Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa (China and Globalization 2.0) [1st ed. 2022] 9789811693953, 9789811693960, 9811693951

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CHINA AND GLOBALIZATION 2.0

Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa

Xiaoyun Li · Lixia Tang Jixia Lu · Xiuli Xu Yue Zhang · Gubo Qi Chuanhong Zhang

China and Globalization 2.0 Series Editor Bai Gao Department of Sociology Duke University Chapel Hill NC, USA

China is now at the forefront of globalization, particularly with the ­implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. What does a Chinese globalization look like, though? This series will explore the distinct legacies and evolutions of China’s worldview and how China’s development model inspires other countries and regions around the world. More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/15881

Xiaoyun Li • Lixia Tang Jixia Lu • Xiuli Xu • Yue Zhang Gubo Qi • Chuanhong Zhang

Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa

Xiaoyun Li College of International Development and Global Agriculture, China Agricultural University, Beijing, China Jixia Lu College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University, Beijing, China Yue Zhang College of Humanities and Development Studies and College of International Development and Global Agriculture China Agricultural University Beijing, China Chuanhong Zhang College of Humanities and Development Studies and College of International Development and Global Agriculture China Agricultural University Beijing, China Translated by  Xiaoling Yue Beijing, China

Lixia Tang College of Humanities and Development Studies China Agricultural University Beijing, China Xiuli Xu College of Humanities and Development Studies and College of International Development and Global Agriculture China Agricultural University Beijing, China Gubo Qi College of Humanities and Development Studies and College of International Development and Global Agriculture China Agricultural University Beijing, China

With Contrib. by  Yibing Sun Beijing, China

ISSN 2523-7209     ISSN 2523-7217 (electronic) China and Globalization 2.0 ISBN 978-981-16-9395-3    ISBN 978-981-16-9396-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

1 History of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa: Why and How  1 2 Agricultural Development through Science and Technology: The Extraterritorial Travel of Agricultural Technocratic Rationality 37 3 Closing-Gap Experience Sharing in Foreign Aid: A Learning Process Based on Construction and Embedding 67 4 Writing Prescriptions while Selling Medicine: Development of a Mechanism with Blurred Boundaries109 5 Institutional Learning: Innovation in Mutual Adaptation149 6 Inspiration and Aspiration: National Interest and Profit Motive183 7 Representing the Country: Assistance Provider and Boundary Construction215 References245

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About the Authors

Xiaoyun  Li Chair Professor and Honorary Dean of College of International Development and Global Agriculture, China Agricultural University. His expertise and research mainly focuses on international development, aid, agriculture and rural development, poverty reduction, gender and development, sustainable resource management. He is also Chair of the Network of Southern Think Tanks NeST), and Chair of China International Development Research Network. He received many awards and honors in development research and practice, including China’s National Poverty Reduction Pioneer in 2021, 2011. Lixia  Tang  Professor of the College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University. Tang has research interest in such fields as poverty, rural social policy, China’s foreign aid and African agricultural development. She has conducted field research in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Malawi and Tanzania among other countries. Tang has undertaken major and key projects of the National Social Science Fund of China (NSFC), and published dozens of papers in core academic journals in and beyond China in addition to many monographs and textbooks. Jixia Lu  Professor at College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University. Lu is visiting fellow of Institute for Development Studies (IDS) in University of Sussex, UK (2012–2013) and East Asia and Southeast Asia Research Center of Lund University, Sweden (2018). In recent years, her research fields focused on China and International Development, South-south migration (Chinese in Africa/ African in China), Chinese Experts in Foreign Aid. She has published over vii

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50 articles on international and national journals, including top ones like World Development, Foreign Affairs Review, etc. Xiuli Xu  Dean of the College of International Development and Global Agriculture (CIDGA) at China Agricultural University, Professor Xu has been a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge, IDS, UK, and the Mendel University in Brno in the Czech Republic. She has broad international collaboration with development partners such as the UNOSSC, UNDP and the World Bank. She is the initiator of the public knowledge platform: IDT (International Development Times) disseminating frontier debates about development studies in China and beyond. Yue Zhang  Assistant Professor at College of Humanities and Development Studies and College of International Development and Global Agriculture (CIDGA), China Agricultural University. Gubo  Qi Professor at the College of Humanities and Development Studies and the College of International Development and Global Agriculture, China Agricultural University. She has been a visiting scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the Mendel University in Brno in the Czech Republic. She has had long-term international collaboration with development partners such as IDRC, UNDP, IFAD, SDC, IIED. Chuanhong  Zhang  Associate professor of College of Humanities and Development Studies/ and Director of Center for International Development Aid Studies at College of International Development and Global Agriculture (CIDGA), China Agricultural University. Dr. Zhang also serves as the Secretary of China International Development Research Network (CIDRN). She was an academic visitor of the China Centre at University of Oxford (2011–2012) and a visiting scholar of the Department of Political Sciences at the University of California, Davis (2017–2018).

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 1.4 Table 2.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 7.1

FOCAC follow-up action plan—methods of agricultural aid 15 Agricultural demonstration centers in Africa 24 ATDCs’ crops, animal breeds and technical services 29 Services by Chinese experts dispatched under FAO framework 31 Basic information of the two ATDCs 50 Dual functions of the ATDC 127 A glimpse of the staff in a demonstration center 134 Plan for the dispatch of agrotechnology teams 2014–2018 230

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Introduction1

This book provides a summary of our study of Chinese aid to foreign countries over the past few years. One important reason we have chosen to conduct our field studies in Africa is that the continent has been a key recipient of Western aid and a region that faces huge colonial and postcolonial development challenges. Another reason is that Africa, a focal point for Chinese aid, is where a number of oppressed peoples have achieved national independence; it is also a key region for mutually beneficial cooperation and has been at the center of the debate on the so-called “neo-colonialism” in recent years. Focusing on a region like this helps us see different historical events as forming a continuum by placing them within either the colonial paradigm or the development framework. The former relies on such labels as “colonial”, “post-colonial” and “neo-colonial” while the latter treats history as an on-going process that moves from pre-development, development, post-development and then to the neo-­ development stage. We have chosen for our case study China-financed demonstration centers for agricultural technology in Africa primarily because agricultural technology has always been a priority for Chinese aid to the region. Furthermore, such words as “agriculture”, “technology”, “demonstration center” provide a clue to the exciting development story happening in China. This, together with the European solutions—from colonial farming in the early years to the assistance in the form of Green Revolution, agricultural

1

 Published in Beijing Cultural Review, 2017 (2).

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research and dissemination and integrated agricultural development—and African countries’ own strategies for food security, agricultural development and economic growth, provides three distinct perspectives for one to understand aid to the continent. We have chosen to title this book “China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa: An Example of New Models of Development” to illustrate new development models through the programs launched by the centers. Further, we regard “demonstration” a culture opposite to that of “intervention”. By providing an overview of China’s foreign aid over the years, this book will help readers better understand changes taking place in China and its unique path to modernity. We visited China’s agricultural technology demonstration centers (ATDCs) in the countries of T, E, Z and M, where we discussed China’s foreign aid with the Chinese aid workers and observed how they managed the centers. Our first-hand experience led to the finding that the practice at these ATDCs was quite different from the Western development assistance we know. The executive secretary of Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, responsible for the management of development assistance, also told us about the difference. According to him, the Western aid workers were more interested in helping them in designing development plans and policies, and often discussed with them how to convene coordination meetings among government departments whereas their Chinese counterparts rarely did this, and they were more like entrepreneurs, busy looking for market and partners and approaching government officials to address specific problems in various projects. Chinese aid workers in Africa seemed to prefer to stay with their own people while Westerners would like to spend more time with locals. Evidently African friends feel the difference in development aid between China and the West. While Western aid workers tend to see the Chinese aid workers as acting in a businesslike manner, they are the real assistance providers in the eyes of Chinese aid workers in Africa. In fact, even among the Western countries, the UK, the US and Germany for example, the way of foreign aid provision differs. Therefore, we need to refrain from rushing into any conclusion about what does the difference in foreign aid between China and the West denote exactly? But as DeHart noted, global development is no longer under the control of Western countries. China and India have totally different aid history and framework from the West. As China provides an increasing amount of aid for foreign countries in diversified ways, it is imperative for us to thoroughly explore this issue. First of all, China’s foreign aid has undergone a series of changes since the 1950s. The

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launch of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, in particular, marks the transformation of China’s development assistance from bilateral behavior to multilateral institutional arrangements. China is now experiencing a great change, from being dragged into the global development strategies to playing a more active role in the strategies. Secondly, such a shift represents not merely a change in the contest for greater say in international affairs, but also marks China’s economic integration into the world under the new development framework which is achieved through the Belt and Road Initiative. While we could not say these two multilateral mechanisms ensure China’s leading position in international development affairs, atleast China has made a serious attempt to better understand the West and the world and worked towards playing a leading role. If this new role is a repetition of the past dominant role of the capitalist countries, it would be unsustainable and unwelcome. As China is on the way to become a new leading country, it is imperative for Chinese social scientists to inform development policy making, and more importantly, they also shoulder the moral obligation to produce public knowledge for the world. This requires Chinese social scientists, who had long played second fiddle to the social science community in the West, to effect a changing role from the “objects” and “targets” to active researchers who seek to better understand China and the world. If a systematic, constructive and critical research is not yet possible, we should at least realize the importance of systematic data collection and our own experience, and of understanding and explaining what we did outside of China. Hoselitz published Non-economic Barriers to Economic Development in 1952, which clearly pointed out that the economic development and especially industrialization not only concern the change of production technology, but also the revolution of social structure and cultural values (Hoselitz 1952: 8–21). His view against economic determinism is not entirely unjustifiable, representing the then prevalent modernization theory that economic development must be based on the fundamental reform of the political, economic and social systems. In fact, this view has always been theoretically underpinning Western foreign aid. Surely China’s rapid transformation has also brought about great changes in political, economic and social systems, but Fukuyama’s question about whether China can sustain rapid development reveals the differences in development paths adopted by China and the West (Fukuyama 2014: 472). Liberal politicians seldom look at China and the West separately as they are more

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in favor of the view about the end of history whereas nationalists and politicians tend to emphasize the differences between China and the West. It is meaningful to interpret such differences from a depoliticized or cultural perspective. Actually, the crux about the dispute on the development paths of China and the West mainly lies in “the government with limited power as compared with the government with relatively great power”. The UK political tradition is shaped by the economic and political activities of the monarch under constraints and all natural people whose power seems unlimited while the Chinese historical political practice is totally different. Differing from the West in political practice, China enjoys economic prosperity comparable to that of the West, which is the exact basis for us to approach the differences between China and the West. Behind the Western countries’ interest in China’s foreign aid is the assumption that China’s development model is naturally reflected in China’s foreign aid. Because the Western development assistance embodies the Western political logic, and China’s assistance naturally reflects the political and social logic of China’s development. As implied by Difference and Indifference we published on IDS Bulletin, China’s foreign aid has always been an overseas extension of China’s domestic development mode (Li et al. 2013). In fact, many scholars at home and abroad have also noticed this, but none of them discusses the connotations of this logic. If, according to the hypothesis of many scholars, the presence of China in Africa is somehow fundamentally different from that of the West, it may be misleading to use the book title “An Example of New Models of Development”. Because, in the strict academic sense, although development means growth, progress, extension and expansion (Petit Robert 1987, quoted from Gilbert Risk 2010: 8), in development research, development refers to the process in which non-European countries and regions change according to the historical experience of Europe and the resulting social model. That is what we call the expansion of Euro-centrism. Even if there appear different modes of change, it is just pluralistic modernity. Therefore, if we make China’s demonstration centers in Africa show how development is achieved, it naturally means that China is showing how to develop by following the Western development model. Nevertheless, although a lot of Western scholars think that many of the things that China does now are not much different from those of the West in the 1950s–1960s (Bond and Garcia 2015), the similarity at the technological level does not mean that the political and social logic behind is the same. The difference is reflected to some extent in the above-mentioned African government

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official’s impression about the Chinese and Western aid. China’s development is to a large extent “new development” and China’s modernity differs from that of the West marked by Enlightenment. Although this point is not a consensus, it enjoys strong empirical support. In this logic, China’s agricultural demonstration centers in Africa demonstrate not only agricultural technology, but also a non-standard transformation experience. This point is borne out by the following chapters of this book. In the research, we find that the demonstration centers present a new subject-­object relationship and a way to build this relationship. In the demonstration centers, we see the interaction between Chinese experts and local farmers, and between local government officials and China’s domestic organizations is quite different from the way that Western aid experts establish social relations in Africa. Therefore, we entitle this book “An Example of New Models of Development”. There has always been controversy between classical development research and critical development research (Li et  al. 2014). The former emphasizes the process that the cultural model dominated by industrial capitalism gradually spreads from the West to the world; this cultural model champions the strength of human rationality, and advocates leveraging natural science to understand and transform the world and establishing a political and economic system fitting industrialization in developing countries (Preston 2010: 14). The reason why the West boasts a dynamic capitalist economy is that it has fostered a modern political system integrating a strong country, the rule of law and accountability (Fukuyama 2014: 472). The core of Western development assistance is to establish and practice such a political and economic system in developing countries while the theoretical framework of development assistance combining new liberalism and new institutionalism is a contemporary embodiment of this theory. This theoretical framework emphasizes that global poverty and violence are caused by the poor political governance system, and a strong system should be put in place to change this situation and serve the poor (Craig and Porter 2006: 4–5). Ever since the emergence of industrial capitalism, the world has gone through the initial stage of the industrial capitalist culture deepened in Europe and expanded beyond Europe, as well as the stage of global expansion of the culture as this cultural model gradually invades into non-European societies and causes large-scale changes in the local culture of non-European countries. It seems that amid today’s globalization, it is hard to say which corner of the world has not been impacted by industrial capitalism which has evolved

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into global capitalism, and such cultural expansion is consolidated through international development assistance. With frequent communication going on between different cultures and especially under today’s highly developed transportation and communication conditions, the material conditions and cultural lifestyles exert growing mutual influence. Ostensibly, the industrialized cultural form is ubiquitous in the world. But we should see that the point may not be whether there is the expansion of industrialized culture, but how to look at the reaction of non-European countries to the impact of industrialized culture. That is what we call “cultural encounter”. First of all, industrial capitalism, coupled with religions, has invaded into various places around the world and changed the local culture of those areas, such as Africa. Because the Western social sciences hold that society evolves from a low level to a high level, and the evolution is irreversible; and that the change from agricultural feudalism to industrial capitalism is inevitable. This is the historical logic of classical development theory, which well defends Western colonialism. In the nineteenth century, the West believed that colonialism was bringing barbarian society into civilized society, and this logic further safeguarded the legitimacy of the Western development assistance known as “modern colonialism”. Secondly, unlike Africa, the rest of the world saw industrial capitalism and its cultural forms have different destinies. China is a typical case. China has not been completely colonized like Africa (the culture of industrial capitalism has not completely changed China’s local culture), nor has it been able to completely avoid the impact of industrial capitalism. Therefore, there are two dimensions in the academic thinking about China’s changes. First, from the evolutionary perspective rooted in Euro-centrism, when capitalism is almost close to the peak of historical development, China is naturally placed at the bottom of historical development. Therefore, the only way for China’s economic development is to say goodbye to the past and learn from the West. This view is rooted in the Hegelian thought of evolutionary romanticism and the tradition of positivism (T. Brook and G. Blue 2005: 5). There is a thought implied here. Because the Chinese culture has not been completely changed by the West, the Western Social Sciences assume that the Western industrial capitalism and China are cultural entities opposite to each other. If China can transform on the track of Western industrial capitalism, it fully proves the universality of Western development path. On the contrary, if China cannot succeed under the condition of industrial capitalism, it will show the absoluteness of Western civilization again when China is relatively backward. The second

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dimension is based on the fact that China is an independent civilization. Although China’s continuous changes have been subject to the cultural impact of Western industrial capitalism, its cultural mode has been following its own logic. The theory of Euro-centrism sees the world in a vertical process of civilization evolution while the anti-evolutionist view holds that world has diversified civilizations which are parallel, with mutual influences upon each other. Industrial capitalism and global capitalism do affect the development course of Western civilization, but non-Western civilization has its own rationality. This dimension shows the particularity and independence of China’s development path. China’s presence abroad provides us with another field of research into China’s changes. Our research into China’s assistance to and investment in Africa, and China and global governance is intended to gain a clear understanding about the characteristics of China’s social changes based on China’s presence abroad. Here is an empirical presupposition: a dominant cultural model should be consistent at home and abroad. We find that Japan and ROK, and especially Japan, a westernized country, not only experienced deepening industrialization similar to that in Europe, but also continued the Western countries’ process of colonial invasion and expansion through industrial products. Although Japan has also created the experience of East Asia, its development model is not essentially different from that of the West, which is reflected not only in Japan’ domestic political practice, but also in Japan’s foreign aid. Japan’s foreign aid is quite westernized, but is very complicated in social and cultural fronts. Recently, Japan proposed to set up a $100 billion Asian infrastructure fund, aiming to “dominate” international affairs, but such dominance is not about money in the main. The case with ROK is similar. Japan and ROK, like the West, emphasize gender and development, and participatory development. Still, Japan and ROK on one side and China on the other share a lot in common in terms of foreign aid, such as emphasizing non-interference in internal affairs and economic cooperation, and being less altruistic. The scholars from Japan and ROK call such convergence the East Asian Development Cooperation Model (Shimomura and Ping 2015). Many Western scholars find that the West had been offering foreign aid since a time much earlier than that of Japan and China and the West had ever gone through the same stage as Japan and China (Shimomura and Ping 2015), but they still ignore some essential differences. A senior official of Japan International Cooperation Agency once said, Japan would like China to participate in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD; and Japan’s foreign aid is

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different from that of the West. In this organization, Japan is lonely as it has no common language with other members. After ROK’s accession to the OECD Development Assistance Committee, it faces the same situation as that of Japan. The inconsistency between “social cultural value” and “political cultural value” is the main reason why Japan cannot dominate the world in peacetime. Amid globalization, China’s internal changes have much in common with those of Europe in major aspects, such as industrialization, urbanization, the flow of farmers to industries and cities. However, these changes clearly show China’s particularity and independence. In terms of foreign aid, China and the West also have a lot in common. However, China’s “non-interference in internal affairs” is different from the Western way of establishing a system in line with industrial capitalism in developing countries through development assistance. As Premier Zhou Enlai said, our foreign aid is not only Marxist, but more importantly a part of our tradition (Wang 2010; Zhang 2013). Based on these issues, we hope to look into the significance of China’s changes through research into China’s foreign aid practice and see whether such changes are consistent in the internal deepening reform and external manifestation. Obviously, it is difficult to answer this question. Only through systematic field research can we get the answer. The Western modernization follows the logic of liberalism in both internal transformation and external expansion while China’s internal change and external presentation are not entirely in the logic of free market economy. Therefore, if a relatively independent civilization (obviously China’s civilization has been impacted, but has not been interrupted so far) shows the characteristics of industrialization and capitalization, but its own political, economic and social structure has not been completely transformed into the Western industrialized system, how should we look at such social transformation? Can we take the transformation as the ground for another type of “new development”? The Western Social Sciences sum up the modernization of different cultural forms as the so-called modernity of selection (Ziegmont Bauman 2002), as is the case of the World Bank which regards China’s transformation as the result of market reform. However, what does the transformation of China show? Is it a different case about development? The research in the dimension of foreign aid at least provides us a new approach to this issue. The above is our basic thinking in the process of studying China’s foreign aid. We believe that to understand the essence of Chinese social change, it is not enough to study the internal changes of Chinese society.

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In the process of rapid development and transformation, China’s existence has far exceeded its border, extending its presence around the world. Amid globalization, the encounter between China and the world is totally different from that between China and the West in the primary stage of industrial capitalism. What’s more, the encounter between China and Africa is different from that between the West and Africa. More importantly, the encounter between China and Africa today is different from that after the independence of African countries in the twentieth century. First of all, today’s multi-center global structure is different from the previous binary or unipolar world. The power relationship between development and underdevelopment is far more complicated than the global relationship before. The single center-margin relationship no longer exists. “The third world” concept in the postcolonial knowledge system is no longer convincing (Chatterjee 2011: 208–234). China and India, which used to be marginal countries, are rising and forming a new center-margin relationship with other developing countries to some extent. Secondly, emerging countries are still dependent on developed countries for capital and technology. The emerging countries have dual identities as center and margin between traditional underdeveloped countries and developed countries. Finally, unlike in the traditional historical economic pattern, the flow of capital and technology is no longer one-way as emerging countries make growing investment in developed countries. China’s investment in the 37 US states increased from $1 billion in 2008 to $5 billion in 2010 (Rosen and Hanemann 2012). Obviously, according to the Western and Non-­ western structuralism theory of traditional development research, we cannot accurately grasp the significance of the new encounter between China and Africa in the new era. The growth of China as a provider of development assistance challenges the Western post-colonial development theory based on the center-margin historical framework of colonialism. All of these provide us with a strong impetus to study China’s foreign aid. International studies on China’s foreign aid mainly focus on international relations and international political economy. The general view holds that China’s foreign aid in the initial stage is distinctively characterized with a lot of ideological output. After the start of reform and opening up, China’s foreign aid gradually becomes pragmatic and serves its own economic development. The limited field studies are mostly political narratives which respond to whether China practices “neocolonialism” from the perspective of international political economy, like the study by

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Bräutigam. The study by Buckley (2013) research is a rare field research from the perspective of developmental anthropology. She focuses on the life narrative of Chinese aid workers abroad and China’s agricultural governance in Africa. However, there are few foreign reports on the field research of China’s foreign aid system. Since 2013, we have been carrying out field research on China’s agricultural assistance demonstration centers and agricultural experts in the countries of T, E, Z and M. We avoid the role of “effect evaluators” and short-term interview-based research in those agricultural demonstration centers. We lived with them, observed their life and work and communicated with them, to see how they worked in Africa, and even offered them training and gave them ideas. At least we hoped to be a team with them at that time. As we are teachers of Agricultural University, we built rapport with them very soon. In this process we accumulated some ethnographic materials, and found it was appropriate to digest our field data from the perspective of anthropology and development. Anthropology originated in the Western colonial era. Ever since its budding, the European capitalist system has experienced changes in the two dimensions of horizontal expansion and vertical reinforcement over the past 400-plus years. The horizontal expansion of Western capitalism relies on a large number of individuals and groups acting as media, including businessmen, soldiers, missionaries and immigrants, who become agents of capitalism (Preston 2010: 132). They engaged in various activities in the non-Western world according to their own expectations and ideas, and developed a set of understandings and views about the non-­ Western world. Their understandings and views have gradually turned into institutions, conventions and even disciplines, as most notably represented by anthropology. The contribution of anthropology to development research can be summed up as the framework of “anthropology and development”. This framework holds a two-dimensional perspective. One is the critical perspective of deconstructionism, as typically represented by the deconstruction thought of Foucault in Escobar (1995), and the criticism of development under the framework of dualizing development knowledge into “world knowledge and local knowledge” (Hobart 1993). Deconstructionism uses Marxist structuralism and the postmodern analytical framework, and regards development as the hegemonic extension of capitalism and a process for the West to maintain its hegemony with knowledge and discourse. Leaving aside the critical development framework of duality, a group of European anthropologists including Long

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(2001), Bierschenk et al. (2002) and Mosse (2005), adopted a perspective that avoided political economy and structuralism and the external-­internal, global-local and other dual analytical frameworks often used in development research. Under the influence of the Manchester school of humanity, they brought the concepts of interactionism and actors into the study of development. They used the concepts of actors, knowledge, interfaces, agency, agents and translation to study the formation and dissemination of Western development knowledge, the operation and implementation process of development projects, and other development-related micro issues from a micro perspective, so as to present the micro practice of aid agencies and foreign aid experts abroad as well as the daily living scenes of these agencies and experts, and thus to obtain the real logic of development assistance operation in the daily life practice. The research from this perspective is a jumble. First of all, development projects concern cultural diversity, and people from different countries encounter each other in the same field; second, even if they come from the same culture, different actors meet in the same field; third, even if they are all local experts, they have different expertise which will interact in the same field. The anthropologists who focus on development take the development projects, development organizations and experts as research objects; take the policies, knowledge, management and technology as research contents, and in particular regard the policy makers, agents and target groups as a system. At the same time, we realize there are some problems in referring to this framework. First, the tradition of Manchester anthropology of interaction provides the framework of British special individualism, which is based on the relationship between the initiative of a highly free natural person and the structure. Long (2001) regards social construction as the result of interaction between individuals, believing that individual initiative can impact the so-called structure. Bierschenk applied Latour’s concept of translation to the framework of interactionism and developed the so-called “development agent” theory. They think that the foundation of “man and institution” is the initiative of a natural man and the technocratic structure of Weber doctrine. They regard development organizations as depoliticized technical institutions, assuming that they all have independent interests and pursuits as well as corresponding structural culture, which gives rise to their interaction with political and local mechanisms. The development experts in these institutions, as individuals, are motivated by their own initiative to translate policies in light of their own interests and experience, and ultimately change the policies, shaping the culture of the

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organizations. By referring to this framework, we observe the Chinese agricultural demonstration centers in Africa. Although we can go beyond the framework of realism, observe more of the interaction between “people and institutions” and see the integration of the state and institutions, politics and technology, and actors, we also realize the quite different social and political characteristics of China and the UK. China’s foreign aid personnel and organizations are not natural persons independent of politics or independent institutions, but are embedded in the Chinese government and society. The motivation behind their behavior is complex and comprehensive, leading to unique interfaces and interaction. All these will be elaborated in this book. Chapter 1 provides an overview of China’s agricultural assistance to African countries over the years, which shows how China’s assistance to the continent mirrored China’s development practices during the same period. From the end of the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, China was eager to phase in agricultural cooperatives and large-scale farming and accelerate industrialization through the transformation of traditional agriculture. Developing state-owned farms was an important measure taken to develop agriculture outside farming zones. In the 1960s and 1970s, agricultural cooperatives and state-owned farms became the main forms of China’s agricultural aid to Africa. In the late 1970s, the institutional barriers brought by the large number of agricultural cooperatives and collectives led to China’s agricultural predicament. The household contract responsibility system aimed at mobilizing the enthusiasm of individuals became a new choice for China’s agriculture. In 1985, China sent agricultural experts to help transform the three rice cultivation areas that had been built in Burkina Faso with China’s aid. Drawing on the experience in China, these cultivation areas decided that while the farmland was still owned by the state, it was distributed among farmers who would operate it and keep the harvest for themselves. This associated the farmers’ income with their activities on farmland. In the 1990s, thanks to China’s ongoing economic restructuring, the market, rather than the government, gradually played a fundamental role in resource allocation. The market-oriented reform included transforming state-owned enterprises to separate government functions from enterprise management. Apart from that, China actively absorbed foreign direct investments in the forms of wholly foreign-­ owned enterprises, equity joint ventures and contractual joint ventures, and foreign investment became the main driving force of China’s

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economic growth. China’s experience about joint ventures and the agricultural technology extension system have been applied to China’s agricultural assistance projects in Africa. As we moved into the twenty-first century, technology began to feature prominently in China’s agricultural aid to Africa, and agricultural demonstration centers and technical training have become the main forms of such aid programs. Chapter 2 identifies technological rationality as the core pillar for China’s agricultural development, and analyzes its three characteristics. Specifically, we rely on modern science and technology, put productivity gains in the first place, attach importance to the leading role of the state, and use the means of commercialization against the background of market-­ oriented reform, so as to improve the sustainability of development. It is believed that technological rationality being gradually made a part of China’s aid program in Africa in the past 50 years reflects the Chinese people’s understanding of the African agricultural development traps and opportunities. The emergence of ATDC indicates, in a more sophisticated way, the spread of technological rationality from China to Africa. The ATDCs themselves are a product of innovation and practical consideration based on the established practice. This chapter reviews the background against which the ATDCs have emerged, depicts in detail what the demonstration centers in the two countries of T and E have encountered in the transfer of knowledge, and analyzes how Chinese and African entities understand the three sets of concepts differently, namely, “agriculture and science and technology”, “demonstration and extension” and “assistance and development” and how such understanding shapes China’s foreign aid practice. This reveals several internal relations with regard to ATDCs, the innovative form of China-Africa agricultural cooperation that has attracted much attention in the new era: First, the disconnection between the overall design of aid policy and the daily practice; second, the interaction between knowledge and politics; third, the possibilities for the demonstration centers to provide alternative development assistance. Whether in form or in the values they uphold, China’s foreign aid practice epitomized by the demonstration centers differs from the existing international development practice dominated by the West. These differences manifest the “non-interference” principle of China’s foreign aid programs. In other words, these programs share development experiences with others on an equal footing and in a non-constructivist manner. Behind this processes open public learning space and many possible forms of development cooperation between various stakeholders. The formation of such a new field

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heralds the start of a new process of development knowledge generation which is different from the traditional international development knowledge framework. Chapter 3 shows how China’s development experience flows to Africa in a parallel framework. Western aid programs tend to bring the Western culture to the recipient countries, as strings attached to the programs, as implementation principles, or in the name of knowledge development. They are thus regarded as one of the important ways to expand Western culture. For example, the US agricultural assistance program implemented in the same small African village as a Chinese agricultural assistance program directly imposes cultural factors on the assisted farmers. The American program stipulates that a certain number of farmers shall be selected as aid recipients from among all the villagers in the principle that an equal number of men and women will be selected and all villagers will join in the voting. This way of cultural expansion is also imposed on the recipient country. China’s aid differs from Western aid as its cultural influence takes a non-­ compulsory form of experience embedding. The experience attending China’s aid is embedded in the system and knowledge of China, with no mandatory requirement for the recipient country. Of course, in practice, in the interaction between Chinese experts and the personnel of recipient countries, the experience from different cultures and objective environments will inevitably collide and blend. China’s aid practice is a process of cross-border reproduction and localization of China’s development experience. In view of their own political and economic interests, relevant entities of China and recipient countries jointly shape the reproduction and localization of China’s development experience through interaction. In the process of China’s development experience entering the recipient countries, it is impossible to maintain the original cultural form in entirety. China’s development experience has been constantly modified by local culture and knowledge, and finally exists in the recipient country in the form of transformed variants. The agricultural technology project conducted with China’s aid is an aid land, which is a product under specific historical conditions, a carrier of culture and a space of practice. In this aid land, historical conditions, culture and practice converge. The implementation of aid projects is a dynamic process. Many actors (institutions) from China and recipient countries operate various economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital in this aid land and use various strategies to interact for their own interests.

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Chapter 4 shows the operation of China’s agricultural demonstration centers in Africa. These centers are a perfect example of clarity and fuzziness that paradoxically define the boundary of any organization. Internationally, the framework of “actor” and “broker” is often used to discuss the behavior and function of international development assistance agencies. The framework of actor analysis emphasizes how actors use “agency” to facilitate the negotiation among such interfaces as social life, knowledge and power, and stresses the interaction of different actors at the micro level. The agent analysis framework focuses more on how the development intervention institution connects providers and beneficiaries of aid through the “broker” and “translation”. This framework is based on the clarity of the boundaries of various actors. The management structure comprising the Ministry of Commerce of China, relevant government departments of recipient countries and Chinese domestic companies formed under the framework of China’s ATDC in Africa has actually made the demonstration center no longer a pure actor or agent due to the fuzzy boundaries in identity and function. In other words, the demonstration center both provides and receives aid; and it is a public service department and an enterprise at the same time. Judging by the operation of the demonstration center, although the intervention management of the three parties often makes it difficult for the demonstration center to “choose”, the confrontation among the three parties makes it difficult for the action of the demonstration center to deviate from the interests of these parties. Almost all the actions of the demonstration center are carried out around the objectives of the three parties. The fuzzy boundary of the demonstration center is the product of careful coordination and negotiation among the Chinese government, the recipient government and the construction company in safeguarding their own core interests, and it is a strategic arrangement of social interaction construction. This is quite different from the deviation, compromise and agency seen in international development assistance when the identity and function are clearly defined. We deem these as what characterize neo-developmentalism. Chapter 5 talks about the logic of cooperation after two cultures encounter. It analyzes the work implementation process of the demonstration center from the organizational and institutional perspectives, in order to explore the essential characteristics of China-Africa agricultural cooperation. Some researchers have analyzed the real China-Africa agricultural cooperation in specific operation; they not only consider whether certain projects or policies have succeeded, but more importantly follow the

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implementation process. China’s aid typically tends to avoid standard solutions, and often needs to respond to the specific requirements of the partner countries by showing its own development experience instead of building a systematic political or economic model (Nordtveit 2009). The process of agricultural cooperation between China and Africa does not necessarily follow the OECD-DAC norms for development assistance to developing countries (Li et al. 2014). As Durkheim (1901/1950) mentioned, the operation of the demonstration center is based on the systems of knowledge, belief and “collective emotion and collective concepts”. These systems are the common product of human interaction, but they are shaped by individuals in an objective and “forced” way. In the fifth chapter, the case study reveals the organizations and regulations for promoting the transferred Chinese agricultural technology in the operation of the ATDCs in Africa, as well as the innovation on the foreign land through the Chinese way of adaptation. Chapter 6 examines the incentives for aid project operators. In order to motivate the operators, China allocates the aid funds to the operation organizations (enterprises or scientific research institutes) which decide how to use the funds and select the personnel to implement the projects. It means the project implementation agencies and individuals can give play to their initiative. In the process of project implementation, the state, operation units and individuals compete for economic interests. The result is that the state’s will is the most obvious in the form and demonstration of the project. The nature of the operation unit determines the daily operation mode of the project. If the project operator is an enterprise, the operation goal is naturally to minimize the operation cost, increase the project income, and encourage project workers to generate income and improve the earnings. Under the dual incentive model concerning both national mission and economic interests, the demonstration center has established a micro relationship of mutual dependence and mutual benefit with the recipient country. Despite the conflict and mistrust between the staff from both sides, all the problems will be resolved through compromise and concession of the Chinese side under the mutually beneficial relationship, so that the demonstration and exchange function of the demonstration center can be sustained. The demonstration prompts Africans to reflect on their own development. The pursuit of sustainable development also motivates the demonstration center to undertake what it is tasked with—encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest in African

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agriculture and conduct extensive technological training and demonstration. As thus, African governments and people are encouraged to draw on the Chinese experience and explore their own path of agricultural development. Chapter 7 focuses on Chinese aid providers. Aid experts from Western countries have been educated in their global mission of bringing the “progressive” thought in the Western culture to the recipient countries, like what early missionaries had done in Africa. However, that is not in the minds of Chinese experts who have come to the continent with a mixed feeling of worry, expectation and excitement. Some of them had only begun to learn about Africa before they set out for the continent. They do not have the sense of superiority that is often found in their Western counterparts. Instead, they regard Africans as “fellows” as they tend to see a cultural similarity between China and African countries, and very often, this mentality shaped their actions, roles and identities in the aid programs. China’s agricultural technology experts differ from independent Western development experts who are paid to work in Africa and the traditional missionaries who are there to disseminate the Western culture. They are ordinary individuals and social actors who, apart from a financial motivation, are attracted to the continent because of a sense of mission and responsibility to share the Chinese dream. Each of them is a part of the country and a friendly messenger between China and Africa. When conflicting with the interests of the country, their personal interests will be subordinate to the mission of the country. However, due to the lack of clarity in the assistance and business functions of the demonstration center, the identity of the experts in the demonstration center is ambiguously defined as well. In this book, China’s agricultural demonstration center in Africa is regarded as an “aid land” where Chinese, African and Western cultures encounter, a “system” with relatively independent interests under the constraints of various interest objectives of the Chinese government, African government, aid implementation agencies and individuals. In this system, political strategies, knowledge and technologies are shared and disseminated, which gives rise to special political, social, cultural symbols and discourse. Through an analysis of the symbols and discourse, this book tries to shed light on how the new model of development flows from China to Africa, so as to construct a new narrative about the relationship between subject and object. This narrative is not about geopolitics, but

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based on the micro presentation of the field study and our academic understanding of the new trend of globalization. Though this understanding is to be improved and we have yet to build a legitimate academic foundation between “justice” and “mind”, “rationality” and “irrationality”, we hope this book marks a useful attempt to launch this seemingly ambitious process. Beijing, China

Xiaoyun Li

References Bert F.  Hoselitz, 1952, Non-economic Barriers to Economic Development, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1 (1), pp. 8–21. Francis Fukuyama. 2014. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (trans: Mao Junjie). Guangxi Normal University Press Group. X. Li, L. Tang, X. Xu et al., 2013, What Can Africa Learn from China’s Experience in Agricultural Development? IDS Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 31–41. Risk, Gilbert, 2010, The History of Development from Western Origins to Global Faith, Zed Books, London & New York. P. Bond, A. Garcia, 2015, BR1CS: An Anti-capitalist Critique, London: Pluto. X. Li, D. Banik, L. Tang, J. Wu, 2014, Difference or Indifference: China’s Development Assistance Unpacked, IDS Bulletin, Volume 45, pp. 22–35. Peter Wallace Preston. 2010. Development Theory: An Introduction (trans: Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, and Xu Xiuli). Social Sciences Academic Press. Craig, David, Doug Porter, 2006, Development Beyond Neoliberalism: Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy, London and New York: Routledge. Timothy Brook, Gregory Blue (eds). 2005. China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies of Sinological Knowledge. New Star Press. Y. Shimomura, Wang Ping, 2015, Chains of Knowledge Creation and Emerging Donors, JICA—RI Working Paper, No. 88, Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute. M. Wang, 2007, The West as the Other: A Genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism. World Publishing Cooperation. H. Zhang, 2013, Development-oriented Assistance—Study on the Model of China’s Aid to Africa. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Zygmunt Bauman. 2002. Liquid Modernity (trans: Ouyang Jinggen), Shanghai Joint Publishing Press. P.  Chatterjee, 2011, Democracy and Economic Transformation, Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial Democracy, New  York: Columbia University Press.

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D. H. Rosen, T. Hanemann, 2012, The Rise in Chinese Overseas Investment and What It Means for American Rusinesses, China Business Review, July 1. L. Buckley, 2013, Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal, Development and Change, 44 (2), pp. 429–450. Escobar, 1995, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hobart, Mark, 1993, Introduction: The Growth of Ignorance?, M. Hobart (ed.), Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance, London: Routledge. N. Long, 2001, Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives, London: Routledge. T. Bierschenk, J. P. Chauveau, J. P. Oliver de Sardan, 2002, Local Development Brokers in Africa: The Rise of a New Social Category, Working Paper, No. 13, Department of Anthropology and African Studies, Mainz, Germany: Johannes Gutenberg University. David Mosse, 2005, Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice, London and Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press, p. 17. H. Nordtveit, 2009, Bjorn Harald Western and Chinese Development Discourses: Education, Growth and Sustainability, International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 29, pp. 157–165. Emile Durkheim, 1950, The Rules of Sociological Method, Glencoe, IL: Free Press (Original Work Published 1901).

CHAPTER 1

History of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa: Why and How

The demonstration centers exemplify the progress the agricultural sector has made in implementing the Going Global policy. They raised the recipient countries’ ability for self-development, and shared our experience and technological know-how accumulated over thirty years of Reform and Opening Up. They play a positive role in capacity building in Africa. —Excerpted from the speech of a Department of Commerce official during a 2012 symposium on sustainable development of agricultural demonstration centers in Africa

1.1   Background: Viewing New Sino-African Encounters from Different Angles Agricultural cooperation between China and Africa started toward the end of the 1950s. Ever since 1959 when China provided Guinea with 10,000 tons of free food aid (Zhang 2013), Africa has remained a major

This study has received support from Beijing Youthful Talent Project, the DFID-financed CIDRN Research Program, and the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) project © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0_1

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destination of China’s foreign aid. Between the 1960s and the early 1980s, China built testing stations, agricultural extension stations, farms (Wang 2008) in most of the African nations and completed 87 agricultural projects and 16 water conservancy projects (Tang 2013) which accounted for half of China’s overseas agricultural-aid projects (Cai 1992). Even in the 1980s and 1990s when its overseas aid was drastically reduced, China continued to make new loans or forgive existing loans to many African nations, and increased the number of high-level visits to the continent (Li 2010). Its activities in Africa during this period, however, did not arouse much attention from the international community. Some scholars believed that China was a middling country without too much political influence to speak of (Li 2014). Bräutigam (2009) believed that China had paved the road for its current involvement in Africa, but nobody really cared. This situation, however, has changed since 2000. With the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the rapidly surging trade and China’s ever growing investment in and agricultural aid to the continent, the surprised international community began to pay more attention to the closer cooperation between them (Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Buckley 2013a; Li 2014). This heightened attention came in part from the global political and economic structure and the evolving Chinese role in global governance, as China has transformed from the biggest recipient nation into the most important new donor nation. It also came from the global, especially African, interest in China’s development practices which focus on poverty reduction and economic growth, in particular the pro-poor economic growth as a result of its agricultural development priority strategy (Ravallion 2009). In short, the international community has fashioned three angles from which to view China’s role in African agricultural development: as a new colonizer, an economic competitor, and a developmental partner (Alden 2007; Buckley 2013a; Scoones et al. 2013). The first two views see China as a potential threat to African development, arguing many Chinese efforts are due to the need for resources to fuel China’s own development and the pressure to ensure food security within China (Buckley 2013a; Alden 2013) while the third sees the Chinese experience as a model for African transformation under the framework of South-­ South cooperation. Moreover, some scholars believe that China’s increasing interest in African agriculture comes from China’s awareness of its role in international development; it signifies a desire on China’s part to participate in global food management through trade, investment, and

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foreign aid as a way of harmonizing domestic food needs with international responsibility (Morton 2012). Even though these studies draw vastly different conclusions regarding the intention and influence of Chinese actions in Africa, they all agree that China is a new and rising power in Africa (Scoones et al. 2013) and their common focus is on China’s intention and influence in Africa. The success of China’s economic development and social transformation has turned the focus of public opinion from an emphasis on China’s intentions to a discussion of China as a role model for other developing countries. In 2004, the famous British think tank Foreign Policy Centre published an article entitled “The Beijing Consensus” which declared that China had forged a development model of its own which was suitable for other developing countries in search of economic growth and better lives. Later, many international media organizations and economists have published articles claiming that “China’s rise has provided a strong alternative to the Western development model,” “Other countries can share in the success of Chinese economic development,” “China has created a vivid example and provided a practical and modern model for other development countries,” (Qin 2008) and “The Chinese model has important implications for other developing countries.” (Zheng 2009) Against this background, the president of the World Bank exhorted the world to learn from China’s experience in a conference on global poverty alleviation in Shanghai in May, 2004. During the World Economic Forum on Africa in 2006, the president of African Development Bank indicated that Africa could learn from China’s experience (Qin 2008). African nations began to focus their attention on China and promoted a strategy of looking eastward. Zimbabwe and Kenya announced its plan to learn from China in 2005 and 2007, believing that China’s experience is more useful for them and that they must learn the Chinese developmental model (Zhang and Yang 2008). The former president of Tanzania Mr. Kikwete said that “China’s successful development model today is the template for African prosperity in the future” (Guo 2010). Under the framework of SouthSouth cooperation, Africa could learn from China in areas such as agricultural reform, port management, exchange rate management, foreign investment, food security, and conflict management (Ali Zafar 2010). Africa can learn from China because both are part of the third world and on the path of development (Chen 2014). China and Africa face the same political, economic, technological, security, and social challenges, but China has overcome most of them and become a world power

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(Long 2013). African nations have been fervently learning and partaking in the Chinese developmental experience; some of them have started to implement the Chinese model. South African scholar Martin Davis (2005, cited in Guo 2010) indicated that “Special industrial zones are testing zones; let a few of the Chinese property investors move in and these zones will be like what happened in China in the 1980s. Using special economic zones to attract foreign investment has been a success in China and I feel that the same strategy has been implemented in Africa.” The 24 special economic zones of Nigeria have become bellwethers of national economic development whereas Mauritius and China have jointly created the first Chinese overseas special economic zone. At the same time, China has adjusted its external strategy to place more emphasis on the sharing and promotion of the Chinese experience. In the past ten years, China has focused on raising its soft power and gaining more say in global governance; it has supported and initiated high-­level developmental dialog and training activities which have gained the support of many developing countries. These activities have no doubt raised the global influence of China’s developmental experience (Li 2014). For all these reasons, some scholars have begun to study the relationship between China’s foreign aid and its internal development. For example, Tang (2013) believes that the marketization of China’s agricultural aid to Africa stems from China’s own experience and corresponds to China’s market reform. When China had a planned economy, its foreign aid was ideologically driven without regard to cost; when the Household Contract Responsibility System was instituted across China, China-aided agricultural development efforts in Africa also adopted a similar model in which the peasants were encouraged to grow and sell the crops themselves. As agriculture in China was emphasizing capital operations and industrialization, its foreign aid programs changed accordingly. Large enterprises operated agricultural projects in Africa on the basis of concessional loans and they would offer technical training and other activities as part of their business projects. The emphasis on market economy in these aid programs is precisely for the purpose of duplicating the Chinese experience in the recipient countries. Wang Shengwen (2012) believes that infrastructure building is a necessary ingredient in China’s successful economic development, and China has increased its support for infrastructure building in Africa for this reason. Zhou Hong (2010) has shown that at the beginning Chinese aid was concentrated in construction projects in which China had some natural

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advantage, and that now China has switched to building infrastructure as well as centers for education and training. This switch came about because China has discovered from its own development that educational investment is useful and necessary for development, and China has thus injected more education, training, and technology transfer in its foreign aid. Demonstrating and sharing the Chinese experience has become the driving force for China’s African aid; Chinese aid invites the recipient countries to have a glimpse of modern production and living conditions and facilitates social transformation (Tang 2013). The increased agricultural aid, trade, and investment help spread the Chinese development experience in Africa (Fan Shenggen 2010).

