Chinese Literature and Culture in the Age of Global Capitalism: Renaissance or Rehabilitation? 9789004461192, 2021015518, 2021015519, 9789004461185

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Chinese Literature and Culture in the Age of Global Capitalism

Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

Chinese Literature and Culture in the Age of Global Capitalism Renaissance or Rehabilitation? By

Wang Xiaoping

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

Cover illustration: The Bund, Shanghai, bathed in sunshine. Courtesy of the Author. Sponsored by the Center for Literature and Translation Studies, Huaqiao University.

  Names: Wang, Xiaoping, 1975- author. Title: Chinese literature and culture in the age of global capitalism :  renaissance or rehabilitation? / Xiaoping Wang. Other titles: Zou xiang wen hua fu xing. English Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2021] | “The present book is a  translation of the Chinese manuscript … Towards cultural renaissance:  Chinese culture in the age of globalization, published by Social Science  Academic Press in 2017, with some modifications … minor revisions  before being included here”—Text. | Includes bibliographical references  and index. | Identifiers: LCCN 2021015518 (print) | LCCN 2021015519 (ebook) | ISBN  9789004461185 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004461192 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Chinese literature—20th century—History and criticism. |  China—Civilization. Classification: LCC PL2303 .W3397713 2021 (print) | LCC PL2303 (ebook) |  DDC 895.109/5005—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021015518 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021015519

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISBN 978-90-04-46118-5 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-46119-2 (e-book) Copyright 2021 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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Contents Acknowledgements ix List of Figures x

Introduction: Mapping the Multivalence of Contemporary Chinese Culture in the Age of Global Capitalism 1 1 Post-New Period, Postmodernism and Postsocialism 4 2 Raymond Williams’ Concept of Three Cultures and Its Chinese Variations 9 3 Structural Outline of the Five Features 14

part 1 The Structure of Feeling of the Traditional Socialist Era 1

A Lyrical Poet in the Era of Postsocialism: On Some Motifs of Fanken Chen’s Poems 25 1 Attachment to a “Cultural China” and Yearning for a “Political China” 27 2 A Heroic Complex with the Plebeian Consciousness 33 3 The Motifs of Patriotism and Homesickness 41 4 Affective Economy and the Spiritual World of the Socialist Era 47 5 Conclusion 56

2

On the Historical-Cultural Connotations of “Chinese New Poetry”: Fu Tianhong’s Poems as a Case-Study 59 1 The Formation of the Rebellious Personality and Critical Consciousness 61 2 Pioneering Spirit, Perseverance and the Desire for Freedom 68 3 Critique of the Alienation of a Commercialized Society 74 4 Historical Retrospection and Social Activities 80 5 Conclusion 83

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part 2 The Historical Consciousness of the New Liberal Humanism 3

Anatomizing China’s “Avant-Garde Fiction”: Articulating Historical Experience in Formal Experimentation 87 1 Ma Yuan: The Dispersion of Meaning during Secularization 91 2 Ge Fei: Disintegration and Dispersion of the Subject 101 3 Yu Hua: Historical Projection of a Post-Revolutionary Secular Society 115 4 Su Tong: Retrospection on Revolution by the New Bourgeois Class 126 5 Conclusion 136

4

Sampling the “New Historical Fiction”: White Deer Plain as a Representative Text of New Historicism 138 1 A Patriarchal Clan System Consisting of Master-Slave Relationships 140 2 The Opening of the Gate of Desire 145 3 Three Rebels Fighting against Existing Institutions 148 4 Three Political Forces: An Incomprehensive Representation 152 5 A Rebel’s Tragic Ending and the Incompleteness of History 154 6 The Textual Blankness and the Absence of Political Belief 156 7 “Cultural-Psychological Structure” and the Culturalist Mentality 160 8 Historical Revisionism and New Historicist Fiction 164 9 Conclusion 166

part 3 From Post-Revolutionary Passion to Postmodern Consumerism 5

Two Kinds of Bildungsroman: On the Avant-Garde Films of China’s Sixth-Generation Auteurs 171 1 Dirt (1992): A Bildungsroman of Youth in the Early 1990s 172 2 The Making of Steel (1997): Why Could the Steel Not Be Successfully Made? 185 3 Conclusion 196

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6

“Postmodern” Love Stories: Articulating the Self-Consciousness of the Entrepreneurial Class in China’s Pop Cinema 197 1 A Hedonistic and Yuppy Life Philosophy: Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 as a Tale of China’s Entrepreneurial Class 199 2 Nihilists and the Pragmatic Principle: So Young (2013) as a Symptomatic “Youth Film” 214

part 4 Middle Class Tastes and Intellectual Trends 7

Making a Historical Fable: The Narrative Strategy of Lust, Caution and Its Social Repercussions 231 1 A Précis of the Surface Plotline 233 2 Projection of Social Institutions in Historical Representation 234 3 Displacement of Party Politics by Sexual Politics 240 4 Appropriation of Historical Allegory through Identity Deconstruction 247 5 Conclusion 253 6 Coda 255

8

Social Democracy or Neoliberal Freedom? Globalization and Contemporary Chinese Intellectual Thought 257 1 Dialectics of Postmodernism and (Post-)Nationalism 258 2 Cooperation of Neo-Statism and “Corporatism” 263 3 Conflicts between New Left and New Right 269 4 Outcry for New Socialism and the Urge for Neoliberal Capitalism 278 5 Conclusion 283

part 5 Cultural Identity and Subjectivity in the Age of Global Capitalism 9

The Exploration of “Cultural Politics” and Its Crossroads: On the Discussion of “Chinese Identity” in the Era of Globalization 287 1 Why Take German Thinkers as the Object of Research? 289 2 Totality and the Dialectics of Historical Materialism 294 3 The Dialectic between Universality and Particularity 298

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4 5

Cultural Diversity and Pluralism 302 How to Transcend the Nation-State System and Rebuild Continuity? 305 6 What is Cultural Politics? 309 7 Tensions and Dilemmas: Whose Cultural Politics? 312 8 Conclusion 316 10

Establishing the Subjectivity of Modern Chinese Culture: Zhou Ning’s Research as a Case Study 318 1 Critique of Sinologism and Modern Academic Institutions 319 2 From “Study of the Chinese Image in the West” to “Cross-Cultural Study” 325 3 The Problems of “Self-Orientalization” and “Universal Value” 330 4 The Pitfalls of Genealogical Study and Culturalist Mentality 334 5 Exploring the Subjectivity of Modern Chinese Culture 338 6 Conclusion 343



Conclusion: In Search of the Renaissance of China’s Socialist Culture 346 Selected Bibliography 359 Index 374

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Acknowledgements The present book is a translation of the Chinese manuscript 走向文化复兴： 全球化时代的中国文学与文化 [Towards Cultural Renaissance: Chinese Culture in the Age of Globalization], published by Social Science Academic Press in 2017, with some modifications. Some sections of the chapters included here have been published in distinguished international academic journals. They had undergone minor revisions before being included here. I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their comments and advice. The Chinese version of the first chapter was published in Journal of Huaqiao University (华侨大学学报), No. 5 (2015). The Chinese version of the second chapter was published in Journal of Jinan University (暨南大学学报), No. 11 (2015). The Chinese version of the third chapter was published in Modern Chinese Literature Studies (中国现代文学研究丛刊), No. 12 (2011). The Chinese version of the fourth chapter was published in Modern Chinese Literature Studies (中国现代文学研究丛刊), No. 4 (2015). The Chinese version of parts of the fifth chapter has been published in Art Forum (艺苑), No. 4, 2016; and South China Communication (南国传播), No. 7 (2012). The Chinese version of the sixth chapter was published in Art Forum (艺苑), No. 1 (2014). The seventh chapter has been published in Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, No. 65 (2010): 573–590. Part of the eighth chapter was published in Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2012): 511–531. Part of the Chinese version of the ninth chapter has appeared as “It is culture, but it is also politics” (是文化，也是政治), in Reflexion (思想), No. 7 (2007): 273–288. The Chinese version of the tenth chapter has appeared as “From Critique of Sinologism to a Cross-Cultural Studies for Exploring the Subjectivity of Modern Chinese Modernity” (从“汉学主义”批判到探寻中国现代性主体的 跨文化研究), in Cross-Cultural Dialogue (跨文化对话), No. 30 (2012): 199–234.

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Figures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Fanken Chen (1943–). Courtesy of Fanken Chen 26 Ruiyun Tower, built in AD 1615 during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Courtesy of the author 53 Fu Tianhong (1947–). Courtesy of Fu Tianhong 62 Bai Jiaxuan in a screenshot of the TV Series Bailuyuan (2017) 142 Heiwa and Tiao Xiao’e in the movie Bailuyuan (2012), directed by Wang Quan’an (1965–) 150 Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: A full screen of Chairman Mao’s famed quotation “The World Belongs to You” 174 Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: Ye Tong returns to Beijing. 175 Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: A middle shot of Peng Wei in performance 176 Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: Ye Tong, Weidong and Weidong’s father 180 Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: Ye Tong sings the song “Red Kite”. 182 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhu Helai reads a lot at night. 186 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhou Qing dreams of being a hero with strong willpower. 188 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhou Qing visits Ji Wen after returning to China. 189 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Fu Shaoying satirizes Zhou Qing. 190 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhou Qing finds the book How the Steel was Made in a street bookstall. 195 A screen shot of the political melodrama Romance on Lushan Mountain (Lushan lian, 庐山恋), 1980 200 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Zhou Yun deeply loves her daughter, Geng Fei’er. 203 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Wei Ning is pursuing Geng Fei’er. 204 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Ma Jiang photographs Geng Fei’er for fun. 206 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Ma Jiang and Geng Fei’er, a fancy couple 210 The opening shot of So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我 们终将逝去的青春), 2013 215

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Figures 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

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So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Xu Kaiyang initially feels angry over Zheng Wei’s egocentrism. 216 So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Zheng Wei feels desperate over Xu Kaiyang’s departure. 218 So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Zhang Kai becomes a ghostwriter. 220 So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Zhang Kai mourns in front of Ruan Wan’s tomb. 224 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: A screenshot showing the passionate, patriotic students 235 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: The intricate relation between “Mrs. Mak” and Yee 238 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: Merciless Yumin engages in assassination. 241 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: “Mrs. Mak” and Yee are seemingly fond of each other. 243 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: Old Wu demands the unconditional service of “Mrs. Mak”. 245 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: A scene echoing the historical romance between the Conqueror Xiang Yu and his concubine 246 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: A resplendent, enticing scene with colorful light effects 252 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: The patriotic show is reminiscent of the CCP’s propaganda play “White-Haired Girl”. 254 Shanghai’s Oriental Pearl Radio & TV Tower at night. Courtesy of the author 289

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Mapping the Multivalence of Contemporary Chinese Culture in the Age of Global Capitalism Phenomenal changes have taken place in China since the turn of the new century: “China’s rise” has become a reality rather than a possibility. In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy.1 While “[a]ll signs point to China being in a position to claim global leadership and reshape the economic order …” international observers find that it “… has come into more direct confrontation with the international system.”2 After China’s President Xi came to power in 2012, he shifted from the traditional low-profile foreign policy to one which is more assertive. This is apparent in the new national campaign “One Belt, One Road” across the Eurasian landmass and in the state’s newly-established Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, which offers funds worldwide to countries and traders. This has caused unease in the world’s superpower—the United States—which has launched a “trade war.” What does this new situation mean for China and for the world? Domestically, the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress in 2017 proclaimed that, after decades of hard work, “… socialism with Chinese characteristics has crossed the threshold into a new era.” The main conflict in this new era will be “… between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.”3 The root of social conflict and the other problems that limit China’s future development is this unbalanced and inadequate development. In the meantime, the Party also admitted that, in addition to “… the regional imbalances and structural flaws in development …” the people’s increasing “… demands for democracy, the rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment …” constitute another great challenge.4 Commenting on this “… change of the principal contradiction …” critic Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt aptly notes that it “… mirrors the 1 World Bank, “GDP Growth (annual %),” World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG. Accessed February 19th, 2013. 2 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” in Ban Wang ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 1–2. 3 Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” China Daily, 2017, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/con tent_34115212.htm. Accessed December 21st, 2018. 4 Ibid.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_002

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leadership’s acknowledgment of the fact that society has become more diverse and fractured, demanding a set of public goods that are more difficult to measure and produce than those of the past.”5 Indeed, after four decades of reform and opening-up, China has now long been immersed in the world of global capitalism; accordingly, contemporary Chinese culture is also experiencing dramatic and decisive transformations with multivalent dimensions. With the rise of China’s economy—if not yet its political-military power—President Xi proposed in November of 2012, soon after the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Party, that the “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng, 中国梦) defines the role of the individual in society and the goals of the Chinese nation.6 Western media often translates this term as the “China dream” to highlight the ambition of the state or its ultimate goal to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. However, the Chinese official media prefer the phrase “Chinese dream” to stress the efforts of each and every member of society to build China as a wealthy, strong and modern state and to make the Chinese people happy and prosperous. Thus far, the term has been routinely used in official announcements and has essentially become the political ideology of the new leadership. Although it is apparently inspired by the “American Dream”—usually understood to favor individualism—pro-government scholars characterize the “Chinese Dream” as collectively-oriented, concerning Chinese prosperity and promoting socialism and national glory.7 Western observers thus see the emergence of a “… uniquely Chinese national narrative”: “The search for a unifying ideology, long submerged by the materialism and individualism unleashed during China’s reform era, has taken center stage.” In particular, the terms “ ‘China Path’ and ‘China Dream’ were coined to suggest a strong nation capable of global leadership and of representing an alternative model of governance that sets China apart from market-led capitalism or liberal democracy.”8 What is more, these are terms “… implicitly contesting the universality of the American dream and offering the Chinese dream as 5 Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt, “China’s ‘New Era’: Between Continuity and Disruption,” in “China’s ‘New Era’ with Xi Jinping Characteristics,” China Analysis, December 2017, https:// www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/chinas_new_era_with_xi_jinping_characteristics7243. Accessed December 27th, 2018. 6 See “Chasing the Chinese Dream,” The Economist, May 4, 2013, pp. 24–26. 7 Shi Yuzhi 石毓智, “Zhongguomeng qubieyu meiguomeng de qi da tezheng 中国梦区别 于美国梦的七大特征 [Seven reasons why China Dream is different from the American Dream],” Remin luntan 人民论坛 [People’s Tribune], No. 15, 2013, 46–47. 8 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Mareike Ohlberg, Simon Lang and Bertram Lang, “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future,” Source: MERICS: Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies, https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/171004_MPOC_05_Ideologies_0 .pdf, Accessed Dec. 21, 2018.

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an—even better—alternative …” which then “… has become almost inseparable from … officially constructed Chinese soft power.”9 However, terms such as “rejuvenation” and “revitalization” in the party’s rhetoric are more reminiscent of China’s ambition for a century and a half to restore its erstwhile glory from the imperial period—an ambition which has run tortuously since its defeat in the two Opium Wars (1840–1842 and 1856–1860)—rather than recalling traditional socialist ethical-moral teachings. Throughout the constant efforts of Chinese intellectuals to modernize the nation, culture always plays a significant role. Therefore, the future of China could be inferred from its present cultural conditions. At present, in Chinese intellectual and cultural circles, there is still “… much second-guessing, autocritique, and even a persistent inferiority complex in relation to the more ‘advanced’ capitalist cultures of the West.”10 However, even though it is commonly accepted amongst Chinese policymakers and pundits that culture is the primary source of soft power, it is well observed that “China’s charm offensive for soft power—megamedia events and glamorous Orientalist shows—is falling far short of its economic power.”11 How do Chinese intellectuals deal with this situation and what of their efforts to promote a “cultural renaissance”? The aim of this study is to investigate this ongoing social-historical development by delving into contemporary China’s literary and artistic productions as well as its cultural debates. It offers detailed analyses of literary and cultural texts that cover a variety of media, ranging from fiction, poetry and film to theoretical works. Combining analysis of texts with broader contextual considerations of social, political and economic developments of post-Mao China, this research intends to explore the “truth content” of Chinese society and culture after the 1980s—after its intentional, gradual integration with globalization. This Introduction consists of three parts. The first lays out the general contour of contemporary Chinese society and its culture by inquiring into the intricate relations among three terms or phenomena prefixed by “post”: Post-New Period, postmodernism and postsocialism. The second section discusses Raymond Williams’ theory of “three cultures” and its Chinese variations, which will serve as the methodological framework of this research. After mapping the five features of contemporary Chinese culture arising out of this 9 Paola Voci and Luo Hui, “Screening China’s Soft Power: Screen Cultures and Discourses of Power,” in Paola Voci and Luo Hui ed. Screening China’s Soft Power (New York: Routledge, 2018), 5. 10 Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 19. 11 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” in Ban Wang ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 19.

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inquiry, the last section of the Introduction then offers the structural outline of this critique. 1

Post-New Period, Postmodernism and Postsocialism

In his report to the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2017, President Xi Jinping stated that, with decades of hard work (implicitly referring to the previous four decades of reform and opening-up), China’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” had crossed the threshold into a new era, marking a new beginning. This so-called “New Era” (新时代) has since emerged as a new state ideology and terminological starting point for Chinese society. The term recalls the party’s previous political slogan of “New Period” (新时期) and the unofficial term given by Chinese intellectuals, “Post-New Period” (后新时期). “New Period” was proposed in the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1978 by CCP leader Hua Guofeng 华国锋 (1921–2008), who declared the tenyear “Cultural Revolution” ended and reiterated that the fundamental task of the Party in the New Period was to re-start the project of socialist modernization to make China a powerful, modern socialist state. However, since the 1990s, and especially after the “southern tour” of then supreme leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) in 1992, China has gradually yet decisively joined the capitalist world club by implementing pro-neoliberal economic policies. The socialist economic tenets by which China generally abided in the early reform era of the 1980s did not prevent it from making such pro-market reforms. As I mention elsewhere, from then on, …[the] gigantic momentum of commercialization and marketization, with its ensuing trend of consumerist mass culture, vehemently made inroads into corners of society, and fundamentally changed the physical and intellectual world. In this circumstance, the neoliberal orthodoxy of radical privatization and deregulation, which was taken to be necessary for raising economic efficiency, gradually gained strength. The visage of wholesale marketization and full integration into the capitalist world-system also took shape. When the maximization of efficiency was regarded as the inexorable premise for social progress irrespective of human working condition, it inevitably led to the predominance of the neo-liberalist doctrine in the minds of the policy-making officials.12 12 Wang Xiaoping, Postsocialist Conditions: Ideas and History in China’s “Independent Cinema”, 1988–2008 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018), 16. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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Accordingly, this period is generally taken to be a qualitatively different era, departing from the previous one. Even in the early 1990s, Chinese literary critics had noted that a new era had begun and tried to give it a new name: “Post-New Period.” In the cultural realm, critic Zhang Yiwu summarizes two features of the motifs of the literary productions of this period, namely, (1) the erection of mass media or a Chinese cultural industry that is not only sufficiently “postmodern,” but also sufficiently “nativized” and (2) a reversal in the domain of “serious literature,” which is marked by the disengagement from and demystification of avant-garde experimentation … [resulting in] … a docile and routinized everyday world.13 At this time, literary and cultural critics approached the new reality in the arena of literature by analyzing the “avant-garde fiction” emerging in late 1980s that was then popular. Seeing this trend of fictional writing as a harbinger of a new literature, they coined the term “Post-New Period literature” (houxinshiqi wenxue, 后新时期文学) for this idiosyncratic cultural production,14 and characterized the incoming decade as one of disillusionment as well as liberation.15 Exhilarated by robust economic growth and a rosy picture of consumerist pleasure, they envisioned an alternative road to happiness in which China was free from the spell of the Western myth of “modernity.” A term “Chineseness” (Zhonghuaxing, 中华性) was also formulated, by which these intellectuals sought to de-mythicize Western knowledge of China and find ways to reconstruct China’s cultural identity and national subjectivity.16 Jason McGrath later remarked ingeniously that the prefix “post” also implied that China had entered 13 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-Garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 157–158. 14 See Xie Mian 谢冕 and Zhang Yiwu 张颐武, Da Zhuanxing—hou xin shiqi wenhua yanjiu 大转型：后新时期文化研究 [The Great Transition: Studies of Cultures of the Post-New Era] (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 41. 15 For the earlier discussion of “Post-New Era” as a periodizing concept, see Zhang Yiwu 张 颐武, “Houxinshiqi wenxue: xin de wenhua kongjian 后新时期文学：新的文化空间 [Literature of the Post-New Era: A New Cultural Space];” Zhao Yiheng 赵毅衡, “Erzhong dangdaiwenxue 二种当代文学 [Two kinds of contemporary literature];” and Wang Ning 王宁, “Jicheng yu duanlie: zouxiang houxinshiqi wenxue 继承与断裂：走向后 新时期文学 [Legacy and rupture: towards the literature of the Post-New Era],” in Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Literature and Art Contention], No. 6, 1992: 9–12. 16 Zhang Fa 张法, Zhang Yiwu 张颐武, and Wang Yichuan 王一川, “Cong ‘xiandaixing’ dao ‘zhonghuaxing’—xinzhishixing de tanxun 从“现代性”到“中华性”：新知识型 的探寻 [From “Modernity” to “Chineseness”: In Search of a New Mode of Knowledge],” Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Literature and Art Contention], No. 2, 1994, 14. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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“… a postmodern phase in its cultural life, as the essentially modern intellectual ideologies of the 1980s, and the modernist works of art that accompanied them, were felt to have been surpassed and discredited.”17 However, the Chinese postmodern discourses that thus appeared are mutually contradictory; critic Xudong Zhang noted that they were labelled by their opponents as … subversive (undermining the value systems of the socialist state), complacent (legitimizing the state by affirming and celebrating the commercialized everyday culture under the former’s ideological control), too Westernized (whoring after the academic fashions of the Western theory), too Chinese (harboring haughty nativism and nationalism), too leftist (criticizing capitalism and undermining the universal truth of modernity), too rightist (celebrating desire and commodities) …18 Given this self-defeating contradiction, what does postmodernism really mean in China? In the West, postmodernism is generally regarded as the cultural logic of late, global capitalism whereas, in the Chinese context, it refers to the “… cultural logic of a post-revolutionary, yet residually socialist, Chinese form of life.”19 The hybrid and heterogeneous characteristics of postmodernism, Chinese postmodernists maintain, have appeared in the mixed forms and realities of China’s economy and society: the simultaneous coexistence of pre-capitalist, capitalist and post-capitalist political, economic and social structures in various domains demonstrates a spatial fracturing and temporal de-synchronization, which run against the teleology of modernity and thus exemplify postmodernity. Nevertheless, although the euphoric feelings of Chinese postmodernists were understandable considering the prevalent nationalistic sentiment of the time, the ensuing discourse of globalization, which strikes a chord with the government’s rhetoric, also exposes their depoliticized thinking that neglects the engulfment of global capitalism. True reflection on this ongoing transformation only appeared towards the end of the 1990s when the lamentable aftermath of some pro-neoliberal programs, such as privatization and pro-market restructuration, were discussed by members 17 Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity, 6. 18 Zhang Xudong, “Epilogue: Postmodernism and Postsocialist Society: Historizing the Present,” in Zhang Xudong and Arof Dirlik eds., Postmodernism and China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 404. 19 Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, “Introduction,” in Zhang Xudong and Arof Dirlik eds., Postmodernism and China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 11.

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of China’s “New Left”—a derogatory label applied by its cultural-political rivals who regard themselves as “liberals.” The awakening of this cultural-political critical consciousness has also benefitted from international critical theory. Many Chinese scholars have enjoyed more opportunities to go overseas on academic exchange since the 1990s; as a result, they have been inspired by Western theoretical debates and political movements. For instance, both terms “Chinese postmodernity” and “Chineseness” bear the signature of postmodern and postcolonial theories, whereas politically more critical terminologies such as “depoliticization” and “postsocialism” have also been imported and adapted from the West. Introduced to such cutting-edge intellectual trends, Chinese scholars have realized that China’s post-modernity is “… part of a global condition of postsocialist modernity and must be understood in the context of the history of the global capitalist system.”20 They have also learnt that … postsocialism is not just a condition that characterizes nearly all of the former communist ‘second world’ but is rather a global, universally shared condition. […] The failure of the global communist movement and the apparently overwhelming triumph of capitalism are therefore conditions affecting the entire planet.21 While China’s postsocialism is, to a certain extent, characterized by pragmatism—a political principle practiced by Chinese politicians in the postMao period in general, as well as the living condition and life philosophy followed by the Chinese populace in their daily activities in particular—we must still pay close attention to the inalienable imprint and strong residue of socialism. Cultural scholar Chris Berry’s comparison of Chinese postsocialism with Western postmodernism further highlights this point: in China, “… postsocialism has more parallels with Lyotard’s postmodernism, where the forms and structures of the modern (in this case socialism) persist long after faith in the grand narrative that authorizes it has been lost.”22 Similarly, although McGrath acknowledges that “… postsocialist China is intrinsically postmodern, insofar as it closes the door on the particular vision of modernity offered by the Maoist revolution …”23 he also admits that “… both popular and elite postsocialist 20 21 22 23

Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity, 1–2. Ibid., 14. Chris Berry. “Getting Real: Chinese Documentary, Chinese Postsocialism,” in Zhang Zhen ed., The Urban Generation (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 116. Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity, 6.

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cultures continue to be marked by the memory of socialism, which can often serve as a source of nostalgia under contemporary conditions.”24 Facing this idiosyncratic cultural-political situation, the dualism between the state and society, which is a fashionable paradigm used to study modern Western society and is often applied in the field of China studies, is worthy of greater consideration. Historian Timothy Weston has aptly contended that this dualistic model is “… simply inadequate to describe today’s complex social and political reality …” in China. A case in point is that “… a significant feature of today’s labor disputes is that they blur the once sharp lines dividing ‘society’ and ‘state,’…” because there are “… multiple actors …” implicated “… in these labor conflicts—employed workers, furloughed workers, factory managers, local Communist Party officials, national-level government representatives, officials with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)— and frequently they do not share interests in common.”25 Consequently, he concludes that, “… distinct elements of what in the past might have been lumped together in the ‘state’ and ‘society’ categories respectively now find themselves ranged against one another in cross-cutting, shifting alliances.”26 Similarly, political scientist Peter Gries notes that “State and social actors in China … are not always unitary and antagonistic; they can and often form alliances with each other and against other political groups. Conversely, there can be conflict within segments of both ‘state’ and ‘society.’ ”27 Indeed, observers have noticed that, since the 1990s, there have been “… two countervailing movements …” in the Chinese cultural arena in this “Post-New Era”: … “[a trend of deterritorialization] from heteronomy to autonomy in the relationship between cultural production and state institutions and ideology, and a simultaneous reterritorialization as culture is commodified and subjected to the market mechanism and the profit imperative.”28 Granted these complex conditions, how should we study Chinese culture?

24 Ibid., 12. 25 See Timothy B. Weston, “The Iron Man Weeps: Joblessness and Political Legitimacy in the Chinese Rust Belt,” in Gries and Rosen, eds. State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 73. 26 Ibid. 27 See Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, “Introduction: Popular Protest and State Legitimation in 21st century China,” in Gries and Rosen, eds. State and Society in 21st Century China, 73. 28 Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity, 11. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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Raymond Williams’ Concept of Three Cultures and Its Chinese Variations

For our purpose, I find the theoretical trend of cultural materialism in literary theory and cultural studies, particularly the theory of Three Cultures proposed by Raymond Williams (1921–1988), a useful perspective. It is well known that cultural materialism is founded upon the tradition of the Frankfurt School. Being a theoretical combination of leftist culturalism and Marxist analysis, it typically deals with specific historical documents and attempts to recognize the zeitgeist of a particular historical moment. Adhering to the class-horizon of traditional Marxism, it maintains an additional emphasis on the marginalized population. Compared to traditional humanist readings which often neglect the oppressed and the marginalized, cultural materialists consider such groups in textual readings, bringing out new approaches to representation in literary criticism. In particular, this theoretical school aims to demonstrate how hegemonic forces in society appropriate canonical texts to validate (or inscribe certain values onto) cultural imaginaries. Being a theoretical device, four elements are crucial to defining the features of this critical inquiry: historical context, close textual analysis, political commitment and theoretical method.29 Analyzing the processes by which the dominant ideology is promoted in power structures (such as the church, the state or the academy), cultural materialism delves into a text’s historical context to pinpoint its political implications; through a close textual reading, it exposes and criticizes the hegemonic ideology of the ruling class. Besides engaging in this task of debunking the myth of hegemonic notions, cultural materialism also identifies what Raymond Williams calls “residual”, “emergent” and “oppositional” cultural elements, with the purpose of finding possibilities for rejecting and/or subverting the hegemonic position. British critic Graham Holderness thus calls it a “… politicized form of historiography.”30 Raymond Williams’s conception of the “three cultures”—the dominant, the residual and the emergent cultures—could be understood in this context. This framework is instrumental in analyzing the complex and dynamic ways in which a national culture operates. The dominant culture is advocated by the ruling and most powerful class of the state. Meanwhile, within the dominant 29 See Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfiled eds., Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. vii. See also Scott Wilson, Cultural Materialism: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 30 Quoted from Peter Barry, Beginning Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 182. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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values of the culture, elements of the past or residual culture also exist, although they are being filtered and bleached out. When the residual becomes oppositional to the dominant culture, the dominant tries its best to marginalize it, although not always successfully. The residual culture is the remnants of an earlier stage of society, which might have become a very different social construct in terms of its heterogeneous political and religious beliefs. These residual beliefs and practices may remain dominant, even long after the social conditions that made them dominant have disappeared. In China in the early reform era of the 1980s, for instance, socialist ideals and concepts, although becoming residual and falling short of favorable social-political circumstances, were still dominant in the minds of the populace. According to Williams, the elements of the emergent culture are inherent within the dominant and could become the alternative. They develop as society transforms, generating new sets of social interactions. Being a new force that actively challenges the dominant culture, they are qualitatively new. Starting from the margins of society, they may eventually become the dominant culture—although not necessarily. Raymond Williams discusses these power relationships and the processes of change in Culture and Society (1958) and then explores these concepts more clearly in Marxism and Literature (1977). His deliberation of the intricate relations among the dominant, residual and emergent cultures of a society, or such elements within a culture in a particular historical moment, departs from Hegelian and Lukacsian diagnoses of history as monumental epochs, in which stages of history succeed one after another, with each epoch being characterized by a spirit of the times. Williams, rather, stresses the dynamic momentum and the diachronic structure of a society in a synchronic chronotope, pointing to its revolutionary potential. Dominant formations such as “feudal,” “bourgeois,” “capitalist” and “late capitalist” are thus too broad to be analytical units, and he divides them into more specified moments or stages/periods. Williams’ approach could be characterized as a complex process in which the socialcultural elements of dominant, residual, and emergent exist in a dynamic and interactive relationship. Opportunities are accordingly opened when the subversive and oppositional forms emerge to challenge and compete with the dominant. His inspirational framework notwithstanding, Williams’ formulation is a theoretical articulation of the European society of his time. When applied to China, it necessitates some key revisions in order to suit the particular socialhistorical situation and cultural-political conditions. For instance, the dominant culture in the postmodern West is a commercial culture controlled by

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capital, whereas, in postsocialist China, the case is far more complicated: a compromise between the “leitmotif culture” promoted by the state and the actual pop culture of society. To be more precise, China’s true dominant culture is not the “mainstream culture” but a consumption-oriented culture enshrining middle class tastes and distinctions, which are a “glocal” version of the West and are nourished by a developing “civil society.” This culture has gradually been developing since the secularization of social life in the 1980s post-Mao era. When the socialist promise of equality and justice was shelved in the 1990s in favor of economic growth, with money and capital becoming the only totems and symbols of success, this culture became the truly dominant one. For Williams, the dominant culture would reinterpret and thus incorporate the residual elements, which otherwise would be its subversive alternative. In Chinese society since the 1990s, the residual culture has been the “red culture” of the Maoist era, which was dominant in the past. In this regard, cultural critic Liu Kang has astutely observed that “… the revolutionary legacy is deeply ingrained in the everyday life of China’s populace and is still active today.”31 Although it sometimes could manifest as a “red songs party” when the government deems it necessary to boost its legitimacy, this legacy oftentimes could only be witnessed in a sedimented form as a “structure of feeling,” deeply buried in the political unconscious of the populace. To be sure, in times of emergency, the political unconscious of socialist egalitarianism and fairness may transform into a distinct political awareness and materialize in more concrete forms.32 Nevertheless, thanks to depoliticizing conditions, more often than not “… civil disobedience and legal activism has [sic.] taken forms in which class rhetoric and consciousness frequently yield to liberal discourses of rights

31 Liu Kang, “Introduction,” in Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2004), 16. He further notes keenly that “The centrality of ‘revolution’ in today’s China, as both a historical legacy and a powerful ideological hegemony, has to be reconsidered within the context of globalization. The dazzling variety and plurality of political and ideological strands in contemporary Chinese intellectual discourses and their interpretations notwithstanding, the revolutionary legacy itself cannot be elided if one intends to find a sense of direction in the labyrinth of social life in China today.” Ibid., 17. 32 For instance, in many workers’ strikes, the demonstrators formulate the slogans of their protests “out of a vocabulary and symbolic repertoire grounded in the history of Chinese communism” (Timothy B. Weston, “The Iron Man Weeps,” 68), with which they articulate their resentment towards the various forms of capitalist injustice that have emerged in the state’s pro-neoliberal reform.

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and citizenship at a time of deepening class divisions.”33 However, political scientists have also observed that “… workers’ banners also demand subsistence rights … often appealing to standards of justice harking back to socialist ideology and the social contract between the working class and the state that prevailed throughout the first four decades of the People’s Republic.”34 In William’s framework, the emergent culture refers to a new culture with new significance, values, social relations and praxis, which emerges vis-à-vis the appearance of new class organizations and the awakening of a new class consciousness; however, in reality, it referred to the culture created by the working class of Britain. In China, “… massive dislocation and the collapse of many previous social ties and cultural codes …” has occurred since the 1990s with the implementation of market reform; consequently, “… relations and values are increasingly reduced to abstract market function” just as in the West.35 With such change, a new class organization emerges in which the new class consciousness of the emergent class—the business entrepreneurs—is awakened. However, this new class stratum does not create any substantive, new culture but merely emulates the old bourgeois culture of the Republican period and imitates Hollywood pop shows; thus, the appearance of the phenomena of “Republican spree” and “Shanghai nostalgia”; these cultural fashions blindly regard the Republican era as the “good old days” of a “Golden Age.” Oftentimes, this emergent culture takes vulgar or conservative forms with refined and exquisite mannerisms and distinctions, as witnessed in the “Lust, Caution fever” to be analyzed in Chapter 8. Accordingly, China’s real emergent culture is not produced by the “newly emerging” bourgeois class but is, as Williams analyzed regarding Britain, created by the “downfallen” working class. This is apparent in various forms, such as “migrant workers’ new-year’s party,” “migrant workers’ poems and songs,” “subaltern literature” and video productions (including movies) devoted to their lives. It demonstrates the renaissance of socialist working-class culture or the return to and re-creation of progressive left-wing literature and art. This renaissance is also shown in the debate on the cultural-political significance of being Chinese, or the implication of the subjectivity/identity of Chinese culture in the age of globalization, which nevertheless often coexists with the ideology of cultural conservatism. Sometimes, these emergent elements do set 33

See Ching Kwan Lee and Mark Selden, “China’s Durable Inequality: Legacies of Revolution and Pitfalls of Reform.” 34 Ibid. 35 Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 8.

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themselves in opposition to the dominant culture. If, as is believed, the interaction and clash between the dominant and the emergent culture would lead to societal change, then where China will go still depends on the negotiation between these two cultures. Meanwhile, since the political consciousness of various social classes is generally still ambiguous and not yet fully developed, class conflicts have not, in reality, been fully articulated in political discourse. The five sections of the present study will follow this general theoretical framework. The first section will examine the residual elements of contemporary Chinese culture; the next two will explore the dominant culture; the remaining two sections will inquire into the emergent one. These five parts also map out the five distinct features of contemporary Chinese culture. What is the social-cultural significance and political stake for us to recognize in the three cultures in general, and the five features of Chinese culture in particular? If, as Fredric Jameson points out, the function of cognitive mapping is “… to enable a situational representation on the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society’s structures as a whole,”36 then this act of cognitive mapping has cultural-political significance. This is because the understanding and representation of social reality conditions any further meaningful action to be taken. Changing society becomes possible only through rethinking the social order and envisioning an alternative future. In more general terms, for cultural studies as an academic discipline and as a social practice, it is known that, In the Gramscian view, the common-sense and popular culture through which people organize their lives and experience becomes the crucial site of ideological contestation. This is the place where hegemony, understood as a fluid and temporary series of alliances, needs to be constantly rewon and renegotiated. The creation and dissolution of cultural hegemony is an ongoing process and culture a terrain of continuous struggle over meanings.37 In particular, Chris Barker notes that cultural studies, as “… an intellectual project … provided wider social and political forces with intellectual resources…” that “… sought to play a ‘de-mystifying role’ by pointing to the constructed character of cultural texts …” and “… aimed to highlight the myths and 36 37

Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Postmodernism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 51. Chris Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice, 3rd edition (Los Angeles and London: Sage, 2008), 444.

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ideologies embedded in texts in the hope of producing subject positions and real subjects opposed to subordination.”38 Although Barker describes this mission of cultural studies in the past tense, it is apparently not outdated for our study because various competing ideologies are fiercely contesting cultural hegemony in Chinese society. With this in mind, we now set out to explore the multivalent characteristics of Chinese culture in this neoliberal age of global capitalism. 3

Structural Outline of the Five Features

Through an inquiry into some representative works of contemporary Chinese poetry, fiction and film, as well as an examination of the ongoing cultural debates and academic exploration, the present research finds that there are five distinct features or trends amongst contemporary China’s “three cultures.” The first is socialist memory and its aesthetic distinctions, appearing as the “structure of feeling” of the socialist “new man,” still witnessed in literary imagery and cultural mannerism—especially in the literary productions of the “Middle-Aged Generation” poets. Being politically unconscious in daily life, these aesthetic distinctions have become China’s residual culture. Secondly, the belief of liberal humanism greatly impinges on fictional works, shown particularly in avant-garde fiction and stories of the “New Historicism.” Thirdly, the logic of the market has seeped into every corner of society and affected interpersonal relations. These two phenomena—liberal humanism and market logic (partly shown as consumerism)—are key features of the dominant culture in China. The fourth feature refers to the bourgeois consciousness of middle-class tastes, which—disguised as refined aesthetic distinction and valuable life wisdom—permeates elite groups after socialist idealism has withered away. Fifthly, with China’s rising economic power, the new Chinese identity in the age of globalization is proposed and debated, further fostered by the robust growth of cultural nationalism. These two phenomena—the predominance of middle-class tastes and debate around Chinese identity— characterize the emergent culture. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly outline this critique. Critic Ales Erjavec has found that all postsocialist countries not only “… share very similar problems …” but also “… possess[ed] a similar cultural and ideological legacy …” from which “… there emerge[d] similar kinds of 38

Ibid., 445.

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artistic endeavors.”39 In the case of postsocialist China, Liu Kang notes that the “… aesthetic forms and structures …” of the “… revolutionary legacy …” are “… deeply ingrained in the Chinese cultural imaginary and constitute a significant dimension in the contradiction-ridden cultural arena.”40 In particular, the structure of feeling of the socialist period is still often found in contemporary Chinese poetry, which could be taken as a typical feature of residual socialist culture. Thus, the first section deals with this issue by examining two poets, who are members of the so-called “Middle-Aged Generation” in Chinese literary circles. The first chapter is about some of the motifs in the poems of Fanken Chen, whom I typify as “a lyric poet in the era of postsocialism.” Motifs such as the explicit love of a “cultural China” and an implicit longing for a “political nation,” the heroic complex of a plebeian nature uniting the Mao era and the Dengist socialism of the 1980s, patriotism and homesickness, the recitation of love and nature, as well as the intrinsic ties between the individual feelings of the New Era and the collective affective machine of the Maoist period, all reveal the residual socialist imprints in the persona of the poet. The second chapter continues this topic, exploring the historical significance and cultural import of the “Middle-Aged Generation,” with Fu Tianhong’s poems as its case study by integrating the personal experience of the poet with his literary works. In general, the collective cultural-political awareness and political unconscious shown in their works through common feelings, shared imagery as well as similar poetic expressions which display the inexorable spiritual residue of the Maoist period. On the other hand, the gradually developed belief in liberal humanism and, ultimately, the rampant trend of depoliticization also find their salient embodiment in Chinese fiction, which is a facet of the dominant culture. The third chapter therefore discusses the interrelated connections between the historical experience of the 1980s and formal experimentation in Chinese avant-garde fiction, which was popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Here, I will engage in dialogue with the existing scholarship in the field of Andrew Jones, Xiaobin Yang, Lu Tonglin, Liu Kang and, especially, Xudong Zhang. In terms of the timing of this trend, it should be noted that the avant-garde writers are “… suspended between the ‘utopian fever and fascination with cultural roots’… of the 1980s and the massive globalization and commodification that has characterized Chinese cultural production in the 1990s …” which results in 39 Aleš Erjavec, “Introduction.” in Aleš Erjavec ed. Postmodernism and the Postsocialist Condition: Politicized Art Under Late Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 3. 40 Liu Kang, “Introduction,” in Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 19.

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… their appropriation of a host of techniques of international modernism, their deliberate subversion of the expectations (be they ethical, ideological, or formal in nature) of their readers, and their penchant for convoluted narrative labyrinths and thematic cul-de-sacs.41 Regarding their form, the Chinese avant-garde constantly evokes “… the textual reflexivity, the ceaseless play of language …” and composes “… fragmentary, ironic narrative …” which “… deconstructs the rigid structure of the grand narrative.”42 On the other hand, in terms of the content of the writings, critics trained in Western scholarship hold that “… the world of meta-fiction is built on the inspiration drawn from an emerging world of senses, perception, and imagination …” and “… its empirical raw material comprises the social relations and material environment of Deng’s China captured … as a swelling personal history.”43 As a result, The labyrinth of fiction … crystallizes a constant effort to expand the fragments of memory and experience, to capture images of the present, to meet a past sunk deep in collective oblivion, and to reproduce the fabric of contemporary life with a stylistic quality.44 I do agree with Xudong Zhang’s view that avant-garde fiction deals with “… radically contemporary life …” and “… seeks to turn it into a historical expressivity through its formal, that is, meta-fictional, artifacts …” in which “… the fading of the totality of collective experience in the late 1980s …” is simultaneously “… a ‘clearing of being’ (Heidegger) that brings about a world for experience to grow in rather than wither …”45 However, I cannot completely endorse his point that as “… a tacit affirmation of the New Era, avant-garde fiction entails not so much the end of subject and narrative as the origin of self and history in the changed conditions of possibilities.”46 What this means is that we should 41 Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” in Mostow, Joshua and Kirk A. Denton, eds. Columbia Companion to Modern East Asian Literatures (NY: Columbia UP, 2003), 555. 42 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern: Trauma and Irony in Chinese Avant-Garde Fiction (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 164–165. 43 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-Garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 194. 44 Ibid., 157. 45 Ibid., 154, 194. Zhang aptly notes that “… the new genre marks the first discursive construction of the totality of the immediate experience of the New Era.” Ibid., 154. 46 Ibid., 164. In other words, although this meta-fiction is “… a cultural-ideological advance fortification …” which “… turned out to be instead a social-symbolic shelter …” we have reservations over the argument that “… the genre delivers the sharp, unmistakable image

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pay attention to the Janus-like nature of the cultural-political implications of this kind of writing. I will contend that Chinese avant-garde fictional writing is not merely formal experimentation arising out of the influence of foreign fiction, or a variation of Western postmodernism; instead, what it essentially shows is the secularization of Chinese society in the post-revolutionary period in which a cynical interpretation of the Mao era in particular, and a revisionist understanding of modern Chinese history in general, is brought about by the budding consciousness of the newly emerging “middle class.” In this rendition of both the present and the past by way of projection, there is nothing but a vulnerable subjective consciousness seeking to establish its subjectivity; however, it is ultimately in vain because its apolitical way of thinking renders it susceptible to the pitfall of “unhappy consciousness.”47 Consequently, when “… the postsocialist, postpolitical reality made the imaginary world of their experimental fiction increasingly irrelevant …” the avant-garde writers not only “… lost their audience …”48 but also lost their specious critical consciousness. In the same vein, the fourth chapter explores the New Historicist Fiction in vogue at around the same time, with White Deer Plain as the cardinal text. Critic Qingxin Lin argues that this fiction, which to him is a category of the “new historical fiction,” is “… a constituent part of Chinese avant-gardism…” that “… manifested both influences from foreign literature and the anxieties over Chinese reality.”49 Here, I will explore how the novel White Deer Plain displays the revisionist rewriting of China’s socialist revolution premised on the tenet of New Historicism. While Lin contends that this kind of fiction “… has risen first of all as a critical reaction to the politicized and monologic discourse of revolution …” by reversing “… almost all aspects, from narrative of a new subject position and the social, symbolic space it is determined to make its own.” Ibid., 156, 171. 47 In this regard, Xudong Zhang also admits that “… the disturbance of subjectivity …” permeates many narrative-oriented works of writers (181), and acknowledges that this “… disturbance of the subject under the construction of time betrays a historical dislocation and overlap that is carried and somehow manifested by fiction” (183), which becomes so because “[T]he coming into being of this subject position symbolically inscribed is circumscribed by a historical as well as a cultural reorientation, where alienation becomes part of the conditions of possibility for self-construction and self-understanding” (198– 199). Consequently, in my view, the kind of “… self-reflexivity emerging from individual experience and from the material circumstances in which this experience has been conditioned” (198–199) is nothing but a bourgeois individuality, which is, however, yet to firmly establish the bourgeois reason for itself. All quotations are from Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms. 48 Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 103. 49 Qingxin Lin, Brushing History Against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical Fiction (1986–1999) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 1.

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skills to thematic structures, of the revolutionary discourse …” and thus “… has shaken the foundation of both the discourse of revolution and the discourse of Chinese modernity …”50 I will suggest that the postmodernity that it displays is none other than post-revolutionary and postsocialist nihilism and agnosticism. It is under this conservative social climate that have we witnessed the disappearance of idealism since the 1990s. Idealism in China was a byproduct of the socialist ideal, which still persisted in the 1980s as the praxis of reform and opening-up kept its promise or premise of pursuing the objective of the self-improvement and self-development of socialism. However, since socialist principles have been suspended in economic policy since the 1990s, rampant cynicism and money worship is apparent everywhere—the market principle envelopes society. This unfortunate transformation, the other face of the dominant commercial culture, could be glimpsed in two movies of Sixth-Generation directors, who generally endeavor to expose the dire effects that pro-neoliberal programs have had on the socially marginalized and underprivileged. They have done so by “… exploring new domains of film form in conjunction with forms of moral and affective economy and the possibility of sensory revivification.”51 I treat this subject in Chapter 5 and argue that, while the directors of this group generally do not subscribe to socialist concepts, there are exceptions. One key member of the group, Guan Hu (管虎, 1969–), in his first feature Dirt (Toufa luanle, 头发乱了, 1992), pays respect to the older, revolutionary generation. The spiritual state of the youthful protagonists and their adventure in the diegetic space is also an ethnographical account of the Chinese nation in the early period of reform. Another director, Lu Xuechang (路学长, 1964–2014), in his debut work The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人, 1997), also implicitly eulogizes the Red Guard generation who still hold political idealism. But towards the end of the second movie, the “elder brother” figure nicknamed Zhu Hehai—a name derived from the novel How the Steel was Tempered by Nikolay Ostrovsky (1904–1936) of the former Soviet Union—is maimed in the mercenary era and symbolically dies. The two sorts of Bildungsroman evident in these two films allegorically exemplify the fading of political passion and the ensuing spiritual wasteland. While auteurs try to produce quality art movies, popular cinema is more welcome in the Chinese market; such cinema not unexpectedly promotes the ideology of the consumerist gospel. Indeed, ever since the turn of the new 50 Ibid. 51 Zhang Zhen, “Urban Dreamscape, Phantom Sisters, and the Identity of an Emergent Art Cinema,” in Zheng Zhen ed, The Urban Generation: Chinese Cinema and Society at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 346.

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century, China’s cultural landscape has been “… filled with spectacles of sound and image, thanks to the rapidly growing electronic media and information technology: pervasive consumerism, with its values and images centered on material and instinctual desires, naked hedonism, and philistinism.”52 The sixth chapter therefore examines two films that proceed in the narrative form of “postmodern” love stories, which nevertheless either bemoan the incapability of establishing the subjectivity of the middle class or brandish the selfimage of Chinese entrepreneurship. Neither of them could fruitfully diagnose the illness of society and present its totality; instead, both follow mainstream pragmatism and take cynicism or philistinism as life wisdom. As the unconscious articulation of the self-consciousness of this class, this mentality demonstrates the relentless forfeiture of idealism amidst the prevalent mentality that seeks business success. This knowledge of society’s dominant culture then leads into the fourth part of the book, which is about the changed value system of Chinese—and thus the emergent—culture in this era. The screening of the film Lust, Caution in China in late 2007 and the subsequent banning of its main actress in early 2008 created a great stir, arousing heated debate lasting for more than half a year and becoming one of the most sensational cultural (and political) events in China. As a result, the intricate texture of the film’s cinematic text and the complex reactions of its social context constitute an intriguing case of sophisticated cultural politics with rich and significant import. By analyzing the movie’s narrative strategy, the seventh chapter reveals its nature as a political film noir that aimed to allegorize the history of modern China. A discussion of its diversified reception in the Chinese world, rather than echoing the mainstream opinion that sees the harsh critique from the Chinese public as merely a blind reaction of rampant nationalist sentiment, discloses the heterogeneous voices among differing social forces competing for cultural hegemony, particularly emergent voices demanding a renewed consciousness of class interests. This heterogeneity is furthermore examined in the next chapter, which reviews contemporary Chinese cultural trends and debates from the perspective of intellectual cultural politics. This discussion is placed in the context of the ongoing development of China’s political economy and complex society. It suggests that there have been three trends of intellectual thought in society since the 1990s: the intricate dialectic between postmodern discourses and nationalistic sentiment, the “conservative” cooperation between statism and corporatism, and the conflicts between the pursuit of social democracy and the dream of neoliberal freedom. It concludes with a discussion 52

Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 44–45.

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of the characteristics of intellectual politics in this period—a gradual turning to a pursuit of “new socialism” envisaged by the New Left, and a disenchantment with the neoliberal agenda by the broad populace. The last, but not the least important, section also deals with emerging intellectual exploration in the cultural world. Although passionate nationalism since the 1990s has often been castigated by foreign observers, the emerging quest for a new national cultural identity by Chinese scholars not only correlates with their efforts to articulate the glorious civilization of the past and radical self-innovation during the modern era but is also intimately tied to the legitimacy of the reformed state machine in the age of global capitalism. The ninth chapter then explores this problem by discussing an intellectual exchange between a “new leftist” and two “liberals.” From their debates on the convergence and divergence between culture and politics, we can witness the two directions that Chinese scholars chart for the nation. The Chinese intellectual world since the 1990s has also begun its search for its own academic subjectivity by introducing Western critical theories, in particular postmodern theory and postcolonial criticism. The last chapter takes the academic inquiry of famed Chinese intellectual Zhou Ning during the past 20 years as the object of reflection and considers the merits as well as the defects of this experience. It examines several aspects of the scholar’s research: a critical reevaluation of sinology, the discourse of “national character” and the establishment of the modern academic discipline; a systematic study of the various “Chinese images” in Western countries and in other parts of the world; a comprehensive inquiry of “Self-Orientalism” and a trenchant critique of the problem of “universal value.” To a certain extent, Zhou’s efforts represent Chinese intellectuals’ preliminary efforts to establish the subjectivity of Chinese scholarship in the past two decades. Is what is taking place in China a renaissance of (traditional) Chinese culture or a painful rehabilitation or overhaul of its ancient and modern heritages? As cultural critic He Guimei has keenly observed, “When discussing China’s economic rise in recent decades, the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ is a discourse that is often talked about. Yet, the questions as to what does this ‘rejuvenation’ mean? What is to be rejuvenated? are rarely clearly explained.”53 Facing this predicament, Liu Kang’s admonition is worthy of recall: “If socialism can be rejuvenated in China, it should indeed begin with a rigorous self-critique that interrogates the ideological positions and assertions 53 He Guimei 贺桂梅, “Wenhua zijue yu zhongguo xushu” “文化自觉”与“中国” 叙述 [Cultural Self-Awareness and China Narrative],” Tianya 天涯 [Frontiers], No. 1 (2012): 35.

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of the ideological state apparatuses, the commercial popular culture, and the intellectual elite.”54 Keeping this critical consciousness in mind, we may ponder these questions: How do the three existing cultures discussed above shed light on the direction in which China will go? In the age of global capitalism, can Chinese “postmodern culture” harmoniously work hand-in-hand with its post-socialist conditions? We will return to these issues in the Conclusion. 54

Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 77.

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part 1 The Structure of Feeling of the Traditional Socialist Era

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A Lyrical Poet in the Era of Postsocialism: On Some Motifs of Fanken Chen’s Poems Chen Fanken 陈藩耕 (1943–), whose pen name is Pangeng 盼耕, graduated from the Chinese Department of Fujian Normal University in 1969; in 1979, he emigrated to Hong Kong, thanks to China’s then recent policy of reform and opening-up. After working many years in the Hong Kong publishing industry, he amassed enormous experience and became an expert in the field. Due to this professional experience, he was appointed in 2002 as the inaugural professor and director of the studies of compilation and publication in the School of Chinese Literature at Beijing Normal University’s Zhuhai Campus. He worked there for a decade until his retirement in 2014. In the meantime, he has served as vice-chairman of the board of directors of the Hong Kong Association of Chinese Culture and as chairman of the board of directors of the Hong Kong Association for the Promotion of Literature for many years, and has been the Vice President of the Hong Kong Prose Poetry Society and the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Hong Kong Literary Gazette. His life experience is a microcosm of many of the Chinese cultural elite, who left mainland China after the end of the Cultural Revolution for overseas Chinese communities in pursuit of a better life. Many then returned to serve their motherland after China’s economy took off and its society became more pluralized. In Hong Kong, Fanken is a member of the so-called “Long Xiang literary group” (龙香文 学群),1 which mostly consists of fellow writers who grew up on the mainland and moved to Hong Kong during the same period. Fanken is a poet who has, nevertheless, not produced many poems. Among his works, I have only come across Lüse de yinfu 绿色的音符 [Green Notes]—a collection of poetry—and Sheng yu huo de xili 生与活的洗礼 [Baptism of Life and Living]—a literary collection including fiction, essays and prose poems;2 there are also a few short anthologies of poems. A reading of these works reveals that he is not an artist who follows the dictum of “art for art’s own sake” but 1 “Long Xiang” literally means “dragon and fragrance,” a term filled with the flavor of traditional Chinese imagery. Nevertheless, in reality it is the abbreviation of the name of the place where these poets now live in Hong Kong: Jiulong, Xianggang (Kowloon, Hong Kong). 2 Pangeng 盼耕, Lüse de yinfu 绿色的音符 [Green Notes] (Xianggang: Wenxuebaoshe, 1997); Sheng yu huo de xili 生与活的洗礼 [Baptism of Life and Living] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2009).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_003

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Fanken Chen (1943–) courtesy of fanken chen

who does express his feelings and emotions with keen intuition. Nevertheless, the influence that the literary classics exert on his affection for literature, plus the unique “lyrical” temperament arising from his specific historical experience, are instrumental in cultivating an extraordinary aesthetic charm in his creations. A mentality of socialist ethics has also been deeply ingrained in this poet’s life experience and spirituality as a kind of collectively-oriented political unconsciousness, and it has inexorably left its signature in his poetry. Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) argued that Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867) was … “the lyric poet of the era of high capitalism;”3 by contrast, I see Fanken as “the lyric poet of the era of post-socialism.” Such a title also belongs to the cultural community from which the poet comes: the general poetic characteristics of this group demonstrate a collective commonality which shares a similar cultural-political awareness and aesthetic distinction. In other words, their poetry, which often seems to lack personal distinctives, consists in essence of comparable feelings, imagery and lyrical styles. They are the leftovers of the 3 Walter Benjamin, A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism (London: Verso, 1997).

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traditional socialist era, asserting their beliefs and articulating their affections and feelings through often unconscious, casual expressions. In this chapter, I will analyze some motifs in Fanken’s poems which are representative samples of this group: his attachment to the “cultural China” and his yearning for a “political China;” his complex of (revolutionary) heroism with plebeian consciousness; his patriotic feeling expressed in homesickness; his altruistic affections and bygone zeitgeist. I will thereby attempt to show that his seemingly “non-political” poems are better appreciated from the perspective of a political poetics—the poetics of socialism, which is, simultaneously, part of the poetics of postsocialism. The prefix of “post-” here does not merely denote an era “after socialism” but also points to the fact that the historical experience of the traditional socialist era and its structure of feeling continue to have a lasting impact on the poetic structure of artists, retaining its aesthetic appeal in the post-revolutionary and depoliticized period. 1

Attachment to a “Cultural China” and Yearning for a “Political China”

Overall, the writer’s poems do not simply display a peculiar expression of Mao’s era, for the 1980s was an intermediary period between traditional socialism and the post-socialist era of the 1990s and after, when a so-called “awareness of human nature” (renxingde juexin, 人性的觉醒) and enchantment with a “cultural China” replaced the political (read “Marxist”) understanding of the nation and the people. In mainland China, the nostalgia for and attachment to the “cultural China” was once represented by the beautiful prose and poetry of Yu Guangzhong 余光中 (1928–2018), a poet born in the mainland yet growing up in Taiwan who, ever since the 1950s, created a peculiar mode of lyrical narration that has intoxicated Chinese readers. This longing for (traditional) Chinese culture and its aesthetic distinctions was developed after the 1980s by the famed mainland Chinese writer Yu Qiuyu 余秋雨 (1946–) in his “cultural prose” (wenhuasanwen, 文化散文): middle-brow writing that expresses homesickness for the history and culture of ancient China. Fanken Chen shares this cultural disposition; his poem “Singing for the Travel to Zhou Village (周庄行呤),” for instance, is a piece laden with classical Chinese cultural imagery: A little boat is loading us / rowing into the Song dynasty/ and into the Ming and Qing / The gaily-painted boat is loading at Zhou Village / rowing into a poem and into our hearts / On a meandering river, in a tortuous

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street / I am seeking for the tone of poetry / In the melodious shanty, in the beautiful Kunqu Opera / I am seeking for the rhythm of poetry / Over the 900 hundred year history of the water town / I am seeking for the soul and life of poetry. 小船载着我们／摇进宋朝摇进明清／画舫载着周庄／摇进诗歌摇进我 们心中／我在曲折的小河，曲折的小街上／寻找诗的平仄／我在悠扬 的船歌，悠扬的昆曲中／寻找诗的韵律／在九百年水乡的延伸中／寻 找诗魂和诗的生命4

This “seeking” presupposes that the essence of traditional Chinese culture can be discovered in existing cultural relics or in so-called “cultural heritage” (such as ancient shanties and Kunqu Opera). Such cultural nostalgia gives us a feeling of lost beauty and elegance with a sense of melancholy. In reality, however, the inspiration of the “memory” of “traditional China” arises from a depression caused by the alienation of modern social life, which is reminiscent of Plato’s memory of an Ideal in the heavens for fallen souls.5 It thus implies a critique of the state of alienation in present society which harms a “perfect” humanity. However, the illusionary satisfaction that has been sought here is more often than not replaced by a sort of confusion. For instance, in the poem “Seeking (寻)” which focuses on exploring alternative features of Chinese history, we read these lyrics: Where is it? The sparks arising from the collision of the five-thousandyear-old yellow stone and the blue sky; Where is it? The infatuation between the Great Wall and the sound of a ship in space; I look up at the icicles of Bayan Har, asking about your traces, The icicles give me a piece of withered duckweed; I bow to the mausoleum of the Emperor Xuan Yuan, discovering your nature, The mausoleum casts me a bag of swear words and obscenity; I hold tightly the ornamental column before the golden water bridge, and quietly imagine your face and voice, I (only) find a steel handle for an ax;

4 Pangeng 盼耕, Sheng yu huo de xili 生与活的洗礼 [Baptism of Life and Living] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2009): 84. 5 See W.D. Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951).

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I bend myself to the echo wall of the Temple of Heaven and listen piously to your cry at birth, What I get are a cane and a pair of presbyopic glasses … 在哪里啊？五千年的田黄和蓝天撞击的火星 在哪里啊？万里长城和空中船音的痴情 我仰望巴颜喀拉山的冰棱，询问你的履印 冰棱给我一片枯萎的浮萍 我俯伏皇帝的辕陵，发掘你的品性 辕陵给我一袋粗口秽淫 我揽住金水桥前的华表，悄悄想象你的音容 我拾到钢铸的斧柄 我贴耳天坛的回音壁，虔诚地聆听你临盆的破啼 我获得拐杖和老花镜……6

All the poet receives from his seeking is disappointment. The particularity left by a gorgeous civilization that has lasted for thousands of years and has been extolled by the prevailing cultural discourse seems quite at odds with the physical as well as spiritual inheritance it has given to the present. Consequently, the narrator issues this lamentable sigh: Having searched the shore of wind, Having explored the shadow of cloud, Your tears cannot be seen in the sad eddy, Your frown cannot be seen in blue meditation. I hold my breath, and pray silently with head and arms down; I beat my breast, and beg loudly in excessive grief If you cannot sing the solemn chant or roar out thunders and lightning either. Please cast me a casual sentence of somniloquy and an idle ring tone, Or give me a heavy sigh, or a whine of a wild goose; Even a weak moan Is the mother of life, the sound of the footstep of green … 寻遍风的岸 觅尽云的影 忧忡的漩涡中没有你的泪痕 蓝色的凝思里没有你的蹙颦 6 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 67.

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chapter 1 我屏声敛息，俯首垂臂默默祈祷 我捶胸顿足，呼天抢地大声苦求 假如你唱不出壮歌豪曲，吼不出电闪雷霆 那就给我一句紊乱的梦呓，一个闲散的铃音 要不，就给我一阵沉重的叹息，一声秋雁的哀鸣 哪怕是一丝孱弱的呻吟 也是生命的母亲，绿色的足音……”7

Apparently, the narrator here expects a “solemn chant” and “thunders and lightning,” yet history over the last 5000 years (usually taken to be the time of the Chinese nation’s existence) seems to be empty and silent. He thus expects some audible voices when he is conducting a direct dialogue with it. This is because what he longs for is the motivation of life and progress rather than mere addiction to relics and exhibits. Thus, in another poem, we witness the author/narrator acknowledging the putrid state of ancient history (which implicitly refers to traditional culture): “I’ve smelled the fragrance of history / though the body has already been in erosion / the shroud has been stuffed with too many sachets / which made the stiff body even more bloated / after all it’s a corpse, never to turn into spice” (我闻到历史的香味／虽然那陈躯早 已糜烂／寿衣下塞进了太多的香袋／使僵尸更加臃肿／但仍是一具陈尸， 不会成为香料).8 Although the author has not received any response, he keeps exploring: “I am seeking, along the wildfire and through the mud” (我寻觅着， 沿着鬼火，沿着泥泞).9 In another poem “Sung Wong Toi (宋王台)”—the rhetoric and artistic con-

ception of which is again reminiscent of Yu Qiuyu’s prose—Fanken complains of the absence of standards in historical evaluation. It is worth noting that the poem was produced in 1980, ten years earlier than Yu’s similar creations:

History anchored once here / Time lost its name card here / A weak dynasty / got ashore / on the gigantic rock in a rush / And then embarked on board helter-skelter / The amorous bay hides / The last days of Song history / Does that mean merit, or demerit? / Or weal, or woe? / Seven hundred years have elapsed / The wind and the waves / are still arguing / Foam splashed everywhere

7 Ibid., 67. 8 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 81. 9 Ibid.

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历史在这里抛过锚／岁月在这里遗失了名片／一个虚弱的王朝／在巨 石旁／匆匆上岸／又匆匆登船／多情的海湾／藏起了宋史的末叶／是 功？是过？／是福？是祸？／七百年了／风和浪／还争得口沫四溅？10

Premised on an essentialist mentality towards cultural discourse, here the author could not give an effective appraisal of Chinese history. Such a non-historical recalling of a “peaceful and prosperous China” that allegedly existed in the past can easily transform into a terrifying memory of “despotism” or “tyranny” in Chinese history. For instance, in “Stillness Speaks—A Record of the Dinosaur Eggs (无声胜有声—记广东河源恐龙蛋),” readers find that over 9000 dinosaur eggs are “scattered along the Pearl River / within the scroll of history … telling their one hundred and ninety million years of yearning” (散落珠江沿岸／历史的长卷之间…… 倾诉着一亿九千万 年的思念): “Yearning for the land with abundant trees and grass / Yearning for the homes with dinosaurs coming and going / the brilliance of the boom years / is flashing in every dinosaur egg” (思念那草木丰盛的大地／思念那龙来龙 往的家园／繁荣岁月的光华／在每一个恐龙蛋中闪现).11 Such a “yearning” evolves into (and also contributes to) grievance and complaint: “Complaining about the disaster one hundred and ninety million years ago / which razed their home into cemetery / and destroyed and trampled on their right of birth / the despotic power of the cruel age / still terrifies the dinosaur eggs nowadays” (控诉一亿九千万年前的灾难／灾难把家园夷为墓地／灾难把出生的权利摧 毁踏践／残酷世纪的淫威／至今仍令恐龙蛋惊恐满面).12 On one hand, this complaint reveals the enlightened thinking of the 1980s which indicted the harsh political circumstance of Mao’s time (particularly the Cultural Revolution) by naming it “feudal dictatorship;” on the other hand, it also contains a kind of socialist ideal fighting against unequal class hierarchy and oppression (which is itself an inheritance and development of the European Enlightenment of the 18th century) and calling for equality for everybody, regardless of class or social status. Therefore, the poet believes that the following questions “… are to be deciphered and investigated” (等待破译 和究源): “Who is more immortal / the dead or the living? / Who is of better nobility / the unburied or the buried? / Who is of sharper insight / the viewer or the one being viewed? / Who is of more dignity / the renowned one or the

10 Ibid., 171. 11 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 80. 12 Ibid.

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hermit?” (生者和死者谁更有生命／出土者和未出土者谁贵谁贱？／观赏者 与被观赏者谁更具洞察力？／显耀者与深隐者谁更有脸？)13 These lyrics are reminiscent of Beidao’s (北岛 1949–) famed piece “The Answer (回答),” produced in the 1970s during the Cultural Revolution. In that poem, there are some classic lines such as “Meanness is the passport of the mean man / Nobility is the epitaph of the noble man” (卑鄙是卑鄙者的通告 证／高尚是高尚者的墓志铭). Similarly, in Fanken’s A Piece of Verse (小贴一 束), completed in 1988, we come across these exclamations: “In the dictionary of a great man / the word ‘great’ never exists / in the mind of a shameless man / the word ‘shameless’ never exists” (伟大者的字典里／永远没有“伟大”两个 字／无耻者的脑海里／永远没有“无耻”这只辞).14 Coincidence or not, it indicates nothing but a homogeneous “structure of feeling” in the spiritual world of the two poets, distilled and accumulated from the same historical experience. We can also infer from the verses that socialist idealism still prevailed in 1980s: shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution, some party ideologues called for a reexamination of Marx’s theory of alienation, although this reexamination was often clothed in the liberal discourse of humanity. They argued that, in socialist states, there could also be some varied forms of alienation brought about by bureaucratism and corruption, which echoed Mao’s premonition of the transformation of socialist society into a capitalist one arising from the ruling elites’ metamorphosis into a “new class.” Therefore, the poet’s indictment of injustice and darkness still bears the imprint of socialist ideas. Similarly, even though his eulogy of “the return of human nature” seems consistent with the bourgeois discourse of humanity, the socialist notion of a universal equality is still closely tied with patriotism throughout his poems. Thus, we read the following lines in a poem written in 2008, just after the Wenchuang Earthquake: “When the Republic embraces a people-based society, people and their leaders will be able to open the door to prosperity shoulder by shoulder … When the soul of China is cast by love / there must rise a giant of the century on the ancient land” (当共和国拥抱民本社会，百姓与领袖定能并肩推开繁 荣的大门……当关爱铸成华夏之魂／炎黄的土地必将崛起世纪的巨人).15 In all, it is against this psychological deposit of the socialist notion of equality, baptized by Mao’s revolutionary idealism, that the ahistorical desire for a “cultural China” behind the surface of historical retrospection, predicated upon a culturalist mentality, is replaced by the pursuit and longing for an equal and just society of a “political China.” 13 14 15

Ibid., 80–81. Ibid., 71. Ibid., 78–79.

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2

A Heroic Complex with the Plebeian Consciousness

Although the lyrical subjects of the poet seem to be individual and personal, most of the lyrics that stem from an individual perspective are anything but the singing of atomized individuals about private affairs. On the contrary, even expressions of personal affection always inadvertently reveal a heroic (un)consciousness of the collectivist kind. Take the poem “A New Poem of Kapok” (木 棉新帖) as an example: In the chilly wind, Who lets all the branches of the tree rise one after one just like fists swearing war? In the deep haze, Who lights the torches in the branches; handfuls of handfuls, bunches of bunches, clumps of clumps, just like numerous campfires in the army? On the approach to the bridge of time, Aside the wharf of history, Kapok is dressed in flaming war robe, and climbs up high resolutely, erects a big banner. 在料峭的寒风里 是谁令满树的枝梢 纷纷向上举起 象一只只宣誓出征的拳头 在沉沉的阴霾里 是谁在枝头燃起火炬，一把把，一树树，一丛丛 象一堆堆军旅的篝火？ 时光的引桥上 历史的码头边 木棉花披着火红的战袍 毅然攀上高处，矗起大纛16

16 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 56.

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As critic Huang Yongjian puts it, here “… the series of images, such as ‘fist’, ‘torch’, ‘campfire’, ‘war robe’, ‘big banner’ and so on, not only have connected with the features of Kapok; they have also strengthened the heroic consciousness flowing in the poet’s mind with the overall imaginative atmosphere.”17 With these images, the poet aims to express his attitude towards life: “Kapok is also named as the flower of heroism; and it is from this modern aesthetic perspective that Fanken has discovered this new aesthetic implication of Kapok through the language of prose poetry … highlighting the aesthetic tendency of the lyric subject and showing the poet’s optimistic disposition and passionate life-attitude filled with fighting spirit.”18 Such a heroic complex—a revolutionary idealism prevalent in Mao’s era—was still echoed in society during the early years of reform. A further example, the poem “The Sky, That Piece of Blueness (天空，那 一片蓝)” recalls the popular Song of the Yangtze River (长江之歌), which was very popular in 1980s Chinese society: “That piece of blueness / owns the lofty resolution of the North China Plateau / has the firmness of the Yangtze River heading toward the sea / possess the might of the south wind” (那一片蓝／有 华北高原雄立的刚毅／有长江入海的坚定／有南国长风的浩荡).19 The tone here appears vigorous and manly, but nevertheless is immediately neutralized by feminine and tender images: “Its vitality is surging like the blue waves / its poetic feeling is as soft as blue satin / its soul is as crystal as blue stones” (它的活力像蓝色波涛般激荡／它的诗情像蓝色缎绵般轻柔／它的心灵如蓝 色宝石般晶莹).20 This neutralization does not aim to attain the sort of femininity brought about by reification of the female body as a commodity, nor does it mean to be apolitical. Rather, it shows the residual aesthetic appeal of Mao’s revolutionary romanticism, combining sublimity and beauty. The poem’s affective structure shows itself clearly in subsequent lines that seem somewhat too plain to merit literary value: “That piece of blue / is the melody that never drifts away / is the faith that never goes under / and is the loyalty that never fades away (那一片蓝／是永不飘散的旋律／是永不沉落的信仰／ 是永不褪色的赤诚).”21

17 Huang Yongjian 黄永健, “Sangwenshi-Xianggang wentan de lingyi fengjingxian 散文 诗—香港文坛的另一风景线 [Prose Poem: the Other Scenery in Hong Kong’s Literary Field],” in Dangdai shitan 当代诗坛 [Contemporary Poetry], No. 27, 1999: 162. 18 Ibid. 19 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 68. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

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The other side of this heroic romanticism is willpower that never gives up in the face of hardship. This willpower is not merely related to the loftiness of traditional Chinese Confucian culture (such as the poet and politician Qu Yuan 屈原 [340–278 BC], who was slandered and ridiculed yet never surrendered) but is also related to contemporary poet Gu Chen’s (顾城, 1956–1993) heroic sentiment, expressed in his verse “One Generation (一代人),” which reads: “I was deigned black eyes by the darkness / yet I keep chasing the brightness with them (黑夜给了我黑色的眼睛／我却用它来寻找光明).” Gu’s lyric was produced in 1979 and sought to express the collective wish of the “new period”: sufferings and hardship in life (particularly during the Cultural Revolution) would never eliminate the resolve of that generation to pursue a better life, a prosperous, democratic and civilized socialism. Similarly, Fanken’s lyric poems in the “post new period” still unconsciously retain this impressive idea: Without weighing thousands of times when locked in the darkness, There will not be today’s green language Without meditating for thousands of years when lying deep in the earth’s crust, There will not be today’s green belief. Without the green language, Your beauty of spring will never exist; Without the green belief, Your soul will never exist … There is one day when the tree of life will wither yet the stone of life never flags. It will never rewrite its own belief, even though it’s smashed to pieces. It will never break its own promise, even if mountains fall and the earth splits. May human beings have the integrity as you do; May the earth own tomorrow as you do. “The Charm of the Stone.” 没有在黑暗的重锁中推敲了千万遍 就没有今天翠绿的语言 没有在地壳的深层里凝思了千万载 就没有今天翠绿的信念

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chapter 1 没有翠绿的语言 便没有你的春色 没有翠绿的信念 便没有你的灵魂 …… 生命之树有枯黄的一日 生命之石却没有萎靡的季节 就是粉身碎骨 也不会改写自己的信仰 就是山崩地裂 也不会背弃自己的诺言 愿人类有你的情操 愿地球有你的明天（《石韵》）22

The verse is reminiscent of a famed prose piece entitled “The Style of Pine Tree (松树的风格),” written by the staunch Chinese Communist leader Tao Zhu (陶 铸, 1908–1969) in the 1960s—the high-tide of the socialist period. “I Love Those Lotus Leaves (我爱那田田的荷叶)” is another piece that employs a scene to express the poet’s affections and articulate his ideal: two functions which are usually taken to be the two traditions of classical Chinese poetry. Take the third section of this lyric as an example. It first portrays the green lake and lotus leaves by comparing them to images in traditional Chinese painting: If the Pinghu Lake overflowing with greenness is an enormous painting, then the lotus leaves swaying over the lake are the smile of fruits in Chinese painting. 假如绿意潋潋的平湖 是一幅巨大的丹青画面 湖上扇影摇曳的荷叶 就是国画里一串串硕果的笑颜

Taking advantage of this picture, the poet continues to convey his aspiration:

22 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 50.

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Every grain of crystal is showing that Only by embracing the sun can one own a character as pure as jade. Every maturity is saying that Only by being open-minded can one become an unsinkable flagship in his life. 每一粒晶莹都在展示 只有拥抱阳光 才有翡翠般清纯的品格 每一颗成熟都在畅淡 只有胸怀坦然 才有生命中不沉的旗舰23

Comprehending the imagery structure and lyric style (including the sometimes gnomic expression) of this type of poetry can never be achieved without a deep understanding of the spiritual world of the men and women living in the Mao era. As an alternative life world with its own idiosyncratic social relations, including interpersonal relationships, it was very different from a contemporary world greatly influenced by market relations. If readers can appreciate the enormous artistic appeal and social influence that Yang Shuo’s 杨朔 (1913–1968) prose had on 1960s China, they will see that Fanken’s similar articulation of his sentiments and ideals derives from the pursuit of the same spirituality; they will also realize its structure and charm, as well as its awkward place in the present. In this era of atomization, when commercialization engulfs all of society, many Chinese people pursue nothing but personal material interests and ignore overall social welfare and the exploration of a better world; consequently, socialist ethics and morality premised on collectivist welfare have become obsolete. The artistic expression of socialist mores seems to exert artistic appeal no more. Furthermore, Fanken’s heroism resonates with plebeian consciousness, indicating that it is anything but heroic nobility; instead, it is founded on the belief that everyone is equal and it aims to achieve the great cause of socialism with humility and self-sacrifice. Therefore, it articulates the “structure of feeling” of the (socialist) revolutionary hero of the masses. However, although this heroism harbors the pride that arose from socialist education in the 1950s and 23

Ibid., 83.

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1960s, it simultaneously contains an innovative, aggressive pioneering spirit and an entrepreneurial ethos that emerged in the early reform era of the 1980s. This spirit and ethos nevertheless carried on the revolutionary idealism. In this light, we can better comprehend the poem “The River (河),” which portrays the river’s pursuit to merge into the sea: When the rainy season spreads, Unrequited love wafts up with the clouds; Just for an ancient legend, It carries the bag of bitter love resolutely on its back And tightens the shoelace to pursue. 雨季漫开时 单相思也随云朵飘来 只为了一个古老的传说 就毅然背上苦恋的行囊 绑紧追求的鞋带24

The lines are reminiscent of the famed lyrics by Taiwanese writer Sanmao 三 毛 (1943–1991), “Olive Tree (橄榄树),” which enjoyed great popularity in 1980s China. Some lines of the lyrics read: “Do not ask me where I come from, my hometown is afar (不要问我从哪里来，我的故乡在远方).” However, while Sanmao pursued individual and personal romance, Fanken’s poem pursues a collectivist entrepreneurship, a revolutionary romanticism of the indomitable and brave reformers, who still called themselves “revolutionaries.” My analysis here is to show that the poet’s works comprise the continuity and dialogue between the two periods of post-1949 China, both of which have forged his intellectual world and aesthetic disposition: the ideological education of the Mao era from the 1950s to the 1970s and the collectivist-oriented entrepreneurship of the early reform period of the 1980s. The following poem “The Road (路),” written in 1988, invokes the works of the 1980s with similar subject matter, often eulogizing the reformers by comparing them to pioneers and appraising them as embodiments of the working class—rather than “entrepreneurs” (namely businessmen or capitalists)—as the “heroes of the time.” Through a series of pastoral images and hypothetical sentences, the poem displays the reforming spirit of those explorers who had the courage to make self-sacrifice, continuing the revolutionary idealism: 24 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 17.

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You are the association of foot, the poetry composed by the sounds of footsteps. You are the cattle cultivating the wasteland, the smoke scattering in the earth. The explorer is cast in the lonely harbor; If the days rush you into a press of the deaf and the blind, You are also the spray of seeds, the fragrance of life. If the heaven and the earth boil you into a vat of briny slurry, You are still the vines chanting a long song, the square of sweetness. 你是脚的联想 　跫的诗章 你是　踏荒牛 嵌在大地的炊烟 探索者 铸在孤寞的港湾 假如　岁月将你 冲成一堆聋盲 你也是种子的浪花 生命的芬芳 假如　天地把你 熬作一缸卤浆 你也是长歌的藤蔓 甜蜜的平方25

There are abundant associations here connecting “cultivation” and “exploration” with unremitting and indomitable “waves” and “vines.” Further still, “Spring Tide (春潮)”, composed at the inauguration of reform in 1979, delivers the unique vitality and impetus of the early reform age by a metaphorical invocation of a vigorous socialist labor scene:

25

Ibid., 91.

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The eternal rhythm Arrives from the distant shore To bear in mind the meditation in the winter solstice, By inspiration from the sound of the time when insects awaken, To enjoy the romance with spring breeze, To fly with the bright sun. The sunshine in the morning reflects the crests of the waves Thrashing heartily around in the tsunami. Seagulls dive over and over again and hold up countless passionate waves. Rosy clouds and red wave-light are crowding into the harbor joyfully; Happy harbors and industrious ships are crying excitedly to sail away. The sunshine has stroked the elf of every wave of water and illuminated the vows of spring tides; As long as there is spring breeze, the earth, and tomorrow, The tides will always surge forward 永恒的律动 自远岸传来 铭记冬至里的凝思 乘着惊蛩声中的启示 与春风一道浪漫 随明日一起飞翔 朝辉映着柔美的浪峰 尽情在海啸中翻腾起伏 一次次鸥鸟俯冲 抱起无数激情的浪花 赤的霓霞红的波光 狂欢着簇拥着涌入港湾 快乐的港口勤劳的巨轮 不时亢奋长鸣破浪出征 阳光抚遍每一朵水的精灵 照亮了春潮的一行行誓言 只要还有春风还有地球还有明天 潮将永远永远奔腾向前26 26

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This poem bears distinct features of the age: “passionate waves,” “happy harbors and industrious ships,” and the “the vows of spring tides” are all familiar images from the socialist era that refer to the optimism and willpower of the working class in dedicating themselves to the cause of socialist enterprise. This kind of lyrical expression, as well as the heroic complex conveyed in a plebeian consciousness, had already become obsolete in the postsocialist period. 3

The Motifs of Patriotism and Homesickness

As part of the first generation that moved to Hong Kong from the mainland after the Mao era, Fanken’s patriotic feeling is especially embodied in his constant yearning for the motherland and his chanting of a wanderer’s homesickness. The piece “Soldiers at the Bridge in Shenzhen: When the Sino-British Agreement is about to be Signed (深圳桥头的士兵：写在中英协议即将签 订之时)” demonstrates the patriotic dream of reunification with the motherland, a sentiment very different from that of the middle class in Hong Kong (which harbored confused misgivings towards Hong Kong’s return to the mainland). Such affective feeling is more frequently revealed in imagery of a wanders’ homesickness. This theme emerges in the lyric “New Year’s Eve in My Hometown (故乡的除夕),” with some features of popular songs: I fold up my umbrella, Allowing the New Year’s Eve to kiss my chest. Bold rain holds my hands tightly to red; Naughty wind breaks into my throat. Checking my local accent: How much does it still remain? A long absence, dear New Year’s Eve. We meet in our hometown, There on the New Year’s Day, the wind should be so fierce That it itches the heart There on the New Year’s Day, the rain should be so cold That it makes the blood boil. 我收起张开的伞 任除夕吻着胸膛 泼辣的雨握红了我的双手 顽皮的风闯进喉中 盘点我的乡音 还剩几钱几两？ Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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chapter 1 久违了 亲爱的除夕 我们相逢在故乡 故乡的年 风该这样狂 狂得令人心痒 故乡的年　雨该这样冷 冷得教人热血激荡27

There are also some masterpieces with strong poetic quality and the artistic conception of classical Chinese poetry, like “Jasmine Tea (茉莉花茶),” This string of clear music notes is Neither the grand music of Beethoven’s Nor the solemn chorus of The Yellow River, But the classic piece of Two Springs Bathed in Moonlight To play a solo, at the bridge where the moonlight meditates Among the willows, two nightingales are reticent; A cool clean spring flows slowly through the strings of urheen. I’m washing my feet in the cool water With my eyes slightly closed, Allowing the green and the comfort to ooze into every vessel. The affectionate boat, along with the wave of the beauty of the countryside, slowly overflows from the jade tea cup. 这音符碧透的一盏 不是贝多芬的宏伟乐章 不是庄严的《黄河》大合唱 是一曲经传的《二泉印月》 独奏　在月光凝思的桥畔 柳枝间　两只夜莺敛声 一泓透爽的泉 缓缓流过 二胡的弓弦 我濯足在清凉中 微翕双目 27 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 127–128.

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任绿和爽　沁进每一血管 相思的舟 随乡色的波 悠悠 溢出玉色的茶盅。28

Through the transition and transformation of a series of associations, the imagery of jasmine tea and music are organically integrated with the theme of homesickness. The skill of synesthesia is widely used here, while the classical artistic conception has already been transformed by modern notions. Similarly, in “Faraway Letter (远方来鸿),” readers witness the same application of this technique. There, the poet is “… planting (种出)…” in the garden “… the frog’s speech of hometown (故园蛙语)…” and “… the moonlight of the Jiangnan region (江南月光)…” Across the ocean you posted A bag full of newly-picked revelry. You said the local soil you took away had already grown in the garden; the frog’s speech of hometown and the moonlight of the Jiangnan region. 你自大洋彼岸 寄来 满满一袋 新采摘的狂欢； 你说你带去的乡土 已经种出 一掬故园的蛙语 一朵江南的月光29

The artistic sentimentality here recalls Yu Guangzhong’s related prose pieces. Similar is “August (八月),” written during the mid-autumn festival,

28 29

Ibid., 116–117. Ibid., 109.

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August is the oblique path behind the village; The autumn moon is the shade of bitter love along the road. A cloud of light slides from the tip of a tree, breaking into two pieces of local accent. August is puppy love; The autumn moon is a greeting, a surprise, Under the grape pergola, in the snooping eyes of kids There is my smiling. August is a well, Is the malty maple forest; The autumn moon is tide, Is the echo of preterm birth. I’m a fine sleepwalking spring in the far coast, Wound into knots Flowing to become an octachord. 八月是村后 清瘦的斜径 秋月是路畔 苦恋的林荫 树梢上滑下 一团清光 落地跌成两瓣乡音 八月是情窦初开 秋月是迎　是惊 葡萄架下 偷窥的童眼中 有一颗 是我的笑颦

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八月是井

是微醉的枫林 秋月是潮 是早产的回音 我是远岸 一丝梦游的细泉 绕成结 流成弦琴30

The skillful employment of parable and synesthesia here seems to stem from an inborn inspiration. Those other unpretentious works on homesickness, such as “Stamps (邮票),” “Letter (信)” and “Night Talk of Guang’s Cake (光饼 夜话)”, move the readers with strong emotion, whereas the prosaic narration makes such an effect more direct.31 In all the author’s childhood’s experience, the friendship of siblings is the most memorable. Fanken has expressed his deep affection for and gratitude to his sister, who still lives in the mainland: To you, my beloved sister, This gauzy smile; It used to be a weak ripple curling along the ditches behind the house. It’s you that added a scoop of water to make it spill over the countryside and flow into the green pieces of life. Now, the ocean takes it to the end of the world Days crush it flat, Yet it still cherishes the dream of childhood. The dream is the verdant circle: Although it has weak roots and short hair, Although it fails to stand erect on the mountain top, It nevertheless stands firmly on the violently waving water 30 31

Ibid., 78–79. Ibid., 118; 119; 122–123.

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chapter 1 献给你　姐姐 这一叶薄如蝉翼的笑靥 它原是一汪微弱的水涟 蜷曲在屋后的沟边 是你添上一杓井水 使它溢出乡间 流成生命的翠片。 如今　大海把它带到天涯 岁月将它碾平压扁 它依然怀着童年的梦 梦是嫩绿的圆 虽然 它根疏发短 虽然 它未能 像大树挺立山巅 但 站住了 在波摇浪巅的水面32

The subject of “Sister” appears several times in Fanken’s poems, reminiscent of Haizi’s (海子, penname of Zha Jiansheng 查建生, 1964–1989) well-known verse “Sister, Tonight I’m in Delingha” (姐姐，今夜我在德令哈) and the Chinese popular singer Zhang Chu’s 张楚 (1968–) lyric “Sister, I wanna go home” (姐 姐，我要回家). However, while the latter two highlight an existential sense of loneliness, what Fanken conveys is a recollection of the sibling’s love. The rich poetic quality is rooted in the poet’s life experience of suffering: Fanken lost his birth-parents when he was little and was raised by foster parents. Due to his family background, he was perceived as an outcast and his relatives and friends distanced themselves—including his classmates—making him yearn for parental love from an early age.33 As he once recalled, At that time, being lonely and helpless, I tended to see every tree and bush, and every stone and water, as the one that cared for me, so as to find some comfort. Gradually, they all had spirit in my eyes. Then, my longing for love transformed into the desire to participate in the construction of a world full of love.34 32 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 107–108. 33 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 19–39. 34 Personal e-mail from poet, dated October 7th, 2010.

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This bitter-sweet sentiment did not make the author resent his homeland; instead, it is now transformed into another source of homesickness, which contributes to the author’s patriotic feeling. Such an experience is one of the primary phenomena witnessed in the overseas Chinese writers of the “middleaged generation.” 4

Affective Economy and the Spiritual World of the Socialist Era

When the author expresses his individual emotions about love and nature, he delivers anything but merely personal feelings. Facing “eternal” and “universal” themes such as life, love and nature, the poet’s lyrical structure still bears the unique mark of his times and is reminiscent of those of such renowned poets as Wen Jie 闻捷 (1923–1971) and He Jingzhi 贺敬之 (1924–), in which the poetic features of the socialist era appear. It is quite common for Fanken to express the vastness of love through the image of the sea. For example, the fourteenth section of “A Bunch of Verses 小贴一束” reads: “The seawall reaches out his long arms / not to wait for the sea to run into his arms / but to expect the sea to embrace him / the love of the sea is more deep and lasting than his” (海堤伸出长臂／不是等待大海投 入怀抱／而是期待大海拥抱他／海的爱情比他更深更长).35 A description of the river’s persistence in pursuing the love of the sea is witnessed in another poem: “At first, the graceful light waves / are the shy eyes / the first awakening of love / later the rolling surge / is the burning love song / the valiant declaration of love; the ocean / is eventually touched / to embrace the first kiss from afar / with its broad heart opened” (初时那曼妙的轻波／是含羞的眉眼／是 情窦乍开／后来那翻腾的激浪／是滚烫的情歌／是英勇的表白 海／终于被 打动了／向远道的初吻／敞开广阔的情怀).36 In “Love of Maple (枫之恋),” he

sighs, “Despite the frost wind and freezing rain / the love is still that passionate / Even if it is withered and ground to dust / the sincere love-sickness will never perish” (霜风冻雨中／仍然爱得热烈／直到凋零碾作尘／也没熄灭赤诚的相 思).37 Although the particular object of love of traditional socialist times— the working class—cannot be discerned here, the peculiar way of expressing love, with its specific vocabulary such as “burning” (滚烫), “valiant” (英勇) and “sentiment” (情怀), and rhetoric and phrases such as “the sole love” (爱的专 一) and “sincere love-sickness” (赤诚的相思) remain the peculiar “structure of 35 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 71. 36 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 17–18. 37 Ibid., 82.

