stable relations with the United States remains connected to the overall state of Chinese foreign affairs. Although the United States is inclined to take a hard line on maritime disputes involving China in the near future and increasingly echoed great power competition, it in fact does not wish for this issue to affect overall Sino-US relations, and proactively advocates for highlevel exchange and strategic dialogue between China and the United States. As neither China nor the United States could afford a complete breakdown in their relationship, universal restraint is favored by both countries as a moderating handbrake in this intense game concerning maritime issues. The United States of course wishes to contain China, but it is increasingly difficult to do so. The United States is already aware that the challenge China poses to the United States is quite unlike that of the Soviet Union, so with regard to China, the United States cannot adopt a comprehensive containment policy of politics, economics, military, culture and other aspects, as it did with the Soviet Union. Under rapidly developing interdependence, the United States can only adopt a partial containment policy against China. Expressly, on the one hand, it bides for opportunities to suppress and check China in some measure on maritime and other issues, and on the other hand also endeavors to maintain a stable relationship with China on the whole. The United States’ implementation of such a policy would inevitably aggravate mutual conflicts and reciprocal hedging in the competition and cooperation of Sino-US relations. This would further deepen the relationship of ‘neither friend nor foe’ between China and the United States. Maritime functional cooperation will advance the stability of Sino-US relations Competition between China and the United States in East Asia or the Western Pacific Ocean is only one part of comprehensive Sino-US maritime relations. In global waters there is extensive space and potential for cooperation between China and the United States. The seas, in particular the distant oceans, still encompass most unknowns in the world whose exploration and exploitation is very difficult and invariably represent a feat no single country

Power transition between China and the US  153 can accomplish alone. At the same time, due to characteristics of maritime connectivity and mobility, the marine economy and social activities have naturally open features. Whether safeguarding maritime security, shaping the maritime order or proceeding with maritime development, all is inseparable from the unswerving cooperation of littoral states. Both China and the United States are global powers with interests circulating worldwide, and in a time of globalization and economic interdependence, the two countries both rely on an open world and economic systems for fulfilling and protecting overseas interests. For both sides, this produces an enormous need and potential for collaboration on areas such as maritime security, maritime politics and the marine economy. In the field of maritime security, in the present world, there is neither one country nor one maritime power that alone can secure its own interests, let alone protect worldwide common interests. As powerful as the United States may be, it is no exception to this. Since the end of the Cold War, confronted by the diversification of maritime threats and naval duties, the US Navy has actively supported cooperation on maritime security and proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative, the 1,000 Ship Navy Plan and the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative and other international collaboration schemes in succession, in addition to prominently emphasizing the necessity of international cooperation in National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005) and A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007), among other publications. In the 2015 edition of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, while the United States stresses the challenges and risks of China’s A2/AD, it also candidly recognizes that the Chinese Navy is making ever greater contributions in maritime affairs such as cracking down on piracy, providing humanitarian assistance and participating in large-scale multilateral exercises.48 Compared with the United States, China somewhat lacks the capability and resources to uphold SLOCs and its overseas interests through military measures on a global scale, thus cooperation would be its foremost choice. Lyle J. Goldstein of US Naval War College believes China and the United States can engage in cooperation on at least six main areas of action: the establishment of maritime trust and crisis management mechanisms, maritime search and rescue, disaster relief, marine environmental surveillance, the safeguard of regional maritime security and on assuring the security of SLOCs.49 Global maritime issues and sudden crises often compel China and the United States to work more closely. For instance, the joint escort in the Gulf of Aden, the Malaysia Airlines MH370 search and rescue operation and other united operations have highlighted the need for China and the United States, as global maritime powers, to cooperate hand-in-hand. With regard to the maritime order, common interests between China and the United States are increasing significantly. As I have mentioned before, the current maritime order based on UNCLOS is far from fully formed.

154  Power transition between China and the US To  form a cogent maritime mechanism, the participation and support of major powers are crucial. Moreover, policy coordination between China and the United States is a vital prerequisite. China and the United States are maritime powers, both with extensive continental coastlines, and share an intrinsic common language and joint historic responsibility in shaping the maritime order. With the narrowing of the gap in strength between China and the United States, Chinese and American perceptions on issues such as safeguarding freedom of navigation and shaping the maritime order are rapidly converging and the influence of ideological differences and other irrational factors on this issue will gradually decline. As for marine development and management, China and the United States will become deeply interdependent in scientific research, exploitation of marine resources, environmental protection and other areas. Development of the seas, with their considerable openness and shareability, is very different from management of land, for even marine resources within territorial waters are dynamic. Both China and the United States possess their own unique advantages. The United States has rich experience in marine development and management and an advanced technological level, whereas China has relatively abundant human resources and plentiful capital. In the exploration and exploitation of the global maritime spaces, the high seas and international seabed areas, development and management of resources and space require intensive capital and advanced technology. The two countries would both benefit from cooperation, whereas both equally stand to lose from conflict. In the vast expanses of the Arctic, mid-Pacific and south Atlantic Oceans, mankind is severely underinvesting in capital, human resources and other factors. Maritime awareness and investigation of these waters require China and the United States to collaborate hand-inhand; the two countries are also increasingly inseparable on issues such as worldwide maritime meteorological forecasts, awareness of maritime domains and disaster early warnings. At present, Sino-US contests in the maritime sphere are becoming ever more eye-catching. China and the United States would often erupt into skirmishes and conflict, neither side appreciating the other, and both countries’ defense departments even reinforcing ‘worst-case scenario’ preparations aimed at the other side. However, from an objective perspective, China and the United States, as rivals who ‘detest’ one another, also increasingly cooperate, coordinate and unite on numerous fields. Strategic maritime rivalry between China and the United States is inevitable, but to undermine the other party completely would be even worse. While the two countries may not like each other, the functional cooperation offered by the other side is indispensable.

Constructing a new type of Sino-US maritime power relations There are major issues in the construction of a new type of Sino-US maritime relations, covering substantial subject matter. However, how to manage and

Power transition between China and the US  155 alleviate the maritime rivalry between the two countries is without doubt one of the most important issues and is also an area that both parties recognize and are willing to cooperate on. In light of China’s proposal to construct a new type of power relationship, the US government has responded selectively. On the whole, the United States has accepted the two principles of ‘no conflict, no confrontation,’ while expressing reservations on the two main principles of ‘mutual respect’ and ‘win-win cooperation.’ The construction of a new type of maritime power relationship is key for the two sides, China and the United States, to break the historical curse of ‘inevitable conflict between a rising nation and dominant nation’ or to step out of the ‘Thucydides’ Trap.’ The fact China and the United States should cooperate does not, however, means that the two sides will definitely cooperate. The very low probability of large war between China and the United States also does not mean that peace is guaranteed. Sino-US relations are currently advancing toward a fork in the road, where future prospects depend on both parties’ choices and endeavors. Since the Sino-US contest of interests in East Asian waters is not a matter of ‘life and death,’ and both sides cannot afford the costs of direct conflict, jointly improving interaction processes, taking advantage of peaceful opportunities, and preventing ‘tragedy’ from occurring appear particularly important. Strengthening strategic dialogue and communication to improve interaction process There are already over 90 pairs of bilateral dialogue and communication mechanisms or channels between China and the United States. Under Trump’s administration, the two sides have also established four new independent mechanisms, namely, the Diplomatic Security Dialogue, Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue and Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue. These channels range from the top to the executive levels, covering communication and interaction in politics, military, economics, culture in addition to many other aspects. Nevertheless, the efficiency and efficacy of Sino-US communication are far from satisfactory, as in many cases the purpose and expectations of contact are unable to be fulfilled. In other words, there is inadequate depth of communication. At present, many interactions end at wining and dining stage, with each party expressing superficial viewpoints. Both China and the United States are keen to emphasize their own individuality, or ‘exceptionalism’: China often highlights the distinctiveness of its culture and traditions, and unwillingness to follow the West’s old path; in contrast, Americans take pride in statements like ‘the US is a City Upon a Hill’ and ‘Americans are voters of God.’ As Kissinger said, China and the United States are two powers with entirely different traditions and strategic cultures. Each side accurately perceives the other to face numerous practical difficulties and cultural obstacles.50 In addition, in the two countries,

156  Power transition between China and the US there are growing numbers of individuals and departments involved in decision-making, invariably increasing the difficulty of effective communication. A large degree of the so-called strategic distrust is due to the misunderstandings arising in communication. The relationship between the two countries is extremely complex to begin with; at the same time, the two sides have completely different political cultures and bureaucratic systems. As a result, even the most brilliant leaders and politicians may not always be able to steady the ship. Even an excellent policy decision may be destroyed by the two countries’ cumbersome policy implementation systems. An accord agreed in principle by the United States and China may be dismantled based on disagreements in the details; at times even when consensus is reached on perspective and interests, divergences on implementation may lead to failure in cooperation.51 In this situation, it is very important to use language and logic, which the other party can understand in order to express one’s views and objectives. This implies that acting unilaterally and flaunting oneself is simply a diplomatic show, serving only limited purpose in the development of Sino-US relations. Only if both sides are prepared to renounce their individuality and exceptionalism, earnestly listen to each other, and moreover understand one another, can strategic dialogue and communication prove successful. In addition, both sides should have the courage to face the genuine issues of power competition rather than the false ones of freedom of navigation; need to maintain strategic consciousness, arrange dialogue on issues of West Pacific region as soon as possible, conduct substantial negotiation with respect to strategic conception of each other, launch arms control dialogue or mutual restriction on maritime armament development, reach necessary consensus on power distribution and power balance in the region and form an inclusive security framework for coexistence on this basis in the process of the competition. With this foundation, China and the United States also need to accomplish the endeavors discussed below. On the one hand, the United States ought to maintain considerable confidence in response to China’s growing maritime power. First, China’s coastal advantages will be limited, whereas the United States will have plenty of space throughout. Currently with powerful rivalries emerging in East Asian waters, China experiences not only US containment, but also encounters strong competition from Japan, South Korea, and even Vietnam, Indonesia and other countries. China may benefit from certain advantages, but it is unlikely to control these waters exclusively. Second, China is unable to gain advantages in the open seas, as through offshore balancing the United States can continue to maintain its maritime hegemony. China and the United States’ offensive and defensive balance in coastal waters and the open seas demonstrates that if China’s growing strength maintains its momentum, while it may attain coastal advantages, it is unlikely to scale new heights and become a strong challenger to the United States in the open seas, as the United States can still form powerful restraints against China’s

Power transition between China and the US  157 capabilities and intentions by virtue of its advantages in the open seas. On the other hand, the United States ought still to maintain essential rationality. If a relatively declining United States insists on conducting comprehensive checks and balances against a rising China in East Asian waters, pursuing impractical goals in its own areas of disadvantage, this would be unquestionably imprudent. Not only would this be futile, but may accelerate the decline of American hegemony. Consequently, the United States should consider accepting objective realities in China and the United States’ relative changes in strength, in addition to grasping the strategic importance of compromise and concessions. If the United States puts itself in the forefront of those trying the contain China, the potential for future tension – or worse – in Sino-­A merican relations can only increase. By pulling back from its hegemonic role in East Asia and adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United States could better preserve its relative power and strategic influence.52 At the same time, without undermining its position of global leadership, the United States should clearly demonstrate to what extent it is able to respect China’s legitimate interests.53 As its strategic focus turns toward the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region, the United States should carefully consider its responsibilities and obligations to certain allies, accommodate China on issues that concern Chinese core and major interests and refrain from offering allies commitments that are too difficult to honor; even if it wants to unite with allies to check and balance China, the United States also should to be cautious against actions that trigger a military race with China. Regarding the ‘Rebalance’ and ­Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States still needs to take concrete steps to gain trust. Apart from repeatedly expressing that these strategies are in fact not directed at China, it also needs to be more cautious, more transparent in its actual conduct. In order to build mutual trust, the United States must pursue a regional security mechanism that includes China, in place of constructing a ‘united front’ against China through bilateral military alliances and multilateral political security alliances. With respect to its adjustment of objectives, China should pay greater attention to the tactical issue of communication. First, considering that the United States’ strength still far exceeds that of China, China should adopt a clearer strategy. On the one hand, it is essential to clarify the issues on which China and the United States are competitors, and on which they are cooperative partners, so as to aid both sides in comprehending each other’s bottom lines in policy and avoid actions that may transgress into each other. As the relatively weaker party, it is inadvisable for China to dictate extensive national core interests; it must strictly define the scope of its core interests, clarify on which interests it is possible to compromise vis-à-vis on which it is vital to persevere. On the other hand, it is

158  Power transition between China and the US necessary to insist on established bottom lines, not to compromise too easily. As the weaker party, China needs to clearly demonstrate its intentions to the United States. China will take utmost care not to challenge the United States’ core interests; however if China’s core interests are encroached upon, it would resist the United States with greatest determination and the belief that ‘it is better to die in glory than live in dishonor, better to die a hero than live a coward.’ Only by adhering to its own bottom lines, strengthening its strategic resolve, being firm where it must be firm, can China better safeguard its maritime interests. Second, China should better enlighten the United States on Chinese military power’s development plan and strategy. Under certain conditions, it is necessary to pay attention to improving the transparency of policy and effectiveness of information transmission. Although China has made remarkable achievements on improving transparency, but due to institutional coordination, mass media sensationalism and other problems in the transmission process, contradictory information still often occurs in external transmission, leading to incoherent situations. Finally, China also needs a high degree of strategic awareness regarding the importance of exchange and communication mechanisms on both sides equally. It must not be China’s habit to use dialogue mechanisms themselves as a tool or weapon in diplomatic disputes. Interruptions in communication can of course exert pressure on other parties but would also harm one’s own interests. Moreover, the cost and efficiency of this style of diplomacy is even more unacceptable when other more substantive political, economic and military means of retaliation available. Establishing an effective crisis prevention management mechanism As friction, conflict and crisis between China and the United States cannot, for the instant, always be avoided, risks of Sino-US conflict induced by third parties are rising. In order to avert unintentional direct confrontation or even conflict, reinforce crisis management and reduce crisis incidents, conflict prevention has become an urgent priority. It is essential that both China and the United States enhance the style and substance of existing maritime military security dialogue mechanisms, promote discussion on maritime crisis management, build trust and form effective norms or transition of order, both as precaution and as control. China and the United States should at the very least include the following emergency and crisis prevention management mechanisms: First, the two sides should reach a basic consensus on maritime military security issues, such as mutual means of notification, navigation and flight regulations and emergency procedures. After more than a decade of dialogue and consultation on maritime security, this initiative has already achieved some success like Code of Conduct for Maritime and Air Safety in the High Seas and Mutual Notification Mechanisms on Major Military Operations (2014).

Power transition between China and the US  159 In future, while continuing to uphold original matters of discussion and implementing specific codes of conduct, it is also possible to attempt to devise, on the basis of existing mechanisms, dialogue and consultation platforms on US-Asia-Pacific strategy, US-Asia-Pacific alliance systems, maritime security and any other regional security issues, so as to encourage consensus on conduct and third parties. Second, there should be effective emergency channels of communication. ‘Established channels are prone to remain open when relations between two countries are amicable, but reliability is often compromised in the event of an emergency. Motivation is important, but institutional arrangement is also required for assurance.’54 Therefore, it is necessary to agree to standard procedures concerning the Sino-US military affairs hotline and other communication mechanisms, clarifying their duties, and systematically ensuring that they remain effective in times of crisis. Third, there are relevant regulations on crisis alerts and controls. Presently, the two parties need to shape crisis management procedures into a set of mature and workable norms, to prevent misjudgment or misconduct in decision-making departments in the midst of crisis, which would lead to further unnecessary suspicion or conflict. For contradictions in Sino-US policy and intensifying ‘strategic distrust,’ pragmatic and professional crisis management mechanisms can act as a vital safety valve. In addition, they also have strong spillover effects, can enhance mutual trust and encourage cooperation in other fields. If the two powers could recognize that both sides share a considerable common interest base, the two countries may establish crisis prevention measures, expand channels of contact and strengthen communication and coordination, to avoid catastrophic events and bolster desire for cooperation between the two sides, so that their relationship progresses in a positive direction.55 This type of professional or technological cooperation will ultimately lay the foundation for improvements in overall military and security relations between China and the United States. Adapting to essential compromises in pursuit of ‘maritime co-governance’ On solutions for Sino-US maritime strategic competition, James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara have once proposed the theory of Sino-US ‘maritime co-governance,’ believing that the United States is willing to entrust East Asia to China, provided that China is able to fulfill a series of requirements and conditions.56 In truth, Sino-US ‘maritime co-governance’ is far from limited to the Western Pacific. As the Chinese Navy becomes the world’s second largest sea power, the two countries’ naval cooperation in global waters will likewise become ever more extensive and pervasive. While strengthening maritime crisis management, China and the United States should simultaneously endeavor to promote maritime cooperation to

160  Power transition between China and the US safeguard joint interests and build mutual trust. China has already accepted the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative that was proposed by the United States. On 29 July 2003, China also formally joined the US Container Safety Initiative (CSI), playing an important role in the latter. In future, cooperation between the two sides to maintain security in fields of public global maritime commons will become increasingly common. I believe that China and the United States can focus on strengthening practical cooperation on issues such as maintaining of freedom of navigation; cracking down on piracy, anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, and disaster relief; and controlling narcotics trafficking and other illegal activities, so as to promote awareness of joint interests and form key strategic mutual trust. Next, the two sides should promote the integration of ideas and beliefs to boost cooperation in the construction of an international maritime order. Sino-US agreement and divergences on maritime ideology and regulation are of crucial importance to the evolution of the international maritime order and have a significant impact on the progressing transition of sea power. It is necessary for both sides to advance dialogue and cooperation to improve aspects such as maritime law and international maritime mechanisms, promote convergence on maritime perspectives, and while seeking not to fully bridge differences, but to better understand one another’s discourse and actions. The third major implication of strategic cooperation is that China and the United States must mutually make accommodating concessions, adjust competition strategy, as well as control the ‘intensity’ of conflict in the Western Pacific. Sino-US maritime contradictions or conflicts are mainly concentrated in epicontinental seas or coastal areas of East Asia, where the two sides have long been regarded as strategic rivals. Due to constant changes in the balance of power, all kinds of strategic probes and conflicts have become commonplace. This has brought both risks and challenges: with China’s rapidly growing strength, its actions to safeguard maritime interests are growing more confident and resolute, while as the United States grows ever more alarmed at China’s rise, its containment efforts progressively increase. At the same time, this has also brought opportunity: as Sino-US conflict gradually intensifies, the imminent outbreak of warfare conflict may inspire convergence in interests or positions, compelling both sides to recognize the value of communication and cooperation. Without China’s support and tolerance, the United States would never be able to ensure freedom of navigation and stability in this region; without the United States’ reluctant recognition, it would be near impossible for China to successfully reunify and very difficult to satisfactorily uphold its maritime territorial sovereignty and relevant rights. Objectively speaking, both Chinese and American goals have somewhat unrealistic aspects. In order to secure one another’s core or more important interests, both sides ought to prepare to renounce or compromise on some secondary objectives, in order to better adapt to and accommodate

Power transition between China and the US  161 the other party. China must establish powerful military deterrence, but take care to afford the United States appropriate diplomatic space, better express demands over its legitimate interests to the United States, carefully reconsider its employment of war in maritime disputes, avoid coercing the United States into a dead-end and encourage ‘concession with dignity’ from the United States. When pursuing coastal advantages, it is also necessary to fully examine American concerns over freedom of navigation. While containing China and upholding its maritime hegemony, the United States must at the same time fully recognize the significance and sensitivity of the Taiwan issue and maritime disputes involving China, thus in time adjusting its regional policy regarding Taiwan, cautiously approaching disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea to avoid aggravating the Chinese people’s nationalist sentiments, easing Chinese hostility toward American strategy in the Asia-Pacific by providing China’s coastal maritime power sufficient space to develop, and encouraging China to make further contributions to maintaining freedom of navigation and regional stability. Within the existing system, China and the United States should accomplish ‘two types of sharing’; the United States ought to ‘share power’ with China, and China needs to ‘share responsibility’ with the United States.57 China needs to improve its approach and technique in the pursuit of interests to better adapt to the current US-led international system, whereas the United States needs to adjust the aims of its Asia-Pacific strategy accordingly to better accommodate China. The central connotations of Sino-US ‘maritime co-governance’ are China’s acceptance of the United States’ global maritime advantage and its strategic partnership with the United States to safeguard global maritime security and accessibility. In contrast, the United States must respect China’s core and vital interests in the Western Pacific region and make certain compromises in its policies.

Notes 1 Originally published in World Economics and Politics, No. 5, 2014, with edits to the title and contents. 2 Robert Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Yan Xuetong, ed., Security Cooperation in East Asia (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004), pp. 51–54. 3 Document: Air Sea Battle Name Change Memo. https://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/ document-air-sea-battle-name-change-memo 4 The World’s Top Economy: The US vs. China in Five Charts, www.weforum. org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/; https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/gdp-ranking-ppp-based 5 World Economic League Table 2016 Highlights, https://cebr.com/reports/ welt-2016/ 6 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, p. 17. 7 Yan Xuetong, Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years (­Beijing: CITIC Publishing Group, 2013), p. 5. 8 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, 5 February 2014.

162  Power transition between China and the US 9 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China’s Military & The U.S.-­ Japan Alliance In 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, May 3, 2013, p. 308. 10 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy ­Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress, September 2013, p. 42, www. fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf 11 China’s Military & The U.S.-Japan Alliance In 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment, pp. 186–187. 12 Yuan Peng, “A New Era of Strategic Thinking on China’s Greater Periphery,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 10, 2013, p. 31. 13 James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell, Conflict with China Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence, pp. 5, 9. 14 Department of U.S. Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, pp. 4-–5, http://www.defense.gov/news/­ Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 15 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-­ Access and Area-Denial Challenge, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003). 16 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why Air Sea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p. 24. 17 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004 (White Paper), http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-01/06/ content_4249947_2.Htm 18 Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (White Paper), www.mod.gov.cn/ affair/2013-04/16/content_4442839.Htm 19 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, www.defense.gov/ pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf 20 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy ­Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress, p. 10. 21 Elbridge Colby, “Don’t Sweat Air Sea Battle,” July 31, 2013, http://­nationalinterest. org/commentary/Dont-sweat-airsea-battle-8804?page=6 22 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010, p. 33, www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf 23 Norton A. Schwartz and Jonathan W. Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012, http://www.The-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1212. 24 Jonathan W. Greenert, “Breaking the Kill Chain,” May 16, 2013, www.­foreignpolicy. com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle?Page=0,1 25 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-­ Departure Operational Concept, May 2010, pp.  17–30, www.csbaonline.org/ publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept 26 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-­ Departure Operational Concept, p. xi. 27 Seth Cropsey, “Statement of Seth Cropsey Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to P.L.A. Naval Forces modernization,” December 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/ AS28/20131211/101579/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-CropseyS-20131211.Pdf 28 Thomas X. Hammes, “A Military Strategy to Deter China,” December 1, 2013, www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/01/a_military_strategy_to_deter_ china_106987.Html

Power transition between China and the US  163 29 U.S. House of Representatives, “From Representative J. Randy Forbes to the Honorable Leon Panetta,” November 7, 2011, http://forbes.house.gov/­ UploadedFiles/Panetta_ASB.pdf 30 Amitai Etzioni, “Preparing to Go to War with China,” July 2013, http://www. huffingtonpost.com/amitaietzioni/preparing-to-go-to-war-wi_b_3533398.Html. 31 Thomas X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, National Defense University, June 2012, pp. 5–6. 32 Elbridge Colby, “Don’t Sweat AirSea Battle,” http://nationalinterest.org/­ commentary/dont.sweat.airsea.battle.8804?page=3. 33 Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications and Recommendations,” p.  11, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20131211/101579/ HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-EricksonA-20131211.pdf 34 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Anti access/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer 2016, pp. 13, 41, 48. 35 See more information about the relations between ASB and JAM-GC, Terry S. Morris, Martha VanDriel, Bill Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Richard H. Schulz, and Kristin E. Jacobsen, “Securing Operational Access: Evolving the AirSea Battle Concept,” February11, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ securing-operational-access-evolving-the-air-sea-battle-12219 36 Naval Surface Forces Commander, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control, January 2017, p. 9. 37 Liu Zhuoming and Jiang Zhijung, eds., Naval Equipment (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House), pp. 523–537. 38 Ian Easton, “China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” The Project 2049 Institute, February 2014, pp. 9–16. 39 Ian Easton, “China’s Military Strategy in the Asia Pacific: Implications of Regional Stability,” The Project 2049 Institute, 2013, p. 16. www.project2049.net/ documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf 40 James R. Holmes, “An Age of Land-Based Sea Power?” March 2012, http:// thediplomat.com/2013/03/An-age-of-land-based-sea-power 41 Naval Surface Forces Commander, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control, January 2017, p. 9. 42 Strategy Research Department of Chinese Military Science Acdemic, eds., Strategy (Beijing: Chinese Military Science Press, 2013), p. 96. 43 Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Naval Modernization: Implications and Recommendations,” p. 5. 44 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2012), p. 75. 45 Hu Bo, China’s Sea Power Strategy: Diplomacy, the Marine Economy and Sea Power (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2012), p. 153. 46 At the time, Germany hoped that its high seas fleet could exert a certain amount of pressure on the British in the North Sea or in waters near the English Channel to deter the British from participating in the war. These waters were central to Britain’s core interests, tied to British national security and the security of most important sea lane between Great Britain and Continental Europe. There was a very limited strategic buffer space between the two sides, so Germany’s construction of a mighty fleet was insupportable for the British. 47 Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping Holds Talks Wwith US President Obama, Emphasizes Constructing New Types of Sino-US Relations from Six Key Directions,” http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebr/chn/zgyw/t1209988.htm

164  Power transition between China and the US 48 U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2015. 49 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival, Vo1. 53, No. 2, 2011, p. 92. 50 Henry Kissinger, On China, Reprint edition (London: Allen Lane, 2012). 51 Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Sega, “The G-2 Mirage,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 3, 2009, pp. 14–23. 52 Christopher Layne, “China’s Challenge to US Hegemony,” Current History, Vo1. 107, No. 705, 2008, pp. 13–18. 53 Zhu Feng, “U.S. Rebalance in the Asia – Pacific: China’s Response and the Future Regional Order,” CSS Discussion Paper, No. 12, New Zealand: Victoria University of Wellington, 2012, p. 14. 54 Zhang Tuosheng, “A Case Analysis of Sino-US Security Crisis Management, ”in Zhang Tuosheng and Michael D. Swaine eds., Sino-American Security Crisis Management Classic Cases, World Affairs Press (Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe), 2007, pp. 302–303. 55 Zhao Quansheng, Great Power Politics & Diplomacy, World Affairs Press (Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe), 2009, pp. 16–20. 56 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 112. 57 Jin Canrong and Duan Haowen, “Dilemmas and Solutions in Current Sino-US Relations,” International Review (Guoji Guancha), Vol. 1, 2014.

8 Maritime relations with Japan, ASEAN, India, Australia and Russia

The Asia-Pacific region is an area where leading global sea powers are concentrated and has become a strategic focal point of contention for those maritime powers. With the exception of European countries, which participate relatively less in this realm, virtually all other major maritime powers are clustered here. Besides the United States, Japan and other traditional maritime powers are also redoubling their efforts to consolidate vested interests and establish their place in the international order; China, India and other newly rising forces are emerging as a group; while South Korea, Australia, Indonesia and other middle powers are also full of ambition. The naval race is already ongoing in this region and is affecting every country in the area. The Pacific and Indian Oceans have officially replaced the Atlantic as the strategic center of international maritime politics. The differentiation and combination of China, the United States, Japan, Russia, India and the ASEAN countries, among other powers, will determine, to a great extent, the future of the world’s maritime order. For China to become a world leader in this group of maritime heavyweights, it would be very difficult to maintain an unassailable position in the maritime conquest without the systematic planning of great power strategy.

Rationally facing frosty and tense Sino-Japanese relations Japan is a neighboring country with immediate stakes in Chinese maritime power. Historically, Japan has repeatedly impeded progress in China’s maritime rise and is presently the most complex and keen-edged country with which China has disputes at sea. In recent years, Japan has frequently sensationalized concerns over China’s ‘maritime expansion.’ Chinese ventures to build maritime power have not only been construed by Japan as a ‘corrosion’ of its rights and interests, they have at the same time become Japan’s best excuse in its pursuit of political and military normalization. Japan is a traditional maritime country, with sophisticated comprehensive strength at sea that ought not be underestimated. In-depth analysis of Japan’s China strategy, domestic political characteristics and policies designed for appropriate response is a matter of vital urgency.

166  Maritime relations The long continuity in Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation On 11 September 2012, following Japan’s ‘island purchase’ incident, Sino-­ Japanese relations plummeted and were further aggravated as the Abe government assumed power, inheriting the Noda cabinet’s hardline stance on the Diaoyu Islands issue, while zealously striving to amend the constitution and strengthen the military in opposition to China. It is unlikely that the Japanese government, constrained by Japan’s national interests and the domestic political environment, will be able to make sweeping policy reforms in the short term, while strategic confrontation and military rivalries between China and Japan will endure in the long term.1 At present, in the case of China and Japan, there exist virtually all elements required for confrontation, as frictions exist between the two sides in diverse fields, such as geopolitics, territorial sovereignty, ideology and popular sentiment. In the next decade or so, it will be very difficult to establish a decisive détente in Sino-Japanese relations, which may even further deteriorate, as a result of regional structural conflict, China’s and Japan’s respective policy demands, and US intervention. First, there are strong structural conflicts between China and Japan in the East Asia. China and Japan are the two most powerful countries in East Asia. Historically, the two countries have alternately enjoyed leadership or dominance in this area. Before 1894, China was the leader in the East Asian system; the power transition between China and Japan and Japan’s dissatisfaction with its role in the regional system prompted the outbreak of the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese war. Between 1895 and 1945, Japan gradually controlled large parts of East Asia by virtue of its military strength. For long periods after the end of the Second World War, both countries experienced unbalanced development in strength and had strategic deficiencies: China was strong politically and militarily, but comparatively weak economically; Japan was economically formidable, but was weaker politically and militarily. From the beginning of the 21st century, as Chinese comprehensive national strength soared, Japan accelerated its march toward political and military normalization, and a ‘parallel power’ structure emerged for the first time in the history of East Asia. In a period of rapid change in the power structure, both parties will place greater emphasis on relative gains, hinging on ‘one man’s loss is another man’s gain.’ As a zero-sum win–lose game emerges, fierce opposition might become inevitable between the two countries. It is no exaggeration to claim that the Japan issue may present the greatest peripheral challenge to China’s rise over the next decade or even further into the future. The intensity and complexity of Sino-Japanese conflicts far outweigh those of Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine skirmishes and disagreements. The ferocity and risks involved in Sino-Japanese confrontation also even exceed those of Sino-US structural discrepancies. If friction and various strategic paradoxes between China and the United States are said

Maritime relations  167 to be anticipated, eventual or conjectural, escalation in conflicts between China and Japan have, in contrast, already become a reality. Japan, alarmed by China’s growing influence in political, economic, military, cultural and other areas, fully focuses its efforts on opposing China on a global level. In addition to engaging in far-reaching contests of power with China in Northeast Asia, Japan also frustrates Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, sparks political and economic rivalries with China in Africa and Latin America, seeks support in Europe, and persuades European countries not to lift the ban on arms sale to China. Second, both China and Japan have policy demands with regard to confrontation. At present, the two countries are in a similar stage of domestic and international strategic adjustment and need to consolidate resources both internally and externally, amassing power. For China, the Sino-­ Japanese conflict is intricate and complex, merging a range of negative issues, including international power struggles, historical memories, national sentiment, realist interests and geographical competition; in recent years, it is increasingly apparent that the two countries’ maritime strategies are in the conflict mode. Japan controls channels that are strategic to China’s eastward access to the Pacific Ocean and furthermore has irreconcilable disputes with China, over issues, such as sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and maritime delimitation in the East China Sea. Japan’s strategy to protect ‘outlying islands’ and expand maritime frontiers clashes directly with China’s path to a maritime power. Growth in Chinese sea power will undoubtedly cause Japanese maritime supremacy in the East China Sea to falter, triggering Japan’s vehement backlash. As a power rises, it must establish prestige, and as China aims to become a maritime power and a global power, whether through peaceful or nonpeaceful means, it must first overcome the hurdle that is Japan. China has no intention of initiating conflict with Japan, but from an objective perspective, the external threat from Japan also provide opportunities for China to refine various strategic measures in the process of building its maritime power. China can thereby test its overall capabilities in international and domestic mobilization, dissemination of public opinion, legal disputes and military deterrence. As for Japan, China is viewed as its greatest external threat and competing adversary. China’s military modernization, especially the modernization of sea power, leaves Japan ill at ease2; burgeoning Chinese influence in politics, economics and other fields also unsettles Japan, as it cannot accept large shifts in the Sino-Japanese balance of power, fearing a strong China. Admittedly, some Japanese admirals, like Yoji Koda, have argued that the capability of Chinese Navy should not be overestimated.3 But ‘the China threat’ has become the best cover for Japan’s right-wing leaders to amend the constitution and strengthen the ‘military.’ Sensationalism of this issue has already become a critical strategic tool as the Japanese government attempts to sustain approval ratings and to implement independent security policies. In the process of Japan’s drive toward political and military normalization,

168  Maritime relations issues with China have provided excellent leverage as it intends to remove major domestic and international obstacles under the pretext of the ‘China threat,’ and seek a position of greater equality and autonomy within the US–Japan alliance. Third, the United States’ ‘appeal for Japan to contain China’ has increased its strategic reliance on Japan. Confronted by a rising China and a distinct trend of relative decline in American strength, the United States’ power appears to be far outweighed by its ambitions, in a situation where the US-led Asia-Pacific security order is currently experiencing the most severe challenge since the end of the Second World War. Meanwhile, the United States is trapped between domestic headaches and foreign turmoil. As turbulent episodes frequently surface in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, a shift in US strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific is easier said than done. In the future, military might and hard currency, which the United States is able to relocate from other regions to the Asia-­Pacific, will be extremely limited. The United States repeatedly proclaims that 60 percent of its naval and air force has been transferred to the Asia-Pacific, but in reality, this is more fiction than fact. Approximately 60 percent of US Navy vessels have in fact already been deployed to the Asia-Pacific region and in the future, even based on the plan for 355 vessels additions may be insufficient, which is not at all comparable with China’s rapid rates of shipbuilding. Yet, on the other hand, there is no sign that the United States has the slightest willingness to abandon its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. As its own resources and capacity progressively diminish, the United States has no alternative but to depend greatly on the power of its allies, anchoring its hopes in the integrated alliance system. In the ‘gang war’ against China, Japan is the United States’ most important ally in the Asia-Pacific and naturally the focus of its attention and reliance. As the United States promotes the ‘Rebalance to the Asia Pacific’ and its Indo-Pacific strategies, its dependence upon Japan will deepen considerably in the future since it shares responsibilities with Japan. Maintaining strategic supremacy against China in the Indo-Pacific region reinforces the US–Japanese alliance in political, economic, military and other fields. The United States supports the lifting of limitations on Japan’s collective self-defense rights, acquiesces in appropriate revisions to the Japanese constitution, and frequently reaffirms its defense obligations in Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan with respect to the Diaoyu Islands issue. After the Japanese cabinet enacted Abe’s doctrine of ‘proactive contribution to peace’ and passed the decision on collective self-defense, Japan would become more active and seek more military cooperation in international security issues. These actions are all designed to win Japan’s unreserved support for its strategic adjustments in the Asia-Pacific. With the United States vocally fanning the flames, it will be even more difficult for Sino-Japanese relations to approach normalization.