1.2   China in Africa: Discourses in Agriculture and Technology 1.2.1  African Development: Deficiencies in Agriculture According to studies in the field of agricultural archeology, 250 of the 600 major crops of the world originated in Africa, including cereals, tubers, legumes, oils, beverage ingredients, fibers, and melons (Li 1991). Primitive farming appeared in central Saharan plateaus around 7000 BC (Lu 2000). Sorghum and millets have been, and still are, the most important crops in the history of African agriculture. In 2007, the harvest areas of African sorghum and millets are 29.5 and 21.33 million hectares respectively, representing 29.43 percent of total harvest area and 48.04 percent of cereals harvest area. In China, the harvest areas of rice and wheat are 29.18 and 23.72  million hectares respectively, representing 31.88  percent of total harvest area and 61.47 percent of cereals harvest area (Li et al. 2010). But the onslaught of Western imperialism in the fifteenth century cut short the development of African agriculture. “Western imperialists carved up Africa and destroyed African agriculture.” (Stavrianos 2006) They implemented monoculture, replacing traditional crops with cash crops and causing African agriculture to develop abnormally: cotton in the Nile Valley of Egypt and Sudan; cocoa, palm, coffee, and rubber on the western coast and peanut and cotton inland; clove and hemp on the eastern coast and nearby islands and tea, cotton, and coffee inland; tobacco and sugar cane in the southern part of the continent. Single crops took up large areas and grew rapidly, making Africa an important region for the production and

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export of cash crops. In the 1950s, African cotton represented 12 percent of the global market, palm 80 percent, cocoa 75 percent, peanut 30 percent, tea between 40 percent and 50 percent, and hemp 65 percent. In contrast, African food crops had a much lower market share in the same period: wheat was less than 4 percent of the global market, and maize less than 7 percent. (Li et al. 2010) As African nations gained independence, they refocused their development on agriculture. Some of them, such as Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, Guinea, Botswana, Mozambique, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Benin, Togo, and Ethiopia strongly promoted agricultural cooperatives, of which Tanzania’s Ujamaa project is the most representative. The governments used cooperatives to raise agricultural investment and modified production methods; they also implemented a series of proactive measures such as providing free or lowcost seeds and fertilizers to improve land usage, create new farmland, and develop irrigation. From 1962 to 1977, arable land went from 154 to 210  million hectares and areas under irrigation went from 7.38 to 9.32  million hectares. The implementation of a series of measures increased annual agricultural output by 2.7  percent in the 1960s while food crops increased from 50.47 million tons in the 1960s to 70.83 million  tons in the 1980s, significantly elevating food self-sufficiency. According to FAO’s data, Africa was 96  percent self-sufficient in food between 1962 and 1964 and 83 percent between 1972 and 1974. But the continent was hit hard by drought in the 1970s and the growth rate of agriculture dropped to 1.3 percent between 1970 and 1977, not even half of the 2.8  percent growth rate of developing countries of the world (Zhuang 1982). In 1980, the Lagos Plan of Action put self-sufficiency in food as the number one priority for the first time. The aim of this plan was to drastically lower food import while promoting local food production and consumption, putting the emphasis on investing in the food processing industry and finding markets for industrial products. Its goal was to reach self-sufficiency in cereal, animal, and fish products between 1980 and 1985. But the World Bank’s Berg Report of 1981 stated that export crops ought to be the priority and that the African strategy for development should be export-oriented. African Priority Program for Economic Recovery 1986–1990, published by the Organization of African Unity in 1985, suggested that between 20 percent and 25 percent of government budget be earmarked for agriculture and that reform be implemented

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through changes in agricultural production structure as well as in foreign exchange, price, and trade policies. This program was not executed efficaciously and led to a drop in food self-sufficiency, which was down to between 60 percent and 70 percent in the 1980s and around 50 percent in the 1990s. On the other hand, food import began to rise to about 8.4 percent annually. In the 1980s, 20.4 million tons of food was imported annually, costing 5 billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves. The volume of food import oscillated between the 1980s and the 1990s, but the reliance on import remained consistent. Except for the production of maize, which was able to satisfy regional need and whose import was kept within 5 percent of total consumption, 45 percent of wheat and 80 percent of rice had to be imported. Data shows that of the 53 African nations, 21 need food assistance (Li and Shi 2008). The lack of investment is a main reason why African agriculture was slow to develop. Between 1967 and 1973, agricultural investment of many African countries represented 5 percent or 6 percent of national budget (Lu 2000) and the figure was 4 percent in 2004 (the World Bank 2008). Even though some countries have begun to realize the importance of agricultural investment in recent years, their efforts have not been effective. African Union member states adopted the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in 2003, committing 10 percent of national budget to agricultural and rural development within five years; only 20 percent of the member states have done so. Currently, sub-Sahara African countries’ low levels of public investment in agriculture can hardly ensure the sector’s sustainable growth (the World Bank 2008). The continent’s long-term problem of underdeveloped agriculture has prompted the international concern and agricultural development has thus become the major area of international developmental aid. The earliest agricultural aid to Africa can be traced to the colonial era. A committee led by Lloyd Harley had suggested that technology had to be used to make African soil fertile. But it was in the 1970s that agricultural aid was truly delivered to Africa. Due to the success of Asia’s “green revolution”, it was hoped that this agricultural success could be duplicated in Africa. Agricultural aid to Africa began to emphasize households’ food security, health, and education and supported smallholder farmers through comprehensive projects in agricultural development. But the implementation of structural adjustments of the 1980s changed the focus of international aid to economic liberalization and good governance, resulting in reduced importance of agriculture and a decline in agricultural aid. In the 1990s,

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agricultural aid represented only 10 percent of total aid. As food security became more problematic and hunger became more serious in recent years, the international community began to redirect its focus on agricultural development in Africa. The World Bank provided 2.8 billion dollars for agricultural aid between 1991 and 2006, representing 8 percent of its total aid to Africa; of its 77 developmental loans, 18 were tied to agriculture. It adopted the Africa Action Plan in 2005 and recognized the importance of agriculture in African growth. These efforts have seen good results. The international community’s agricultural aid to Africa has been kept at 2 billion dollars per year; this figure rose to 2.8 billion dollars in 2007 (UK Food Group 2008). 1.2.2  Chinese Experience in Development: Foundation Building and the Crucial Role of Technology In the twenty-first century, the pro-poor development strategy that gives priority to agricultural development has made China the second biggest economy in the world and the country which has lifted the most people out of poverty; this is in direct contrast to Africa. Though the measures China is adopting such as biotechnology, massive subsidy, and automation are not directly applicable to Africa given its current condition of development, this difference in development and the fact that China once faced the same situation attract the African nations to the Chinese experience. China, moreover, is proud of its past fourty years of development and confident that its experience can be shared. Accordingly, Hu Jintao declared at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, “Each of us respects the other’s chosen path of development and wishes to learn the other’s experience.” When researchers of the World Bank and elsewhere discuss China’s developmental experience, they never fail to mention China’s agricultural development. Policy and technology are at the core of China’s agricultural growth, and technology, in particular, is the driving force behind it. As Stavrianos (2006) aptly said, “Four thousand years ago, at the eastern end of the Eurasian continent, the Chinese people created a unique and self-governing society; this society was based on agriculture, not on commerce, and ruled by landowners and bureaucrats, not merchants and politicians.” Chinese rulers have always favored agriculture at the expense of commerce and agriculture has always been at the core of China’s development. China began to grow rice around 7000 BC during the time of

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the Hemudu Culture; it was the first to do so in the world. It began to grow wheat and millet around 5000  BC.  China was unified in 221 BC. There were dynastic changes but the agrarian culture continued to develop in spite of them. During the healing period at the beginning of a new dynasty, there was always a policy encouraging farming, and Chinese agriculture was able to benefit from this historical continuity. The farming methods and tools, developed over a long period of time, are still in use today; they are still a model for the contemporary farmers (Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, and Tang Lixia 2010). Agriculture continued to be the core of development after the establishment of the People’s Republic. The change in agricultural production and management based on the first land reform was one of the three big socialist transformations. The government subsequently placed agriculture at the core of a series of national development master plans. It was clearly stated in the National Agricultural Development Program 1956–1967, a document published in 1957, “…quickly raise agricultural productivity in order to strengthen industrialization under socialism and lift the living standard of peasants and all Chinese people.” The Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee in September 1962 adopted the general principle of “agriculture-based and industry-dominated” economic development, reaffirming the importance of agriculture. In 1965, the Third Five-Year National Economic Development Plan stated that “We must strive to develop agriculture because it is our foundation” and stipulated that the government’s mission was to “develop agriculture and satisfy people’s basic needs.” The Fourth Five-Year National Economic Development Plan in 1970 emphasized once again the foundational role of agriculture and the importance of quickened pace of agricultural automation. The primacy of agriculture in the economy was unshakable. In 1978, the second land reform based on the household contract responsibility system was the starting point of another round of economic reform. The government released five “No. 1 Documents” which all dealt with agricultural development. The No. 1 Document of 1982 defined as part of the socialist economy the practice of contracting work to households and fixing farm output quota by household which were later widely adopted in China. The document of 1983 abolished people’s communes; the Document of 1984 emphasized the production of commodities in the countryside; the Document of 1985 abolished monopolized and assigned purchase systems of agricultural products; and the Document of 1986 reconfirmed the direction of agricultural reform. A rural economic system

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was firmly established and agricultural development was ensured through institutional arrangements. Even though the share of agriculture in the Chinese economy has dropped since 2000, its fundamental status has never wavered. Between 2004 and 2014, eleven No. 1Documents were published to solve the problems of agricultural development. The document of 2004 adopted measures such as “Three Subsidies” to raise the income of peasants, and that of 2005 was developed to raise the integrated agricultural productivity. The documents of 2006, 2007 and 2008 were about rural development, modernized agriculture and agricultural infrastructure respectively. The document of 2009 emphasized higher peasant income and national food security and promulgated measures ensuring food stability, higher income, infrastructure, and food supply; those of 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 dealt with balanced urban-rural growth, irrigation, agricultural technology and modernizing agriculture; and that of 2014 reemphasized systemic reform and placed food security as the priority in agricultural development. In sum, China adopted different strategies at different historical junctures in agricultural development, from collectivization and the cooperatives to household-based agricultural activities, marketization, and financial support from the central government. But the fundamental role of agriculture has never changed and agriculture has always been the core of national development. The various reforms were the driving force of agriculture development. The first land reform raised agricultural productivity to a large extent; compared with 1949, food production rose 17 percent in 1950, 28  percent in 1951, and 45  percent in 1952, representing an annual growth of about 15 percent on average. The second land reform and associated measures raised agricultural production by 35.4 percent, or about 7.9  percent per year. Investment has continued to rise in recent years, keeping agricultural growth at about 14  percent per year (Zhang 2009). The Chinese government supports the development and extension of agricultural technology; new technology and new crop varieties are the main reasons for agricultural development (Ali Zafar 2010). Chinese research has shown that technology is conducive to growth; better varieties can boost production by 8 to 12 percent, better fertilizers 16 percent, better cultivating methods 4 to 8 percent, and better pest control can erase 10 to 20  percent of loss (Li 1989). Hu Kai’s research (2013) has found that technological advances have contributed 51.9  percent in agricultural development between 1978 and

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2010. Between the Sixth and the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Periods, technology contributed 34.84 percent, 27.66 percent, 34.28 percent, 45.16 percent, 48 percent, and 53 percent respectively in agricultural development (Lu and Yu 2013). The contribution of technological advances has been increasing while that of policy changes has been decreasing (Qiao 2006). Nowhere was the emphasis on technology more obvious than in the strategy of “using technology to bolster agriculture.” Mao Zedong once pointed out that irrigation was the lifeline of agriculture (1954) and that the only way for agriculture to get ahead was to automate (1959). The eight-point rule for productivity gains, which involves soil, fertilizer, water, seed, density, pest control, management, and tools, had been a kind of motto guiding Chinese agriculture for more than twenty years. On December 27, 1989, the State Council’s Decision to Rely on Technology to Bolster Agriculture and to Disseminate Technological Achievements promoted the role of technology as the driving force for agricultural development and called for the efforts of governments at various levels in this regard. It pointed out that “the important question of agriculture, which decides the prosperity or decline of a country, has to be addressed, especially regarding the use of technology to bolster agriculture.” It also mentioned the importance of peasant education in technology in alignment with the strategy of “using technology to bolster agriculture”. On November 29, 1991, the Eighth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee adopted a decision to advance agriculture and rural work, emphasizing the strategic importance of technology and peasant education for agricultural modernization. On February 12, 1992, the State Council released the Notice to Promote Agricultural Development by Technology and Education, noting combining agriculture, technology, and education is an important way to realize agricultural modernization. On October 12, 1992, Jiang Zemin stated in his report to the Fourteenth CPC National Congress, “We must rely on technology and education to bolster agriculture, increase agricultural investment in various ways and forms, work consistently to improve irrigation, and raise agricultural efficiency and productivity.” On September 28, 1995, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth CPC Central Committee adopted the Proposal for Developing the Ninth Five-Year Plan Regarding Economic and Social Development and a Vision for 2010 and noted the importance of technology in seed projects and in the conservation of water and fertilization. On September 12, 1997, the report to the Fifteenth CPC National Congress

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reaffirmed the importance of technology and education for agriculture and highlighted the need to develop high-quality, high-productivity, and water-conserving agriculture. On October 14, 1998, the Third Plenary Session of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committee adopted the Decision Regarding Several Important Issues of Agriculture and Rural Work, pointing out that agriculture needs technology and education to get ahead and that efforts need to be made to shift the focus to the two to drive the development of agriculture and the rural economy. In 2002, the Sixteenth CPC National Congress proposed to accelerate technological advances and promote education and science. The No. 1 Documents of 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2014 all emphasized support for technological advancement. The No. 1 Document of 2012 regarding promoting agricultural innovation and strengthening the capacity for food supply stated explicitly that “agricultural technology ensures food security and is a sure choice for us to break through the limits of resources. It decides whether we can quicken agricultural development, plays a fundamental role and is in the interest of the public and the society.” It also noted the need to “build the capacity for agricultural technology extension” and to “strengthen agricultural education and technological training.” The effects of these directives were obvious: adoption rate of improved varieties and breeds has reached 100  percent; new crop varieties have been introduced every six to seven years; new crops have had 15 percent more yield than old ones; a third of total farmland and two thirds of sown land have adopted a multi-crop regime and the multi-cropping index has gone up from 128  percent in 1949 to 158  percent, with the highest region reaching 250 percent, successfully improving on land usage and integrated productivity (Li et al. 2010). Rice production per hectare has reached 6.4 tons. China has 10 percent of the world’s arable land and uses it to feed 20  percent of the world’s population; food self-sufficiency has reached 95 percent (Ali Zafar 2010). 1.2.3   China in Africa: The Focus on Agriculture Mao Zedong said in the 1950s, “China is a nation of 9.6 million square kilometers and 600 million people. It should have a higher level of contribution to mankind.” (Shi 1989: 14–15) China then began to provide aid to Africa. The aid in agriculture was due to two factors. First, the Chinese economy was dominated by agriculture at the time. China was receiving aid from the Soviet Union in building an industrial economy; it had very

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little industrial experience to speak of but its agriculture was developed comprehensively and independently. Second, agricultural aid satisfied Africa’s developmental needs at the time. In the 1970s, some African nations such as Senegal, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Niger asked China to pick up the agricultural aid projects of the Taiwan region as the condition for establishing diplomatic relations with China. China sent in farming teams in 1971 to replace those from Taiwan and expanded the number of African countries receiving aid to 18.1 At this point, agricultural aid became the major component of China’s African aid. China hoped to share with Africa its experience in production cooperatives and collectives and the eight-point agricultural production system by establishing big farms and testing stations. In the 1980s and 1990s, due to China’s reform in developmental strategy and foreign aid, its agricultural aid efforts in Africa were more about improving the sustainability of existing programs. China began to rethink its aid to Africa in the twenty-first century. Though the underdeveloped agriculture in Africa has historical reasons, of which institutional inadequacy is one, China reduced them to a lack of technology in the spirit of non-interference in Africa’s internal affairs, which is the guiding principle of China’s foreign aid; but this point was also consistent with reality. Of the major crops of sub-Saharan nations including rice, wheat, maize, sorghum, cassava, and potato, the rate of change to improved varieties in their respective sown areas is the lowest in the world (the World Bank 2007; cited in Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, Tang Lixia et al. 2010); even with maize and wheat, which are more successful in this regard, the proportions of improved varieties are 40 percent and 60 percent respectively. This figure is 22 percent, 17 percent, 19 percent, and 15 percent respectively for rice, sorghum, cassava, and potato. African agriculture relied on simple hand tools, and a modicum of pesticides and fertilizers, and the levels of automation and irrigation remained low (Yao 2002). For all these reasons, the prominent issue of African food security caused by the lack of technology has become the point of departure of China’s policy toward Africa in the new era. Many policy documents emphasized the importance of technology when they mentioned 1  Important countries are those which established diplomatic relations with China as early as the 1960s: Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, and the Republic of Congo while the 18 countries include Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Ghana, Togo, Benin, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Chad, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Madagascar, Niger, and Mauritius.

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Sino-African agricultural cooperation, making it very clear that technological cooperation was the major part of China’s aid to Africa. It was stated in the Document of China’s Policy on Africa, “The focus is on land development, cultivation and livestock farming techniques, food security, machinery, and by-product processing. We will strengthen agricultural cooperation and technical training and establish agricultural technology test and demonstration centers in Africa.” The South-South Cooperation Letter of Intent signed by China and the FAO stated that China would send 3000 experts to provide Africa with investment, tools, installations, and appropriate technology to raise the productivity of small producers as quickly as possible. The follow-up actions of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 all alluded to technology as the core of agricultural aid and their goal was to demonstrate and promote China’s agricultural technology. Such actions ranged from the dispatching of agricultural experts, including the experts for south-south technical cooperation under the framework of FAO’s Special Programme for Food Security, the establishment of agricultural demonstration centers, to technical training workshops. China in effect created an aid framework with agriculture technology at its core; this coincided with China’s own experience in agricultural development (See Table 1.1).

1.3   Path of China’s Agricultural Aid at Various Stages 1.3.1  The Dazhai Model and the Eight-Point Agricultural Production System From the 1950s to the 1970s, China was influenced by the classic path of modernization. It wanted to realize national development through rapid industrialization; the introduction of agricultural cooperatives raised productivity and provided funds for industrialization. Agricultural output rose from 1952 to 1958; if we set the year 1952 as basis at 100, agricultural output in 1958 is 127.8, a rise of 27.8 percent. Food production per capita rose from 576 jin in 1952 to 612 jin in 1958.2 China’s fast agricultural development caught the attention of some African nations who 2  PRC Ministry of Agriculture: Statistics of China’s Agricultural Economy (1949–1986), Agriculture Publishing House, 112, 127.

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Table 1.1  FOCAC follow-up action plan—methods of agricultural aid Mechanism

Publication time

Major points of agricultural aid

FOCAC-Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009)

2006

FOCAC-Sharm El-Sheikh Action Plan (2010–2012)

2009

FOCAC-Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015)

2012

✓  Dispatch 100 senior technical experts ✓  Establish 10 ATDCs with distinct features ✓ Strengthen practical technology and human resource development ✓ Strengthen cooperation under the framework of FAO’s Special Programme for Food Security ✓  Dispatch 50 technical teams ✓  Train 2000 technical personnel ✓  Increase number of ATDCs to 20 ✓  Improve on existing ATDCs ✓ Invest 30 million dollars in FAO trust fund to support South-South cooperation under the framework of FAO’s Special Programme for Food Security ✓ Continue dispatching technical teams and training African technical personnel ✓ Dispatch professional agricultural trainers and help build system of professional training ✓ Increase demonstration centers, enrich their functions, jointly develop production demonstration and technology promotion ✓ Help raise development capability and provide technical support in food growing, storing, processing, and distributing ✓ Actively support FAO agricultural development projects, jointly develop food security with national and regional organizations under the framework of FAO’s Special Programme for Food Security (continued)

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Table 1.1 (continued) Mechanism

Publication time

Major points of agricultural aid

FOCAC-­ Johannesburg Action Plan (2015–2018)

2015

✓ Implement demonstration projects, build or upgrade ATDCs, maximize their effects on research, demonstration, and training; expand training, teach seed and cultivation technology, support growth in production ✓ Continue dispatching 30 senior expert teams, provide vocational agricultural training, trainmore African students in China in technology and management ✓ Implement “Get Rich in Agriculture” project in 100 villages ✓ Continue jointly implementing high-quality, high-production demonstration work, establish “10+ 10” cooperation mechanism of SinoAfrican Agricultural Research Organization ✓ Actively promote project design, finance, and management under the framework of African Integrated Agricultural Development Plan ✓ Continue strengthening cooperation with African nations under the framework of FAO’s Special Programme for Food Security, explore cooperation with other organizations or nations regarding agricultural aid to Africa

Source: www.focac.org

became independent during that period. For instance, when Guinean economic adviser Gaoshu visited China in 1960, he expressed that the agricultural cooperatives were just what his country needed and that through them China could help raise Guinean agricultural output (Zhang 2010). Moreover, Tanzanian newspaper The Standard published an article about the Ujamaa movement which it characterized as “…in reality a combination of the kibbutz of Israel, the people’s commune of China, and the collective farm of the Soviet Union.” (Zhang and Cai 1981) But the excessive implementation of cooperatives in China revealed the bottlenecks in the system, and the frequent natural disasters which began in 1960 only exacerbated the decline in food output from 200 to 143 million tons. From 1958 to 1965, agricultural output dropped from 53.7  billion yuan to 41.5  billion yuan, a decline of 22.7  percent (Wu

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1999). China attempted to increase agricultural output by using technology without changing the system. In 1958, China adopted the eight-point agricultural production system to increase productivity.3 In 1964, the labor-intensive Dazhai Model replaced the monetary investment model and agricultural output began to recover. This model affected China’s African aid quickly. In 1973, Zhou Enlai invited President Moussa Traoré of Mali to visit Dazhai. In 1972, Zhou met with the prime minister of Guinea and suggested that the eight-point agricultural production system be used for Guinea’s agricultural reform and included them in the training of African agricultural personnel. Hua Guofeng instructed the Chinese agricultural experts to make the eight-­ point system more amenable in the African environment and to promote the Chinese methods regarding the seeds, fertilizers, planting density, tools, and irrigation in Africa. The management methods in the Dazhai Model such as crowd mobilization and public support for private enterprise were applied to Africa’s agricultural production. In 1973, Chinese agricultural experts in Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) helped the local government in Ruzizi Reclamation Area to mobilize 20,000 people to use Chinese manual tools for cultivation. They planted cotton in 7000 hectares of land, 2077 more than in 1972. In countries such as Burkina Faso, Togo, Rwanda, and Senegal, aid personnel adopted the principle of “self-reliance with public support” to lower the cost of cultivation. In Burkina Faso, cultivation cost dropped from 352 to 101 yuan per mu of land. The cost of developing fields for growing rice in Senegal was between 48 and 80 yuan per mu, about a fifth of the cost determined by the World Bank (Jiang 2013). The major reason that the Chinese agricultural development model could be directly applied to Africa is that the conditions of development are similar in China and in Africa. First, the backwardness of both can be traced to colonial exploitation. As Zhou Enlai stated during a meeting with President Senghor of Senegal, “Both China and Senegal are developing countries and both belong to the Third World. Our peoples share the same fate of having long been ravaged by imperialists and colonialists.”4 3  The Eight Components of Agriculture are soil (deep tilling, improved soil, soil assessment, and land usage planning), fertilizer (reasonable amount), water (waterworks and reasonable usage), seed (improved seeds), density (reasonable planting density), conservation (crop and disease protection), management (in the fields), and work (improved tools). 4  “Zhou Enlai’s Speech during Welcoming Banquet for President Senghor,” news release of Xinhua News Agency of May 6, 1974.

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Second, both China and Africa have vast resources in arable land and China’s state farm system can be applied to Africa. Finally, many African nations adopted an economic system similar to China’s state-owned economy. The second reason concerns Taiwan’s aid to the continent. At that time, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade had found that Taiwan’s methods of exclusive control, technical monopoly, contracted operation, reliance on the international market, and machine cultivation did not yield good results (Jiang 2013). China used a method similar to the Dazhai Model in Africa and the rice growing area in 14 countries reached 700,000 mu while the rice output reached 70,000 tons. But this effort did not make Africa selfreliant; when the Chinese teams of experts left, the yield dropped quickly as well (Yun 2000). African farmers were not used to the Chinese way of cultivation, so there were clearly some problems in knowledge transfer (Tang 2013). This socialist development model, with its extraordinary mobilization mechanism, robust labor, improved cultivation method, and sophisticated technology exacted stringent requirements on the practitioners and made it impossible to be duplicated. But in reality, the failure in large-scaled farming in Africa was an extension of the failure of agricultural cooperatives in China. The wholesale switch-over to cooperatives caused a crisis in agriculture in China during this period.5 Compared with 1958, agricultural output dropped by 33.7 percent in 1961. Food production was 200  million  tons in 1958, 170  million  tons in 1959, and 148  million tons in 1961. Food production per capita was 303 kilograms in 1958, dropping precipitously to 253 kilograms in 1959, and 224 kilograms in 1961. China’s agricultural aid to Africa was not successful during this period. 1.3.2   Adoption of Household Contract Responsibility System Towards the end of the 1970s, the overemphasis on cooperatives and collectivization brought obstacles to agricultural development in China. The household contract responsibility system, which can effectively stimulate the enthusiasm of producers, became an option; it was applied to both 5  PRC Ministry of Agriculture: Statistics of China’s Agricultural Economy (1949–1986), Agriculture Publishing House, 112, 127. Food production per capita is based on data on pages 6 and 147.

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rural areas and state farms and became the new management model. Its beneficial effects were evident; from 1979 to 1984, agricultural output rose 355.4 percent, or 7.9 percent annually; food production rose from 304.77 million tons in 1978 to 407.31 million tons in 1984, an increase of 17.09 million tons per year or 4.95 percent, and peasant income rose by 176.2 yuan per year. The adoption of the household contract responsibility system was the main reason for the growth during the period, contributing 46.89 percent of the growth (Lin 1982). Due to the effectiveness of the new system, the Chinese government began to make adjustment to its African agricultural aid. It began to modify the way the existing projects were run by adopting a contract system which was at the core of the household contract responsibility system. In 1985, China’s team of experts in Burkina Faso applied the new system to the three rice-growing districts whose ownership belonged to the state but whose right of operation was left to the peasants. The operating principle was that rice fields were assigned to individual peasants who ran them privately and kept the surplus. Profit, operation, and management were bundled together with the Chinese experts providing technical advice. In 1987, the three rice-growing districts produced 176 million tons of rice, yield per unit area was 10.5 ton (double-crop) per hectare, the net annual income per household was 1300 to 2600 dollars (Zhang 2013). This model was also used in the Lubendi and Rwomaganareclamation areas of Rwanda, the Afif reclamation area of Ghana, and Kolo and Sebellireclamation areas in Niger. These reclamation areas continued to grow years after the Chinese experts had left (Zhou and Wang 1997). This is how Tang Xiaoyang (2013) summarized it: The Chinese government provided funds for irrigation projects, machines, and tools while the local governments coordinated management and contracted peasants for land lease. The Chinese experts demonstrated the cultivation method and trained the peasants on technical service throughout the production cycle. Under this model, the government on both sides had no long-term economic burden; the peasants cultivated, harvested, and ran the farms all by themselves and this fostered a sense of responsibility and proactively. It kept the projects lively. The success of the contract system and the failure of the cooperative-­ collectivization method on the basis of big farms and testing stations compelled the Chinese government to review how it delivered aid to Africa. Funds for aid were cut at that time, so the Chinese government decided to reduce the aid to large-scale farms and dispatched experts to change the

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way the projects were run. The aim was to find a method which maximized aid efficiency but facilitated self-development of the African nations. But the contract system did not fully address the problem of unsustainability in aid programs. The reforms were implemented and then abandoned when the Chinese experts left, and it became a vicious cycle of “build, transfer, abandon, re-invest, re-transfer, re-abandon.” (Li Xiaoyun, Qi Gubo, and Tang Lixia 2010) This is the case in Guinea’s Kindia Farm, Tanzania’s Mbarali Farm, and Mali’s Sugar Factory. 1.3.3  Expansion of Marketization Market, rather than government, began to play a leading role in resource allocation in the 1990s. Not only did China institute reforms toward a market economy and separate government administration from enterprise management in SOEs, it also attracted direct foreign investment through wholly foreign-owned enterprises, and equity and contractual joint adventures. Foreign investment became a major driving force, contributing 15 percent of growth between 1992 and 1998 (Wang 1999). Marketization was not limited to the economic realm at the time; it also spread to the domains of public service and agricultural technology. Toward the end of the 1980s, agricultural technology was commercialized and research and development institutes were allowed to provide commercial technical service such as the sale of improved seed varieties and chemical fertilizers (Huang et al. 2001). The fee-based services were enough to make agricultural technology extension organizations self-­supporting (Mei 2005). The reform gradually involved all kinds of organizations. The market reform in Chinese enterprises (including joint ventures) and in the agricultural technology extension system was naturally extended to China’s African aid. Sinolight International had provided management and technical support for Mali Sugar Factory since 1984, but operation proved difficult. The company executed a joint-stock contract with the sugar factory and established Sukala Sugar Conglomerate, with China owning 60 percent of the shares. The new company had 4500 employees and this number peaked at 7000 at one time (Zhou 2013). Sugar output reached 330,000  tons and the joint-stock company paid over 3  million  euros in tax to the Mali government (Zhong 2004). Other similar cases include China Agricultural Reclamation Corporation’s Sino-­Zambian Friendship Farm and China Fishery Corporation’s 23 projects in 13 African nations (Yun 2000). In 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture

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established the African Agricultural Development Center and used this entity to create the Sino-Guinean Agricultural Cooperation Development Corporation with the Agricultural Project Bureau of the Guinean Ministry of Agriculture, with the Chinese side taking 80 percent of the ownership. The joint venture developed a farm of 2000 hectares in Guinea, growing Yuan Longping’s improved rice with an annual output between 2000 to 3000 tons; it also developed farms or factories for raising chickens, maintaining machines, processing feed, making plastic woven baskets, and processing rice according to market demand. These businesses, which continued to be profitable years later, created a large amount of agricultural and animal products for Guinea, trained personnel in agricultural technology and machine operation, and promoted scientific cultivation to other peasants (Tang 2013). Moreover, many African nations believed that foreign investment was more effective than inter-­governmental agricultural aid and desired to attract more foreign investment (Zhou 2013). The hopes of the Africans, the success of China’s own experience, and the sustainability of marketization all contributed to the marketization of China’s African aid; it was entrepreneurship which sustained aid projects (Tang 2013). The marketized aid system later promoted Chinese enterprises’ overseas presence, and the companies behind China’s agricultural aid became important players of Chinese overseas investment in agriculture. But such a system has an inherent contradiction between profitability and public service. Some aid projects lost its original nature under marketized management; they evolved into businesses, and the public welfare and technical demonstration functions of the testing stations got lost along the way. Chinese aid projects were criticized more and more for their commerciality and lack of social responsibility. China’s African aid programs found it difficult to strike a balance between government and enterprises, between marketization and public welfare (Zhang 2012). But the international community’s belief that China’s marketized aid was the manifestation of Chinese expansionism ignored the fact that China’s foreign aid policy was in fact an extension of China’s developmental experience; it also skewed the cause-effect relationship between marketization and aid and failed to see that marketization was part of the Chinese experience and that the real aim of marketization is to serve African aid. In 1995, a government official stated in a conference on foreign aid reform that the purpose of the aid projects’ sole-proprietor operation or joint ventures is to apply the

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domestic successful marketization reform to the aid projects, to expand their funds and scope, and to raise their effectiveness (Wang 2001). Even though there were huge differences in history and politics between Africa and China for a long time before 2000, their difference in economic development was much less, and there were cases where China’s development practices were merged directly with those of Africa, whether they were the Dazhai Model, the eight-point agricultural production system, the household contract responsibility system, or marketization. There is logical continuity between the reforms in China’s African aid and the developmental methods adopted in China at various stages of development. Of course, some of these methods did not succeed because they were met with societal and cultural conflicts in Africa.

1.4   Return of ATDCs—The Primacy of Technology After the announcement during the Forum on China-African Cooperation in 2006 that China would build ten agricultural technology demonstration centers in Africa, many African countries expressed the desire to have these centers in their countries. “We made the promise to build ten such centers, but fourteen countries requested them, so we built fourteen in the end.”6 During the fourth Forum on China-African Cooperation in 2009, China decided to increase the number of demonstration centers to twenty, but the actual total of existing and to-be-built centers was twenty-­ three. After a recipient nation made a request for a demonstration center, the Chinese ministries of commerce and agriculture would form a team and do a feasibility study. They would make an initial decision on the location of the demonstration center along with the recipient nation. Once the recipient nation specified the auxiliary conditions, a final decision was made to build or not to build a demonstration center in the recipient nation. There is no public record explaining the primary reason for the building of the twenty-three demonstration centers. Looking at the countries in which they were built, the following observations can be easily made. First, the recipient nations had low development capabilities; sixteen of them were poor and indebted. Second, the recipient nations had a 6  The writer posed this question to the officials of the Ministry of Commerce and they indicated that the demonstration centers were built according to the requests made by the African countries.

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strong need for agricultural development; they had problems with food security and ten of them were in a sustained crisis regarding food security.7 Third, there was intimate cooperation between the recipient nations and China; China had provided them with agricultural assistance in the past and the foundation for cooperation was firmly established (See Table 1.2). Chinese government had three considerations when it worked on the demonstration centers’ design. First, the centers must look attractive and be able to demonstrate new technology. Second, they must provide training for local peasants. Third, they must be sustainable (Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Tang 2013). Sustainability was at the core of the demonstration centers’ design (Bräutigam and Tang 2009). “Both sides agree that the center must shed the strange phenomenon that ‘projects function nicely when the Chinese are here and go to seed when they leave.’” (Xu and Qin 2011) Chinese enterprises were chosen for their experience in overseas investment and their keen interest in overseas investment. Among the 18 enterprises chosen to participate in the demonstration centers, 10 had experience in overseas agricultural investment and cooperation. For instance, Hubei Agricultural Reclamation, a subsidiary of Hubei Lianfeng Agricultural Company, began building farms in Mozambique in 2005 whereas Shaanxi Agricultural Reclamation Group started to invest in Cameroon in 2006. China National Agricultural Development Group, which built two demonstration centers in Africa, had invested in farms in Tanzania and Zambia. Qingdao Ruichang Cotton, which built the demonstration center in Malawi, had invested in cotton growing in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Mali. Zonergy, responsible for the demonstration center in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, had conducted agricultural testing parks in the country as well as in Sudan. China’s agricultural development and technological system proved adaptable in Africa. To ensure that the demonstration centers could show China’s agricultural skills, government policies clearly stipulated that the enterprises had to have a good track record, their building unit had to be an agricultural business or research organization which was experienced in working in Africa. The exact words of the condition were: “The enterprise has to be a leader in agricultural industrialization on the national or provincial level and have a compelling specialty or a respected brand name. It 7  According to the observations of FAO, there are 22 countries in the world which have a sustained crisis in food security and 17 of them are in Africa.

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Table 1.2  Agricultural demonstration centers in Africa Nation

Conditions

Entities providing aid

Agricultural assistance

Zambia

Food insecurity, heavily indebted Food insecurity, heavily indebted

Jilin University of Agriculture

Building of factories of cotton and food processing at the initial stage

Tanzania

Cameroon

Republic of Congo

Rwanda

Benin

Togo

Liberia

Ethiopia

Chongqing Academy of Agricultural Sciences’ Zhongyi Seed Co. Ltd. Heavily Shaanxi indebted Agricultural Reclamation Group Heavily Chinese Academy indebted, of Tropical sustained crisis Agricultural of food Sciences insecurity Heavily Fujian Agriculture indebted and Forestry University Heavily China National indebted Agricultural Development Group Co. Ltd. Heavily Jiangxi Huachang indebted Infrastructure Co. Ltd. Heavily Longping Hi-Tech indebted, Group sustained crisis of food insecurity Heavily Guanxi Bagui indebted, Agricultural sustained crisis Technology Co. of food Ltd. insecurity

Building of farms and factories of cotton and sugar at the initial stage

Dispatching technical team of experts, gifting of machinery Building of farms and cotton factories at the initial stage

Replacing Taiwan’s cultivation teams, farm and executing sugar factory projects at the initial stage Replacing Taiwan’s cultivation teams and executing farm projects at the initial stage Replacing Taiwan’s cultivation teams, executing farm and sugar factory projects at the initial stage Executing farm projects at the initial stage and dispatching experts within the FAO food security framework Providing vocational training, and dispatching experts within the FAO food security framework

(continued)

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Table 1.2  (continued) Nation Sudan

Conditions

Entities providing aid

Sustained crisis Shandong of food International insecurity Economic Cooperation Group Mozambique Heavily Hubei Lianfeng indebted Overseas Agricultural Development Co. Ltd. Uganda Heavily Sichuan Huaqiao indebted, Phoenix Group sustained crisis of food insecurity South Africa China National Agricultural Development Group Co. Ltd. Zimbabwe Sustained crisis Menoble of food insecurity Madagascar Heavily Hunan Academy of indebted Agricultural Sciences Democratic Heavily Zonergy Republic of the indebted, Congo sustained crisis of food insecurity Angola Sustained crisis Xinjiang of food Production and insecurity Construction Corps Malawi Heavily Qingdao Ruichang indebted Cotton

Agricultural assistance Building of farms and cotton factories at the initial stage

Sustained agricultural technical cooperation projects

Building of farms and dispatching of expert within the FAO food security framework

Creation of China-South Africa Joint Working Group on Agriculture Food aid on multiple occasions

Replacing Taiwan’s cultivation teams, executing farm and sugar factory projects at the initial stage Replacing Taiwan’s cultivation teams, executing farm and sugar factory projects at the initial stage

Dispatching of senior technical team, execution of irrigation projects Trust fund projects under FAO food security framework (continued)

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Table 1.2 (continued) Nation

Conditions

Entities providing aid

Agricultural assistance

Mali

Heavily indebted

Jiangsu Bauhinia Textile Co.

Mauritania

Heavily indebted

Heilongjiang Yanlin Manor Technology Co.

At the initial stages: dispatching of experts, execution of farms and water conservancy projects, factories of cotton, sugar, food processing; dispatching of experts and trust fund projects under FAO food security framework Execution of farm and water conservancy projects at the initial stages; dispatching of experts under FAO food security framework Dispatching of expert technical team

Central African Heavily Republic indebted, sustained crisis of food insecurity Equatorial Guinea Cote d’Ivoire Sustained crisis of food insecurity

Shanxi International Economic Cooperation Co. Jiangxi Ganliang Industrial Co. Liaoning International

Dispatching of expert technical team Dispatching of expert technical team; gifting of agricultural material

Source: Various online data and documents

has to be strong in research and development, modern production, and management. It has to have a talented team which is well-versed in international operation, a desire to open up the agricultural market in Africa, and a long-term development plan.”8 We can see from this that agricultural technology was always an important consideration in choosing the building units of the demonstration centers. When we look at the 22 chosen organizations, 18 of them were agricultural organizations: 2 provincial-­ level agricultural universities, a national-level research organization, a provincial-level research organization, 8 national agricultural enterprises, and 6 private enterprises, of which 4 were provincial-level leaders and 2 had agricultural investment and operation experience in multiple African 8  Please see “Guiding Opinions Regarding the Sustainability of the Demonstration Centers in Africa.”

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nations. The remaining 4 were non-agricultural enterprises, but they have had investment experience in Africa and teamed up with their respective provincial-level research institutions or leading enterprises who were able to provide technical support. For instance, Shandong International Economic Cooperation Group teamed up with Shandong Academy of Agricultural Sciences while Jiangxi Huachang International Economic and Technological Corporation established a working relationship with Jiangxi Henghu Reclamation Farm. One of the functions of the demonstration centers was to showcase Chinese companies on the world stage. “There are huge risks involved in overseas investment; it has to be big and the return takes a long time to come in. So the Ministries of Commerce and Agriculture created a mechanism where, at the early stages of a project, the government provided the necessary funding to the project undertaking unit to find a proactive and experienced partner who wanted to go global. The demonstration centers are a window for these enterprises.”9 But “the demonstration centers must have core technology; our agricultural skills are not only modern, they are based on knowledge accumulated over decades or even thousands of years. The world needs this kind of technology and we must use the demonstration centers to promote it. It’s doubtful that demonstration centers lacking in core technology could develop properly or be profitable. Some of them engage in trade or even real estate development, but these can only be auxiliary activities.”10 We can see from this that though the demonstration centers have the function of bringing Chinese enterprises onto the world stage, demonstration and promotion of Chinese agricultural technology remains their core mission under China’s policy framework. On the various ceremonial occasions before and after the building of the demonstration centers, Chinese and African government officials and Chinese diplomatic envoys expressed a common vision for the centers. The Chinese ambassador stated during the opening ceremony of the Tanzanian demonstration center, “China wants to transfer its agricultural technology and management to the Tanzanian people through this demonstration center.” President Kiwete of Tanzania gave his assessment of the demonstration center as being “able to raise the skills of the farmers while promoting agricultural development.” As he toured the Zimbabwean  From a government official’s speech in a seminar of demonstration center sustainability.   From a government official’s speech in a seminar about demonstration center sustainability. 9

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center, former Minister of Commerce Chen Deming said, “We can demonstrate fish and poultry farming at the center, as well as methane gas production for small farmers. The climate here is very good for methane gas production.” The Zimbabwean minister of agriculture discussed the demonstration center this way: “It is all about agricultural automation and this is very good. The farmers can see and touch the machines and learn to use them. I’d like to see it as a place for training for agricultural technicians as well as for teachers and students of universities throughout our country, and then they can transmit the knowledge they gain here to others. The demonstration center wants to promote potato growing; this is something new for Zimbabwe. We’re not talking about new varieties since potatoes used to be our staple. They could be a major food but they couldn’t bring income to the farmers. But things are different now. French fries are popular and potatoes have become a cash crop. The demonstration center wants to promote potatoes and bring cash to the farmer’s pocket. I know a farmer about 300 kilometers from here; he knew there were machines for growing potatoes here and he came to see and learn. I’m very glad that the center is promoting the use of machines for growing potatoes.” A Chinese government official was in Africa on an inspection tour and he expressed that, even though the commercial aspect of the demonstration centers was important, they could never become “farms for a few people” and must show their function of public service. The centers’ function of spreading China’s technical know-how also influences China’s decision makers’ attitude toward multi-party cooperation. An official of the Ministry of Commerce stated very clearly during a working conference that “To use another country’s fund to promote our technology at the demonstration centers is very good, but we must insist on our primary position. We would be violating the principles of the centers if we use them to promote other people’s technology.” We can see from this that promoting and spreading Chinese agricultural technology is a basic principle of the demonstration centers. There are currently 14 demonstration centers which have completed the first stage of basic installation and begun the second stage of technical cooperation. They all have offices, classrooms, dormitories, and a farm between 50 and 100  hectares. The majority of them test, demonstrate, and promote crop cultivation and fish and poultry farming; they also conduct training in crop hybridization, animal and plant protection, and agricultural implementation and automation (Zhou 2012). We can see from this that technical demonstration, training, and promotion have become the common activities of the demonstration centers (See Table 1.3).

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Table 1.3  ATDCs’ crops, animal breeds and technical services Nation

Crops/animal Technical service provided breeds as per bilateral agreement

Zambia

Maize, wheat

Tanzania

Cameroon

Republic of Congo

Rwanda

Benin Togo Liberia

Ethiopia Sudan

Test cultivation of maize and soybeans in an area of 38 hectares Rice Test cultivation of rice, maize, vegetables; demo of new varieties, promotion of technology, training of 50 researchers and promoters and 120 farmers; building agricultural center websites; held African rice conferences Rice Planting of rice, maize, vegetables, cassava; cultivation of new varieties, deep processing of bioenergy; raising of ostriches, assembling of machinery; promotion of “company + base + farmer” model Cassava, Test cultivation of vegetables, cassava, maize; test vegetables, egg-laying and meat chicken farms; training in cultivation egg-laying technology; gifting of vegetable shoots to farmers; chicken short-term training in tropical agricultural technology for 27 students; translation of 16 volumes of Tropical Agriculture Technology Series; held festivals of new food made of cassava Edible fungi, Cultivation of rice, silkworm, fungus; demonstration of rice, silkworm agricultural technology, water and soil protection, product freezing, drying by baking, package storage; 11 sessions of training for 397 persons, agricultural extension among 1000 farming households Maize, Cultivation of maize, vegetables; egg farms; training in vegetables maize technology for 25 students Rice Improving on sandy soils; test cultivation of rice; trained 46 students including technical personnel and farmers Rice Test cultivation of rice, vegetables, maize; breed selection of pigs; essential training in agricultural technology for 23 students in Bong County; training for students of professional school BWI; technical guidance in growing rice for peripheral farms and local farmers Vegetables Vegetable cultivation, fowl farm, cattle and sheep raising; training classes Maize, wheat, Testing of domestic and foreign varieties of wheat, maize, cotton, cotton, peanut, vegetables; research into cultivating peanuts wheat, maize, cotton; demonstration of new technology and new varieties (continued)

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Table 1.3 (continued) Nation

Crops/animal Technical service provided breeds as per bilateral agreement

Mozambique Maize, rice, pigs Uganda Fish farm

South Africa

Fish farm

Zimbabwe

Potato, maize, farm machinery

Madagascar

Rice

Demonstration of food and vegetable testing; 7 training sessions for 200 technical personnel and farmers Testing of feed processing; selection and farming of tilapia and parent fish; introduction of Chinese grass carp, silver carp, catfish; 5 training sessions for 122 students; organize Chinese experts to develop and translate training materials Promotion of fresh-water fish farming; cultivate fresh-­ water varieties suitable for South Africa; training for local farmers Demonstration of maize, soybean, potato testing; demonstration and promotion of precision vacuum seeder, circular sprinkler, plant protection machinery; training in automation in potato cultivation for 25 students; training in agricultural machinery for 150 students Testing in rice hybridization; training for 10 senior agricultural managers and 100 local experts

Source: Zhou Haichuan (2012)

Apart from the demonstration centers, China demonstrates and promotes its agricultural know-how through organizing expert teams and training workshops as part of its foreign aid. The experts are classified into senior experts and technical personnel; their numbers and specialties are usually requested by the recipient nations and China does its best to honor such requests. The experts are mainly culled from universities, research institutions, or departments of agriculture at various levels. The domains they serve are mostly in the cultivation and processing industries including farming, landscaping, machinery, irrigation, animal husbandry, and agricultural planning; they transmit knowledge of production and management and raise Africa’s capability for agricultural adjustment and self-development. The experts are selected through various channels such as online forums and local recommendations; they must have worked in Africa for at least a year, and the Chinese government picks up the overall tab for international travel, medical insurance, and living expenses. The experts must participate in the activities of agricultural departments and

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other relevant organizations in Africa and work with African researchers and promoters of agricultural technology (Li et al. 2010). In 2001, the ministries of agriculture of China and Ethiopia executed a Letter of Intent Regarding Vocational Training in Agricultural Technology and Cooperation in Green Certification and China began to help Ethiopia establish a system of professional agricultural education. The two nations cooperated to implement a series of 10 training projects; China sent experts to teach in Ethiopia and they numbered 324 in accumulated total in 2012. There were 48 courses in 6 domains including crop cultivation, animal husbandry, veterinarian medicine, machinery, home economics, and natural resource development, resulting in 66,000 trained students. Moreover, China participated in the Framework for Action for Food Security in 1996 under the aegis of FAO and provided agricultural assistance to developing countries. China has already completed 16 aid projects under this framework and dispatched 890 experts and technicians to 21 countries in Africa, Asia, the South Pacific, and the Caribbean (Table 1.4). Table 1.4  Services by Chinese experts dispatched under FAO framework Nation

Agricultural extension and demonstration

Ethiopia

Demonstration of growing broad beans, wheat, barley and of irrigation and vegetable nursery in four peasant training centers in Wenchi Implementation of layer farming project Demonstration of making Chinese steamed buns and baos Demonstration of machines for making noodles and flour Egg-laying chicken immunization techniques Demonstration and promotion of fresh-water fish farming Demonstration of rice and vegetable growing, organic fertilizer fermentation Micro irrigation Guidance in high yields for peanut, maize, millet, and vegetable growers Demonstration of Chinese hybrid rice and maize Demonstration of wooden chicken coop, ammoniated straw, feed processing Demonstration of seedling techniques of tomato, onion, cabbage Demonstration of pruning orange trees Demonstration of drought-resistant rice and seedling-throwing technique Prevention of animal diseases Rice growing, vegetable/grain, fish and animal farming, forestry, irrigation

Nigeria Senegal

Uganda

Liberia Sierra Leone

Source: Authors made based on the information from South-South Cooperation on the website of the Foreign Economic Cooperative Center, MARA, P.R. China.