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feeling” of the “new people” (新人) of that era. We glimpse here the trace of the love experience of that generation—it greatly differs from today’s popular yet frivolous and superficial love poems that are oftentimes commodified, however much the latter might pledge to “love you ‘til I die.” As critic Sun Shaozhen puts it, These abundant amatory poems fully show that love is apparently most active in the poet’s inner heart. There is retrospection on puppy love, which is full of the scent of youth … In this spiritual realm, Fanken is innocent and naïve … but he is also introverted; what he impresses on us … is that he seeks quietly for the expression of romance when experiencing nature silently, persistently and lingeringly.38 Critic Yu Yu also notes that … most of Fanken’s love poems have an inner sense of great depth. In “Love of Wind,” “Whirlpool,” and some other poems, the expression of hesitation and misgiving in love makes love appear to be more profound. Such profoundness does not mean giving up love but being more persistent.39 The words and themes of “expectation” (期待) and “awaiting” (等待) are frequently found in these poems, which are often connected to desires to be a man who is ordinary yet dedicated, who is not seeking for fame but a guiltless conscience. Today, this phenomenon can only be witnessed in the poetry of those of the poet’s generation. They sing for integrity: “The frank chopsticks are bent by the rumors of light in water / however, people still believe in the soul of the chopstick” (直爽的筷子在水中被光的谣言所弯曲／但是，人们依然相 信筷子的灵魂).40 They advocate the cultivation of tolerance: “Those who are unwilling to forgive others will never obtain others’ forgiveness / those who are always angry will always anger others” (不想原谅别人的人，永远得不到

38

Sun Shaozhen 孙绍振, “Xunqiu ziwo chanshi: Ping Pangeng de ‘lüse de yinfu’ ” 寻求自 我阐释—评盼耕的“绿色的音符” [Seeking for Self-interpretation -on Pangeng’s “Green Notes”], Sheng yu huo de xili, 176. 39 Yu Yu 余禺, “Long Xiang—Touxiang shiguode meng 龙香—投向诗国的梦 [Long Xiang: the Dream of Devoting to the Kingdom of Poetry],” Dangdai shitan 当代诗坛 [Contemporary Poetry], No. 15, 1993. 40 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 71.

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别人的原谅／永远的愤怒者，永远被人们所愤怒).41 What they essentially convey is self-sacrifice, a willingness to be paving stones for others, and a spirit of dedication:

The tree, with its roots in the earth stretching towards (the sky), shows its green hat / while the branch on the ground grabs the soil, the earth being its crown / People are used to praising the raised beauty / ignoring the unpretentious greatness hidden under the feet (树，那地上的根伸 向空间，展示了清凉的绿帽／而地上的枝却抓起了土壤，让地球做他 的冠／人们习惯赞美被举起的美丽／而不理会朴实无华，掩藏在脚底 的伟大);42

The greatness of the sun doesn’t arise in the day but at night / when people miss the stars / it leaves the heaven agreeably (太阳的伟大不在白 天而在夜晚／当人们怀念星星时／它愉快地让出天堂);43 I shall sing for the silence, for tolerance, for implicit reticence / because, they never sing the songs in their inner hearts (我永远歌唱沉默，歌唱忍 耐，歌唱含蓄／因为：它们不唱自己心底的歌).44 It is quite unusual nowadays to sing an ode to the spirit of “never sing[ing] the songs” in one’s own “inner heart” because this is at odds with the individualist entrepreneurialism we now cherish. We must recall the requirements put upon the personalities of ordinary men during socialism, as well as various historical limitations and even, occasionally, the detrimental effects that those historical mistakes have on these poets. Only then can we comprehend that the sanctification of self-seclusion and sacrifice is not only an individual cultivation forged by the socialist ethical-moral system but also a symptom of a historical period. This symptom points to the failure of traditional socialism—as a mode of production, as a historical experience and as a lifeworld—to realize its promise that every individual’s free development is the prerequisite for the free development of all, as well as its mission of transcending the capitalist mode of production. These double dimensions have contributed to the laudable personality of the poets but also continue to force them to perform their (sometimes self-imposed) harsh duty in the postsocialist era with self-restraint and even resignation—they often decide to self-sacrifice for the happiness of the next generation and for the brightness of the future. 41 42 43 44

Ibid., 70. Ibid., 69. Ibid. Ibid., 72.

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This knowledge can help us better understand the significance of the following poems, Never to show off / its once being enormous mountain rocks / never to tell either / the pain when being smashed into pieces / Only crushes the wind’s rumor, the rain’s instigation / into a pulpy lesson / which then hides in the depth of its heart / To reunite the divided family / into a team / despite not towering as before / yet with sincerity and persistence / it has built the open field / despite not being as masculine as the day before / yet with gentleness and kindness / it has bred the spring – “Mud”

从不显耀／自己曾是巨大的山岩／也不诉说／粉身碎骨时的苦痛／只 把风的谣言　雨的挑拨／搅成稀烂的教训／默默收藏在心灵的深处／ 把四分五裂的家族／重新凝聚成团队／虽然不能像往日那样巍峨／但 凭诚心与坚持／筑出了广袤的原野／虽然没有了昨日的阳刚／但却以 温柔与亲和／孕育出满地的春天（《烂泥》）45

In another piece “Wuzhishan Mountain (五指山),” Fanken similarly proclaims his altruistic desire, “I just want to / pick up a piece of melodious thunder / for the drunk earth / I just want to / comb the wind from all sides / into the soft hair of young girls / May the worn Wuzhishan / ward off the chilly haze / for the tender spring of Hainan” (我只想／给醉熏的大地／摘一曲悦耳的雷鸣／ 我只想／把八面的来风／梳成少女柔和的秀鬓／愿阅尽沧桑的五指／为嫩 春的海南／挡住料峭的寒霪).”46

A man who holds such a lofty spirit can always be himself even when misunderstood and cast aside; this is the “spirit of green leaves” that is commonly witnessed in Fanken’s poems. In Withered Leaves (败叶), for example, Fanken expresses his aspiration through portraying the fate of leaves and appraising their contribution: Abandoned by the branches / the pain of falling down turns [the leaves] into withered yellow / Next to the huge trunk / it nevertheless does not seek help / Looking up at the prosperous leaves ahead / it never envies / but follows the iron law made by wind / striving to rot its own body / It enjoys the requiem of time / trying to turn its life into dust soon / and integrating itself into the flow of nutrition around the root / Sincere 45 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 74–75. 46 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 47.

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blessings / have strengthened a tree of branches / the wish of rebirth / has made bloom a land of emerald green 被树枝遗弃／跌落的痛苦熬出枯黄／挨着巨大的树干／没有求援／仰 望头上的茂叶／没有嫉妒／它遵从秋风订下的铁律／努力让身体酿成 腐朽／它享受时间的安魂曲／尽快把生命化为尘土／融入树根四周的 营养之流中／真诚的祝福／粗壮了满树的枝桠／重生的愿望／茂盛了 一片翠绿。47

In another lyric with the same imagery, “Farewell, Green Leaves (别了，绿叶)”, the author again expresses the same will of selfless devotion, “They are waiting for the thunder fire / And as firewood / They still have some flames (等待着雷 火／做柴／还有一息热焰).”48 How should we appraise such expression? These poems seem to contain less lingering poetic charm but, rather, simply articulate an altruistic will comparable to masochism. Only when the historical experience hidden beneath the text, as a subtext, is recalled, can we comprehend this phenomenon. Critic Ban Wang aptly notes that sublimity is one of the defining features of the cultural aesthetics of the Mao era.49 Therefore, the sense of loftiness and the sublime altruism of sacrificing oneself for others, abundant in Fanken’s poems, are nothing but remainders from the socialist period. This was not uncommon in the early and middle 1980s, when society still maintained some of that idealism. For example, the “spirit of the old ox” and the “spirit of the screw”, which were promoted at the time, were both residues of the Maoist “socialist new culture.” The “uncommonness among the commonness” of the ordinary people, a spirit celebrated then, is thus widely evident in Fanken’s works. Only in light of such a selfless state can we better understand his masterpiece “At Noon in the Forest (森林的中午).” As critic Xiong Guohua has keenly observed, there is “Light and shadow, sound and color, movement and stillness there; animals and plants are laden with humanity and fun. All in the universe blends into one harmonious whole, and the sounds of nature play a piece of silent music;”50 47 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 74. 48 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 85–86. 49 See Ban Wang, The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and Politics in Twentieth-Century China (Stanford University Press, 1997). 50 Xiong Guohua 熊国华, “Lüse de Genyun: Lun Pangeng shige de weimeizhuyi qingxiang 绿色的耕耘—论盼耕诗歌的唯美主义倾向 [Green Cultivation: On the Inclination of Aestheticism of Pan Geng’s Poetry],” in Pangeng 盼耕, Sheng yu huo de xili 生与活的洗 礼 [Baptism of Life and Living] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2009), 182.

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The steaming hot light is touching the unnamed geometric figures under the tree; A waterfowl can’t find any white shrimp in the water so it has pecked the stored white clouds. The hall of the hive is crowded by all the officials attending the imperial rituals. The mountain wind, just starting to write, is learning with the eyes of the wildcats as its blackboard. Along the lake is the drunken song vanishing. The sleepy bog rushes fail to turn these deeds into notes or write them on the staff under feet. 热腾腾的光线　触摸着 树下未取名的几何图形 水鸟在河底找不到白虾 啄碎了沉淀的白云 蜂巢的大殿　拥挤着 朝仪的百官 初识字的山风借野猫的 眼做黑板　学着1 字 湖边　醉歌散去 睡眼朦胧的灯芯草 没将这些事迹弯成音符 写入脚下的五线谱间。51

The poet who possesses this selfless state thus has “utter innocence” (or “a pure heart of a newborn baby” 赤子之心), as critic Wang Guowei 王国维 (1877– 1927) has suggested.52 To observe the world with this “utter innocence”, one 51 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 71. 52 According to the explanation of “utter innocence” in the Chinese Dictionary of Ethics: “Coined by Wang Guowei, it originally refers to childlike innocence. In Mencius· Li Lou Second, it says ‘A great man is one who retains the heart of a newborn baby.’ Wang Guowei adapted it to be an aesthetic concept, referring to the pure and innocent feelings in artistic creation. Jen-chien T’zu-hua [The Notes and Comments on Ci Poetry] says ‘A poet is one who retains the heart of a newborn baby.’ By quoting Li Yu as an example, it shows that ‘… the less sophisticated one is, the more genuine disposition one has.’ It is believed that the most valuable quality a poet possess is to retain ‘utter innocence.’ Only being free from cupidity, can one maintain genuine temperament and feeling” (“中国王国维 用语。原为童心之意。《孟子·离娄下》：‘大人者，不失其赤子之心者也。’王国维 转用作美学概念，指艺术创作中真纯无伪的感情。《人间词话》：‘词人者，不

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Ruiyun Tower, built in AD 1615 during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) courtesy of the author

can be open-minded enough to be free from worldly affairs and recall beautiful things. For instance, in a piece entitled “In Memory of Ruiyun Tower (瑞云塔 的怀念),” Fanken reminisces about his childhood, “… the green jade bamboo shoots / string seven lotus petals of delicate beauty / on cloud-approaching cornice / hangs a bunch of my tender childhood” (碧透的玉笋／串起七瓣灵 失其赤子之心者也。’以李煜为例，说明‘阅世愈浅，则性情愈真’。认为作为词 人，最可贵的是具有‘赤子之心’，只有不为利欲环境所干扰，才能保持性情和 感情之真。”). See Zhu Yiting 朱贻庭, ed., Lunlixue dacidian 伦理学大辞典 [Dictionary of Ethics] (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2002), 372–373.

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秀的荷片／凌霄的飞檐／挂着我一串嫩嫩的童年);”53 thus he remembers the summer in his childhood when he was punished by a teacher for his mischief:

Once near the tower gate, In the croaking of frogs, I picked up some whisper of the cowherd and the girl weaver. I once added black glasses to the figures of Buddha and door-gods, And they were pleased, winking and grinning at me, almost bursting into laughter There was once when I felt the proudest: I came out of the spire And stood on the smooth gourd stone, urging the kite to chase swallows. The great deeds are full of constant danger, scaring the teacher who passed by the tower; I didn’t receive any song of praise But got a heavy pinch, the pain of which lasted for seven days. 我曾在塔门旁 于一把蛙鸣中 捡到几颗 牛郎织女的窃窃私语 我曾给佛像门神 添上一副副墨黑的眼镜 他们乐了 向我挤眉咧嘴 差点“扑哧”喷出笑音。 最骄傲的一次 我钻出塔尖 站在溜光的葫芦石上 催风筝追逐飞燕 伟大的壮举 险象环生 吓坏了塔下过路的老师 53 Pangeng, Lüse de yinfu, 111.

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A Lyrical Poet in the Era of Postsocialism 我的耳朵没收到赞美的歌 却挨了重重的一拧 痛了七天。

Yet, he says at the last: The most painful time, so far, has been brewed into the sweetest memory. My teacher, if I could return to the summer woven by the sound of cicadas and to the tower which gazed at the wanderer for a long time. How I want that—you give another heavy pinch And twist my ears just like before; Once and once again twist me back to childhood. 那最痛的一次　如今 被岁月酿成最甜的怀念 老师 假如让我回到蝉声编制的夏日 回到久久凝望着游子的塔边 多想—您再给我重重的一拧 拧住我的耳朵　就像从前 把我再一次　再一次 拧回童年54

The recalling of childhood and the affection of the teacher are memories of innocent days. It is both a “voluntary” and an “involuntary” memory. Being a “shock experience,” it works against the alienated society of the post-socialist era with its aura.55 The poet’s life experience is one of the origins of his “Inner Eye” (天眼) which then observes the world with love. Here, the theory of “childlike innocence” (童心说), which was advocated by the late Ming dynasty critic Li Zhi 李贽 (1527–1602) and which calls for the elimination of political trickery in literary creations and in life, provides effective theoretical notes for the poet’s oeuvre as a whole.

54 Ibid., 111–113. 55 See Ann Tukey, “Notes on Involuntary Memory in Proust,” French Review, 42.3 (1969): 395–402.

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Conclusion

According to a Chinese idiom, “The writing mirrors its writer” (文如其人)— one’s writing reveals one’s mentality and mannerisms. Fanken is both a learned scholar and a sensitive and sentimental poet. He has admitted that he is “… fond of looking to the sky / thinking of a language / alternating between azure blue and pitch-dark / … to obtain a diamond-like judgment / (I) would rather be a single virgin / pondering for thousands of / millions of years” (喜欢 仰望苍穹／思考 湛蓝和墨漆／交替的语言 …… 为了一颗钻石般的结论／宁 可 处女独身／再苦思 万年／万万年).56 He does not seem to take too much effort in polishing the language of his poetry, and often expresses his emotions and ideas by portraying natural landscapes. Nevertheless, his familiarity with modern and classical poetry enables him to express his feelings with the skillful application of synaesthesia by imagination and association, and by employing various images, symbols and metaphors. Critic Wan Dengxue has reasonably commented that, “The intrinsic quality of the poems of the Long Xiang group belongs to traditional realism and romanticism, but there is also modern consciousness and application of symbolism, imagery association and other modern ways of articulation.”57 These are precisely the general characteristics of this group of post-socialist lyric poets. When expressing their ideals and aspirations through poetry, they rarely assert themselves as individuals; instead, their feelings and signification are blended with the matters or landscapes they are portraying. When they come to express their personal affections, their “pure mind” is frequently presented like that of “a newborn baby.” Within these two strands, readers can notice the firm existence of a unique subjectivity, created by a particular historical experience and idiosyncratic culture. From Fanken’s unpretentious poems, people can easily note such qualities as sedateness, reservation and altruism. Compared with the traditional Chinese requirement that a gentleman should be gentle and kind (温柔敦 厚), as well as holding the principle of benevolence and loyalty (忠恕之道), he holds such additional qualities as being upright, low-key, generous and abiding by a compassionate sense of equality; what readers often ignore is that these are the features of the “socialist new man” (社会主义新人). The making 56 57

Pangeng, “Kusi zhi haitang 苦思之海滩 [The Beach of Bitter Missing],” in Pangeng duanshixuan 盼耕短诗选 [Selected Short Poems of Pangeng] (Hong Kong: Yinhe chubanshe, 2001), 64. Wan Dengxue 万登学, “Xianggang Shitan taishi 香港诗坛态势 [The Trend of Poetry in Hong Kong],” Dangdai shitan 当代诗坛 [Contemporary Poetry], No., 20, 1996.

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of this “new man” was promoted during the Mao era but is now situated awkwardly. Consequently, postsocialist lyricists are already unlikely to sing with pride about “the people” and “the (socialist) future” because it is hard for the people, as a political concept, to continue to exist in reality when confronted with man-made class differentiation and polarity. It is also difficult to imagine a socialist utopia in pro-capitalist circumstances. However, the touching power of this last “socialist new man” still appears in poems from time to time, confirmed by the poet’s life. Fanken claims to be “honest but not dull” (木而不 讷); notwithstanding his indifference to fame and fortune, he is a persuasive and eloquent teacher who is deeply beloved by his students. His consistently deep affection for teaching and his persistent pursuit of scholarship are well recognized. In addition, he is a low-key social activist keen on engaging with matters of public welfare. In this context, the easily-noted shortcomings of his poems—such as their monotonous images and occasionally dilatory words—have as much to do with the deficiency in the historical experience of a collective-oriented society which left the individual’s psychological experience and aesthetic parameters underdeveloped. The traditional socialist world has suffered devastating disintegration in this postsocialist society; after the demise of Mao’s socialist experiment, its aesthetic experience was on the brink of extinction. Consequently, the lyrical poet in the post socialist era, as an atomized individual who already lacks the support of collective experience, can only occasionally express the romantic feelings that arise from their experiences in the past. In one of his prose poems, Fanken once wrote: “This is a mystery, one that I leave for myself … it seems that its origin, together with its partner, will retire to another world forever; and there will never be any echo. Yet I never try to expel it though it is unidentified. It has become my treasure, because we have experienced childhood together and it is the record of that time” (这是一团 谜，是我留给自己的一团谜……看来，它的来历，将同它的另一半，永远隐 居在另一个世界里，永远不会有回声 。 我并没把身份未明的它驱逐出境，  它也成了我的珍品。因为它和我一起经历了童年，它也是那个年代的凭记).58 Although what the poet writes of here is just “a half piece of litchi leaf” (半片 荔枝叶), we might take it as a metaphor that recalls the memory and “struc-

ture of feeling” of the past age. While this is so because, with the elapse of time, the memory of the “primary scenes” (which has turned the poet into a “socialist new man” with the socialist ethical-moral mentality and mannerism) has become blurred, it is also because the changed relations of social production have made the “structure of feeling” of the other world—the traditional

58 Pangeng, Sheng yu huo de xili, 40–41.

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socialist form of life—appear so awkward. The “involuntary memory,” classically described by Proust in his novel Remembrance of Things Past, has hence been reproduced here: “For several moments, I gazed for a long time / the distant childhood, and the hometown that had been blurred / seemed to float with veins slowly, and flowed gradually toward me along the veins” (有几次， 我久久地凝视／远去了的童年，模糊了故乡／似乎随着叶脉慢慢浮起，沿 着叶脉缓缓向我漫来).59 The author, who, as a lyrical poet in the post-socialist

period, is incapable of suppressing his “poetic” feelings, wanders between the new, market-oriented society and its interpersonal relationship and the old, socialist society and culture, continuing to express a collective-oriented emotional structure. The poems leave Chinese readers with a seemingly familiar, yet ultimately alien, aesthetic feeling—”a transposition of the sense of loss and doubt permeating society as ‘mannerism and style’ … thereby exposing and commenting on the prevalent epistemological and moral uncertainty that has overwhelmed postsocialist consumerist China.”60 Just like recollecting an innocent childhood, the postsocialist lyrical poets are calling for the return of an invaluable entity, which presents a sharp contrast to, and an implicit critique of, a commercialized reality. 59 60

Ibid., 41. Zhang Zhen, “Urban Dreamscape, Phantom Sisters, and the Identity of an Emergent Art Cinema,” The Urban Generation: Chinese Cinema and Society at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Zheng Zhen (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2007), 370.

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On the Historical-Cultural Connotations of “Chinese New Poetry”: Fu Tianhong’s Poems as a Case-Study When advancing the concept of “Chinese New Poetry” (汉语新诗), critic Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐 (1958–) comments on its distinctive trait: The rhythm, aesthetics and symbolic charm of the Chinese language as expressed by poetry were apparently comparable, contributing to the unique feature and style of “Chinese new poetry” distinct from that of any other language. Such literary style and aesthetic character tend to make more substantive and comprehensive contributions to human civilization than national poetry or national style in the general sense.1 Poet Fu Tianhong 傅天虹 (1947–) goes a step further, arguing that the new term “… highlights its difference from traditional classical Chinese poetry; and such difference in linguistic application actually indicates a transformation of cultural belief, which is established on a belief in the language of the whole of China.”2 It is generally held that the poets born in the 1950s or 1960s, who matured and dominated poetry in the 1980s and early 1990s, are the main cohort creating this type of poetry; they are known as China’s “Middle-Aged Generation” (中生代).3 In my view, the poetic pieces created by Fu Tianhong over the past several decades could be taken as the best specimens of the Chinese New Poetry. Critics usually appraise the poet as pursuing a free spirit and independent personality, possessing a critical nature and reflective consciousness.4 Although 1 Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐, “Hanyu xinshi yu hanyu xin wenxue de xueshu bianzheng 汉语新 诗与汉语新文学的学术辩证 [Dialectics between Chinese New Poetry and Chinese New Literature],” Aomen ribao 澳门日报 [Macau Daily], July 3, 2010. 2 Fu Tianhong 傅天虹, “Dui ‘hanyu xinshi’ gainian de jidian sikao 对“汉语新诗”概念的几点 思考 [Some Thoughts on the Concept of ‘Chinese New Poetry’],” Jinan daxue xuebao 暨南大 学学报 [ Journal of Jinan University] (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), No. 1, 2009. 3 See Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐, “Zhongshengdai shiren de qunti jiaolvü yu shixing zijue 中生代诗 人的群体焦虑与诗性自觉 [Group Anxiety and Poetic Consciousness of the Middle-Aged Generation of Poets],” Dangdai Shitan 当代诗坛 [Contemporary Poetry], No. 47–48, 2007. 4 For instance, Wang Ke suggests that his poems are “the symbol of his pursuit for freedom.” Wang Ke 王珂, “Shi de zizhuan: Qinggan xuyao yu sixiang xuyao de caihong 诗的自传：情

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_004

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such an opinion is reasonable, I cannot fully concur with views that either take freedom as the foundation of art or that regard the artist’s innate genius as the key to creating literature: both understand art as something that can be isolated from society and history. In contrast, Carl Gastav Jung (1875–1961) maintained that art is a kind of “… innate drive that seizes a human being and makes him its instrument;” The artist is not a person endowed with free will who seeks his own ends, but one who allows art to realize its purposes through him. As a human being he may have moods and will and personal aims, but as an artist he is “man” in a higher sense—he is “collective man.”5 This opinion goes a step further than the theory of innate genius, sees through the illusion of the so-called “free-willed individual,” and reveals the nature of a poet as someone who expresses the collective unconscious. However, I do not fully identify with Jung’s theory of collective unconscious. He essentially suggests that the structure of the unconscious is shared among all human beings, in whom instincts and archetypes inhere. In contrast, I take poets as spokesmen for a certain ethos and zeitgeist, showing symptoms of the times, either consciously or unconsciously. This role does not conflict with the poets’ idiosyncratic nature/practice of narrating their personal affections, which often cares little for grand narratives. Therefore, while the classical Chinese approach to literature is to “comment on the world (and the works) premised on an understanding of the man (知人论世),” my method conversely it is to “appraise the artist (and his works) based on an understanding of the historical experience (知世论人).” On the other hand, Russian critic Vissarion Bellinsky (1811–1848) believes that style is the unique mark of one’s personality and spiritual particularity in its fusion of thought and form.6 This opinion attributes literary style to the author’s thought and personality, not distancing itself from the theory of innate genius, and ignores to some extent historical and social factors. By contrast, the remarks of Fu’s fellow poet Luofu 洛夫 (1928–2018) seem more pertinent: “All of Fu’s poems are derived from the hardship of his life experience;” 感需要与思想需要的彩虹 [A Poetic Autobiography: The Rainbow for the Emotional Need and Intellectual Need],” in Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐 ed., Lun Fu Tianhong de shi 论傅天虹的 诗 [On Fu Tianhong’s Poems] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshem 2009), 162. 5 C.G. Jung, “Psychology and Literature,” in Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 15: Spirit in Man, Art, And Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 101. 6 V.G. Belinsky, Selected Philosophical Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956).

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they are “… not only the records of his brave spirit of moving upstream against counter-currents, but also the testament of an era of suffering and the witness of a wounded nation.”7 From this perspective, Fu’s verses become the ethnography of the time and the nation. However, Bellinsky’s opinion is still relevant, for we do need to organically combine the uniqueness of individual personality and spirit with the social-historical experience of the times and understand how they interact. With this methodology in mind, the uniqueness of the poet’s personality and spirit serves merely part of the source of his/her literary instincts revealed in textual form; whereas the social-historical elements of the times, which ostensibly seem to be merely the external background, become the inalienable structural factor for interpreting the artist’s idiosyncrasies, poetic connotations and aesthetic values. For our purpose, we need to ask: What kind of social climate led to Fu’s pursuit of a free spirit and independent personality? Where did his critical spirit and reflective consciousness come from? How are the two displayed in his works? Furthermore, what significance does his creation have for our times? Such questions transcend Friedrich Hölderlin’s (1770–1843) proposition of what a poet could do in the age of poverty8 and instead ask: What does a poet mean in an impoverished time? This chapter thus seeks to organically integrate Fu’s poems with his personal experience in the historical transformation, in order to illustrate the significance and cultural import of Chinese New Poetry created by the Middle-Aged Generation poets. It will explore the literary value and social significance of this poetry after 1949, the sense of obligation that this generation bears towards history, the collective psychological and affective structure that they have acquired, and the corresponding artistic conceptions and styles of the differing eras. 1

The Formation of the Rebellious Personality and Critical Consciousness

What, then, is the origin of the poet’s innate features: his rebellious personality and critical consciousness? This idiosyncratic personality needs to be distinguished from that of the bourgeois elite. We must thus examine Fu’s early life. 7 Fu Tianhong 傅天虹, Xianggang shuqingshi 香港抒情诗 [Lyric Poems from Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Yinhe chubanshe, 1998), 216. 8 See Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, “Heidegger and Hölderlin: The Over-Usage of ‘Poets in an Impoverished Time,’ ” Heidegger Studies (1990), 59–88.

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Fu Tianhong (1947–) courtesy of fu tianhong

His father, a county magistrate of the KMT government, left for Taiwan in 1949 before the People’s Republic was established; consequently, Fu was under the foster care of his maternal grandparents since he was only two. His painful record of the want of parental affection and the faithful recollection of what the era imposed on him, both physically and mentally, are the first events that are narrated in his poems. He was included among the “Evil Five Categories” (黑五类) during the Cultural Revolution, and his grandfather was classified in the list of “ghosts and monsters” (牛鬼蛇神) because of the family’s overseas connection and antiques business. Consequently, Fu suffered much discrimination and humiliation during his childhood. In his poem I Am Not Being a Good Boy (我不是一个乖孩子), written in 1968, we find a precocious little boy, who places his hope in the pursuit of poetry and beauty, Don’t be mad at me / I wasn’t being a good boy / yet / I could write poetry Parents left me early / grandpa brought me up / he had an antique shop in Nanjing / he thought I was smart / I was sent to private school at four / the school was on the old Jinling Road / “Three Character Classic” “Hundred Family Surnames” / I had to recite so hard / they were disgusted Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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… I wasn’t being a good boy / yet / I could write poetry I liked watching the colorful cloud in July / they had no hands / no mouth / even without pants / they followed well / all my orders / whatever I thought of / they would make / I laughed / I marveled / I had such great power … I liked / squatting beside the hearth / watching the ants moving / they were busy around / I was busy too / I liked / lying beside the river bank / listening to the river crying / the river shed tears / I shed tears too / I liked / running into the storm / the storm was crazy / I was crazy too Don’t be mad at me / I was not being a good boy / yet / I could write poetry 莫责怪我／我不是一个乖孩子／但是／我会写诗 父母早丢弃我了／养育我的外公／在南京开一家古董店／他夸我聪 明／四岁时我被送去上私塾了／私塾在古老的金陵路边／“三字经”“百 家姓”／死命背诵／令人生厌

……

我不是个乖孩子／但是／我会写诗 最喜欢七月看彩云了／没有手的云／没有口的云／没穿裤子的云／ 最听从／我的命令／我想到了什么／它们就变出了什么／我哈哈大笑 了／我欣赏／自己有天大的本领

…… 我喜欢／蹲在灶台边／看蚂蚁搬家／蚂蚁忙乱／我也忙乱了／我喜 欢／躺在江堤旁／听大江呜咽／大江流泪／我也流泪了／我喜欢／钻 进暴雨里／暴雨疯狂／我也疯狂了 莫责怪我／我确实不是乖孩子／但是／我会写诗9

Such a description of the loneliness of a child abandoned by the times, from the perspective of childlike innocence, moves us with its existentialist touch. In the poet’s retrospection, things of childhood have unique significance, for they witnessed a wild and intractable personality in its formation: a rejection of the old-style education which circumscribed people’s minds and individuality; the development of the imaginative power; the fondness of an unrestrained

9 Fu Tianhong 傅天虹, Fu Tianhong Shicun 傅天虹诗存 [Collected Poems of Fu Tianhong] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2005), 9–12. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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individuality. All these remind us of the description of the heroes’ childhood in John-Christopher and many other Bildungsroman novels of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, a more spectacular coming-of-age narrative of his adolescence appeared only after the continuous unraveling of a great era. As early as the age of 13, Fu managed to leave home and travel around. During the Cultural Revolution, he again wandered from place to place; within four years, he left his footprints in 14 provinces. He was once severely ill on the outskirts of Qingdao city and was saved by an elderly carpenter, from whom he learned carpentry, and with whose “underground carpentry team” he drifted around. During this period, his rebellious and independent character was further molded. Sour Fruit (酸果), a poem written in 1976 portraying this experience, won the Literary Prize awarded by the Yuhua (literally meaning “flower of rain”) magazine in Nanjing in 1980 due to its genuine and sincere delivery. With the skill of symbolism, the verse firstly shows a self-portrait of the poet in those hard times, In childhood / I was a sour fruit / from a twisted tree / People kept distance from me / birds were far away / Winds and rains teased me / whereas frosts tortured me … Disaster / destroyed my dream / (yet) awakened me / I appreciated the tree / raising me / by sucking the blood of the earth / with its brawny roots / Raising me up / with its injured green arm / let me feel the vastness of the heaven and the earth; I was not the tears of the tree / nor its sighs / but the sustenance of its life / so I have no reason to / fall down from the branches of trust … 童年的我／是一棵扭曲的大树上／结出来的一枚酸果／ 人，不亲近我／鸟，不亲近我／风雨把我戏弄／霜冻把我折磨…… 劫难／复灭了我的梦幻／（却）唤醒了我的思索／我感激大树／是它 顽强的根须／吮吸大地的血液／养活了我／是它用受伤的绿臂／高 高地举起我／让我感到天地的辽阔 我不是大树的泪／不是它的叹息／而是它生命的寄托／我没有理由／ 从信任的枝头跌落……10

His gratitude to those ordinary laborers who raised him gives him insight into the era: they are the “tree” that raised him “by sucking the blood of the earth.” Although this eulogy pays direct tribute to the various kinds of help he received from the masses, it also benefits much from the socialist ideology 10

Ibid., 115–120.

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that prizes the laboring class. Thus, in another poem, the image of the tree is replaced by the earth, “Although discrimination and prejudice have driven me to the edge of cliff / The tide of insult has stirred up my sorrow / There is still hope lasting in my gaze / What supports me is my love for the earth (尽管歧视和偏见把我逼上悬崖／潮水般地凌辱激起我无限的悲哀／我凝视 的目光仍蕴含最后的希冀／支撑我的是对大地的爱).”11 It is the people that give him the power to keep loving and he correspondingly expresses his deep gratitude to them. Within this implicit contrast between “me” (as the “sour fruit”) and the laboring masses (as the “tree” and “earth”), we witness the difference between China’s Middle-Aged Generation, who grew up in the socialist era, and Westernized, bourgeois individualists: the former harbors a humble spirit that recognizes the greatness of the masses and does not embrace a selfaggrandizing egocentrism. After his wanderings, Fu returned to Nanjing, where he earned his living as a carpenter and persisted in self-study at night. His suffering aroused his thinking and exploration, and thus he began very early to Question the Heavens (问天): “Galaxy, black holes, and constellations / I wonder about things taking place in the universe / I hear in the macro world / a star is a citizen // I am the son of the earth / the earth is a star, so I am / I am already eighteen / I have the right to learn things (银河，黑洞，星群／很想知道天宇发生的 事情／听说在宏观世界里／一颗星星就是一个公民／／我是地球的儿子／ 地球是颗星，我也是一颗星／我满十八岁了／我有权利打听).”12 A common

understanding of the poem views it as showing Fu’s dissatisfaction with the “autocracy”, his awareness of human rights and even his longing for a “civil society.” However, such questioning of the heavens—apparently a metaphor for challenging authority about injustice—arises not merely from the influence of traditional Chinese poetry since Qu Yuan 屈原 (340 BC–278 BC), which expressed resentment and expostulation (怨刺). Instead, while such questioning and challenging of the ruling authority is the universal state of young heroes during the rise of the bourgeois class (as witnessed in the historical genre of Bildungsroman), it is a persona more encouraged by the great, transformative age of the Mao era which ostensibly appears to be in chaos. As a popular revolutionary song of the time, “A Revolutionary Man is Always Young”, chants: “It is not afraid of wind and rain / It is not afraid of coldness and freezing. // It does not shake, nor tremble / and is always sternly erect on the peak” (它不怕风吹雨打，它不怕天寒地冻。它不摇也不动，永远挺立在 山巅). This is a persona encouraged by Chairman Mao in order to challenge 11 12

Ibid., 20. Ibid., 21–22.

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and repudiate dogmatic political authority and bureaucratic institutions; it is instrumental to the formation of Fu’s critical consciousness and even his rebellious inclination. For instance, Fu questions abnormal phenomena and even doubts the ruling authority, “I won’t inquire anymore / for the universe isn’t peaceful / the meteor that pierces the night / must have betrayed the heaven … ( 我不再打听了／看来宇宙也不安宁／那划破夜幕的流星／一定是背叛天 庭).”13 These verses, with their strong critical consciousness, were written in 1968 when the Cultural Revolution seemed to engulf the whole world, both East and West. Thus, this new morality—which was usually taken to be heresy in feudal (and in any conservative and autocratic) times—was stimulated by the epochal storm of the Mao era, rather than awakened by an awareness of human rights of the bourgeois class, for civil society did not exist at the time. Consequently, we witness his insight into an alienated society, metaphorically expressed in his curse of nature: “The sun is not bright / the spring rain is not wet / the flowers are not fragrant / the stream doesn’t flow / as I go close to it / I feel the chill air / as if I entered / an ancient cave / the coldness of limestone / constitutes the heaven / and constitutes the earth” (不亮的太阳／不湿 的春雨／不香的花朵／不流的小溪／走近它／感到袭人的寒气／仿佛进入 一个／远古的山洞／石灰岩的冷酷／结构成天／结构成地).14 We also read

his resentment against alienation and suppression, and his expression of the spirit of dedication: With all my clothes off / I laugh and rush into the storm / this polluted body and mind / should have been washed earlier / Can it wash off / this year-long dust? / Can it brush away / the various marks? / You might as well split me, lightening / You might as well blow me, thunder / Maybe, in this way can I be reborn / I long for living my life again / I should own / the brain and the body that really belong to me 脱掉所有的衣服／我大笑着冲进暴风雨／这染污的身心／早该好好地 洗一洗／能洗得掉吗／这成年累月的灰尘／能刷得清吗／这形形色色 的印记／还是劈了我吧，电闪／还是轰了我吧，雷击／也许，这样才 能重生／我渴望重活一次／我应该拥有／真正属于自己的大脑和肌 体。15

13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 12. 15 Ibid., 30.

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The resolution to resist and the violent image of declining all unrighteousness remind us of a revolutionary image. Although there is here also an impulse of individualistic heroism verging on anarchy, the imprint that the Red, radical times left on it is well recognized. Within the same social-political context appeared such humanistic discourses as “We are human beings / we possess / human rights / human dignity / human personality / human emotion” (我们是人／我们有／人的权力／人 的尊严／人的个性／人的情感).16 This sloganeering cannot simply be taken to be the same as “the awakening of human consciousness” during the rise of the Western bourgeoisie, which was a reaction against the oppression of Medieval Christianity. On one hand, the so-called “awareness of one’s human rights” is a kind of ideology rather than the real motivation under which history transpired; on the other hand, humanist thought in 1980s China was still committed to the rehabilitation and development of socialism. Therefore, to find the true origin of this liberal discourse, we must deal with the following issue: How was the revolution distorted due to excessive politicization; or, rather, due to the persecution arising from a process of de-politicization?17 We also have to acknowledge that, due to the immaturity of historical and political development, existing socialist states have not yet fulfilled their promise. In this light, we can understand why the poem Epitomes of the Country (农村缩影) pungently satirizes the strange conditions of society, whereas Plum Blossom (梅) repudiates dignitaries and authority and is full of artistic and subversive power.18 This courage of questioning and interrogating reality continues the tradition of Chinese scholars’ consistent concern with national destiny; more importantly, it got its political support from the era which called “[for] continuing the revolution.” Accordingly, Fu’s State of Mind (心迹) (1974) bears revolutionary overtones: The mountain path is lost in the fog / yet the mind isn’t lost, can still pick the distant flowers / the north wind blows the nursery into yellow / yet the heart isn’t frosty, can still sprout unyielding verdure. (Even if) buried in the earth, (it) still answers the call of spring / (Even if) steamed into vapor, (it) still bears the valley of parenting in mind / (Even if) frozen into icicles, (it) still sticks to integrity / (Even if) collapsed into pieces, (it) still stays as solid as stone 16 Ibid., 29. 17 See Wang Hui, “Depoliticized Politics: From East to West,” New Left Review 41, no. September–October (2006): 29–45. 18 Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong Shicun, 35–39, 40–41.

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chapter 2 大雾湮没了山路／心不迷途，仍能采到远方的花束／朔风吹黄了苗 圃／心不僵冷，仍能萌发不屈的新绿 埋葬地层不忘春天的呼唤／蒸为水气不忘养育的河谷／冻成冰棱不 忘精纯的操守／山崩地裂不忘石质的坚固19

These lyrics are reminiscent of the magnificence and nobility of Beidao’s poem Answer (回答): “If the ocean is destined to breach the dike / then let all its bitter water pour into my soul / If the land is destined to rise, / then let the human rechoose the peak for survival (如果海洋注定要决堤／就让所有的苦水都注入 我心中／如果陆地注定要上升／就让人类重新选择生存的峰顶).” Created in the same period of the 1970s, the similarity between the two verses shows the analogous structure of feeling of that generation due to their similar historical experience. 2

Pioneering Spirit, Perseverance and the Desire for Freedom

The second stage of Fu’s artistic career came after China’s reform and openingup commenced in the late 1970s. Just like many other poets then, this age endowed him with a pioneering spirit, perseverance and the desire for more freedom. Like the first period, these new elements of personality are anything but what liberal elitism understands; instead, they crystallize the zeitgeist and project the social-historical experience. After the Cultural Revolution, colleges resumed public enrollment and Fu was admitted to the Chinese Department of Nanjing Normal University. During college years, he read broadly and continued composing poems. History of Vaccination (种痘术的史话) and Lightning Rod (避雷针), published in 1979, are, on the one hand, a response to the Party’s call for “marching towards science”; on the other hand, it restarts the rebellious spirit under the constant inspiration of Maoism: “Members of the church unwilling to be vaccinated kept whining desperately / they fell down in batches before the idol of God (不肯接 种的教徒仍发出绝望的哀鸣／在上帝的偶像面前成批倒下);”20 “Those scary statues in the church / were afraid of thunders and lightning of nature” (教堂里那些吓人的神像／也害怕大自然的雷轰电击).”21 Although this period is usually taken to be an era of “intellectual emancipation” launched by elite scholars in order to critique Maoist radicalism, in effect this emancipation was 19 20 21

Ibid., 41. Ibid., 50. Ibid., 51.

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carried on from before—although it was now transformed from whipping the phenomena of “socialist alienation” during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution to propagandizing for socialist-oriented “reform and opening up.” “Since life has already turned mature / it should be allowed to sing loudly” (生命既然已经成熟／就应让它引吭高歌).22 Riding on the tide of the time, Fu’s poems in this period were passionate and full of youthful vigor. The first person “I” or “me” appears 17 times within 16 lines of the poem. “Youth” (青 春) is compared to such images as “stream”, “dew” and “weeds”. This emphasis on individual consciousness is not the same as the commitment of the bourgeoisie to its self-interest; rather, it shows a person aspiring to be “a Human with a capital-H” (大写的人)”, a still-popular discourse in the 1980s which harbored the Maoist spirit of the sublime while simultaneously acknowledging oneself to be “a little me” (小小的我). Here, humility is taken to be honorable. While this is usually interpreted vis-à-vis the traditional Chinese teaching that a nobleman should be gentle and sincere, and with the discourse of humanism which demands a man exhibit dignity through humility,23 it still articulates a collective will of the 1980s. This assertion of individuality is prayed for and blessed by the collective enterprise because it desires to integrate itself into this collective consciousness so as to achieve its “subjectivity.” Here, the expression and development of individualism truly begin to become a necessity of society—the individual and the collective begin to benefit each other. It is a longing for a lifestyle which is different, yet does not essentially depart from, the revolutionary age, a life world in which one feels at home. This aspiration is a desire for a “socialist civil society,” an effort to establish the “socialist new man” in the new period of reform. It is still the inheritance and the dialectical development (as sublation) of the Maoist ideal of socialism. Therefore, the poet “Longs to be rivers and seas / for flowing into a vast world … longs for sublimation / for moisturizing the land of our fathers … longs for dedication / for dressing our mother with a green coat (渴望江海／渴望流 入广阔的天地…… 渴望升华／渴望湿润祖先的土地…… 渴望奉献／渴望给母 亲披上一件翠衣).”24 This new idealism as expressed in the early reform period is not a sort of hyper-altruism. Rather, “… through a rapid narrative rhythm 22 23

24

Ibid., 58. For instance, Luofu 洛夫 (1928–2018) writes, “He shows in his poems on one hand indomitable and firm vitality; on the other hand, a mind as humble as the plant and as tolerant as the earth. The humble images of the tiny things such as ‘branches’, ‘grass’, ‘fallen leaves’, ‘streams’, ‘root’ and so on repeatedly appear in his poems. In terms of the composition of humanity, the dignified personality tends to lie in the humble things, and simultaneously be highlighted through the latter.” See Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong shicun, 308. Ibid., 58.

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and repeated lyric intonation, this full outburst of the poet’s emotion and the expression of the emotional torrent longing for sublimation and dedication is nothing but idealism filled with youthful courage and power.”25 Thus, the poet also became the singer of the times, although he merely seemed to be expressing his personal feelings. What it reveals is the esprit of the times, a kind of collective ambition and wish. On the other hand, consistent with the “literature of trauma” and “literature of introspection” popular in the early 1980s, Fu also produced a series of works on the bitterness of the past; the most distinguished of these is The Song of a Bitter Love (苦恋曲). Whether or not it truly reflects his personal experience, its affective sentiment demonstrates the general mood of the time. What is more impressive is presented in the second half of the work: when, decades later, the narrator was rehabilitated, he was going to reunite with his lover. However, he hesitated the moment he heard from the room that, “The husband was calling for his wife / the mother was petting her kids” (丈夫在呼唤妻子／母亲在 亲暱儿女).26 Even though he was recalling the moment when they had loved each other passionately, he came to realize that a new tragedy would eventuate if he proceeded further. Therefore, “The dead has come to life, the living has already been dead” (死了的虽然活了，活着的却已经死去); his restraint is a self-willed sacrifice. Fu’s other series of poems in this period portray active scenes of the socialist development of a commodity economy in urban and rural areas, filled with the vitality of the age. Like most poets at the time, he loved to employ the image of ploughing in spring to express the joy of everything coming back to life, as well as the willpower to forge ahead.27 For instance, in Plough (耕) (1984), we read the following lyrics, “Don’t be afraid of insect pupae forming before winter / don’t be afraid of the hideousness of the grotesque rocks / the snow on the numerous mountains has already melted / why don’t we go to plough deeply; / We might damage the plow tip of life / yet how can we miss the planting 25 Wen Fumin 温阜敏, Zhao Huichao 张惠潮, “Dadi shishi: Shiyide xingzou yu yinchang 大地诗使：诗意的行走与吟唱 [Emissary of the Earth: the Poetic Walk and Singing],” in Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐 ed, Lun Futianhong de shi 论傅天虹的诗 [On Fu Tianhong’s Poems] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2009), 204. As Wen and Zhao put it, “These daily images such as fog, stone, streams, grass, roots, rainbow, vines, earth, moon, spring and so on are commonly employed in the image system of Fu Tianhong’s early works. His poetic imagery is of single reference to symbolic content, which is either straight metaphor of or hidden correspondence to reality.” Ibid., 203–204. These images were the significant content of the popular poems at the time, corresponding to favorite lyrical subjects before the large-scale urbanization since the late 1980s. 26 Ibid., 67–71. 27 Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong Shicun, 92–93.

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season? (莫怕虫蛹过冬的成形／莫怕怪石深埋的狰狞／千山雪已经化尽／ 我们为甚么不去深深地耕耘／／或许会撞坏生命的犁尖／又怎能错过播种 的节令…).”28

Nevertheless, those poems, seemingly “out of step” with the leitmotif of the era, reveal better the poet’s extraordinary sensitivity and perception. For example, “Vines on the Mountain (山藤),” composed in 1981, tells of the dream of becoming a vine along the edge of a cliff: Getting through the cold winter, getting enough sunshine and water, With enough strength, I stuck closely to the stern cliff. I climbed and climbed, ‘til to the glittery peak. Fighting against the wind and rain, I grew day by day. Rooted deeply in the crevices, I stretched step by step. Unexpected that there was one day with a tremble, My root should be cut off that easily. Was it the kid’s innocent trick? Or the woodcutter’s first try of the blade? I died, not in a cold winter, But in a warm spring morning. 熬过寒冬，获得充足的阳光和水份。 我又有气力贴紧峭拔的陡壁， 攀呀，攀呀，上面是闪光的顶峰。

…… 我博击风雨，一天天发展， 我扎根石缝，一步步延伸。 谁知有一天我浑身一震， 竟轻易被人砍断了老根！ 是愚童天真的戏谑？ 是樵夫初试着锋刃？ 我死了，没死在寒流滚滚的冬日， 却死在春光明媚的早晨！29

28 29

Ibid., 93. Ibid., 73.

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The last paragraph is rather intriguing, for it seems to convey an apocalyptic power, the mystery of which few readers can effectively decode. This is exactly the power of poetry and the value of the poet to which Shelly compares “the nightingale,” A Poet is a nightingale who sits in darkness, and sings to cheer its own solitude with sweet sounds; his auditors are as men entranced by the melody of an unseen musician, who feel that they are moved and softened, yet know not whence or why.30 The ominous presentiment of this verse is particularly reminiscent of some “underground poems” written in ultra-radical times which questioned authority and orthodoxy. There are two major themes in Fu’ works during this period: the articulation of the will to tough vitality, and the yearning for more freedom; these are often integrated in the name of love. “Love of Cedar (雪松之恋)” (1984) compares the City Tree of Nanjing cadre to an affectionate girl: “You fearlessly / in every needle / burst forth green / and burst forth the freshness of youth and romance / Making the listless life / be recovered in the moisture of love / Making the worn, ancient capital / be bred in the moisture of love” (你大胆地／在每一 根针叶上／开放绿色／开放出青春浪漫的新鲜／让荒芜的生命／在爱的滋 润中复苏／让疲惫的古都／在爱的滋润中衍息);31 “You are greeting floating clouds and the birds / You are calling for the breath of liberty …” (你招呼流云， 招呼小鸟／你招呼着自由的气息……).32 This combination thus often leads to a humanistic discourse. In Moon and Woman (月亮•女人), Fu expresses his

desire for freedom through the traditional Chinese literary image of the goddess Chang Er on the moon. He firstly applies light and graceful brushwork to describe the charming gestures of this fairy: In a thin veil / You move your step slowly / Staring out at the thick green willows / The heart ripples gently; /(You) listen to the sound of tides / Autumn thoughts gradually come up/ You are drunk, you are guzzling alone / Climbing across the garden of the bistro / (You are) imbecile, you are dancing stumblingly / With the rhythm of bamboo shadows …

30 31 32

Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defense of Poetry,” in Gay Wilson Allen and Harry Hayden Clark eds., Literary Criticism, Pope to Croce (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), 306. Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong Shicun, 90–91. Ibid., 91. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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披着轻纱／移动步履／望浓浓杨柳色／动了春情／听鸣鸣涨潮声／启 了秋思／ 醉了　你独自狂饮／爬过酒楼东篱／痴了　你颠簸轻舞／ 随着竹影节律／甚至隐进丛林…33

However, the poet soon changes the motif of the poem: “loneliness is your story / whereas seeking becomes your theme (寂寞是你的故事／寻觅是你的 主题).” Therefore, the poet recites in the main body, “If love is only a gift / or occupation / enslavement / and even incarceration / then this love / is doomed to be a tragedy from the beginning / I really believe / that maybe one day / in the mythical sky / there appears / the miracle of fission” (如果爱情只是恩赐／ 只是占有／只是奴役／只是幽闭／那么这一场／从开始注定就是悲剧／我 真怀疑／也许真有一天／这神话一样的天空／会出现／裂变的奇迹).34 This

implies an unfaithful affair and subsequent break-up, which again become the oracle of the times, prophesying the end of the romance between the state and society. Contrasting famous myths between West and East, Myth (神话)—written in 1987—makes a “cultural comparison,” a theme of great popularity in the 1980s: On the peak, so sexy The naked shadow and the sound of singing Fall into the deep canyon; In Goddess Lorelei’s Bay, those freakish seamen, one after one, were caught by the whirlwind and ended up in Davy Jones’ locker. China has no Lorelei; There is a queen-mother in the heaven, The Queen Mother of the West. She pulled off the silver hairpin and hastily made a division; The river then began to rage A glance at the sky, Hearing The cowherd and the weaving maid Were crying. 33 34

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chapter 2 山峰　性感的 裸影　歌声 顠下峡谷 在女神罗累莱的海湾 异想天开的水手 一个个 卷入旋涡 葬身鱼腹 中国没有罗累莱 有一位天上的王母 王母娘娘 她拔下银簪子 轻轻一划 从此河水汹涌 望一眼天空 就听见 牛郞和织女 在哭35

Although this discourse of the liberation of human nature from the 1980s is ideological, it is simultaneously the articulation of a utopian dream of looking forward to the further expansion of the space of the social realm, which is the premise of the formation of a “socialist civil society.” Being the singer of the age, Fu thus unconsciously accomplished his obligation to the times, articulating the collective-oriented entrepreneurship of the early reform period. 3

Critique of the Alienation of a Commercialized Society

In 1983, Fu moved to Hong Kong after getting in touch with his family abroad; thereafter, he embarked on a new life journey. Being one of the “south-comers” (referring to those immigrants from mainland China), the poet, whose mentality had been fully baptized by socialist ideals, made a sharp critique of the alienation of the capitalist commodity society—a common feature shared by this group of the Middle-Aged Generation. When he first came to Hong Kong, house rental was incredibly expensive, so Fu’s carpentry came in very handy. He lived in a wooden house on a 35

Ibid., 106.

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mountain built by himself: hence his poem “Song of the Wooden House on Ciyun Mountain (慈云山木屋歌)” overflows with a spirit of nobility: “From Ciyun Mountain / I borrow a piece of slop land / From now on / I sleep with the moon … The little carefree cabin / is bathing in wild wind … At dawn / from the tiny nest / fly quietly a flock of poetic sparrows (向慈云山／借一袭 坡地／从此／枕月而眠……无忧无虑的小木屋／沐浴野风……黎明／这小小 的巢中／便恬恬地飞出一群诗雀).”36 Analogy, exaggeration and imitation, as well as the sound and action and the scene of sparrows flying out of the nest, all imply the poet’s resolution to not yield to difficult times, as well as his will to turn the hardship of life into the beauty of poetry. It also shows the toughness of the intellectuals from the mainland towards the capitalist world and their courage in fighting against adversity. Stranded in Hong Kong, Fu earned his living by leasing his cheap labor and living in his dove-cage cabin, tasting all the bitterness of the dregs of life. Although he struggled for survival, Fu still devoted himself to literature. Besides working and pursuing an academic degree, he made time to write and even established a magazine, Contemporary Poetry [当代诗坛]. During this period, he obtained a better understanding of Hong Kong society. Often quoted and commented on by critics is his Hong Kong Nights (夜香港): The mystery of light / overflow through the fingers / What flows are the various skin colors / At night / the beauty of Hong Kong / all floats on the ocean / The skyscrapers with swaying red and green / is the version / of the gem flower / Night clubs are always the brightest cluster of stars / with naked ears / hunting quietly for / the sound of a whale Indulged in lust / desiring for material / the fragrant hair drops like waterfall / Desire / is expanding / and rising /along a curve Nights of Hong Kong / are jeweled lavishly / Even the moon over the sky / is twinkling / with the vision / of a silver coin. 光的神秘／溢出指缝／流动的是各种肤色／入夜／香港的美／全浮在 海上／ 摇红摇绿的摩天大厦／是宝石花的／翻版／夜总会是最亮的一把星 星／正用全裸的耳朵／在潜猎／鲸的声音 人欲横流／物欲横流／香发流成瀑布／渴望／膨胀／沿曲线上升

36

Ibid., 121.

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chapter 2 夜香港／珠光宝气／连天上斜挂的月／也闪烁／一枚银币的／ 眼神37

Although Bai Ling has aptly remarked that this poem, with its various images, “… banters about the scene of feasting and revelry, luxury and the moneyoriented air in Hong Kong in a slyly humorous way …”38 few critics have pointed out its source of inspiration. Wang Ke is an exception: Fu Tianhong’s metropolitan poems, especially those describing Hong Kong, leave one noticeably with the impression that he was just like Baudelaire, who, “having rejected the bourgeois and capitalist law of order which spares no room for him with great disappointment, comprehends better than any other poets of his time that poets are living in a culture that controls all objects and price manipulates all values.” He has great critical consciousness of such a culture. As he moved to Hong Kong during his adulthood, his insight into the contrast between the two social systems and cultures is more unique, even more profound than that of those travelers or the residents in Hong Kong, which provides his poems of Hong Kong with particular style and value.39 Zhu Shoutong is also among the few scholars who have noticed the sympathy that Fu’s poems have for those who are at the bottom of society and cannot master their own destiny: those such as prostitutes, dancers, fortune-tellers, Filipino maids, upstarts, recluses, night walkers, stowaways and so on are comparable to the sleepwalkers of Charles Baudelaire’s pen, who consciously spy on the secrets of the metropolis.40 Indeed, in the early days when Fu arrived in Hong Kong, most of the masterpieces from his pen were of critical realism.41 For example, in “X-road (十字街头),” Fu applies metaphor and synaesthesia to sharply and pungently satirize the disorder of the British colony:

37 38

Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong shicun, 121. Bai Ling 白灵, “Hundun bianyuan zhili 混沌边缘之路 [The road of chaos and margins],” in Zhu Shoutong ed., Lun Fu Tianhong de shi, 37. 39 Wang Ke 王珂, “Shi de zizhuan: Qinggan xuyao yu sixiang xuyao de caihong 诗的自传： 情感需要与思想需要的彩虹 [A Poetic Autobiography: The Rainbow for the Emotional Need and Intellectual Need],” in Zhu Shoutong ed., Lun Fu Tiaonhong de shi, 161. 40 See Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐, Xu Yanchuan 许燕传, “Hong xiang tiankong sushuo buxiu 虹向天空诉说不朽 [The rainbow is telling the immortality to the heaven],” in Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong shicun, 21–22. 41 Ibid. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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Incense is sold along the street: Man and God communicate through the medium; The kite is a piece of metaphor, Unrest is everywhere under the sky. Termites, cockroaches, mosquitoes and flies: The Hong Kong government lets them run ahead. Tsing Ma Bridge stretches its nose; Only the rose garden lives in the minds of high officials. Lines are reassembled; The heart is a hive of chaos. Corn drawn fictionally in the pattern Is all groundless. The fallen leaves: Some may turn green anyhow Near the end of the year Someone is reading a flowing cloud. 香烛沿街摆卖 人和神也有媒介交流 风筝是一条暗喻 动荡写满青天 蟑螂，白蚁，蚊蝇 港府放任不管 青马大桥伸长了鼻子 高官心中只有玫瑰园 线条在重新组合 人心是混乱的蜂群 图案上凭空画出粟米 粒粒无根无蒂 落下的叶子 总该有几片返青 临近岁晚 有人在重读一片流云42 42

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The following lines reveal more directly the weird situation in the colonial Hong Kong: “The TV program is not eerie / but Hong Kong is just so uncanny / it’s difficult to differentiate official from bandit, or day from night / nor to separate police, drug dealer from secret guards (并非电视节目怪诞／香港原本就 是这样五光十色／分不清是官是匪是朝是夕／分不清警察毒贩锦衣卫).”43 Furthermore, Fu exposed the vulgar mentality of Hong Kong’s denizens in a bitter yet humorous way. Celestial Phenomena (天象) is a penetrating summary of life on this little island. What dissatisfied the author was not merely the alienated society under commercialization, “… a cold game of treasure hunting / money comes first … the speculated petty bourgeois / are all ambitious (冷酷的寻宝游戏／金钱第一… 契准时机的小市民／个个野心勃勃),”44 but also the mediocre mentality of these petty urbanites: just like the life of a canary willing to be bound, “… the bird has been tamed / it flies out of the cage jumping onto your shoulder / flies two rounds in the hall / and returns to its cage (小鸟已被驯服／它飞出笼子 跳上你的肩膀／厅内飞二圈／又返回 自己笼中).”45 The poem also describes a selfish society which cannot manage emotional exchange: “… not in the subway / nor in the street / or even coffee place / to convey your genuine affection (地铁里不可以／／街上不可以／ 咖啡座里也不可以／倾诉真情).”46 A series of verses—such as The Words of a Bellman (看更阿伯的话), Typhoon Shelter (避风塘), An Old Beggar Woman (老乞妇) and the Watercress Woman (西洋菜女)—profoundly expose the dark side of society, showing the poet’s empathy for the misfortunes of the women and laborers who struggle at the bottom of society. During this period, within his image system, “… those concrete images like cabin, lotus, kapok, sail, eagle, nest and so on were frequently applied; the extension and development of the images have enriched their original connotation; and the mutual interrelation and overlapping of the images have expanded the overall tension of the poems.”47 They uncover the ulterior dimension of the superficially prosperous and modern urban landscape, which indicates that the poet had seen through vanity and penetrated into the essence with his insightful eyes. This is a result of the firm perspective that Mao’s socialism, which has transcended weak and pale humanistic concerns, has given him.

43 44 45 46 47

Quoted from Zhu Shoutong ed., Lun Fu Tianhong de shi, 44. Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong shicun, 154. Ibid., 182. Ibid. Wen Fumin 温阜敏, Zhao Huichao 张惠潮, “Dadi shishi: Shiyide xingzou yu yinchang 大 地诗使：诗意的行走与吟唱 [Emissary of the Earth: the Poetic Walk and Singing],” in Zhu Shoutong ed, Lun Futianhong de shi, 204.

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Scholars often attribute Fu’s assailing of social injustice to his pursuit of individual freedom and liberty, without noting the strong impingement of the socialist values of Mao’s China. Let us take as an example his Song of The Polishing Workers (磨光工人之歌), which narrates the tragic plight of workers. It has even been compared to British poet Thomas Hood’s (1799–1845) famed piece The Song of the Shirt, which describes the hardships of sewing women,48 and Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s (1806–1861) The Cry of The Children, which portrays the miserable suffering of child laborers.49 Nevertheless, in my view, the poet’s protest approximates much more closely to The Silesian Weavers (1844) by Heinrich Heine (1797–1856).50 That is to say, the conscious comparison of, and more frequent unconscious contrast between, the two cultures is an idiosyncratic feature that the socialist era conferred on “south-coming” intellectuals like Fu. The reason why “… he could see through the superficial prosperity and uncover further the ugliness and misfortunes of the capitalist world the moment he came to Hong Kong, instead of feeling like entering a ‘paradise’ ”51 lies in his penetrating insight forged by socialist ideas. His critical consciousness of decadent capitalist society, which is filled with luxury and dissipation and scenes of debauchery, originated from socialist discourses which were still popular in the 1980s. Thus, when the poet looks at the wildness, he sees “…’the accent turns pale due to loss of blood … lying around everywhere / is the lost eclogue’; the vast field has been split by ‘private cars / private houses / private gardens / private roads,’ while ‘every sharp iron cluster on the fence / is the declaration of power and benefit’ ” (“乡音失血变成苍白”，“遍地都是／ 遗落的牧歌”，广袤的原野皆被“私家的车／私家的屋／私家的田园／私家 的路”所割裂，而“篱墙上每一根尖利的铁簇／是势和利的宣言”).52 In all, during the period of Fu’s stay in Hong Kong, he reveals a society where people laugh at poverty but not prostitution (such as what The Girl Next Door [邻家少女] delivers) while showing his profound understanding of and great sympathy for the nobodies who suffer much their whole lives (as expressed in 48

First published in Punch, or the London Charivari. 16 December 1843, see also Inglis, R.B., et al., Adventures in English Literature (Toronto: W.J. Gage, 1952), pp. 436–37 49 Edmund Clarence Stedman ed., A Victorian Anthology, 1837–1895 (Cambridge: Riverside, 1895). For the comparison, see Tu An 屠岸, “Cong yecao dao hengxing” 野草到恒星 [From Weeds to Stars], in Zhu Shoutong ed, Lun Futianhong de shi, 7. 50 Tu An 屠岸, “Cong yecao dao hengxing 从野草到恒星 [From wild grass to star],” in Zhu Shoutong ed, Lun Futianhong de shi, 7. 51 Gu Jitang 古继堂, “喧响过后的深沉 [The Depth after the Noise],” in Zhu Shoutong ed, Lun Futianhong de shi, 42. 52 Wu Huangzhang 吴欢章, “Fu Tianhong duanshi de gousi yishu 傅天虹短诗的构思艺 术 [The Art of Conception of Fu Tianhong’s Poems],” in Zhu Shoutong ed, Lun Futianhong de shi, 87.

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The Old Tea Drinker [老茶客]).53 Not unexpectedly, his frank persona of blunt satire and resentment of evil offended some snobs in local literary circles, and he was framed and jeered. However, his steely character, which had already been molded by his earlier career, enabled him to continue writing. Luckily enough, as a man of genuine disposition, Fu gained the admiration of an elegant female poet there; and their love story became widely known. 4

Historical Retrospection and Social Activities

Having experienced the three stages of his life, Fu stepped well into his middle age. His persistent adherence to the morals shaped in socialist times rendered him unfit for interpersonal relationships filled with tension and intrigue in a commercialized society. How would he choose the “harbor of his life” after having experienced three different cultures: of Mao’s era, of the early period of reform and opening up, and of a capitalist, postcolonial culture? After the wedding, Fu and his wife moved to Macao. Rather than being a poor coolie as before, Fu’s life was better off and he could afford leisure to enjoy scenic spots. Wandering in the small town of Macao with its rich historical relics and profound cultural heritage, Fu mused over the past, sighed about the ups and downs of life and reflected on the lessons of history. In A Tour of the Kwan-yin Hall of Macao (游澳门观音堂), he sighs deeply: The depth of the temple yard / means a kind of concentration / (I) also feel / the shock of space-time interleaving; Wood-carved Kwan-yin is vivid / it began with the story of a wild camphor tree / yet now dressed in golden makeup and with infinite mercy / time is testifying its immortality; Right at the foot of this Buddha / the Treaty of Wanghsia was signed on this stone table / by the arrogant American envoys / and humiliated senior officials of the Qing dynasty; With the personnel changes of generation and generation / several eminent monks took over / a sunset is hanging on the glass eaves / without noticing the floating cloud 庙院是很深的／说明了一种浓度／也已感触到／时空交织的震撼； 木雕的观音栩栩如生／缘于一株野生樟树的典故／而今全身妆金大 慈大悲／岁月在证明她的不朽； 53

Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong shicun, 227, 230.

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就在菩萨脚下／这石台上竟签订过 “ 望厦条约”／狂妄的美国特 使／辱国的清廷重臣／／ 一代一代的人事变迁／换过几许高僧逸士／玻璃檐角挂着一轮落 日／流云无暇顾及54

Here, Fu’s profound reflection on modern Chinese history, as well as his patriotism, is well presented. He resumed much closer ties to the mainland in Macau. As Chinese society had transformed dramatically to a market-oriention since the 1990s, various dregs of the old society that had disappeared over past decades floated up again, worrying the poet. In A Revisit To Qinhuai River (重访 秦淮河), the author once more sighs, “The peaceful Qinhuai River / suddenly from peaceful /changes into greedy // The desire for wealth is as sharp as a plough / on the hardened book of ancient history / all the characters carved in the stone / are stirring (归于平静的秦淮河／突然又由平静／变得多欲／ ／发财的欲望尖锐如犁／板结的古志书上／如今一个个石印的字／都泛起 骚动).”55 The wisdom the poet has drawn from history enables him to suggest

that “… history never ends / the night stays in the pupil of the lake / spring water, spring flowers and spring scenery / are all hovering uncertainly (历史 何曾落幕／夜在湖的瞳孔里／春水春花春色／都在徘徊不定).”56 This verse can be comprehended by meditating on history and reality, by comparing the modern to the traditional, and by taking history as a mirror: they “… both make use of the techniques of classical poetry (such as the employment of stories, allusions, words, sentence patterns, musicality, and so on) and maintain the freshness and density of modern poetry.”57 Only in this way can we comprehend the profound meaning under the poetic techniques of metaphor and synaesthesia. Fu drifted and wandered throughout China for over 20 years. At that time, he had no idea when he would return to the motherland. However, as an artist growing up in China, his heart remained there. In Return (归), his intention to retreat from the world and back to his roots is revealed in Chinese traditional imagery:

54 55 56 57

Ibid., 239. Ibid., 258. Ibid. Long Bide 龙彼德, “Lun Futiaonhong 傅天虹论 [On Fu Tianhong],” in Zhu Shoutong ed, Lun Futianhong de shi, 20.

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The weeds of the days/are swimming over; / On the lake / returns an old boat. The moon and the stars withdraw finally; / the old house is mottled; / what’s late / is a long list of fleeting memories. The road’s already split / yet keeps / the average speed / since childhood. Right now, he’s holding the hands of his wife left in the hometown / gazing at her eyes / in the yard / rains can’t hold the branches fast. 岁月的乱草／游来／江湖上／有破旧的归舟 星月终於退隐／老屋斑剥／迟到的／是一长串飞逝的往事 路早已分裂／仍保持着／童年起所有的／均速 此刻他握着故乡老妻的手／久久凝视／庭前／一滴滴抓不牢树枝的 雨58

Here, we should comprehend “the elder wife in the hometown” as a metaphor for the nostalgia for his beloved motherland, people and culture. Fu eventually chose to return to mainland China. He is now the director of the Institute for the Development of International Chinese Literature in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai Campus. Devoted to fostering the next generation of young students in the motherland with his rich knowledge and writing experience, he affects his students with his spirit of persevering with poetry. Such a change can be taken as both a choice of wisdom and a decision of benevolence. The “crazy yet chivalrous” poet, as he is called by his friends, is simultaneously a zealous publisher and social activist. He devotes a great deal of effort to publishing poetry and planning related activities: in 2000, he designed a major publishing program entitled “Collection of Chinese and Foreign Modern Poetry” (with Chinese and English versions) and the series called “Century Verse.” In addition, he has continued publishing a collection entitled “World Chinese Poetry” with over 1000 books, and has established “The Chinese New Poetry Library” in order to preserve valuable materials, including a large number of manuscripts, letters and photographs from the poets of the pan-Chinese regions. Meanwhile, he also initiated the Forum on Contemporary Poetics, which lasts to this day.

58

Fu Tianhong, Fu Tianhong shicun, 164.

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Conclusion

Zhu Shoutong once commented insightfully on Fu Tianhong’s lyrics: Although the poet travels around Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao all the year round, his poems and poetic composition have always been targeted at his ideal readers from the mainland, and taking the poetic circle of the mainland as the stage for him to fulfill his dream. All the Chinese language in his poems is newly created and constructed, which selfevidently reflects a sense of cultural belonging.59 This confirms his viewpoint that “In different areas, Chinese New Poetry may represent different social environments and personal experience.”60 He goes on to evaluate its ideological nature, The ideological basis or even ethical basis on which to deal with the aesthetic representation of the environments and experience and on which to make value judgments, is nevertheless the new cultural convention and its corresponding creative thoughts, which closely tie in with the May Fourth Movement and have been formed in modern Chinese language.61 Indeed, the concept of Chinese New Poetry indicates that it has integrated the historical poetic tradition while simultaneously sharing the characteristics of modern Chinese idiom. Nevertheless, what we witness from Chinese mainland Middle-Aged Generation poets like Fu Tianhong is not merely a new literary tradition from the May Fourth Movement and the notions and thoughts of the May Fourth New Culture. More importantly, their unique personality traits and structure of feeling, as well as their application of images and handling of artistic conceptions, are endowed by 60-plus years of historical experience of the People’s Republic of China (from 1949). Therefore, just as Zhu admits, “The Middle-Aged Generation is not merely a temporal concept; instead, it is a state of writing, a particular state of the poets’ life and their composition of poetry.”62 Fu Tianhong himself also confirms that 59

Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐, “Hanyu xinshi yu hanyu xin wenxue de xueshu bianzheng 汉语 新诗与汉语新文学的学术辩证 [Dialectics between Chinese New Poetry and Chinese New Literature],” Aomen ribao 澳门日报 [Macau Daily], July 3, 2010. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.

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Chinese New Poetry has effectively changed the fact that modern Chinese poems have put excessive weight on ‘modern’ semantics. It refers to not only the ‘inter-generational’ order of genre in the temporal dimension, but also to a kind of continuous language strategy and symbolic system.63 In short, it is only by taking historical experience as the premise and subtext of the crystallization of poetic content that can we make a dialectical evaluation of the artistic achievement that the poet’s works have attained as well as their historical significance and aesthetic limitation. 63 Fu Tianhong 傅天虹, “Lun Hanyu xinshi de lilun yunxing yu meixue jiazhi 论“汉语 新诗”的理论运行与美学价值 [On the Theoretical Operation and Aesthetic Value of “Chinese New Poetry”],” in Fu Tianhong 傅天虹 ed., Zhongguo xinshi: xinshiji shinian de huigu yu fansi—Liangan sidi disanjie dangdai shixue luntan lunwenji 中国新诗： 新世纪十年的回顾与反思—两岸四地第三届当代诗学论坛论文集 [Chinese New Poetry: Review and Reflection on the First Decade of the New Century—a Collection of Essays from the Third Contemporary Poetics Forum of the Four Sides of the Taiwan Straits], 2010.

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part 2 The Historical Consciousness of the New Liberal Humanism

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Anatomizing China’s “Avant-Garde Fiction”: Articulating Historical Experience in Formal Experimentation China’s “avant-garde fiction” became a popular literary trend in the mid1980s, triggering world-wide attention and heated debate. According to Andrew F. Jones, literary historians usually find in these texts a “… similar disdain for conventional ways of writing history and representing humanity”1 and they claim that that “… no other fictional moment epitomizes the sheer audacity and self-consciously provocative spirit of the literary avant-garde that transfigured the Chinese literary scene.”2 Accordingly, this literary movement is usually understood as an artistic experiment influenced by foreign fiction: these “… narrative innovations took place soon after the translation into Chinese of a number of works of Euro-American modernist fiction (including volumes by Jorge Luis Borges and William Faulkner);” they revealed their influence and “… represented a deliberate use of modernism as a means of unseating the heretofore unquestioned authority of the omniscient narrator of socialist realism.”3 The avant-garde dimension seems to be modernist because, as Xiaobin Yang suggests, an “inherent, active irony”4 is often present. However, critic Xudong Zhang contends that this kind of fiction is ultimately “postmodern” in form because the writers “… have redefined the field of literary innovation through writing about writing.”5 Curiously, this viewpoint is echoed by Xiaobin Yang himself: it is “… a fiction that is aware of its own fictionality, a fiction that comments on itself.”6 In view of these differing opinions, the first question for us is whether this fiction—avant-garde or not—is a genre of modernism or postmodernism? 1 See Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” in Mostow, Joshua and Kirk A. Denton, eds. Columbia Companion to Modern East Asian Literatures (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 556. 2 Ibid., 554 3 Ibid., 555 4 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern: Trauma and Irony in Chinese Avant-Garde Fiction (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 163. 5 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-Garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 150. 6 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 163.

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On the other hand, considering the pursuit of meaning or relating art to society—the idiosyncratic feature of Western avant-gardes (and the original connotation of the concept)—scholars in China often believe that there is nothing particularly “avant-garde” about the Chinese variation. As a result, such concepts as “narrative trap” (叙述圈套) and “the vicious circle of narrative” (叙述的怪圈) become the major terms for interpreting these works. Existing scholarship thus almost “… uniformly concentrates on the formal aspects of the new genre, ignoring the material and cultural conditions of the avant-garde fiction;” in short, it “… refuses to make a basic judgment on the sociological content of its object of study.”7 I intend to question such an interpretation that is predicated on a superficial, formalist approach. Through a close reading of some key texts that uncovers the interrelated connections between the historical experience of the 1980s and the formal experimentation of this particular school of fiction, I suggest that these stories profoundly display (and sometimes refract) a postrevolutionary, secular society undergoing a depoliticized process of transformation; they give a revisionist rendition of the history of modern China from the perspective of the emergent middle class. A dialectical comprehension of their content and form is thus necessary for reappreciating the merits and faults of this fictional writing. Unlike critics in China, scholars trained in Western learning have long noted that the narrative content of Chinese avant-garde fiction arises out of a changed social reality. For instance, Xudong Zhang rather sharply suggests that “[T]he breaking apart of collective experience and the scattering of the dominant mode of representation … have forged the immediate situation of the Chinese avant-garde of the 1980s.”8 In particular, this new collective experience engendered changed social relations, both real and imaginary; these greatly weakened the existing cultural-political hegemony, if not rendering it utterly irrelevant, … the increasing development of a market economy restructured the material as well as the social conditions of everyday life in China; this change created the necessity for a modified imaginary relationship between humans and their world. Along with these changes in social existence came the crumbling of the authoritative discourse of the

7 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 154. 8 Ibid., 200.

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state, which no longer had the power to provide an overriding cohesiveness or coherence vis-à-vis a radically fragmented social and cultural community.9 Avant-garde fiction is thus nothing to Zhang but “… a set of rhetorical strategies conveying a new complex of social-cultural relations, giving voice to the subject positions dwelling within this complex.”10 In other words, the “… existential environment …” of avant-garde experimentation is none other than the “… political relaxation, economic marketization, the new cultural and ideological spaces created by the synchronic coexistence of different discourses;” rather than “… the social background for meta-fiction,” this environment is “… the natural surroundings and material hotbed of a new generation, a new community of imagination.”11 What this knowledge tells us is that formal experimentation in fiction was intimately tied to the social texture and fabric undergoing dramatic, “experimentalistic” change, which impinged on the personal, everyday life of average people.12 As such, Zhang aptly notes that the Chinese avant-garde fiction is “… not an aesthetic experiment, but rather a linguistic genesis and structuration.”13 However, what kind of historical account does this writing deliver? What ideological message does it convey? If, as Zhang argues, it heralds “… the onset of a social consciousness in post-contemporary China,”14 what sort of “social consciousness” was realized? While Zhang keenly observes that “… the consciousness formation of a historically emergent social sphere is tortuously expressed in the riddle of language …” which “… bestows and justifies the aesthetic novelty and the obscure sense of emancipation,”15 what I want to stress is that we need to pay attention to the two dimensions of the historical dynamic—to look more closely at the other side of the totality. In accordance with such a dialectic, we will find that the narrative structure of 9 10 11 12

13 14 15

Ibid., 151. Ibid. Ibid., 154. Xudong Zhang aptly notes that “[T]he formal innovativeness of the avant-garde fiction is synchronic to the erosion of the old order and the restlessness of a nascent social form which are not only an external landscape but the space in which its narrative experience is nourished. In other words, the narrativity of meta-fiction lies in the personal experience produced by Deng’s immense social ‘experiment.’ ” Ibid., 155. It is thus “… a style striving for its poetic autonomy as a representation of social change;” being a “… self-referential genre …” it “… has functioned as the formal-discursive space for a social communication.” Ibid., 199, 154. Ibid., 164. Ibid., 163.

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meta-fiction or avant-garde writing is not merely “… a configuration of social individuality by means of a deliberate dispersal of meaning in the journey of meta-fiction.”16 Rather, to deconstruct its reified and semiautonomous architecture, we should delve into the political unconscious of the writers by probing the texture of their works. In this regard, Andrew Jones has perceptively found that the notion of the “postmodernity” of the writings belies the shallowness of existing scholarship on this kind of creation, It is these characteristics of avant-garde fiction—its refusal of historical causality and humanism, its determined avoidance of overtly politicized ways of writing and reading, its deadpan depictions of transgressive violence, its playful and self-referential experimentation with narrative form, and its preference for surfaces over psychological depths—that have led many critics, both in China and abroad, to view the movement as heralding the advent of literary postmodernity in China. Although this contention remains a matter of debate, and cultural and literary developments of a more local nature have clearly been just as important as global cultural currents in the formation of the avant-garde, the claim itself is symptomatic of a desire for contemporaneity and literary parity with the developed world.17 Nevertheless, although this argument itself exposes the dalliance of critics with Western academic jargon, the characteristics of avant-garde fiction Andrew Jones here mentions are also worthy of more exploration. In particular, both of the facts that “… psychological depth is conspicuous by its absence and notions of progress are shattered by narratives that are anything but neatly linear,”18 and “… the playful impulse … at work in the labor of self-portrayal and self-construction”19 demonstrate symptoms of schizophrenia. Consequently, to me, the birth of a “new subject” confidently claimed by Xudong Zhang does not necessarily mean the emergence of a confirmed, robust subjectivity—like the writers themselves, we need to reject this teleological mindset.

16 17 18 19

Ibid., 164. Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” 558–559. Ibid., 557. Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 155.

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Ma Yuan: The Dispersion of Meaning during Secularization

Ma Yuan 马原 (1953–) is usually considered the first writer to place narration at the core of fictional writing in mainland China. Having graduated from the Chinese department of Liaoning University in 1982, he went to Tibet as a reporter and returned to Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning province, seven years later as a professional writer. For critics, the so-called “narrative trap” of his fiction was “… considered to have set in motion a spectacular turn to metafiction,”20 and his “… intricately constructed and sometimes enigmatic tales about an eponymous narrator’s travels in Tibet insistently foregrounded the artificiality of storytelling itself.”21 Indeed, it is noted that Ma Yuan’s “… most important works are concerned with Tibet,” the setting of which “… resonates … with the literary trend of cultural root-seeking.”22 How, then, can the narrative be understood not merely as a formal play but to tie in with a particular historical conjuncture? What effect does it have? Such questions call for inquiry. Two short novels become the entry point for us to get into the unknown terrain. The novella “The Enticement of Gandisi Mountain” (冈底斯的诱惑, 1985) is one of the earliest stories of the kind to earn the author a name.23 Mainstream understanding takes its invocation of minority culture as a move that “… invokes the elements of the marginal culture to contest the Han Chinese cultural hegemony without essentializing the ethnic other.”24 The prevailing view of this piece considers it influenced by Jorge Luis Borges’ (1899–1986) “narrative labyrinth;” that is, it intentionally creates a kind of confusing “narrative gap” (or “trap”) between reality and fiction. Some even believe that his narrative does not convey any practical meaning at all, for the author makes it

20 Ibid., 153. 21 Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” 555. 22 Explaining his idiosyncratic literary techniques in more detail, Xiaobin Yang makes a comprehensive summary: he “… dissolves the rigid model of plot and the integrity of flawless narration,” and “… departs from narrative totality by showing fragmentation, lacunae, and incoherence in narration by way of self-interruption and self-referentiality that question the legitimacy of the homogeneous grand narrative;” in the meantime, the narrator is “… always implicated in the self-incurred interruptions of the narrative continuity and destined to deviate into ‘self-engulfing’ impasses.” Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 154. 23 Ma Yuan 马原, “Gangdisi de youhui 冈底斯的诱惑 [The Enticement of Gandisi Mountain],” Shanghai wenxue 上海文学 [Shanghai Literature], No. 2, 1985. The story is included in Ma Yuan 马原, Ma Yuan wenji 马原文集 [Collected Works of Ma Yuan] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1997). 24 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 154.

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clear that his novel is fictitious. The credulity of Ma Yuan’s personal claim and negligence or indifference to the narrative content results in a shallow reading. In Ma Yuan’s novella, the narrative voice seems to be both serious and casual; the narration consists of fragmented episodes which do not necessarily imply thematic concern. Overall, the readers get four stories without logical causality. The Tibetan sharp-shooter Qiongbu is invited to hunt bears, during which he discovers the Snowmen; the captain of the expedition, Lu Gao, befriends a beautiful Tibetan girl named Yangjin, who unexpectedly dies in a car accident; Lu Gao and his assistant Yao Liang attempt to watch the Tibetan ritual of celestial burial but fail to do so; finally, elder brother Dunzhu and younger brother Dunyue live with the same woman successively. The general contents of each section are as follows: 1. “I” (Lu Gao) invite someone (Qiongbu) to join the expedition team. 2. “My” (a 50-year-old senior writer serving in the army) experience. 3. “I” tell “you” (the son of a hunter) what “I” have learned from the villagers about their encounter with bears. 4. The love story of Lu Gao and Yangjin. 5. “I” tell a story about the mysterious humanity and nature of Tibet. 6–7. “Your” experience (Qiongbu meets the cavemen). 8. Lu Gao and others go to watch the celestial burial. 9. Lu Gao and others hunt for the cavemen. 10. Missing the celestial burial, the driver tells his experience of a car accident. 11–15. The story of the brothers—Dunyue and Dunzhu—and a woman. 16. Yao Liang composes poems. In this “multifarious structure,” Xiaobin Yang suggests that the “… unified narrative voice that predominates in modern Chinese fiction is broken down;” meanwhile, by “… implicating poly-vocal narratives …” the author “… challenges the oppression of the one-dimensional, teleological history.”25 Indeed, even for Western-trained Yang, the disparate messages of the story cannot knit themselves into a coherent narrative, Supposedly a grand narrative about seeking the snowman … the story ends with frustrating simplicity and impassivity, which nullify the anticipation of the heroic “hunting” journey. The narrative understatement here sets an ironic contrast to the previous magnificent remark … on the significance of searching for the snowman. Such an understatement … about the failure of their adventure invalidates the significance of the narrative … The hunt for something unknown could be a symbolic act of 25

Ibid., 155.

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teleological quest. In Ma Yuan, however, the archetypal emplotment that presupposes a teleological quest is understated and trivialized.26 Similarly, critic Wu Liang holds that the author “… seems to deliberately maintain the fragmentation, presentness [sic.], irrelevance and illogic of experience …” by “… intentionally not giving the cause, intentionally not giving the satisfactory finale, intentionally making the story rootless and endless, and intentionally withdrawing the crucial parts of the plot.”27 Based on these arguments, Yang suggests that the constant “… discrepancies within the narrative …” and “… invalidation of the narrative …” constitute a “structural irony,” which then “… misleads the otherwise coherent plot.”28 To him, this is a “… postmodern collage … that abolishes the legitimacy of totality.”29 However, to me, the paucity of a grand narrative does not necessarily abrogate all rational formulations, as there are indeed some “minor” narratives full of meaning: despite the dispersion of “plots” and the variety of the narrative perspectives, we can still find several “themes” or plots that are roughly relevant to each other: 1. The history of Tibet around liberation: the relationship between the People’s Liberation Army and the local people, as discussed in Sections 2, 10 and 11–15. 2. The love stories: Section 4 (about the premature affection between Lu Gao and Yangjin), Sections 11–15 (the romance of Dunzhu, Dunyue towards a woman, showing the tenacity of life) 3. The magic of Tibet: Sections 3–5, 6–7 and 8–9. 4. The relation between tradition and modernity: Sections 8–9 and 14–15. Therefore, while, formally speaking, Ma Yuan’s “avant-garde experiment” aims to do away with a teleological and complete narrative, there is still “story” there which delivers certain “meaningfulness.” For example, the diegetic senior writer’s narration of his personal experience before and after the liberation vicariously reflects the modern history of Tibet over several decades. 26

As for the unexplained four-day lacuna in the text, Yang argues that they are “… not spaces provided for creative imagination but, rather, apertures that incapacitate narrative integrity;” in this way, the “… narrative unbalance …” tends to “… abrogate the rational formulation of the grand narrative.” Ibid., 156. 27 Quoted from Ibid., 156. 28 Ibid. 29 He argues that “Ma Yuan’s narrative collage, a structurally ironic assemblage, is not only a disintegration of the grand narrative but also a problematization of narrative as such, insofar as even the minor narratives are unable and susceptible to self-negation.” Ibid., 157.

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The narration of a car accident, in which a local Tibetan boy was killed by the driver and he and the boy’s parents’ request the impunity of the captain before the traffic police and the company commander, also shows the intimate friendship between the Chinese Liberation Army and the Tibetan people around the time. The story of the brothers Dunyue and Dunzhu might remind us of the affection of two brothers for the same woman in the novel Border Town (边城), written in the early 1930s by the famed modern Chinese writer Shen Congwen (1902–1988). However, it is probably more influenced by the trend of “Roots-Seeking Literature” of the 1980s, being reminiscent of the famed writer Zhang Chengzhi’s stories Black Steed (黑骏马) and The River in the North (北方的河), both of which highlight tenacity by portraying the sexual customs of an ethnic minority. In Ma Yuan’s novella, Dunyue lives together with the woman regardless of her father’s objection and makes her pregnant; he dies tragically in a car incident because he wants to satisfy the woman’s father, who wishes his son-in-law to be an automotive soldier; since Dunyue’s death is unknown to his family, he is considered missing and, consequently, Dunzhu marries the woman. This “plotline” apparently recalls the tales of the previous two writers. More complicated is that, in this love story, there is another implicit thread about the socialist ethical-moral tale: after Dunyue dies, the monitor of his company all along sends money to his mother still in his name and reports his safety in correspondence. In the love story between Lu Gao and Yangjin, the social changes around the liberation of Tibet are mentioned when introducing Yangjin’s background: “Xiao He says that she is the daughter of Lord Balang, the great patriot. She returned to China from Norway with her parents in 1977, and she just graduated from a college in Beijing. (小何说她是爱国人士大贵族巴朗的女儿，  她和父母亲七七年由挪威回国的，她在北京读书也是刚刚毕业 ),”30 The background of the 1980s is also more or less introduced in the description of Yangjin’s affection for Lu Gao: she is excited when she learns that Lu Gao has just graduated from a college in Beijing, as she has, and twice says to Lu Gao, “Take a seat, please!” The readers can feel that their similar experiences of having studied in the national capital lead to Yangjin’s intimacy with or even affection for Lu Gao. In the description of the fantastic human landscape and natural scenery of Tibet, the narrative voice demonstrates his respect for the customs there, in which the discourse of “tradition vs. modernity”, popular in Chinese society at that time, can be well observed. 30

Ma Yuan, Ma Yuan wenji, 66.

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I cannot understand life in their way. To me, they are only a form, though I respect their customs. I can only speculate what they understand and experience within the customs, to infer by rationality and damn logic … However, we always assume ourselves to be smart and civilized, and them to be so foolish and primitive that they need to be saved and enlightened by us. 因为我不能像他们一样去理解生活。那些对我来说是一种形式，我尊 重他们的生活习俗。他们在其中理解的和体会到的我只能猜测，只能 用理性和该死的逻辑法则去推断……可是我们自以为聪明文明，以为 他们蠢笨原始需要我们拯救开导。31

Another comment made by this voice says that: “At the moment when 1.8 million of our fellow men have entered socialism, entering science and modern civilization, they are still living in their own magical world in their particular ways (我的一百八十万同胞在走进了社会主义的同时—在走进科学和文 明的同时，以他们独有的方式仍然生活在自己的神话世界).”32 Here, we not only note the glorification of the minority culture’s tradition but that socialism was still equated with “science and modern civilization.” What this signifies is that, even during the high tide of enlightenment in the middle 1980s, socialist belief was still prevalent among intellectual writers. To understand how these disparate themes can become an organic whole, we must inquire into social-historical context. From the early to mid-1980s, several schools of thought were fashionable in China. Optimism about modernization was predominant and, accordingly, the discourses of liberalism were promoted; in the cultural field, the “roots-seeking literature” took traditional life (especially that of the ethnic minority) as the admirable “other” that differed from the road to modernity, revealing the strong influence of cultural conservatism.33 On the other hand, Marxism was still the leading discourse, in which modernization was considered the self-improvement and selfdevelopment of socialism. The “primary stage of socialism” that the party-state proposed was thought to be a transitional period, but not an unending process “unchangeable for 100 years.” Still, the discourse of modernization, as a seemingly neutral ideology, resulted in depoliticization. 31 Ibid., 70. 32 Ibid., 70. 33 But in reality, it is just an ornament of modern life. For example, the celestial burial as described in the story seems spectacular but it is implied to be a savage and inhuman wonder; this was one of the reasons that this novel offended the minority and aroused a stir in society; consequently, it was banned by the authorities.

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We can thus comprehend the variegated milieu shown in the text, in which these disparate schools of thought interact with each other. It is fragmented, yet the author effectively represents many facets of everyday life which together demonstrate the totality of 1980s Chinese society. For instance, Tibet and Chinese society in general are shown to exist in a chaotic—although exciting—less -modern state, which explains the populace’s widespread fascination with the mysterious traditions of ethnic minorities as well as the desire for “civilization” (namely, the state of “modernity”). Accordingly, the word “enticement” in the story’s title refers to both the enchantment of the mysterious natural and human landscapes of Tibet, which leave people feeling both awe and the temptation of the future (namely the prospect of modernization), as well as the corresponding confusion about the past and the relationship between tradition and modernity. The two unfulfilled romances in the story are both fictional narratives and, from a phenomenological perspective, a symptomatic allegory of this incomplete transition. Hence, the novel as a whole portrays a certain stage of post-revolutionary, secular society in formation in early 1980s China. The hybrid and conflicting discourses (such as the worship of traditional customs and the desire for modernity, and the conviction of socialism and the superstition of the ideology of modernization) are the unconscious representations of a heterogeneous state, in which these ideologies are all “on the road”: they co-exist harmoniously and seemingly cannot be clearly differentiated. This situation brings about the shortage of a hegemonic cultural dominant. Critic Chen Sihe aptly notes that the reason for the author’s incapability to “interpret life” and “… organizing experience … to make it become a legible and logical narration …” is that he lives in a period of transition during which the “authoritative ideology” has lost its explanatory power; this leads to the inability to endow individual experience with meaning; what results is “… the dubious and illusory individual experience and personal narration.”34 In this light, Ma Yuan’s departure from traditional teleological narration by displaying only fragments and narrative ellipsis is a symptom of that time rather than just an experimentalist imitation of Western avant-garde fictional technique. In the novel, both attempts of discovery are aborted: in one, the characters fail to witness the whole process of celestial burial; the other is the unrequited hunting for cavemen. They both indicate that sightseeing in the secular world is dispensable, without any purpose and significance. Alternatively, 34

See Chen Sihe 陈思和 ed. Zhongguo dangdai wenxueshi jiaochen 中国当代文学史教程 [A Course on Contemporary Chinese Literary History] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1999), 297.