Maritime relations  169 Fortunately, despite the media in the two countries being filled with aggressive saber rattling, it is unlikely that China and Japan will advance from cold confrontations or paramilitary conflicts to a hot war for the following reasons. First, without a doubt, war would not be either side’s first choice of policy. Disregarding the high degree of economic interdependence between China and Japan, it cannot be ignored that the two countries’ economic growth depends on a peaceful environment in East Asia. In the absence of a peaceful environment, the post-war ‘Japanese miracle’ and the China dream of the past 40 years would both be edifices of fantasy. With sufficient will, it is yet not too late, and decision makers on both sides should not be inclined to resolve differences through war. Sensationalizing the ‘China threat’ helps the Japanese government pander to popular opinion and earn approval ratings, but this in fact cannot solve the underlying problems that plague Japan’s future. The economy should be the Japanese government’s first priority. While the right-wing may discuss initiating war with China, it would be unrealistic to do it in practice, considering the current balance in Sino-Japanese comprehensive strength. As strength balance shift is favors to China, China has all the more reason not to take the initiative to launch a war when time is on its side. Second, the United States functions as Japan’s ‘cork’; US influence acts as a double-edged sword in Sino-Japanese relations, for under the presence of US influence, Japan will certainly be unable to connect with China in earnest. However, the United States is also objectively the cause for ‘tension but no outbreak’ in the status quo of Japan’s military confrontation with China. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has simultaneously implemented two major policies with regard to Japan. On the one hand, it views Japan as its strategic anchor in the Asia-Pacific, with a high probability of leveraging Japan to check Eurasian continental powers, such as China and Russia, and attain strategic and economic power. On the other hand, in multiple senses, the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific acts as the lid to ‘Pandora’s box,’ forestalling a resurgence in Japanese militarism and objectively curbing a genuine upsurge in the Japanese military. Although the United States endeavors to profit from tumult in East Asia, sowing discord between Japan and China, thereby reaping effortless gains, the United States would be trapped in a difficult dilemma if Sino-Japanese ‘cold confrontation’ were to transform into a ‘hot war.’ For the United States, a declaration of war against China in order to fulfill obligations in the treaty with Japan against its will would be equivalent to a strategic catastrophe; failure to meet treaty obligations however would indicate that American security commitments are no longer effective, resulting in a great blow to the United States’ international reputation and prestige. If the United States does not defend a key ally such as Japan, how could it defend other allies and partners? It would be highly likely that other American allies in the Asia-Pacific would scatter and dissipate. The Sino-Japanese

170  Maritime relations position of ‘no war, no cooperation’ best corresponds with overall US interests. Thus, while reaffirming Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan, the United States has also highlighted the importance of peaceful dispute settlement and has cautioned Japan against provoking China on multiple occasions, urging Sino-Japanese negotiations. Under US restrictions, even if the right-wing forces of Japan had ambitions to launch a war, it would not possess the conditions necessary for strategic execution. Third, there have been improvements in the military situation and enhancement in management experience. China and Japan maintain a state of coexistence and joint-administration in waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. Games frequently arise, in which the China Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard monitor and track each other’s ships. The two countries’ air forces each implement relevant regulations in their respective ADIZs above the East China Sea, often coming into close contact. In this regard, ‘accidental exchange of fire’ has always been a source of concern for all parties. However, from a technical standpoint, the possibility of such events, while conceivable, are slim to the point of inconsequential. Historically, US–Soviet confrontation and Soviet–Japanese friction have been commonplace, but never has large-scale conflict occurred as a result.4 In addition to historical experience, advancements in China’s and Japan’s weaponry, equipment, and military systems have further averted such a possibility. State-of-the-art weapons and equipment, live communication and integration of multiple channels of intelligence prevent relatively infrequent accidents and erroneous judgments from arising. The main driving force of Sino-Japanese aerial confrontation in future will be third-­generation and even fourth-generation jet fighters. At present, the two sides’ dominant forces are aircraft with characteristics similar to those of the J-10, J-11 and F-15, whose maneuverability features are particularly outstanding, with excellent capabilities to mitigate risk. At the same time, channels of communication between fighter aircrafts, airbase stations, early warning platforms and command centers are increasingly comprehensive and it is possible to achieve close to real-time image transmission and integration of commands. In this case, risks of unintentional collision or accidental exchange of fire are much lower relative to those of second-generation jet fighters and traditional air command mode. Warships travel at comparatively slow speed; therefore unless subjects purposefully open fire, such types of chance events are highly improbable.

Decision-making characteristics of Japan Diplomacy is an extension of domestic politics. To understand Japan’s foreign policy, it is imperative to first gain an intimate knowledge of Japan’s unique domestic political ecology and operational logic.

Maritime relations  171 It is often said that the greatest damage in Sino-Japanese relations is largely caused by a handful of right-wing activists and politicians. The assessment of ‘a handful’ is correct; whether of pre–Second World War militarists or post–Second World War right-wing activists, they account for a negligible proportion of total Japanese nationals and are in the absolute minority. Nonetheless, it is this minority that has once and once again impelled Japan toward indelible perdition. We cannot help but question, how is it that this minority is so self-righteous, so competent and so powerful, as to take the vast majority of the Japanese people hostage? For a long time, it was as though we were in fact unaware of the political and social origins from which this handful of individuals was able to incite unrest. In her influential work The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, the American anthropologist Ruth Benedict illustrates the extremism of Japanese culture that upholds shame as a virtue.5 The cultural origin of Japan’s popular phenomenon of suicide and exporting war is an excessive esteem for honor and dignity. Many of those who engage with Japan feel, to varying extents, bewildered. One the one hand, Japanese individuals often appear polite, cultivated and civilized; on the other hand, as a country, Japan’s history and present reality are both full of violence and intolerance. How can it be that differences are so immense between individuals and communities? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to begin by discussing the social organizational culture and political ecology in Japan. Historically, from a young age, the Japanese are indoctrinated with team and national loyalty, as well as respect for seniors, predecessors and leaders. The thinking and mentality of team leaders or national leaders often determine the group’s or entire country’s general direction. The majority of the Japanese people are merely followers, even if they do not approve of the leaders’ selected path, they would not protest compellingly and even openly challenge the leadership’s authority. They are unconcerned with politics for the most part, but as soon as the government makes a decision, they would usually choose to obey, drawn passively into a political vortex and assuming potential risks. As Rong Jian observes, ‘During several of Japan’s key junctures in the past century, Japan’s elite, particularly the intellectual elite, have not exercised their requisite critical spirit, and have not truly fulfilled their historical responsibility to independently surmount national interests.’6 Politically, Japan has always remained exceedingly exclusive, as powerful family heritages and legacies passed from teachers to students have proved the main paths to bringing forth new generations of politicians. Most important politicians originate from specific households and are beyond the reach of the general populace. As a result of fierce struggles between political factions, frequent political interference from military figures, and potent civil extremists, Japan has rarely had strong cabinets and has lacked promising politicians since the Meiji Restoration. Political decision-making in Japan has often been heavily influenced and even dictated by military

172  Maritime relations hardliners, right-wing groups and parties and other extremist forces. Faced by the military’s or the right-wing’s certain radical claims and actions, the Japanese government at times exploits opportunities to effortlessly profit, while at other times feigns objection, but very rarely does it directly oppose and restrain. Although members of Japan’s right-wing forces and conservative extremists are few in number, they ‘dare to lead’ and are vigorously active, enthusiastically participate in the administration and discussion of state affairs and farcically exaggerate their behavior, in stark contrast to the silence of a majority of Japanese and the weakness of Japan’s cabinet. For over a century, Japan’s basic national policy principle formed through interaction between the three actors of extremist forces, the government cabinet, and the populace, repeatedly taking extreme measures. In Japanese history, many notable movements had often been spearheaded by a small number of militarists or members of right-wing forces, who then forced the Japanese government to adopt measures and formulate extreme policies, finally followed by the frenzied participation of the Japanese people. From the end of the 19th century to the year 1945, this had been the process and policy logic behind Japan’s initiation of foreign aggression in all cases without exception. It is irrefutable that domestic right-wing forces and militarists in Japan are always in the minority. Nevertheless, due to the Japanese government’s weakness in addition to the public’s group mentality and sense of obedience, the fate of most individuals is to be ultimately dragged onto Japan’s militarist chariot. For instance, following the end of the First World War, Japan’s cabinet and military had constantly strived for absolute supremacy in northeast China, and was even willing to engage in intense conflict with the United States to achieve it. In spite of this, prior to the incident of 18 September 1931, the domestic civil service system still retained a certain degree of control over the military in Japan, though of course the only difference between the two sides is in their use of measures. However, following the successful ventures of the Kwantung Army, which had fewer than 20,000 troops, the domestic political situation in Japan began to incline toward predominantly military solutions. The appetites of the Japanese government and the general public were abruptly awakened, as mass participation erupted beyond control, outright war was declared against China and a surprise attack was launched on Pearl Harbor, gradually leading toward a deadly conclusion. Following the end of the Second World War, Japan underwent democratic reform under US military occupation. Nevertheless, democratic reform has not been comprehensive and inertia in Japanese politics and society renders Japan’s democracy incapable of escaping extreme ‘conventions.’ Politics remains dominated by the same families and the same factions, for any changes are slight and superficial. These circles remain as tightly closed as before, and for a majority of Japanese, an awareness of and motivation for

Maritime relations  173 political participation have never in fact been triggered. For instance, of Japan’s 34 post-war cabinet prime ministers, the overwhelming majority of them are either dignitaries from the former dynasty and veteran soldiers, or were those hailing from prominent political families. Murayama Tomiichi and Kan Naoto may be the two sole exceptions. With regard to members of Japan’s right-wing, while their numbers may have indeed markedly decreased, they continue to stand at the forefront and remain exceptionally active, routinely attacking neighboring countries on territorial and historical issues. In recent years, the impact of Japan’s far right forces has swelled, while their levels of public recognition have also soared rapidly. The growing influence of right-wing politicians such as Ishihara would drive the Japanese government to a stronger position concerning the East China Sea disputes.7 The travesty of Japan’s ‘island purchase’ has once again confirmed that it is en route to extremism. As a matter of fact, although the Japanese Noda cabinet hoped to boost its approval ratings using the Diaoyu Islands, to directly stoke trouble would be problematic, in consideration of widespread common interests between China and Japan. Furthermore, Sino-Japanese economic interdependence means that a majority of the Japanese populace is also not in favor of conflict between China and Japan. At that time, Shintaro Ishihara, a figure infamous for advocating a resurgence in Japanese militarism, began to speculate on this matter. Subsequently, the Japanese government proceeded with ‘nationalization’ of the Diaoyu Islands, under the guise of preventing Ishihara’s ‘island purchase’ and purportedly for the protection of Sino-Japanese relations. Amidst provocation and incitement by right-wing forces, and as a result of the Japanese government’s one-sided propaganda and analysis, a majority of nonpartisan Japanese danced to the tune of the Japanese government, supporting the fallacy that ‘there is no dispute over the Diaoyu Islands,’ while its opponents were few and far between. Japan’s political and social spheres also reflected on the subject when China adopted hardline countermeasures. However, the focus of this introspection was not the question of ‘nationalization’ and other matters of right and wrong, rather it was to examine the opportunity’s selection, diplomatic communication and other technical issues.8 Even numerous heavyweights in the Japanese business sphere, whose own interests are closely tied to those of China, could not play any constructive role whatsoever, regardless of whether before or after the incident, and merely expressed superficial concern over damage to interests in China. If it can be said that Japanese society’s collective silence on the involvement of territorial issues, sovereignty and nationalist sentiments may be somewhat understandable, then Japan’s glamorization of invasion and denial of aggressive acts truly leave the world astounded. It would appear that underneath a veneer of democracy, Japan’s extremist traits persist. Japan regularly complains that China, South Korea and other countries persistently pursue historical issues, but the truth is that Japan constantly engages in outrageous rhetoric on historical issues and the Japanese

174  Maritime relations government incessantly sows discord on this matter, so that China and South Korea have no choice but to enter into altercations with Japan. Even more frightening is that we are unable to detect discipline and restraint from the Japanese government on this issue, while rational voices among the Japanese people are also gradually fading. In recent years, disingenuous claims such as ‘Everyone was taking action. At the time Japan was simply doing what the US, Great Britain, France, and other countries all had done’ and ‘Japan was merely unfortunate, for it would be a different scenario if it had been victorious’ have become increasingly prevalent in Japan. If this trend were to continue, Japan would come close to eschewing its history of aggression completely. Be patient and rational The past century of Sino-Japanese historical interaction provides for extremely profound and negative educational material. It is true for both Li Hongzhang and Zhang Xueliang that the greater the fear of war, the more inevitable war becomes. To truly avoid war, it is first necessary to have determination and capital dedicated to combat. That is to say, to prepare for war is to avoid war. Only through meticulous preparation is it possible to form a strong deterrent to other parties so that they dare not act rashly. This ought to be especially applicable for China in its contacts with Japan. As mentioned previously, Japan has a tradition of extremism, and once it embarks on a path to radicalism, it would resolutely persevere unless compelled to regress by an external force. Historically, China has learned profound lessons, and both the Nationalist Government and the People’s Republic of China have committed similar errors. With regard to Japan, they have repeatedly been overly reliant on diplomatic approaches, in the hope that Japan will transform domestically, while overlooking the need to create deterrence through more heavy-handed measures. To preserve peace between China and Japan, in truth it is necessary to prepare for all eventualities. The September 18th Incident occurred precisely because the Kwantung Army believed that the Northeastern Army was defenseless against an offensive and was inadequately prepared. This was indeed the case. In 1928, during the Sino-Soviet conflict that resulted from the Chinese Eastern Railway incident, the Northeastern Army’s decrepit combat capacity was altogether exposed, greatly boosting Japan’s confidence. At the time of the September 18th Incident, Zhang Xueliang personally commanded its main forces to encircle and suppress Shi Yousan in Tianjin. Preparations were insufficient, from both aspects of military deployment and political resolve, for battle against Japan. In Japan’s ‘island purchase’ incident, although China had applied diplomatic pressure and engaged in communication, concrete measures were not taken to deliver a firm and tenacious message to Japan, and to some extent this precipitated Japan’s misjudgment of the situation. If China’s surveillance ships had

Maritime relations  175 suddenly entered into 12 nautical miles of the Diaoyu Islands for normal navigation in advance, demonstrating China’s resolution to counter such moves, it is highly likely that the ‘island purchase’ would have been aborted. Difficulties in promoting ‘new perspectives’ on Japan China and Japan are neighbors which are separated by only a ribbon of water, and have no alternative but to interact with one another and cannot survive isolated. In recognition of this, it is necessary to acknowledge that even when the two countries were in diametric opposition, there were plenty of views and actions in both China and Japan that facilitated goodwill between the two countries. Domestically, China has long advocated for ‘new perspectives’ on Japan with regard to the continued exacerbation of Sino-­ Japanese relations at the turn of the 21st century due to historical issues.9 The main arguments in favor of new perspectives toward Japan are that post-war Japan has experienced tremendous change and that since it is now a democratic state, where the majority of the populace is not interested in war, China cannot regard Japan with the same old prejudices. From a humanist point of view, this judgment is undoubtedly correct, but a political standpoint, a democratic state and peaceful population cannot in fact modify the trajectory of Japanese political workings and development. As I have previously discussed, post-war Japan merely has the ostensible outlines of a democracy, and not its true essence. It also matters little whether a majority of the population is in favor of war, for its channels of participation and roles within Japanese politics are severely limited. It must be noted that Japan’s right-wing activists and militarists have always remained in the small minority. This view was tenable even during the Second World War, when a majority of Japanese people were simply victims of incitement and momentum. Therefore, while we recognize that substantial changes have occurred in Japan and in the Japanese populace, this transformation cannot satisfactorily explain ‘why new perspectives on Japan would be feasible.’ In addition, all relationships are bilateral or multilateral interactions, and stability cannot be maintained through compromise, concession and restraint from one party alone, thus new perspectives based solely upon wishful thinking on China’s part are highly unrealistic. Compromise and conciliation always require a suitable environment. New perspectives encourage China to ease pressure on Japan regarding historical issues in exchange for improvements in Sino-Japanese relations. However, the crux of the matter is not whether China refuses to relinquish historical issues, but that Japan is increasingly interested in amending the historical narrative, hoping to progress toward political normalization through the embellishment and revision of history. This is also the case with the Diaoyu Islands dispute. For Japan, disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and maritime delimitation in the East China Sea are strong starting points for its push toward political and military normalization. Through unceasing sensationalism of

176  Maritime relations maritime disputes with China, the Japanese government mobilizes its domestic strategies and policies. Disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and maritime delimitation in the East China Sea are tied to sovereignty, and it is impossible for Japan’s typically weak government to have the audacity to make any major concessions. Moreover, the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea are increasingly used as key tools by Japan to stymie China’s rise and contain China at sea. If China were to have ‘new perspectives’ on Japan, they would only prove effective under the precondition that Japan simultaneously harbors new beliefs about China. Unlike the somewhat naïve logic of Ma Licheng et  al., another type of ‘new perspective’ on Japan is rooted mainly in realist positions. They believe that for China, principal areas of contradiction are Sino-US paradoxes, while it is possible for a Sino-Japanese rapprochement to ‘alleviate certain key aspects of passivity in the face of the US and significantly bolster diplomatic leverage over the US.’ Since strategic competition between China and the United States is becoming ever more intense, with structural contradictions already having formed between the ‘World No. 2’ and the ‘World No. 1,’ China ought to also engage Japan from a strategic balance of power perspective. However, as Professor Shi Yinhong, a forerunner and emblematic figure in this school of thought, himself indicated, It is necessary to recognize that Japan is the US’ principal ally in East Asia, and furthermore it lacks a tradition of diplomatic independence; it is inconceivable that potential conflicts between the US and Japan would develop to the extent of palpable upheaval in the US-Japanese military/political alliance.10 Together with mutual distrust, which the transition of power between China and Japan has generated, and Japan’s long tradition of alliances with the strongest powers (with Great Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and with the United States post–Second World War), a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, even if credible, would be extremely difficult to achieve and operate. Strategic confrontation and compellence Contradictions and differences between China and Japan are a manifestation of strategic paradoxes. Before Japan accepts the reality of China’s rise, it would be unrealistic to expect that the tension between China and Japan could decrease significantly. Therefore, it is time for China to forgo any illusions and be combat-ready for challenges ahead. The Sino-­Japanese strategic conflict represents a critical test for China’s peaceful rise and in particular, the rise of its maritime power. More importantly, no matter whether China wishes to embrace or confront Japan, it must attach great importance to the position and role of Japanese influences in the process of

Maritime relations  177 China’s development of sea power and national rejuvenation. Meanwhile, China must remain calm in the face of tense Sino-Japanese relations, while maintaining a sense of vigilance in response to Japanese policies targeted at China and trends in Sino-Japanese relations, taking a long-term view, while not taking action to appease a few persons. At present, Japan’s policies indeed heavily feature ‘Abe’ characteristics. Although domestically there is some dissent in Japan with regard to this, divergences mainly center on the mode, methods and extent, while there remains widespread recognition of Abe’s general trajectory of political and military normalization. China must fully comprehend that before there are any material changes in the overall environment of Sino-Japanese relations and in the balance of power between the two sides, it is unlikely that any Japanese government would have motivation for or success in promoting Sino-Japanese thorough reconciliation. Furthermore, whether during or after the ‘Abe’ era, China should not harbor inordinately high expectations with regard to Japanese policy. In accordance with current developing trends, China ought to make sufficient preparations for long-term competition with Japan. Of course, China must also welcome various opportunities and prepare for a potential olive branch from Japan, but should not repeat mistakes similar to those that had occurred during the establishment of formal Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. It was too generous for China to neglect the past aggression and the significant value of Diaoyu Islands during the negotiations. China still must seek to develop Sino-Japanese relations in a positive direction, but cannot surrender its own principles and core interests in doing so. In the current situation, the Japanese government must demonstrate sincerity on historical issues and the Diaoyu Islands dispute. This will act as the new foundation for normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and China ought to adhere to a strict position on both of these major matters. Japan has the characteristic of fastidiousness, and this would be of benefit to both parties. In order to discourage Japan from possible further serious provocation, China must reinforce its strategic preparation and deterrence. On historical issues and maritime disputes, it is necessary to establish a certain bottom-line with regard to the Japanese government, prevent continued reversion in the Japanese government’s position and deter its endorsement of right-wing forces for its own illicit gains. At the same time, it is essential to clearly convey an unequivocal message to the Japanese government, so that military deterrence can achieve its effect, curbing the Japanese government’s indulgence and ambiguity, thwarting Japan’s progress toward extremism. If Japan’s right-wing forces were to rise in rebellion or cause a disturbance, it is necessary to adopt retaliatory measures and press ahead undaunted despite any adversity. Imagine if in 1931, Zhang Xueliang and the hundreds of thousands of soldiers under his command in the Northeastern Army, had been able to decisively and forcefully attack the invaded Kwantung Army, which numbered close to 20,000 troops, it would be doubtful whether Japanese militarist forces could have risen and whether Japan would have staged a full-scale offensive on China. Of course, today is no longer the era of ‘close

178  Maritime relations combat.’ Therefore, deterrence measures against Japan are not limited to military approaches, but also include economic, diplomatic, legal and various other means. As stated before, the balance of power between China and Japan is increasingly disadvantageous for Japan, and over time, China will grow further emboldened. Thus, the motivation for China to use force in territory disputes will continue to decrease in the future. Therefore, as long as Japan is willing to preserve peace and does not militarily provoke China, China’s best policy is to reach a peaceful solution of historical issues and Diaoyu Islands disputes through political and diplomatic measures. Japan is the United States’ principal ally in the Asia-Pacific. The direction of Sino-Japanese relations is inevitably affected by developments in the US–Japanese alliance; therefore, it is imperative not to disregard American influence in the process of pressurizing Japan. In the context of China’s rapid rise and the relative decline of US strength, both the United States and Japan have a strong incentive to strengthen relations with one another in an attempt to construct a modern global alliance. In spite of this, behind the United States’ and Japan’s alliance, there exist fierce differences over the recognition of Chinese influence, respective interests and demands, as well as response mechanisms and other key issues: first, the United States and Japan differ on their understandings of the ‘China threat’ and the two countries’ strategic aims regarding China are difficult to reconcile. For the United States, China is a rising strategic competitor but still a ‘distant concern’ and caution is currently emphasized, especially in the East China Sea; as for Japan, China is perceived as an ‘impending peril’ and it struggles to understand American judgments on ‘balance.’ Second, the two parties differ in international status and deviate structurally in their definitions of national interests. The United States hopes that Japan will lend further support for its hegemony on a global scale and wishes that Japan would not incite a furor in East Asia, whereas Japan concentrates for the most part on its vicinity, as East Asia encompasses virtually all of its traditional security interests, and exigently expects US ‘patronage’ in this region. Third, they have different conceptions of cooperation, for the United States appears to trade in futures, whereas Japan invests in stocks. The United States seeks a long-term foundation and is spurred to perfect cooperative mechanisms, promoting the US–Japanese alliance as the most important touchstone for the US-led security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and focusing on eliciting greater contributions from Japan; in contrast, Japan attaches more importance to immediate ‘arbitrage’ measures, for instance joint exercises targeted at China to seize islands and military deployments, in an attempt to gain an unassailable position in strategic contests with China, in addition to elevating its own clout in the Asia-Pacific strategic framework with the assistance of US strength. As a result, China is generally comparatively passive under the security structure of the US–Japanese alliance against China, but it is also not

Maritime relations  179 entirely devoid of space in which to make capital. In contests with Japan and with strict counter-US precautions, it must at the same time engage in cooperation. For instance, with support from the United States, China could appropriately contain Japan in response to provocative actions from the Japanese political right-wing and military. Of course, a ‘degree’ of control is necessary in the process of ‘playing off one power against another’; therefore, China must remain cool-headed and not expect too much from the United States. ‘The US has its own interests, sometimes exploiting, and at other times suppressing, conflicts between China and Japan. Its role couples the dual aspects of intensification of conflict and temporary stabilization in the situation. For China and Japan, notions of beseeching the US to thereby force the other side into capitulation are unrealistic,’ particularly as the United States and Japan are allied states.11 China must also uphold a mature mentality to embrace peace and opportunities for cooperation. Nowadays, global strategic conflict is reflected more in diplomacy and politics, while military approaches are often employed as a means of last resort or deterrence, rather than for direct combat. As complexities arise in the foreign relations of major powers, a certain degree of disorder will occur in relationships between friends and adversaries. Although China and Japan are competing rivals in politics, military affairs and diplomacy, in the economic field, they remain key cooperative partners. The relationship between China and Japan is indeed very poor, but they nevertheless sustain basic diplomatic relations and vast individual exchanges, while bonds of peace continue to be strengthened. Chinese personnel and departments working with Japan ought to clearly understand the intricacies of Sino-Japanese relations. In the spirit of dialectical thinking that there are two sides to a story, contention is required where conflict is necessary. Meanwhile, China also needs to seek cooperation where collaboration is necessary, in order to expand its strategic options beyond a ‘reductive Cold War-esque calculus.’12

Reinforcing the provision of security to Southeast Asia As a whole, Southeast Asian countries use ASEAN as a platform to command ever greater clout and influence at the regional and international levels; moreover, these countries are situated at vital strategic points, while some countries have sizeable populations, vast territories and enormous development potential. Therefore, in China’s maritime strategy, they are ‘important powers’ that cannot be disregarded. The dichotomy between economics and security China has a well-established and rich history of contact with Southeast Asia. In over 2,000 years of historical interaction, periods of neighborly and amicable relations were overwhelmingly dominant, while war and

180  Maritime relations conflict were far from commonplace. Although various Southeast Asian countries were of nominally unequal status as China’s tributary states or dependencies under the ancient East Asian system, relations between most of these countries and China in effect were devoid of substance. Furthermore, to a large extent, these ostensibly unequal relations resulted from exaggerated interpretations of Chinese official history. Ancient Chinese rulers welcomed arrivals from all nations, and certainly did not wish for every country to surrender to Chinese rule.13 Historical descriptions of the tributary system phenomenon were little more than wishful thinking and fallacious fantasy on the part of ancient Chinese rulers and scholars. The essence of such unequal relations was in fact reciprocity and mutual gain. Ancient Chinese rulers were thereby satisfied with vanity and prestige, whereas Southeast Asian countries took advantage of the tributary system to not only reinforce trade with the Zhongyuan dynasty, but to also procure huge economic interests.14 This is also the reason why Annam, the Sultanate of Sulu (modern-day Philippines), and other countries requested, on multiple occasions, to increase the frequency of tributes to China on their own accord. This type of relationship collapsed in the wake of the arrival of Dutch, Spanish, British, French and other Western colonists. Various Southeast Asian countries successively entered an era of colonization under Western imperialist powers. Subsequently the newly burgeoning powers of Japan and the United States also proceeded to engage in contests over this region. The involvement of external forces had disrupted East Asia’s original political ecology, and ever since then, China’s relations with these countries have, without exception, been subject to the containment by and influence of the United States and other outside powers. Impacted by the Cold War and China’s revolutionary diplomacy, political relationships between China and various Southeast Asian countries were, by and large, frosty for a long time, with economic ties little better and both sides taking precautionary measures in security matters following the end of the Second World War, to the extent that one major purpose of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967, was to forestall a possible ‘incursion’ from China.15 Post–Cold War relations between China and Southeast Asian countries have improved rapidly, as China’s relationship with ASEAN advancing from one of dialogue partner to that of a strategic partnership. In over 20 recent years of exemplary diplomacy between China and South East Asia, Sino-ASEAN relations can be rated as a shining example of China’s neighborly and amicable diplomacy. Since first contact between China and ASEAN in 1991, there has been enormous progress in the development of bilateral relations. In particular, the period between 2003, when China established a strategic partnership with ASEAN countries, and 2013 has been labeled ‘the golden decade’ of development in Sino-ASEAN relations. The value of bilateral trade increased at an annual rate of 23.6 percent over this

Maritime relations  181 decade, and it has reached USD 514.8 billion in 2017. Until 2017, the aggregate mutual investment surpassed USD 200 billon.16 Presently, China is the largest trading partner of ASEAN and the vast majority of ASEAN countries, while ASEAN is China’s third largest trading partner. Politically, China actively participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit (EAS) and other diverse regional mechanisms led and constructed by ASEAN. In 2003, China also acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, becoming the first major power to sign this treaty; China, which signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) with related parties in 2002, maintains relevant restraint on the South China Sea issue and currently seeks to establish a South China Sea code of conduct with greater binding force with the other claimants. Guided by a policy of ‘bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors,’ China has swiftly attracted ASEAN countries through economic cooperation, political support and security restraint, while relations between China and Southeast Asian countries in areas such as politics, economics, security and culture have developed across the board. However, there is a wide variation in the pace of improvement and development across different types of relations. Development in economic relations has been highly notable, whereas progress in security relations has been unduly sluggish and extremely delicate. In particular, fragilities in security relations between China and Southeast Asian countries have been thoroughly exposed following the United States’ promotion of its ‘pivot’ and ‘rebalance’ in this region beginning in 2010. In comparison, China’s development of security relations with these countries is not only inferior to that of the United States but is even weaker than that of Japan and India. In the context of China’s rise, most Southeast Asian countries regard the United States as the guardian of regional security in the Asia-Pacific, and maintain close military relations with the United States. Indeed, the South China Sea dispute is a major obstacle to security and military cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries, but we should not overstate its role and impact. It is very easy to understand why the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and other South China Sea disputant parties would appeal to the United States and take precautionary measures against China. As Singapore, Indonesia and other nondisputant parties are also troubled by China, the pursuit of US goodwill cannot be entirely explained through the South China Sea issue. Predicaments caused by geographic proximity have also prevented Southeast Asian countries from drawing closer to China on security matters. ‘Befriending the far and attacking the near’ has always been a classic geographical survival principle of the weak. What is more, all Southeast Asian countries had once existed for a prolonged period of time under the formidable shadow of ancient China. With acceleration in China’s rise, Southeast Asian countries grow ever more anxious with respect to China.