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1.5   Conclusion Though China’s agricultural aid to Africa has undergone changes in content, method, and management, what has remained constant is China’s desire to share its developmental experience with Africa which finds itself in a developmental stage that China had gone through. Some scholars believe that Chinese policies and technical system for agricultural development based on small farmers can bring opportunities to Africa (Li et al. 2013; Shenggen Fan 2010). Some African nations also feel that the Chinese experience can prove beneficial to them. The Vice President of Kenya once said, “China has a large population and small arable land but it can feed itself. Africa has a small population and large arable land but has a crisis in food security. Africans can learn something from China.” (Alden 2013) Ethiopia is in the process of duplicating China’s economic development zones while Nigeria is learning China’s comprehensive poverty-­ alleviation plan. But so far no African country is able to duplicate China’s successes. It is unrealistic to assume that emulating the Chinese experience will result in the same victory. The success of China’s reform is based on China’s particular situation; Chinese policies may not be amenable for transplantation elsewhere (Ravallion 2009). President Ravalomanana of Madagascar emphasized that Africa must learn from the Chinese experience but should not try to copy it (Tao 2009), and when China shares its experience with the world, it should not try to universalize its experience or feel superior to others because of it (Li 2014). The preconditions for the rapid spread of agricultural technology in China are the Chinese government’s capability for mobilization, the unique history of agro-technology development, ample government subsidies allowing new technologies to become prevalent, and an industrial base for agricultural investment, production, and processing. These conditions are absent in Africa. The jury is still out whether Chinese agricultural technology could be met with approval, acceptance, or adoption in Africa, but some researchers have found that African farmers have problems adapting to the Chinese way of cultivation. Even though some Chinese organizations have tried to promote Chinese cultivation in some communities, whether it will be adopted through a truly organic process of osmosis remains to be seen. China has emphasized the transmission of technical knowledge in its agricultural aid but its lack of understanding of social and cultural factors in the end has hindered the spread of technical knowledge. China had transferred agricultural knowledge to Africa in a big way before

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the 1980s, but most of it had met with failure. Even though the demonstration centers have tried to ensure sustainability through commercialization, whether this can be done successfully according to the plan set by the Chinese government remains to be seen. Even if we do not think about how the demonstration centers are run and only consider the adaptability of technology, who can truly predict that the agricultural technology system which China wants to bring to other countries can find a home in Africa? China has dispatched close to one thousand experts, trained six thousand African technical personnel, and built fourteen demonstration centers. Apart from a few reports citing the adoption of Chinese technology, there is not any case suggesting that Chinese agricultural technology has become the driving force for African development.

References C. Alden, 2007, China in Africa, London: Zed Books. C.  Alden, 2013, China and the Long March into African Agriculture, Cahiers Agricultures, Vol. 22, No. 1,pp. 16–21. Ali Zafar, 2010, Learning from the Chinese Miracle: Development Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa, policy research working paper 5216, World Bank. D.  Bräutigam & X.  Tang, 2009, China’s Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside, The China Quarterly, 199, pp. 686–706. D. Bräutigam, 2009, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. L. Cai, 1992, China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa, International Economic Cooperation (2). S. Fan, Bella N, et al, 2010, China’s Agricultural and Rural Development: Implications for Africa. China-DAC Study Group on Agriculture, Food Security and Rural Development, http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/ publications/chinaafricadac.pdf. Q. Guo, F. Ren, S. Zhu, 2010, The Universality Discussion on China Development Model, Academics (4). J. Huang, F. Qiao, L. Zhang, S. Rozelle, 2001, Farm Pesticides, Rice Production, and Human Health in China, Research Report 2001—RR3: International Development Research Centre (IDRC) 2001, pp. 49–52. K. Hu, 2013. Measures and Analysis of Contribution Rate Achieved by Advancement in Agricultural Technologies from 1978 to 2010. Commercial Research, (6). X. Chen, 2014. Implications of China’s Development Path for Developing Countries. Teaching and Research, (2).

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H. Jiang, 2013. Offering Agricultural Technologies to Africa (1971–1983): Study on the Assistance Model and Outcomes in Africa. Foreign Affairs Review, (1). Justin, Y. Lin, 1992, Vol 82 No.1: 34-51. Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China, the American Economic Review. A. Li, 2010, Stories of China’s Assistance in Africa: Depiction from an American Scholar, Foreign Affairs Review, (5). A. Li, 2014. Evolution of China’s Voice Internationally from the Perspective of Sino-African Relationship. World Economics and Politics, (2). J. Li, 1991. Origins and Contributions of African Agriculture. Agricultural Archaeology, (1). X. Li, G. Qi, L. Tang, 2010, Smallholder-Based Agricultural Development: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and African Experience, Social Science Academic Press, Beijing, China. S. Li, J. Shi, 2008. Global Food Crisis and Development of African Agriculture. World Agriculture, (10). X. Li, 1989. Technologies Are the Key to Accelerating Agricultural Development. Forum on Science and Technology in China, (5) X. Li, 2014. Avoid Falling into Traps. http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_ china/2014-­09/5149308.html. X. Li, L. Tang, X. Xu et al., 2013, What Can Africa Learn from China’s Experience in Agricultural Development? IDS Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 31–41. G. Long, 2013. Reflections on African Colonist Heritages. World Economics and Politics, (9). T. Lu, 2000. A Brief History of African Agriculture. China Financial and Economic Publishing House. W. Lu, X. Yu, 2013. Advancement of China’s Agricultural Technologies and Increase of Farmers’ Income. Journal of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences), (7). Martin Ravallion, 2009, Are There Lessons for Africa from China’s Success Against Poverty? World, Development, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 303–313. L. Mei, 2005, A Case Study of Chinese Agro-technical Extension System, Acta Agriculturae Slovenica, 85–2, pp. 429–442. K. Morton, 2012, Learning by Doing: China’s Role in the Global Governance of Food Security, RCCPB Working Paper, 30. Z. Qiao, 2006. Development of China’s Rural Economic System and Increase of Agricultural Production: An Empirical Analysis of China’s Agriculture Increase from 1978 to 2004. Economic Review, (7). X. Qin, 2008. China Development Model in International Discourse, Journal of Renmin University of China (4). I. Scoones, et al., (2013). “New Development Encounters: China and Brazil in African Agriculture”, IDS Bulletin 44: 1–19.

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L. Shi, 1989, China’s Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries in the Modern Era. China Social Sciences Press. Stavrianos 2006, A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century, Chinese edition, Peking University Press, 2006. The World Bank, 2008, 2008 World Development Report. Tsinghua University Press. X. Tang, 2013, Evolution and Effects of Management Mode of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa. World Economics and Politics, (5). W. Tao, 2009, Implications of Chinese Mode to Africa. International Studies, (1). UK Food Group, 2008, More Aid for African Agriculture: Policy Implications for Small-scale Farmers. C. Wang, 2001, China’s Strategies from Higher Level: Diplomacy. Shaanxi Normal University General Publishing House Co., LTD. C. Wang, 2008, Analyzing on the New Modality of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa, International Economic Cooperation, (4). S. Wang, 2012, Experiences and Prospects of China’s Helping Africa with the Construction of Infrastructure. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (12). X. Wang, 1999, Contributions of Foreign Direct Investment to China’s Economic Increase. Foreign Economies and Management, (3). L. Wu, 1999, Economic History of the people’s Republic of China. China Economic Publishing House. J. Xu, L. Qin, 2011, Suggestions on the Sustainable Development of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers. World Agriculture, (12). G. Yao, 2002, Origins of Agricultural Crisis in Africa. West Asia and Africa, (3). W. Yun, 2000, China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa from the Viewpoint of International Assistance. West Asia and Africa, (2). B. Zhang, 2009, Reflections on the Currently-implemented Land Reform Policies. Special Zone Economy, (4). J. Zhang, 2013, China’s Aid to Africa. Transmitted from Zhou Hong (ed.). China’s Foreign Aid: Sixty Years in Retrospect. China Social Sciences Academic Press. J. Zhang, 2010, Unconditional Aid: Formation of China’s Aid to Africa. Foreign Affairs Review, (5). M. Zhang, S. Yang, 2008, Africa “Looking Eastward”: Opportunities and Challenges Facing China. Contemporary World, (12). S. Zhang, L. Cai, 1981, Ujamaa Movement in Tanzania. West Asia and Africa, (5). Y. Zheng, 2009. China’s Development Mode in International Development Pattern. Social Sciences in China, (5). Q. Zhong, 2004, Embroidery Training in Africa. People’s Daily (Overseas Version), (8), August 5th.

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H. Zhou, 2012, Problems Encountered by China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers on Sustainable Development and Countermeasures. China Soft Science Magazine, (9). H. Zhou, 2010, China’s Foreign Aid in the Past Sixty Years: Reflections and Retrospect. Foreign Affairs Review, (5). H. Zhou, 2013, “The Policy and Mechanism of China’s Foreign Aid”, Sixty Years of China’s Foreign Aid, Social Science Academic Press, Beijing, China. J. Zhou, Q. Wang, 1997. Discussions about China’s Aid to African Agriculture under New Circumstances. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (3). R. Zhuang, 1982, Positions and Characteristics of African Agriculture. World Agriculture, (3).

CHAPTER 2

Agricultural Development through Science and Technology: The Extraterritorial Travel of Agricultural Technocratic Rationality

My idea is to share China’s agricultural experience and technology with African countries to help them increase grain production and provide sufficient food for their people. How did China get rich and make such outstanding achievements? The reason is that China started its reform and opening up first in agriculture in a bid to feed the 1.3 billion people. Only when the problem of food is solved can we concentrate on development in other fields. I think it advisable for Africa to take this path as well. —Wei Jianguo (2011: 230)

Since the twenty-first century, particularly the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the 2008 financial crisis, domestic and foreign concerns over China’s economic and aid activities abroad,

Part of this chapter has been published. See Xu and Li (2017). Remodeling International Development Practices—Based on the Daily Observation of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa. China Fudan International Studies Review, Vol. 1. and Xu X et al. (2016). Science, Technology and Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa, World Development, Vol. 81, pp. 82–91. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0_2

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especially in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, have been on a sharp rise and China’s foreign aid has emerged as a hot topic of international development. Compared with research works in the 1980s and 1990s that focused on China’s motives and strategies, recent works have a wider coverage and take more diverse perspectives. Apart from the motives and strategies, the history (Hairong and Sautman 2010; Qi and Luo 2011; Jiang 2013; Tang 2013), philosophy, methods, scale, management, actors, rules, discourse, and influence (Kragelund 2008; Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Bräutigam 2011b; Scoones et al. 2013; Buckley 2013a, b; Li et al. 2014) of China’s foreign aid efforts have all become topics of quite hot debate. The debates over these topics, intertwined with keywords such as “neo-colonialism”, “neo-imperialism”, “land grab”, “resource grab”, “emerging economies”, and “Chinese model” that came up once in a while, gave rise to the unique “China phenomenon” in the twenty-first century. These research works compare China’s foreign aid with the current international development system in terms of its philosophy, sectors, methods, norms, management, and so on. However, as Bräutigam (2010a) noted, many who compare China’s foreign aid with official development assistance by the West end up comparing apples and oranges that are poles apart. In researches into “aid with Chinese characteristics” (Bräutigam 2010a) or “China exceptionalism” (Alden and Large 2011), the ultimate question asked is actually this: How will a rising or revitalizing China contribute to or affect the global politics, economy, society and culture? With respect to international development in particular, is China a follower or a maker of the current international development rules? Will China and other emerging economies lead a “quiet revolution” to reshape the current international development system? Will China’s unique understanding and practice of “development” provide an alternative development path for other developing countries? The above questions are closely associated with the reflections on modernity and globalization in Chinese and Western academic world. They may have an impact on whether the modern society and its functioning model that came into being in the seventeenth century will change. Are the development path and foreign aid of China and other emerging economies a continuation or a transformation of those stemmed from the Western modernity? Will China and other emerging economies give birth to a new type of globalization? These are the topics covered in this Chapter.

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2.1   Literature Review: Will China Reshape International Development Practices? In response to the above ultimate concerns, a great many studies have been conducted from various perspectives. For example, Nyiri (2006) pointed out that compared with the current international development concepts and practices of the West, China’s development assistance focuses more on technological progress and economic development than on system building. China will continue to, in the name of “development” and “civilization”, promote the modernizing process that had originally been advanced only by the West. In essence, China does not intend to set itself as a challenger to the current system, but rather a middleman on the ladder of modernity who still needs to move up from the position of the suppressed. This view finds an echo in Alden and Large (2011). The latter argues that although the relations between China and other developing countries remain asymmetrical in economic terms, China maintained its position in the middle through such political discourses as “mutual respect and shared benefit” in South-South cooperation, and thus built economic strength on par with the West while keeping its unity and coherence with other developing countries. In contrast, Mawdsley (2012) and Six (2009) reckon that China’s aid and related practices essentially posed a challenge to the colonial framework and historical existence of the “center-­periphery” or Western and non-Western/others relationship pattern which have served as the basis of the development assistance of the West. As stated by Tan-Millins et al. (2010), Xu and Xu (2011), Xu et al. (2015), Bräutigam (2011), and Li (2014), the concept of aid should be redefined in China. It is no longer essentially a Western and post-colonial concept, because there is no historical process and system in China to support the Western interpretation of the concept. In addition to the above studies that focused more on macro perspectives, there are studies from micro perspectives. For example, Sato et al. (2011) examines China’s aid planning process in Cambodia and concludes that China’s foreign aid practices reshaped the concept of “ownership” in the international development system. They reckon that it is the local people’s participation and flexibility in the project implementation process rather than project planning, that help the recipients obtain more initiative, yet this is often overlooked in the design and research of the current international development policies. Buckley (2013a) depicts the process of collisions, conflicts and coordination in the interactions between Chinese

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experts and Senegalese locals, indicating that pure technical assistance may give rise to unexpected consequences in practice and that social interaction and social imagination play a crucial role in this process. Both of these two empirical studies show that macro aid policies and micro aid practices are more often than not disconnected. In the meanwhile, the uniqueness of China’s development assistance at the micro level remains a mystery due to the lack of in-depth analysis. To sum up, compared with the mature process of developing industrialized knowledge in the West, China’s foreign aid has long been in lack of support from systematic academic research, particularly anthropological observations and accounts of exotic lands (Niu 2014). In consequence, the knowledge production, application, transfer and accumulation processes that lie behind the formulation and implementation of China’s foreign aid policies have been strikingly different from those backing Western assistance policies. At the bottom of this is a shift from the “West–others” power structure in traditional development studies to the current “others–others” parallel relationship which has not yet been sufficiently supported by micro-level ethnographic materials (Mohan 2008). This added to the simplified and stereotyped understanding of China’s foreign aid policies and practices. Based on these, this chapter will present case studies of the daily operations of demonstration centers in the countries of T and E to reveal the institutional and cultural collisions and remodeling in the process of technology-based interactions between China and Africa.

2.2   Traveling Agricultural Technocratic Rationality 2.2.1  Governance System of China’s Agricultural Science and Technology: Agricultural Technocratic Rationality Agriculture has always been important in China since ancient times, as have efforts to help farmers acquire better technologies and learn new skills. In ancient Chinese agricultural books as early as in the Western Zhou Dynasty (c. 1045–771 BC), there were already detailed records of teaching the people about twelve agricultural activities including the techniques of field farming, fruit tree and vegetable cultivation, felling and gathering in the mountains and forests, picking wild fruits, raising animals, producing silk and linen, as well as other sideline agricultural activities.

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This covered almost all farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and sideline industries in the Western Zhou Dynasty and such tasks were put in the charge of designated officials. It can be said that the policies facilitating economic recovery and encouraging farming advocated at the beginning of most dynasties over the millennia-long Chinese history have given rise to a persistent agricultural production system centering on small farmers, as well as the corresponding farming methods and production tools. Moreover, through the extensive mobilization of public resources in large-­ scale canal construction and other water conservancy projects, the public gradually conjured up a vision about the power center of the empire and a shared identity. Since the Han Dynasty (202B.C–220A.D.), China has always put emphasis on “food as the paramount necessity of the people” in its political governance. Food supply is a critical matter relating to the life or death of a regime. The political instability incurred by famines and low grain production has always been a great concern for rulers. Therefore, we can see that the agricultural technology governance system in ancient China is a complete system incorporating legends about ancestors (agricultural education and farming culture), written records of traditional techniques for intensive farming (ancient agricultural books), practical technical systems (technical routes and tools for intensive farming), and the corresponding bureaucratic system (agricultural officials). With the introduction of modern science and technology from the West, this system of national development and national identity with “agricultural technology system” at the core was further reinforced. As time went by, the ancient agricultural technology system based on farmers’ trial-and-error experience gradually became something “traditional”, “backward” and “needs transformation”. In his Plea to Li Hongzhang, Sun Yat-sen noted that “there are many reasons for the insufficient food supply in China, but the biggest reason lies in agricultural backwardness”.1 “The farmers know only to cling to traditional ways and do not know how to make changes. Since not enough has been done to reclaim more land and irrigation systems have fallen into disrepair, people toil much but gain little”.2 His prescription for the problem of insufficient food in China was to pursue modern agriculture from seven aspects, namely machinery, fertilizers, seed replacement, pest control, manufacturing, transportation, and disaster prevention. That is, to develop grain production as a 1 2

 Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen. People’s Publishing House. 1966: p. 11.  Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen. People’s Publishing House. 1966: p. 9.

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large-scale industry.3 This set of ideas that emphasize the importance of grain and agricultural production, along with the thought of transforming traditional agriculture with modern technology, has persisted to this day. After China’s first modern agricultural experimental farm was initiated in 1906, all provinces followed suit to build their own farms of the same type. This is an agricultural technology development and promotion system based on modern research work. By 1911, Sichuan Province had established 74 experimental farms. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, an entire set of modern agricultural technology system was soon established on this basis with well-organized institutional arrangements. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture, this system covered the entirety of China with seven regions and made significant contributions to China’s agricultural technology progress and food security (Xu 2004: 28). During the period, Mao Zedong proposed the Eight-Point Charter of Agriculture (namely soil improvement, rational application of fertilizer, water conservancy, improved seed strains, rational close planting, plant protection, field management, and improvement of farm implements), emphasizing the importance of agricultural technology to agricultural production from eight aspects. These ideas were soon put into practice as part of national development plans, while being promoted through the top-down agricultural technology system. However, the system was severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution. Soon after the launch of the reform and opening up policy in the 1980s, China’s agricultural technology governance system was gradually restored and further improved under the guidance of the government. Subsequently, in consequence of market-oriented reforms in the early 1990s, the system became more diverse and complex. During the period, China’s agricultural technocratic rationality finally took shape following the establishment of a series of mainstream mechanisms and structures. Specifically, after the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping summarized experience and drew lessons from the past development. The first thing he did was to restore the social and political status of intellectuals, which paved the way for the subsequent knowledge economy development and market-­oriented reforms. He attached great importance to the role of science and technology in agricultural development and national economic growth. He pointed out that “agricultural development depends first on policy and second on science... but in the end, it must rely on science to solve 3

 Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen. People’s Publishing House. 1966: p. 11.

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problems.” He later put forward other important thoughts such as “science and technology as the primary productive force”, “agricultural development relying on science, technology and education”, and so on. Deng’s thoughts on agricultural technology were later transformed into the strategic guideline of “reinvigorating the country through science and education”, which was implemented step by step as part of the national development plans. This was the first time that the emphasis on agricultural technocratic rationality was elevated to a national strategy. As such, the importance and institutional support for the development of technocratic rationality was established in China. Under the guidance of such a strategy, China made considerable investment in the development of agricultural science and technology. Studies show that China invested heavily in its agricultural research and promotion system in the 1970s and 1980s. It set up the world’s largest team of agricultural researchers in 1992 (Huang and Hu 2004) who worked mainly on promoting agricultural mechanization and the high-yield varieties of staple food crops, such as the development of a series of superior crop varieties represented by hybrid rice. The contribution of agricultural technology to agricultural output growth increased steadily, reaching a maximum of 40 percent. However, compared with the contribution of 70 percent to 80 percent in the United States and other developed countries, there was still much room for improvement. Therefore, in the 1990s, China launched a series of marketoriented reforms in its agricultural technology system. Special research funds and projects as well as the competition mechanisms were introduced to better align research efforts with market demands and streamline relevant institutions and staff. Such reforms have persisted up to now, delivering mixed results (Hang and Hu 2004). China’s agricultural development, especially over the past 30 years, can thus be seen as a process of expanding technocratic rationality. In the long-term fight to ease the high tension between land and population, China pursued a path of relying on technological progress rather than institutional innovation. In addition to modern philosophical and ideological foundation, China’s agricultural technology development system also features a series of matching strategies, policies, and practical measures and constitutes the core driving force for modern development. Specifically, there are three key points. First, it emphasizes modern technology’s core and vital role in promoting modern economic and social development and puts stress on the improvement of output or productivity, or, more broadly, economic growth and accumulation. Second, its

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implementation often needs to rely on or require the establishment of a set of powerful state apparatus. In the beginning, this need often originates from the need to defend against invasions from the outside. However, as this system is gradually de-politicized over time, reinvigorating the country through technological progress turns from a means into the end in itself and development becomes an inherent and lasting driving force. On the one hand, technological progress needs to rely on a powerful government capable of mobilizing collective resources. On the other hand, the process of promoting national prosperity through technological development itself becomes part of the process of national development and the building of a national identity, adding to the legitimacy of the government. Such pragmatic approach to science and technology, relying on collective power, is vastly different how modern science and technology rose to prominence in the West. The latter mainly derived from the Enlightenment, demonstrating the emancipation of the individual and the expansion of individual rationality which occurred after mankind got free from the constraints of religion and nature. Third, the modern technocratic rationality is diverse in form and dynamic in development. As mentioned earlier, with the advancement of market-oriented reforms, China’s agricultural technology governance system has gradually diversified. As the market-oriented reforms advanced, agricultural research and promotion departed from the original system dominated by the public sector. A hybrid system featuring public-private partnerships gradually took shape and held out expectations for a sustainable future. So, can this Chinese-­ style agricultural technocratic rationality travel to Africa through China-­ Africa agricultural cooperation of various forms? If yes, how can it be achieved in practice? 2.2.2  Traveling Agricultural Technocratic Rationality: A Historical Perspective on China’s Agricultural Assistance in Africa Agricultural technology transfer and economic cooperation have always been central in South-South cooperation. At a similar stage of economic development, a vast majority of developing countries are facing common development tasks, such as poverty reduction, food security, infrastructure construction, energy supply, and medical service delivery. Furthermore, due to historical exchanges and other factors concerning connectivity and political communities, horizontal technology transfer between countries

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within the framework of South-South cooperation is much easier than vertical technology transfer between countries in the North and South of the globe, and much more effective due to similar social, political and economic backgrounds. In fact, agricultural technology transfer has always been present in the history of China-Africa agricultural cooperation over the past 50 years. In the twenty-first century, guided by the ancient Chinese adage that “teaching one to fish is better than giving him fish”, China sought to build African countries’ capabilities for self-sufficiency and agricultural technology transfer has increasingly become a core element in the sustainable development of China’s foreign aid initiatives. Specifically, China’s agricultural aid in Africa can goes well back to the 1950s. In the early days, as China had different diplomatic priorities and positioned itself differently in Africa, agricultural aid was not attached great importance, even though it was listed as part of bilateral cooperation. Then, in the 1960s, in consequence of the competition in Africa between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan of China, agricultural aid in Africa was strengthened (Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Jiang 2013). In the process of “replacement assistance”, African countries requested agricultural technical experts from the Chinese mainland without driving away the farming teams from Taiwan as expected, hoping for more agricultural technical support. In this context, the Chinese government got wise to the importance of agricultural technical assistance to breaking the ice in China-Africa relations and increasing its global influence (Jiang 2013). Soon afterwards, China dispatched agricultural experts to 18 African countries in 1971, which was followed by a host of agricultural technology assistance activities in Africa. As such, the Eight-Point Charter of Agriculture, the Dazhai model (collective farming) and other comprehensive systems for agricultural technology application and agricultural production organization and management were brought to Africa through agricultural assistance programs. It gave rise to a great many Dazhais in Africa. It shows that technology transfer has been deeply embedded in the history of China’s agricultural aid in Africa since the very beginning and has served as the backbone of such efforts. In the meanwhile, China’s agricultural aid in Africa went through a series of management reforms. Due to the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and the 1970s, China’s agricultural research and promotion system suffered a heavy blow. A large number of agricultural experts were transferred to the countryside and some farms, making it more difficult to select experts for the aid programs in Africa. At the same time, agricultural

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aid was endowed with more political meanings in the context of the Cold War. As more emphasis was given to pedigree and political background over professional quality in the selection of experts to aid Africa, a host of problems emerged. Farms with support from China had low output and the aid was not so effective, adding weight to bilateral relations on some occasions. It was not until 1973 when the problems incurred by the dispatched experts’ inadequate professional quality got fairly prominent that Chinese government began to shift its attention back to the professional quality and capabilities of agricultural experts. In the 1980s and 1990s, in consequence of reforms in its foreign aid system, China adopted a project-­ bidding approach, placed more stress on economic benefits and demonstration effects, and attached importance to project evaluation in terms of economic rationality and technical feasibility, instead of merely in terms of the political effect. In addition, the Chinese government vigorously explored bilateral and multilateral aid models, encouraged the joint participation of diverse entities such as Chinese companies and banks, and implemented a lump-sum project investment scheme to enhance the feasibility and sustainability of aid projects. Technology transfer and business cooperation were regarded as more efficient and more sustainable means (Zhou 2008; Xu 2004; Tang 2013). This shows that China’s management of agricultural aid to Africa has been getting more technology-centered and rational. Entering the twenty-first century, the above technology-centered management model which featured increasing dependence on technocratic rationality in the practice of China’s agricultural aid to Africa reached its peak with the launch of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDC) in Africa in 2006. For a long time, China has been feeding more than one-fifth of the world’s population with less than 10 percent of the world’s farmland and 25 percent of the world’s per-capita water supply (Hang and Hu 2004). This macro discourse is frequently seen in summaries of China’s experience in agricultural development. The advancement of agricultural technology and the improvement of agricultural productivity are often quoted as core elements contributing to this development miracle. In the meanwhile, China’s successful experience holds great appeal to many African countries. Many scholars believe that by increasing small farmers’ productivity, Africa can be rescued from “agricultural pessimism” and thereby achieving self-sufficiency in food supply (Li et al. 2012). This will contribute significantly to the development of Africa as a whole and even the poverty reduction and food security of

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mankind. This proposition of scholars aroused strong echoes in China’s policies. For example, the White Paper on China’s African Policy issued in 2006 and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) together with its action plans all mentioned the importance of increasing agricultural productivity in Africa. Moreover, this proposition also elicited warm responses from Africa and the world. For example, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) emphasized the importance of technological progress for agricultural development. Vice President of Kenya once noted that the vast land and abundant resources of Africa are complementary to the agricultural technology of China. Giving full play to such complementary advantages will produce great synergy and win-win outcome (Alden 2013). For another example, the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (2010) has begun to test and evaluate the correlation between Chinese agricultural technology and Africa’s small farmer-based way of agricultural production. In addition, a series of efforts by the international community, such as the establishment of Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the launch of Millennium Villages Project, also reflected the orientation toward revitalizing agriculture in Africa through technology. From the above we can see that technocratic rationality, whether as a summary of the lessons learned from both successes and failures in China’s own agricultural development or as a response to the current international development trend, is deeply rooted in the history of China’s agricultural aid to Africa over the past 50-plus years. It reflects how the top leadership and experts of China understand and percept agricultural development traps in Africa and the overall development prospects of the country, i.e. science and technology should be the top priority, the prerequisites and foundation for solving all problems related to development and a core pursuit. Former Vice Minister of Commerce Wei Jianguo opined that the paradox between abundant agricultural resources and short food supply in Africa can be explained by the lack of technology among farmers. Therefore, it is vital to teach local farmers to grow food properly. My idea is to share China’s agricultural experience and technology with African countries to help them increase grain production and provide sufficient food for their people. How did China get rich and make such outstanding achievements? The reason is that China started its reform and opening up first in agriculture in a bid to feed the 1.3 billion people. Only when the problem of food is solved can we concentrate on the development in other fields. I think it advisable for Africa to take this path as well (Wei 2011: 230).

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In fact, this purely technical perspective also encountered various challenges in practice. For example, local people found it difficult to keep to the “best practices” which brought high agricultural productivity once Chinese experts left, thereby falling into a cycle of “easy start, quick returns, and fast decline” (Yun 2000). However, these lessons from practice did not change the absolute priority of traveling technocratic rationality in China’s agricultural aid to Africa. On the contrary, the failure or unsustainability of transferred technologies is often attributable to local people’s poor understanding of new technologies or the farmers’ inadequate capabilities. It can be seen that in the process of delivering agricultural aid to Africa, China transferred more than specific agricultural technologies. What travelled to Africa along with technologies was the “development philosophy” of agricultural technocratic rationality, though it may not have been so planned. Such “development philosophy” puts technology at the core and gives priority to the improvement of productivity and the related economic growth.

2.3   ATDC’s Daily Operations at The Micro Level: Clashing Chinese and African Perceptions The ATDC program in Africa was officially announced at FOCAC 2006 as one of the eight initiatives for China’s aid to Africa. Policy makers deemed it the most important and innovative model to improve the sustainability of China’s agricultural aid to Africa in the new era. It entails infrastructure construction, technology transfer, capacity building, establishment of partnerships, and profit-making business, among others. ATDCs have been established in 23 African countries so far. The operation of ATDCs goes through three phases. For a start, the phase of infrastructure construction lasts about one to two years. Next comes the three-year phase of technical cooperation and finally the phase of sustainable development. The most prominent feature of this model is that the mandate is given to a company to run the ATDC. The Chinese government provides each ATDC with a preliminary financial support of yuan 30 million to 50 million for infrastructure construction during the first phase and staff cost during the second. The companies running the ATDCs must seek resources on their own after the expiration of the second phase,

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with a view to providing public training, demonstration, promotion, and other services for African countries. In the following sections, based on an analysis of the ethnographic field data collected in two countries, T and E, the author will look into and interpret the events, as well as the setbacks and rebound of China’s travelling agricultural technocratic rationality in the daily operations of ATDCs at the early stage. In particular, the author will examine the different perceptions of China and Africa of agriculture and technology, demonstration and promotion, and aid and development. This research was carried out from February 2013 to August 2014. We assigned one researcher for research into each country. Each year, the researcher brought one or two doctoral candidates along to target country for a one- or two-month field study. During the period, the ATDCs were at the stage of technical cooperation. We followed staff members there to observe their daily work and life, including training, demonstration and planning. We also interviewed Chinese staff members and different local stakeholders to further verify and supplement the information we collected. 2.3.1   ATDCs: Physical Space, People and Governance Table 2.1 shows the basic information of the ATDCs in the above two countries. In terms of infrastructure, both ATDCs feature a relatively enclosed physical space that serves the purpose of both life and work. Both are encircled by walls, with dormitories for Chinese employees, offices, conference rooms, dormitories for trainees, and demonstration zones within the walls. Inside the buildings, the decoration and design are mainly in the Chinese style, highlighting the characteristics of the province where the company is based. For example, the ATDC in country T is dubbed “Made by CQ”. The ATDC in country E is designed and built by a contractor in GX province, with all building materials shipped from China. In terms of floor space, each ATDC covers an area of 52–62 hectares. A vast majority of the area is used for experiments and demonstrations of superior-­quality varieties from China, and for comparisons with local varieties as well. There are also experiments and demonstrations of cash crops, such as mushrooms or other vegetables and forage grass. As a typical example of China’s “advanced agricultural technology” and “modern agriculture”, China’s agricultural machines are also demonstrated on some farms.

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Table 2.1  Basic information of the two ATDCs Country Province Project of China undertaker involved (parent company)

Demonstration projects

Distance Area Local partners to the (ha) capital (km)

T

CQ

240

62

Ministry of Agriculture; C Research Institute

E

GX

Rice, maize, vegetables, laying hen breeding, agricultural machinery Maize, wheat, vegetables, forage grass, mushroom, animal husbandry

86

52

Ministry of Agriculture; G Town government responsible for coordination Informal exchanges with AMBO Research Institute nearby

An agricultural high-tech company, focusing particularly on seeds An agricultural high-tech company engaged in modern agricultural industry and development

The ATDCs also serve as the social space for China-Africa cooperation. Therefore, most ATDCs are located in or near the capital of the host country for the convenience of visits by political dignitaries or other activities. presidents or ministers in charge of agriculture of the host countries, as well as Chinese leaders and Chinese ambassadors to the host countries usually attend major events at the ATDCs, such as the handover ceremony, in a bid to highlight the significance of the project. Starting from the commencement of an ATDC construction, senior officials from both China and the host country made frequent visits and the media followed the progress closely. Moreover, ATDCs have been frequently mentioned on important international occasions such as multilateral or bilateral events, so as to emphasize ATDCs’ key role in demonstrating Chinese agricultural technology and ensuring food security in Africa. Visitors to the ATDCs include officials from ministries of agriculture, science and technology, and Education of various countries, local partners at the basic level, Chinese enterprises in Africa, international development organizations,

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researchers, students, people working to promote relevant projects, and farmers. With respect to the staff of ATDCs, there are usually 5 to 13 Chinese staff members, mostly from agricultural research institutions, universities, colleges, companies, or government affiliates in the province of origin of the Chinese company undertaking the project. The company is to take the lead in setting up a temporary operation team. As it is temporary, the team management is loose and flexible. Given that the ATDCs are to perform both non-profit functions like experiments, demonstration and promotion and commercial functions such as production and sales, the team is roughly divided into two parts accordingly. However, the division of labor among team members is relatively vague and subject to change according to specific situations. The distinction between public-interest and commercial functions is not clear-cut. The team leader is usually a middle-aged person with a senior professional title or rich experience in farm management, business operations and aid project management. Team members are generally 20 to 50 years old, mostly incapable of smooth communication with local people. Interpreters are helpful to a certain extent, albeit with limitations. These team members were previously engaged in related work in China. Some are agricultural technical experts in corn, rice, vegetables, tropical crops, animal husbandry, etc., and others may have worked supporting personnel such as drivers, chefs and the like. Many of them worked abroad for the first time. Without the companionship of family members, the Chinese foreign aid workers mostly mingle with Chinese people and spend time within the ATDCs for food, drink and other leisure activities. They mainly rely on the Internet to communicate with family members and could go back to China for a one-month vacation every 12 or 18 months. In general, the Chinese as well as the ATDC staff show diversity in terms of personality and professional background, as well as the organizational structure. The team members’ professional backgrounds, motives, interests, expectations, and status in social life all have profound impact on the daily operations of the ATDCs. Their perceptions and understanding of foreign aid work and the local society have also influenced the daily operations of the ATDCs to a large extent. Meanwhile, “surprises” and disruptions abound as to the nature and identity of the ATDCs.

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2.3.2  China and Africa’s Different Perceptions of “Agriculture” and “Technology” As mentioned earlier, an important way for China’s pursuit of the development path based on technocratic rationality is to make the best use of technology to achieve high agricultural productivity, address food security issues and promote agricultural growth and poverty reduction in a broader sense. However, in the daily operations of the ATDCs, the idea of boosting agricultural productivity by relying simply on technology may experience resistance when it encounters local partners, institutions and culture. In the daily operations of the ATDC in country T, especially in the process of training and demonstration, Chinese experts particularly focused on the introduction and promotion of high-yield hybrid rice varieties. For example, during a farmer training session in March 2013, the author noticed that while explaining technical essentials in the whole process from rice seedling cultivation to harvesting, Chinese experts repeatedly emphasized the excellent performance of China’s agricultural technology, particularly the high yield and efficiency of hybrid rice strains. This constituted a major part of many training programs at ATDCs. During the training session, Chinese experts compared the performances of Chinese and local rice varieties. The highest yield is three tons/ha for local rice varieties in country T, as opposed to the 6–12.5  tons/ha for China’s hybrid rice varieties, which is two to four times the former. Then, the Chinese expert went further to stress that “the top priority in agricultural development is to achieve high yields … The adoption of Chinese hybrid rice varieties is a sure way to increase yields and income.” The remark found an echo in the pictures of drooping ears of rice hanging on the wall and the billowing rice fields in the ATDCs’ experimental fields. However, it has not been a smooth process for country T to accept the Chinese perception of promoting agricultural development through technology, in particular, giving priority to increasing the yields of major food crops, in a bid to lay a solid foundation for national development. An official from the local partner M said: For rice, aroma is more important than high yield. We used to have many high-­ yield rice varieties, but found it difficult to promote them among local farmers. For example, the average yield of IR54 can reach 65 tons per hectare on large farms and 9 tons/ha on small farms. This Japan-funded project was implemented in A and K.  But it was the lack of aroma that made it difficult to promote the varieties.

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M from the Ministry of Agriculture of country T and some local farmers also share this view: Technically, China’s high-yield varieties are indeed awesome. However, in our opinion, they are not as good as the local variety SARO, because Chinese varieties have no aroma. In fact, rice carries a special cultural significance, instead of being simply a staple food for local people. In general, only the upper-middle class in country T can afford rice, while for ordinary people, the primary staple food is maize while rice is only for special occasions.

It is evident that the local people have endowed agriculture with some special sociocultural meaning. For locals, it is important to develop technology for better “aroma”, rather than simply higher yields. After getting wise to the local people’s views on the aroma of rice, the Chinese experts held varied opinions. W said that he had never heard of it. L thought that this was an excuse of the T government to reject Chinese hybrid rice. Aroma? I do not think it matters. Without the current seed franchise policy adopted by the T government, I’m sure that local farmers will choose our affordable and high-yield rice strains.

The person in charge of the ATDC noted that, It’s to our surprise that they had such a strict seed franchise policy. It takes nearly five years for us to complete the application, experiment and demonstration processes before the hybrid rice varieties can be promoted. Moreover, local farmers won’t buy hybrid rice seeds every year, nor can they afford them. Meanwhile, the government is incapable of providing subsidies for local farmers to buy seeds of high-yield varieties.

L said, “I now realize that it is impossible to promote hybrid rice varieties here.” He may be too pessimistic. The local partner M in country T and the person in charge of the ATDC pointed out that pilot work is being carried out at multiple localities. “We are doing our best to speed up the application process, but it takes time”. Under such difficult circumstances, why does the ATDC persist in the promotion of hybrid rice, rather than switching to maize, the primary staple food for the locals? In the opinion of someone from the project undertaker,

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Rice varieties have been a core competitive edge of China since the 1980s. Since we are here to demonstrate, it’s natural for us to show our most advantageous products. In terms of maize cultivation, we lack comparative technical advantages and they already got quite mature varieties. Moreover, what we demonstrate is yellow maize that’s mainly used by locals as fodder. What they eat is white maize and we have no advantage in this regard.

This shows that the logic behind the ATDC’s selection of technology is to demonstrate China’s best technological competitiveness in modern agriculture and development model to the greatest extent. The same logic applies to country E. It means only the most advanced agricultural technology of China is eligible, despite the low possibility of large-scale promotion in the country. An agricultural official from country E spoke the minds of the local people. “It’s the future of our country’s agriculture! It should be a future of large-scale production based on a complete array of facilities and machinery. We cannot always lag behind.” China’s high-yield technology brings motivation and reference for the local governments and farmers to fulfill the vision of “food self-sufficiency”. It can be seen that during the daily operations of the ATDCs, the project undertakers studied the policies for China-Africa agricultural cooperation and gave full play to their own technical advantages in line with the local conditions. In this way, they helped China’s perceptions of “agriculture” and “technology” travel to African countries. However, it is clear that such perceptions and their application in practice stemmed solely from China’s own development experience, and thus encountered a series of setbacks incurred by traditional local values, socioeconomic structures, policies, and systems in their host countries in Africa. Furthermore, the differences in ideas and values between Chinese foreign aid experts and local workers and farmers in Africa were offset by African officials’ visions about “modern agriculture” and a “bright future” promised by China’s high-yield agricultural technology. Guided by such a mixed knowledge system, the front-line staff from both China and the African host country have been constantly modifying, adjusting and enriching the original macro policies and plans to blaze a trail that is different from the one originally charted.

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2.3.3  China and Africa’s Different Perceptions of “Demonstration” and “Promotion” According to the macro plan, demonstration and promotion are the core functions of ATDCs, but China and Africa have different view about what such functions entail exactly and how they should be performed. In the opinion of Chinese experts, demonstration means to conduct comparative studies and pilot programs to explore how Chinese technology can help Africa. In the macro design of ATDCs, demonstration plays a vital role in displaying China’s advanced modern technology to African countries. As many Chinese experts endow it with great political significance, demonstration is more about the display of China’s “development miracle” than its technology. Therefore, they would try their best to create a viable environment for the demonstration. In the case of the ATDC in country E, it took almost a year for the experiment site to be determined. Since there were no water sources at the original site, the plan needed to be adjusted to secure extra budget for four wells for irrigation. Water is a key element of the Eight-Point Charter of Agriculture. Chinese people believe that water plays a decisive role in the success of the demonstration. The lack of water would make it impossible to fully demonstrate China’s advanced agricultural technology. In contrast, the ATDC in country T was not as lucky as that in country E, not being able to secure a sound irrigation system prior to the start of the phase of technical cooperation. The Chinese team in the ATDC in country T was bothered by the irrigation system for nearly three years. They tried various means within reach, including convening meetings with partners, reporting to senior Chinese officials, urging the Ministry of Agriculture of country T to honor the previous agreement and initiate the construction of an irrigation system. However, the efforts have not borne fruits due to the lack of fund from country T’s government and poor coordination. The person in charge of the ATDC said: Without an irrigation system, the land of 50 hectares outside the demonstration area won’t be able to be used for demonstration. As such, our work was limited to areas with 24-hour water supply. But so far, we’ve fulfilled our tasks.

However, local partners at the basic level held different views on the ATDC’s practices in demonstration and promotion. They thought that

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the Chinese team should take on more responsibilities while appreciating China’s advanced technology. For instance, a technician of country T said, I think they are still at the stage of research, but we must be award that this is a demonstration center, not a research center. Technicians need to walk outside the ATDC and interact more with locals in the fields, instead of limiting their work within the ATDC.

In this regard, Chinese experts think that after the demonstration tasks are accomplished, if the technology is highly regarded by the locals, the local government or local technical partners should take the lead in promoting the technology and Chinese experts are ready to provide assistance when necessary. In the case of country E, the Chinese experts at the ATDC complained about the local government and the promotion service departments’ low efficiency and poor performance in promoting the ATDC’s technologies. As a Chinese technical expert said, “They kept speaking highly of our technology, but when we discuss with them the promotion of the technology among farmers, they would keep silent. They mentioned long ago sending a local person to cooperate with us at the ATDC, but we haven’t seen one. I have no idea why they kept putting it off.” Something similar happened to the other ATDC too. Nevertheless, some Chinese experts have tried to communicate with local farmers by various means. In particular, as the three-year technical cooperation phase was to end in 2015, the ATDCs came under greater pressure from all sides. Countries T and E launched technology promotion in 2014. Q has been in charge of technology promotion and sustainable development at the ATDC in Country T since March 2014. He pointed out a series of challenges in the promotion process. “China has established relatively stable partnerships among the government, researchers, promotion workers, and farmers engaged in pilot projects. However, the situation in country T is different. First, in China, the field work is usually done by farmers under our guidance, but in country T, we need to do the field work ourselves. The reason is that after communicating with the local people, I’m not sure whether they can strictly follow the technical process. Second, the promotion work needs to be done together with local staff members, but the local technology system in Africa is not conducive to bringing technology to households. Third, unlike the Chinese government, the local government is incapable of mobilizing the farmers or providing financial subsidies to push ahead with new technologies.” It

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is evident that the connections among African governments, research institutes and farmers are very weak. As mentioned earlier, a core feature of China’s technocratic rationality lies in the government’s leading role. In the process of demonstrating and promoting agricultural technology, the interaction and coordination between the central and local governments directly led to the establishment and consolidation of the coordination mechanisms among governments (both central and local), technical personnel and farmers. Therefore, when Chinese experts who were familiar with such Chinese mechanisms went to Africa for demonstration and promotion work, they were expecting the same support from the African government and the local research institutes. However, unlike their Chinese counterparts, most African governments lack the capabilities to mobilize financial and human resources. For example, in the case of the ATDCs in the countries T and E, the most frequently mentioned factor that hinders the participation of local governments is the per diem system. Originated in the United Kingdom in the fourteenth century, the system was later adopted by various aid organizations and has been commonly used in African countries. This is an “external incentive” system intended to encourage staff members to attend meetings or go on business trips. Local government organs often lack sufficient financial resources and promotion systems to motivate government officials to take an active part in foreign aid projects. China failed to take this into account when planning and implementing the ATDC program. Therefore, the fragmenting relations between the governments, research institutes, and agricultural administration authorities in African countries seriously hinder the effective operation of technocratic rationality advocated by the ATDCs. 2.3.4  China and Africa’s Different Perceptions of “Aid” and “Development” The vehicles of the ATDC in country T bear two distinctive signs. One is the sign of “DFP” for “donor-funded project” on their rear license plates. The other is the sign of “China-T Agricultural Development Co. Ltd.”. The signs highlighted the dual nature of the ATDCs both as a vehicle to transfer Chinese agricultural technology to Africa and as a platform to help Chinese culture “go global”. As mentioned earlier, such “aid-business” or a public-private-partnership (PPP) model is seen as an innovation that can enhance the sustainability of aid projects. China believes that aid alone

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cannot achieve development. As Chinese ambassador to country M pointed out, “No country in the world can develop soled with aid … Economic development is a country’s internal affair and the country must count on itself for that”. Such a view on aid and development stems from China’s experience in receiving foreign aid during periods of socialist construction and reform and opening up. During the period of socialist construction, China explicitly put forward the principle of “relying mainly on one’s own efforts while making external assistance supplementary”. During the period of reform and opening up, China’s opening-up policies brought in new technologies, policies, methods and concepts from the West, which contributed to the country’s modernization (Zhou 2008). Meanwhile, however, China firmly adhered to the principle of “putting our own needs first”. Unlike the rapidly changing discourse in the field of international development, China’s perception of aid features more continuity. It has been consistent in stressing that aid must ultimately serve the independent development of the country (Bräutigam 2009: 35), while deeming that the main driving force for development lies in the marketoriented reforms, thriving businesses and entrepreneurship. This shows that China’s perception of aid and development is different from that of the West and Africa. The development studies on aid in China lag far behind that in developed countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries. It did not attract attention until recently as a result of increasingly frequent exchanges between China and Africa, the development of G20 and the global financial crisis (Haan 2011). A large quantity of development studies in China have been mostly about how to make better use of existing capital, labor, technology, entrepreneurship, policies, and market mechanisms to promote domestic economic growth and transformation, with scant attention to aid. Such a situation has led to a rather blurred boundary between aid and business in Chinese academic discussions, and some studies even referred to aid directly as “aid investment”. Moreover, in China, there are no training programs for aid workers or think tanks dedicated to promoting the research and practice in this regard. In other words, the current aid policies and practices of China have been a result of “wading across the river by feeling for the stones”. Without guidance from systematic theoretical thinking, such policies and practices are fragmented, discontinuous, vague, varied, and under great influence of China’s development path towards a market economy.