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instead of accomplishing any predetermined goal, what really counts is merely to satisfy human curiosity and entertainment; thus, the presence of meaning is irrelevant. What the phenomenon reveals is that Chinese society gradually stepped into secularization and leisure in the 1980s, when the lack of wonder in life became normal. Consequently, the worthless death of Yangjin in a car accident, as an ordinary misfortune in life, also does not organically integrate itself into the narrative totality: that a budding love ends in vain is something commonly witnessed in daily life. The author’s interruption of the narrative flow, such as by informing the readers that “… the experiences of that four days are enough for a whole book… (那四天经历足够写整本书)” without giving more information, and his self-denial of the reliability of the narrative, only indicate that all things in ordinary life become insignificant—even the narrator appears to be tired, hollowed out and hypocritical in this post-revolutionary society undergoing de-politicization. Another novelette by Ma Yuan, “Fiction” (虚构), is a similar story set in Tibet. It is a first-person narrator’s experience in a leprosarium village called Maqu. There, he “… encounters an odd and mysterious old hunchback, sees the meaningless life of the lepers, gets a fever and recovers, has sex with a female leper … and so on.”35 The story is taken by most critics as fabricating an absurd world of lepers from the perspective of a psychopath, because this psychopath—the narrator—enters the village on May 3rd, staying there for seven days; yet the day he leaves there turns out to be May 4th, which means that the seven days that he has spent there do not exist at all. To critics, this fabrication demonstrates the concept that “fiction is fictional” and implies the nothingness of the world—the concept of nihilism. Xiaobin Yang also observes that the narrator does not express “… any sociohistorical idea about the subjective experience in the leprosarium;” and “… the mental and material misery in the leprosarium is not a historically backward condition to be redeemed by the ‘I’ or any authorial subject.”36 In accordance with this narrative setup, he suggests that what the story reveals is that “… at the margin of the human world, the meaning of human life or social history seems to be surplus to its people.”37 However, this interpretation dismisses the entire social content of the text and merely pays attention to some formal elements. A more reasonable argument would be that the priority of its theme is to express the author’s 35 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 158. 36 Ibid., 158–159. 37 Quoting the text to support his argument, he particularly notes that, in the story, the female leper has once said, “Except for men playing basketball, except for sleeping with men, what can women do?” Ibid., 159.

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life experience—his sense of illusion and absurdity—for the living conditions of the lepers in the village stands for the insignificance and plight of life. Nevertheless, where does such existentialist angst arise? We need to delve deep into the narrative content. First of all, the description of the poverty, folly and idleness of the people in a Tibetan village engulfed in a listless state deconstructs the “mystery” shown in the previous story. At the end, the first-person narrator leaves that nightmarish existence and returns to a normal, modern life of convenience, escaping from a savage and primitive life which seems to remain in the Stone Age. It is a real relief for him and for his readers as well: the “modern life” is insinuated into the text by the undiegetic voice of a radio broadcasting an international sports competition held in Beijing. The voice is full of vitality, thus forming a sharp contrast with the inactive and atemporal state of the leprosy village. However, in this seemingly prehistoric existence, there appears significant yet ostensibly dispensable historical content: an old Kuomintang soldier (or officer) who has been hiding there for many years to escape the punishment of the new regime. When he speaks to the narrator, he intends to show off the fact that he owns a “twenty-ring Mauser pistol” but he is upset when the narrator says that he knows this fact. When the latter changes his attitude and says that he does not know anything about it, he turns happy. He appears to be a kind yet lamentable and senile man. Nevertheless, the readers do not know why he now would show off his real identity; in any case, he has pretended to be mute for several decades. The narrator then finds that the man has a cap with the design of the blue sky and white sun, a service cap of the Nationalist army. The narrator guesses, It was in 1950 that Tibet was liberated, which means he entered Maqu village 36 years ago; then, why did he hide here? Doesn’t he know that leprosy is contagious? If he knew (it’s impossible that he has no idea about it) but still came in, then we can suppose that he has been trying to escape from some vital chase. To have a further guess, what hideous crime is he guilty of (it’s unnecessary to take such risk for some tiny or small crimes in my reasoning)? Then, if this reasoning holds water, he may be someone important in the Kuomintang, or maybe this important somebody disappeared secretly before the liberation of Tibet. 解放西藏是一九五零年，也就是说他在三十六年以前就进了玛曲，那 么他为什么躲到这里来呢？难道他不知道麻风病会传染？如果知道 （估计他不会不知道）还要进来，那么可以假想他在躲避生死攸关的 追捕，进一步可以假想他犯了大罪（不犯大罪不至于冒这么大的风

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险—我的推理）。那么，如果这种推理能够成立的话，他也许是国民 党的一位要人，也许这位要人在解放西藏的时候神秘地失踪了。38

His supposition continues, I will never connect the cap and that Mauser pistol with this thin, stooped, and wizened old man; I especially cannot imagine how he has spent 30 years here … He has a dull and hollow look. I can assume that he is either mentally disabled or an excellent actor, a demon and vicious murderer 我没法把那个大檐帽，那支盒子枪和眼前这个又瘦又驼的干巴老头联 系到一起。我尤其想不出他怎么度过了这三十多年……他一副痴呆相。 我断定，他要么是个精神残废，要么是个最了不起的演员，是个魔鬼 和凶恶的杀人犯。39

Due to the lack of concrete explanation for the old man’s final suicide, we can only infer that he does so out of fear that his real identity has been “discovered,” or out of his ennui after having lived in disgrace for more than three decades. The abrupt appearance of this mysterious old man (as well as his sudden disappearance) presents a challenge to the emptiness of contemporary life and its homogeneous temporality. The concealed history for which he stands seems to be meaningless in the secular life of de-politicization: he seems to be nobody but a poor and muddled old man. However, his suicide reveals that there are still many secrets hiding in the darkness; nevertheless, the absence of a historical-political consciousness in de-politicized society renders the narrator unable—or unwilling—to explain, to explore, the buried secret: just let this history become a lost “dream”, like the nightmarish life of the village! Thus, the narrator, intentionally or not, implies that the suicide is a result of “existential angst”: a trying life of 30 years makes one prefer dying to living in nonsense. The imprints of Sartre’s philosophy of existentialism, influential in the Chinese cultural world of the 1980s, can be fairly felt here. This state of living, enclosed by a concealed incident, enables us to notice the prelude to a de-moralized life: the narrator sleeps with a leper woman, yet walks away to escape from “the primordial” to “the modern.” The desert area of “pre-modernity” thus becomes the convenient fantasy land for the narrator to sate his personal desire, which is also a sort of self-orientalism. This naked fact exposes the truth of the “root-seeking literature” of the 1980s: on the surface, it 38 39

Ma Yuan, Ma Yuan wenji, 33–34. Ibid., 33.

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paid respect to and worshipped the “otherness” of the minority culture; however, ultimately it was a kind of relief from the spiritual impoverishment of heading towards modernity and a kind of (spiritual and material) exploitation and pillage of the domestic alien—a symbolic act of “internal colonization.” From these two stories, we can conclude that the reason for the appearance of the meta-fictional form as well as the narrative ellipsis is that the writer fails to organize the disparate historical experiences into a coherent and meaningful causal whole. This failure was the consequence the particular situation of Chinese society’s transformation into post-revolutionary secularity since the early 1980s. Thus, Ma Yuan’s technique of “meta-narrative” is nothing but a trick: his breaking of linear narration to show fragmentation, blankness and inconsistency does not subvert the unified system of the “grand narrative,” nor does his “post-modern collage” abolish the validity of totality. The truth is that such a totality does not refer to the original society under highly consistent socialist ideology, for it has become such a secularized state that the “authoritative ideology” is gradually dispelled. The characteristic of this “new” society lies in its lack of meaning and wonder at everyday life, which results in fragmented, dispersed episodes, the “normal” living condition of the secular world. This state of being is reminiscent of the theory of the novel proposed by the influential twentieth-century Marxist literary critic, George Lukács (1885–1971). In his seminal work on literary theory, The Theory of the Novel, Lukács starts by comparing the historical conditions that, respectively, brought about the epic and the novel. In the age of the novel, the once known organic unity between man and his world has been lost; consequently, the hero becomes an estranged seeker of the meaning of existence. This is so because the Enlightenment, the rise of capitalism and modernity (namely the process of secularization and disenchantment spurred on by the colonization of all social spaces by the commodity form) has sabotaged the existing “totality”—the rounded, immanently meaningful world of the Middle Ages provided by the Christian God.40 In Ma Yuan’s novel, the organic unity between man and his world also becomes lost: not because of the loss of religious belief but because of secularization and the deconstruction of the theory and praxis of class struggle. Consequently, while the Chinese populace still seemed then to abide by the socialist ideal, they could not find a real “class enemy”. The disappearance of revolutionary ideals in the post-revolutionary age stripped the people of their political consciousness and made them unable to identify friend or foe: the revolutionary past seemed distant and outdated. Consequently, the loosening of revolutionary 40

George Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel (London: Merlin Press, 1963).

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disciplines and mores also caused the widespread immorality evident in society at the time.41 2

Ge Fei: Disintegration and Dispersion of the Subject

The stories of Ge Fei 格非 (1964–) during this period are also taken to be devoted to orchestrating narrative labyrinths that emulate the works of Joyce and Borges.42 As with Ma Yuan, it is assumed that a “… reader of Ge Fei also has to admit that, amid dazzling social-cultural changes, the collective experience as a whole is broken … the reader as a public figure has retreated to become an atomized ‘individual.’ ”43 The differences seem to lie, on the one hand, in the fact that the author now “… challenges the totality of grand history formulated by the master discourse …” by “… revealing discrepancies of collective and personal memories in the irreconcilable narrative fragments.”44 On the other hand, unlike Ma Yuan’s “narrative trap,” Ge Fei mainly shows his characters’ psychological disorder and constructs the narrative by a collage of episodic fragments, which seem to present a vicious narrative circle. While Ma Yuan’s novels make it difficult for readers to comprehend the narrative, Ge Fei’s are too obscure to understand. In this regard, Xudong Zhang takes more note of the writer’s narrative content and suggests that “… the narrative labyrinth that makes Ge Fei’s works appears to be ‘postmodern …’ ” is “… not intended as … a ‘free play of language,’ but as a semiotic shelter in which time, memory, and history can seek refuge and … open a new space of experience.”45 What kind of experience does Ge Fei seek to deliver and articulate? Let us explore this issue in two specimens. “Lost Boat” (迷舟) tells a story set in the Republican period.46 During the Northern Expedition (1926–1928) launched 41 It is from this perspective that we can better understand Xiaobin Yang’s judgment: “Structural irony in Ma Yuan is a narrative madness, a schizophrenic experience of schizophrenia as such.” Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 166. 42 For instance, Xudong Zhang has noted that “The institution of modernism from Joyce to Borges is for Ge Fei and his peers a symbolic laboratory.” Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 193. 43 Ibid., 199. 44 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 168. 45 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 163–164. Zhang further suggests that “By integrating fragmentary collective memory into individual consciousness as its characteristic of meta-fiction, Ge Fei presents a state of freedom of narrative that can be justly grasped with reference to history, specifically, to the particular historical moment of post-Mao China.” Ibid., 163. 46 See Ge Fei 格非, Mi Zhou 迷舟 [Lost Boat] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1989).

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by the Nationalist government in order to unite the nation-state, a troop commander of the northern warlord Sun Chuanfang, named Xiao, heads for the Small River village to attend to his father’s funeral and investigate the local situation in order to block the attack of the revolutionary Northern Expedition Army; however, he is wrongly executed by his bodyguard who mistakes his sexual affair as treason. Although it seems to be a revolutionary story being retold, the narrative is very different from the then works of socialist realism. Firstly, the “… military engagement, with its larger background of nationalist revolution, is irrelevant to the fatalistic force that chases Xiao through the narrative game.”47 Secondly, the protagonist is on the enemy’s side, and he is not portrayed as evil. Rather, there is a sympathetic narrative of his unfortunate fate, rarely seen at the time. While it is easy to characterize the tale as nothing but a fake revolutionary romance, common interpretations, best summarized by critic Yan Qinan, still regard it as “… telling us that human history is complicated, life is hard, and some accidental factors may tend to play a decisive role.”48 A seemingly opposing, but essentially similar, argument, articulated by Xiaobin Yang, contends that here “… a rational history is failed by irrationalities, which stem not only from blind desire … but also from the presumably rational assumption.”49 In other words, no matter whether the presumed idea that “history fails” is due to “accidental factors,” “blind desire” or “rational assumption (calculation),” the finale or whole scenario in general stands for agnosticism and fatalism, rife with the atmosphere of death and tragic destiny. From this perspective, the story is nothing but a “… sterile encounter between the arbitrariness of history … and a destructive self-consciousness,” as suggested by Xudong Zhang.50 Moreover, the blankness in the story, deliberately left for readers to digest, is taken to lead “… not to the objectification of historical facts but to the lacunae of subjective representation,”51 which confirms the postmodern epistemology. However, all such interpretations do not address the core of the problem. Let us start our inquiry by pondering the so-called “avant-garde” features in the text. Firstly, its genre is undetermined: is it a historical account of revolution and war, or a legendary, unofficial history? It seems that the narrator attempts to restore an ideologically-neutral, “authentic” history; therefore, 47 48 49 50 51

Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 186. Yan Qinan 阎奇男, “Lun Mizhou de yishu meili 论《迷舟》的艺术魅力 [On the Artistic Charm of Lost Boat],” in Shangdong shehui kexue 山东社会科学 [Shandong Social Science], No., 2, 1996, 75. Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 179. Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 186 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 176.

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before formally unraveling the story, the narrative voice seriously explains the historical background. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, the narrator deliberately creates a giant narrative vacancy and mystery. Such a confusion or hybridization of genres seems to display certain features of post-modernity. Secondly, the story aims to show that true fact cannot be ascertained in real history: is Xiao killed due to his love affair or treason? It also demonstrates that accidental factors often play a significant role in history. This subversion of the traditional narration of revolutionary war also does not differentiate the reactionary army from the progressive party. The author’s purposeful mixing of love and sex is a rebellion against the narrative tradition of “revolution plus love” popular in modern Chinese literature. All of these differ greatly from previous revolutionary historical novels. In all, its narration of the decisive role that sexual affairs play in life and history, and its highlighting of personal trivia (especially sexual desire)—both of which aim to challenge the “grand narrative” of class struggle and political conflict—compose its “avant-garde” dimension in a departure from the official, socialist narrative. Indeed, Commander Xiao, who is on the politically evil side and thus would be a reactionary warlord in earlier historical novels, seems to be merely a professional military officer who loses himself in war and politics and quite tragically fails to manage his life. He succeeds to his father’s tragic fate, which reminds us of what the latter said: “There has never been a defeated or victorious army, but just wolves and hunters (从来就没有失败或者胜利的队伍，只有狼和猎人).”52 Xiaobin Yang has made a perceptive comment on this statement, While the young Xiao’s question already presumes a confusion of the orthodox judgment of the wars as the just versus the unjust, Xiao’s father draws the issue into a more ambiguously metaphoric domain, in which history seems to be conceived as equivalent to the unjust natural world.53 The idea of “winner-takes-all” implied in this sentence was (and is) popular in the mainland Chinese society which feels resentful towards the official narration of modern history. This reflects the true nature of Chinese avant-garde fiction: it highlights de-politicization, de-revolutionization, the determinism of sex and contingency in history, as well as the repudiation of the so-called “grand narrative.” In short, this practice replaces dogmatic, Marxian historiography with the similarly die-hard beliefs of New Historicism. 52 53

Ge Fei 格非, Ge Fei 格非 [Selected Works of Ge Fei] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2000), 49. Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 177.

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However, this de-politicized ideology also contains self-deconstructive elements; the traces of the fabrication of an incredible story with a particular ideology are evident. For example, we read that “… he walks to his father and inquires why he has been devoted to a failed troop (他走到父亲身边询问他 为什么投身于一支失败的队伍).”54 Such questioning, apart from the imprint of the nihilism and the winner-takes-all thinking of Social Darwinism, itself implies the answer. Secondly, regarding the reasons for the different choices made by Xiao and his elder brother, although the text brushes them aside, some clues can still be found: the brother joins the Huangpu Military Academy (which was a progressive, revolutionary institution before the 1927 Nationalist coup) while Xiao becomes the minion of a reactionary warlord. Historically, the choices are apparently not made casually, while the narrator is unable or unwilling to explain the difference of lives decided by different political faiths. Furthermore, on the surface, the novel intends to show that historical reality is ambiguous and the truth is hard to attain. Nevertheless, the prominence of sexual affairs, the degradation and dead-end of the hero arises from engaging in his personal desires, all of which confirm a stubborn conviction in a peculiar way of “unveiling the truth.” Finally, the story tries to show that history is nothing but a consequence of mistakes due to the accidental factors of personal trifles. However, Xiao’s death still implies that history is not so haphazard: no matter whether Xiao is killed or not, he has already been manipulated by historical rationality because the bodyguard has been sent by the warlord to watch him all along. Hence, even the critic subscribing to postmodern rhetoric has to acknowledge that “… the historical power has not forgotten its responsibility and is potentially active and lethal all along.”55 As a result, the view that the story is meant to convey the belief that men are just the pawn of history subverts, or contradicts, the other conviction which it simultaneously aims to deliver—that history is just the unintentional consequence of personal, irrational choices such as desire. This is a paradox, because we are not sure whether it is the “irrational” human desire or the “rational” calculation that leads to the hero’s failure, or whether it is the execution at the last moment announcing the death of the depoliticized indulgence of personal desire, in which political reason kills the irrational proclamation of “human nature.” All these factors of self-deconstruction reveal the incapability and mistakes of the avant-garde historical novel in re-presenting and interpreting history with its ahistorical, depoliticized view of humanity and history.

54 55

Ge Fei, Ge Fei, 49. Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 178.

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Indeed, I will go a step further and suggest that this narration is more a projection of a post-Mao social-cultural fantasy or ideology than a true, authentic representation of any political event. This is so because all of Xiao’s behavior is symptomatic of a depoliticized society which not only does not know where it is going but also pragmatically pays careless heed to any political (and ethical) tenet that seems to be of its interest. First and foremost, Xiao, the chief protagonist of the novelette, is an anti-hero worthy of deeper inquiry. Xudong Zhang finds that “… the alteration of melancholy and restlessness …” constitutes his “… inward life;” he “… clings to the emptiness of temporal experience in search of a self-identity.”56 However, throughout the text, we are not sure whether he has any political belief or not.57 His death ultimately originates from his calculations which rank his self-interests, including his sexual desire, above any other concerns. He is mistaken by his bodyguard, yet he is not mistaken by history or politics—or, rather, he is not mistaken at all, for at the critical political-historical conjuncture, a person like him could not be entrusted with any serious mission and must be taken out of the picture. The story appears within the depoliticized climate of Chinese society at a historical moment in which the past—particularly the imagined enchantment of the Republican era—returns like a ghost. Shorn of revolutionary or socialist ethics and discipline, post-revolutionary society discovers the bliss of secularization. Xiaobin Yang thus finds that “… the partiality of each narrative …” here “… comes from the inner attraction and/or resistance to the moral taboo. In some cases the moral taboo censors real experience.”58 In this light, Xudong Zhang confirms that “The adultery between Xiao and Apricot is rather a rite in search of the odor of the past.”59 In more general terms, their affair bespeaks the rampant desires spreading at the time: the “… phonetic sameness of ‘Apricot’ (xing) and ‘sex’ (xing) seems to suggest that the heroine is not the object simply of a concrete desire, but of desire in general, which reveals its own part in a more general symptom.”60 Indeed, sex—or, rather, the breaking of sex as a taboo topic—played a key role in the secularization of post-Mao Chinese society. Various stories of rape and adultery flooded the cultural market at the time, indicating the loosening 56 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 185. 57 Therefore, even Zhang also admits that although Xiao is “… positioned at the center of the disturbances of the self …” he “… nevertheless does not know who he is and where he is going;” in other words, he is “… not capable of perceiving …” and “… the constant selfconsciousness is rather a blindness on Xiao’s part.” Ibid., 185. 58 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 183 59 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 188. 60 Ibid.

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of revolutionary puritanism. Apparently, this story highlights the immoral adulterous affair committed by a warlord general and his sweetheart, which is typical of the so-called “secret histories” (yeshi, 野史) or “popular legends” (chuanshuo, 传说) promoted by the market of the time, satisfying the vulgar, voyeuristic desire of its readership. Xiao’s personality simultaneously reveals symptoms of the time. Why does he appear nonchalant about any ethics and morality? Rather than taking the three cases he engages on—attending his father’s funeral, committing adultery and visiting his lover—as naturally as the narration tries to convey, it is better for us to take them as showing his idiosyncratic manner derived from his class habitus. Although not clearly introduced, his family background could be found in the description of his father, whose shadow, as the narrative informs us, often appears before Xiao and ominously envelops him. As Xudong Zhang keenly observes, the father represents part of the content of Xiao’s political unconscious: “If not love, the fatalistic structure of the unconscious must lie elsewhere … the disruptive unconsciousness must have already been a ‘discourse of the other’ (Lacan);” to be specific, because his “…(absent) presence … casts a shadow on Xiao’s struggle …” in the same manner as “… the dead lives as an assassinated history,” “… the prehistory of individual history … seems to be none other than the time of the father.”61 The father was one of the heads of the Small Sword Society of the late Qing period, one of a number of rebel groups arising in the 1850s during the upheavals of the Taiping Rebellion and consisting of natives from Guangdong and Fujian provinces. The name “Small Swords” refers to the daggers used by the insurrectionists. The organization is believed to have close ties with triads; spreading from Fujian to Shanghai in 1851, it fought the Qing rulers and the foreign imperialists occupying China and was put down in 1855 by a coalition of the two.62 Consequently, it was highly praised in the Mao era for showing the undaunted fighting spirit of the Chinese people against both feudal rulership and foreign imperialists. In 1959, around 100 years after its birth, a dancing opera was created by Shanghai Opera Troupe; in January 1960, the show was staged in Shanghai to celebrate the opening of the Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress. Reportedly, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou En’lai watched the show and lauded its “anti-imperialist, anti-feudalist” spirit. Although the Taiping Rebellion is usually taken to be a peasant revolt, many of its leaders came from the landlord and gentry class. In this story, Xiao’s father 61 Ibid., 188–189. 62 Linda Cooke Johnson, Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074–1858 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 267–291.

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owns a “dark, dusty” (阴暗尘封的) study in which there is a “tall, shiny bookcase made of carved redwood” (雕花红木制成的高大的书架) which has “a large collection of popular military classics” (大量散失在民间的军事典籍). He even creates “exceedingly bold and coarse” (过于苍劲，粗粝) handwriting,63 so he must have come from a gentry-landlord class family and have been trained by traditional learning. What Xiao cannot shed is the inexorable influence of the intellectual (and political) heritage of this father. Although the story does not tell us about the father’s behavior in the past, we do know that, throughout the 1980s (and even to today), not a few Chinese scholars take the revolution(s) in modern China as nothing but peasant revolts without a firm, modern political belief. For them, what such “revolutions” deliver has been nothing but riots and dynastic change. Moreover, the CCP regime is taken to not essentially differ from past, feudal dynasties; thus, these “revolutions” are nothing but meaningless recurrences or endless cycles. This anti-revolutionary thought, a product of the post-revolutionary era, predominates the intellectual world, so we can understand why Xiao and his mother harbor the same lethal premonition of his death: in this way, “[T]he totality of this history extends into such an enormous time-space that the present merges into the flaring images of a suppressed past.”64 In hindsight, this post-modern, avant-garde writing is confirmation that China’s post-modernity has essentially experienced metamorphosis. It has transformed from the post-revolutionary secularization of the early 1980s, which still followed a socialist orientation or maintained a yearning for socialist modernization, to a new stage of de-revolutionization or de-politicization since the mid-1980s, when the discourse of “bidding farewell to (socialist) revolution” and “converging to mainstream (capitalist) civilization” gradually became predominant. It also confirms that China’s modernity is essentially the experience of socialist revolution and transformation. This social-cultural transformation accounts for the origin and ramification of this movement of rewriting history, both in the field of historical research and in the literary world. With this knowledge in mind, we can then reexamine another of Ge Fei’s stories, “Green Yellow” (青黄), whose theme is ostensibly the pursuit of historical truth. The first-person narrator starts from aimless investigation; finding “… collected stories, overheard rumors, erotic scandals which themselves find one another …” notwithstanding,65 the search ends with multiple possibilities 63 64 65

Ge Fei, Ge Fei, 49, 65–66. Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 189. Ibid., 195.

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without a conclusion, which seems to reveal the subjective nature of the objective world and even the illusory nature of reality. In this way, as Xiaobin Yang convincingly argues, the story “… offers a narrative that points to obscurities, hiatuses, and internal contentions within the history produced by official or intellectual authorities.”66 Xudong Zhang goes a step further to contend that in “… this intricacy of occurrence the investigator (narrator) is the sole action that gives the tale its tenacity. This action in turn constitutes a web of the impossibility of meaning.”67 Does the fable intend to deliver this kind of agnosticism? To answer, we again start our inquiry by exploring the avant-garde features of the story’s form. In this regard, Xudong Zhang has commented on its formal idiosyncrasies, The internal dynamism of “Green-Yellow” unveils itself along two intertwined trajectories of fictitious construction and meta-fictitious reflexivity, which are as independent from as they are complementary to one another. One is the pursuit of meaning (allegorically, of the word qinghuang) on the symbolic plane; the other is the pursuit of the Self on the imaginary plane. What makes “Green-Yellow” particularly interesting for the present reading of meta-fiction is its self-construction of a contemporary subjectivity that makes its self-assertion within and through the deconstruction of actuality and authenticity.68 Indeed, this first-person narrator makes an effort to seek truth and identity while simultaneously belying self-centered interests in pursuing an intellectual game. Consequently, the suspenseful plots in search of the truth make this story seem like suspense fiction and the exploring process renders it like mystery fiction. All along, the genre seems to be indefinite. In addition, its conclusion partly subverts the authority of official history and dispels the prestige of academic authority; the relevance and conflicts of disparate narrations make the narrative fail in consistency. In all, history becomes a series of mysteries and the truth is hard to ascertain. However, these judgments are predicated upon the perspective of the narrator, which renders a valid narrative impossible, clearly attesting to the predominant influence of the New Historicism. The narrator now and then asserts his subjective judgments and feelings. When the villagers tell him something, 66 67 68

Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 179. Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 195. He also notes that “… in the first episode of the story, almost all of Ge Fei’s previous stories flash up one by one as the stranger ‘I’ arrives in the village.” Ibid., 192.

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many assumptive and subjective words are evident in their speeches. All these are meant to demonstrate that personal and subjective factors have always been integrated into all narrations. Therefore, objectivity can never be achieved.69 On the other hand, the assertive gesture of the narrative voice and its bold intervention into various matters expose its overbearing manner and strong conviction of its own “subjectivity.” Nevertheless, as Xudong Zhang convincingly argues, “Subjectivity is inscribed not in the presence of the narrator, who is merely one of the actants of the narrative game.”70 The significance of Chinese avant-garde writing thus lies in its spirit of challenging any authoritative narrative. It confirms that historiography is always tied to the position and stance of the subject narrating that history. In this way, it pokes fun at any dogmatic historical narration and interrogates the legitimacy and authenticity of the official version of history. From this perspective, Xiaobin Yang astutely remarks that, by “… evoking the absences—that is, the moments suppressed under the totalizing discourses—Ge Fei’s narrative becomes a ‘polyvocal’ one, in which each narrative voice is confronted, externally or internally, with its hidden rival.”71 However, this postmodern belief itself similarly requires interrogation. Yang admits that, “No narrative (in this text) … is free from subjective involvement: each of the narrators, including the authorial narrator, seems to participate in the reconstitution of the past from his or her own position.”72 As a consequence, the narrative often betrays its man-made fabrication. For instance, the folk from the fisherman’s family are illiterate and have no family archives at all; how then could they leave any historical record in a book form in the first place? In addition, the elder who has a conversation with the narrator can actually be regarded as a doppelganger of the narrator himself. In fact, the narrator, who essentially orchestrates the narrative game, has been speaking to himself all the time. However, he is not only a self-righteous subject but also an irrational one, for he is unable to make the judgment by himself among all the disparate voices. Hence, he perfunctorily elaborates the story in a spirit of 69

In this regard, Xiaobin Yang points out that “The connections and collisions among different narrative voices … create narrative inconsistencies and disarrange the absolute history, which is broken down into a miscellany of mysteries without the possibility of unification.” Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 181. 70 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 193. 71 Consequently, “The attempt to pin down the historical truth fails: what is generated from it becomes something causal, diverse, and incongruous. The various narratives of the historical past … decenter the original and incapacitate the imagination of a complete chronicle.” Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 182. 72 Ibid.

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self-entertainment. Besides the old man, the young lad—who is dealing with the old man in the story—is also the double of the narrator: “When he is narrating the past, he leaves us a very strange impression: the moment he discloses something, he covers up some others (他在叙述往事时给人造成的一个 奇怪的印象是：他在揭示一些事情的同时也掩盖了另一些事).”73 Here, “he” is also the first-person “I”: the narrator similarly reveals some things and hides some others. Despite the keen observation that a “… dramatic shift within Ge Fei’s storytelling can be pinpointed where the narrator ‘I’ becomes a listener, a collector of stories rather than the agent for restoring experience …”,74 it fails to realize that even such listening is merely a gesture and a narrative contrivance. Indeed, the role played by the narrator here is worthy of particular note. Xudong Zhang finds that On his way to a “meaning,” the narrator is overtaken by the striving of the self outside of him … In the course of the trip, the narrator leisurely enjoys the pleasure of free-floating; throughout the research trip, he engages in what could be called planned dawdling. The competitive relationship between time and narration … is no longer a sensor motor for narrative, because the exploration of the mystical term qinghuang is but a conspiracy for self-exile.75 However, critics make differing interpretations of the same symptom in the same text, especially regarding the issue of subjectivity. For Xiaobin Yang, since the narrator “… frequently acknowledges the fictionality of the story by making public how he has been endeavoring to fabricate it and by stating the necessity of making up the end of the story in the way it now is,” it becomes “… a disillusionment with unlimited subjectivity, for the authorial voice is not exempt from self-skeptical scrutiny.”76 However, Xudong Zhang holds a different view; for him, because Ge Fei’s writings meticulously register the painstaking growth, formative development, adventure, and endless flow of unexpected encounters of a reified, sometimes utterly lost ‘I’ … the final coming-into-itself of this 73 74 75 76

Ge Fei, Ge Fei, 126. Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 193. He thus suggests that “… getting lost becomes the most effective way for the narrator to push forward his anxious search.” Ibid., 195–196. Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 160. In other words, “… since nothing is determinable, narrative subjectivity becomes a self-questioning one.” Ibid., 163.

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suspended subject-position is to be captured in the process of its (narrative) actualization as a metaphysical effect of meta-fiction.77 In other words, for Zhang, the “… strategic betrayal of the act of erasure is akin to a restless self-consciousness that has become its own objective world in its social position and poetic construct.”78 What is worthy of particular attention is that he calls this as a sort of “implicit subjectivity,” Underneath a sufficiently stylized storytelling, one can sense the pervasive presence of an author whose intense activity is made palpable by the constant erasing of traces while spreading an almost impenetrable web of names, images, and episodes of an event. The implicit subjectivity or consciousness formation becomes visible from this collage of abrupt encounters, fragmented, absentminded dialogues with strange people, perverse obsessions with certain objects, and above all, sexual shocks that become the narrative norm of everyday life. All this is reproduced as a lyric experience, which exists as the basic unit of meta-fictional configuration.79 Zhang thus understands subjectivity both from the author’s perspective as his right to deal with the subject matter,80 and from the “protagonist’s” perspective as the latter’s laisser-faire, if not totally absent-minded, manners.81 Furthermore, Zhang compares the narrator to Kafka’s “K,” for the latter is “… also a classic mixture of keenness and absentmindedness …” Like “K,” the narrator in “Green-Yellow” does not seem to worry too much that he is trapped in a dubious situation; like “K,” he enjoys walking around, seeing harmless people, listening to anecdotes, or simply lying in the strange room lost in thought (or perhaps more appropriately, anxiety).82 77 78 79 80 81

82

Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 170; italics mine. Ibid., 172; italics mine. Ibid., 171; italics mine. In the meantime, for Zhang, “… the reconstruction of life experience at the level of metafiction presupposes a calculated judgment about the reader.” Ibid., 172. Therefore, he understands “… the technique of Ge Fei’s ‘pure fiction’ as an effort to conquer the isolation of the self from others, to bridge the gaps between individual images and collective experience …” which is so because, in the author’s works, “… the external relationship between the self and its milieu is grasped and elaborated in terms of transition and mediation between different moods or moments of consciousness.” Ibid., 180. Ibid., 196.

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For Zhang, this habit “… betrays the true identity of Ge Fe’s narrator”: he is “… neither a land surveyor nor a local historian. He is the phantom of the writer catching his inspirations while sleepwalking.”83 Indeed, the narrator here is fully identified with the writer himself and there is no critical distance between the two.84 Yet, while Zhang suggests that the pensive, self-absorbed narrative subject shows a construction of a self-image,85 Xiaobin Yang contends that the “… mesh of voices …” has “… virtually dispersed the dominance of the narrator’s voice …” leading to the narrator’s “… inability to rationalize the incidents in the past through contemplation.” Consequently, The narrative subject’s “self-consciousness to meet its imaginary emancipation” … and “impulse to restore the past” cannot but face constant disseminations of meaning, without reaching an absolute, self-sufficient knowledge that might otherwise confirm his historical identity. The “beginning of man” that Xudong Zhang argues as a better interpretation than the “end of man” remains suspended between the desire of forming and the reality of deforming.86 This argument is quite convincing. In fact, it is Zhang himself who acknowledges, though ambiguously, the vulnerability and unfeasibility of this 83 84

Ibid., 196. Zhang thus believes that, in the story, “The self is generated by narrative, that web of signs, rather than being deconstructed by it” because, even “… during the investigation, the selfportrayal is retained within the unique syntax of narrative language.” He is so positive about this process that he makes the judgment that, … the more readily the consciousness is to lose itself in the logic of pure fiction, the more intimately it enjoys a status of freedom, of being itself in its other. The more thoroughly it disappears into the thickness of its other, the more “truthful” it becomes as an idea in the Hegelian sense of the development of the “mind.” Ibid., 197. 85 In other words, Zhang is essentially convinced that the story is “… to disseminate the fragments of fiction to collect the harvest of a fuller self,” although he quickly makes an amendment: the “… regained self at the far end of fiction, to be sure, needs sociohistorical, cultural, as well as ideological definitions and modifications.” And he acknowledges further that, … to what extent the future can be imagined depends on how this self-consciousness, while dissociating itself from the reified order of tradition, grasps past experience that flashes up in front of it. It depends on the representation of the radically new as a historical experience, as historicity in its nascent form. Regretfully, however, he does not elaborate how this self-consciousness “… grasps past experience …” in this text, not to mention how it imagines the future. Ibid., 197. 86 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 183.

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subjectivity. Firstly, the fetishistic immersion in objects is itself a symptomatic illness: … the fantastic incarnation of the abandoned self in objects is the prosodic of fetish, which consists of an alienated relationship to the world that does not return his or her gaze. The meticulous efforts of reestablishing communication between storyteller and audience, between traveler and native, indeed between images and events encompassed by a metafictional space, reflect a hidden anxiety about a world that is becoming more and more impersonal.87 Secondly, there is essentially no otherness in this confrontation or restless engagement: although “… the subject position inscribed in Ge Fei’s writing tries to escape from the mere psychological sphere to associate itself with a deeper reality that finds its life in its other,” nevertheless, this “… metaphysical pursuit for permanence …” only “… achieves its vividness in its imagined situation, where the absence of otherness is confronted in an ideal yet realistic manner.”88 Ultimately, Zhang admits, the “subjectivity” never establishes itself, as the self-consciousness never arrives at the final stage of reason but falls into a stalemate of “unhappy consciousness …”: “avant-garde fiction is not merely a triumphant carnival of the sign … it is the symbolization of an ‘unhappy consciousness’ … which is defined in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as splitting, binary, and merely contradictory consciousness.”89 How, then, can we understand this abstract argument: “There is only one audience to whom all Ge Fei’s stories are addressed: time. The awareness of this desperate struggle with time seems to be the true root of the disrupted optimism in Ge Fei’s writings”?90 To me, the reason why the narrator feels 87 88 89

90

Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 194; italics mine. Ibid., 182. Ibid., 182. In other words, while, in Zhang’s view, avant-garde fiction is “… the social construct of a self-consciousness harnessed in form …” (184), he also admits that it is nothing but the “… restless …” yet “… totally lost, self-consciousness of the narrator …” (194). In short, although “… history participates in the self-construction and self-destruction of the ‘I’…” and “… asserts itself as the unconscious of the style …” the narrative ‘I’ is nothing but “… a symptom of time at a standstill, of history in conjuncture” (183). Zhang argues that “By setting time as the only measure of consciousness, the stories of Ge Fei seem to dissolve themselves into a pure voice of the private inwardness … the narrator seems to be convinced that, by wrestling with time, he also makes time full and palpable; that he is getting “closer” to his own social experience as a whole, which remains not only abstract to him but also fundamentally beyond the range of any artistic skills. This is the fantasy land meta-fiction creates for its reception.” Ibid., 182.

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anxious about time is because the homogeneous time in the secularized, postrevolutionary era—the constant state of modernity—pushes the author to look for meaning not in everyday life but in the past. Nevertheless, again because of the prevalent nihilism and agnosticism engulfing society—including the author himself—only schizophrenia predominates, which then becomes the source of post-modernity. The new “subject position” for a new “consciousness formation” could not fruitfully produce a new subjectivity precisely because it can only lead to schizophrenia out of the prevailing anti-revolutionary agnosticism and nihilism. To understand the origin of this avant-garde writing in China, we need to return to its historical context. This writing encourages us to accept the fact that we can only know certain aspects of history from those parts that have already been discovered, but we can barely know anything for any of history: ultimate truth is unknown. This story, through the non-existence of the conceptual entity “Green-Yellow,” aims to deliver the deconstructionist view that there is no meaning in the world or that meaning is merely an illusion. In the West, this deconstructionist practice, premised on the doctrine of New Historicism, is progressive in its critique of the “grand narrative” of enlightenment and modernity; however, when imported into China, it was inevitably adapted and appropriated by the conservatism which seeks to repudiate the socialist revolution, thus becoming the origin of historical nihilism. In short, while the agnostic inclination in China’s avant-garde fiction is greatly influenced by postmodern ideas of history (such as Hayden White’s), yet—more importantly—this nihilistic tendency is the aftermath of the anti-socialist trend of thought, which gradually arose in the 1980s, against the official narrative of modern revolutionary history. Furthermore, I would suggest that, in the context of contemporary China, the superficially postmodern subject is actually the post-revolutionary individual(ist). The formal experimentation of avant-garde writing desires to dispose of the bondage of the Marxist vision of history by rewriting history to establish an independent, self-centered subject. However, in reality, its symptoms of schizophrenia (such as its self-imposed thinking and talking to itself, and its self-styled narration with multiple characters as its own incarnations) only show the disintegration and discretization of the subject as a rational being. Therefore, the viewpoint that subjectivity “… lies in the final effect of reading, in which a reconstruction of the subjective is realized in its dispersal” is too optimistic to be warranted,91 because this subject position is merely a result of post-revolutionary schizophrenia. 91

Ibid., 192.

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Yu Hua: Historical Projection of a Post-Revolutionary Secular Society

Yu Hua 余华 (1960–) is generally considered the avant-garde writer who is “… most explicitly interested in collapsing the humanistic emphasis on character depiction in realist fiction, an interest partly informed by the French new novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet’s critiques of the European novelistic tradition.”92 In his fictional world, “… the past is conceived of as a site overflowing with extreme cruelty and seemingly gratuitous violence.”93 A series of his works published during this period that portray death, blood and violence, and written in the “zero degree” style, are thought to reveal the cruelty of humanity and absurdity of existence. They are also taken to be a kind of dissection and criticism of the ultra-radical period. However, here I still suggest that they are none other than the historical projection of post-revolutionary society. Because he “… focuses on the present …” and “… the unconscious affect can only be phrased within the ‘Now’ ( Jetztzeit) in the Benjaminian sense—in which all the past events are dispersed as ruins, discontinuities, or collages in an instant and from which the revolutionary, nihilistic force rockets up,” his “ahistorical approach” is compared to Benjamin by Xiaobin Yang.94 However, I find that his narrative method, just like the narrative content, is by no means “revolutionary;” on the contrary, this nihilism is precisely anti-revolutionary. In other words, although his narrative “… challenges the unidirectional, homogeneous order of history established by the grand narrative …”95 the fact that he “… perpetrate(s) violence by suggesting that nothing can be outside the circle of violence, thus further ruling out the possibility for fundamental change in the current power structure,”96 as pointed out by Tonglin Lu, precisely shows a conservative and irrational mentality. In the following analysis, two stories created by the writer serve as case studies. For critic Andrew Jones, the story “1986” (1986) is “… a comment on the depredations of Maoism and the excesses of the Cultural Revolution,” although the author “… takes care to deflect just such an interpretation by pointedly deflating the reader’s desire for an unambiguous, neatly resolved political allegory.”97 However, Yu Hua himself has admitted that: “1986 was the year 92 93 94 95 96

Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” 558. Ibid. Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 73. Ibid., 206. Tonglin Lu, Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics: Contemporary Chinese Experimental Fiction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 160. 97 Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” 558.

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when writers still cared much about the subject matters of writing, myself not an exception … I wanted to describe the Cultural Revolution in a peculiar way, a way that nobody used, so that (the things narrated) were not my memory.”98 Indeed, the author could not be immune from the popular ideology of the time, just like most other writers. What we need to interrogate is the ideology within which such writing is created, which could only be fruitfully diagnosed by examining the texts themselves. On the surface, the narrative voice of this story reveals no emotion and inclination. The illusive appearance notwithstanding, its true nature could still be explored with a close reading. The voice tells readers rhetorically at the beginning: That catastrophe over ten years ago is as transient as fleeting cloud today. Those slogans left on the walls have been completely covered after being painted one time and another. When the people are walking in the street, they could not see the past any longer; they just see the present 十多年前那场浩动如今已成了过眼烟云，那些留在墙上的标语被一次 次粉刷给彻底掩盖了。他们走在街上时再也看不到过去，他们只看到 现在。99

This remark, far from being “zero degree” and neutral, is clear enough to show the narrator’s attitude: a kind of condemnation of oblivion and an emphasis on the necessity of recalling the past. The most significant section of the text is the description of violence. Most critics note that the physical injuries that the madman inflicts on his own body is a metaphor of the violence of the Cultural Revolution, which is exactly the writer’s intention when deliberately piling on the bloody scenes. As Xiaobin Yang aptly remarks, “[T]he tragedy of the madman is a biting accusation against historical violence … Such a past permanently occupies the deep psyche and induces only deferred reactions to traumatic experiences.”100 What is more, the various descriptions of physical violence and the implication of frequent spiritual violence in daily life is meant to convince readers that violence and death are the essence of life. Because of this, “1986” is frequently 98 Quoted from Hong Zhigang 洪治纲 ed., Yu Hua yanjiu ziliao 余华研究资料 [Research Materials of Yu Hua] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2007), 18. 99 Yu Hua 余华, Yu Hua zuopinji 余华作品集 [Collected Works of Yu Hua] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1995), Vol. 1, 150. 100 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 61.

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regarded as the inheritance of a predominant theme of May Four Literature: enlightenment which repudiates the Chinese national character. In particular, in showing a world filled with alienation and the relationships between people littered with indifference, contempt and hatred, the novelette becomes a social critique. What first comes to our attention is that none of the characters in the novelette have a name. In fact, all the author’s fictional characters in this period bear no name, because they “… represent nothing more than ‘props’… or pawns to be guided by the author across a complex literary chessboard;” consequently, as Andrew Jones astutely observes, “Yu Hua’s earliest and most provocative fiction … lingers clinically over the surface of things, denying readers even the illusion of realistic, psychologically well-rounded characters.”101 Furthermore, the time and location in which the events take place is not introduced; thus, the events could seemingly happen at any time and place. On the other hand, to choose a teacher of history as the protagonist here is certainly freighted with profound implication. His enthusiasm for penalty and his injuring of himself imply his endorsement of violence; hence, he can be regarded as the representation of the average Chinese with an inclination to violence, thus revealing the evil in human nature. When a whole society and culture is incorporated into the reflection of violence, the theme that the author is conveying is more than clear: an examination of violence within history as a warning to the living. Nevertheless, all these popular opinions are superficial. We need to consider the kind of social thought and inclination that leads the author to deliver these fashionable notions in his particular way. The emergence of this kind of writing is subject to the influence of two schools of thought from China and abroad. Externally, Western modernist literature exposes the spiritual numbness and damage of humanity brought about by capitalist alienation, which is often assumed to be a revelation of the universal state of human nature. Domestically, so-called “complicity between the victims and the abusers” is the predominant understanding of the Cultural Revolution. However, not only is the humanistic discourse of 1980s China and its explanation of history incapable of explaining away people’s desires and pursuit of material enjoyment; the author’s sharp questioning of this humanistic discourse (shown by the text’s fondness for exposing the evil of human nature) is still essentially based on the official verdict of the Cultural Revolution. The violence being portrayed here seems to be physical but it is actually metaphysical, for the alleged reflection of history falls short of considering the causality of social-political experience. The various fictional elements merely 101 Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” 558.

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superficially correspond to the social-historical conditions of the time: making a scholar the protagonist demonstrates the trend for specialization; the purported reflection on the violence of the Cultural Revolution panders to the popular view that it was nothing but a result of feudal autocracy. In addition, the call for humanity reminds us of the heated debate regarding socialist alienation. Furthermore, the display of historical amnesia is the projection of the popular appeal to political reform in order to avoid historical catastrophe. Therefore, taking the story as an exploration of the meaning of life under the influence of Western modernist literature fails to apprehend its internal dynamism. As a matter of fact, the feelings of alienation here mainly arise from the official verdict on the Revolution, which, however, does not delve into the particular social history of its origin. What have been rarely noted by critics, however, are the symptoms inherent in the text itself. Firstly, the narrator’s neurosis is similar to that of the patient. “Zero-degree writing” is the result of the author’s political consciousness which delivers resentment with an explosive power. Yu Hua admitted in 1999 that the story “… recorded the frenzied state I had experienced. Violence and bloodiness flew like waves among the lines. This is a narrative starting from a nightmare and arriving at oneiric delirium.”102 Just as the wounded man in the text is deprived of the ability to reflect, the author himself accepts the official verdict without a second thought. The bourgeois academic’s incapability of adopting an adequate approach to studying the subject of his research—the application of horrendous penalties to criminals throughout Chinese history—leads to his psychological entanglement and identification with the punishment and brings about his final self-execution. Although this has more metaphorical significance than real possibility, it appears to be ironic. Similarly symptomatic is the superficially non-historic and timeless context of the plotless “story”. This indicates that, while aiming to be reflexive, what eventuates is merely a selective representation sharing the symptom of historical amnesia which declines to confront the historical experience.103 102 Yu Hua 余华, “Wo yongyou liangge rensheng 我拥有两个人生 [I own two lives],” in his Huanghun lide nanhai 黄昏里的男孩 [A boy in the Twilight] (Shanghai: Shanghai wenyichubanshe, 2004). 103 Critic Yi Hui is one among the few critics who perceive the symptomatic and the (contrary) meaning of the text. He notes that … the significance (of the fiction) does not mainly lie in the presentation of a humanistic and individualistic stance towards the narrative of the Cultural Revolution differing from the state ideology; on the contrary, it lies in the description of the plight that this stance suffered from in the mid-1980s, a kind of failure which attempts to recuperate the ‘historical-cultural memory’ in the context of social transformation. It is in this sense that the text 1986 is confirmed as an ‘anti-traumatic fiction’.

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What is more, the narrator cannot maintain distance from the character; his perspective is the same as that of the madman. As Xiaobin Yang sharply critiques, … the indelibility of the past lies in the recurring psychic agitation not only of the mad protagonist but, more significantly, of the narrator. In other words, the narrator cannot distance himself from the character, as they both suffer from the traumatic past. The correspondence between the narrator’s point of view and the madman’s is a sign of the decline of the rational representational subject. The narration itself becomes an “irrational” one, rather than a rational representation of irrationality or a rational discourse camouflaged by irrational utterances. The narrator virtually identifies himself with the character and perceives in an equally irrational way without translating it into rational discourse.104 Thus, he concludes that, both “… being irrational ways of penetrating the inextricable, Yu Hua’s narration of self-mutilation and the madman’s action of self-mutilation are equally perverse in their allegorical disfiguring of bodily existence.”105 This phenomenon reveals nothing but an irrational being losing his subjectivity.106 Here, it is necessary to make a distinction between the narrator (as well as the madman) here and the “madman” in Lu Xun’s masterpiece “Diary of a Madman.” While Lu Xun’s madman is not really mad, here the hero is truly lunatic; while the “psychotic” in Lu Xun’s story is pitted against the feudal (conservative) culture, the madman and the mad narrator here resent radical culture. The former has his own subjectivity so as to independently make an essentially “rational” judgment, whereas the latter is a fake subject, one selfcastrated and collapsed with hysteria. The differing strategies have also been compared by Yang:

He further points out that the moment when the madman in the story “… loses the sense of reality, he is forfeited of the sense of historicity, too.” See Yi Hui 易晖, “ Wo” shi shui: Xin shiqi xiaoshuo zhong zhishifenzi de shenfen yishi yanjiu“我”是谁—新时期小说中 知识分子的身份意识研究 [Who Am “I”—A Study of the Identity Consciousness of the Intellectuals in the Fiction of the New Era] (Nanchang: Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 2004), 169–170. 104 Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 59. 105 Ibid., 60. 106 Yang aptly comments that, “The traumatic experiences provoke the neurotic symptoms in both the protagonist and the author/narrator of the story. Narrative madness becomes a sign of traumatized subjectivity that is deprived of its integrative ability of articulation.” Ibid., 58.

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If Lu Xun inverts the existing logic of sanity and insanity and speaks in feigned madness, Yu Hua, too, identifies the narrator’s voice with the madman’s. Madness in Yu Hua, however, is devoid of rational foundation and no longer represented as a formation of the discourse of the modern that, as Lu Xun intends, soberly accuses the oppression of the postmodern. Rather, it is a deformation of the discourses of both the modern (Maoist discourse about historical violence) and the premodern (traditional Chinese penological conceptions). It neither adopts a transcendental attitude toward them nor converts them into a new form of discourse.107 He decisively contends that, “If Lu Xun’s discourse of paranoia forms an intended indictment (though ostensibly insane and thus unreliable, for all practical purposes) against real oppression, Yu Hua adopts a parodied discourse of paranoia that points nowhere except to an agitation within the self.”108 Accordingly, he laments that the “… perplexed writing … deals with equally perplexed abnormal actions. The narrator’s insane voice hardly does justice to the pain of torture.”109 However, although he surmises that the reason why “… the narrator shares the catastrophic destiny of the protagonist …” is that the author’s own trauma has been transformed into the deformative, irrational phrasing of the experience of violence,110 the two traumas apparently could not be equated, as the author’s personal trauma is unrelated to the particular history: Yu Hua admits that what is narrated is not from his memory. The non-existence of a subject/subjectivity that can comprehend and pass judgment is also evident in the narrative form, for there are many “… episodes intertwined …” which “… consist of a fragmentary and discontinuous picture without being integrated into a spatial and temporal whole.”111 This disintegration means that the narrator falls into a psychotic state, signifying

107 108 109

Ibid., 58. Ibid., 60. Ibid., 60–61. He even indicts these narrative acts as “inhuman”: … what is striking is not so much the narrated event as the dissonance between the brutality of the narrated event and the casualness of the narrative voice. Yu Hua is in no sense realistic, for his inadequately simplistic style sets off … an excess or overflow of atrocities. The inhumanity lies not only in the abominable behavior of the characters but also in the subjective inadequacy of representing their behavior. Ibid., 191. 110 Ibid., 61. 111 Ibid., 72.

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“… the infeasibility of a universal reason by which the tragedies could be fully comprehended.”112 As for the narrative content, the novel treats all violence in history equally and takes them to be the same. Accordingly—although “… the bloody characteristics of Yu Hua’s stories are not produced as a remembering function that implies the cruelty of political persecution or the destructiveness of Maoist discourse”—by making the violence of revolution comparable to a penalty, and by implicitly equating the success of revolution with the substitution of a new feudal regime for the old (which was the popular notion at the time), the “… irrational form, or form of deformation …” of the violence “… abolishes the rational order … that the master discourse appropriates to exert historical violence”113 —leading to irrationality. In other words, the desire for freedom from violence and history deprives the characters and the narrator of the ability to reflect. Additionally, due to this incapacity to analyze historical incidents and maintain critical distance between the author and the narrator, the author/narrator does not realize that he is still continuing his madness when he attributes the past to nothing but “insane” years. Conversely, when the narrative accuses history with its portrayal of de-politicized, de-historicized wonders, it has implicitly tired of the mediocrity of secular society and calls for “not forgetting the past.” Consequently, in a dialectical sense, it appeals for a re-politicization of social life. The novel witnesses the further development of the alienation of postrevolutionary society, which was merely fermented in The Enticement of Gandisi Mountain. Vividly presented in its description of social life are the following phenomena: the increasing entrenchment of commercialization, the prevailing influence of the love stories orchestrated by the famed writer Qiongyao 琼瑶 (1938–), crowed theaters, bulletin boards of family planning, early popularization of TV sets, and women’s crazy pursuit of colorful fashion. On the other hand, the residual institutions of socialist culture—such as the clubs of labor unions in which workers can enjoy their leisure time, and workers’ night schools where they can continue their study after work—and the promotion of socialist morality (as shown by some middle-school students who voluntarily help others) are also shown casually in the text. Nevertheless, once society is depoliticized, the policemen seem unfamiliar with their roles as the guardians of socialism and the people, which is revealed in their 112 Yang incisively comments that “Atrocities, deaths, and evil remain enigmatic and cannot be rationalized by any discourse that would have established another historical subject to redeem the disastrous past.” Ibid. 113 Ibid., 69.

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reluctance to deal with troublesome matters. In understanding these representations of the various facets of daily life in post-revolutionary, commercialized society, it is necessary for us to see the whole story as nothing but an allegorical rendition, a phenomenological projection of the perspective of (a certain popular stance of) the 1980s. The theme of “1986” repeatedly appears in Yu Hua’s other stories of this period. “The Past and Punishment” (往事与刑罚, Wangshi yu xingfa) is one that similarly “… traces the personal traumatic unconscious and [is] an allegory that pursues the anachronism of the disastrous history.”114 Even though the protagonist is also an expert in penology, this time he is not a historian but is actually a penologist. He remains a historical incarnation and tells the experience of the past to a stranger, repeatedly saying that “You are not cut off from your past … You’ve always been deeply immersed in your past. You may feel alienated from the past from time to time, but that’s merely an illusion, a superficial phenomenon, which only means that you’re really that much closer.”115 As Xiaobin Yang suggests, these words “… demonstrate the atrocious violence of history beyond rational articulation.”116 In the end, the anti-hero also commits suicide. With an allegorical framework full of symbolic imagery, Yu Hua conveys a Kafkaesque theme of the absurdity of the world, highlighting law and judgment. However, the narrative discourse or the subject of the narration here is worthy of inquiry. Yang aptly notes that, in all these stories, by “… showing a barbarous world that appears normal and ordinary, Yu Hua alludes to a traumatized and incapacitated subject both alert and numb to the shocking violence;” yet, “… the seemingly ignorant voice of narration intensifies the indefinability of subjective pathos.” Consequently, without “… a purposive critical reflection upon the brutality, the perverse tone of narration here implies a questionable narrative subject.”117 However, he tries to explain away this abnormal phenomenon by arguing that “… the narrative subject exposes vulnerability from within, for there is in reality no superior subject who can be immune, or completely detached, from despair.”118 In his view,

114 115 116 117

Ibid., 62. Quoted from Xiaobin Yang, The Chinese Postmodern, 63. Ibid., 64. Likewise, in the novella “One Kind of Reality” (现实一种, Xianshi yizhong), “… trauma effects a kind of indifferent narration, a narration apathetic to atrocious and cruel actions.” Ibid., 66–67. 118 Ibid., 67.

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Here the evils are deprived of their sociohistorical backdrop and allegorized at the core of human behavior. In other words, social disaster is shown as an uncontrollable psychic impulse or mechanism. This is, however, by no means a depoliticization of the disaster; rather, it is the absence of the political that indicates the original lack of ability to articulate the disaster.119 To me, however, this “… absence of the political …” is exactly the manifestation of depoliticization, in the sense that it refuses to differentiate different kinds of violence and explore the causes of violence, resulting in the inability to diagnose the nature of the catastrophe.120 Violence and injustice in the author’s stories are generally attributed by critics to the Foucault-ian theory of (ir)rationality and power relations, which, to them, leads to a postmodern, agnostic irrationality: “[T]he real past and the disasters, for Yu Hua, are irretrievable … these events/incidents are essentially unidentifiable, intangible and ungraspable.”121 However, although incapable of diagnosing the real cause of this illogical and irrational narration, and trying his best to legitimize and rationalize the narrative act, Yang still complains that … what piques us is not only the devastation of [the] traditional ethical ideal … but the mode of narration that appears to be inadequate to articulate the shocking violence. Perverse lyricism permeates only to evince the psychic incapability of phrasing or to imply the ambivalence derived from the traumatic experience of the assaults.122 Indeed, the “perverse lyricism” is more typically evinced in Yu Hua’s parody of the traditional Chinese narrative genres of “genius-and-beauty” (才子佳人, caizi jiaren) and “knight-errant” (武侠, wuxia).123 In what follows, I examine how Yu Hua parodies the traditional narrative formula. 119 Ibid., 68. 120 Thus said, Yang further diagnoses the pathos: “This lack implies the traumatic affect whose real origin is unidentifiable. The unidentifiability of the origin of trauma opens up an obscure view toward the experience of atrocity. Psychic desire and impulse appear to be the tangible but indirect figuration of history, whose turbulence is not merely externally but also internally active … The “moral” rationality of violence is established as a ground for psychic irrationality, but the logic of behavior is so tenuous that the lofty concept of rationality has to fall into the irrational abyss.” Ibid., 68. 121 For instance, see Yang’s comments. Ibid., 70. 122 Ibid., 69. 123 The first traditional genre narrates “… the harmonious union of the talented young man and the beautiful young lady …” which is “… achieved through a series of battles against

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“A Classical Love Story” (古典爱情 Gudian aiqing) is of the “genius-andbeauty” category. It is generally held that such thematic coldness in portraying violence and meaninglessness, as witnessed in the author’s aforementioned stories, advocates a humanistic concern. Meanwhile, the deconstruction of classical form and discourse subverts the value of traditional culture and challenges reason and order; to play with the game of death is to confirm the absurdity of existence. However, all these common understandings do not account for the socio-historical experience. The novelette, deliberately omitting any specific historical and political context in a seemingly natural state of extreme indulgence, parodies classical Chinese romantic stories with its bloodless descriptions of violence. However, the dialectic between form and content tells us that this “zero-degree writing” is not merely a defamiliarization that shows the cruelty and relentlessness unknown or overlooked in daily life. It is, rather, a symptom of the era: in radically reproducing merciless scenes without explication, it unconsciously falls into the inhumaneness it meant to indict. It intends to inform readers that it is violence that deprives people of their human nature, but the way of de-politicization results in its inability to effectively diagnose history. Consequently, the writing can only express the cliché that the world should be filled with love, which nevertheless is a cheap ideology that cannot address the origin of cruelty. As with the story “1986,” we here find a text inspired by reality: the reappraisal of traditional culture facilitates its impulse to parody the classical literary formula; the popularity of the discourse of human nature without the perspective of class analysis becomes the hotbed of zero-degree writing. The symptom of the textual form also shows the failure of “subjectivity.” For example, the narrative voice is unable to distinguish beauty from ugliness, so that when it describes the scene where the hero helps clean up the dead body of the lady he loves, her wounds appear to be bright-colored peach flowers: “The skin and flesh that had been displaced by the knife curled out around the puncture: it was still deep red, like a peach flower in bloom.”124 In all, the series evil forces …” whereas the second tells of “… the triumph of the good over the evil by violence …” As Yang suggests, these two genres both “… present modes of emplotment that can be used to illustrate historical dialectics in its vulgar form: all the crises or adversities are to be dispelled through the struggles between good and evil, and ultimately the consummation will be reached as the ultimate telos.” Ibid., 188. 124 Quoted from ibid., 191. Xiaobin Yang convincingly argues that, since “… the peach blossom is a stock metaphor for female beauty in traditional Chinese literature …” this “… reference to the fatal and ghastly looking wound … confounds beauty and ugliness, happiness and misery.” Consequently, the “… confounded narrative attitude seems unable to handle

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of symptoms here—the disorder of the narrative voice, anachronism, and so on—once again confirms the disintegration and discretization of the reason (for the narration) as well as the subjectivity of the narrator/narrative. “Plum Blossoms of Fresh Blood” (鲜血梅花 Xianxue meihua) is of the second “knight-errant” category of writing. Here, Yu Hua declines the “… historical certainty of justice …” and emphasizes “… the condition of uncertainty or purposeless …;” moreover, the hero there is devoid of ethical motivation.125 The story is reminiscent of Lu Xun’s story “Forging the Swords” (铸剑, Zhujian, 1927), both being narratives of how a young man avenges the death of his father. However, they greatly diverge in terms of their thematic concerns and the generational ethos they represent. As Xiaobin Yang notes, “Lu Xun’s chivalrous heroes, who take revenge on the foe at the cost of their own lives, can be seen as symbolic embodiment of Lu Xun’s own character: a vehement spirit aiming to extinguish the origin of social injustice and oppressive power.”126 Apparently, this is a modernist, or rather, revolutionary spirit which Lu Xun extols as the Chinese national character.127 By contrast, Yu Hua’s “old story being retold” narrates an aimless journey in which the protagonist, a 20-year-old youth with no ambition to avenge his father’s death, reluctantly goes out into the world to seek the foes responsible for this tragedy 15 years previously, only at his mother’s urging. His mission is never fulfilled, as he is not only physically disqualified from being a knight-errant but also never technically prepared—he does not master any of the martial arts. In this way, Yu Hua’s narrative degrades “… all the spiritual exaltation of the knight-errant genre.”128 However, while the author aims to parody the traditional genre and, furthermore, deconstruct the traditional chivalrous spirit and the ideas of the “… historical certainty of justice …” and the “… dualistic struggle between good

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such a miserable and disastrous subject.” Ibid., 192. In short, for him, the narration is “… awkward and perverted …” as “… the subjective engagement of the narrator cannot bring about real strength to sublimate the unbecoming content of the story to a transcendental state.” Ibid., 194. Ibid., 195–196. Ibid., 194. However, in the post-revolutionary era, this fearless and selfless spirit of self-sacrifice is discredited, and even Yang challenges the narrative with a postmodern nihilism: the protagonist’s “… credulity of the dark man’s promise to accomplish the mission of revenge is more naive than courageous, and the narrative of the bitter battle against the three heads in the cauldron is more comical than tragic. The serious revenge becomes a carnivalesque danse macabre that undercuts the original import of the story.” (Ibid., 194). Apparently, this is an invalid critique, as it enforces a reading that interprets the allegorical plotline with a realistic principle of probability. Ibid., 194.

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and evil …” which socialist literature has advocated,129 the self-deconstructive elements are still found throughout. The protagonist’s mother burns herself in order to urge her son to take vengeance, which is filled with the sublime spirit that the story intends to satirize yet fails to explain. The reason why the author orchestrates this fantastic, ridiculous plot is that the popular intellectual trend since the mid-1980s has taken the Chinese traditional knight-errant as an “irrational” human being whose behavior is unfit for “modern reason;” the same is held of the modern (Communist) revolution. However, while the “story” tries to repudiate modern —or, rather, revolutionary —ethics and morality by applying the “postmodern” tricks of storytelling, its childish, illogical plotline shows nothing but the immature and playful irrationality of the narrative itself. By no means does it confirm the “irrationality” of either the traditional chivalrous spirit or the modern revolution; instead, it only betrays the illegitimacy of the historical projection of post-revolutionary secular society and, ultimately, the superficiality of the anti-revolutionary, conservative mentality. 4

Su Tong: Retrospection on Revolution by the New Bourgeois Class

Su Tong’s avant-garde stories can be regarded as the magnum opus of this literary movement because they contain multiple themes from the works of other writers and simultaneously show the dispersion of meaning, the disintegration of the subject, the formation of secular society and the historical projection of post-revolutionary conceptions. His trilogy —The Exodus of 1934 (1934 年的逃 亡, Yijiusansinian de taowang), The Family of Opium Poppy (罂粟之家, Yingsu zhijia), and Crowd of Wives and Concubines (妻妾成群, Qiqie chengqun)—have be taken as “… an exploration of sensuality, mainly centered on men.”130 In particular, the novel The Family of the Opium Poppy is representative in this regard. In this novel’s portrayal of the complicated relationship between landlords and farmers in modern China, the key historical event of this period, the socialist revolution, receives a treatment that differs from socialist realist writing. Although critic Zhang Jingzhi still takes the story to be a development of the narrative tradition of linking family history with national transformation,131 the omnipresence of sexual desire in the plotline as a dynamic of historical 129 Ibid., 195. 130 Tonglin Lu, Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics, 133. 131 Zhang jingzhi 张静芝, “Yinshu zhijia: Tuifei jiazu de shengcun shixiang 《罂粟之家》： 颓败家族的生存世相 [Home of Poppy: The Lives of the Decadent Family],” Dangdai wentan 当代文坛 [Contemporary Literary Field], No. 3., 2001, 87.

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development still distinctively shows the collective feature of avant-garde fiction at that time. For instance, the legal father of the protagonist Liu Chencao, the landlord Liu Laoxia, is shown as one who has numerous sexual encounters with women. As Chen Xiaoming puts it, here desire “… becomes so active and so capable of reconstruction …” that, although it is “… the personal, physical act …” it nevertheless “… incorporates with it the class relations, and thus transforms personal desire into desire in history and becomes a historic desire. Consequently, the delivery of personal desire harbors the consciousness of class and history.”132 If this is the case, is the instinct of desire the logic of history as the novel seems to imply? Is the consciousness of class and history the same as the non-historical consciousness of desire? How does non-historical desire express class consciousness and the consciousness of history? The class relation here is illustrated by the entangled relationship between Liu Chencao, the offspring of a landlord, and Chen Mao, the poor peasant. Chen Mao has endured a lot of suffering, as portrayed in works of Chinese socialist realism. The difference lies in the fact that Chen Mao cares only about releasing his class hatred by satisfying his sexual desire. When he becomes the chairman of the peasant association and thus the leader of the peasant movement, he not only confiscates the land of Chencao’s biological father but also pours all his hatred onto the daughter of the landlord and rapes her, which makes readers disgusted with him as one of the revolutionary proletariat. In effect, this description of the proletarian revolutionary is nothing but a specimen of the “New Historical Fiction” popular then (and now). As critic Qingxin Lin pertinently generalizes, the way of … rewriting, or deconstructing, Revolutionary History characterizes many NHF s [New Historical Fictions] … By deliberately blurring the boundaries between the revolutionaries and the plebs, these writers dissolve the sanctity of revolution and equate it with the struggle for power and domination.133 In particular, revolutionary cadres are portrayed in the New Historical Fiction as those “… who abuse their right at will for personal gains …” 132 See Chen Xiaoming 陈晓明, “Lun ‘Yinshu zhijia’—Su Tong chuangzuo zhong de lishigan yu meixue yiwei 论《罂粟之家》—苏童创作中的历史感与美学意昧 [On Home of Poppy—the Historical Sense and Aesthetics Implication of Su Tong’s Works],” Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Literary and Artistic Debates], No. 6., 2007, 109. 133 Qingxin Lin, Brushing History Against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical Fiction (1986–1999) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 218.

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… all of them threaten and rape women. The depiction of the proletarian cadres as rascals and local bullies parodies the idealized revolutionary heroes … who are politically mature (showing class-consciousness), morally altruistic (attention to the welfare of the masses), and physiologically ascetic (aphanisis and frugality). As the revolutionary heroes metamorphose into the avaricious and lustful hedonists in alternative histories, one can easily perceive a pungent irony.134 In general, these stories “… tend to depict both the decline of the old patriarchal families and the failure of the alleged aims of revolution, i.e. ‘emancipation,’ ‘justice’ and ‘freedom.’ ”135 More importantly, as Chen Xiaoming concludes, this kind of narration expresses the view that “… class hatred might not be so strong. Only by taking the form of sexual possession to symbolically take revenge, can the gap and contradiction between classes be erased, without (necessarily) taking the sharp form of violently subverting the enemy class.”136 Apparently, this is the literary rendition of the revisionist historiography of the 1980s, which equated Mao’s socialist revolution (with the peasants as the major force) with traditional peasant riots and rebellions throughout Chinese history, and insurrectionists nothing but country rogues. This reactionary view also holds that “… the simple hatred and sexual desire of the peasant class is unable to rise to the level of historical reason, not to mention of establishing a (new) idea of the society.”137 However, this opinion is misplaced in that it regards the new type of peasant revolution, namely a socialist revolution armed with progressive, Marxist ideas of class struggle, as the repetition of riots against old dynasties. What we need to notice is that the country rogue Chen Mao could not typify the new peasants who participate in the revolution under the education of the party’s revolutionary ideology. Such a narrative of the peasant-landlord relationship is just a kind of legendary anecdote, despite its attempt to “restore” a “true history.” It is true that the core interest of this novel lies in narrating a differing version of the historical story of the landlord class, through which it attempts to rewrite modern China’s history. The birth of Liu Chencao, for instance, is introduced as the result of Chen Mao’s affair with the landlord’s wife, Cui Huahua. 134 135 136 137

Ibid., 42. Ibid., 218. See Chen Xiaoming, “Lun ‘Yinshu zhijia’,” 109. Therefore, in the novel, “Chen Mao’s revolution is the pure articulation of his desire, for he does not know what revolution is on earth. For him, revolution is just the same as his physical desire which needs to be satisfied and it is just the form of physical violence.” Ibid.

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However, this symbolic fact does not obscure Chencao’s identity as a landlord, for kinship (and one’s family and property relations) is not the key element in deciding one’s class identity in the Chinese socialist revolution. Instead, one’s class consciousness plays the most significant role in determining one’s class identity. Moreover, there is no misplacement of class relationships here. Nevertheless, as Chen Xiaoming properly notes, “… in this work, Su Tong interprets the origin of the historical transformation of China’s modernity [from the perspective of landlord class] in his own unique way …” that is, by the blending of “… the historical substantiality [opium] with the historical destiny [the sexual insanity].”138 Indeed, from the landlord’s perspective, the class relationship between the peasants and the landlords based on the political-economic issue of land acquisition is replaced by the relationship within the landlord class itself, by its own fratricidal conflicts, which are taken to be the underlying cause leading to the decline and fall of this class, whereas the morbidity and decadence of reproductive desire is treated as the core issue of this inner relationship. Consequently, by “… bringing the relations of desire into the class relationship, this novel subverts the class relations; and eventually, the law of desire has overwhelmed that of class struggle.”139 However, what we need to ask is whether this revisionist rewriting is valid: is it just the reconstruction and projection from certain perspectives other than that of the landlord? To begin with, the view that desire transgresses the division of class (or that desire accounts for all) is not a “universal truth” but comes from a particular class’ understanding of human nature. From this perspective, we could gain a new knowledge of the narration. While the story ostensibly accounts for the origin of China’s modern historical transformation from the perspective of the landlord class, in reality it is a retrospection of history from the perspective of a newly born bourgeois class in a post-revolutionary society and post-socialist era. From this perspective, although the structural, revolutionary reorganization of agrarian Chinese society is acknowledged to be the destiny of modern China, it is not taken to be the result of any justice or the inevitable logic of political economy. This perspective also raises the mysterious notion of predestination, which comes from the melancholy of this bourgeois class for feeling that they have missed the historical opportunity presented in previous years; it thus projects this sense of unblessed fortune into China’s modern history. To substantiate my point, let us first consider the life experience of Chencao. At first sight, his identity seems questionable: 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid., 110.

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Chencao has no fixed identity. His identity as the heir of The Family of the Opium Poppy is misconstructed as a result of his opium addiction. His blood ties him to the enemy of his legal father, Chen Mao, whom he murders in order to fulfill the demand of his alleged family. His education ties him to Lu Fang, who, as the regional Communist leader, has to execute him at the end of the story. His marginality in the Liu family ties him to his mysterious sister, who often represents the value system opposite to that he is supposed to assume as a the only male descendant of the family … he dies in a big opium jar, which symbolizes his misconstructed identity.140 Critic Tonglin Lu thus concludes that Chencao is “… a sign of indeterminacy par excellence—vacillating among Liu Laoxia’s world of patriarchy, Liu Suzi’s domain of femininity, and Lu Fang’s realm of Communist ideology.”141 In contrast to this argument, I suggest that Chencao does have a relatively fixed identity: since he has received an enlightened, modern, Western-style education, he is no longer the traditional landlord; rather, he is the representative of a new class in historical transformation. When he returns to his hometown and takes over the family business, despite his disgust with poppies, he seconds the act taken by the landlord Liu Laoxia, who provides the means of livelihood for the impoverished peasants by offering them jobs planting poppies. These facts apparently imply the complexity of the Chinese situation. In contrast to Liu Laoxia’s still-traditional behavior, Chencao carries out a series of modern reforms, such as reducing rent and interest; he even allows poor peasants and farm laborers to have more freedom and loosens their personal attachment to the landlords. However, these bourgeois reforms have more to do with his crisis management (in order to rescue the fortune of the landlord class) than with his trans-class feelings for the masses at the bottom; he despises them and expresses his ingrained thought that he hates all of them as much as he hates himself. Obviously, he does all that due to the consideration of the interest of his family’s class. Tonglin Lu thus notes that he is “… part of his system …” which is symbolized by his “… becoming addicted to opium— the source of the Liu Family’s wealth.”142 A degenerate scion of the landlord’s family, he nevertheless is “… a passive instrument … not only in his father’s patriarchal economy but also in his sister’s world of femininity.”143 It is only 140 Tonglin Lu, Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics, 146. 141 Ibid., 146. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid.

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from this perspective that we can understand why this novel is filled with amorous desire.144 The absence of subjectivity, partly out of the lack of any firm political belief and partly because of a shortage of substantial economic and political power, leads to the dysfunction of any desire mechanism. The more significant narrative, nevertheless, is still the representation of revolution and land reform. Although the author attributes “revolutionary action” to ahistorical desire, he still involuntarily portrays the following phenomena: … despite the high accumulation of land, the landlord class still cannot get their desire satisfied. To gain extra profit, all of Liu Laoxia’s lands are grown with one single plant, poppy, which indicates that the economic production in the rural area of China has already fallen into certain madness … the impoverishment of the country, illness, bandits and hatred are all described by Su Tong, which is the soil of the revolution destined to take place.145 On the surface, this way of describing the political economy is, for Chen Xiaoming, “… examining the ending of a grave, ancient history on the stance of a desperate sense of the history by the landlord class;” in truth, however, it subscribes to none other than the bourgeois class’s peculiar perception of “destiny”: “The land reform is nothing but a violent form of the eschatology of peasant China. It does not confirm the inevitability and legitimacy of revolution but is just a fate to arrive. Its arrival is the approaching of the historical eschatology.”146 What should be noted is that this is knowledge held by contemporary China’s bourgeois class, which perpetuates the conservative opinion of its previous incarnation in the Republican era that consisted of backward landlords and gentry. In contrast, in the eyes of the developed and mature Western bourgeois class, there is no so-called “destiny,” not to mention

144 Chencao is “… characterized by the absence of desire for the female body and the presence of a highly intense relationship with another man;” whereas at the same time he “… remains much closer to the feminine world represented by his sister.” Ibid., 145–146. Similarly, there is no female desire in the text. As Tonglin Lu perceptively suggests, “[S]exuality in absence of any female desire is itself instrumental and impossible; instrumental to the extent that it serves mainly as the search for a reconfirmation of a lost masculine identity, and impossible because of the lack of minimum equality between the male subject and the female object.” Ibid., 154. 145 Chen Xiaoming, “Lun ‘Yinshu zhijia’,” 111. 146 Ibid., 112.

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predestination; rather, one’s fate (actually, the fate of this bourgeois class) can be changed through personal struggle. For this newly-born bourgeois class, “… land reform is a parasite living on the dislocated structure of desire;”147 therefore, the narration of land reform is riddled with the air of strong irony: the peasants even kowtow to the “open-minded landlord” Chencao because of his reduction of rent and interest. However, what needs to be pointed out is that these are merely the peasants before receiving a proper revolutionary education: the acquisition of a proper class consciousness requires enlightenment by revolutionary ideology. However, the author here stresses that no matter how the revolutionary Lu Fang inspires Chen Mao as to the significance of revolution, Chen cannot understand it and continues his plundering of the wealth of landlords—which, however, are just the actions of a very few rural rascals and lumpen-proletarians. The struggle for land reform looks ludicrous in the story, which merely demonstrates the vulgar view of revolution held by the bourgeois class, which considers class struggle a farce. It is also from this perspective that the inertia of some peasants, as well as their desire to be landlords, is taken to be inherent in this class, or its class nature. However, this “nature” is merely the pre-revolutionary condition; what the revolution aims to do is to exterminate this state of inertia and awaken the revolutionary consciousness of the peasants. Therefore, instead of taking the human nature of the peasants to be invariable, it is better to argue that the class nature of the landlord is unchanged, exemplified in Chencao’s personality and actions. His deeply-rooted contempt of the peasants does not change after he intellectually becomes a member of the new bourgeois class; instead, because of his ingrained class interests and family stakes, he kills Chen Mao despite their close kinship. Despite this revisionist view of history, the objective reality of class oppression is still occasionally introduced. In his childhood, Chencao used to be a playmate of Jiang Long, who is now a bandit; however, his oppression of the latter is a kind of class oppression, and so the story involuntarily shows class antagonism. Chencao cannot understand the resistance of the oppressed: “I have paid you [for what you have done]!” In the eyes of the oppressors, the resentment and class hatred of the oppressed is irrational. Chencao and Lu Fang, the leader of the land reform team, had also been classmates and friends, but Lu seems to be a cold-blooded “monster”: neither Chencao nor the narrator can understand his philosophy or his different choices from Chencao, revealed by the presence of the incomprehensible revolution and Lu’s enigmatic political concepts. Due to incomprehension of the Revolution, or as a result of an 147 Ibid., 112.

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emotional—if not yet intellectual—reaction against the socialist revolution, the author can only ambiguously hint at the homosexual sentiments between Chencao and Lu Fang. Accordingly, the class struggle objectively described, which subverts all traditional relationships, appears to be ridiculous and irrational. A melancholic atmosphere thus envelops the novel. It must be stressed that the limited horizon of the landlord class makes it impossible for it to admit the inevitability of its historical destiny. Therefore, the knowledge of the landlord’s destined fate could only originate from Chencao, who has experienced enlightened, bourgeois culture, and from the newly-born bourgeois class in the postsocialist era. However, the irony lies in the fact that the doomed fortune of the landlord class is seen as predestined, instead of as the historical logic of the political economy. As Chen Xiaoming judiciously reveals, the narration of the novel unfolds from two dimensions: One is “… Chencao’s psychological feeling, a kind of congenital premonition and fatalistic psychics …” which assumes that, as long as eliminating “… the stuff that is hidden in the blood and fate …”—namely by murdering Chen Mao who is his biological father—“… can his history be rewritten and can he own a brand-new beginning of history.” However, this is “… a huge misunderstanding of history.”148 We cannot help but feel that Su Tong’s presentation of historical predestination, arising from a bourgeois perspective born in the late 1980s, is also a similar misconception. Nevertheless, there still exists a more realistic dimension in the plotline of the novel: It is the real history that Chencao, together with the landlord class which he belongs to, can never understand. Chencao’s premonition is a hunch towards his personal destiny; he is not aware that this is the presentiment of the reality, the foreboding of the upcoming revolutionary history to be unraveled in reality … Though Chencao, the last landlord, has experienced the enlightenment of modernity, he is incapable of changing the fate of the landlord class. In other words, by no means can the landlord class be brought back to life because what is waiting for it is the even more cruel and ferocious, violent revolution. Meanwhile, the contradiction between the new education he has received and the mode of production of the landlord class is shown here. All of these are delivered by Su Tong in a subconscious way of art.149

148 Ibid. 113–114. 149 Ibid.

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Chencao is decadent by nature, which is out of the unique class character of the bourgeoisie in modern China, a result of the inherent limitation of the traditional gentry and landlord class that the bourgeoisie evolved from. He is helplessly forced to make decisions, but still fails to reverse his doomed fate because the social structure (and the mode of production of the landlord class) of agrarian Chinese society must be destroyed when confronted with modernity. Commenting on how history is portrayed in the novel, critic Qinxin Lin keenly observes, History in these works, like Walter Benjamin’s exegesis of “the allegorical physiognomy of nature-history” in the German tragic drama … appears “in the form of ruin and decay.” The aura of decadence emanating from such rhetoric of sickness, which permeates the “allegorical physiognomy” of these fictive histories, is indicative of a rejection of the conjectured historical process predestined by the project of modernity.150 Notwithstanding the rejection of the “inevitable” process of history, in this ruined wasteland there is no subjectivity and freedom that could be envisaged, although “… in his denial of his own body, Chencao’s disheartening passivity may also be interpreted as resistance to the patriarchal order.”151 In other words, although “[B]y denying his physical desire, Liu Chencao creates an illusory freedom vis-à-vis his father’s patriarchal order and his former friend’s bond to communism …” nevertheless, his “… passivity is a logical outcome of his lack of a subject position. He does not have a subject voice either in the family or in society.”152 What needs to be stressed is that the ambivalent position of the author himself is revealed by the sympathy bestowed upon Chencao and the latter’s inability to understand the political ideas of Lu Fang, his attitudes toward this former fellow classmate, and the ambiguous affective relations between the two. Although Su Tong opposes the traditional patriarchal order and “feudal” power, and realizes the decadent force of sexuality which is intimately tied to opium consumption, his distance from, if not repugnance for, the revolutionary idea—arising from the intellectual fashion of this postrevolutionary era—prevents him from delving deeper into Chencao’s and Lu Fang’s inner minds, as well as the differing political forces they represent. What

150 Qingxin Lin, Brushing History Against the Grain, 22. 151 Tonglin Lu, Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics, 149. 152 Ibid., 149–150.

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is left in the text is therefore a touching, yet inexplicable, brotherhood enveloped in the spirit of humanism: Suddenly, Lu Fang heard Chencao call his name: “Lu Fang, give me a hand!” Lu Fang stretched out his hand and grasped Chencao’s sweaty hand. Lu Fang remembered their past friendship when they often held each other’s hands … Chencao lifted his hand and wiped his eyes; his whole body smelled of opium …153 庐方突然听见沉草轻声喊了他的名字，“庐方，拉我一把。”他把手伸出 去抓住了沉草冰凉的汗津津的手掌。庐方回忆他们手臂相缠时勾起了 往昔的友情…… 沉草抬起手臂擦着眼睛，他的身上散发出罂粟枯干后 的气味……

We should not take Chencao to be totally incapacitated, as he can kill his retarded brother Liu Yanyi when he fights him for the object he cherishes, the tennis ball; being a modern instrument of sport and a symbol of the friendship between Chencao and Lu Fang, it apparently symbolizes (Western) modernity. On the other hand, since Yanyi is only concerned about his voracious hunger, Chencao’s killing, although inadvertent, also reveals his egocentrism and the severance of his ties to his class affiliation in pursuit of something he could not safely acquire. Out of these observations, I suggest that the “unconscious writing” of the author arises from his political awareness as well as his political unconscious, which is of the newly born bourgeois class in the postsocialist era. This political (un)consciousness can be dated to the popular, de-politicized, humanistic discourse which has prevailed since the mid-1980s; to the intellectual trend which depreciates the socialist revolution as the reincarnation of peasant revolts in feudal times; to the sexual dissipation resulting from pro-capitalist marketization; and to the resurgence of debased phenomena from the old society. It is also a result of the impingement of the New Historicism: the replacement of class analysis premised on a study of political economy with human desire explaining historical evolution, essentially substituting the Marxist materialistic view of history (namely, class struggle) with bourgeois notions of history. Consequently, although the avant-garde novelists more or less hold the view that they are practicing “subjectivity” in order to make “rational reflection,” the study of the ideology of the novelistic form confirms that these authors once again involuntarily become pawns of history. In the eyes of the newly-arisen 153 Quoted from Ibid., 148–149.

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bourgeois (culturally if not yet politically) class of late-1980s China, history is always transmigrating and reincarnating.154 What should be noted is that this view of historical palingenesis not only expects to return to the “glorious past” (as is shown in society’s popular nostalgia for pre-1949 Shanghai) but simultaneously intends to converge with the “mainstream civilization” of Western, capitalist culture. Nevertheless, it also has misgivings about its incapability of doing so.155 The way to break the spell of the historical curse probably lies in the continuation of the revolution. However, this is hard to imagine or anticipate from the point of view of the narrator as a member of the bourgeoisie, or middle class.156 With the emergence of the historical apparition in 1989, the trend of the avant-garde fiction of the 1980s finally came to its end—or, it accomplished its ultimate historical mission. 5

Conclusion

When analyzing China’s avant-garde fiction of the 1980s, we should pay heed to its historicity, which explains its ups and downs as well as its mixed and 154 This notion is also implied in this text, “Chencao says almost dreamily: ‘I am going to be reborn.’ How he wishes that he could live once more! Now, we finally get to understand the narration at the very beginning of the novel: ‘this is my barn …’ Is the scene that he sees before he is shot? Or the one that he sees after he has been reborn? Unfortunately, even if Liu Chencao is reborn, his narration would be a samsara. The narration of the novel begins with ‘this is my barn …’ This is a cycle, which means the same history will restart. The scent of poppy blows on the face directly and engulfs Lu Fang. The attachment of such spirit of apparition to the newly born revolutionary like Lu Fang is the sign that history will recur on him, although in a different way.” See Chen Xiaoming, “Lun ‘Yinshu zhijia’,” 115. 155 Thus we see that Chen Xiaoming sympathetically laments, “Su Tong’s Home of Poppy was published in 1988, which seems to be a certain historical parable, for its premonition of the history ending in a certain way, its fear of the restart of the future, its [feeling of] nihilism towards the transformation of revolution in history, all of which project into the future just like an allegory. Whether the history [to be unraveled] is a revolutionary opening or decadence as that of the past still remains a mystery; just like the flavor of the poppy roused by the death of Chencao winding around the revolutionist Lu Fang, it looks like an interrogation, a satire, as well as a curse.” Ibid., 118. 156 From this perspective, Chen Xiaoming perspicaciously observes that in the novel, “… the generation of the sense of decadency of history is attributed to the decadent sentiment of the narrator himself. It is the sentiment that not only favors, but also indulges in, failure and depression, so as to experience its flavor. The narrator has integrated himself into it so deeply that he even obtains the same infection as such sentiment and situation does. It seems that the fate of the character is also that of the narrator.” Ibid., 116. Indeed, the past and the present life of the bourgeoisie has been a warning to people all along. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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hybrid features. It appeared during China’s transformation to a postsocialist state, thus bearing the signature of Western cultural fashions, ranging from high modernism to postmodernism. Nevertheless, although it posed a challenge to the established literary institutions, it became disoriented because of drastic sociopolitical transformations and quietly withered away. Having observed this relentless disappearance, Andrew Jones comments judiciously but sarcastically: Ironically, the brief flowering of the avant-garde may also be remembered as the last unitary literary movement in twentieth-century Chinese history. The rapid commodification and consequent market segmentation that have transfigured the Chinese cultural scene in the 1990s seem to have spelled the end of an era in which any one literary trend is able to occupy cultural center stage … the avant-garde as a viable and ideologically coherent movement ultimately fell victim not to censorship or official disapproval but to the vagaries of the market and the changing artistic agendas of its constituent members.157 Xudong Zhang, no less ironically, remarks that, “[N]o sooner had writers and critics become ready to settle down in a semiautonomous dwelling than the formation of a quasi-consumer society in late 1980s … rendered such an effort irrelevant.”158 Nevertheless, with the approach of 1989, history did not come to the end; instead, it re-started once more. From this perspective, the disappearance of China’s avant-garde fiction is not because of the failure of the formal experiment, but because it had finished its historical job. It expressed the spirit of liberal humanism behind the facade of anti-humanism; yet, in the guise of critique, it fell short of a genuine, self-reflexive consciousness. On the other hand, its merit lies in its independent character in terms of producing a “pure literature” (although this is also a kind of ideology) in a time of commodity consumption and mass culture, and in its unconscious calling for a re-politicization of social life and re-politicization of the consciousness of the ordinary people living in a depoliticized state (which is indeed paradoxical and ironic). Therefore, the analysis of avant-garde literature needs always to be associated with the anatomy of its historical-ideological content, and both its merits and faults should be considered in the spirit of historical dialectic when we learn from history. 157 Andrew F. Jones, “Avant-Garde Fiction in China,” 559. 158 Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms, 156.