182  Maritime relations In this regard, the ideas of Lee Kuan Yew are able to accurately capture these countries’ mindsets. The countries of the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia and Australasia have established and maintain good relations with China, and though China says it will never seek hegemony over them, it is in their best interest to have a strong US presence in the region. ‘The world hopes the U.S. will remain a counterweight to China. No other single country or group of countries, such as the EU, can fill this role.’17 Most countries in Southeast Asia do not only hope that the United States will check China, but also wish to draw in Japan, India, Australia and other extra-regional powers to neutralize China’s steadily growing influence in this region.18 On the one hand, ASEAN countries are delighted to develop various forms of economic cooperation with China, and share the dividends of ­China’s rise; on the other hand, in security matters they are also vigorously strengthening countermeasures to guard against China and actively impeding Chinese dominance in this region.19 Good neighbors and close friends in a crucial period Moreover, it is worth remaining vigilant, for it is possible that this divergent situation, in which developments of security relations and economic ties are unbalanced, will continue to intensify. Escalations in the South China Sea dispute and aggravations in security precautions are increasingly irreconcilable with more intimate economic connections. To remedy this situation, China must calmly regard future issues, risks and challenges, which will be encountered in diplomacy with the Southeast Asian countries, and ought to reflect on experiences and lessons from China’s interaction with them. In retrospect, diplomatic achievements, which China has secured in Southeast Asia over the past two decades, have all been somewhat passive and providential elements, because while China has taken advantage of opportunities presented, its active pursuit and creation of opportunities have in fact been rare. As the United States has long maintained an indifferent attitude to ASEAN-led regional mechanisms, political, economic, diplomatic and military investment has been relatively thin in this region, providing China with greater strategic space. At the same time, the vast market size of China and Southeast Asia has also provided both sides with strong incentives for economic cooperation. In this case, China has enthusiastically responded to ASEAN proposals and arrangements, indisputably greatly enhancing space for strategic cooperation between the two parties. Looking forward, there have already been significant changes in the situation, and if China and Southeast Asia wish to accomplish further success in their relationship, levels of difficulty and complexity will multiply

Maritime relations  183 accordingly. First, the entire world’s attention on Southeast Asia has surged markedly, as political contests between major powers steadily intensify, and the political ‘window period,’ which China may utilize, has already ended. This region is considered by the United States to be an area of foremost importance in its ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ and is also viewed by the EU, India, Russia and others as a crucial hinge in order to partake in contests in the Asia-Pacific and even Indo-Pacific geopolitical frameworks. Second, the marginal effect of economic cooperation between China and ASEAN countries is dwindling as competition intensifies with economic homogenization, while the difficulties and pressures of promoting economic ties soar. Meanwhile, differences and issues in politics, security and other fields are becoming more pronounced, restricting the scope and quality of cooperation between the two sides. If security pressures and tension resulting from China’s rise cannot be adequately alleviated and diverted, mutual distrust and precaution in security matters will also corrupt cooperation in political and economic areas. Third, comparing today’s starting point with that of over 20 years ago, there are already enormous discrepancies. To make further progress based on the current starting-point would require exponentially more effort and investment. Without active initiative and systematic preparation, it would be as though to sail against the current, for not to advance is to regress. How to reassure one’s neighbors? China’s relations with all countries in Southeast Asia and even ASEAN have entered a critical stage. If security ties can be substantially improved, relations between the two sides will be transformed; on the other hand, the reverse is certain to lead to deterioration. In view of this, China’s Southeast Asia strategy needs the determination and courage of storming a fortress, and action should also be more readily taken, with focus on facilitating the coordinated and synchronous development of security and economic relations, so that countries in the region might feel more secure. Powers are often the largest providers of regional security, with their means of delivery limited to no more than two types: first, there is self-restraint and self-discipline, where their greatest contribution to regional security is to not sow discord themselves; second, there is the supply of financial capital, manpower and expertise to enthusiastically respond to regional concerns and crises, while maintaining regional peace and stability. In both measures of contribution, there are currently certain issues in which China has space for improvement. Although China upholds a high degree of strategic restraint in Southeast Asia, playing an important role in regional peace and stability, the delivery and announcement of its strategies are inadequate, while methods of expression are somewhat awkward, which have impacted upon actual outcomes. In the provision of public goods, China has been neither proactive nor sufficiently bold, not yet satisfactorily fulfilling the

184  Maritime relations potential of the three factors of ‘financial capital,’ ‘manpower’ and ‘expertise.’ To change this situation, the following measures and tactics ought to be adopted. First, China ought to have meticulous strategic designs and policy plans, clearly communicating its regional aspirations to all Southeast Asian countries. In the past, China has proposed guidelines for neighborly diplomacy, consisting of camaraderie and partnership with neighboring countries, bringing harmony, security and prosperity to its neighbors, in addition to the maxim of ‘amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusivity’ for peripheral diplomacy. It also once proposed a new security concept of ‘equality, mutual gain, coordination, and cooperation’ and a holistic perspective of security in Asia, to better expound to the outside world its guiding principles in peripheral diplomacy and security ideology. Nevertheless, this still cannot act as a substitute for specific strategies and policies, and ASEAN countries still hope to receive the assurance from China that it will not pursue hegemonic status in the region.20 The core questions are as follows: exactly what kind of position should Southeast Asia occupy in China’s peripheral and foreign strategies? What types of strategic objectives should China pursue in the fields of politics, economics, diplomacy and security in this region? Furthermore, how should these relationships with diverse characteristics be coordinated? I believe that Southeast Asia is the crux and focal point of China’s neighborly diplomacy and is the ideal partner with which to create an East Asian security community; China should endeavor to mold Southeast Asia into its own economic and political ally on the foundation of equality, mutual gain and cordial negotiations, enabling it to become a strategic support in China’s peaceful rise. There is a widespread belief that the United States is the most important factor in maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia, while, in reality, this is not the case, as China is in fact the greatest contributor to security in Southeast Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, peace in Southeast Asia has been irrevocably connected with China’s strategic restraint and active participation. On the South China Sea issue, China maintains restraint, does not resort to the threat of armed force or war, encourages countries in Southeast Asia to unite for self-reliance and supports ASEAN’s important role in regional economics, politics and security. In the future, what China needs to do, other than to uphold established practices, is to focus more on external expression, so as to clarify its own positions and to publicize its contributions. The real question is how to solve the disequilibrium in development between economic ties and political and security relations. China’s relationship with Southeast Asian countries has already reached a bottleneck, namely the question of how to build political and security connections from economic cooperation and development, and even affinity or identification regarding values. More pressing is China’s rise, in particular the development of its military power, which has applied pressure on some countries that are

Maritime relations  185 confounded by China’s power position and the direction of its future development. From the perspective of security concepts and values, China still lacks a set of mature and practical regional strategies with which to defuse this tension, which has formed as a result of changes in its own power and status. How to direct spillovers from economic cooperation, as well as promote synchronized and coordinated developments in political, security and economic relations have already become matters of urgency. The Maritime Silk Road initiative provides an excellent platform for cooperation between China and ASEAN countries.21 When implementing this initiative, China should strongly encourage participation from Southeast Asian countries, not only to bolster cooperation between China and Southeast Asia, but furthermore to augment the expansion and connotations of the Maritime Silk Road through the ‘China + ASEAN + X’ model. In other words, it is best for China to engage ASEAN countries and together promote the Maritime Silk Road, rather than view them merely as tools in the expansion of its own strategic space. Such joint decision-making, joint turn westward and joint development will be very different from mutual economic cooperation, will produce enormous spillover effects and can markedly elevate the degree of political cohesion and mutual trust in security. Second, appropriate handling of the South China Sea issue. In practice, disputes over the ownership of islands and reefs and maritime delimitation in the South China Sea represent the largest obstacle to China’s pursuit of neighborly and amicable diplomacy in this region. Effective management of the South China Sea dispute is one of the major tasks for promoting continuous improvement in relations. As the quality and intensity of relations between China and ASEAN countries advance, the prominence of the South China Sea issue in bilateral relations will inevitably decline in the long run. In reality, even now the South China Sea does not occupy an important position in relations between China and disputant parties, with the exception of Vietnam, which retains a harsh stance on this issue. Moreover, China’s ability to manage the South China Sea dispute is rapidly improving, and accordingly its confidence is also buoyant. In the future, China can continue to advocate for the settlement of issues through dialogue and negotiation, and promote the establishment of binding codes of conduct in the region, in order to both apply a certain amount of institutional pressure on countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and also extend a gesture of self-­ discipline to facilitate mutual trust politically with ASEAN countries. Finally, diplomacy in Southeast Asia should be organically linked to formation of the regional order. As a developing world power, China still ought to consider how to dedicate its own power and wisdom to the political, security, social and cultural integration of East Asia. At present, economic interdependence in East Asia is steadily increasing and economic cooperation is rapidly flourishing, whereas pace in the construction of political mutual trust and security cooperation lags severely behind. China has made important contributions in stimulating the regional economy and promoting

186  Maritime relations regional economic integration. While China’s economic impact has already been acknowledged, its actions in the field of regional political, security and cultural integration are evidently still inadequate. If Chinese security concepts and international political values cannot be accepted in the region, difficulties will multiply for China in its peaceful rise. If the regional order, which China hopes to build or shape, is not recognized by Southeast Asia, it would be impossible to completely assuage estrangement and mutual precaution between China and ASEAN countries. Specifically, China should have an overarching plan and layout for the regional order, in particular for the security order. For instance, what type of regional order does China seek, and what reasonable measures does it have in order to achieve the order it pursues? What are the positions and functions of ASEAN countries in this regional order? Of course, more important than theoretical interpretations are concrete actions and practices. As a major power, China still needs to provide security assurances and security solutions for the region on both material and psychological levels. China must have its own rational plans for settling diverse burning issues within the region (regardless of their relevance to China’s own interests), and actively endeavor to contribute public goods to the regional security order, mechanisms and norms in East Asia.

Efforts to accommodate India on maritime issues Outside of the East Asian geographical framework, India is the country that China’s maritime strategy can least afford to overlook. ‘A rising China and an emerging India are turning to the sea in ways that they did not before. This fact alone has the potential to radically alter the world’s maritime pattern.’22 As China exits the Malacca Strait and enters the Indian Ocean, India is a presence that truly cannot be circumvented. Peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region will be critical as China’s economy, politics, military and other influences ‘step out.’ As the largest coastal state in the Indian Ocean, India’s attitudes and roles with respect to China are by no means trivial. Good Sino-Indian relations are by and large indispensable to achieving China’s goals as a maritime power. Discussions on Sino-Indian maritime conflicts While there are in fact no direct conflicts of maritime interest between China and India, mutual suspicion and containment in the two sides’ maritime strategies are both substantial and omnipresent. China and India, both rising stars in the global maritime system, are emerging simultaneously at sea. The two countries’ maritime activities have inevitably attracted the world’s focus, while a ‘Dragon-Elephant Contention’ is all the more striking. As the two countries’ strengths begin to impact the structure of sea power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, overlaps have appeared in their naval domains.

Maritime relations  187 China’s advancement into the Indian Ocean and India’s progression into the Western Pacific Ocean have led to a resurgence in mutual encirclement theory, which has long revolved around Sino-Indian rivalry.23 The Indian media is awash with reports and analysis that the intention of China’s elevated levels of activity in the Indian Ocean is to encircle India, while there is also widespread coverage in China on India’s potential threats to Chinese SLOCs and opportunistic interference in the South China Sea issue. Robert Kaplan even predicts that ‘As the competition between India and China suggests, the Indian Ocean is where global struggles will play out in the twenty-first century.’24 With the Chinese Navy going to the distant seas, and especially as Chinese warships navigate the Indian Ocean with ever increasing frequency, India has expressed extreme caution and suspicion toward China’s growing naval power and its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.25 India and some Western countries perceive port expansion projects contracted by Chinese companies in coastal states along the Indian Ocean, such as Sri Lanka Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, as a part of the ‘String of Pearls Strategy,’ which China is currently utilizing to encircle India and control the Indian Ocean. Since its emergence in 2004, this concept has received strong support in Indian media and has become another leading synonym for the ‘China threat.’ Although Indian officials have publicly refrained from commenting on this issue, in practice they indeed demonstrate suspicion and anxiety in their policies. India expresses unambiguous disapproval of Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean, aggressively excluding China from both the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and various institutions’ multilateral exercises. India is expediting the implementation of its ‘Eastward’ policy, vigorously boosting its military and economic presence around the South China Sea, while likewise inflaming China psychologically. In July 2001, India formally established the Andaman and Nicobar Command (abbreviated as the Eastern Naval Command) on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, followed by a substantial increase in military deployments on these islands. The ­Andaman-Nicobar Islands are Indian territories that are situated to the southeast of the Bay of Bengal. They are composed of 572 islands of varying sizes, have a total area of approximately 8,325 square kilometers, span more than 1,000 kilometers from north to south, and are India’s gateway to the East. At their nearest, this group of islands is only a distance of 90 and 50 kilometers away from Indonesia and Myanmar, respectively, guarding the ‘NL10 Degree Channel’ and ‘Great Channel,’ from which the Malacca Strait enters the Indian Ocean. India also regularly dispatches fleets to the South China Sea to carry out joint patrols with the US military in the Malacca Strait, to conduct joint naval exercises with ASEAN countries and to furthermore offer military aid to countries such as Vietnam. India has been cooperating with Vietnam and other countries on oil and gas development in the South China Sea since

188  Maritime relations 1988. In 2011, in spite of Chinese protests, India and Vietnam signed agreements for cooperation on blocks 127 and 128 in the vicinity of the Nansha Islands. In addition, certain statements from the Indian government and media have associated China with the abovementioned actions. On 3 December 2012, the then Indian Navy’s Chief of Naval Staff, Devendra Kumar Joshi, professed to media that India has its own ‘economic assets’ in the South China Sea and that the Indian Navy must intervene in the South China Sea dispute, even dispatching troops when necessary. At the same time, he claims that the formidable strength of the Chinese Navy is the ‘greatest concern’ for tension in the South China Sea.26 A general view is that China dominates the South China Sea and is also beginning to repeatedly foray into the Indian Ocean. Therefore, India must collaborate with the United States, Japan, Australia and others in the Indo-Pacific region to counterbalance China.27 Such hawkish rhetoric from India naturally infuriates China, where some media and experts have also expressed misgivings about India’s maritime threat. Cautionary remarks with regard to India’s involvement in South China Sea and blockade of the Strait of Malacca have resounded persistently. In reality, there already exists extensive and intense Sino-Indian competition at sea. Its scope encompasses not only all island states in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, but also includes the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. While the two parties’ politics, economic activities and disposition of troops in these regions are certainly not aimed exclusively at one another, acts of mutual infiltration and mutual hedging in the two sides’ rea;-world prisoner’s dilemma clearly substantiate the abovementioned ‘war of words.’ India’s ambitions and grievances Controlling the Indian Ocean has been India’s strategic dream ever since its independence. This compulsion is mainly determined by the strategic status of the Indian Ocean and India’s own position. Mahan once predicted: ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the 21st century. The destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.’28 Historically, India’s and the Indian Ocean’s fates have been irrevocably interconnected, ascending and declining in unison. Ancient India’s seafaring industry was highly advanced, as the Pandya, the Chola and several other mighty naval powers emerged at different points in time in the south of India and established close commercial and cultural ties with the Roman Empire and the Arabian region through the Indian Ocean. Whereas in modern history, India’s colonial destiny derived from with the loss of India’s maritime supremacy. In addition, Mahan’s theories in relation to sea control have been extolled as a touchstone by Indian leaders and strategists, in effect guiding India’s strategic planning and practice. In 1958, then prime

Maritime relations  189 minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted that ‘whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s sea-borne trade at her mercy and, in the second, India’s very independence itself.’29 The celebrated Indian historian and strategist, K. M. Panikkar, believes that ‘the future of India is not determined by land borders, but by the open seas that surround India on three sides.’ He claims that ‘whoever commands the Indian Ocean, has control over India’ and furthermore declares that ‘To become a sea power, it is sufficient for India to independently defend national interests in seas important to security and become a leader in the Indian Ocean.’ Arguments and convictions such as ‘The Indian Ocean is India’s ocean, India’s backyard, and India’s lake’ are rather common in New Delhi, although very few high-ranking figures in India would openly acknowledge this.30 Evidently, the ultimate goal of India’s maritime strategy is to eliminate the presence of all extra-regional powers from the Indian Ocean. India wishes to obtain absolute authority and dominance in the region, so that the Indian Ocean might become India’s lake. Rajiv Gandhi, the former prime minister of India, once publicly declared that India ought to ‘control the situation in between the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean’ based on exerting control over the five majors straits.31 Views similar to the opinion that ‘India’s strategic boundaries cover the entire Indian Ocean region, from western Asia in the west, including coastal areas of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, to the Pacific’s South China Sea region in the east’ are extremely popular among India’s elite. However, while the ideal is splendid, the reality is highly tenuous. Currently India cannot hope to realize its lofty ambitions and aspirations for control over the Indian Ocean. While it is very difficult to attain dominance in the Indian Ocean, its strategic layout is relatively simple, as power distribution in these waters is the most intricate and complex in the world. The United States, which firmly controls important sea lanes on the eastern and western coasts of the Indian Ocean and additionally maintains a vast military base in Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean, is in fact the most powerful force in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Russia and Australia all view the Indian Ocean as a region important to their strategic interests and have long retained an effective power presence here. France has constructed a sophisticated naval base on the island of Réunion, close to Madagascar. In recent years, Japan, Russia and other countries have also commenced patrols in the Indian Ocean, under the pretext of fighting piracy. A situation has arisen in which powerful rivalries crowd the Indian Ocean, no single country can achieve exclusive domination or total control, and even the United States enjoys only a relative advantage. There are few strategic maritime fulcrums in the Indian Ocean, making it difficult to attain omnidirectional control of these waters. Judging from the current situation, it would be difficult for any power to fully control a majority of strategic points, let alone gain control of the Indian Ocean in all directions. However, most of its waters are

190  Maritime relations unrestricted and so suitable for military maneuvers at sea, and therefore of strategic significance.32 Under these circumstances, India’s so-called control over the Indian Ocean is merely a romanticized longing and a dream. It is clear that India is also very much aware of the disparities between ideals and realities, for its maritime strategy is far more conservative in practice. India divides the Indian Ocean into three areas according to their levels of importance with respect to itself: the Zone of Positive Control – ­waters within 500 kilometers of the coast; the Zone of Medium Control – waters within the range of 500–1000 kilometers; and the Zone of Soft Control, encompassing all remaining areas of the Indian Ocean. Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategies has pointed out in 2007 that since India’s naval missions cover vast areas, India must distinguish between areas of primary interest areas and those of secondary interest areas, so as to focus on the former.33 Following these points, India also classifies its maritime interests into two main categories according to their levels of importance: India’s so-called Primary Interests Areas, which cover the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, mainly include India’s EEZ, islands and island expansion; access to the Indian Ocean’s key strategic points, principally the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Mandeb Strait and the Cape of Good Hope; island states in the Indian Ocean; the Persian Gulf; and major international shipping corridors that traverse the Indian Ocean. In contrast, India’s so-called Secondary Interest Areas include the southern Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the South China Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The areas of interest have been extended in Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015).34 Among them, the South and East China Seas, Western Pacific Ocean and their littoral regions are in the category of Secondary Interest Areas. The South China Sea has a certain place in India’s maritime strategy, but it is certainly neither of foremost concern, nor a core interest. The main motive for China’s advancing military forces in the Indian Ocean is to safeguard the security of sea lanes and overseas economic interests. Presently, 80 percent of China’s oil imports originates from the Middle East and Africa and is shipped to China via the Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait, and other channels. Although China is actively seeking to diversify sources of its oil imports, the Indian Ocean region, which accounts for 60 percent of global crude oil reserves and 35 percent of natural gas reserves, remains China’s most reliable source of crude oil imports. By 2020, over 85 percent of imported oil volumes will pass through routes in the India Ocean. The security of the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait regions will impact this ‘maritime lifeline,’ which concerns the heart blood of China’s economy. With gradual depletion in China’s domestic resources, China now needs or hereafter will need various mineral resources from around the Indian Ocean, such as copper, lithium, beryllium, nickel, cobalt and phosphate, hence China must cooperate with these countries to ensure the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, China has

Maritime relations  191 growing investment interests along the Indian Ocean’s coastlines. The best way to secure these interests is to cooperate with India and other countries to uphold peace, stability and freedom of navigation in this region, whereas the most foolish path would be to simply confront India outright over the Indian Ocean. In the foreseeable future, China will also be incapable of challenging India in the Indian Ocean. In the era of peaceful development, opportunities for large naval battle and enlarging the enclosure have by now vanished from existence. It is also very difficult for China to modify its intrinsic maritime geographic disadvantages through armed force; furthermore, China is incapable of possessing numerous overseas military bases as the United States. The focus of China’s maritime strategy remains on East Asian waters and their surrounding areas. China must create a strong oceangoing force, but in truth its mission is not to overthrow the United States and India in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; its objective is to acquire an effective power presence and maintain basic operational depth along exterior lines. In the case of strategic competition, the Indian Ocean represents interior lines for India, as opposed to exterior lines for China, and hereby India possesses natural advantages. The comprehensive strength of the Chinese Navy far outweighs that of India, however, in consideration of current and possible future military technologies, China’s overall strength, relative to that of India, cannot yet compensate for its geographical disadvantages in the Indian Ocean. India benefits from exceptionally favorable geographic conditions in the Indian Ocean, whereas China has yet to gain a foothold in the Indian Ocean. Although China may establish a few military bases in coastal countries bordering the Indian Ocean through fair, mutually beneficial and cordial cooperation, but there are no countries, with the exception of Pakistan, that are willing to risk antagonizing India, and these military bases’ wartime significance and operational efficacy will be severely curtailed if used to target India. Moreover, bases acquired through peaceful means are naturally subject to the restrictions of various treaties and are far less convenient than India’s use of its own territory. Therefore, unless India were to weaken considerably, it will otherwise be impossible for China to reform its strategic disadvantages and passivity when confronted by India in the Indian Ocean. If one were to take into account the United States, then a Sino-Indian clash would become even more absurd. It goes without saying that in the future the main naval forces in the Indian Ocean, will be the United States, India and China, while as the United States’ strength progressively diminishes, China and India are presently filling the void left by American power. However, neither China nor India will be able compete with the United States in the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future. In the tripartite politics of the Indian Ocean, China is clearly not India’s greatest rival, for the United States is in fact the most significant obstacle to Indian hegemony in the Indian Ocean. ‘The five main strategic waterways,’ which India professes to administer, are all currently under US control in practice. Sino-Indian

192  Maritime relations maritime strategic confrontation is of secondary importance and a façade, whereas in contrast a potential strategic maritime conflict between the United States and India is of genuine importance. The implementation of India’s maritime strategy does not chiefly concern Chinese interests, but rather American interests. India wishes to possess real and effective sea control in the entire Indian Ocean. The pressure it faces from the US will certainly not be less than that which China faces in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea region.35 Indian sensationalism of ‘China’s maritime threat’ derives more from historical resentment, regional security predicaments and the diverse needs of strategic planning as a major power. Its extreme sensitivity to Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean is due chiefly to its overall outlook on Sino-­I ndian relations. India has long regarded China as its rival and opponent in Asia, while Chinese growth has created new anxieties for India, namely the question of what type of global position will India be placed in as a result of China’s extensive and rapid development? India is even concerned that China’s growing military power will threaten its security, with China’s military modernization intensifying this perception. To a large extent, it is India’s overall perception of China that has determined its views and attitudes toward China’s entry into the Indian Ocean. India’s unbridled propagation of ‘the China threat,’ conspicuous ‘advance eastward,’ the expansion of its naval influence and operations to the South China Sea and Asia-Pacific, are in part also to avoid a conflict of strategic interests with the United States. For Sino-Indian relations, the most critical differences between the two sides are territorial disputes, mutual trust in military affairs, trade imbalances and the Pakistan issue, and do not in fact include the South China Sea issue. For India, its core interests do not relate to the South China Sea issue, which is of significance to India in only the two aspects of its eastward advancement policy and to balance China, although freedom of navigation is used as a slogan.36 From the perspective of power competition, Indian resistance against Chinese expansion of power in the Indian Ocean is due to considerations on how to guarantee its relative supremacy. India harbors hostility and prejudice against China’s limited military operations in the Indian Ocean and has concocted the ‘China threat,’ a necessity in its power contest with China. ‘A stronger Indian naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean can increase China’s maritime vulnerabilities and thereby to some extent offset China’s superiority over India on land, in air, and in space.’37 This implies that in case a large-scale conflict breaks out on the northern Sino-Indian land border, India may then take measures to target SLOCs in the Indian Ocean, which China depends upon for its survival, so as to compensate for its unfavorable position in the face of China’s formidable land power.

Maritime relations  193 Developments in Chinese sea power and its ‘stepping out’ will of course mitigate these vulnerabilities to some extent, but this is a situation that India is unwilling to witness. Maintaining Sino-Indian strategic stability at sea In reality, China and India both have their distinct strategic strengths and weaknesses. China’s comprehensive strength and geographical conditions on land are more favorable compared to those of India, and it is able to form an enormous advantage over India in its overall strategy and on land whereas in the Indian Ocean, India possesses a strategic advantage over China. Thus, there is a clear strategic equilibrium between China and India, and a true maritime security dilemma does not exist, for the two sides’ strategic maritime rivalry ought to remain within manageable bounds.38 Would India leverage the vulnerability of China’s sea lanes to launch an attack on China? India possesses such conditions and capabilities, as it guards China’s westward channels and may, at any moment, pose major threats to China’s SLOCs. Indian sea power cannot be ignored, but if I­ ndia wishes to utilize these strategic maritime advantages to provoke China, it would face numerous difficulties and risks. First of all, there is a great disparity in national strength between China and India, with India at a disadvantage in the overall strategic contest between the two countries. India faces considerable strategic pressure from China on land and on the direction of Pakistan. While India is able to strike Chinese vessels sailing the Indian Ocean, China can nevertheless utilize missiles and fighter aircrafts to directly attack central regions of the Indian subcontinent. Consequently, it would be very difficult for India to turn a blind eye to risks on land so as to take necessary measures at sea. Second, with the rapid ascent of China’s sea power, China is, by no means, without any capacity for resistance at sea, which means that blockading and harassing oceangoing Chinese ships will not be readily attainable; furthermore, the scale of India’s economic exchange with Southeast Asia, China, Japan and other East Asian countries is steadily expanding, and such obstructive actions will undoubtedly undermine freedom of navigation throughout the entire region, causing India to become a target of public censure, and ultimately harming the security of its own overseas trade. Finally, Sino-Indian common interests in politics, economics, security and other areas are progressively increasing, allowing India’s determination to wane. Is India going to join the United States’ and Japan’s anti-China camp? In recent years, the United States and Japan have spared no efforts to charm and cajole India, in the hope of coordinating and collaborating together in efforts to contain and suppress China. For the greatest possible integration of resources, the United States has even proposed a geostrategic concept wider than the old ‘Asia-Pacific’ – the Indo-Pacific, building a quadrilateral security system and elevating India to a very high strategic status.39

194  Maritime relations Leveraging Indian power, the United States attempts to increase its number of bargaining chips in its contest with China in the Asia-Pacific. As India’s political, economic and security ties with East Asia rapidly burgeon, India’s focus with regard to China and East Asia is likewise intensifying sharply, as India also desires to take advantage of US power to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific; in certain regional hotspots and on matters such as security, India indeed shares much common ground with the United States and Japan, and cooperates in operations. India also hopes to use US power to check and balance China, but this does not mean that India will join the United States’ and Japan’s camp to contain and suppress China. India is among a select few countries worldwide that have long retained ambitions as a great power, pursuing an independent foreign policy and is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Although India happens to concur with the United States and Japan on precautions against China’s sea power, India nevertheless still has reservations on cooperating in security matters with those two countries. Moreover, Indians remain acutely conscious that the US Navy rules the waves in Asia, especially in the Indian Ocean.40 Uday Bhaskar, director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), clearly explains this: ‘India’s DNA does not allow it to become a Japan or a Britain in terms of adopting a subordinate status to the U.S. and relying on America to guarantee the nation’s security. India’s strategic culture would not allow it.’41 More importantly, the degree of conflict and disagreement between India and China is in fact not so high as to demand comprehensive strategic confrontation. India is certainly not China’s adversary or enemy in maritime affairs. On the contrary, it is a collaborator in China’s distant ocean strategy and partner in solidarity. On the whole, there exists a certain strategic equilibrium between China and India, and moreover there are no fierce or irremediable conflicts in their maritime strategies. Cooperation between the two countries will be of major benefit to the implementation of both countries’ maritime strategies, whereas conflict at sea will cause their respective dreams of maritime rejuvenation to become remote and elusive. All decision-makers and serious scholars in both China and India need to have a clear understanding of this reality and should not dance to the tune of media and public opinion in the two countries, let alone blindly adhere to the United States’ and other forces’ preposterous arguments and absurd theories, unthinkingly adopting the ideas of others and reducing Sino-Indian relations to the strategic asset of a third-party state. As for China, if it wishes to carry out its Indian Ocean strategy and safeguard the security of its SLOCs, it must embrace India and assuage mutual suspicion and precautions as far as possible. First, it is necessary to strengthen strategic communication with India as military forces progress toward the Indian Ocean. With the proliferation of overseas Chinese interests and enhancements in the Chinese military forces, the large-scale ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces has become

Maritime relations  195 a relentless movement, with Indian Ocean as an area of top priority. In the near future, China is expected to sustain normalized sea power in the ­Indian Ocean, and even maintain a number of support bases. These actions and operations will inevitably stoke Indian anxieties, suspicion and precautions.42 While India may not be capable of halting China’s ‘stepping out’ operations, China also need not meaninglessly provoke India. Therefore, China’s Indian Ocean strategy ought in general to respect India, accommodate India and strengthen clarification and communication with India on the Maritime Silk Road, China’s Indian Ocean strategy and other major sensitive issues, in order to eliminate gratuitous misunderstandings and establish an essential foundation for mutual trust. Since China has neither the capacity nor the desire to challenge India’s strategic supremacy in the Indian Ocean, there is no harm in emphasizing its arguments in due course and expressing to India that ‘China respects India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean and has no intentions to contend with India for hegemony in this region.’ At the operational level, China must also promote the launch of substantive and open dialogue with Indian security mechanisms on maritime and naval affairs, so as to establish maritime security mechanisms that are reconcilable with the interests and positions of both countries. Similarly, it will be beneficial for India to accept the fact that China has legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean and should seek to engage with the rise of China’s sea power.43 Second, China should enhance military communication and cooperation with India to improve the military relationship. Military cooperation between China and India is severely disproportionate to overall development in Sino-Indian relations and has impacted strategic mutual trust. For the two militaries, there exists only a defense and security consultation mechanism for the Chinese and Indian ministries of defense, while the three military branches of the army, navy and air force lack permanent mechanisms for contact and communication, and nor is there a hotline at the top level. Not only are there too few joint exercises between the two countries, but they are also too superficial. Even such exercises are often interrupted due to various political reasons and lack institutionalized training arrangements similar to those between China and Russia. In the field of military communication, China needs to elevate the strategic importance of India, increasing its attention on India and the strength of its appeal. China should expedite establishing a routine exchange and communications mechanism between the armies, air forces and in particular the navies, encouraging the creation of mutual trust through the promotion of a military hotline, port visits and other measures. China ought to institutionalize ‘hand-in-hand’ army exercises, in addition to attempting large-scale and more extensive collaborative exercises; it should seek to reinforce bilateral and multilateral interaction with the Indian Navy, strengthen cooperation with the Indian Navy on anti-piracy measures, naval convoys and other areas, in anticipation of progressively joining an array of Indian Ocean naval mechanisms

196  Maritime relations that are dominated by India. In return, China can also invite the Indian Navy to engage in joint exercises and patrols in the South China Sea. Finally, it is furthermore necessary to bolster media control or guidance to prevent unfounded and unjustifiable criticism. Public opinion in both countries has been distorted to a certain extent by hostile sentiments, while reciprocal attacks in the media and speculation in public opinion have constantly cast a shadow over developments in Sino-Indian relations. As mentioned earlier, whether India’s claims of an alleged ‘onshore China threat’ or the so-called String of Pearls Strategy or the Chinese media’s exaggerated renderings of the Malacca dilemma and of possible armed intervention by India in the South China Sea, the majority of views represent groundless conjecture and embellishment. Nonetheless, we cannot underestimate the impact of such public opinion. China and India are big powers as well as neighbors, which in addition harbor territorial disputes and an intrinsically compelling security dilemma. Coupled with a history of troubling experiences between China and India, the populace in the two countries are exceptionally vulnerable to the beguilement and influence of extreme speech, an undercurrent that hampers the development of bilateral relations between the two countries and their peoples. There is no shortage of media, experts and even officials, who trumpet theories of the ‘India threat’ or ‘China threat’ domestically in either China or India. The two countries ought to build an environment of mutual respect and win–win cooperation, rationally view one another’s diplomatic actions and military deployments, and not blindly censure without substantiation. More importantly, it is necessary to pay attention to the sources of information. Currently, the vast majority of international reports speculating on confrontation and conflict between China and India stem from the Western world while extremely lacking in original information from both sides, especially China.