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The above knowledge landscape directly gave rise to the obvious disparities between the ATDCs’ daily operations and other existing development assistance projects. Such disparities are manifested in multiple aspects, such as the symbols, professional skills, standard processes, and dominant schedules and discourses. The existing international development system dominated by the West largely features clear logic for planning, well-defined term of reference (TOR), uniform training manuals and procedures, and elaborated and well-developed monitoring and evaluation system, as well as keywords such as social gender, climate change and Millennium Development Goals. By comparison, the routine practice of Chinese aid project feature blurred distinction between aid and business, the Chinese staff’s plight of defining identities, tension between the profitability of businesses and the public-interest nature of aid projects, the conflicts between the needs and expectations of various stakeholders, and uncertainty about the management model of the ATDCs. On the one hand, the aid workers or experts at ATDCs are under the leadership and supervision of the central and local governments, as well as the parent company at home. On the other hand, they are facing an array of problems in daily operations abroad concerning technical suitability, marketing, operating costs, pursuit of cooperative projects, language barriers, cultural conflicts, and so on. To sum up, ATDCs have multi-layered, decentralized and complex management structure. In line with the mainstream Chinese understanding of aid and development, the front-line aid workers from China regard aid merely as a supplementary means of promoting development. They believe that the actual local development depends mainly on the initiative of local stakeholders, instead of aid personnel. Therefore, aid workers are eager to see local partners who are active and deeply involved in relevant training, demonstration and promotion work. This also explains the aid workers’ disappointment and incomprehension about the local governments’ lack of enthusiasm about building an irrigation system and technology promotion. In the eyes of Africans, on the contrary, Chinese aid projects operate differently from the aid they previously received from the West and Japan. As a front-line technician from country T commented, I’ve been working with Japan International Cooperation Agency a lot. They are particularly good at making detailed plans. For example, they send me schedules prior to the training session. They also provide participants with labor allowances. In the case of ATDC, however, they provide no more information

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other than that there will be a training program. Therefore, I would rather call it an ad hoc meeting than a training session.

In fact, China and Africa’s different perceptions of “agriculture”, “technology”, “demonstration” and “promotion”, in the final analysis, originated from their different understandings of “aid” and “development”. Such differences and conflicts have become a part of the ATDCs’ daily operations and continuously shape the ATDCs on the micro level. In this process, Chinese staff at the basic level kept adjusting their perceptions and understanding of practices based on the following considerations: First, the feedback from Chinese ministries of commerce and agriculture and the project undertaking companies based on supervision and evaluation. Second, the suggestions from the basic-level partners and the high-­ level ministry of agriculture or science and technology of the host countries of ATDCs. Third, the pressure of competition with the models of the country’s other donors in practice, such as the World Bank, US Agency for International Development, and Japan International Cooperation Agency.

2.4   Conclusions and Discussions Due to the limit of research duration and space, this chapter merely covers the initial stage of the ATDCs’ operations in Africa. It shows the setbacks and rebounds of Chinese development concepts and perceptions, or to say, the travelling agricultural technocratic rationality, in the operations of the ATDCs at the micro level against the backdrop of an entirely different socioeconomic culture and political system in Africa. However, if we broaden our horizons and cover a longer period, we will see different stories. In different countries involved in our case studies, the Chinese and African staff members at the basic level have been continually adapting to and learning from one another in their daily work and exchanges. Such an interactive process of mutual learning is of great significance to the China-­ Africa cooperation in a macro sense, indicating the foundation and process of developing a new type of China-Africa relations. Guided by the principle of “going global” in the new era, the ATDC with a standardized design has been established in 23 African countries and engaged in multiple interactions with locals in political, social and economic spheres. In this sense, the author reckons that the ATDC cannot be simply defined as a platform for transnational technology transfer. It is actually an embodiment of a set of development ideas originated in China

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and visions of agricultural development in contemporary Africa, such as the functions of agriculture, the meaning of development, the governments’ role in technological progress and technology promotion, and the approaches to development with the help of aid rather than complete reliance on aid. This set of ideas and imaginations is completely different from the established CG system, or the Western multilateral or bilateral aid programs. In the process of daily operations, ATDCs not only transfer technology to Africa, but also convey China’s perceptions and concepts of modern development to Africa and the world. In fact, since the mid-to-late nineteenth century, Western colonial empires represented by the United Kingdom and Germany have sent a large number of technical experts to Africa through the colonial regime. Furthermore, they established a colonial technology governance system, incorporating a bureaucratic institutional setup, classified personnel training mechanisms, and specialized research and experiment methods (Hodge 2007: 9–10). The system largely survived the Second World War and became an integral part of the post-war international development scheme. It reflects a West-centric historical pursuit which aims to change the socioeconomic and cultural development process of non-Western countries. This pursuit is highly legitimate within the framework of the modernization theory. It can be said that the West dedicated massive time and energy to establish a CG system in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other places through the expansion of their territories. To a certain extent, they contributed to the progress of agricultural science and technology in Africa, boosted local productivity and put in place specific knowledge and technological systems, such as the farming system and the participatory rural assessment (PRA). In practice, over the past 60-plus years, however, the system has repeatedly fallen into the trap of low efficiency or inefficiency as a result of an imbalanced power structure. In this context, the Western development community has been closely watching the foreign aid practices of emerging countries, including China, in a bid to explore new and alternative development models. In theory, the daily operations and the development concepts embodied by ATDCs have, by means of mutual adaption between different groups in terms of their mentality, discourse systems, legends, folk customs, knowledge, and learning methods, opened up a new world in the field of international development and constructed a “new world of aid” (Mosse 2011). This “new world of aid” became a valuable asset for international development studies, highlighting the specific direction of

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“alternative development models”. In this regard, this chapter uses micro-­ level ethnographic materials in response to various discussions about China’s aid practices in international development studies, such as the significance of “alternative development models” and the meaning of the Beijing Consensus which is entirely different from existing international development assistance. Although the current research on this “alternative” form is still in its infancy and it is difficult to draw conclusions yet, its profound implications are evident. It foreshadows the emergence of a new type of relationship between “the other” and “the self”, represents a breakthrough in the West-centric knowledge production and program development which has been in place for a long time, and gives prominence to the “subjectivity” of self-cognition. For Africa and other low-­ income developing countries, this “subjectivity in development” means more development models to choose from. This alternative model is no longer guided by a simple emphasis on changing “the other”, in a bid to avoid the binary and divisive relationship featuring tensions between “the self” and “the other”. Instead, by virtue of such macro-discourse as “win-­ win”, “mutual benefits”, “South-South cooperation”, as well as micro-­ practices of “wading across the river by feeling for the stones” and “learning by doing”, the alternative model puts emphasis on a parallel and harmonious relationship between “the self” and “the other”. It attaches importance to equal political status, the similarities in development issues, and the similar conditions required to solve problems encountered. It focuses on sharing the experience of parallel development and provides an effective path for new development knowledge, thereby becoming a divergence from traditional development knowledge (Li 2015a). For China, the development of subjectivity means that the intellectual community needs to dig deeper into China’s development history and practical experience, while vigorously getting to know more about the diversity of the world. Whether “the other” refers to the West or Africa, China has gained the possibility to re-examine itself, which has great implications for China and the world. Finally, we will get back to the initial questions about Western modernity. Following the geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century and the subsequent Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, especially the expansion of colonialism that began in the late eighteenth century and the establishment of progressive ideas in the nineteenth century, the modernity originated from the West has travelled around the world and set up a rigid modern system based on system building. The connotation

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of these elements has been continuously enriched in the process of historical transformations, including individualism, modern technology, market mechanisms, nation states, limited government, civil society, and gender. These discourses and institutional forces have been too powerful to be neglected in any modern way of life. These elements also travelled to China and Africa, giving rise to mixed modern systems with local characteristics as a result of various local responses to them. These mixed systems now meet through China-Africa cooperation, presenting a more diverse and complex cultural and institutional landscape. To gain in-depth understanding of this landscape, we need to revisit history and what we have been through. For example, as far as this chapter is concerned, we need to take a closer look at technocratic rationality. Is it proper to refer to it as “China’s technocratic rationality”? The three core elements of technocratic rationality, namely nationalism, supremacy of technology, and productivity, and the application of the market mechanism, are originally core concepts from the West. In this case, we need to go further to ask ourselves the following questions. What new characteristics have these core elements developed after being introduced to China? What changes have occurred after they travelled to Africa? For a more in-depth analysis of these questions, besides focusing on the direction of future practices, we need careful review of the history of world development since the fifteenth century to come up with new narratives. This is the only way to properly answer the questions about the uniqueness of China.

References C. Alden & D. Large, 2011, “China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of Delivering Difference in Africa”, Journal of Contemporary China, 20: 68, pp. 21–38. C.  Alden, 2013, China and the Long March into African Agriculture, Cahiers Agricultures, Vol. 22, No. 1,pp. 16–21. D.  Bräutigam & X.  Tang, 2009, China’s Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside, The China Quarterly, 199, pp. 686–706. D. Bräutigam, 2009, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. L.  Buckley, 2013a, Chinese Agricultural Cooperation in Africa: Narratives and Politics, IDS Bulletin, 44 (4):pp. 42–52. L.  Buckley, 2013b, Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal, Development and Change, 44 (2), pp. 429–450.

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David Mosse, 2011, Adventure in Aidland: The Anthropology of Expertise and Professionals in International Development, Berghahn Books: Oxford, p. 21. De Haan, 2011, Will China Change International Development as We Know It? Journal of International Development, No. 23, pp. 881–908. Y. Hairong, B. Sautman, 2010, Chinese Farms in Zambia: From Socialist to Agro-­ imperialist Engagement?, African and Asian Studies, 9 (3), pp. 307–333. J. M. Hodge, 2007, Triumph of the Expert-Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism, Ohio University Press, Athens, pp. 9–10. J.  Huang, R.  Hu, 2004, China’s Agricultural Research System and Reforms: Challenges and Implications to the Developing Countries, Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 1 (1) June, pp. 1–17. H. Jiang, 2013. Offering Agricultural Technologies to Africa (1971–1983): Study on the Assistance Model and Outcomes in Africa. Foreign Affairs Review, (1). P. Kragelund, 2008, The Return of Non-DAC Donors to Africa: New Prospects for African Development, Development Policy Review, 26, pp. 555–584. X. Li et al., 2012, Agricultural Development in China and Africa: A Comparative Analysis, Routledge, Abingdon, UK. X. Li, D. Banik, L. Tang, 2014, “Difference or Indifference: China’s Development Assistance Unpacked” IDS Bulletin, 45 (4): pp. 22–35. G.  Mohan, 2008, China in Africa: A Review Essay, Review of African Political Economy, 35 (155), pp. 155–166. Z. Niu, 2014, China’s Development and Its Aid Presence in Africa: A Critical Reflection from the Perspective of Development Anthropology, Journal of Asian and African Studies, published online. P. Nyiri, 2006, “The Yellow Man’s Burden: Chinese Migrants on A Civilizing Mission”, The China Journal, No. 56, pp. 83–106. G. Qi, J. Luo, 2011. Study on the History of Sino-Africa Agricultural Cooperation and Implications. China Agricultural University Journal of Social Sciences Edition, (4). J.  Sato, H.  Shiga, T.  Kobayashi, 2011, Emerging Donors from A Recipient Perspective: An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia, World Development,(39)12, pp. 2091–2104. I.  Scoones, L.  Cabral, H.  Tugendhat, 2013, New Development Encounters: China and Brazil in African Agriculture, IDS Bulletin, 44 (4), pp. 1–19. C.  Six, 2009, The Rise of Postcolonial State as Donors: A Challenge to the Development Paradigm? Third World Quarterly, pp. 1103–1121. M. Tan‐Mullins, G. Mohan & M. Power, 2010, “Redefining ‘aid’ in the China– Africa context”, Development and Change, 41 (5), 857–881. X. Tang, 2013, Evolution and Effects of Management Mode of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa. World Economics and Politics, (5). J. Wen, 2011, Africa: A Lifetime of Memories--My Experiences and Understanding of Africa, China Commerce and Trade Press, 226; 227, 232, 234–238.

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X. Xu, 2004, Research on Agricultural Science and Technology Policy for the Poor, China Agricultural University. W. Yun, 2000, China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa from the Viewpoint of International Assistance. West Asia and Africa, (2). H. Zhou, 2008, China’s 30 Years of Reform and Opening up, World Economy and Politics, No. 11, pp. 33–43.

CHAPTER 3

Closing-Gap Experience Sharing in Foreign Aid: A Learning Process Based on Construction and Embedding

Training is doubtlessly a gradual process of making a positive impact. The locals do need the assistance from China, the help of experts with technical training and agricultural improvement. This will give them a favorable view of China, of the sincerity and kindness of the Chinese people. They will feel China is indeed an advanced country. —Leader of an ATDC expert group in country T

3.1   Introduction For a long time, China’s social scientists with a research interest in Chinese society have conducted their research merely within the country. This, however, might prove inadequate as China, now part of a closely interconnected world, interacts with the rest of the world in a way that is different from the Western society, presenting new materials for researchers. Some scholars have called for a shift of attention from the “inside” to the “outside” and advocated a closer look at the world after opening up to it (Gao 2009, 2010, 2014). Others proposed using the “outside world” as a mirror to “examine ourselves,” to better know ourselves through China’s going-global process. Only by a comparison with societies that are different from us in cultures and structures, can we fully and objectively understand ourselves. China is connected with the world in such aspects as economy, trade, political diplomacy, cultural exchanges, immigration, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0_3

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technology transfer, and foreign aid. Among them, foreign aid involves economics, politics, nations, individuals, technology, and culture, and thus makes an “ideal” object of study. What’s equally important is that the current international aid environment makes it significant and possible to compare, reflect, transform and innovate China’s foreign aid research. With the transition of some aid receivers to aid givers, the concept of international aid has shifted from the “aid effectiveness” to “development effectiveness.” The conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals was followed by the Post-2015 Development Agenda. In this context, due to the difference in concepts, models and characteristics between China and the traditional Western aid projects, China’s foreign aid has attracted worldwide attention and discussions and became the focus of studies on international aids. Two hotspot issues in China’s foreign aid have attracted continuous attention of the media and academia, that is, “Africa” and “agriculture.” As a continent concentrated with the least developed and low-income countries in the world, Africa tops the world in the number of beneficiary countries of China’s foreign aid. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation initiated by the Chinese government in 2000 has become a special platform for China-Africa cooperation, putting in place an important development framework and mechanism for China’s assistance to Africa. Since agriculture is closely related to food security, poverty reduction and better life for people, and plays a fundamental role in the economies of recipient countries, it has been given priority in China’s foreign aid. In addition, given the remarkable achievements China has made in agriculture over the past three decades, African countries have been eager to learn from China’s experience. China has much to share with the African countries in terms of agricultural production models, development strategies and policies, agricultural science and technology extension, and technology diffusion systems (Li et al. 2011). Therefore, although China’s agricultural aid to Africa made up a small proportion of the total aids, it is a foreign aid practice that is rich in content and at the focus of attention and discussion. As scholars, policy makers and development practitioners are getting more interested in China’s agricultural aid to Africa, combined with the mystery of China’s aid practices incurred by lack of transparency, a large number of scholars have conducted studies in an attempt to unmask China’s agricultural aid to Africa, with a view to exploring its essence (Alden 2007; Bräutigam 2009; Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Buckley 2013b). Existing literatures show three main viewpoints about the essence

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of China’s agricultural aid to Africa: experience sharing, business activity and land grabbing. Researchers holding the view of “experience sharing” tried to sum up China’s agricultural and rural development experience to help Africa accelerate development and reduce poverty (Fan et al. 2010; Rotberg 2008; Banik 2013; Li et al. 2013). For instance, Martin Ravallion (2009) mentioned two lessons drawn from China’s agriculture development experience for Africa. First, market incentives and public support are used to help increase farming productivity. Second, strong leadership at all levels of government and good public administration are put in place. Although the “experience-sharing” discourse has been widely accepted and supported by the Chinese government and many Chinese scholars, the evidence in practice indicates that there are close links between private sectors and agricultural aid, which has raised doubts about the commercial motives of the aid. Relevant quantitative data shows that business activities, trade and investment are at the core of China-Africa economic relations (Wang 2007). In agriculture, the “Friendship Farm” is both a diplomatic activity and a part of foreign investment. An empirical study found that Chinese companies engaged in “Friendship Farms” are about to enter the local markets in South Africa within a few years (Ganho 2013). However, the aid project in such special public-­ private partnership (PPP) model managed by companies was regarded by Li et al. (2012) as an attempt to replicate the Chinese agricultural extension model in Africa, which is required by enduring and sustainable development (Bräutigam and Tang 2009). In recent years, the media coverage about land grabbing has brought about heated discussions. Land grabbing is seen as a form of neocolonialism, as well as the main target of Western criticism about China’s agricultural aid to Africa. Some researchers believe that China’s land transactions around the world serve as a means to satisfy the demand for food production in consequence of rapid industrialization, urbanization and population growth (Grain 2008; Wild and Mepham 2006). Some researchers pointed out that China has no intention of using Africa as its overseas planting base for staple food grain (Bräutigam and Ekman 2012). Bräutigam and Tang noted that there is no evidence to support the assertion that specific projects are conducted to help China acquire land masses in Tanzania and Senegal. The varied viewpoints of numerous studies reflect the complexity of China’s agricultural aid to Africa. Such complexity needs to be understood in the context of Chinese history, culture and domestic development

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experience, as well as on the basis of regarding China’s agricultural aid to Africa as a process of dynamic interaction among multiple subjects. At the same time, globalization has granted cultural studies with new directions and significance. Against the backdrop of “globalization,” the cultures of various countries and regions in the world constitute a global multidimensional network of mutual collisions, exchanges and interactions. No culture is completely passive in cultural collisions. Culture is fluid in space, and it is more created than inherited over time (Wong 1999). From a cultural point of view, foreign aid represents a process that the donor country’s culture enters a society with different cultures through a vehicle in the form of a project, and then collides and interacts with the local culture. Previous anthropological studies on the cultural aspect of aid have focused on how the aid projects affect the local society and culture through interactions. Such studies are based on the assumption that “society is the product of humankind.” With the emergence of donor countries, especially the rapid development of China’s foreign aid in recent years, a new phenomenon has stirred a debate in the academic world. That is, why China’s foreign aid displays many characteristics that are different from those of the traditional Western aid? In practice, how does China’s foreign aid with new characteristics interact with the local society and culture of the recipient country in a way different from that of the Western culture? A single cultural perspective will not suffice to answer these questions. We need to adopt a dual perspective to combine that “man is the product of society” with that “society is the product of humankind,” so as to transcend the binary opposition of structure and agency. The Practice Theory dating back to the 1980s provides a theoretical framework and foundations for studies into aid practice. The basic idea of the practice theory is that society is a system that is extremely compulsory, yet it can be produced and transformed by human actions and interactions. The practice theory treats development as a category of practice (Mosse 2013). That is, development, as a way for people to understand the world, becomes produced and reproduced, and in a certain historical circumstance, cultural logic and subjectiveness does the delineation of development originate (Curtis and Spencer 2012). As a leading advocate of practice theory, Bourdieu believes that practice is the product of a dialectical relationship between habitus, field and capital. Actors in practice dialectically interact with the field structure by virtue of the habitus. The habitus guides and drives actors to engage in various practices to shape and construct the field, while constantly creating and regenerating the

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habitus itself. Meanwhile, the habitus is constrained by the field structure, while the field structure exercises restraints on practices by shaping the habitus. Therefore, practice is both active and passive (Yin 2004). The actor and the formation of structure are not two series of established phenomenon that are independent of each other, but are repeatedly produced in the interactions (Lv and Zhou 2009). The practice theory has been revelatory to our research. While studying China’s foreign aid projects from a cultural perspective, we draw on the practice theory to transcend the analytical paradigm of binary opposition between structure and agency, and focus on both the impact of social and cultural structure on practical behaviors and the process in which the individual practices reproduce social culture through interactions between different cultures. Based on a micro-level ethnographic field survey of a China-funded ATDC, this study treats China’s aid practice as a process of embedding China’s domestic development experience into aid practices for reproduction and localization in a place with different cultures. Based on a cultural perspective, this study draws on the practice theory to transcend the analytical paradigm of binary opposition between structure and agency. In this way, the study analyzes the cultural process in aid practices both vertically and horizontally. Vertical analysis factors in historical context to study the process in which Chinese development experience was embedded into aid practices, spread in space and inherited over time. Horizontal analysis demonstrates the process in which active subjects from difficult cultures reproduce and localize their experience through interaction. The aid practice mainly comprises three parts, namely enterprise contracting, cooperative operation, and knowledge transfer. They represent the path of embedding China’s development experience into the aid practice, as well as the process of reproducing and localizing experience by active subjects in aid practice.

3.2   Embedded Experience and Practice of Enterprises as Project Contractors The ATDC project is a technical cooperation project initiated by the Chinese government. The project operation is market-based. Enterprise serves as the subject of project construction and implementation, while being responsible for commercial exploration of the project’s sustainable operation in the future. The project operation is carried out in a way that

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“governments set up the stage, various departments cooperate and enterprises put in the show.” Tang et al. (2014) summarized the project management model as follows—The Ministry of Commerce manages the experts, financial affairs and process of aid projects, the Ministry of Agriculture provides technical support, contractors are responsible for the operation and management, and the counterpart departments of the recipient country engage in direct management and assistance of the project. Given that aid is non-profit international public goods, the operation by profit-driven enterprises is bound to spark disputes over the relationship between public good and pursuit of profit. Western aid has gone through a transition from the combination of aid, trade and investment in the early colonial period to the gradual separation of the three after World War II.  Some Western scholars pointed out that the current Western aid ethics that advocate the separation among aid, trade and investment has been challenged by emerging donor countries, especially China. Some Western scholars reckon that China’s foreign aid is intended for economic benefits. However, such view usually ignores the difference between China and the West in terms of international political and economic context to provide aids, while failing to taking into account the impact of China’s domestic development experience. Take the ATDC as an example, the enterprises’ participation in China’s aid to Africa is a new attempt based on China’s domestic development experience, the considerations about project sustainability and the strategy for agriculture to “go global.” 3.2.1  Origin of Enterprise Contracting System Firstly, the institution arrangement for enterprises to undertake aid projects is an extension of China’s experience in market-oriented reforms during the course of China’s domestic reform and opening up. China’s agricultural aid to Africa has been developed based on specific domestic development experience. With respect to institutional design for aid project, government organs, as the initiator and designer of aid projects, have been influenced by the government’s thinking and experience in the domestic development process. Looking back at the institutional characteristics of China’s foreign agricultural assistance since 1960, you may find that the institution of each period has been an extension of China’s development experience. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, as China was

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undergoing a period of planned economy, the foreign aid also featured a high degree of state control and a unified allocation of resources. Tang et al. (2014) referred to the aid model during this period as the “statecontrolled management model.” This model changed with the launch of economic structural reform in China at the end of the 1970s. The reform has endowed the market an increasingly important role in the allocation of economic resources. As China gradually separated administration from management, some administrative departments carried out market-oriented reforms to set up enterprises for market-oriented operations. China’s foreign aid work during this period was also affected by market-oriented and economic structural reforms. The Chinese government proposed that foreign aid work should take “economic development as the central task” (Zhu 2011). The market-oriented and commercialized reforms of aid agencies also brought about changes to the models of China’s aid to Africa. During this period, China’s agricultural assistance to Africa has taken the main model of enterprise contracting. The evolution in the models of China’s assistance to Africa has been closely related to the market-oriented reforms in China. The gradually market-­based operation of aid projects mirrored China’s development experience (Tang 2013). Domestic market-oriented reforms are, through a series of joint action mechanisms, manifested in the foreign aid projects across time and space. At the same time, the commercialized reform of China’s agricultural technology extension system affected the way of technology extension in China’s foreign aid in agriculture. In 1989, China introduced the commercialized reform of domestic agricultural technology extension system, allowing agricultural technology extension units to set up their own departments for sales and operation of agricultural means of production. The project contracting enterprise ZY in this research has been established as a result of the commercialized reform of local agricultural research institute. In essence, this unique model of corporate participation in foreign aid is an institutional continuance of China’s domestic development experience in Chinese government’s overseas activities. It reflects the statemarket relationship in the most recent period, featuring the market’s dominant role and the government’s role in guidance, administration and supervision. This is a root cause for institutional differences between China and traditional Western countries in terms of foreign aid. Secondly, the institution arrangement for enterprises to undertake aid projects is an attempt out of the consideration for project sustainability. Among a large number of China’s agricultural assistance projects over the

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past more than a half century, most of them face problems of sustainable development. The projects were off to a good start with efficient operation, but when the Chinese experts withdrew and transferred the projects to local counterpart, the operation went wrong quite soon towards the fate of being shut down, stopped, merged or transferred. Moreover, the project operation was highly dependent on government fund. In response, relevant departments are actively exploring measures to make Chinese technicians stay in Africa for a long time and take root there. In this way, instead of a short-term and superficial impact, an in-depth and enduring impact of the aid projects is intended for the agricultural improvement in recipient countries. The main approach has been to combine aid with market and maintain and support the aid projects through corporate operation (Tang 2013). The corporate (public-institution) system has been introduced into the ATDC project. In terms of funding, the government will stop investment in the project three years after it is put into operation. Then, the public-welfare activities of the project shall be funded by the profit from products experimented and demonstrated in the ATDC and the enterprise’s profits from production. In terms of management, the technical staff from Chinese enterprises will stay in the recipient country for a long time to maintain technical and operational sustainability of the project. Finally, the institutional arrangement for Chinese enterprises to undertake aid projects serves China’s agricultural strategy of “going global.” Whether it is as a part of the national strategy for food security or the business operation strategy, agricultural enterprises’ “going global” has become an inevitable trend in the development of China’s agricultural industry. Since the 1990s, China has adopted an approach to integrate foreign aid, economy and trade, and mutually beneficial cooperation. Foreign aid has become an important instrument for China to boost exports, guarantee the supply of resources, and create more opportunities for domestic enterprises to “go global” (Meibo and Ailan 2013). The main idea of promoting domestic agricultural enterprises to “go global” through foreign aid projects is to, on the basis of consolidating achievements of foreign aid projects, gradually expand the scale of foreign agricultural aid, innovate the approaches of agricultural aid, and integrate with the agricultural strategy of “going global” as well (Zhang and Yang 2014). With the introduction of enterprises as main contractors of ATDC projects, it is hoped that Chinese enterprises (public institutions) could take advantage of the platform to “go global,” make best use of “two sorts of

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resources and two markets,” and enhance their competitiveness.1 Zhang and Yang (2014) pointed out that the ATDC funded by China has gradually become an effective way to boost the export of Chinese agricultural talents, technology and means of production. 3.2.2  Reproduction of Government-Enterprise Relations 3.2.2.1 Coupling of Government and Corporate Interests In consideration of the principle of mutual benefit and the sustainable development of aid projects, the ATDC project enters the phase of sustainable development after three years of technical cooperation. During the phase, enterprises are expected to achieve industrialized development based on project work in a bid to attain the dual goals of corporate profitability and sustainable development of the aid project’s public-welfare functions. This guideline runs through the project and the exploration of a path for enterprise’ industrialized development begins from the initial phase of project design. The project design document proposes relevant measures to promote contracting enterprises to engage in profitable production and operation activities through the aid project. “Since enterprises (public institutions) need to survive and develop, it is understandable for them to pursue profits in operation. If unprofitable, it is hard for any enterprise to simply serve the public good for a long time. Therefore, it is necessary to provide some favorable conditions to attract enterprises for project operation and management. First, the land should be spacious enough to provide space for enterprise’s development and diversified economy. Second, attempts should be made for enterprises to use the aid asset, facilities and equipment for free. Third, efforts should be made to reduce the burden on enterprises by tax and fee concessions.”2 The leader of the expert group at the ATDC said, “The project has two major purposes. One is to demonstrate Chinese technology and provide training. The other is for enterprises to make profit, which is actually a requirement.” The company ZY that undertook the project is a mainstay in China’s seed industry. Based on its own superior technologies and resources, the company took the industrialization of crop varieties as a strategy to achieve local industrialization and sustainable development in the future. Relying 1 2

 Source: The ATDC Project Operation Scheme.  Source: The ATDC Project Operation Scheme.

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on the experiments on crop varieties during the phase of technical cooperation, the company will engage in planting, production and sales to generate profit. Under such designated framework, the top priority during the phase of technical cooperation is the experiment and demonstration of rice technology. A main part of the work is comparative experiments on rice varieties, with the focus on the company ZY’s superior varieties of hybrid rice. In this way, it integrates the public-welfare nature of the government project with the corporate profitability. 3.2.2.2 G  overnment’s Management and Control Mechanism for Enterprises It is natural for enterprises that undertake aid projects to seek profits, but their profit-seeking activities are constrained by the public-welfare nature of aid projects. Therefore, the contracting enterprises are subject to government’s multiple management and control through formal and informal systems. The Chinese government is the initiator and funder of the project. The project undertakes the tasks of displaying China’s national image and implementing the national political and diplomatic strategies. The Chinese government fulfills these tasks through formal management and control mechanisms, such as design, guidance and supervision of the project. Specifically, Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture are responsible to promote and manage the project as a whole. The Agency for International Economic Cooperation under Ministry of Commerce cooperates with the Economic and Commercial Office of China stationed in the recipient countries and other local agencies for following matters: During the early phase of the project, organize site inspections, conduct program design, draw up budget, and select domestic companies to sign internal contracts. During the period of project construction, assume responsibility for approval of construction, final completion and acceptance, and signing transfer certificates with relevant agencies of the recipient country. During the phase of technical cooperation, examine and approve the operation plan submitted by enterprises for the technical cooperation period, and conduct project inspection and evaluation. The Ministry of Agriculture provides technical training and guidance for the project. The Embassy and the Economic and Commercial Office of China stationed in the recipient country serve as “on-site managers” of the project. With their advantages in distance and identity as the Chinese government’s representative offices in the recipient country, they are responsible

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for a part of routine management. They will also attend the political ceremonies or activities relating to the project on behalf of the Chinese government, to provide political capital support for the project. In addition to the formal management and control mechanism, affiliation ties and trust capital accumulation also play an important role. The institutional design of agricultural technology projects combines corporate interests with the aid projects’ public-welfare nature during the sustainable development phase of the project. During the phase when a project is no longer supported by government funds, there are two main motivations for enterprises to continue to perform the public-welfare functions of the project. One is the affiliation ties between the contracting enterprise and the government or public institution. In terms of institutional affiliation, the enterprise gives consideration to national position on the project to a certain degree, which is made clear in the project design document. “The successful implementation of projects cannot rely on the enterprise’s consciousness alone. It requires a certain degree of constraint. First, it should be subject to the constraints of administrative affiliation, with the superior authorities responsible to strengthen the management of enterprise.” Company ZY’s government-related status helps it gain greater trust of local government. Company ZY is subordinate to a local academy of agricultural sciences. It is an entity for commercial operation of the academy’s Rice Research Institute. ZY relies on the seed technology of the Rice Research Institute, and its backbone members are all researchers from the institute. In the words of the rice expert L in the project team, “ZY and Rice Research Institute of the academy are inseparable. ZY will not be able to survive without the institute’s support.” The other motivation lies in the strategy of trust capital accumulation adopted by the company for the sake of interests. Enterprises undertaking aid projects could benefit from the project funds. Therefore, enterprises have expectations for potential profits from the construction of aid projects. With an eye on the trust and relational capital from the central and local government organs, enterprises will perform the aid tasks in the project contract with the government and take into account the national interests and image in practical activities. However, the investigation on the implementation of aid projects by enterprises in practice revealed that, due to the lack of effective evaluation, monitoring, and reward and punishment mechanisms by administrative government departments, enterprises tend to adopt a negative response strategy when the project’s public-welfare activities

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conflict with corporate interests. In this case, the enterprises only aim to achieve the minimal project goal, resulting in unsatisfactory project results. 3.2.3  Corporate Strategies in Recipient Countries Although the high-yield characteristics of Chinese hybrid rice have received some recognition from government officials and farmers in the recipient countries, the planting of such varieties is still limited to the project’s experimental fields. The promotion of hybrid rice among local farmers encounters obstacles due to local policies and dietary preferences. In terms of policies, in country T, the sales of imported seeds need to go through a series of certification processes. After obtaining the import license and the safety and hygiene certificate, the imported seeds have to go through tests at advanced test stations, joint studies at test stations with local researchers, and multi-site trials. Finally, the research committees will sign an agreement. The entire process usually lasts four to five years, but the technical cooperation period for China’s agricultural assistance projects only lasts 3 years. In addition, the author learned during the survey from the heads of local research institutes and local villagers that the locals have a strong preference for the taste of local conventional rice variety SARO. Despite the fact that the high-yielding rice varieties have also been promoted here before, the locals have a special preference for the aroma of the local variety. The same dilemma facing China’s hybrid rice varieties makes it difficult to promote them locally. Chinese experts also got wise to this situation. A rice expert said, “The original plan was for the enterprise to promote seeds here. It is not after we got here that we knew better about the regulations on seeds management in the recipient country. The seeds management rights are exclusive and monopolized by the state, and the import of seeds must gain approval, which is quite difficult. I had similar experience in Southeast Asia before. For example, I once spent one year respectively in Vietnam and Laos engaging in local experiments of Chinese varieties. After the experiments succeeded and the local Ministry of Agriculture granted approval, the seeds could be exported to the country. But now it looks impossible to take the opportunity of aid projects to promote and export seeds and enter the market in the recipient country.” Due to inadequate research on local policies and actual market demands, the strategy with rice seeds at the core of industrialization ended with the failure to meet the enterprise’s profit expectations. After more than two years of exploration during the technical cooperation phase, ZY gradually

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tweaked its plan for future development, shifting from industrialized development of seeds to a diversified and industrialized operation focusing on commercial production, processing and marketing of crops. “With respect to the project’s industrialization, we can simultaneously develop the seed industry and conduct industrialized operations, such as commercial production, processing and marketing of crops. First, as the project enters into the technical cooperation phase, we achieved preliminary success in planting and delivering high-yield, superior-quality and high-­ efficiency rice, vegetables and maize. Therefore, regarding the industrialized operation of the project, we planned to engage in the following five industrialized programs, namely development of seed industry, the production and development of commercial rice, maize and high-end vegetables, the cultivation of fruit tree seedlings, laying-hen breeding, as well as chick hatching.”3 At the same time, ZY gave full play to the project’s role as a platform facing local markets of the recipient countries, in a bid to seek cooperation with other Chinese companies for mutual benefit. For instance, ZY established cooperation with a mechanical equipment company. By making use of the aid project’s special advantages in public-­ welfare functions, such as experiment and demonstration, technical training, demonstration and promotion, and international exchanges and cooperation, they intended to establish a monopoly market of branded agricultural machinery, demonstrate farming technology and provide training programs on maintenance techniques on a regular basis, increase the African market shares of agricultural machinery, and set up assembly lines in a proper time. Therefore, to undertake an aid project, an enterprise needs to take into full account the integration of the aid project’s content with the corporate interests during the selection and design of the project. Only in this way can it be possible to maximize the aid project’s public welfare and the corporate interests simultaneously.

3  Source: “Program for the Sustainable Development of China’s Agricultural Aid Projects in Recipient Countries” drafted by the company ZY and approved by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture.

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3.3   Embedded Experience and Practice of Cooperative Operation Embedded with the tradition of China-Africa relations and the experience of the Chinese government-led development model, the aid project adopts the operation mode of “cooperative operation” between China and the recipient country. Due to insufficient government investment and absence of cooperative institutions in the recipient country, Chinese experts turned to establish loose partnerships between the ATDCs and their local counterparts based on informal reciprocal relations. 3.3.1  Embedding and Arrangement of Experience in Cooperative Operation 3.3.1.1 Design of Cooperative Operation Different from the traditional Western aid projects in which the beneficiary countries are passive recipients of aids, China’s agricultural aid projects in this study feature a model of “cooperative operation” between China and the recipient countries. This model is an inheritance of the historical tradition in China-Africa relations, as well as a product of embedding the Chinese government-led development experience, for the purpose of the projects’ sustainable development. For a start, since the founding of People’s Republic of China, the equal and friendly diplomatic relations established between China and African countries have served as the foundation of “cooperative operation.” In the early days of the People’s Republic of China, China supported the national independence of African countries who in turn helped China return to the international stage. Such mutual assistance laid the foundation for equal and friendly China-Africa relations. During a visit to Africa in the 1960s, the then-Premier Zhou announced the Five Principles concerning China’s relations with Africa and Arab States and Eight Principles of China’s Foreign Aids. They have been treated as the basic principles guiding friendly China-Africa relations. At the core of the eight principles are “equality and mutual benefit, respect for the sovereignty of recipient countries, and no strings attached,” setting the tone for equal and friendly China-Africa relations. Since then, the successive generations of Chinese leaders inherited and carried forward the policies for friendly China-Africa relations. By tradition of China-Africa relations, China’s aid projects in

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Africa adopt the model of “cooperative operation” to uphold the basic principles of equality and respect for the sovereignty of recipient countries. Next, the past 30-plus years have seen remarkable achievements in China’s development. Government leadership is an integral part of the experience and lessons drawn from China’s development over the past three decades (Gu 2013). Guided by the experience, China made the same assumptions and expectations for recipient governments in the design of aid projects, in the belief that the recipient governments will also play an important role in guiding their countries’ development. Therefore, the aid projects were designed for joint management with the recipient governments who will be responsible for part of infrastructure construction and helping with pilot demonstrations and training programs. Finally, it is out of consideration for the project’s sustainability. The capacity of recipient countries has always been an important factor affecting the sustainability and long-term effectiveness of aid projects. All aid projects have deadlines. Ensuing the withdrawal of funds and experts from the donor country, the recipient country needs to rely on its own resources and capabilities to maintain the project’s smooth operation and benefits, or to internalize the project’s achievements for its own need. However, over the past decades of international aids, the recipient countries have not been capable enough to absorb, digest, and utilize aid projects and resources. Take China’s agricultural assistance projects in Tanzania for example. There are a dozen of China-aided projects in the country, involving rice farms, sugar mills, sugar cane farms, farm implements factory, and agricultural technology stations. After the project was completed and handed over, China continued to send experts for technical cooperation with the recipient countries for years, which produced significant effects and promoted the agricultural development in Tanzania. The three China-­ aided rice farms produced and sold one quarter of the total rice in Tanzania. The opening of the sugar factory put an end to the Tanzania’s history of importing sugar. Agricultural technology stations have played an active part in promoting rice cultivation techniques and training farmers in the use of agricultural machinery. However, following the expiration of the aids, these projects generally suffered losses and were shut down due to poor capabilities in operation and fierce market competition. Following the withdrawal of Chinese agricultural experts and technicians, the China-­ aided farms in Africa may soon fall into decline despite of short-lived success in the early days (Yun 2000). Take the mechanized Mbarali Rice Farm for example. The farm was built in 1977 with China’s aid, covering an area

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of some 6000 hectares, of which 3300 hectares are arable land equipped with hydropower stations, rice mills, agricultural machinery repair plants, pig farms, cattle farms, broiler farms, and a complete set of farmland irrigation and drainage system, with a total investment of about 25 million dollars. Due to poor management by the recipient country, it was eventually resold to Indian operators for 1.2 million dollars. In order to improve the recipient countries’ capabilities, Western aid providers launched a host of targeted assistance programs in this regard. By comparison, China is trying to establish a unique organization and project operation model featuring “joint operation, division of labor and cooperation” in response to the poor capabilities of recipient countries. 3.3.1.2 Specific Arrangements for Cooperative Operations During the project cooperation period, the allocation of personnel stipulated by the operation plan fully demonstrates the feature of “cooperative operation.” According to the plan, the project is staffed by 38 people from both China and the recipient country, including 5 managers, 17 technicians and 16 others. Among them, 11 are appointed by the Chinese side, 6 assigned by the recipient country and 21 employed locally. In the testing, demonstration and technical service departments, the number of personnel from the recipient country is equal to that of the Chinese experts, with a deputy director from the recipient country. The project’s cooperative agency in country T also has options at the beginning of the project inspection and design. All the four sites initially selected for the project rely on local agricultural research institute, company or experimental station. The finally selected Dakawa in M region relies on the local agricultural research institute. The newly constructed project park is separated from the agricultural research institute only by a wall. Therefore, the cooperative agency in the recipient country mentioned in the project organization scheme is, in practice, the Chollima Agricultural Research Institute that is located in Dakawa in northwestern M region and 240  km away from the capital. Chollima Agricultural Research Institute, one of two rice-based institutes under the Ministry of Agriculture of the recipient country, is originally built under a North Korea-aided project in 1982. This aid project ended in early 1990s due to funding problems and later evolved into a research center subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture. The institute is currently committed to the research on maize and vegetables, especially rice. The institute also engages

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in the seed production of maize and vegetable. It is staffed with 32 members. The “cooperative operation” model has been based on optimum conditions. First, in terms of system design, the project features an organizational structure conducive to the division of labor and cooperation between China and the recipient country. Second, the location of the project is adjacent to Chollima Agricultural Research Institute, a local partner in the recipient country, which makes communication and collaboration highly convenient. Third, the contents for experiment and demonstration in the project are consistent with the research focus of Chollima Agricultural Research Institute, namely rice, maize and vegetables. Finally, in the project feasibility report and the budget section of cooperation agreement, the expenditures on training, experts and technicians in experiments and demonstration incorporates office expenses for personnel appointed by the recipient country, such as the fees for mobile phone and network communications, business trips and others. Could optimum basis for cooperation translate into great cooperation in practice? The actual operating state under the cooperative operation model will be presented below. 3.3.2  Operational Reality: Loose Cooperation under Institutional Asymmetry The Ministry of Agriculture in the recipient country is the most important cooperation partner of the Chinese government. The Research & Development Departments and the Policy Planning Department under the ministry are the main administration in charge of the cooperation. They are responsible for coordinating government resources of the recipient country, fulfilling the obligations of the recipient country as stipulated in its agreement with China, and providing assistance to the project during the technical cooperation phase. However, due to poor efficiency and capital shortage in the recipient government, the Ministry of Agriculture of the recipient country has been slow in fulfilling its cooperative management responsibility for the project. Institutionally, China’s domestic development experience based on a “strong government” has come up against “weak governments” in the recipient countries. Such institutional asymmetry poses a dilemma for the overseas extension of China’s domestic development experience. Compared with technical elements, institutions are a more difficult and

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important part of the development experience extension. As for the cooperative agencies, the Ministry of Agriculture of the recipient country has not formally appointed its project representative in the ATDC, resulting in the absence of the recipient country’s agency in formal cooperation. In daily project operation, the Chollima Institute serves as the default cooperative agency in the recipient country. However, since it has not been formally appointed as the project representative, the Institute lacks the title and remuneration to engage in project cooperation in line with the formal system. In this context, they could only afford a loose partnership with Chinese experts based on informal reciprocal relations in practice. From the beginning of the project construction, the Chinese expert team has made active efforts to establish close and friendly informal relations with the director of the Institute. According to the Chinese expert team leader, upon their arrival for the project construction, they took the initiative to visit the Institute bearing gifts. What’s more, they tried to offer help every time the Institute asked for it. For example, Chinese experts let the Institute’s interns live in the dormitories for project trainees, provided internship opportunities to local university students recommended by the Institute, loaned greenhouse facilities in the project park to local researchers introduced by the Institute for planting experiments, among others. In return, the director of the Institute helps with the project at the request of the Chinese expert team leader. For example, during the harvest season on the project’s experimental fields, the Institute would assign local technical experts to record videos of evaluating Chinese agricultural technology. The Institute also helps to arrange villagers to participate in the farmers training and open day activities for the project. The institute provides English-Swahili interpretation services during training sessions and many other occasions. During the visits of government officials, the Institute presents as the representative of the recipient country. The Institute helps to seek and recommend local villagers as project employees. In addition, the Institute provides assistance to the project on all sides, such as convening people for technical training, providing interpretation services during training sessions, assisting to manage local employees, coordinating the project’s cooperation with relevant government departments and research institutions in the recipient countries, and providing local crop varieties.

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3.4   Embedding and Encounters of Knowledge and Technology 3.4.1  Technical Construction of “Development” China’s Agricultural Assistance Project is the process by which we impart our agricultural development experience and knowledge to the recipient countries. Such transfer presupposes the applicability of what China has to offer in countries with different socioeconomic cultures. There are three aspects to this. First, the level of agriculture development is roughly comparable in China and the recipient countries. In the early days of the People’s Republic of China, agriculture in both China and Africa was under-developed, lagging far behind Western developed countries. The rich, unadulterated and first-hand agricultural experience and knowledge China has accumulated over the past decades of rapid agricultural development are readily applicable in Africa at their current agricultural development stage. Second, China’s agriculture has many similarities with that of the recipient country. In particular, both adopt the agricultural development model dominated by small-scale farming and the agricultural development is closely linked to poverty in both countries. Third, China’s remarkable achievements in agriculture over the past few decades have served as a model for the recipient countries’ agricultural development, providing development experience for reference. The core content of the ATDC project is “agricultural technology.” In response to slow agricultural development, low agricultural productivity, and other problems that have long plagued the Africa, traditional donor countries have tried to provide solutions involving capital, technology, market, trade, policies, public inputs, and investment (Collier and Dercon 2013; Jayne et al. 2010). China’s aid project provides a solution based on technological progress. “Technology” runs through the project’s entire process from design proposal to execution. As stated in the project operation plan for the phase of technical cooperation, the anticipated goal is to “introduce high-yield and superior varieties, advanced and practical agricultural production technologies, and improve the recipient country’s agricultural production technologies through experimental research and demonstration.” Notably, all Chinese experts for China’s aid project specialize in agricultural technology, while experts in Western aid projects are from diverse fields. The experiments, demonstrations and trainings in China’s aid projects all

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involve agricultural technology, with the focus on new varieties of rice, maize and vegetables combined with supporting high-yield cultivation techniques. The project features a technical construction of “development” from two dimensions, namely, the technical construction targeted at the issues concerning local agricultural development in the recipient country and the technical construction of China’s domestic agricultural development experience. The technology-based agricultural development model has been under great influence of China’s domestic development experience. It is one of China’s important national strategies to treat “science and technology as the primary productive force.” As early as in 1975 before the reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping pointed out, based on Marx’s statement that “science is a part of the productive force,” that science and technology are productive forces. In 1988, Deng formally proposed the strategic idea that “science and technology constitute the primary productive force.” Under the guidance of this strategy, China has since taken steps to develop and improve science and technology related policies, contributing to tremendous development in the field of science and technology. As part of China’s modernization process, agricultural development is manifested by the modernization of agricultural technology. China’s agricultural development and increase in the per unit area yield of grain has mainly depended on technological progress. Deng Xiaoping stated that China’s agricultural development “depends on both policy and science.” At the strategic level, the Chinese government has continued to emphasize the importance of science and technology to agriculture, introduced the strategy to “develop agriculture by relying on science, technology and education,” and draw up the “Outline of Agricultural Science and Technology Development,” among others. Judging from the actual results, China’s sustained agricultural growth since 1949, especially since 1978, has mainly benefited from the advancement of agricultural technology. By 2008, the contribution rate of science and technology to agricultural development in China reached 50 percent. In the course of development since the reform and opening up, China has actually regarded development as a non-political technical development. The basic manifestation of such development is technological modernization (Zhu and Tan 2010). China’s agricultural development can be interpreted as a process of technological modernization. Apart from the technical route of agricultural development, the types of technologies applied in aid projects can also be traced back to China’s domestic development experience. Characterized by a large population

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with relatively little land, China’s agricultural development over the past 30-plus years has been mainly driven by advances in biological agricultural technology. Through China’s agricultural technical assistance projects in Africa, China’s agricultural modernization model with biotechnology as its core was introduced to Africa, which is mainly reflected in the use of biologically improved seeds and land-saving field management to increase per unit area yield. Following China’s agricultural development model, Chinese agricultural experts carried out Chinese-style technical construction of agricultural issues in Africa in the practice of agricultural assistance to Africa: backward technology—low per-unit-area yield—low output—backward agricultural development. That agricultural development should rely on technology became the founding idea in Chinese expert’s understanding of African agriculture and aid practices. After looking into the situation of rice cultivation by farmers in the neighborhood, the Chinese rice experts in the project concluded that the crux of low rice output in the recipient country lies in the low per unit area yield for which technological backwardness was the decisive factor. Chinese rice expert L commented on local rice planting technology as follows. “The local people’s planting technology is indeed backward. I have conducted investigation in this regard. … Their fertilization method is very wrong and the timing is not proper. They do not use base fertilizer. Therefore, our training programs attached higher importance to technology.” China’s technology-based agricultural development experience, through symbolic mechanisms, was introduced by Chinese agricultural technology experts to other countries for reproduction. However, after being introduced to the recipient countries whose conditions differ from China, such model was found to be unsuitable. The Chinese model of agricultural technology for intensive and meticulous farming has been developed against the backdrop of a large population with a relatively small land in China. In the context of rich land resources in the recipient country, the diffusion of technology to local farmers was hindered. The rapid development of agricultural infrastructure led by the Chinese government has encountered the disadvantage of insufficient investment in agricultural infrastructure in the recipient country, making it difficult to give full play to technological advantages. After accommodating the local environment and system, the model exists in a compromised and adjusted form in the recipient country. The technical construction of “development” resulted in the absence of institutional elements in the agricultural

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development experience, posing great challenges to the project implementation and effects. Without sharing of institutional experience, it became more difficult to solve problems arising from disparities. 3.4.2  Cognitive Construction of “Technology” As one of the project’s three major functional activities, technical training in practice is no longer limited to technology transfer in the literal sense. Instead, it has become an action of “cognitive construction” for local farmers in the recipient country that is planned and participated in by Chinese agricultural technology experts based on a host of political and cultural considerations. In the face of politics and culture, the goal of technology transfer was forced to take a back seat, and the details of technical training have notable political and cultural implications. While talking about technical training, the leader of the Chinese expert group said that “The purpose of training is to create the conditions for people to learn things by osmosis. I believe that training is definitely better than nothing and is sure to deliver better and better results. The locals do need the China’s aid and the help of Chinese experts with technical training and agricultural improvement … In this way, they will approve of China and believe that China is helping them genuinely and sincerely. They will truly acknowledge that China’s indeed advanced. China’s agricultural assistance also lays a foundation for Chinese companies to enter African market in the future. To this end, communication is very important. On the one hand, to show them in practice, and on the other hand, to transmit our views and technologies to them through language and texts.” Obviously, the leader of Chinese expert group is well aware of the political and diplomatic considerations of agricultural aid projects. In his opinion, the technical training of the aid project is a process of “winning the approval” of people in the recipient country for three objectives. First, “they will feel that China is helping them genuinely and sincerely.” Second, “they will truly acknowledge that China’s indeed advanced.” Third, “the project will lay a foundation for Chinese companies to enter African market in the future.” The three objectives respectively correspond to the following political and diplomatic considerations: friendly diplomatic relations between the two countries, China’s advanced nature, and China’s “going global” strategy. He also pointed out the ways to achieve the above three objectives. “One is to show them in practice, and the other is to transmit our views and technologies to them through language and texts.”