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Sampling the “New Historical Fiction”: White Deer Plain as a Representative Text of New Historicism China’s “New Historical Novel”, popular in the 1990s and after, holds that “History is no longer an objective record of historical events as they were, but is rather a text imbued with personal idiosyncrasies and ideology; historical events that really took place are inaccessible to us except through texts that describe them, not without partiality.”1 It is a trend greatly influenced by the ideas of Western “New Historicism”. There is such a familial resemblance that it could be taken as China’s “New Historicist Fiction.” Critic Qingxin Lin has thus suggested that the New Historicist writers’ “… competition with historians for the right to the historical discourse …” attests to nothing but “… their acute observation of the distinction between the historical materialist’s and the new historicist’s conceptions of history and text.”2 White Deer Plain (白鹿原), a novel written by Chen Zhongshi (陈忠实) (1942–2016), substantially confirms this point. It has been very popular since it was first published in 1993, winning the Fourth Mao Dun Literature Award five years later. In 2010, it ranked first in the selection of the “Eleven most outstanding works from 1979 to 2009” launched by the distinguished literary periodical Zhongshan (钟山). When talking about the novel, it is often noted that it was among a series of fictional works produced by writers from Shanxi province, which were published around the same time and attracted great attention on the national cultural field. They constituted a phenomenon known as “the eastward expedition of (cultural) armies from Shanxi (陕军东征).”3 What, then, makes White Deer Plain stand out among these works? Since its publication, the novel has been adapted for various literary and media forms, including local traditional opera, comic strip, modern drama, symphonic dance drama, cinema and a television series. It has thus aroused heated discussion, attesting to its lasting influence in cultural circles and across society. What kind of 1 Qingxin Lin, Brushing History Against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical Fiction (1986–1999) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 1. 2 Ibid., 3. 3 See Bai Ye 白烨, “Zuowei wenxue, wenhua xianxiang de ‘shanjun dongzheng’ 作为文学，  文化现象的“陕军东征” [‘Eastward expedition of armies from Shanxi’ as a Literary and Cultural Phenomenon],” Xiaoshuo pinglun 小说评论 [Fiction Review], 4 (1994): 61–65.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_006

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position does the novel undertake regarding the history of modern China? In what sense could the narrative be taken as a classic? The story begins with the protagonist Bai Jiaxuan, the clan chief of White Deer Village located on the White Deer Plain. The narrator informs us that when he is reminiscing the past, he is “… proud of his having married seven women in his life (引以为豪壮的是一生里娶过七房女人).”4 This way of imitating the first sentence of One Hundred Years of Solitude, a novel that has been a best seller and significant in China’s cultural community since the “high cultural fever” in 1980s,5 clearly indicates that the novel is narrated in the present tense: the retrospect of a “later” age upon a “past” one. In the present age, when equal rights for women and men are taken to be natural and granted, the readers learn that Bai Jiaxuan, who is considered by the villagers to be a pervert in his sexual life because he tortures women to death, is proud of his “robustness.” This fabrication, if not a total narrative lapse, could still hardly be accepted and it inadvertently endows a certain “post-modern” quality to the novel. This exaggeration could only be taken as normal in this contemporary era and in a middle-class society where powerful sexual capability is greatly honored and Chinese women have become objects as commodities since the widespread marketization of the 1990s. While this phenomenon reminds us of the saying that all history is contemporary history, this negligence nevertheless still does not directly classify the novel as “fiction”—that is, a completely fabricated story without any historical authenticity. This is so because, in the age in which the story is set, it was true that “… women are just the paper for pasting on windows; if broken, just paste a new piece on it (女人不过是糊窗子的纸， 破了烂了掉了再糊一层新的)”6—as the hero’s elderly mother says. Whether it is effective or not to commence a novel by highlighting the hero’s virility, this is the first appearance of the authoritative patriarch. Just as the two sides of his “great achievement” demonstrate, he is a man with a dual character. The novel’s second chapter focuses on the description of another key character, “the Venerable” Zhu. Bai Jiaxuan intends to consult a geomancer to discover why he still has had no children. On his way to the house of this geomancer, he finds a precious treasure which he takes to his brother-in-law, the Venerable Zhu. Zhu is not only a perfect Confucian but also knows everything 4 Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实, Bailuyuan 白鹿原 [White Deer Plain] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1993), 3. 5 The sentence is “MANY YEARS LATER as he faced the firing squad, Colonel Aureliano Buendía was to remember that distant afternoon when his father took him to discover ice”. Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude, translated by Gregory Rabassa (London: Harper Perennial, 1970), 1. 6 Chen Zhongshi, Bailuyuan, 14.

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past and present, and can even predict the future. He tells Bai that the object is “a deer.” Although he does not give too much detail, Bai immediately resolves to obtain the land where the deer-shaped creature grows, for the legend holds that the white deer, a mythical animal in the plain, could bring boundless auspiciousness in the world. Consequently, the struggle that lasts for decades between Bai’s family and the original owners of the “treasure land”—the Lu family—formally starts, which is also a microcosm of the century-long history of modern China. Is the novel a “faithful” narrative of modern Chinese history? To answer this question, we should examine the text within the social-historical context of 1990s China. This chapter thus analyzes the correlation between the narrative strategy of the novel and the New Historicism’s viewpoints on human nature and historical development. I will suggest that this novel presents a more complicated picture than any other stories published previously in China in describing a number of social phenomena. The first is about rural governance and the Confucian tradition in modern China, which was a patriarchal system constituted by a master-servant relationship in terms of ethical-moral customs. Another is related to the narration of the unlocking of desires in rural areas arising from the onslaught of the commodity economy. The third is tied in with the portrayal of rebels within and without the traditional system. However, its narrative falls short of accounting for the disintegration of rural China and the existing three major political forces. This incompleteness is partly due to the so-called “cultural-psychological structure” of the traditional culture, and is also closely related to the unfinished nature of modern Chinese history. As an incomplete historical legend, the moralistic, humanist discourse and culturalist perspective of the novel, aside from orchestrating cultural myths, are unable to penetrate deeply into the roots of political economy and social history beneath the great transformations that swept Chinese society in the early twentieth century. 1

A Patriarchal Clan System Consisting of Master-Slave Relationships

The most impressive part of the novel is doubtlessly its portrayal of local governance and the Confucian tradition in modern China. The ethical-moral system of Confucianism is one that emerged and developed in China along with the unique patriarchal clan system; it is a nepotistic system of power relations. In history, the value “humanity and righteousness” (仁义), together with the ideal of “harmony” (和谐), was proposed by Confucius and his disciples and successors in order to restrict conflict within the ruling class to maintain social order and feudal rule. Therefore, the ethics of “loyalty and filial piety” (忠孝), innate Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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to the value of “humanity and righteousness”, effectively illustrate the integration of family and nation in traditional Chinese society, as well as its hierarchical order and caste system. With the Confucian doctrine and its corresponding ethical-moral system gradually being accepted by the rulers of subsequent dynasties—thereby becoming the state’s ideology—those who genuinely and sincerely followed it were respected by ordinary folk. Nevertheless, this seemingly non-historical, universal system and its values encountered numerous frustrations in modern China, vividly portrayed in the novel. In family novels since the May Fourth era, traditional, conservative intellectuals usually stand for pedantry and rigidity. However, after the “rootsseeking literature” of the 1980s, along with the flourishing of the “Four Little Asian Dragons” that were said to be governed by Confucianism, it has gradually become popular with Chinese writers to seek inspiration for national revival from tradition, particularly the Confucian tradition. In the novel, the essence of traditional Confucian culture is embodied by the Venerable Zhu, the great Confucian scholar in the ancient Guanzhong area. Being a holy man, he not only values cultural inheritance but also devotes himself to a spiritual value system. We can find the prototype of this character in history: apart from the local masters of Confucianism living in Republican China (1911–1949), there are the so-called Neo-Confucianists who advocated a Chinese cultural renaissance during the Anti-Japanese war; they continued this job in overseas Chinese communities after the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. Furthermore, there have constantly emerged so-called “masters of sinology” since “sinology fever” took hold of China in the 1990s. The portrayal of this character’s experience is therefore indicative of the ambivalent attitude of Chinese society towards the Confucian tradition. Here, the invalidity of the Confucian ethical-moral system in modern China—a result of its divorce from the transformed mode of social production and interpersonal relationships—makes its embodiment look pedantic and old-fashioned. Hence, the Venerable Zhu is always confined to the feudal, traditional culture and knowledge system, adhering to the small-scale peasant economy and propagating the virtue of benevolence to correct corruption and revive social morality. However, the White Deer Academy that he sets up has to be closed down because all the students go to town to attend the school of “new learning” (knowledge from the West) which is closely tied to modern life and a prerequisite to enter college; Zhu’s heroic conduct of ploughing poppies in person also comes to naught because his efforts are no match for the temptation of commercial interests for the villagers. Confronted with the powerful ruling force, his personal adherence to high moral standards cannot change anything. Zhu’s act of distributing food as disaster relief does not protect the masses from hunger and suffering; and Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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Bai Jiaxuan (middle) in a screenshot of the TV Series Bailuyuan (2017)

his request to join the national resistance is abortive. While he symbolizes an ideal from the traditional world, this “thing-in-itself” could hardly maintain itself in the modern world. By contrast, the clan Chief Bai Jiaxuan is a performer of traditional concepts and actual clan culture, which allows us to explore, through his conduct, traditional ethics in a rapidly restructuring society. He starts with self-reliance and maintains his diligence throughout his life; he learns to be a good man and returns good for evil. All his deeds in the novel are meant to indicate that the patriarchal culture, with its core teachings of “humanity, justice, virtue and morality” (仁义道德), is best represented by him. In contrast to the previous images of evil landlords with whom the Chinese people are familiar in the writings of socialist realism, this new rendition portrays this leader of a feudal family-clan as a pleasant human authority immersed in Chinese cultural traditions. His cultural personality is highlighted but his social personality and political identity as a landlord are never touched upon. However, readers also witness his merciless behavior: he has no sense of guilt for his ex-wives who have died from his physical torture; he flogs and evicts his son, Bai Xiaowen, because of the latter’s improper actions that violate Confucian values; he disowns his beloved daughter, Bai Ling, who joins the revolution; after the tragic death of Tian Xiao’e, the despised woman in the village, he not only builds a

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“Demon Locking Tower” above her body but also eliminates those small moths flying on the plain that are believed to be the reincarnation of her ghost. It thus seems that, in Bai Jiaxuan, benevolence coexists with cruelty. This portrayal of a landlord might be more balanced than previous depictions of the traditional ruling class. However, this does not mean that he has a split personality; rather, his heartlessness is the performative converse of his “benevolence”: only by strictly conducting all discipline within the patriarchal system can he keep the clan following the Confucian order, lest he be the sinner. In this regard, the novel tells the history of some sinful clan chiefs whose lax management led to the decline of the whole family. In fact, all his actions are given a raison d’être. He does not feel guilty for the successive deaths of his ex-wives because the highest moral code in Confucianism is that “there are three ways to be unfilial: the worst is not to have off-spring” (不孝有三，无后为大). His beliefs allow him to boldly do other shameful things. He orders the wife of a family member who has not been fertilized to sleep with the grandson of his vassal Lu San, Tuwa, in order to have offspring. He craftily occupies Lu Zilin’s valuable land, which is believed to have a good geomantic omen, and builds the graves of his ancestors there because of the traditional belief that only in this way would the descendants of his family be blessed. His brutality to Tian Xiao’e is understandably supported by his clansmen (the Venerable Zhu, the embodiment of “goodness,” even directly participates in the design of the tower). Therefore, all of those deeds seem to be heartless and monstrous to us is because they are understood by contemporary readers from their moral standpoint. However, for Bai Jiaxuan and his clansmen who live in the traditional world, these things are perfectly reasonable and even desirable. Even his accumulation of an enormous fortune by vigorously cultivating poppy is considered to be responsible to the whole clan in traditional values. From this perspective, although he intentionally shields his villager, Lu Zilin, who seduces and rapes women, he receives unanimous praise from his whole society. Therefore, it is not that he is hypocritical in nature; rather, it is traditional society and its corresponding morality which can hardly maintain their legitimacy in modern society that lead contemporary readers to find his hypocrisy and cruelty unbearable. The second difference between this new historicist novel and the “old” historicist fiction of socialist realism lies in the characterization of Bai Jiaxuan’s long-term hired hand, Lu San. Lu not only performs benevolence and righteousness but also organizes a protest, on behalf of his master, against the local authorities for their exorbitant levies and taxes, even replacing his master to be cast into prison. Unlike Zhu Laozhong—a heroic, revolutionary peasant

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revolting against the landlords’ exploitation in the key text of China’s “red classics” of socialist realism, The Ancestry of the Red Flag (红旗谱)—the poor man Lu takes his master as his benefactor and devotedly defends the patriarchal culture that his master symbolizes. Therefore, just like Bai Jiaxuan the landlord, Lu San is a non-typical prototype of the farm laborer. He is non-typical because both his internalization of the ruling class’s morality and his loyalty to his master might not have been so common at that time when the traditional empire was about to collapse. However, he is also a prototype because he is more capable of standing for the image of ordinary peasants than Lu Xun’s Ah Q, for he builds his dignity and earns his living through his diligence and uprightness. His inferiority complex, formed by his long servility and blind sense of happiness, could be taken as the common state of the peasants. In this light, he and Bai Jiaxuan both act as the two pillars of this traditional (rural) world and thus reveal the fundamental conditions by which this world could persist—thus, they are both real and unreal. They are real because they are not purely fictional (such images appear in many novels produced in the 1930s and 1940s describing the same era, such as Lu Ling’s The Children of the Rich [财主的儿女们] and even in Ba Jin’s Family [家]); however, they are also unreal because they are the embodiment of certain ideas. However, just like his master, apart from his benevolence and docility, Lu San also shows his own side of brutality, which is displayed in his murder of Tian Xiao’e on behalf of his master. The portrayal of his being haunted by the ghost of Xiao’e is indicative of his deeply guilty conscience: he actually harbors doubts about the inhumane patriarchal conventions. In this light, this narrative of the peasants’ complexity is another contribution that the author has made to present the richness of history. By contrast, Lu Zilin, the last chief of another prominent clan in the village, is a dishonest, mercenary and sanctimonious man. In order to satisfy his lust, he sleeps with Tian Xiao’e, who is spat on by the villagers; he is so shortsighted and freeloading that he is hoodwinked by Bai to sell his land with great geomantic omens. As the semi-official head of the village, he often uses his public office for private gain. Being a man of small moral stature, he offers a sharp contrast to Bai Jiaxuan, who is considered noble. Nevertheless, both of them are the defenders of the patriarchal institutions and merely the two sides of the same system. They jointly constitute the ethical-moral totality of traditional society. That is why both are highly respected by the villagers and also why Bai Jiaxuan’s conscience is not bothered at all after he helps exculpate Lu Zilin from raping Tian Xiao’e—if Lu were exposed, the patriarchal values would face earth-shaking consequences and the people of the village would

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riot. In this light, Lu Zilin is even more representative of that culture than Bai, for he appears to be more human.7 It is under a benevolent facade, collectively constructed by masters and servants, that all kinds of people participate in maintaining the patriarchal order. For instance, the village doctor, Mr. Leng, who is trusted and respected by the people, silently yet decisively poisons his daughter personally when she becomes mad after having bitterly struggled between reason and desire. The portrayal of a complementary and collusive relationship between masters and servants, as well as the structure of social classes and customs which exclude and support each other in the patriarchal system, renders the novel more “objective” than previous revolutionary historical novels. 2

The Opening of the Gate of Desire

Murdered by the cooperation of master and servant is a story of “free love,” a popular theme in the May-Fourth New Literature. However, now the story around this staple theme has been substantially transformed: in literature and films of China’s new historicist writings of the 1990s, stories of free love have changed into secret romances of desire and lust, also a subversive rewriting of the May-Fourth New Literature in the era of the market economy. Moreover, love in the present novel does not occur between young masters and maids; instead, it is among the lower ranks and the description of lustful indulgence is emphasized. As critic Qingxin Lin suggests, The decline of an old patriarchal family, as is depicted in the NHF, normally starts from the enfeeblement of the patriarch himself. Many, though not all, of these family histories seem to ascribe the decline to internal factors, such as adulteration of blood, diseased body and/or diseased mind, the descendants’ betrayal, moral degeneracy, etc.8 Indeed, in this novel, the enchantment of physical dissipation is brought in by Bai Jiaxuan himself: he well knows that the opium that his wife brings to the village is poisonous, yet he cannot resist the temptation of wealth and widely 7 The unity of the two can be substantiated by a detail in the novel: at the establishment of the village school, Bai Jiaxuan is recommended as the executive of the school, and Lu Zilin as the counselor. 8 Qingxin Lin, Brushing History Against the Grain, 126.

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plants it. A symbolic move, his behavior epitomizes the degeneration of the ruling class: this immersion in opium historically opened the gate of degeneration, and eventually toppled feudal rule in China. Opium is closely connected with destructive desire, which is witnessed in Bai’s beloved son, Bai Xiaowen, whose last step of degradation is smoking opium. The poisonous plant thus activates all sorts of desires which had been restrained by the traditional teachings of benevolence and justice. This narrative shows that traditional values cannot be sustained when confronted with the new commodity world. With the power of the village conventions (乡约) and his status as the patriarch, Bai Jiaxuan imposes Confucian moral instructions on the villagers. He preserves the full text of the conventions and strictly carries them out in the village; moreover, he makes every attempt to maintain the interest of the ruling class to which he belongs, although he considers it to be in the interest of the whole household. To do so, he strangles anything that violates the conventions by means fair or foul; the most thrilling scene is where he deals with Tian Xiao’e. These subplots—Xiao’e the poor girl and Heiwa the son of Lu San risk the condemnation of the villagers to engage their free love, and their final death, for instance—have been witnessed in the May Fourth literature and the left-wing literature of the post-May-Fourth period.9 However, consequent developments go beyond these patterns: Lu Zilin, uncle of Xiao’e, seizes the opportunity to possess her and abets her seduction of Bai Xiaowen; she seems to degenerate into an unabashed, lewd woman. Here the complexity of the lower classes is fully exposed. Although the Venerable Zhu launches the prohibition of opium in the village, it still spreads along with human desire, which reminds us of the experience of General Lin Zexu 林则徐 (1785–1850), whose efforts in prohibiting opium in China came to nothing in the late Qing period because the corrupt state had already fallen into a hopeless situation. However, in this novel, the rural social order around the time is still seemingly peaceful and harmonious. Historically, such social order results from the normal functioning of the traditional mode of rural governance, in which the gentry class play an important role in the countryside.10

9 The plotline that Xiao’e is physically and mentally insulted and mutilated by the patriarchal authority is reminiscent of what the leftist writer Lu Ling described in his novel Hungry Guo Su-e in the 1940s. 10 See Lü Yuntao 吕云涛, Lu Fei 李辉, “Bailuyuan zhong xiangcun zhili moshi de liubian jiedu ji qishi 《白鹿原》中乡村治理模式的流变解读及启示 [Interpretation and Inspiration of the Evolution of Rural Governance in White Deer Plain],” in Nongye kaogu 农业考古 [Agricultural Archaeology], No. 6, 2010, 367–369.

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It is the 1911 Revolution that brings changes to the life of the villagers. To them, the abdication of the emperor does not bring any great joy of being rid of autocracy; rather, they merely fall into confusion. Instead of showing these men to be fatuous and lacking enlightenment, the novel here reveals that society needs to find new rules and beliefs in order to function smoothly when it loses its old order and the “heavenly mandate” which has maintained its normal operation. Historically, this is the most disordered period in China. Bai Jiaxuan sends for Mr. Zhu to lay down the “village conventions” in order to maintain the rural order and requires the villagers to read them after him and Lu Zilin. The narrative voice informs us, From then on, events like stealing poultry or fruit immediately disappear; all gambling business, like cards, mahjong, dice and so on are closed down and incidents like affrays, fights and fierce arguments do not take place anymore. Everyone from White Deer village becomes nice, kind and urbane, even their voice seems to be softer and gentler than before. 从此偷鸡摸狗摘桃掐瓜之类的事顿然绝迹，摸牌九搓麻将抹花花掷骰 子等等赌博营生全踢了摊子，打架斗殴扯街骂巷的争斗事件再不发 生，白鹿村人一个个都变得和颜可掬文质彬彬，连说话的声音都柔和 纤细了。11

This subjective tone indicates the intervention of the narrative subject. Such a description is meant to show the functioning of traditional moral teachings and regulations of the patriarchal world. However, it is much more the selfimage and self-eulogy of agrarian society than “… a real, objective description of the simple folkway, benevolent and righteous morality and good social order in the traditional patriarchal rural society.”12 It is an idealized identification with the old times by the conservative thoughts of post-revolutionary China of the 1990s. However, the inherent class contradictions and political conflicts of this period could never be avoided with moral guidance and by integrating customs and courtesy. Consequently, Bai Jiaxuan’s authority as the patriarch is 11 Chen Zhongshi, Bailuyuan, 93. 12 Cao Wenshu 曹书文, Wang Xiujie 王秀杰, “Bailuyuan: Jiazu wenhua de minjian xushi 《白鹿原》：家族文化的民间叙事 [White Deer Plain: Folk Narrative of Family Culture],” Henan daxue xuebao: Zhexue shehui kexueban 河南师范大学学报：哲学社 会科学版 [ Journal of Henan Normal University: Philosophy and Social Science Edition], 2010 (1): 208.

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soon challenged when Lu Zilin, whose power had ranked below that of Bai, becomes a government official and suddenly has a higher status than him. The traditional autonomy of the rule of the gentry collapsed under the new administrative system, in which the central government appropriated the right to dominate rural society through new institutions. The title of the officer of the new Security Institute (保障所), in which Lu Zilin has a position which is the same as the old one, unexpectedly indicates a certain overlap between the new and the old ruling institutions. “Lu Zilin dressed in blue calico uniform is still the one in long gown and mandarin jacket (那个穿一身青色洋布制服的鹿子 霖，仍是那个穿长袍马褂的鹿子霖),”13 as readers are informed. The new ruling system still relies on a former squire for its administration, implying that reform could not be completed. 3

Three Rebels Fighting against Existing Institutions

What follows is the dramatic change of an autonomous, agrarian society, or its inevitable disintegration and inexorable collapse, with its focus on sexual affairs departing from earlier works of revolutionary realism (pre-1949) and socialist realism (post-1949). Something is soon out of control within the existing patriarchal system. Tian Fuxian, the general administrator, invades and acts recklessly in the White Deer Plain as a modern political force. Lu Zilin immediately joins this new, powerful force. Being greedy and selfish, Lu begins his first governmental affair with the collection of stamp duty. The heavy taxation triggers a peasants’ protest, plotted by Bai Jiaxuan, and displays the first confrontation between traditional governance by the gentry and the new state power. In spite of the seemingly more enlightened nature of the new regime over that of the old bureaucracy, terms such as “democracy, freedom, equality” and “allowing the people to assemble and demonstrate” articulated by the law officer puzzle Bai Jiaxuan, who attempts to surrender to the new power, revealing the crumbling of the old law of “the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues (三 纲五常).”14 But the assignment of an inexperienced youth to inform the new 13 14

Chen Zhongshi, Bailuyuan, 96. See Guo Wuke 郭武轲, “Shilun qingmo mingchu shiqi guojia quanli zai xiangcun de shentou: jiyu xiaoshuo Bailuyuan xushi de kaocha 试论清末民初时期国家权力在乡村的 渗透：基于小说《白鹿原》叙事的考察 [On the Penetration of the State Power into the Rural Areas during the Late Qing Dynasty and Early Republican Period: A Research Based on the Narrative of the Novel White Deer Plain],” Henan jingcha xueyuan xuebao 河 南警察学院学报 [ Journal of Henan Police Academy], 2011 (4): 125–128.

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policies also signifies the illusory nature of these discourses in reality. Thus, when silver dollars are sent to the wife of the president of the court, the man who should be punished is released. Since the protest threatens Lu Zilin’s authority, he resents Bai Jiaxuan so much that he instigates Tian Xiao’e to seduce the latter’s son, Bai Xiaowen, which leads to the loss of Xiaowen’s fortune and honor and his eviction from the household. Furthermore, Lu buys land from the impoverished Xiaowen and demolishes its houses to humiliate Bai Jiaxuan. The local governance by the gentry, represented by Bai Jiaxuan, is one on which the “new” ruling system is founded; therefore, Lu acts unconsciously as the grave digger of the agrarian society and its administration. In this way, the narrative reveals that the collapse of the old society is eventually driven by its internal contradictions. Moreover, there is constant conflict between modern, new concepts and traditional culture, one of which is displayed by the breakup of the familial relationship between Bai Jiaxuan and Bai Ling, who embraces the Chinese Communist Party and joins the revolution. The force of bandits also contributes to the downfall of the old rule, which is typified by Heiwa’s experience. Consequently, conflicts between families, struggles between parties, revolts of armed bandits and all kinds of revolutionary campaigns and wars are unraveled and entangled. The dissolution of rural, patriarchal institutions is unavoidable, with the process being embodied specifically by three rebels: Bai Xiaowen, Heiwa and Bai Ling, who also represent three directions of rebellion. Bai Xiaowen, the eldest son in Bai’s household, is well cultivated in traditional scholarship and is thus an ideal successor to Bai Jiaxuan. An episode shows that he conducts himself well and decently during the sacrificial rites in the ancestral hall, which helps build his prestige among his clansmen. Nevertheless, since he is still young and inexperienced, he has not firmly internalized traditional ethics and morality and thus succumbs to the seduction of Xiao’e. After being punished, he shakes off his patriarchal dreams and unabashedly purses his desires. Having sold off his estates and fields, he becomes a beggar in lower society. His revolt is an unconscious burst after having suffered much from the repression of the traditional ethical-moral institutions, also confirming that he desires something new; a new moral code is coming into being in his personality. Therefore, his destiny does not end right there, but is to be developed. It is also difficult for the next generation of servants to maintain the values of loyalty and filial piety. Heiwa is the son of the loyal servant Lu San, who has always tried to instill his contented nature into his children. Heiwa’s rejection of his father’s teaching is not caused by external instigation or education (such as that from any revolutionary party); instead, it comes from his instinct. It is

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Heiwa and Tiao Xiao’e in the movie Bailuyuan (2012), directed by Wang Quan’an (1965–)

puzzling that such an impulsive resistance stays with him even when he is still a boy. His excuse for refusing to work for the Bais is that he feels Bai Jiaxuan is too straight and hard, clearly implying Heiwa’s natural spirit of rebellion. However, although these descriptions of his nature as the foreboding of his coming revolt depart greatly from socialist realist writings of class oppression, readers could not divine the true reason for his rebellion. A series of deeds thereafter are indicative of the complexity of his unconscious resistance: his affection for Tian Xiao’e results in his remorse and shame when faced with his master who has treated him kindly, and by Confucian tenets of loyalty and piety. Nevertheless, he is still involved in peasant riots and is arrested. After the defeat of the Red Army which he joins, he joins a bandit gang. However, his conscience is always tortured. His self-accusation shows that his revolt is blind all the way, which eventually leads to his conversion and the ultimate tragedy. He accepts the government’s amnesty and enlistment, becoming a member of the county’s security group. After that, he marries a nice woman and reforms himself by following traditional teachings. What is more, he even gives a thorough denial of his past and returns to his hometown to worship his ancestors and repent sincerely. Yet, although he is co-opted by the traditional institutions, he ultimately still becomes the victim of an evil scheme plotted by leftovers of the old regime. However, his experience thus

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far is merely a superficial rendition; the characterization of this character will soon be questioned. Eventually, the demolition of the old system requires conscious mutineers— the revolutionaries. In this regard, the third rebel—Bai Ling, Bai Jiaxuan’s beloved daughter—is the one who is self-conscious and self-independent all along. Compared to the other two females in the novel, who are murdered by the traditional institutions because of their unconscious rebellion (like that of Heiwa),15 Bai Ling is a brand-new woman, for she is unlike Lu Zhaopeng’s wife, who dares not go beyond the bound of feudal ethics, and her rebellion does not have to rely on men, as does Tian Xiao’e. Instead, she not only acts for herself in choosing the object of her love, which is the theme of “New Women” in May Fourth literature, but she also has the capability to think and survive. Furthermore, her revolt goes beyond fulfilling her personal desire; instead, she fights against the unfair social order and takes revolutionary ideals as the highest goal for her life. As the only clearly defined revolutionary in the novel and the embodiment of the “white deer spirit” which now is transforming into a symbol of revolution, she aims to destroy the entire old world and create a new society. The characterization of this figure has appeared earlier in Chinese socialist literature: early in the 1950s, there was a revolutionary girl nicknamed “white dove” who is very similar to Bai Ling, as shown in one of China’s red classics, the novel Tracks in the Snowy Forest (林海雪原). This kind of character is a favorite stereotype capturing the hearts of intellectual writers, as she—the incarnation of both revolution and modernity—embodies the Good, the True and the Beautiful. Through Bai Ling’s split with her lover Lu Zhaohai, son of Lu Zilin and a member of the Nationalist Party, and through her shifting affection for Lu Zhaohai’s elder brother Lu Zhaopeng, a Communist, the novel shows its endorsement of the socialist revolution. However, the description of the conflicts between the two parties is sparse, mainly included in the following plots: Heiwa arrests the local despot Tian Fuxian because of his corruption, whereas the Nationalist county magistrate pardons and releases Tian; the Nationalists madly slaughter Communists after the reactionary coup; the Nationalists mercilessly conscript innocent people during the domestic war. All these show the injustice and brutality of the Nationalist administration. However, the political objective of the Communists is rarely discussed.

15

Frightened by the power of traditional ethics, Lu Zhaopeng’s wife cannot help but allow the fire of lust to devour her reason; Tian Xiao’e’s seeking the satisfaction of her desire offends traditional ethics and she dies tragically at the hand of her father-in-law.

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Three Political Forces: An Incomprehensive Representation

In these descriptions, the changes in rural political power lay the foundation of further unrest in the countryside. Historically, since the rightists in the Nationalist government seized power, the bao-jia (保甲) system of neighborhood administration which aimed to control residents and manage them had already degenerated into dependence on the cooperation of local tyrants and evil gentry, becoming their instrument for ruling grass-roots society. The traditional mode of rural governance declined and rural society went to the edge of bankruptcy. It is against this historical background that the novel defines the three forces apart from the traditional clans in modern China: the Communists (represented by Bai Ling and Lu Zhaopeng), the Nationalists (represented by Yue Weishan and Tian Fuxian), and the bandits (represented by Heiwa and Bai Lang). However, the conflict and cooperation between the Communist Party and the Nationalists are not addressed in a detailed manner; instead, they are merely the background to the love affairs. The narrator informs the readers that Lu Zhaopeng has reinforced his revolutionary will and developed from a childish youth into a prudent Communist in his 20 years of experience in society. However, how he grows in maturity is never elaborated; instead, there is only one sentence that introduces his transformation. When Bai Ling returns home to visit her parents, through her association with Lu Zhaopeng, she gets the impression that, Lu Zhaopeng is a piece of furniture which has already taken shape, while Lu Zhaohai is still a log which has just been cut down; Lu Zhaopeng has already been forged into a sharp axe, while Lu Zhaohai is still a lump of iron slab. He can be counted an admirable big brother in every aspect. 鹿兆鹏是一件已经成型的家具，而鹿兆海还是一节刚刚砍伐的原木； 鹿兆鹏已经是一把锋利的斧头而鹿兆海尚是一圪塔铁坯，他在各方面 都称得起一位令人钦敬的大哥哥。16

However, readers could hardly feel so. Rather, there are many incidents in which his immaturity is inadvertently exposed: he objects to feudal ethics and advocates freedom of marriage, but he himself cannot do this because the traditional thought and practice of respecting elders makes it hard for him to abide by his stance firmly; instead, he compromises with the familial 16

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arrangements. He reluctantly accepts an arranged marriage after he has been given three slaps in the face by his father, and is again forced to return home by his grandfather. As a matter of fact, there are no mature Communists in the novel. Even if there are some, they are not fully represented; for instance, the county magistrate Mr. He, who is an underground Communist and is killed by the reactionary forces, does not receive proper treatment in the novel. For the revolutionary activities the CCP launched in history, the novel only gives this description: Lu Zhaopeng returns to White Deer Plain to lead the peasant movement during the short period of cooperation between the Communist Party and the Nationalists. However, the description of the movement only shows the immaturity of the Communist Party in its early days. It appears that these characters have never really mobilized the vast majority of the masses but just employed rogues like the lumpen-proletariat Bai Xing’er, who is a desperate gambler and dismissed by the patriarch for sleeping with another man’s wife, and those who have no class consciousness like Heiwa and Tian Xiao’e. Although the poor peasant He Laoliu dies bravely in the reactionary counterattack, he does not appear until that time; as to how and why he behaves in the campaign, the novel does not give any account. Consequently, since there is no detail about how these people were mobilized and how their revolutionary consciousness was cultivated, only the narrowness of the revolutionary movement is highlighted. This rendition does expose some facts in history, but it also harbors a specific narrative strategy that avoids handling some other key problems in revolution. For the Nationalist side, we mainly witness the characterization of Lu Zhaohai, who is adventurous and entrepreneurial. He loves Bai Ling but they eventually have to go separate ways due to their differing political beliefs. The narrative shows a relatively objective portrayal of the adversary in history, though he still does not seem to be a man with principle: while he appears so romantic that he vows to “marry no one” except Bai Ling, he still becomes engaged to a woman who resembles her. Nevertheless, he longs to contribute to the nation and fights courageously during the Anti-Japanese War. However, he later joins the anti-communist Domestic War and becomes a victim. The length of the vicarious description of the struggle between the two parties does not match that of the narration of the bandit Heiwa. He is the first from the plain to fight the patriarchal institutions. The fire with which Lu Zhaopeng aids him to burn the granary arouses his desire to revolt. Although he cannot understand the significance of the revolution (or perhaps it is merely the author who thinks he cannot, for we are not informed how he is mobilized by the Communists), he still devotes himself to it. Later, readers are informed of a series of his deeds, such as attending the Peasant Movement Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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Institute, establishing the Peasant’s Association, executing the depraved old monk who rapes women, and even attempting to send Tian Fuxian to the scaffold. However, we have no idea as to whether he has ever experienced the feeling of being the master, for what is being shown is just his urge for vengeance. His almost crazed overthrow of the old social order seems to be nothing but a personal retaliation in the name of public interest. For instance, he robs the Bai and Lu families, beats the elder Mr. Lu to death, breaks Bai Jiaxuan’s spine, and eventually immerses himself in indulgence and depravity. When he discovers that his father is the one who murdered his lover Tian Xiao’e, he falls into further degradation. With a propensity for banditry, he commits many wicked crimes. These descriptions are much less a faithful record of the historical events than the result of the social-historical climate of the 1990s, when conservative, counter-reactionary views took root, which viewed peasant uprisings during the feudal dynasties as irrational and illegal and regarded modern peasant revolution as nothing but violent, blind upheaval just like historical rebellions. Heiwa’s ambivalent political stance and unsettled social role, together with his unexpected ending (first being recruited by the Nationalist authorities, then becoming the deputy magistrate of the Communist Party after he joins the PLA, and finally being unjustly framed and executed by Bai Xiaowen) make him the most complicated to decode of all the characters. Thus, analysis of his experience becomes key to unravelling the ideological core of the novel. 5

A Rebel’s Tragic Ending and the Incompleteness of History

Even before his tragic ending, Heiwa has changed tremendously, converting from a bandit to a “nobleman” in the Confucian tradition. However, he shifts so abruptly that we can only infer the reason for his change. He has been well acquainted with traditional ethics and exposed to Confucian education from childhood. It is possible that he never really goes beyond the traditional idea of social hierarchy which has stayed with him since his youth. As the author explains, his change results from “… the (traditional, Confucian) culturalpsychological structure of the character (人物文化心理结构).”17 Nevertheless, only by considering the social-historical context of 1990s China can we comprehend Heiwa’s transformation: his “psychological structure” is exactly the 17

Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实, “Xunzhao shuyu zijide juzi: Bailuyuan xiezuo shouji 寻找属于 自己的句子—《白鹿原》写作手记 [Finding My Own Words: Writing Notes of White Deer Plain],” Xiaoshuo pinglun 小说评论 [Fiction Review], No. 6, 2007, 69–76.

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echo of the psychological structure of the present era and a projection of the “incompleteness” of ongoing history. Furthermore, he dies at the time when he has converted to the traditional culture and set out on a successful official career, which not only shows the ruthlessness of the traditional administration rejecting converts (reminiscent of the outcome of Song Jiang in the classical Chinese novel Legend of Water Margin) but also implies that his conversion is untimely: the evolution of modernity and ruthless Social Darwinism (his death is caused by Bai Xiaowen for his self-protection) leave no room for the survival of traditional ethics. In this light, Heiwa’s tragic ending is closely related to the incompleteness of history in modern China. Since Bai Xiaowen drifts into begging after he is expelled from the household, he takes survival as his supreme principle. He thus symbolizes those who save themselves by any means when they are evicted from the traditional world to a brave, new world; there is no established, new ethical-moral value for them to follow after traditional society collapses. Instead of taking him to be representative of those possessed by the feudal remnants, Bai Xiaowen is better regarded as a new, bourgeois individualist; his efforts to rise high in society by means fair and foul remind us of the experience of the entrepreneurial capitalists who attempt everything to rise in the society in Western realist novels of the 19th century. When he is the commander of a Nationalist security group, he tries hard to arrest Communists in order to be promoted; yet, when he is surrounded by the People’s Liberation Army, he even shoots the face the regimental commander who personally promoted him. He eventually comes out on top and becomes a county magistrate within the new regime. His act of framing Heiwa can be taken as revenge for his family, but also for his class. He could, for his own interests, sell out his best buddy in childhood and could cheat his father Bai Jiaxuan who comes to ask mercy for Heiwa. Some critics hold that all he has done “… seems to be unreasonable, but it exactly shows the twisted inhuman aspect of Confucian culture.”18 Nevertheless, this argument neglects the fact that he eventually becomes a ruthless politician of the bourgeois class rather than a disciple of Confucian teaching. In short, while Heiwa’s conversion to the Confucian tradition symbolizes the persistence of traditional cultural psychology, his miserable death stands 18

Chen Chuancai 陈传才, Zhou Zhonghou 周忠厚, eds., Wentan xibei fengguoer—Shanjun dongzheng wenxue xianxiang toushi yu jiedu 文坛西北风过耳—“陕军东征”文学现象 透视与解读 [Northwest Wind Blows to the Literary World: Observation and Interpretation of the Literary Phenomenon of “Eastward expedition of armies from Shanxi”] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin chubanshe, 1993), 199.

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for the incompleteness of history: the author does not explicitly show the ultimate fate of Bai Xiaowen. Consequently, it has been suggested that Heiwa’s tragic death and Bai Xiaowen’s promotion imply the threat of the persisting feudal force to the people’s newly acquired mastery of their own fortune.19 Nevertheless, if we explore Bai Xiaowen’s (possible) end, it is not too farfetched to suggest that, no matter how cunningly he disguises himself, his unabashed lack of any morality and slipping into the revolutionary movement could hardly escape the coming political campaigns, in particular during the “continual revolution” of the Cultural Revolution, due to his class origin and his experience in the reactionary regime. If so, what is the message the author intends to deliver when he designs a plot in which good men are not rewarded with a good ending whereas evil men do not receive proper punishment? This message is that the history of modern China is nothing but an unreasonable, restless process of jactitation, the point of which is clearly expressed by the Venerable Zhu. Although the author does not mention anything of Zhu’s political detachment, the latter’s outstanding insights clearly present him as a person of foresight. He even predicts that his tomb will be disturbed after his death, leaving these words to those desecrators in advance “When to stop making much ado about nothing (折腾到何时为止)?”20 When the Red Guards indeed desecrate his grave during the Cultural Revolution, they witness this mysterious prophecy there, which brings out their exclamation. However, it is better to say that those crying about this are not the students and villagers witnessing the scene, but the author himself and the society of post-revolutionary China: the mainstream opinion during the transformation from the postrevolutionary, secular society to a state of post-socialism in the age of global capitalism takes the revolutionary history of modern China as a process of “too much ado about nothing.” It is during this counter-revolutionary intellectual climate that this novel appears and is highly evaluated. 6

The Textual Blankness and the Absence of Political Belief

As noted above, the historical struggle between the Communist and Nationalist Parties in the novel is treated as a simple background to the love affairs. Has Heiwa really ever changed through history? Here I mean the issue of historical authenticity or probability discussed by Aristotle. The root of Heiwa’s unpredictable mentality lies in whether there has been any change in his political awareness: his attendance at the Peasant Movement Institute is given as his 19 Ibid. 20 Chen Zhongshi, Bailuyuan, 642. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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motivation to join the revolution and mobilize the peasants after he returns to his hometown. However, since the content of these lectures is never given, there is no way for the readers to determine whether his political consciousness has been awakened. In other words, what is the real motivation for his revolt since the motivation of revolution appears absent? Similarly, the tale of the sexual affairs of Tian Xiao’e appears to be abrupt. The exposure of her love affair with Heiwa shows that the author intends to go back further from the discourse of enlightenment popular in the 1980s to the starting point of the May-Fourth theme of the liberation of humanity (in this regard, readers are also informed of an episodic love story between a bandit nicknamed Thumb and his lover Xiaocui).21 Ironically, however, while the narrative of May-Fourth literature opposes Confucian ethics, the author here means to reappraise the Confucian tradition; thus, the “wisdom” and “cruelty” of the Venerable Zhu and the nobility and mercilessness of Bai Jiaxuan are displayed simultaneously. Nevertheless, due to the lack of a proper perspective, he is unable to convincingly portray an organic picture of both sides. Therefore, upon closer scrutiny, the “wisdom” of the Venerable Zhu and the sublime morality of Bai Jiaxuan betray traces of fabrication. In fact, there are many more such blanks in the novel like the content of the political lectures that Heiwa has received. For instance, when Bai Ling and Lu Zhaopeng discuss “… the similarities and differences of Communism and the Three People’s Principles, and on the vigorous Northern Expedition and people’s revolutionary upsurge (谈论三民主义和共产主义的共同点和不同点， 谈论轰轰烈烈的北伐和各地的人民革命热潮),”22 the novel mentions nothing of what they are discussing. The only place that refers to the theoretical content of Communism is the one in which Lu Zhaopeng attempts to convince the Venerable Zhu of the raison d’être of Communism, On his visit to Mr. Zhu, he (Lu Zhaopeng) preaches communism to him. The Venerable Zhu smiles and asks, “It sounds quite agreeable that you are going to eliminate the system of exploitation of men by men and oppression of men by men. But what if there are some people who are willing to be oppressed or exploited?” Lu Zhaopeng replies, “How could it be possible that there are such people in the world?” Mr. Zhu illustrates 21

22

There is much discourse here against the Confucian ethical code. Lu Zhaopeng once says to Heiwa: “You—Heiwa, are the first one in this White Deer village to break the shackles of feudalism and realize the freedom of marriage. You have neglected those feudalistic staff, withstood the oppression of patriarchal clan law, and accomplished the freedom of marriage (你—黑娃，是白鹿村头一个冲破封建枷锁实行婚姻自主的人。你不管 封建礼教那一套，顶住了宗族族法的压迫，实现了婚姻自由).” Ibid., 172. Ibid., 206. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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his point with an instance, “How about those men carrying people across the Runhe River? If you are too kind to have him not be oppressed, he cannot earn money to buy pancakes.” Lu Zhaopeng answers, “The people’s regime will arrange a better job for him than carrying people across the river.” Mr. Zhu says, “What if someone loves the job of carrying people better than anything else for he has been addicted to it?” Lu Zhaopeng becomes impatient, “Then the people’s regime will build a bridge over the river, free for the vehicles and people to cross. Even if those carriers want to carry people, they could not do it.” Mr. Zhu laughs, “Your regime has quite a lot of methods …” When Lu Zhaopeng is recalling it, he just feels that he has been too ludicrous at the time…. 他去拜望朱先生时就向先生宣讲共产主义。朱先生笑着问：“你要消 灭人压迫人人剥削人的制度，这话听来很是中听，可有的人甘愿叫人 压迫：叫人剥削咋办？”鹿兆鹏说：“世上哪有这号人呢？”朱先生举 出例证说：“在润河上背河的人算不算？你好心不让他受压迫，可他 挣不来麻钱买不来烧饼。”鹿兆鹏说：“人民政权会给背河的人安排一 个比背河更好的职业。”朱先生说：“要是有人背河背出瘾了，就专意 想背河，不想干你安排给他的好工作，你咋办？”鹿兆鹏急了：“人民 政权就给河上搭一座桥。车碾人踏都不收钱，背河的人就是想背也背 不成了。”朱先生笑了：“你的人民政权的办法还真不少……”鹿兆鹏现 在想起这件事觉得自己那阵子很可笑……23

Faced with the pedantic Mr. Zhu who instructs people with backward teaching (although wise for the maintenance of agricultural society)—“to start slowly with cattle, a small field and a small house (地要少，房要小，养个黄牛慢慢 搞)”24—Lu’s childish answer shows that he is completely unable to awaken those people who are “willing” to be slaves. Here, the key point which has been explained reasonably by class analysis in the Red Classics of socialist realism is dismissed by Zhaopeng’s childish rebuttal. Rather than negligence, the author’s aphasia and immaturity are over-conditioned by his times: he even could not understand this immature Communist. Therefore, the “revolution” being narrated in the novel is nothing but violence, legend and the secret history of love affairs. It is not an occasional negligence by the author, for the judgment that the struggle between the Communists and the Nationalists is no more than “a dispute between a couple”

23 24

Ibid., 433. Ibid., 301.

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appears in this conversation as well.25 Even in the debate between Bai Ling and Lu Zhaohai, we just read a superficial statement that “reprisal-breeds-reprisal (冤冤相报)”.26 On the other hand, the whole narrative once again falls into the trap of the traditional Chinese ideology of “fathers being strict with children, and children filial to parents (父严子孝)” as well as “the elder being kind to the young and the young respectful for the elder (长惠幼敬);” though this is frequently confirmed from the reverse side, When he [the Venerable Zhu] reads County Annals of the past dynasties, he finds that in spite of the many differences among the various versions of the Country Annals, the evaluations of the people in Zishui county are consistently such words: adequate water, fertile soil, and unsophisticated people. Mr. Zhu thinks to himself, “Could it still be made with this appraisement in the newly revised Country Annals?” 他翻阅着历代县志，虽然各种版本的县志出入颇多，但关于滋水县乡 民的评价却是一贯的八个字：水深土厚，民风淳朴。朱先生想：在新 修的县志上，还能作如是的结论吗？27

An elderly gentleman invited by the Venerable Zhu to participate in the writing of the County Annals also sighs gloomily, “Can the undermined trust from the public be mended (人心还能补缀完全么)?”28 In this narrative, the failure of the idealized agricultural society is attributed to the restless, irrational class struggle. To understand all these phenomena, we need to know that, among the avant-garde fiction of the 1990s, the New Historicist novels tend to be ahistorical (just like the other stories). Although White Deer Plain seems to have a stronger sense of history than those novels and delves deeper into history, its silence on the nature of the class struggle between the two parties, as well as its failure to clearly interpret why and how the characters make their political choices, arises not merely out of the author’s literary weakness and intellectual incapability; rather, it shows the political aphasia of the era. The reason that this abbreviated (or blanked) historical novel, which has undergone a process of self-censorship, can still stir up contemporary readers is because 25 26 27 28

Ibid., 329. Ibid., 285. Ibid., 225. Ibid.

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(middle-aged) Chinese readers still retain memories of history. They can fill in these blanks in the novel with their presupposition (or knowledge acquired from the Red classics which they have previously read) so as to acquire an overall picture. For example, the scene where the characters are taking an oath on joining the Communist Party has been treated as a set pattern; in this critical moment, the characters eventually achieve their class consciousness and establish their political identities. However, the scene described by this novel is not exactly the same as previous ones, for it lacks a soul: when joining the Party is no different than joining any other organization, the inner “passion” is actually a state of “calmness”—the concept “comrade” here has been hollowed out, just as in daily life.29 7

“Cultural-Psychological Structure” and the Culturalist Mentality

Rather than lacking such historical content, these historical-political materials have been concealed intentionally or unconsciously by the author’s culturalist mentality. Thus, we read such fragments as the following: before Lu Zhaopeng leaves, he questions Heiwa, “How can you return to the Plain and even grovel in the front of that ancestral temple? How can you? (你怎能跑回原上跪倒在 那个祠堂里？你呀你呀)” Rather than Heiwa answering this interrogation, “Lu Zhaopeng immediately turns around and heads for the lane before Heiwa can reply to him (未及黑娃回话，鹿兆鹏已经转身出了大门进入巷子了).”30 Another time, Heiwa leaves a silver coin with the old farmer after taking off his clothes to escape. This detail actually reveals that he has received a revolutionary education, although this does not receive any further treatment. When future generations read these paragraphs, they cannot perform the whole reading process (which the author would have taken for granted) because they 29

30

Similar to this scene is a discussion about traitors. “Lu Zhaopeng says: ‘Now, I’m afraid that it is not easy for those who have joined the Communist Party to be a traitor, and I don’t believe it is easy to be a traitor either, for they have to treat themselves as a dog first, not to say anything like belief, ideal, morality, and conscience.’ Bai Ling is pleasantly surprised: ‘What you say is quite amazing! I have never thought that being a traitor is something not easy’ (鹿兆鹏说：“现在要进共产党的人恐怕不容易当叛徒当叛徒我想也不容 易，他们首先得自己把自己当作狗，且不说信仰理想道德良心。”白灵惊喜地 说：“你这句话说得太好了。我可是没想到当叛徒还是很不容易的事”).” Ibid., 419. The “belief” here actually has no specific content, so Bai Ling always stresses that it is the cruelty of the Nationalists that pushes her to join the Communist Party all along. What has remained is merely the “morality and conscience” to be the motivation for continuing the revolution. Ibid., 597.

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would not have the experience of pre-reading the Red Classics. Therefore, the classic status of this novel was created by the era of the 1990s, the years of depoliticization and secularization. What replaces class analysis is a moralized discourse about human nature. Due to the alienation from and “unfamiliarity” with the concept of class struggle between the two parties, the representation of the characters from both sides could only resort to moralization. For instance, after Lu Zilin has been put into prison, his wife moves to rescue him through bribery; after Lu is released, she sighs to him, “Only Secretary Yue (the Nationalist official) is the true god (who does not accept her bribery) (只有岳书记是一尊吃素不吃 荤的真神).”31 The description of Tian Fuxian from the Nationalist side is also inconsistent: when he is put on trial by farmers led by Heiwa, he is exposed as involved in corruption. However, he sends back the money that Lu Zhaolin’s wife gives him, which suggests that he helps his friends by not taking monetary interest. The images of Lu Zhaohai and Lu Zhaopeng, the representatives from the two parties, are quite vague, not to mention the underground Communist and county magistrate Peng, the martyr, who receives no treatment. The characterization of Bai Ling reveals nothing except her outer appearance.32 This inclination to vulgarize history not only mythologizes the pedantic Venerable Zhu (although the author denies that) but also leads to unrealistic imaginings. For instance, the author has Lu Zilin end up freaked-out and dying after he finds that the stage for the trial where the Communists shot Heiwa is exactly the one in the opera theater where the drama of suppressing the rebellious peasants had taken place. The narrator makes a moralistic comment on this scene: His moral concept is different, so is his value system … his whole psychological and mental world is not just simply subverted but entirely collapses with the bang of the gunshot. This is because all of his psychological balance, constructed by his ethics, values and ideals of social life, has broken down; it is not a common psychological imbalance but it collapses thoroughly, so that he goes insane, which even leads to some physiological problems: he is scared to shit. 他的道德观不一样，他的价值观也不一样……他的整个精神心理世界 就不再是简单地被颠覆了，而是随着那一声枪响，整个地崩溃了。因 为他的道德观，价值观，以及所有的社会生活理想所构成的心理平衡 31 32

Ibid., 600. Ibid., 405.

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chapter 4 全部就垮了，那不是一般的心理失衡，而是整个地坍塌了。所以他就 疯癫了，连生理上都引起了症状，他吓得拉稀了。33

However, if the dire consequences of the “irrational revolution” have led him to go insane, how could others be spared? Moreover, since Bai Xiaowen can live meanly, why can Lu Zilin not pretend to be progressive and advancing with the times? The author might argue that Lu Zilin is still supported by his traditional values, whereas Bai Xiaowen is undergirded by unabashed egocentrism, but why does Bai Jiaxuan, who upholds the same values as Lu Zilin, have a greatly different response? What kind of different morality and values make Lu Zilin psychologically collapse? I would suggest that what brings on his psychological breakdown is the egoism of 1990s China. This, of course, does not mean that, in actual historical reality, a landlord who has committed crimes would never be scared of going insane due to his fear of the revenge of the masses. However, it does mean that the reason why Lu Zilin, as the bad landlord in the novel, must go mad is because, in the post-revolutionary and depoliticized years of the 1990s, the view that history is nothing but irrational transmigration and a restless process of “reprisal-breeds-reprisal” pushes this character to an irrational state— he cannot understand in what direction history would turn; his misgiving is shared by the author. To be sure, we are not informed that Lu owes any blood debts in spite of his evil habit of raping women (the author skips over this intentionally and just mentions in a comic tone at the end of the novel that he claims many “surrogate sons”). This is probably so because the author is afraid that Lu would be taken by readers to be another evil landlord or local tyrant if his deeds are clearly shown; if they were introduced, the novel would not be much different from the Red classics. While Lu’s madness cannot be explained by the traditional “culturalpsychological structure” as the author claims, Lu’s family is still “verified” to be flourishing through their ancestor’s engagement in selling sex, which is introduced here by the vulgar means of “leaking secret history.” Here, the author’s culturalist mentality could hardly be refuted: he is apparently eulogizing Bai Jiaxuan’s unrighteousness and is critical of Lu Zilin’s debasement. In this light, quite a few critics are suspicious of the writer’s nostalgia for traditional 33

Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实, Li Yuchuan 李遇春, “Guanyu Bailuyuan zhong de renwu suzao wenti_ Chen Zhongshi fantanlu 关于《白鹿原》中的人物形象塑造问题—陈忠实访 谈录 [On the characterizations of characters in White Deer Plain—An Interview with Chen Zhongshi],” in Jiaoyan tiandi 语文教学与研究 [Teaching and Research of Chinese Language], No. 31, 2009, 6–10.

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culture, although he denies this: “It has nothing to do with nostalgia, but I just focus on writing of the spirit and moral strength of our nation (这不是我留 恋什么的问题，而是我着力去写我们这个民族的精神人格力量！)”34 Is this nostalgia or identification? The brief answer to this question can be found in the two facts we have discussed: the conversion of Heiwa and the “wisdom” of the Venerable Zhu. Heiwa converts to Confucianism and grovels in front of the ancestral temple, which is figurative of the cultural spirit of tradition. But this is not as much to suggest that his conversion reveals the two dimensions of traditional clan culture as to contend that he is the spokesman for a certain symptom of the present age. This does not mean that a bandit would never grovel before an ancestral temple or deny the tremendous impact of traditional forces (including its ideology) on contemporary society. It does, however, stress that Heiwa, once a progressive peasant who has even attended a revolutionary institution and received enlightenment, is destined to go through complex psychological struggles. However, the author is incapable of reasoning out this struggle, if not only due to his self-censorship. On the other hand, the great Confucian scholar the Venerable Zhu, who is the successor of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties, acts as the embodiment of the “Tao of heaven,” which is recognized by Bai Jiaxuan: [Bai] has been detached from the concrete individual event such as the famine years, plague, peasant’s associations and so on, and gotten into the state of considering the regularity of life and human beings … during the great retraction of the population, when he has experienced the verification of the spell for the first time in his lifetime, he starts to be convinced that above the sky of the White Deer Plain, there is a pair of eyes in supervision. (白嘉轩）已经从具体的诸如年馑，瘟疫，农协这些单一事件上超脱 出来，进入一种对生活和人的规律性的思考了……他在自己的有生之 年里，第一次经历了这个人口大回缩的过程而得以验证那句咒语，便 从怀疑到认定，白鹿原上空的冥冥苍穹之中，有一双监视着的眼睛。35

The “pair of eyes in supervision” is apparently none other than the “Tao of Heaven.” Bai Jiaxuan is not a man as wise as Mr. Zhu, but he has already known the “Tao of Heaven”! What, then, is this “Tao” on earth? Obviously, the narrator here identifies with this “Tao.” The wisdom of traditional Chinese agricultural 34 Ibid. 35 Chen Zhongshi, Bailuyuan, 489–490.

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society holds that “Nature does not change, nor does Tao” (天不变，道亦不变). Nevertheless, this eternally unaltered “Tao of Heaven” or “Heavenly Principle” has been bombarded and ruined by Western firearms since the late Qing, for what it corresponds with is the idea of the palingenesis of agricultural society, which is inconsistent with industrial civilization in accompaniment with modern capitalism’s new mode of production. 8

Historical Revisionism and New Historicist Fiction

When the author eulogizes the Venerable Zhu as an extraordinary prophet, it is undeniable that he not only identifies with the moral ideals of Confucianism for which Zhu stands but also empathizes more or less with the historical view which this character upholds. Therefore, the narrator frequently looks at modern history through the metaphors of the Venerable Zhu’s rhetoric such as “griddle (鏊子)” and “biting within the nest (窝里咬);” the author apparently delivers his feelings through the sighs uttered by the characters, “the best scholar” (namely Zhu), “the most righteous and benevolent clan chief” (namely Bai Jiaxuan) and “the last long-term loyal servant” (namely Lu San). This makes it hard for the author to deny that he himself is filled with pathos for what has passed away. Nevertheless, while the author takes advantage of the characters to convey his culturalist mentality, the idea itself is contradictory: he is unable to have a dialectical appreciation and organic representation of both the positive and negative side of the tradition of Chinese national culture. The author of White Deer Plain claims that he would like to narrate a “secret national history (民族的秘史).” Obviously, such a secret history would contrast with official history, but why is it secret? What happens to the official history? It is this question that connects this novel with China’s avant-garde fiction since the 1980s, particularly the New Historicist novels (新历史主义小 说). White Deer Plain shares quite a few of their conventions: the genre of this novel is hybridized, not being a single historical story, a story of revolutionary wars, or purely legendary and unofficial history, but a composition of them all. Critic Wu Huixiang has thus suggested that: The narrator shows different histories and family sagas with the method of bi-location. On one hand, he narrates the traditional culture including the family culture and its value system, namely the secret history, from the perspectives of the characters such as Bai Jiaxuan, Mr. Zhu and so on; on the other hand, from the perspective of the rebels of the clan such as Bai Ling, Lu Zhaopeng and so on, he narrates the history of the time

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and social revolution, which is a kind of explicit historical narrative. By the combination of the two narratives … the narrator accomplishes the disintegration and reintegration in a tension.36 However, in my view, it is better to say that the author has a split view of history than to argue that there are not two perspectives in the novel. He grafts his own perspective onto the revolutionaries and projects it onto the traditionallystyled characters. On the other hand, the reason why this novel is different from the other avant-garde stories of this time, which generally have superficial and casual attitudes toward revolution, is that the author’s social experiences have allowed him to obtain a better sense of history than other young writers. Nevertheless, although he is reluctant to playfully interpret history and unwilling to completely approve of the views that history is hard to tell, that truth is hard to obtain and that there is no justice in history, he still inadvertently accepts some tenets of the popular New Historicism. Consequently, he attaches much importance to the description of a secret history of sexual affairs, projects the ahistorical view of humanity onto the psychology and behaviors of characters in history, repudiates the analytical method of historical materialism, and creates characters with his concept of “cultural psychology.” Rather than being “novel”, the description of characters such as Bai Jiaxuan resembles that of family novels dating back to the years before 1949. While the Venerable Master Kao in Ba Jin’s (1904–2005) Family still stiffly prevents the young from engaging in free love, in Children of the Rich of the same period, Lu Ling (1923–1994) characterizes the image of the clan chief Jiang Jiesan as shouldering himself with traditional morality and full commitment to his children. A different method of historical narration only started after 1949, when the Marxist ideology of class struggle had changed the historical narrative to be one in which the peasants, under the guidance of the revolutionary political party, were united to resist the holy alliance of landlords, traditional family culture and the reactionary regime (one key example would be The Ancestry of the Red Flag [红旗谱]). Whereas, after the 1990s, influenced by the resuscitated historical view of liberalism, the picture of class struggle was replaced by the culturalist narrative in which the narration departs from social-political struggle and enters “daily life”, stretching into the so-called “national, cultural 36

Wu Huixiang 吴晖湘, “20 shiji jiazu xiaoshuo xushu fagshi de zhuanhua 20 世纪家族小 说叙述方式的转换 [The Transformation of the Narrative Mode of Family Novels in the Twentieth Century],” in Hunan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) 湖南大学学报（社会 科学版） [ Journal of Hunan University: Social Science Edition], Vo. 17, No. 6, 2003, 94.

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psychology,” such as we have in this novel. Consequently, there is no class consciousness or political struggle anymore; what remains is just a depoliticized struggle for power. Who, then, is the true narrator of the novel? He is not so much a folksy, conservative intellectual who sticks firmly to the stance of traditional Confucian values, as a humanistic intellectual who possesses bourgeois (as well as the traditional gentry’s) taste and upholds the intellectual legacy of conservatism under the influence of the revisionist New Historicism. Some critics note that, in the novel, “… the benevolence and humanism that it eulogizes is enveloped by the kind of aesthetic sentiment resembling that of modern, Western humanistic works …” whereas the “… love and hatred, affection and revenge of family struggle that it reflects carries the appreciation and sentiment of ancient, legendary novels or modern novels of secular affairs.”37 The reason why, besides all these features, the author seems to be still extraordinarily conservative is that he is deeply influenced by the theory of Confucian Revival. He does not reject the belief that palingenesis is ingrained in traditional Chinese culture. The worship of primitive reproduction, the portrayal of the rich regional culture and custom, and the rendition of the cultural characters concealing their class nature or even individuality, as shown in the novel, all serve this conservative consciousness of traditional mentality. The fact that the essentialized Chinese tradition is treated as the resource for rethinking modernity indicates that some Chinese intellectuals at the time had been repudiating the revolutionary idea of class struggle as being the driver of historical progress and aimed at a conservative, revisionist reinterpretation and reconstruction of modern history. 9

Conclusion

If we take modern Chinese history as an evolutionary progress of modernity, then it begins with subverting the feudalism premised on family rule to build a modern national state. White Deer Plain attempts to re-present the historical course of the early half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, although the narrative has already broken away from the dogmatic account of class struggle and narrated a more complicated historical reality—under the influence of the New Historicist thoughts brought in from the West as well as the local conservatism—history is re-interpreted as the “secret history” of restless violence and sexual affairs. It attempts to demonstrate that the antagonism 37

Chen Chuancai and Zhou Zhonghou, eds., Wentan xibei fengguoer, 12.

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between classes can be mediated by moral restraint and improved interpersonal relationships, especially by the benevolent spirit of Confucianism. The “national spirit and soul” is treated simply as the accumulation of several thousand years of Confucian culture, which brings out “… the certainty that this nation will definitely go through the course from decline to revival and rejuvenation,”38 a process not blessed by any modern system of values, including revolutionary ideology. Consequently, despite its many the differences from other New Historicist novels at the time —because of the author’s belief in the historical value of the modern revolution—by not heeding the political-economic as well as the social-historical causality behind the cultural myth, historical progress is shown to be discordant with traditional morality and its cultural deposits. Cast in this light, the New Historicist novels indeed “… emerges as a discourse that rebels against official History, manifesting a cyclical return to the traditional mode of the historical narrative characterized by a circular conception of temporality and the historical process …” and thus “… negates a temporal logic, i.e. linear irreversible time and the progressive view of history that this logic entails, which characterizes both the project of modernity and the discourse of revolution.”39 However, this discontent with modernity, or a form of postmodernity, is nothing more than a post-revolutionary disillusionment with the socialist historiography of class struggle, which breeds a post-socialist form of nihilism and agnosticism. To be sure, this is a symptom of the times and not simply the ideological confusion of the author. 38 39

Ibid., 196. Qingxin Lin, Brushing History Against the Grain, 3.

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part 3 From Post-Revolutionary Passion to Postmodern Consumerism

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Two Kinds of Bildungsroman: On the Avant-Garde Films of China’s Sixth-Generation Auteurs China’s “sixth-generation” directors are a group of film makers who graduated in the early and mid-1990s from colleges and began their professional career around that time. They all aspired to be auteurs, yet China’s official film-making institutions at that time still retained a large extent of rigidity and refused to confer the mission of making official (and propagandist-oriented) productions on these newly-graduated students. Thus, these directors had to find financial resources through personal connections, often through overseas channels by sending their independently-made works to Western film festivals. Since they cast their camera on a transitional and transformative Chinese society and focused faithfully on marginal figures—usually those outcasts repudiated by mainstream society—their movies could not get public release; nevertheless, they won acclaim from Western critics, who valued their products as films that were “avant-garde” or “independent.”1 Nevertheless, not all members of this group of directors worked outside the official system; especially since the mid-1990s, after the state reshuffled institutions in the wake of market reform and allowed foreign capital to enter the field of co-production, most of these directors have been willingly “co-opted” by the state. In the meantime, what is often neglected by most critics is that, although the subject matter of their products was often bypassed by the state’s studios and they more or less maintained distance from the state’s officiallychanted ideological discourse, there was a certain idealistic undercurrent which remained faithful to the socialist ideal, at least in the early stage of their efforts. This could be witnessed in two films—Dirt (1992) and The Making of Steel (1997)—which were produced by two directors generally taken to be that kind of auteur and which got public distribution. This knowledge not only gives us more information on the plural dimensions of sixth-generation artists, but also informs us of China’s peculiar cultural conditions in the 1990s.

1 For more information about the sixth-generation auteurs and their works, see my two monographs: Ideology and Utopia in China’s New Wave Cinema: Globalization and Its Chinese Discontents (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Postsocialist Conditions: Ideas and History in China’s “Independent Cinema”, 1988–2008 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_007

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Both of these two movies explored “… the imaginary spaces, created and occupied by disaffected young male Bohemians in Beijing in the 1990s.”2 Dirt is regarded as one that addresses “… issues such as alienation, nostalgia, and rebellion …” which are “… symptomatic of this generation’s existential crisis.”3 Similarly, The Making of Steel has been praised as “… a highly intriguing look at a young man’s search for identity and the erosion of his childhood dreams and beliefs in contempo, semi-capitalist China;”4 however, the director claims that he wishes to express a sort of “… nostalgia for the past and indulgence in the future …” as well as “… a lingering sense of idealism and sentimentality …” which is unique to his generation.5 Since they have differing representations of the historical experience of the urban and the young as well as the prospects for the nation, a comparative reading of the two movies would enrich our knowledge of the commonality and differences within this group of auteurs and inform us of the multiple possibilities for China in the transformative epoch. Meanwhile, it has been noted that fashionable “… rock’n’roll music, by the late 1980s, had also become something that could not be separated in an artistic work delineating the life of the country’s urban youth …”; in essence, “Chinese rock music and the burgeoning youth culture interact actively in two respects, i.e., rebellion and authenticity.”6 Despite their very differing attitudes to it, both movies embrace this cutting-edge music, which was enjoyed by the youth of the time. Thus, the two films could be read as stories of the generational vanguard, which then offer “… an entry point to explore this new generation’s formative years in the mid-1990s.”7 1

Dirt (1992): A Bildungsroman of Youth in the Early 1990s

Almost unanimously, people who have watched Guan Hu’s Dirt (头发乱 了) agree that it is an “art film” characterized by adolescent confusion. Some 2 Stephanie Hemelrik Donald, Public Secret, Public Spaces—Cinema and Civility in China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 107. 3 Yingjin Zhang, “Rebel without a Cause? China’s New Urban Generation and Postsocialist Filmmaking,” The Urban Generation: Chinese Cinema and Society at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century, edited by Zhang Zhen (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007), 49. 4 Derek Elley, “Review: ‘The Making of Steel’,” Variety, August 3, 1998. http://variety.com/1998/ film/reviews/the-making-of-steel-1200454803/. Accessed July 2, 2016. 5 Han Xiaolei 韩小磊, “Dui diwudai de wenhua tuwei 对第五代的文化突围,” Dianying yishu 电影艺术 [Film Art], 61. 6 Ibid. 7 Yingjin Zhang, “Rebel without a Cause?” 49.

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believe that, because it is too close to 1989—when youngsters were dispirited and confused—the soundtrack here is accordingly noisy and unsettling, mirroring the youngsters’ innermost feelings at that time.8 Full of the spirit of rebellion that revealed the antagonism between individuals and institutions, as well as individuals’ alienated feelings towards mainstream society, it was banned for three years in China but received prizes abroad and won the Artistic Innovation Award in the first Beijing College Student Film Festival in 1992. It is filled with exploratory passion in content and form; for many audiences, even for many ordinary audiences, it merely gives an indistinct and unclear feeling, whereas its theme and motif are very ambiguous.9 The director Guan Hu 管虎, born in Beijing in 1961, was a graduate of the directorial department of the Beijing Film Academy in 1991. Compared to other sixth-generation film directors, he was more fortunate: when his classmates were still assistant directors, he began to show his talent in Chinese and foreign film festivals with this debut. Generally speaking, the first film made by Chinese independent directors often features a rich autobiographical flavor: by integrating the life experience of the director himself and people around him, the movie becomes a microcosm of the changing society. Dirt, vicariously showing the changing destiny of the country by portraying the growing-up stories of five youths, is apparently one of the best specimens of this kind. At first sight, the film seems to be expressing feelings of confusion and rebellion in youth, just like many early independent films at the time; nevertheless, a close examination will disclose an entirely different concern. The difference lies in its demonstration of the commonality between the youths’ exuberant libido and the spiritual circumstance of the era, between the young characters’ existential angst and the existing socialist tradition. This conveys the real thematic motif: the destination of these robust youngsters and their undecided future is open to all possibilities. The undetermined scenario nevertheless harbors an optimistic tone. In this way, the movie is meant to orchestrate an ethnographical account of the newly-reformed nation-state with a revelation of the youths’ passionate spiritual state by representing their unbridled generational adventure.

8 See the comment of a netizen named “Dreamer”, “Qishi zhe bushi yibu henqian de dianying 其实这不是一部很浅的电影 [In fact it isn’t a shallow movie],” http://movie.douban.com/ review/3235853/. Accessed July 3, 2016. 9 See the comment of a netizen named Niba 泥巴, “Xiang jimao yiyang fei de toufa 像鸡毛 一样飞的头发 [The Hair Flying Like a Chicken’s Feather],” http://movie.douban.com/ review/1160892/. Accessed July 3, 2016.

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Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: A full screen of Chairman Mao’s famed quotation “The World Belongs to You”

1.1 Desire and the Yearning for Liberty The film starts with a series of quick montage flashes of the old days, with a full screen shot of Chairman Mao’s famed quotation in the high revolutionary days of the 1960s: “The world belongs to you as well as to us; but ultimately it is yours. You youngsters are like the rising sun between 8 and 9 in the morning. Hope is placed onto your shoulders.” We then see a group of pupils having fun in a big house listening to a gramophone broadcasting the Beatles’ song “Hey Jude.” It then follows with a young girl, the heroine of the movie named Ye Tong, walking toward us with a guitar on her back; then her voice-over tells us these children’s background: “We five have been bosom friends since childhood and all lived in this Hutong.” A sentiment of narcissism is thus formed: “Fragments of her childhood memory crosscut with glimpses of the modern cityscape, and the Beatles soundtrack intensifies her melancholy …” in “… an MTV-like fashion.”10 From her narration, we learn that she went to Guangzhou because of the persecution of her father in the Cultural Revolution, where she lived for more than ten years until the late 1980s, when she was admitted to a medical college in Beijing. The story unfolds from then.

10

Yingjin Zhang, “Rebel without a Cause?” 56.

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Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: Ye Tong returns to Beijing.

Ye Tong soon becomes romantically entangled with two men who were her childhood best friends, though with seemingly opposite personalities. She is attracted to the rock singer Peng Wei by his free and easy manner as well as his unruliness. With her friends’ assistance, she also manages to find a rehearsal studio for the band that Peng leads. The strict life in medical college makes her yearn for a free and uninhibited life like Peng Wei’s; she thus seeks consolation in music. Utterly fatigued and stressed when a big fire burns the studio, she falls into Peng’s arms. However, the smile leaves her face when she finds that Peng has been unfaithful to her all through their dating. Soon after, Peng dismisses the band and goes south alone. Peng is on the social margins and is rarely restrained by moral codes; yet Zheng Weidong, Ye Tong’s other best friend, who takes over his father’s job as a policeman, is an orthodox man (his name literally means “defending Mao”, a popular name for those born in the 1960s). He and Chi Xuan (now a small private businessman) welcome Ye Tong with the familiar sounds of whistling. Weidong restrains his love for Ye and safeguards her silently. When he perceives the dubious relationship between Ye and Peng, he informs her that Peng once made a girl pregnant and she died in childbirth. After a sharp conflict with Peng, he confesses his love to Ye Tong. In that moment, Lei Bing, who is also their childhood friend yet now a fugitive, appears. Fearing that Lei might hurt Ye, Weidong tries to arrest him; in the fight, Lei stabs and wounds Weidong, while Lei himself accidentally falls down a road bridge and dies. When Ye

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Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: A middle shot of Peng Wei in performance

Tong and Weidong leave the hospital at night, they consummate their love at Ye’s house. All these young men feel affection for Ye Tong yet express it differently. Peng boldly shows his desire, whereas Weidong conceals his love deeply in his mind and Lei releases his envy of Weidong. Is this desire sheer physiological impulse or does it have some spiritual significance? As youthful passion, it could be taken as an integral part of an inner drive that is not satisfied with the status quo but longs for the liberty of the human spirit and energy. It is overflowing with the youthful enthusiasm and impulse particular to that era, which is reflected in a series of montage sequences: a group of college students are dancing on square around a bonfire in night; the scene then cuts to a performer who is reciting poems themed with eulogies of youth and motherland; the passion of their age is also displayed in the rock scenes that appear throughout the film. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw rock music spread and prosper in China. Young people in that period were particularly enthusiastic about this musical form born of a rebellious spirit. The film has four excerpts from three rock songs played by one of the most popular bands at the time. The first one is entitled “Chen Sheng, Wu Guang”—literally the names of two renowned leaders of peasant revolts in the Qin dynasty (221 BC–207 BC)—which is sung by Peng Wei. A middle shot shows his flying hair; the lyrics are brimming with violent imagery:

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Crying loudly for your standing up; Preserve your life by clinging the knife; Blood splattered on my body; I fail to distinguish between hate and death; Treading on me, releasing souls from suffering purgatory to heaven. 呼喊你快给我站起来， 抓紧这刀你的生命仍在， 鲜血溅在我身上， 分不清什么是仇恨与死亡， 踏着我超度去天堂

These lyrics illustrate the wanton abreaction of Peng Wei’s adolescent libido; while the following sentences such as “… the crowd are dispersed / only I am crying loudly / no more tears / the sky would never be blue again / follow me / let my flag fly up high (人群驱散／只有我一人还在高声喊／泪水流干／天 空从此不再湛蓝／跟我来／让我的旗帜飞起来)” are not only reminiscent of the chaotic, heated political events of late 1980s but are also filled with the heroic drive imparted by the heightened individualism of the time. However, rock songs—an irrational musical form in which anarchism thrives—are not always a positive symbol here. Their personification, Peng Wei, is not only despised by Weidong but also deserted by others, as society at that time still generally maintained a socialist aesthetic disposition and thus could not appreciate its sense of alienation and Westernized style of artistic expression.11 Peng also feels self-abandoned; he once confesses to Ye Tong that, “Weidong is right, you don’t know how terrible I am!” Although his enthusiasm for music is commendable, it is a way of escaping from reality: when the studio accidentally burns down (which signifies the destruction of their spiritual manor and shelter of escape from reality, and also implies that their disordered life only leads to self-destruction), he has to wrap up and wander south alone. Although these best friends diverge in their life trajectories after they grow up, they are still aristocrats in their spiritual world, which is revealed in several incidents. Ye Tong once says that she returned to Beijing because it is too boring to stay in Guangzhou; when she knows that Peng has sexual relationships 11

Thus, critic Yingjin Zhang finds that “The recurring image of an uncomprehending crowd of neighbors outside the band’s rehearsal site … constantly reminds the rock band of their alienation and isolation as a result of public disapproval.” Yingjin Zhang, “Rebel without a Cause,” 61–62.

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with cheap women only for his sexual urges, she feels disgrace for him; when she notes a music tape of Aaron Kwok (a famed popular singer from Hong Kong) in Peng’s room, she disdainfully interrogates him: “You listen to this [low music]?” Peng looks very embarrassed: “It’s hers [namely his girlfriend’s]” and throws the tape away. Hong Kong was admired by many Chinese at the time for its material prosperity, yet to these heroes, it is merely a place overflowing with money and vulgar taste without a refined culture. By contrast, what they are looking for is the meaning of life or for spiritual value. What, then, is this value? 1.2 Tradition and the Post-Revolutionary Era To these youths, whichever life they choose (or have no choice in, but must to adapt to, changed circumstances), they are trying to find the meaning of life when the authoritative ideology—the socialist ideal—has lost its dominant status, rendering them morally confused and spiritually dispirited. Ye Tong one time unplugs the breathing tube of a patient who lives senselessly like a zombie and shows nonchalance when her practice is exposed. The act itself implies that she feels it would be better to die when the world is no longer meaningful. To be sure, this episode shows the impingement of Existentialist philosophy in the mid-1980s when many young Chinese read Sartre’s Being and Nothingness and Heidegger’s Being and Time. This insistence on the right of personal choice is also shown in the changed custom of marriage: Weidong’s sister Weiping, who works for a foreign company, gets divorced not long after her wedding and raises the child alone, which was not unusual at that time as society became more tolerant of freer life-styles. Later on, she also resigns from the company when she feels repressed and becomes a self-employed small business woman. In this spiritual seeking, various characters make their personal choices. Weidong takes over his father’s job as a dutiful policeman, which implies that he inherits the ethical-moral code of his father’s generation. He displays uprightness and follows the law, even bringing his childhood friend Lei Bing to justice. Ye Tong’s narrative voice also informs the audience that Chi Xuan, timid and weak in childhood, marches into the business world as a small trader in the early stage of reform. Peng Wei, as a wandering artist, has his own way of life which seeks true love in roaming and art—this makes his casual behavior look not so disgusting. However, Lei Bing used to dream of being a PLA soldier; Ye Tong also tells us this very early, so how does he degenerate? How do these childhood friends become separate and diverge from their similar road to ones of no-return? The audience witnesses that, initially, it was the persecution of Ye Tong’s father that forced these young people to separate, which is shown at the very

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start of the movie in a series of montage sequences; with Ye Tong’s narrative voice, we learn that her father and she had to move from the capital to the south, which meant that they left the center where ideology is highly unified to a marginal/border area. Their fortunes diverged from then on and the differentiation in their life trajectories is displayed when they come together ten years on. They have now become a small trader, an employee of foreign company, a self-employed private businessman, a civil servant and an unemployed scamp, respectively. The differentiation of society becomes increasingly intense, except for college students confined to the ivory tower who still sing, dance and chant passionately. Weiping feels tired all the time, revealing that members of the white-collar class working in joint ventures are also bread winners subject to exploitation. Rock music expresses young people’s dissatisfaction: they do not know how to vent their passion which, under the impingement of Western hedonism, often leads to sexual indulgence. This is a post-revolutionary era where the unified (socialist) ideology has disintegrated. The end of the autocratic system and the beginning of liberalization have their liberating effects but also bring on a series of social and spiritual diseases. Nevertheless, traditional socialist ideology has not yet completely lost its aura, shown in the relationship between fathers and sons. It is indistinct yet appears throughout the film. Weidong’s father, a skilled, older revolutionary, is confined to a wheelchair and cannot move freely, indicating that he is worn out with age and powerlessness. While he seems to be deaf and blind, a few scenes imply that he actually just pretends to be ignorant: when sensitive words are raised in the discussion of the protagonists, he turns his head to them and appears very concerned.12 Several other scenes featuring two minor characters are also noteworthy. The literary federation’s older male leader and a granny of a neighborhood committee, who at the time are often sarcastically portrayed in literary works as “old lefties”, appear not unreasonable here, although still inflexible in manner. Initially finding rock music wearisome, they nevertheless gradually become interested in it, especially when Ye Tong sings the lyric Red Kite and expresses longing for a hopeful future. They are shown attentively listening. The young generation also maintains their respect for the generation of their fathers. A particular scene is arranged in this regard. In a room, they are watching a documentary showing the public funeral of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (1894–1976); the clips show the masses along Chang’an Avenue cast in 12

For instance, when he hears that Weidong says to Ye Tong: “Don’t make me worry about you,” he asks as an aside: “What?”; he also knows that the young ones do not tell him the truth and he laughs at himself: “Now I am old and become your burden.”

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Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: Ye Tong, Weidong and Weidong’s father

gloom and engulfed in sorrow. The camera then cuts to Peng Wei and Weiping, who appear entranced. The seemingly casual shots in other places also show the official portrait of Zhou Enlai hanging on the wall. When Ye Tong and Weidong make love, there deliberately appears a shot of Chairman Mao’s official portrait. Regarding these scenes that cross-cut between personal, intimate scenes and the (once) beloved revolutionary leaders, critic Yingjin Zhang feels confused and contends that the sequence is a “… mixture of unsettling feelings of contradiction, bewilderment, and irony.”13 Yet this deliberately orchestrated filming indicates none other than the fact that these youngsters are a generation brought up under the red banner. Their rebellion against the rigid system shows the youthful impulse of adventure and entrepreneurship, which is, however, not alien to socialist ideology. Even the rocker Peng Wei, deemed as most rebellious, is similar. Only in this light could we understand the meaning of the rock lyric, “You were my only love / I feel sad only when I already lost you / When the window is opened, what tomorrow will be? / My heart beats as usual /yearning for passion overflown” (你曾是我唯一的爱／失去 后才知悲哀／推开窗明天会怎样／我的心跳如同以往／渴望着热血沸腾 ). The expression of sorrow for “lost love” is the last salute to the political ideal of the revolutionary years, the feelings of which were still shared then by the 13

Yingjin Zhang, “Rebel without a Cause?” 58.

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general populace. Although “what tomorrow would be” is unknown, what is unchanged is the youthful passion and socialist-tinged idealism. Therefore, when this idealism faces the dichotomy between the materialist interests epitomized by Guangdong (from which Ye now comes) or Shenzhen (where Peng Wei is going to roam) and the spiritual home symbolized by Beijing which is, however, pending demolition at the end of the movie, it is not ambiguous as to which side is superior. This is a post-revolutionary era when secular happiness is openly pursued, yet not a (completely) post-socialist era that repudiates socialism. Secularization does not yet mean “money first” but demands a deeper development in spirit to pursue more space, possibility and opportunity in unknown lands. 1.3 An Ethnographic Account of Early Reform China So far, we have seen that there are many motifs present, such as desire, the relationship between two generations, the meaning of life, the problematic relationship between the modern and traditional, and the new ethic of a postrevolutionary secular society. How could we tie these together? What is the general theme of the movie? This question could be changed to another: who is/are the “protagonist(s) of the film? The most significant characters in this film are certainly Weidong and Ye Tong. Weidong has a deep love for Ye Tong. Although he does not fully appreciate her pursuit of music, he is tolerant of and even supports her. When the studio is burning, he runs into the house and picks up Ye’s guitar, which is her spiritual sustenance. At the end of the film, he boldly fights with a scoundrel who tries to insult Ye and is badly wounded. When Ye is departing once more, he sees Ye off in his wheelchair, which seems to imply that he has lost his capacity for action, just like his father. However, since he will soon recuperate, the audience expects a favorable future for him and a reunion with Ye Tong. Nevertheless, the most notable character in the film is still Ye Tong. The story is mainly narrated from her perspective and follows her narrative voice. In all, the whole diegetic space is about her experience of several months in Beijing. She is bored with the homogenized life of materialist Guangzhou and returns to Beijing, where there are profound cultural deposits. On the other hand, as a passionate woman, she does not live a chaste life and is keen on new things. However, she also cherishes the socialist tradition in a certain way. She is serious about love and gives her love and virginity to Weidong; her final choice is to drop out of school (which implies her separation from the official system) and to travel on an unknown road (similar to Peng Wei). In the movie’s last scene, she receives the blessing of her childhood friends, who gather to send her off.

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figure 10 Dirt (Toufa Luanle, 头发乱了), 1992: Ye Tong sings the song “Red Kite”.

As the object of these men’s desire, is Ye Tong the incarnation of desire? Or is she the incarnation of purity and symbol of vitality? By all accounts, the film takes her as the cardinal character, which “… foregrounds the female consciousness and thus distances itself from the type of male narcissism— sometimes even misogyny—typical of the all-male Sixth Generation.”14 On the other hand, although the director “… depicts his female lead as the ‘other’ against whom male characters negotiate their social, sexual, and ‘aesthetic’ identities …”15 this does not necessarily imply a negative connotation. Instead, since she is the only female in the film and the object of desire, she is not only the symbol of the “new people” raised up in the era of reform and opening-up, but also stands for the object of the youth at that time. From this perspective, the movie can be appreciated as an ethnographical account of the youthful generation in a transitional period. Since the consummation of love between Weidong and Ye Tong could be deemed as the ritual of their adulthood, are they really of age when the film finishes? When the movie approaches the end, the death of Weidong’s father indicates the inevitable vanishing of the traditional (read “socialist”) world; the youngsters, cherishing childhood memory as their spiritual sustenance, are continuously looking for the meaning of life in adventure. In this light, although they come to age physiologically, they are psychologically not mature enough. But this is not their fault: they are in their twenties. Possibilities 14 15

Yingjin Zhang, “Rebel without a Cause?” 56. Ibid., 56. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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abound for their future. What is more, when Weidong and Chi Xuan are sending off Ye Tong, a group of pupils walk across the street singing the “Song of the Chinese Young Pioneers” and wave a greeting to the protagonists, with the lyrics “… to carry forward the revolutionary tradition …” particularly loud enough to be heard; the implication of this is more than clear. In the meantime, class stratification has gradually taken shape, making childhood friends antagonistic toward each other. In the movie, this happens because of the insufficiency of material life, such as the pressure of employment, which pushes Lei Bing into a life of delinquency after he fails to realize his childhood dream of becoming a member of the heroic PLA. The movie thus shows that “contradictions among the people” (人民内部矛盾) evolve into ones “between ourselves and the enemy” (敌我矛盾); it is also hard to unify people’s minds as life styles tend to be pluralized. Consequently, the once homogeneous group becomes differentiated. We might wonder whether these characters are a generation of confusion and blindness. The Chinese title of the film literally means (their) “hairs are ruffled,” which implies that they are no longer dogmatic or staying on the rails; instead, they dare adventure in the brave, new world so as to satisfy their desire. Nevertheless, their passion for rebellion still needs an objective. Although the two “new people” ultimately consummate their love, they are yet to be the same in spirit: Ye Tong is looking for a higher level, both spiritually and physically. What should be acknowledged is that it is not necessarily a bad thing to find no fixed answer in the moment. “To wade across the stream by groping the way,” a famed dictum stipulated by supreme leader Deng Xiaoping at the time, referred to the exploration of unknown terrain in reform and was historically rational. Thus, these youngsters’ passionate life and desire is worthy of appreciation. It is a time of self-enlightenment; in this regard, as critic Xudong Zhang aptly remarks, The ultimate definition of Enlightenment is that it is both development and autognosis; it is external as well as internal. If someone spends his/ her youth with this spiritual intensity, then he/she could say that his/her most barren, painful, ambiguous, uncertain and helpless time is also his “most glorious time for growth.” This state in which “although you do not know where to go, you are filled with brightness in heart” corresponds to a superior attitude toward life.16 16 Zhang Xudong 张旭东, “ ‘Qimeng’ de jingshen xianxiangxue “启蒙”的精神现象学 [The Spiritual Phenomenology of the Enlightenment],” Kaifang shidai 开放时代 [Open Times], No. 3, 2008, 162. Translation mine. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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In light of this knowledge, we might argue that, by showing the spiritual tensions and conflicts of a group of youths living in early 1990s, the film ultimately reveals the transitional nature, uncertainty and contradiction of the early reform and opening-up era. Ye Tong’s journey of return ends earlier than she expected and she leaves Beijing, which could be taken as another beginning of wandering toward an uncertain destination. She might go back to Guangzhou, which means that she would trudge again through an alien place. Nevertheless, having acquired strength and encouragement, she is blessed by her old buddies to adventure again in a foreign world. A non-alien world can only be sought by wading across an alien one. Just as the lyric sung by Ye Tong (and Peng Wei), “traversing the rainbow in my heart” (穿越我心中的彩虹) implies, men and women can conquer themselves only through trudging and striving in an unfamiliar world in order to realize their dreams. During their striving, these youngsters also pay attention to the next generation, as the rock lyrics implies, “I follow the tired crowd home / And search for the path I lost yesterday / Watch the child smiling / I want to fly kites with them /And let the strings soar high (跟着疲惫回家的人群／寻找昨日走过的 脚步／看大地上孩子的笑容／我想和那孩子一起放风筝／绕动心中缠绕的 线绳).” They are fighting for themselves, but they are also striving for a better

life for the next generation. In the montage sequence at the end, we witness Weiping giving birth to a child and the group of primary school students walking across the street singing the Team Song: although the future is still uncertain, a young China with robust vitality and youthful passion is beyond doubt. Similar scenes are commonly witnessed in some other sixth-generation films of this period, such as Beijing Bastard (1993).17 Over ten years later, the actor playing Weidong admits that both his performances and the directing skill of the director “… were very immature at that time;” nevertheless, they “… had really sincere emotions … because it was a time when everyone was anxious to express himself.”18 It is the era that endowed the young director, then at most 25, with the chance to deal with such a serious subject and with the enthusiasm to produce it. There are some ambiguous sentiments there, which could be understood because the director also acknowledges that they were experiencing “moments of crisis” at the time; and critic Yingjin Zhang has pointed out that “… back in 17 For analysis of the similar scene in Beijing Bastard, see Wang Xiaoping, Ideology and Utopia in China’s New Wave Cinema: Globalization and Its Chinese Discontents (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 41–42. 18 See “Zhang Jiayin3Di liudai daoyan Guanh Hu 张嘉译3 第六代导演管虎 [Zhang Jiayi 3: Guan Hu, the 6th-generation Director],” Hebei qingnianbao 河北青年报 [Hebei Youth Daily], June 13, 2007.

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the early 1990s, the images of public mourning in Tiananmen Square could not help but evoke the publicly unspeakable moments of idealism and crisis of 1989 Tiananmen.”19 Shooting the film in the shadow of the 1989 crackdown, which symbolized the severance between the authoritarian regime and the people, the director pays his last tribute to youthful idealism with melancholy. On the other hand, by narrating the experience of the youngsters in the decade of early reform, it offers both a realistic and symbolic ethnography of the nation; in this light, the filmic narrative becomes a social-historical phenomenology of the social-spiritual impulse of China in the early reform era. 2

The Making of Steel (1997): Why Could the Steel Not Be Successfully Made?

Like Dirt, The Making of Steel (长大成人) is also a director’s debut. Born in Beijing, Lu Xuechang 路学长 (1964–2014) was admitted into the prestigious Director’s Department of the Beijing Film Academy in 1984. In September 1990, he began working as a director at the Beijing Film Studio and remained in the system throughout. Completed in 1995, The Making of Steel nevertheless suffered two years of censorship. It was finally released at the end of 1997. Once it came out, it immediately shocked audiences and critics, and won unreserved acclaim as a classic. The film is divided into two parts, essentially narrating a coming-of-age story of a young musician, with the diegetic space running from late 1970s to early 1990s. Derek Elley finds that its “… elliptical structure …” looks “… like a reverie for lost innocence.”20 While it presents the boy’s adolescent experiences, it also captures the spirit of an era and the remarkable transformation taking place at that time. How does it organically combine the two narrative threads into one? 2.1 A Socialist Hero and His Symbolic Death The original name of the film was “How the Steel was Tempered”, the same as a novel written in the Soviet Union by Nikolai Ostrovsky (1904–1936) and originally published in the 1930s. It was a socialist realistic classic popular and widely read in Mao-era China.21 This novel is about the birth of a socialist “new man” and focuses on the experience of a young boiler worker, Pavel Korchagin, 19 Yingjing Zhang, “Rebel without a Cause?” 59. 20 Ibid. 21 Nikolai Ostrovsky, How the Steel was Tempered, trans. R. Prokofieva (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959).