Winning over Australia’s relative neutrality Australia is the largest country in the Southern Pacific. It borders the Pacific Ocean’s coral seas and the Tasman Sea in the east, and faces the Indian Ocean and its marginal seas on three sides – west, north and south. Its location as a transoceanic, intercontinental hub and its geographic situation is highly favorable. As the two prominent plates of geopolitics and economics in the Indian and Pacific Oceans continue to merge, and with the formation and dissemination of the geographical concept of ‘Indo-Pacific,’ Australia’s strategic location will be of ever greater importance. Geographically, Australia is another noteworthy country, which may have a huge impact on the strategic implementation of China’s maritime power, and especially on the development of its distant ocean strategies. As a non-Asian country, Australia nevertheless is just across the sea from Southeast Asia, and so has geographic freedom to interpose in East Asian affairs; at the same time, it guards strategic routes for Eurasian continental

Maritime relations  197 powers to venture southward, while its left and right flanks also have a considerable impact on SLOCs in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Australia plays a critical role for China, regardless of whether it is to exit eastward to the Pacific Ocean or southward to the Indian Ocean. The robust vitality of US–Australian alliance We must clearly recognize that the US–Australian alliance is virtually unassailable. Australia is a crucial ally for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, while the US–Australian alliance forms the bedrock of Australia’s security strategy. Friendship between the two countries in security matters stems from the their experience of fighting shoulder-to-shoulder in the Pacific War. It is also due to the United States’ presence that Australia was able to avoid large-scale invasion by Japan on its own territory. In view of this knowledge and recollection, the foundation of Australian security strategy post Second World War has been to strengthen the US–Australian alliance. As the United States’ ‘southern anchor’ in the strategic Asia-Pacific region, Australia aspires to continue acting as the United States’ ‘deputy sheriff’ in the Southern Pacific, broadening its influence by relentlessly reinforcing alliance relations with the United States. Consequently, Australia has actively participated in the Korean War, the Vietnam War and various other US-led wars. Since the end of the Cold War, it is widely believed in Australia that myriad hot topics in the Asia-Pacific, such as issues of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, in addition to increasingly intense and diverse regional security dilemmas and arms races have a substantial risk of spiraling out of control with very high costs associated. Moreover, only the United States and its alliance system are able to safeguard peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific by continuing to maintain a powerful presence in the region. With this awareness, Australia has long devoted considerable effort to supporting and cooperating with the US–Asia-Pacific strategy. Australia furthermore responds enthusiastically to US expectations in matters of military and security cooperation. In order to assume duties and obligations required of the US ‘security bandwagon,’ Australia participates in wars initiated by the United States and assists it in resolving regional and international affairs as important ways of preserving the US–Australian alliance. Cooperation between the two sides is not confined to Asia-Pacific affairs exclusively, as the fervor of Australia’s participation in the Gulf War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is matched by only that of Great Britain. In terms of intimacy and integration, the US–Australian alliance may even surpass the US–Japanese alliance, as joint naval and air force exercises between them are extremely frequent, while many deputy command posts in the headquarters of US Pacific Command are held by Australians. Australia’s strategic significance to the United States is self-evident. For the United States, Australia is not only able to strategically support the First

198  Maritime relations Island Chain, but is also a crucial mainstay of the Second Island Chain, and can furthermore bolster the Third Island Chain. It is an exceptionally important ally in the Asia-Pacific in addition to Japan. As the United States promotes its ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ and ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategies, the United States has substantially boosted its military presence in Australia, with the deployment of 2,500 marines to Darwin, increased the distribution of naval and air forces in northern Australia, and increased the frequency of naval activities near Australia’s coasts as well as number of air force sorties in and out of Australia.44 Australia both welcomes and firmly supports such American actions to strengthen military deployments. In reality, policies to reinforce the US–Australian alliance are not only highly coherent, but enjoy widespread consensus of opinion domestically in Australia. Whether in state or civil circles, the importance of the US–Australian alliance is incontrovertible, as all domestic sectors within Australia share a very high degree of awareness on the issue. During a speech at The Lowy Institute for International Policy on 9 August 2012, the then Australian Minister for Defense, Stephen Smith, remarked, The US has underwritten stability in the Asia-Pacific for more than the past half century… A continued, indeed enhanced, US presence in the Asia Pacific is essential to peace and stability in our region. Australia welcomes the US enhanced engagement.45 On 23 February 2013, in an interview with a mainstream domestic newspaper, The Australian, Kevin Rudd commented that ‘A long-term, sustained strategic American influence in this region would enhance Australia’s interests in security, diplomacy, and other areas in the long run.’46 These statements certainly do not represent government rhetoric, but instead heartfelt support. There is also an abundance of praise for the US–Australian alliance from the Australian people. In a 2012 survey of public opinion and foreign policy organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute for International Policy, 87 percent of respondents believed that allied relations with the United States were very important or quite important to Australia’s security. Australia’s entanglements with regard to China We must note that for all issues concerning China, Australian policy is hardly consistent and explicit for significant domestic discrepancies exist. Not only is the intimacy of Sino-Australian relations dwarfed by that of US–­ Australian relations, but it also pales in comparison to that of Japanese–­ Australian relations. When faced with China, Australia increasingly exhibits conflicting parallel psychologies of both ‘reliance’ and ‘restriction.’ On the one hand, it welcomes economic connections with China, recognizes China as a leading global economic power and regards China’s rise as an opportunity for Australia; on the other hand, it is also anxious that development

Maritime relations  199 in Chinese military power will affect stability in the Asia-Pacific region, expressing disquiet against China’s regional impact, hoping that China will not alter the status quo in the Asia-Pacific, and fearing that China will attain strategic supremacy in this region. Between the two conflicting parallels, some scholars, like Euan Graham, has argued that Australia should learn from Vietnam to develop its own naval capabilities and avert dependence on a single ally, managing ‘a broad-spectrum relationship with Beijing that includes both cooperation and competition.’47 In regard of realist interests, Australia in fact does not wish to enter into conflict with China, as after all China’s rise is associated with economic opportunities. At present, China is Australia’s largest trading partner. The latest data published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade show that Sino-Australian trade achieved many milestones, with the total two-way trading increasing from AUD 149.8 billion in 2015 to 174.7 billion in 2016, an increase of up to 16.6 percent. China is also Australia’s largest source of imports, with the total value of Australian imports from China amounting to AUD 64.3 billion in 2016, accounting for 17.7 per cent of Australia’s total imports. Moreover, China has become a key export market for the Australian services sector, especially its tourism industry, with international visitors’ expenditure from China has surpassed the sum of visitors from the No. 2 and No. 3 (the United States and the United Kingdom). In 2016, the value of exports from Australia’s services sector to China totaled AUD 14.7 billion, a dramatic year-on-year increase of 50 percent.48 However, in security matters with regard to China, Australia adopts a discordant attitude, involving mostly vigilance and containment. For example, Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) reaffirms that its strong and deep alliance is at the core of Australia’s security and defense planning, and Australia will continue to broaden and deepen its alliance with the United States, including by supporting the rebalance of US military forces.49 From an objective perspective, this position predominantly derives from Australia’s own security requirements. Australia lacks necessary awareness of China’s strategic security intentions, believing that China’s ascent in security affairs portends an escalation of security risks in the Asia-Pacific, while agonizing that China will become hawkish and intrusive in its military and political expansion as it grows in strength. On 2 May 2009, Australia unequivocally expressed such concerns in a defense white paper titled ‘Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030’: ‘The pace, scope, and structure of China’s military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern.’ ‘In future, China will be a potential crisis flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region.’50 On 12 February 2014, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) issued a report titled ‘China’s New Dream,’ which claimed that The re-emergence of China as a great power will be Australia’s greatest foreign policy challenge during the 21st century. Canberra will have to

200  Maritime relations carefully balance Australia’s growing economic relationship with China and its traditional alliance with the US. The major threat to this balancing act would be if America’s fiscal problems force it to slash defense spending and withdraw from the East Asian region. Such a scenario would render Australia more vulnerable to ‘foreign invasion’ than at any period since 1942.51 In terms of its alliance relationship with the United States, Australia also has anxiety between the fear of ‘abandonment’ by the United States in the event of a conflict, versus the fear of ‘entrapment’ in the potential Sino-American conflict that is contrary to Australia’s own interests.52 Undeniably, the reason behind Australia’s full cooperation with the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategies is chiefly to alleviate its sense of insecurity in the Asia-Pacific’s complex security environment, while supporting the United States is equivalent to purchasing American ‘security insurance’ as a precaution against threats and harm that a rising China may inflict upon Australia. In 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australia clearly expressed deep concern about China’s rise: ‘Navigating the decade ahead will be hard because, as China’s power grows, our region is changing in ways without precedent in Australia’s modern history.’ And the paper further pointed out, the alliance with the United States is central to Australia’s approach to the Indo-Pacific and to counter this kind of power shift.53 Furthermore, pressure to fulfill alliance commitments has also cast a shadow over Sino-Australian relations. Due to the United States’ heavy involvement in East Asian affairs that are associated China, such as the Diaoyu Islands dispute and issues with respect to Taiwan and the South China Sea, and steady contractions in the two countries’ power gap, the United States has increased its expectations of ‘enhanced input’ from Japan, Australia, and other allies. In consideration of China’s continuous development of ‘Anti-Access’ and ‘Area Denial’ forces, the United States has been adjusting its deployment of military forces in recent years, focusing greater attention on Guam, Australia and other second line bases in the Western Pacific. During peacetime, the United States needs to charm Australia into applying political and strategic pressure on China. If an incident breaks out in East Asia, it is highly likely that Australia will become a strong pillar of support for US military action. Although it is not in Australian interests to become embroiled in Sino-US conflict, and Australia would be exceedingly unwilling to make a binary choice, it would in reality be very difficult for Australia to refuse the demands of the United States, its greatest ally. Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser claimed that ‘Australia is so locked into the US system that it would have no option but to join any American war with China.’ Collaborating with the United States to implement its ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ and develop the US–Australia–Japan plus multilateral security cooperation scheme, Australia has also significantly strengthened relations

Maritime relations  201 with Japan on political ties as well as military and security cooperation. In the Joint Statement of Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century, signed between Japan and Australia in July 2014, Australia conveyed its support and appreciation for Japan’s security policy and ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ that is founded upon international cooperation.54 It also endorsed Japan’s exercise of collective rights to self-defense in accordance to UN Charter principles. Immediately following the removal of Japan’s ‘Three Principles on Arms Exports,’ Australia extended an olive branch. In June 2014, at the 5th ‘2+2’ talks, attended by both Japan’s and Australia’s Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defense, an agreement was reached on cooperation in areas of equipment and technology. In July, the two sides signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. On the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan, the Australian government stands patently on Japan’s side in diplomacy. On this subject, even some of Australian academic circles believe that the Australian government maintains ‘double standards’ on the Diaoyu Islands issue, as it does not take any action on Japan’s unilateral ‘nationalization’ of the disputed islands and denial of historical aggression, while unjustifiably accusing China of disrupting the status quo. Reasonable expectations and the law of gradual progress A framework of ‘economic reliance on China, security dependence on the US’ has emerged in Australia’s foreign strategy, which intends to preserve this arrangement in the long run. In Sino-US–Australian trilateral relations, China is at a relative disadvantage as it is very difficult to convert China’s economic superiority and ties with Australia into actual power. With regard to Australia’s diplomatic traditions and domestic opinions, the United States is its natural ally with shared values, whereas a strong China is an instinctive target against which to take countermeasures. As a British colony, Australia was located a great distance away from its home country in the complex geographical environment of the Asia-Pacific. Early settlers, uncomfortable with Australia’s neighbors in Asia, were concerned that the neighbors would threaten their own existence and livelihoods. A way of mitigating such unease was to form alliances with the world’s most powerful countries. Thus when Great Britain could no longer ensure its security, Australia quickly turned to the United States. Although this sense of insecurity has subsided substantially with enhancements in political and economic connections between Australia and Asian countries, it has not disappeared entirely. In the context of a rising China, there will be no fundamental changes in Australia’s general mindset of ‘appeals to the US, precautions against China.’ In Australia’s foreign strategy, considering Australia’s quest for security and the strong economic power of the United States, the prominent

202  Maritime relations US–Australian alliance is near unshakable. Unless American strength suffers a severe setback, causing the United States to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific, it would be very difficult for China to supersede the US position in Australian strategy for a long period of time to come, and compelling Australia to make choices between China and the United States is by all means ill-advised. However, ‘although the relationship between Australia and the US will always be closer than that of Australia and China, it is possible to bridge this gap by a large margin.’55 China can indeed narrow the distance between Sino-Australian relations and US–Australian relations, or, in other words, reduce the level of attention and pressure targeted at China from developments in the US–Australian alliance. If conflict or confrontation ensues between China and the United States, while China cannot expect Australia to take its side, it may urge Australia to exercise greater caution and restraint in its support to the United States, preventing Australia from becoming a direct bridgehead in American efforts to contain China. Unlike Japan and other countries, Australia has no major conflicts of interest with China. In security, Australian policy toward China focuses on precaution, rather than containment. During peacetime, Australia purposefully endeavors to avoid provoking China as the strengthening US–Australian alliance, and there exist many opportunities to develop relations between Australia and China. If China and the United States were to become ensnared in confrontation or conflict, it is a foregone conclusion that Australia would side with the United States and undoubtedly endorse American politics, diplomacy and morality. Nonetheless, there is a large degree of uncertainty as to how much Australia would support the US military and as for what role it would play, while it may even potentially maintain a relatively neutral position in its actions. In summary, how far would Australia go to guard against China? To what extent would it follow the US to contain China? These answers are as yet unknown, but may be nonetheless striven for. China requires a profound understanding of Australia’s intrinsic sense of insecurity, prioritizing the other side’s level of comfort in the process of communicating with Australia. In operations to safeguard maritime rights and as its military power ‘steps out,’ China must increase the transparency of its policies as appropriate and inform Australia of anticipated circumstances prior to major operations. In order to mitigate Australia’s sense of insecurity, it is first of all necessary to not make unjustified criticisms; second, to not react in an excessively radical manner; and third, to not assume the air of a chauvinistic power. In interactions with Australia, it is necessary, as far as possible, to avoid coercing Australia into making the singular choice of ‘approaching China by opposing the US.’ Not only would this be unnecessary, it also may prove counterproductive. China also needs to progressively bridge the gap with Australia through pragmatic cooperation and expansion in military exchange and cooperation. Unlike India, Australia is relatively open to China’s participation in

Maritime relations  203 affairs in the Indian Ocean and is willing to maintain communication and cooperation with China to safeguard freedom of navigation and regional peace and stability. China and Australia both attach great importance to the Malacca Strait and to Southeast Asia, while the two countries share vast common interests in the eastern Indian Ocean. In recent years, they have engaged in outstanding cooperation on antipiracy matters, in search and rescue operations for the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, in addition to other nontraditional security fields. In view of Australia’s imprecise understanding of China’s security strategy and profound misconceptions regarding the Chinese PLA’s strategic intentions, boosting communication between the two sides’ militaries, supporting joint military exercises and training, and other operations are of even greater significance.

Expanding maritime connotations in the Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership Russia has all the features of a global power and is an important force, upon which China may leverage in the process of building maritime power. Although Russia has frequently suffered serious setbacks in its economic restructuring since its declaration of independence from Soviet Union, and to this day has not yet found a suitable path for its development, it nevertheless remains a leading global power in terms of its military, political, diplomatic and cultural strength and a renaissance should only be a matter of time. As the crisis in Ukraine clearly demonstrates, the United States and Europe’s preventative strategies toward Russia are deeply engrained for they are constantly concerned about Russia’s resurgence and expansion, while Russia’s political system, heritage of great power, and cultural characteristics mean that it cannot be wholly accepted into the Western world. The probability of an outbreak of war or a ‘new Cold War’ between Russia and the West is very slim, but fierce strategic games will endure for a long time to come. With the release of the new national security strategy by the United States, it is likely that China and Russia will be viewed by the United States as its greatest and second greatest global strategic rivals for a long time in the future. Appeals to allies and partners from both east and west to encircle China and Russia respectively and prevent the two countries’ ‘ascent’ will continue to be a core pillar of US global strategy. Relentless eastward expansion by NATO and the EU, Indo-Pacific quadrilateral alliance promoted by the United States, in addition to the intrinsic demands of Chinese and Russian national rejuvenation, will all encourage closer contact between the two countries. The two parties’ strategic cooperation on issues such as Syria and Iran, global economic regulation and other areas highlight the rich connotations of ­Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. The seas are currently becoming a new domain for strategic cooperation between them. There is enormous scope and potential for Sino-Russian cooperation, particularly in Arctic and Asia-Pacific maritime affairs. Nonetheless, the two countries are

204  Maritime relations ‘partners rather than allies,’ for it is necessary to clearly acknowledge challenges and limits in their maritime cooperation as the scope of cooperation actively expands and collaborate intensifies. Russia’s maritime tradition Russia originated from inland Eastern Europe and has traditionally been a continental power; however, it has always harbored somewhat extravagant and obsessive maritime dreams. Peter I of Bulgaria once said, ‘A great leader who has an army has one hand, but he who has a navy has two.’56 Similarly, Tsar Alexander III and Russian President Vladimir Putin have asserted, ‘Russia has just two allies, the army and the navy.’57 Under long-standing imperialist practices, such aspirations and emphasis upon the seas are indeed truly indispensable. The reason Russia was able to develop from a small duchy into an empire, which spanned the Eurasian continents and directly connected three major oceans, is because Russian rulers have historically yearned fiercely for the seas.58 During the country’s long-term continental expansion in Eurasia, the Russians have gradually recognized the importance of the seas. In order to rapidly encircle and invade vast areas of land, they exploited unique geographical conditions and coordinated transit systems of land and water, using waterways to link the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the White Sea in Russia’s Arctic region, through Europe’s rich river systems and lakes, into a giant land-­ water transit system; in the Far East, the Cossacks in the Tsardom of Russia invaded eastward, along east–west tributaries of the Siberian Ob River, the Yenisei River, and Lena River, subsequently advancing southward along the Heilongjiang to reach the Pacific Ocean. In comparison with the Mongols, whose conquests depended upon cavalry, the Russians indeed had greater imagination in their utilization of water channels and power. Without the support of waterways, the rather frail Tsarist Russia would at any rate find itself unable to traverse these immense deserts, forests, quagmires and other geographical barriers with existing technological conditions at the time. The perfection of such a land–water transit system invariably required reliable access to the sea, while winning control over the ocean would furthermore have achieved greater transportation freedom and strategic depth in defense. Marx once noted, ‘For a system of regional empire, land was sufficient; for a system of universal aggression, water had become indispensable.’59 Consequently, ever since the reign of Peter the Great, the pursuit and protection of gateways to warmer seas has become a traditional geographic complex passing from the Tsardom of Russia, to the Soviet Union, to the Russian Federation. Over several centuries of expansion in the past, although Russia’s maritime military force was inferior to that of its European counterparts in most situations, when confronted with nearby Sweden, Turkey and other secondary powers, as well as the decrepit Qing dynasty, it nevertheless earned abundant dividends.

Maritime relations  205 The ascent of the Soviet Union drove Russia’s sentiments toward maritime power to their zenith. Through decades of painstaking accumulation following the Second World War, the Soviet Union had, in one leap, become a naval superpower capable of competing with the United States, even surpassing its rival in the ballistic missile submarines. The Red Navy had distributed strategic hubs across all major oceans worldwide and was a powerful tool as the Soviet Union implemented hegemonic foreign policies and entered into global contests with the United States. A strong navy was also an important emblem of Soviet superpower, while in a similar fashion, historical glory is a vital source of inspiration for the elite of modern Russia as they contemplate the present and reflect on the past, while channeling energy and effort to seek rejuvenation. The history of the Russian people’s pursuit of sea power demonstrates that the development of Russia’s navy has been overly tied to geopolitical interests from the outset, with maritime trade and overseas economic interests usually not the focal point of policy; this differs enormously from Great Britain, the United States and other maritime countries. As such, Russian maritime programs have long held a tradition of ‘military first, trade second.’ As a stark contrast to its swift progress in military power, developments in maritime trade and the marine economy have disproportionately lagged behind. Even at the height of the Soviet Union’s power, there had not been any noteworthy amelioration in this situation. Russia has frequently suffered from economic hardship following the end of the Cold War, with both its comprehensive strength and sea power plunging. However, Russia’s primary intention to restore its traditional maritime power has never changed. Judging from a series of documents on maritime strategy published by the Yeltsin and Putin governments, Russia has never forsaken global maritime power, a strategic goal that the outside world may find inconceivable. The 2008 financial crisis had a severe impact on the Russian economy, while American and European sanctions, in addition to falling global oil prices, have created new challenges for Russia’s military modernization and maritime affairs. Nevertheless, the situation should not be more adverse than that of the 1990s, as the Russia’s state of affairs is far from desperate. Moreover, deterioration in the external security environment would all the more cement Russia’s political determination to accelerate the construction of a global maritime power. Arctic ambitions and Pacific dreams After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s geographic situation and strength in the direction of the Atlantic Ocean steadily declined, as it was by then unable to stage a full confrontation with NATO at sea and in an ever more defensive position; in contrast, Russia enjoys certain geographical and military advantages in the Arctic, while strategic pressure from the direction of the Pacific is also not as great as that from the west. In consideration of

206  Maritime relations this, the directions of the Arctic and Pacific have naturally become strategic focal points for Russia’s maritime military affairs. In the 2012 presidential election period, Putin reasserted, ‘Our mission is to thoroughly revitalize the ‘ocean-going’ navy, beginning with the North and the Far East.’ The Arctic Ocean is of priority because this region is of crucial interest to Russia, which has important needs in resource development, shipping, military security, delimitation and other issues; the Pacific Ocean is stressed not only due to abundant resources contained in Russia’s far eastern EEZ and continental shelf, but more importantly in view of development in Russia’s far east and its response to the shift eastward in US strategic focus.60 It is common knowledge that there is an immense wealth of resources in the Arctic, hence Russia increasingly views the Arctic as the strategic resource base for its future development. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020, enacted in 2001, stipulates that Russia’s top two long-term objectives in Arctic waters are to: research and development of the Arctic to the development of export-oriented economic sectors, priority social problems; protecting the interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.61 On 18 September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Until 2020 and Future Perspectives, expressly proposing the ‘the use of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation that provides for the solution of tasks for the social and economic development of the country’ and ensuring the realization of ‘competitive advantages for Russia in the extraction and transportation of energy resources.’62 In its Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which was released in 2015, Russia has claimed that it would ‘reinforce the standing of the Russian Federation among the leading maritime powers.’63 To this end, Russia is at the moment reinforcing diverse far-reaching measures in the military, diplomacy, the economy and international law, in an attempt to boost its strategic supremacy in the Arctic and seize the first mover’s advantage in the scramble for Arctic resources. Russia also has high expectations for the ‘Northern Sea Route’ (also known as the Arctic Northeast Passage). This sea lane follows the coastlines of the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, and Chukchi Sea, among others, and is an important channel connecting Russia’s European and Asian regions. From St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, this sea lane spans 14,000 kilometers, whereas taking the Suez Canal measures 23,000 kilometers. At present, these routes are only navigable for a few weeks in the summer, but their commercial prospects grow progressively brighter with the relentless melting of glaciers, bringing huge transportation benefits and enormous economic gains for Russia. Moreover, after this route is connected, Russia’s seas can be linked from east to west into a single stretch, fundamentally transforming the geopolitical strategy in which its sea power disposition has heretofore been partitioned and obstructed by glaciers, and considerably improving Russia’s strategic environment.64

Maritime relations  207 Russia’s territory extends across the Eurasian continent, while its foreign strategy cherishes the tradition of the ‘double-headed eagle.’ With the rise of the Asia-Pacific region in the global domain, this double-headed eagle strategy will become better balanced. Russia declared its ‘turn to the East’ virtually at the same time as the United States initiated its Pivot to the Asia-Pacific. This move is certainly not a pretentious pursuit of vogue on Russia’s part, but derives from political and economic considerations. On this point, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave very clear explanations in February 2013 when it released a new edition of ‘The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.’ This document claims that Strengthening Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is becoming increasingly important since Russia is an integral part of this fastest-developing geopolitical zone, toward which the center of world economy and politics is gradually shifting. Russia is interested in participating actively in the APR integration processes, using the possibilities offered by the APR to implement programs meant to boost the Siberian and Far Eastern economy, creating a transparent and equitable security architecture in the APR and cooperation on a collective basis.65 In addition, security and strategic factors are also very important. Russia cannot help but direct its attention to escalations in the Asia-Pacific’s geographic rivalries, especially the constant intensification of conflicts over maritime power and of maritime disputes. At a time when all powers are competing to become Pacific countries, promoting the 21st century as the Pacific century, Russia, which defines itself as a global power, of course would not wish to miss out on the drama of the century. The Kuril Islands dispute provides an excellent foothold for Russia to participate in strategic contests in the Asia-Pacific. Each time Russia is on the verge of fading from the Pacific Ocean, it would invariably and promptly demonstrate resolve to territorial defense or brandish its military might. As disputes over the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Liancourt Rocks have escalated, Russia has also often demonstrated an extraordinary hardline on the Kuril Islands issue. Senior Russian officials, including Putin, have frequently made tough statements and actions on the issue. Russia’s Eastern military district has also bolstered construction of airfields, deployment of missiles and other military facilities on the Ostrov Iturup (Etorofu-to) Islands, frequently conducting island defense exercises around this archipelago. Such actions by Russia are naturally responses to Japanese provocation, but for the most part, Russia hopes to attain its goal of strengthening its military presence in the Pacific by leveraging the Kuril Islands issue, with the aim of capturing a favorable position in Northeast Asia’s future strategic structure.66 In light of territorial disputes between Russia and Japan, the complex situation on the Korean Peninsula, mounting US military presence in the

208  Maritime relations Asia-Pacific, and rapid growth in Chinese sea power, Russia attaches ever greater importance to bolstering military strength in the Asia-Pacific. The Pacific Fleet is considered a major tool in protecting Russia’s maritime interests and security in the Asia-Pacific. It is Russia’s second largest, and also has been maintained comparatively intact following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, with a collection of over 20 nuclear submarines, its undersea power is extremely impressive. Russia has already started to implement a more balanced strategy, in which east and west have equal importance, with particular emphasis on the eastward shift of military resources to compensate for inadequacies, thereby greatly augmenting the strength of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Russia is at present steadily deploying a fleet of newly constructed large and medium-sized assault ships like Borei class strategic nuclear submarines. Russia remains actively engaged in political contests in the Asia-­Pacific, taking the initiative to participate in regional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and Asia-­ Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and regularly conducts a wide range of joint military exercises at sea with countries within the region, such as China, India, Vietnam and even Japan. Russia’s maritime forces and bombers also often frequent the East China Sea and the South China Sea to carry out deployment and drills, highlighting its power presence. Priorities and limitations in Sino-Russian maritime cooperation There has gradually been a revival in the Sino-Russian partnership of strategic cooperation, with interdependence and cooperation between the two parties in global strategy, regional affairs and economic development constantly increasing in incidence and scale. Specifically regarding the maritime domain, there are no fundamental conflicts or disputes between China and Russia at sea. In contrast there exist numerous shared interests in sea lanes, maritime security, geopolitics, the marine economy and other fields. Since 2012, China and Russia have held a series of large-scale naval exercises.67 As China’s and Russia’s maritime conflicts with the United States, Japan, Europe and other forces escalate, the tendency for China and Russia to unite together for greater strength in maritime affairs to alleviate strategic pressure will become even more palpable. In this context, economic collaboration in the Arctic and maritime strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific are likely to become the two most noteworthy sources of optimism. Though Russia may be self-satisfied with its achievements in the Arctic, in recent years it has been subject to capital and technological bottlenecks, with progress stagnant in the development of various resources. In particular, while its energy development is concentrated predominantly in onshore oil and gas fields, petroleum and natural gas resources in Russia’s Arctic territory are distributed chiefly in the region of the Arctic continental shelf. In the foreseeable future, it would be difficult for Russia to carry out large-scale

Maritime relations  209 exploitation without substantial foreign assistance or cooperative partners. China’s advantages in these respects, such as financial resources, human capital and technology, in addition to enormous resource shortages, exactly happen to form excellent complements to those of Russia. On the basis of its colossal economic size and total volume in foreign trade, China remains the Northern Sea Route’s largest potential customer. Despite accelerated melting of the Arctic glaciers, and even the possibility of meteorological conditions for year-round navigation prior to 2040, in the absence of huge economic investment, sophisticated societal management and professional teams for maritime safety, the lack of infrastructure and harsh natural environment in the Arctic will continue to limit possibilities for the large-scale commercialization of the Arctic Northeast Passage. From a global perspective, China has both the greatest need and strongest support for Russia to expand and strengthen this sea lane. Although Russia is actively developing in the direction of the Asia-Pacific, its power is insufficient and it is unable to mimic past aggressive expansion undertaken by Soviet Union in this region; in addition to relatively unfavorable geographical conditions, it is very difficult for Russia to directly exert any commanding influence over most Asia-Pacific affairs. The United States and Russia are geographical competitors across all areas, while Japan and Russia are in dispute over the Kuril Islands, and neither the United States nor Japan can freely permit Russian power to develop and burgeon in the Pacific. In this region, China has emerged as the most important player other than the United States. However, with myriad opponents at sea, China is positioned in a circle of warring adversaries, is in sore need of partners for strategic maritime cooperation. It may be remarked that Sino-Russian maritime cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is a natural product of circumstances. Not only are the two countries able to redress one another’s deficiencies in issues with regard to maritime disputes, engaging to some degree in strategic coordination and policy cooperation; they unite in matters on the regional maritime order, jointly resisting attempts by the United States and Japan to preserve maritime supremacy; they are also interdependent and mutually supportive in the expansion of strategic space in the Indian Ocean. However, as China accelerates the advancement of its maritime cooperation with Russia in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific and strives to enrich all aspects of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, China must also rationally prepare for obstacles and bottlenecks in Sino-Russian cooperation. On the one hand, it is difficult for the two sides to achieve major breakthroughs in key military and security matters, as strategic maritime cooperation between China and Russia is underpinned by the ‘partnership without alliance’ nature of overall Sino-Russian relations. In the context of realist interests, due to enormous developmental pressures and needs of economic transformation, China and Russia are committed to integration into the Western-led international system in the realms of both politics and

210  Maritime relations economics. For the time being, there is yet no substitute available for reliance upon the capital, technology, management experience and institutional power of the United States and European countries. Although China and Russia are both subject to US hegemonic containment and suppression, while simultaneously often reserving thinly veiled criticism for the current international order, in general they do not wish to sever ties with the West completely. In terms of geopolitical law, unions between continental powers commonly tend to be unstable and lack the success required to transform global maritime patterns. For instance, during the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon, acting with a fully unified continental Europe, was still unable to force Great Britain into surrender. China and Russia are naturally the Eurasian continent’s two major powers. Geographic complementarity between them is poor, while similarities and competitiveness are strong. An alliance between the two countries cannot truly transform the geographical disadvantages that each side must face to become a global maritime power. Therefore, the absence of a military alliance between China and Russia is not in fact due to issues of political mutual trust or conservative diplomatic doctrine, but chiefly because the costs of an alliance between the two countries would exceed the benefits. Only if the United States were to force both China and Russia into a dead end at the same time, would a Sino-Russia alliance be raised on the agenda, but it increasingly appears that the United States possesses neither the capability nor the desire to do so. Differences in China’s and Russia’s main strategic directions have meant that while the two countries often stand ‘back-to-back,’ they are unlikely to stand ‘shoulder-to-shoulder.’ Each side can only primarily rely on itself to manage strategic pressure from the east and the west respectively, while the greatest value of strategic cooperation is mutual political encouragement and reciprocal diplomatic support, rather than combined hostility toward shared adversaries. Russia has its own specific strategic interests in waters of the Asia-Pacific and certainly would not provoke the United States, Japan and other countries carelessly as a result of China’s issues in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Military coordination and cooperation will increase, but cannot possibly develop into a genuine alliance. Expecting Russia to unite with China in retaliation against the US–Japan alliance on issues such as the Diaoyu Islands dispute is without doubt an excessively naïve fantasy. On the other hand, although there are no underlying divergences or conflicts of interest between China and Russia in the Arctic and in Asia-Pacific maritime affairs on the whole, there nevertheless exist some fierce contradictions in certain specific areas. First, Russia is extremely zealous and aggressive in its Arctic policy, and much still remains to be done for cooperation between the two sides. The Arctic region is a center of Russian maritime strategy. At present, Arctic

Maritime relations  211 countries, which are in the intense conflict to seize the Arctic, demonstrate ever more xenophobic inclinations, this being especially true for Russia.68 Russia has once actively hindered and resisted China’s accession to the Arctic Council, engagement in Arctic scientific research, resource development activities, and other matters. There is great potential for cooperation between them in the Arctic, but it will also be difficult for China to change Russia’s geographic distrust as well as gain its understanding and support. Second, Russia is enthusiastically involved in the South China Sea issue, and China cannot help but be alarmed by its proclivities. Since 2000, Russia has enhanced its participation in South China Sea and Southeast Asian affairs, actively initiating trade in military technology, political dialogue and economic cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, and other countries. In particular, the Russian–Vietnamese ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ deserves China’s heightened attention, as Russia has long supported Vietnam’s weapons modernization program that is targeted conspicuously at China.69 For example, Russia has provided Vietnam with Sukhoi Su-27 and Sukhoi Su-30MKK fighter aircraft, conventionally-powered Kilo-class submarines and other advanced weapons; and aids Vietnam in the formation of its submarine force, with which it jointly produces missiles. Russia is also Vietnam’s most important collaborator in the exploitation of oil and gas in the South China Sea. In recent years, while many petroleum companies in the West have become increasingly cautious regarding cooperation with Vietnam due to concerns over agitating China, momentum in joint-­ development between Russian oil companies and Vietnam in disputed areas of the South China Sea has nevertheless increased. Third, it is possible that the steady rise of China’s sea power will aggravate Russia’s strategic anxiety. Russia views itself as a key player in strategic contests in the Asia-Pacific and, at heart, does not wish any country, China included, to grow strong. As China’s sea power develops and ‘steps out,’ the probability of confrontations between Chinese and Russian military forces in sensitive waters will rise considerably. It is difficult for China to exonerate Russian movements close to the South China Sea, while Russia is also irrefutably apprehensive about possible future Chinese presence and activities in the Sea of Japan and the Northwestern Pacific Ocean. In short, there are so many reasons for China and Russia to cooperate at sea, as the general trend in the two countries’ maritime relationship shows that cooperation far outweighs competition. However, there will not be a royal road to cooperation, as competition and precaution will follow closely like a shadow, moreover contradictions and friction will oftentimes occur. On this matter, China ought to remain sufficiently rational and mature, strive to attain the best outcomes through utmost effort, and neither erroneously exaggerate Russia’s precautions and vigilance against China, nor entertain any unrealistic expectations and fantasies with Russia.

212  Maritime relations

Notes 1 Stephen R. Nagy, “Can China-Japan Relations Return to ‘Normal’?”, 22 October, 2018, www.policyforum.net/can-china-japan-relations-return-normal/ 2 Alexander Neill, “Japan’s Growing Concern over China’s Naval Might”, 28 May 2017. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39918647 3 Yoji Koda, “A Japanese Perspective on China’s Evolving Surface Fleet”, in Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, eds., China’s Evolving Surface Fleet (U.S. Naval War College CMSI Red Books, 2017), pp. 31–42. 4 Ian Bowers, “Escalation at Sea: Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asia,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 46, 61. 5 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946). 6 Rong Jian, “Three Questions in Sino-Japanese Relations,” Ling Dao Zhe, No. 58, June 2014. http://www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/zlwj/article_20140721109768_4. html. 7 Alessio Patalano, “Seapower and Sino-Japanese Relations in the East China Sea, “Asian Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2014, p. 47. 8 International Crisis Group. “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” Asia Report, Vol. 245, 2013, pp. 5–29. 9 Ma Licheng, “New Perspective on Relations with Japan – Popular Sino-­Japanese Concerns,” Strategy and Management (Zhanlue Yu Guanli), No. 6, 2002. 10 Shi Yinhong, “The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and Diplomatic Revolution,” Zhanglue Yu Guanli, No. 2, 2003. 11 Gui Yongtao and Huang Chuyun, “The Historical Background and Crux of Deterioration in Sino-Japanese Relations,” China International Strategy Review 2014 (Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Pinglun, 2014), Peking University Institute of International and Strategic Studies (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2014), p. 48. 12 Lin Kun-Chin and Andrés Villar Gertmer, Maritime Security in the Asia-­Pacific: China and the Emerging Order in the East and South China Seas (­London: Chatham House, 2015). 13 Mi Cui, “Reasons of Ancient Southeast Asian Countries Paying Tribute to Ancient China,” Southeast Asian Studies, No. 1, 2014. 14 Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), pp. 25–27. 15 Ibid., 51–59. 16 The Data Is from China’s Ministry of Commerce, www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/ jshz/new/201801/20180102706664.shtml 17 Lee Kuan Yew, “China’s Growing Might and the Consequences.” https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0328/billionaires-11-current-events-leekuan-yew-china-consequences.html 18 Vikram Singh, Yuan Peng, Melanie Hart, Brian Harding, Zhang Xuegang, Chen Wenxin, and Zhang Fan, “Recalibrating U.S.-China Relations in Southeast Asia,” 25 October, 2016, www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/ 2016/10/25/225690/recalibrating-u-s-china-relations-in-southeast-asia/ 19 Joseph Chinyong Liow, “Southeast Asia in the US Debate,” Southeast Asian perspectives on US–China Competition, Aaron L Connelly, ed., (Lowy Institute, 2017). 20 Vikram Singh, Yuan Peng, Melanie Hart, Brian Harding, Zhang Xuegang, Chen Wenxin, and Zhang Fan, “Recalibrating U.S.-China Relations in Southeast Asia”, 25 October 2016, www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/ 2016/10/25/225690/recalibrating-u-s-china-relations-in-southeast-asia/ 21 Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, “China’s Maritime Silk Road: Challenging Test for ASEAN,” 2018, www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/co18030-chinasmaritime-silk-road-challenging-test-for-asean/#.W_Xg1_n7SUk

Maritime relations  213 22 C. Raja Mohan, translated by Zhu Xianchao and Zhang Yumei, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Beijing: China Democracy and Law Press,. 2014), p. 1. 23 Ibid., p. 161. 24 Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, No. 2, 2009. 25 Darshana M. Baruah, “China’s MSR: A Strategic View from India,” www.­ orfonline.org/research/30058/ 26 Devendra Kumar Joshi, “Rapidly Modernizing Chinese Navy Concerns India,” www.indtvusa.com/rapidly-modernising-chinese-navy-concerns-india-­n avychief/ 27 Vivek Mishra, “India and the Rise of the Indo-Pacific”, The Diplomat, 30 September 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/india-and-the-rise-of-the-indo-pacific/ 28 This passage is very much in vogue, but there is great doubt over its source. There is in fact no such content in Mahan’s works, and it is likely the fabrication and fiction of subsequent generations of strategists. However, there is a certain truth in this argument, for the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean is incontrovertible. 29 K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1965), p. 89. 30 David Scott, “India’s Grand Strategy for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions,” Asia Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 97–129. 31 Dick Sherwood, Maritime Power in the China Seas: Capabilities and Rationale (Canberra, Australia: The Australian Defense Studies Center, 1994). 32 Wu Qirong, “Military and Geographic Conditions in the Indian Ocean Region and Their Impact on Maritime Military Operations,” Junshi Xueshu, No. 8, 2010, pp. 76–77. 33 Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defense (Navy), Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategies (New Delhi, 2007), p. 59. 34 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Indian Navy, October 2015, p.  32. www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_ Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf 35 Zhang Wenmu, “Great Power Politics in the Center of the World Geopolitical System – on the Strategic Complementary Significance of Sino-Indian Security Cooperation,” Taipingyang Xuebao, No. 3, 2010, p. 50. 36 Hu Xiaowen, “From Tactical Involvement to Strategic Deployment – New I­ ndian Trends in the South China Sea,” Guoji Zhanwang, No. 2, 2014, pp. 107–108. 37 Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and sStrategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd., 2009), p. 288. 38 David Brewster, “Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: Is There Really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, p. 1. 39 Donald J. Trump. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017. 40 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the United States in the Indian Ocean: An emerging strategic triangle”, Naval War College Review, No. 3, 2008, pp. 40–60. 41 Baldev R. Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 230. 42 David Brewster, “India and China: Playing ‘Go’ in the Indian Ocean,” www. lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-and-china-playing-go-indian-ocean 43 Rory Medcalf, “The Western Indo-Pacific: India, China, and the Terms of ­Engagement,” Asia Policy, Vol. 22, No.1, 2016, pp. 61–67.