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In practice, these two ways are respectively translated into demonstration of experimental fields and classroom training, which constitute the main contents in training practice. Specific behavioral practices with political goals are bound to be influenced by the culture and knowledge of the subject of practices. In the case of Chinese experts, their culture and knowledge stem from their social, historical and cultural background, that is, China’s agricultural and foreign-relation cultures. Therefore, technical training has become a process of political and cultural manifestation in which Chinese experts, as the subject of practices, take the initiative for cognitive construction among local farmers in the recipient country based on political considerations as well as their own agricultural and foreign-­ relation cultures. 3.4.2.1 Cognitive Construction in Spatial Narrative The spatial narrative of the project park plays a vital role in the cognitive construction of China’s aids and Chinese agricultural technology for local farmers in the recipient country. As the spatial carrier and geographical entity of the agricultural aid project, the project park funded by the Chinese government covered an area of 62 hectares and was located in the village of Chollima, an important rice production area in the recipient country and 225 km away from the capital. During the training, the project park welcomes farmers, technicians and university students from various places. They got the chance to see the external form of China’s aid projects, attend lectures on Chinese agricultural technology knowledge, witness the production scenes and achievements of Chinese agricultural technology in the experimental fields, and experience Chinese culture directly through interacting with Chinese experts. This is a special space. In the Chinese-style agricultural parks built in the villages of the recipient country, aid and culture are strengthened and highlighted on purpose. Such a physical entity provides space for the cognitive construction of China’s aid and China’s agricultural culture. 1. The well-designed “park” The park as a whole is highly conspicuous. Compared with the Chollima Agricultural Research Institute across the wall, the China Agricultural Aid Project Park looks beautiful and modern. The Chollima Agricultural Research Institute, due to long years out of repair, looks old and lackluster, with a simple iron gate and the faded and peeling enclosing walls and

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buildings inside. The China Agricultural Aid Project Park next door features a building complex in bright yellow, with a tall gate, spacious courtyards, exquisite gardens, brand new buildings and facilities, creating a sense of modernity. The director of Chollima Institute said, “Your project park is quite beautiful and modern.” Even for a large part of villagers in the neighborhood who have not got the chance to visit the project park, China’s agricultural aid project is a symbol of advancement and modernity, which is based on a comparison of the same area in different times. Before the China Agricultural Aid Project, this area belonged to Chollima Research Institute. Due to the lack of infrastructure and water source, the area had been deserted and lackluster as other wasted lands in the village. China’s aid project marks a turning point in the area. Along with the project, beautiful buildings rose above the area and farmland was cultivated to plant crops, various supplies were transported from China, electricity was produced, and wells were dug. When there is no water supply, the primary school next to it borrows water from the project park. Judging by the appearance of the project park seen from outside of the walls, combined with the depictions of the project park by villagers working in the park, the local villagers are full of praise for the project and wished for a study tour in the park. By comparing with the Chollima Institute and the previous situation of the area, local villagers perceive that Chinese project is advanced and modern. As the project progressed steadily, villagers in the neighborhood got the chance to go inside the project park for training and visit. The landscape and furnishings inside the park further strengthened local villagers’ perception of China’s agricultural technical assistance project, which became an important part of villagers’ cognitive construction. There are exquisite gardens in the living and office areas of the park. The entrance is lined with agricultural machinery from China, including tractors large and small, rice transplanters and harvesters. The laboratory on the first floor of the office building is equipped with a state-of-the-art tissue culture test system. In the conference room, there are grand desks and chairs, as well as advanced multimedia equipment. All these are advanced and modern in the eyes of local villagers. The buildings in the office and living areas are symmetrically distributed, with the dormitories for Chinese experts and trainees on two sides. Such design highlights the importance of trainees and the equal relationship between the two sides. In the office area, visitors could see silk banners printed with the image of Chinese leaders, photos of the visit of recipient country’s president, photos of training

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classes, photos of Chinese rice experts in front of the fruitful rice fields, photos of locals with huge vegetables in the garden, as well as a painting by a famous local artist that was a gift to the park from the recipient country’s president. They serve as all-time reminders to local officials, local farmers and other visitors to the project park that the project has received high attention from national leaders of both sides. In the principle of equality and friendliness, the project aims to help local farmers improve agricultural development with China’s advanced agricultural technology. The experimental fields in demonstration area are planted with rice and maize that present different views in different seasons, either green with seedlings or golden with fruitful crops. There are also vegetable gardens in the area. These experimental fields directly contribute to the cognitive construction among visitors about the advanced and high-yield Chinese agricultural technology. Apart from these promising scenes, a 50-hectare production demonstration area of the project has been barren due to water shortage. This area is separated from the core area of the project by a wall and has never been mentioned or visited during training and visiting activities. 2. Ritual activities Ritual activities with the presence of national leaders have endowed this space with profound symbolic meaning and authority. On April 2nd, 2011, the President of Country T attended the handover ceremony of the project. Among the nearly 1000 participants at the ceremony are honored guests from China and country T, representatives of local farmers, and villagers in the neighborhood. The leader of the Chinese expert group said, “A festive atmosphere reigns at the ceremony, with colored flags billowing, lined tents and banners of congratulations at the site.” Such lively and pleasant atmosphere laid a friendly foundation for China’s aid projects. At the beginning of the ceremony, the band played national anthems of the two countries, indicating that it is a national project. As the most important part of the ceremony, the President of country T unveiled a golden plaque in front of nearly 1000 guests. The plaque is inscribed with the characters meaning “the President unveiled the project on YYYY-­ MM-­DD.” Subsequently, a ribbon-cutting ceremony was held in front of the office building. The presence of the recipient country’s top leaders at the ceremony has profound symbolic and political significance. It represents the friendship between the two countries and affirms the maturity

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and influence of China’s aid projects. The project park as the venue for the ceremony also becomes the best place to evoke local people’s memories of this ceremony. The project park, as a spatial carrier of the project, becomes a carrier of the enduring legitimacy and importance of the aid project. 3.4.2.2 Cognitive Construction in Technical Training Literally, technical training is a training process in which experts with specialized knowledge impart technologies to trainees. However, after carefully observing and analyzing the project’s technical training program in terms of the entire process, form, contents, sessions, schedule, discourse, and other details, you will find that it is less a purely technical training than a process in which Chinese experts help with trainees’ cognitive construction about China’s aid and China’s agricultural technologies, with the technical training at the core. 1. Classroom teaching In classroom teaching, Chinese representatives, including Chinese ambassadors and Chinese agricultural experts, would all talk about China’s aids to convey the political connotation of China’s aid to the audience. Their speeches usually contain nouns with obvious symbolic meaning and verbs with similar symbolic meaning. “The China-Africa economic ties can be traced back to the 14th century. China maintains close traditional friendship with Africa and country T. The president of country T is an old friend of Chinese people. He is fascinated by China’s advanced agricultural technology and particularly optimistic about China’s agricultural technical assistance to country T in the hope that it will benefit the farmers that make up the majority of the country’s population.” Words like “traditional friendship” and “old friends” used by the ambassador in his speech symbolize Sino-African friendships. By using these words, the ambassador intends to express the friendly diplomatic relations in an emotional way so as to win the local villagers over. The leader of the Chinese expert group and rice expert L said, “Our training is actually a session of exchange and communication and a two-way learning process.” Chinese rice expert L said, “We learn from each other in the training process for the sake of the best results. We sit together to exchange our ideas.” In the speech, he repeatedly used words like “communication,” “exchange” and “mutual learning.” These words most commonly used to describe relations between people are presented as the basic principles in China’s foreign aid. These

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words underline the political implication that China upholds the basic principles of “mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, and mutual benefits” in providing foreign assistance. The speeches in technical training sessions are delivered for the purpose of cognitive construction about the political meaning of China’s aids among trainees with symbolic words. The training courses on technology also completed the cognitive construction about China’s high-yield agricultural technology through words, numbers and images. To begin with, Chinese experts have always expressed the pursuit of “high yield” directly. Rice expert L said in the training class, “This training course is mainly designed to introduce China’s seed technology. I hope that this training course will help our farmer friends to learn practical technologies to realize the goal of high yield. This is our primary goal.” The leader of the Chinese expert group stated in English in the class that, “High yield—this is the most important property of our superior rice varieties, including QU6, QU1, QU2 and QU5.” While explaining the gap in the yield of Chinese and local rice varieties obtained by the project’s rice experiment lab, the Chinese expert group leader showed a PowerPoint slide, demonstrating a series of figures with large gaps in the form of significantly different bars. The graph comes with pictures of rice ears in various forms during the harvest season. By use of figures, graphs and pictures and through abstract, vivid and photographic rendering methods, the Chinese expert group leader instilled an impression of higher-yield Chinese rice technology into local farmers, aroused their interest and trust in Chinese agricultural technology, and completed the cognitive construction about high-yield Chinese agricultural technology. The Chinese expert group leader once broadcasted a promotional video of the city where the company ZY is located for local villagers. The leader posted on the Internet that “We also played the promotional video for them before the training session that day. The video mostly shows the scenery of the city. They said that it was too beautiful, far better than (their) capital.” Such promotional video of China’s cities, ostensibly irrelevant to agricultural technology and output, actually instilled the pictures of China’s modernization and urbanization into the local villagers in the training program. Such pictures show the socioeconomic environment of China’s agricultural technology and strengthen China’s modernity and advancement from a macro perspective. Moreover, as China’s urbanization based on agricultural development has also been the ultimate

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aspiration of African farmers, such pictures are quite appealing and persuasive for local farmers in the training program. 2. Experimental field visit Compared with classroom teaching, the experimental field visit is a clear and concrete training method. Regarding the demonstration of experimental fields, the Chinese expert group leader said, “We could arrange a field visit for them and ask them to conduct comparative studies. Based on a comparison between advanced and general technology, they will find that advanced technology is conducive to higher yield and better performance of crops. We need to help them recognize by themselves that farming also requires science, advanced technology and good methods.” To this end, the initial site selection for experimental fields took into account of serving the demonstration function. The experimental fields mainly demonstrate the high-yield and high-quality properties of Chinese agricultural technology. Such advancement mainly derives from two factors, namely superior varieties and high-yield cultivation techniques. Therefore, the setting of experimental fields focuses on serving two types of comparisons. One is the comparison between Chinese and local varieties, and the other is the comparison between high-yield Chinese cultivation technology and conventional local cultivation technology. Taking the rice experimental field in 2012 as an example, the above two types of comparisons were made. For the comparison between Chinese and local varieties, ten high-­ quality hybrid rice varieties introduced from China were selected. These varieties have shown outstanding high-yield characteristics in the previous experiments. At the same time, SARO, a conventional rice variety commonly planted by local farmers, was used as a control variety. SARO was planted side by side next to the Chinese variety. They were sowed on the same day and the same cultivation techniques were applied. Several months later, the actual per unit area yield of Chinese rice variety QU6 was 705 kg/mu (one mu equals approximately 667 m2), 219 kg higher than that of the local control variety SARO (486.3  kg/mu). Another eight Chinese hybrid rice varieties reached the yield of 556.5 to 684.5 kg/mu, about 70–200 kg higher than that of the control variety. The high-yield cultivation experiment results show that, compared with the conventional local cultivation technology, China’s high-yield cultivation technology increased the per unit yield of SARO by 84 kg/mu.

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The number of per unit area yield may be an abstract concept, but the “plant height,” “effective panicle,” “number of grains per panicle (grain/ panicle),” “average panicle length” and “graining density” in the above two tables can be shown in the rice fields and rice plantlets. As the visiting farmers grow rice themselves, apart from the gap in per unit area yield, the contrast presented by the rice fields and the rice panicles of different varieties make a big visual impact on the visitors. In particular, the contrast in comparative experiments of different varieties is quite striking. The Chinese rice varieties display the high-yield property in the appearance of rice panicles and outperform the local varieties with higher plants, more effective panicles, more grains per panicle, longer panicle on average, and higher graining density. As a supplement to the data support of the high-yield property, Chinese experts divided the experimental fields into plots in a way for the convenience of comparisons between Chinese and local varieties, and between Chinese high-yield cultivation techniques and local conventional cultivation technologies. In the meanwhile, Chinese experts intended to create a visually contrasting scene, in a bid to enhance the local farmers’ intuitive feeling and thus their perception of high-yield and high-quality property of Chinese agricultural technology. In this way, the “advanced nature” of Chinese agricultural technology could be translated into visual memory to stick in the visitors’ minds. 3.4.3  Cognitive Construction of “High Yield” In China, where per capita arable land is very limited but the demand for food enormous, the pursuit of high yield has always been a top priority in China’s agricultural development, as well as a core development indicator. Given the limited land area, the pursuit of high per unit area yield has been a key path to increase grain production. Such culture of pursuing high yield has existed all along with China’s agricultural knowledge system and practice, exerting a ubiquitous influence on governments, small farmers, agricultural research institutes, among others. In the process of developing agricultural production, it has been a consensus between the government and farmers to boost food production by increasing per unit area yield. During the period of “Great Leap Forward,” the pursuit of high yield was taken to extremes. All localities scrambled to launch high-yield “satellites,” claiming to have developed rice varieties with a yield of tens of thousands of kilograms or even hundreds of thousands of kilograms per

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mu. The frenzy during this period was ridiculous, but serves well to show the profound impact of high-yield culture in Chinese agricultural production. At the macro-policy level, the important documents of the Chinese government have frequently mentioned to “promote sustained growth of grain output,” “focus on increasing per unit field yield” and other similar expressions. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Extension of Agricultural Technology, first promulgated in 1993, sets high yield as the primary goal of extending agricultural technology. “The Implementation Plan for the Promotion of High-yield Crops across the Integrated System in 2013” proposes to develop a batch of “townships, counties and cities with a yield of over 1 ton per mu.” In the field of scientific research, a super hybrid rice breeding program was launched in 1996 and chaired by Yuan Longping, the “father of hybrid rice,” to pursue for per unit area yield, which showed the high-yield culture of Chinese agriculture clearly. The third phase of hybrid rice cultivation was completed in 2011, with a yield of 900  kg/mu. At present, Yuan Longping is leading the team towards the goal of 1000 kg/mu. In actual production, significant achievements have been made in grain production since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, with the total output up from 11.318 million tons in 1949 to 58.957 million tons in 2012. In the two periods of from 1949 to 1978 and from 1979 to 2012, the increase in per unit area yield contributed 86 percent and 116.5 percent respectively to the total grain output, as opposed to 14 percent and −16.5 percent contributed by the land area (Lu 2013). The increase in per unit area yield is the main driver for the increase in grain output (Sandrey and Edinger 2009). The huge contribution of high per unit area yield to total grain output in production practices further reinforced the approval of high-yield pursuit by social institutions at all levels and individuals. As such, the high-yield culture has been continuously consolidated. At the same time, China’s agricultural achievements have attracted worldwide attention, particularly those of the developing countries in the face of similar issues concerning agricultural development and food security. These countries hope to draw lessons from China’s agricultural development experience to promote domestic agricultural development. One of the most immediate ways is to boost grain output by increasing per unit area yield. In the meanwhile, agricultural production on the African continent was facing the plight of low yield. African agricultural development has been slow since the 1970s. Based on the data of the Food and Agriculture

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Organization of the United Nations, Tang et al. (2011) arrive at the conclusion that there is a huge gap in agricultural production capacity between China and Africa. The per unit area yield of maize, rice, sorghum, barley, and wheat in China is respectively 3.02 times, 2.73 times, 5.19 times, 3.94 times and 2.31 times as high as that in Africa. After undergoing a crisis in the 1980s, a restructuring period and rapid development in the 1990s, African agriculture ushered in a period of agricultural development with food security at the core in the twenty-first century. Agriculture continues to play a vital role in Africa’s food security, employment, economic growth, and poverty reduction (Diao et al. 2010; Christiaensen et al. 2011). Many African countries regard agricultural development as a key strategy for national development. The “Maputo Declaration on African Agriculture and Food Security,” signed by the member states of the African Union in 2003, pledged to allocate at least 10 percent of annual budget to agriculture within five years, but in the end only six countries honored the pledge. African regional organizations formulated a series of agricultural development plans, such as the African Union’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). In addition, most African countries introduced their own plans and policies in support of agricultural development. African countries urgently need to increase per unit area yield, which has historically been very low. The Chinese public and experts’ understanding of African agriculture also focused on the low yield. For Chinese agricultural experts working in Africa, China’s achievements in yield increase is a distinct source of pride. One of their main goals in African has been to replicate these achievements. 3.4.3.1 Produce High Yield and Elevate Influence From the very start of the project, the main work has been to carry out experiments on Chinese crop varieties and to improve cultivation techniques. The goal of the experiments is to achieve high yield. In my first interview with the Chinese expert group leader, he specified that “the goal of the technical cooperation period is to introduce high-yield and high-­ quality varieties as well as advanced and practical agricultural production technology, and improve the recipient country’s agricultural production technology through experimental research and demonstration. In addition, under the premise of guaranteeing quality, step up efforts to significantly increase the productivity of related varieties.” Increasing output has

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indeed been the most important and time-consuming part of Chinese experts’ daily work. Chinese experts selected high-quality Chinese crop varieties and local conventional varieties for field comparative experiments. The experimental results showed that the maximum per unit area yield of Chinese rice varieties reached 705 kg/mu, 219 kg higher than that of the local control variety SARO (486.3 kg/mu). Such a significant edge established the prestige of Chinese technology in country T. Officials of country T have been for of praise for the high yield of Chinese varieties. Farmers are in the neighborhood were also inspired, saying, “This is amazing. It rekindled the hope in us. If we do this, we can reduce poverty. If we work as hard as Chinese people, we will get rich.” At this stage, the high yields of Chinese agricultural technology have been praised and recognized by local farmers and officials. The pursuit of China’s aid projects for high yields is consistent with the current needs and strategies for developing agriculture and increasing food production on the African continent. Chinese technical experts excel at technical work for high yield. The recipient countries are willing to see high yield. Both are in need of each other. “High Yield” became the icon of Chinese projects in the recipient country. 3.4.3.2 Local Conditions Threw the Project into Doubt Into the 2nd year of the project, the experimental work achieved commendable results. The contents and objectives of the project show that, apart from experimenting on Chinese crop varieties and cultivation techniques, the subsequent two important tasks are demonstration and extension. However, until the 3rd year of the project, these two tasks still made no significant progress. Due to lack of irrigation facilities, 50 hectares of demonstration areas were left uncultivated. And the strict and precise requirements of Chinese agricultural production for field management, input of means of production, and labor input conflicted with the local condition of extensive farming habits and insufficient cash investment, thus, China’s technology transfer to local farmers and fields was hampered. Back then, in the eyes of local villagers and officials, China’s high-yield crop varieties and related cultivation techniques were simply what the Chinese experts did within the project park, so did the high-yield scene of Chinese agricultural technology. Neither the high-yield varieties nor the cultivation techniques could be introduced to the agricultural research institutes or the fields of local farmers. Incapable of going outside the

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project park, China’s high-yield technology was “trapped,” raising doubts of local villagers and officials. Such situation also occurred in China’s other agricultural aid projects. For example, agricultural experts sent by China to Guinea-Bissau increased rice yield considerably within the demonstration area, but the promotion encountered difficulties (Zhu 2012). The authority of China’s aid projects in recipient countries has been weakened by voices of doubts. Clearly, such situation went against the original intention of project design and the expectations of Chinese experts. Facing various difficulties in reality, Chinese experts had their own versions of concerns. For one thing, in accordance with the project implementation plan, the local partners of the project, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Chollima Institute in the recipient country, were responsible for selecting farming fields for promotion and multi-point experiments of the project. However, one year after the project operation, no fundamental progress was ever made. Plus, it would also be hard for Chinese experts to find cooperative farmers on their own. For another, Chinese experts have their own concerns. They deemed it impossible for local farmers to invest means of production, labor and technology that are exactly the same as those in the experimental fields. The technology transfer to local farmers’ fields requires the investment of elements that guarantee high yields, such as irrigation facilities, fertilizers, pesticides, and operation methods, just as in the experimental fields of the project. This indicates a discount for high yields. Experiment in the project park aims at high yields and low costs, while experiments in farmers’ fields come with the risk of low yields and high costs. 3.4.3.3 Appropriate Adjustments to Regain Trust In response to the doubts, Chinese technicians began to try an array of possible means to transfer high-yield agricultural technology from the experimental field to local farmer’s fields. Chinese experts first tried Chinese rice varieties and planting techniques in the farmland of local employees of the ATDC, and then carried out technical trials on a farm with better production conditions. Both have significantly improved yields. In this context, Chinese experts stopped worrying about the “discount” of high yields caused by local famers’ failure to fully apply Chinese agricultural technology. Instead, they moved to appropriately adjust Chinese agricultural technology in line with local conditions. The farmers could adopt the ones that are perfectly suitable for the existing local

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conditions and make their own decision about whether to adopt the ones that are less perfect for the local conditions. In the promotion of Chinese rice planting technology, the focus was on row spacing and fertilization. Local farmers had been used to random scattering, with no regard for spacing. While promoting the Chinese technology to local farmers, the row spacing was 5 inches × 8 inches (16.5 cm × 26.4 cm). Local farmers used to applying base fertilizers when the seedlings grow to 24 to 25 cm in height and topdressing until the ear sprouting period. Chinese experts thought such timing for fertilizers was relatively late. Therefore, Chinese fertilization method was promoted among farmers to apply sufficient base fertilizer before transplanting the seedlings (about 20 cm high) and perform topdressing 7 to 10 days after transplanting. The contents relating to seeds, irrigation, field management, and other elements that are emphasized in China’s rice production technology were no longer required due to limitations of local farmers. Local farmers continue to use local conventional rice varieties, arrange irrigation in line with local conditions, and make their own schedule for filed management work relying on labor input, such as weeding. In the process of promoting China’s maize planting technology, Chinese experts learned about local maize planting technologies first and found that some local technologies have their own advantages and are suitable for local conditions. Initially, Chinese experts wished to promote Chinese maize varieties to the locals, but it turned out that the Chinese varieties were not well suited to the local soil and other natural conditions. By contrast, the self-reserved seeds of local maize varieties had a certain hybrid advantage because of natural crossing. In addition, as for the land-covering during maize planting, Chinese people generally covers the soil with a hoe, while the locals tread on it. Chinese experts generally advise against treading on it, but in fact, it makes some sense locally. As the local soil is sandy and tends to largely evaporate, treading would help the soil more adapted to local acrid environment. Technically, “high yield” is a description of the crop production. In the projects of the demonstration center, “high yield” is more of “a connection point” that plays an important role than a technical term. Its role of “connection point” is mainly manifested from three aspects. First, on the macro level, it connects China’s high-yield agricultural history and achievements with African goal of high yields. Second, on the micro level, it connects the knowledge and skills of Chinese agricultural technology experts with the technical needs of local farmers in the recipient countries. Third,

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it connects China’s agricultural technology with the influence of China’s aid projects in the recipient countries.

3.5   Conclusions and Discussions 3.5.1  Western Theoretical Construction and Chinese Empirical Construction China’s foreign aid projects are different from traditional Western foreign aid in both theory and practice. What factors lie behind such differences? What is the logical root of such differences? Based on the case studies of China’s foreign agricultural aid projects, this study believes that the logical root of the uniqueness of China’s foreign aid lies in the differences in the development of knowledge construction path. Traditional Western donor countries and a vast number of recipient countries have long been in an unequal structural relationship in history. Moreover, their economic and social development have not been on the same track. The traditional Western donor countries have always been far ahead of the recipient countries in terms of the socioeconomic development, and the former never encountered the socioeconomic development stage and most problems facing the recipient countries. Western countries’ transformation of recipient countries began after the failure of colonization. “Western social sciences, such as comparative politics, development economics, development anthropology, and development sociology, have conducted systematic research in non-western societies and come up with a series of technical solutions for transforming developing countries. Such technical solutions mainly took the form of international development assistance after the Second World War” (Li 2015b). Western scholars, based on studies into the economic development and social issues like poverty in recipient countries, put forward development theories that they thought suitable for the recipient countries and capable of guiding the countries to get rid of backwardness. These theories became the reasonable foundation for the traditional Western donor countries to design and conduct foreign aid projects. For example, the neo-institutionalism in Western academia believes that poverty and violence are the product of the lack of effective governance, and thus their foreign aid projects emphasized the need for powerful institutions in recipient countries. These theories created by Western scholars have rarely been verified in practice in Western countries, but they have served as the only dogma for Western

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foreign aids. From this perspective, the traditional Western donor countries’ construction of knowledge on foreign aid has been a theoretical construction. In addition, in the 1950s, China, as backward as a vast number of developing countries in socioeconomic development, embarked on a unique development path of “crossing the river by feeling the stones” in the following 60-plus years and made achievements that astonished the world. In the course of its development, China encountered the problems in agricultural development and poverty reduction that are currently facing the recipient countries. In this sense, China’s development experience can serve as a direct reference for the recipient countries. Unlike traditional Western aid that is based on theoretical construction, China’s aid knowledge has come from empirical construction. In the practice of China’s foreign aid projects, China’s domestic development experience affects and shapes the project’s institutional system and the Chinese experts’ perceptions, decisions and behaviors from different aspects. 3.5.2  Experience-Embedding Mechanism and Encounters of China’s Foreign Aid Projects Previous development anthropology research has paid more attention to the impact of development assistance on the economy and social culture of the recipient countries, because the West’s long-term control over international aid has deprived researchers of the perspective to reflect on their own cultural roots of assistance. With emerging donor countries with different sociocultural backgrounds on the rise, their international aid activities present different characteristics from traditional Western aid. It enabled researchers to start reflecting on the origin of such differences, making it inevitable to trace back to social history and culture. Therefore, the new international aid structure has prompted researchers to focus not only on the impact of aid on the economy and social culture of recipient countries, but also the impact of the donor countries’ social history and culture on their aid activities, so as to better understand and reflect on the transitions and cultural essence of international aids. Western aids, together with Western culture, marched into recipient countries in such forms as additional conditions, principles for aid project implementation, and development knowledge. Western aid can be regarded as an important means of Western cultural expansion. For example, an agricultural aid project of the US in the same small African village

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directly imposes cultural elements on recipient farmers. The US aid project requires to select from all villagers a certain number of farmers for aids. The selection process must follow the gender requirements of equal representation of men and women and the democratic requirements of universal voting. This approach of cultural expansion went directly to the recipient country and forced the locals to accept it. Different from Western aids, China’s foreign aids’ cultural influence exist in a form of non-mandatory embedded experience. The empirical construction path of China’s aid knowledge provides a natural way for the impact of culture on practice. China’s domestic development experience is the crystallization of the history and culture of Chinese society, and thus China’s development assistance knowledge based on experience is inevitably embedded with culture. The development experience in China’s aid projects is mainly reflected in two dimensions: system and knowledge. The development experience accumulated in the long history and social development process exists in the form of systems, habits and knowledge at a higher level than society and individuals. Social systems with cultural characteristics, personal habits and knowledge systems exert an immediate influence on practice, thereby demonstrating, reproducing and diffusing the development experience in practice. China’s domestic development experience, derived from the development history of Chinese society, not only fundamentally shaped China’s foreign agricultural aid practice, but also expanded to societies with different cultures by the vehicles of institutions, knowledge and experts of the aid projects. The experience in China’s aid is embedded separately in the Chinese system and knowledge and poses no mandatory requirement for the recipient country. In practice, however, experience originating in different cultures and objective environments inevitably collide and blend with each other in the interactions between Chinese experts and locals in the recipient country during the project implementation. China’s assistance practice is a process of transnational reproduction and localization of China’s development experience. Such process has been jointly shaped by active subjects from China and the recipient countries in practice and interactions based on their own political and economic interests. It is impossible for China’s development experience to maintain its original and intact cultural form in the process of entering the recipient country. Rather, it is continuously modified by local culture and knowledge in the process and eventually exists in the recipient country in a transformed form. The China-funded agricultural technology project is

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regarded as a field of assistance, which is a product of historical conditions, a carrier of culture, and a space for practice. It is in this field of assistance that historical conditions, cultures and practices are brought together and many actors (institutions) from China and the recipient country operate various economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capitals, and interact through various strategies to seek benefits for themselves. 3.5.3  The Role of Chinese Experts In China’s agricultural aid projects, Chinese agricultural experts designated by the corporate contractor are the project implementers. As the core subject in project implementation, they play a vital and decisive role in deciding the direction of project development in the absence of the China’s government authorities and the corporate contractor. Moreover, Chinese agricultural experts also serve as Chinese representatives in direct contact with the recipient governments and local farmers during the project operation phase. From the perspective of the relationship between culture and active subjects, Chinese experts perform a dual role. First, they are carriers of domestic development experience. Chinese experts have received education, worked and thrived in China during the past decades of development, therefore, their perceptions and professional knowledge systems of development have been deeply influenced by domestic development experience. Second, they are the ones to shape the process of overseas reproduction and localization of China’s development experience. As the active subjects, Chinese experts have a huge influence on the direction and process of the project implementation. Nevertheless, even with such significance, China’s agricultural experts have shown the characteristics of non-professionalization and personalization in aid practice, in stark contrast to the professionalization and unification of workers in Western aid programs. The identity of aid workers in traditional Western aid programs has undergone three stages of change. In the early days of international aid development, aid workers in the context of colonialism and Eurocentrism were the bearers of religious developmental missions. Following the specialization of aids, they gradually transformed into agents proposed by Weber. Afterwards, ensuing the bureaucratization of development aid, they became bearers of their own interests. Moreover, in Western aid programs, especially in agricultural aid programs, aid workers are divided into two categories. One is the development agent responsible for aid project consulting, design, policy

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formulation and management, and the other is the technicians responsible for specific technical work. So, what is the identity of Chinese agricultural experts in China’s foreign agricultural aids? How does it differ from that of Western aid workers? Overall, the identity of experts in China’s foreign aid programs also underwent changes. At the beginning of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, society was highly centralized and foreign aid projects represented the will of the state. For individual project experts, it was a political mission to engage in the government’s foreign aid projects. They embodied the national reputation and undertook the political tasks. With the advancement of political and social reforms in China, individuals were gradually depoliticized and the direct connection between individuals and the will of the state was broken. As such, the experts’ participation in the government’s foreign aid projects has become more of an act of pursuing personal interests. In the long-standing aid form of sending senior agricultural experts for China’s agricultural foreign aid projects, the government directly designated technicians and granted them the title and honor of “expert.” Under such circumstance, the pursuit for state-level honors became the main motivation for technical experts to participate in government’s aid projects. Nevertheless, the agricultural aid projects in this study are different from the aforementioned senior agricultural expert project. In this study, the aid projects are contracted by enterprises who select and designate technicians for the projects. The involvement of enterprises has weakened the connection between technical experts and central government, thereby reducing the technicians’ motivation to pursue honors. Instead, their motivation has shifted to economic benefits of participating in aid projects contracted by enterprises. Experts in China’s aid projects are characteristic of non-­ professionalization that is manifested in many aspects. For a start, unlike workers in Western aid projects, Chinese experts have not been long engaged in the field of development assistance. Instead, they worked as agricultural technicians in China before being employed by the contracting enterprise for aid work during the project implementation. Next, there is no division of management position and technical position among Chinese experts in China’s aid projects. The technicians are put in charge of project management as well, whereas most of these technicians lack professional knowledge and work experience in development assistance. Third, these experts are not capable enough in such basic skills as language, coordination and communication. Finally, these experts do not thoroughly approve the aid concepts and are mainly motivated by the

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economic benefits of the work. Therefore, the Chinese agricultural technology experts in China’s aid projects are not “development workers” as in the Western aid context, but technical personnel in pursuit of personal economic benefits on short-term contract with the contracting enterprise. Without incentives in the salary system, it is difficult for them to make positive and enduring commitment. The lack of development knowledge and skills of Chinese agricultural technology experts has hindered the smooth implementation of the projects to a certain extent.

References C. Alden, 2007, China in Africa, London: Zed Books. D.  Banik, 2013, China and Poverty Reduction in Africa, Guanghua Yu (ed.), Rethinking Law and Development: The Chinese Experience, London: Routledge. D. Bräutigam, 2009, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. D.  Bräutigam & X.  Tang, 2009, China’s Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside, The China Quarterly, 199, pp. 686–706. L. Buckley, 2013b, Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal, Development 955 and Change, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 429–450. L. Christiaensen, L. Demery, J. Kuhl, 2011, The (Evolving) Role of Agriculture in Poverty Reduction—An Empirical Perspective, Journal of Development Economics, 96, pp. 239–254. P.  Collier, S.  Dercon, 2013, African Agriculture in 50 Years: Smallholders in a Rapidly Changing World?, World Development. J. Curtis, J. Spencer, 2012, Anthropology and the Political, The Sage Handbook of Social Anthropology, Vo1. 1, ed. R. Fardon, O. Harris, T. Marchand, M. Nuttall, C. Shore, et al., pp. 168–182, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Deborah S. Bräutigam, S. M. S. Ekman, 2012, Rumours and Realities of Chinese Agricultural Engagement in Mozambique, briefing, African Affairs, 111 (444), pp. 483–492. X.  Diao, P.  Hazell, J.  Thurlow, 2010, The Role of Agriculture in African Development, World Development, 38. 10, pp. 1375–1383. A. S. Ganho, 2013, “Friendship” Rice, Business, or “Land-grabbing”? The Hubei-­ Gaza Rice Project in Xai-Xai, LDPI Working Paper, 32. Gao Bingzhong, 2009. Will and Academic Action to Perceive the Outside World— Significance of Overseas Ethnography to China’s Social Sciences. Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities(Philosophy and Social Science Edition), (9). Gao Bingzhong, 2010. Overseas Ethnography: One Way to Develop China’s Social Sciences. Northwestern Journal of Ethnology, (1).

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Gao Bingzhong, 2014. Overseas Ethnography and the World Community. Ethno-­ National Studies, (1). GRAIN, 2008, Seized: The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial Security, GRAIN Briefing. Gu, 2013. Vicissitudes of the Government-led Development Model from the Perspective of Comparison. Hebei Academic Journal, (11). M. Huang, A. Liu, 2013. Motivations and Economic Benefits of China’s Foreign Assistance. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (4). T.  S. Jayne, D.  Mather, E.  Mghenyi, 2010, Principal Challenges Confronting Smallholder Agriculture in Sub–Saharan Africa, World Development, Vol. 38, No. 10, pp. 1384–1398. X. Li, 2015b. Construction of “Imagination” and Sharing of Experiences: Developing Knowledge. Global Times, July 30th. X. Li, Z. Guo, and J. Wu, 2011. Implications of China’s Agricultural Development on Africa. West Asia and Africa, (8). X. Li et al., 2012, Agricultural Development in China and Africa: A Comparative Analysis, Routledge, Abingdon, UK. X. Li, L. Tang, X. Xu et al., 2013, What Can Africa Learn from China’s Experience in Agricultural Development? IDS Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 31–41. Q. Lu, 2013. China Science Daily, (1). http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2013/12/286759.shtm. December 26th. J. Lv, D. Zhou, 2009. Reflections on Practices, Power, and Cultural Diversity from the Perspective of Post-modernist Anthropology. Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Science Edition), (7). Martin Ravallion, 2009, Are There Lessons for Africa from China’s Success Against Poverty? World, Development, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 303–313. David Mosse, 2013, The Anthropology of International Development, Annual Review of Anthropology, Volume 42, pp. 227–246. Ron Sandrey, Hannah Edinger, 2009, The Relevance of Chinese Agricultural Technologies for African Smallholder Farmers: Agricultural Technology Research in China, Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, http://www. ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/ccs-china-agricultural-­ technology-research-report-april-2009.pdf. R. I. Rotberg, 2008, China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Shenggen Fan, Bella Nestorova, Tolulope Olofinbiyi, 2010, China’s Agricultural and Rural Development: Implications for Africa, China—DAC Study Group on Agriculture, Food Security and Rural Development, Bamako, April, pp. 27–28. X. Tang, 2013, Evolution and Effects of Management Mode of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa. World Economics and Politics, (5).

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L. Tang, X. Li, and G. Qi, 2014, Evolution and Effects of Management Mode of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa. China International Studies, (6). L. Tang, L. Zhao, and H. Wang, 2011, What did Africa Learn from China’s Agricultural Development. China Agricultural University Journal of Social Sciences Edition, (4). J. Wang, 2007, What Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa? IMF Working Paper, WP/07/211. L.  Wild, D.  Mepham, 2006, The New Sinosphere: China in Africa, London: Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). N. Wong, 1999, Study on the Effects of Globalization on Culture. Sociological Studies, (6). P. Yin, 2004, Bourdieau’s Theory of Practice: from Theory to Experience. Thinking, (6). W. Yun, 2000, China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa from the Viewpoint of International Assistance. West Asia and Africa, (2). J. Zhang, Y. Yang, 2014, Promote Agriculture to “Go Global” through Foreign Assistance. World Agriculture, (10). R. Zhu, 2011, Evolution of CPC’s Foreign Aid Strategies. Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories, (9). M. Zhu, et al. 2012. Reflections on Rice Production in the Republic of GuineaBissau and China’s Foreign Aid. World Agriculture, (10). X. Zhu, Y. Tan, 2010, Reflections on China’s “Development” and “Development Interference”. Sociological Studies, (4).

CHAPTER 4

Writing Prescriptions while Selling Medicine: Development of a Mechanism with Blurred Boundaries

Maize has thin profit margin. In fact, all field crops are not very profitable. We cannot grow cash crops in the ATDC, since the centers are meant to demonstrate the growing of field crops. As such, the dual golas of experimental demonstration and sustainable development have become a source of tension. Local farmers, associations, universities, and research institutes frequently come to visit our center. The ATDC is not notably better managed than the farms run by the white people. However, the white people are only responsible for farm management. They do not teach anything to the Africans. —A staff member in the ATDC

This study is jointly supported by the Beijing Youth Talent Program, the China International Development Research Network (CIDRN) research program funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) and the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) research project. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0_4

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4.1   Sustainability Issues and Solutions within the Framework of International Development Assistance In the discourse system of international development, sustainability is closely related to aid effectiveness and serves as an important gauge of the latter. The unsustainability of aid, also known as uncertainty, is usually regarded as a key factor that affects aid effectiveness (McGillivray 2006). A common criticism of traditional aid projects is that they never become self-sustaining and fade away when government funding ends (Lawson 2011). In general, the aids’ sustainability carries three meanings. One is the sustainability of the aid itself. This mainly requires both donor and recipient countries to vigorously create conditions for aid activities and reduce the influence of their political, economic and social reforms on aids, thereby promoting the continuity of the aids. Such sustainability is more relative to the conditionality of aids. Western aid system often provides aid after factoring in the developing countries’ political structure, governance organization and human rights situation. For example, at the end of 2014, due to a scandal over the third-party funds trusteeship of Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL), twelve major donor countries declared to temporarily freeze the aids worth $558 million pledged for the country. After Zimbabwe announced to carry out land reforms, Western countries stopped providing development assistance to it. It was not until 2014 that the European Union and the International Monetary Fund lifted sanctions on Zimbabwe. Following the “cash-gate” corruption scandal in Malawi, the United Kingdom immediately ended its budget support to the country. The international community has been closely following the sustainability of aid itself. The Monterrey Consensus adopted in 2002 proposed that international development assistance should take into account national development needs and objectives of the recipient country, provide untying aid, rely on development frameworks that are owned and driven by developing countries, among others, in an effort to improve cooperation and coordination between donor and recipient countries and thus ensure the sustainability of aids. The Paris Declaration in 2005 enriched the above content with cooperation and mutual accountability between donor countries, with a view to increasing the coordination for aid resources. In 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action put more emphasis on the autonomy of recipient countries, stressing those donor countries should respect the development priorities of recipient countries.

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Another meaning relates to the sustainability of project implementation. It mainly refers to that the cyclical activities, such as the finalization, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of aid projects, can continue without interruption or major fundamental adjustments. Such sustainability is often closely associated with the political, economic, and cultural circumstances of both recipient and donor countries. For example, will some large-scale infrastructure projects come under pressure of environmentalists at home and abroad? Will some social development projects be excluded by the local society? Will the recipient government be able to provide necessary conditions for project implementation, including appropriate support in terms of information, organization, manpower, and funds? All these factors will have an impact on the sustainability of aid projects. The study by Ostrom et  al. (2002) suggests that the recipient country’s ownership and right to the project is a key factor that affects sustainable outcomes of the aid projects. Such sense of ownership can be fostered through the following processes. First, participate in discussions about the aid activities, articulating the need and jointly deciding how to mobilize resources to provide for this need. Second, get directly involved in the aid project and make investment, such as time, effort and other resources. Third, share both the benefits of project success and the risk of project failure. Fourth, participate in decision relating to the project (such as the decision to continue or not continue a project once it has been initiated). Shediac-Rizkallah (1998) believes that the potential influences on sustainability of the projects may derive from three major groups of factors. The first group refers to project design and implementation factors, mainly including project negotiation process, project effectiveness, project duration, project financing, project type, and training. The second group relates to factors within the organizational setting, mainly incorporating institutional strength, integration with existing programs/services, and program champion/leadership. The third group concerns factors in the broader community environment, mainly referring to socioeconomic and political considerations and community participation. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) has always attached great importance to the sustainability of aid projects. It conducted systematic analysis and studies into the influencing factors of project sustainability, and applied their research results to the country’s international development assistance projects. AusAID grouped the key factors affecting sustainability under nine main headings, namely: (i) recipient and donor countries’ policies; (ii) local participation and ownership; (iii)

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management and organization; (iv) financial resources; (v) awareness and training; (vi) technology; (vii) social, gender and culture; (viii) environment; (ix) external political and economic factors (AusAID 2000). A third meaning concerns the sustainable effectiveness of aids. It means that after the conclusion of the aid projects, the infrastructure and service facilities that were provided along with the aid continue to function and serve the recipient country, while the related technology transferred during the project continue to be used by the aid recipient. Some international institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, attach more importance to the performance evaluation after the conclusion of the projects, with the focus on project’s outcomes, sustainability of the outcomes, impact on institutional development, the performance of the bank and the borrower, as well as experience and lessons. The sustainability of project’s outcome is an important part of performance evaluation. The sustainability standards examine whether human, institutional, financial and natural resources are sufficient to maintain the outcomes achieved throughout the project duration, and whether there are risks that need to be managed or can be managed. Sustainability constitutes an integral part of operational performance and is affected by project design and implementation. The focus in the sustainability assessment is on the financial arrangements of the project, social support, management capabilities of the organization, and related policy support, in addition to the sustainability of the project’s outcomes. The nine measures of sustainability proposed by the World Bank are worthy of reference, namely technical resilience, financial resilience (including cost recovery policies), economic resilience, social support (including conditions affected by security policies), environmental recovery, government ownership (including central government and institutions’ possibility of obtaining operation and maintenance funds), ownership of other stakeholders (including local participants, beneficiary incentives, civil society, non-governmental organizations, and private sector), institutional support (including the legal framework for support, organizational management effectiveness), recovery from external influence (including trade, economic fluctuations, regional politics and security). For the criterion of sustainability, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank still use the four-level measurement standard (excellent, good, fair and poor). Based on the above three concerns for aid sustainability, the international community solves the problems relating to aid sustainability mainly by providing a relatively stable and considerable amount of aid resources

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from donor countries, attaching importance to the relationship with recipient countries, emphasizing the priority needs of recipient countries, devising more thorough and comprehensive technical specifications and institutional constraints for aid management, and facilitating coordination between different donors. These efforts improved the overall effectiveness of the aid industry to a certain extent, but the problems with the sustainability of individual aid projects remain difficult to resolve. Therefore, the aid effectiveness still faces multiple challenges. Following the global financial crisis and the economic slowdown, it is getting hard to raise funds for development. Some countries have slashed their foreign aid budgets. In 2009, for example, Ireland cut its foreign aid budget by 24 percent, as opposed to 12 percent in Germany (Conley 2012). Under such circumstances, the sustainability of aid has been posed with more challenges. Therefore, the Monterrey Consensus on financing for development began to advocate the private sector’s role in international development and recommend adopting public-private partnership (PPP) more in the international development assistance system, so as improve the effectiveness of development assistance. The PPP model can be integrated into the commercial profit mechanism to make the aid more sustainable (Lawson 2011). PPP means that public and private sectors cooperate to jointly provide a certain service, during which process they share risks, costs and benefits (Klijn and Teisman 2003). This is not a new development model and has been more applied to domestic development, especially in the field of infrastructure construction. Under this model, private sector could provide services such as project design, construction, financial management, and follow-up maintenance (Sambrani 2014). The model’s strength lies in that the introduction of the market mechanism helps to reduce the operating costs and improve the effectiveness of the project, particularly to improve the quality of the services and products provided (Auzzir 2014). In recent years, PPP model has increasingly been adopted in the international development, such as countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, the Netherlands, and France, as well as international organizations like the World Bank and the European Union. From 1999 to 2009, Germany initiated 3375 PPP projects with a development assistance fund of approximately €1.4 billion. Between 2003 and 2012, the Netherlands spent €2.23 billion on 75 PPP projects. While the UK did not publish the amount of funds for PPP projects, it explicitly emphasized in its development strategy documents that the PPP will be a key direction for the country’s future foreign aids (Conley 2012). At

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present, there exist four common PPP models in the international development assistance, namely pro-supply-chain initiatives, service delivery partnerships, product development partnerships in health, and inclusive business approaches in general. The development agencies provide enterprises with certain technology, knowledge and early-stage risk-sharing subsidies to facilitate enterprises to invest in pro-poor industries and sectors (Callan and Davies 2013). In theory, market mechanisms can improve the sustainability of aid, but except for a few cases, no empirical studies have proved that PPP model is more conducive to aid sustainability than non-PPP model. Many development agencies see PPP potential of attracting more resources into the development field and providing new opportunities for continuous development interventions after the end of aid projects (Lawson 2011), but it will also lead to a number of challenges, such as management difficulties, distortion of development priorities, unfair competition, and bad bedfellows (Lawson 2011). Furthermore, different countries have disparate understandings of public-private partnership. The UK is pursuing PPP to improve the efficacy of the aids, engaging more enterprises and nongovernmental organizations in recipient countries as partners, instead of local British institutions. Germany uses PPPs more as a resurgence of “tied aid” to promote the exports of domestic companies. France sees PPP as a primary means of financing development budgets, in the hope of taxing the private sector to provide additional financial resources (Conley 2012). However, in any case, PPP has clearly become an important way for the international development system to improve aid effectiveness and sustainability.