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figure 11 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhu Helai reads a lot at night.

who, through overcoming a series of hardships, eventually leaves his bourgeois lover Tonia, develops his iron-like will and becomes a revolutionary hero. In the novel, Paul meets Zhukhrai (in Chinese it is translated as Zhu Helai), a tough revolutionary soldier and a senior Bolshevik who mentors him along his journey. Like the novel, there is also a character in the film named Zhu Helai. However, this name is only said by the protagonist Zhou Qing, whereas the character’s real name is unknown. Zhu’s first appearance establishes him as a model proletarian elder brother: he fights against injustice by standing up for the boiler room worker Zhou Qing and teaches the lazy and overbearing “bureaucrat” a lesson.22 In the Soviet novel, Zhukrai teaches Pavel British boxing skills, which Pavel uses to beat an evil fellow after being provoked. In this film, the Chinese Zhu Helai lends Zhou Qing the novel, which helps Zhu leave behind his adolescent enchantment with his “Tonia” and identify himself with the heroic Pavel. During this process, Zhou Qing sees the incarnation of Zhukrai’s spirit in this worker Zhu Helai, who appears to be a model socialist undertaking his duties.

22

The dress of the callous, domineering superior makes him look much like that of a typical despotic landlord in Chinese revolutionary literature and films. In contrast, Zhu Helai’s appearance reminds us of model revolutionary soldiers found in the same works.

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Zhu offers Zhou many valuable life-lessons, such as not drinking alcohol when working, not being motivated by money and not being tempted by women but being faithful to his beloved.23 In addition, Zhu also generously lends money to Zhou Qing when the latter faces an emergency. The film also implies that he is concerned about the political situation of the country, which is shown in a close-up that reveals him reading and pondering when smoking at night, apparently a deliberate portrait of an intellectual-like figure. Moreover, Zhu is altruistic: after Zhou Qing accidentally falls and is wounded, he takes his own bone and implants it into Zhou’s leg; the metaphoric connotation here is unambiguous. Whence does Zhu Helai’s socialist morality and spirit arise? Since the film unfolds from Zhou Qing’s perspective and is mainly narrated by his off-screen voice-over, the question remains unanswered. In addition to Zhu’s collection of socialist red classics, the audience only learns from Zhou’s voice that Zhu comes from the generation of the Red Guards. Therefore, his being an idealist and having a strong air of an orthodox revolutionary hero probably comes from his baptism in the revolutionary ideals of the older generation. Zhu is a leftover of a bygone era, with the spirit of past times. Zhou is unable to comprehend Zhu’s revolutionary ideals because he lives in a different age. When Zhou leaves the hospital, he learns that Zhu has passed the college entrance exam and has left for college. Although it is difficult for us to know why Zhu does not leave any message to Zhou, metaphorically speaking, Zhu’s prolonged disappearance indicates that the new era treats him coldly, or that his altruistic, socialist beliefs and behaviors are already obsolete. Indeed, this noble character faces great adversity in the new market society. After a long separation, Zhou is finally informed that Zhu is badly beaten and got his eyes stabbed by thugs because he once again courageously attempts to help an actress who is being raped; however, Zhu’s wife, once his comrade-in-arms, leaves Zhu because of the incident. Zhu’s blindness signifies that he has been castrated by the lawless and money-worshiping “nouveau rich”. There is no place for people like him in this merciless world. 2.2 A Romantic Youth and His Obstructed Growth Although Zhou Qing’s departure, introduced at the very beginning of the movie, indicates that his revolt against his high-handed family is symbolically a resistance to conventional cultural norms, his anarchistic impulse also falls short of a rational reason, which foreshadows his quest for a spiritual father. Before he meets Zhu (which comprises the first 20 minutes of the film), he 23

Zhou Qing finds a picture of Zhu Helai’s sweetheart in the book Steel.

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figure 12 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhou Qing dreams of being a hero with strong willpower.

develops affection for his classmate Fu Shaoying, who nevertheless dates a Don Juan-esque character, Ji Wen. Catching the tide of economic reform, Ji Wen organizes a band to earn quick money. However, the band’s equipment is damaged by his rival in love, and Zhou is beaten and injured in the incident; yet Ji Wen refuses to pay for his medical bills. Zhou has attempted to fight against this injustice, yet when the time really comes, he becomes panicstricken, which thus gives Ji Wen a chance to retaliate and Zhou flees gloomily. It is Zhu Helai as well as the book he brings, How the Steel was Tempered, that eventually inspires Zhou and helps to set a model for him to live up to. Zhou begins to emulate Pavel and, implicitly, Zhu, who take matters into their own hands. However, this is brief in duration, for after he is unexpectedly wounded, he loses the opportunity to continue improving himself by studying from Zhu, because the latter unexpectedly leaves when he is hospitalized. Consequently, Zhou loses his guide and is thrown into the cruel world. He once sighed to himself when he reminisces over past experience, “Sometimes, I feel so regretful that Zhu has vanished from my life; if only I had a little bit more time to spend with Zhu, I would possibly be someone like him.” He misses this spiritual mentor and never finds the opportunity to learn the import of Zhu’s persona. In other words, what Zhu has taught him so far is merely to be a “man”, a fashionable image out of the popular humanist discourse of “being a man” in 1980s China (the film’s present Chinese title literally means “Growing to Manhood”).

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figure 13 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhou Qing visits Ji Wen after returning to China.

Zhou, however, never acquires the intellectual significance of this tough, altruistic hero. Consequently, what Zhou needs now is to find his own way through this sinister world of Social Darwinism. The movie then turns to Zhou Qing in his adulthood, who has not yet found a place in society. A series of montage sequences appear, and his voice-over tells us his experience in the period. In the mid-1980s, after failing the college entrance exam, he went to Berlin to study music; towards the end of the decade, he returned to Beijing. When he is sitting in a taxicab touring the city, his voice informs the audience that he realizes that in the past four or five years, things have fundamentally changed. Blocks of skyscrapers have been built and the crowds are eagerly in pursuit of their material interests, caring nothing for spiritual values. He thus feels a sense of unfamiliarity—everything is just not the same as before. His voice continues, “My father spends all his time in the hairdresser now; my musician friends have sunk into a tightly-knit and oppressed community smoking cocaine; the girl I used to have a crush on (namely Fu Shaoying) is now the mistress of a married man (namely Ji Wen); and those rich but ignorant Hong Kong ‘country bumpkins’ have dominated the cultural market.” As in Dirt, Hong Kong is regarded by these youths as a rich but vulgar place. Since he has been away and lived in a foreign land for several years, he has not fundamentally transformed and thus feels uneasy in this new, cynical world. The fact itself hints that there was a gigantic event taking place in the late eighties (the subtext of which is the 1989 crackdown in

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figure 14 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Fu Shaoying satirizes Zhou Qing.

Beijing) which destroyed the youthful idealism. As a conscientious and persistent idealist, Zhou seems to have lost touch with his generation and is out of sync with the time: he is aloof and proud (refusing to snort cocaine with his pal and partake in the meaningless performance art), kindhearted (saving the young girl who becomes intoxicated and who cannot wake up in the bar) and he has a sense of righteousness (alerting the police, which leads to the arrest of the drug-fueled band mates). However, he is still just an ordinary and isolated person. How can he make a difference in such a society? He is at a loss and does not how to react to what he is confronted with. In a post-revolutionary society, if even someone like Zhu can be wiped out, then what will happen to Zhou, whose ethical-moral world is not firmly developed and who has no sense of power? When he turns to Ji Wen with his bloody hands for a solution, Ji Wen, who has just come out of the toilet, lifts up his pants and says to Zhou pejoratively, “You are not different from all those assholes in the street just like me. Make do with what you have in life!” In response to this, Zhou has nothing to say but appears utterly speechless. He is also sneered at by the money-mad Fu Shaoying, who is now selling her body to anyone who comes to her. A particular scene shows that she also satirizes Zhou, “Don’t think you are somebody! [Or, don’t consider yourself a hero!]” Moreover, Zhou himself is not immune to the carnal pleasure in which the whole society seems now to be immersed. No matter whether or

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not he has body contact with the girl whom he assists in the bar (the movie is ambiguous about this matter), it is apparent that he has forcible relations with Fu Shaoying, because the next scene shows that when the girl whom he has assisted smells the scent from his body, she refuses to let him enter the room. In this light, the allegedly changed finale does not undermine the director’s intended critique. Zhou Qing, whose self-dignity and self-esteem have experienced multiple drawbacks, incidentally learns from the newspaper of his early mentor Zhu’s untimely misfortune and runs into Zhu’s ex-wife, who has just remarried. Abetted by her, he decides to find out the culprit responsible for harming Zhu. However, whether he has the nerve to avenge his mentor is moot: the film provides us with two likely scenarios. In the first, the film changes its hue to imply that what follows is merely Zhou’s hallucination, in which he kills the ruffian, who is a hotel manager, with his hands. In the second, having explained to the audience that “As a matter of fact, this is just a daydream,” his off-screen voice continues to tell us that the hotel manager is confirmed as the culprit and “… naturally cannot escape the punishment of the law.” Regardless of whether this ending is an arrangement due to censorship or not, even in the first imaginary scene, Zhou holds up both of his arms, which implies that he surrenders himself to the law. Therefore, in terms of the theme of the movie about finding one’s spiritual master to mature intellectually, it is apparent that Zhou never becomes mature enough to be a Zhu Helai, or a Pavel; instead, he must daydream to hastily bring closure to his heroic fantasies. Reportedly, the film’s climax was initially designed to be like this: Zhou stabs his band mate “Jiang Punk” as Jiang threatens him, and takes revenge for Zhu by blinding the hooligan; however, after he comes out of prison, he finds that nothing has changed. Judged by this alternative ending, the film’s modified finale would not disappoint the director; rather, I would assume that he may feel the adaptation renders the artistic merit of the movie superior. This is so because, if Zhou really kills the hooligan with his bare hands, it only confirms his anarchic impulses. The publicly released version —in which this entire scene is nothing but his fantasy whereas, back in the real world, he is still living a lowly and pitiful existence—apparently is better for revealing the truth. This modification best shows the protagonist completing his Bildungsroman by learning to accept reality as it is. 2.3 A Generation of Decadence and Its Self-Salvation Zhou’s dilemma and immaturity are the necessary consequence of his time, which has not allowed him to transform into another Zhu Helai. This is so because Zhu is the direct offspring of China’s “red generation,” whereas Zhou is the younger generation which now lives in a depoliticized, commercialized

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society. This post-revolutionary generation already shows an empty persona; being ignorant of any political notions, Zhou’s rationality could never be formed and he does not know how to deal with society. In the second half of the story, the movie shifts to the Chinese society of the late 1980s and early 1990s, revealing an era of nihilism, a time of dispirited morals and callousness. In particular, it exposes the chaotic confusion and sexual promiscuity of the rock band members who fancily cry out the lyrics “God knows, I have friends everywhere.” Beneath the unbridled and frenzied rockn-roll music scene is an undisguised urge for money and women. For them, hallucinogenic drugs become a symbol of culture and fashion, and smoking marijuana and snorting cocaine imply the spirit of art and avant-gardism. Zhou once sarcastically comments: “These people may have been healthy, yet now lose their healthy minds.” He cannot endure this atmosphere any longer and gives these people a metaphorical slap on the face: “Stop playing at decadence. Can’t you see that you are just putting up a facade to show off?” Zhou himself is now a musician; yet facing the sham avant-garde, he feels disgusted. For him, Ji Wen is a man who never loses: Ji understands the importance of adapting to society, which reveals his pragmatic philosophy. Although this personality has been suppressed in Mao’s period, in the era of reform he moves with the currents and becomes the hero. Nevertheless, he loses his finger in a fight caused by jealousy, which makes him unable to play guitar. This implies that, although he is capable of getting what he wants, he still is incapable of making something of himself. Thus, he is still a fake, under-developed subject. By contrast, the “real hero” is now like the hotel manager, who holds power and resources: he appears to be gentle and polite, yet in reality engages in criminal activities. Everyone is wearing a mask. The world where “everything is possible” is, in essence, a wasteland in which every value is negotiable. In this debris of a postsocialist world, people have totally lost their political idealism. At the house of the drunken girl whom Zhou saves, the movie once again delivers the feeling of hopelessness; the vocals on tape that continuously plays Tayu Lo’s (a popular Taiwan singer who has broad influence across Chinese society) song Future Masters is meant to inspire the audience to reflect: what has caused this generation (who are allegedly “masters of the future”) lose their ideals and faith? In this society, which is now not only post-revolutionary (losing revolutionary passion) but also post-socialist (forfeiting socialist ideals and morals), Zhou is continuously motivating himself to live a noble life similar to that of Pavel or Zhu Helai. For example, he sends the drunken girl at the bar home without ulterior motives; he exposes the drug-pusher in the band and gives the woman who abandons Zhu a slap on the face. Nevertheless, how could

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he make a difference to the existing hopeless conditions? What does it matter even if he finds his former intellectual mentor Zhu? 2.4 How to Create Critical Realism on the Ruins of Post-Socialism? When Zhou Qing is faced with repudiation and insult by Ji Wen and Fu Shaoying, he fidgets and paces, appearing irresolute against the thugs who attack him. However, filled with a feeling of moral superiority, he proudly goes to look for Zhu’s former love. After Zhou sneers at her and sees her being emotionally tortured, he says to her victoriously, “Every single tear from you is exactly what I come here for.” At this moment, the audience might also gain a feeling of satisfaction. However, this is only cheap self-deceit: not only does this victorious feeling not solve any problems but it also applies a moral denunciation to acquire an effect of psychological catharsis, which does not change reality for the better. As one critic trenchantly observes: A good person like Zhu Helai and those plotlines of the novel How the Steel was Tempered are just a hopeless ideal in reality. The protagonist, looking for Zhu Helai over and over again, is just losing himself in the darkness. The only real things around him are drugs, rock-n-roll, (decadent) girls, violence, the so-called “brothers”, as well as feelings of perplexity.24 How can Zhou Qing deal with post-socialistic ruins? In essence, this is also the issue that the director ponders and works to resolve. In the prelude to the movie, in a series of montages, we witness Zhou and his buddy inadvertently traversing and playing in a bomb shelter, which shows their youthful heroiccomplex. They also “… wonder at the distant Great Wall, lit like an idealized symbol of China’s cultural heritage.”25 Just at that moment, the 1976 Tangshan earthquake hits, which brings about a seismic wave. The allegorical significance of this scene becomes apparent when it is tied in with the historical subtext: the departure of the revolutionary Chairman is earthshaking and the impending massive changes that are about to occur force these young offspring of the revolutionary generation to face a completely different world, which is the subject matter of the movie.

24

Liang Benben 梁蹦蹦, “Ruci yaogun de huozhe 如此摇滚的活着 [to Live in a Rocking State],” http://movie.douban.com/review/1973084/. Accessed July 7, 2016. 25 Derek Elley, “Review: ‘The Making of Steel’.” Variety, August 3, 1998. http://variety .com/1998/film/reviews/the-making-of-steel-1200454803/. Accessed July 2, 2016.

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This thematic concern is realized by contrasting different men in differing eras. To convey Zhu Helai’s subtle influence, there is a scene where Zhou is pulling a tipper car and chasing the train Zhu is driving. The scene is full of poetic sentiments imparting a spiritual message, which reminds us of critic Xudong Zhang’s remarks on Wang Anyi’s novel Age of Enlightenment, “Kids of her age are always running as if they had some determined goals in the future.” This posture of running with all of one’s might itself connotes and moves towards an unclear goal. It is like a sculptural work fixing an abstract concept in a beautiful and sensuous form. This kind of intrinsic glory and posture marks a high point … in contemporary Chinese spiritual history. It is representing a kind of pure immanence, a pure historical and moral possibility.26 Such idealist passion demands a time full of idealism to motivate and activate it; thus, it appears merely temporal. It has never been witnessed again since the late 1980s. As we have seen, when revealing the possible finale of the protagonist’s search, the movie is also effective. The changed ending of the film is more powerful in disclosing the symptoms of the time: Zhou is gaining his “reason” by conceding to authority, yielding to its existing institutions of law and order, and essentially accepting reality instead of fighting against it. In this light, the film fulfills the mission of critical realism and does not attempt to glamorize or put Zhou on a pedestal of any kind. More so, when reflecting on Zhu Helai’s plight in contemporary society, the film especially shows its profundity. Towards the end, the director uses a panning shot sequence to show a series of beauty portraits on the magazine covers on a roadside bookstall, in which Zhou finds his favorite novel How the Steel was Tempered. What is peculiar about the book is that Zhu Helai’s picture is on the second page of it, which seemly indicates that he is the translator of the Soviet novel. Zhou’s voice informs us that “The preface (of the book) is entitled ‘To the masters of the future.’ ” At this moment, Zhu Helai’s off-screen voice unexpectedly occurs the first time. He tells us that the book’s complete Chinese version will soon be available; and the Soviet Union’s Ostrovsky Museum will soon be renamed “the state-run Ostrovsky Museum” and “the Humanitarian Center for Overcoming Oneself.” This strange narration deserves careful analysis, as it harbors an abundance of meaning. It affirms that Zhu is still “alive” among us, although when he will 26

Zhang Xudong, “ ‘Qimeng’ de jingshen xianxiangxue.”

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figure 15 The Making of Steel (Zhangda chengren, 长大成人), 1997: Zhou Qing finds the book How the Steel was Made in a street bookstall.

appear is uncertain. As for the museum being renamed, the message to be conveyed is profound and inauspicious, especially when we recall that the Soviet Union had already then collapsed after its socialist ideology was rendered impotent by revisionist political authority. The weird name, “Humanitarian Center for Overcoming Oneself”, seems to deliver the message that, since we are incapable of changing society, all that we can do is to seek to overcome ourselves to become “human.” The socialist connotation of the original red classic has been depoliticized, and its political ideal has been transformed into a humanist message of developing an iron will to deal with the hardship of life. Yet, the concept of humanitarianism is itself paradoxical here: all that Zhou can do is to rub at Zhu’s ex-wife’s wounds to seek a sense of self-nobility. Consequently, this kind of humanitarianism is nothing but a cheap and sad annotation. The fact that it is renamed by the failed former Soviet Union also implies powerlessness and self-abasement. Yet the film itself is incapable of avoiding this sort of contradiction. At the end of the movie, Zhou Qing and the girl from Lanzhou (who had got an abortion because of her earlier degenerate life) whom he befriends arrange to look for Zhu. For this scenario, the audience only gets an awkward feeling: although the female character’s facial expression is full of enthusiasm, we cannot ascertain whether she and Zhou share the same sense of aspiration. In addition, how does it matter even if Zhou finds his mentor? Since the prospect of this

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search is uncertain, it could only be taken as an act of self-consolation under a state of helplessness, and a reluctant self-motivation. This dilemma shows the difficult situation faced by directors in this period when they undertake the job of making cinematic works of critical realism. 3

Conclusion

Although the two movies were filmed only four years apart, two distinct ways of narrating reality are presented. What is fascinating is that although the movie Dirt is the earliest representative work of “China’s New Wave Cinema,”27 it is filled with a sense of excitement and passion, showing the positive side of people in the existing system. By contrast, The Making of Steel is full of critical undertones. This is because Dirt demonstrates the early years of the reform society in which the impulses and desires for liberation are warranted by the residual socialist spirit, whereas Steel portrays the ruins of a post-socialist wasteland when the market logic has sway over human relations. Therefore, they do share a certain commonality: both highlight the dispirited side of rock’n’roll and both maintain a deep respect for the socialist tradition. They are also both incomplete Bildunsroman, for they both focus on a young character who plays the dual role of narrator and the protagonist undergoing a profound transformation. Moreover, the reason why these characters are unable to complete their intellectual maturation is due to the transitional nature of reality at that time period. This period is long and slow and is still incomplete. Thus, this four-year interval notwithstanding, the attitudes of the two movies towards reality differ vastly, which itself indicates the rapid evolution and differentiation of contemporary Chinese society. The Chinese Sixth Generation auteurs emerge collectively from this societal and political background, and the similarities and differences between these two films are shared by them. 27

The term “China’s New Wave Cinema” is coined by me to refer to the productions made by the Sixth-Generation auteurs. See Wang Xiaoping, Ideology and Utopia in China’s New Wave Cinema: Globalization and Its Chinese Discontents (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

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“Postmodern” Love Stories: Articulating the Self-Consciousness of the Entrepreneurial Class in China’s Pop Cinema It is a consensus among cultural critics that, in today’s China, “… the visual field is increasingly inundated by fantastic representations promulgated by the transnational industry and Hollywood’s dream machine.”1 However, a complex situation lies in the fact that, … while the observers on the right no doubt overestimate the extent to which market reforms have helped the poor in China, critiques from the left must not underestimate the appeal of the new imaginary of consumer capitalism, even to those in China who so far have benefited from it only modestly or not at all.2 In particular, this “new imaginary of consumer capitalism” appears to be continuously expanding across the cultural field, becoming the dominant ideology. This chapter will examine some representative texts of popular entertainment cinema in order to inquire into how this consumerism’s “desire machine” is packaged for sale and consumption. In particular, by analyzing two commercial films of melodramatic romance, I find that they have a “postmodern” narrative form, which either bemoans the incapability of establishing the subjectivity of the middle class or promotes the self-image of the Chinese entrepreneurial stratum. In all, they demonstrate the relentless forfeiture of political idealism to a prevailing mentality of chasing business success. Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (庐山恋2010), distributed in 2010, is a sequel to the film Romance on Lushan Mountain (庐山恋), which was produced 30 years ago. Screened in 1980, the old film had a sensational reception across Chinese society, partly thanks to the fact that it was the first film with the theme of a love affair after the Cultural Revolution. It received the 1 Ban Wang, “In Search of Real Images in China: Realism in the Age of Spectacle,” Journal of Contemporary China, 17 (56), 2008: 497–512, 502. 2 Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 18.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_008

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best actress award at the first China’s Golden Rooster Film Festival in 1981 and the best feature and best actress awards at the fourth Hundred-Flowers Film Festival (both festivals are government-sponsored). In addition to impeccably portraying the marvelous beauty of Lushan Mountain, it achieved many other records. For instance, the actress Zhang Yu 张瑜 (1957–) changed costume in the movie 43 times. Due to her charming performance in this film, Zhang, then a new movie star, became the audience’s dream lady for the 1980s. What is more, the film also broke the record for the longest run in a single theater. It premiered at the Jiangxi Movie Circulation and Screening Company in Lushan, China, on July 12, 1980 and, because watching the film there became a tourist attraction, it has since been shown there daily. However, the plot of that film has nothing to do with its “sequel”, Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (庐山恋 2010), directed by Zhang Yu. Apart from the heroine of the first movie, all other characters are new. When the film was released, the government was just launching a massive celebration for the 30th anniversary of the Reform and Opening-up, and the film was taken as a tribute to this significant event. Thus, both films have become the symbol and living specimen of the era. On one hand, within the framework of a commerce war, and through the victory of “conscientious” businessmen over their unscrupulous adversary, this “new version” shows the capitalist class’s boast of their ethical-moral superiority; on the other hand, with the appearance of a romantic tale, it reconfirms the cultural “taste” of the elites by narrating a story of the triumph of a hippie’s “genuine love” over the hypocrisy of a fashionable “golden-collar.” In all, what the film delivers is essentially the self-image of China’s entrepreneurial class. However, while disguising itself as a fable of encouragement, what it ultimately evokes are nihilistic feelings and hedonism. In contrast, So Young (致青春, 2013) is a film that exhibits the inevitable failure and gloom of some college students after overindulging themselves. By telling a cruel story of youth, it aims to express “the true meaning of life”: idealism is useless and pragmatism wins. On the surface, it is about the transformation of life observed from a feminist angle; hence, there appear some roles and plots that are hard to conceive for male audience. Nevertheless, a close examination shows that mixed symptoms of egotism and self-rejection actually demonstrate the resignation of China’s newly-developed, vulnerable middle class, who are incapable of consolidating their subjectivity after they submit themselves to the dominant ideology of pragmatism. However, the film fails to fruitfully diagnose the era and represent the social totality. Instead, it only stops before this ambiguity and takes cynicism as life’s wisdom.

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A Hedonistic and Yuppy Life Philosophy: Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 as a Tale of China’s Entrepreneurial Class

Essentially a political melodrama, the 1980 version of Romance on Lushan Mountain is the story of how, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979—when the Cultural Revolution has been over for a year—Zhou Yun, the daughter of a former Nationalist general, visits Lushan Mountain again. There, she remembers five years previously, when she traveled to China from the USA for the first time, she met and fell in love with a young man named Geng Hua who, because his father—a high-ranking Communist official—was persecuted in the Cultural Revolution, accompanied his gravely sick mother there for recuperation and immersed himself in self-study. Unfortunately, not long after their acquaintance, because of the ultra-radical ideology of that time, Geng was arraigned by the authorities for his frequent contact with Zhou Yun, who reluctantly had to return to America. Now, Zhou unexpectedly encounters Geng again, who is now a graduate student at Beijing’s renowned National Tsinghua University and is attending an academic conference there. The couple are so thrilled and excited that they decide to get married. When Geng goes to his father for consent to the marriage, the latter realizes that he and Zhou’s father had served for the CCP and KMT respectively and had fought against each other during the Domestic War (1945–1949). Would the two former enemies agree to the lovers getting married? Ultimately, the common longing for the unification and prosperity of the motherland allows them to walk together and, at last, Zhou and Geng are happily married. While this love story is the major narrative thread of the film, the theme of the solidarity of people from the two parties also features. Apparently, this tale bears the strong imprint of the 1980s, when the CCP tried its best to establish a “united front” with the Nationalists, who ruled Taiwan. Metaphorically, the plotline shows that the unification of the nation is tied to the mutual understandings of the younger generation. It thus extolled, on one hand, the magnificent landscape of the country by presenting the splendid scenery of Lushan Mountain; on the other hand, it dramatized the innocent love of the pair. Therefore, the three dimensions of the movie—natural scenery, extolling love and propagating the Party’s political policy—are rolled into one. The film may therefore be seen as a cultural product of socialist realism, a work of “political melodrama” that integrates political propaganda with mass entertainment in the service of national politics.

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figure 16 A screen shot of the political melodrama Romance on Lushan Mountain (Lushan lian, 庐山恋), 1980

By contrast, over 30 years later, the “sequel” mainly focuses on spectacular urban scenes and the sweetness of the young couple’s romantic intimacy, without the political messages of the old version. However, the new edition seems to continue some aspects of the old, as noted by one cultural commentator: Thirty years ago, Romance on Lushan Mountain was really “in”. Both its view on love and the dress style of its leading actor and actress took the lead for the young people in 1980s. However, Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 develops the features of the previous film into a fashionable urban film, catering to the taste of contemporary young people.3 The director echoes this point: “Despite the different techniques of representation, Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 has retained the essential parts about love like the last film: namely, when everyone encounters love, his/her mind 3 Xin Zong 新宗, “Zhang Yu: Hisdai zainian, aiqing congwei zouyuan 张瑜：时代在变爱情 从未走远 [Zhang Yu: The era changes, love never goes away],” Changsha wanbao 长沙晚报 [Changsha Evening Paper], September 26, 2010.

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would not intermingle with impurity …[which]… enables us to understand the true meaning of love: however the times change, true love is never gone.”4 These assertions, featured as the promotional blurbs, aimed to arouse the audience’s curiosity. However, critical analysis will find messages other than “pure love.” 1.1 Incarnation of Capital and the Personification of Its Power Struggle The prelude of the film presents scenes such as rows of skyscrapers, crowds and classy gyms, which are frequently seen in the media. While the skyscrapers and the crowd ostensibly present the prosperity and the “sublime” aesthetics of the modernized city, they also display its deep alienation; in contrast, people in the gym demonstrate that these middle-class men and women adapt to the environment so well that they enjoy their lives there. At this moment, the cross-cut shows that one of the two main characters is walking out of the gym, while the other is rushing onto the street; both of them are on their mobile phones. This coincidence implies their crossed destinies and, hence, a romantic love story begins. The event to be narrated, however, is somewhat stereotypical; therefore, the stylized emplotment has been the subject of this sarcastic summary: While the urban scenes are just fashionable appearance … the conflicts from the plots fit quite well with those emotional subjects on marriage and love which urban young men and women are most keen on and confused about … The heroine is a talented woman who just returned from overseas study, being both a returnee and a member of the rich, second generation; the two young men with whom she is affectionate, Ma Jiang and Wei Ning, are a freelancer and a golden-collar, respectively. The one who understands her so well is unwilling to be trapped by marriage, whereas the other who is considerate and cares about her seems to be somewhat shrewd and lacks passion.5

4 See the news report, “Xin Lushan lian juzhao puguang, sanhi nian hou yanxu chunzhen de aiqing 新《庐山恋》剧照曝光，30 年后延续纯真的爱情 [Exposure of the Stills from “New Romance on Mount Lushan”—Pure Love Continues after Thirty Years],” ed. Pan Da 潘达, http://yule.sohu.com/20100925/n275243003.shtml. Accessed February 2, 2017. 5 See the news report, “Lushanlian 2010 rong xiandai dushi yinsy, qiangli gongru guoqing dang 《庐山恋2010 》融现代都市元素，强力攻入国庆档 [Romance on Mount Lushan 2010 combining modern city elements, launching vigorously into the National Day period],” Resource: Tencent Entertainment, http://ent.qq.com/a/20100913/000427.htm. Accessed February 2, 2017.

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Indeed, the outer appearances of the movie are quite fancy: there appear … luxurious bars and fun games, exquisite Western foods and fantastic parties, a backpacking photographer traveling around with cameras, and a high-ranking golden-collar who is decently dressed but exhausted from the bidding; whereas the climax of the film arrives at an outdoor forest music festival, which is generally appealing to the artistic youths.6 However, if we take a closer look, it would be easy to discover that the world where the golden collars work and the artistic people live are the same. This does not necessarily mean that they have the same dream but they do live in the same world in spite of their seemingly different statuses. This world is one that belongs to the entrepreneurial class, which values so-called “taste” that is built on wealth. When, in a car, the heroine Geng Fei’er is amazed by the paintings of the villa for which the hero Wei Ning helps his friend with the design work, the latter just casually replies that it is not his major, but just his fascination. Inspired by that, the heroine then comes up with the idea that it would be nice to try to set up a company for garden decoration, since she is acquainted with some designers who are experts in the field. In another scene, with a highaltitude lens skipping across a row of high-rise buildings (which might imply that real-estate businessmen in China are now busy with the acquisition of land), the heroine is accompanying a group of customers to inspect the base. “Are these lands all yours?” she asks. When she gets an affirmative answer from her customer, she promises him, “You can trust us, boss. The motto of our company is: ‘We can give whatever you need!’ ” Such a deep-pocketed statement is indicative of the strong financial power of the entrepreneurial class. On the other hand, the young, artistic man Ma Jiang, who is generally thought to be virtually poor, could also conceivably take the same first-class flight as the heroine and even denounce those well-dressed upper-class men at the auction site. Moreover, he has even traveled to Africa and brought back some indigenous artwork! All this highlights his extraordinary taste and, implicitly, his spectacular wealth. Our “chairwoman” Zhou Yun, the mother of the heroine in the movie, is played by the director herself. She appears after the prelude. Having developed from the innocent girl of the early movie to a successful businesswoman, she 6 See the news report: “Lushanlian Zhang Yu lun xinping zhuan jiujiu, jie xinpian wuda kandian 《庐山恋》张瑜论新瓶装旧酒，揭新片五大看点 [Romance on Mount Lushan, Zhang Yu explains Old Wines in New Bottles, revealing the five major features],” http://ent .qq.com/a/20101001/000111. Accessed January 2, 2017.

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figure 17 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Zhou Yun deeply loves her daughter, Geng Fei’er.

shows her quality by sedateness; all her acts indicate her elegance and maturity. As she steps into the lobby surrounded by a group of men, everyone in the hall whispers: “Look, here comes the chairwoman!” One of the employees is so startled by her imposing air that his file drops onto the floor. Zhou walks to him, picks up the file, and delivers it to the young man. She comforts him by patting his shoulders, saying: “Young man, take it easy!” Then Zhou continues to head steadily for her office and gives orders confidently and calmly, while the secretary beside her reports the schedule for the day. These scenes, apparently showing the image of a merciful, sympathetic and able businesswoman, actually display a deep-rooted desire for power, the worship of the entrepreneurial class’s air of domination, and the humble obedience to that class as the actual masters of the city in contemporary China. The movie then switches to a different scene, one of inside trading in an office. Another protagonist appears, Wei Ning, who is mercilessly ordering his business rival to sign an unequal deal because the latter has lost the battle of business and his company is being merged. Despite the man’s piteous begging to not split his company, Wei Ning is totally unmoved. After the defeated businessman’s trembling hand signs his name, Wei even takes away his pen. An unscrupulous businessman is thus introduced who is meant to present a

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figure 18 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Wei Ning is pursuing Geng Fei’er.

contrast with Zhou Yun, who shows kindness and mercy. During the conversation, the audience also witness Wei playing with his cell phone, and the message on the phone is shown in a close-up: he is inviting someone he calls “baby” to have dinner, which thus implies his flirtatious manner. When Wei continues to carry out his evil plans, competition between he and Zhou escalates. In his attempt to manipulate Zhou’s plan for investment, he executes whatever orders he receives from his boss and tempts Zhou’s daughter, Geng Fei’er, by skillfully playing romantic tricks and hooking her. However, it turns out that chairwoman Zhou, who has a better insight into the tricks of business, has already detected everything. When the cards are finally laid on the table, Wei is confronted with the chairwoman who is well-prepared with a pile of evidence; he is totally speechless. Thus far, the narrative thread of the film seems to progress in the context of a commercial war, showing how a virtuous and principled businesswoman defeats an immoral and wicked adversary. However, this is merely a fight between the masters of the city, or these entrepreneurs, who are all personifications of Capital. Thus, the confrontation between conscientious traders and their unscrupulous opponents is merely how this class parades its ethicalmoral image. 1.2 Hypocrisy of Golden-Collars vs. the “True Love” of Hippies Nevertheless, this is still not the whole story delivered by the film. The third character who appears in the film is the heroine, Geng Fei’er, whom Wei Ning Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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pursues. Another sarcastic summary of the subsequent fantastic plotline that focuses on this girl is given by an amateur critic: A whimsical film telling the story of the extravagant life of a rich, second generation [person]. The heroine is a princess-like figure growing up with Barbie dolls … the price of each doll can cover one-year’s living expense of one kid from a distant rural area. However, our heroine is not yet satisfied for she lacks maternal love. When she wants to set up a company, she is able to immediately become the gorgeous CEO. When she cannot run the company successfully, she has a wealthy mother to straighten out the mess. Her daily routine is to go dining or shopping with those girls whose first language is English. But all these are far from enough to comfort the loneliness of this unmarried lady. Thus, one affectionate and successful gentleman and another passionate, artistic young man are considerately arranged to soothe her loneliness. Both these two men are arranged somehow to fall in love with this living Barbie who is just keen on showing off wealth.7 This outline is a fair illustration of the illusory nature of this fashion show-like movie, in which the capricious personality of this girl is displayed everywhere. To start with, in order to free herself from her mother’s supervision, the individualistic, elite-born Geng Fei’er urges her mother to enjoy life, such as taking some friends home to play bridge or drink wine when she feels lonely, which implies that the traditional lifestyle of the old elites is outdated; instead, they should emulate this new-born hippie. In the company, Geng attempts to brush her mistakes at work under the carpet, whereas her mother, the president, indicates that Geng has broken the bottom line and asks the lawyer to have her daughter sign a document of dismissal. On the surface, this scene is a fake performance of the mercilessness of the business world. However, the worried look on the mother’s face and her conversation with her lawyer Mr. Gao (whose familial manner with Geng and her mother implies his unusual status in the family) after her daughter has left reveals that this is just play-acting to train her daughter, a typical practice for traditional family-owned business. Indeed, Geng still receives special treatment. When Geng’s company is failing, her mother buys it because she “… strongly believes that the company still has great potential,” as she professes. However, what this shows is nothing but Geng’s incapability and naivete.

7 See Rusi 如斯, “Shao nv de yiyin zhi zuo 少女的意淫之作 [The Lewd Works of a Young Lady],” http://movie.douban.com/review/4191256/. Accessed January 3, 2017. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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figure 19 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Ma Jiang photographs Geng Fei’er for fun.

Geng seems to have no Chinese friends and just mingles with foreigners. After her business fails, the frustrated young woman has dinner with her foreign friends; when she is about to check out, she is told that her credit cards are not working—it appears that her mother has disabled them. The lifestyle of this privileged woman becomes very noticeable: her extravagant life depends on the support of her mother and her normal life will not be possible once she loses this financial resource. The caprice and egoism fostered and encouraged in Geng by this arrangement are particularly displayed in the following incident. When the company’s share price drops drastically because an awkward photo of her, inadvertently taken by Ma Jiang, has been uploaded onto the internet, her mother accuses her of “being too selfish” and of “not considering the interest of the company.” Geng retaliates by arguing that her mother is selfish for just caring about the interest of the company without taking her daughter’s “free way of life” into consideration; because her mother forgets the date of her birthday, she cries and falls to Wei Ning’s arms. Ma Jiang, Wei Ning’s rival for this princess, is a photographer for a magazine. However, his first appearance is of him walking out of a building with some personal possessions in his arms because he has just lost his job—we are not sure whether it is because the press has just become bankrupt, as he casually informs the guard, or whether he was fired. Either way, he cannot afford his

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luxurious lifestyle. He further jokes with the guard: “My mom has called me to go home for dinner!” Apparently, he has fun with his unemployment rather than becoming upset. While this seems to show his optimism, it is not proportional to his status as a “blue-collar” worker. Therefore, this portrayal is merely the projection of the hallucinatory imagination of the middle class, further shown in the next shot when Ma boastfully claims that, “From now on, my life becomes more wonderful!” For this hippie to be loved by the princess, he must be a gentleman. Therefore, his kindness is highlighted on his way back to Lushan Mountain (dramatically, he is a man from Lushan; and he even lives in the same house as Zhou Yun did when she traveled there 30 years ago); when he finds a stray cat, he carefully takes it to an old man (ironically, he does not think of raising the cat himself). Furthermore, he has a keen sense of refinement: not only does his mother praise him that he “has quite a sharp nose” when he notices the changed odor of the newly decorated house, but he also notices a hair in the bed—reminiscent of Hans Christian Andersen’s (1805–1875) tale “The Princess and the Pea.” Not only does Ma Jiang’s “taste” compete with that of Geng Fei’er but he also excels in his spirit of egoism. His second appearance is on a delayed flight. In spite of the stewardess’ request to turn off his cell phone, he keeps it on and even secretly takes pictures of Geng Fei’er, who is dozing beside him, and sends them to his friend to show off. Here, we have reason to believe that he is actually a modern Xi Menqing, a notorious playboy in China’s traditional literary classic The Golden Lotus (金瓶梅). When he is caught out by Geng Fei’er for his impropriety, he shamelessly claims that “A decent man like me disdains taking candid pictures!” However, soon afterwards, he is taking candid photos again as an employed photographer. Obviously, he is not at all honest, despite his boast. After he leaves the flight, he is very angry because the wood carving he bought in Africa has been broken by Geng’s suitcase, so he follows Geng to the site of an auction she is attending (here, his ability to fish for information is again confirmed) and clamors for compensation. We have no idea how this “blue-collar” working for a small magazine can afford to travel to Africa and bring back this artwork. However, we should note how this “decent man” behaves when he shows his disdain of the wealthy men at the auction by repudiating them as “… formally-dressed yet pretentious.” When Geng asks him to put a figure on his loss, he throws her a coin, saying: “What I want is not money, but face!” Apparently, he is much more pretentious than those men he seemingly looks down upon—in fact, they are all the same. Therefore, this hippie, who regards pleasure as a lifelong career, will not easily give up his pursuit of a beauty he is interested in. He deliberately arranges

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their rendezvous at a splendid party and invites Geng to play games and cooperate with him; without her permission, he even swindles a kiss from Geng. While this seems to be just a trick, since they will soon confront one another in court, his imprudence seems inconceivable. Geng, whose desire has already been tantalized, instantly agrees to date him on the rooftop. While she dances there, Ma dutifully takes photos for her. They are shown to appreciate each other when Ma shows off his masculine muscles with his coat off. Their spontaneous behavior also reveals their flirtatious nature. Nevertheless, Ma is not yet the preferred man for Geng, who indulges in the sweet romance offered by Wei Ning. Therefore, she not only openly says to Ma that “You are not comparable to Wei,” but also invites Ma’s band to play for her engagement. Only when Wei’s scheme is revealed does she come to realize that her dream is broken. Another meeting of Geng and Ma is therefore arranged on Lushan Mountain. Only then does Geng come to know that Ma is the son of her relative whose home her mother has lived in during her holidays these years. Thus, as Ma amorously claims, they “… actually have been living in the same house all those years.” The reason why they have not seen each other until now is that when Geng spent the summer vacation here with Ma’s mother, he happened to be out. Geng’s affection for Ma grows at another crazy party after seeing him play guitar; their romance formally starts when Ma once again shows his playful nature by kissing Geng in the river. Their hippy lifestyle and self-centeredness, self-righteousness and narcissism—all features of China’s entrepreneurial class—make them a perfect match. Nevertheless, the story then takes an unexpected turn. The moment Geng announces publicly at the party that she wants to marry Ma, she never suspects that Ma could turn her down: she is sure that her identity, status and property far surpass those of Ma the “poor” hippie. What is worthy of note is that this takes place after Geng tries to probe Ma’s will by asking him whether they would have more fun if they got married, and Ma swears, “Absolutely! It would be wrong if we did not get married! I will never regret marrying you!” However, when Ma declines Geng’s proposal, he still has grandiose rhetoric: “I was just kidding then … I don’t believe that there is anything eternal;” instead, his life philosophy is that “I believe in short-term passion, just like a flash;” which evidently refers to the bliss that he enjoys from sex. He continues to explain his philosophy: “Love is something limited. I know you won’t be happy with me, because I’ll let you down. But it is who I am!” And then he shrugs his shoulders and leaves handsomely. The film gives a close-up of his awesome figure moving firmly forward. Geng, although depressed, chooses to let Ma go after she has tried all means to retain him, and is ready to accept Wei—who appears penitent. When the

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two are planning to take a journey to Paris for a vacation, Ma returns in time. It turns out that he has had a sudden “spiritual rebirth.” When travelling in Tibet, he fell off a cliff and woke up after some Tibetans had picked him up and piously chanted for him. Having suffered this accident but experiencing religious enlightenment, he seems to have changed into another person and makes up his mind to win Geng again. When he magically shows up at the airport to stop Geng, she has simultaneously decided not to go with Wei because she has not got the “right feeling” when Wei kissed her. At last, in a dreamlike scene, with shot-reverse-shots and in slow-motion, the screen shows Ma and Geng running to each other. In this way, the film attempts to show that, in the competition between the “genuine love” of a hippie and the hypocritical romance of the golden-collar, the hippie finally wins. Political Unconscious of the Entrepreneurial Class and Its Proclamation The film seems to be a Hollywood-style romance: having experienced several setbacks, the wealthy girl finally comes to realize that true love will overcome the gap between the family’s background (she previously thought the two were not compatible); she hence realizes that she must rid herself of her egocentrism (whereas she had taken it for granted that she would not be turned down because of her wealth). In the competition for love, the humble young man ultimately defeats his adversary and wins the woman with his willpower and his uninhibited and charming character. Nevertheless, we also find that the film contains many elements characteristically Chinese, which makes its genre quite equivocal: it is framed by commercial competition but is not a film about it; it shows nostalgic sentiments while resembling fashionable youth films. However, upon scrutiny, the movie shows nothing but the Chinese entrepreneurial class’ proclamation of its self-consciousness. Firstly, in spite of all the ups and down, both lovers do not fundamentally change their moral codes and views of marriage. Ostensibly, the reason why Geng finally favors Ma rather than Wei is that she does not feel right when kissing the latter; this is based on sheer physical attraction. Nevertheless, in reality, more profound factors are involved. Although Wei’s status seems much higher than Ma’s, he turns out to be nothing but a seducer following orders from his boss; consequently, due to sexual discrimination in Chinese society, he—as a man—is more humiliated and shameless in selling his body. What is more, he is merely a watchdog who may be fired at any time for failing to accomplish his task. Therefore, the real reason Geng leaves him is that she sees through Wei’s humility. As a woman born into a wealthy family, she comes to realize that she has to stop before indulging in any more of this nasty game. 1.3

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figure 20 Romance on Lushan Mountain 2010 (Lushan lian 2010, 庐山恋2010), 2010: Ma Jiang and Geng Fei’er, a fancy couple

In contrast, Ma appears more fashionable because he has the same lifestyle, interests and life philosophy as her. They are more like-minded. Likewise, while Ma changes his mind due to a mysterious religious nirvana, he is really very conscious of Geng’s higher social status and what he will gain after marriage. It is at this point that we need to look more closely at the real identity of Ma. The artistic young man’s favorite thing is taking photos for the “flash-like” feeling. He travels to various places at home and abroad with an expensive camera. He even sets up a band with a group of young men who share similar interests. How is he able to afford such a free and enjoyable life? When Geng forces him to marry her, he just replies: “Why don’t we just love each other without marriage?” The implied message is clear: he can have sex with someone but does not need to marry that person. When the feeling of love has reached its limit, it is right to find a new partner. Rather than being an immoral and “counter-cultural” hippie, this lifestyle shows the other side of the self-consciousness of the Chinese bourgeois class. His life philosophy and mannerisms are reminiscent of popular sayings in China about the standards of judging a “nouveau riche”: One, wearing prayer beads, not gold chains; two, dressing like a Tibetan, not a Han Chinese; three, drinking red wine, not white spirits; four,

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wearing sackcloth and cloth shoes, not suit or leather shoes; five, playing golf, not Mahjong; six, riding bicycles, not driving a Benz; seven, to practice “Bi Gu” (namely keeping away from cereal food as means of enlightenment) with friends, but not traveling around the world; eight, investing in movie-making, not in nightclubs; nine, associating with friends from EMBA class, not with common buddies; ten, being Buddha-styled, not dude-ish.8 Ma apparently conforms to quite a few of those standards. He once informs Geng that, although Wei looks like “so-called gentleman,” he is nothing but a patient wolf deep in his heart. However, Ma himself is no better, for he also plays all kinds of tricks to get Geng. The only difference between them is that Wei uses material interests for temptation, whereas Ma pretends to be easy and free. For instance, Ma claims that he bitterly disdains those pretentious and face-conscious rich men, yet he simultaneously demands “face” before Geng, which is not just out of his self-contradictory nature. Rather, what it unintentionally shows is an identity consciousness of the concept of dignity, which has nothing to do with the “politics of dignity” pertaining to the subaltern class. The subtext here is a hypocritical belief that “you may insult anything of me but my soul.” This is reminiscent of the famed proclamation by Ren Zhiqiang, a distinguished (or notorious) real estate tycoon in contemporary China, who boasted of himself as a man who “never pretends,” Why am I becoming the one that “girls want to marry best”? The only reason is that I am genuine and honest and I never tell any lies. Therefore, on the internet, there a saying: “If you want to marry, marry a man like Ren Zhiqiang. Here Ren Zhiqiang is just a sign, a sign rarely seen in modern society.9 Being the most eminent spokesman and symbol for the capitalist class, Mr. Ren is indeed quite popular among some young girls; however, this has less to do with his honesty and sincerity than with his financial (if not yet political) power and wealth. Therefore, his boastful proclamation is exactly the same as 8 See the entry of “Beijing xin tuhao shida biaozhun 北京新土豪十条标准 [Ten New Standards of Judging a “nouveau riche in Beijing],” posted by Justfaint88, http://www.xcar .com.cn/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=19660885. Dated November 7, 2013. Accessed July 7, 2017. 9 See Zhuanjijingxuan 传记精选, “Ren Zhiqiang: weishneme wo shi ‘guniangmen zui xiang jia de ren’ 任志强：为什么我是“姑娘们最想嫁的人” [Ren Zhiqiang: Why Am I ‘the Man whom Girls Mostly Want to Marry With’?],” http://finance.sina.com.cn/zl/lifestyle/20131022/18011707296 1.shtml. Accessed January 4, 2017.

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Andersen’s “emperor’s new clothes”, which assumes that people do not know the secret of his “success”—a result of the complicity between the bureaucrats and the capitalists (Ren himself is among the second generation of politicians). Ma’s tenet “to (make) love without marriage” is the lifestyle for which this class badly yearns under the cover of being a gentleman: “to live like a freestyled artist” in order to enliven their lives. Whether or not Ma can actually afford this extravagant hippie’s life does not matter; what really counts is that he worships and conducts this sort of “high-class” way of life. Geng’s ultimate choice, however, means that she subscribes to the tenet that “only people from the higher class are deserving.” This belief is seen firstly in the lifestyle of which this class is proud. Geng and her mother live in a palatial, luxurious house and spend their days on yoga. They are fond of showing off their “nicely-mannered” remarks: Geng once suggests to Ma that he needs to pay attention to his “manner” (素质). However, Ma sharply retaliates that, although those people typically proclaim themselves to be “on-time, bragging, taking low-carbon and green life, kind and kidloving,” they are incomparably hypocritical: “Don’t they just take such efforts to do charity so as to evade paying taxes?!” However, despite Ma’s fondness for ridicule, he is merely one idiosyncratic member of this class who is used to self-mockery. This pretension is also displayed when Geng and Ma pretend to appreciate their mutual souls; in reality, both are just addicted to bodily indulgence. As those sharp remarks on the internet put it, “Why does our hero like to have his upper body naked every now and then? Shouldn’t he take off his trousers instead of clothes when he looks for stones in the river?”10 When Geng spends her holidays in Ma’s home on Lushan Mountain, she first screams loudly when she runs into Ma taking a shower, and then again when his bathrobe happens to come off after he has just cleared the “accident.” The reason why all these are a kind of disguise is that here Geng acts Like A Virgin—as sung by Madonna— who has, however, just broken up with her foreign boyfriend and even confessed to her foreign female friends that she can reach orgasm at any time. All the above, to be sure, is purposely arranged or is designed by the director to avoid antipathy from some “conservative” viewers to the protagonists’ “Westernized” lifestyle. Thus, we see that Ma, the lady-killer who takes as his principle “love without marriage”, could behave “like a virgin” as well: he bashfully scurries around when Geng accidentally glimpses his body. The same scheme appears when Ma explains why he is reluctant to marry. According 10 Rusi, “Shao nv de yiyin zhi zuo.” A similar picture shows again in a rainy scene on the rooftop.

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to him, marriage is too significant to be treated causally. However, the truth is that he just wants to have fun. His way of elusion is commonly witnessed in Western soap operas; it is applied here to avoid offending the conservative values of the middle class. One may also wonder, after the heroine has kissed so many different persons, how she could still come to realize that kissing is something as peculiar as having compatible bone marrow or genes. This is a life philosophy of a hippie of China’s bourgeois class, whose insatiable desire is comparable to Capital’s logic of endless accumulation. However, it now goes further in yearning to be a yuppie with more refined “taste.” In the film, Ma tells Geng: “If it were 30 years ago now, all that (marriage) would come true. Yet nowadays marriage is unfashionable.” Geng reluctantly admits: “You are right, and you are free now.” What has transformed over the past 30 years? And what does this change mean? On the surface, as the director claims, the “innocent love” of the past has transformed into one that is “postmodern”; however, for her, “… true love never changes.”11 Nevertheless, the “innocent love” of the past was already not so “pure”, for it is one between two members of the “second generation of the powerful,” deliberately arranged for the political need of establishing a “united front.” The screening confirmed that this sort of love story was still welcomed by the populace of the time because they desired entertainment in the post-revolutionary society. The trend of de-politicization has developed rapidly since 1990s; however, the differentiation of social strata is overlooked in a deepened depoliticized social life. There are some episodes in the new movie which touch historical memory. During her trip with her mother to pay respects to their ancestors, Geng says: “It is quite amazing that Papa and maternal Papa used to be friends, then they turned into enemies, and finally they became close relatives again.” Zhou Yun’s interpretation of this is that, “There are many uncertainties in our life. They seem complicated but are very simple in truth. Everything has its destiny, and we cannot importune.” Here, characters who live in a depoliticized society that repudiates class analysis cannot understand the back-and-forth changes between friends and foes. Consequently, something like the Buddhist concept of “destiny”—actually, chance—is applied to explain that transformation. Agnosticism brings about political nihilism, which leads to hedonism in life. Geng thus responds to her mother, “Therefore, we should try to make ourselves happy every day.”

11

Xin Zong, “Zhang Yu: Hisdai zainian, aiqing congwei zouyuan.”

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Nihilists and the Pragmatic Principle: So Young (2013) as a Symptomatic “Youth Film”

Although college students in China nowadays have not been “the favored ones by God” (天之骄子) as they were called in the 1980s, their spiritual lives still, to some extent, represent the mores of the times. Since the beginning of the new century, there has been a trend of “youth films” in China’s popular cinema which targets a young audience. Some critics have noticed that, in these films, … the here-and-now execution has already been gradually taken over by a retrospective, lyrical expression … This kind of narrative has already become more and more popular; and it is continuously spreading, summoning and even building the structure of feeling of one generation.12 So Young is one of these movies that show the lives of college students of the 1990s. Its director, Zhao Wei 赵薇 (1976–), a famed film star now producing her first movie, has acknowledged that her ambition is to show “… the youth history of a generation;” therefore, she refused to “… turn the film into one with innocent and romantic feeling.”13 Instead, she claims that what she wanted to do was to “… pursue something direct, genuine, and cruel …” through narrating a “… gritty and heavy history of youth …” in mainland China, revealing “… the great vicissitudes of the time (大沧桑).”14 Is her narrative authentic and valid? On the surface, from the very beginning, the film displays familiar scenes of collective memory.15 The Chinese-style humor in many scenes in the first half means that the domestic Chinese audience cannot help smiling. However, the development of the plotline gradually endows the narrative with an idiosyncratic, personal atmosphere. What is the dialectical relation between the collective memories and the personally-tinged narrative? Usually, the youth film 12

Wang Dake 王大可, Feng Ni 冯妮, Huang Lei 黄蕾 and Liu Jia 刘佳, “Tan dangdai qingchun dianying 谈当代青春电影 [On Contemporary Youth Films, 1st round],” 21 shiji jingjin baodao 21 世纪经济报道 [21st Century Business Herald], June 22, 2013. 13 Xiao Yang 肖扬, “Zhao Wei: Wo pai bu chu xiaoqingin de qingchun 赵薇：我拍不出小 清新的青春 [Zhao Wei: Sorry, Not the Fresh-styled Youth],” Beijing Qingnianbao 北京青 年报 [Beijing Youth Daily], April 23, 2013. 14 Ibid. 15 For instance, “The first scene is the freshmen arriving on campus, and then male seniors pick up female juniors, which fits in well with the common phenomena in modern campus. Then the film unfolds the panorama, presenting such scenes as lives and conflicts in dorms, rural and gender-neutralized roommates, campus queen complex, canteens, love, college associations, evening parties on the campus, graduate recruitment, overseas study, abortion and so on.” Ibid.

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figure 21 The opening shot of So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我 们终将逝去的青春), 2013

is simultaneously a narrative of bildungsroman: in this movie, has the process of intellectual growth been completed? 2.1 Emptiness of the Cruel Story of Youth The subtitle of the movie claims that it aims to pay homage “… to the youth destined to lose (致我们终将逝去的青春)” by narrating a cruel story of youth and its inevitable failure after egocentric overindulgence. The main thread is the experience of an 18-year-old girl, Zheng Wei, who calls herself “a little jade flying dragon (玉面小飞龙)”. The carefree girl is a high-school student at the very beginning. Seemingly brimming with youthful vigor, she is nevertheless faced with the risk of desertion. When she is admitted, as she wishes, into the college in which her lover Lin Jing is studying, she is shocked by the news that her sweetheart has already left to study abroad without saying goodbye to her. However, due to her romantic and passionate character, her frustration does not last long. Soon, she is crazily pursued by Xu Kaiyang, a boy from a rich family, but she shows her preference for her “cool” classmate Chen Xiaozheng,16 whose coolness is displayed as coldness. Chen Xiaozheng scolds Zheng Wei when she plays with his model for class, for he worries that she may break it. His rudeness drastically astonishes the heroine, who is used to being doted upon. 16 “Xiaozheng 孝正, literally means filial piety and uprightness, harboring a heavy dose of traditional Chinese culture, and people from mainland China after 1949 have rarely used it to name their children.

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figure 22 So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Xu Kaiyang initially feels angry over Zheng Wei’s egocentrism.

Therefore, she takes revenge by humiliating Chen with an extraordinary public temperament. A series of actions are meant to astonish the audience with her arrogance and selfishness. However, after many a strike-back, Zheng Wei finds that she has already fallen in love with this top student, who is kind on the inside. Thus, those crazy strike-backs turn into hell-bent pursuits. If we approve of the popular saying that the ones with whom we fall in love are nobody but our own images, then we will find that the two actually share the same interests and have similar dispositions. They are used to being selfcentered and safeguarding their interests, displaying their individuality. In fact, this individualism has been considered necessary for cultivating personality since the 1980s in China, when society started promoting the so-called “entrepreneurial spirit” (although, at that time, collectivism was still simultaneously propagated). As expected, Chen finally surrenders to Zheng’s passionate chasing, and the two joyful enemies turn into sweet lovers. This is an inspiring Chinese version of the Hollywood romantic film, which always eulogizes the rosy picture of picking the fruits through untiring pursuit. However, the Cinderella and the prince do not start living happily ever after; instead, there is a Chinese-style transformation: huge social pressures and different life experiences make the romance end with nothing. Chen decides to leave Zheng and study abroad. Zheng feels she has been cheated, so she runs out and inadvertently sees Xu Kaiyang holding a girl in his arms, another shock to her.

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I suggest that the adaptation is in the Chinese style because it is quite consistent with the traditional Chinese narrative pattern of “a gifted scholar meeting a beautiful lady 才子佳人.” Chen appears to be a clumsy and dull student, whereas Zheng is a rather pretty and audacious lady; the two characters thus follow the Chinese formula. In this traditional mode, the couple also suffer due to an outside force. Here, the suffering comes from society: although Chen’s departure could not be glamorized as arising from oppression from vicious power and social prejudice—often witnessed in literary works of the “School of the Mandarin Duck and Butterfly” during the late Qing period through to the 1930s—the film still finds its excuse. Chen’s maxim is that “One’s life cannot allow the slightest deviation,” making it seem a pardonable, heroically tragic feat for an inspiring young man to sacrifice love for his professional career. Or it is an unwilling choice, just like the Chinese proverb: “You can’t get fish and a bear’s paw at the same time (鱼与熊掌不可兼得).” Moreover, the ending of this couple is also reminiscent of the “School of the Mandarin Duck and Butterfly” formula. Many years later, when the two finally meet again, they both talk about the uncertainty of fate and vicissitudes of life. However, the difference is that Zheng has now become one of the whitecollar elite whereas her two former lovers, Lin and Chen, return to her almost simultaneously with regret and love. How will she make her choice? Unlike the original novel from which the movie is adapted—where Zheng chooses Lin— in the film, she not only refuses Chen but also leaves Lin to the girl who loves him deeply, although Lin does not love the latter. Zheng’s experience seems to endow her with life wisdom: she seems to understand the true meaning of life and love and is no longer egocentric. This story of cruel youth is largely shared by Zheng’s roommates, who all experience different tragedies one after another. Ruan Wan, the girl who is gentler, more attractive and popular than Zheng, blindly loves a guy who has betrayed her and even made another woman pregnant. She lets him go but is killed by a car on her way to meet the unfaithful man for the last time. Through Zheng’s repeated sighs, the film seems to extol this blind passion for love, which nevertheless shows more the feature of a narcissistic woman who stubbornly and vainly justifies the affection that is generally considered unworthy. In contrast, another roommate, Ni Weijuan, has plans for herself very early: she abandons her boyfriend who was once her companion in hard times and instead marries an older man and gives birth to a son just to inherit his fortune. Apparently, the film takes her as an unworthy counter-example. A third classmate, Zhu Xiaobei, who dresses and behaves like a boy, abandons herself to despair and finally drops out of the college after she is wrongly accused of

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figure 23 So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Zheng Wei feels desperate over Xu Kaiyang’s departure.

theft by a small drugstore. This incident might imply discrimination between rich and poor in college; however, since this potential cause is not emphasized, it appears merely as an unfortunate accident. Years later, when Zhu encounters her former classmates again, she has become a successful “master of success science,” yet she pretends not to recognize any of her previous friends. Again, we do not know why, as we see no discrimination against her from her classmates when she is studying in college. The male classmates are no exception in expressing this theme of frustrated youth. After arriving in America as he has wished, Chen—although successful in his career and a US citizen through marriage—is unhappy, so he returns to confess his love to Zheng in the hope of resuming it. In comparison, Xu marries Zeng Yu, Chen’s ex-girlfriend and the former student leader, who is simultaneously the daughter of the college president. However, Xu is also unhappy because they do not love each other. Zhang Kai, who had a crush on Ruan Wan in college, later becomes a professional ghostwriter in order to make a living; he is always muttering to himself before the grave of his lover. All these plots have men confessing endlessly to their beloved girls, which surely portrays a female-centered perspective. Judged by all these events, the course to maturity for these boys and girls is awfully painful. However, are they faithful representations of real life? A critic aptly remarks that in this movie,

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… the youth in effect never appear in their lives. Most of the protagonists are very sophisticated, even lethargic, from the very first day of their college. Everyone seems to live with depression. Chen Xiaozheng nags himself a lot that his life will not allow the slightest deviation; goddess-like Ruan Wan all along has been indulging in a love with no dignity; Zheng Wei’s love both comes and goes rather bafflingly. Most times she is at the edge of hysteria, but generally she shows a kind of abnormal calmness and tolerance after her breakup. Another character, Zhu Xiaobei, suffers an unjustifiable body-search in a small store and then gets expelled from college, by which the film seems to express that youth means reckless impulse … there is no room even for the thought of demanding “fairness” and “justice”, not to mention any resort to action; the most desperate one must be Ni Weijuan, who realizes her dream of “waiting for a price (for herself)” in the end. The more thoroughly she sees through “reality”, the faster she falls into it, the more she lets the audience down. She has not been young at all throughout, without even one single positive confrontation with reality, for she has chosen obedience and material interests at the very start. Anyway, we cannot find any hope or brightness to console the viewers throughout the film; thus, the so-called youth shows itself merely in a physiological sense.17 All in all, men here present a somewhat premature senility in their spirit; women, after their longing for love has faded, piddle away time as their life philosophy. Thus, the central motif of the film is readily delivered. What Chen says in the end puts it clearly: “The experience of youth is to witness yourself turn into the one that you are disgusted with.” Cast in this light, we can understand why the overbearing and strong-willed Zheng Wei, who is rendered as a “frank and innocent” girl by the movie, turns into a cynical white-collar lady, whereas the arrogant (actually, just as selfish) Chen becomes philistine—in fact, he has been a philistine all along. This rule is also applied to the minor characters. Lin Jing seems to be not as sincere as he was in college and must accept a woman he does not at all like. Xu Kaiyang, who always pursued true love in college, now seems to have compromised with fate—being a member of the second generation of an official’s family, he is always domineering and bossy. He now marries a girl from the same family background whom he does not love. The movie seems to picture that, when confronted with the cruelty of reality and an adult world driven by 17

See Wang Dake, Feng Ni, etc, “On Contemporary Youth Films, 1st round.”

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figure 24 So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Zhang Kai becomes a ghostwriter.

money, interest and desire, all men and women turn into the opposite of their original, “authentic” selves. Innocent love in college is thus destined to fail; it is nothing but a necessary stage for everyone to experience in order to learn how to behave in the adult world. In particular, Chen’s deception and betrayal appears so natural that he is taken to be the one who has enlightened Zheng, who even says something like: “Every man used to be Chen Xiaozheng and will finally become Lin Jing or someone else after experiencing something.” Nevertheless, despite harsh reality, is it valid to have such a twisted understanding of “life-wisdom” with this narrative of emptied youth? How could this philosophy appear in Chinese society? To answer this question, we should analyze the authenticity, causes and effects of this sort of narrative. We will find that emptiness here is a symptom of the times. 2.2 Unfulfilled Love as Symptom of the Era: Egotism and Resignation It is difficult for today’s college students to relate to college life as presented in the film. For instance, after watching the film, not a few Chinese students think that, The behaviors of Xu Kaiyang, Zhang Kai and so on keep us wondering whether such a campus life riddled with desire and gangsters really presents the so-called youth? … The director intentionally conceives the dormitory hallway to be “a jungle infested with wild animals,” in order to

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show that a campus like this is disappointing and wasteful of life and youth. But it is hard to tell whether it is the youth-wasting college that shapes those youth-frivoling students or, conversely, the latter forges the former. In the film, the director tries to prove that the “youth-wasting” college is forged by many factors, such as the irresponsible dorm administrator, the store owner who tramples human rights and the corrupt administration of the college, but in reality it still impresses us that it is these students who are wasting their youth.18 In their view, although it is understandable that the film “… presents some scenes on campus or in dorms in such an exaggerated way …” nevertheless “… campus life in the film does not faithfully show the situation in reality; it even appears kind of ridiculous.” For instance, they seriously doubt in such a representation whether “… all college students in China today are as decadent, lost, shameless and pointless as those in the film … Is it true that campus love cannot withstand the test of interest and will be finally betrayed?”19 To be sure, the real situation varies across different regions and colleges. In a certain period between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, it was not unusual to see such youth-squandering and debauched lives in some Chinese colleges, especially in schools of the arts and performance. This film is, to some extent, a portrayal of the “1989 generation” who had no need to worry about their future because the state would assign them handsomely-paid jobs with guaranteed security after their graduation. However, this situation has now become unimaginable for college students with the market economy fully predominating society since the mid-1990s; they now have to be busy with packaging themselves for sale on the job market. Thus, the question is much less whether the college life shown in the movie is authentic or not than why it is shown in such a way and which perspective it is from. On the surface, the transformation is observed from the perspective of a woman (either Zheng Wei or the female director); therefore, there are some characters and sub-plots difficult to accept for the male audience. For example, the characterization of Zheng’s capricious character is meant to show her lovely personality, while the (male) audience will find this very uncomfortable. The glorification of Chen’s motives is similarly unacceptable; Ruan Wan’s submission is appreciated in the name of love, which again makes the male audience feel ridiculous: “This blind tolerance indicates that there is some demand 18 See Wu Zhaosheng 吴兆晟, “Xuwan de qingchun 虚妄的青春 [Fallacious Youth],” course paper, Tan Ka Kee College, 2014. 19 Ibid.

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for women in the inner mind of the screenwriter herself; namely, a woman should love a man regardless of all consequences, while the man does not need to take too much responsibility for her.”20 Nevertheless, the problem with this narrative perspective is still merely superficial. We must proceed further in order to comprehend the social and class factors behind this gender-related perspective. Although the film does not reveal the family backgrounds of the two main characters, we can still roughly know these from their speech and actions. Judging from her bossy manner and capricious character as well as her reckless action and indulgence in enjoyment, Zheng is apparently one of the “second generation of the rich.” She even deliberately wastes food in the canteen just to spite Chen.21 By contrast, Chen seems a poor boy from a certain rural area (or from an impoverished worker’s family), which can be ascertained from his accusing Zheng of her spoiling food. Moreover, he seems a motivated, promising young man and he does things by principle. Nevertheless, there is no trace of shame in his words when he abandons Zheng, by which the film attempts to impress upon the audience that he is justified for deserting his beloved. Therefore, rather than showing that his consideration of his professional career overwhelms his love, the film actually illustrates the significance of individualistic egoism to one’s life. It is this implicit ideology that reminds us of more detailed messages in the film: There is no way out for children from poor families. The only way for them to achieve success is to abandon love (like Chen Xiaozheng), “wait for a good price” (like Ni Weijuan), or “have one’s name changed” (like Zhu Xiaobei). Only beautiful girls deserve youth (like Ruan Wan) and love (like Zheng Wei); country people have no business with love stuff (like Ni Weijuan) and even have to hide for selling steamed buns (like Zhu Xiaobei); win-win cooperation is still the key to success (like Xu Kaiyang and Zeng Yu). Nevertheless, as Zhao Wei notes, all of these are not about the issue of rich-poor division but just a cruel story of youth.22

20 Ibid. 21 The issue that an only child would inevitably be spoiled aroused nationwide concern in the 1980s. However, with the use of such words as “rich second generation” and “officialling” in the 1990s, the new generation has witnessed qualitative changes: as social polarization between rich and poor worsens, the reinforcement of egoism and the tendency to take illegal and unreasonable interest by force appear. 22 This is Huang Lei’s view, See Wang Dake, Feng Ni, etc., “On Contemporary Youth Films, 1st round.”

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Apparently, the director’s perspective is of a particular class, and so is her particular method of dramatization. Through Ruan Wan’s love and her tolerance for her boyfriend, the film hopes to confirm that only by this kind of “unconditional love” can one’s youth be memorable. However, all of these characters move down a road of eventual material desire. A non-historical understanding of “love” has revealed some of its real nature, that it actually comes from the understanding of a certain class. What they love is merely their selfimage; therefore, either Zheng’s self-indulgence that only considers her personal feelings (her favor for Chen reveals that there is consonance between the two in their spiritual realm) or Ruan Wan’s unconditional tolerance only show the egotism of this class. Moreover, Chen’s life choice reveals that this egotism is enforced upon the lower class: the film never gives any clues as to his scheming, meaning that his choice is implied as something natural. Nevertheless, granted that there might be a case in the lower class, it still results from the social circumstance that makes “success” the highest value. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.”23 Whence, then, does this ruling idea in the film, namely egotism, come? Due to the director’s intentional avoidance of class issues, as well as taking egotism as the constant value of the middle class, it seems difficult for us to discern any message about the ruling class. We might, then, lay aside this problem for the moment and firstly discuss the resignation that accompanies this egotism, this upward mentality regardless of all consequences. Apparently, a passive attitude toward—and a hopeless submission to—a materialistic society predominates the movie. Under its wanton claims on personal interests, there is simultaneously a strong feeling of impotence and vulnerability. This signifies that not all who carry the ideological concepts of the ruling class are members of it. Although the sons and daughters of officials (such as Xu Kaiyang and Zeng Yu) can achieve success in their professional career through their powerful parents, they are not necessarily satisfied with what they receive in love. Nevertheless, their egotism, standing out by means fair or foul, has greatly influenced the lower class. Consequently, Chen seeks fame and fortune regardless of any virtue. These youngsters are generally faithful to their emotional attachments in their early years; however, the moment they step into society, they repudiate their naive youth and idealism and are devoted to pragmatism (some even start this process earlier). The rampant pragmatism and social Darwinism of contemporary Chinese society are taken to be the true meaning of life in the film. On the one hand, this shows that the powerless middle class 23

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers. Co, 1970), 64.

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figure 25 So Young (Zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun, 致我们终将逝去的青春), 2013: Zhang Kai mourns in front of Ruan Wan’s tomb.

has to submit to (and even wholeheartedly worship) the notions of the ruling class; on the other, it reveals the prevalence of cynicism and nihilism in society. Generational Contradiction and the Weakness in Representing the Totality Only when we bring the social subtext back into study can we know more of the ideological message. In this case, there are two social contradictions here: the American Dream, a seemingly external force, and the social structure, which seems to be merely an internal problem. Critics have noted that in three recent popular films, America or “the American dream” constitutes the inalienable, structural factor. In Zhongguo hehuoren 中国合伙人 (literally “Chinese Partners,” whereas its English title is American Dreams in China, 2013), the American dream “colludes with youth” as an inspiration for Chinese entrepreneurs; in So Young, the American dream is “the third party intervening love,” one more tempting than personal affections. In 北京遇上西雅图 (literally “When Beijing meets Seattle,” but its English title is Finding Mr. Right, 2013), it is “both the matchmaker and parson”—the American dream here offers the opportunity for a couple of lovers to come together and gives them encouragement.24 In one word, “Without the presence 2.3

24

Wang Dake 王大可, Feng Ni 冯妮, Huang Lei 黄蕾 and Liu Jia 刘佳, “Tan dangdai qingchun dianying 谈当代青春电影 [On Contemporary Youth Films, 2nd round],” in 21 shiji jingjin baodao 21 世纪经济报道 [21st Century Business Herald], July 6, 2013. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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of the American dream, youth will be aimless and love will be unable to transit.” In So Young, for instance, “Zeng Yu earnestly expostulates to Chen Xiaozheng that he has to go abroad to put his talent into use; otherwise he would be sorry for his dream if he stayed in China.”25 It is under such expostulations that Chen makes his choice, without shame. Here, America, the symbol of individualist success, becomes the incarnation of the highest value. Stimulated by this supreme object of enticement, this absent presence, all other values will collapse. Zheng Wei might be less of a typical young girl in contemporary China. Nevertheless, she does show the mentality and behavior of a certain class by wantonly satisfying her desire in her college years and skillfully manipulating her desire after she enters society and “matures”. The other protagonist, Chen, also has an exceptional ability to control and judge; being aggressively ambitious and patient, he would unabashedly pursue his objective by any means. He firmly believes that the most reliable person in the world is himself, which is the fundamental life tenet of the entrepreneurial class. Although, on the surface, this merciless principle is exposed and criticized, it is in truth understated and taken as inevitable in order to stand out. By contrast, Zheng’s ex-girlfriend, Zeng Yu, is a character who is likely to be neglected, partly because the film does not give her any opportunity to show herself. In the school party, her performance looks old-fashioned and tedious. The dullness of her performance is highlighted by the contrast between the vitality of the music, her hypocritical smile, and Zheng Wei’s vigorous singing. They are thus the symbols of two classes. While Zeng stands for the continuation of the listless, old bureaucratic class, Zheng seemingly typifies the new generation full of vitality. The facial expressions of the school’s leadership imply that they harbor reservations about the “new generation,” which indicates that there is no resonance between the two generations.26 However, Zheng actually could not represent the new generation because, as a capricious character, she is always making a fuss about nothing or making trouble. Meanwhile, although the union between Zeng Yu and Xu Kaiyang might imply the alliance between the bureaucratic class and the bourgeoisie, there is little introduction to the family backgrounds of the two characters. What is more, Chen’s choice of America instead of Zeng implies that, when asked to choose between the prestige offered by local bureaucrats and a supposed luxurious life in the States, the speculator still prefers the latter. 25 Ibid. 26 See Wu Zhaosheng’s paper. As he puts it, “… in fact the director and the screenwriter fail to shape Zheng Wei as the representative of the ‘new generation.’ ” Wu Zhaosheng, “Xuwan de qingchun.” Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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In other words, while the enticing power of the American dream is presented, the critique of domestic society is ambiguous. After the conflict with Chen in her dorm, Zheng “borrows” an armband of the Student Management Committee to find fault with him. Such act of vengeance through public power is improbable in reality but might be used by the film to imply unfairness in reality. However, the intended effect could not be achieved in this way. Xu Kaiyang ultimately becomes a prosecutor in the court, the profession of which has nothing to do with his coldness and rudeness to his wife, who was his college classmate and loves him tenderly. There is no implication of any class gap in Zhang Kai’s concealed love for Ruan Wan. Zhang’s unsatisfactory experience after graduation seems to show that there are few chances for people from the bottom of society; however, apart from his inaction, it is not easy to find any other social factors for his failure. In the movie, it seems that all the meanings of youth point to love. Nevertheless, while love has been worshiped as the “first principle,” it “collapses once it is challenged by any outside factor.”27 What is more, although love “… could have been taken as an opportunity to reveal the deep-seated contradiction in the present society,” the film regretfully “… starts with love and ends up with love as well,”28 without correlating it with cultural and social factors. For instance, in terms of the questions “Why do we finally turn into someone that we abhor?” and “What has made us become someone with whom we are disgusted?” that are raised by the movie, there is no conscious or effective representation. All of the transformations of the characters in effect could be attributed to materialistic values, which nevertheless receive little explanation. Moreover, social injustices are not deliberately addressed nor organically integrated into the plotline. Although the privileged life of Xu Kaiyang—a member of the “rich second generation”—and the corruption and abuse of public authority within the system are touched upon in the description of Xu’s romance with the college president’s daughter Zeng Yu, it is not consciously explored. Zhu Xiaobei’s smashing of the small store might embody the struggle and rebellion of young people, forming a sharp contrast with others, but the film merely presents it as an irrational act. Obviously, the director has never taken the question of “whether we change the world or it changes us” seriously, although she does raise this significant issue. Consequently, the film must focus on feelings of indulgence to examine life. When, at the end, Lin Jing reveals the truth about why he betrayed Zheng Wei 27 This is Feng Ni’s point. See Wang Dake, Feng Ni, etc, “On Contemporary Youth Films, 2nd round.” 28 Ibid.

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years ago, it is because he chanced upon the secret affair between her mother and his father. When he sighs that “only they live in the right present,” the message is clear: one should submit to his/her inner desire irrespective of the constraint of any moral regulation. Apparently, this immoral teaching is just an expression of egocentrism. However, in this film, we see the paradoxical coexistence of egocentric wantonness and the sense of helplessness, or egotism combined with self-resignation. Do these characters own their “subjectivity”? Regarding this question, critic Liu Jia has suggested that “… since there is little trace of the (intellectual and social) development of these characters, the issue of the subject’s formation here does not exist at all.”29 Against this interpretation, I would suggest that there is still the issue of subjectivity-formation here. The film exhibits the inevitable failure and gloom of these young people after their overindulgence, thus delivering this life “wisdom”: idealism is useless and pragmatism prevails. Since this is the individualistic life principle held by the “middle class” in contemporary China, it ultimately contributes to the birth of its subjectivity. However, this subjectivity is not yet consolidated. The mixed state of egotism and resignation is nothing but the symptom of the era, which actually shows the vulnerability of China’s middle class, arising from its inability to realize its idealistic dreams. Confronted with this predicament, the director fails to anatomize society and represent its totality. Instead, she just subscribes to mainstream pragmatism. When vulgarity and philistinism is taken to be the mark of growth and maturity, a sense of fatalism constrains this class to fight for its social ambition. Following the ruling value of pragmatism, it popularizes such cynicism in the name of “wisdom from the lessons of life,” and proffers it as the “chicken soup for the soul” (心灵鸡汤) for a Chinese audience. 29

See Wang Dake, Feng Ni, etc, “On Contemporary Youth Films, 1st round.”

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part 4 Middle Class Tastes and Intellectual Trends

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Making a Historical Fable: The Narrative Strategy of Lust, Caution and Its Social Repercussions In early March 2008, a piece of news that was never-officially-authenticated (appearing rather like a rumor) but circulated in cyberspace attracted great domestic attention in China and triggered hot debate; it was also picked up by news agencies worldwide. It was reported that a young actress, Tang Wei, had been banned from China’s domestic media; this was believed to be a result of her graphic sexual performance in the recent film of famed director Ang Lee, Lust, Caution. Initially, this incident appeared to be another ordinary case of the state’s behavior of suppressing and banning anything that it considers violent or pornographic in content or that it deems “threatening to the stability of society”—references to social unrest or other sensitive political issues. What is unusual is that this punishment was meted out after it had punished another film company for portraying similar steamy scenes. Thus, the government’s problem with Lust, Caution seems to be that it began a trend and incited other filmmakers to produce films with outrageous sexual content. However, the strange aspect of this ban is that it came four months after the movie had been launched onto the Chinese market and had virtually completed its theatrical run. The screening of the film and the ban both created a big stir, arousing lively, heated debate across society that lasted for more than half a year, making it one of the most sensational cultural events of the year. Indeed, the film is quite unusual in many ways. To begin with, its reception in the East and the West was vastly different: while its gross in the Chinese world (mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) was huge, it did not receive an enthusiastic reception in the United States.1 The Women Film Critics Circle 1 It premiered at the Venice Film Festival on Aug. 30, 2007 and won the Golden Lion award (Chinese director Zhang Yimou was the jury president). Despite only a heavily-edited version being screened, thanks to its successful pre-screening advertisement campaign which publicized the sex scenes, the film was a huge success in mainland China and grossed $17,109,185 USD, making it the country’s third highest-grossing domestic production film of 2007 (see “2007 China Yearly Box Office Results,” http://www.boxofficemojo.com/intl/ china/yearly/?yr=2007&p=.htm. Accessed Feb. 1, 2008). However, its gross in the U.S. was disappointing. It was rated NC-17 and never played at more than 143 theatres in its entire U.S. run, eventually grossing $4,604,982 (See “Top Grossing NC-17 Rated Movies at the Box Office,” http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/domestic/mpaa.htm?page=NC-17&p=.htm. Accessed Feb. 1., 2008).

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(WFCC) even ranked it in the “Top Ten Hall of Shame” of the year, with a derogatory comment “Adam and Eve in Old Shanghai. Female-assisted destruction of a nation while falling in love with torturer/rapist.”2 Ang Lee himself, although he had expected some difference at the box offices, expressed surprise at such a vast gap, and attributed it to the fact that Americans lack the experience of being occupied by a foreign regime and hence do not have the concomitant empathetic feelings. Moreover, even the proper genre of the film was controversial: is it an espionage thriller, an art film or film noir? Many film critics had differing opinions and conjectures.3 The only thing that is undoubted is that it is a wartime melodrama, although the disclosure of the secrets of the film’s content (which is premised on repeated viewings and freeze-framings) would reveal more subtlety and sophistication than these seemingly pulpy themes. This, together with its extremely lush yet apparently languorous style, is as much the result of its ambition to be an art film as well as a political motivation to make film noir allegorizing the historical maelstrom of modern China. Although many overseas (mostly Chinese) critics hailed the film as a success that ingeniously deconstructed patriotism,4 it was the subject of vehement critique in mainland China. However, this critique was not articulated in the mainstream media but on the internet and most of it was couched in nationalist rhetoric. In a domestic poll taken in cyberspace, the ratio of supporters and opponents of the ban, contrary to what we might have expected, reached more than 2:1.5 This quantitative data forms a sharp contrast to the overwhelmingly positive appreciation of the film in elite circles. Why this interesting phenomenon? In this chapter, I will argue that, insofar as the cinematic content produces conflicting and contradictory discourses appropriated for differing purposes, the intricate representation of its cinematic text and the complex reactions of the social context together constitute a rich cultural politic to be deciphered. Through an analysis of the narrative strategy of the film, I suggest that, for its 2 See the website of this association, available at: http://wfcc.wordpress.com/women-film -critic-circle-awards-2007/. Accessed 1 February 2008. 3 See the comments on the well-known film review website, “Rottentomatoes.” http://www .rottentomatoes.com/m/lust_caution/. Accessed Feb 1, 2008. 4 For instance, see two articles by Chen Xiangyin and Song Jiafu, published in Sixiang 思想 [Reflexion], a famed journal in Taiwan, no. 8, 2008. 5 As of March 22, the poll reached around 20,734: 9261, with altogether 29,995 people participated. See http://comment2.news.sohu.com/255572601/d66587862.html. Accessed March 22, 2008. No mainstream media reported the result of this poll.

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specific nature in a rare genre of political film noir, such elements as character design, plot motivation and narrative mode, through the mechanism of operation as projection, displacement and appropriation, interact with and reinforce one another in prescribed ways. This together postulates a specific internal order that is underwritten with a particular historical conception and world view. This narrative strategy informs the human experience represented in the work. Only through such a meticulous dissection can we understand why there were so many diverse and even antagonistic audience responses in the Chinese world. Furthermore, this contestation itself shows the existence of heterogeneous voices in society that compete for cultural hegemony in contemporary China. 1

A Précis of the Surface Plotline

Although a synopsis of the story can hardly explain all the complicated, multilayered plots, it is still indispensable for our analysis. In 1939, Wong Chia-Chi, a transferring first-year college student in Hong Kong and refugee from Shanghai, is introduced to an acting troupe consisting of college students led by Kuang Yumin. Kuang invites her to join them to put on a patriotic play to rouse morale and gather donations for the resistance against the Japanese, which is a stunning success. However, Yumin wants to achieve more by killing would-be collaborator Mr. Yee. He asks Chia-Chih to assume the persona of “Mrs. Mak” to insinuate her way into his confidence. Mr. Yee is a defector from the KMT’s quarter in Chungking, now hiding in Hong Kong to prepare for the establishment of a collaborationist government. Their plan fails just as it has begun as Yee returns to the hinterland to assume his official service in the pro-Japanese regime now established there. The film then flashes forward to 1941 and now we are now in Shanghai. Kuang, now recruited as an agent of the KMT government, approaches Chia-Chih again. She is brought to Old Wu, the underground organizer, who demands that she reinstate herself in the life and bed of Mr. Yee, who now is in charge of the secret police. Instead of assuming a role of femme fatale, she is first raped and then tortured by Yee. Despite being physically and emotionally torn and bleeding, and even though she knows that he is betraying his country and executing many resistance fighters, she falls in love with him. At the last moment, ostensibly an assassination scene, when she sees Yee presenting her with a six-carat diamond

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with a caring gaze, she blurts out: “Go. Go away quickly.” Yee runs downstairs, jumps into his car and slips away. “Mrs. Mak” and her coterie are arrested and executed but their boss, Old Wu, together with his two gunmen, escape the net. 2

Projection of Social Institutions in Historical Representation

Two parallel and intricately layered love tales are here played out and ultimately meet fatefully together; both conceal explosive secrets. When examined closely, not only does the scenario of love stories contain a discourse of love that is attached to a particular ideology, but the fable itself is formulated with layers of projection. The first tale is Chia-Chih’s emotional attachment to Kuang Yumin, the idealistic youth; instead of developing this passion into a romantic story, Yumin forfeits her virginity to the only member of the group who has sexual experience (picked up from hookers) to prepare her to be the paramour of Yee. What is more, three years later he asks her again to reprise the role of their first meeting. He is too patriotic to be a genuine lover and so persistent as to willingly use any means, fair or foul. By the same token, Chia-Chih’s acceptance of the arrangement is also much more amenable to the explanation of her own patriotic passion than the possibility that she loves Yumin so much as to willingly follow his will. Patriotism, or the nationalist resistance, drives these people to make cruel and inhuman decisions, which is more than false and ridiculous; it not only finally proves futile, but also destroys the possibility of genuine love between the couple. The plot is based on the historical experience of modern China rather than an ahistorical fairy tale, so the scenario itself is subject to a discussion of its historical probability.6 Thus, even though it is a film that is “… twice removed, as it were, from an unrecoverable historical experience … [as] … a fictionalized treatment of an ideological version of past events … [it] … must nevertheless be judged according to its fidelity to history.”7 Here, “… the criterion of historical truth … [is] … important because, as many discussions about the value of 6 Insofar as the virginity of a female body is always regarded by the Chinese people as the symbol of the integrity, sanctity and dignity of the mother country (just like anywhere in the world), this disgraceful action of mercilessly stripping a compatriot of her virginity would, by itself, violate the token of sacred national interests. In the meantime, both the historical facts of Chinese society of the period (which show it to be more sex-enlightened than we might expect) and the literary tradition of the era are at odds with this anti-mainstream narrative. 7 Yi-tsi Mei Feuerwerker, Ding Ling’s Fiction: Ideology and Narrative in Modern Chinese Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 139.

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figure 26 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: A screenshot showing the passionate, patriotic students

art and literature show, audiences often respond to works literally as reality.”8 From this perspective, the story appears barely credible in the reality of historical experience,9 as some critics have pointed out. These critics believe that this plot is not “realistic” in terms of either the “poetic truth” or the “historical truth” of the Aristotelian categories.10 8 Ibid. 9 The cinematic plot comes from the original short story, yet the writer, Eileen Chang, has herself claimed that, as early as her teens, she had been familiar with traditional Chinese pornographic novels and adult matters. Meanwhile, ever since the May-Fourth movement (1919), and especially in the 1930s, enlightened efforts by intellectuals had also brought about a “sexual revolution” by helping society to be familiar with “sexually enlightenment” pamphlets, if not sheer pornographic fiction, by writers such as the nicknamed “doctor of sex” Zhang Jingshen (1888–1970) and “triangle affairs expert” Zhang Ziping (1893–1959). Moreover, modern China’s literary history and the historical record would also offer quite a different perspective on Kuang’s restraint in love. Before the period depicted in this film (the late 1930s) and ever since the mid-1920s stories with so-called “revolution plus love formula” had been prevalent for a whole decade, which exerted great influence on the youth. Many of them, because of that influence, went to pursue the revolutionary path. This is especially true after the outbreak of the full-scaled resistance war in 1937. Here, the film adopts an anti-mainstream narrative—the latter being the staple of the works from both Nationalist and Communist perspectives—for its thematic purpose. 10 See Aristotle, Poetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

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But a historically “unrealistic” plot is not totally irrelevant, for we can study it in terms of its narrative strategy and the message it meant to present.11 This rite of sexual initiation introduced by a rogue-like figure, shown vividly in minute detail, is not devised to be a spy comedy, as some critics have surmised. Rather, to substantiate its probability, the film offers another elusive thread of plots, with the only other girl in the group, Lai Xiujing, as the protagonist. She loves Yumin secretly, yet the latter has no feelings for her. Many shots in the film present her in the same frame as Chia-Chih, in which she always seems to show a genuine care of the latter. However, it is only from the film script that we can clearly know the implied storyline: because Yumin is attracted to Chia-Chih, Xiujing then sets the traps for the latter throughout—including instigating this initial act of sacrificing her virginity (in order to deprive Chia-Chih of the opportunity of acquiring Yumin’s love) and, furthermore, implicating her for the job again three years later. In all, it appears that this treacherous person is the cardinal figure responsible for the tragedy. However, as Miss Lai’s nice appearance disguises her intention, she seemingly appears not evil at all but, at most, only blamable in her vanity and desire to win Yuming’s love. Therefore, even those viewers who have perceived Lai’s evil scheme would believe that it is still patriotism that is the key to this Paradise Lost: only due to blind passion do the students accept her vicious proposal, and only because of Chia-Chih’s vanity does she consent to it. This discourse on human nature, or the correlation between inhumanity and patriotism, can be subjected to an examination through narratology. The decipherment of the political as well as aesthetic encryption embedded in these cinematic details requires the decoding of another shocking scene: after their first attempt ends fruitlessly, Yee’s lackey Old Cao threatens the students with exposure. The extortion results in an impulsive, awful murder: they take turns stabbing him with seven knives, but still cannot end his life. Then Yumin miraculously remembers some trick and twists Cao’s neck in one blow. Who teaches him this execution skill? This protracted, brutal murder scene poses a great enigma, which not only puzzles much of the ordinary audience but has also perplexed some seasoned film critics: “Where did that come from? Who

11 Allegedly, the plot of the original story was derived from hearsay that the writer Eileen Chang had acquired from her husband about a similar action practiced by patriotic students in Beijing. However, as her husband was a collaborationist who was hostile to and even directly suppressed the anti-Japanese resistance, the hearsay cannot by itself be taken for granted as historical fact. Furthermore, the incident, even if it is true—which is scarcely possible—was too rare to be typical.