214  Maritime relations 44 The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America, August 2014, www.austlii.edu.au/au/ other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2015/1.html 45 Paper presented by Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, to the Lowy Institute on the 2013 Defence White Paper, https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/ publications/paper-presented-stephen-smith-mp-minister-defence-lowy-­ institute-2013-defence-white 46 The Australian, February 23, 2013. 47 Euan Graham. “What the Philippines and Australia Can Learn from Vietnam about Living with China”, 5 October 2016. www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ what-philippines-and-australia-can-learn-vietnam-about-living-china 48 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Trade and Investment at a Glance, 2017. https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/trade-at-a-glance/ trade-investment-at-a-glance-2017/Documents/trade-investment-at-a-glance2017.pdf 49 Department of Defense. 2016 Defence White Paper, www.defence.gov.au/­ WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf 50 Department of Defence (Australia), “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030”, http://www.apo.org.au/sites/default/files/defence _white_ paper_2009.pdf. 51 David D Hale, “China’s New Dream: How Will Australia and the World Cope with the Re-emergence of China as a Great Power.” www.aspi.org.au/­ publications/chinas-new-dream-how-will-australia-and-the-world-cope-withthe-re-emergence-of-china-as-a-great-power 52 Cameron Hill, “Australia and the South China Sea: debates and dilemmas,” www. aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_ Library/pubs/BriefingBook45p/SouthChinaSea 53 Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p.  4, www.fpwhite paper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper 54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe Joint Statement, “Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century”, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044640.pdf 55 Mark Beeson, “Australia’s Response to a Rising China,” Foreign Affairs Review (Waijiao Pinglun), No. 1, 2014, p. 69. 56 Alan Yuhas and Raya Jalabi, “Ukraine cCrisis: wWhy Russia sSees Crimea as iIts nNaval sStronghold,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/07/ ukraine-russia-crimea-naval-base-tatars-explainer. 57 See “Putin aAgrees with eEmperor that Russia’s only aAllies aAre Army and Navy,” http://tass.com/russia/789866. 58 Jing Zhongjie, “Characteristics and Inspirations in the Development of Russian Sea power,” Jinglüe, No. 16. 59 Karl Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century (Beijing: ­People’s Press, 1979), p. 80. 60 Zuo Fengrong, “Primary Investigations in Russian Maritime Strategy,” Waijiao Pinglun, No. 5, 2012, p. 136. 61 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020, http://arctichorizons.org/ sites/default/files/policy%20literature/Russian_Maritime_Policy_2020.pdf 62 Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020, https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/­ uploads/f iles/content/upload/29%20Russian%20Arctic%20Strategy%20 Until%202020%20BW.pdf 63 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows. net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/ Maritime%20Doctrine%20TransENGrus_FINAL.pdf ?sr=b&si=DNNFile ManagerPolicy&sig=fqZgUUVRVRrKmSFNMOj%2FNaRNawUoRdhdvp FJj7%2FpAkM%3D.

Maritime relations  215 64 Historically, the Russian Navy has repeatedly suffered defeats on the battlefield due to its inability to swiftly assemble forces from east and west due to obstruction by Arctic glaciers. For instance, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Baltic Sea Fleet and other forces in Russia’s European regions could only take a circuitous route via the Cape of Good Hope, across the Indian Ocean, and then northward through the Malacca Strait to free the Pacific Fleet, which was trapped by Japan in the Far East. In the absence of overseas supply bases, the outcome of victory or defeat had in reality long been determined as it had taken them over six months to traverse virtually half the globe. Thus, when the majority of Russian reinforcement fleets arrived in Namibia’s Lüderitz, the Russian Pacific Fleet had already been annihilated in Lüshungang. When they finally approached Vladivostok, Japan was already well prepared for conflict and a trap awaited. 65 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. www.mid.ru/en/ foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/ id/122186 66 Zuo Fengrong and Zhang Xinyu, “Maritime Strategy in the Process of Russian Modernization”, Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Bao, No. 6, 2011, p. 73. 67 David Scott, “Russia-China Naval Cooperation in an Era of Great Power Competition,” http://cimsec.org/russia-china-naval-cooperation-in-an-era-ofgreat-power-competition/36773 68 Ibid. 69 Alexander Korolev,“The Two Levels of Russia’s South China Sea policies,” www. eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb376.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=36045

9 Deterrence is preferable to fighting

The military is a political tool, and war is an extension of politics. Military affairs and war are both means to an end, and not politics itself. As Sun Tzu says, ‘supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.’1 Armed coercion in peacetime is akin to victory in battle during times of war and has always been a key function of military forces. Deterrence is, put simply, ‘a show of strength’ and a means of offensive defense. In today’s society, ‘laws of the jungle’ are not yet to disappear entirely, but at the same time, the influence of international mechanisms and moral standards are also on the rise. The costs and effectiveness of war or brazen coercive approaches are increasingly disproportionate. In particular, due to restraints from nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence and other factors, large-scale wars between powers have now become extremely rare, while peaceful development has progressively become the contemporary theme. In this situation, armed force often forms the material basis for coercive diplomacy, rather than being used to seize territory and conquer adversaries.

The purpose and importance of deterrence Deterrence, in particular reciprocal nuclear deterrence, was once an important pillar of maintaining peace and security during the Cold War. Deterrence theory was formed alongside nuclear terrorism, and a central topic in early research on deterrence theory was nuclear deterrence. But deterrence as a practice has long existed in the extensive history of human society. Deterrence refers to a defensive strategy to prevent a situation (such as war or invasion) from occurring, rather than a strategy to compel others to submit to one’s will through intimidation. Means of deterrence are not only applicable in the field of security, but are also widely used in economics, diplomacy and other areas. It is simply that there is often more uncertainty and greater difficulty in managing deterrence in other domains. At appropriate moments in international interaction, displays of one’s strength and determination may be conducive to the fulfillment of one’s interests, in addition to the maintenance of regional stability and the promotion of peaceful

Deterrence is preferable to fighting  217 development worldwide. In relation to the matter of China’s national interests, demonstrating one’s will and resolve to opponents may induce fear and restraint, achieving the purpose of deterrence. There are three features of successful deterrence: a retaliatory force, a genuinely effective threat and reliable ways to disseminate the concept of this threat. A retaliatory force mainly indicates the ability or strength to engage in retaliation, whereas a genuinely effective threat refers more to the desire or motivation to retaliate. Diplomacy is the principal method of transmitting information about deterrence, frequently including discourses of leaders, statements from diplomatic representatives, diplomatic notes, secret meetings and other measures. If a country has only considerable political, economic and military strength, and were to lack prowess in the art of diplomacy, it cannot necessarily precipitate the opposition’s surrender. Furthermore, diplomacy itself is a type of retaliatory force, for instance interruptions in bilateral military communications, expulsion of diplomatic representatives and diplomatic protests. Consequently, deterrence tactics are commonly used in diplomacy, in order to prevent other countries from taking actions that are disadvantageous to oneself. The development of China’s sea power will inevitably lead to containment by the United States, Japan and other countries, while these containment approaches will be a combination of both heavy-handed and light-handed measures. That is to say, they will try their best to maintain an absolute military advantage over China, creating enormous pressure for China’s sea power, and if necessary, even launching preemptive, localized strikes against China’s sea power; in diplomacy, they will continue to emphasize the China threat theory, exploit opportunities to intervene in maritime disputes between China and its neighboring countries, and appeal to smalland medium-sized countries in the vicinity to unite and resist China; they will continue to obstruct access to cutting-edge technologies, control vital strategic hubs, and impede the rapid expansion of Chinese sea power. In fact, such efforts at containment will not be deterred as per China’s wishes for some time to come, but for as long as Chinese sea power continues to develop and grow, this containment will forever remain and strengthen. Declarations of peace and displays of diplomatic goodwill alone are insufficient to undo such containment; use of powerful measures in response to antagonistic intentions when necessary is also vital. Enhancements in deterrence are also required to safeguard realist maritime interests, as China’s sea power has also been widely impacted by challenges from surrounding countries. In the case of the South China Sea issue, despite persistent incursions upon Chinese sovereignty and economic interests by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries, neighborly relations nevertheless remain China’s priority, as it still advocates the ‘shelving of disputes and joint development.’ In 2002, China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) with ASEAN countries, the core content of which prohibits the various parties

218  Deterrence is preferable to fighting from taking actions to disrupt the status quo before a settlement agreement is reached. This is a position consistent also with China’s management of territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. However, some countries have failed to comply with the DOC and continue to adopt various measures to intensify their seizure of islands and reefs in addition to plunder of resources. China must strengthen deterrence against these hostile maneuvers, demonstrating to the relevant countries its will and determination to protect its maritime interests through practical action. Only then will it be possible to curb continuous deterioration in the South China Sea situation. For instance, China’s ostensibly ‘heavy-handed’ countermeasures since 2012 have not only reversed the difficult situation in the South China Sea but have also landed a heavy blow against the aggressive actions of countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, directly leaving them little alternative but to maintain restraint in their conduct on-site.

Accustomed to deterrence as a ‘new normal’ The world is, as a whole, an amalgamation of conflicts. In comparison with agrarian civilizations, the greatest characteristic of maritime civilizations is its direct confrontation of differences, willingness to engage in conflict and not intentionally manufactured unity and harmony. At present, neither resources for and channels of deterrence are problems. What China needs is to reinforce its will and determination to resolutely safeguard its own interests. The Chinese people yearn for peace and long for harmony, but as China develops its sea power, there are certain to be obstacles at every step of its path which abounds with competition and resistance everywhere. Unless China wishes to retreat entirely back onshore, its national interests mean this has to be faced. Here, it is furthermore necessary to refute popular anxieties about conflict and war as they would derail China’s monumental plans for a peaceful rise; with regard to some disputes and conflicts, if it is possible to endure, China should endure; if it is possible to defer, China should defer. Strategic windows of opportunity for peaceful development can by no means be gained by relying on compromise and tolerance alone. In fact, appropriate levels of deterrence would not only not aggravate conflicts, but also prevent exacerbation of and escalations in conflicts. The process of evolution in the international system is shaped by interactions between countries. All countries would as far as possible try to seize opportunities to maximize their own advantages, thus disagreements and contradictions are inevitable regardless of a single country’s goodwill and restraint. This cycle is particularly clear in the development of Chinese sea power. China’s naval modernization has been a topic of only the past decade or so, in part to make up for previous deficits and to close the distance between China and developed Western countries. This has resulted in absurd conjectures and precautionary measures. The obsessive exercise of restraint and

Deterrence is preferable to fighting  219 patience in international intercourse would not only allow opposition forces to make insatiable demands, to yearn for more and more, but also amplify other countries’ suspicions about China’s strategic intentions. Others would all the more doubt China’s motives if it were to insist on appearing modest and genial, while all other countries in the entire international system strive to protect their national interests as much as possible. Moreover, to blindly compromise, tolerate and evade problems could present a trap of one’s own making, because once the outside world grows accustomed to such behavior from China, there would be an enormous fallout if China were then to show the slightest impression of strength. This, on the contrary, would be unfavorable for the normal development of China’s foreign relations. Deterrence is a type of preventative measure in diplomacy to maintain the status quo and to forestall conflict. If left at the mercy of practical realities caused by other countries, China would become ensnared in an even more passive position, such that confrontation and hostility between the two sides would only intensify. On many issues, China had no alternative but to adopt drastic measures in order to coerce other parties into reforming their policies following the actual outbreak of events, largely because the impressions conveyed to them previously were misleading. It is naturally difficult to convince opposing foreign leaders to acquiesce and compromise in today’s era of open diplomacy, with public participation levels on the rise, hysterical misrepresentations in the media and a high degree of attention from the other side’s general population. Meanwhile, the domestic populace’s emotions in China, as the victim, are more intense and domestic political risks of compromise even greater, thus, China is more unlikely to back down, and can only increase retaliatory measures and boost their strength. This often would result in a stalemate in the style of a ‘prisoner’s dilemma,’ where there are ultimately no winners regardless of the conclusion. Even if it were possible to break the deadlock, it would still be very difficult to attain a win–win outcome, as each party would believe that it has made more concessions than other sides. The bilateral relations would not only be undermined on the inter-governmental level, but civil hostilities will also be aggravated. For instance, during the Diaoyu Islands boat collision crisis in September 2010, although in the end China made Japan release the captain through various countermeasures (temporarily interrupting bilateral communication at the provincial and ministerial levels and above, suspending increases in the number of flights between the two sides, expanding Sino-Japanese engagement on matters of navigational rights, delaying the China–Japan General Forum on Coal, limiting tours to Japan by Chinese citizens and so on), thereby gaining a superficial victory, there was a significant increase in the Japanese people’s hostility toward China. The Japanese populace were extremely displeased with the compromise of the Japanese government, which was showered with condemnation for its weakness toward China. In the long run, this environment is in fact not beneficial to China’s development of diplomatic relations with Japan.

220  Deterrence is preferable to fighting Therefore, it is imperative to anticipate or predict actions that may be taken by other countries before matters deteriorate or in the early stages of the unfolding process. Next it is necessary to express one’s own discontents and possible retaliatory measures to the other side through diplomatic channels or other special channels, so as to control the situation to a specific extent or to practically eradicate it. We must take precautions against risk and adversity and cannot wait to protest only when it is too late. In this sense, deterrence supports crisis prevention and control. The effective use of deterrence at appropriate moments can contain or eliminate the emergence or development of trends that may potentially cause grievous damage to China’s national interests. Likewise, it is necessary to avert another extreme movement from emerging, namely, disproportionate responses to conflict and mindless displays of uncompromising strength. Deterrence, especially deterrence in security affairs, does have some negative impacts and is in reality not a tool that may be often utilized. Deterrence here mainly refers to anticipating harm to one’s interests, while being compelled to take action when cordial negotiations prove unfruitful. In fact, this is not to say that China must confront and combat other countries on all matters. In the majority of cases, China will adopt soft deterrence, utilizing diplomatic, economic and other means of retaliation, rather than readily threatening other countries with armed force. Specifically as to what kind of deterrence should be adopted and under what conditions must be determined based on the nature of the interests and the extent to which the status quo is disrupted. There does not exist a protocol that can be applied across the board, for this is a very intricate art in diplomacy. In a similar vein, when confronted by other countries’ deterrence measures against China, it is necessary to respond calmly both by maintaining a high degree of vigilance against others’ unscrupulous intentions and by sensibly managing matters. China cannot blindly link economic issues with politics, associate political issues with security and magnify matters of low politics into those of high politics, while overanalyzing all subjects. In the current phase of China’s development, the intensity and intimacy of China’s interactions with the rest of the world are unprecedented, therefore the diversity and complexity of conflicts between China and the world are also unparalleled. As other countries manage their differences and conflicts with China, they will naturally adopt some deterrence approaches and countermeasures. In future, China will inevitably frequently encounter deterrence from other countries. Most of these deterrence measures are a natural phenomenon and a procedural matter, and something, that China must experience in its rise. As long as it responds with confidence, China will certainly be able to resolve these issues one by one. At present, harmony is an ideal and an objective for the international community, whereas in reality, dispute and conflict are the normal state of

Deterrence is preferable to fighting  221 affairs. China must adapt to this world filled with conflict, grow accustomed to deterring other countries in order to protect its interests, and also become acclimated to deterrence from other countries. It should neither carelessly conceal its capabilities to bide its time, nor should it ostentatiously display its strength and make everywhere enemies. China cannot allow a number of conflicts and contradictions with other countries to affect its judgment of the overall situation, nor can China retain a mentality of victimization in the long run, interpreting all deterrence attempts by other countries as ‘undying imperialist ambitions to subjugate us’ and similar acts.

Creating a smart deterrence system It should be recognized that factors such as nuclear terrorism resulting from nuclear weapons, global opposition to war and expansion in peaceful forces, globalization and developments in interdependence have rendered largescale wars between major powers largely preventable. For a power such as China, strategic deterrence is strong and unassailable. The outstanding historical achievements of Chinese People’s Liberation Army in wars against foreign forces and the three-in-one integrated strategic nuclear strike capabilities of land, sea and air are sufficient to deter any potential large-scale wars targeting China. ‘Those who do not dare to fire the first shot against China, may yet dare to violate China’s national interests.’ Even under existing conditions of strong strategic deterrence, Chinese interests are nevertheless subject to frequent infringement by neighboring countries. Reasons for boldness on the part of these countries are mainly rooted in the following three components: first, there is substantial middle ground between ‘war’ and ‘peace,’ while, in most situations, there is no place for armed force in strategic deterrence. If other parties use political, social, diplomatic, economic, legal and other non-­m ilitary means to oppose China, or apply military measures to conduct low-­intensity, cold confrontation, China would be unlikely to retaliate on a large scale. Second, major powers often do not have comprehensive capabilities, and they may even be positioned at a disadvantage in local areas and certain domains. For instance, although China’s overall military strength is formidable, it does not have a marked advantage relative to its surrounding countries in small-scale maritime conflicts and low-intensity confrontations at sea, for it suffers from problems such as a low rate of informationization and poor projection capacity. Third, the effectiveness of strategic deterrence has begun to decline with fewer large-scale wars. International mechanisms, international norms and international public opinion play an ever-greater role, while the diplomatic risks of armed force grow higher and higher; the costs of modern warfare are huge, as economic and political costs soar continuously. In this case, it is very difficult to translate the threat of a largescale war into practice. Opponents are undoubtedly aware of this, and consequently pay little heed to the risks.

222  Deterrence is preferable to fighting In order to carry out surgically precise strikes, China needs ‘more dexterous’ deterrence tactics and measures. While continuing to accelerate construction of a powerful system of strategic deterrence, China also urgently needs to strengthen its creation of a tactical deterrence system. The quality of strategic deterrence used directly reflects a country’s strategic decision-making and policy implementation abilities. Good deterrence often results from the integrated and coordinated application of multiple approaches. It requires not only correct judgment of the other side’s intentions, insights into the adversary and awareness of both parties’ weaknesses, but also needs unified internal understanding, coordinated positions and integrated resources so as to form a joint effort and create a ‘fist.’ In order to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of deterrence, China should concentrate on the following improvements. First, it is necessary to pursue an active deterrence policy, to ‘preempt’ rather than to ‘react.’ Deterrence is a preventive strategy to maintain the status quo, to avert outbreaks of conflict or escalations in crises. Its purpose is to avoid any future passivity; therefore, ‘preemption’ has always been one of the essential components of deterrence. In addition, the reason why ‘preemption’ is advocated is because ‘reaction’ strategies are often difficult to satisfactorily implement in practice. In the event that conflicts or crises occur, space for bilateral maneuver will shrink and compromise will become very difficult in today’s age of open diplomacy, with extensive public participation, media sensationalism and intense popular scrutiny from all parties concerned. China’s triumph in resisting the Philippines at Huangyan Island is in fact neither representative, nor consistently replicable. If this were instead Vietnam, whose national strength is relatively greater, such a model may prove ineffective. Moreover, the international community favors the principle of fait accompli, in which actions that instigate escalations in conflict are easily isolated. Often when ‘punishing innocent and guilty alike,’ regardless of right and wrong, emphasis is placed on preventing behavior that expand disputes, provoke crises and escalate conflicts. Those who disrupt the status quo, especially those who use armed force to undermine the status quo, always suffer from even greater external pressure, as ‘Those who react are commonly at the mercy of others.’ Therefore, China establish a foothold, make the first move and not continue to passively wait until it is too late. Second, it is necessary to improve the relevance of deterrence, that is, to adopt measures that can send a message directly to other parties. Although the momentum of a combination blow may be great, it may be insufficient to strike the heart of the issue, while at the same time leading to unnecessary collateral damage, which is detrimental to safeguarding one’s own interests as far as possible. Using the 2010 Diaoyu Islands boat collision incident again as an example, the objective of the series of deterrence approaches and measures, adopted by China during the crisis, was to press Japan to apologize and release the Chinese nationals taken prisoner. First, Spokesman

Deterrence is preferable to fighting  223 for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Councilor and the Premier of the State Council issued a series of protests and warnings to Japan, and engaged in significant negotiations with Japanese diplomatic representatives. As deterrence, they delivered a message that if the captain were not released, there would be further action taken. Second, China adopted a series of measures, such as deferring negotiations on issues on the East China Sea, postponing the National People’s Congress delegation’s visit to Japan, suspending contact over arrangements to increase flights between the two parties and expand Sino-Japanese traffic rights, postponing the China–Japan General Forum on Coal and suspending Sino-Japanese exchanges above provincial and ministerial levels, all of which were described as a combination blow to secure the release of Chinese nationals. It should be noted that these protests, negotiations, warnings and countermeasures amply conveyed China’s resolve and tenacity to Japan and applied sufficient pressure on Japan. However, there still remains room for discussion or improvement. First of all, the Chinese evaluation of the Japanese government’s intentions and understanding of Japan’s domestic political model were in fact inaccurate. As a result, China was unable to rapidly achieve its goals, continuing to promote deterrence measures and expand their scope. Lasting 17 days, the crisis stretched for too long, attracting long-term speculation from domestic and foreign media and triggering a long period of passionate antagonism between the Chinese and Japanese people, which was not conducive to future improvement of relations between the two countries. Furthermore, it is clear that certain measures adopted by China did not have a significant impact on Japan’s decision-making, but did lead to resentment from the Japanese people, for instance, the suspension of or delay in normal civil communications. These non-targeted measures expand the scope of attack but arouse the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people. Finally, credibility of deterrence does not depend on the quality or quantity of retaliatory measures, nor does it depend on fervent public diplomatic displays by the defending state. It relies primarily on the challenger’s perceptions of retaliatory measures and the assessment of its own intentions and motives. Communication of intent between the two sides is critical in deterrence, and poor communication will lead to failure. Therefore, in order to ensure that one’s deterrent is credible and effective, it is crucial to maintain essential channels of communication. With regard to sensitive events, special channels of communication can often play an unexpectedly important role. Third, China needs the reinforcement of political, economic, diplomatic, military and other measures, translating ‘strength’ into ‘ability.’ Neither China, nor any other major country is an omnipotent champion. For instance, China is relatively fallible in its maritime operational capabilities. While China prepares to win localized wars with advanced technological conditions, it must also bolster the power of paramilitary forces law

224  Deterrence is preferable to fighting enforcement, in order to respond to emergency events, civil disputes and maritime crises. Historically, coastguard ships are usually the first to arrive on the scene during maritime crises and conflicts. Their response speeds, operational capacities, command capabilities often play a decisive role in controlling incidents. Very often, military measures are in fact not the best tools for deterrence. Economic, diplomatic and other means of retaliation have greater precision and practicality at times. Therefore, in addition to the construction of military and law enforcement forces, it is vital to enhance economic influence and diplomatic capabilities. In economic matters, it is necessary to support technological innovation and the establishment of international mechanisms. While expanding the size of the economy, China should focus on structural adjustments, pursue international discourse and optimize international economic power; in diplomacy, China ought to concentrate on strengthening diplomatic resources or translating proven strength into diplomatic ability. There remains a considerable imbalance between China’s capacities in diplomacy relative to its rapidly rising national strength, manifested for instance in the consciousness of strategic thinking, the professionalism of diplomats and the efficiency of decision-making and executive agencies. Fourth, China should optimize decision-making mechanisms, and seamlessly integrate resources, strengths and approaches. In order to prescribe the right solutions, it is essential to first identify where counterparty weaknesses are found and what kinds of offensive measures can be used to compel opponents to withdraw. In view of this, the most important task is to strengthen the overall command, comprehensive research and institutional coordination, clearly understanding measures and capabilities that one can put into action, rationally planning goals to be achieved and response measures. It is imperative to build strong mechanisms to coordinate foreign and security affairs. Today, issues in diplomacy or foreign affairs frequently involve numerous departments or multiple work units. In present-day China, the number of departments and mechanisms that participate in such matters grows ever larger, limited not only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce and other traditional foreign affairs departments. Various major ministries and commissions in the State Council system, all echelons of the National People’s Congress, all levels of government and the military have their own areas of interests and foreign channels, and each has its own articulation capabilities as well as means of response. If these units were able to join forces and form a concerted effort, they would be able to convincingly display their power and resolve to the outside world; if they fight individually, they would impede one another and be incapable of conveying clear and cogent information to the rest of the world. Deterrence would fail, and undesirable outcomes may even appear. With regard to maritime security issues, China already has a Central Office of Foreign Affairs, a Central Office of Maritime Rights, National Security Commission of the

Deterrence is preferable to fighting  225 Communist Party of China and other primary central coordination bodies. The definition of the functions of these mechanisms themselves and the division of tasks between them still need further clarification. On the policy implementation level, there exists in a similar fashion the problem of blurred lines between rights and responsibilities, as well as of ambiguities in relevant rules and norms. In addition, it is necessary to furthermore boost the effectiveness of deterrence and to follow words with action. Although heated verbal exchanges are highly enticing, they are largely ineffective if unaccompanied by substantive action. The purpose of diplomacy is to communicate one’s intentions and messages of deterrence to adversaries. It must be supported by political, economic, military and other measures working together to prove successful. Without the support of powerful strength, even the most outstanding diplomatic accomplishments would do little to improve matters. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, although the speech of Mr. Wellington Koo, China’s representative, captivated and electrified the audience, it changed nothing as British, French and American powers agreed nevertheless to Japan’s annexation of the Jiaodong Peninsula. It is exactly as Wellington Koo said to Zhang Xueliang and the government of the Republic of China following the Mukden Incident on 18 September 1931, ‘it is unrealistic to hope to gain through diplomacy what cannot be obtained on the battlefield.’2 Even if strength exists, deterrence cannot succeed without the determination to apply strength. Views on deterrence expressed on diplomatic occasions must be supported by appropriate measures. Before these views are openly declared, it is also necessary to fully consider if one has the necessary resources to put them into practice; if not, the careless use of hardline rhetoric would be inadvisable. In the use of deterrence, once statements are issued, actions must follow. It is imperative that deterrence does not become a mere formality, nor a war of words. Under normal circumstances, if deterrence operations are not carried out according to diplomatic declarations, no further attention would be paid to future efforts at deterrence, whose credibility and effectiveness will be greatly reduced.

Notes 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Mou Gong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 2 Wellington Koo, Wellington Koo Memoirs, Volume Vol. 2, Chinese Vision (­Beijing: China Publishing House, 1985), p. 189.

10 Tridents beyond armed force1

In comparison with continental governance, human control over the seas is relatively limited. As ‘it is very difficult for any country to administer even a small area of ocean in the same way that it governs land,’ sharing of power is a unique feature of maritime power. Even the British Empire, upon which the sun once never set, and the current maritime hegemon, the United States, must be well versed in the limitations of sea power and the restrictions of expansion. Armed force is often merely one trident used to achieve one’s objectives, as the adoption of nonmilitary measures, for instance in diplomacy, economics and politics, are also of vital importance. Especially in the present era of rapidly developing economic globalization and strong global interdependence, the effectiveness of armed force has significantly decreased. While Thomas Hobbes’ ‘survival of the fittest’ competitive doctrine of states remains valid, norms and mechanisms, advocated by John Locke and other liberals, have progressively won over hearts and minds, while the status and role of non-military approaches are increasingly prominent. In order for China to achieve its maritime rise, it must skillfully forge tridents of nonmilitary measures, requiring comprehensive efforts in diplomacy, economics, law, public opinion and other areas.

The diplomatic transition from an Agrarian civilization to a maritime civilization Historical experience shows that the geographic environment and conditions for subsistence are the most important factors in shaping attributes of human civilization. Mighty inland rivers often nurture agrarian civilizations and societies, whereas communities engaged in fishing and commercial trade tend to congregate in regions close to seas and oceans, while lush grassland areas, such as the Mongolian Plateau, are the birthplace of various nomadic tribes. Beginning from wild and primitive times, human society has formed three general major types of agrarian civilizations, maritime civilizations and grassland civilizations. The four leading ancient civilizations of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, China and Indus all relied on rivers

Tridents beyond armed force  227 to develop and can be categorized as agrarian civilizations, also known as river valley civilizations and continental civilizations. Among these, China has the clearest imprint of an agrarian civilization. The Chinese people have long lived within a relatively confined geographic region of East Asia, with plateaus to the west, the Gobi Desert to the north, and seas in the south and in the east. As domestic produce was sufficiently plentiful, the agricultural industry highly advanced and the political system exceptionally precocious, there was a dearth of motivation for commercial exchange and maritime exploration. Although early peoples had for generations long been aware of the seas’ presence, onshore interests far outweighed those offshore for these people. Together with the vast immensity of the Pacific Ocean, the cost of maritime conquest truly was insufferable. The oceans were often characterized as profound mysteries in the discussions of literati, very few of whom had actual practical experience. Over time, a majority of the Chinese people gradually formed an inexplicable dread of the oceans. It is furthermore worth noting that over the long course of history, China had long adhered to a principle of prioritizing agriculture and subduing trade, hailing rule by past dynasties as ancestral guidance, and viewing agriculture as the nation’s cornerstone, and on which emphasis has been placed. Such a continental civilization or tradition has never been broken and has endured for several millennia. One should certainly underestimate neither its deep-rootedness nor its lasting influence. The Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans have been known as ‘the Sea Peoples’ since ancient times. They used the ease of transportation offered by the Mediterranean Sea to travel the length and width of southern Europe, western Asia and north Africa, once building a large number of commercial bases and colonial fortresses along the Mediterranean coast. In the work Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel passionately praised the seas, upon which the survival of Western civilization rests. In addition, using China as an example, he remarks that various Asian countries do not share in these activities, which transcend territorial boundaries and span across oceans, even if they have more magnificent political buildings and even if they themselves are flanked by the sea. For these countries, the sea simply represents an interruption in the continent, a discontinuation in the land: they do not have any constructive relationship with the seas.2 Ancient Greece is a classic maritime civilization. Ancient Greece was situated in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, centered around the Greek peninsula and encompassing a considerable number of the Aegean Islands, the Ionian Islands to the west of Asia Minor, as well as southern Italy and the island of Sicily. In terms of natural geographic conditions, it was mountainous, encircled by seas, with rugged terrain and only a number of modest plains, most of which are shielded by mountains and cliffs. These particular geographic features have had a decisive impact on ancient Greek economics, politics and culture. These small plains, concealed by mountains and cliffs, have created classic ‘small city-states (poleis)’ and implied that the ancient

228  Tridents beyond armed force Greeks could only survive and develop through trade and commerce. Moreover, such trade can only be in the form of overseas trade, thereby determining the ancient Greeks’ national characteristics, which are dominated by business, industry and seafaring. Over the past 700 years of history, the ancient Greeks had achieved profound accomplishments in numerous fields such as philosophy, history, architecture, natural sciences, literature, drama, sculpture, while their genetic stamp as a maritime civilization was also firmly established. Following the collapse of Ancient Greece, the ancient Romans continued to perpetuate this gene with constructive effect. Thus, the spirit of Western civilization as a whole can be traced back to the ancient Greek civilization. Standing on the shoulders of the ancient Greeks, modern Europeans initiated the Renaissance, a cultural movement that unlocked early modern European history, by organizing and researching classic works in the humanities from the Ancient Greek and Roman periods. The advent of the Age of Sail in the 15th century emboldened Europeans to journey the world. Of course, the purposes of these early European maritime activities, which were motivated mainly by the ‘exploration of global navigation routes, discovery of new worlds, plunder of foreign riches, and establishment of colonies’ were far from glorious.3 However, it is undeniable that such expansion indeed stimulated the development of maritime civilizations. Profiting from the experience of the Greeks and the Romans, Europeans have cultivated modern systems of maritime civilization from rich maritime practices, eventually diffusing these systems worldwide. With regard to the development of maritime civilization practices, the American naval historian E. B. Potter remarks that Westerners first mastered and began utilizing the vast seas in the Mediterranean, subsequently expanding their experience in the Mediterranean Sea on a global scale. In his view, ‘waterways worldwide have not only enhanced mankind’s mobility, providing large-scale markets for the fruits of hard work and technological innovation, and all the while offering new fields for the development of human thought.’4 In the end, the rise and fall of the powers that dominated Europe and even the Western world, such as Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States, were all intimately linked to efficiency in utilization and control of the seas. While the modern Western world is indisputably built upon the concept of maritime civilization, and the current international system and the international order are based on the customs and experiences of Westerners, there seems little reason not to call the current international system one based on marine civilization. Agricultural lifestyles tend to follow the course of nature: they cherish nature, rebuke the ways of man and are not fond of change; while merchants in maritime nations are entirely different: they have greater opportunities for exposure to foreign peoples of other languages and different cultures, are predisposed to change, not afraid of the novelty and have the courage to innovate.5