4.2   Sustainability Concerns in China’s Foreign Aid Policies China’s foreign aid is strikingly different from the Western development aid system in terms of basic concepts, main principles, and aid means, but they both are very concerned about the effectiveness of aid, particularly the sustainability of aid. In 1958, China’s first official document on foreign aid, entitled Inquiry Report on Strengthening the Leadership of Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance Work, pointed out that with a view to ensuring good results of China’s foreign economic and technical assistance, it is a must to factor in the recipient country’s actual situation, “develop measures in line with the local conditions, focus on small and

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medium-sized companies, combine domestic and foreign methods, and help them set up their own industrial foundation.” Aid aims not to “make them reliant on us, but to help and promote their self-reliance.” “We must ensure the completion of foreign aid projects with high quality and on schedule” (Li 2010). In its first systematic summary and declaration about China’s basic positions and eight guiding principles in foreign aids, the Chinese government made it clear that “while providing any foreign technical assistance, the Chinese government shall make sure that the people of the recipient country will completely master the technology,” revealing China’s sprit of being fully accountable for its foreign aids (Li 1986). In essence, such spirit is to maintain the sustainability of aid projects. During the period of planned economy, China adopted a state-­ controlled aid management system for its foreign aids (Tang Lixia et al. 2014). The central government formulates foreign aid policies, while relevant ministries and commissions implement such policies and manage the aid projects (Zhou 2008). In this way, administrative instructions and political mobilization are used to ensure the quality of foreign aid supplies and complete sets of projects, the smooth implementation of projects, and “the same material benefits for Chinese experts dispatched to recipient countries with that for local experts in the recipient countries, without any preferential treatment.” During this period, as China’s foreign aid policies were closely correlated with political struggles and revolutionary causes, decision-making was more a representation of the will of the top leaders and China did not adhere to the policy of doing everything within its ability (Li 2010). From 1971 to 1975, China’s foreign aid spending mostly accounted for about 5 percent of its fiscal expenditures, with the highest rate at 7.2 percent (Zhu 2011). Such foreign aids went beyond China’s economic muscle at the time. Meanwhile, the approach of aid project management under the highly political mobilization model has led to the aid projects’ excessive reliance on Chinese experts. Following the withdrawal of Chinese experts, the projects are hard to sustain. For example, the survey by the American scholar Brautigam showed that most of China’s agricultural aid projects in Africa have discontinued, with the exception of a few countries like Gambia where the farmers continued to grow Chinese rice varieties. After the withdrawal of Chinese experts, some agricultural projects were abandoned at a surprisingly fast speed. In 1979, the ten farms managed by the Sierra Leone Ministry of Agriculture were overgrown with weeds,

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only two years after the withdrawal of Chinese experts (Jiang 2013). Against such backdrop, the sustainability of aid projects became a major problem that has plagued China’s foreign aids. Since then, sustainability has become a fundamental consideration in China’s foreign aid management reforms (Tang et al. 2014). In the early days of reform and opening up, Deng Xiaoping proposed that the basic requirement for efficiency of foreign aids is to reduce the quantity without compromising the quality (Zhou 2008). In 1980, the Opinions on Doing a Good Job in Foreign Aids promulgated by the State Council objectively analyzed the downsides of previous foreign aids. “China’s foreign aids were provided beyond its capacity and without attaching importance to economic laws, leading to a terrible waste” (Zhu 2011). Nevertheless, the Chinese government insisted that foreign aid was a “strategic issue,” emphasizing that the quality and effectiveness of aid cannot be compromised because of downsizing, and “the specific methods of aid must be modified to deliver tangible benefits to the recipient country” (Zhu 2011). In 1983, China announced the four basic principles for the economic cooperation with Africa, namely “equality and mutual benefit, effectiveness, diverse forms, and common development.” Meanwhile, it was made clear that “China and African countries can carry out economic and technological cooperation in diverse forms suited to local conditions, such as providing technical services, training technical and management personnel, conducting scientific and technological exchanges, undertaking construction projects, engaging in cooperative production, and establishing joint ventures” (Zhu 2011). In 1984, the Chinese government unveiled the Opinions on Consolidating the Achievements of the Completed Economic Aid Package Projects, introducing measures like “strengthening technical cooperation after the completion of the project and actively participating in the operation and management of enterprises according to the needs of the recipient countries.” Various policy documents were promulgated intensively during this period in the hope of improving the economic efficiency, quality and sustainability of China’s foreign aids by diversifying the forms of assistance. China took specific actions to improve the effectiveness of foreign aids. First, China adjusted the field of assistance from production projects to iconic buildings, assisting in the construction of a number of monumental projects, such as convention centers, parliament building, stadium, and hospitals. It is easier to manage iconic buildings than production projects,

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lightening the burden on China and improving the project sustainability. In addition, China shifted the assistance from large-scale projects to small and medium projects, liking assisting in the construction of rural schools and other essential social infrastructure, sending experts to recipient countries to give lectures and transfer technology, inviting and funding people from recipient countries to visit China for study and technical training, just to name a few (Zhou 2008). Second, China shifted from simply providing aid in both cash and kind to helping the needy build their own capacity by offering assistance both during and post project construction. For example, from 1979 to 1985, the proportion of complete projects and technical assistance in China’s economic assistance to Africa rose from 37 percent to 78 percent (Li 2010). Third, China changed its traditional “turnkey” approach for complete project assistance. By this approach, China is responsible for project investigation and design, providing complete or partial sets of equipment and building materials, dispatching personnel to organize or guide construction, installation or trial production, and providing comprehensive technical assistance during project construction (Zhou 2008). Due to the lack of management experience in the recipient countries, many completed projects did not yield great results, and some were even on the verge of collapse. In response, China became involved in project management in various forms, including participative management, escrow operation, lease operation, cooperative operation, among others (Li 2010). These efforts aimed at helping recipient countries to gain capabilities for self-reliance and teaching people the methods, thereby improving the sustainability of aid projects. For non-productive complete projects, the supporting technical cooperation projects are provided. After the project is completed, Chinese experts continue to cooperate with local technical personnel and provide technical management and consulting services until the local technicians are capable of managing the projects well (Lv 1988). To improve the effectiveness of productive projects, China introduced and implemented such methods as participative management, cooperative management, escrow operation, lease contract, and joint venture. This signified that China begun to include enterprises in its foreign aids and adopt economic means to improve the effectiveness of foreign aids, instead of relying solely on political mobilization and mandatory administrative intervention prior to the reform and opening up. Meanwhile, along with the market-oriented reforms such as the corporate restructuring of

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domestic aid agencies and the contract responsibility system for foreign aid projects, corporate entities and market mechanisms begun to be closely integrated with China’s foreign aid projects. However, it should be noted that during this period, the goal of such integration was limited to transform the struggling complete projects and consolidate the achievements of foreign aid projects. Under the three models of participative management, cooperative management and escrow operation, the benefits of the reformed aid projects were still enjoyed by the recipient country. For instance, in the China-Mali agreement on cooperative management of sugar factories, pharmaceutical factories, textile factories, leather factories, and tea factories, it is clearly stated that “all the operating results of the firm belong to Mali” (Jin 1988). In the cement plant in Rwanda under the model of escrow operation, Rwanda enjoys profits and bears losses (Wang 1987). Under the models of lease contract and joint venture, Chinese enterprises can share certain benefits, but they are rarely adopted in transformed projects, except for Anie Sugar Complex (ComplexeSucrièreD’Anie) in Togo and a textile mill in Jamaica (Lv 1988). Such transformations laid the foundation for the further reform of China’s foreign aid system and the further involvement of enterprises in foreign aid work. However, the transformation of aid projects based on cooperative management was abandoned again after the withdrawal of Chinese experts, falling into a vicious circle of “construction—transfer—disruption—re-investment—retransfer—disruption” (Li et al. 2010). Take the Mali Sugar Factory as an example. Since 1984, the Chinese company Sinolight International Holdings Corporation has kept providing cooperative management and technical support to the sugar factory it assisted to build earlier. However, its operating performance showed no signs of improvement until the Chinese company signed a joint venture contract with Mali in 1996. Based on the China-funded Mali Sugar Factory, Sinolight International Holdings Corporation established Mali Sukala Sugar Conglomerate, holding 60 percent of the shares. The new joint venture recruited 4500 employees, up to 7000 at peak time (Zhou 2013: 25). With an annual output of 330,000 tons, the company paid over €3 million in taxes to Mali (Zhong 2004). The joint venture reform of Mali Sugar Factory is another institutional reform and attempt by the Chinese government to improve the effectiveness of aid. Enterprises’ participation in foreign aid work officially began in the mid-1990s. In 1995, China once again convened the National Working Conference on Foreign Aid Reform. At the meeting, then Vice Premier

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Zhu Rongji proposed to “pursue an encouraging policy and promote outstanding Chinese enterprises to carry out various forms of economic cooperation in Africa. They could select projects with resources, markets and potential of benefits and establish local joint ventures” (Qi 1995). Wu Yi, the then Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, spelled out to reform the methods for foreign aids and combine government foreign aid funds with bank and corporate funds, giving full play to the role of financial institutions and enterprises. There are two means to this end. One is to provide concessional loans in aids, and the other is to promote the joint ventures and cooperative projects in foreign aid. By the latter means, with the policy and financial support of Chinese and recipient government, China’s foreign aid project should be implemented mainly in the forms of joint ventures, cooperative operations or sole proprietorship by Chinese enterprise. In this way, the project benefits are linked to the interests of enterprise, thus conducive to improving aid effectiveness, increasing revenues and creating jobs in the recipient country (Qi 1995). In 1998, China set up the Foreign Aid Fund for Joint Ventures and Cooperative Projects. The fund was used to support Chinese enterprises to make use of local resources in recipient country and Chinese equipment and technology, cooperate with enterprises in the recipient country to develop small and medium-sized joint ventures or cooperative projects based on production, markets and profitable prospect (Li 2010). Combination of aids with corporate operations can generate profits enough to cover the costs for resident personnel and equipment maintenance, thereby maintaining the vitality and sustainability of aid projects. Moreover, it can also be used as a model for demonstration to attract other companies to follow suit or directly integrate into the local economy, in a bid to improve the industrial system, increase production capacity and create jobs. At the same time, companies can understand the local market in a genuine and thorough manner to grasp development trends. It means that the pursuit of profit can help improve both the effectiveness and the sustainability of aids (Tang 2013). This approach blurs the boundary between business and aids to a certain extent. These aid projects changed its nature under corporate management, and have basically evolved into real enterprises. The technical demonstration functions of the original public-welfare experimental stations have mostly discontinued, giving rising to criticisms about the commercial nature of China’s foreign aids and the lack of social responsibility of Chinese companies.

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China began to face a difficult trade-off between companies and the country as well as between market-orientation and public welfare (Zhang 2012). Nevertheless, this approach directly led to the success of the Sugar Union in Mali. Similar cases abound, including the China-­ Zambia Friendship Farm project of China State Farms Agribusiness (Group) Corporation in Zambia and 23 fishery cooperative projects implemented by China National Fisheries (Group) Corporation in 13 African countries (Yun 2000). These successful cases also enhanced China’s confidence in expanding and promoting the organic combination of foreign aid with business. Both the Chinese enterprises’ participation in management in various forms in the mid-1980s and their joint ventures since the mid-1990s constitute a part of aid projects based on commercialization and market mechanism, with the focus on productive complete projects, such as farms, textile mills and sugar factories. For the non-productive complete projects, such as the construction of buildings, “turnkey + technical cooperation” remained a main approach for China, while the technical cooperation funds are still mainly provided by the Chinese government in the form of grants. Such assistance lacks a mechanism to break through the vicious cycle of “construction—transfer—disruption—reinvestment—re-­transfer—disruption” that is most prominent in agricultural projects. For example, the Agricultural Technology Experiment and Extension Station in Kindia of Guinea was completed and handed over to the Guinea government in 1982. Chinese government continued to provide four technical cooperation projects from 1989 to 1999. Following the withdrawal of Chinese experts after the technical cooperation period expired, this 20-year-old agricultural cooperation project stopped again (Yun 2000). Therefore, in 2006, after the then Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed at the Beijing Summit of the Third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to “establish ten characteristic agricultural technology demonstration centers in Africa,” all parties reached a consensus in the ensuing discussion about the construction of the ATDCs in Africa. They all agreed to get rid of the vicious cycle and strive for sustainable development (Xu and Qin 2011).

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4.3   One Institution, Two Names: Institutional Design for the Sustainable Development of ATDCs Productive complete projects have achieved sustainability through commercial cooperation, whereas non-productive complete projects have maintained public-welfare operations through technical cooperation. The ATDCs could draw reference from these two models for institutional setting. The project of ATDCs has been endowed with three objectives from the very beginning. First, use advanced technology and machinery to demonstrate high-yield crops, cultivation of superior varieties and breeds, production of various vegetables and livestock, in a bid to display modern agricultural technology to the local society. Second, train technicians and farmers in the recipient country and impart practical technology. Third, maintain long-term and sustainable operation of the ATDCs (Tang 2013). To fulfill these objectives, the Chinese government devised a compound model of “complete project + technical cooperation + commercial operation.” Under this model, Chinese government directly entrusts companies or scientific research institutions to carry out the complete project of ATDC construction in the form of grant projects. After the construction of ATDC is completed, the undertaking company or institution will continue with a three-year demonstration and training period based on technical cooperation. In addition, during the three-year construction period and three-year technical cooperation period, companies are encouraged to seek business opportunities in the recipient country or build the ATDC into a commercial farm that can break even and make profit, thereby maintaining the sustainable operation of the ATDC after the end of technical cooperation phase. Specifically, the ATDC project is divided into three phases, namely construction phase, technical cooperation phase and commercial operation phase. During the construction phase, the Chinese government provides a grant of 40 million yuan for the construction of the ATDC, including park, farmland and other infrastructure. During the technical cooperation phase, the Chinese government provides about five million yuan in aid funds every year to support the basic operation of the ATDC that needs to complete the necessary production tests, demonstrations, training and technical promotion activities. During the commercial operation phase, the contracting enterprises and institutions shall, based on their own commercial operations, meet the resource needs for the ATDC’s public-welfare functions. Obviously, the ATDC under such policy design has the basic characteristics of the PPP model that is

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increasingly discussed globally. In terms of the basic operational design, China’s ATDC falls into the first of four PPP models summarized by Callan and Davies (2013), namely inclusive business approaches in general.1 Under this model, the development agencies provide enterprises with certain technology, knowledge and early-stage risk-sharing subsidies to facilitate enterprises to invest in pro-poor industries and sectors. In the operation practice of the demonstration centers, the contradiction between the activities of commercial investment and operation and the function of technical service for public welfare has made it confusing about the identity of the ATDC and its management personnel. “While negotiating with or collecting debt from the potato acquisition company, I cannot say that I am with the ATDC, nor can I say that I am with Chinese aid project. We cannot discuss wages or sign contract with workers in the name of the ATDC.  Otherwise, we would have to pay wages in line with the government standards, which would be too high for us to afford. We can only discuss wages with them in the name of an agricultural company, since we can only afford the wages in line with the standards for agricultural workers.” The staff of the demonstration center explained their awkward situation in identity. In response, the demonstration center came up with the idea of “one institution, two names.” That means to register an agriculture company relying on the ATDC whose management personnel will concurrently serve as the company’s employees. In this case, they could conveniently shift between the dual identities regarding the matters they are dealing with. This is a special administrative and management phenomenon arising during the reform of separating the functions of Party organs and government departments and separating government administration from enterprise managements. In practice, it is manifested as one institution with two names, so as to choose a name and identity in line with the actual needs in work. Currently, most of the construction companies and institutions of the demonstration centers have registered agricultural companies in the local area to engage in agricultural investment. Take the demonstration center in country Z as an example. After the demonstration center was officially opened, the ZM Company that undertook the project registered an agricultural company in the Country Z as an overseas agricultural development subsidiary of a domestic construction company that the demonstration center relies on. 1  The other three PPP models are pro-supply-chain initiatives, service delivery partnerships and product development partnerships in health.

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In this way, the demonstration center got two completely different identities, namely demonstration center and agricultural development company. As a demonstration center, its functions mainly include production demonstration and training. As an agricultural company, its functions mainly include agricultural machinery sales, agricultural production and agricultural product sales. Corresponding to these functions, the demonstration center set up General Office, Agricultural Production Department, Training Department, Project Department, and Finance Department. The General Office is mainly in charge of labor, personnel, safety, and logistics services. The Agricultural Production Department is mainly in charge of agricultural production and experimental demonstration of demonstration farms. The Training Department is responsible for various training programs of the center. The Project Department is in charge of external liaison to seek agricultural cooperation opportunities. The Finance Department is in charge of financial affairs of the center. Correspondingly, the agricultural company established General Office, Finance Department, Agricultural Production Department, Project Department and Sales Department (See Fig. 4.1).

Fig. 4.1  Management structure of the ATDC

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To ensure sustainability, some technical measures were adopted for the policy design of the demonstration center. The first technical design was used to choose an agricultural company to undertake the project. The Chinese government follows the traditional approach of pairing one recipient country with a province in the field of foreign aid to select the participating enterprises, that is, the provinces with better agricultural development and rich foreign aid experience shall select the undertaking company of the demonstration center (Bräutigam and Tang 2009), such as Chongqing Zhong Yi Seed Co., Ltd. that contracted the ATDC project in Tanzania and Guangxi Bagui Company that constructed the ATDC in Ethiopia. At the same time, it is supplemented by directly designated and centrally administered state-owned agricultural enterprises, such as the China National Agricultural Development Group engaged in foreign aid to South Africa and Benin as well as the Menoble Co., Ltd. engaged in foreign aid projects in Zimbabwe. Both the approach of pairing one recipient country with a province and the direct involvement of the centrally administered enterprises aimed at additional supervision and management of the enterprises. In particular, the pairing approach can mobilize provincial resources to make up for the potential shortage of aid funds. Moreover, it is conducive to developing the demonstration center into a cooperative platform for provincial agricultural enterprises to develop in Africa, so that the center could garner more resource support after the aids run out. For example, the ATDC in Mozambique was undertaken by Hubei Province. During the visit to Mozambique, the then Secretary of Hubei Provincial Party Committee Luo Qingquan laid the cornerstone for the ATDC, along with Mozambique Minister of Science and Technology, Mozambique Minister of Agriculture, the Chinese Ambassador to Mozambique, and the Chinese Commercial Counselor to Mozambique. Luo put forward the goal of “building a high-­ quality and top-class demonstration center,” emphasizing to build the center into a demonstration base for superior agricultural products of Hubei Province and a platform for the promotion of advanced agricultural technology in Hubei. Currently, Hubei Lianfeng Company that undertook the ATDC project has successfully introduced Hubei Wanbao Grains & Oils Company and Hefeng Company into Mozambique. They formed an agricultural investment consortium in the country, enhancing the technical influence of the demonstration center. The second technical design was applied to whole-process guidance and supervision of the enterprise towards sustainable development. The contracting enterprise shall go to the recipient country during the construction

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phase of the ATDC project for preliminary research and simple production experiments. On this basis, the enterprise shall prepare a sustainable operation plan for the technical cooperation phase and commercial operation phase. Then, the plan shall be reviewed by experts convened by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, the Ministry of Commerce also entrusted the Foreign Economic Cooperation Center of the Ministry of Agriculture to provide technical support for the sustainable development of the demonstration center and issued the Manual for Monitoring and Evaluating the Sustainability of Demonstration Centers. Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture convene annual “Symposium on Sustainable Development of Demonstration Centers,” inviting relevant government departments, financial institutions, representatives of demonstration centers, and researchers for discussion and exchanges. The ultimate goal of these policies, measures and actions is to allow all institutions and departments to “work together to form a synergy and actively create a favorable environment for the sustainable development of the demonstration centers.” The third technical design was used to encourage the participation and capacity building of recipient countries. Among various reasons for the unsustainability of China’s agricultural assistance projects, one that has been agreed upon is the recipient governments are not sufficiently participatory and proactive during the phase funded by China, and thus incapable for project management after the withdrawal of Chinese aids. This should be fully taken into account during the technical design of the demonstration center. It should be made clear that after the construction phase of the demonstration center is over, the center shall be handed over to the recipient government who shall own the property rights of the center. It is intended to improve the initiative and enthusiasm for participating in the project. During the technical cooperation phase, the recipient government should take part in the management of the demonstration center to improve the management capacity. In this way, after the withdrawal of Chinese agency, the recipient country will have a team that is familiar with the operation and capable of taking over the center, which shall ensure the sustainability of the demonstration center. For example, in Country Z, the Ministry of Agriculture set up a management committee comprising four members, including the director general and deputy director general of its Education and Training Department, the deputy director general of its Agricultural Mechanization Department, and the principal of a local agricultural school. They are jointly engaged in the management and operation of the demonstration center.

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4.4   Commercial Operation or Technical Service: ATDCs’ Functional Ambiguity In the institutional design of the ATDCs, the commercial operation aims at the sustainability of the center. The priority function of the ATDCs remains to provide public welfare services, such as technology demonstration and promotion. The management entities such as the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the recipient government, and the construction company all hope that the demonstration center will run sustainably. They also reached a consensus on the basic operation logic of the demonstration center, that is, “to achieve the sustainability of the demonstration center through commercial operation.” For example, the Director General of the Education Department (Leader of the Management Team) of the Country Z’s Ministry of Agriculture said, “This center will continue to run for at least ten years. In the hope of sustainable operation of the center, some commercial operations are feasible.” Officials of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce also made it clear at a meeting that “Sustainable development is the goal of the ATDC project. The demonstration centers are established to provide a platform for enterprises to go global and fulfill its public-­ welfare functions through sustainable development.” The construction company of the ATDC project also opined that “only a well-­ developed demonstration center could establish a brand and attract investment.” It can be seen that various entities involved in the ATDC management have reached a consensus on the ATDC’s dual functions of commercial operation and technical services. Nevertheless, such consensus encountered challenges in practice as well. To fulfill the dual functions (See Table 4.1), almost all demonstration centers were built in the model of “park + farm.” Each center contains a park covering an area of 1 to 2 hectares and a farm of 50 to 100 hectares. Take the ATDC in Country Z as an example. The park extending two hectares is divided into three parts, namely office area, living area and production and processing area. The office area has more than twenty rooms, including three training classrooms with thirty seats each for all training and reception activities, four instrument showrooms for agricultural production monitoring and measuring of moisture, yield and quality, and one conference room for reception and internal meetings. At 7:30 every morning, the staff members hold regular meetings here to discuss the work for the day. On the south side of the office area is a two-story living building, equipped with separate kitchen, dining room, storage room and some

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Table 4.1  Dual functions of the ATDC ATDC

Technology transfer

Commercial operation

ATDC in Country Z

Potato Association’s training for farmers during weekend; Agricultural machinery technician training; College student internship & training; Other production and experimental demonstration Technical training for farmers in neighborhood; Production and experimental demonstration Fifteen training sessions for agricultural officials, technicians and producers

The farm grows soybeans, maize and potatoes for sale; Farming and harvesting service with agricultural machinery; Sale of agricultural machinery; Subletting land, and so on

ATDC in Country E

ATDC in Country M

ATDC in Country T

Growing vegetables; Raising laying hens

Establish Hubei-Gaza Friendship Farm; Cooperate with other companies for agricultural development Production and experimental Vegetable production and sale; demonstration of varieties like rice, maize Raising laying hens and vegetables; Seven training sessions for agricultural technical

Source: Field research

thirty rooms with separate toilets. The management personnel and their family members live on the first floor, and the visiting guests could stay in spare rooms. To the north of the office area is the production and processing area with a fully enclosed warehouse for agricultural machinery parts, seeds, fertilizers and other means of production. In addition, there are semi-enclosed warehouses and concrete-cast plazas, mainly for the storage of agricultural machinery and dried or harvested agricultural products. Among the agricultural machineries are intelligent flue-cured tobacco machines, tractors, spraying machines, combine-harvesters, plowshares and so on. Most of these agricultural machines are produced by agricultural machinery companies that constructed the demonstration centers. Some machines are used for display only, such as flue-cured tobacco machines; others are for both display and production. In addition, the demonstration center has a farm of 74 hectares, about 300 meters away from the park. During the rainy season each year, the farm mainly grows

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potatoes, soybeans and maize. During the dry season, the farm mainly grows wheat. The ATDCs in Mozambique, Ethiopia and Tanzania have similar layouts. In terms of park construction and farm structure, the ATDCs are almost the same with the agricultural technology experiment stations in China in structure, featuring living and office complex, subsidiary rooms for experiments, drying yard, agricultural machinery warehouse, and farm.2 The ATDCs, by reference to the basic structure of China’s domestic agricultural technology experimental stations, can basically meet the needs for functions of “experimental demonstration, technical training and promotion.” Therefore, though it is still difficult to comprehensively evaluate the impact of ATDCs, they have become well-known across the world and attracted high attention from international agencies like the United Nations Development Program and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, as well as governments of developed and developing countries. The ATDC has become a “golden brand,” a symbolic form of China’s agricultural assistance to Africa, as well as an important platform for sharing modern agricultural technology with African countries. Officials of the United Nations Food Programme (WFP) visited the demonstration center in Country Z twice and investigated the hardware facilities and conditions there. They showed great interest and confidence in carrying out agricultural technology training programs relying on the ATDC. Regarding the training programs of the ATDC, the Chinese government has imposed the most basic requirement on the ATDC “to conduct experimental demonstrations and train at least 120 people each year.” Therefore, all demonstration centers are carrying out variety tests and training programs. For example, the ATDC in Country Z successively carried out trial cultivation of domestic and local varieties, conducted training on the use of agricultural machinery, cooperated with agricultural schools to provide farmers with weekend training courses on potato cultivation, and participated in various agricultural exhibitions. The demonstration center in Ethiopia hosted training courses for farmers and agricultural technicians. The ATDC in Tanzania ran farmers’ training program on rice cultivation technology and experimented on diverse varieties of rice, maize and vegetables. The ATDC in Mozambique has provided fifteen training 2  Based on an analysis into the situation of agricultural technology experimental stations established by China Agricultural University in Quzhou, Kaifeng, Shangzhuang, Tongzhou, Wuchuan and other places, the author found that these stations have the same structure.

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sessions for farmers and grew rice, maize and greenhouse vegetables on a trial basis. Each demonstration center is clear about the importance of the public service functions in technology promotion and dissemination. Nevertheless, what makes the management personnel more stressful is the sustainability of the center. G with the ATDC in Country Z said, “The normal operating cost of the park is at least two million yuan a year, including staff salaries, equipment maintenance, receptions, and training. With the support of government funds in the first three years, the center’s operation is not a problem, but we need to make a good plan so that we will be self-reliant three years later.” Some construction enterprises and research institutions did not have any investment experience in the country of the project or even any other country in Africa. For instance, the construction companies of ATDCs in countries Z, T and E had no investment experience in these countries and still face many difficulties in seeking business opportunities. During the author’s survey in the demonstration center, a person in charge noted that “going global is a very complicated matter for enterprises. It takes some getting used to. How many agricultural companies from China have made profit after going global? I do not know their profit model, but I know that you cannot make money without processing. There is labor and land, but no infrastructure. If the input cost is high, no company would be able to afford it. Where is the market for agricultural products in Africa? For example, if you raise cattle, where to sell the beef? Where to sell semi-finished products such as leather goods?” This company had been in operation for nearly four years in the country, but still cannot find investment opportunities. In another ATDC, a main task of the person in charge is to prepare the feasibility study report. He visited many farms in the host country, as well as many farmers, agricultural companies and associations there. He said that the priority is to find opportunities for cooperative projects. At the time, they were striving for an opportunity to cooperate with the local prison bureau, in the hope of expanding the planting area of the cooperative farm. Second, expand the farm’s area and business scope by taking advantage of various opportunities, such as the report to the Economic and Trade Department, the ministers’ visits and the activities of domestic companies. These efforts aimed to prompt the local government to provide more land or allow them to carry out local agricultural machinery maintenance services. However, for the time being, it is quite difficult to expand the land area and business scope. “The Ministry of Agriculture does not have the power to give us

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more land. The application for agricultural machinery maintenance service is under review, which is challenging.” Therefore, the center had to temporarily focus on exploring cooperative projects. At a plenary meeting of the ATDC, the chief leader set priorities of work in 2013, including material storage, sales revenue sharing, and project implementation. “In 2013, there are eleven projects to be planned. The first is the Prison Bureau project; the second is Ada company’s project on three farms… the ninth is a dairy farm project; the tenth is a video teaching material project; the eleventh is a biogas project. Let us get started according to plan.” Among the 11 projects, eight were about striving for cooperative projects. However, the demonstration center was not optimistic about the prospects of these cooperative projects. “None of the above projects is easy to succeed.” Business investment and operation face many difficulties. In order to achieve sustainable operation, these companies had no choice but to work hard on the farms subordinate to the demonstration center, in the hope of making profits to cover the cost for the operation of the park (See Table 4.1). For instance, the demonstration center in Country Z not only conducted crop rotation of potatoes, soybeans and maize on its nearly 80-hectare farm, but also cultivated 100 hectares of land in cooperation with local agricultural schools. Moreover, the company provided farming and harvesting services for surrounding farms and sold agricultural machinery manufactured by its domestic parent company, with an annual profit of about 180,000 yuan. The demonstration center in Country E grew 120 mu (80,000 m2) of vegetables and raised laying hens, beef cattle and pigs, generating some revenues by selling vegetables and eggs. The demonstration center in Country M took advantage of the opportunity of integrating agricultural investment resources in H Province and engaged in development of large farms in Country M. However, its revenues were barely enough to maintain the operation of the center by solely relying on the exiting agricultural production resources. “The park’s operating cost is over 2 million yuan per year, including staff salaries, equipment maintenance, receptions, and training. Excluding production inputs, the income from farming is about 180,000 yuan. Only when the farm area is expanded to 600 hectares, can we keep the center running.” The demonstration center distinguishes its functions of public service and commercial operation by means of “one institution, two names.” This experience of playing the dual roles of “government and market” in a specific historical stage of China somewhat reduced the institutional obstacles

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to China’s market-oriented reforms. However, it is merely a transitional institutional arrangement towards the ultimate goal of “separating government administration from enterprise management.” In addition, such arrangement was exactly the opposite of China’s experience back then. China’s successful experience was to allow the government body to perform the function of market and gradually move towards marketization, whereas the mechanism of the demonstration center was to prompt enterprises to assume public functions. Although the marketization and privatization of global and domestic agricultural technology service entities have become a trend, the motivation for these companies to engage in technology extension services mainly comes from the market share. That means to expand their market shares in agricultural production materials and agricultural products through marketing service (Schwartz 1994). However, it is obvious that the construction companies of the demonstration centers did not have such conditions and capabilities in the host country, and there is no direct connection between the agricultural technology extension services it undertakes and its original business scope. Moreover, the company has not yet been able to make effective commercial investments in the host country. Under the dual pressures of tough policy and sustainable development, each demonstration center has completed the annual training tasks as required by the Ministry of Commerce and some also carried out some other technical demonstration activities. However, as the pressure of sustainable development is more immediate, demonstration centers usually put more energy on operating the farm, leading to its blurred functions and leaving the demonstration center in a relatively awkward position. The host government is dissatisfied with the demonstration center’s emphasis on commercial operations. “They seem to have forgotten why they came here and their original intention. They always come to me to talk about how to expand land management.” The Economic and Commercial Office in charge of the demonstration center also pointed out that the center had the problems of overemphasis on commercial investment and insufficient foreign aid services. The chief of the demonstration center also felt helpless. “We are caught in a bind. We have done a lot, but they still called us ‘white elephant.’” The host country wants the demonstration center to prioritize technology demonstration and training. The Chinese government hopes the center to engage in appropriate commercial operation after completing the technology demonstration and training tasks. The company wants the center to complete the annual operation tasks and project goals. An employee of a

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demonstration center said, “Our center is a complex institution. On the one hand, it needs to complete the work arranged by the Chinese government, to provide training programs, conduct experiments and seek publicity. On the one hand, it needs to operate sustainably and make profit. In addition, the local Ministry of Agriculture believes that we have to serve them since we have used their land.” Internationally, a particularly common opinion on China’s agricultural cooperation in Africa is that it is difficult to distinguish the development assistance with the public sector as the main body from the economic and trade cooperation with the enterprise as the main body. The distinction between the two is vague. Such opinion largely derived from the fact that the Chinese enterprises investing in agriculture in Africa are state-owned enterprises with very strong public attributes. For example, among fifteen China-funded farms in Zambia, six are state-owned. Researchers are inclined to regard these investments as development assistance (Freeman et al. 2008). In other words, the main body of commercial development has publicity, so that the commercial development behavior has the assistance function of public services. This is opposite to the situation of agricultural demonstration centers, in which case the public service provider is highly commercial, leading to the predominance of commercial operation over the public-welfare essence of the aids. For the workers in the demonstration center, the role of the company’s employee comes before that of the aid provider. This also explains why many researchers are worried that PPP might give rise to the misunderstanding that gives priority to development (Lawson 2011). Under the dual objectives of commercialization and public welfare, the demonstration center “has to give consideration to the interests of our own countries, the recipient country, our company, the center, and the individuals.” However, “it is too much for the handful of people in the center to satisfy the interests of so many parties.” Conflicts often arise between different goals from different subjects. The goals of demonstration and training come from the Chinese government and the Ministry of Agriculture of Country Z.  The goal of commercialization comes from the domestic head office. The demonstration center is under the joint influence of its domestic head office, the Ministry of Agriculture of Country Z and the Chinese government.

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4.5   ATDC Staff: Aid Workers or Farm Operators? Compared with the traditional Western aid system, China’s foreign aid system has neither a special agency for overseas aid management nor a professional development industry (Haan 2011). Foreign aid personnel are usually designated by the contractor of the aid project. The past foreign aid projects were mainly complete projects, or to say the “turnkey” projects like infrastructure construction. Even if technical cooperation assistance were provided later, foreign aid personnel mainly consisted of engineering and technical personnel. In addition, the demand for local interaction was relatively weak. Most foreign aid personnel will return to their domestic jobs after completing the project abroad. Therefore, although China has completed more than 2000 foreign aid projects over the past 60 years, it has not set up a professional and foreign aid team. The aid personnel are selected by the HR department of the project contractor. A common standard for such personnel selection is profound professional knowledge, since most of the personnel lack sufficient experience in foreign aid work. The survey showed that the demonstration centers are mostly staffed by the employees of the contractor’s company in China. Some non-agricultural companies that contracted the project may hire some agricultural experts for the demonstration center. Take the demonstration center in Country Z demonstration center for example (See Table 4.2). Judging from the educational background or domestic work experience, none of the center’s eight employees had experience of managing or even participating in foreign aid projects. They were selected based on the ability to operate and manage the farm. “We knew little about foreign aid. After arriving in the country, I found the aid workers from other countries more professional and doing things differently from us. Before coming here, we received trainings on agricultural economy, agricultural machinery, plant protection, financial management, international laws and regulations, and potato cultivation. A teacher who worked in the demonstration center for two months made an introduction of the country and the demonstration center.” No wonder that the demonstration center staff often encountered difficulties in performing the function of public services, such as the organization of training programs and the technical production and demonstrations. In addition, due to the lack of experience and ability to publicize and introduce the work they do, they often failed to obtain the understanding and approval of the host country. “Demonstration center is a new model. Our company has no experience

M

M

M

M F

M

M

M

G

Y

L

J H

W

YQ

LW

24

26

25

45 46

52

51

54

Previous job in China

English proficiency

Agricultural Machinery Fresh (Bachelor’s Degree) university graduate International Trade Fresh (Bachelor’s Degree) university graduate Fluent

Fluent

Agricultural Machinery Head of a None (Bachelor’s Degree) national farm(retired) Agricultural Machinery Deputy Fluent (Bachelor’s Degree) Head of a national farm (retired) Senior high school Driver For simple communication Senior high school Cook None Accounting Accountant None (vocational college) Gardening Fresh Fluent (Bachelor’s Degree) university graduate

Name Gender Age Education

Table 4.2  A glimpse of the staff in a demonstration center

Deputy Director of the center, Head of Production Department and Training Department Staff member in Training Department Head of General Office Head of Finance Department Staff member in Production Department and Training Department Staff member in Training Department and General Office Staff member in Training Department and General Office

Director of the center

Job in the demonstration center

Head of General Office Head of Finance Department Staff member in Project Department, Production Department, General Office and Finance Department Staff member in Sales Department and General Office Staff member in Project Department, General Office and Sales Department

Head of Sales Department

General Manager of the company; Head of Project Department Deputy General Manager of the company; Head of Production Department

Job in the agricultural company

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in this area or any successful and mature experience for our reference, since each demonstration center is facing the same difficulties. We did a lot of work, but due to insufficient publicity, they thought we did nothing and called us ‘white elephants.’ We felt much wronged.” In Western development projects, the employment of many development experts and technicians has incurred a high personnel cost. According to the studies of Bräutigam (2009), a total of 3500 Western technical experts in Mozambique generated an annual cost of approximately US $3.5 billion, that is, US $100,000 per head per year. There were roughly 100,000 foreign technical personnel in Africa, incurring an annual cost of US $5 billion, that is, $50,000 per head per year. Speaking of the aid system, the Western system involves a large number of consulting companies, which inevitably increases the management cost of aid (Lancaster 2007). By comparison, China’s foreign aid system features the approach of relying on the corporate contractor’s expatriate staff to implement the foreign aid projects. It greatly reduces the personnel cost, but also causes some difficulties in aid management and project implementation. “The company thought training quite easy, but it is actually quite difficult,” said Y, the head in charge of the training and the production of the demonstration center. Y felt quite helpless about training. “We need training specialists. As the only person in charge of training, I cannot go out for field survey. I have too much work to do.” “I am a farm manager, I know how to run a farm, but I really do not know how to carry out assistance activities. No one gave me guidance here.” In the operating practice of the demonstration center and agricultural company, the situation for the demonstration center’s management staff to hold several posts simultaneously is more complicated than specified in the document of organizational structure. We recorded the main work of a demonstration center staff W for a week (See Box 4.1). We can see that as a staff member of the Production Department of the demonstration center, W successively made signboards for trial varieties in the farm and sorted out the potato growth records. As a staff member of the Training Department, W prepared teaching materials and the instrument room. In addition, W also undertook some work of the General Office, such as repairing the network malfunction, settling bills and purchasing lawn mowers. As an employee of the agricultural company, W successively sorted out potatoes for the Production Department, combed through financial records and salary accounting for the Finance Department,

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Box 4.1  W’s Work Log for a Week

February 17th: Deliver potatoes to a local potato chip company in the morning; go to the communication company to deal with the network malfunction and pay the bills at noon; pick up the survey team from the airport in the afternoon. February 18th: Stay in the office to make signboards for trail varieties in the farm in the morning; instruct local female workers to sort potatoes in production operation area; go to a Chinese-funded company to discuss to jointly apply for a cooperative project; go to a commercial mall to buy a lawn mower; and discuss with a broker about investment in Zambia. February 19th: Spray paintings on the signboards that were made the previous day; organize the instrument room; comb through financial records, make wage and social insurances accounting for temporary workers and prepare salary slips in the afternoon; prepare teaching materials. February 20th: In the morning, organize local women workers to sort potatoes and install signboards for varieties in the farm filed; at noon, comb through financial records; in the afternoon, go to the supermarket to purchase food and necessities, sort out the potato test results and send them back to China. February 21st: In the morning, arrange local workers to clean the park and organize the brochures for the demonstration center; in the afternoon, join G to greet the Minister of Agriculture, Permanent Secretary and Director General of Country Z, and serve as an interpreter.

discussed cooperation with a Chinese-funded company on behalf of the Project Department, and made purchases for the General Office. W is not alone in holding multiple posts simultaneously and switching his roles from time to time. All of the eight staff members at the demonstration center have to be always prepared for temporary work in addition to their own clearly defined responsibilities. Furthermore, although the demonstration center employed local agricultural workers and security guards, the management staff also needs to help with the job of agricultural workers and security guards. “During the harvest season of maize, all of us

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must rush in the harvest, otherwise maize will be soon stolen in the field. We also take turns to patrol the field every night to prevent the stealing. If security guards spotted theft, they will call us to catch the thief together.” Such management structure and personnel arrangement led to the staff’s confusion about their identity. “When I worked as a salesman, I felt I am an employee of the company. When I was preparing for training, I felt to be a part of the center. I do not feel comfortable with such frequent switching of roles,” said the worker W. “I usually introduced myself to others as a worker of the demonstration center.” He prefers the identity of working for the demonstration center, but his employment contract is signed with the agricultural company who has the final say in his salary and bonus. Therefore, they have to give priority to the company’s arrangements in daily work. “For sure, we are first the company’s employees. I just do a good job as required by the company.”

4.6   The Real Boss: Domestic Company, Host Country or Ministry of Commerce? According to the cooperation agreement signed between China and the host country, the demonstration center shall be handed over to the host country’s government once the construction work is completed, evaluated and accepted. “The demonstration center belongs to the host country’s government” who will grant the center’s administrative power to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Science and Technology, or other government departments. For example, the demonstration centers in countries Z and E are administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, while in Country M, it is under the administration of the Ministry of Science and Technology. The heads of the various demonstration centers are very clear about this. G at the demonstration center in Country Z emphasized several times that “The center cooperates and is administered by the country’s Ministry of Agriculture.” With the legal ownership of the demonstration center, the host country usually appoints someone to manage the center. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture of Country Z established a fourmember management committee to participate in the management of the demonstration center. The four members are the director general and deputy director general of Education and Training Department, the deputy director general of Agricultural Mechanization Department, and the principal of a local agricultural school. As the demonstration center belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture in Country Z, the two vehicles of the

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demonstration center carry special licenses of the Ministry of Agriculture. “It is very important. Here, vehicles with government licenses will not be stopped for fines by the traffic police and are exempt from parking fees.” The work visa for all Chinese personnel in the demonstration center is issued based on the invitation and certificate provided by the Ministry of Agriculture to the Immigration Office. In addition, the Ministry also provides support within its reach to the daily operation of the demonstration center, such as helping to provide local varieties for experimental demonstration, assisting with the center’s participation in agricultural machinery exhibitions and organizing visits to demonstration farms in Z. “The Agricultural Mechanization Department thought they will take over the center and would like to do something for the center. As such, they contacted a dozen of companies to supply seeds for pilot production. However, only four companies showed up, each supplying 17 varieties, 2 kg for each variety. They also agreed to supply fertilizers, pesticides, signboards and so on.” “Last year we attended an agricultural machinery exhibition at the invitation of the Ministry of Agriculture. We participated in the name of the center for publicity and promotion. Other companies had to rent their own booths, but we could use the booth for the Ministry of Agriculture. Our booth was arranged next to the machinery of the Ministry’s Agricultural Machinery Department and the experimental fields of Chinese experts, and thus quite conspicuous and influential.” Country Z’s Ministry of Agriculture sincerely hopes to make the demonstration center a brand of its own. Though somewhat dissatisfied with the work of the demonstration center, they take chances of publicity campaigns to energetically praise China and the demonstration center for their support to the country’s agriculture. They would like to see the relevant institutions relying on the support of demonstration center, particularly the financial support for local farmers to visit the demonstration center. When the center opens its arms to almost all visits by anyone, the Ministry will show a great satisfaction with the center. When the Chinese delegation came to evaluate the center, “they put in a good word for us, showing an attitude totally different from ordinary times.” Apart from the ownership and direct management rights of the demonstration center, Country Z’s Ministry of Agriculture shows a ubiquitous presence in the center’s daily operation. “The Ministry treats the demonstration center as their own property. It is true that it helped a lot. For example, it got us the chance to attend the local agricultural exhibitions to showcase our agricultural machinery. It helped contact local seeds companies to supply local varieties for our trial planting. It invited us to local Open Farm Day to learn about

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production demonstration in farms. It encouraged local agricultural schools to join us to provide training programs. In addition, the leaders of the Ministry deliver speeches at the opening and closing ceremonies of the training programs.” Furthermore, the preparatory work and reception of the Western delegation during the survey period also reflected the managerial role of the Ministry at the demonstration center (See Box 4.2). Box 4.2  Reception of the Western Delegation

When the demonstration center received a notice from the Country Z’s Ministry of Agriculture about the visit of a Western delegation, there was not much time for preparation. The Ministry attached great importance to the visit. The Deputy Director General Venga of the Ministry’s Education and Training Department and the Deputy Director General Koza of the Agricultural Mechanization Department came to the center one day in advance to discuss the specific arrangements for the next day and made detailed and elaborate plans, including the speakers, topics and duration of speech, seating plan, and visit route. Koza said, “We mainly want the visiting institutions to understand the role of the demonstration center in research, demonstration and technology transfer. Since these institutions are engaged in community projects, and in the future, we hope they can support our farmers to visit the demonstration center, we would like to win their support for our farmers’ visits to the demonstration center and cover the farmers’ cost for transportation, accommodation and others.” During the visit next day, G briefed them on the situation of the demonstration center before Venga’s detailed introduction to the main functions and activities of the center. Venga said, “The demonstration center is equipped with classrooms, laboratories, demonstration fields, and agricultural machinery. Farmers can come to visit and learn. The center is not only open for China’s training programs, other aid agencies are also welcome to conduct training programs here, since there are favorable conditions here. We have funds for training, but in the meanwhile, we hope that the international community could also aid the farmers who live far away by covering their costs for transportation, accommodation and others.” After the delegation left, Venga said to me, “See? The demonstration center is quite appealing. These institutions directly serve communities and small farmers. They were thinking about leaving our country, but after we invited them to visit the center, they are now thinking about staying longer.”