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knew he had it in him? What does it mean?” as Eric Snider is amazed and eager to know.12 As a symbolic ritual, this extraordinary scene is intended to work as another initiation rite into this horrific, atrocious political world—so that the director admits that the design of this horrible scene is “… to expose the horrors of violence, to show that once the patriotic students cruelly murder a man, they unrelentingly follow a path that would slaughter numerous innocent people.”13 Notwithstanding its apparent narrative purpose, the scene itself has a rupture that could hardly be sutured by the narrative, and also unexpectedly answers the lingering doubt: insofar as the cruel execution could only be carried out with skill derived from special training and from an experienced agent, it is scarcely possible from these innocent, idealistic youths. In other words, the horrible scene is only a projection. There is also a second layer of projection in the narration. Many in the West complained that Wong Chia-Chi’s moral inspiration for the scheme is as unclear as the cruel crimes of the collaborator, Mr. Yee, against his homeland.14 However, the film does offer an explanation of the latter, which appears as a tangential remark uttered by Yee’s wife at the mahjong party, in which she laments: “I said to Old Yee, your government [the collaborationist regime] could not even put on a presentable show: no matter how many good deeds you have done for the people, they would not buy what you have done for them.” They feel greatly wronged because the Chinese people in the occupied area, constrained by narrow nationalist sentiments, do not appreciate the regime’s good intentions when accepting their offers of protection. As is well known, this ratiocination was the staple excuse of collaborationists. We will not evaluate it per se but will go on to tease out the layered secrets of the cinematic texture. In the narrative itself, the decryption of the protracted mahjong scene in which this statement is uttered will contribute to our comprehension of its cinematic information—although only through a wordby-word dissection of the gossip and their facial expressions. By technically slowing these down, we get the message the characters communicate: most of these ladies have had affairs with Yee. And Mrs. Yee not only knows about these affairs but conspires to bring them about, including the one with “Mrs. Mak”.15 12 13 14 15

Eric D Snider, “Review.” see http://www.ericdsnider.com/movies/lust-caution/. Accessed March 21, 2008. See Zheng Peikai 郑培凯, ed. Sejie de Shijie 《色戒》的世界 [The World of Lust, Caution] (Nanning: Guangxi nanjing chubanshe, 2007). This was expressed in the numerous reviews on Rotten Tomato. Here there is no space for me to give a full account of the words and subtle countenance of these ladies fighting for the affections of Yee. But a Chinese e-friend with the nick

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figure 27 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: The intricate relation between “Mrs. Mak” and Yee

These privileged, powdered and pampered wives of the collaborators slap down the mahjong tiles to relieve their boredom. Their suffering under the occupation is minimal, unlike those countrymen starving in the streets, as shown in one or two shots (which is meant to remind us that survival was the principal concern at the time). These mahjong scenes suggest that their politics are governed by preserving their lifestyles. They (these ladies and their husbands) are classified as the Chinese comprador class, a section of the privileged upper-level bourgeoisie that metamorphosed from the traditional landowning gentry class, the crucial component of the modern Chinese middle class as it developed the capitalist mode of modernity in modern China. When examined from this angle, the game between Yee and “Mrs. Mak”, essentially the bourgeois play of adultery, yields new knowledge for our appreciation of the story. Here, it is not that Miss Wong plays the two tenuous halves name “Spanish eyes” has done an excellent job in this respect. See his analysis in “Yee taitai de mimi” 易太太的秘密 [The Secrets of Mrs. Yee], posted on website http://cache .tianya.cn/publicforum/content/filmtv/1/211079.shtml. Accessed Feb 3, 2008) Meanwhile, the various actresses playing these ladies also confirm this point in their interviews or personal blogs. See, for instance, an entry of Joan Chen’s (who plays Mrs. Yee) blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_48fbb60e01000bkw.html (accessed Feb 23, 2008), which confirms this.

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of her personality, but she is now entrapped in a changed identity: one is a patriotic, petite bourgeois student; the other is a middle-class lady of leisure trying to become a member of this aristocratic circle. When she is unable to distinguish her real from her fictional self, she misplaces her body and her psyche in a class to which she does not belong and her true nature is distorted by the role she is assigned. Thus said, the three sexual episodes in the film are worthy of further analysis. The coarse, explicit rape is shockingly presented to us just when we are lulled by the film’s languid pace. But “Mrs. Mak” seems to enjoy this and, a few days later when they meet again, they immediately embrace each other, with Yee lying down in her arm like a baby. As for the second sexual encounter following immediately, Michael Wood has described it like this: it is “… the visual set piece, with four pairs of limbs all over the place, as if the couple were trying to compose a difficult fleshly jigsaw puzzle rather than have sex.” Roland Barthes’ remark is quoted here to illustrate the theoretical puzzle: “Complexity of combinations, contortions of the partners, everything is beyond human nature.”16 The crosscutting between the lovemaking and shots of an open-eyed vigilant police dog can be read as conveying the message that sex is the most sensual enjoyment in a circumstance imbued with sheer terror, yet the parallel editing also helps the audience read the copulation on the most inhuman, bestial level at a time of national humiliation, both metaphorically and metonymically—and under the surveillance of an invisible force, just as the dog is led by a master whose face is not shown. The “jigsaw puzzles,” which try to display the couple’s respective attempts at gaining power, are also baffling in their effect on “Mrs. Mak”. Thus, in the third sexual encounter of the film, when Yee practices the missionary position, the film completes its goal of narration: love is produced by, or emerges from, raw sex—she falls in love with this cruel traitor in the face of the grand phallus. This worship of the patriarchal symbol of the “name of the father” initiates her, through a discourse of love, into the “symbol of order” of the traitors. Here, the key to the ultimate mystery (or rather, myth) of “love” is ideological: she is turned on by his domineering fascist-aristocratic power-entitlement. The hieroglyph of the fetal curl, as well as the imagery of the grand phallus, indicates that it is primitive passion or lust that finally counts. All human cultural adornments and love as a genuine emotion, when measured against this “primitive pleasure,” pale and are stripped away.

16

Michael Wood, “At the Movies: Lust, Caution,” London Review of Books, 24 Jan. 2008. http:// www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n02/wood01_.html. Accessed Feb 6, 2008.

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This discourse of love takes power-play as a love potion that leads to lust but does not regard love romantically. Nonetheless, since this experience sickens “Mrs. Mak” to the core as she complains bitterly to her boss and is informed by her boss that, in the same situation, Yee has killed two other female spies, her headlong plunge into love with the devil is hardly imaginable. As an ideological effect, this discourse of love was popular in a certain period and among a certain class stratum, which points to love as a historicallyconditioned (and, so, historically ever-changing) social, cultural and, finally, psychological institution. A patriotic petite bourgeois girl, Chia-Chih can hardly “fall in love” with a collaborator, no matter whether she physically enjoys sex or not; however, a middle-class lady like “Mrs. Mak”, without much nationalistic consciousness, might do so. However, change in class consciousness (from Chia-Chih’s to “Mrs. Mak”’s) needs years of habituation, not a sudden metamorphosis—some critics have pointed out that the delicate flirtation with and intricate seduction of Mr. Yee by “Mrs. Mak” is unrealistic, given the latter’s real identity as a lower-level, naïve fille.17 Therefore, this scenario of love is not only “just a movie” for its thematic purpose but also constitutes the second layer of projection. 3

Displacement of Party Politics by Sexual Politics

When the film’s brooding meditation on the unnerving power and terrible cost of emotional (and political) masquerades finally exposes its authentic concern, it will show the sexual politics of loyalty and betrayal as only a displacement of national (party) politics, accomplished by setting up multiple moralistic paradoxes. Like Chia-Chih, the erstwhile idealist Yumin has two widely differing identities. While his sacrifice of Chia-Chih when he was a progressive student is hardly credible, he assumes a new personality when he is assimilated into the KMT’s secret agency. In the face of tough Old Wu, who requires Chia-Chih’s blind allegiance to unreservedly play her sex-toy role, Yumin often remains silent (he protests once but, when reproached, he desists). He cannot help her, but he also feels a mix of guilt and jealousy; although, out of a veiled plot which is only detectable from their ambiguous dialogue in the phone call, he finally explodes when he plans the fateful sabotage, without the permission of his boss, to release Chia-Chih’s burden and with her co-operation. He is no longer 17

For instance, see Michael Wood, “At the Movies: Lust, Caution,” Ibid.

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figure 28 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: Merciless Yumin engages in assassination.

loyal: due to his love for Chia-Chih, he betrays the inhuman order of the ruthless domestic regime. For the heroine, there is also a paradox of loyalty and betrayal. She deludes herself by living an illusory life and gets lost in this simulated role. However, this is an artifice for the sake of the storyline. In the original story by Eileen Chang (1920–1995), “Mrs. Mak” never loves Yee but only in a last moment’s psychological turmoil does she mistake Yee’s care as a gesture of love. And the narrative voice tells us that Yee believes she must hate him at the execution site. The re-creation of this complex relation in the film again calls for our deeper consideration of the concept of the “realistic,” both in the sense of being faithful to the probable and the historical fact; it reminds us of the film’s idiosyncratic narrative strategy which pertains to its ideological theme. Like Wong, Yee is also playing roles within roles. Extremely guarded and suspicious, he immediately deduces her real identity after they meet. Although turned on by his lust, he veils his masochistic impulses behind a pretense of propriety. With the true nature of a political chameleon due to his fear of the terror imposed by the Japanese invaders as well as the underground resistance, he also clandestinely flirts with top KMT leaders. Meanwhile, his opponent, Old Wu, who seemingly suppresses all his feelings except a passionate devotion to the cause, is, in reality, also not loyal to his mission: he hates Yee to the marrow due to a family feud. When he receives the petition from Kuang to

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supervise “Mrs. Mak”’s meeting with Yee, he immediately realizes that Kuang wishes to kill Yee to relieve his lover. As this is a good chance to take revenge without shouldering the responsibility, he not only agrees to the plan but also offers Kuang two gunmen. The many teasing layers of guile, secrecy and cool impersonation played out here arise not merely from the genre of espionage but correlate closely with its thematic purpose which has set these many moral riddles in the first place. The whole story gives us the impression that loyalty or betrayal is never black and white, but this deliberately bewildering array of plots has led many uninformed critics to complain that the story calls “… for a powerful nation to depend on a young, inexperienced woman to help win a war.”18 The complaints arise from a lack of historical knowledge of modern China during the Anti-Japanese War, when China was by no means a powerful nation, as well as a lack of knowledge of the war strategies employed by the KMT government, which had to rely on a weak regular army. Without proper education, their soldiers were poor villagers drafted by coercion and force; to prevent them from escaping, they were often chained. Consequently, the army often lacked military efficiency. It also should be noted that it is for this reason that Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), who led KMT deserters to pursue the so-called “Peace Movement” and set up a collaborationist government, fell into desperation when he saw the KMT crack troops hopelessly defeated in the first few months after the onset of full-scale war. Another similarity shared by these two factions is that they put pivotal emphasis on the role of the secret service to assassinate their political enemies. In the movie, the impudent means taken by the KMT side are illustrated in vivid detail (though the message is only conveyed very subtly). Historically, the KMT agency recruited inexperienced citizens—such as these fledgling college students—to assume “dirty” tasks (such as the badger game) and undertake assassinations that would require special long-term professional training.19 Such operatives often disregarded their safety and ruthlessly sacrificed their lives (Lao Wu arranges his gunmen and himself to run away, while leaving the youths unattended). Thus, we can understand why the director said in an interview that, in showing details of the specific historical facts, the film expressed 18 Review by Marcy Dermansky, http://worldfilm.about.com/od/chinesefilms/fr/lustcau tion.htm. Accessed Feb 7, 2008. 19 For historical background, see Frederic Wakeman Jr. The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Timothy Brook. Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).

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figure 29 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: “Mrs. Mak” and Yee are seemingly fond of each other.

his disillusionment with the actions of the KMT in the Resistance War that the KMT propaganda had imposed on him during his childhood.20 While exposing this dirty history, the film does not show the torture and executions of patriotic resisters by collaborators. Instead, as noted, it shows Yee working dutifully, politely dropping in to greet guests and having no interest in money.21 It makes us feel sympathetic to a man whose schizoid nature is but an outcome of grim political circumstances, a man whose cruelty is almost dissolved by the cool and subtle humanity he shows now and then. In a nutshell, he is at worst a pitiable victim of the inclement era, rather than a shameless traitor and merciless executioner. 20 The interview was conducted in Chinese in a TV program by TVG, dated Oct. 27, 2007. The video was online and I viewed it personally and downloaded it for my use. For the detailed record of Ang Lee’s words, see Wang Qitao 王琦涛, “Sejie de wenben fenxi, lishi changshi yu duiqi xianshi yiyi de sikao” 《色戒》的文本分析，历史阐释与对其现实 意义的思考 [Textual Analysis, Historical Interpretation, and Thoughts of the Social Significance of Lust, Caution], http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/wenyi/2009/09/26470 .html. Accessed April 7, 2018. 21 See Zhang Xiguo 张系国, “Zhenzhi zhengque de laoyi” 政治正确的老易 [A “politically correct” Old Yee], published in the supplement of Zhongguo ribao 中国日报 [China Times] November 11, 2007. Also see the entry of his blog, http://blog.chinatimes.com/ changsk/archive/2008/07/28/212133.html. Accessed March 4, 2008.

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His re-defection to the KMT emphasizes this point: the motivation is revealed by his confession to “Mrs. Mak”: “When the war began with the Americans, they [the Japanese] knew the war would soon come to an end.” The U.S. declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941, following the Pearl Harbor incident. Yee therefore feels his doomsday approaching. The syuzhet of the film occurs on one day, 27 October 1942, as the signature of the document Yee signs for the execution of the resistors indicates. This was the second day of the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, when the Americans won a decisive battle against the Japanese. What this narrative detail subtly conveys is that it is America’s involvement, rather than China’s resistance efforts, that transforms the fate of the originally doomed resistance and, as a consequence, also the mind of Yee. If the Japanese had not attacked Pearl Harbor, the Americans probably would not have intervened and there would have been no chance for China to win the Resistance War; thus, the implied message that the “Peace Movement” efforts would appear more patriotic, as the latter prevented China from being ruled by the Japanese and let the country still be ruled by the “Chinese.” Who would know that contingent incidents would unexpectedly change the course of history? “When I review that period of history, a word always comes into my mind: fear … Man’s calculation is never comparable to nature’s mystery,” the director lamented in the same interview conducted in Los Angeles.22 Thus, we can understand why there are so many “moral riddles” here— ultimately, they come from this historical belief and explain why the fear of Mr. Yee would metamorphose into a sadist/masochist drama. It does not mean that Yee is either emotionally or physically ineffective but only alludes to the death of his soul. When Yee throws out the confession, “I know better than you how to be a whore,” in responding to “Mrs. Mak”’s remarks that he wants to keep her as a harlot, he is disclosing his true nature. However, compared to the ending of the original story, when the writer has Yee allude to a phrase to pinpoint the relationship between him and “Mrs. Mak” (now dead)—“Alive, Chia-chih was his woman; dead, she is his ghost”—which apparently underscores his inexorable cruelty, the finale of the film does not stage Yee as a dead man who has been psychologically raped and killed by the Japanese, but represents him as dying for love. After he signs the execution document, he steps into the room reserved for “Mrs. Mak”, sits on the bed and caresses the velvety sheet. When the bell rings, he steps out, tears in eyes, and sentimentally pays a last tribute to the bed: his shadow is cast on it—symbolically he becomes the ghost of “Mrs. Mak”. 22 Ibid.

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figure 30 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: Old Wu demands the unconditional service of “Mrs. Mak”.

If we do not take account of the political rhetoric of the collaborators, the film might not be read as delivering a special patriotic message. Instead, the audience witnesses, in the execution scene, the camera craning up at a dizzying speed to show the depthless cavern the resistors face as they kneel, howling to meet their destiny; they also hear a male character’s voice from a movie screened in the theater where Yumin and “Mrs. Mak” are making their rendezvous, “Sister, let us go home. Mother is still waiting for us (for dinner);” “How can you be here?!”. These deliver an unambiguous message to the audience: heed your own business and do not involve yourself with dirty politics. However, the ostensibly tragic love story glosses over, to some extent, its ulterior motive; what is easily neglected is that emphasis is placed less on Yumin’s unfulfilled love (as a strong emotion of regard and affection) than on “Mrs. Mak” and Yee’s consummated lust (as a fundamentally animal instinct). In this story about transformation—by war, politics and sex—the sexual politics played out communicate or, rather, displace passionate ideological commitments, which are fundamentally underwritten with classbased party politics. That this politics is class-bound is further suggested by the film’s representation of the role that women assumed in the war in particular and in society in general. Around the time when “Mrs. Mak” works as an erotic spy in Yee’s bed, Old Wu sends two other female agents to seduce Yee but they are exposed, raped and executed; according to Old Wu, they are even forced to submit a

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figure 31 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: A scene echoing the historical romance between the Conqueror Xiang Yu and his concubine

long name-list. This subplot already transmits the message that women cannot play any constructive role in the resistance, as they have no intellect. Worse still, Old Wu uses “Mrs. Mak” as just a sex toy and does not count on her to earn valuable information. Her weakness and lack of intellect cost many lives. This conservative misogyny extends to the principal plot. Mr. Yee gives her no reason to love him but the actress gives seemingly haunting expression to her conflicted feelings and sense of entrapment. From this perspective, her seemingly strong will, as shown by her initiative in engaging in intercourse and her remorseless countenance at the execution site, is only a patriarchal ruse. The nature of this setup could be more fruitfully explained by a real cultural difference, with two scenes from the film underwritten with historically Chinese literary figures. One is a popular bard song, sung by a girl accompanied by a one-string fiddle, in a tavern where the ladies meet. The song laments the destiny of an imperial concubine and an emperor of the Tang dynasty (618–906). The emperor was forced to order his concubine to commit suicide because he was threatened by his generals who believed it was she who caused national chaos, the emperor being infatuated with her and neglecting the governance of the country. To maintain his power and status, the emperor succumbed, on the pretext of sacrificing his concubine for the country. The film evokes this parallel reading to suggest that Yee likewise has to sacrifice

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his beloved for his tough mission, as the woman is really a source of trouble. Another similar message could be found in the imagery (as a result of the mise en scène) in which Yee embraces “Mrs. Mak” in his arms and she offers him a song-dance—an image that recalls a famous moment from Chinese history, when the conqueror Xiang Yu (232 BC–202 BC) bid farewell to his concubine before she killed herself to avoid the trouble she would have implicated him in when he was entrapped. The concept of love displayed in these two stories, which demands innocent women to willingly sacrifice their lives for powerful men, is a traditional (in the sense of being aristocratic or feudal), patriarchal ideology that the conservative KMT and its regime had embraced:23 “Mrs. Mak” is sent to death by her master even though he “loves” her; she never regrets—not to say hates—it but feels self-assured and happy. 4

Appropriation of Historical Allegory through Identity Deconstruction

This insinuation of party politics finally points to the problem of national identity, the ultimate crux of the movie. When Yee buys a diamond for the heroine, she is confused, oscillating, and finally betrays her mission and her country. Her personal and national identities are shattered. This action itself, as well as the film in general, becomes a symbolism in which lust (rather than love) prevails. The more important implication of this ideological message, however, is that it speaks to an idiosyncratic representation of history. As a film determined to be a microscopic mapping and allegorical rendition of modern China’s history, there is another plotline in the movie which is deeply embedded in the text yet rarely exposed. It involves the supply of ammunition, which is sent by the US to the KMT government as wartime assistance, which is intercepted by Yee. In their meeting, Old Wu informs “Mrs. Mak” that the Japanese are currently also inquiring about its whereabouts. Where is it? To whom does Yee give it? Right at the beginning of the movie, Yee asks Secretary Zhang to kill the captured KMT spy before the Japanese interrogate him. Why does he try to kill the informant? Obviously, he wants to keep some of his secrets. 23 The KMT promoted itself as the authentic inheritor of essential Chinese culture. The first image of “Mrs. Mak’s” thoughts in flashback is a close-up shot of Wong Chia-Chih with her hair handsomely waving in the air, which is a typical aesthetic imaginary of the KMT’s discourse of neo-traditionalism.

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The conundrum can only find its answer in correlation with historical experience as the subtext. When we examine all the forces at that time, this hidden force that covets weapons could be none other than the CCP army: the KMT’s propaganda always portrayed the role of this power-force during the Resistance War as one that, at best, passively fought the Japanese and, at worst, sabotaged the KMT’s resistance efforts while actively strengthening itself. It is only from this perspective that we can understand why the director states at the film’s premiere in Japan, on Dec. 4, that, “The movie ostensibly is about the war between the Chinese and the Japanese; in truth, it is about the domestic war between the KMT and CCP.”24 Seen in this light, the CCP, as the force behind the curtain, is the most treacherous historical actor: it sabotages the resistance efforts by secretly working with the traitors to steal the advanced weapons the United States sends the KMT government; it is because of her mission of ferreting out this vicious domestic enemy that “Mrs. Mak”, as well as numerous KMT agents, sacrifice their lives. As a standard picture offered by the Cold War narrative of conspiracy theory, this account itself, held by few historians today, is open to debate and needs historical evidence to justify it. The partisan viewpoint aside, the movie implies that China’s Anti-Japanese War was thus doomed to lose without American intervention, partly also because the resistance efforts of the two political actors (KMT and CCP) were both half-hearted, fooling their people yet dallying with the enemy. This narrative is actually a far cry from the historiography of either the KMT or the CCP and comes very close to that of the collaborationists. However, the allegorical dimension extends even further: besides American assistance indicated by the ammunition, the other global power at that time, the Soviet Union, is not left out. There are rich verbal as well as visual hints throughout the film that insinuate a Russian presence,25 implying that the Soviet Union is the black-hand meddling in China’s politics that would lead to civil war. Again, this is the traditional story provided by Cold War rhetoric. In a nutshell, these narrative details convey that, in the turmoil of the country’s political crisis, the dangerous game of deception is a dueling set of power plays. What is special in this particular narrative, however, is that collaborators such as Yee are out of their league when they lock horns with global geopolitical powers. A victim of dirty domestic party politics and global geopolitical power-play, he has a tragic fate because he has to execute “Mrs. Mak” whom he 24

This is from a news story reported in a Taiwanese media. See the link http://www.im.tv/ VLOG/Personal/236326/3235095. Accessed March 3, 2008. 25 White Russian prostitutes walk around the street corners and two Russian “chefs” are looking over at “Mrs. Mak” when she makes calls, etc.

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“loves”. His secretary, Mr. Zhang, is assigned to oversee him and has known the identity of “Mrs. Mak” for a long time and keeps close watch.26 Like the tragic heroes in the two traditional Chinese stories analyzed above, Yee has to sacrifice his lover for a greater, sublime cause. By presenting a “tragic” story of a collaborator and a traitor, this presumed ethnography intends to be a national allegory of modern Chinese history, as well as a global allegory of the world political power-transactions played out in the country. For this motif, it presents an allegorical place in which the concepts of oppression and treason are tacked onto universal human needs like love and desire. But this is also why it fails to make the political goals of Mr. Yee cogent and compelling: its portrayal that irrational emotion wins out over tidy political abstraction is merely an ideologically preemptive motive that sets out to manipulate a narrative that is barely plausible to start with. Furthermore, a closer examination of the cinematic texture reveals it to be much less a symbolism of the power of lust than an allegory the failure of history. “The supersession of the symbol by the allegorical,” Jameson informs us, “would thus dramatize the overcoming of some first naïve and representational immediacy … with a reflexivity that demystifies that immediacy and identifies its constituents as purely literary and linguistic realities.”27 Allegory is the result of a process of reading. As De Man says, it designates a temporal process: “In the world of allegory, time is the originary constitutive category.”28 In the film, the failure of history means the failure of the resistance efforts of both the populace (represented by the students) and the official regime (as Old Wu stands for the resistance endeavors of the KMT government). It even signifies the failure of the collaborators (typified by the treacherous political chameleon Mr. Yee). Therefore, when the film is read as an allegory of the history of modern China, it shows the failure of all the three major forces in play. Meanwhile, there are no clean players in history: all historical actors, even those who claim to be on the just side, are ignoble partners. Yet would not this allegory of failure only lead to the conclusion that history is absurd? Indeed, as life is presented as tragic, pointless and absurd here, the entire story is an exercise in absurdity; or the absurdity is played as a drama. Such absurdity apparently points to the infructuous efforts of the patriotic 26

27 28

The agents in the diamond shop are not Kuang’s assassination group but are sent by him to safeguard Yee’s safety. As soon as he sees “Mrs. Mak” for the first time in Yee’s house, he suspects her—the film cues us with several single shots and two-shots (with “Mrs. Mak”) of him—and he sets off to investigate. Fredric Jameson, A Singular Modernity (London; New York: Verso, 2002), 107. Paul De Man, Blindness and Insight (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1997), 207.

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resistance which, manipulated and used by party politics, forfeited so many innocent lives. But when a woman (in particular, her body) is to assume all the weight of history, this woman’s body again becomes a symbolic space. Hence, this allegory of the failure of history is only the other aspect of a symbolism, a symbolism of the supremacy of lust, which means that this is a pseudo-allegory—insofar as lust is treated as one that owns the preemptive power, it simultaneously already means the failure of all the others such as patriotism, love and history. The failure of history seems to have been brought about by the base means applied by the various characters. However, for the spirit of allegory defined by Jameson and De Man, this ethical concern needs to be placed in its historical situation to be seen as a response to an essentially social dilemma; we need to translate it into political terms. Insofar as this allegory of (historical) failure is not historically tenable for the Chinese nation, I would argue that it is at most a workable one for a particular class; that is, it is an allegory of the failure of the politics of this comprador class. Moreover, I will go a step further to suggest that this scheme of historical fable derives its inspiration from the history of a particular location from which the film’s producers (the director and the script writer) come: the ultimate understanding of the filmic text should take the social context of Taiwan’s cultural politics into account, making this film essentially an appropriation of another set of historical allegories. This is because, to the extent that the film script characterizes the larger geopolitical conflict of the Second Sino-Japanese War with the experience of a young, traditional Chinese “good girl” who has become a war orphan and loses her national identity, the film is simultaneously very amenable to another allegorical reading in reference to the history and national identity of modern Taiwan. For, when it is revealed that Chia-Chih’s mother is dead, this can be interpreted as an allusion to the death of traditional Chinese culture for modern Taiwan (as well as mainland China, to be sure. This figurative expression is a common phrase in the Chinese world). Again, when it is revealed that Chia-Chih’s father flees to England with her brother and abandons her, and when a figure like Old Wu (as a merciless surrogate father) uses her as a tool and sex toy to deal with the enemy,29 it could be read as a message that Taiwan’s mother country—China—had abandoned her and used her as bait to satisfy the Japanese by signing the secession treaty in the wake of defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. In this light, the fact that the heroine’s national 29

These plots are not contained in the original story, where she is still seriously entrusted with the mission.

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identity is simultaneously shattered and co-opted then finally becomes a perfect fable of the formation of an “ambiguous” Taiwanese identity, the discourse of which is popular in the area.30 Indeed, as a visual reconstruction of the national memory, this epic/antiepic film noir inserts itself, through a representation of body, gender and revolution, in the public consciousness as a point of reference for intellectual discussion of the historical experience of Chinese modernity. In the climactic moment of the film, the heroine’s national identity is shattered and deconstructed. The deliberation of its social-phenomenological import could be pursued through a study of the discursive changes of China’s national identity. The history of modern China is one by which the Chinese seek to forge their modern national identity through a strenuous process of nation-state building, in which the Resistance War also made a substantial contribution. The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 established its national identity as one that was based on the concept of class-nation, a discourse that asserted that the Chinese people were now citizens in a socialist country, with the working class as the leading class and the alliance of workers and peasants its foundation. Fundamental changes have taken place since the late 1980s, when post-socialist China witnessed the adoption of a pro-neo-liberal policy that propelled the acceleration of privatization, which injured the interests of the working class and caused millions of them to lose their jobs. Now the country resorts to traditional, cultural sources (especially Confucianism) to define what “Chineseness” is. Many critics believe that this new definition is fluid and unsubstantial, with no solid foundation to back it up. It also tries to promote nationalism to replace the crumbling state ideology. Accordingly, the national identity that it had proclaimed is fragmented and dispersed. Sacrificing the interests of their once “leading class” to the interests of the domestic nouveaux riches and trans-national capital, the state is anxiously being co-opted into the world market-system and joining the trend of globalization. In this light, the central motif of the film—betrayal—echoes a prevalent social sentiment among the populace in contemporary China.31 The massive transformation, or 30

31

When this reasonable speculation is associated with contemporary political events, when the then-DPP regime’s policy of de-Sinicization ousted Chiang Kai-shek from the altar, it is mainland China’s alleged communist regime that simultaneously demolished Maoist doctrine as well as the socialist infrastructure and followed the developmentalist policy that the KMT has adopted, and boosted the status of Chiang in historical writing. This inevitably leads to our contemplation: are these the ultimate “historical absurdities” that are projected back to the displaced allegorical time-space? In early 2008, there was a mobile-phone short messaging phrase that was very popular in cyberspace, which read: “After viewing Lust Caution, I feel women are not reliable; after

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figure 32 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: A resplendent, enticing scene with colorful light effects

the abruptly turning fates of different classes within China, also invests some with the feeling that history is a process of absurd, purposeless transmigration. While the narrative strategy can make any sort of historical representation, the historical experience per se would not lend itself to any indiscriminate specific use. Thus, the dialectic also subjects this allegory of the failure of history to its opposite through a deconstructive reading. With a realist surface and a new political fervor, the film intends to present an enclosed world “as it was” (although it has also been dressed up to a great extent). This effort also leads to some revelations it might not have expected and brings out some jarring, incoherent discourses. One case is regarding the patriotic play performed by the students, which is probably meant to satirize a CCP propaganda play “White-Haired Girl” (as the meticulously equivalent mise en scène suggests), watching The Warlords, neither are brothers; and after seeing Assembly, I only realize the organization is the most undependable.” (Here “the organization” in China historically and literally refers to the CCP). The three movies mentioned here ranked in the top three at the box-office in 2007. It is generally accepted that this phenomenon reflects the crisis of mutual trust and the lack of a sense of security in the society. The most salient trait is, to be sure, the mistrust of “the organization,” which means the government and the Party. It reveals the scrambling of the political-ethical codes of the regime with the moral-ethical codes of the populace, which makes an inarticulate politico-economic reality visible.

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for, in reality, Yuming (who plays the solider) cannot save Chia-Chih (who acts the peasant girl), unlike the rosy picture narrated by the original drama. But the very fact that Yuming cannot liberate the people and his lover also suggests that there must be a historical alternative road for the goal of national salvation. In addition, the resplendent, enticing scenes with colorful light effects and tawdry embellishments are yet filled with emptiness, boredom, intrigue and deceit in the inhumane mahjong room, a constant reminder of the politico-economic truth-content underneath the frivolous ornamentation and indulgence of bourgeois life. As a result, by presenting a distorted view of life as it was, the film discloses the decadent, treacherous life-world that anticipates a new world. Furthermore, the content or implications of this new world can be found in the ephemeral scene of the authentic, simple-hearted genuine emotions (a token of sincere love) and encouragements (to fight the invaders unswervingly) exchanged between this peasant girl and the soldier. Meanwhile, the audience’s passionate calls for national salvation in the theater also convey the message of an unyielding resistance. In other words, in its efforts to deconstruct patriotism, the film simultaneously—in an unconscious and unintentional way—articulates the discourses of genuine love as affectionate emotion and uncompromised resistance as fearless devotion. In short, the unwittingly juxtaposed scenes present a hybrid (“semi-colonial, semi-feudal” and multi-layered classes) society and its overlapping social, ideological and moral orders, which is made explicit by the vastly different political attitudes of the various characters towards the Japanese imperialists. In this light, the ontological passion of the film becomes its dialectical opposite: it not only stands for an ideological reification and fantasy but also paradoxically speaks to an alternative historical imagination and aspiration. 5

Conclusion

By scrutinizing the many aspects of the cinematic narrative, from its selection of theme and subject matter, concepts of character, notions of causality and plot, to its use of setting and metaphor, style and language, as well as its choice of narrative mode, I propose that the film aims to be a closely-knit, coherent yet subtly concealed political film noir subservient to a particular ideological demand, but that its multiple-layered narrative also unwittingly contains contending and antithetical discourses that trigger differing responses. To be more specific, the passionate desire to reconstruct collective memory and rewrite national history finds its genre objectification in a film noir disguised as an erotic thriller, in which the juxtaposition of the melodramatic

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figure 33 Lust, Caution (Se jie, 色戒), 2007: The patriotic show is reminiscent of the CCP’s propaganda play “White-Haired Girl”.

and the epic is the crux of this cinematic artifact. The melodramatic covers up the political supplement of the epic and the epic unravels the political sublimation of the melodramatic. In a series of operations such as displacement and projection, denial and reaction formation (the utterance of fear), as well as rationalization and identification (of defeatism), the cinematic artifact endeavors to undo anxieties and compensate for unfulfilled desires. But the film means to flatten out this endeavor by its artistry of an unobtrusive narration, seamless editing and camerawork. The visual and narrative logic of the cinematic language, such as framing, editing, sound effects (for example, music like the drum-beats in the sexual scenes) and, in particular, the heavy uses of POV shots, eye-line matches and shot/reverse-shot patterns, reflects its intention to manipulate audience response towards an imaginary reality, one that possesses a semblance of coherence and wholeness, which constitutes a representative example of suture theory.32 The living rooms of the rising Chinese urban middle class are the imagined spaces in which a meta-historical critique of Chinese revolution or resistance 32

Stacy Thompson has distinguished two sorts of “sutures.” One is “imaginary suture” which sutures spectators with characters, whereas “symbolic suture” sutures the ‘world-views’ represented by films with us. Lust, Caution typically exemplifies both the operative mechanisms. I would add a third kind, “practical suture”, which precedes “imaginary suture” and uses shot/reverse-shot to make the psychology and deportment of the characters more credible and ‘realistic.’ Cf. Professor Rob Nowlan, “What is ‘suture’?” http://www .uwec.edu/ranowlan/suture.html. Accessed March 4, 2008.

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as traumatic experience are to unfold. Conservative ideology (assuming itself as liberal humanism) rejuvenates by venturing into this terrain of time and memory. The preponderance of flattering acclaims of the film in the Chinese mainstream media (all with the same expressions: “excellent representation of profound humanity”, “a great art film;” etc.) show that, in the Chinese elite strata, nationalist sentiments, which are generally viewed as rampant in society, could in certain times easily be outweighed by a new class consciousness. This class consciousness, if not yet coming from a class stratum that is substantively formed, then at least is in the process of formally institutionalizing the habitus, or the “subjectivity,” of a fledgling middle class. The reason for this easy transformation is that contemporary Chinese nationalism is only premised upon a robust consumerism backed by the same emerging class stratum. This group is easily subjected to the influence of an idiosyncratic code of love and universal humanity: “True love is blameless,” an aggressive slogan propagated by the advertising organ of the film’s producer, is largely accepted by this elite group. It is within this general ideological or cultural-political framework that a misplaced historical drama plays out; however, just as the film also sets in motion the fundamental discrepancies, conflicts, and co-existence of different systems of value, culture, and social codes of conduct, it also turns out that history still goes on, and not necessarily towards “the end”: although, in various public elite media, positive reviews were overwhelming, on the internet the movie was also subject to much criticism. But these repudiations are mostly expressed in nationalist rhetoric: “How can a patriotic girl turn into a traitor falling in love with a collaborator?” Ironically, it is in the context of the rapid reshuffling of class structures that the perspective of class analysis is obsolescent. 6

Coda

Amid the heated debate conducted in cyberspace (but not in the elite media), two lawyers filed an official lawsuit against China’s State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), accusing it of allowing a movie extolling collaborators to be screened, which harmed their feelings as scions of martyrs of the Resistance War. In the meantime, during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress that was being held in Beijing, denunciation of the film and its vicious influence was also reported to have been made by some representatives attending the conference. Probably due to these pressures, the internal memo regarding the ban was issued by the administration. However,

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when facing pressure from the elite media which impeached it of practicing punishment without legal sanction, it had to explain that the reason for this prohibition was due to “… the bad influence the nude scenes might incur on juveniles.” This ludicrous reasoning itself only reveals administrative awkwardness. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of the ban by not a few mainland Chinese also should not be regarded as an endorsement of the administrative measure; it merely shows the populace’s spontaneous opposition to the film’s classbound ideology. In this light, the conflicting responses to the movie finally become a mirror of contemporary Chinese society: it reflects the existence of all the heterogeneous elements among differing social forces, vying with and competing against each other to claim their political legitimacy and cultural hegemony in the ongoing development of Chinese (post-)modernity.

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Social Democracy or Neoliberal Freedom? Globalization and Contemporary Chinese Intellectual Thought “Despite economic globalization and interdependence, despite the flow of capital, commodities, media, and culture across borders…” scholars around the world have worriedly observed what is unfortunately going on in the world: “… geopolitical conflict and economic competition by powerful nations continue and often flare up. Interstate conflict, unequal development, neoliberal agendas, and environmental disasters are tearing the world apart.”1 In this tumultuous age, China’s integration into the world economic order brings to it the norms and values of global capitalism. Yet, although in China “… capitalist globalization is never viewed as a factor in the contradictions and conflicts of interest at the national level,” the state’s virtual leader of the “new leftist school”, Wang Hui 汪晖 (1959–) finds that, since the 1990s, “China’s economic policy and developmental trajectory are locked into the process of capitalist globalization, whose outcomes have included successive financial crises and growing social tensions and inequalities.”2 Since the state in this period continues its developmentalist policies of the 1980s and implements many pro-market programs, it has been widely observed that practices such as “… the commodification of land and labor and enterprise privatization…” have “… simultaneously stimulated economic growth and threatened the livelihood and security of segments of the rural and urban working classes.”3 On the other hand, the state’s political-economic complex is generally taken to be “… the power-manipulated process of marketization or a market-based reconfiguration of state and social power…”4 or the alliance and complicity between local power elites, the proto-middle class and transnational capitalism. There is a consensus that society has long been divided into diverse 1 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” in Ban Wang ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 1–2. 2 Wang Hui, “Depoliticized Politics, From East to West,” The New Left Review, Vol. 41 (September– October 2006): 43. 3 Ching Kwan Lee and Mark Selden, “China’s Durable Inequality: Legacies of Revolution and Pitfalls of Reform,” Japan Focus, January 2007. 4 Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), 14.

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communities with a wide variety of interests. The so-called “new social class strata”—the newly emerging bourgeois class consisting of private entrepreneurs, managers and staff in foreign-funded, domestic firms, and artistic and business free-lancers—has emerged with increasing economic and political power. On the other hand, the rising proto-middle class, although complicit with the regime in making their wealth, is demanding more rights. In the meantime, the working class bears the brunt of profound social transformation, suffering from a fragile social security network and insufficient education and training opportunities. In such circumstances, it is not unexpected that the attendant cultural landscape is no less bewildering. On one hand, there are “… pervasive consumerism… naked hedonism, and philistinism …”; on the other hand, the “… rising resentment amid the disgruntled and dispossessed populace, coupled with a nostalgia for Mao’s era of egalitarianism; and increasing assertive nationalistic sentiments in the general public…”5 are more than prominent. Keen tensions among different factions of intellectuals have gradually escalated. At the end of the 1990s, after further fragmentation and polarization, two principal parties loomed large: the so-called “New Left” school and the self-assumed “liberal” group. The former calls for a revival the socialist ideal of equality and justice; the latter argues for jettisoning socialism and converting to the “universal trend” of global capitalism. This chapter’s aim is to review contemporary Chinese cultural trends and debates. It suggests that there are three trends of intellectual complexity in Chinese society since the 1990s: the intricate interaction between, and the dialectic of, postmodern discourse and nationalistic sentiment; the “conservative” inclinations of statism and “corporatism” and their implicit cooperation; and the conflicts between the pursuit of social democracy and dreams of neoliberal freedom. The last one leads to the urge to demand a new socialism from the broad populace, and the will of the elite nouveaux riches to continue the neoliberal agenda to join the global club of capitalism. 1

Dialectics of Postmodernism and (Post-)Nationalism

Since the 1990s, the coexistence and complication of postmodern and nationalist discourses have become an intellectual trend. Postmodernism celebrates the freedom of the individual, whereas nationalism is a sense of belonging and paying loyalty to the nation-state. In light of the US domestic scene after the 5 Ibid., 45.

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“9/11 Incident”, this is no unique phenomenon, but China’s case is surely different: it simultaneously displays feelings of excitement and dejection, overflowing desire and a sense of constraint in a developing country, with many internal conflicts. The “liberals” deem this trend of postmodern discussion reactionary, for they believe that China’s backward political, economic and social complexes are far from postmodern. Some left-leaning scholars also argue that the postmodernist celebration of commercialized culture debases elite, refined cultural schooling while catering to vulgar, popular tastes. For this reasoning, although postmodern discourse has been bitterly rejected by some of the New Left for their unreflective endorsement of marketism, it is still seen by “liberals” as belonging to the left camp for its critique of unilateral modernity. The intricate appropriation of Chinese postmodern discourse by different intellectual groups stems from the rapid economic growth and drastic improvement in the material condition of the populace since the early 1990s, which brought about the popular positive attitudes towards the future of the state. Shortly thereafter, however, the overwhelming trend of commercialism in society, together with rampant consumerism and moral cynicism, also provoked alarm among elite scholars, who never expected that wholesale market reform would produce such a “decadent” picture. Disgusted at the vulgarization of society, they lamented its degeneration and felt that they could no longer exert any significant influence over the masses. Feeling bitterly alienated, they advocated a “humanistic spirit” in order to fend off this commercial fetishism while acknowledging the necessity of “secularization.” What they missed at this historical point is that a market revolution had taken place, which would have lasting and comprehensive impacts. What is more, the shortage of real political thinking results in them “… vacillating between cultural conservatism and a desire for secular intervention,” as Liu Kang astutely remarks, because they cannot rationalize themselves “… by denying from the outset the validity of any politically engaged criticism.”6 The “humanists” did not see the turn, nor did the postmodernists. One representative of the postmodern critics, Zhang Yiwu, argues that what these intellectuals are unwilling to face and what they detest is historically inevitable and what the masses truly want. While the commercialization of society, including interpersonal relations, is a natural result of the market economy, what has happened is apparently beyond the people’s choice. However, because of this populist tendency, Chinese postmodernists have denounced the cultural critique of Chinese tradition in the 1980s, seeing it as falling into dichotomies of China-West, traditional-modern. In contrast, they welcomed the arrival of the 6 Ibid., 41.

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market economy and its attendant ideology of commercialism and consumerism. In particular, they celebrated the rise of commercialized mass culture as a liberating force that breaks up the elitist division of high and low cultural spheres. For them, it is thus invaluable for constructing a popular space that the masses truly need, and these changes are the victory of the Chinese people who win what they truly want and need by refusing both domestic official propaganda and Western hegemony. It does away with the teleology of modernity, opening up a horizon for various possibilities. The postmodern culture of mass consumption also has great effects on emancipation: as the desires of ordinary people enter the space of culture, they contribute to an embryonic form of democratization.7 Therefore, this Chinese form of “postmodernism” is taken to be a brand-new ideology, a “new state of affairs” that is enjoyed by the masses. In these hasty judgments lie some paradoxical arguments. On one hand, they argue that China’s postmodern era, by embracing heterogeneous elements in spatial and temporal terms, questions the ingrained idea of cultural authenticity; on the other hand, they assume that Chinese post-modernity is authentically Chinese. They treat the commercialism of society as a democratic power for registering people’s true voices as distinct from the official and the elite; however, by regarding this commercialized culture as the playground of the masses, they pay little attention to its undemocratic effects or totalizing anesthesia, as indicated by the Frankfurt school, or they regard such critiques as untimely for contemporary China when its liberating effects are far from exhausted. Nevertheless, China’s fast developing pace is beyond their imagination and expectation, which soon makes optimistic views “outdated.” For that matter, China’s postmodernist discourse envisages a newly emerged, alternative choice that diverges from European-type modernity. A brand of “Chineseness”—believed to be “… a dialectical negation and continuation of China’s classical culture and modern Enlightenment tradition, and an effort to redefine a Chinese identity in the age of globalization”8—comes from their theoretical musings. Without considering that the environment in which they grant the laureate of “new modernity” is generated by the globalization that China has embraced—by converting to the capitalist economic, social, and political order, and from which a local version of the global capitalism is produced—these viewpoints fall into the same pitfall of grand narrative that 7 Zhang Xudong, “Postmodernism and Post-socialist Society: Cultural Politics in China in the 1990s,” in New Left Review, I/237, September–October, 1999. 8 Wang Yichuan 王一川, Zhang Yiwu 张颐武, Zhang Fa 张法, “cong xiandaixing dao zhonghuaxing 从“现代性”到“中华性” [From Modernity to Chineseness],” Wenyi yanjiu 文 艺争鸣 [Literary and Art Contention], No. 2 (1994): 10–20.

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they have critiqued. As Liu Kang keenly notes, this postmodern and postcolonial discourse of “… from modernity to Chineseness …” is “… a futile and misleading attempt …” to assert a “… counter-hegemonic stance …” revealing nationalism and Sinocentrism.9 It is true that the early success of the “socialist market economy” provided a semblance of a broad, free space and possibilities of self-realization for many Chinese, but the postmodern critics do not go beyond this simulacrum to see through the veil of “the people’s need (or desire)” to perceive the complicity between domestic businessmen and transnational capital, and to address the profit goal of commercialized culture. In short, like those who see radical privatization and marketization as the only correct way to deconstruct the old system and to establish new institutions, they do not realize that marketization is “… an even grander grand narrative …”; the postsocialist state has now, in many aspects, become an agent for international capital and interest groups at home. For this reason, Wang Hui incisively points out that “… the postmodernists shared a number of assumptions with the later neoliberals: their deconstructivist posture and some of their liberating effects coexisted with an implicit conservatism.”10 Chinese postmodernists take the nationalists as their implicit partners, as both arose out of rapid economic growth. However, contrary to the Western image of a government-inspired, escalating anti-Western movement, the cause and import of rising nationalist sentiment since the 1990s needs more careful analysis. Many have pointed out its origin and foundation in economic achievement, in the context of broadening international exchanges (which call for a confirmed cultural self-identity) and in intense opposition to external threats, as well as the challenge towards the sovereignty and integrity of China’s territory. In all, the popular nationalistic sentiment shows itself as both a renewed sense of pride and as feelings of humiliation and frustration. It cannot be simply equated with the old-fashioned, protectionist mind from which nationalism originated in the West, or the blind, “irrational” anti-Western hysteria of the Boxers (1899–1901). Instead, it is a local response to its economic and security concerns. For that reason, although it is shaped like an after-image of the traditional nation-state, to call it “post-nationalism” does not require the nation-state to stop working as a separate unit of local interest. To be sure, there are sometimes chauvinistic or ethnocentric sentiments and the cultural industry also appropriates nationalistic sentiment and publishes some sensational booklets, which legitimately iterate China’s national 9 Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 40. 10 Wang Hui, China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition, ed. Teodore Huters (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 96.

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interests yet also exaggerate popular feelings, causing apprehension and reaction from the West. It is, however, contentious what role the government plays. Doubtlessly it exploits nationalism in its negotiation with the West and utilizes this economic, culturally-based nationalism to boost its legitimacy, in which it is relatively successful. However, contrary to some assumptions that the government launched and mobilized this movement, nationalism is a two-edged sword. While political nationalism can help the nation resist the universal claims of global capitalism and outward political pressure, yet, Whenever the national modernity and strength that are imagined through and projected by the success story of contemporary China go unmatched by the country’s performance in other areas or go without full recognition by foreign countries, such popular nationalism tends to surge to the fore in negative and destructive forms such as self-loathing, xenophobia, and provocative confrontation with the government.11 Consequently, the state must cautiously deal with this sentiment. When the protest movements expand and seemingly get out of control, they need to be soothed by persuasion, coercion or repression. Geopolitical and economic considerations for the formation of nationalistic sentiment aside, contemporary Chinese nationalism also derives its momentum from culture. There was a so-called “National Learning Fever” in the early and middle 1990s which originated from the cultural vacuum caused by the stringent political circumstance. The constitutive elements of the movement are complex; it was partly boosted by scholars versed in classical Chinese learning. When faced with rampant commercialism, they felt their status increasingly marginalized and they wished to concentrate on an apolitical, autonomous, national tradition of scholarship to find the meaning of life. It is also partly promoted by those who tried “… to participate in a new global ideological mainstream by means of the rationalization of ‘local knowledge’ ”12 to achieve cultural capital. It was also supported by those who endeavored to set it up as a state ideology to replace the “radicalism” (implicitly, the Marxist, revolutionary hegemony) which supposedly dominated modern Chinese history. The last group was mainly composed of the overseas practitioners of “New Confucianism” who viewed the revolutionary hegemony as the chief destroyer 11 Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview,” in Zhang Xudong ed., Wither China: Intellectual politics in Contemporary China (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2001), 42. 12 Ibid., 22.

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of Chinese tradition. Both defiant and complicit with the global capitalist culture and local bureaucracy, the National Learning Fever, in dismantling the revolutionary legacy, simultaneously helped to construct a state-sanctioned, cultural-oriented nationalism.13 Coming into the new century, it is apparent that the state increasingly tends to promote traditional ethics and morality in order to showcase its “cultural confidence” and enhance its legitimacy as the upholder of the “national essence.” Both the blindness and insights exemplified in the postmodernist discourse also manifest themselves here. Economic nationalism may potentially contribute to a more just social economic order because, for the nationalist, “… any serious consideration of the fate of the Chinese working class and the peasantry … (when) facing the supranational structure of uneven capitalist development, must search for a new vision of democratically reorganizing the national and international social systems.”14 Insofar as the signing of the WTO treaty was conducted by closed-door negotiations between the government and the Western powers, the criticism from the nationalist side shows its validity in calling for more democratic discussion in a free, public sphere. Meanwhile, the significance for China’s democratic movement of the political participation of the masses in nationalism is also acknowledged, particularly by the New Left.15 However, these are now only potentialities: Chinese nationalism still lacks an explicit political consciousness, nor does it have a clear plan for installing equality and justice in society. The undeniable fact is that, before a clear, persuasive political ideology is soundly founded, “The lack of a fully developed political discourse on Chinese nationalism …” will prolong an “undertheorized” nationalist discourse in a vague political semblance.16 2

Cooperation of Neo-Statism and “Corporatism”

It is clear that the postmodernist discourse and the nationalist sentiment in China have a conservative inclination, reflecting the people’s optimism in 13 In this regard, Liu Kang aptly notes that it works with global neo-Confucianism as “… ideological bedfellows under the same roof of a nationalism …” to debunk “… the revolutionary legacy in the service of global capitalism.” Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 37. 14 Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview,” 45. 15 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 107. 16 Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview,” 46.

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national development since the 1990s. This has furthermore led to the emergence of two conservative theories of state legitimacy. As is widely acknowledged, China’s most serious crisis is one of legitimacy, which results from the discrepancy between Mao’s revolutionary idealism and the post-Mao pro-market developments. As Liu Kang aptly remarks, Mao’s revolutionary ideological hegemony has been deradicalized, and its meaning and content have been made hollow, but its discursive formations and rhetoric still provide the legitimation for the post-Deng regime. The legitimating discourse is simply incommensurable with the economic policies, because the discourse is predicated on Maoist ideologies of revolution, mass democracy, and egalitarianism, which are diametrically opposed to the endless accumulation of capital as the utmost aim of capitalism. Consequently, the ideological and legitimation crisis has haunted China since the beginning of the reform.17 As a result, Deng’s pragmatic theory (of which Jiang’s proposal of Three Representatives is but an integral part),18 as well as Mao’s revolutionary hegemony, could not deal with this hybrid situation. At the turn of the new century, two theories of legitimacy have emerged to join the competition for ideological hegemony. One is advocated by He Xin 何新 (1949–), a controversial scholar who played an important role in both the pre- and post-1989 intellectual scenes.19 His theoretical thrust is a renewed “neo-statism” intended as the national guiding principle.20 It is 17 Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 6. 18 “The Three Representatives (sange daibiao) are that our party has always represented [1] the development demands of China’s advanced productivity, [2] the forward direction of China’s advanced civilization, and [3] the fundamental interest of China’s broadest populace.” Jiang made his keynote speech to mark the 80th anniversary of the Party on July 1, 2000. The intention of Jiang in putting forward this new slogan was to allow the capitalist, new managerial class, etc. to join the party. Although it has long been reality in the process of the reform, the formal green light has now been given. It is believed that the nature of the Party has or would be fundamentally changed and acclaimed by the Western media that the Party returns to the right side of history. 19 He Xin sometimes is regarded as the harbinger and the patron of the New Left. The major difference lies in the fact that he publicly endorses the state’s embrace of capitalism as an inevitable measure to strengthen the national economy. 20 His three major essays advocating on this neo-statism are “Lun zhenzhi guojia zhuyi 论政 治国家主义 [On Political Statism],” “Zhongguo xiang hechu qu 中国向何处去 [Wither China],” “Guojia zhuyi de jingji zhengzhi lilun yuanyuan 国家主义的经济政治理论渊

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… a doctrine that regards the national interest and benefits as the towering priorities; the unity and prosperity of the state, the social benefits of the citizens, as well as the national culture, as the ultimate values…. [It] not only is against the “liberalism” which treats the individual as ontological entity and disrespects national sovereignty, but also opposes the “cosmopolitanism” that proselytizes whole-sale Westernization.21 Traditional statism, he argues, stems from Italy in the sixteenth century and later became one of the foundations of Western constitutional institutions, legal systems and state theory. He acknowledges that this neo-statism is not his theoretical invention but was born in Europe in the early 1990s as the theoretical foundation for the integration of the European states. The neo-statism he advocates for China sets its national interest as the highest standard for uniting all classes and belief-holders. It can, and should, replace Marxism as the state ideology because, for him, Marxism is too complicated and has too many ramifications to convince everyone. The legitimacy of the regime in this neostatism lies in its promise of building a powerful, prosperous state and providing welfare to its citizens. However, while He Xin deems his theory “new”, it seems that he does not realize that the legitimacy theory he offers is nothing but the state’s actual practice, though not openly proclaimed. In actuality, He Xin’s stance always vacillates. Sometimes, he claims that he believes in Marxism and that a Marxist class analysis is necessary. His analysis following this methodology is often incisive and penetrating;22 more often than not, however, he retains a pragmatism reminiscent of Machiavelli. In reality, this de-politicized statism cannot but expose its true political nature: a bourgeois schema of nation-state building, or nationalistic conservatism. Another doctrine, that of the “Corporatist State”, is advanced by Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光 (1963–), then a researcher at the Institute of Policy and Management at China’s Academy of Science.23 This theory was systematically proposed in a series of articles written between 1999 and 2003. The theoretical frame, generally speaking, is a system of power-division among different classes. It absorbs many principles from Western corporatism and its basic 源 [The modern political theoretical origins of Statism].” See He Xin 何新, Lun zhenzhi guojia zhuyi 论政治国家主义 [On Political Statism] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003). 21 Ibid. 22 See He Xin 何新, “Yong xin shehuizhuyi qudai xin guojiazhuyi 用新社会主义取代新国 家主义 [To Replace Neo-Statism with a New Socialism].” http://www.caogen.com/blog/ Infor_detail.aspx?articleId=13709&Page=4. Accessed Jan 30, 2013. The article was written in June 2006. 23 Kang Xiaoguang is now professor of regional economics and politics at Renmin University.

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formula is “… authoritarianism plus free market economy plus corporatism plus welfare state …”, according ultimate priority to such values as efficiency, justice and stable, “cooperative” social order. Its four cardinal principles are self-governance, cooperation, balancing and restriction, and common sharing.24 It is doubtless that efficiency and justice do not always work together. However, the key to understanding Kang’s theory lies in its replacement of legitimacy with efficiency as the crux of the continuation and stability of the regime. If society maintains rapid economic growth and if the populace enjoys a comfortable life, the efficiency of the political system would be taken for granted and the crisis of legitimacy would be naturally solved. Like He Xin’s theory, Kang’s doctrine is not based on any principles but premised on his observation of China’s current political situation. His rationale is similar to He Xin’s neo-statism: a corporatist state enjoys legitimacy among the population because it allows the people to derive the most favorable benefits. He thus sees the contemporary mechanism of the authoritarian state—which supports the “elite alliance” with “administration integrating with politics” or “politics replaced by administration,” as its characteristics—as an effective system that should be maintained. Nevertheless, he also sees establishing a theory of legitimacy as the most important and urgent task. His blueprint is to construct a “good authoritarianism,” legitimated by a sort of “benevolent governance” based on the benevolence of the ruler. It does not care how administrators derive their power but only attends to how they put their power to use, the core of which is still their subjective intention. It is distinct that, in this theoretical scheme, the ultimate ideal is not “freedom and democracy” but a “powerful, prosperous, and just state.” This is reinforced by Kang’s unambiguous judgment that “… in reference to the political legitimacy, consensus is a second-rate concept … Justice is the ideal more fundamental than consensus.”25 For the realization of this ideal, he believes that some sort of authoritarian system would be more effective in achieving social justice than the liberal democratic system. To a certain extent, his view echoes the Party’s contemporary political line, which is simultaneously two related Confucian doctrines: meritocracy and harmony. Meritocracy selects the best and brightest and places them in posts of prominence. Combining virtue, talent, and expertise, this elite manages public affairs and performs administrative duties. With the greater good 24

See Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光, “Lun hezuozhuyi guojia 论合作主义国家 [On a Corporatist State],” Zhanlue yu guanli 战略与管理 [Strategy and Management], No. 5, 2003, 85–95. 25 Ibid.

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in mind, the leaders promote the well-being of all under heaven. The administrative hierarchy may even open its doors to talent and experts from foreign lands, like the multiethnic Han Empire. Harmony, on the other hand, brings together diverse ethnic groups to partake of a common culture without shedding their own traditions.26 However, Chinese critics also suggest that “Given much historical evidence to the contrary, it seems easy to rebuke hierarchy as authoritarian, meritocracy as elitist, and harmony as Sinocentric.”27 Shared viewpoints with the New Left are easy to locate within the arguments of these two scholars. For instance, they all hold that social justice and equality are (among) the ultimate standards and the utmost ideals. Values such as democracy and liberty are not metaphysical but historically formed—they have no independent value but only an instrumental worth. In a market society, the most dangerous force of dictatorship is not the government but capital or the capitalist class. He Xin says that his neo-statism calls on the state to protect the majority of the people, particularly the disempowered and dispossessed working class, rather than just the few of the social elites and capitalists. Kang argues that even though at this “transitional stage” the contemporary “elite alliance” can effectively construct a new social order and ensure social stability, he nevertheless “hates” this because it also brings about political corruption, financial risk and inequality; these are unjust and should be changed in the long run. Kang also develops the New Left’s proposal of a “hybrid constitutional system.” His corporatism envisages a system in which the elites thwart each other and where the restriction between the elites and the masses functions to check the over-expansion of power and curb widespread corruption. It needs to be acknowledged that building a strong, wealthy and just society is the ideal of the nationalistic and socialist revolution, for the sake of which any other priority is secondary. The difference between these two scholars and the New Left is the different roads the state should take. The New Left is convinced that contemporary China’s problems should be solved through social democracy, while the conservative ideas of He and Kang view a political settlement by the regime as better protection against social chaos. These theoretical frameworks are derived from contemporary China’s social-economic complex; they are conservative in the sense that, instead of emphasizing the value of constitutional democracy or mass participation, they 26

Ban Wang ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 13 27 Ibid.

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trust the state to implement and adjust policies. However, this conservatism is different from the sort of neo-authoritarian thinking prevalent in the late 1980s, which entrusted the state with the power to implement the neoliberal agenda. In contrast, these two official scholars now urge the state to care well for the disempowered and dispossessed when it wields its strong power. The two theories did not trigger wide-scale discussion but raise some valuable questions. For instance, the legitimacy of the regime in the theory of the “corporatist state” is founded on so-called “modern good governance,” which relies on political achievements, especially economic growth and the improvement of the people’s living standard. How, though, can people trust the government when difficult times come or amidst severe corruption and deteriorating social inequality? In such questioning, the regime’s legitimacy comes not solely from good governance but also from the people’s subjective evaluation. However, will the government be able to persuade the people of its goodwill or are the measures it takes always correct and timely? Meanwhile, in Kang’s theory, if the administrator is not “good,” power can be transferred through Chinese traditional “concession” or revolution. The prerequisite for the survival of an authoritative regime, then, is that the leader should be a sage; this is, however, not always be the case, and so the stability of society cannot be guaranteed. For that reason, the difficulty in determining an effective, feasible alternative for electing a good leader erodes the feasibility of authoritarianism, or the “corporate state”, as a long-term scheme. Kang also argues for applying Confucian values (mixed with Marxist ideas and values from liberal democracy) as the state’s ideology to replace Marxism. Indeed, China watchers have observed that, in recent years, A revival of Confucianism has sought to promote China’s new image— its millennial culture, identity, and role on the world stage. The revival involves the government, institutions, popular culture, the media, and local communities. In small towns and villages, Confucianism is filling the vacuum left by the collapse of the dominant ideology and moral fabric.28 In contrast, the goal of this new Confucianism is “… to look to past resources to advance a new worldview to meet the challenges of the contemporary world.”29 However, this cultural nationalism cannot function autonomously, as it needs 28 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” in Ban Wang ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 6. 29 Ibid.

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ways to demonstrate itself as the truth or it will not be persuasive enough for the people to follow. It is also worth noting that both these theories call for rethinking the policies the state has adopted in recent years, which prioritize the elites but neglect the disempowered. As the government prohibits any direct debate over political reform, those scholars who argue for changing the developmentalist, neoliberal economic thinking must register their opinions by resorting to Deng’s two aphorisms of “… eliminating exploitation and reduc[ing] social dichotomies, and finally … achieve[ing] prosperity for all,” and “After 2000, we will then begin to solve the disparities in distribution of social wealth.” It seems that the state has accepted some suggestions from them and has implemented some measures to care for the welfare of the disempowered and dispossessed communities of society in the past ten years. This is viewed as progress by the New Left in particular and society in general—which has obviously absorbed some ideas of the New Left. But what has remained unchanged until now is the social triad of “market economy, elites’ alliance, and authoritarianism,”30 as well as the state’s “socialist ideology.” The theoretical formations of the two new theories surely contain many insights, yet the state can hardly adopt any of them in toto to substitute for the current one; at best, it can appropriate some of their principles. This is because socialist ideology, as the sole difference between the national identity of China and that of Western “liberal democratic” countries, still provides legitimacy for contemporary China’s political structure. Otherwise, with no nominal difference, it will have no recourse but to convert to a multi-party system. 3

Conflicts between New Left and New Right

The origin of conservative trends in intellectual discourse can be traced back to a round of “reflection” on the issue of radicalism in modern China in the early 1990s. In this discussion, utopian elements of China’s long history, together with Western-imported Marxism, were denounced as the sources of the radical revolutionary movements and disasters brought to modern China. The viewpoints in these discussions are contested yet are valuable for reflection and further exploration in historical study. But when they targeted the 30 Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光, “Shinian bubian: shichang jingji, jingyin lianmeng, quanweizhengzhi 十年不变：市场经济，精英联盟，权威政治 [Ten-years Unchanged: Market Economy, Elites Alliance, Authoritarianism],” in Zhongguo gaige 中国改革 [Reform China], No. 1 (2004): 7–8.

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Chinese socialist revolution and the 1989 social movement, its utilization by Chinese Neoliberals became inevitable. They equated radicalism, idealism and utopianism with the call for equality, social justice and mass democracy. The fault of their analysis, according to the New Left, “… was built on an ahistorical perspective, since it failed to take into account the historical factors behind the movement and the motivations for radicalism …” in other words, it “… conflate(d) analysis of movement strategy with the study of history, thereby establishing the premise on which was constructed neoconservatism’s (that is, neoliberalism’s) historical narrative.”31 This trend of rethinking radicalism let Neoliberal ideology ignore systematic corruption and “… prepared the ground for an antidemocratic discourse on individual freedom.”32 But the deepening political and economic crisis brought about by largescale lay-offs and systemic corruption since the late 1990s has led to deep political conflicts among intellectuals on which direction China should go. Wang Hui has sharply noted the new situation, Agricultural reforms caused crisis in rural areas, while the marketisation of social security systems, including medical insurance, led to increasing disparities of provision between the rich and the poor, the country and the city. This has led to unrest: in 2008, the state council announced that there were 128,000 “collective protest incidents” in that year. The number has increased since then to 180,000 a year.33 The crisis precipitated a fierce debate between the so-called “New Left” and the “(neo-)Liberals” in 1997, which extended into the new century. The New Left includes different groups with either social-democratic, egalitarian or populist tendencies, such as neo-Marxists, nationalists, postmodernists and feminists. They generally consist of three theoretically distinct but related groups. One is those who formulate the “State Capacity Theory,” represented by Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, who have called for strengthening the role of the state to counteract systematic corruption and assure a just distribution of wealth since the early 1990s. Another is those who argue for institutional innovation and intellectual liberation, led by Cui Zhiyuan (and, in my view, also Wang Hui), who advocate devising new institutions to propel mass participation and dismantling ossified, dogmatic neoliberal concepts, such as “property rights” and the so-called “invisible hand” of the “free market 31 32 33

Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 80. Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field,” 24. Wang Hui, “The Rumour Machine,” in London Review of Books, Vol. 34, No. 9–10 (2012).

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mechanism.”34 A third group consists of those who contend that the state should be transformed from a “rural China” into a “cultural China” and a “political nation,” represented by Gan Yang and others.35 The Neoliberal side includes several groups, including political liberals who mainly argue for constitutional democracy of the Western kind, and economic liberals who maintain that the framework of socialist ideology should be jettisoned for neoliberal principles of deregulation, efficiency and competitiveness for the purpose of a sweeping privatization of the economy. It has been observed that both sides often lack a “rational” discourse— ferocious exchanges frequently occur. Although many expected that they could unite to constitute a “community”36 or to keep some “common underlines [sic.],” such good will has hardly come true as both sides realize that their arguments are founded on antagonistic ideological convictions, political ideas and theoretical persuasions. According to the Neoliberals, the opposition is between the nostalgia for the old despotism and the struggle for the “universal value system” of global capitalism. For the New Left, the “battle line” is drawn “… between those who seek smooth integration with a homogeneous ‘world civilization’ … and those who envision and strive for a pluralistic world in which differences in tradition, culture, and social-political ideals can be viewed as assets rather than burdens for the creation of better lives”37 or, alternatively, the battle is “… between the masses and the elite, between the search for economic and political democracy and an aristocratic concept of ‘liberty.’ ”38 These interpretations, albeit reductionist, already reveal that the core differences are ideological. In their exchanges, it is clear that one of the key questions is the role of government in the present age. When it comes to the current political-economic complex of elite alliances, it is interesting to observe that they accuse each other of colluding with the government; that is, both charge the rival party as 34

Theodore Huters pointed out that one of Wang’s most important arguments is his observation that “… terms like ‘free’ and ‘unregulated’ are largely ideological constructs masking the intervention of highly manipulative, even coercive, governmental actions on behalf of economic policies that favor a particular scheme of capitalist acquisition … (which) must be distinguished from truly free markets.” Theodore Huters, “Introduction”, in Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 6. 35 These three groups are generalized by Zhang Xudong, see his “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview,” 56–65. 36 Gloria Davies, “Anticipating Community, Producing Dissent: The Politics of Recent Chinese Intellectual Praxis,” The China Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002). 37 Zhang Xudong, Wither China, viii. 38 Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field,” 14.

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being de facto in league with the regime. For instance, the Neoliberal side sees the other having, … an affinity with traditional socialism; a nostalgia for Mao’s China; an affirmative attitude towards direct democracy, the centrality of politics, and public passion; a longing for a poetic and romantic idealism; and is discontented with a practical-oriented social transition of contemporary China.39 These accusations are true in many respects, if we read “traditional socialism” as a system that takes justice and equality as its ideal—“a longing for a poetic and romantic idealism”—but which was not accomplished well and caused much human tragedy; read “direct democracy” as social democracy which stresses the participation of the disempowered and the lower strata in political life. In short, the New Left insists on the historical necessity of socialist revolution and revolutionary idealism. However, this has all been absent in the present reality. Thus, the Neoliberals’ last accusation of being “discontented with a practical-oriented social transition” only validates the New Left’s critique of opportunism and pragmatism. As a member of the New Left acknowledges, their resentment stems from “… the increasing frustration and anxiety of social groups, whose economic and political well-being are undermined, not improved, by radical market reform and the stagnation of undemocratic political-bureaucratic institutions;”40 therefore, they really question “… to what extent these undemocratic positions derive from the residual system of Mao’s proletarian dictatorship and to what extent they are redefined by the new technocratic-managerial regime.”41 Apparently, they target the latter, whereas their rivals point to the traditional socialist system. The counterattack from the New Left is also conducted in a confrontational tone: Both neoliberals and the state believe economic development means capitalist development; and …[it] spells out the necessity for radical government protection of private property and economic inequality. Both … 39

40 41

Ren Jiantao 任剑涛, “Jiedu ‘Xinzuopai’ 解读“新左派”[Deciphering the ‘New Left’],” in Li Shitao 李世涛 ed. Zhishifenzi lichang: ziyouzhuyi zhi zheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua 知识分子立场：自由主义之争与中国思想界的分化 [Intellectual positions: The debate on liberalism and the differentiation of Chinese intellectuals] (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000), 193. Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field,” 54. Ibid., 4.

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fetishize private ownership as the essential unit … for pragmatic economic behavior and spontaneous social order. Both worship the “inevitable hand” of the market, the real supercomputer that can correct the folly and arrogance of central planning. And both … are convinced that the market is the only way to happiness—there is no alternative.42 Such a detailed comparison of the overlapping layers reveals the intimate relationship between developmentalism and the Neoliberal economic discourse. This relationship is related to the fact that the privatization of public wealth depends on the initiation and cooperation of the state. Neoliberals are not critical of the state’s authority to do so. In this sense, economic Neoliberals are really spokesmen of the elite alliance, especially for those new upstarts who often illegally get rich by bribing officials and breaking rules. Generally speaking, the dislike of government by Neoliberals stems not from the government’s economic policies, which often follow their cherished principles and rely on its power to provide private capital through thorough privatization of public property. Their hostility instead originates from the state’s nominal revolutionary ideology and its attendant political system. They dislike it not because it is undemocratic but because it prevents wholesale Westernization. Meanwhile, as the state keeps supporting some state-owned enterprises and non-state economic entities still rely on the state for various benefits, Neoliberals believe that the old system still operates and discourages China’s economic growth.43 Therefore, the Chinese Neoliberals, out of their free-market orthodoxy, oppose any actions that build strong government, which they take as moving towards Stalinist totalitarianism. While the New Left admits that the traditional role played by the state should be adjusted, they wish to reverse the enfeeblement of the state and strengthen its role in building a robust economy. Thus, for them, systems of social welfare, social security and public education need to be immediately reconstructed to safeguard against social turmoil and protect the dispossessed, while guaranteeing national security. In their words, they have “… a guarded faith in the state … to ensure basic social justice, 42 43

Ibid., 29. But, as the New Left points out, as “… the entire national economic and social-political structure …” is “… over-determined by standards set by advanced capitalist economies … even the most ardently socialist enterprises …” have to “… run in ways compatible with Western corporations”; the Chinese economy is then “… no different from other nonWestern national economies linked to the global systems.” Ibid., 11. For this reason, since the “modern enterprise system” was set up, the main thrust of neoliberals has shifted to the claims of “clarity of ownership;” i.e., wholesale privatization.

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political rights, and balanced economic growth by strengthening, not weakening, its legitimacy and functions.”44 Furthermore, such a hope lies in launching social democracy, “… the democratic control of society over the state to oblige the state to implement social insurance and to prevent it from becoming the protector of domestic and transnational monopolies.”45 By contrast, privatization and laisser-faire freedom are the most significant values for Chinese Neoliberals. These values are founded on a belief in the autonomous mechanism of “free market.” Gloria Davies has made an in-depth study of the rhetoric the Neoliberal side has appropriated which reveals its dogmatism.46 Their unreflective faith in the neutrality and self-functioning mechanism of “the free market” and its autonomous mechanism of delivering social justice is seriously interrogated by the New Left, who intensely and theoretically analyze the impossibility of separating political power from the market. Their critique of Chinese Neoliberal discourse, furthermore, echoes the views of the Western Left: that Neoliberalism is ultimately against political liberalism, as the radical marketism it holds to cannot tolerate the latter’s principles of social justice, fairness and egalitarianism, as well as substantial democracy.47 In this vision, Chinese Neoliberals are the “New Right,” or “Far Right” in the Western context. Yet the positions of Neoliberal economists are not so clear-cut; many of them hold the same views as their rivals regarding existing problems, although with differing solutions. For instance, He Qinglian 何清涟 (1956–) has described in detail the phenomena of widespread rent-seeking, insider-trading, the theft of public property by local government and the alliance between officials and national and transnational corporations during the process of “ownership reform”.48 Her denunciation of such phenomena differs from some Neoliberal economists, who even hold that corruption, “… though not the best, [is] at least the second best choice for capital accumulation (and thus ‘good’ for economic 44 45 46 47

Ibid., 38. Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 124. See Gloria Davies, “Anticipating Community, Producing Dissent.” This is particularly studied by Cui Zhiyuan and Wang Hui, see Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元, Di erci sixiangjiefan yu zhidu chuanxi 第二次思想解放与制度创新 [The Second Thought-Liberation and Institutional Invention] (Hong Kong: Niujing daxue chubanshe, 1997); “Kangbujian de shou”: fanshi de beilun “看不见的手”: 范式的悖论 [The Paradox of the Paradigm of “Invisible Hand”]” (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1999; Wang Hui 汪晖, “Shi jingji shi, haishi zhengzhi jingjixue 是经济史，还是政治经济学 [Is it Economic History, or History of Political Economy?],” in Tianya 天涯 [The World], No. 5, 2000. 48 See He Qinglian 何清涟, Xiandaihua de xianjing 现代化的陷阱 [The Trap of Modernization] (Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1998).

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reasons).”49 Another example is Wu Jinlian 吴敬琏 (1930–), who expresses his concerns about radical Russian-style privatization and warns against the rightwing economic revolution, Prudent reformist regulations are now condemned as either too idealistic or too conservative. What has been praised to the sky, instead, are various forms of rent-seeking of government branches; ownership reforms aiming at swallowing public wealth; lease of public land in a manner reminiscent of the Enclosure movement in English history; and the financial tricks designed to rip off ordinary shareholders.50 The “praises” that he so scathingly castigates all come from Neoliberal, “rationalistic” economists. The third representative figure, Qin Hui 秦晖 (1953–), also opposes the proposal by radical liberal economists of the “free trade of public goods” by the power elites, which, as he rightly points out, would result in a scramble for public wealth. Unlike these economists’ prescriptions—which often reiterate the Neoliberal dogma of creating economic and social forces supposedly “independent of the state system” or advocate reliving the classical capitalist moment to compensate for the “unnatural” course China has undergone in the modern period—the Chinese New Left sees the root of the problem residing in the unjust privatization prevalent in the 1990s. There is a “… fundamental conflict …” between the “… popular demands of guaranteeing social justice and the democratization of economic life …” and “… the demands by interest groups for radical privatization.”51 For them, political injustice and economic inequality are created in this process. To act against it, they call for the initiation of social democracy to curb corruption and ensure social justice. To this end, they argue for the need for “positive freedom,” of letting the majority of citizens become the subject, not the object, of reform. Both sides seem to argue for freedom but what the Neoliberals prefer is Isaiah Berlin’s idea of “negative freedom” or freedom from, rather than freedom to. They are afraid that positive freedom, which entails active participation in political life, will result in chaos and over-regulation, particularly concerning their ongoing project of sweeping privatization, which, as the New Left 49 50 51

Such a view is uttered by Zhang Weiyin 张维迎 (1959–), an economics professor at Beijing University, which typically represents the interests of the nouveaux riches, many of whom have relied on illegal methods to gain wealth. Quoted from Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field”, 13. Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 61.

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believes, will inevitably meet wide-scale opposition should it be in a democratic context. Moreover, they prefer freedom to justice. In their view, freedom is the prerequisite of justice and its value is higher than justice—“If there is no freedom, justice is senseless.”52 For them, justice is procedural, whereas the New Left believes that without substantive, distributive justice, procedural justice is meaningless and hypocritical, That its demand for “negative freedom” means not the withdrawal of the state from the social sphere, but its political intervention in a different kind of sphere, namely, its selective and preferential protection of the “fittest” in the market environment. Such a hypocritical rhetoric of freedom would be rejected by most Chinese if a democratic and wellinformed public debate were to take place.53 In short, the freedom advocated by Neoliberals only “… spells a right-wing despotism that could ensure the freedom of the few against the economic and political deprivation of the masses.”54 Their preference for negative freedom against mass democracy and positive freedom only addresses their hidden desire to guarantee the interests of these few commercial and power elites. From this perspective, their proposal for establishing a corresponding legalpolitical system is merely “… a nearly fascist demand … in the service of the newly emerging upper class in a power-infested, unequal and unjust space of ‘efficiency’ and ‘free competition.”55 To give them their due, it is true that when the Neoliberals argue that “… there’s no such publicly accepted, universal principle of just distribution existing on earth …”, there is also no publicly accepted, universal principle of freedom at any specific historical moment. Although economic liberals prefer freedom to democracy, political liberals call for constitutional or parliamentary democracy, with a multi-party system as its soul. Yet most of them believe that democracy can only be realized by the power of the market. However, for the New Left, procedural, parliamentary democracy is historically determined but is not metaphysical and universal: it is premised on bourgeois society and its economic and class structure rather than an “… ahistorical symbol of a teleological future …” for China.56 52 53 54 55 56

Liu Junning 刘军宁, “Ziyouzhuyi yu gongzheng: dui ruogang jienan de huida 自由主义与 公正：对若干诘难的回答 [Liberalism and Justice: Response to some Interrogations],” in Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu 当代中国研究 [Contemporary China Studies], No. 4, 2000. Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field”, p. 29. Ibid., 32. Ibid., 18. Ibid., 30.

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Substantive, distributive justice and social democracy is to be fought for by the broad population, not solely by the elites through the market mechanism: the latter is power-infused and not neutral. The juxtaposition of the arguments of these antagonistic schools clearly indicates that “democracy” and “freedom” in the differing rhetoric of the two factions have different connotations. The New Left interprets democracy in terms of the positive legacy of Mao’s socialist experiments and the French Revolution, from which they emphasize a certain spirit of egalitarianism and strongly stress the right of “positive freedom” for citizens, particularly those who are disempowered and dispossessed. The Neoliberal side, on the other hand, favors “negative freedom” and constitutional or formal democracy. Nevertheless, even a “rational” Chinese liberal Xu Jilin 许纪霖 (1957–) acknowledges that … a liberalism bereft of positive freedom is not a democratic liberalism anymore, but it only concerns private interests under the protection of authoritarianism. In contemporary China, the “economic liberals” who don’t participate in the debate are such “negative liberals.” They only demand economic freedom, but do not ask for political rights … the result might be that we get our personal rights in the private sphere but give up our responsibility as citizens and forsake the possibility of democracy.57 In his view, what Chinese “liberals” hold is “liberal democracy”, which emphasizes the restriction of public power to ensure that personal rights are not illegally infringed, whereas the New Left proposes “republican democracy,” which underlines the wide participation of citizens in political affairs, therefore articulating the legitimacy of the public authorities.58 These differentiations are theoretically sound and helpful in clarifying the murky contours of the two “democracies.” Nonetheless, it neglects the New Left’s objective of exploring alternative roads to capitalist modernity or a new form of democracy different to Western procedural democracy. But Xu does point out that the politically utopian mode of thinking that “only … ism can save China”—the commonly-used rhetoric of contemporary Chinese Neoliberals—exposes its insufficiency in terms of the issue of legitimacy, 57

Xu Jilin 许纪霖, “Liangzhong minzhu he ziyou: dui ‘ziyouzhuyi’ yu ‘xinzuopai’ lunzhan de fangsi 两种民主和自由：对‘自由主义’与‘新左派’论战的反思 [Two sorts of Liberties and Democracies: Reflection on the debate between the ‘Liberalism’ and the ‘New Left’],” Zhongguo daxue xueshu yanjianglu 中国大学学术演讲录 [Academic Lecturers in Chinese Universities] (Nanjing: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2002). 58 Ibid.

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which in praxis would favor a disguised authoritarian regime. Such a warning is not very different from the accusation of the New Left. 4

Outcry for New Socialism and the Urge for Neoliberal Capitalism

During the late 1990s, many of the basic tenets of Neoliberalism had been applied in China’s economic policies. The state took privatization as the only solution to the predicament of state-owned enterprises (SOE s) and suspended its promise of equality and justice for economic considerations. China established a whole system to safeguard working people’s basic rights in the Mao era, which have been severely eroded after the late 1980s; in the 1990s, the situation continued. The so-called “iron rice bowl” was attacked in the 1980s for its supposed utopian egalitarianism; now it is deconstructed under the Neoliberal economic rationale. The decision to massively lay off workers when restructuring SOE s to “boost production efficiency” took place around 1997–1998.59 The year 1998 then became another watershed, when the formal rise of the Neoliberal group and its debate with the New Left simultaneously occurred. Widespread corruption was another prominent phenomenon throughout this decade. These inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power, together with the worsening of social hierarchies, contributed to an explosive situation. What caused this? Some, mainly from the Right, attribute it to the existing political system. However, if the same system did not create such conditions before, we must turn to the ongoing process of globalization for answers. In its initial stage, the reforms were trying to correct the extremism of Maoist ideology without abandoning socialist ideals. Modernization and “building up a wealthy and strong socialist country” are the same process and inalienable 59 Meanwhile, as the state prohibited any self-organized worker (and peasant) organizations, many people worked in harsh conditions and had to accept the inhuman treatment proffered by the alliance of bureaucracy and transnational capitalism. For incisive descriptions and analyses of the workers’ conditions and the worker movements in the 1990s, see Timothy Weston, “China’s Labor Woes: Will the Workers Crash the Party?” in Timothy B. Weston and Lionel M. Jensen, eds, China beyond the headlines, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 245–272; “The Iron Man Weeps: Joblessness and political legitimacy in the Chinese rust belt,” in Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen eds. State and Society in 21st-Century China (London: Routledge, 2004), 67–86. Weston incisively points out that the worker-protesters are “… by definition questioning the virtue of the market-oriented change that the Party has embraced in the name of growth and modernization;” that in their eyes “… the social compact of the Maoist past … resulted in a more just society than the policies of the reform era that followed.” Ibid., 74.

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from each other. Nevertheless, as Deng’s reforms “… prioritized modernization and economic development …” without “… charting a political and ideological map”,60 the absence of “… a clear vision of social and political values and meanings of gaige kaifang [reform and opening-up] …” gradually resulted in the legitimacy crisis, as income disparity and injustice brought about by the reform challenged the socialist claims.61 In hindsight, so-called Maoism mainly includes revolution, mass democracy and egalitarianism. These ideas in the “New Period” of the 1980s (especially in the latter half of that decade) were deradicalized and challenged by some intellectuals: revolution was derided as bringing about human tragedy and poverty, mass democracy was taken to be the instrument of the “feudalist despotism” of Maoist rule; egalitarianism was held responsible for the disasters of “the people’s commune” and the like. After the 1990s, Maoist legacies in mainstream political thought and praxis were furthermore discredited. So-called egalitarianism not only met its death sentence but the ideal of an equal, just society was challenged by prioritizing “efficiency and competitiveness,” the two golden principles of Neoliberalism. At the beginning of the reform, in order to dismantle asceticism and galvanize economic growth, exploitation was legalized and economic development was advanced; however, astounding disparities in the distribution of wealth have also been created, both among different areas and different classes, which were exacerbated during the 1990s and let China step into the ranks of “the most unequal nations” in the world. Meanwhile, the expedient strategy contradicted socialist principles of equality and justice.62 The functioning legitimacy of the state in maintaining economic growth and social stability, moreover, was carried out mainly by enforcement measures instead of the ideological mechanism it had previously applied. The practice extended to the 1990s, but the Neoliberal reform agenda has changed its nature and significance. The mainstream cultural trend, both encompassing the forces of global market capitalism and the new class formations in China, assumes a more complicated semblance. To be sure, the socialist idea still has currency for some intellectuals and among the broad masses; in particular, the legacies of Maoist ideals for a more equal and just society and to let all the people enjoy the benefits of 60 61 62

Liu Kang, “The Debate about Modernity, Postmodernity, and Postcoloniality,” in Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2004), 31. Liu Kang, “Introduction,” in Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 12. Liu Kang, “What Is ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: Issues of Culture, Politics, and Ideology,” in Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 62.

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development are still ingrained in the minds of the populace. This shows itself in the intense nostalgia for Mao’s era at some times, but more often sees the promotion of the ideas and praxis of social democracy, which emphasizes a social welfare system to meet the demands of the people and adjust socially unjust distribution to redress the ultimate goal of capitalism: accumulating Capital. This “nostalgic” mentality in the face of rampant commercialism, corruption and exploitation is one key to understanding the intellectual debates of this period. This mentality found more theoretical expression in the debate between the two groups. “The manifest goal of New Left Chinese intellectuals,” Zhang Xudong propounds, “is to break the straitjacket of socialism and capitalism, seeing them as two reified and fetishized social, political and theoretical institutions.”63 Socialism is not cast away as a dirty word; this reflection is conducted by rethinking the idea of modernity. From this perspective, socialism and its crisis are understood as innate to the crisis of modernity. The Chinese socialist movement is understood as a resistant movement as well as a modernization enterprise through nationalistic revolution and industrialization. Chinese socialism has deep and profound lessons for reflection but such lessons do not stem from the equality it aimed to achieve; rather, they come as a result of its failure to achieve it. Wang Hui has thus differentiated two kinds of socialism: One is the “socialism” of the old state ideology, characterized by a system of state monopoly; the other is the movement for social security that developed out of that system of state monopoly and the expansion of the market system, characterized by its opposition to monopoly and its demands for social democracy.64 In their analysis, Maoist China “… put priority on equality in ideology and in the distribution of benefits, but through coercion and planning it maintained structural inequality between the city and the country, between different economic systems, and between regions.”65 On the other hand, in their analysis, capitalism is an “… anti-market system that always relies on and tends towards monopoly;”66 the capitalist market’s actual operations which involve 63 Zhang Xudong, “The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview”, 55. 64 Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 47. 65 Ibid., 57. 66 Ibid., 122.

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the interactions of power, violence and interference should be differentiated from professed neoliberal economic principles; capitalist democracy is thus a compromise between capitalism and democracy. According to this rationale, globalization is seen in a different light from the Neoliberals’ view of integration with the world economic system and conversion to the world “mainstream culture.” While echoing the Western left’s critique of globalization that its fundamental and irreconcilable contradictions are the ever-increasing rifts between the wealthy and the dispossessed, between the powerful and the disempowered, the Chinese New Left also argues that those “… who monopolize the strength of the whole world in the name of globalization …” are “… the biggest nationalists.” Therefore, this “globalization” is in actuality, … a force for “anti-globalization” in the world, a sort of hypernationalism masquerading as globalism. The process of military globalization that has accompanied economic globalization very clearly demonstrates the hegemonic quality of the neoliberal economic order.67 Thus, although the anti-globalization movements in the West include a number of right-wing, conservative components, they “… embody a yearning for equality, democratic reform, and freedom of communication … exemplify a close unity between the values of democracy and freedom and a movement to protect social security.”68 According to this critique, while the question of whether capitalist globalization is inevitable or if there are possible non-capitalist alternatives appears a formidable challenge, the answer nevertheless still seems positive. In the minds of the Chinese New Left, the goals of socialist experimentation (that is, justice, equality, democracy, etc.) should be reintegrated into current historical developments so that the oppressive tendencies of global capitalism can be effectively curbed, and new democratic forms, institutions and beliefs should be invented. In view of these proposals, the nature of these critical intellectuals’ “alternative choice” has become clearer: it is a revised version of socialism. Indeed, the pursuit of a socialist way of development is now largely a “consensus” among intellectuals, if not among still-dogmatic Neoliberals. Even the conservative He Xin now openly confesses that the neo-statism he proposed ten years ago was a expedient choice for the government, but that he believes

67 Ibid., 128. 68 Ibid., p. 64.

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in a sort of “new socialism”, which is “… better than nationalism, conservatism, statism, and (neo-)liberalism …” for achieving social harmony.69 In this context, the international politico-economic landscape and events often provide a framework of reference.70 From this theoretical perspective, any struggle aiming at democracy and social justice must be integrated with a new international horizon. It should be stressed that one key idea of Maoism is globalism, which is often termed “internationalism.” Critic Wang Ban thus poignantly remarks that “… in its vision of a world run by the sovereign people and free producers …” socialism is “… inherently internationalist …” because it “… seeks to go beyond the nation-state by transcending the capitalist world system.”71 This dialectic of nationalism and internationalism is indispensable to the search for an alternative modernity. China after Mao has concentrated on its internal affairs; now, for the New Left, “… how to reconstruct the historical tradition of internationalism in a period of globalization …” is viewed as one of the most urgent tasks they face.72 Although the logic of consumerism in this age of globalization is so powerful as to co-opt and seemingly eliminate the possibility of local resistance, it is still believed that there are “… plural and multiple movements and counter-movements …” which will create possibilities for “… multiple alternatives …” and “… creative initiatives …” to “… ultimately confront global-scale injustices and inequalities and construct new forms of democracy, equality, and justice.”73 Similarly, Wang Hui contends that although globally there seems no possibility of “… a social movement with the goal of seeking an alternative globalization that has any internal strength …” yet “… regional links …” could be the bridge to “… combine the critical force.”74 69 70

71 72 73 74

He Xin, “Yong xin shehuizhuyi qudai xin guojiazhuyi.” For instance, the miserable social and economic consequence of Russia’s adoption of the free market is a framework for Chinese intellectuals to reflect on the dogmatic tenets of neoclassical economics. Partly because of this lesson, the calling for a “Chinese alternative,” which is envisioned as different from laissez-faire capitalism, emerged. The incident where pro-Yeltsin troops bombarded the parliament building while the Western powers kept silent on the massacre was in sharp contrast with their response to China’s 1989 crackdown and also invited reflection on the true nature of the democracy and freedom they recommend for China. The East Asian financial crisis was another opportunity for intellectuals to reconsider the role of the state in protecting the fledgling national economy and refuting the Neoliberal propaganda of financial deregulation. Ban Wang ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 13. Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 106. Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 12. Wang Hui, China’s New Order, 133.