Tridents beyond armed force  229 In 1792, when Great Britain appointed George Macartney as envoy to China, Eastern and Western civilizations officially collided for the first time, resulting in undesirable consequences due to the two sides being entirely unable to understand one another’s conduct and actions. There was great failure in communication, as differences over the ceremonial etiquette of ‘kneeling and kowtow’ demonstrated that the continental world, represented by China, was at odds with the maritime world, dominated by Great Britain. The isolation and hubris of the former, in addition to the boldness and avarice of the latter, left indelible impressions upon one another. The history of China’s passive acceptance of Western civilization commenced with the Opium War in 1840. In particular, following defeat in the Second Opium War in 1860, the self-esteem of the Chinese civilization suffered setbacks ‘un-encountered for millennia,’ as the Chinese people not only were conquered by foreigners’ invulnerable ships and sophisticated firepower, but also were progressively convinced by foreign scientific and cultural beliefs, and even political systems. Confronted by Western civilization, Chinese civilization had suffered a crushing defeat on the material and spiritual levels as well. Thus learning from the West became both necessary and fashionable, which undoubtedly set a historical precedent. It should be known that since its conception, the Chinese civilization had never experienced such humiliation and never suffered such adversity. Historically, in the Zhongyuan dynasties, defeat against foreign forces was commonplace, as China was often also positioned at a disadvantage in battle against nomadic tribes. In fact, elite individuals in the Empire of China also did not always believe their military forces to be unassailable; on the level of morale, confidence had nevertheless always prevailed. Even when facing formidable challenges from the Hunnic Empire and the Mongol Empire, China never doubted the superiority of its own civilization. In truth, while nomadic tribes were able to conquer the Zhongyuan dynasties, they could not win over the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, showing contempt for Chinese military power but often filled with spiritual admiration for Chinese civilization. If these nomadic emperors wished to maintain long-term peace and security, to ensure stable governance, they had no choice but to learn from the Han Chinese, to fuse customs and practices with those of the Han, because most of those involved in state administration and national management were Han Chinese. Degeneration and decline in the late Qing dynasty caused the Chinese people to question themselves for the first time in all areas, from the material to the psychological, objectively compelling China to start reconstructing itself, using Western civilization as a model. Following the Xinhai Revolution (the Chinese Revolution of 1911), the late Qing government collapsed, but this learning process did not conclude. The Republic of China greatly resembled Great Britain and the United States in both style and substance and used the United States as its benchmark; the new democratic revolution, led by the Chinese Communist party, adhered to and studied from the Soviet model. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the entire Chinese nation was at the time learning from

230  Tridents beyond armed force the Soviet Union. From the 1960s to the late 1970s, China had, for a brief moment, ‘turned over a new leaf,’ attempting to embark on a new trail, but with little success; since reform and opening up, China once again turned to the Western world, represented by the United States, by learning from the West and integrating into the Western-led international system. It should be noted that as China has maintained full contact and interaction with the Western world for over 100 years, it has been studying Western systems, culture and regulations virtually throughout this entire time. While China’s identity as an agrarian civilization may not appear as apparent as in the past, we must recognize that ancient Chinese experiences or culture still have a significant impact upon China’s present-day development. Cultural fluctuations have their own rhythm, while developments in material culture are not necessarily able to drive advancements in nonmaterial culture.6 Although China’s material culture is already essentially in line with that of the Western world, the evolution of its nonmaterial culture still lags behind by comparison. By and large, China remains a country governed by the mentality of agrarian civilizations. Especially when compared with maritime civilizations, this characteristic becomes even clearer. The most important features of agrarian civilizations are their conservative and defensive natures. In contrast, maritime civilizations are open and offensive. Agricultural peoples are sedentary beings, with the family being the most basic unit of society. To establish homes around fertile farmland far and wide, ‘to settle in peace and contentment’ and to live prosperously with family have forever been the ultimate pursuit for the vast majority of Chinese, who work diligently and tirelessly. If not for the inimical forces of foreign powers, there would have been few changes in this perpetual cycle of  agricultural life. There would even have been little difference between rural life during the Chinese Qin dynasty and during the late Qing dynasty, separated by over 2,000 years. Self-sufficient mode of production also ensured that trade was not imperative, and that there was a severe lack of motivation for foreign interaction. In the long term, China naturally moved toward isolation and conservatism. In his outstanding work, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age, the eminent scholar Andre Gunder Frank exposes an important phenomenon. For almost 300 years since 1500, China and Asia were at the heart of the global economy. China needed silver, whereas Europe demanded Chinese goods. China had long had a trade surplus, in which silver flowed toward China. However, China’s foreign trade was entirely passive, in the interest of accumulating silver and other precious metals rather than exchanging everyday necessities. Conservatism and passivity extended to national military and diplomacy, naturally creating undue emphasis on defense, with the Great Wall being a classic example. Agrarian civilizations have insufficient impetus to subjectively initiate war and engage in expansion due to their self-sufficiency and conservatism. The ancient Chinese people’s views on war and peace can be largely summarized by three beliefs, those being: ‘prize peace,’ ‘cautions on war’ (慎战) and ‘war with

Tridents beyond armed force  231 courtesy’ (礼战). In the words of modern international politics, this is to say that ideas of peace take precedence and war must be waged with caution.7 Beginning with Sun Tzu, Chinese strategists have stressed the importance of active defense. There have also of course been wars of conquest and expansion in Chinese history, but in the majority of cases they have been in response to foreign aggression. In Antiquity, they have been forms of counterattack against incessant harassment and constant invasion by nomadic tribes, whereas in modern times, they have been a form of self-defense and retaliation against the imperialism and hegemony of Western powers, in order to pursue independence and sovereignty. Chinese history indicates that the Han people have never been excessively belligerent. In times when China showed signs of aggression, it was often when it had been conquered by external powers and had suffered rule or humiliation at the hands of foreigners.8 Sea people are often unable to achieve self-sufficiency and must trade and communicate with the outside world. The key to their livelihoods rests neither with land nor with property but with formidable naval forces and buoyant trade. For the British Empire, the crux of sustaining its hegemony was a question of whether the Royal Navy was able to control crucial global sea lanes, defeat opponents overseas and empower Great Britain to become the worldwide center of trade and commerce, rather than the development and prosperity of the British Isles themselves. Unlike the development trajectories of agrarian civilizations, the rise of modern maritime civilizations has inevitably always involved chaos and bloodshed. During the Age of Sail, heroes such as Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Magellan were in fact the pioneering trailblazers of colonialism. Initially in various maritime nations, most naval recruits hailed from piracy. This fully brings to light the unscrupulous history of certain Western countries. However, there is always another side to the story, as trade and conflict at sea have in the long run inculcated these countries’ national characteristics of openness and audacity. The greatest foreign pursuit of agrarian civilizations is stability and dignity, whereas the foremost concern of maritime civilizations are realist ­benefits – power and interests. With regard to attitudes toward war and peace, the Chinese people prefer peace and order. A prominent feature of Chinese culture is the pursuit of stability and order. Chinese tend to be staunchly ‘risk averse,’ fearing situations of chaos and turbulence.9 This is very easy to understand, as during the era of agrarian civilizations, war was the arch enemy of civilization’s progress and society’s development; at the same time, the economy in China was far more affluent and advanced than that of peripheral regions. Thus, in ancient times, the Zhongyuan dynasties were not generally inclined to expand externally through the use of armed force. Development and continuation of the Chinese civilization depended on social stability, economic

232  Tridents beyond armed force prosperity and cultural progress. It is certainly no coincidence that Confucianism, which emphasizes etiquette and hierarchical order, was highly praised by rulers throughout history, while this is also closely connected to Chinese people’s living environments and ways of life. ‘Eschew chaos’ and ‘stability above all else’ remain among Chinese people’s most important values. Chinese people also attach great importance to dignity and reputation or, put more bluntly, like to save face. In the ancient East Asian system, so long as neighboring countries symbolically expressed obedience to the Chinese emperors, who would be reveling in the fantasy of ruling the whole world. Then, these neighboring countries may also have benefitted from abundant presents and rich rewards from the Zhongyuan dynasties. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China entered a bitter war of words with the Soviet Union and passionately supported revolutions in Third World Countries, with little consideration of its actual strength; to some extent at least, these activities were related to face-saving. It was not until the end of the 20th century that China finally began to accept the principle that national interest was the main objective of diplomacy. As for maritime nations, represented by Great Britain and the United States, struggles of power form the main substance of international relations, and the concept of interest is inborn with their founding. The 19th-century British prime minister, Henry John Temple, the Third Viscount Palmerston, once famously said, ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’10 Closely related to this is power. The international system in modern Europe is a series of historical contests for hegemony and dominance. With regard to Western theories of international relations, they are undoubtedly also built on a foundation of ‘power and interests.’ National interests are above all a Western tradition, and, in a sense, a tradition of maritime civilizations. Unlike agrarian civilizations that promote agriculture and curtail trade, maritime civilizations all originate from commerce, invariably leading to natural scrutiny of interests. While Westerners may of course also value dignity and face, the Chinese treat it with far greater significance. For agrarian civilizations, the principal method of upholding the international order is political negotiation and concession, whereas maritime civilizations primarily rely on contests of power and treaty systems. Needless to say, strength is most important cornerstone in the existence of any international order, whether the regional order led by China in ancient East Asia, or the modern world order led by the West. However, there are vast differences in the main approaches to revising international relations in the various types of international order. In ancient East Asia, members of the international system mainly adhered to ethical principles, morals and related Confucian norms, coordinating relations with one another through unwritten political consultations. Based on their power, leading countries in the system ensured its operation through methods such as conferment of

Tridents beyond armed force  233 political titles and economic concessions. The problem was that different leaders had different perspectives on the world, while there was a considerable divergence in the definition of their countries’ responsibilities and obligations vis-à-vis that of other countries. In Chinese history for instance, there was both restraint in the use of force under the rule of Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, who declared 15 countries ‘forbidden to be conquered’ and cavalier dominance during the era of the Qianlong Emperor, who pursued ‘Ten Great Campaigns.’ Similarly, during the Zhongyuan dynasties, neighboring countries’ attitudes toward China varied greatly according to regime succession and changes in leadership. Any set of bilateral relations required specific consultations, which may vary with time, actors and location. There is little uniformity, but much discretion, in such relationships. Maritime civilizations successfully integrate commercial contracts and credibility into international relations. Both permitted and proscribed actions, respective responsibilities and obligations are recorded in black and white in treaties. In modern times, many situations that do not comply with treaties or demand changes in treaties, have been mediated through war or diplomatic games, based of course on fundamentals of strength. The current international system is in fact a system of treaties under a power framework, with the profound signature of maritime civilizations. Such prominent and palpable differences in conduct remain even to this day. Although China, which is influenced by the traits and conduct of agrarian civilizations, has experienced over a century of study and integration, it is at present not entirely accustomed to the treaty system. Since the founding of the PRC, it has formed alliances with the Soviet Union, certain Third World Countries, and the United States in succession, and then quickly parted ways with them all. There were many reasons for this, but definitely included China’s unfamiliarity with cultivating bilateral relations according to treaty systems. China did not wish to be subject to unnecessary treaty constraints for the sake of alliances. Even if treaties were to apply, China does not want excessively specific regulations, preferring ambiguous and imprecise ones, while hoping to maintain requisite flexibility and leeway for maneuver. According to treaty terms, China and North Korea are allies, while the United States and South Korea are also allies. However, the former situation is undoubtedly not as clear as the latter. On the issue of its nuclear tests, North Korea pays little heed to China, whereas South Korea requires US approval even to extend its missile firing range from 300 to 800 kilometers. Although in 1961 China and North Korea signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, which is comparable to a military alliance as ‘this treaty guarantees that when a signatory is in a state of war, the other signatory must do all within its power to provide military aid and other forms of assistance,’ the exact interpretation, comprehension, implementation and other issues depend entirely on how different leaders on both sides perceive China’s relations with North Korea, which at times may be inseparable but at other times irreconcilable (Table 10.1).

234  Tridents beyond armed force Table 10.1  M  ajor differences in the ways agrarian civilizations and maritime civilizations approach foreign relations

Main features Value orientation Customary path

Diplomatic mode of agrarian civilizations (China)

Diplomatic mode of Maritime civilizations (the United States and Great Britain)

Conservative and Defensive Order and dignity Political negotiation and concessions

Open and Offensive Power and interests Power contests and treaty rules

Comparative analysis along these distinct lines may indeed seem excessively abstract and oversimplified. It also cannot explain all historical narratives and experiences. Chinese maritime trade thrived during the Song and Yuan dynasties, while the story of Zheng He’s seafaring voyages in the southwest to as far as Africa also strongly highlighted China’s maritime heritage; for a considerable period of time after its founding, the United States pursued the ‘Monroe doctrine,’ illustrating classic characteristics of continental culture as it was content to enjoy sovereignty over the Americas. This model was also overly idealistic and idiosyncratic. Agrarian and maritime are relative terms. As modern China has accepted many Western views, matters at present are obviously not entirely conducted according to concepts of agrarian civilizations; nor are the majority of Western countries necessarily textbook maritime nations. With the exception of Great Britain, which may be described as a purely maritime nation, even the United States has very strong continental cultural connections. However, these comparisons still have key practical significance. To this day, even as China observes, understands and transforms the world, its conceptions of agrarian civilizations or the perspectives and influences of continental culture still by far outweigh those of maritime civilizations. The opposite is true for Britain, the United States and other Western countries. Overall, China remains a country where mentalities of continental culture and agrarian civilizations reigns supreme, whereas Britain, the United States and the remainder of the Western world, remain for the most part countries dominated by a maritime civilizational outlook. The purpose of such a comparison is not in fact to determine whether agrarian or maritime civilizations are superior, but to better understand oneself, comprehend others and more effectively integrate into the world. The Chinese civilization is the epitome of an agrarian civilization. Its dialectical understanding of concepts such as disputes and pursuits of peace and harmony will be inherited and promoted if well organized, strongly contrasting with shortcomings in the West’s path and current international system.11 However, reviving the Chinese civilization certainly does not imply suffering delusions of grandeur or resting on one’s laurels. Regardless of the

Tridents beyond armed force  235 criteria in question, whether the accumulation of maritime tradition and culture, or awareness and experience at sea, there remains an enormous gap between China and Western countries like Britain and the United States. In practical maritime affairs, especially in diplomacy, China trails maritime civilizations by a vast distance. China has always persevered with integration into the current international system, in hopes of reform rather than to start from scratch and to overthrow the entire international order. Furthermore, as China has already decided to build its maritime power, it not only need to make strides toward the seas from the continent in terms of action, but also it must progress from an agrarian civilization to a maritime civilization in terms of its mindset and beliefs. In this process, diplomacy policy will be the first to undergo a series of transitions. China must learn from Britain, the United States and other Western countries to be open, confident and enterprising; learn how to rationally confront and manage conflicts by standing firm on national interests; become familiar with the spirit of the contract, skillfully use treaty systems and rules; and clearly define and develop relations with countries around the world.

Efforts for international ‘legitimacy’ and maritime discourse power Humans are gregarious creatures. An individual’s or a group’s political actions must all be acknowledged or recognized by others. The construction of a maritime power is no exception. Not only does it require considerable strength, but it also demands a certain degree of international legitimacy and recognition from the international community. ‘Legitimacy’ is a very important concept in political science and politics in practice. In the political sense, legitimacy is defined as the extent to which the wider public accepts a certain regime or power. Legitimacy does not in fact simply refer to the principle of legality in law, for it also has underlying implications regarding the public’s recognition of and respect for authority, regardless of whether the behavior of this authority complies with existing legal rulings. The international community is in a state of anarchy and disorder, lacking a central authority. A country may obey or recognize other countries due to power, interests, or ideology. Countries with superior strength can rely completely on hard power to build a cut-throat imperial order. For instance, countries either capitulated against or were decimated when facing the Mongol Empire, founded by Genghis Khan. Other hegemonic countries with weaker military strength must temper justice with mercy in order to win the support and docility of other countries, on the one hand practicing deterrence, while on the other hand presenting them with interests and benefits; a country with relatively power strength depends more on transfer of interests and ideological inducement. After the end of the Cold War, large-scale applications of military power are greatly restricted and a trend

236  Tridents beyond armed force of decentralization is emerging in developments of power. Not only is the pattern of international power becoming multipolarized, but the power of sovereign states is being eroded by non-sovereign actors. In this situation, the construction of imperial orders and hegemonic orders becomes increasingly unfeasible. It is even difficult for the United States, a superpower, to act independently with no regard for others. For any country, the majority of its actions must receive the international community’s recognition. Thus, the matter of international legitimacy has become a recent subject of vital importance. Legitimacy is not the same as justice. It is not awarded by the UN or the International Court of Justice. It is dynamic and must be striven for individually. ‘Whosoever can amass greater legitimacy, will receive comparatively more support from the international community.’ Whoever has power over codes of conduct, principles and the right to express and explain international trends has greater legitimacy. Strength is the foundation of legitimacy, upon which major powers intervene in international affairs, but is undoubtedly not the only condition required. Aside from armed deterrence and allocation of benefits, guidance of ideas is also of critical importance. Guiding ideas, also known as mastering the rules of the game, is in reality the issue of international discourse power. One’s ideas, proposals and rhetoric should be able to attract and win over other parties. It is inevitably necessary to mention international discourse power when discussing international legitimacy. At present, various actors, including sovereign states, multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations, seek discourse power as the main objective of contention in international public opinion. In addition, they actively demand that their specific involvement in that international discourse be consolidated as part of the rules of the game, and commonly accepted by the international community. To some extent, international politics has progressively become ‘the politics of discourse.’12 Discourse is power, as power is ingrained in language. Discourse power does not refer to whether one has the right to speak, but the application and expression of power through language. World history was entering the great divergence around the year 1500, as Europe and the United States rapidly overtook the rest of the world, including China and other civilizations, by virtue of large-scale maritime exploration and the Industrial Revolution. As European and American countries competed over the seas, they gradually promoted the formation of the international order and world system, inaugurated with the Peace of Westphalia (1648). In almost 400 years of history, Europe and the United States have virtually monopolized the discourse of maritime power. They relentlessly mass produce political and economic jargon and statements on sea power, oceanic activities, maritime law and maritime policy, which are then carried to all countries worldwide. They coerced all countries to accept such discourse, and in doing so devised rules of the game that favored maritime activities of Europe and the United States. Almost all civilizations

Tridents beyond armed force  237 worldwide have been yoked into Europe’s and the United States’ track and have no choice but to accept rules of the game that they formulated. All non-­ Western countries were in a passive and mute state. China, as a non-Western country, was naturally placed in an acquiescent and voiceless position in the system of maritime discourse.13 Modern China has remained near silent on the process of constructing a maritime order and has even suffered greatly as a result. China had long been afflicted by poverty and fragility, with simply no strength to spare to advance toward the sea. In an era when warships dominated above all else, China had no power to interfere in any major maritime issues. After the end of the Second World War, economic globalization and interdependence flourished, as the world entered an environment of overall peace and stability. Although regional wars continued to occur, no largescale wars between maritime powers ensued. With the rising tide of global decolonization and resurgence of developing countries, the dominance of hegemons and superpowers in maritime affairs was somewhat diluted. The international maritime order gradually progressed in the direction of justice and fairness, while a series of maritime norms and mechanisms were eventually formed on the basis of negotiations and consultations. Among these, the negotiations and signature of UNCLOS represent a crucial triumph for a large number of developing countries in the construction of a new international maritime order. Although military strength at sea remains the bedrock and support upon which sovereign countries engage in maritime affairs, diplomatic capabilities and experience in international law are also becoming increasingly important. In the process of building a new international maritime order, a number of small coastal states have played a major role and wielded influence incommensurate with their national strength. Unfortunately, due to a lack of strategic foresight and inadequacies in experience, China has not sufficiently seized this critical juncture to adjust the maritime order, forfeiting an opportunity to peacefully pursue more power in maritime discourser. Although China has actively participated in negotiations, it was only as a bystander. China more commonly echoed views of developing countries, demarcating lines according to ideology, without significant considerations on the impacts of UNCLOS system for China and the world. The celebrated diplomat Ling Qing, who participated in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, remarks in his memoirs that support of the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone is linked to the resistance against hegemony. At that time, as China was establishing diplomatic relations with countries in Latin America, all committed to a clear position on the issue. I myself also believe that support should be an immutable matter of principle.14 In reality, the advantages of the 200-mile EEZ system far outweigh the disadvantages for a country such as China, with its semi-unfavorable maritime

238  Tridents beyond armed force geographic conditions. The rapid intensification of disputes over delimitations in the East China Sea and the South China Sea is also due to none other than the signature and implementation of UNCLOS. Even today, as China advances toward the sea in earnest and on a grand scale, it finds itself positioned in a multifaceted embarrassing situation of insufficient strength, unfavorable geography, and scant international discourse power. Due to combined disruption in the distribution of power, latecomers’ disadvantages, the geopolitical environment, maritime disputes and various other factors, the building of China’s maritime power is currently encountering an enormous ‘legitimacy’ crisis. The United States attempts to contain China as it turns itself into a maritime power, while countries such as Japan, India and Russia remain vigilant and even seek checks and balances against it, and small- and medium-sized countries in the vicinity are in a state of collective anxiety and fear. Very few countries will be happy to witness China’s successes. While China has not yet achieved its potential strength at sea, the China threat theory has already spread far and wide. As for China’s ‘failure to comply with international law,’ ‘use of armed force to change the regional status quo,’ ‘intent to become the maritime hegemon’ such negative news reports have engulfed major global media outlets. On the part of China’s sea power, the international community is clearly not yet prepared to accept a strong Chinese navy, nor is it ready to acknowledge the scope of China’s core maritime interests and indispensable security borders. It does not even show the respect for China’s basic maritime economic rights and interests as required. China’s military modernization and actions to safeguard maritime interests have often served as an excuse for certain countries to attack China on the international stage. The international ‘legitimacy’ crisis is a hurdle that China’s maritime power has no choice but to overcome in its development. To resolve this predicament, strategic clarification is perhaps imperative. It first requires clarification of China’s claims and strategic goals. What are China’s specific objectives as a maritime power and how will China fulfill them? What kind of maritime order does China endorse, and how will China wield its international influence? How to improve communication with other international actors, demonstrate China’s objectives of developing military strength and express its intentions in applying of military power is the other major issue in the accumulation of international legitimacy. It is important to understand ‘what will China do and in what manner’ rather than ‘what does China have.’ There are extremely complicated reasons as to why there is no international consensus on China’s construction of a maritime power. For some countries, this includes needs in power struggles, factors stemming from suppression of China in moral and public opinion and also indeed misunderstandings due to barriers in communication. There also indeed exist misunderstandings as a result of obstacles in communication. With regard to the former, China must fight with determination and resolve, whereas for the latter, it unquestionably needs to reflect

Tridents beyond armed force  239 upon and improve its diplomatic thinking, as well as approaches to public opinion and propaganda. For instance, China has always adhered to international law and has never impeded freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, there is widespread concern from the international community regarding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. This is related both to the deception, prevarications and deliberately tarnishing the image of China from countries such as the United States, Vietnam and the Philippines, and is influenced by the nebulous nature of China’s strategy and position on the South China Sea. In view of this, Chinese policy ought to be clearer, more open, and more nuanced. Greater clarity means that China needs clear and viable design at the highest level in order to promote correct understanding and expectations domestically and overseas. The negative effects of maintaining ambiguous policies were not yet evident when China’s military strength and capacity for economic development were relatively limited. Today, as China’s diverse strengths continue to rapidly flourish, there is ever greater urgency for a clearer strategy, so as to domestically consolidate policy comprehension and integrate measures and resources, while internationally stabilizing other parties’ behavior expectations on China, and reducing external misconceptions and erroneous judgments. What are the objectives of China’s maritime strategy and policies? How will it apply its power pursue these goals? What are China’s positions on and justifications for disputes? A plethora of other such issues need to be systematically elaborated upon and clarified. For instance, a policy white paper or strategic document on the South China Sea could be published to codify and perpetuate one’s claims through various mechanisms for bilateral dialogue, multilateral platforms within the ASEAN framework, in addition to other international arenas. More openness indicates that China ought to behave as a major power and open its doors to examine issues and discuss cooperation with various parties. Take the South China Sea for example, first and foremost, it is necessary to distinguish island sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes from non-dispute matters, such as freedom of navigation and regional security. The two types of affairs can then be treated separately from one another: on non-dispute matters, China can conduct consultations with any country or organization at any time and place and be more proactive in the establishment of relevant international mechanisms. China can also engage more extensively in various military exercises, taking the initiative to cooperate with relevant parties in law enforcement, convoy efforts, disaster relief and other fields, as well as making greater contributions. On disputed issues, China should welcome all rational dialogue and communication while resolutely opposing multilateralism and internationalization. Whether it is regarding codes of conduct in the South China Sea, or various proposals to ‘freeze’ issues as suggested by countries such as the United States and the Philippines, China can initiate negotiations or communications with relevant parties.

240  Tridents beyond armed force Greater nuance and sensitivity means that China still needs to enhance its communication skills on the operational level of diplomacy, so that the international community may feel more comfortable about China. China’s rapid ascent will inevitably increase pressure upon neighboring countries, whose fear of China and unwarranted interpretations of Chinese ‘strength’ reflect routine patterns in international relations. Furthermore, it is normal for some countries to express concern about China’s safeguarding of its rights. It is imperative that China’s policymaking individuals and departments understand and attach great importance to the psychology of the weak, who should not be perceived purely as unreasonable and vexatious. Even on matters that engender conflicting views and irreconcilable positions, it is necessary to maintain calm and rationality. One must suppress thunderous outbursts of wrath and not casually label others as ‘friend or foe.’ China not only needs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its external communication, clearly articulating its positions and opinions to the outside world, but also listen diligently and patiently to the views and demands of all sides involved, truly comprehending the meanings and subtleties behind the rhetoric of other parties. There ought to be more indepth communication and interaction, and less senseless criticism and fewer accusations. Clarity furthermore requires that China promotes the world maritime order toward the direction of lesser ambiguity and lesser equivocality by influencing and reshaping international norms. With regard to the accusation of outsiders, if China were to adopt a policy of blind circumvention and accommodation, this will objectively reinforce other countries’ emphasis on their own core interests and select international norms. In the long run, this may incite greater resistance against China’s rise. China cannot become ensnared in the externally manufactured logic of constantly explaining to the outside world that ‘we do not possess this’ and ‘we are peace-loving.’ Instead, China needs to strengthen its rhetoric against the outside world, emphasizing the logic of ‘why China should be able to possess this.’ China needs most to consider how to persuade foreign countries to accept its goals by applying norms and rules that are generally accepted by their domestic political forces. At the same time, no matter whether a country’s core security interests, or the norms and rules it advocates, they all have a certain degree of stability and are simultaneously positioned in a process of dynamic development. Legitimization strategies therefore encompass both reinforcement of interaction and communication, reorienting countries’ interests toward cooperation rather than conflict with those of China and the creation of new norms or refinement of existing norms, dovetailing them with Chinese interests. In addition, while promoting clarity, it is necessary to enhance how international legitimacy is presented. First, China needs to properly uphold and publicize its overall national strategy of peaceful development. Developing or rising peacefully does not in fact imply that China renounces the

Tridents beyond armed force  241 use of force, but rather that it will practice restraint and refrain from using armed force as the primary method of its development and rise. China’s emergence is for the most part a peaceful process. China must apply traditional force with caution and prudence, and furthermore actively contribute public goods to the international community. It should continue to pursue a policy of good neighborliness, without resorting to threats of armed force and without relying on military measures as the main means of resolving territorial sovereignty issues and maritime delimitation disputes between China and its neighboring countries. Even in times of crisis, when there is little choice except to enforce military measures, restrictions must be imposed. China ought to boost its contributions of global public goods for international security, making this one of the most important fields in the way its military power is applied. As described above, all countries are paying increasing attention to non-warfare applications of military power. Owing to constraints from ­China’s development environment and chosen developmental path, it is difficult to imagine the large-scale application of military power in traditional security issues, including the capture of islands and reefs, control of waters and the annihilation of foreign forces. However, there remain bright prospects for China’s maritime forces in nontraditional security domains, such as combating piracy at sea, opposing international terrorism, promoting nonproliferation, maintaining security on the high seas, and contributing to maritime disaster relief. China’s demonstration of restraint in traditional security fields and active participation in matters concerning international public security will be of benefit in rectifying the international community’s negative perceptions of the Chinese military forces. With regard to publicizing its grand strategy of peaceful development, in future China ought to pay greater attention to its own developmental path and the domestic situation. China has focused on making highly methodical and extremely detailed explanations of times condition, China’s peace-­ loving traditional culture, and other factors while propagating the path to peaceful development. In 2011, the Chinese government issued a white paper titled ‘China’s Peaceful Development,’ which demonstrated China’s perspective and its determination to take the peaceful road to development. This white paper specified that ‘Taking the peaceful road to development has rich historical roots and cultural foundations in China, embodying a sincere desire and unremitting quest of the Chinese people.’15 This declaration is an excellent demonstration to the outside world of China’s commitment to peaceful development, but undoubtedly such a statement would not be enough to convince the international community. Peaceful development is not so much an international strategy as a domestic strategy, which is often a reflection of a country’s domestic politics. Therefore the outside world often pays greater attention to China’s economic transitions, political reform and other domestic development issues. The simple truth is that if a country’s domestic political and economic development

242  Tridents beyond armed force model is sustainable and its developmental path remains peaceful and harmonious overall, it will not have any substantial incentive or desire for overseas expansion. Since its reform and opening up, China has accomplished spectacular feats in its development. How is it possible that China has performed such miracles under the existing international system? Analyzing such issues from the perspective of China’s own developmental path would provide more compelling answers. Actively formulating a tactic of ‘honoring the king, expelling barbarians’ in the modern era has been the preferred international legitimacy strategy for countries seeking hegemony or dominance since ancient times. ‘King’ herein indicates universally acknowledged and generally accepted forms of international conduct, which function as norms and standards, whereas ‘barbarians’ broadly refer to major threats to the international community. For the purpose of upholding international integrity and justice, China ought to assume greater responsibility and play a more prominent role wherever possible in response to regional security threats and global issues. At the same time, international action should center less on core interests and concentrate more on common interests, fixate less on self-interest and focus more on international justice. It is important to understand that international political culture has clearly advanced and that no single country can unabashedly pursue its national interests in today’s society, with the United States being no exception. All diplomatic actions, especially military operations, must take into account international public opinion, or that is to say, international popular views. Of course, practical action and endeavors alone are far from sufficient, as corresponding presentation is also of utmost importance. A successful propaganda strategy is one that intrinsically fuses the national interests it strives toward with the concerns of international audiences, amply reflecting new trends and movements. One example of how legitimacy was successfully presented was when the United States skillfully combined the fight against global terrorism with its military strategy of advancing into Central Asia during the war in Afghanistan, winning the support of almost all actors worldwide. A less successful instance of how legitimacy was presented was when the United States, once again, linked defense against mass destruction weapons with its desire to occupy and dominate Iraq. Although the United States was able to gather support and corral troops from certain countries, most countries, including France, Germany, China and Russia, all decided to oppose its actions. This is due to the international community’s lack of conviction that Saddam Hussein’s regime possessed mass destruction weapons and in the belief that the United States was waging war in pursuit of hegemony. The crisis of US legitimacy during the war in Iraq war even had impacts on the world’s general perception of US hegemony, seriously affecting the soft power that the United States prides itself upon. China is in the shadow of US containment measures, beset by numerous regional security difficulties and politically alienated from the Western

Tridents beyond armed force  243 countries that dominate the international order. China’s pursuit of legitimacy in its military operations thus involves arduous tasks and faces an uphill journey. As a consequence, China must attach greater importance to the presentation of international legitimacy in its military activities. It is necessary to garner, accumulate and create new resources for legitimacy during peacetime, while not only paying close attention to each country’s foreign policy and military strategy, but also augmenting the understanding of and research into these countries’ domestic socio-political circumstances and ideological inclinations, in addition to religious affairs and other situations. In order to swiftly integrate a range of resources, as well as optimize and improve methods used in propaganda and communication, China needs not only to bolster military diplomacy and improve means of communication in the course of action, but also to robustly advance newly emerging channels of communication and modes of expression, such as social media. In terms of style and substance, China must pay greater heed to the international community’s mindset and sentiment, communicating with others, while volunteering more information and details in expressing views and positions.

The essence of peacefully winning the maritime contest As the probability of large-scale battles at sea between major powers becomes extremely remote, the main functions of armed force and military power have focused on deterrence. As an era of overall peace at sea dawns, this trident, which embodies development and management of the oceans, will play an ever more important role in the process of constructing a maritime power. The oceans contain close to 70 percent of the Earth’s space and natural resources and represent humanity’s last beacon of wonder and hope. The 21st century is hailed as the ‘ocean-century,’ as the marine economy is currently fully entering the age of marine industrialization from its state of natural economy, the comprehensive and three-dimensional development of marine space is the trend of the times. Whosoever has the strongest development and management capabilities has the greatest likelihood of emerging victorious in this new maritime race. At present, China’s marine economy accounts for approximately 10 percent of its total GDP, which is far lower than respective figures in traditional maritime powers such as the United States and Japan16; science and technology, contribute merely 35 percent to China’s marine economy, whereas this figure reaches more than 50 percent in the United States and Japan. It can be stated that regardless of whether in terms of quantity or quality, there remains a considerable gap between China and the world’s marine economic powers. If we take growth rates into consideration, the outlook is even less optimistic. From ‘General Operations of the Marine Economy,’ issued annually by the State Oceanic Administration, growth rates in the Chinese marine economy are not in fact high, not even exceeding the rate of GDP growth in some years.