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However, the host country does not provide financial support to the demonstration center, which fundamentally weakens its ownership and initiative in the center. G said, “Since they did not make investment, we are not in an actually cooperative relationship. Only with the investment by both parties can we be truly partners, in which case we can jointly conduct activities and spend the money. But now, we do not need to inform them about how we spend the money. We can show them our plan and welcome their suggestions and proposals. However, it is upon us to run the center.” In addition, the differences in the use of aid funds between Chinese and host country managers also presented a great challenge to the bilateral cooperation. The host country believes that the personnel cost for their participation in management, including subsidies for duties, transportation and meals, should be borne by China. “Demonstration center is merely a part of our job. The Ministry of Agriculture does not provide us with remuneration for the services to the demonstration center. We have to drive there by ourselves and we have to pay for the gas by ourselves. We serve the demonstration center at our own time, but without any allowances or subsidies.” During several work meetings with the demonstration center, the host government officials talked about the expenses and subsidies for them, but Chinese workers believed that such expenses should be borne by the host country since the two sides are in a cooperative relationship. “We are here to help them. Of course, they have to contribute as well. When Western countries provided aids to China, our government contributed money as well.” Such differences of understanding between the two sides mainly stem from the different practices and attitudes of China and African countries in receiving development assistance. China has long been a large recipient country, but Chinese government has always positioned itself as a “partner.” While receiving assistance, Chinese government usually provides matching funds. The expenses for the participating Chinese personnel, especially Chinese government staff, have been borne by China. While providing aids to Africa, China as a developing country has always emphasized the win-win model of “mutually-­beneficial cooperation” and the bilateral relationship of “partnership.” Therefore, in the official government discourse, China addresses the country receiving aids as “host country” rather than “recipient country.” However, in the eyes of African countries, China has been a developed country like Western countries and China is providing aids like Western countries. Having long been a recipient country of the Western development assistance, the African countries have been used to the role

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of a recipient. “They have been used to having the costs for anything or any contribution being covered and receiving subsidies for attending meetings, business trips or any other activities. Without subsidies, they would think of no reason to get involved. China treats us as a partner and would like us to contribute as well, but we are not used to such arrangement. Take the demonstration center for example. If the official in charge would receive no personal stimulus for signing a document, he would not be interested in it. He would think, ‘Why should I do more? Even if I do not do it, I still have the job and the same salary. If I do it, I will need additional income; otherwise I will not do it.’” An African researcher once explained to the author why the African personnel in the demonstration center did not actively cooperate with the Chinese workers. The Ministry of Commerce of China is currently the provider of operating funds for the demonstration center. Many staff members at the demonstration center believe that the center should belong to the Chinese government in essence. China’s Economic and Commercial Office in the host country should, on behalf of the Chinese government, direct and manage the demonstration center. “For any new ideas or thoughts, the center should communicate with China’s Economic and Commercial Office. We cannot directly take them to Country Z’s Ministry of Agriculture, since it is clearly stated in the agreement that any matter concerning the demonstration center should be handled through diplomatic channels. China’s Economic and Commercial Office requires them to submit monthly briefing in writing to include the problems we encountered.” However, the funds provided by China’s Ministry of Commerce to the demonstration center were transferred through the construction company. The expenditure of the center follows the company’s regulations, with relatively fewer financial constraints from the Ministry of Commerce and the Economic and Commercial Office. For the construction company, the main goal is to increase its reputation and influence in the local area through the construction of the center, whereas the fundamental goal to participate such government-led projects is to obtain investment and profits. “The company has its own plans, in the hope of using the demonstration center as a stepping stone to enter the African market.” To manage the farm properly, the company designated two heads with rich and extensive experience in this regard and the experience of serving as the head in farms. Currently, the farm mainly grows four crops of soybean, maize, wheat and potatoes. As the climate in Country Z is appropriate for planting all year along, the crop rotation was

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carried out. During the busy season, all the staff of the center go to work in the field. “Since a while ago, we have been working in the fields all day long till night, since we would sell potatoes to a local potato food company that imposes strict requirements on the size and cleanness of potatoes. During the weekends, as the local workers are unwilling to work, we had to work in the fields by ourselves.” The staff members are very serious with the production work in the farm. In order to measure and compare the yields of different varieties and crops, they carried out very detailed and specific costs analysis. Their analysis results showed that potato is the most profitable, while maize is the least profitable. Therefore, the center plans to plant more potatoes, which also meets the actual agricultural production needs of Country Z. During the survey, the Minister of Agriculture of the country said, “The center promotes the potato planting on a trial basis, which is new to us. Of course, it is not a new crop. We used to use potatoes as staple food. As a food crop, it cannot generate income for farmers. But as fries and chips get quite popular nowadays, potato has become a cash crop that can increase income for farmers. I heard that a farmer who is more than 300 kilometers away came to the center for study after learning that the center demonstrates potato cultivation and has relevant machinery.” The domestic company, China’s Ministry of Commerce and its representative agency Economic and Commercial Office have management rights over the demonstration center in different ways. The domestic company is the direct fund provider of the demonstration center and the party to sign employment contract with the center’s staff. It has direct corporate management power over the demonstration center, especially the agricultural company registered on the basis of the demonstration center. The host government owns the property right of the demonstration center, in addition to the joint management rights as agreed by both governments. China’s Ministry of Commerce and its representative agency Economic and Commercial Office are the direct management agencies for foreign aid projects and exerts management rights because the demonstration center is an aid project of the Chinese government. Different owners of management rights have varied expectations for the demonstration center. The host country hopes the center to prioritize technology demonstration and training services. The Chinese government hopes the center to engage in appropriate commercial operation after completing the technology

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demonstration and training tasks, and thus supportive of the activities of the company established on the basis of the center. The direct owner of the company registered by relying on the center is the domestic agricultural company that wants the demonstration center to complete the annual operation tasks and project goals. It can be seen that despite varied interest appeals and expectations of all sides, their interests have been realized to a certain extent through the vehicle of the demonstration center. For the company, it could expand its influence and seek investment opportunities by attending agricultural machinery exhibitions and pursuing cooperative projects by virtue of the demonstration center. Apart from promoting the training activities at the demonstration center, the Country Z’s Ministry of Agriculture is also actively using the platform of the demonstration center to gain more support from China and the international community. The demonstration center has become a significant symbol of Chinese government’s willingness to provide Country Z with agricultural assistance, undertaking the task of showing China’s image in foreign aids. For China’s Ministry of Commerce and the Economic and Commercial Office, the demonstration center is a good choice for the visit of domestic and international delegates as well as an effective platform to publicize China’s agricultural assistance to Africa. The center’s visiting records showed that it had received delegations from nearly 20 organizations, including Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center. It had also been interviewed by Z TV, The Herald, Reuters and others. The demonstration center has become a vehicle for all parties to realize their interests. Sometimes all parties would cooperate to achieve their goals. Take the visits of Chinese officials and the Western delegation as examples. The visits of Chinese officials are regarded by the Country Z’s Minister of Agriculture and the demonstration center as important opportunities to obtain support of China’s national resources. The Minister of Agriculture would inspect in advance, arrange senior officials to accompany the delegation, and wait for Chinese officials. Although the host country is dissatisfied with the managers of the demonstration center in terms of training programs and financial support, it is quite supportive of the center’s work. The center has become an important bargaining chip for the negotiation between Country Z and international development assistance agencies, as well as an important means to gain international development resources.

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4.7   Conclusions Over the years, China has adopted the “demonstration + extension” model in the commercialization of agricultural technological achievements, carried out the market-oriented reform of the agricultural technology extension system, transformed the operation and management system of China-funded farms in Africa in the 1970s, and enabled domestic companies to “go global” through China’s foreign aid projects in the field of infrastructure construction in Africa. All the successful experience has prompted the Chinese government to expand the model featuring the integration of business and aid to the field of agricultural assistance, while adopting the “government-led, enterprise-dominant and market-based operating” model to implement the aid projects of the ATDCs. By virtue of the three-year complete projects to build the demonstration centers fully funded by Chinese government and three-year technical cooperation, the aid projects are hoped to “help the recipient country to increase the grain output, improve the agricultural technology and enhance the food security, while establishing a platform for enterprises’ development in Africa towards the strategic goal for agriculture to ‘go global’” (Zhou 2012). A domestic company in China won the opportunity to build an agricultural demonstration center in Country Z. The construction of the center has been completed and the project has entered the technical cooperation phase. To enable the demonstration center to carry out commercial production and operation activities, the construction company registered an agricultural company in Country Z and established corresponding departments. The management framework of “one institution, two names” has taken shape. In the name of the company, the center has carried out commercial operations like farm operation, agricultural product sales, farming and harvesting services, and expansion of investment channels. In the name of the demonstration center, the center undertook trial planting, demonstration and training activities. Despite a consensus on promoting the sustainability of the demonstration center, the Chinese government, the recipient country and the construction company have different understandings of sustainability. The Chinese government would like the center to serve as a platform for the construction company to make agricultural investments in recipient countries. The income on investment could be used to maintain the operation of the demonstration center, based on the premise that the demonstration center provides technology transfer services, especially during the

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technical cooperation period, and puts equal emphasis on both commercial operation and public-welfare services. The recipient country would like the demonstration center to commit to public-welfare services first and not to regard the commercial operation as its ultimate goal. The commercial operation should serve the public-welfare services and benefit the agricultural development of the recipient country. The construction company believes that only after commercialization is realized can public-­ welfare services be provided. However, as the company serves as the most immediate manager of the demonstration center, the activities of the demonstration center at the current stage represent more of the company’s interests and goals, with much higher investment in commercial operations than in public-welfare services. This adds weight to the view of David Mosse (2005: 17) that “development practices and actions are diminishingly guided by policy goals or formal goals, but rather increasingly determined by institutional goals.” The model featuring the close integration of development assistance and business development is commonly known as the public-private partnership in the international community, mainly characterized by the joint planning, joint investment and risk sharing of government, public sectors and market players. This model is conducive to directing more resources into the development field. After the government stops providing aid funds, the injection of commercial capital can provide new opportunities for the continuity of development assistance projects (Lawson 2011). From the perspective of policy design, China’s ATDC project fits into the model of inclusive business approaches in general, one of the four PPP models summarized by Callan and Davies (2013). Under this model, the development agencies provide enterprises with certain technology, knowledge and early-stage risk-sharing subsidies to facilitate enterprises to invest in pro-poor industries and sectors. It is still too early to say whether this model can succeed and address the problem of “imbalanced development priorities” in the PPP-based international development assistance. Internationally, the frameworks of “actor” and “broker” have been often used to discuss the actions and functions of international development assistance agencies. The framework of “actor” focuses on analyzing how actors use “agency” to facilitate negotiations between different interfaces of various social life, knowledge and powers, with the emphasis on interactions of different actors at the micro level. The framework of “broker” is more focused on analyzing how development intervention agencies connect aid providers and beneficiaries through “brokerage” and

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“translation.” Despite different focuses, both frameworks pay more attention to the relationship between providers and beneficiaries of development interventions and regard aid agencies as the “broker” for aid funds providers. Under the framework of China’s ATDC project, the management structure featuring the joint involvement of three parties, namely China’s Ministry of Commerce, relevant government departments of the recipient country, and China’s domestic company, has actually allowed the demonstration center to go beyond the roles of actor and broker. The demonstration center is simultaneously both a donor and a recipient, both a public service department and a company. This is undoubtedly a supplement to the international development assistance system and structural relationship. Western aid agencies, out of the needs for their own institutional development and the professional needs of practitioners, may lead to the deviation of their actions from the goal of aid providers (Mosse 2005). Judging from the operation of the demonstration center, the tri-­ party intervention often led to difficulties in “making choices” for the center. But on the other hand, the tri-party intervention made it difficult for the center to deviate from the interest appeals of the three parties. Almost all activities of the demonstration center are based on the goals of the three parties. China’s domestic development experience, such as “one institution, two names” and “multiple-job holding,” provides valuable experience for the demonstration center to achieve the three parties’ goals. Regardless of the variant goals for the center, it still represents common interests beyond the original intentions of the Chinese government, the recipient government and the construction company. That is, to develop the demonstration center into a successful model for Chinese government to publicize China’s foreign aids, for the recipient country to prove its ability to receive aid resources and put them to effective use, and for the construction company to establish a good reputation and obtain government support and business investment opportunities. As a result, the Chinese government, the recipient government and the construction companies cautiously coordinate and negotiate with each other to safeguard their respective core interests and goals, with a view for the balanced operation of the center. Judging from the current situation, such balance has been achieved temporarily, but it still needs time to see how long it can sustain.

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References AusAID, 2000, Promoting Practical Sustainability, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ publications/pdf/sustainability.pdf. Auzzir, Zairol A., Haigh, Richard and Amaratunga, Dilanthi, (2014) Publicprivate Partnerships (PPP) in Disaster Management in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework, Procedia Economics and Finance, 18, 807–814. D.  Bräutigam & X.  Tang, 2009, China’s Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside, The China Quarterly, 199, pp. 686–706. D. Bräutigam, 2009, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. M. Callan, R. Davies, 2013, When Business Meets Aid: Analysing Public–private Partnerships for International Development, Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper 28, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra. Conley, 2012, Leading from Behind in Public-private Partnership? An assessment of European Engagement with the Private Sector in Development, CSIS Report. David Mosse, 2005, Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice, London and Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press, p. 17. De Haan, 2011, Will China Change International Development as We Know It? Journal of International Development, No. 23, pp. 881–908. D. Freeman, J. Holslag, S. Weil, 2008, China’s Foreign Policy: Can Land Provide Security? Brussels Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, BICCS Asia Paper, 3. E.  H. Klijn, G.  Teisman, 2003, Institutional and Strategic Harriers to Public– Private Partnership: An Analysis of Dutch Cases, Public Money & Management, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 137–145. C. Lancaster, 2007, The Chinese Aid System, http://www.cgdev.org/files/13953_ file_Chinese_aid.pdf. M.  McGillivray, 2006, Aid Allocation and Fragile States, NAU—WIDER Discussion Paper, No. 2006/01. D.  Ostrom, C.  Gibson et  al., 2002, Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation, Main Report, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, SIDA Studies in Evaluation 02/01. V. N. Sambrani, 2014, PPP from Asia and African Perspective towards Infrastructure Development: A Case Study of Greenfield Bangalore International Airport, India, Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences, Volume 157, pp. 285–295. L.  Schwartz, 1994, The Role of the Private Sector in Agricultural Extension: Economic Analysis and Case Studies, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/view-doc/ download?doi=10.1.1.89.8798&rep=rep1&type=pdf. M. L. Lawson, 2011. “Foreign Assistance: Public-Private Partnership (PPPs)”, Congressional Research Service Reports.

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H. Jiang, 2013. Offering Agricultural Technologies to Africa (1971–1983): Study on the Assistance Model and Outcomes in Africa. Foreign Affairs Review, (1). Y. Jin, 1988. Consolidate Economic Assistance Project and Strengthen SouthSouth Cooperation—A Brief Introduction of the Cooperation between China and Malaysia. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (12). C. Li, 1986. Consolidate Economic Assistance Outcomes and Improve Economic Benefits. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (12). W. Li, 2010. Evolution and Assessment of People’s Republic of China’s Policies Concerning Foreign Economic and Technological Assistance. CPC History Research and Teaching, (2). X. Li , G. Qi, L. Tang, 2010, Smallholder-Based Agricultural Development: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and African Experience, Social Science Academic Press, Beijing, China. X. Lv, 1988. Explorations of Different Modes to Consolidate Foreign Assistance Outcomes. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (12). G. Qi, 1995. Foreign Aid Reform under New Circumstances—National Conference on Foreign Aid Reform Was Convened in Beijing. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (11). Shediac-Rizkallah, C. Mona & LR. Bone, 1998, Planning for the sustainability of community-based health programs: conceptual frameworks and future directions for research, practice and policy [J]. Health Education Research, 13(1). L. Tang, X. Li and G. Qi, 2014, Evolution and Effects of Management Mode of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa. China International Studies, (6). X. Tang, 2013, Evolution and Effects of Management Mode of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa. World Economics and Politics, (5). H. Wang, 1987, Management by a Third Party: Another Way to Consolidate Assistance Outcomes. Journal of International Economic Cooperation, (7). J. Xu, L. Qin, 2011, Suggestions on the Sustainable Development of China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers. World Agriculture, (12). W. Yun, 2000, China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa from the Viewpoint of International Assistance. West Asia and Africa, (2). H. Zhang, 2012, Strategic Balance of China’s Aid to Africa. West Asia and Africa, (3). Q. Zhong, 2004, Embroidery Training in Africa. People’s Daily (Overseas Version), (8), August 5th. H. Zhou, 2012, Problems Encountered by China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers on Sustainable Development and Countermeasures. China Soft Science Magazine, (9). H. Zhou, 2008, China’s Foreign Aid and Thirty Years of Reform and Opening up. World Economics and Politics, (11). H. Zhou, 2013, “The Policy and Mechanism of China’s Foreign Aid”, Sixty Years of China’s Foreign Aid, Social Science Academic Press, Beijing, China. R. Zhu, 2011, Evolution of CPC’s Foreign Aid Strategies. Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories, (9).

CHAPTER 5

Institutional Learning: Innovation in Mutual Adaptation

The future of agriculture in country E should be large-scale production based on advanced infrastructure and mechanization, just like what the ATDC shows, instead of staying in a backward production state. —An agricultural promotion officer in country E We work with the locals every day, so I pick up a little bit of the Oromo language. On weekends, I do not stay in the dorm, but hang out with the locals. I do so not for work, but out of interest in the local culture. To work more efficiently, we also need to know more about the employees of the ATDC. Two college graduates are working with us. I want to train them so that they may become foremen some day. Our production approach is completely different from that of the locals. The vegetables planted in the ATDC are totally different from those grown by local residents. However, the locally improved varieties of corn now planted and the complete field management method are very suitable for local farmers. —A staff member of the ATDC

Part of this chapter was published in the 19th issue of Fudan International Economic Relations, 2016, as well as the 2nd issue of Cultural Aspect in 2017. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0_5

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5.1   Introduction Existing studies regarding the agricultural cooperation between China and African countries, present various discourses on the cooperation model, concept and policy making from multiple perspectives such as economy, society, culture and system. This chapter takes the ATDC supported by China that operates in country E as an example, offering an in-depth analysis of agricultural cooperation process from an institutional perspective, and describing the seemingly impromptu behavior of experts in the ATDC before exploring the logic behind it. 5.1.1  Background Among an array of discussions on the aid models for emerging countries, many approach the topic from aspects like the international development cooperation framework, international and domestic policy influences, and knowledge generation paths and so on. (IPC-IG 2010; M. Mounir Zahran et al. 2011; Sebastian Rarnet Fuchs 2013; Yasutami Shimomura and Wang Ping 2015). There are also an increasing number of discourses tackling this topic in terms of the economic and social dimensions (Bräutigam 2012; Tang 2013). Those discussing the topic from the cultural aspect mostly offer discourse at the philosophical and policy level, for example, harmony and cooperation, as well as justice over economic gain, in China’s aid to Africa, Chinese traditional virtues like benevolence, and new elements such as internationalism and mutual benefit (Wei 2013). The discourses from the institutional dimension mostly focus on the study of development models, such as China’s development guidance and proposal of a mutually beneficial cooperation and assistance model (Zhang 2013; Zhang 2012; Qi 2015), offer an interpretation of China’s long-established principle of aid to Africa, and analyze China’s model shift based on its development path (Li et al. 2014). Agricultural cooperation, as one of the important areas of China-Africa cooperation, have generated a great deal of interests (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2015; Dawit Alemu et al. 2015). The importance of agricultural cooperation is not reflected in the extent of cooperation, but the undeniable fact that agriculture ensures the basic livelihood for the rural residents, who account for the majority of the population in most African countries (the State Council Information Office 2014). Agricultural cooperation is also of great significance in terms

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of China’s development strategy. For example, Alden (2005) believes that population growth, the reduction of farm land due to industrialization, and the growth of urban consumption in China have prompted the Chinese government to heed food security, which explains why China keeps introducing new crop varieties toAfrica, as well as increasing its investment in agriculture, fishery and the related processing industries. Studies on China’s agricultural aid policy texts and project implementation level have also received increasing attention (Buckley et  al. 2013). These studies are not limited to the established aid concept and framework, but focus on the project implementation process as well as the interplay of the goals and actions taken in the process. In short, they offer insights into the current projects while analyzing the interaction of relevant groups, adding to the previous summary on the launch, effectiveness and follow-up of the projects. (Yun 2000). Some of the macro-strategic, institutional, and policy-level studies on agricultural cooperation between China and Africa have been incorporated into the empirical studies for specific projects (Li et  al. 2014; Bräutigam 2012; Zhang 2012), and the field studies during the implementation of the projects inevitably provide feedback on the project objectives and related strategic background (Xu et al. 2015). The agricultural cooperation between China and Africa follows its own logic when connecting China’s development strategy and experience with the development needs of African countries. It is worth further discussing the similarities and differences between this logic and the principles followed by the Western aid to Africa. This study will take China’s ATDC that offers assistance to Country E as an example to deeply explore the cooperative action and the reasons behind it, that is, how the ATDC worked in its own way, what is the logic of its impromptu behaviors, and how these behaviors, through its own path, responded to the unexpected situations the center encountered in Africa. I conducted three field studies in country E from November 2013 to September 2014, a period during which I exchanged ideas with and collected data from the ATDC through semi-­ structured interviews and participant observation, and I also interviewed officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance and Economics of country E, as well as Chinese experts involved in the China-­ country E agriculture cooperation project. Moreover, I personally got involved in the ATDC’s daily routines, chatting and hanging out with Chinese experts and local workers. However, without participating in the training and other activities hosted by the center, I did not personally

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observe the interaction between the Chinese experts and the locals. As such, I documented the negotiations for adjusting programs and promoting cooperation merely through interviews with the experts. 5.1.2  China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Strategy and ATDCs in Africa China has arranged agricultural cooperation projects with Africa under its national cooperation strategy, with many policies guiding these cooperative efforts. In the fourth part of “China’s Policy Towards Africa (2006),” a document issued on January 12th, 2006, there is an article in the economic field dedicated to agricultural cooperation: “continue to carry out multi-level, multi-channel and multi-form China-Africa agricultural cooperation and exchanges, with focus on strengthening cooperation in areas such as land development, planting, aquaculture technology, food security, agricultural machinery, and processing of agricultural by-products, in addition to strengthening agricultural technology cooperation, actively carrying out agricultural practical technology training, establishing agricultural technology demonstration projects in Africa, and speeding up the formulation of China-Africa agricultural cooperation plans”1 (www.aweb. com.cn 2012). The White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid in 2014, once again, emphasizes the importance of agriculture for poverty alleviation in developing countries. China believes that establishing ATDCs, sending experts overseas to provide consultation and engage in technical cooperation, and developing agricultural technologies and managing personnel training in developing countries can help them improve agricultural productivity to effectively tackling food security. Under the policy framework made up of this series of documents, China would establish 15 ATDCs in Africa as the core of its specific project, which was announced once again by the Chinese Premier of the State Council at the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2007. In July 2012, at the 5th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Chinese government promised to establish more ATDCs to further strengthen technical training and extension, and help African countries with food production, processing, storage, transportation, and sale of 1  “Agriculture Has Become a Strategic Priority for China’s Aid to Africa,” by China Economic Net, http://intl.ce.cn/sjjj/qy/201204/16/t20120416_23243340.shtml, April 16th, 2012.

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agriculture products (the State Council Information Office 2014). Meanwhile, Africa expresses its new demands for agricultural technology and infrastructure. With global economic stall on the cusp of a new century, we have seen agricultural development reviewed and evaluated. In sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge for agriculture still lies in how to increase food productivity and help farmers (Dethier and Effenberger 2012); to address this challenge, an array of questions concerning property rights, seeds, agricultural R&D projects, irrigation, fertilizer, agricultural promotion, credit, rural infrastructure, storage, and channels to the markethave been raised. Solving these problems requires concerted efforts, including foreign aid. For example, under the framework of its economic development strategy, country E endeavors to pool resources from the international development circles into its agricultural fields, one of which is to improve the R&D capacities of the next generation. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, country E has depended on foreign instructors and experts that support agricultural vocational training schools, because “the capacity building of intermediate skilled workers is an important factor in promoting productivity, stimulating economic competitiveness, and lifting people out of poverty” (the World Bank 2012). Country E’s agricultural growth plan (AGP) over the past five years, funded by several supporters, has been promoting agricultural production, commercialization, and small-scale rural infrastructure construction in target counties in four provinces (MoFED 2006). With China’s emphasis on agricultural technology and food security, as well as the requirements of the agricultural development in African countries, China and some African countries are looking forward to realizing the project for establishing ATDCs on the continent. In this new era, the idea on how to run anATDC draws on China’s experience, either successful or failed, in helping African countries build agricultural pilot farms in the past. According to studies on China’s agricultural assistance projects in Africa over the four decades, these efforts show an undesired sign of rapid starting off with quick results, yet unfortunately failing in a short time (Yun 2000). Bräutigam (1993) found that Kpatawee, a state-­owned farm in Liberia, was simply copying the operation practices in China, so that it still faced the problems that China encountered in terms of state control, over-industrialization, and non-economic production. Even by separating China’s small-scale irrigation farmlands from the state-­ owned dryland farming areas, we can tell our country’s farm produce is not as competitive as imported agricultural products, which explains why China only

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managed to provide a limited, practical farming system for rural Liberia. Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce is planning to place the task of building and running ATDCs to the hands of local businesses, with the hope that the motives to gain profits would make it possible for ATDCs to operate in a long time, which in turn would free the Chinese government the burden of repeated “relief” efforts (Bräutigam 2012). Considering the different geographical characteristics in terms of agricultural production, the Chinese government recruits units for building ATDCs from its provinces like Jilin in the northeast to Gansu in the northwest, along with Chongqing and Guangxi in the southwest, Henan and Hunan in the central region, Hainan in the south, and Jiangsu in the east. This is the traditional approach of pairing a recipient country with a province. With the guidance of these macro strategies and reference to experience, the new agricultural aid projects are coming to conclusion. There exists a variety of discussions about its effectiveness and sustainable prospects. However, it is still worth exploring how this mechanism hypothetically fusing “public welfare” and “commercial profits” works during the cooperation process. Researchers have analyzed the actual situation of China-Africa agricultural cooperation in specific projects. Besides taking into account whether these efforts are successful or not, they pay attention to the implementation process. For example, research about Senegal conducted by Buckley (2013b) parses how different ways of land management were negotiated and reshaped by different parties involved, just like dances temporarily choreographed by varied professionals, which means that personal improvisation always led to unexpected project results. Buckley points out that the China’s agricultural production system adopted in Africa results in situations where both conflict and cooperation occur, providing small-farming households with benefits. China’s aid is not characterized by empty rhetoric or standard solutions, but more of attention to practicality and effectiveness, often prompting the recipient countries to learn from China’s experience when responding to their special needs, instead of just thrusting politically or economically systematic models on these nations (Nordtveit 2009). The process of China-Africa agricultural cooperation does not necessarily follow the rules for providing assistance to developing countries formulated by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) (Li et  al., 2014). As Durkheim (1901/1950) says, the system followed by the ATDC involves

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knowledge, beliefs and “collective psyche and ideas”—a product born out of human interaction, yet experienced by individuals in an objective and “compulsory” manner (Durkheim 1950). More than 85 km away from the capital, the China’s ATDC in country E is run by GX’s BG Agricultural Technology Co., Ltd. (hereafter referred to as the BG Company), with 14 Chinese experts on agriculture—professionals used to be working in China’s agricultural extension system with a top-down management mechanism—responsible for operation. The ATDC aims to introduce China’s agricultural technology to country E by demonstrating China’s farming approach and training local workers. The ATDC’s arable farming fields are close to those of a typical agricultural demonstration park within China, and require manual labor for cultivation and harvesting. When the 52.36 hectares of land are fully utilized, about 20 local workers will be needed every day during the agricultural slack season, and around 50 people daily due to irrigation tasks on busy days. In July 2014, 9  hectares were planted with forage grass, one hectare with bran, 14 hectares with corn, and the remaining 17 hectares with vegetables, including green peppers, tomatoes, cucumbers, beans, string beans, and broccoli, Lettuces, garland chrysanthemum, spinach, pumpkins, cauliflowers, leeks, celery, asparagus, and the like. There were 11 hectares of greenhouses for cultivating vegetable seedlings and as demonstration sites for how to grow vegetables. In addition, 40 pigs, 120 chickens and 16 cows were raised as well. During the dry season, four wells in the four corners of the field were pumped for irrigation. Cultivating and ploughing were done by three tractors. However, in the rainy season, since the soil was rich in water, a tractor with higher power, which could be borrowed from the agricultural department in the nearby Anbao County, was required to get the job done. Most of the harvested produce was shipped to a farmers’ market in the capital, or sold to Chinese restaurants or companies near the capital. After a year and a half of financial hardship, the center finally gained an annual net profit of 120,000 dollars. Of the 14 Chinese staff members in the ATDC, only four were initially affiliated with the BG Company, including an interpreter, a horticultural expert from the BG demonstration garden, and a horticultural expert hired as a manager responsible for overseas project management, and an administrative staff member; other experts are from different departments of the GX agricultural system. Except the interpreter, all the experts used to work in the agricultural promotion system in China, or work overseas, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, and Gambia. And they all performed

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specific tasks, such as project management or agricultural technology training and promotion, in the agricultural sector, with some of them having breeding and seed production experience for 20 years or so; some have worked for decades at county agricultural machinery stations, responsible for maintenance of agricultural machinery and often rated as excellent for doing a good job. The way the experts work in the ATDC is shaped by their experience in China’s agricultural promotion system. China formulates its foreign policies by drawing on its experience. Building ATDCs overseas and sending experts to work on site is essentially an approach based on China’s experience in agricultural promotion and adjusted according its national development strategy. What’s more, the partner lacks a comprehensive agricultural technology promotion system that can provide needed support. The system formed based on China’s experience does not guarantee the results achieved in China can also be achieved by the promotion project carried out in country E.  How the implementation process proceeds depends, to a great extent, on how well the experts do their jobs. These professionals gain experience and abilities while working in China, which means their working mode largely reflect the characteristics of China’s systems.

5.2   Imitation Occurred During the Construction of ATDC The operation of China’s ATDCs in Africa is generally divided into three phases. The first phase is a two-year construction period, the second is a three-year technical cooperation period, and the third one is a 3-to-7-year sustainable development period. The contract usually states that in the third stage, China and African partner countries should jointly decide which party will be responsible for later operation. The situations in countries S and E, however, are relatively special, and the contract stipulates that the ATDC will be directly and completely transferred from the China’s side to the other party in the third stage. Since the beginning of construction, the methods and ideas that China has obtained during its R&D on agricultural technologies have been introduced into the fabric of country E’s society.

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5.2.1  China’s Agricultural Technology R&D System Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has accentuated the development of agricultural technology and established a sound national agricultural technology promotion system. Both the research and promotion units have recruited a large promotion of staff. In the late 1970s, a very robust agricultural promotion system was rebuilt on this basis, with more than one million promotion people engaged. Among them, 90 percent worked at the grassroots level in towns and villages to provide high quality services for rural areas (Hu et  al. 2009). However, because of the financial burden created by such a large staff, the government kicked off commercialization by dividing the system into different units based on the source of funding, such as fully-funded units totally supported by the government, semi-funded units whose paychecks were partially covered by the government, and self-supporting units covering their expenditures by holding commercial activities or receiving donations (Hu et al. 2009). The specific implementation process was complex, including establishing sales department for agricultural technology units, creating fixed positions for township promotion personnel, division of public welfare functions and non-public welfare functions of the promotion system, optimization of agricultural technology teams through post competition, and cultivation of diversified agricultural technology promotion agents. The reform that began in 2006 separated public service functions totally funded by the government, such as technology introduction, testing, and demonstration, from commercial functions like sale of fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides—two mechanisms working in parallel. Regardless of what kind of reform is instituted, China always has a complete system of agricultural technology research and promotion in which research institutions also assume promotion tasks. Under the policy of cultivating diversified promotion bodies, a variety of forms, such as creating expert quarters or introducing technology to rural areas, are emerging; Promotion agencies need all-round talents who can conduct experiments, demonstrations, and training, besides undertaking an array of tasks while carrying out various projects2 and establishing economic entities. The achievements China’s agricultural technology promotion 2  Such as the bumper harvest plan, national key scientific and technological achievements promotion project, vegetable basket project, and comprehensive agricultural development.

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system made at the beginning of the reform and opening up were largely attributable to agricultural technology promotion personnel at grassroots level, stationed at villages across China, who made progress mainly through training and publicity; After the 1990s, the mode of demonstration households gradually appeared. According to the subsequent series of documents about reform and building of promotion systems, in the absence of ATDCs, the agricultural science and technology demonstration parks implemented by the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture starting in 2001 had similar characteristics; The National Agricultural Science and Technology Park Management Measures issued during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period further clarified the park’s demonstration role, characterized by the mechanism whereby “the government takes the lead, businesses run the system, society gets involved, and farmers receive the benefits,” in order to turn the park into a “modern agricultural technology demonstration base of innovation and transformation,” an “entrepreneurship base for technology personnel from rural areas,” and a “modern incubation base for emerging agricultural industries.”3 China’s agricultural technology promotion is a top-down system. However, promotion not only covers demonstration and training, but also includes providing funds for farmers to carry out follow-up supporting projects. The projects carried out by the demonstration households are relatively complete follow-up supporting projects, which are guaranteed by the subsidy policy jointly formulated by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance, which offer in-kind subsidies for agricultural technology promotion services, agricultural technology demonstrations, and agricultural technology personnel capacity building, and the like. In the implementation area of the high-yield grain, cotton, oil, sugar and sugar production project, the subsidies for the reform and construction of the grassroots agricultural technology promotion system focus on the training of agricultural technicians and technical services for achieving high yield.4 The experimental and demonstration base is different from 3  “‘Twelfth Five-Year’ National Agricultural Science and Technology Park Management Measures”. 4  The notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and the General Office of the Ministry of Finance on printing and distributing the “Guiding Opinions on the Implementation of the Reform and Construction of the Grassroots Agricultural Technology Extension System in 2012,” General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and General Office of the Ministry of Finance [2012] No. 71.

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demonstration households, but with a complete set of supportive measures in place, they can work side by side—a system in which promotion personnel are required to organize farmers to visit and study at the experimental and demonstration base, and personally instruct farming households how to give demonstrations. The multi-entity framework proposed in the system reform has been adopted to adjust operating entities, with specific functions allocated to the original government promotion departments, businesses, and individuals. Some businesses offering public services operate on a mode combining public services and business operations. One example is the BG Company, a business venture established in 1999 and affiliated to GX Agriculture Department. With full support from the government, BG has built a 25-hectare modern agricultural demonstration park with objectives like “introducing and promoting new varieties, technologies and achievements; offering modern agricultural science and technology education, training and internship; and engaging in agricultural industrialization management and demonstration as well as new-type sightseeing tourism agriculture.” The park is actually a comprehensive modern agricultural demonstration base fusing organic vegetable and fruit cultivation, organic edible fungi production, livestock breeding, and the national agricultural tourism demonstration. With a technology demonstration function falling more on the side of public service, BG is a company whose main goal is not to generate revenues. After reform, China’s agricultural technology promotion is still a top-­ down system, characterized by integration of departments and regions at different levels and institutional setting and management based on discipline and business, with promotion services carried out through project application, approval and assessment under the national agricultural development goals and project guidelines. The Chinese government sets annual goals for different crops and overall agricultural production at the national level before formulating corresponding promotion plans and goals at various levels. Then, grassroots promoters in towns and villages follow county-­ level plans set up according to the tasks assigned by the Party organization at the upper level.5 Promotion personnel may have close contact with farmers, but they serve for the country rather than the farmers, so they 5  The notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and the General Office of the Ministry of Finance on printing and distributing the “Guiding Opinions on the Implementation of the Reform and Construction of the Grassroots Agricultural Technology

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have to follow the goals set by their superiors while responding to the needs of the farmers to complete their tasks. In short, this top-down approach does not incorporate too much the needs of farmers as technology users. At the beginning of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, when the country’s food security goals exactly echoed the farmers’ livelihood goals, this approach turned out to be the most effective way to accomplish the dual goals. In the 1990s, diversified promotion approaches began to emerge, such as expert quarters, demonstration parks, and demonstration households. However, since the goal of the R&D system was to advance China’s agricultural restructuring and ensure food security, it was still characterized by advanced technology orientation and emphasis on scientific knowledge, yet neglect of local agricultural know-how (Zuo et al. 2003). Meanwhile, the scientific research and promotion personnel at all levels and different disciplines were responsible for promoting agricultural technologies; moreover, the tasks of grassroots promotion staff often overlapped with the general work assigned to townships. Therefore, the personnel of agricultural functional departments, scientific research institutions, agricultural research departments, and township promotion departments all had various experiences in promotion, thanks to the institutional arrangements mentioned above. As the executive agency of the ATDC of Country E, the BG Company employed personnel from domestic agricultural technology research and development system, thus introducing these employees’ experience to the partner. 5.2.2  Imitation of Design Before leaving for country E, the relevant personnel, who had not received formal training on design and construction, did not have a clear idea about what the ATDC should look like. They took an approach of “trial-and-­ error” and “learning by doing.” As such, the design of each ATDC was closely related to its implementing agency6 Knowledge and principles Extension System in 2012,” General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture and General Office of the Ministry of Finance [2012] No. 71. 6  These characteristics are reflected in the layout of daily life and technical arrangements, showing the characteristics of the local culture of the operating organization while presenting the operating organization’s strengths. In Ethiopia, the ATDC has a large round table like that used by Guangxi people for meals. In the field, you can see the pepper varieties brought from Guangxi. In the ATDC in Tanzania, you can see kimchi, chopped pepper, and

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about the tasks of the ATDC are generally introduced at ceremonies marking the start or completion of construction, such as the seminar organized by the GX Agriculture Department on November 9th, 2012, and the meeting hosted by the embassy in country E scheduled on November 26th, 2012. Just like the “preludes”7 given before promotion jobs kicked off in China, these “reminders” and “words of entrust” were, in fact, phrases presenting a vision, pep talks, symbolic wording for creating an image, routine concern over safety, and the like. There were no specific requirements for the experts, and no corresponding, meaningful guide for the aid project. That being said, there was invisible pressure, because the experts “represented China”—in the words of a staff member of the ATDC. The preparation work covers the site selection, design and construction of the ATDC. In a conventional design process, selection of the designers and the construction company already complies with China’s institutional arrangements. The operating principles and methods of the undertaking institution are an embodiment of these institutional arrangements. Domestic agricultural technology R&D mechanism is created to introduce new technologies to ensure food security, and the BG Company incorporates its own characteristics into this preparation process: introducing modern agricultural technologies to create a system fusing experiment, demonstration and promotion into a whole. Country E’s ATDC is designed according to the layout of the agricultural park managed by BG, along with experience that the agronomists smoked sausage bacon. The Chinese staff members always talk with the locals in very standard Chongqing dialect on the test site. The small experimental demonstration fields are mainly planted with rice that are a common sight in the villages of Chongqing. Offices in the ATDC in Zambia have very tall and beautiful bookcases. Large agricultural machines are neatly arranged on an open space, high-end laboratories are equipped with soil measuring instruments matching the research capabilities of the staff from the Jilin Agricultural University, and the edible fungi room highlights the research characteristics of the Jilin Agricultural University. 7  For example: The Miluo City Agriculture Bureau: “Miluo City Agriculture Bureau Holds the ‘Implementation of Agricultural Technology Promotion and Subsidy Project’ and ‘Agricultural Technology Extension Center Offering Star-rated Services ’Mobilization Conference,” Ministry of Agriculture website, http://www.moa.gov.cn/fwllm/qgxxlb/ hunan/201404/t20140422_3880282.htm, April 22, 2014. Another example: Gao Chuqing: “Zhejiang University and Huzhou Hold the 2012 Annual Meeting on Cooperation to Build a Beautiful Country by Mobilizing and Deploying Special Reforms in Agricultural Technology R&D as well as System and Mechanism Promotion and Innovation,” Zhejiang University Press Office, http://www.news.zju.edu.cn/news.php?id=36413, December 9th, 2012.

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gained while promoting agriculture back in China. For example, the design includes a mechanism of “manure,” “planting,” and “biogas” that draws on the ecological loop agricultural model, in addition to other advanced technologies applied in China, for example, mechanization of agricultural cultivation and harvesting, plastic film mulching, industrial breeding, facility gardening, water-saving irrigation, effective intensive planting and fertilization, integrated livestock and poultry breeding and so on. Similar arrangements can also be seen in the design concepts and finished products of other ATDCs set up in China’s aid projects to Africa. For example, the ATDC in Tanzania by Chongqing Seed Group and Chongqing Agricultural Investment Group Co., Ltd. takes rice experiment demonstration as its main goal, and the ATDC in Zambia by the Jilin Agricultural University uses edible fungi demonstration as its main feature, both of which exemplify the experience and advantages of the respective agency. These characteristics are very different from the design process of a Western agricultural aid project—no project feasibility assessment team, no project preliminary assessment (appraisal), no project logic framework (log-frame) were formed, even without a corresponding monitoring and evaluation system. Nevertheless, the staff members all make all-out efforts, and some of them even lived alone in humble hotel rooms of the parting countries for months or even half a year to conduct inspections and make proposals. The design and preparation of an ATDC is just like the launch of China’s agricultural technology research and promotion approach in a foreign country, which conforms to various formal and informal methods of China’s agricultural technology research and development system. It also indicates that the ATDC will present, in country E, not only specific technologies, but also a process of institutional migration, adaptation and adjustment—a process less reflected in laws and policy texts, but more in the individuals, who, in the process, rely on and rebuild a system introduced from China, according to their personal interests, academic and work background, understanding of Country E’s agricultural and R&D system, and communication skills (Zhang 2013).

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5.3   ATDC’s Imitation During the Technical Cooperation Period After the ATDC enters the operation period, its activity plan and activity arrangement are also similar to China’s promotion mechanism and related work arrangements, especially the division of public welfare functions and commercial functions adopted since reform and opening up began. The characteristics of the operation stage also reflect those of China’s agricultural promotion system. The Chinese staff only offers assistance in experiments, demonstrations, and promotion training, without giving any advice on how the demonstration households should present themselves. The agreement only contains specific activities related to experiments, demonstrations and training, without specific evaluation indicators that may affect various activities.8 Since the twenty-first century, hybrid promotion systems involving the public and private sectors have been emerging in China, where the national administrative management system of the public sector actually has not changed, characterized by a traditional “planning and professionalism” style. On the one hand, China has a relatively complete and standardized promotion system, including administrative establishment on top of professional business, and agricultural technology promotion tasks at the national and provincial levels (Zhai 2000); on the other hand, the diversity of demands and resource constraints in the actual operation process, as well as the adoption rate of new technologies by farmers, are directly related to the professional background, sense of responsibility and working ability of promotion personnel (Fan et  al. 2014; Huang et  al. 2009). Most of the staff of the ATDC used to work in this system. Since they have to learn by doing in most cases, what they can rely on is their experience. The characteristics of China’s promotion campaigns are reflected in the ATDC’s management regulations, that is, it has very comprehensive requirements for the promotion staff. The director of the center serves as the leader of the entire team, with each group having its 8  According to the project design and implementation specifications of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, there should be corresponding evaluation indicators and standards for the food security and poverty reduction goals set up by the ATDC, such as the amount of food production and the rise in farmers’ income. When it comes to experiments, demonstrations and training, there should be an evaluation system for the degree of application of the skills learned by the visitors and trainees involved, and even the changes brought by such applications to the farming structure and work efficiency.

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own leader and members. The groups and staff include the planting demonstration group, animal husbandry group, administrative group, market development personnel, hydropower management personnel, machinery management personnel, and interpreters. Experts from the planting demonstration group and animal husbandry group are responsible for the whole work process in training activities, including trials, production, lectures, and field guidance. On the whole, every expert in the ATDC has their own understanding about China’s agricultural technology R&D situations, yet basically knows nothing about the conditions of country E.  The ATDC introduced, through these experts, China’s research and promotion experience—a mix of formalized general features and geographical characteristics reflecting personal capabilities and connections. The Chinese experts have done their utmost to introduce their experience, although they also put forward their views on the different, especially incompatible, systems, materials and cultural conditions that they have encountered in country E. The experts have tasks corresponding to their expertise—agronomy experts are responsible for corn planting demonstrations; horticulture experts for vegetable planting demonstrations; animal husbandry experts for raising chickens and cattle; and agricultural machinery experts for repairing and maintaining machinery and guiding drivers to prepare the land and harvest crops. Demonstration fields, nursery bases, greenhouses, edible fungus production rooms, vegetable storage warehouses, and biogas facilities are all available, but these infrastructures, in fact, are not fully used. In the rainy season of the first year, only 50 percent of the demonstration field was used for corn and vegetable production, but the edible fungus production room was lying idle. The reasons for underutilized facilities are complicated, and one big reason is that there is a gap between design expectation and the actual situation. For example, country E neither has an irrigation system, nor supporting funds for agricultural machinery, and even the vegetables grown by local farmers are totally different from those in China. The vegetables for demonstrations were meant to be exported; however, after having grown vegetables in the rainy season, the staff not only failed to obtain an export license, but also had difficulties in sale of the produce. The director says, “The original plan includes exporting vegetables, but we did not get an export license. We dared not plant vegetables in all the land. Since we do not have experts on edible fungi, the idle edible fungus

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production rooms were once used as brooding rooms for raising chickens.” Even the land is not fully utilized, the center is still under a lot of pressure of selling their products. “Vegetables that cannot be sold have rotted on the ground, causing such a waste,” adds the director. The experts of the center and other Chinese with a certain knowledge of the center describe the operation of the ATDC during the first year in this way. The Chinese experts must adopt various methods to follow the project design while making adjustments to suit local farmers’ conditions and interests. The turning point came with the replacement of the director of the ATDC.  After one year in operation, the center had a new director, who took office in November 2013, and who used to be in charge of assistance projects in China initiated by bilateral or multilateral (such as FAO) agencies, besides serving as an aid project officer stationed in Cambodia. “When I set foot here, I knew nothing about country E’s agricultural condition, and there had already been many criticisms of the ATDC. What’s in mind at the time was two points: fully utilizing the land and finding and doing things more suitable to the local.” I had a meeting with the new director, two weeks after he took office in 2013. He was studying the agricultural structure in different regions of country E, focusing on the research of corn and teff. He showed us a paper on the application of enhanced rice cultivation technology (SRI) for growing teff.9 “I want to try teff. The farmers here grow a large amount of low-yield varieties. We can find a couple of farmers to do experiments. The Anbao Agricultural Research Institute said they have achieved some research results in this field, but have yet to promote it. I think there must be a problem here. Anyway, we can try to plant some, and at least sell the harvest. What’s more, I found this paper online and realized teff has great potential for a bumper harvest.” The local farmers also grow a small amount of corn. Therefore, the new director also discussed the research of new corn varieties with the Anbao Agricultural Research Institute, 10 km away from the ATDC, to see if some new varieties can be planted in the center, which has yet to put its biogas into use, among other technologies designed by the ATDC. The new director wrote a report on the adjustment of the demonstration program (Chen 2013), in which he said that the altitude and climatic conditions here are not suitable for the use of biogas, and locals’ breeding habits are also not conducive to the collection of manure, a waste 9  TarekeBerhe and Nigusse Zena, Results in a Trial of System of Teff Intensification (STI) at Debre Zeit, Ethiopia, Sasakawa African Association Rice Regional.