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Conclusion

The course of China’s development still meanders without a settled destination. Therefore, intellectuals must not cling to determined dogma and lose their critical edge and creative mind. In the process of change, new forms of democratic participation will be created—in fact, some have already emerged. By now, the concerns of intellectuals have been heard and objectives of justice and equality in the distribution of wealth—letting all enjoy the benefits of economic growth—and to protect the disempowered and the dispossessed, have also been embraced by the populace and promoted by the state. Living in the era of global capitalism, Chinese critical intellectuals must always practice theoretical reflection and critique. Since China’s contemporary situation cannot be described by “… how intellectual politics is defined in domestic terms …” but “… by how Chinese intellectual life relates itself to and participates in international cultural politics.”75 the intellectuals’ theoretical explorations, when combined with the concrete praxis of Chinese people, also interact with and contribute to an international critical consciousness. 75

Zhang Xudong, “Preface,” in Whither China, viii.

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part 5 Cultural Identity and Subjectivity in the Age of Global Capitalism

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The Exploration of “Cultural Politics” and Its Crossroads: On the Discussion of “Chinese Identity” in the Era of Globalization In recent years, international politicians and scholars have found that China’s new government under the guidance of Xi Jinping “… aims at creating a distinct Chinese ideological framework, the ‘China Path,’ as an alternative to ‘Western’ concepts;” and the Party … seems to view it as essential for its own survival to fill the perceived moral vacuum in a society which has been more inspired by consumption than by socialist campaigns ever since the reform and opening policy paved the way for China’s economic rise.1 The assertion of a “China Path” is, to a certain extent, backed by a group of Chinese scholars who, ever since the late 1990s, have deliberated on the issue of establishing China’s “cultural consciousness” or “cultural self-awareness.” They call for the establishment of a Chinese cultural subjectivity and identity for a nation rising in the international arena. However, is political maneuvering and cultural reflection the same thing? If not, where do they differ? Is there any differing view regarding this new cultural-political discourse? Such questions merit a deep investigation into China’s academic world to find answers. A cultural phenomenon from 2005–2006 is significant in this regard. A theoretical work by Zhang Xudong 张旭东 (1965–), a renowned Chinese scholar teaching at New York University in the United States (whose works on the Chinese postmodernism and avant-garde writings we have discussed in previous chapters), attracted the interest of many Chinese readers, not only because it was a best-seller that year but also because it aroused the indignation of some overseas scholars. The book, Cultural Identity in the Era of Globalization (全球化时代的文化认同, hereinafter referring to as Identity), was published by Peking University Press, a distinguished publishing house in China.2 1 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Mareike Ohlberg, Simon Lang and Bertram Lang, “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future,” Source: MERICS: Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies,” https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/171004_MPOC_05_Ideologies_0 .pdf. Accessed December 21, 2018. 2 Zhang Xudong 张旭东, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong 全球化时代的文化认同 [Cultural Identity in the Era of Globalization] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2015). © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_011

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This well-structured book applied four stages of intellectual thought of the modern West as its framework. The first stage is the foundation laid by Kant and Hegel for the bourgeois legal system and the concept of world history in the rising stage of modernity. During the two world wars, Nietzsche’s and Weber’s respective reflections on modernity became the second period. In the third era, the critique of bourgeois democracy by right-wing conservatism was represented by Carl Schmitt and by the theory of national cultural-politics by Max Weber. Finally, in the fourth stage of the contemporary postmodern period, the various intellectual heritages were re-evaluated by three intellectual trends: the rehabilitation of political liberalism by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, social democratic thought represented by Richard Rorty, and Marxist critical thinking typified by Fredric Jameson. Throughout the discussion, the author calls for Chinese readers to establish their cultural-political self-awareness in order to form their cultural identity in this age of globalization. While the book was well received by ordinary Chinese readers due to its nationalist call for the Chinese to establish their awareness of cultural politics, it sparked heated debate within intellectual circles. Among these critiques, the articles by Gao Quanxi 高全喜 and Xiao Gaoyan 萧高彦 particularly aroused the attention of scholars in China and abroad.3 They were published in the famed intellectual Taiwanese journal Reflexion (思想). These two review essays impress upon readers the authors’ eagerness for the formation of a free and democratic state (or the establishment of constitutionalism); they also inform us of the great differences between the two positions, which show the estrangement of overseas scholars from the political-economic and social-cultural conditions of contemporary China. They also reveal the misunderstanding of China’s “liberal” scholars about issues of “cultural politics” and “modernity.” Therefore, this chapter aims to bring Zhang’s Identity’s thesis and its opponents’ opinions together to reflect on their concerns and respective methodologies. Firstly, with regard to the object and content of the book, I will outline my understanding of the first question raised by the two critics of why Zhang selects German thinkers as his object of research. Next, I will explore the different approaches employed by Identity and the two opponents. In my opinion, it is their different methodologies that lead them to their different arguments. Then, I delve into the theme of the book, which is also the main argument that the critics interrogate. This is about the dialectics of universality versus 3 See Xiao Gaoyan 萧高彦, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun “文化政治”的魅力与 贫困 [The Charm and Poverty of “Cultural Politics”],” and Gao Quanxi 高全喜, “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei 文化政治与现代性问题之真伪 [Cultural Politics and the Authenticity of the Issue of Modernity],” both from Sixiang 思想 [Reflexion] (Taipei), No. 3, 2006. The following citations are all from these two articles and therefore the sources will not be indicated in detail. Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

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figure 34 Shanghai’s Oriental Pearl Radio & TV Tower at night courtesy of the author

particularity, cultural pluralism versus political and cultural diversity, as well as the diverse ways of “transcending nationalism.” It is followed by a deliberation of the key point of debate: does Chinese civilization have its own universality that differs from Western modernity? What is cultural politics? If China owns its own universal values and discourses, what ideas have China’s ancient civilization and modern history provided for contemporary China’s political legitimacy? After a brief comparison between the views from Identity and that of the two critics on how to be Chinese in this age of globalization, I will give, in the last part of the reflection, some of my own thoughts on the connotations of the cultural politics of “Chinese-ness.” This chapter can be taken as a research note on the ongoing debate on the direction of contemporary China as widely witnessed in Chinese academic circles. 1

Why Take German Thinkers as the Object of Research?

Gao Quanxi’s criticism begins surprisingly with an outright denial of the significance and value of modernity as an academic issue: “Modernity is not a

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real problem for mainstream thinkers from Britain and America.”4 This seems like a bizarre argument. If what he says is true, then Anthony Giddens (1938–), who is extremely popular in Britain, would not be “a mainstream thinker” to him. Gao goes on to suggest that, “… even for classical liberalism, so-called modernity itself is a pseudo-problem … In their point of view, the formation and development of a social pattern is a completely spontaneous process of evolution in which there does not exist an absolute fracture and revolutionary transformation.”5 According to him, “… in the thoughts of social politics and law in Britain and America from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century, even in corresponding French thinking, the violent impingement of modernity which the Germans deeply felt did not exist.”6 Is this really the case? Among the three countries he mentioned (Britain, America and France), the United States of America—as a state that has existed for only just over 200 years—has no tradition to withstand historical onslaught. However, the intensification of the conflict between slavery in the South and industrial and commercial capitalism in the North eventually led to civil war, whereas, in France, there was the famous intellectual battle between the ancien and the moderne. The French Revolution ended the feudal system; Charles Baudelaire’s proclamations became the classic exposition of modernity. Thus, it makes no sense to say that France falls short of an awareness of modernity. As for Britain, it has the longest history of capitalism. Here we can briefly review British history to determine how the capitalist system, taken to be “consistent with the needs of human nature” and “naturally-evolved”7 by Gao, was produced. The opening of new routes in the sixteenth century enabled England to become the shipping center of the Atlantic. It obtained from colonization and plunder immense profit from unfair trade through expanding markets and exploiting raw materials. This means of actively exploring overseas trade brought the rapid development of its wool manufacturing industry, the traditional sector of English industry. In order to adapt itself to the market, there appeared many manual workshops. The increasing scale of the development of wool manufacturing also had great effects on other sectors such as coal mining, iron smelting and shipbuilding, which all adopted production by handicraft workshops. Development then spread to rural areas with the “enclosure movement”, leading to capitalist farming. Accordingly, there emerged a number of graziers and farmers. Some of them also engaged in industry and 4 Gao Quanxi, “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei,” 238. 5 Ibid., 240. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 241.

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commerce and accumulated much capital. They shared the same interests as the bourgeoisie and were known as the new aristocracy. Agricultural workers soon appeared. As a result, the British accumulated the necessary capital for the development of capitalism. Within this process, financiers, bankers, commercial capitalists and factory owners became the new bourgeoisie. As the forces of the bourgeoisie and the new aristocracy constantly strengthened, the contradiction between them and the feudal, autocratic system which represented the old means of production became more serious, ultimately sparking the bourgeois revolution in which King Charles I (1600–1649) lost his head. In light of such facts, how could we say that there is no “fracture or revolutionary transformation” in history? Instead, the so-called “spontaneous” economic activities of British capitalist development were inseparable from its overseas expansion and trade as well as its domestic enclosure movement. Even quite a few scholars hostile to Marxism have admitted the early brutal exploitation of primitive capitalism as described in the writings of Karl Marx, and have acknowledged that it is proletarian resistance that forces the state to undertake gradual reform and implement more humane policies. Therefore, could we still argue that all the capitalist institutions were “… gradually formed in the spontaneous evolution of economy, law and culture in accordance with the needs of human nature,”8 as Gao contends? Although Gao recognizes that this transformation of human historical formation—as implicit in the concept of modernity—is true, he still charges Zhang with falling short of the basic knowledge of modernity in Germany; he believes that, in Germany, “… the rights of private property, civil society, political state and overseas colonization, world history and international public law …” as well as “… core propositions …” such as “… mutual recognition, state sovereignty, homogeneous society and cultural identity …” have never been truly achieved.9 Yet, whether those have been realized or not is not the key issue. Even if the theory of German thinkers is “… the conceptual summary of the British social experience …” and granted that “… the premise of the republican, constitutional state that Kant’s perpetual peace appealed for did not exist in Germany at all, Hegel’s theory of civil society is the summary of British civil society, and Marx’s Das Kapital has been modeled on the British capitalism,”10 these theoretical summaries themselves could not be disproven, for they have laid the foundation for related discussion to now. We cannot assume that the conceptual summary of the British social experience can only 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 239. 10 Ibid., 242.

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be made by the British so as not to be idealistic rhetoric; or the modern form of capitalism under the special experience of Germany cannot be referred as a form of capitalism, as Gao does.11 To me, the tension or estrangement that is alleged to exist between German theory and British (and French) society does not exist. Nevertheless, to insist on the authenticity of British and American experiences, Gao upholds a certain principle of legitimacy to reject all “nonauthentic” forms of capitalist countries and completely negates theories that do not fit into his ideal model, notwithstanding that they are widely recognized in Britain and the United States, and constitute one of the foundations of their jurisprudence. By contrast, what Gao favors, as he acknowledges, is “… Britain’s tradition of common law, Scotland’s political economy, America’s philosophy of positivism, and the theory of empiricism and value of conservatism.”12 Most of these, as we may note, are purely theoretical formulations without analysis in concrete historical experience. Indeed, Germany and France are well known for their highly-developed social-historical research and philosophy, whereas Britain and America have abounded with “pure” analytical philosophy and ahistorical liberalism. The reason why theories without much historical analysis have been so much favored by the two critics, to me, might be because these non-historical treatises can relieve anxiety regarding the historical atrocities that occurred during the process of capitalist development. However, since Gao simultaneously admits that the universal discourse of German thought is still inclined to identity with the basic structure of the British and American business society and constitutional rule,13 Zhang’s study of German thinking is warranted. What really disturbs him lies in the fact that the so-called “… real thoughts and theory and political-economic system of British and American liberalism or even German liberalism …” turn out to be “… the target of the German thinkers.”14 It is true that the penetrating analysis of Identity has convincingly shown the true nature and limits of liberalism. The more valuable criticism would be that which indicates any mistake in the analysis; yet, neither of the two articles does. In contrast with Gao’s article, which completely negates the value of modernity, Xiao seems much more cautious in his argumentation. He agrees that modern German culture is one of the important sources of Western modernity but denies that it constitutes the whole and origin of the Western discourse 11 12 13 14

Ibid., 240. Ibid., 241. Ibid., 243. Ibid., 244.

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of universalism. He believes that the period from Bismarck (1815–1898) to the Second World War was a destructive process and thus not worthy of study.15 However, the problem with this assertion is that Identity does not call for the Chinese to learn from the German experience, although learning a lesson from a failed experience is justified. Rather, it cautions against the ultimate consequences to which Germany submitted: internalizing and being subjected to the ideas of its competitors. Consequently, the road that Germany found and followed was not its own; it was subsumed into the Western system and was tamed by its rival. As explained by the author of Identity, the reason why he chose Germany and its thinkers as the object of study is because its late-developing modernity is the inevitable road that non-Western countries must take; the history of modern Germany is one of state unification, national building and capitalist development combined, which qualifies it as a reference. Moreover, the fact that it later transformed into a fascist country was not an unavoidable development. Instead, for Zhang, the fact that Germany committed itself to emulating powerful countries like Britain and America serves as an inspirational reference for China. However, for the two critics, learning from Britain and America means entirely adopting their system of a constitutional state, so any other considerations are not only incidental but also nonsensical. This said, what Identity focuses on is still the critique of the discourse of universalism, which is undertaken through an analysis of bourgeois rights and jurisprudence established by German thinkers. Since the two critics are unable to refute Zhang’s reasoning, they once more choose to avoid it. Nevertheless, let us look at how Identity engages in this demythicization. Zhang notes that both Kant and Hegel take private property as their theoretical starting point, In the eyes of the bourgeois class, the rights of the bourgeoisie are both natural and rational … For Kant, property is not and cannot be questioned. It is the natural starting point of history and morality … At the same time, it is rational … In a certain sense, this is a paradox and a logically unreliable premise. Why does the natural thing happen to be rational? And why does the rational thing happen to be natural?16 In a nutshell, this is nothing but “… a moral statement and a political statement;” instead of being the universal truth, it is a “… strong self-affirmation

15 16

Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 208. Zhang Xudong, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 23.

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of a historic subjectivity, and an understanding and expression of a kind of particularity with the concept of universality.”17 However, the political and cultural identification of Zhang’s two critics with the bourgeois constitutional state means that they take the history of the West as world history per se, becoming the only road that China should take. By contrast, Identity aims to demonstrate that “… [these things ranging] from private property to civil society, from constitutional state, international law to world history … are nothing but the self-rendition of the political consciousness and subjectivity consciousness of the Western countries.”18 Therefore, to fully understand the historical development of modernity, the British and American experience is certainly indispensable; however, this is not the job of Identity. What it intends to explore is the nature of the Western universalist discourses of modernity. Although the conception of history and the view of human nature by British and American thinkers are also universal discourses, they have already been thoroughly repudiated by classical Marxism. Since German thinkers and their theory have rarely been subjected to the same historical analysis and political critique, Identity undertakes this job. Let us now examine its methodological procedure. 2

Totality and the Dialectics of Historical Materialism

Gao criticizes the logical structure of Identity as a mess with no theoretical foundation.19 However, Identity does have a theoretical framework that undergirds its critique. As to the questions of the purpose of this criticism and to what such criticism contributes, Identity is also clear. “The (function of) theoretical thinking…” as the author of Identity proclaims, is “… to act as the intermediary between different theories, and to find the factual relevance between them.”20 In Identity, critical approaches such as new historicism, post-colonialism, structuralism, post-structuralism and hermeneutics are discussed and sometimes employed. Nevertheless, it is the Marxist dialectic of historical materialism that unifies all these approaches. What is historical materialism? To put it simply, it explains changes and development in society through historical inquiry, because it believes that only in history have human beings collectively created their ways of life. For example, 17 18 19 20

Ibid. Ibid., 23. Gao Quanxi, “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei,” 245. Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 21.

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the market economy and parliamentary democracy did not spontaneously emerge from human brains but were jointly created by the political, economic and cultural conditions of societies at particular social-historical conjunctures. Accordingly, to place the non-historical notions of free people and an absolute (free) economy as the presuppositions of universalist claims is historically ungrounded. Compared to Gao, critic Xiao better understands Zhang’s approach here, as he aptly generalizes: “The universal proclamations monopolized by the West must be deconstructed, reassembled and restored to the specific historical and political context.”21 However, this is not due to the reason that “… we are in the postmodern era when subjectivity and universality are strongly interrogated,”22 implying that the undertaking in Identity is nothing but post-structuralist trickery. Instead, Identity “restores” the mystified and sanctified doctrines to the historical conditions from which they originated, and notes that things such as constitutional states, parliamentary democracy and market economies are all historical phenomena rather than absolute truths: there are different forms and patterns of these institutions in history, over-determined by diversified social, political and economic conditions and historical experiences. Xiao apparently does not fully comprehend Zhang’s methodology. Commenting on Zhang’s assertion that “The Germans have set up the law in spirit and thought for the whole modern western bourgeois class; it even can be said that the mature bourgeois system had already been given an intellectual practice or a formal rehearsal early by German romanticism,” Xiao remarks that this “… fundamental presupposition …” typifies Zhang’s holistic methodology.23 Elsewhere, he again takes Zhang’s assertion, “The consciousness of subjectivity of a non-Western social culture must be one of totality,” as the starting point of Zhang’s argumentation, which to him is a holistic way of thinking.24 However, this argument, premised on the analysis of the cultural politics of particular nations, is a hermeneutical notion—as a whole, Zhang’s analysis in Identity can be taken as a hermeneutical practice. “Holism” (整体主义), Xiao’s charge against the author, is of his own definition; nevertheless, there has never been such a term in Marxist theory. Judged by what Xiao says, “holism” in his mind probably refers to an arbitrary (and erroneous) framework. However, apart from outside resemblance, this term “holism” has nothing to do with the Marxist concept of totality. 21 22 23 24

Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 217. Ibid., 209. Ibid. Ibid., 214–215.

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Contrary to Xiao’s belief that Zhang’s analysis is the result of selfconfirmation predicated upon certain a priori assumptions, I have suggested that the approach of Identity is premised on historical materialism; in particular, it is a practice vis-à-vis the Marxist notion of totality. This Marxist concept holds that a society is a system of totality, in which politics, economy and culture have their semi-autonomous status respectively, but these different dimensions have their structural homogeneity intertwined. They constitute the whole relational system not only through their unity but also through their mutual differences. In other words, this totality is not the outcome of a single and one-way determination. Rather, any practice or phenomenon is the result of many different determinations which have their own logic and specificity irreducible to any others; or, it is “over-determined.” In particular, the notion of “expressive totality” maintains that all practices in a society—political, economic, cultural—interact and affect each other. Therefore, rather than the mechanical exclusiveness shown by Gao’s assertion that “… culture is culture and politics is politics …”25 it is the correlation and mediation among various social practices/factors that compose the systematic whole. In short, any phenomenon is over-determined by multiple factors; it is not to be interpreted or dealt with from one single dimension. Therefore, while a cultural phenomenon has a separate signifying system with its particular effects, it is simultaneously constitutive of our understanding of what the political and economic is. The other major concept of Marxism is dialectic, or the dialectic of historical materialism. Simply put, everything has its dual character and evolves in history with positive and negative sides simultaneously. While Hegel’s and Marx’s versions of dialectic both share so-called “reflexivity,” the differences lie in the fact that Hegel just reflects on the framework of the concept itself, whereas Marx goes further to explore the historical origin and generation of the concept, a process of demystification. In this regard, we may notice that Identity does not single-mindedly affirm or deny abstract, non-Marxist dialectics, regardless of the dialectic of Hegel’s “negation of negation” or of Nietzsche’s “affirmation of affirmation.” Instead, it acknowledges the German thinkers’ merits in theoretical thinking and practice, but also relentlessly exposes the weakness and contradiction of their positions. Because of his estrangement from Marxist theory, Xiao finds “conflicts” in the methodology of Identity: “Zhang claims that he takes postcolonial theory as the starting point, yet his efforts to describe the presupposition of the holistic approach here are obviously inadequate.”26 This statement shows that Xiao 25 26

Gao Quanxi, “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei,” 246. Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 209.

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not only has misunderstood the approach of Identity but is also very unfamiliar with critical theory. Rather than taking postcolonial theory as his starting point, Zhang criticizes it throughout the book. In one place, Zhang argues that, To put it bluntly, all the so-called “alternative programs of modernity,” ranging from the “East Asian models” to the “post-colonial theory” in the West, are nothing but the defense of the development of capitalism in some particular regions with cultural and religious particularities, aiming to establish, under the condition of global capitalism, some “semiautonomous” power branches or subsystems in the name of “subjectivity” … Such “alternative projects” just aim at obtaining “identity” and “recognition” for the elite groups of some nationalities, societies and regions within the western hegemonic order. But they turn in a blank sheet in terms of the creation of a rational social order and a new cultural and political pattern, for the substance of collective historical experience has already been excluded … China’s modern history, especially the historical choice of the mass revolution and socialist modernity, is itself the creative transcendence of this “alternative project.”27 In this regard, it is also necessary to address Xiao’s accusation that, in the socalled “self-mediation of universality,” Identity has tried to repudiate universalism through a right-wing interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy.28 It is true that Identity takes universality to be the self-proclamation of certain particularity; however, its interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy aims at nothing but revealing the essence of universalism as a desire for self-affirmation. Against this move, Xiao contends that Identity restores “… the universality represented by the concept of law or right (Recht) of western modernity to the bourgeois class’s needs for the legal and political legitimacy of its private property and contract” in order to show that they are none other than “… the special ideologies of the bourgeois class in different historical stages.” To Xiao, this practice demonstrates “the anti-historical tendency” of “reductionism”29 However, while it is true that Identity does not take universalistic discourses such as “natural rights and sacred private property” as natural and unquestionable, it is so simply because the reified concepts themselves are mystified notions to be decoded.

27 28 29

Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 61. Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 210. Ibid., 213.

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It is this misunderstanding that propels us to examine the methodological undertakings of the two critics. In his article, Xiao expounds the universal value in his mind: In Kant’s time, the universality of the West has developed different social imagination from the moral vision, which then bred the two great Revolutions in America and France … the development of Western modernity is the incarnation and consolidation of several macro-social imaginations, including market economy, public sphere, and the democratic system of the people’s sovereignty.30 By these statements, we can understand his presupposition: imagination inspires action; moral visions breed revolution. Here, thinking dictates action; consciousness determines existence. When the utopia of communism is seriously criticized in the present age, we witness that another utopia is unabashedly asserted. In contrast to Xiao’s idealistic interpretation, Gao focuses on concrete institutions. To him, the lack of a proper political system is the source of all degradation in contemporary China, the view of which is both his starting point and his conclusion. In spite of the differences, the methodological underpinnings of the two critics are essentially the same: an ahistorical view of history and human nature as well as a sort of mechanistic determinism. They are ahistorical because both take the historical discourse of Western modernity as the universal truth, irrespective of any social-political difference in differing regions and eras. 3

The Dialectic between Universality and Particularity

The dialectic between universality and particularity is the key point of Identity, which is also the point attacked the most. As a matter of fact, there are several universal discourses advanced in Identity, and not all of them are repudiated. First are the universal values held by every civilization. Any civilization, as a Lebenswelt (“lifeworld”) having evolved over several hundreds (and even thousands) of years, has formed its universalistic discourse by creating their peculiar value system, which shows their ideal for society, life and politics. Vico’s New Science has made a pioneering and extraordinary analysis of this process, contending that, since the road to universality is paved by the historical formation 30

Ibid., 212.

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and development of a nation, national language, customs and ideas—as the subjects of civilization—are universal,31 which is acknowledged by Identity. Secondly, compared to the universal truth of all civilizations, Zhang declines to acknowledge the universalistic discourses of Western modernity, such as rationality, human rights and public communication. For instance, Identity notes that Max Weber believes that, “Only we [Westerners] have this kind of universality, whereas you [non-Westerners] can only imitate something like that, but can never create it with your own value and culture.”32 Identity does not concur with this viewpoint but perceptively remarks that, … the self-knowledge and self-proclamation of the modern West … are ultimately not the truth claim, but a narrative of value, a culturalistic narrative. It does not show the historical law or the objective truth, but is the articulation of an individual as well as collective willpower and ideal.33 Thirdly, Identity holds that the universalistic discourse of the rights of the bourgeois class is nothing but a moralized statement and political assertion. Rather than being universal truth, it is a “… clear, strong self-affirmation of a historical subject, and the understanding and expression of a sort of particularity with the concept of universality.”34 Fourthly, standardization in the age of globalization appears as “a lifestyle which is subsumed into the capitalist system of production and consumption;” and it is a condition of “… the postmodern globality or the global postmodernity.”35 Zhang contends that this lifestyle determined by the transnational economy is not truly universal but it is only standardization. In all, Identity reveals that the essence of the discourse of Western universalism is a dialectical process in which Western modernity, “… when confronted with the conflicts arising from the historical process, gives rise to a stronger cohesion of subjectivity through more radical self-critique, so as to further promote Western modernity to a higher level of universality.”36 Hence, it is the self-claim of particularity. In this light, rather than “… exchange the position of the West and China, as well as universality and particularity …” as Xiao

31 32 33 34 35 36

Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 40. Ibid., 13. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 49. Ibid., 120.

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charges,37 what Identity does is to urge the expansion of Chinese ethical-moral life and their development into a universal, discursive system. Does this proposal demonstrate a sort of Sino-centrism that insists on an a priori subjectivity of China? It is undeniable that there is a difference between subjectivity and universality; the author of Identity holds that, in real politics, any non-Western political and cultural entity should adhere to its subjectivity. However, before the formation of a unified life world, philosophical notions of “universality” and “particularity” can only be applied within a civilization rather than across all of them. In other words, comparability can be a real issue only after a unified lifeworld is attained.38 Rather than showing a mentality of Sino-centrism, Identity often stresses that Chinese cultural self-awareness should incorporate the “Other” into itself to be more encompassing. It suggests that Western universalistic discourses have become problematic in reality because “The logic of the self-production of Western-centric theory has been increasingly suffocated in its own ideological illusion and its universal discourse has been increasingly losing its nature of universality, becoming a defense for its established privileges.”39 Therefore, for Zhang, the key to establishing the self-identity of Chinese culture is “… not how to define the boundary between modernity and ‘Western culture’ but how to input new elements into the struggle for the definition of universal cultures and values,”40 thus creating a more open, inclusive universality. Xiao, however, questions the identity of the carrier of this “subject consciousness of totality”: Since only the state has the highest sovereignty in the modern world, the answer to this question is very clear: it is and can only be the state (rather than cultural tradition). More still, according to Zhang Xudong’s logic, the foundation of universal values is common law, whereas the basis of common law is national culture, and the origin of national culture is the nation-state.41 Although we acknowledge that the resource of universal values comes from national culture (essentially, civilization), the origin of national culture is 37 38

Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 214. Zhang Xudong 张旭东, “Yuanli jiti jiaolv de celue” 远离集体焦虑的策略 [Strategies to Stay Away from Collective Anxiety],” Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao 21 世纪经济报道 [21st Century Business Herald],” December 17th, 2006 39 Ibid. 40 Zhang Xudong, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong. 41 Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 216.

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not necessarily the nation-state, though it does act as the principal carrier of national subjectivity. Rather, for Identity, the universality originates from a relatively stable system—from the culture, psychology, morality and customs of a civilization accumulated through history. In reality, whether a civilization could expand its universal value depends on its social-political praxis. The stake lies in whether a nation or civilization has both the drive to include the Other in itself, and the historical ambition to develop new things by creatively transforming tradition and the Other. On the other hand, since in the modern world only nation-states theoretically have the highest sovereignty, they do play a crucial role in building national culture. The universal framework of each civilization as the “form of life” dictates that national culture, once constituted, would not only claim sovereignty over other cultures but also impose its rules on its subjects. As to what this (national) culture is, Said has defined its internal and external boundary: it designates “… not merely something to which one belongs but something that one possesses and, along with the proprietary process … a boundary by which the concepts of what is extrinsic or intrinsic to the culture come into forceful play;” it is, in other words, … the power of culture by virtue of its elevated or superior position to authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, interdict, and validate: in short, the power of culture to be an agent of, and perhaps the main agency for, powerful differentiation within its domain and beyond it too.42 From this perspective, the universal framework lays the foundation for understanding any alien culture; as Zhang Xudong unambiguously proclaims in another place, For meaningful comparison to come into being, there must be a recognized common ground that allows both agreement and difference to be registered, understood, and acted upon. Such common ground, homogeneity … is something to be decided upon by the sovereign of a form of life in relation to its power and legitimacy, as well as vis-à-vis other social beings in the world-historical space.43

42 Edward Said, “Introduction: Secular Criticism,” in The World, The Text and The Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 9. 43 Xudong Zhang, “Political Philosophy and Comparison: Bourgeois Identity and the Narrative of the Universal,” Boundary, No. 2, Vol. 32 (2005): 82.

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A universal framework is always claimed by any state aiming to maintain its cultural subjectivity; different civilizations adhere to their respective subjectivities by claiming their universality. For instance, politically speaking, contemporary comparative thinking in the West places its frame of reference on “… the cultural-political struggle for self-recognition and self-identity of the ‘bourgeois-Christian form of life’.”44 This does not mean that the various civilizations are not compatible to each other. Rather, “Civilizations do not clash, only empires do.”45 However, against Zhang’s assertion, Xiao believes that, “As long as there is the dialectics of universality and particularity, there would be no diversity and tolerance; and it will only lead to political resolution and practical struggle.”46 Is this really true? Once we admit that each civilization has its universal claims, will there necessarily be conflicts? This question can be put in another way: if the world is supposed to be diverse, then what is this diversity? 4

Cultural Diversity and Pluralism

Cultural pluralism is a policy adopted by some Western countries—such as America, Canada and Australia—to cope with multiple domestic ethnic groups and the sharp ethnic problems that have emerged in these countries. Located in the marginal position in these countries, these minorities and vulnerable groups protest against discrimination in social life and try to obtain from mainstream society recognition and equality of treatment. To settle these social disputes, these countries employ a strategy of cultural diversity. However, rather than all values being taken as equal, Identity points out that this diversity is one “… inside the Western political and economic system and its cultural life.”47 In particular, Zhang gives readers some examples, You can enjoy the equal protection of the law as members of racial minorities in America, yet remain as a culture of no importance. You can still keep the habit of eating Chinese food and can continue to pray to

44 Ibid. 45 Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: the Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). 46 Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 217. 47 Xudong Zhang 张旭东, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong 全球化时代的文化认 同 [Cultural Identity in the Era of Globalization] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009), 354.

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Buddha, but you must follow the laws of the United States and submit to the various forces that lead the American social life.48 Because the values of the mainstream society have become dominant and hegemonic, this diversity does not detract from the dominant position of the bourgeois-Christian lifeworld and its values. Diversity is thus tolerated and promoted, merely strengthening the legitimacy and institutional capacity of the hegemonic force. To Zhang, this is merely a pretense at diversity and plurality because these ethnic groups have been involuntarily cast into “the great melting pot” of mainstream society and become homogenized, gradually losing their nationality. Facing this predicament, some scholars propose “… a more radical concept of multiculturalism …” which “… calls for a profound restructuring and reconceptualization of the power relations between cultural communities”: “Refusing a ghettoizing discourse, it links minoritarian communities, challenging the hierarchy that makes some communities ‘minor’ and others ‘major’ and ‘normative’ ” and promoting “… the intellectual and political regrouping by which different ‘minorities’ become a majority seeking to move beyond being ‘tolerated’ to forming active intercommunal coalitions.”49 However, to me, this program is too idealistic, as different minorities would not of themselves naturally constitute a majority within a state. Ultimately, they have to resort to the international arena to “globalize multiculturalism,” which is termed “polycentric multiculturalism”: Within a polycentric vision, the world has many dynamic cultural locations, many possible vantage points … The “poly” … does not refer to a finite list of centers of power … No single community or part of the world, whatever its economic or political power, should be epistemologically privileged.50 Its many advantages aside, because this polycentric multiculturalism thinks and imagines from the margins, it is still only the discourse of those minoritarian communities, an idealistic will without solid, substantial foundations.51 It is fine to advocate that no single community or part of the world should be 48 Ibid., 9. 49 See Ella Shohat and Robert Stan, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media (New York: Routledge, 1994), 46. 50 Ibid., 48. 51 Ibid.

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epistemologically privileged; yet, without plural epistemologies, there would be only one epistemology to be privileged. Just as universalist claims entail particularist arguments, without multiple universals, there could only exist one “feasible” way of life and knowledge to be taken as the universal. What this theoretical and political dilemma informs us of is the importance of economic and military power in shoring up real equality as well as the universal framework held by different nations. The ethnic minorities in a state normally would not hold such a universal framework, but just want to maintain their lifestyles and customs. With multiculturalism they might attain the goal to a certain extent, but they cannot avoid the destiny of the melting pot, brought about by the homogenizing influence of the powerful, universalistic claims of the mainstream nation in the state-society. Here, the concepts of “cultural diversity” and “plurality of values” are not identical. For the conservatives of the West, the bourgeois-Christian lifeworld is the only truth and thus, from time to time, they try to extend this truth to other parts of the world. Although they also advocate “cultural diversity” in the world, the intention is nonetheless that the culture of other countries, even other civilizations, “… transform to be one position among the internal differences within the Western system …” and just like “… a member of the ethnic minorities in America subject to the equal protection of the law.”52 Therefore, Identity reminds us that, “… the regime … behind the diversity and freedom and democracy … is very important … The so called multiculturalism of today … is a lifestyle shaped by this ruling structure of law.”53 In effect, as Identity aptly notes, “A real ‘globalization’ and ‘cultural diversity’ needs a fundamental precondition, that is, the common order and law that all the people abide by and live by as ‘world citizens’ in a political, power, legal and cultural framework which includes all people. “54 That is exactly the form of empire where there are no so-called different civilizations, or where they have already perished; where a variety of different cultures as minorities surrender to the mainstream values and order of the bourgeois-Christian lifeworld. It is out of this concern that Identity raises the question of the self-identity of contemporary Chinese culture as a civilization. Should it be defined as “… a minor, weak and marginal culture …” just like the minority groups within Western countries, or a “… central, powerful culture with its subjectivity and significance in world history?”55 This is not just a lesson drawn from the 52 53 54 55

Zhang Xudong, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 19. Ibid., 390. Ibid., 353. Ibid., 355.

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observation of the theories and practice of modern German thinkers; more importantly, it is because China, as a civilization, has owned its universal ideal and philosophy as a unique lifeworld. Zhang further notes that cultural diversity is not just a modern phenomenon; for instance, in the Tang Dynasty (618–907), Chang’an, the metropolitan capital, was already diverse.56 To him, China has its own unique advantages: “In terms of religious affairs, China is very tolerant and diverse.”57 Being a country with thousands of years of cultural tradition, China does not have to follow the problematic “cultural diversity” of Western society but could develop its own practices. However, Xiao believes that “What such nationalistic thought reflects is the enormous fear that the weak countries have for their survival, which also leads to the consequence that every nation would produce a fundamental hostility to other nations.”58 Against this misgiving, Identity does not endorse Huntington’s view that there is inevitable conflict between differing civilizations, so long as all they respect the universal claims and sovereignty of each other. 5

How to Transcend the Nation-State System and Rebuild Continuity?

In Identity and the two articles, there appear two understandings of the present role of the nation-state and, correspondingly, two ways of transcendence. One holds that the function of the nation state is declining and that a universal world led by America is gradually emerging, together with its style of democratic governance and lifestyle spreading across the world. The other insists that the nation state still plays a crucial role in safeguarding and promoting its people’s livelihood and resisting foreign military and economic aggression; in addition, Chinese civilization could play a key role in creating an alternative form of governance. The concept of nation-state needs to be clarified here. In the West, the modern nation-state is taken to be constitutional. Theoretically, as Identity generalizes, in the modern world, “The general will leads to the social contract, which brings out the constitutional governance, leading to the (modern) state.”59 Nevertheless, this definition does not apply to the Chinese context. Since 56 57 58 59

Ibid., 391. Ibid., 397. Xiao Gaoyan, “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ de meili yu pingkun,” 227. Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 102.

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ancient times, China has been in possession of many attributes of modern, Western nation-states; nevertheless, it still owns many functions as the carrier of civilization.60 Regarding this idiosyncratic condition, the Western sinologist Lucian Pye (1921–2008) contends that China is a civilization disguised as a nation-state, or it is a state-nation.61 Both the two critics hold that this situation becomes an obstacle that prevents China from integrating into the mainstream of Western civilization. By contrast, Identity confirms the value of this unique condition. In particular, it affirms that in ancient China, Chinese culture was a universal culture, and what the educated people were concerned about was “Tianxia” … which became the Great Chinese Tradition formed over a long time … This cultural and psychological tradition which takes its own culture as universal is a precious intellectual source.62 Is this statement a nationalistic discourse? For the two critics, nationalism is no more than a narrow, arrogant mentality of uncivilized nations isolated from the mainstream of world civilization. By contrast, Identity has adopted the definition of the British sociologist Ernest Gellner (1925–1995), taking nationalism as “… primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent,”63 as Zhang Xudong eloquently suggests: China, as a “cultural being” and a “political being,” possesses intrinsically the nature of a modern nation state. Its “nationalism” is naturally legitimate, which is substantiated by history rather than an ideological argument … the cultural and political aspirations of modern China have gone far beyond the scope of nationalism in essence; and fundamentally, it opposes narrow nationalism and the various theories of “China exceptionalism.” As for this point, it is easily understandable as long as he/she is not hostile to the objective existence of China out of ideological prejudice. For those against this point, although they frequently hold the banner of “anti-cultural nationalism”, what they really want to express is nothing but that China should give up its present regime and integrate 60 Ibid., 387. 61 See Mei Zurong 梅祖蓉 and Tan Junjiu 谭君久, “Guanyu Bai Luxun zhongguo zhengzhi wenhua yanjiude pingjia yu yanjiu zongshu 关于白鲁恂中国政治文化研究的评 价与研究综述 [Evaluation and Review of Lucian Pye’s Studies of Chinese Politics and Culture],” Guowai shehui kexue 国外社会科学 [Social Science Abroad], No. 2, 2011. 62 Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 39. 63 Ernest Gellener, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

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into the Western political system. Nevertheless, how can such a new regime established by simply transplanting these systems deal with the structural difference between the contemporary Chinese society and the West in the broadest sense of culture? How can it cope with the historical demand of the “cultural and political unity” as Gellener calls within the system?64 Since the practice and theory of Western constitutional nations are based on their own culture and particular history in modern times, which do not accord with China’s historical tradition and its modern experience, does Identity here suggest creating a new system of jurisprudence in order to provide legitimacy for China as a “civilization-nation” or even, in a more fundamental sense, as an alternative form of “modern, constitutional nation”? We must note that Identity objects to narrow nationalism (though the definition of it is slightly different from that of the critics); hence it repeatedly warns of the danger of this narrow-mindedness and advocates building a real “world culture” by introducing various examples.65 Granted these historical facts, how can we imagine a new Chinese culture which is “national” and “world” rolled into one? In terms of this question, the following sentence in Identity may be one of the most unacceptable assertions for the two critics: One of the most fundamental causes for the historical and structural conflict between contemporary China’s cultural politics and the globalization or the global empire, namely the contemporary dominant culture represented by the British and the American, is out of the origin of modern China, which has a different jurisprudential foundation and a different structure of “reason.”66 64 Xudong Zhang 张旭东, “Wenhua mingzu zhuyi, ‘cuozhegan,’ yu zhongguo xueren de jingshen shiming “文化民族主义，“挫折感”，与中国学人的精神使命 [Cultural Nationalism, “Sense of Frustration”, and the Intellectual Mission of Chinese Scholars],” in Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao 21 世纪经济报道 [21st Century Business Herald], August, 14th, 2003. 65 For instance, “The culture of the French is not one of narrow nationalism, but a cosmopolitan one, because it is the expression of the political enthusiasm and imagination of the French people” (35); “Nietzsche’s view of culture goes beyond vulgar nationalism. It resorts to a common concept, yet it originates more from a value that goes beyond history, which demands the combination of the content of the political life and the cultural form of the nation” (36); and Max Weber has suggested that “Germany’s logic is that we must create a real world culture if we want to have a real German culture” (37); all in Zhang Xudong, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong. 66 Ibid., 18.

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Thus, for Identity, the legitimacy of China as a civilization-state lies less in the fact that China has a 5000-year history than in the resources its modern history has offered. In the present moment, when China is situated at another crossroad, Identity asserts that the priority is to rebuild “continuity” in history. What is this concept of “continuity”? Identity offers some examples. In the West, the narrative of subjectivity “… tends to spatialize and materialize others and historicize itself; it cuts off the historical continuity of others and links up and bridges the historical rupture of its own.”67 One typical case of mending fractures into a continuous and coherent unity can be found in Weber’s analysis of the rise of capitalism. Thus, Identity asserts that the mission for the Chinese is to learn, … how to maintain the cultural autonomy within globalization, and to make the continuity of value, ethics and daily life world to expand in accordance with its own logic, instead of being forced into the discourse and value system of the ‘mainstream of world civilization’ once more.68 In light of this historical lesson, how can we reconstruct this “continuity” for the history of modern China, both for the years before 1949 when the People’s Republic was established and the contemporary post-1949 period, as well as for the years before and after the reform era?69 In this regard, the second period is more significant. Zhang tries to discern the rationality in contemporary China’s tortuous historical experience because he believes that “… despite the serious mistakes, detours and even setbacks in the process … still, generally speaking, there is a great deal of rationality within it.”70 This is not simply to affirm or negate any period of history, such as the period of “Cultural Revolution” or the reform era. Different from the popular view that Deng’s reform abandoned Mao’s socialist ideal and is a complete rupture, this way of thinking aims to investigate its continuity. The quest for the constant self-affirmation, in a dialectic of continuity and rupture, is to bridge the fractures within Chinese society between the left and right. It is widely observed that Zhang’s stance is shared by some of China’s “New Leftists.” Gan Yang, one prominent scholar, has advocated over the past decade the integration of “three traditions” (Tongsantong, 通三统): the Confucian 67 Ibid., 45. 68 Ibid., 1. 69 Identity contends that only after this continuity is established, could “… the positive, active, constructive and creative values in China’s modern historical experience be brought out.” Ibid., 4. 70 Ibid., 6.

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tradition, which cherishes family relations and human emotions; the Maoist heritage that stresses equality and justice; and the market tradition of Deng’s reform and praxis of opening-up, which highlights efficiency.71 Apparently, the continuity that Gan underlines is not that between the ancient and the modern but between Mao’s socialism and Deng’s market-oriented praxis. It seems that the Party has accepted this strategy in recent years and applied it in its propaganda. China watchers thus observe that the government has determined that, “The 30 years of the PRC before the beginning of ‘reform and opening’ in 1979 must be seen as equally important to China’s revival under CCP leadership as the 30 years that have followed” and desires “… to reconcile the socialism of the Mao era (1949–1976)…” characterized by “… a planned economy, relatively equal income distribution and recurring ideological mobilization …” with Deng’s “reform and opening” legacy which “… promoted a large degree of openness towards ideas and methods originating in the United States and Europe.”72 However, is this version of continuity the same as Zhang’s proposal? In reality, the state merely favors a pragmatic use of this rhetoric for its legitimacy but does not bother to explain a “… great deal of rationality …” as Zhang suggests. In this regard, it is a challenge to distinguish Zhang’s stance as a critical intellectual from the state’s promotion. Besides, what kind of value has China’s modern history provided? The two critics hold that Identity does not offer a set of universal values and question the identity of the carrier of the so-called “cultural politics”. Indeed, Identity does not offer a comprehensive system in this regard, for that is what it is calling for. However, when going through the whole book, we may find many key hints. Before we inquire into this issue, we should start with the concept of cultural politics. 6

What is Cultural Politics?

Gao’s most daunting criticism is that the author of Identity “… does not know what politics is, what culture is and what the essential difference between the two is;” for him, “Politics is politics, and culture is culture.”73 As he puts 71

Gan Yang 甘阳, Tong santong 通三统 [Unifying Three Traditions] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2007), 1–3. 72 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Mareike Ohlberg, Simon Lang and Bertram Lang, “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future,” Source: MERICS: Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies, https://www.merics.org/sites/default/…/171004_MPOC_05_Ideologies_0.pdf. Accessed Dec. 21, 2018. 73 Gao Quanxi, “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei,” 248.

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it, politics is nothing but the political system, a sort of institutional rule and political order.74 By contrast, Identity holds that culture cannot be separated from politics and can, in some instances, become politics; in my opinion, this can be explained as follows. Firstly, every culture (actually, every civilization) is universal in its selfconsciousness; hence, this lifeworld, as a collective social existence, must show itself as something universal in reality. As Western superpowers do not readily acknowledge this, to insist on the universality of one’s culture is to maintain its subjectivity in the political field. Secondly, as Identity notes, “The best form of universal expression is not culture in the aesthetic sense, but law;” one of the examples the author provides is that “American culture, the American way of life, American democracy and the American Constitution are all of the same thing.”75 Another case in point, as Zhang informs us, is that “Rome was ruled by law, whereas (ancient) China was ruled by its culture.”76 This is not to say that there was no law or legal system in ancient China, but that the Confucian moral norms and tradition played a more important role in the legitimacy and continuity of China’s traditional political regime. Nor is this to suggest that China today can maintain its social order by counting on its moral tradition; rather, China should learn how to enliven its cultural tradition (both ancient and modern) for the creation of its social and political institutions. In light of this knowledge, Identity insists that there is no ready-made scenario to be blindly imitated; rather, it is worth pondering how culture (namely tradition) and institutional arrangement may work hand in hand. We thus need to achieve the innovation of institutions through re-thinking tradition. In this light, for the author of Identity, cultural politics is to reconsider the issue of culture on the level of law or the philosophy of law.77 Thirdly, Fredric Jameson informs us that postmodern culture is essentially “… the becoming cultural of the economic, and the becoming economic of the cultural.”78 Following this rationale, Identity confirms that contemporary capitalist consumption is not merely an economic behavior but also a cultural 74

Ironically, he simultaneously asserts that “… cultural politics is a way to deliberate problems, even an ingenious and comprehensive way to deal with Germany’s integration into modernity and globalization.” Ibid., 247. 75 Ibid., 6. 76 Ibid., 363. 77 Ibid., 3. 78 Fredric Jameson, “Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue,” in The Cultures of Globalization, edited by Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 60.

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one.79 This lifestyle itself is not universal but standardized. Nevertheless, as a way of life, this culture, being economic, is political. Therefore, since the totality of culture and politics is built on the continuum of history and value, cultural politics is “… the most fundamental selfawareness of a nation and its lifeworld.”80 To put it another way, since both culture and politics are the impulse of a nation to understand itself as a sort of value system and the self-affirmation of its lifeworld,81 they are closely tied in with each other. As a result, instead of taking this culture as one that “… commands, reduces and eliminates politics …” as Gao charges,82 culture from this perspective actually guides, concretizes and substantiates politics. As Zhang explains it in one article, The “cultural politics” that I talk about does not mean to discuss politics in the field of culture or vice versa, much less to deliberate identity in the sense of emotion and aesthetics … It is a holistic concept, rather than the combination or making a match of two separate fields or categories together. The concept as a whole refers to the inherent intensity of the existing world: any social or political existence has its own cultural intensity. In turn, any civilization, value system or lifestyle also has its own political intensity. And any beingness that can be called “civilization” or “life world” is both cultural and political, ontologically speaking … The concept of “cultural politics” is to overcome the simplified way of thinking and the way to overcome it is to define culture as the innate intensity of being itself, which is autonomic yet political ontologically; namely, it points to its affirmation of its own lifestyle and its own value system; both in the inner core and the outer edge of the cultural self-consciousness, it is purely political: to defend its own way of life and values, and to fight those external forces or internal forces which try to destroy them … From the perspective of the concept of cultural politics, culture or the ontology of life form politically faces a critical point. Once the critical point is reached, the self-consciousness of culture will directly emerge as the cultural-political consciousness, and obtain a kind of clarity: whether it is necessary to defend its own life values, its own culture and its lifestyle, and whether such “debate” on defending its own lifestyle will reach the same intensity as contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, and 79 80 81 82

Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 46. Ibid., 2. Ibid., 356. Gao Quanxi, “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei,” 250.

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thus accomplish the qualitative transformation from culture to politics. Actually, this intensity is not to be attained at all times. Most of the time, it cannot be reached and also there is no need to reach it. But ontologically, this point is always there and would never be eliminated. This critical point has marked the substance of the concept of “cultural politics.” Therefore, to speak concisely, the concept of cultural politics can only be explained by the following tortuous proposition: politics is the cultural intensity of the being, whereas culture is the political intensity of the being.83 In terms of the issue regarding how to guide, concretize and substantiate politics with culture, Zhang has referred to the universal framework provided by Chinese civilization. However, he also believes that this is not enough to challenge the holistic system of Western capitalism.84 Instead, he contends that China’s socialist practice offers a more valuable alternative. Mao’s socialist China used to be an extremely powerful nation with an extraordinary capacity for social and ideological mobilization with its particular values and ideals. As a new historical subject, it integrates modern Western culture—such as Enlightenment concepts of equality, fairness and justice—into its selfconsciousness. It is thus compatible with the conditions of modernity, but at the same time transcends its social limitations.85 7

Tensions and Dilemmas: Whose Cultural Politics?

Thus said, I must stress that, its many merits aside, Zhang’s analytical scheme is filled with tensions, which are shown both in its methodology and in its content. We might start our analysis with the “tension” that he believes exists in present Chinese society. Identity contends that one of the key contradictions in contemporary China is “… the conflict and contradiction between the ideology of mass revolution, such as equality, justice, democracy and so on, and the ‘rational choice’ for the development of the economy, such as liberty, prosperity, and so on.”86 That is to say, the contradiction between the objective 83 Xudong Zhang 张旭东, “ ‘Wenhua zhengzhi’ yu ‘zhongguo daolu’ “文化政治”与“中国 道路” [“Cultural Politics” and “Chinese Road”],” May 29th, 2016. http://www.guancha.cn/ ZhangXuDong/2016_05_29_362060.shtml. Accessed September 4, 2016. 84 Ibid., 11. 85 Ibid., 9. 86 Ibid., 4.

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demands of efficiency and the subjective ideal of fairness is something of an antinomy or paradox. This diagnosis is reminiscent of the rhetoric of the state, which often claims that social conflicts can only be resolved through deepened reform and further development. However, Zhang—once a student of Fredric Jameson—would not deny the fact that this antinomy is merely a false paradox caused by the established mode of production. To put it another way, we may question whether so-called “rational choice” is the patent of capitalist modernity or whether socialist modernity only refers to the ideology of mass revolution but includes nothing like “rational choice.” Without clarifying this confusion, the “contradiction” mentioned by the author here seems to be a tension between (capitalist) “rational choice” and socialist mass democracy. This sort of tension is also witnessed in the book’s methodology. On the one hand, Identity is a Marxist analysis that demythicizes “bourgeois rights” and is guided by the principle of historical materialism; on the other hand, the two most significant Marxist approaches—class analysis and political-economic analysis—are rarely witnessed here. Without the latter, the arguments of “cultural identity” become questionable. That is to say, the concern about cultural politics between nations (or civilizations) has prevailed and replaced the engagement with the substantive content of political economy and political culture; this makes the purpose of the research ambiguous. Does the author of Identity attempt to do as the bourgeois scholar Max Weber did: appeal for the state to compete for cultural superiority in the rise of a great power? Or does he aim to carry forward the values of China’s socialist revolution by calling for socialist re-orientation, a call resembling that of Marxist theorist George Lukacs (1885–1971)? The author might argue that, since the present book deals with issues at a different level, it therefore focuses on culture but is still premised on a fundamental understanding of the political economy of contemporary China. One presupposition is particularly taken for granted here: “the rise of the fourth estate.” This refers to the enhancement of the political-economic rights of the laboring class or the proletariat. In an interview, Zhang contends that, The Chinese revolution put forward the issue of the liberty and democracy of the fourth estate in world history. The freedom, democracy and equality of the majority is more than a question of quantity, for some fundamental conflicts in structure and theory will be inevitably brought in and a new set of social theory, political theory, mode of social organization and values is definitely needed to deal with these problems. I believe

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that the ultimate value conflict between the United States and China is a historical conflict …87 In Identity, he further argues that “This new and expanded (non-bourgeois) civil class can represent more universal rights and freedom than the bourgeois rights, and can establish a universal cultural identity in history, which is the standpoint of this new, more universal and selfless political party of the civil class.”88 That is to say, he essentially suggests that contemporary China’s social progress can be characterized as the rise of “the fourth estate,” led by a socialist political party; consequently, even the envisioned conflict between America and China is taken to be a competition of values in world history.89 This supposition is based on his judgment of the nature of contemporary Chinese society: Today, will some people believe that they are developing capitalism, yet in reality they are walking on the socialist path … Is there any possibility that people think that they are busy … converging with (the mainstream civilization) and connecting with the huge sign of the United States, but actually it is the road with Chinese characteristics that has been explored?90 However, the author’s implied judgment in this hypothetical proposition is not substantiated. For this historical evaluation, Zhang nevertheless hesitates, which is shown in the hypothesis and a series of self-contradictory statements. For one, when commenting on the “key contradiction” in contemporary Chinese society— the conflict between the ideology of mass revolution and “rational choice”— he asserts that “… both in theory and observed from historical experience, the two are not necessarily contradictory; or this contradiction is not necessarily 87 Xudong Zhang 张旭东, Xue Yi 薛毅, “Xixue xiangxiang yu zhongguo dangdai wenhua zhengzhi de zhankai 西学想象与中国当代文化政治的展开 [The Imagination of Western Learning and the Development of Cultural Politic in Contemporary China],” Tianya 天涯 [Frontiers], No. 2, 2003. 88 Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 110. 89 Indeed, the author repeatedly states that one of the major factors in the success of the Chinese revolution is that it expanded democracy to the fourth estate; thus, it won their support and seized power. But a lesson exists in history: in France, the rise of the bourgeois class relied on the support of the Fourth Estate; however, it subsequently betrayed the latter and suppressed the economic and political demands of the proletariat. Therefore, in the classic works of Marxism, the year 1848 is taken to be the turning point when the bourgeoisie became reactionary. 90 Xudong Zhang, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 68.

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incompatible.” Instead, “The view that the two are incompatible actually stems from the ideological bias of the global age, which is external to the contradiction itself.”91 Indeed, from a Marxist perspective, the conflict between efficiency and fairness is specious. The solution to this antinomy relies on the historical rearrangement of political and economic relations to solve the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations in society. This does not mean a call for class reconciliation, which is the strategy of social democracy as a way of bourgeois reform. Also because of this confusion, readers find the implied idea of “sublating” bourgeois rights in Identity when it exposes the naturalization of property rights; on the other hand, apart from demanding that the Chinese elites care for the interests of disadvantaged groups, there seems to be no alternative. Distinct from Zhang’s optimistic view, a pessimistic opinion holds that not only is the fourth estate in contemporary China unlikely to rise up, but that its position is even lower than that of the working class in capitalist countries in political and economic rights. Worse still, the situation is unlikely to substantially improve. In other words, some scholars contend that China may enhance the living standard of the fourth estate by taking the social democratic path of Western Europe but it would not allow them to become true masters of themselves. Apparently, Zhang must respond to this view in order to support the premise of his hypothesis. Otherwise, he may only go as far as Richard Rorty’s appeal for bettering the way of “substantive democracy,” which he actually criticizes, rather than going further to follow Jameson’s appeal to explore the utopian imagination of an alternative history—a code word for socialism. If so, the weakening of his critical edge would be quite obvious and his theory of “continuity” not different from those bourgeois scholars who try to cover up unfavorable history. Indeed, when Zhang remarks that “This class, maybe unconsciously, happens to be the representative of the interests of all classes in society as a whole,”92 he probably refers to the newly-born “middle classes” but not to the working class, a departure from his seemingly Marxist position. In fact, Zhang has made a serious critique of China’s bourgeois class, which intends to “rewrite history” or “make up” for the lost capitalist period, The idea to reconstruct a bourgeois civil society within the state form of contemporary China sounds like it is to follow (the tide of) history, but in fact it is a kind of historical nihilism, because it has radically cut off the relationship between China’s reality and its history. It … shifts its moral, 91 Ibid., 4. 92 Ibid.

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political and theoretical responsibility as a historical successor. This way of “going back to Kant,” no matter how impassioned its moralistic rhetoric, is a kind of attitude which only cares about “my own judgment and intention, as well as my objective,” as Hegel once criticized. Such a judgment, intention, and goal only exposes the narrow interest of the newlyemerged property-owning class in Chinese society, and the intellectual vulnerability and simplicity of the spokesman of this class, for the “outside,” namely the historical conditions and real national conditions of contemporary China was “presumed as something inconsequential” by this “subjective will.”93 Convincing as this argument may seem, the dilemma still exists. Although Zhang holds that mass revolution as well as the historical choice of socialist modernity has creatively transcended the “alternative modernity” of the postcolonial countries, he admits that there is not yet a complete “scheme of replacement” to supersede the capitalist mode of production. How then to wrestle with this problem? How can those intellectuals, who look forward to social progress, deal with this situation? Zhang has contended that it is wrong to equate the United States with capitalism, for it has already taken in many elements of socialism. Nevertheless, the country is still manipulated by the unique logic of capital. How can China, which is developing its capital market, manipulate capital effectively instead of being controlled by it? How can its supreme power avoid usurpation by the agent of the capitalist class? The answers to these questions are the key to the argument’s presupposition. 8

Conclusion

Both Identity and Gao’s article propose the question How should we be Chinese in the present era of globalization? Gao holds that this question is essentially not one of cultural politics but pertains to the arrangement of the political system.94 While acknowledging the necessity of institutional arrangement, it should be stressed that to establish one’s cultural identity is ultimately an issue of value judgment, which pertains to the realm of culture and cultural politics. For Identity,

93 94

Ibid., 81. Gao Quanxi, “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei,” 254.

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The value in the ultimate sense is a cultural-political determination, which could be witnessed in the following questions … Who am I? What kind of person do I want to be? What kind of life do I want to live? Where can I get happiness? In what kind of life world and cultural context will my happiness be established and realized?95 Should the Chinese seek the answers in the bourgeois-Christian lifeworld and its civilization or in the Chinese ethical-moral world within its peculiar cultural tradition? The moment of this pursuit is the time when culture and politics become intertwined. In summary, Identity holds that the key to finding the identity of (modern) Chinese culture is to inject new elements into the struggle for defining universal culture and values. Nevertheless, while the author insists that the socialist new China which carries on the Chinese lifeworld has gone beyond the historical framework of the constitutional state of Western civil society, we wonder whether contemporary China will fall back once more into this framework? When he proposes that the value impulse and political instincts precipitated in the unconscious of the masses is the root cause of the legitimacy of the leading class, we ponder who is the leading class in contemporary China? When the author argues that the history of the Chinese revolution and national liberation in the twentieth century has determined that the masses and mass democracy constitute the core content of the positive value of Chinese modernity, we also want to learn from him how to develop substantive democracy in China when procedural democracy is still immature. That is to say, only after a fair development of the socialist political economy and socialist political culture can there be a meaningful exploration of a fruitful cultural politics in contemporary China. If one of the key differences between socialism and capitalism is that socialism is more democratic, thus promoting more social progress, whereas the key contradiction in capitalist society is that it cannot realize the substantive democracy or full potential of the ideal of modernity, then what critical intellectuals need to do first and foremost is to call for fulfilling the prerequisite for the modern form of Chineseness or Chinese identity, namely to restore so-called “continuity” in reality rather than just in theory. This, I believe, is what a meaningful “cultural politics” points to in the mind of the author of Identity. 95

Zhang Xudong, Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong, 383–384.

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Establishing the Subjectivity of Modern Chinese Culture: Zhou Ning’s Research as a Case Study While the Chinese academic world was eager to import and introduce nonMarxist, Western intellectual trends (such as the schools of Freud and Heidegger) in the 1980s, Chinese intellectuals since the 1990s have aimed at establishing their own academic subjectivity; however, this was attempted by introducing more Western critical theories, especially postmodern theory and postcolonial criticism. Only in recent years has this situation been more or less changed. If we are looking for a Chinese scholar whose research epitomizes the development of China’s cultural and intellectual world over the last two decades, Zhou Ning 周宁 (1961–), a professor teaching at China’s renowned Xiamen University, would be one of the best candidates. In 2011, he published Cross-Cultural Study: China’s Image as a Methodology, which summarized his studies of more than a decade, as well as some self-reflection and further exploration.1 The eightvolume edited series entitled The Image of China: Theories and Legends from the West was published in 2004,2 the two-volume The Distant China: Western Image of China in 2006,3 and the nine-volume, edited series entitled Image of China in the World was first published in 2007 and completed in 2013.4 These publications and this conclusive 2011 book of his research findings and methodology show that the focus of Zhou’s cross-cultural study of China’s image in the world has always been situated in a systematic reflection of the century-old impingement of Western cultural hegemony on China. This latest book symbolizes the ending of one stage of research and the opening up of another; both are closely related to the exploration of Chinese intellectuals over recent 1 Zhou Ning 周宁, Kuawenhua yanjiu: yi zhongguo xingxiang wei fangfa 跨文化研究：以中 国形象为方法 [Cross-Cultural Study: China’s Image as a Methodology] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2011). 2 Zhou Ning 周宁 ed., Zhongguo xingxiang: xifangde xueshuo yu chuanshuo 中国形象：西 方的学说与传说 [The Image of China: Theories and Legends from the West], 8 vols. (Beijing: xueyuan chubanshe, 2004). 3 Zhou Ning 周宁, Tianchao yaoyuan: Xifang de zhongguo xingxiang yanjiu 天朝遥远：西 方的中国形象研究 [The Distant China: Study of Western Image of China] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006). 4 Zhou Ning 周宁 ed., Shijie de zhongguo xingxiang yaniiu 世界的中国形象研究 [Studies of the Image of China in the World], 9 volumes. Beijing: Renming chubanshe, 2007.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_012

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decades. Thus, an examination of Zhou’s academic inquiry and his findings is highly significant and meaningful in this regard. As a research note based on a detailed, critical review, this chapter employs Zhou Ning’s academic exploration as a case study. The survey thus will not be chronological; instead, this summary and reflection is organized into various categories, which seem the only way can we better understand the achievements as well as the likely weaknesses in his study. I find Zhou’s research intimately tied with, and ultimately leading to, an inquiry into the culturalpolitical subjectivity of modern Chinese culture. 1

Critique of Sinologism and Modern Academic Institutions

Since the introduction of Said’s Orientalism by China’s most famed intellectual journal Reading (读书) in the mid-1990s, the post-colonial criticism which has been popular in Western academia since the 1970s began spreading to China. It aroused some controversy within and without cultural circles. More than a decade later, it is time to undertake a fair evaluation of these debates. The reason why post-colonial cultural theory has played an important role in contemporary China is closely related to the social atmosphere. With the rapid development of its economy and the remarkable improvement in people’s lives, the optimism about the nation’s future resulting from the pleasure of consumption and enhanced international prestige has spawned a cultural nationalism, witnessed in the so-called “craze for traditional Chinese culture (国学热).” At that time, due to their inability to find a direction for national development and the corresponding “anxiety of explaining China (阐释中国 的焦虑),”5 some Chinese scholars, both at home and abroad, began to employ Western postmodern and post-colonial theories to examine the new cultural phenomena, which soon became popular in cultural circles. This intellectual trend aimed at reflection on the “cultural fever” of the 1980s, which had called for complete Westernization by joining the “blue, marine civilization,” as typified by the TV series River Elegy (河殇). Meanwhile, critique of the popular discourse of “national character (国民性)”—namely the accusation of a Chinese morbid personality which allegedly favored the “feudal autocracy” in China’s traditional agricultural society and imperial dynasties—was also heard in society.

5 Jin Yuanfu 金元浦 and Tao Dongfeng 陶东风, Chanshi zhongguo de jiaolv 阐释中国的焦虑 [Anxiety of Explaining China] (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1999).

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Thus, the introduction of Orientalism to China and the repercussions that it brought about should be reconsidered from the perspective of changes in academic trends, which were strongly influenced by the political-intellectual tide of the era. The “New Enlightenment” of the 1980s reached a peak in the sensational TV documentary series River Elegy, released around 1989, whose lack of academic integrity in its ideological bias was noted in the heated debates it triggered. Moreover, the validity of Lu Xun’s critique of China’s “national character” was intensely interrogated by Chinese scholars and overseas postcolonial critics. This was more than theoretical: the differing appraisements reveal different expectations for China’s future. The critique of orientalism thus inspired Chinese domestic scholars about a Chinese way of “alternative modernity” distinct from the Western (discourse of) modernity. Whether this alternative was capitalist or socialist by nature was not decided. However, implicit was an idealistic notion of “a third path” between socialism and capitalism. Zhou Ning was not involved in these debates. As a serious scholar, he engaged in translating and introducing the theory of reception aesthetics and the literature of phenomenology, which was popular in China as early as the mid-1980s. Since the late 1980s, he started to study comparative drama. When he felt the impact of the new wave of postcolonial and postmodern theories in the mid-1990s, he turned his attention to trans-cultural studies. Although he has always been catching up with academic trends instead of being simply attracted to the hot and relevant topics, he has, for over a decade, engaged in a solid examination of the image of China and Chinese culture in Western countries and other major civilizations. This new job arose out his reflection on the ideology and practice of “sinology” in the wake of Said’s critique of orientalism. As is well known, “orientalism” in Said’s scholarship has several levels of significance. One of these is that the study of Oriental cultures in the West is closely related to the colonial adventure of the past several centuries; accordingly, it is filled with ideological prejudice. However, Said discusses little of sinology due to his unfamiliarity with this field. Inspired by Said’s admonition and from the perspective of post-colonial cultural criticism, Zhou Ning questions the legitimacy of sinology as a discipline, warning academics of the potential danger of “sinologism”. He aptly notes that those who are engaged in its translation and introduction just assume sinology to be scientific, yet they never seriously think about the issue of the legitimacy of sinology as a discipline. This causes serious problems; for instance, “… those questions such as whether sinology is knowledge or imagination, truth or myth, a scientific subject or an ideology, and (whether it is) sinology or sinologism, matter not only to the legitimacy of the knowledge of sinological study in contemporary

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China but also to the legitimacy of the knowledge of (all of) scholarship in contemporary China.”6 Consequently, there is an urgent need to engage in a reflection of sinology as a modern discipline. Zhou contends that, “Western sinology carries strong ideology from the very beginning. Broadly defined, sinology itself is a sort of sinologism.”7 Having presented detailed, textual evidences, he arrives at the conclusion that, “Sinology in a broad sense has never been free from the whimsical and exotic ‘imagination’ as a kind of ‘knowledge’, in which the image of China is described either positively or negatively. Even in some serious works, there is never lack of ridiculous details;” therefore, “… it is more a kind of ideology than a learning or a system of knowledge.”8 An extreme example is that the sinology of the missionaries was actually a theological study. What is more, while narrowly-defined sinology is generally taken to be a serious, objective, strict and genuine discipline which is irrelevant to utility or power, it is still difficult for it to avoid ideological jaundice: ideological assumptions penetrate the institutional system. For instance, the sinological narrative, established through the travelogues of visitors, through professional study and common social thought in the period of classical Western imperialism, repeatedly demonstrates a unifying theme in which ancient Chinese civilization is stagnant, closed and tyrannical, which is also closely related to the fundamental assumption of sinologism: What classical sinology studies is ancient China, purely textual China, while the premise of this discipline is that China is a nation without reality and stagnated in its history and is a kind of dead civilization. Such a theoretical assumption originates from general social theories such as Hegel’s philosophy or Toynbee’s historiography, or even vulgar social evolutionism.9 As a result, Zhou finds that there is a certain mutual reference between the theoretical premise of sinology and contemporaneous Western ideology: “While colonial expansion wipes out the reality of China in the field of politics 6 Zhou Ning 周宁, “Hanxue huo ‘hanue zhuyi’ 汉学或“汉学主义” [Sinology or ‘Sinologism’],” Xiamen daxue Xuebao (zheue shehui keueban) 厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版） [ Journal of Xiamen University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)], No. 1, 2004, 12. 7 Ibid., 6. 8 Ibid., 5–7. 9 Ibid., 7.

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and economy, sinology eliminates the reality of China within its system of knowledge.”10,11 Furthermore, Zhou demonstrates that Western sinology has gone through three stages: the early explicit ideological stage, the implicit ideological stage, and the half-explicit and half-implicit ideological stage. The latter comes at the time when so-called “China studies” appears as a discipline. The difference of “China studies” from traditional sinology is that it advocates the study of modern China, which reveals the urgent political necessities at that time demanded by the cultural-political context of the Cold War. In this way, inspired by postcolonial criticism, Zhou launched an astute analytic critique, which is significant and has shaken the academic foundation of sinology, because it is the first in China to challenge the myth and deconstruct the blind worship of knowledge from abroad. Compared with Said’s works, the feature of Zhou’s study lies in his awareness of China’s problems, which leads to his discovery of the complicity between Enlightenment discourse and imperialist aggression, The Jesuits once established a China of Christian mythology, whereas modern philosophers started to build another China of enlightenment mythology. The Renaissance was an epoch of “great geographical discovery,” whereas the Enlightenment was an age of “great cultural discovery.” The great geographical discovery initiated the tide of the worldwide expansion of the West. Following those adventurers, the Enlightenment scholars began the expansion of knowledge in the intellectual field by constructing the world order of knowledge within the dual spatial frame of East and West, as well as the “three-numbered” timeframe of past, present and future: the West belongs to civilized modern (society) and is free, democratic, rational and advanced, whereas the East is the barbaric or semi-civilized ancient society which is oppressive, tyrannical, ignorant and stagnant. In this grand narrative of the Enlightenment, the image of China is defined by sinology as “the Other” of modernity; China is the Other of the order of progress—a stagnant empire; the Other of the order of freedom—a tyrannical empire. Here, sinology represents 10 Ibid., 7–8. 11 Consequently, “… the practical cultural effect of sinological study within the discipline of oriental studies does not [help the foreigners’] approach China but alienates and excludes China in the cultural space-time. China is the kind of alien civilization existing in the far past and distant East. To study it by locking it into the study of texts is exactly the same as placing it safely and orderly in the museums, containing it in the ‘other time and space’ of reality yet excluding it from reality.” Ibid.

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both knowledge and power. Once the antagonistic concepts between democracy and autocracy, civilization and brutality are established, and the inexorable law of historical progress that democracy will eliminate autocracy and civilization will overcome brutality is affirmed, the imperialist expansion of the Western colonialists obtains a certain specious “justice”.12 This criticism places China’s “new enlightenment” discourse of the 1980s in the light of the insights offered by postmodern epistemology and postcolonial criticism, in which the ideologically rival discourses of “freedom and democracy” versus “slavery and tyranny” expose its true nature. What is more, because at that time the discourse of so-called “slavery and tyrant ruling for thousands of years”—which was popular in the Chinese academic world and implicitly referred to the centralization of state power in the Mao era—demands that (capitalist) democracy eliminate “socialist autocracy” and (capitalist) culture overcome (socialist) brutality—Zhou’s job of dymythicization also deconstructs this anti-revolutionary mentality. Moreover, Zhou falsifies the discourse of an alleged morbid Chinese “national character” that emerged around China’s May-Fourth era and continues to this day, by disclosing the essential feature of this indictment premised on Enlightenment mentality: Many of the so-called fixed Chinese characteristics or their abstract, ahistorical “essences” such as servility, ignorance, laziness, numbness, weakness … are nevertheless the textual fictionalization by the West with strong hues of racism. They are not truth, but just a sort of discourse. With the introduction of Western learning to the East and the spread of modern thought into the circle of Chinese intellectuals, these discursive systems of the Chinese national character, constructed with the dualistic concepts … asserted its power of knowledge, culture and morality in the level of unconsciousness within China’s intellectual trend of modernization.13

12 13

Ibid., 7. See Zhou Ning 周宁, “ ‘Bei bieren biaoshu’: guominging pipan de xifang huayu puxi “被 别人表述”:国民性批判的西方话语谱系 [“Expressed by Others”: the Genealogy of Western Discourse of Critique of National Character],” in Wenyi lilun yu piping 文艺理论 与批评 [Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art], No. 5, 2003, 43.

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This criticism is premised on a strict methodological analysis. Having examined the genealogy of the discourse regarding “national character,” Zhou finds that many early modern Chinese thinkers assumed the national character to be the fundamental element that decided a nation’s history. Furthermore, this discourse stems from the theory of social evolution, because Westerners tend more and more to explore the cause for the stagnation of Chinese civilization from the perspective of Chinese human nature or national personality. Once the cause of stagnation is taken to be due to an ethnic character, stagnation then becomes the unchangeable destiny. And once the issue pertaining to the systematic institutions turns into one of race, the imperialist world order is not only legitimized in history but also appears reasonable on the basis of human nature.14 Besides revealing the academic genealogy of oriental studies and questioning its presupposition, Said’s more significant contribution is his understanding of the power of the Western cultural discourse, showing the structure that its cultural hegemony possesses, and the danger and temptation of employing this structure with nations—especially those previously colonial nations. Zhou Ning has also achieved these objectives in his critique of sinologism; he has even gone further by revealing the fundamental problems within the modern disciplinary system—that not just sinology, but all modern disciplines, such as oriental studies, history, economics, politics and sociology, are ideological by nature. He starts the analysis by discussing the spatial classification of disciplines: “The object of study in (the disciplines of) history, economics, politics and sociology is the civilized world of the West, whereas that of anthropology and oriental studies is the non-Western, barbaric or semi-barbaric and semi-civilized world.” In this classification, the West and the non-West are in effect concepts of civilization: “The differentiation of anthropology and orientalism also pertains to the geographic division of civilization. What anthropology studies is those ‘savage, ancient’ tribes, whereas what orientalism studies is those semisavage empires of Asia.”15 Furthermore, he suggests that the problems of this division lie in the fact that,

14 Zhou Ning 周宁, Tianchao yaoyuan: Xifang de zhongguo xingxiang yanjiu 天朝遥远： 西方的中国形象研究 [The Distant China: Study of Western Image of China] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006), 487. 15 Zhou Ning 周宁, “Hanxue huo ‘hanue zhuyi’ 汉学或“汉学主义” [Sinology or “Sinologism”],” Xiamen daxue Xuebao (zheue shehui keueban) 厦门大学学报（哲学社 会科学版） [ Journal of Xiamen University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)], No. 1, 2004, 8.

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The disciplinary division of traditional social science has separated the past from the present, the West from the non-West, and the state/market from the society in the dimension of time and space … Those disciplines divided by spatial and temporal geopolitics, such as history, anthropology and oriental studies, assume idiographic non-repeatability, and separate the modern from the past as well as the West from the non-West, so as to establish the concept of the “modern West” with its particularity, whereas those disciplines divided by spatial and temporal eternity, such as economics, politics and sociology, assume nomothetic validation. Although their research materials and objects are all about the modern West, they assume regularity to be universal. In this way, the specific Western modernity is universalized and has the potential to merge [with] the ancient non-West. The disciplinary system ties more closely to ideology than truth. The economics, politics and social order of the modern civilization of the West is universalized, while the ancient civilizations of the non-West are marginalized as special types.16 The merit of this finding lies in the fact that Zhou explores the origin of these modern disciplines with the principle of historical materialism. As the “scientific” nature of these disciplines of social science and humanity is debunked, the validity of applying them to China becomes questionable. While Chinese academic circles still largely subscribe to the disciplinary knowledge of the West, Zhou is conducive to thinking about the necessity of a Chinese initiative in social science. 2

From “Study of the Chinese Image in the West” to “Cross-Cultural Study”

Zhou Ning’s criticism of sinology as well as his analysis of the discourse of “national character” innate to it has been misread by those intellectuals who persevere with the Enlightenment mentality. They censure him for falling into the trap of nationalism yet ignore the great efforts he has made to clarify misunderstandings: In the modern cultural context of China, by the simple negation of orientalism, which is ideological in nature, it is easy to cultivate a nationalistic sentiment which calls for cultural self-enclosure and is antagonistic and 16 Ibid.

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hostile (to Western cultures). Worse still, within the trend of the postcolonial cultural critique, it might lead to the absurd alliance between crazy and ignorant pre-modern or anti-modern nativism, and fantastic, postmodern neo-leftist theory.17 Apparently, Zhou has a clear-minded theoretical consciousness; in particular, he is alert to the applicability of postcolonial cultural criticism in China. As he puts it, the postcolonial critique has different imports in different cultural contexts: in the West, it means the openness and inclusiveness of Western culture itself, showing the spirit of self-reflection; in the context of postcolonial or post-semi-colonial social culture, however, it might be taken advantage of by narrow-minded cultural conservatism and fanatic nationalists as a weapon to reject Western—and even modern—civilization.18 Although here he might ignore the ideological connotation of “Western and modern civilization,” in his in-depth study of China’s image (and the image of the Chinese) in the West, Zhou does identify another version of orientalism. This is an orientalism that admires and glorifies the East. In particular, Zhou Ning specifies two kinds of “orientalism” in the tradition of Western culture, One is negatively-oriented and ideological in nature; the other is positively-oriented and utopian in character. The former builds an image of the orient which is inferior, passive, corrupt and evil, which becomes a kind of “calculated planning” of the Western imperialist ideology, whereas the latter idealizes the East as the paradise of happiness and wisdom, which then becomes the utopia to transcend and from which to criticize the Western social ideology of various times.19 Zhou believes that the positive and utopian orientalism has a longer history and far-reaching significance in Western culture. And he contends that “… the spirit of openness and tolerance, justice and transcendence, and self-doubt 17

Zhou Yunlong 周云龙, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue: Cong xingxiang leixing dao xingxiang wangluo-Zhou Ning jiaoshou fangtan 跨文化形象学：从形象类型到形象网络—周 宁教授访谈 [Cross-cultural Imagology: from Image Type to Image Network—Interview with Professor Zhou Ning],” Shehui keue luntan 社会科学论坛 [Forum of Social Science], No. 3, 2010., 122. 18 Ibid. 19 Zhou Ning 周宁, “Ling yizhong dongfang zhuyi: Chaoyue houzhiming zhuyi wenhua pipan “另一种东方主义：超越后殖民主义文化批判 [Orientalism of Another Type: A Criticism Beyond the Post-Colonialist Cultural Criticism],” Xiamen daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexueban 厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版） [ Journal of Xiamen University (Arts & Social Sciences Edition)], No. 6, 2004, 5.

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and self-criticism peculiar to the concepts of the Western world” is “… the source from which the vigorous creativity of the Western culture comes” and “… what it truly offers for our reflection in the modern context.”20 The identification of this orientalism does not mean that Zhou could not see through its “ideological” nature. Instead, he aims to stress the open-mindedness that is necessary for China’s practice of postcolonial critique. Zhou’s research starts with the classification and judgment of these two forms of cultural stereotype: utopian glorification and ideological distortion. His research confirms that 1750 was the turning point of the image of China in the Western world when Western modernity took its shape. The Chinese image was positive from 1500 to 1750, by which the West applied self-critique and emulation; after that, the negative Chinese image appeared and became the instrument for the West’s self-affirmation and colonial adventures. Compared with the job of identifying these phenomena, exploring its cause and functional mechanism takes more time. In this regard, Zhou illustrates the principles, systems and assumptions of the production of sinological knowledge. Apparently, he knows that the practice of utopian glorification is itself still ideological in nature. Therefore, in his review of the West’s “Chinese image,” he reveals the relations between the two archetypes and the development of Western modernity—or how the image of China, as the “cultural Other,” has been involved in the production of modern knowledge and institutional systems. More specifically, Zhou Ning finds that, from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, the West has constructed three Chinese utopian images: the realm of the Great Khan, the great Chinese empire and the Confucian utopia. They lay stress on different aspects of China’s image, ranging from material wealth and institutional culture through to ideological beliefs, which symbolize how the three stages of the Chinese image have positively contributed to Western modernity. Firstly, exploiting Chinese natural laws and customs, Western scholars challenged Christian theology. The secular, utopian Chinese image of the late Middle Ages opened a new world to Europeans and triggered their vague longing for modern life. Then, with the introduction of the Chinese practice of the “politics of the philosopher,” European thinkers challenged royalty by appealing to the rule of reason rather than tyranny. Finally, in the European imagination of a Confucian utopia, a strong belief in enlightened rulers and moral politics led to complete disappointment with autocratic monarchy and elicited either a yearning for modern constitutionalism to restrict monarchy 20 Ibid.

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or a revolution to destroy it.21 In general, Zhou confirms that the scholars’ “… longing for the secular spirit, commercial drive, urban life, and the power of the monarch (allegedly existing) in utopian China…” became the way to “… express the budding spirit of the European capitalism…” which then “… shaped the symbolic significance of the earlier Chinese image.”22 During this period, modern world institutions such as the world economic system, the multi-national state and a pluralistic cultural system began to take form. It was the imaginary picture of the great Chinese empire that became the resource for Western scholars to explore this modernity. Nevertheless, the Chinese image transformed dramatically after the modern structure of the West was established around 1750. Since the Chinese image was gradually defaced, a stagnant, autocratic and brutal Chinese empire emerged. It was stereotyped as standard discourse by European Enlightenment thinkers and politicians and was then “philosophized” by Hegel. In the newly established world order of knowledge and concepts, in order to identify Europe as the world’s center and the criterion of progress, it was necessary to classify non-Western culture into the contrary category of stagnation, tyranny and brutality. China was thus taken to be a stagnant nation ruled by an autocracy, as well as a barbarian nation. Such an image provided the ideological basis for the colonial expansion of Western capitalism; its brutal invasion and plunder was justified by discourses of liberty, progress and civilization. In short, the negative Chinese image served as “the Other” for Western self-identification during this period of imperialism and colonialism. In accordance with this historical analysis, the logical framework of the Western imagination of Chinese culture was revealed, which confirms that the West’s understanding of China reveals nothing but its own desire and fear. These Chinese images are the cultural projection of the West in different periods; the discursive mechanism by which these images are presented and constructed serves the conceptual order of Western modernity. Apart from demonstrating the dynamic structure of the generation of meaning in the West’s images of China, this analysis demonstrates the functioning mechanism and the spiritual structure of the West’s cultural discourse of modernity. Zhou’s contribution in this regard is twofold. On the one hand, while Said’s critique of orientalism substantiates that elements of culture and technology from Islamic civilization and the Arabic world had been incorporated into the foundations of Western modernity, Zhou’s historical analysis convincingly proves that the Chinese image (or broadly speaking, Chinese culture in the 21 22

Zhou Ning, Tianchao yaoyuan, 168. Ibid., 29.

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view of the West) had been used by the West to reform its society, as he convincingly asserts: The concepts of modernity took shape in the cross-cultural or crosscivilizational “public domain” or “public space.” It is a process of diverse development and interaction. Not only did Western modernity shape modern Chinese culture but also the Chinese image, as “the cultural other,” was involved in the formation of the ‘self’ in modern Western culture.23 On the other hand, Zhou highlights the fact that China’s image in the West has been disciplined and institutionalized as an integral element of the ideology of colonialism, imperialism and globalism. He thus accomplishes the first stage of his research project of “cross-cultural iconography”: how this image, as a system of knowledge and imagination, was generated and disseminated in the West and, as a discursive force, has manipulated related discussion and joined the praxis of Western modernity. Within this analytical framework, the original iconography of comparative literature has changed from formalist, discursive practice into a discourse analysis of cultural study. When reflecting on his methodology, Zhou suggests that the theoretical examination of China’s image in the West should be carried out at three levels: image, type and prototype.24 Thus, the cross-cultural study of Chinese images in the West (and the non-West) has gone beyond the boundary of sinological studies: “What sinological research concerns is the issue of pure knowledge, whereas the study of trans-cultural image focuses on the relationship between knowledge and imagination, as well as the functioning ways of power that penetrates into knowledge and imagination.”25 It is, therefore, more conscious of interdisciplinary exploration: What the iconography of comparative literature focuses on is just the exotic imagination in literary works, whereas the study of cross-cultural iconography concentrates on how different types of texts refer to and interpenetrate each other, and how they jointly weave into the form and significance of the general social conception or … imagination. The iconography of comparative literature mostly contents itself with characterizing the features of China’s image in a certain piece of work or some 23 24 25

Zhou Ning, Kuawenhua yanjiu, 4. Ibid., 22–31. Ibid., 3.

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works of a certain period, and is only aware of the content of the study, without reflection on the reason of study, and lacks a real awareness of any problem. Therefore, the iconography of comparative literature is a discipline without issues, whereas cross-cultural iconography is (studying) the problematic without (heeding to) disciplinary boundaries.26 This is so for the author because the concept and method of trans-cultural study has already gone beyond pure literary study and entered other disciplines such as history and philosophy, and has heavily relied on modern social theories. As a result, for him, “While the iconography of comparative literature is still a form of literary study, cross-cultural imagology is first and foremost (the practice of) cultural study.”27 Today, comparative literature as a discipline has encountered a deep crisis, for it has been widely recognized that comparison would be superficial and unsustainable without penetrating the historical experience and social dynamic structure of respective cultures, becoming, as Zhou says, “a discipline without issues.” By contrast, the “cross-cultural iconography” in which he engages is without disciplinary boundary; it is knowledge that has integrated a variety of disciplines and has an explicit awareness of problems. Zhou’s efforts thus illuminate the development of comparative literature in China. 3

The Problems of “Self-Orientalization” and “Universal Value”

Throughout Zhou’s study, there is a deep concern for social welfare; his problem awareness is premised on a social-political concern to establish the subjectivity of contemporary Chinese culture. This is how he is frequently misunderstood by some elite scholars, who naively persevere with the project of wholesale Westernization. Zhou once tried to clarify the dispute caused by his refutation of the discourse of “national character”: … the reason …[why I] describe and analyze the genealogy of the discourse of Chinese national character in the West is not to deny the significance and value of the critique of national character itself in the Chinese 26

27

Chen Jingxia 陈菁霞, “Yi sixiang de fangshi kangju zhongguo ‘bei tazhehua’—zhuanfang xiamen daxue Zhou Ning jiaoshou 以思想的方式抗拒中国‘被他者化’—专访厦 门大学周宁教授 [Resistance to ‘Being Otherized’ by Way of Thought—An Interview with Professor Zhou Ning from Xiamen University],” Zhonghua dushubao 中华读书报 [Chinese Reading Newspaper], September, 29th, 2010. Zhou Ning, Kuawenhua yanjiu, 3.

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modernization movement … [but] to reveal the hegemony of Western culture that is shown during the modernization movements of the world and to reflect on the historical role and independence of cultural criticism undertaken by the intellectuals from the third world, interrogating them whether they can provide the proof of a free subjectivity and legitimacy for the modernization of their cultures.28 Such critical consciousness and sense of obligation and responsibility are what Zhou bears as a critical intellectual. The same idea is explained more explicitly in his analysis of the ideology of sinology.29 For Zhou, since “The Chinese image constructed by the imagination of Western modernity has directly or indirectly shaped the self-imagination and identity of modern China, and influenced the direction and mode of reflection and self-consciousness of modern Chinese culture,” the real risk lies in the fact that “China has been or is being otherized intellectually.”30 This is the second set of issues attached to his study of Chinese image: the problem of “self-orientalization” as well as the issue of the Western image in China and the corresponding problem of “occidentalism.” Zhou finds that it is through modern Chinese thought that Western concepts of modernity were transformed into the vision and framework of modern China. Consequently, all of those issues and methods related to modern Chinese culture such as prosperity and progress, freedom and democracy, enlightenment and civilization and so on have become Western[ized].31

28 Zhou Ning, “ ‘Bei bieren biaoshu’,” 42–43. 29 Zhou argues that, “Suppose the Western view of China is ‘knowledge’ and is of ‘truth,’ then there is great chance that we can learn and identify ourselves with the Western idea of China, get self-sinologized and thus lose our cultural subjectivity. [In contrast], if Western concepts of China are confirmed to be a sort of social imagination, an ideology of a discourse aimed at coordinating power or mastering power, then we are likely to gain a critical position, or what Said says of ‘writing-back.’ That is the obligation of us as intellectuals.” See Zhou Ning 周宁, Song Binghui 宋炳辉, “Xifang de zhongguo xingxiang yanjiu-guanyu xingxiangxue xueke lingyu yu yanjiu fanxing de duihua 西方的中国 形象研究—关于形象学学科领域与研究范型的对话 [Study on the Western Image of China-A Dialogue on Imagological Study and Research Paradigm],” Zhongguo bijiao wenxue 中国比较文学 [Comparative Literature in China], No. 2, 2005, 156–157. 30 Chen Jingxia, “Yi sixiang de fangshi kangju zhongguo.” 31 He keenly notes that, “… as modern China identifies itself in front of the Western mirror, the West represents both an overwhelming, real oppression and object of desire, as well as a surreal illusion. Modern China constantly acquires its identity from this illusory mirror-image of the other. However, such self-identification is more a kind of misrecognition than confirmation.” Zhou Yunlong, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue,” 122.

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Although not all the knowledge acquired from the West is misrecognition, his analysis does reveal the cultural hegemony implied in the Western discourse of modernity, which possesses a “daunting structure” that is dangerous and tempting in China’s experience of modernity. The Enlightenment discourse of (China’s) national character is one example, and the discourse of “universal value” is another. As a matter of fact, the diagnosis of the Enlightenment discourse has illuminated the nature of the universal values such as democracy and liberty, because the study of China’s image in the West has revealed the mechanism of the discourse of modernity in the West’s colonial adventure, which established the dichotomy between the “liberal and democratic” West and “autocratic and ignorant” China. Therefore, the more valuable finding lies elsewhere: Zhou has further realized the danger of this cultural hegemony, The way that the universal value has been consciously established by Western modernity leads to a cultural illusion or cultural delusion in the modernization movement or in the process of globalization. The recently modernized nations are always unconsciously equating universal values with the discursive power of Western universal values. Their attitude towards universal values relies on their attitude toward the West: either because they identify with the West, thus they identify with the universal values; or because they are against the West, thus they refuse Western universal values and then deny the [existence of] universal values themselves. Both of these two choices have fallen into the trap of the cultural hegemony of postcolonial culture.32 Consequently, he aptly concludes that, instead of being against universal values, those who “refuse the universal value” are actually against “the discursive subject of the universal values, namely Western power;” whereas we cannot tell whether those who “identify with universal values” are actually identifying with “universal values” or with “a specific discursive subject of it, namely the West.”33 Following the same rationale, there appears the erroneous accusation that opposition to the West (namely Western political power) is opposition to democracy, as well as the wrong assertion that identification with the West (namely, Western cultural-political hegemony) lends support to democracy. 32 Zhou Ning 周宁, “Pushi jiazhi, women yeneng dangdang? 普世价值，我们也能担 当？ [Universal Values, Can We Bear?]” http://www.aisixiang.com/data/24630.html. Accessed April 3, 2016. 33 Ibid.