244  Tridents beyond armed force With regard to measuring indicators of development and management, in addition to potential for peaceful competition at sea, one may say to each his own personal opinions and preferences. However, management expertise, technological and scientific capability, and actual maritime space occupied are indisputably the three most crucial core aspects of competition. If China wishes to triumph in this peaceful contest, it must be willing to go the extra mile on these three areas. First of all is management expertise. Development and management of the oceans are increasingly becoming an extremely complex and professional enterprise, involving the humanities, social sciences, agricultural studies, engineering, medicine and almost all fields of science, in addition to the participation of a significant number of individuals, corporations, official institutions and other actors. As of 2016, in China, 36.24 million people were employed in ocean-related industries nationwide and the value of the total marine output reached RMB 7050.7 billion, accounting for 9.5 percent of total gross national product.17 The enormity of this scale and high degree of professionalism prominently highlight the importance of integrated management. Therefore, in peaceful maritime contests, all countries must compete first and foremost on the basis of management capability. As mankind turns increasingly toward the seas, and with the extensive application of UNCLOS, all coastal states will face management predicaments of differing severities. Beginning in the mid-1990s, major coastal states such as Canada, the United States, Japan, Vietnam, Russia, India and South Korea all introduced laws of the sea and comprehensive maritime strategies, in order to further improve policy and regulations, enhance overall maritime management and maximize efficiency. The Canadian government published and implemented its Law of the Sea in as early as 1997, thus making Canada the first country in the world to establish legislation on comprehensive maritime management. In July 2000, The US Congress enacted the Oceans Act of 2000 (known in full as An Act to Establish a Commission on Ocean Policy and for Other Purposes), which offered legal safeguards for the US adoption of maritime policy in the new century. Under this act, the US Commission on Ocean Policy officially submitted a policy report, titled ‘An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century,’ to the President and to Congress on the 20 September 2004. The report, which specifically recommends strengthening ‘coastal and watershed management activities, and growing efforts to link these two approaches’ and introducing the new concept of ‘ecosystem-based management,’ vastly enriches connotations of integrated maritime management. Furthermore, on 17 December, President George W. Bush presented the US Ocean Action Plan to Congress, proposing concrete measures to execute ‘An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century.’ In 2007, the Japanese parliament passed The Basic Act on Ocean Policy and promulgated its ‘Oceanic State’ strategy. Shortly thereafter, Japan announced a series of legislation, regulations and plans in support of The Basic Act on Ocean Policy, fully implementing maritime strategies and policies

Tridents beyond armed force  245 while bolstering its competitiveness at sea. In that same year, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam also published its ‘Maritime Strategy towards the Year 2020,’ which clearly introduced the strategic goal of building maritime power. In May 2012, Vietnam issued its Law of the Sea, expediting its previously established maritime strategy. China has clearly lagged behind on this front. Presently, it is of utmost importance to formulate a cohesive and coordinated national maritime development strategy, a comprehensive system of maritime laws and regulations, and a complete system of strategic planning, zoning, policies and guidelines for development at sea. The current priority ought to be the enactment of a Chinese Ocean Basic Law and the refinement of maritime legal systems. The Ocean Basic Law should reflect the national position on maritime issues in addition to its guiding principles and fundamental strategies with regard to operations at sea. The Ocean Basic Law occupies a dominant position and takes precedence above lex specialis in the maritime legal system. This is the legal basis upon which China administers maritime affairs domestically and safeguards its rights and interests internationally. Along with the establishment of regulations, various coastal states have simultaneously stepped up institutional restructuring of ocean-related departments and additionally established mechanisms for integrated maritime management. In December 2004, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13366, establishing the Committee on Ocean Policy as a part of the Council on Environmental Quality to coordinate ocean-related activities of various US departments and agencies, as well as assume overall responsibility for the execution of US maritime policy. In 2010, President Obama signed an Executive Order on ‘Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes,’ dissolving the Committee on Ocean Policy founded in 2004, while creating the cabinet-level National Ocean Council. Directly subordinate to the Executive Office of the President, the National Ocean Council is responsible for directing and coordinating all ocean-related tasks of federal departments, in order to implement national maritime policy in a pragmatic and sensible manner. In January 2001, the government of Japan initiated large-scale reforms to downsize its executive branch. Following restructuring and reorganization of ocean-related departments and offices, responsibility for the management of maritime affairs lies mainly with eight administrative agencies, namely, the Cabinet Office; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; Ministry of the Environment; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of Defense. The Department for Comprehensive Ocean Policy, established in accordance with The Basic Act on Ocean Policy, is the leading agency in Japan’s ‘state maritime governance,’ overseen by Prime Minister and his Cabinet Office. The Minister of State for Ocean

246  Tridents beyond armed force Policy is responsible for this department, who is also the Minister of Land, Transport and Communications, while remaining members concurrently are appointed by relevant state ministers. Russia also places considerable emphasis on comprehensive management of the oceans. The integrated maritime model it pioneered was the first of its kind worldwide, established almost 10 years prior to that of the United States. The Marine Board under the Government of the Russian Federation, established on 1 September 2001 with the approval of the Russian government, is the most powerful institution for integrated maritime management in Russia. As a permanent governing body, its main responsibilities are to coordinate all maritime affairs of federal administrative bodies and scientific organizations, including all research and development activities in oceans worldwide and in the polar regions. From reforms to maritime management mechanisms in the United States, Japan, Russia and other maritime powers, it is clear to see that every coastal state follows an essentially similar track in integrating their institutions and improving their efficiency, achieving the same results through different methods. First there is the establishment of a comprehensive maritime governance institution at the national level, responsible for drafting policy and overall planning, in addition to integrating the activities of ocean-related departments and enhancing overall coordination; second is the consolidation of existing ocean-related departments, curtailment of institutions, clarification of responsibilities and improvement of efficiency in implementation. Since 2012, China has established the Central Leading Group for Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests in addition to its Office (abbreviated as the ‘Central Maritime Rights Office’),18 founded the National Ocean Council, reformed and strengthened the Coast Guard, split and reorganized the relevant functions of the State Oceanic Administration.19 Among these organizations, the Central Maritime Rights Office belonging to Central Foreign Affairs Committee is an executive coordination mechanism for the safeguard of maritime rights and interests, specifically responsible for coordinating Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Ecological Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese military and other ocean-related departments to integrate the management of maritime rights, interests and other issues. Ministry of Natural Resources and Ministry of Ecological Environment represent SOA to supervise the use of seas, manage the protection of marine environments, safeguard maritime rights and interests in accordance with the law and organize maritime scientific and technological research. At present, it would appear that the Central Maritime Rights Office specializes in coordinating operations to uphold rights and devising maritime strategy, while the National Ocean Council and Ministry of Natural Resources focus on development and management of the seas as a whole. It should be pointed out that China’s reform of maritime related institutions is still in exploratory and far from completed, and there would be some major adjustments in the future.

Tridents beyond armed force  247 Second, maritime powers compete on the basis of marine scientific research capabilities. Science and technology are the primary driving forces of productivity, while for all countries, advancements in marine science and technology are crucial and play a decisive role in the maritime contest. Marine science and technology, already at the forefront of global technological rivalries, are becoming an increasingly important part of national maritime development, as, one after another, countries draft scientific marine strategies and substantially boost investment in research, so as to seize a commanding position in science and technology. In view of China’s sizeable population, comparatively limited maritime space, and onerous developmental pressures, any rapid and healthy development in China’s marine economy must rely on substantial advancements in maritime technological capability, increasing efficiency in the use of resources and space through technological progress. In fact, marine technological strategy is both the forerunner and the cornerstone of maritime strategy for various global maritime powers. The United States, Great Britain, Japan and other maritime powers began work on researching and planning national marine technological policy in as early as the 1960s, issuing multiple strategy and policy documents on marine science and technology. In contrast, it was not until 2006 that China drafted its first national level planning document, namely ‘An Outline of Plans for the Development of Marine Science and Technology as part of the National 11th Five-Year Plan.’ In terms of investment in marine research and exploration, although there have been numerous special initiatives in recent years to promote the development of marine science and technology, overall investment nonetheless still lags far behind that of the world’s maritime powers. Furthermore, as efficiency in scientific research remains relatively low in China on the whole, there remains an enormous difference in the overall sophistication of China’s marine technologies and that of the United States, Japan and other major maritime powers, with China lagging behind by 10–15 years. Due precisely to its underdevelopment of marine science and technology, China is vulnerable in areas such as marine research, surveillance and protection of the marine environment, marine economic industrialization, while it is not compatible with the reality of safeguarding maritime rights and developing the marine economy. During international joint search and rescue operations for MH370 in 2014, although China made huge contributions, equivalent to almost half of total international investment, its input was mediocre on a technological level. All major discoveries were made by the United States, Great Britain and other countries, while key processes depended entirely on Western technology. Moreover, domestically produced Chinese equipment was humbled by advanced foreign equipment, once again exposing shortcomings in the development of China’s marine economy. For breakthroughs in the realm of maritime technology, increases in investment are essential, but even more important are improvements in the

248  Tridents beyond armed force efficiency of scientific research. On the one hand, the government ought to increase its financial investment, so that investment in maritime scientific research and technological development may occupy an appropriate proportion of investment in the overall marine economy and accommodate the needs of marine economic development. Government investment mainly centers on more sophisticated, higher risk, basic theoretical research and exploration projects conducted over long periods of time. On the other hand, the state ought to boost social investment in maritime technology, devoting social capital to relatively more practical scientific developments and technological innovations, using policies as guidance, financial leverage as encouragement and other measures to promote greater investment of social capital in maritime science and technology. While financial investment at the state and all governmental levels is of course important, research endeavors of private enterprises, at whose core is economic efficiency, are more critical. When boosting investment, the state moreover must at the same time focus on fostering a supportive environment for enterprises to conduct scientific research in terms of policy and management. Maritime powers depend on the support of competitive industries. China should concentrate its efforts on becoming a world leader in numerous marine economic industries. It should focus on the integrated and three-­ dimensional utilization of coastal areas, endeavoring to establish industries like pharmaceuticals based on marine organisms, equipment manufacturing, coastal tourism and offshore aquaculture, striving to advance technology in various major traditional industries, using scientific and technological innovations to improve the efficiency of space utilization. In deep-sea areas and the open oceans, China should particularly boost research investment spending on deep sea exploration, study of marine biology, maritime surveillance, remote sensing at sea and other fields; improve technology and equipment used in deep-sea exploration, including deep water submersible technologies, comprehensive technologies used in the search for offshore natural gas hydrates and those of offshore oil and gas platforms, taking the initiative to explore new domains in both familiar and unfamiliar maritime spaces. Furthermore, as large quantities of manganese nodules, sulfide ore and resources are present on seabed ‘areas,’ China must also aim at advancing its technologies in deep-sea exploration, mineral extraction, among other fields of scientific research. World-class maritime equipment forms the basis upon which humans are able to command the seas. This is particularly true for deep-sea drilling and extraction, in addition to exploration in the open oceans and polar regions. China is known across the world for its manufacturing and has an extensive oceangoing shipbuilding industry with excess production capacity. However, from onshore laboratories to scientific trials at sea, 90 percent of important equipment components need to be imported. In consideration of this, China needs to accelerate the creation of advanced products in a number of industries, including deep-submergence vehicles, deep-sea

Tridents beyond armed force  249 drilling vessels, offshore drilling systems, dynamic positioning systems, deep-sea mooring systems, high-performance power generators on offshore platforms, large offshore cranes, jack-up rigs and underwater production systems; have the capability to provide deep-sea pipeline and standpipe systems, as well as independently design and manufacture maritime surveillance facilities, integrated offshore platforms for observation, underwater apparatus, submersible operational equipment and transferable basic components for deep-sea use. Finally, space is essential for any form of human activity. As a maritime power rises, it will naturally flourish over vast maritime expanses. Although China does not seek to rise by means of war, this does not imply that China will not actively expand its maritime space. In this regard, it is necessary to integrate national strategic planning with comprehensive political, diplomatic, economic, military and other measures to safeguard and expand available maritime spaces. This includes both profiting from existing assets and seeking new additions, by increasing the efficiency of maritime spaces, pursuing expansion, in addition to searching for new and attainable spaces. First, China must fully and rationally make use of its jurisdictional sea. UNCLOS confers 300 square kilometers of waters to China, upon which rests the foundation of China’s maritime power. Only with correct maintenance, management and administration of this comparatively meager maritime space will it be possible for China to realize its potential as a maritime power. As China’s marine economy has, as a whole, long developed in a laissez-fare and predatory environment, it has a low capacity for sustainable development and was a later-starter. Moreover it was small in scale, had little exposure to market forces and the majority of its industries are still at the early stages of development. In addition, there is little regulation, coordination and supervision of China’s maritime development activities. Backward conceptions of management and a laissez-faire development model have resulted in an ever more severe environmental burden. There is extensive pollution in coastal waters of the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea, while algal blooms are frequent occurrences and degradation of the marine ecological environment has progressively become one of the major factors restricting sustainable marine economic development. The situation in the prevention and alleviation of maritime disasters is likewise rather grim. In consideration of severe environmental deterioration in coastal areas, China needs to redouble its environmental protection efforts, steadfastly fortify management and control of ­environmental pollution, and furthermore phase out unsustainable industries. Only in doing so may China take advantage of current assets, making full sustainable use of maritime spaces within the bounds of our sovereign rights and interests. Second, China ought to actively participate in development and exploitation of the high seas, seabed ‘areas’ and other public maritime spaces. Over 60 percent of the world’s seas and oceans is categorized as public maritime

250  Tridents beyond armed force space and belongs to all of humanity. In comparison, China’s own maritime spaces are comparatively limited and its per capita area extremely small. It is therefore urgent that China moves from geographically unfavorable coastal waters and regional seas toward extensive deep seas and boundless open oceans. As the world’s most populous country, China should authoritatively and effectively voice its own positions on rules surrounding the management, utilization and development of oceans worldwide, gaining its rightful place in the future of global maritime management with commensurate power. At the same time, China must continue to support scientific investigation in the polar regions and encourage maritime scientific research using a multitude of measures to conduct investigation into and exploration of strategic resources on international seabed areas, expedite applications for resources in international seabed ‘areas’ and accelerate international cooperation. China needs to gain priority development rights of strategic resources in these ‘areas’ through diverse measures and occupy a favorable position in the scramble for deep sea resources and in the international maritime contest. Third, China needs to engage in international cooperation with all countries, so as to expand access to other countries’ maritime spaces. There is already considerable internationalization in production, marketing, consumption and other aspects of the marine economy. In the case of marine fisheries, the market for different fish species and seafood products has steadily globalized. More than 75 percent of the world’s total seafood harvest is not sold or consumed in countries in which these fish are caught. Another example of an ambitious undertaking demanding numerous factors of production intensive in human capital, financial resources and technology is the exploitation of seabed resources, particularly in deep-sea areas. All coastal states have their advantages and disadvantages and must count on international networks to optimize the allocation of factors of production worldwide. China commands unique comparative advantages in aspects such as labor, capital and diplomacy, while nevertheless falters in marine science, technology and expertise, among other areas. In comparison with the world’s most advanced countries, China trails significantly in areas such as the research, development and manufacturing of deep-water drilling equipment and reserves of talent and expertise. However, China has begun to rapidly catch up to its competitors, believing that it will also become a dominant forerunner in certain technological fields and that furthermore it is only a question of time before technology and industries are exported on a large scale. China should actively pursue cooperation with various coastal states worldwide, so as to cultivate expansive spaces for development by taking advantage of labor, capital, technology and other factors of production. The Chinese people have always been an outstanding contender in peaceful competition. With less than 7 percent of global arable land, Ancient China once supported over a third of the world population and accumulated enormous wealth, while nurturing and advancing the unbroken

Tridents beyond armed force  251 Chinese civilization. Since reform and opening up, the Chinese people are once again demonstrating their wisdom to the outside world with regard to peaceful development and peaceful competition, as China has neither colonized nor invaded foreign countries. In the short span of just over 40 years, China has become the world’s second largest economic power through large-scale production and trade, and furthermore will soon become the world’s leading economy. Learning from history and looking to the future, we have reason to hope that China will surely fulfill yet another miracle at sea. On the basis of its people’s wisdom and diligence, so long as China familiarizes itself with the rules of the maritime order and establishes sound market mechanisms in addition to pertinent scientific research institutions, it will emerge as a tour de force in this peaceful maritime race.

Notes 1 In Greek mythology, a “trident” was originally the weapon of Poseidon, god of the sea. It is similar in shape to a long-handled fishing fork, with a long middle blade and shorter blades on either side; in literature on maritime strategy, it is used as a metaphor as a tool or important means to capture sea power. 2 G. W. F. Hegel, translated by Wang Zoushi, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2001), p. 93. 3 Yang Jinsen, A Brief History in the Rise and Fall of Maritime Powers (Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2007), pp. 9–10. 4 Elmer Belmont Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History (Beijing: Chinese People’s Liberation Army Press, 1992), p. 1. 5 Feng Youlan, A Brief History of Chinese Philosophy (Tianjin: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2007), p. 25. 6 Liang Shuming, The Fate of Chinese Culture (Beijing: Citic Press, 2013), p. 108. 7 Guo Shuyong, “The Cultural Tradition and Diplomatic Philosophy of Chinese Strategy,” in Guo Shuyong, ed., Strategic Speeches (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), p. 209. 8 For dialogue between Scowcroft and Brzezinski, refer to Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2009), p. 96 9 Zhou Fangyin, “China’s World Order and International Responsibilities,” International Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011, p. 36. 10 Henry John Temple, Speech to the House of Commons, 1 March 1848, ht t p s://ap i.p a rl i a m e nt .u k / h i s t or i c - h a n s a r d /c o m mo n s /18 4 8/ m a r/01/ treaty-of-adrianople-charges-against 11 For more on the essence of Chinese civilization or Huaxia civilization, refer to Ye Zicheng and Long Quanlin, Huaxia Doctrine: 500 Years of Wisdom of the Huaxia System (Beijing: People’s Press, 2013). 12 Sun Xuefeng, ed., Strategic Legitimization and the Rise of Great Powers (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), p. 141. 13 Zhang Ersheng et al., “The Weakness of Maritime Discourse and Strategy of China’s Maritime Power,” World Economic and Political Forum, No. 2, 2014, p. 137. 14 Ling Qing, From Yan’an to the United Nations: The Diplomatic Memoirs of Ling Qing (Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 2008). 15 Information Office of the State Council (PRC), China Issues White Paper on Peaceful Development, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceph/eng/zt/peace/t895028.htm

252  Tridents beyond armed force 16 It should be noted that there are at least two types of statistical method for marine economy. If using Chinese relatively broad statistical criterion on marine economy in US and Japan, the proportion would be approaching 50 percent. 17 The State Oceanic Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 2017 Statistics Bulletin on the Chinese Marine Economy, www.soa.gov.cn/xw/hyyw_90/ 201712/t20171226_59745.html 18 According to 2018 plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions, the related functions of the Central Leading Group for Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests has been combined into Central Foreign Affairs Committee. 19 CPC releases plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions, www. scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1625741/1625741.htm

11 Conclusion and expectation China’s maritime power in the year 2049

A complete strategic design must have not only an objective and a roadmap, but also an approximate schedule. The year 2049 represents the centennial of the People’s Republic of China, 37 years since the Chinese government officially proposed the construction of a maritime power, and 30 years from this book’s publication. The interval between the present day and the year 2049 represents an unknown world and a protracted period of time. However, in terms of constructing a maritime power, this span of time is not enormous. In modern times, the navy has steadily become a technologically sophisticated branch of the military. In comparison with the army and air force, it has historically taken longer to form a formidable navy force, hence the saying ‘decades for an army, centuries for a navy.’ It will take a very long time for a power, whose national strength is on the rise, to build a formidable naval force from a low starting point, for the higher the technological demands and the more complex the fleet structure, the longer the process will be to create a strong combat force. The US Navy began large-scale military expansion at the end of 19th century, and it was not until the 1920s that the United States joined the select club of maritime powers, benefiting from the First World War, which had ravaged Great Britain and Germany. The German Reich was slightly quicker to adopt to militarism and aggression. Nevertheless, it was still close to 20 years from when Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Secretary of State for the German Imperial Navy, presented the ‘Fleet Laws’ (Flottengesetze) for naval expansion to when Germany became the world’s second largest naval force in 1914. Following the end of the Second World War II, it took nearly 40 years for the Soviet Red Navy to emerge from a little-known underdog to ultimately become a modern global power, second only to the US Navy in the 1980s. At present, there have been major innovations in naval technology. In the information and intelligent age, informationization and systemization are flourishing, as naval fleet formations also become notably more complex, and joint operations between the navy and other military services reach unprecedented levels in breadth and depth. Together this forms a stark contrast to the situation in the 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore, it is highly likely that China will require more time than

254 Conclusion its German, American and Soviet counterparts of yesteryear. China’s naval modernization began in around the mid-1990s, approximately 55 years away from 2049. On the basis of the abovementioned historical experiences, we can cautiously anticipate that, by that time, China will begin to build a world-class, all-encompassing and balanced navy. Progress in other indicators of maritime power, such as politics, diplomacy, economics and culture, tends to be even more sluggish and unpredictable. Although both the USSR and the German Reich had succeeded in building strong naval forces, they did not reap commensurate power in maritime politics and lagged behind in marine economic and cultural development, while their progress toward the sea suffered a severe lack of coordination. In accordance with China’s three-pronged strategy for economic development, by the mid-21st century, people’s lives will be more affluent and prosperous, models of economic growth healthier and more balanced, while the economy will have been modernized as a whole and per capita GNP will have reached the levels of middle-income countries. Only under these conditions of balanced and high quality-growth is it possible to become a maritime power. Over the previous 30 years or so, China has completed its preparations to advance from the continent to the seas, enlarging the scale of its overall economy, although not boosting its quality. Over the next 30 years or so, economic transition, including that of the marine economy, will be of utmost importance. It commonly takes between 10 and 20 years for countries like Japan and South Korea to transition from an economy based on scale to one based on quality. In consideration of the Chinese economy’s size, it seems more plausible that it would take close to 40 years for the country’s marine economy to expand and strengthen. Since the reforms and opening up of the economy, China has fully integrated into the international system, has by and large familiarized itself with the letter and spirit of international rules and norms and is currently making the leap from ‘mastering the rules’ to ‘creating the rules.’ In areas such as international trade and regional integration, China is already catching up with Western countries in its institutions’ operational capacities. China has just entered the stage of maritime development on a grand scale. With approximately 30 more years of learning and practice and a further two generations worth of tireless endeavor, China’s ability, from a political and diplomatic perspective, to participate in maritime politics will no longer lag far behind that of the world’s other maritime powers. In terms of maritime consciousness and culture, with long-term education at the national societal level and large-scale practical experience at sea, there will still exist a disparity between China and countries like Great Britain and the United States; however, this will no longer represent a substantial difference. To summarize the abovementioned predictions, come what may, China as a maritime power in 2049 promises exceptionally auspicious prospects. The greatest value of all sciences lies in forecasting. However, when it comes to predicting future international events, 2049 remains far too distant

Conclusion  255 a future. In other words, this is beyond the time frame of accurate prediction. It is generally acknowledged that the current research methods in international studies are unable to accurately predict the international state of affairs beyond the next 20 years. Therefore, research into and forecasts of the international strategic situation focus heavily on periods between 10 and 20 years. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC), for instance, regularly publishes Global Trends, a series of reports that aim to predict future worldwide trends in development over the next 15–20 years. The time point in even the latest edition, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, is only 2030. To forecast developments in China’s maritime power more than 30 years into the future is tantamount to fortune telling. When forming slightly bolder conjectures, it is nevertheless possible to identify a number of long-term trends. For instance, congestion and resource depletion in land spaces are becoming ever more pronounced. Humanity’s accelerated march toward the seas and impetus to explore the oceans will endure, as by the mid-21st century the Earth will undoubtedly represent an entirely new maritime world. Mankind has achieved cutting edge advancements in science and technology. However, innovative and sophisticated technologies, including 3D printing, artificial intelligence and biomedical developments, concentrate on changing the way people work and live. In the field of macrophysics, mankind will find it very difficult for key inventions and innovations to overturn existing basic frameworks in the natural sciences for a considerable period of time to come, instead reiterating the indispensable contributions of Newton and Einstein. Scientific and technological progress will not yet completely transcend barriers of distance and space imposed by geography. A vast war on a global scale is even more difficult to initiate, while features of peaceful competition and peaceful contest become ever more conspicuous in the global maritime order, as matters of development overtake issues of warfare as the focal point of maritime politics. China will indisputably have the maritime qualities of a global power. Unless there would be severe errors in its strategies and policies, China is certain to become a genuine maritime power, while enjoying great flexibility in its connotations and methods of development. If subsequent Chinese policymakers and mainstream society are able to thoroughly appreciate the abovementioned trends, consciously adapting to new demands in development of the marine economy and maritime politics, adopting on the roughly rational and practical strategies and policies, then it is highly likely that my projections and vision with regard to maritime power as outlined below will become a reality around the year 2049. China will have formidable anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capacities; furthermore there will be significant improvements in China’s peripheral environment. After more than 30 years worth of hard work and collaboration, the Chinese armed forces will have made comprehensive informationization a reality, while there will have been a qualitative leap in the coordinated combat capacities of the army, navy, air force, cyberwarfare defenses and

256 Conclusion other forces. Under the leadership of a newly reformed military system, the Chinese armed forces will have realized thorough, root and branch reforms. The difference between China’s strength and that of surrounding countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, will be so pronounced that these countries would no longer have the ability or audacity to provoke China. As relations between the two Koreas thaw and approach détente, it may be possible that the Korean Peninsula will reunify and the situation stabilize. Taiwan and Mainland China will likely continue to maintain the status quo, but political, economic, security and cultural ties between the two will become ever closer. Cross-strait reunification will no longer be a topic of sensitivity in Taiwan, and moreover the issue of ­Taiwanese independence no longer popular. In truth, the two sides of the strait will converge as one united entity. Maritime disputes involving China will no longer be the focal points or hotspots of China’s relations with its neighboring countries at sea. Questions of delimitation in the Yellow Sea may be settled, and although the Diaoyu Islands, East China Sea and South China Sea issues may continue to linger, the sovereign rights of islands themselves will no longer be as important as they are at present. China will have unparalleled capacities in developing, managing and controlling the East China Sea and the South China Sea, while its legal claims regarding the Diaoyu Islands, the East China Sea the South China Sea, and other disputed issues will be well-founded and widely recognized by the international community. Under the powerful deterrence of combined forces, the proposal of ‘shelving disputes and seeking joint development’ will be met with keen responses from countries including Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, as these countries actively initiate negotiations with China over disputed issues. Geographic barriers due to island chains in the Western Pacific will have also, to a significant extent, been lifted. Deterred by China’s powerful capabilities in anti-access/area denial, also known as ‘A2/AD,’ the United States will no longer enjoy supremacy in the Western Pacific’s First Island Chain. The importance of maritime disputes involving China and the United States will plummet, while the arena for Sino-US contests will shift to the waters of the Pacific Ocean between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, together with the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean. By implementing a coordinated strategy of ‘mastering seas through land, balancing land and sea,’ China’s geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region and even worldwide will change markedly over the long run. Projects such as China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh–China–Myanmar international Corridor and Zhongnan (Indochina) Peninsula railway will be fully completed. A multidimensional land, sea and air transportation network will have been created in the Southwest region, passing through the Zhongnan Peninsula and entering the Indian Ocean. This will comprehensively boost China’s relations with all countries in Southeast Asia and even with countries along the Indian Ocean’s northern coastline, considerably

Conclusion  257 improving the security situation of China’s westward sea lanes and the geographic situation along the eastern coast of the Indian Ocean. China’s northwestern regions will no longer be distant from ports. There will be a land bridge, which will ultimately connect Eurasia, traveling westward from Xinjiang to Central Asia, linking Iran with Afghanistan, and terminating at the Gulf of Oman. The railway, which begins in Kashi (Kashgar) in Xinjiang, crosses the Hongpuqila (Khunjerab) Pass on the Sino-Pakistani border, runs the entire length of the Pakistani border, and directly reaches Gwadar Port, Pakistan, on the western coast of the Indian Ocean, will also be entirely connected. In the northeastern region of China, the Changjitu strategy will be meticulously executed.1 Northeast Asia will make great strides toward regional economic integration. In cooperation with Russia and North Korea, China will acquire stable seaports in the Sea of Japan. As large areas of Arctic glaciers melt, Arctic maritime routes will grow ever more mature and increasingly hectic. China will benefit from these two additional routes to Europe and North America, which are more rapid and more reliable. In addition to these developments, China will also have four Eurasian land bridges.2 The development of these entirely connective, high-speed railways in the continental hinterlands will once again highlight the status of land power on the Eurasian continent. The renowned English geographer and political scientist, Sir Halford Mackinder’s ‘heartland theory’ will experience a revival following centuries of suppression in favor of ‘sea power theory.’ ‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-­ Island commands the world.’ As, the world’s island, the Eurasian continent will demonstrate its geographic superiority. China’s political and economic impact over the whole of Eurasia will reach a new pinnacle, as China realizes the strategic vision of its Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road. With China’s active support, the degree to which Eurasia is economically and politically integrated will reach unprecedented heights, forming a new zone of economic cooperation that stretches from the Western Pacific coastline in the east to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas in the west, spanning across the Eurasian continent. China, where the seas meet the land, will be at the center of Eurasian economics and politics. Not only would China be a bridge between the hinterlands of Eurasia and the seas, it will also be a hub of interaction between East and West. In geopolitical and geo-­economic terms, China will become the ‘intermediate country’ that links east to west, and south to north. It will be Eurasia’s, and possibly the world’s, ‘central country.’3 It is almost certain that China’s oceangoing fleet will have already been formed and China’s navy will proceed, in all respects, toward the deep oceans. The Chinese Navy will possess approximately five domestically manufactured, first-generation and second-generation aircraft carriers, some of which are conventionally powered, others nuclear powered.

258 Conclusion They will be equipped with second generation Chinese carrier-borne fighter jets and early warning aircraft. Among them, two aircraft carrier formations will be assigned combat duties in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, respectively. Another aircraft formation will maintain combat readiness. Other aircraft carriers will remain near the Chinese mainland, taking turns to rest at dock. There will be significant changes in both the quantity and quality of China’s destroyers and frigates. As the Chinese Navy plans to shift from a purely defensive strategy to more diversified tasks, there will be a sharp increase in the number of its destroyers, which are expected to double to approximately 50 to meet the needs of its military’s ‘stepping out’ strategy. The Lüda class, Lühai class and Lüzhou class, all of which are series 051 destroyers, in addition to series 052B/C destroyers such as the Lühu and Lüyang, and practically all other vessels in current service, will be phased out. After between 10 and 20 years of mass production and service, the new 052D-type and 055-type destroyers will form the next generation of China’s regional air defense systems. The rumored 052E and 059 models will have been outfitted one after another and will eventually represent the fleet’s core. Compared with numbers at present, there will be a slight increase in the number of frigates to around 70 ships, while the 054B, 056 and subsequent models will enter service in large numbers. Not only will they provide strong backup support for China’s oceangoing fleet but will also be the vanguard in coastal operations. The size of China’s submersible fleet will remain at approximately 70 vessels, but its overall combat effectiveness will increase in leaps and bounds, especially as the number of nuclear submarines surges to around 30 and their combat capabilities become comparable to those of the Russian submarine fleet. Furthermore, large numbers of surveillance vessels, support vessels, supply ships and other auxiliary ships will frequent China’s coastal waters, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Whether judging based on indicators of overall scale, fleet structure or combat effectiveness, the Chinese Navy is already second only to that of the United States in the world. China’s political prohibition against and military principle of ‘not stationing a single solider overseas’ are surely destined to be abandoned in the future. In line with its military forces’ ‘stepping out’ strategy, China will have built dozens of overseas supply points, communication relay centers and comprehensive support bases around the world through means of political negotiation and diplomatic consultation with amicable countries and in the spirit of the UN Charter. These overseas bases, mainly launched along the coasts of the Eurasian and African continents, will be designed to provide necessary geographical support for China’s overseas military activities. In considering strategic needs, geographic access and developments in foreign relations, China may establish overseas support points in the some countries below with different areas of focus: a Northern Indian Ocean supply line, centered around Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar; a Western

Conclusion  259 Indian Ocean supply line, with Yemen, Amman, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique at its core; and a supply line concentrated around the Seychelles and Madagascar in the Central and Southern Indian Ocean.4 With supply and communications bases in South Pacific island countries, including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu, and logistical support centers in South American and West African countries, such as Chile, Argentina and Namibia, China’s communications and maritime reconnaissance satellites will be able to offer comprehensive communications and intelligence support for Chinese military operations in the vast majority of waters globally. The Chinese Navy will have the capability to operate on a global scale in terms of both hardware and software. However, even under these circumstances, the Chinese Navy will nevertheless remain a regional naval force, which ‘emphasizes regional distribution and wields global influence’ and cannot compare with the US Navy in scale and complexity of tasks. The Chinese Navy will also be beginning to possess the capabilities required to achieve China’s strategic maritime intentions in global waters. The Chinese Navy will conduct a diverse range of tasks in waters around the entire world at three different levels – exerting control, balance and influence. In coastal areas near the First Island Chain, China will maintain a comparative advantage with power to command the seas; therefore, it will be ready to respond to challenges initiated by any country or group. China will maintain an effective presence in the Western Pacific and the Northern Indian Ocean and be able to somewhat check and balance the US, Japanese, Indian and other powers within this region, while also cooperating with countries, including the United States, Japan, Russia and India, on issues such as safeguarding freedom of navigation. In waters elsewhere in the world, China can swiftly exert influence through small-scale, temporary deployments, non-warfare military operations, military diplomacy and other various means. As to China’s seapower, there would be a posture of offshore control, regional presence and global Influences. In the year 2049, the world’s maritime political establishment will be a multipolar structure, composed principally of the United States, China, Russia, Europe, India and groups of Third World Countries, with China playing a pivotal and decisive role as one polar force. China will play a vital role in international maritime mechanisms, such as the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). China will participate fully in various types of cooperation mechanisms in the Pacific and coastal regions of the Indian Ocean. It will jointly maintain regional peace and stability in the Western Pacific with the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea and other maritime powers, while at the same time emerging as an important partner in cooperation with the US, Indian, European and other powers in the Indian Ocean. In matters regarding the Arctic, East Pacific, the Atlantic and other waters worldwide, Chinese

260 Conclusion participation will be indispensable as well, as it is becoming a country of crucial importance that all states endeavor to cooperate with. Chinese diplomacy will be no different from that of Europe and the United States in terms of its personnel quality, conflict experience or familiarity with international norms. China will not only have appreciated the essence of the international system that is dominated by the West, but also have enriched the relevant institutions and rules with its extensive practical maritime experience. It will have also brought China’s traditional culture of ‘harmony’ and ‘unity’ into international maritime politics, winning a strong voice in the world maritime order. China’s position as a maritime power will have been widely recognized worldwide. As the China threat theory subsides, China’s participation and its role will be imperative in areas such as the settlement of maritime disputes, international development and cooperation, and the conservation of public spaces and resources. It is likely that China will have firmly established its strength by the year 2049, while also beginning to systematically declare its plans and visions for the world’s maritime order. Chinese diplomacy will have completed the initial steps required in its transformation from a continental civilization to a maritime civilization, while the country is a whole will have concluded its metamorphosis from a continental state to a coastal state. The year 2049 for China is akin to the year 1919 for the United States; it is a starting point from which China, as a maritime power, may advance toward the world and deeply engage the world. It is popular international belief that China’s aggregate economic output will soon surpass that of the United States as it becomes the world’s largest economy. By conservative estimates, as long as China’s planning, management and technology are able to conscientiously keep pace, according to the marine economy’s current growth rate patterns, which are between two and three percent faster than national economic growth over corresponding periods of time, China’s marine economy will account for over 30 percent of GDP by the year 2049, making it the world’s largest maritime economic power. China’s fishing fleet, which ranks second to none both in terms of its size and range of activities, will soon become the world’s largest. Likewise, China’s merchant fleet will maintain a presence in all of world’s major oceans and coastal ports, as the number of Chinese-flagged merchant ships will exceed those of any other country worldwide. In addition, China’s maritime construction teams will be active on coastal and offshore construction sites in various countries around the world. China’s drilling platforms will be present in the world’s leading offshore oil and gas fields, while Chinese oceangoing vessels for exploration and mining will operate deep in every ocean. A large number of unmanned underwater vehicles and robots will navigate in the depths of the oceans, unraveling deep-sea secrets. In China, marine science and technology will make enormous contributions to the marine economy, as China transforms itself from a country that is deficient

Conclusion  261 in marine maritime science and technology to one that benefits from a superabundance. China will become a leading power in deep-sea drilling, offshore engineering and other industries. The entire Chinese nation is already passionately conscious of marine issues. As maritime legislation and management systems improve, and operations of institutions in comprehensive maritime management mature, China’s marine economy will maintain high-quality, sustainable development on a large scale. China will benefit from an agreeable coastal environment and set the benchmark for the comprehensive management and three-dimensional development of marine environments worldwide. China will be organized and efficient in the development and use of marine resources, and its marine ecological environment splendid and wholesome, achieving a balance between land and sea, as well as harmony between mankind and the oceans. The Maritime Silk Road will prosper and flourish as China further deepens cooperation with various coastal states around the world. Marine economic cooperation between China and virtually all coastal states will fully transition from maritime trade to cooperation in marine industries. Cooperation between China and certain countries on various levels is unavoidable in fields including the construction and operation of ports, exploration and exploitation of marine resources and development of diverse maritime industries. China will participate both extensively and intensively in production, trade, consumption and various market segments of marine economies in all coastal states. As interdependence intensifies in the marine economy, China will rank among the world’s leaders in the competitiveness and attractiveness of its marine economy. While it is possible that China may not have fully become a global maritime power in 2049, the outline of its maritime power will have already been decided by that year. The foundations of economic, political, diplomatic, military and various other aspects will nevertheless have been cemented. All indicators will display a ‘powerful spirit’ and crucially, most of the key steps on the road to success will by then be completed.

Notes 1 The Changjitu strategy is an abbreviation for the “Outline of plans for cooperation in and development of the Tumen River region in China – Changjitu as a pilot development zone,” officially approved by the State Council in August 2009. The Changjitu region encompasses the city of Changchun in Jilin province, certain select areas of Jilin city, and Hunchun city, located in the Tumen river basin. 2 The First Eurasian Land Bridge is a trans-Siberian land bridge, which begins in China, spanning Vladivostok in Russia window city of Hunchun in Changjitu pilot development zone, crossing Siberia and various European countries, and terminating ultimately in the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The Second Eurasian Land Bridge is a new Eurasian land bridge that connects Longhai and Lanzhou-Xinjiang railways in China with railways in Kazakhstan. It starts

262 Conclusion in the east at Liangyungang, reaching Alashankou (the Dzungarian Gate) at the Chinese-Kazakh border in the west through the Longhai rand the Northern Xinjiang railways. The Second Eurasian Land Bridge enters Kazakhstan and terminates at the Dutch port of Rotterdam, traversing Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany. Kunming rests as the hub of the Third Eurasian Land Bridge, which spans across Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran, entering Europe from Turkey, and finally arrives at the Dutch port of Rotterdam. By contrast, the Fourth Eurasian Land Bridge is a branch that diverges from Manchuria, forming a distributary arm of the Binzhou railway and Binsui railway. It links the Liangyi railway with the Baia railway, joining the Pingqi railway, and connecting Xinganmeng (Hingan League), Tongliao city, Chifeng, and Beijing on one route. Additionally, with the construction of multiple tracks, the Changbai railway is able to link with the Changtu railway, connecting to the North Korean railway network. This is currently in process of being approved. The above-mentioned four rail routes are merely common examples. In addition to these, there are already numerous branches and connections planned. 3 Refer to Wang Jisi for more on the terms “middle country” and “central country,” “Thoughts on China’s geo-strategy,” Strategic Briefing, No. 83, Peking University Institute of International and Strategic Studies. 4 Hai Tao, “China Should Build ‘Third Front Bases’ in the Indian Ocean.” http:// news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2011-12/23/c_131321310.htm

Index

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes. Abe, Shinzô 166, 177 An Act to Establish a Commission on Ocean Policy and for Other Purposes see Oceans Act of 2000 Afghanistan War 133, 143, 197, 242 Africa 37, 39, 41–4, 167, 190, 234 Age of Exploration 43, 44 Age of Sail 228, 231 agrarian civilizations 227; China as 227, 230, 233–5; diplomatic transition to maritime civilization 226–35; features of 230; foreign relations, approaching 234; greatest foreign pursuit of 231 agricultural peoples 230 aircraft carriers: and China’s two-ocean strategy 67–74; coastal operations and 72; first-generation 257; modern 70–1; planning and construction of Chinese 67–9; principal duties of China’s 70–3; second-generation 257; as systemic project 67–8; two-ocean deployment of Chinese 73–4 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 88–91 Air-Sea Battle (ASB) 127, 131–40, 143, 145, 147 AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept 136 ‘Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty’ 135 American defense spending 129 American maritime hegemony 42, 126 American ‘New Silk Road’ initiative 42 American-style isolationism 22 Amman 259 Ancient Chinese philosophy 44

Ancient Greece 227–8 ancient Greek economics 227 Ancient Silk Road 38, 40–1 Andaman and Nicobar Command 187; see also Eastern Naval Command Andaman and Nicobar Islands 187 Annam, the Sultanate of Sulu 180 Anti-Access (A2) capabilities 4, 8, 16, 132 Anti-Denial (AD) capabilities 8 anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) 143 anti-smuggling operations 77 The APEC Connectivity Blueprint 42 APEC Leaders’ Declaration 42 Aquino, Benigno S., III 101, 114 Arctic Council 211 Arctic exploration 37 Arctic Northeast Passage 206, 209; see also Northern Sea Route ‘Area Denial’ (AD) forces 16, 132 Art, Robert J. 4 Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 168, 170 artificial intelligence 255 ‘ASEAN 10+3’ Energy Ministers’ Conference, Manila 87 ASEAN Plus One 181 ASEAN Plus Three 181 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 55, 181, 208 Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 37 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 208 ‘Asia-Pacific Rebalancing’ strategy 40, 98, 99 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): balancing tactics of

264 Index ‘befriending the far and attacking near’ 55; established in 180; maritime relations with 165–211; purpose of 180; South China Sea dispute and 102–6, 118, 122 Australia 18, 36, 88, 102; as British colony 201; Defence White Paper (DWP), 2016 199; entanglements with regard to China 198–201; Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017 200; foreign strategy 201; Korean War and 197; as a non-Asian country 196–7; reasonable expectations and the law of gradual progress 201–3; robust vitality of US–Australian alliance 197–8; Vietnam War and 197; winning over relative neutrality of 196–203 The Australian 198 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 199 Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) 199 Bangladesh 187, 258, 262n2 Bangladesh–China–Myanmar international Corridor 256 The Basic Act on Ocean Policy 244–5 Bay of Bengal 12, 187–8, 190 Beixiao Dao (Kita-kojima) 79 Bei Yu (Okino-Kita-iwa) 79 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 38; interconnectivity 41–3; openness and inclusivity 44–6; potential maritime meaning of 37–46; win–win cooperation 43–4 Benedict, Ruth 171 Bhaskar, Uday 194 Biddle, Stephen 138 biotechnology 36 Bohai Sea 24, 249 Boxing Day tsunami 70 British Empire 226, 231 Bush, George W. 244–5 C4ISR system 18, 135–6, 143, 146 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), United States 114 ‘Central Maritime Rights Office,’ China 246 Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) 128 China: attaining strategic supremacy within First Island Chain and surrounding waters 140–3; Australia’s

entanglements with regard to 198–201; coastal geostrategy 47–60; exterior line strategy at sea 61–78; global vision of maritime power dream 35–7; maritime power in year 2049 253–62; maritime renaissance 38; material culture 230; not compromising over Diaoyu Islands 79–83; over-arching strategy 2; path of peace and revolutionary uprising 32–5; promoting peaceful power transition between US and 126–61; shifting strategic balance between US and 128–31; Sino-US maritime competitive posture in next 30 years 126–48; South China Sea strategy 97–101; US–Australian alliance and 198, 202 ‘China + ASEAN + X’ model 185 China Coast Guard (CCG) 77–8, 170 China-Greece Maritime Cooperation Forum 33 China–Japan General Forum on Coal 219, 223 China Maritime Bureau 119 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 36, 119, 121, 123 China Oceanic Administration (COA) 79 China Ocean Mineral Resources R & D Association (COMRA) 36 China Oilfield Services Limited (COSL) 119 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 256 China People’s Liberation Army Military Terms 5 ‘China’s New Dream’ report 199 ‘China’s Peaceful Development’ 241 Chinese aircraft carriers: planning and construction of 67–9; principal duties of 70–3; two-ocean deployment of 73–4 Chinese Air Force 63, 71 Chinese civilization 45, 229, 231, 234, 251 Chinese coastal tourism industry 37 Chinese Coast Guard: Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and 82; supporting law enforcement activities of 77–8 Chinese Communist Party 229; 18th National Congress of 1, 32; new democratic revolution, led by 229 Chinese defense spending 129 Chinese Eastern Railway incident 174 Chinese elites 1, 3 Chinese maritime power: connotation and characteristics of 29–46; global

Index  265 influence 13–20; global vision of maritime power dream 35–7; international political maritime power 20–3; No. 2 world sea power 3–20; offshore control 5–9; path of peace and revolutionary uprising 32–5; potential maritime meaning of belt and road initiative 37–46; regional presence 10–13; three major systematic objectives of 1–26; ‘variable’ vs. ‘invariable’ rise 29–31; world marine economic power 23–6 Chinese Miracle 22, 43 Chinese National Reform and Development Commission 87 Chinese Navy 6, 16; C4ISR system 18–19; external strategy of 12; India and 191; nonwarfare operations of 74–8; objectives in waters beyond Pacific and Indian Oceans 16; oceangoing capabilities of 56, 76; oceangoing fleet of 257–8; RIMPAC joint exercises and 77; as second largest sea power 159, 258; US Navy and 16; Western Pacific Naval Symposium, multilateral drills with 77 Chinese Ocean Basic Law 245 Chinese PLA Navy 2 ‘Chinese sovereignty’ 97–8, 101 Chiwei Yu (Taisho-to) 79 Chongzhiniao Jiao (Okinotorishima) 81 The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Benedict) 171 Chunxiao gas field 87 civilizations: agrarian 226–35, 234; ancient Greek 228; Chinese 45, 229, 231, 234, 251; continental 31, 227, 260; Eastern 229; grassland 226; maritime 30–1, 226–35, 234; river valley 227; Western 31, 227–9 coastal geostrategy 47–60; ‘contesting the East’ 55–60; ‘harmonizing the South’ 52–5; overview 47–8; ‘stabilizing the North’ 48–52 coastal navies 3–4 ‘Cobra Gold’ multinational warfare exercises 64 Code of Conduct for Maritime and Air Safety in the High Seas 158 Colby, Elbridge 138 Cold War 17, 39, 50, 53, 64, 69, 97, 127, 148, 153, 180, 184, 197, 205, 216, 235 colonialism 231 Columbus, Christopher 231

Committee on Ocean Policy, US 245 Commonwealth of Independent States 6 Communist Party of Vietnam 245 Comprehensive Economic Dialogue 155 ‘The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’ 207 Confucianism 232 continental civilizations 31, 227, 260 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 153 Council on Environmental Quality, US 245 counterterrorism missions 73 crisis prevention management mechanism: establishing 158–9 Cropsey, Seth 137 customs inspections 77 ‘Dashed Line’ 54 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) 55, 98, 181, 217–18 deep sea mining 36 demarcation, in East China Sea 79–93; truths and falsehoods of 83–8 deterrence: accustomed to deterrence as ‘new normal’ 218–21; creating smart deterrence system 221–5; purpose and importance of 216–18 DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile 134, 141, 145 DF-26 missile 134 Diaoyu Dao (Uotsuri-shima) 79 Diaoyu Islands 6; China not compromising over 79–83; disputes over 79–93 Diaoyu Islands: The Truth 80 Diplomatic Security Dialogue 155 ‘Distributed Lethality’ 139 Djibouti 64–5 ‘dog eat dog’ laws 30 DPRK 50–1; see also North Korea ‘drinking straw effect’ 87 Duterte, Rodrigo 99, 101 East Asia Summit (EAS) 55, 93, 181, 208 East China Sea 5; commitment to the security of sea lanes in 91–3; continental shelf 85–7; demarcation of 79–93; truths and falsehoods of demarcation in 83–8 Eastern civilization 229 Eastern Europe 90, 168, 204

266 Index Eastern Han Dynasty 111 Eastern Naval Command 187; see also Andaman and Nicobar Command economic globalization 14, 19, 21–2, 24–5, 29, 33, 35, 39, 41–2, 45–6, 80, 226, 237 economics: ancient Greek 227; dichotomy between security and 179–82; international maritime mechanisms and 30; Sino-Indian common interests in 193; South China Sea dispute and 54 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 1, 32 Einstein, Albert 255 Emperor Wu 146 Erickson, Andrew S. 72, 138 ‘Eschew chaos’ values 232 Etzioni, Amitai 137 Eurasian Economic Union 42 European Union (EU) 99, 102, 203; ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ 42; eastward expansion by 203 ‘Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Law’ 86 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 5, 22, 77, 81 Executive Order 13366 245 Exercise RIMPAC (the Rim of the Pacific) 64 exterior line strategy at sea 61–78; aircraft carriers and China’s twoocean strategy 67–74; nonwarfare operations of China’s naval force 74–8; ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces 61–7 Feilan Dao (Tobise) 79 First Island Chain 4, 6, 10, 12, 17, 19, 56, 62, 64, 73–4, 81, 90, 92, 130–1, 136, 140–7, 256, 259 First World War 138, 172, 253 ‘Fleet Laws’ (Flottengesetze) 253 Forbes, James Randy 137 France 15, 25, 39, 61, 63–7, 76, 99, 112, 140, 174, 189, 228, 242 Frank, Andre Gunder 230 Fraser, Malcolm 200 freedom of navigation: American maritime hegemony and 42; as function of modern navies 75; India and 191; in Indian Ocean 191; interconnectivity at sea and 42; as international public good 15, 33;

safeguarding 75–6; US military’s 131; in the Western Pacific 132 Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategies 190 freelance gunboat diplomacy 21 ‘Free Tibet’ movements 17 free trade 39 Friedberg, Aaron L. 4 ‘Galaxy’ Cargo Ship 11 Gandhi, Rajiv 189 Gates, Robert 135 George Washington University 137 German-British conflict 150 German Imperial Navy 253 German Reich 15, 253–4 globalization: economic 14, 19, 21–2, 24–5, 29, 33, 35, 39, 41–2, 45–6, 80, 226, 237; of marine economy 25; trends against 39 global maritime hegemonies 3–4, 26, 29, 150 Global Maritime Partnership Initiative 153, 160 Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds 255 global vision, of maritime power dream 35–7 Gobi Desert 146, 227 Goldfein, David L. 139 Goldstein, Lyle J. 153 Gonggu Strait 91–2; see also Gonggu Waterway Gonggu Waterway 91, 93; see also Gonggu Strait Graham, Euan 199 grassland civilization 226 Great Britain 15; Afghanistan War and 197; First World War and 253; as imperialist power 140; Iraq War and 197; as maritime hegemons 30, 33, 43; Napoleonic Wars and 210; participation in the Gulf War 197; as traditional maritime power 30, 68, 247; world’s maritime order dominated by 21 ‘Great Channel’ 187 ‘Great Wall Line’ 148 Great Wall of China 146, 147, 230 Greeks 227–8 Greenert, Jonathan W. 135, 137 Gulf of Aden 12, 61, 64, 153 Gulf of Oman 257 Gulf War 133, 197

Index  267 Hagel, Chuck 120 ‘Hainan Navigation Warning No. 0033’ 119 Haiyang Shiyou (Ocean Petroleum) 981 119, 122; debut display of 119–23; and its future maneuvers 119–23 Hammes, Thomas X. 137 Han Chinese 229 Han Dynasty 40, 111, 146 ‘harmony’: China’s traditional culture of 260; Chinese people and 218; essence of 33; international community and 220–1; between mankind and the oceans 261; as organic component of ‘innovation’ 34 ‘heartland theory’ 257 Hegel, G. W. F. 227, 251n2 hegemonism 3 HMS Hermes 70 HMS Illustrious 71 HMS Invincible 70 Hobbes, Thomas 226 Holmes, James R. 4, 142, 159 Hua Chunying 114 Huangwei Yu (Kuba-shima) 79 Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) incident 98, 101, 107 Hudson Institute 137 Hunnic Empire 229 Huns 17, 40 Hussein, Saddam 94n6, 242 Ilyushin IL-76 63 imperialism 3, 231 Incheon Winter Olympics 2018 50 India 18, 102; ambitions and grievances of 188–93; Andaman and Nicobar Command 187; discussions on SinoIndian maritime conflicts 186–8; ‘Eastward’ policy 187; efforts to accommodate on maritime issues 186–96; as emerging military power 61; maintaining Sino-Indian strategic stability at sea 193–6; Ministry of Defense 11; Primary Interests Areas 190; Secondary Interest Areas 190; sensationalism of ‘China’s maritime threat’ 192; South China Sea situation and 102, 187–8 Indian Navy 188, 190, 195–6 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy 190 Indian Ocean 11, 12; India’s ambitions and grievances 188–93; Zone of

Medium Control 190; Zone of Positive Control 190; Zone of Soft Control 190 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) 187 Indonesia 18, 37, 40, 48, 102–3, 156, 165, 181, 187 ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy 198 Industrial Revolution 236 Inner or Marginal Crescent 13, 28n27 innovation: harmony as organic component of 34; in naval technology 253; technological 128, 147, 224, 228, 248 Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 194 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems 141, 143 interconnectivity 41–3; economic globalization and 41–2; freedom of navigation and 42; global 45; maritime 42–3 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 84, 105, 236 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 129 international ‘legitimacy’: efforts for 235–43 International Maritime Bureau 12 international maritime politics 2, 20, 22, 33, 44–6, 165, 260 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 39, 128 international political maritime power 20–3 International Seabed Authority (ISA) 20, 36, 259 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 143 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 20, 101, 109, 259 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Court of Arbitration 105 Iraq War 133, 143, 197, 242 isolationism, American-style 22 Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 2006 71 J-15 fighters 67 Jane’s Defence Weekly 141 Japan 18; ADIZ 88; be patient and rational 174–9; decision-making characteristics of 170–9; difficulties in promoting ‘new perspectives’ on 175–6; long continuation in

268 Index Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation 166–70; strategic confrontation and compellence 176–9 Japan Coast Guard (JCG) 82, 170 Japanese culture 171 Japanese Parliament 86 Jiawu Sino-Japanese War 7 Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) 127, 139 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) 131, 135 Joshi, Devendra Kumar 188 Jurchen 17 Kan Naoto 173 Kanwa Defense Review 141 Kaplan, Robert 4, 187 Kenya 259 Khan, Genghis 4, 235 Kissinger, Henry 155 Korean Peninsula 17, 48–52, 197, 207, 256 Korean War 197 Kosovo War 133 Krepinevich, Andrew F. 131, 132 Kuril Islands dispute 207, 209 Kwantung Army 172, 174, 177 Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue 155 Law of the Sea (Canada) 244 Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Hegel) 227 Lee Kuan Yew 182 legitimacy 235–43; crisis for UNCLOS 113; defined 235; international 235–43; justice and 236 Liaoning (Chinese aircraft carrier) 59, 67–9, 72 Li Hongzhang 174 Li Keqiang 33 Ling Qing 237 Lingshui ‘collision incident’ 127 Liu Huaqing 2, 5, 26n5, 74 Liu Zhongmin 1 Locke, John 226 Lowy Institute for International Policy 198 Macartney, George 229 Mackinder, Sir Halford 257 Magellan, Ferdinand 231 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 3, 21, 26, 30, 44, 141, 188, 213n28

Mahan-style sea power 2 Mainland China 6–7, 55, 91, 123, 124n1, 130, 142, 147, 256; see also China ‘Malacca Dilemma’ 11; see also ‘Malacca Predicament’ ‘Malacca Predicament’ 11; see also ‘Malacca Dilemma’ Malacca Strait 12, 52, 74, 91–2, 186–8, 190, 203, 215n64 Malaysia Airlines MH370 Flight 61, 64, 153, 203 Ma Licheng 176 marine geography 30, 47, 71, 92, 144–5 maritime civilizations 227, 233; diplomatic transition from agrarian civilization to 226–35 ‘maritime co-governance’: adapting to essential compromises in pursuit of 159–61 maritime contest: advancements in marine science and technology and 247; essence of peacefully winning 243–51; international 250 maritime discourse power, efforts for 235–43 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 206 ‘Maritime Great Wall’ 10, 62 maritime interconnectivity 41–3 maritime power dream, global vision of 35–7 maritime public goods 15, 21, 118 maritime relations: with ASEAN 165–211; with Australia 165–211; with India 165–211; with Japan 165–211; with Russia 165–211 Maritime Silk Road 33, 38, 43, 45–6, 185, 257, 261 maritime terrorism 74 Marx, Karl 204 Mearsheimer, John J. 4 Median Line 84, 86–7; see also ‘SinoJapanese Median Line’ Medvedev, Dmitry 206 ‘Meeting the Anti-Access and AreaDenial Challenge,’ report 132 Meiji Restoration 171 ‘Middle Ages’ 45 Middle East 37–8, 45, 74, 168, 190 military diplomacy: China and 243, 259; and international cooperation 76–7; Russia and 206 military modernization 9, 71, 89, 127, 134, 139, 146, 167, 192, 205, 238

Index  269 Ming Dynasty 111 Mongol Empire 229, 235 Mongolian Plateau 226 Mongols 5, 17, 204 monotheism 45 ‘Monroe doctrine’ 234 Mozambique 259 Mukden Incident 225 Murayama Tomiichi 173 Mutual Defense Treaty 133 mutually assured destruction (MAD) 151 Mutual Notification Mechanisms on Major Military Operations 158 Myanmar 187, 256, 258, 262n2 Nakagawa Shoichi 87 Nansha Islands 2, 71, 95, 100, 107, 111, 113–18, 122–3, 124n1, 130, 132, 188 Nanxiao Dao (Minami-kojima) 79 Nan Yu (Oki-no-Minami-iwa) 79 Napoleon 138, 210 Napoleonic Wars 210 National Defense University, United States 137 ‘National Defense White Paper’ 133 National Ocean Council, China 246 National Ocean Council, US 245 National People’s Congress 224 National Strategy for Maritime Security 153 NATO 203, 205 Nebe, Chris D. 80 Nehru, Jawaharlal 189 Netherlands: First Eurasian Land Bridge 261n2; rise and fall of 228; world’s maritime order dominated by 21 Newton, Sir Isaac 255 The New York Times 79 ‘Nine Dash Line’ 108, 111 ‘NL10 Degree Channel’ 187 No. 2 world sea power, China as 3–20 Noda Yoshihiko 82 nomadic tribes 229 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 194 nontraditional security threats 12, 75–6 nonwarfare operations of China’s naval force 74–8; building integrated system of management and defense at sea 77–8; initiating military diplomacy and international cooperation 76–7; responding to nontraditional security threats 75–6; safeguarding freedom of

navigation 75–6; supporting Chinese Coast Guard’s law enforcement activities 77–8 Northeastern Army 174, 177 Northern Pacific Ocean 5 Northern Sea Route 206, 209; see also Arctic Northeast Passage North Korea (DPRK) 47, 49–51, 56, 233, 257 North Korean nuclear crisis 17, 50 Northwestern Pacific Ocean 131, 211 Northwest Pacific Ocean 91, 121 nuclear deterrence 22, 29, 151, 216 nuclear terrorism 216, 221 Obama, Barack 120, 245 ‘An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century’ report 244 ‘Oceanic State’ strategy 244 Oceans Act of 2000 244 Oelrich, Ivan 138 ‘Offset Strategy’ 130 Offshore Control Strategy 137 Okinawa island chain 5, 26n5 Okinawa Trough 85–7 1,000 Ship Navy Plan 153 openness: China and 239; and inclusivity 44–6; maintenance of the world’s oceans’ 15; South China Sea dispute and 239 ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ 70 Opium War 229 ‘An Outline of Plans for the Development of Marine Science and Technology as part of the National 11th Five-Year Plan’ 247 over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems 141 Pacific War 197 Pakistan 187, 191–3, 256–8, 262n2 Panetta, Leon 137 Panikkar, K. M. 189 Paris Peace Conference of 1919 225 ‘Peace Ark’ (PLAN hospital ship) 74, 76 Peace of Westphalia 236 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 8, 65, 221 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 89–90 People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) 89 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 67, 69, 90, 118, 144

270 Index Persian Gulf 11–13, 189–90 Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean–Malacca Strait maritime channel 13 Peter I of Bulgaria 204 Peter the Great 204 PetroChina 36 ‘petty peasant mentality’ 18 Philippines 9, 47, 48, 53–5, 59, 74, 95, 98–112, 114–17, 122, 124n1, 133, 149, 181, 185, 217–18, 222, 239, 256; Exclusive Economic Zone 107; ‘Triple Action Plan’ 98 Philippine Tubbataha Reefs 118 Phoenicians 227 piracy 12, 15–16, 63, 65, 74–5, 118, 153, 160, 189, 231, 241 PLA Daily 68 PLA Rocket Force 90 Portugal 21, 228 Potter, E. B. 228 Proliferation Security Initiative 153 Putin, Vladimir 204–5 Qianlong, Emperor 233 Qin dynasty 230 Qing Dynasty 111, 140, 204, 229, 230 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 135 RAND Corporation 56–7, 129, 130 ‘Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific’ strategy 127, 130, 133, 183, 198, 200–1 reconnaissance satellites 141, 143–4, 146 Red Navy 205, 253; see also Soviet Red Navy Red Sea 12, 189–90 regional sea powers 3–4, 20, 69 Renai Jiao incident 101 Renaissance 228 ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Frank) 230 Revolution in Military Affairs report 131 RIMPAC joint exercises 77 ‘Rising East, Declining West’ 39 river valley civilizations 227 Roman Empire 188 Romans 227, 228 Rong Jian 171 Ross, Robert S. 127 Roughead, Gary 135 Rouran 17 Royal Navy 231 Rudd, Kevin 198 Russell, Daniel 111 Russia 6; Arctic ambitions and Pacific dreams 205–8; Eurasian Economic

Union 42; expanding maritime connotations in Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership 203–11; limitations in Sino-Russian maritime cooperation 208–11; maritime tradition of 204–5; priorities in SinoRussian maritime cooperation 208–11; see also Russian Federation Russian Federation 204, 206–7, 215n65, 246; see also Russia Ryukyu Arc 85 safeguarding, freedom of navigation 75–6 ‘salami slicing’ 53 Schwartz, Norton A. 135 sea: building an integrated system of management and defense at 77–8; maintaining Sino-Indian strategic stability at 193–6 sea lane security 7, 10 sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) 10, 12, 33, 40, 43, 50, 54, 62, 72, 74, 91–2, 153, 187, 192–4, 197 Second Island Chain 17, 57, 64, 136, 144, 198, 256 Second Opium War 229 Second World War 7, 15, 19, 22, 29, 30, 32, 70, 117, 138, 141, 166, 168, 172, 180, 197, 237, 253 secular rationality 45 security: dichotomy between economics and 179–82; sea lane 7, 10 September 18th Incident 174 Shi Yinhong 176 Silk Road Economic Belt 38, 40, 257 Sino-Indian maritime conflicts: discussions on 186–8 Sino-Japanese maritime conflicts 9 ‘Sino-Japanese Median Line’ 79, 86, 87; see also Median Line Sino-Japanese relations: long continuation in Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation 166–70; rationally facing frosty and tense 165–70 Sino-Japanese war 166 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty 233 Sino-Okinawan continental shelf 86 Sinopec 36 Sino-Russian joint military drills 64 Sino-Russian ‘Joint Sea 2013’ drills 77 Sino-Russian maritime cooperation: limitations in 208–11; priorities in 208–11

Index  271 Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership: expanding maritime connotations in 203–11 Sino-US–Australian trilateral relations 201 Sino-US maritime competitive posture, in next 30 years 126–48 Sino-US maritime power relations: constructing new type of 154–61; establishing crisis prevention management mechanism 158–9; ‘maritime co-governance’ 159–61; power rivalries grow progressively fiercer reconcilable 148–50; strengthening strategic dialogue and communication to improve interaction process 155–8 Sino-US relations: Anti-access vs. AirSea Battle 131–40; maritime functional cooperation advancing stability of 152–4; prevailing China or United States 140–6; reluctant compromise and desperate balance 146–8 Sino-US trade war 151 smart deterrence system, creating 221–5 Smith, Stephen 198 Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue 155 Somalia 12, 118 Song Dynasty 111 South America 37, 44, 91 South China Sea code of conduct (COC) 55 South China Sea ‘Dash Line’: debate over 110–13 South China Sea dispute 5, 105; accurate understanding of situation in 95–7; debate over South China Sea ‘Dash Line’ 110–13; debut display of ‘Haiyang Shiyou 981’ and future maneuvers 119–23; in defense of legal principles in 106–10; intelligently navigating complex relations in 101–6; new opportunities and implications of South China Sea strategy 97–101; openness and 239; solution to tensions in 95–125; thoughts on land reclamation of Spratly Islands 113–19 South China Sea strategy (China): 12 Chinese characters guiding principle and 100–1; new opportunities and implications of 97–101 Southeast Asia: dichotomy between economics and security 179–82; good neighbors and close friends in crucial period 182–3; reassuring one’s

neighbors 183–6; reinforcing provision of security to 179–86 South Korea (ROK) 47, 49, 50–1, 56, 88, 156, 165, 173–4, 233, 244, 254, 259; ADIZ 88 Soviet Red Navy 253; see also Red Navy Soviet Union 18, 90, 151–2, 203–5, 208–9, 230, 232–3 Spain 112, 141, 228 Spratly Islands 5, 6; thoughts on the land reclamation of 113–19 Sri Lanka 187, 258 State Council’s National Maritime Economic Development Program 1 Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea 7 State Oceanic Administration, of the People’s Republic of China 1, 243, 246, 252n17 ‘stepping out’ of China’s military forces 61–7; how to 65–7; necessity to ‘step out’ 62–3; possible to ‘step out’ 63–5; strategy to 65–7 Strait of Malacca 10–11, 188 String of Pearls Strategy 187, 196 Suez Canal 206 Sui dynasty 49 Sun Tzu 216, 231 Suyan Rock and Rixiang Reef 49–50 Taiwan 2, 5–6, 9, 24, 26n5, 55–9, 81, 92, 96, 127–8, 130, 132, 142, 147, 149–50, 161, 197, 200, 256 Taiwan Relations Act 132 Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–1996) 96, 127, 132 Tang Dynasty 49, 111 Tanzania 259 technological equipment manufacturing 36 technological innovation 128, 147, 224, 228, 248 Temple, Henry John, Third Viscount Palmerston 232 10th Asia-Europe Meeting 42 terrorism: counterterrorism missions and 73; global/international 241–2; maritime 74; as nontraditional security threat 12, 14; nuclear 216, 221 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 237

272 Index Third World Countries 22, 66, 131, 232, 233, 259 3D printing 255 Till, Geoffrey 14, 75 Tirpitz, Alfred von 253 Toshi Yoshihara 4, 159 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) 39 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) 39 Treasure Voyages of Zheng He 41 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia (TAC) 55, 181 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 132, 168 tridents beyond armed force 226–52 Trump, Donald 53, 151 ‘trump card’ weaponry 134 Tsar Alexander III 204 Tsardom of Russia 204 Tsarist Russia 18, 204 Turks 17 ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ 37–43, 46, 118, 187 two-ocean strategy, of China: aircraft carriers and 67–74 2014 Military Balance 129 2016 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 14 Typhoon Haiyan 74 UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 85, 95, 98, 109, 259 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 5, 20, 81; Article 7(1) 86; Article 15 84; Article 38 84; Article 56 83; Article 283 of 107; Article 287 106; Article 298 of 107; Articles 74 84; Articles 83 84; principle of fairness and spirit of impartiality 92; signed in 22 United States: constructing new type of Sino-US maritime power relations 154–61; maritime functional cooperation advancing stability of Sino-US relations 152–4; military perpetuating its maritime hegemony in distant waters 143–6; overall interdependence restricting fomentation of conflict 150–2; possibility of maintaining peace at sea between China and 148–54; promoting peaceful power transition between China and 126–61; Prompt

Global Strike (PGS) deployed by 59; robust vitality of US–Australian alliance 197–8; shifting strategic balance between China and 128–31; Sino-US maritime competitive posture in next 30 years 126–48; Sino-US power rivalries growing fiercer but reconcilable 148–50; world’s maritime order dominated by 21 unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) 136 UN Peacekeeping Operations 63 UN Security Council 64 US Air Force 135–6 US-Asia-Pacific strategy 159, 197 US–Australian alliance: Australian people praising 198; China and 198, 202; robust vitality of 197–8; Second World War and 197; Stephen Smith on 198 US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 129 US Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 138 US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change 151 US Commission on Ocean Policy 244 US Congress 244 US Container Safety Initiative (CSI) 160 US Department of Defense 134; Office of Net Assessment (ONA) 131 US National Intelligence Council (NIC) 128, 255 US Naval War College 72, 138, 153 US Navy 4, 9, 16, 253 US Ocean Action Plan 244 US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 129 US P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft 59 USS Abraham Lincoln 70 USS Cowpens 59 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 120 USS Enterprise 72 USS Guardian minesweeper 118 USSR 68–9, 254 ‘Varyag’ aircraft carrier 67 Vietnam 9, 18, 54; Law of the Sea 245; ‘Maritime Strategy towards the Year 2020’ 245 Vietnam War 197 Wang Shuguang 1 Wang Yi 105 Wellington Koo 225 Western civilization 31, 227–9

Index  273 Western maritime traditions 31 Western Pacific Naval Symposium 77 Western Pacific Ocean 17, 36, 187 White, Hugh 147 World Bank 128 world marine economic power 23–6 World War I see First World War World War II see Second World War WTO Doha round of negotiations 39 Xianbei 17 Xi Jingping 34 Xi Jinping 32–3, 37, 42, 89, 100, 150 Xinhai Revolution (the Chinese Revolution of 1911) 229 ‘Xinjiang Independence’ 17 Xisha Islands 100, 103, 116, 118–23 Y-20 large airfreighter 63 Yellow Sea 5, 17, 24, 26n5, 48–9, 52, 91, 110, 249, 256

Yeltsin, Boris 205 Yemen 259 Yin and Yang 44 Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign Matters) 111 Yoji Koda 167 Yuan Dynasty 111 Zhang Guobao 87 Zhang Qian 40 Zhang Wenmu 2 Zhang Xueliang 174, 177, 225 Zhang Yesui 45 Zheng He 41, 234 Zhongjian Depression 121 Zhongjiannan incident 121 Zhongjiannan initiative 119, 121–2 Zhongnan (Indochina) Peninsula railway 256 Zhongyuan dynasties 18, 146, 180, 229 Zhu Yuanzhang, Hongwu Emperor 233

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