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Zhou’s analysis thus reveals the nature of displacement of the real issue. By contrast, he makes a dialectical argument instead of proposing an eitheror option, It is dangerous to identify with Western universal values … [for this] means identification with the discursive power of Western universal values and the loss of intellectual sovereignty, which degrades oneself to the cultural ignorance of post-colonialism … To deny universal values due to the refusal of Western universal values is even more dangerous. In the world history of intellectual competition, to degrade one’s own culture into local knowledge and local value and to surrender the discursive right of universal values is nothing more than to act as “undercover” for Western cultural hegemony.34 To me, however, it is probably better here to modify the phrase “Western universal values” to “the universal values that the West claims it stands for and symbolizes,” so that it can more precisely articulate the author’s intended message. In effect, Zhou’s argument could more precisely be delivered in this way: it is invalid to claim that the West stands for and symbolizes universal values, and it is even worse to think that these “universal values” simply exist in the forms that the West assumes, for this would easily lead to a denial of the values of modernity themselves. Having made this clarification, as a critical intellectual with an independent stance, Zhou declares his own proposal, “Any nation or country that is responsible for world history should bear the mission of [articulating] universal values consciously. The only way to protest the discursive hegemony of Western universal values is to establish Chinese universal values.”35 Although he holds that the Chinese academic world “… still lacks the intellectual ability and moral courage to consider these issues …”, he insists on raising a series of questions: We should possess the intellectual capacity and moral courage that this great age promises, and reply to these questions uncompromisingly and openly: Are we able to answer the fundamental question of the universal values? Can we provide the knowledge and conceptual system for an understanding of this world? Can we offer an institutional ideal and a practical model for this world? Can we give a good and noble meaning 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid.

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for people’s lives in this world? If we can, we have to go further to answer the questions: What is the direction of human history? What is the historical and world significance of China’s way of modernization? What is a reasonable and just system for a modern nation and society? Has China worked at that or has it done an exemplary job? What is the meaning of our lives? What is the universal value for the virtuous lives of human beings that Chinese culture offers? Confronted with these questions, has the Chinese praxis of modernization sincerely and earnestly made its efforts?36 All these questions indicate that the scholar has made great efforts to establish China’s discursive rights of claiming “universal values.” 4

The Pitfalls of Genealogical Study and Culturalist Mentality

Zhou’s understanding of comparative cultural iconography is a constantly deepening process. China’s image in the West is the starting point of the project of “studying the Chinese image in the world,” which investigates the intercultural movement of China’s image and the network of this knowledge and power among different countries and cultural regions in the world. After Zhou has finished the first stage of the project, he goes furthered to explore China’s image worldwide by taking as examples Japan, India and Russia. He finds in these that the West’s image of China has already become a dominant narrative that influences China’s image in non-Western countries. Thus, although China’s image varies with the changing conditions of these non-Western nations, it is always based on Western thinking: “All of these modern, ‘oriental’ Chinese images are eventually the self-orientalized narrative of the ‘orient’ itself. Both the vision and stance are Western, and so is the subject of imagination.”37 This is the problem with which later-developing nations are commonly confronted. Through his study, Zhou concludes that the issues of trans-cultural iconography can boil down to the question of the world’s conceptual system and how modern states and their citizens identify themselves in this system.38 With this knowledge, the author’s study reaches the third issue of inquiry: how the “self-orientalism” and “self-Westernization” by which the Chinese identify their self-image impinges on their cultural consciousness and the 36 Ibid. 37 Zhou Ning, Kuawenhua yanjiu, 8. 38 Ibid., 10.

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corresponding project of cultural reconstruction, and how to “write back” the cultural hegemony of the West and to build a “real” image of China’s subjectivity after deconstruction. Zhou acknowledges that the problem has just been proposed, whereas whether it is possible to rescue the historical subject of China remains to be explored.39 While some critics believe that, to achieve this objective, it is necessary to undertake the project of studying the image of the West in China, Zhou has a different idea. He notes that China’s Western image has also utopian and ideological dimensions of significance, The Utopian one of the Western image might provide for Chinese modernity the intellectual (or imaginary) resources of self-adjustment and selfcriticism; whereas the ideological one of the Western image becomes the way and direction of self-identification and self-confirmation for Chinese modernity … In China’s Western image, there is also the tendency of ‘occidentalism,’ although it presents different features in the context of Chinese history.40 Consequently, carrying out this study is nothing more than mechanically reproducing the earlier study. Just like the formation of Western modernity (which was achieved by going beyond Chinese culture), China’s modernity under the impact of modern Western culture is simultaneously a response to its challenge. Therefore, the cultural consciousness of China’s modern identity is closely related to its historical experience. In this light, the key to acquiring the identity of modern Chinese culture is to attain a self-knowledge of historical experience, which could not be attained by studying the Western image of China. In my opinion, the reason why the objective of establishing modern Chinese cultural identity and subjectivity has not been achieved in the present study is due to the limitation of the method that the author has employed. Firstly, throughout the author’s iconographic study, Michel Foucault’s discoursepower theory offers key support. A detailed study of the genealogy of power relations in China’s image in the West becomes the operative procedure to uncover the real nature of knowledge. While this has contributed much, it also 39 40

Chen Jingxia, “Yi sixiang de fangshi kangju zhongguo.” Zhou Ning 周宁, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue: dangxia zhongguo wenhua zijue de sanzu wenti 跨文化形象学：当下中国文化自觉的三组问题 [Cross-Cultural Imagology: Three Groups of Questions of Cultural Self-consciousness in Contemporary China],” Xiamen daxue xuebao 厦门大学学报 [ Journal of Xiamen University], No. 6, 2008, 8.

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constrains the author’s efforts to explore the subjectivity of modern China: the knowledge-power theory or the discursive genealogy itself is a static mode and cannot show the development and interaction of the subject and the object in a dynamic motion. Moreover, being a de-politicized or non-political practice, it knows little of the nature of the various powers. Next, both Foucault’s theory and post-colonial criticism tend to regard discourse as historically substantial to explain real historical experience. It is true that postmodernism believes that all is nothing but discourse: there is no so-called substance; the “thing-in-itself” is unknowable. This agnosticism relinquishes the effort of engaging in a substantive exploration of the historical experience from the perspective of political economy. Zhou is alert to this inclination and tries to find the real historical experience beneath the discourse, but sometimes he also falls into the trap of culturism. For instance, when he is eulogizing Western orientalism, he contends that, Only with enough cultural confidence can [the West] produce and accommodate this negative self-criticism; only through accommodating this self-criticism, can [it] preserve the spiritual freedom and the health of a culture; only by this cultural mechanism of confession can the moral balance be achieved and maintained, so that the cultural tension brought about by the expansion would not break down and collapse.41 We can fault nothing in this idealistic assertion as a cultural comment; but from a substantive, historical perspective, it is an opinion created by a culturalist mentality. In particular, while the author is aware of the trap of postmodern theory and postcolonial criticism, his narrative of “orientalism” unconsciously follows the culturalist discourse of postcolonialism. Instead of delving into the substantive relation between politics and economy, he tries to understand the human mentality and psychology shown in the phenomenon: In Western civilization, there exists another impulse in its mentality and psychology, which is a kind of psychological tendency of self-denial for and affirmation of the other. When they were conquering America, they invented the image of “noble savages” to criticize the degradation of Europe. When colonizing Asia, they constantly narrated the oriental legend and imagined the East to be the place where paradise existed.42

41 Zhou Ning 周宁, “Ling yizhong dongfang zhuyi,” 12. 42 Ibid.

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This abstract generalization of the Western “culture and spirit” is divorced from any concrete political and historical context. Similar analysis can be seen in the criticism of the Chinese “modern character”: The Chinese modern character yearns for and admires the West culturally and conceptually. But since it was oppressed and invaded by Western expansion forces politically and economically, this admiration and yearning for the outside tends to be accompanied by a feeling of inferiority and contempt for itself psychologically; thus the imbalance of cultural mentality and social structure eventually led to another extreme: to show resistance by (self-)isolation in politics and economy, and xenophobia by arrogance in culture. Consequently, between concept and reality, rather than forming a healthily tension between the inward and outward, it brought about a narrowness of the cultural spirit, which shows either extreme worship or extreme hostility, either extreme inferiority or extreme arrogance. That is the common problem that the third world or the entire East faces during the process of modernization.43 Apparently, in this discourse of China’s “modern character,” Zhou unconsciously embraces the same culturalist discourse which is very similar to the discourse of “national character” that he has criticized. Rather than a rigorous academic description, the alleged “… Chinese resistance by [self-] isolation in politics and economy …” is merely media language. Even if China has been self-isolated, did that result from “… a feeling of inferiority and contempt of itself psychologically …” and “… the imbalance of cultural mentality and social structure …”? This deduction does not analyze the real historical context from the perspective of political economy. In other analysis with substantive historical content, there is still a frequent lack of consideration of the political-economic stake behind the discourse. For example, in an apt analysis of the Western discourse of universal values, the author suggests that the greatest contribution of Western modern culture to the world is that it “… has established the discursive power of universal values, which includes a syllogistic argument.”44 Zhou astutely suggests that this 43 44

Zhou Yunlong, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue,” 122. This syllogistic argument holds that “… first of all, freedom exists in human nature and possesses the significance of absolute value, which constitutes the premise of universal values; second, freedom develops in Western history, the civilization of the West is a liberal civilization, and freedom is a Western value; finally, the West owns cultural sovereignty over freedom, since freedom is the universal value; so it is natural that the West owns the discursive power of universal values.” See Zhou Ning 周宁, “Pushi jiazhi, women

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syllogistic argument is a logical deduction but not a historical interpretation because it does not trace the origin of these discourses and the source of the desire for power. Whence comes the discourse of freedom and human nature? Whither does it proceed? The practice of genealogical analysis fails—or has no responsibility—to answer these questions. Therefore, we need to go beyond the study of “cross-cultural iconography” and embrace the praxis of historical hermeneutics to account for historical experience and the various discourses. Although historical phenomena appear as texts, they are not just discourse. Instead, they are the object of a historicallyoriented interpretation which explains the development and evolution of the various cultural and philosophical discourses initiated and blessed by the dynamic process of political economy. The explanation of the subjectivity and the cultural-political identity of modern Chinese culture also demands this historical/political hermeneutic. Without this praxis, the iconographic study itself is unable to accomplish its mission. In contrast, in this hermeneutic, the study of China’s image in the West and the West’s image in China can organically and interactively intertwine. 5

Exploring the Subjectivity of Modern Chinese Culture

There are some analyses of Chinese images in the modern era in Zhou’s study. Yet, compared with the convincing analysis of the transformation of China’s image in the West for the formation of Western modernity, the job done for China’s modern images seems hasty and problematic. For example, the author fails to explain one of the most significant image transformations in modern history: after their disenchantment with the bloody violence of the French Revolution, “The Romantics’ disappointment with political revolution in the real world generally retreated into the depoliticized ‘inner spiritual freedom’ and pursued a kind of distant, mysterious, spiritual sanctity and peace.”45 Consequently, the utopian image of the ideal nation of Confucianism transformed into other two types: “Chinese sentiment 中国情调” and “Red holy land 红色圣地.” In this idealistic interpretation, the West’s Chinese images in the twentieth century are taken to be Chiang Kai-shek’s failure and Mao Zedong’s victory; all these drastic changes defeated the self-confidence of America and its value system. The excessive disappointment caused by excessive anticipation

45

yeneng dangdang? 普世价值，我们也能担当？ [Universal Values, Can we Bear?],” http://www.aisixiang.com/data/24630.html. Accessed April 3, 2016. Zhou Ning, Tianchao yaoyuan, 216.

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led to extreme hatred and fear.46 This superficial, psychoanalytical explanation departs from the substantive analysis of historical experience. It is worth noting that, when Zhou admits that the self-confidence and value system of American culture has been beaten by that of China, he pitifully neglects to analyze the cultural (and political) significance of Red China’s victory, which is actually key to the establishment of modern China’s subjectivity. Other specific instances of contemporary Chinese history are also interpreted by this practice of iconography. For instance, in discussing Edgar Snow’s Red Star over China, Zhou notes that, “Snow not only discovered a ‘Red Utopia’, but also found the ‘philosopher-king’ of this Red Utopia. (The image of) Mao Zedong under his pen reminds us of Kangxi (the emperor of early Qing dynasty), who is perfect as a scholar, a philosopher, as well as a political and military leader.”47 And he remarks that, later on, Beauvoir, J. Diva Chris and the “Tel Quel” group from France still harbored “revolutionary ideals” and “… believed that avant-garde art could become the ideology of political revolution, and one more time fantasized about transforming literature into ideology so as to accomplish social revolution.”48 As a matter of fact, being a wellqualified modern journalist, Snow’s reportage gives readers no sense of absurdity; rather, it impresses people with authenticity. Mao is also undoubtedly an extraordinary scholar, philosopher and political and military leader. Thus, regardless of his personal belief, Snow did his job with the objective perspective that a modern journalist should possess. The passion of the Western Left for Red China in 1960s did not result from any illusory belief; rather, it came from the expectation China provided for an alternative, socialist road different from both the Western capitalist system and the socialist imperialism of the Soviet Union. That “… avant-garde art could become the ideology of political revolution …” is also exactly what Chinese literature in the CCP-controlled areas in the 1940s and socialist literature after 1949 aimed to practice. Here, the author’s problem lies in the fact that, while Zhou’s method works well when dealing with China’s image in the West before the modern period, it is not appropriate for the study of China’s image in the West in the modern era. This is because modern China, as a Subject itself, encounters and deals with the West in a dynamic fashion, whereas the West now has turned into a stable and well-developed entity; thus, the Chinese image in the West has become a reaction to a nation and its people who have chosen an alternative path of development. The examples Zhou provides above are the critical 46 47 48

Ibid., 395. Ibid., 253. Ibid., 268.

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intellectuals who kept a distance from the capitalist West. They might still have fantasies about China but these were not directly built upon the presupposition of the Other. Therefore, the analysis of the West’s China image in modern times is of no significance for the establishment of the self-consciousness of modern Chinese culture (especially during and after Mao’s revolution). The West’s image in modern China is even more dynamic, so its study needs a more sophisticated model to take this interaction into consideration. Consequently, neither genealogy nor discourse-power theory can establish (or reconstruct) the cultural self-consciousness of Chinese modernity. One of the author’s insights is that the two types of the West’s image of China in the pre-modern period reveal a political philosophy at the core of (concepts of) modernity. What should be noted is that the historical experience of modern China forms another political philosophy at the core of its own (concepts of) modernity. While China’s image in the West has greatly influenced the consciousness of modern Chinese culture, the way that China reacted was a dynamic process with its own subjectivity, which could not be contained by the static pattern of challenge-response. This question is also put by a scholar interviewing Zhou: It is easy to fall into the erroneous zone of talking to oneself from one concept to the other, which is also a major drawback of contemporary disciplines of the humanities. Yet the initiation of a concept is always closely tied to politics, economy, technology and so on. As we base our exploration on the study of material history, we cannot treat the crosscultural communication of the West’s Chinese image as a simple process of being unilateral, transparent, passive and silent. On the contrary, it is a complicated process abundant with active selections, negotiations, conflicts, appropriations, meaning creations and feedback. [Since your] entire narrative is based on the premise of denying the subjectivity of modern Chinese thoughts, it actually implicitly admits the West’s monopoly of intellectual capability.49 Indeed, the neglect of the issue of “subjectivity” is a blind spot of postcolonial theory, which correlates with the applicability of postcolonial criticism in modern China. As a consequence of the unsuccessful resistance of some thirdworld nations that were fully colonized by the West in the modern period, postcolonial theory and critique mainly focus on the relation between the colonists and the (ex-)colonized. It works well to expose the various tricks of the 49

Zhou Yunlong, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue.”

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cultural imperialism of the Western powers and their after-effects; however, because modern China has successfully realized not only its national independence but also accomplished a socialist revolution, postcolonial theory offers it few useful lessons. Its mechanical application to the case of modern China by China studies often results in farfetched arguments. For instance, some scholars blame the youth of the May Fourth period for their denunciation of Chinese tradition because of their alleged surrender to the temptations of the West and for their alleged insincerity in engaging in the liberation of women due to their patriarchal concepts—this merely reveals the misuse or abuse of postcolonial theory.50 In particular, postcolonial theory repudiates all master narratives and believes that they are all Eurocentric discourses, including the Marxist analysis of the political economy of capitalism and its principle of class analysis. As a result, although it effectively challenges the ideology of developmentalism—since it blindly refuses even the category of capitalism and denies the capitalist world structure—it erroneously views everything in terms of discourse and power, without recognizing the substantial politicaleconomic relations behind it. Consequently, it appears merely a symptom rather than a sharp dissection of postmodernity in the present stage of transnational capitalism. In fact, Zhou has realized this problem, admitting that “… from Foucault’s thoughts to the cultural criticism of postcolonialism, Western poststructuralism provides the approach of deconstructionism but it fails to offer a path to liberation.” Therefore, Chinese scholars need to transcend the cultural criticism of post-colonialism.51 To him, the way to surpass the mode of binary opposition between orientalism and occidentalism is, “… to embrace the wisdom of a cross-cultural in-betweenness, to carry out an in-depth dialogue on the basis of cultural self-consciousness.”52 How can we undertake such an idealistic, “cross-cultural dialogue”? Zhou has effectively refuted Bryan S. Turner’s arguments in the latter’s book, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism.53 Turner holds that the key to transcending orientalism is to go beyond the West’s horizon and the binary mode of East-West opposition, replacing the dichotomy of orientalism/Westernism with globalism, which, he believes, can banish the geopolitical and cultural prejudice and the narrow ethnic concern of nationalism and statism. However, in his study of China’s 50

See Wang Xiaoping, “Three Trends in Recent Studies of Modern Chinese Literature and Culture,” China Perspectives, No. 4 (2009): 118–126. 51 Zhou Ning, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue.” 52 Ibid. 53 Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism (London: Routledge, 1994).

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image in non-Western nations, Zhou has found that the issues raised from the perspective of globalism may challenge the legitimacy of the hypotheses of globalism itself because “The self-image and self-identification of different nations in the world are always achieved in the mirror image formed in the relations with a specific other.”54 Having identified this plight, he nevertheless seems to fall into the same dilemma when he argues that, Within one century, we moved from Social Darwinism through the Enlightenment to Marxism, and then retreated from Marxism through the Enlightenment to Social Darwinism, in which progress/evolution is always the core of our view of modernity. To achieve progress, we constantly carry out reforms, but these reforms may turn into repeated turbulence, with stagnation hidden in the changes … What we need is modernization but not Westernism within it; we abandon the tradition in stagnation but want to keep the continuity of tradition. Nevertheless, without modernization, we are unable to identify the progress of the world’s civilization; without the continuity of tradition, we cannot identify the local subject of civilization. We are still exploring the third path to transcending the opposition between tradition and modernity, and between the East and the West. We are still thinking over the issues of China’s own tradition of progress and its identity in an alternative way of modernization.55 Here, Zhou describes the evolutionary genealogy of the Chinese people’s social-political beliefs. The problem is that he talks about all the beliefs as only ideologies. Moreover, this presentation of the genealogy itself is incapable of explaining the causes of these transformations. For instance, why do we depart from Marxism and retreat into the cruel route of Social Darwinism? This inquiry calls for a political (and political-economic) analysis. Meanwhile, tradition is not a static entity; rather, it is always in a state of recreation in modern life. Rather than abstract concepts of newness, progress or evolution, the core of the concept of modernity lies in pursuing the path of conquering the injustice and unfairness that hinders the development of modern productive force. Therefore, although Zhou has successfully transformed the theoretical issue of orientalism and gone beyond the non-historical method of postmodern new

54 55

Zhou Ning, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue.” Zhou Ning, Tianchao yaoyuan, 513.

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historicism, the understanding of historical experience still needs to be conducted by engaging with the principle of historical materialism. 6

Conclusion

As critic Wu Lisheng has noted, Zhou Ning’s exploration shows that Chinese academe has departed from the “… pre-reflective stage, namely the stage that simply consumes and imports [Western] postmodern scholarship, and arrived at the reflective stage.”56 His mastery of various Western critical theories and skillful application of them in the Chinese context has enabled his notable accomplishments in research. In all, as Wu aptly summarizes, he has … effectively responded to questions like how the issues of ‘China’ and ‘Chinese image’ emerge and are structured in the modernity of the West and in the orientalist discursive genealogy, which reveal a dynamic structure of the concept of Western modernity and the cognitive structure of the Chinese image in the imaginary relevance, thus laying a solid knowledge and theoretical foundation for the reconstruction of Chinese subjectivity.57 Indeed, Zhou’s findings indicate that many Chinese scholars have not only comprehended and proficiently applied postmodern theory and postcolonial critique but have also known how to select, develop and discard, so as to “… transcend the cultural criticism of postcolonialism, find the Chinese issues and Chinese methods in cross-cultural iconographic study, and respond to the epochal issues of China’s cultural self-consciousness and the rise of Chinese civilization.”58 As a result of this consciousness of independence, Zhou maintains distance from the ideal of pluralism that the mainstream academic circle vociferously claims,59 and calls for a rejuvenation of the cultural creativity of 56

Wu Lisheng 吴励生, “Zai Tazhe de yixiang guanlianxing zhong chongxin jiangou zhutixing zhongguo xingxiang (shang) 在他者的意象关联性中重新建构主体性中国形象 [To Reconstruct the Subjectivity of Chinese Image in the Image Relevance of the Other],” Shehyi kexue luntan 社会科学论坛 [Forum of Social Science], No. 11, 2008, 56. 57 Ibid. 58 Zhou Ning, “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue.” 59 He aptly contends that “… as to the issue of cultural self-awareness in modern China within the circumstance of the coexistence of plural cultures in this age of globalization, what is important is not bragging about the ideal of plural coexistence, multiple equalization and harmonious development; rather, what counts is to realize reality and positively

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modern China. To him, this is to be achieved “… not by blindly seeking the resources and inspiration for revival from ancient Chinese thought or by shifting from postcolonial Orientalism to Occidentalism for the illusionary rise of great power.”60 Thus said, how can we attain the goal of establishing the identity and subjectivity of modern Chinese culture? Should we merely embrace the culturism which allegedly “… leaps to the intercultural, liberal utopia …”,61 as he has suggested? Zhou has repeatedly pointed out that “… if our reflection repudiates the subject of Chinese history, given that the previous pitfalls of China can be found, the future prospect of China could not be foreseen.”62 The self-reflection of China as a “historical subject” means engaging its historical experience, especially the experience of its modern history. He has even noted that China “… held high the banner during the first 30 years [of the PRC’s history], in which its soft power outweighs its hard power; it bides its time and hides its capabilities in the next 30 years, in which its hard power outweighs its soft power.”63 What do the changes in China’s soft and hard power of the two 30-year periods mean? How should they be analyzed? How can China or Chinese intellectuals fight for discursive power? Although Zhou does not respond to these questions, he still holds that the cultural self-awareness and cultural reconstruction of China must have the ability to propose a whole set of cultural concepts with universal values, which cannot be achieved simply by utilizing tradition. Instead, he contends that to find the identity and reconstruct the subjectivity of modern Chinese culture, The Chinese dream has to express all the rights for survival and dignity of the lives of human beings, must articulate a certain peculiar global ethical ideal generated from Chinese intellectual resources. Such an ideal has to specify the direction and the method of comprehensively realizing people’s values, and contain the universal values that harbor the modern vitality and that promise a bright future.64

face the strong impact of the cultural monism of modern Western culture behind cultural pluralism.” Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Zhou Ning, Kuawenhua yanjiu, 1. 63 Zhou Ning 周宁, “Wenhua ruanshili tanhe rongyi 文化软实力谈何容易 [Cultural Soft Power: Easier Said Than Done],” http://www.aisixiang.com/data/24629.html. Accessed July 4, 2016. 64 Ibid.

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This confirmation of the road to be taken will doubtlessly assist Zhou in accomplishing his duty of “writing back” the West’s cultural hegemony. As such, the findings and reinterpretations regarding the values of Chinese modernity in modern Chinese history, which the Chinese were once proud of, would probably be the next academic project that he, as well as many other Chinese scholars, undertakes.

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conclusion

In Search of the Renaissance of China’s Socialist Culture In recent decades, there is “… a recrudescence of the vocabulary of modernity …” all over the world, critic Fredric Jameson keenly observes; and he raises serious doubts about this renaissance: Does it mean modern technology? In that case, nearly every country in the world has surely long since been modernized, and has cars, telephones, aeroplanes, factories, even computers and local stock markets. Does being insufficiently modern … simply mean not having enough of these? Or failing to run them efficiently? Or does being modern mean having a constitution and laws, or having [things] the way people in Hollywood movies do?1 Declining all these suppositions, he unhesitatingly contends that, … “modernity” is something of a suspect word in this context, being used precisely to cover up the absence of any great collective social hope, or telos, after the discrediting of socialism. For capitalism itself has no social goals. To brandish the word “modernity” in place of “capitalism” allows politicians, governments and political scientists to pretend that it does, and so to paper over that terrifying absence.2 Jameson’s ideas are inspirational for our evaluation of many phenomena in the world today. In terms of this issue of (alternative) modernity in the context of contemporary China, cultural critic Jason McGrath has also long noticed that Chinese postsocialist modernity is “an integral part of global postsocialist (capitalist) modernity;” therefore, for him, it is “a fantasy to celebrate it as

1 Fredric Jameson, “Globalization and Political Strategy,” New Left Review 4 (July–August), 2000: 62. 2 Ibid.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004461192_013

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primarily an example of diversity or difference,” or an “alternative modernity” that is “fundamentally separable from global capitalist modernity.”3 Many Chinese scholars echo this viewpoint. For instance, Zhao Yuezhi, a scholar of international communication, finds that “The reform era has witnessed a state- and societal-wide reassertion of Chinese cultural difference from western capitalist modernity …” which is “… culminating in a cultural politics that lays claim to the transformational power of Chinese culture in sublating Western capitalist modernity.”4 Indeed, it is well observed that in China’s intellectual world since the late 1990s, the topic of how to establish China’s “cultural consciousness” (文化意识) or “cultural self-awareness” (文化 自觉), has gradually become a hotly-debated issue. Compared to the cultural discussions of the “high culture fever” of the 1980s which then still more or less favored Western culture and demanded Westernization to various extents, this new round of cultural reflection calls for the establishment of Chinese cultural subjectivity and identity, revealing the emerging ambition of Chinese intellectuals when China is on the rise in the international arena. However, we need to note that there are two contradictory positions within this seemingly “conservative” trend: one that embraces so-called “Chineseness” to “sublate” “Western modernity;” another calls for a new, socialist alternative to “transcend” capitalist globalization. Zhao Yuezhi thus notes that the direction of the nation’s future has aroused much attention: If it is the power of this state that has enabled China to become a pole of growth for global capitalism during the era of neoliberal accumulation, it is the future direction of this state that has rendered “the rise of China” so unsettling for the evolving global capitalist order.5 This uncertainty triggers anxieties for both international superpower and domestic elite scholars. The heated “trade war” between the United States and China occurring at the time of writing, which elicits contending voices in the Chinese intellectual world, again shows the vying conditions of the differing interest groups. It is in view of this complex situation that a reflection of the

3 Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 14–15. 4 Yuezhi Zhao, “The Challenge of China: Contribution to a Transcultural Political Economy of Communication for the Twenty-First Century,” in Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, Helena Sousa, eds., The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 574–575. 5 Ibid., 562.

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changing Chinese cultural world in the past four decades—the decades of China’s praxis of reform and opening-up—becomes more urgent than before. Although the Chinese pursuit and praxis of socialism in the Mao era has left strong imprints in the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, its “forms and structures” have become much less distinct and functional in social-economic and political practice in reality. With the demise of older generations, the once strong “structure of feeling” of their traditional socialist ethical-moral world is much less discernible. Instead, there appears in Chinese society a “… distinctive and irony-laden twist …”; namely, “… what was holy and is now profaned by capitalism is not just the premodern value system but also Marxism itself, insofar as a particular version of it was enshrined as a totalizing ideological system … and then largely discarded.”6 On the other hand, Jason McGrath finds that, “… while China in the advanced reform era no longer has any master ideological signifier or overarching cultural ‘fever,’…” it does “… have the central cultural logic of the market …” which then “… leaves its traces virtually everywhere.”7 Consequently, progressive critics, both domestic and abroad, are concerned that while China may “… rise to a position of unparalleled prominence …” nevertheless, whether or not its “… economic growth and capital accumulation will benefit a large enough portion of the population in the medium to long term to maintain the legitimacy of the new concentration of capital and the political system that upholds it …” requires more serious attention.8 However, the mainstream media in China concentrates on forging so-called “soft power”. It has been observed that, “Xi’s ‘Chinese dream’ has become almost inseparable from the officially constructed Chinese soft power.”9 This “soft power” largely promotes traditional culture, in which the ideology of “harmony” is taken as unique to the Chinese cultural essence, departing from Western modernity. In particular, Zhao Yuezhi has discussed an interesting proclamation from a (once) high-ranked Chinese official, A signed front-page commentary on the May 8, 2009 issue of the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, by Ye Xiaowen, director of the central government’s Bureau for Religious Affairs, is symptomatic to this discourse 6 Jason McGrath, Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 9. 7 Ibid., 24. 8 Ibid., 18. 9 Paola Voci and Luo Hui, “Screening China’s Soft Power: Screen Cultures and Discourses of Power,” in Paola Voci and Luo Hui ed. Screening China’s Soft Power (New York: Routledge, 2018), 5.

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[of harmony]. Entitled “Greeting the ‘Renaissance’ of the New Era” and invoking Western intellectual and popular cultural sources ranging from Arnold Toynbee to the Hollywood movie Matrix, the article offered a dialectical view of the European Renaissance, claiming that its initial liberation of humanity from the darkness of the Medieval age has now degenerated into the “virus” in Matrix. It then calls for a “Renaissance of the New Era” which will redeem humanity by drawing on the Chinese state’s “double-harmony model”—a harmonious Chinese society and a harmonious world—and its newly articulated “human-centric, allrounded, coordinated and sustainable scientific developmental outlook” which embodies the “profound wisdom of Chinese culture” (Ye 2009).10 She ponders whether this is “… a necessary expression of cultural selfconfidence …” or only “… a strategic discursive retreat from a discredited socialist discourse to win over national and global cultural leaderships.”11 Notwithstanding, she suggests that the discourse is “… a new cultural politics that critical political economists must confront in grasping the ‘challenge of China.’ ”12 Although inexorably essentialized indigenous cultural values such as “harmony” receive state sanction, cultural conservatism—which rallies support from so-called political Confucianism—is nothing other than a pragmatic nationalism. International critics such as Paola Voci and Luo Hui therefore point out that, Postsocialist soft power betrays an attempt to merge humanism as defined by both May Fourth and Marxism with that of Neo-Confucianism, a process in which the “Western” influence so powerfully embraced by May Fourth thinkers is purged in favor of a “national cultural quality” and the promise of a Chinese-inflected humanity that will allow for a better alternative to modernization.13

10 Yuezhi Zhao, “The Challenge of China,” 575. For Ye’s report, see Ye Xiaowen 叶小文. “Yingjie xinshidai de ‘wenyi fuxing’ 迎接新时代的“文艺复兴” [Creating the “Renaissance” of the New Era],” Renmin ribao (Haiwaiban) 人民日报（海外版） [People’s Daily, Overseas Edition], May 8, 2009. p. 1. 11 Yuezhi Zhao, “The Challenge of China,” 575. 12 Ibid. 13 Paola Voci and Luo Hui, “Screening China’s Soft Power: Screen Cultures and Discourses of Power,” 10.

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Indeed, although political Confucianism occupies a distinct position in the Chinese intellectual world, it does not win much acclaim. This intellectual school is represented by Jiang Qing 蒋庆 (1953–), who argues for the renaissance of Confucian learning as the only way to redress a polity beset by Western concepts.14 Nevertheless, as critic Zhu Ying aptly notes, “China’s turn to Confucius for possible solutions to contemporary social illness associated with commercialization and rapid economic growth inevitably spotlights the tension between tradition and modernity.”15 In particular, since the arrival of global capitalism, the demise of the confrontation between socialism and capitalism in the ideological arena has pushed China to embrace pre-modern imperial history and cultural tradition as the source of its cultural identity. However, leading cultural researcher He Guimei, a professor at Beijing University, reminds Chinese readers that the lack of political awareness of the implications of this “rejuvenation of tradition” has, more often than not, resulted in a de-politicized nationalist ideology, which is often camouflaged as something “with Chinese characteristics”.16 However, this discourse, which is based on the Confucian political ethics that have served to stabilize the hierarchical subordination system, could not by itself deal with the rising class conflicts and ethnic divides resulting from pro-market policies and the weakening of socialist ideology. Throughout our critical inquiry, it has become clear that the Chinese world is undergoing an arduous cultural rehabilitation, an overhaul of the infrastructure and superstructure of the state’s cultural hegemony. Yet how can this goal be achieved, and how can the real “cultural renaissance” be obtained? Left-wing scholars in China and abroad thus contend that the clamor about the “rise of China”, with its fanfare success stories of social elites and business entrepreneurs, “… cannot sustain itself politically in the long run without a rise of China’s lower social classes.”17 China specialist Angela Stanzel has also observed that, “The logic behind the ‘new era’ claim in the party constitution 14

15 16 17

See David Elstein, Democracy and Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2015), chapter 7. Also see Jiang Qing 蒋庆, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, edited by Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan, translated by Edmund Ryden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). Ying Zhu, “The Cinematic Negotiation of Chinese Identity,” New York Times China Studies Website (April 2006); https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll -china-media-004.html. Accessed July 21, 2018. See He Guimei 贺桂梅, “Wenminglun yu ershiyishiji zhongguo 文明论与21 世纪中国 [Civilizational Discourses and 21st Century China],” in Wenyi lilun yu piping 文艺理论与 批评 [Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art], No. 5, 2017. Yuezhi Zhao, “The Challenge of China,” 570.

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relates to dialectical materialism, particularly the notion of a new ‘principal contradiction’ (主要矛盾 zhuyao maodun).” With the CCP having largely solved the problem of “backward social production” that dominated the reform era, the new contradiction was to be found “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life”—including, in Xi’s words, “demands for democracy, the rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment”. The new formulation implies that economic growth alone is no longer the solution: only through “well-rounded human development and all-round social progress” … can the contradiction be solved.18 These notions are reminiscent of the principles underlined by classical Marxism. In his “Speech at the Ceremony Commemorating the Bicentenary of the Birth of Marx” held on May 4th, 2018, President Xi claimed that, Marx and Engels envisaged that in the society of the future, “production will be calculated to provide wealth for all,” and it would feature “the participation of all in the enjoyments provided by all.” Engels integrated a series of views raised by Marx in Manifesto of the Communist Party, Critique of the Gotha Program, Capital, and other works, clarifying how, under the conditions of socialism, society should “give healthy and useful labor to all, ample wealth and leisure to all, and the truest and fullest freedom to all.”19 This passionate proclamation pushes us to return to the issue of China’s “soft power.” Chinese cultural researcher Zhou Ning has keenly remarked that China “… held high the banner during the first 30 years [of the PRC’s history, or the period of Mao’s rulership], in which its soft power outweighed its hard power.”20 We might recall that Joseph Nye informs us that the soft power of a 18 Angela Stanzel, “Introduction,” in “China’s ‘New Era’ with Xi Jinping Characteristics,” China Analysis, December 2017, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/chinas_ new_era_with_xi_jinping_characteristics7243. Accessed December 27th, 2018. 19 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Ceremony Commemorating the Bicentenary of the Birth of Marx,” From English Edition of Qiushi Journal, Vol. 10, no. 3 (2018). http://english.qstheory .cn/2018-09/07/c_1123371913.htm. Accessed September 10th, 2018. 20 Zhou Ning 周宁, “Wenhua ruanshili tanhe rongyi 文化软实力谈何容易 [Cultural Soft Power: Easier Said Than Done],” http://www.aisixiang.com/data/24629.html. Accessed July 4, 2016.

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country “… rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”21 The People’s Republic of China under Mao (1949–1976) held high the banner of Marxism and socialism; its socialist culture of people’s democracy became the cultural hegemony that not only enveloped domestic society but also fiercely spread to and engulfed the West. Its political values of anti-exploitation and the equality of all humanity became the universal ideas dominating the world’s media; its foreign policies of anti-imperialism and internationalistic aid to underdeveloped and colonial countries won an international name because of its moral-political superiority. In this regard, the decline of this hegemony in the post-Mao era calls for more serious deliberation. The most-hotly debated issue regarding China’s “soft power” is certainly about the problematic of democracy. Like Jameson, Slavoj Žižek also argues that the intrusion of the excluded into the sociopolitical space is termed “democracy.”22 From this perspective, ongoing struggles over the unfinished socialist democratic project have become the unavoidable path for achieving the socialist cultural renaissance. Although socialist culture aims to be universal, it is never an abstract entity. It is always the culture of the laboring class but not of the nouveaux riches. The renaissance of this traditional working-class culture requires collective effort. Fredric Jameson has argued that, “Pre-existing forms of social cohesion, though not enough in themselves, are necessarily the indispensable precondition for any effective and long-lasting … great collective endeavor.”23 Therefore, Combination, the old word for labor organization, offers an excellent symbolic designation for what is at issue on this ultimate, social level; and the history of the labor movement everywhere gives innumerable examples of the forging of new forms of solidarity in active political work.24 In this process, the seemingly impossible mission of the materialization of the class consciousness of the Chinese working class, which is the key to the renaissance of this socialist new culture, could be expected. This is simply because 21 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 11. 22 Slavoj Zizek, “How to begin from the beginning,” New Left Review, 57 (2009): 55. 23 Fredric Jameson, “Globalization and Political Strategy,” 68. 24 Ibid.

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“… class struggle, and the slow and intermittent development of genuine class consciousness, are themselves the process whereby a new and organic group constitutes itself, whereby the collective breaks through the reified atomization … of capitalist social life.”25 Jameson concludes his proposal by arguing that, “At that point, to say that the group exists and that it generates its own specific cultural life and expression are one and the same.”26 In China, progressive intellectuals proclaim that what now requires restoration is much less the old Confucian tradition than a socialist culture which values justice and equality, and is safeguarded by a socialist, mass democracy. This viewpoint is particularly articulated by Wang Hui, the leading New Left intellectual in China, who proposes the thesis of “breakdown of representation,” or the coming apart of the political and social form of representation in contemporary world politics, including in China; and he urges the restoration of the tradition of theoretical/political debates of the traditional socialist period.27 A similar appeal is made by Gan Yang, another prominent scholar in China who advocates the “integration of the ‘three traditions’ ” (tongsantong, 通三统). This thesis aims to reconcile past history and present praxis to establish a “harmonious” political order. The three traditions refer to the three practices influential in contemporary China: the Confucian tradition which structures the daily life of the Chinese people, notably their family relations; the Maoist heritage that stresses equality and justice, including mass democracy; and the market tradition of the past decades of reform and opening-up praxis which highlights efficiency.28 Although this thesis is criticized by both the Left and the Right as confusing irreconcilable elements and merely serving the dream of the ruling class for the consolidation of the political order of Grand Unification (dayitong, 大一统), or fabricating the false ideological continuity between Confucianism and Chinese socialism and betraying the traits of conservatism and elitism, Gan Yang has also reiterated the point that he holds Chinese socialism to be one of the most significant resources for China’s soft power, more significant than conservatism and liberalism in contemporary China.29 25 Ibid. 26 Fredric Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” Social Text, No. 1 (Winter, 1979), 140. 27 Wang Hui, “Two Kinds of New Poor and Their Future,” in Saul Thomas ed., China’s Twentieth Century: Revolution, Retreat, and the Road to Equality (London and New York: Verso, 2016), 221. 28 Gan Yang 甘阳, Tong santong 通三统 [Unifying Three Traditions] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2007), 1–3. 29 Gan Yang 甘阳, “Shehui zhuyi, baoshouu zhuyi, ziyou zhuyi: guanyu zhongguo de ruanshili 社会主义，保守主义，自由主义：关于中国的软实力 [Socialism,

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To enhance China’s “soft power” and to parry the international China-bashing movement launched by the United States, China’s leader Xi proposes building a “… community with a shared destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体, renlei mingyun gongtongti). Granted that it is a political strategy, literary scholar Ban Wang, in citing Rofel’s argument, points out that we need to distinguish socialist internationalism from capitalist cosmopolitanism: The former promotes solidarity and common purpose among disadvantaged peoples in their struggle against hegemony; the latter is a veneer of the neoliberal economy driven by consumption, fashion and cultural industries. Although it is the ideology of private corporations and financial elites, this cosmopolitanism operates under the banner of universalism and is touted as the only future for humanity, with no alternative. By riding on its wave, China’s glamorous image today obscures democratic and popular modes of internationalism in the socialist past.30 This bourgeois cosmopolitan thinking is also witnessed in Chinese academic circles, especially in the heated debates regarding the concept of tianxia 天 下 (“all under heaven”). The term refers to an ideal (but also a system) of governance that rules by culture and values to win people’s hearts and minds.31 In their report “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future,” political scientists Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Mareike Ohlberg, Simon Lang and Bertram Lang have keenly observed that, to achieve the “China dream,” partystate media have often applied this classical concept to place “… China at the center of the world as the ultimate source of civilization,” which “… resonates in the ‘China Dream’ concept’s emphasis on national rejuvenation.”32 However, Chinese intellectuals from both the Left and Right have noted the ideological overtones in the tianxia discourse behind China’s soft power efforts. In particular, left-wing Chinese critics have remarked that, in actual practice, the concept “… evinces the entwined operation of consent and coercion …” and is Conservatism, Liberalism: On China’s Softpower],” 21 shiji jingjin baodao 21 世纪经济报 道 [21st Century Business Herald], December 25, 2005. 30 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” in Ban Wang ed., Chinese Visions of World Order: Tianxia, Culture, and World Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 18. 31 As Ban Wang succinctly summarizes, “Sustained by affective ties rather than coercion, tianxia distinguishes the inside from the outside less by geography and ethnicity than by cultural competence.” Ban Wang, “Introduction,” 2 32 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Mareike Ohlberg, Simon Lang and Bertram Lang, “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future,” 45. Source: MERICS: Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies,” https://www.merics.org/sites/default/…/171004_MPOC_05_Ideologies _0.pdf. Accessed Dec. 21, 2018.

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“… fraught with paradox …”33 becoming merely “… an ideological cover for power politics …”;34 moreover, when class perspective is omitted, the political ideal would have no possibility of being realized in the modern world.35 However, although merely a historical ideology, Chinese critical intellectuals at home and abroad also believe that the utopian dimension of tianxia could be exploited because, as “a universal mandate,” it “… aspires to normative principles, and its validity rests not on the power to impose on others but on its potential as a critique of parochial interests and structures of domination.”36 In this regard, Wang Hui calls for imagining a new, universal politics premised on “… the subjectivity of the people.”37 Zhao Yuezhi stresses “… the continuing relevance …” of the “… Chinese socialist revolution’s legitimation of ‘people’s sovereignty’…” and “… the theory and practices of ‘people’s democracy.’ ”38 Liu Kang reminds readers that “… it is necessary to reintegrate the goals of socialist experiments in current historical transformations, so that the destructive and oppressive tendencies of global capitalism can be effectively curbed.”39 Ban Wang contends that tianxia could become “… a hidden weapon in socialist internationalism …” because “… the public space inherent in tianxia provides an opening for participatory politics and popular initiatives.”40 He also notes that not only does Chinese revolutionary discourse evince “… traces of tianxia …” but also “… it was Chinese socialism that actually brought some of its dreams to fruition …” by awakening “… the Chinese people into the selfconsciousness of a ‘class nation’…” which “… sees itself as a natural ally with other colonized regions and communities, and is the key to understanding socialist internationalism.”41 Apparently, all these proposals and arguments add profound socialist connotations to the thesis of establishing “community with a shared destiny for mankind.”

33 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” 18–20. 34 Ibid., 5. See also He Guimei, “Wenminglun yu ershiyishiji zhongguo.” 35 He Guimei 贺桂梅, “Wenhua zijue yu zhongguo xushu ‘文化自觉’与‘中国’叙述 [Cultural Self-Awareness and China Narrative],” Tianya 天涯 [Frontiers], No. 1, 2012, 41. 36 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” 5. 37 See Wang Hui 汪晖, Yazhou Shiye: Zhongguo lishi de xushu 亚洲视野：中国历史的叙 述 [Asian Perspective: The Narrative of Chinese History] (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2010). 38 Yuezhi Zhao, “The Challenge of China,” 568. 39 Liu Kang, “Introduction,” in Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2004), 4. 40 Ban Wang, “Introduction,” 15. 41 Ibid., 17.

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China is at a crossroads. With the phenomenal rise of China in the new century, international China specialists are concerned about the future of its developmental models and methods: It will be crucial which model—the “China Path” or the “Western model”—can attract and inspire the younger generation in the medium to long term. The looming ideological competition … will not just shape China’s trajectory and determine the level of popular support for Communist Party rule. It will also become a defining factor in global politics.42 In this respect, how China evaluates the sources of its “soft power” continually plays a significant role in its ongoing cultural-political strategy and envisioning the telos of its development. If it is true that the essence of the “Chinese dream,” as President Xi emphasizes, means “… the dream of the people …”, namely “… to let people enjoy better education, more stable employment, higher incomes, a greater degree of social security, better medical and health care, improved housing conditions and a better environment,” as well as “… to let our children grow up well, have satisfactory jobs and live better lives …”,43 then the “Chinese dream” is none other than the ideal of socialism, and the people themselves must master their own fate through the meaningful application of the people’s democracy. It is clear from all this that the emergence of the discourse of “cultural awareness” in China—which articulates China’s will to develop its cultural subjectivity as a response to globalization—dates back to the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, the real significance and import of this renewed consciousness of cultural-political subjectivity/identity has only become clearer now, almost two decades later, when the threatening force of global capitalism has raised its head and a new political-economic world order is being ferociously competed over by multiple world powers—the foremost being America and China—with real consequences. Situated in this critical historical conjuncture, although Chinese critical intellectuals do not witness “… any reason to be euphoric about the future for socialist revival or about China as the place 42 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Mareike Ohlberg, Simon Lang and Bertram Lang, “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future,” 80. 43 Cai Mingzhao, “The Chinese dream and its appeal,” http://www.china.org.cn/china/ Chinese_dream_dialogue/2013-12/07/content_30827106.htm. Accessed January 12, 2019. Cai was the Minister of the State Council Information Office when he delivered this keynote speech at the International Dialogue on the Chinese Dream, held on December 7, 2013, in Shanghai.

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for renewed socialist experiment …” they also regard as nonsense “… utter[…] pessimis[m] about the global domination of capitalism.”44 Thus said, to prevent the “uniqueness” of Chinese culture from falling into the pitfall of reactionary conservatism, “national rejuvenation” has to become a renaissance of a genuine socialist culture. For this purpose, Chinese intellectuals need to make more effort to transcend Western postmodern-postcolonial scholarship as well as the essentialized discourse and mentality of Chinese “national essence,” and redirect the direction of cultural debate to imagining an “alternative” road with real socialist contents and connotations. 44

Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, 16.

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Selected Bibliography Anna Xinxin 安娜杏馨. “Geng xiang ouxiangju 更像偶像剧 [More Like an Idol Drama].” Yangcheng wanbao 羊城晚报 [Yangcheng Evening Paper]. October 10th, 2010. Anonymous. “Lushanlian 2010 rong xiandai dushi yinsu, qiangli gongru guoqing dang 《庐山恋2010》融现代都市元素，强力攻入国庆档 [Romance on Mount Lushan 2010 combing modern city elements, launching vigorously into the National Day period of screening].” Resource: Tencent Entertainment, http://ent .qq.com/a/20100913/000427.htm. Accessed March 3, 2015. Anonymous. “Lushanlian Zhang Yu lun xinping zhuan jiujiu, jie xinpian wuda kandian 《庐山恋》张瑜论新瓶装旧酒，揭新片五大看点 [Romance on Mount Lushan, Zhang Yu explains Old Wines in New Bottles, revealing the five major features].” http://ent.qq.com/a/20101001/000111. Accessed January 2, 2017. Aristotle. Poetics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. Bai Ye 白烨. “Zuowei wenxue, wenhua xianxiang de ‘shanjun dongzhen’ 作为文学，文 化现象的“陕军东征” [“Eastward Expedition of Armies from Shanxi” as A Literary and Cultural Phenomenon].” Xiaoshuo pinglun 小说评论 [Fiction Review], 4 (1994): 61–65. Barker, Chris. Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice. 3rd edition. Los Angeles and London: Sage, 2008. Barry, Peter. Beginning Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. Belinsky, V.G. Selected Philosophical Works, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956. Benjamin, Walter. A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. London: Verso, 1997. Berry, Chris. “Getting Real: Chinese Documentary, Chinese Postsocialism.” In The Urban Generation, ed. Zhang Zhen. Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2007, 115–134. Brook, Timothy. Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. Cai Mingzhao. “The Chinese Dream and Its Appeal.” http://www.china.org.cn/china/ Chinese_dream_dialogue/2013-12/07/content_30827106.htm. Accessed January 12, 2019. Cao Wenshu 曹书文 and Wang Xiujie 王秀杰. “Bailuyuan: Jiazu wenhua de minjian xushi 《白鹿原》：家族文化的民间叙事 [White Deer Plain: A Folk Narrative of Family Culture].” Henan shifan daxue xuebao: Zhexue shehui kexueban 河南师范 大学学报：哲学社会科学版 [ Journal of Henan Normal University: Philosophy and Social Science Edition], 1 (2010): 205–208. Chen Chong 陈冲. “跟李安拍《色戒》 [Shooting Lust, Caution with Ang Lee].” http:// blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_48fbb60e01000bkw.html. Accessed Feb 23, 2008.

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Chen Chuancai 陈传才 and Zhou Zhonghou 周忠厚 eds. Wentan xibei fengguoer: Shanjun dongzheng wenxue xianxiang toushi yu jiedu 文坛西北风过耳—“陕军东 征”文学现象透视与解读 [Northwest Wind Blows to the Literary World: Observation and Interpretation of the Literary Phenomenon of “Eastward Expedition of Armies from Shanxi”]. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin chubanshe, 1993. Chen Jingxia 陈菁霞. “Yi sixiang de fangshi kangju zhongguo ‘bei tazhehua’— zhuanfang xiamen daxue Zhou Ning jiaoshou 以思想的方式抗拒中国“被他者化”— 专访厦门大学周宁教授 [Resistance to “Being Otherized” by Way of Thought—An Interview with Professor Zhou Ning from Xiamen University].” Zhonghua dushubao 中华读书报 [Chinese Reading Newspaper]. September 29th, 2010. Chen Sihe 陈思和 ed. Zhongguo dangdai wenxueshi jiaochen 中国当代文学史教程 [A Course on Contemporary Chinese Literary History]. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1999. Chen Xiaoming 陈晓明. “Lun ‘Yinshu zhijia’—Su Tong chuangzuo zhong de lishigan yu meixue yiwei 论《罂粟之家》—苏童创作中的历史感与美学意昧 [On Home of Poppy: the Historical Sense and Aesthetics Implication of Su Tong’s Works].” Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Literary and Artistic Debates], 2007 (6): 106–118. Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实. “Xunzhao shuyu zijide juzi: Bailuyuan xiezuo shouji 寻找属 于自己的句子—《白鹿原》写作手记 [Finding My Own Words—Writing Notes of White Deer Plain].” Xiaoshuo pinglun 小说评论 [Fiction Review], 2007 (6): 69–76. Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实. Bailuyuan 白鹿原 [White Deer Plain]. Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1993. Chen Zhongshi 陈忠实 and Li Yuchuan 李遇春. “Guanyu Bailuyuan zhong de renwu suzao wenti: Chen Zhongshi fantanlu 关于《白鹿原》中的人物形象塑造问题— 陈忠实访谈录 [On the Characterizations of Characters in White Deer Plain: An Interview with Chen Zhongshi].” Jiaoyan tiandi 语文教学与研究 [Teaching and Research of Chinese Language], No. 31 (2009): 6–10. Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元. Di erci sixiangjiefan yu zhidu chuanxi 第二次思想解放与制度创 新 [The Second Thought-Liberation and Institutional Invention]. Hong Kong: Niujing daxue chubanshe, 1997. Cui Zhiyuan 崔之元. “Kangbujian de shou”: fanshi de beilun “看不见的手”：范式的悖 论 [The Paradox of the Paradigm of “Invisible Hand].” Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1999. Davies, Gloria. “Anticipating Community, Producing Dissent: The Politics of Recent Chinese Intellectual Praxis.” The China Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002): 1–35. De Man, Paul. Blindness and Insight. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1997. Dermansky, Marcy. “Film Review.” http://worldfilm.about.com/od/chinesefilms/fr/ lustcaution.htm. Accessed Feb 7, 2008. Dirlik, Arif. “Modernity as History: Post-revolutionary China, Globalization and the Question of Modernity.” Social History, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2002): 16–38.

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Dollimore, Jonathan and Alan Sinfiled eds. Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985. Donald, Stephanie Hemelrik. Public Secret, Public Spaces—Cinema and Civility in China. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. Dreamer. “Qishi zhe bushi yibu hen qian de dianying 其实这不是一部很浅的电影 [In fact it isn’t a shallow movie].” http://movie.douban.com/review/3235853/. Accessed July 3, 2016. Elley, Derek. “Review: ‘The Making of Steel’.” Variety, August 3, 1998. http://variety .com/1998/film/reviews/the-making-of-steel-1200454803/. Accessed July 2, 2016. Elstein, David. Democracy and Contemporary Chinese Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2015. Erjavec, Aleš. “Introduction.” In Postmodernism and the Postsocialist Condition: Politicized Art Under Late Socialism. Ed. Aleš Erjavec. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, 1–54. Fu Tianhong 傅天虹. “Lun Hanyu xinshi de lilun yunxing yu meixue jiazhi 论“汉语新 诗”的理论运行与美学价值 [On the Theoretical Operation and Aesthetic Value of ‘Chinese New Poetry’].” In Zhongguo xinshi: Xinshiji shinian de huigu yu fansi 中国 新诗：新世纪十年的回顾与反思—两岸四地第三届当代诗学论坛论文集 [Chinese New Poetry: Review and Reflection on the First Decade of the New Century—a Collection of Essays from the Third Contemporary Poetics Forum of the Four Sides of the Taiwan Straits], 2010. Fu Tianhong 傅天虹. Fu Tianhong Shicun 傅天虹诗存 [Collected Poems of Fu Tianhong]. Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2005 Gan Yang 甘阳. Tong santong 通三统 [Unifying Three Traditions]. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2007. Gan Yang 甘阳. “Shehui zhuyi, baoshouu zhuyi, ziyou zhuyi: guanyu zhongguo de ruanshili 社会主义，保守主义，自由主义：关于中国的软实力 [Socialism, Conservatism, Liberalism: On China’s Softpower].” 21 shiji jingji baodao 21 世纪经济报 道 [21st Century Business Herald]. December 25, 2005. Gao Quanxi 高全喜. “Wenhua zhengzhi yu xiandaixing wenti zhi zhenwei 文化政 治与现代性问题之真伪 [Cultural Politics and the Authenticity of the Issue of Modernity].” Sixiang 思想 [Reflexion] (Taipei), No. 3 (2006): 237–256. Ge Fei 格非. Mi Zhou 迷舟 [Lost Boat]. Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1989. Ge Fei 格非. Ge Fei 格非 [Selected Works of Ge Fei]. Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2000. Gellener, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Gethmann-Siefert, Annemarie. “Heidegger and Hölderlin: The Over-Usage of ‘Poets in an Impoverished Time’.” Heidegger Studies (1990): 59–88. Gries, Peter and Stanley Rosen eds. State and Society in 21st-Century China. London: Routledge, 2004.

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Guo Wuke 郭武轲. “Shilun qingmo mingchu shiqi guojia quanli zai xiangcun de shentou: jiyu xiaoshuo Bailuyuan xushi de kaocha 试论清末民初时期国家权力在乡村 的渗透：基于小说《白鹿原》叙事的考察 [On the Penetration of the State Power into the Rural Areas during the Late Qing Dynasty and Early Republican Period: A Research Based on the Narrative of the Novel White Deer Plain].” Henan jingcha xueyuan xuebao 河南警察学院学报 [ Journal of Henan Police Academy], No. 4 (2011): 125–128. Han Xiaolei 韩小磊. “Dui diwudai de wenhua tuwei 对第五代的文化突围 [Cultural Break Through the Fifth Generation].” dianying yishu 电影艺术 [Film Art], No. 2 (1995): 58–63. He Guimei 贺桂梅. “Wenhua zijue yu zhongguo xushu“文化自觉”与“中国”叙述 [Cultural Self-Awareness and China Narrative].” Tianya 天涯 [Frontiers], No. 1 (2012): 27–51. He Guimei 贺桂梅. “Wenminglun yu ershiyishiji zhongguo 文明论与21 世纪中国 [Civilizational Discourses and 21st Century China].” Wenyi lilun yu piping 文艺理论 与批评 [Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art], No. 5 (2017): 31–44. He Qinglian 何清涟. Xian dai hua de xianjing 现代化的陷阱 [The Trap of Modernization]. Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1998. He Xin 何新. Xin Guojiazhuyi de jingjiguan 新国家主义的经济观 [Economic Principles of Neo-Statism]. Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 2001. He Xin 何新. Lun zhenzhi guojia zhuyi 论政治国家主义 [On Political Statism]. Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003. He Xin 何新. “Yong xin shehuizhuyi qudai xin guojiazhuyi 用新社会主义取代新国家 主义 [To Replace Neo-Statism with a New Socialism].” http://www.caogen.com/ blog/Infor_detail.aspx? articleId=13709&Page=4. Accessed Jan 30, 2013. Heine, Heinrich. Poetry and Prose. ed. Jost Hermand, Robert Holub. NY: Continuum, 1982. Hong Zhigang 洪治纲. Yu Hua Pingzhuan 余华评传 [A Critical Biography of Yu Hua]. Zhengzhou: Zhengzhou daxue chubanshe, 2005. Hood, Thomas. “The Song of the Shirt.” Inglis, R.B., et al. Adventures in English Literature. Toronto: W.J. Gage, 1952, pp. 436–37. Huang Yongjian 黄永健. “Sangwenshi-Xianggang wentan de ling yi fengjingxian 散 文诗—香港文坛的另一风景线 [Prose Poem: the Other Scenery in Hong Kong’s Literary Field].” Dangdai shitan 当代诗坛 [Contemporary Poetry], No. 27 (1999): 153–166. Inglis, R.B., et al. Adventures in English Literature. Toronto: W.J. Gage, 1952. Jameson, Fredric. A Singular Modernity. London and New York: Verso, 2002. Jameson, Fredric. “Globalization and Political Strategy.” New Left Review 4 (July–August, 2000): 49–68.

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Jameson, Fredric. “Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue.” The Cultures of Globalization, edited by Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998, pp. 54–80. Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Postmodernism. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991. Jameson, Fredric. “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture.” Social Text, No. 1 (Winter 1979): 130–148. Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981. Jiang Qing 蒋庆. A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, eds. Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan; Edmund Ryden, trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Jin Yuanfu 金元浦 and Tao Dongfeng 陶东风. Chanshi zhongguo de jiaolv 阐释中国的 焦虑 [Anxiety of Explaining China]. Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1999. Johnson, Linda Cooke. Shanghai: from Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074–1858. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. Jones, Andrew F. “Avant-Garde Fiction in China.” In Mostow, Joshua and Kirk A. Denton, eds. Columbia Companion to Modern East Asian Literatures. NY: Columbia UP, 2003, pp. 554–560. Jung, C.G. “Psychology and Literature.” Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Volume 15: Spirit in Man, Art, And Literature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 84–108. Justfaint88. “Beijing xin tuhao shida biaozhun 北京新土豪十条标准 [Ten New Standards of Judging a “nouveau riche in Beijing].” http://www.xcar.com.cn/bbs/ viewthread.php?tid=19660885. Dated November 7, 2013. Accessed July 7, 2017. Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光. “Lun hezuozhuyi guojia 论合作主义国家 [On a Corporatist State].” Zhanlue yu guanli 战略与管理 [Strategy and Management], No. 5 (2003): 85–95. Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光. “Shinian bubian: shichang jingji, jingyin lianmeng, quanweizhengzhi 十年不变：市场经济，精英联盟，权威政治 [Ten-years Unchanged: Market Economy, Elites Alliance, Authoritarianism].” Zhongguo gaige 中国改革 [Reform China], No. 1 (2004): 7–8. Lee, Ching Kwan and Mark Selden. “China’s Durable Inequality: Legacies of Revolution and Pitfalls of Reform.” Japan Focus, January, 2007. Li Shitao 李世涛 ed. Zhishifenzi lichang: ziyouzhuyi zhi zheng yu zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua 知识分子立场：自由主义之争与中国思想界的分化 [Intellectual positions: The debate on liberalism and the differentiation of Chinese intellectuals]. Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 2000.

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Liang Benben 梁蹦蹦. “Ruci yaogun de huozhe 如此摇滚的活着 [to Live in a Rocking State].” http://movie.douban.com/review/1973084/. Accessed July 7, 2016. Lin Chun. “China’s leaders are cracking down on Bo Xilai and his Chongqing model.” Guardian. April, 2012. Lin, Qingxin. Brushing History Against the Grain: Reading the Chinese New Historical Fiction (1986–1999). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005. Lin, Qingxin. “Imitation and Transgression: Ge Fei’s Creative Use of Jorge Luis Borges’s Narrative Labyrinth.” Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 8.4 (2015): 649–669. Liu Junning 刘军宁. “Ziyouzhuyi yu gongzheng: dui ruogang jienan de huida 自 由主义与公正：对若干诘难的回答 [Liberalism and Justice: Response to Some Interrogations].” Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu 当代中国研究 [Contemporary China Studies], No. 4 (2000). Liu Kang. Globalization and Cultural Trends in China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2004. Liu, Lydia. The Clash of Empires: the Invention of China in Modern World Making. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. Lu Tonglin, Misogyny, Cultural Nihilism, and Oppositional Politics: Contemporary Chinese Experimental Fiction. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. Lu Yuntao 吕云涛 and Lu Fei 李辉. “Bailuyuan zhong xiangcun zhili moshi de liubian jiedu ji qishi 《白鹿原》中乡村治理模式的流变解读及启示 [Interpretation and Inspiration of the Evolution of Rural Governance in White Deer Plain].” Nongye kaogu 农业考古 [Agricultural Archaeology], No. 6 (2010): 367–369. Lukacs, G. The Theory of the Novel. London: Merlin Press, 1963. Ma Yuan 马原. “Gangdisi de youhui 冈底斯的诱惑 [The Enticement of Gandisi Mountain].” Shanghai wenxue 上海文学 [Shanghai Literature], No. 2 (1985). Mak, Edwin. “Postsocialist Grit: Contending Realisms in Jia Zhangke’s ‘Platform’ and ‘Unknown Pleasures.’ ” Offscreen, Vol. 12, No. 7 (2008). http://www.offscreen.com/ index.php/pages/essays/postsocialist_grit/. Accessed Oct. 10th, 2013. Márquez, Gabriel García. One Hundred Years of Solitude. Translated by Gregory Rabassa. London: Harper Perennial, 1970. Marx Karl and Engels, Friedrich. The German Ideology. New York: International Publishers. Co, 1970. McGrath, Jason. Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008. Mei, Yi-tsi Feuerwerker. Ding Ling’s Fiction: Ideology and Narrative in Modern Chinese Literature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982. Mei Zurong 梅祖蓉 and Tan Junjiu 谭君久. “Guanyu Bai Luxun zhongguo zhengzhi wenhua yanjiude pingjia yu yanjiu zongshu 关于白鲁恂中国政治文化研究的评价 与研究综述 [Evaluation and Review of Lucian Pye’s Studies of Chinese Politics and

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Wang Dake 王大可, Feng Ni 冯妮, Huang Lei 黄蕾 and Liu Jia 刘佳, “Tan dangdai qingchun dianying 谈当代青春电影（下） [On Contemporary Youth Films, 2nd Round].” 21 shiji jingjin baodao 21 世纪经济报道 [21st Century Business Herald]. July 6, 2013. Wang Hui. China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition, ed. Teodore Huters, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Wang Hui. “Depoliticized Politics: From East to West.” New Left Review, No. 41 (September–October 2006): 29–45. Wang Hui. “Two Kinds of New Poor and Their Future.” In Saul Thomas ed. China’s Twentieth Century: Revolution, Retreat, and the Road to Equality. London and New York: Verso, 2016. Wang Hui. “The Rumour Machine.” London Review of Books, Vol. 34, No. 9–10 (2012). Wang Hui 汪晖. “Shi jingji shi, haishi zhengzhi jingjixue 是经济史，还是政治经济学 [Is it Economic History, or History of Political Economy?].” Tianya 天涯 [The World], No. 5 (2000). Wang Hui 汪晖. Yazhou Shiye: Zhongguo lishi de xushu 亚洲视野：中国历史的叙述 [Asian Perspective: The Narrative of Chinese History]. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2010. Wang Ning 王宁. “Jicheng yu duanlie: zouxiang houxinshiqi wenxue 继承与断裂：走 向后新时期文学 [Legacy and rupture: towards the literature of the Post-New Era].” Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Debate in Literature and Art], No. 6 (1992): 11–12. Wang Qitao 王琦涛. “Sejie de wenben fenxi, lishi changshi yu duiqi xianshi yiyi de sikao” 《色戒》的文本分析，历史阐释与对其现实意义的思考 [Textual Analysis, Historical Interpretation, and Thoughts of the Social Significance of Lust, Caution], http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/wenyi/2009/09/26470.html. Accessed April 7, 2018. Wang Xiaoping. “Three Trends in Recent Studies of Modern Chinese Literature and Culture.” China Perspectives, No. 4 (2009): 118–126. Wang Xiaoping. Ideology and Utopia in China’s New Wave Cinema: Globalization and Its Chinese Discontents. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Wang Xiaoping. Postsocialist Conditions: Ideas and History in China’s “Independent Cinema”, 1988–2008. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018. Wang Yichuan 王一川, Zhang Yiwu 张颐武, Zhang Fa 张法. “cong ‘xiandaixing’ dao ‘zhonghuaxing’ 从“现代性”到“中华性”[From Modernity to Chineseness].” Wenyi yanjiu 文艺争鸣 [Literary and Art Contention], No. 2 (1994): 10–20. Westad, O.A. The Global Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Weston, Timothy B. and Lionel M. Jensen, eds. China beyond the Headlines. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. Weston, Timothy B. “The Iron Man Weeps: Joblessness and Political Legitimacy in the Chinese Rust Belt.” In Gries and Rosen eds. State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.

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Xu Jilin 许纪霖. “Liangzhong minzhu he ziyou: dui ‘ziyouzhuyi’ yu ‘xinzuopai’ lunzhan de fangsi 两种民主和自由：对“自由主义”与“新左派”论战的反思 [Two sorts of Liberties and Democracies: Reflection on the debate between the ‘Liberalism’ and the ‘New Left’].” Zhongguo daxue xueshu yanjianglu 中国大学学术演讲录 [Academic Lecturers in Chinese Universities]. Nanjing: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2002. Yan Qinan 阎奇男. “Lun Mizhou de yishu meili 论《迷舟》的艺术魅力 [On the Artistic Charm of Lost Boat].” In Shangdong shehui kexue 山东社会科学 [Shandong Social Science], No. 2 (1996): 74–77. Yang, Xiaobin. The Chinese Postmodern: Trauma and Irony in Chinese Avant-Garde Fiction. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002. Ye, Xiaowen 叶小文. “Yingjie xinshidai de ‘wenyi fuxing’ 迎接新时代的“文艺复兴” [Creating the “Renaissance” of the new era].” Renmin ribao (Haiwaiban) 人民日报 （海外版） [People’s Daily, Overseas Edition], May 8, 2009, p. 1. Yi Hui 易晖. “ ‘ Wo’ shi shui: Xin shiqi xiaoshuo zhong zhishifenzi de shenfen yishi yanjiu “我”是谁—新时期小说中知识分子的身份意识研究 [Who Am “I”—A Study of the Identity Consciousness of the Intellectuals in the Fiction of the New Era]. Nanchang: Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 2004. Yu Hua 余华. “Wo yongyou liangge rensheng 我拥有两个人生 [I own two lives].” In Huanghun lide nanhai 黄昏里的男孩 [A boy in the Twilight]. Shanghai: Shanghai wenyichubanshe, 2004. Yu Hua 余华. Yu Hua zuopinji 余华作品集 [Collected Works of Yu Hua]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1995. Zhang Jieyu 张洁宇. “Women xianzai zenyang zuo zhongguoren 我们现在怎样做中国 人 [How can we to be a Chinese now].” Zhonghua dushubao 中华读书报 [Chinese Readings Weekly], July 17, 2002. Zhang Fa 张法, Zhang Yiwu 张颐武, and Wang Yichuan 王一川. “Cong ‘xiandaixing’ dao ‘zhonghuaxing’—xinzhishixing de tanxun 从“现代性”到“中华性”：新知识型的 探寻 [From “modernity” to “Chineseness”: in search of a new mode of knowledge].” Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Debate in Literature and Art], No. 2 (1994): 10–20. Zhang Jingzhi 张静芝. “Yinshu zhijia: Tuifei jiazu de shengcun shixiang 《罂粟之 家》：颓败家族的生存世相 [Home of Poppy: The Lives of the Decadent Family].” Dangdai wentan 当代文坛 [Contemporary Literary Field], No. 3 (2001): 87–89. Zhang Xiguo 张系国, “Zhenzhi zhengque de laoyi” 政治正确的老易 [A “Political Correct” Old Yee]. Zhongguo ribao 中国日报 [China Times]. November 11, 2007. Zhang Xudong. Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms: Cultural Fever, Avant-Garde Fiction, and the New Chinese Cinema. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. Zhang Xudong. “Postmodernism and Post-socialist Society: Cultural Politics in China in the 1990s.” New Left Review, I/237 (September–October 1999): 77–105.

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370

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Zhang Xudong. “Political Philosophy and Comparison: Bourgeois Identity and the Narrative of the Universal.” Boundary, No. 2, Vol. 32 (2005): 81–107. Zhang Xudong. ed. Postmodernism and China. Durham, [NC]: Duke University Press, 2000. Zhang Xudong. ed. Wither China: Intellectual politics in Contemporary China, Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2001. Zhang Xudong 张旭东. Quanqiuhua shidai de wenhua rentong 全球化时代的文化认 同 [Cultural Identity in the Era of Globalization]. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2009. Zhang Xudong 张旭东. “Yuanli jiti jiaolv de celue 远离集体焦虑的策略 [Strategies to Stay Away from Collective Anxiety].” Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao 21 世纪经济报道 [21st Century Business Herald]. December 18th, 2006. Zhang Xudong 张旭东. “Wenhua mingzu zhuyi, cuozhegan, yu zhongguo xueren de jingshen shiming 文化民族主义，“挫折感”，与中国学人的精神使命 [Cultural Nationalism, “Sense of Frustration”, and the Intellectual Mission of Chinese Scholars].” Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao 21 世纪经济报道 [21st Century Business Herald]. August 14th, 2003. Zhang Xudong 张旭东. “ ‘ Wenhua zhengzhi’ yu ‘zhongguo daolu’ “文化政治”与“中国 道路” [‘Cultural Politics’ and ‘Chinese Road’].” May 29th, 2016. http://www.guancha .cn/ZhangXuDong/2016_05_29_362060.shtml. Accessed September 4, 2016. Zhang Xudong 张旭东. “ ‘Qimeng’ de jingshen xianxiangxue “启蒙”的精神现象学 [The Spiritual Phenomenology of the Enlightenment].” Kaifang shidai 开放时代 [Open Times], No. 3 (2008): 152–165. Zhang Xudong 张旭东 and Xue Yi 薛毅. “Xixue xiangxiang yu zhongguo dangdai wenhua zhengzhi de zhankai” 西学想象与中国当代文化政治的展开 [The Imagination of Western Learning and the Development of Cultural Politic in Contemporary China].” Tianya 天涯 [Frontiers], No. 2 (2003): 15–27. Zhang Yiwu 张颐武. “Houxinshiqi wenxue: xin de wenhua kongjian 后新时期文学： 新的文化空间 [Literature of the Post-New Era: A New Cultural Space].” Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Literature and Art Contention], No. 6 (1992): 9–12. Zhang Yingjin. “Rebel without a Cause? China’s New Urban Generation and Postsocialist Filmmaking.” In The Urban Generation: Chinese Cinema and Society at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century. edited by Zhang Zhen. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007, pp. 49–80. Zhang Zhen. “Urban Dreamscape, Phantom Sisters, and the Identity of an Emergent Art Cinema.” In The Urban Generation: Chinese Cinema and Society at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Zheng Zhen, Durham: Duke University Press, 2007, pp. 344–387

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371

Zhao Yiheng 赵毅衡. “Erzhong dangdaiwenxue 二种当代文学 [Two kinds of contemporary literature].” Wenyi Zhengming 文艺争鸣 [Literature and Art Contention], No. 6 (1992): 10–11. Zhao Yuezhi. “The Challenge of China: Contribution to a Transcultural Political Economy of Communication for the Twenty-First Century.” In Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, Helena Sousa, eds., The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 558–582. Zheng Peikai 郑培凯. ed. Sejie de Shijie 《色戒》的世界 [The World of Lust, Caution]. Nanning: Guangxi nanjing chubanshe, 2007. Zhou Dayi 周达祎. “Pi dianying zhi women zhongjiang shiqu de qingchun 批电影 《致我们终将逝去的青春》   [A Critique of the Film So Young].” Course paper, Tan Kah Kee College, 2014. Zhou Ning 周宁. Kuawenhua yanjiu: yi zhongguo xingxiang wei fangfa 跨文化研究： 以中国形象为方法 [Cross-Cultural Study: China’s Image as a Methodology]. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2011. Zhou Ning 周宁. “Wenhua luanshili tanhe longyi 文化软实力谈何容易 [Cultural Soft Power: Easier Said Than Done].” http://www.aisixiang.com/data/24629.html. Accessed July 4, 2016. Zhou Ning 周宁. “Pushi jiazhi, women yeneng dangdang? 普世价值，我们也能担当？ [Universal Values, Can we Bear?].” http://www.aisixiang.com/data/24630.html. Accessed April 3, 2016. Zhou Ning 周宁. Tianchao yaoyuan: Xifang de zhongguo xingxiang yanjiu 天朝遥远： 西方的中国形象研究 [The Distant China: Study of Western Image of China]. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006. Zhou Ning 周宁. “Ling yizhong dongfang zhuyi: Chaoyue houzhiming zhuyi wenhua pipan 另一种东方主义：超越后殖民主义文化批判 [Orientalism of Another Type: A Criticism Beyond the Post-Colonialist Cultural Criticism].” Xiamen daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) 厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版） [ Journal of Xiamen University (Arts & Social Sciences Edition)], No. 6 (2004): 5–12. Zhou Ning 周宁. “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue: dangxia zhongguo wenhua zijue de sanzu wenti 跨文化形象学：当下中国文化自觉的三组问题 [Cross-Cultural Imagology: the Three Groups of Questions of Cultural Self-consciousness in Contemporary China].” Xiamen daxue xuebao (Zhexue shehui kexue ban) 厦门大学学报（哲学社 会科学版） [ Journal of Xiamen University (Arts & Social Sciences Edition)], No. 6 (2008): 5–12. Zhou Ning 周宁. “ ‘Bei bieren biaoshu’: guominging pipan de xifang huayu puxi “被别人 表述”：国民性批判的西方话语谱系 [‘Represented by Others’: the Genealogy of the Western Discourse of the Critique of National Character].” Wenyi lilun yu piping 文艺理论与批评 [Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art], No. 5 (2003): 41–53.

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372

Selected Bibliography

Zhou Ning 周宁. “Hanxue huo ‘hanue zhuyi’  汉学或“汉学主义” [Sinology or ‘Sinologism’].” Xiamen daxue Xuebao (zheue shehui keueban) 厦门大学学报 （哲学社会科学版）   [ Journal of Xiamen University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)], No. 1 (2004): 5–13. Zhou Ning 周宁 ed., Zhongguo xingxiang: xifangde xueshuo yu chuanshuo 中国形象： 西方的学说与传说 [The Image of China: Theories and Legends of the West], 8 volumes. Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2004. Zhou Ning 周宁 ed. Shijie de zhongguo xingxiang yaniiu 世界的中国形象研究 [Studies of the Image of China in the World]. 9 volumes. Beijing: Renming chubanshe, 2007. Zhou Ning 周宁 and Song Binghui 宋炳辉. “Xifang de zhongguo xingxiang yanjiuguanyu xingxiangxue xueke lingyu yu yanjiu fanxing de duihua 西方的中国形象 研究—关于形象学学科领域与研究范型的对话 [Study on the Western Image of China—A Dialogue on Image Study and Research Paradigm].” Zhongguo bijiao wenxue 中国比较文学 [Comparative Literature in China], No. 2 (2005): 148–161. Zhou Ning 周宁 and Zhou Yunlong 周云龙. “Kuawenhua xingxiangxue: Cong xingxiang leixing dao xingxiang wangluo-Zhou Ning jiaoshou fangtan 跨文化形象学：从 形象类型到形象网络—周宁教授访谈 [Cross-cultural Imagology: from Image Type to Image Network—Interview with Professor Zhou Ning].” Shehui keue luntan 社会 科学论坛 [Forum of Social Sciences], No. 3 (2010): 117–132. Zhuanjijingxuan 传记精选. “Ren Zhiqiang: weishneme wo shi ‘guniangmen zui xiang jia de ren 任志强：为什么我是“姑娘们最想嫁的人” [Ren Zhiqiang: Why Am I ‘the Man who Girls Mostly Want to Marry with’?]” http://finance.sina.com.cn/zl/life style/20131022/180117072961.shtml. Accessed January 4, 2017. Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐. “Hanyu xinshi yu hanyu xin wenxue de xueshu bianzheng 汉 语新诗与汉语新文学的学术辩证 [Dialectics between Chinese New Poetry and Chinese New Literature].” Macau Daily, July 3, 2010. Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐. “Zhongshengdai shiren de qunti jiaolv yu shixing zijue 中生 代诗人的群体焦虑与诗性自觉 [Group Anxiety and Poetic Consciousness of the Middle-Aged Generation of Poets].” Dangdai Shitan 当代诗坛 [Contemporary Poetry], No. 47–48 (2007). Zhu Shoutong 朱寿桐 ed. Lun Fu Tianhong de shi 论傅天虹的诗 [On Fu Tianhong’s Poems]. Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 2009. Zhu, Ying. “The Cinematic Negotiation of Chinese Identity,” By New York Times China Studies Website (April, 2006): https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/ college/coll-china-media-004.html. Accessed July 21, 2018. Zhu Yiting 朱贻庭. ed. Lunlixue dacidian 伦理学大辞典 [Dictionary of Ethics]. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2002. Žižek, Slavoj. “How to begin from the beginning.” New Left Review, 57 (2009): 43–55.

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373

Online Information

“2007 China Yearly Box Office Results,” http://www.boxofficemojo.com/intl/china/ yearly/?yr=2007&p=.htm. Accessed Feb. 1, 2008. “Reviews of Lust Caution.” http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/lust_caution/. Accessed Feb 1, 2008. “Top Grossing NC-17 Rated Movies at the Box Office,” http://www.boxofficemojo.com/ alltime/domestic/mpaa.htm?page=NC-17&p=.htm. Accessed Feb. 1., 2008. “Women Film Critics Circle Awards 2007.” http://wfcc.wordpress.com/women-film -critic-circle-awards-2007/. Accessed 1 February 2008. http://www.im.tv/VLOG/ Personal/236326/3235095. Accessed March 3, 2008.

Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

Index Agnosticism 18, 102, 108, 114, 123, 167, 213, 336 Allegory 18–19, 96, 108, 115, 119, 122–123, 134, 193, 232, 247–250, 252 American Dream 2, 224–226 Avant-garde 5, 14–17, 87–90, 93, 96, 102–104, 107–109, 113–115, 126–127, 135–137, 159, 164–165, 171, 192, 339 Baudelaire, Charles 26, 76, 290 Bellinsky, Vissarion 60–61 Benjamin, Walter 26, 115, 134 Berlin, Isaiah 275 Bildungsroman 18, 64–65, 191, 215 Borges, Jorge Luis 87, 91, 101 Bourgeois 10, 12, 14, 32, 61, 64–67, 69, 76, 78, 118, 129–136, 155, 166, 186, 210, 213, 225, 238–240, 253, 258, 265, 276, 288, 291, 293–295, 297, 299, 302–304, 313–315, 317, 354 Capital 11, 69, 72, 91, 94, 171, 179, 251, 257, 261–262, 264, 267, 273–274, 291, 305, 316, 348 CCP 1, 4, 106–107, 149, 153, 199, 248, 252, 309, 339, 351 Chen Fanken 15, 25–27, 30, 32, 34–35, 37–38, 41, 45–48, 50–51, 53, 56–57 Chen Zhongshi 138 China Dream 2, 344, 348, 354, 356 China Path 2, 287, 356 Chineseness 5, 7, 251, 260, 289, 317, 347 Chinese New Poetry 59, 61, 82–84 Civil society 11, 65–66, 69, 74, 291, 294, 315, 317 Cognitive mapping 13 Collectivist 33, 37–38, 216 Commercialization 4, 6, 37, 58, 78, 80, 121–122, 191, 259–261, 350 Commodification 8, 15, 48, 137, 257 Communism 7, 36, 126, 130, 134, 151–152 Confucian 35, 139–143, 146, 150, 154–155, 157, 163–164, 166–167, 251, 262, 266, 268, 308, 310, 327, 338, 349–350, 353

Conservatism 12, 95, 114, 166, 259, 261, 265, 268, 282, 288, 292, 326, 349, 353, 357 Consumerist 4–5, 14, 18–19, 58, 197, 255, 258–260, 282 Corporatism 19, 258, 265–267 Cultural awareness 356 Cultural consciousness 287, 334–335, 347 Cultural industry 5, 261 Culturalism 9 Cultural logic 6, 348 Cultural politics 19, 250, 283, 288–289, 295, 307, 309–313, 316–317, 347, 349 Cynicism 17–19, 189, 198, 219, 224, 227, 259 Deng Xiaoping 4, 16, 89, 183, 264, 269, 279, 308–309 Depoliticization 6–7, 15, 27, 88, 95, 104–105, 121, 123, 137, 161–162, 166, 191, 195, 213, 338 Developmentalist 257, 269, 273, 341 Dialectics 69, 84, 88, 121, 164, 214, 253, 260, 288, 296, 299, 302, 333, 349, 351 Dialetics 19, 89, 124, 137, 252, 258, 282, 294, 296, 298, 308 Displacement 233, 240, 254, 333 Dominant culture 9–11, 13–15, 19, 307 Egality 11, 258, 264, 270, 274, 277–279 Egoism 162, 206–207, 222 Enlightenment 95, 114, 117, 132–133, 147, 157, 163, 183, 209, 211, 322–323, 331 Erjavec, Alecs 14 Feudal 10, 31, 66, 106–107, 118–119, 121, 134–135, 140–142, 146, 151–152, 154–156, 166, 247, 253, 290–291, 319 Frankfurt School 9, 260 Fu Tianhong 15, 59, 76, 83 Gan Yang 271, 308, 353 Ge Fei 101, 107, 109–110, 113 Global capitalism 2, 6–7, 14, 20–21, 156, 257–258, 260, 262–263, 271, 281, 283, 297, 347, 350, 355–356

Xiaoping Wang - 978-90-04-46119-2

Index Globalization 3, 6, 12, 14–15, 251, 257, 260, 278, 281–282, 288–289, 299, 304, 307–308, 316, 332, 347, 356 Gramscian 13 Gries, Peter 8 Habitus 106, 255 Hedonism 19, 128, 179, 198, 213, 258 Hegelian 10, 113, 288, 291, 293, 296, 316, 321, 328 He Guimei 20, 267, 350 Heidegger, Martin 16, 178, 318 He Qinglian 274 Heroism 15, 27, 33–35, 37, 41, 67, 92, 141, 143, 177, 183, 186, 191, 193 He Xin 264–267, 281 Hippie 198, 205, 207–210, 212–213 Hölderlin, Friedrich 61 Hollywood 12, 197, 209, 216, 346, 349 Hua Guofeng 4 Humanism 14–15, 69, 90, 135, 137, 166, 255, 349 Idealism 14, 18–19, 32, 34, 38, 51, 69–70, 172, 181, 185, 190, 192, 194, 197–198, 223, 227, 264, 270, 272 Jameson, Frederic 13, 249–250, 288, 310, 313, 315, 346, 352–353 Jones, Andrew 15, 73, 87, 90, 115, 117, 137 Jung, Carl Gustav 60 Kang Xiaoguang 265, 267–268 Lacan, Jacques 106 Land reform 131–132 Leftist 6, 9, 20, 257, 326 Legitimacy 11, 20, 93, 109, 131, 143, 256, 262–266, 268–269, 274, 277, 279, 289, 292, 297, 301, 303, 307–310, 317, 320, 331, 342, 348 Liu Kang 11, 15, 20, 259, 261, 264, 355 Li Zhi 55 Lukács, George 100 Lukacsian 10 Luofu (Mo Luofu) 60 Lust, Caution 12, 19, 231 Lyotard, Jean-François 7

375 Mainstream culture 11, 281 Maoism 7, 11, 15, 51, 68–69, 115, 120–121, 264, 278–280, 282, 309, 353 Mao Zedong 32, 34, 57, 65, 78, 106, 180, 264, 272, 277, 282, 308–309, 338–340, 351–352 Marketization 4, 89, 135, 139, 257, 261 Marxist 9–10, 27, 95, 100, 114, 128, 135, 165, 262, 265, 268–269, 288, 291, 294– 296, 313, 315, 318, 341–342, 348–349, 351–352 Mass culture 4, 137, 260 Ma Yuan 91–93, 96–97, 100–101 Middle-Aged Generation 14–15, 47, 59, 61, 65, 74, 83 Middle class 11, 14, 17, 19, 41, 88, 136, 139, 197–198, 201, 207, 213, 223, 227, 238–240, 254–255, 257, 315 Modernization 4, 95–96, 107, 278–280, 323, 331–332, 334, 337, 342, 349 Narrative gap 91 Narrative strategy 19, 140, 153, 232–233, 236, 241, 252 Narrative trap 88, 91, 101 Nationalism 6, 14, 20, 251, 255, 258, 261–263, 268, 282, 289, 306–307, 319, 325, 341, 349 Nation-state 102, 173, 251, 258, 261, 265, 282, 300–301, 305–306 Neoliberalism 270, 274, 278–279 New Historicism 14, 17, 103, 108, 114, 135, 138, 140, 165–166, 294, 343 New Left 7, 20, 258–259, 263, 267, 269–278, 280–282, 353 New Period 3–5, 35, 69, 279 Nihilism 18, 97, 104, 114–115, 167, 192, 213, 224, 315 Nye, Joseph 351 One Belt, One Road 1 Opium War 3 Oppositional culture 9 Orientalism 20, 99, 319–320, 324–328, 334, 336, 341–342, 344 Ostrovsky, Nikolai (How the Steel Was Tempered) 18, 185, 194

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376 Plebeian consciousness 27, 37, 41 Political economy 19, 129, 131, 133, 135, 140, 292, 313, 317, 336–338, 341 Political unconscious 11, 15, 90, 106, 135 Postcolonial 7, 20, 80, 261, 296–297, 316, 318, 320, 323, 326–327, 332, 336, 340–341, 343–344, 357 Postmodern 5–7, 10, 19–21, 87, 93, 101–102, 104, 109, 114, 120, 123, 126, 197, 213, 258–261, 288, 295, 299, 310, 318–320, 323, 326, 336, 342–343, 357 Postmodernity 6–7, 18, 90, 299, 341 Post-New Era 8 Post-revolutionary 6, 17–18, 27, 88, 96–97, 100, 105, 107, 114–115, 121–122, 126, 129, 134, 147, 156, 162, 167, 179, 181, 190, 192, 213 Postsocialism 7, 11, 14–15, 17–18, 21, 26–27, 41, 49, 55–58, 129, 133, 135, 137, 156, 167, 181, 192, 196, 251, 261, 346 Pragmatism 7, 19, 198, 223, 227, 265, 272 Principal contradiction 1, 351 Privatization 4, 6, 251, 257, 261, 271, 273–275, 278 Qingxin Lin 17, 127, 138, 145 Qin Hui 275 Realism 56, 76, 87, 102, 127, 142–144, 148, 158, 194, 196, 199 Rejuvenation 3, 20, 167, 343, 350, 354, 357 Residual culture 10–11, 14 Root-seeking literature 99 Secularization 11, 17, 97, 100, 105, 107, 259 Shanghai nostalgia 12 Shen Congwen 94 Sinologism 320–321, 324 Sixth-Generation 18, 171, 173, 184 Soft power 3, 344, 348–349, 351–354, 356 Statism 19, 258, 264–267, 281–282, 341 Structure of feeling 11, 14–15, 27, 32, 37, 48, 57, 68, 83, 214, 348 Subjectivity 5, 12, 17, 19–20, 56, 69, 90, 108–111, 113–114, 119–120, 124–125, 131, 134–135, 197–198, 227, 255, 287, 294–295, 297, 299–302, 304, 308, 310,

Index 318–319, 330–331, 335–336, 338–340, 343–344, 347, 355–356 Su Tong 126, 129, 131, 133–134 Teleology 6, 260 Tianxia 306, 354–355 Totality 13, 16, 19, 89, 93, 96–97, 100–101, 107, 144, 198, 227, 295–296, 300, 311 Truth content 3, 253 Unhappy consciousness 17, 113 United States of America 1, 199, 231, 248, 287, 290, 292, 303, 309, 314, 316, 347, 354 Wang Ban 51, 282, 354–355 Wang Guowei 52 Wang Hui 257, 261, 270, 280, 282, 353, 355 Weston, Timothy 8 White Deer Plain 17, 138–139, 148, 153, 159, 163–164, 166 Williams, Raymond 9–12 Culture and Society 10 Working class 12, 38, 41, 47, 251, 258, 263, 267, 315, 352 WTO 263 Wu Jinlian 275 Xi Jinping 1–2, 4, 287, 351, 356 Xu Jilin 277 Yang Xiaobin 15, 87, 92, 97, 102–103, 105, 108–110, 112, 115–116, 119, 122, 125 Yu Hua 115, 117–123, 125 Yuppie 213 Yu Qiuyu 27, 30 Zha Jiansheng (Haizi) 46 Zhang Chengzhi 94 Zhang Xudong 6, 15–16, 87–88, 90, 101–102, 105–106, 108–110, 112, 137, 183, 194, 280, 287, 300–301, 306 Zhang Yingjin 180, 184 Zhang Yiwu 5, 259 Zhang Yu 198 Zhou Ning 318–320, 324–327, 343, 351 Zhu Shoutong 59, 76, 83

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