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matter crucial to biogas technology, which should be abandoned from the project for demonstration as a result. “Biogas technology has been well applied in our province, but it is not suitable for country E with a low temperature, just like some places in China where biogas cannot be used,” the manager in charge of construction also explained. “But I thought since GX had experience in this field, we might give it a try here.” For those vegetables only consumed by the Chinese, the director suggested in the report that they continue to be planted, but more channels to the local market need to be developed. Teff cultivation and edible fungus production were also included in the production plan during the 2014 rainy season. At the same time, the ATDC began to adjust the personnel structure, preparing to make the most of its resources such as land by organizing training sessions and putting forward the idea of agricultural land experiments that were not originally planned.

5.4   Adaptation of the Chinese Style System Because country E has completely different environments and conditions, those trying to imitate China’s promotion system by drawing on their experience faced challenges like how to determine the center’s functions, whom to demonstrate, how to handle the products for demonstration, and how to apply the results of demonstration and training to help local farmers—difficulties that cannot be solved simply by drawing on experience the experts gained in China. Therefore, the system imitators made various adjustments, which were not entirely consistent with those proposed by Western technology and institutional innovation theories not always completely derived from locals’ needs—adaptation manifested in a way that individuals ponder and make alterations while applying the systems they are familiar with to the new environments before the collective behavior norms change accordingly. The experience the experts gained while working in China’s agricultural promotion system directly affected the adaptive adjustments—either considering actual demand or insisting that “supply can also spur demand.” What’s at the heart was still to make the imitated system working after adjustment, so that the ATDC could run smoothly. This kind of adjustment was, in fact, a feature of China’s promotion tasks in this new era. At the policy level, the center’s system is similar to the reformed promotion system in China, except that the public service functions and operation functions are simultaneously combined on the platform, or the

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ATDC. On the one hand, the BG Company, the executing party of the ATDC, should provide public welfare services, as the head of China’s Ministry of Agriculture mentioned during his visit to country E, “We are here not to make money, but to support and assist local agriculture and the people.” On the other hand, for continued development of the agricultural aid project, the ATDC also needs to improve its operational capabilities in three years, besides grasping opportunities for sustainable operation. Namely, BG has dual functions nominally—one is its commercial operation, and the other is its demonstration and promotion of “advanced technology”10 as an agricultural demonstration park. As such, the center will have to seek funding after the Chinese government terminates support; otherwise, it would face financial difficulties after it is transferred to the hands of the partner. For the experts now assuming demonstration and promotion tasks, it is difficult to find revenue channels while completing public welfare functions like conducting experiments, making demonstrations, and promotion. However, it is still possible, because they have encountered similar challenges in China. A senior agronomist in charge of corn production used to work in the GX Seed Company and GX Seed Management Station. And he says, “I have worked in a seed test station for more than 20 years. In China, the value added of seeds is very high, because the demand for seeds is huge in agricultural production. If everyone here is willing to cooperate, like using machinery for farming and watering plants in time, similar work can be done here. We can do seed selection and breeding, and even hybrid breeding. We can teach local technicians how to breed seeds, but they have to do the followup work themselves.” However, because breeding requires an average period of 10 years, or at least 5 to 6 years, promotion of seed technology is not feasible for this three-year technology cooperative project. What’s more, technologies with the potential to be promoted to increase local productivity in a short term like water-saving technologies and mulching techniques that are easy to learn cannot be adopted to bring huge benefits to the center. Country E is only looking forward to the public service functions of the ATDC. “This is the government’s asset. It should provide public welfare services, and it is not allowed to make money,” the director of the Ministry of Agriculture of country E said. However, the ATDC has to sell products, 10  “Advanced technology” here refers to local and foreign technologies characterized by high yield and high output.

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including vegetables, pork, chicken, eggs and so on, to stay in business. After the end of the cooperation period, if the government no longer provides support, it would have to rely on its revenues to maintain production, in addition to offering public welfare services like demonstration and training. But, from the official agreement, marketing is neither part of the deal, nor the condition for the ATDC to operate. Therefore, the ATDC cannot be registered as a company and thus issue invoices for selling products—a practice that would cause trouble to customers who want to buy their products and be invoiced. The ATDC even cannot sell live animals to buyers like restaurants, because these buyers need a license for slaughtering livestock. Moreover, as a foreign venture, the center cannot open a store directly selling products to local consumers. It must make a joint venture with local businesses. The dual expectations of the ATDC are out of sync with the actual situations in country E, forcing the staff to find a way around it. First, they identified potential customers for their different products. In their adjustment report, they conducted a very detailed cost-return analysis of each vegetable, targeting Chinese customers living near the center and in the capital of country E. Second, they produced corn and teff that can be easily sold to nearby farmers. Finally, they discussed with Chinese companies interested in taking over the ATDC, including CGCOC Group—which has built a modern integrated agricultural demonstration park in Abuja, Nigeria, and a Wara agricultural park in Kebbi—and Guangxi State Farms, a visiting state-owned conglomerate. Under the pressure of external evaluation, the ATDC was constantly adapting, based on the experts’ own characteristics, to the difficulties it faced in terms of operation specifications and specific activities. To apply the results of demonstration and training to locals, the new director adjusted the plan in accordance with the actual requirements in a timely manner based on his experience in foreign project management. He said, “We are here to demonstrate technology, not to experiment with the farmers. If we do it step by step according to the plan, it is very easy to complete tasks like conducting experiments, offering training courses, and recruiting participants. Plus, there are no requirements for farmland trials in the plan. That being said, both the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture of country E have suggested that demonstration households be chosen to promote new technologies, which is also a form of agricultural promotion in China. So we have selected four demonstration households in this rainy season. We are still making reports and

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planning to apply for 100,000 yuan from GX Agriculture Department to support demonstration involving 15 households. Since it is not included in the plan, we have no relevant budget for it.” At the beginning of adaptation, the ATDC did not carry out farmland trials, but some experts still visit local farmers and made friends with them. The farmers sometimes gave them local corn varieties. The experts gradually learned the local conditions through their contact with the farmers. A horticultural expert said, “We work with the locals every day, so I pick up a little of the Oromo language. On weekends, I do not stay in the dorm, but hang out with them. I do so not for work, but out of interest in the local culture. To work more efficiently, we also need to know more about the employees of the ATDC. Two college graduates are working with us. I want to train them so that they may become foremen some day. Our production approach is completely different from that of the locals. The vegetables planted in the ATDC are totally different from those grown by local residents. However, the locally improved varieties of corn now planted and the complete field management method are very suitable for local farmers.” Issues like whom to demonstrate and how to handle demonstration products were resolved through similar adaptive adjustments. Eight months after my first visit there, I returned to the ATDC in July 2014. Then, I found many changes. Two training courses attended by about 100 people have been held. Seventy of the trainees asked the center for corn seeds. All the land was used, and the vegetables grown extensively there still came from China. The center’s products were mainly shipped to Chinese restaurants, Chinese companies, and individual stalls in the local market. At the same time, it had a bump harvest of the local varieties of corn and teff. The harvested corn was sold locally, with some directly sold to the workers in the center. With the help of Chinese edible fungus experts from another agricultural aid project “Agricultural Technology Expert Group,” edible fungus production also took off. Moreover, four demonstration households began to use the mulching technology demonstrated and offered by the ATDC to grow corn. To make the most of the existing research resources and facilities, the ATDC also constantly communicates with the nearby Anbao Agricultural Research Institute, from which the center introduced the corn varieties and rent the 120-­horsepower tractors they used during the busy season.

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As for sustainable development,11 an issue not reflected in the institutional arrangements beforehand, with external interventions and reflections of the staff, country E, particularly its Ministry of Agriculture, was more and more satisfied with the progress the center was making and thus proposed China’s continued management. The ATDC began to look for innovative operating mechanisms for sustainable development. Looking at the practicalities, the new director said, “Agriculture is an industry with low investment returns and high risks. If we are simply engaged in agricultural production, it is very difficult to survive and develop, not to mention the need to offer training and promote. Unless we can find a company with its main business in another industry that deems agricultural operation as a supplement to its commercial activities or as a channel to fulfill its social responsibility, the BG Company will not continue to run the ATDC. We have already negotiated with CGCOC Group about takeover of the center; and we have also invited Guangxi State Farms to visit here for investigation.” Later, the Ministry of Agriculture of country E collaborated with the BG Company, the Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office, and CGCOC Group, making a proposal that the ATDC continue to work with China for another three years when the contract expired in 2015. These seemingly arbitrary adjustments did not follow the guidance of a very clear and formal monitoring and evaluation system. They were made due to a lot of pressure from China and country E.  The adaptation of management norms and operating rules was closely related to the direct guidance from the higher-level units, and was also related to the stationed experts’ experience and judgment about the actual situations. The higher-­ level units, whether it be the Department of Foreign Assistance of the Ministry of Commerce or the Ministry of Agriculture, all had their own expectations of the center’s operational efficiency, pilot demonstration activities, and sustainable development. The stationed experts explored on their own the actual situations and needs of country E through exchanges 11  Most people in the ATDC think that since country E proposed from the beginning that after the three-year cooperation period was over, the ATDC should be completely transferred to country E, there is no need for China to consider the issue of sustainable development. In April 2014, I participated in the mid-term progress seminar of the ATDC jointly organized by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Center of the Ministry of Agriculture and Department of Foreign Assistance of the Ministry of Commerce, where relevant people specifically pointed out that this situation without consideration for sustainable development should be changed.

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with local partners, information inquiries, and discussions with experienced Chinese colleagues—a sort of adaptation and adjustment quite similar to the operation process of China’s promotion projects. First of all, the long-term goal of promotion may be to ensure national food security or achieve modern agriculture. Even if there is a gap between the goal and actual demand, it is still a catalyst for advancing related projects. Country E had great expectations of the ATDC’s prospects. The contact window of country E in the center said, “The future of our country’s agriculture should be large-scale production based on advanced infrastructure and mechanization, just like what the ATDC has shown, instead of staying in a backward production state.” Under this goal, the adjustment did not necessarily have to be in line with the actual production needs of small farming households, but to ensure the smooth operation of the planned test and demonstration tasks, for example, the tractors should be working normally, and the land be fully utilized. All of these should be based on specific technical output, such as selecting the most suitable varieties for local conditions through experiments and locating higher-yield corn varieties through demonstrations to ensure smooth daily activities like various demonstration parks and promotion projects in China. Secondly, the effectiveness of promotion is largely related to the requirements from higher-level units and the concentrated pooling of resources. The ATDC receives direct pressure from the Chinese management units. The importance of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Commerce during the center’s adaptation to the system is beyond doubt. In 2013, under the guidance of the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Agriculture evaluated the ATDC, and the results revealed the progress of the experiments, demonstrations and promotion campaigns done by various ATDCs. At the time, the staff of the ATDC in country E was embarrassed, because they only grew vegetables, most of which were varieties from China, without doing any training or considering sustainability whatsoever. Needless to say, replacing the director was at the top of the agenda, and the subsequent adjustment of the demonstration structure, albeit without any alteration to the basic production norms, was inevitable. In addition, the Minister of Agriculture said during his visit that commercialization was not the goal of the ATDC, and the evaluation team from the Ministry of Commerce also proposed that demonstration households should be selected—two commands also affecting the center’s positioning and alteration of its system. When the design of policies and

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projects is insufficient to clearly guide an individual’s work, the staff under China’s governance structure would adjust regulations and plans in a similar manner under specific requirements. Finally, a person’s experience, abilities and personality determine how he or she would respond to the unexpected, and whether he or she would flexibly mobilize resources to make adjustments to a plan. Under the existing framework, it is important to have a leadership with enough promotion and management experience, as well as experts capable of meeting the specifications. When the person in charge with only limited capabilities fails to finely adjust the system and norms, personnel change is the only solution. The new director accumulated experience from an aid project in Cambodia. After taking office, he recommended new experts, with special consideration for their qualifications. Nearly 50percent of the personnel were replaced.

5.5   Differences Encountered During System Adaptation Adaptation is mostly based on the assumption that there are similar systems or working methods, but the actual situations do not necessarily meet that assumption, and thus adaptation of the norms and system is confronted with many difficulties. At the beginning of design, demonstration and training were not supplemented with corresponding follow-up activities to ensure that the implementation results can be applied to local farmers. China has demonstration and training programs that are similarly simple yet not isolated, which means its promotion system has “supporting” promotion projects. For example, a training course will have follow­up demonstration activities and corresponding consultation sessions, so that technicians can visit or receive farmers when needed, or have visits by farmers organized by governments at all levels (Chen 2013); or there is a fixed “proportion” of the current demonstration households to the promotion staff (Long 2014). The activities beyond demonstration and training are not included in the ATDC’s responsibilities, but are integrated with the arrangements of country E. The contract covers the training plan, which clearly stipulates that country E must be responsible for recruiting trainees and cover transportation expenses. This does not exceed the expectations of Chinese experts, who only provide knowledge and on-site guidance to the participants and who do not have to specify

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persons to be trained, nor organize them. However, the process did not go smoothly, for country E failed to organize the participants according to the plan. When taking office in November 2013, the new director realized that he needed to push ahead with this process. He organized an internal meeting in time to formulate a training plan, and visited the Ministry of Agriculture, where he discussed the matter with the liaison, saying, “It is country E’s responsibility to choose trainees, and it is clearly written in the mission statement. We are not supposed to directly ask farmers to come in, or allow them to go directly to the ATDC.” He worked in close liaison with the director and contact window of the Ministry of Agriculture, so after only 10 days in office, he decided December 4th, 2013 as the training date. However, things did not go as planned. The date was postponed repeatedly, and training did not start until four months later. The new director also suggested that some local people who helped farming in the ATDC receive training, because most of them are nearby farmers, and he hope that they would be able to combine the training with their farming practices after being trained. At the same time, the Ministry of Agriculture of country E finally combined these training sessions with the country’s activities under the “Agricultural Growth Project” (AGP),12 and transportation costs were therefore covered. The center also invited Chinese experts from the Chinese Agricultural Technology Group at country E’s the Ministry of Agriculture to teach mulching technology in training courses—a task also deemed as one of the AGP activities. As mentioned above, most of the promotion methods adopted in China are top-down. Chinese promotion personnel are relatively more committed to the tasks they have assumed and will do their best to complete them even at a low pay and facing challenges and difficulties. What is supporting 12  AGPstands as country E’s national agriculture growth project funded by the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank (WB). AGPaims to promote women’s and youth’s participation in agriculture, increase the productivity of major crops and animal husbandry, and expand market channels. The first phase was completed at the end of 2015, and the second phase began in 2016. The first phase covered three items: one was agricultural production and commercialization, the second was the construction of small infrastructure in rural areas, and the third was the monitoring and evaluation of project management.

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researchers and promotion staff is the subsequent spiritual incentive and reward mechanism. The promotion staff will persevere to conduct experiments and promote in any way possible to complete the task assigned by the superior. If they put in a lot of efforts, even a little progress will give them a sense of accomplishment and they will be proud of it. The most prominent example is the promotion of hybrid corn and rice in the late 1970s, with the promotion staff making a significant contribution. At the time, farmers still had doubts about the adoption of new technologies, only accepting the taste and texture of traditional varieties. As such, the initial promotion work did not go smoothly. The low-paid promotion staff relentlessly visited villages, one after another, where they would promote again and again, and came up with new ideas like inviting technicians from those villages who still had close liaison with the residents to promote new varieties in villager-friendly languages.13 The farmers eventually adopted the new varieties, which was a big reward for the promoters, who are very happy every time someone talks about their achievement. In China, grassroots promotion agencies cover many areas and have to hold many promotion activities, which explains why the experts in the ATDC unconsciously assumed that the local conditions in country E would be the same. But, in fact, the expected follow-up work did not happen at all because “the grassroots promotion staff was in want of communication and transportation tools and methods, such as mobile phones, bicycles, and subsidies for visiting the countryside, and their salary was very low, around 1,000 birr a month, barely enough to motivate the staff to spend 3 to 4 hours in villages to do promotion,” an expert from the agricultural technology group said. With a different environment, country E does not have an R&D system common seen in China. Most villages and towns have Farmers’ Training Centers (FTC) supposed to serve as a platform for training and demonstration for nearby farmers. In the promotion system, each FTC has three promotion staff members per

13  For example, some technicians started with local varieties of rice, talking about meal flavors before asking the villagers if they would like to try more flavors, which the new varieties could offer. When explaining the wide and narrow row spacing cultivation of rice, some technicians would ask people if they noticed that the rice on the edge of the field grew better and then talked about the “marginal benefit”: rice on the edge grows better than those in the middle.

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township,14 seemingly enough for it to play its role. However, the truth is that the FTC is not up to its task, unless there is a corresponding project activity in its area. At the township level, there are around 8489 farmers’ training centers, and only 2500 of them are functioning well, according to a report (Ethiopia, MOARD 2009). Other studies have identified similar situations. For example, the IFPR study concludes that the farmers’ training centers have quite limited infrastructure and resources, especially lack of implementation-related funding, and thus the majority of the farmers’ training centers and townships are unable to provide operating facilities or production investment to carry out specialized promotion activities on their demonstration farms (Davis et al. 2010)—a situation different from that in China, where demonstration households, or villagers, would still carry out farming activities, even if they do not receive the government’s material support. In country E, a farmers’ training center only has a piece of arable land and open fields, along with offices for training, without any long-term farming staff. Therefore, without support in the form of a project, these farmers’ training centers cannot function.15 The Chinese experts know little about the farmers’ training centers or co-ops, and they do not think that NGOs can play much of a role. Judging from their experience in China, they think that advanced farmers as demonstration households could increase the adoption rate of new technologies, and higher-level departments would assume major responsibility for promotion. These expectations, however, differ from the perception of country E, who believes that they have done enough during the technical cooperation period, such as introducing to the ATDC the Allage College that provided the needed livestock, contacting the Anbao Agricultural Research Institute in Town G to provide local employees for the ATDC, and getting various soil and meteorological data from local agricultural technology stations. In the eyes of the Chinese experts, however, these are far from enough.

14  The township (kebele) is the smallest administrative unit in country E, similar to a residential community or a gathering area of local people. It is part of a county (woreda) or a city (district), with the upper level being a region (zone), and the next higher level a state (region). The states, divided based on ethnic groups and vernaculars, collectively form country E. 15  In certain South-South cooperation projects that China collaborates with FAO in country E, some carried out activities at farmers’ training centers. Theyutilized long-term barren arable fields less than 1 hectare to hold demonstration sessions and training activities like growing millet and new vegetable varieties, as well as improving small planters.

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Based on their experience, the Chinese experts expected local farmers to change their behavior to accept new technologies. Regardless of the situation, they always assume that the locals need high-yield varieties or advanced technologies prompting high yields. In China, improved varieties play a central role in increasing yield Huang (1999), and promotion of high-yield varieties can achieve significant results in a short period of time. And one of the major tasks is to persuade farmers to rely on new varieties. Experts with successful experience in China are also very optimistic, just as an agronomist, who is also on the earliest payroll of the center, said, “We brought from China advanced technology that we are here to promote. There are, in fact, modern planting models here. Intensive and fine farming can also bring high yields, but they are rarely used. If you look around, seeds are not even planted in ridges, and the farmers here grow a large amount of low-yield varieties. Productivity can be largely enhanced.” Meanwhile, the experts also realize that it will take time for farmers to adjust their habits to these new models, because “although local people have been engaged in farming activities since they were kids, what they do are very simple, such as raising cattle means not letting the animals go missing. And they never weed. Sometimes I see them pull grass, but they do so just to feed the cattle. They have yet to know how to plough the fields, and that is why the local farmers working at the ATDC are painfully slow,” explained one of the horticulture experts. Water-saving irrigation is also one of the technologies demonstrated by the center. Since local farmers lack resources to create irrigation systems, it seems that this demonstration technology is not likely to be promoted here. In spite of this, the experts believe that there are solutions if local farmers are willing to learn. One expert said, “There are no irrigation facilities in many places. However, if they really want to learn something, they can still drill wells on their own. The water level around the ATDC is very high. If you dig about 20 meters deep, you can obtain water. It really does not matter whether you have money or not. Wells can be drilled with manual labor. In China, almost every household in areas with water resources has a well.” Although the experts have great confidence in applying these demonstration technologies, local farmers still have their own thoughts and needs. There is an obvious inconsistency between the two parties. For example, after training sessions are over, the experts and local farmers would become friends, but the latter only asked for corn seeds afterwards and no one sought guidance on irrigation, how to make their cattle fat,

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and mulching. Four local farmers have been selected as demonstration households. They are the foremen of the working groups at the ATDC. They usually are very active and have received training. Moreover, their houses and fields are not far from the ATDC. And they have applied their corn production technologies—from choosing good local varieties, mulching, applying base fertilizers, weeding to fertilization at later stages—at the ATDC. Even so, the demonstration households’ improvement of corn production is still driven by the experts, such as when to weed, fertilize and mulch. When the agronomist in charge of the corn demonstration returned to China for the annual holiday, the demonstration households he was in charge of did not follow the plan to apply fertilizers. After he returned, the ideal timing for fertilizing had been missed.

5.6   Conclusions The cooperative process of the Sino-country E ATDC fully reveals the institutional characteristics of China’s agricultural promotion system as well as the changes made to adapt to local social and cultural situations. In the process, the Chinese personnel imitate China’s rules to create a “new” system in a foreign country based on their work requirements and personal objective experience. When driving this system to operate effectively, they adapt it in a unique, “Chinese-style” manner. 5.6.1  ATDC Introduces China’s Institutions, Norms and Approaches to Country E In a totally different environment in country E,China’s institutions, norms and approach are demonstrated through the specific actions of the executive staff, namely the stationed experts. Each of the tasks, whether it be the formation of institutional norms, implementation of an approach following the institutional norms, and the response to difficulties in implementation, is carried out by the experienced experts imitating and adapting with their abilities. Although these institutional norms may not necessarily be independently followed by organizations in the same field in foreign countries, institutional innovation has been completed (Aoki Masahiko 2009) with the support of all the parties, and the basic assumptions, principles, and working methods of the project before the formation of institutions have been revised to be consistent with the new environment.

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The tasks of the ATDC in country E resemble the agricultural research and promotion projects carried out in China. The design combines various modern technologies applied in rural areas in China, with its management standards being consistent with the institutional standards of the implementing agency and the promotion system in countries where Chinese experts are stationed. Its implementation is made possible by mobilizing various resources, including the external support not mentioned in the plan when the project started, the adjustments made according to new needs and conditions, and, more importantly, the individual experience and abilities these adjustments rely on. Since they have not received any training onproject management or work norms concerning foreign aid, the experts just follow their work norms in China. They do not have a clear concept of agricultural cooperation and aid, so they seem to be demonstrating technology, but, in fact, they are demonstrating the norms and implementation methods in their past work systems, as well as their gradual understanding of the changing working environment. 5.6.2  Responding to Local Conditions with System Operation and Making “Chinese Style” Adjustments The agricultural technology R&D system in country E is quite different from that in China in that it lacks the strong promotion system that China has. The promotion approach imitated by the ATDC is somewhat effective in China, but it faces a series of challenges such as lack of supporting facilities and follow-up resources in country E. These challenges require a lot of extra efforts, for example, mobilizing more resources, beyond the design of the ATDC.  Whether these efforts are mobilization of human capital or the matching of physical capital, just like the challenges people are faced with when promoting new technologies in China, what can be truly achieved still depends on the implementing party’s abilities, which explains why, within a certain period of time, promotion is still basically confined to the ATDC without reaching the farmers. The center’s current norms imitate, to a certain extent, part of the norms adopted in China’s agricultural promotion system. In country E’s totally different environment, to continue this demonstration approach, more active adaptation is needed, such as further systematic understanding of the local agricultural R&D system, more contact with different local stakeholders, frequent liaison with contact windows, and personal efforts, all of which are not involved in the original plan but may be very meaningful new experiments.

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Under this logic of “imitating the original system before surpassing it,” cooperation is random, yet based on evidence. Other Sino-Africa agricultural cooperation cases also reveal this logic. For example, Anhui State Farm established a joint venture in Zimbabwe, where it runs the Viali Farm. The negotiation of the contract, the hardships those involved get through, the full efforts they put into reclaiming, and the joining enterprises’ overseas adventure all combine to show a process of “Re-creating an Anhui State Farm” (Wu 2015). Built by CMC Minuo Co., the ATDC in Zimbabwe features agricultural machinery, whereas the ATDC in Zambia was built by the Jilin Agricultural University, mainly being engaged in growing edible fungi—both of them give full play to their strengths, and their management methods reflect the characteristics of their contracting agencies, respectively. 5.6.3  Operation of the ATDC Is Different from the Traditional International Development Aid Framework The ATDC cannot be categorized as an international develop project because it does not follow the universal concept of international development. Of course, the experts working there never claim that they are a professional team for international development, with obvious characteristics of traditional aid projects (Mosse, David 2011). Experts are not confined to routines commonly seen in other development projects such as writing reports and promoting with brochures, and they seldom communicate with people from other aid projects. The Economic and Trade Department has guidance on foreign aid, which only emphasizes those involved should maintain the image of China while working in country E, but varied individuals view the guidance differently, based on the experience they gained in agricultural promotion work in China, in a bid to complete the promotion and production tasks. Moreover, the staff of the ATDC has strange feelings because of the production and sales tasks they undertake. They are nominally employed by the implementing agency, with the responsibility to engage in business activities; however, they still under the impression that they are the personnel of the original agency—promotion staff, researchers, or officials— and thus they prefer to do their research, promotion, and management tasks. In addition, they are not so optimistic about the commercialization of the ATDC, because agriculture is not a profitable industry. If it follows the direction of industrial development, it cannot survive without support

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from the government. Most of the staff clearly know about this from their long-term experience working in the front line of China’s agricultural R&D. When they introduce the promotion system they are familiar with, they have no idea of universal concepts related to development. What’s more, they have a hard time applying their promotion backgrounds to the joint effort combing private businesses, state-owned enterprises, and foreign partners. Therefore, the expected goals, outputs and corresponding activities involved in those project frameworks are not included in the entire management process and its implementation. And the experts cannot run the ATDC according to a business model. Guidance on practical activities is mostly available on how to manage and implement a Chinese agricultural promotion project, and of course, it is gradually adopted to manage and implement Chinese promotion projects in country E, which means that the staff of the ATDC are not necessarily as professional as those working for official development assistance projects in the West, and their activities may not be effective from the beginning. Their work suggestions and effectiveness evaluations are recorded in the relevant work reports, yet the combination of the reports does not qualify as a whole system. With respect to this type of cooperation, they must first understand its own specifications, subsequent operating logic, and corresponding indicators.

References D.  Bräutigam, 1993, South-south Technology Transfer: The Case of China’s Kpatawee Rice Project in Liberia Original Research Article, World Development, Volume 21, Issue 12, pp. 1989–2001. Chen, 2013, Internal Report of Adjusting Demonstration Contents of ATDC. Chris Alden, 2005, China in Africa, Survival, 47 (3), p. 149. Kristin Davis, Burton Swanson, David Amudavi, Daniel AyalewMekonnen, Aaron Flohrs, Jens Riese, Chloe Lamb, Elias Zerfu, 2010, In-Depth Assessment of the Public Agricultural Extension System of Ethiopia and Recommendations for Improvement, IFPR! Discussion Paper, 01041. Dawit Alemu, Seth Cook, Qi Gubo, 2015, Chinese Agricultural Expertise Support in Ethiopia: Approaches, Motives and Perspectives, Working Paper, 114 www. future-agricultures.org. Dethier, Jean-Jacques, Alexandra Effenberger, 2012, Agriculture and Development: A Brief Review of the Literature, Economic Systems, 36, pp. 175–205. Emile Durkheim, 1950, The Rules of Sociological Method, Glencoe, IL: Free Press (Original Work Published 1901).

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Ethiopia, MOARD (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development), 2009, DAs and FTC Data at National Level, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: MOARD. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), 2010, South–South Cooperation? The Same Old Game or a New Paradigm? Poverty in Focus, No. 20. X. Li, G. Qi, X. Xu, M. Mao, 2009, Emergence of Farmer-­centred Agricultural Science and Technology Policy in China, Farmer First Revisited: Innovation for Agricultural Research and Development, edited by Ian Scoones and John Thompson, pp. 185–190, Practical Action Publishing: Warwickshire, UK. M.  Mounir Zahran, Enrique Roman-Morey, Tadanori Inomata, 2011, South– South and Triangular Cooperation in the United Nations System, United Nations, Geneva. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), 2006, Ethiopia: Building on Progress. A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005/06–2009/10), Addis Ababa. David Mosse, 2011, Adventure in Aidland: The Anthropology of Expertise and Professionals in International Development, Berghahn Books: Oxford, p. 21. B.  H. Nordtveit, 2009, Bjorn Harald Western and Chinese Development Discourses: Education, Growth and Sustainability, International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 29, pp. 157–165. R. Hu, Z. Yang, P. Kelly, J. Huang, 2009, Agricultural Extension System Reform and Agent Time Allocation in China, China Economic Review, Volume 20, pp. 303–315. Sebastian Rarnet Fuchs, 2013, China, India and Brazil in Africa, Effects on Development Policy, Kas International Reports, 1/2, pp. 6–27. The World Bank, 2012, The World Bank Agricultural Innovation Systems: An Investment Sourcebook, Washington, DC, p. 138. X. Xu, X. Li, G. Qi, 2015, Traveling Technocratic Rationality Historical Narratives of China’s Agricultural Development and Its Implications to China-­ Africa Agricultural Cooperation, Future Agricultures Working Paper. Y. Shimomura, P. Wang, 2015, Chains of Knowledge Creation and Emerging Donors, JICA—RI Working Paper, No. 88, Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute. R. Chen. 2013. Adoption and Application of Agricultural Extension Methods— Take Chongming County as an Example. Anhui Agricultural Science Bulletin, (13). D. Brautigam. 2012. The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (trans: Shen Xiaolei, Gao Mingxiu). Social Sciences Academic Press. J. Huang, R. Hu, J. Song, 1999, Agricultural Technologies from Generation to Application: Comparison of Behaviors between Governments, Scientific Research Personnel, Promoters and Farmers. Impact of Science on Society, (1) J. Huang, R. Hu, and H. Zhi, 2009. Reform and Development of Grassroots-level Agriculture Extension System in Thirty Years: Policy Assessment and Suggestions. Journal of Agrotechnical Economics, (1).

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CHAPTER 6

Inspiration and Aspiration: National Interest and Profit Motive

We are under great pressure to develop China’s first agricultural technology demonstration center in Africa. If our ATDC is poorly developed, we would have failed at the task entrusted to us by the country. The only way to maintain the sustainability of the ATDC is commercial operation. In this way, the operating units can undertake the public welfare function of the aid project while making profits, naturally leading to the mutual benefits and win-win results. —Director of China’s ATDC in Country M

6.1   Introduction Along with the growing economic strength in recent years, China’s foreign aids have developed rapidly both in speed and scale. At the same time, as the world’s largest developing country, China’s foreign aid is significantly different from the traditional Western aids. China has consistently put emphasis on developing win-win and mutually beneficial South-South cooperative relationship with other developing countries, while encouraging sustainable development of aid projects by combining aids with investment and trade, so as to improve the development effectiveness in partner countries. The international academic community has expressed varied opinions on China’s practice in foreign aids. One view regards China’s practice in African countries as a kind of neo-colonialism for the purpose of establishing hegemony (Australia et al. 2008; McMichael 2012), plundering resources under the pretext of aids and investment, and facilitating © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0_6

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the rapid economic growth in China (Fishman 2005; Junger 2007; Rotberg 2008; Wild and Mepham 2006). Another view believes that China advocated and practiced “development partnership” in Africa for the purpose of imparting its own development experience to African countries (Goldstein and Reisen 2006; Le Pere 2007; Taylor 2006). Compared with traditional donor countries, China has paid more attention to the actual situation of recipient countries and introduced a demand-­ oriented and more effective way of development cooperation, which is more welcome and better received by recipient countries (Moyo 2010). In spite of disparities, all opinions send a common message that China, as an emerging economy, plays a vital role in international development assistance and in bringing about structural changes of international assistance (Bräutigam, 2010). On the whole, these studies did not get away from the traditional binary opposition that defines Sino-African partnership from the black-or-white or zero-sum perspective. The inadequate attention to the recipient countries and the stakeholders in the Sino-Africa interactions has seriously impaired the description and judgment of local phenomena, let alone interpreting the logic beneath the phenomena. From the perspective of methodology, the existing studies of China’s foreign aids mostly adopted discourse analysis or macro-data description. The framework and foundation of the analysis are mostly liberal or neo-liberal, with the local perspective of recipient in neglect (Mohen and Lampert 2012). On the other hand, the Chinese scholars; studies and analysis of China’s foreign aids are largely limited to the macro perspective of international relations, lacking a systematic study into the operation of Chinese aid projects at a specific and micro level. Based on the case study of a flagship agricultural assistance project of China, this chapter follows the anthropological research methodology to present an in-depth understanding of the interaction process between multiple Chinese and African stakeholders during the implementation of China’s foreign aid projects, analyze the logic of Chinese foreign aid projects’ local operation and its impact on Africa, and interpret the underlying economic, social and cultural factors, in a bid to reveal the deep-seated characteristics of China’s foreign aids. 6.1.1  China’s ATDC in Africa: An Important Field to Study China’s Foreign Aid Since the 1960s China has begun to provide agricultural assistance to Africa to help Africa ensure people’s basic living needs. In the meanwhile,

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China has made continuous explorations of ways to provide assistance. In the early days, the assistance was provided mainly in the form of building large farms and agricultural technology extension stations. However, as a combination of the monumental scale, higher staff turnover and the emphasis of demonstration over economic benefits gave rise to insufficient follow-up investment and slow delivery of effects from technology transfer, these farms and stations struggled with operation and even closed. Since the mid-1980s, based on the lessons from the large farm projects, China has gradually changed its assistance methods from large-scale experimental demonstrations to personnel training and technical exchanges. China sent agricultural technology experts to African countries to help improve agricultural infrastructure, while encouraging the involvement of local farmers, providing them with technical trainings on pre-, mid- and post-production services. This type of assistance eased the economic burden of both governments, boosted the enthusiasm of local farmers, and transferred planting technology. However, following the withdrawal of Chinese experts, the transferred technologies were usually deformed and thus failed to deliver the expected results due to the limited number of dispatched Chinese agricultural experts, the short duration of the project, as well as the limited effect of technology transfer as a result of the experts’ competency in language, professionalism and physic conditions, the culture of recipient countries, and the learning capacity of local farmers. It gave rise to the phenomenon of “technologies’ disappearance with the experts’ withdrawal.” Since the mid-1990s, relevant departments of China’s foreign aid have been exploring ways to combine aid with commercial interests, with a view for the sustainability of aid projects. The smoothly functioning China-Guinea Agricultural Cooperative Development Corporation is a bold attempt of such exploration, providing a successful model to combine aid with business. However, not all projects that combine aids with commercial interests are as successful as the Sino-Guinean Agricultural Cooperative Development Corporation. Many projects stopped or struggled with operation due to various factors like politics and climate. Moreover, the successful cases are far outnumbered by the failed ones (Tang 2013). In the twenty-first century, especially since the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the ATDC has become an important part and a new model of China’s agricultural assistance to Africa. At the 2006 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China pledged to build 10 ATDCs in Africa and increased to 14

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afterwards at the request of African countries. At the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2009, China renewed its commitment to increase the number of ATDCs to 20. As of September 2015, China has built 23 ATDCs in Africa. Like other agricultural assistance projects, the ATDC project mainly takes the form of technology transfer and personnel training. What distinguishes the ATDC project from others is the inclusion of sustainable development as a part of the bilateral agreement and an important gauge for the project’s success. The projects are mostly undertaken by Chinese enterprises or scientific research institutions. As a model of assistance, the ATDC project is highly consistent with China’s other foreign aid projects in forms. On the one hand, the ATDC undertakes the national mission of demonstrating and disseminating China’s development experience to Africa, demonstrating and promoting agricultural technologies in Africa, and thereby enabling the African people to master technologies and methods of improving their livelihood in a sustainable manner. On the other hand, the principle of seeking mutual benefit and the goal of sustainable development create a legal space for the ATDC construction company and staff to realize corporate profits and personal goals. In the process of striving for the goals, Chinese project implementers need to fulfill their national mission, while working to create corporate profits and improve their own working and living environment. In addition, the ATDCs’ consistency in form, quantitative superiority and management homogeneity in different African countries make them an important field for studying China’s foreign aid. 6.1.2  Research Methodology and Questions This study adopted qualitative research methodologies in anthropology and sociology. The semi-auto-ethnographic qualitative methodology is adopted to understand the interaction process between different stakeholder groups in China and Africa. It means that during the long-term field research, the researchers “dined, lived and worked” along with the local project implementers, got absorbed into the communities, and blurred the distinctions between “outsiders” and “insiders.” In the meanwhile, researchers paid attention to their self-consciousness and personal experience, focused on the descriptions of research subjects’ personal thoughts, feelings, and stories at the individual level, and interpreted such descriptions in association with the cultural, social, economic and

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institutional background that was familiar to the researchers. In this chapter, the methodology was used to study the Chinese actors, the relevant personnel with the local cooperative institutions involved in the management and operation of the ATDC, the laborers and the trainees in the ATDC.  In addition, the researchers conducted unstructured interviews with relevant Chinese and African government officials and other people engaged in the design, operation and decision-making of the ATDC. Instead of evaluating the quality and effects of China’s agricultural assistance projects based on the general binary structure analysis, the author decomposed the “Chinese” element at ATDCs into “country, technology, operating units, and individuals,” studied their interactions with different local stakeholders in Africa, and analyzed their impact on the project and the local development, in a bid to pinpoint the logical relationship and potential motives and reasons beneath the seemingly complex phenomena. This study aims to answer the following questions. How does the ATDC, as a Chinese aid project, represent the state will in the recipient country? How does the state construct the identity of the ATDC operator? How does the operator use this identity to interact with the local people and play a dynamic role? What is the logic behind these interactions? What impact will it have on the project? By answering these questions, the author aims to describe the presentation of China’s foreign aid projects in different cultural, social and economic environments, thereby revealing its relationship with China’s local development experience.

6.2   ATDC’s Practices to Advance National Interest The biggest difference between traditional Western aids and China’s foreign aid lies in that China does not offer direct budget support to recipient countries. In terms of regional planning, China does not set target regions or countries for foreign aid. However, China clearly stipulated to provide foreign aid under the framework of South-South cooperation. Basic features of China’s foreign aid policy are as follows. First, help recipient countries build up their self-development capacity. Second, impose no political conditions. Third, adhere to the principle of equality, mutual benefit and common development. Fourth, remain realistic while striving for the best. Fifth,keep pace with the times and pay attention to reform and

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innovation. China has also established specific guidelines and procedures for the project implementation. The ATDC project should adopt the following implementation procedures. For a start, the recipient country files an application. Then, the Ministry of Commerce of PRC makes plans before entrusting the Ministry of Agriculture of PRC to set up an expert group to conduct field survey in the recipient country and negotiate with the recipient country to select the site for the project. And afterwards, the Ministry of Commerce selects the Chinese construction company of ATDC through public bidding. After the construction is completed, the ATDC will be handed over to the recipient government who will then appoint the local cooperative department. China sends experts to manage the ATDC whose core tasks are to experiment, demonstrate and promote agricultural planting technology, train agricultural technicians and solve food security problems for African countries. The operation of ATDCs goes through three phases of construction, technical cooperation and sustainable development. During the construction phase, the Chinese government will invest 40 million yuan as construction capital. After the construction is completed, the ATDC will be handed over to the recipient government, ushering into the technical cooperation phase that will last three years or longer.During this phase, China will allocate five million yuan a year to operating companies or scientific research institutions as operating funds. It is hoped that after the end of the technical cooperation phase, the ATDC will be able to sustain without any assistance funds. Any foreign aid project is a manifestation of the state will. In the process of implementing the aid project, the implementer must first understand the state’s objectives. Based on our observations of the ATDC, we noticed China’s national element in the following aspects. 6.2.1  The Locations of the ATDCs While selecting the recipient countries for the ATDC project, China first considers bilateral relationship and then prioritizes the countries with a certain foundation for agricultural cooperation. The earliest 14 ATDCs aided by China were established in African countries with long-term and stable diplomatic relations with China. In addition, prior to the ATDC project, there had been successful Chinese agricultural projects in these

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countries and the advantages of Chinese agricultural technology had been initially manifested. The site selection of ATDCs in the recipient countries mainly takes the following factors into account. First, the geographical location should be convenient for ATDC’s demonstration and external communication. Most of the 25 ATDCs aided by China are located in the suburbs near the capital of the recipient country or the provincial capital cities with convenient transportation. For example, the China-Mozambique Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center is located 23 kilometers southwest of the capital of Mozambique, just by the side of the No. 1 Highway. The China-Ethiopia ATDC is located in Ginchi of Oromia State, about 80 km away from the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Second, the local government attaches great importance to its agricultural development and has made requests for agricultural assistance to China. Third, the country already has agricultural projects aided or funded by China that are influential in the local area. For example, prior to the ATDC project, there was Hubei-Gaza Friendship Model Farm developed by Hubei Bureau of Farms and Land Reclamation in Mozambique. In Malawi, the successful experience of China-Africa Cotton also laid a good foundation for the ATDC project. Fourth, the location has the advantages in agricultural resources and the potential for agricultural development. For example, the China-Tanzania ATDC is located in the Morogoro Region, a major agricultural province of the country. In practice, it is not easy to choose a place that meets all the above conditions. Sometimes a trade-off is necessary. For example, although the China-Tanzania ATDC is located in a major agricultural province, it is relatively far from the main cities of the country and faces problems like the lack of water resources. The location of China-Mozambique ATDC, China’s first ATDC in Africa, meets all the above conditions. 6.2.2  Appearance Design of ATDCs The appearance design of ATDCs attaches importance to its demonstration and display functions. The ATDCs largely cover an area of 50–70 hectares. The investment of 40 million yuan during the construction phase is mainly used for infrastructure construction, including land development, supporting infrastructure, purchase of agricultural machinery, personnel funding and so on. Judging from the established ATDCs, most of them are designed to include office and training areas, experimental display

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areas and production & demonstration areas. However, the construction funds are mainly used for the construction of office and living areas and the personnel funding, leaving the land of the demonstration center not fully developed and utilized. As such, most ATDCs boast a fully-equipped office and living area that goes above the standards and looks more like a leisure resort. For instance, some ATDCs have been built with a swimming pool. At the same time, some ATDCs demonstrated some technologies that are not suitable for large-scale promotion in local area, such as drip irrigation technology, large-scale mechanical equipment, advanced greenhouse cover and shading facilities, and advanced processing and storage technology. This also reflects that the ATDCs have focused more on demonstrating the advancement of China’s agricultural technology, without considering their fitness for local conditions. 6.2.3  Tasks of ATDCs The priority of the ATDCs is to demonstrate China’s agricultural development experience. After entering the technical cooperation phase, the operation and management of the ATDCs are mostly undertaken by Chinese agricultural experts. China dispatches 10 agricultural technology experts to the demonstration center every year, mainly responsible for the operation and management of the center, as well as technical demonstration and training. China does not specify the technologies for the ATDCs’ demonstration, but in practice, the superiority of Chinese technology has been strengthened by the ATDC. As the plan for China-Mozambique ATDC clearly states, a major task of the completed demonstration center is to introduce Chinese crop varieties, understand the local natural environment and climatic conditions, and master the pest control, field management and other relevant techniques under the local planting conditions, and create conditions to provide technical guarantee for the promotion of the tested varieties on a larger scale. The goal of the completed ATDC is to help recipient country build up their self-development capacity in agriculture. Help the recipient country to improve agricultural output, increase farmers’ income and achieve sustainable agricultural development by means of training and promotion of technologies in agriculture and animal husbandry. Help farmers in the recipient country to improve planting and breeding skills through project organization and implementation, so as to help the recipient country to increase output and income by relying on science and

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technology, improve hematopoietic capacity and achieve independent development (China-Mozambique Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center Program 2009). Since its operation in 2011, the ATDC in Mozambique has introduced 127 crop varieties from China and conducted trials and demonstrations of upland rice, paddy rice, cotton, maize, and vegetable cultivation, as well as pig breeding experiments. As of August 2014, except for maize and beans, all plant varieties in the ATDC were imported from China. After nearly three years of technical cooperation, the demonstration center has fully demonstrated the advanced nature of China’s agricultural technology, agricultural machinery and China’s national image. In the meanwhile, the ATDC serves as a platform for agricultural cooperation and exchanges between China and recipient countries in Africa. The government of the recipient country, with the help of ATDC, sends assistance requests to Chinese government and brings in some other aid projects from China. In 2013, for instance, the government of Country M wanted to learn China’s biogas engineering technology and thus invested to build a biogas generating pit next to the ATDC’s pig farm. However, due to the immature technology, the completed biogas facilities cannot function. Later, Country M submitted a request to the Chinese government for assistance to fund the construction and demonstration of a biogas generating pit at the same place for them to learn Chinese technology. Afterwards, the Chinese government put the project out to open tender and selected the construction company L for the project. The construction of the project began in July 2014, and the project site was next to the biogas generating pit built by the government of Country M nearby the ATDC. In May 2015, the construction was completed and the pit could be put into use after other equipment was delivered to Country M. The Chinese government also regards the ATDC as a platform to connect with Country M. If any Chinese investors would like to invest in agriculture in Country M, they could visit the ATDC first to learn about the agricultural situation in Country M. The ATDC provides Chinese agricultural investigation group with agricultural knowledge and other support in country M. In addition, the ATDC undertakes an important mission of exploring the path for sustainable development of China’s foreign agricultural assistance. As an innovation of China’s foreign agricultural assistance projects, the ATDC takes on the important task of overcoming the shortcomings of previous agricultural assistance projects and achieving sustainable development. To this end, the ATDC in Country M has made bold explorations

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and attempts. First, it cooperated with Chinese agricultural enterprises in country M to provide it with mature germplasm resources for its commercial seed production and operations. For instance, the ATDC has become a cooperation platform between LF Company, YY Farm and WB Company, while engaging in commercialized seed production and operations at the rice experimental and demonstration base at HB-JZ Farm. As of 2013, two varieties have passed the regional test to be planted on a large scale in Country M, providing superior rice seed sources for the industrialized development of rice. Secondly, the ATDC took advantage of the established infrastructure facilities and technology to establish partnership with other companies in production and operation. In 2013, for example, the ATDC joined a Swaziland company to introduce breeding pigs from South Africa. The pigs could be used for demonstration and profits, increasing income for the center while contributing to sustainable development of livestock and poultry farming. Thirdly, based on its own resources, the ATDC finds varieties with market potential in the local area and plants them on a relatively large scale, conducive to fulfilling its demonstration role and generating income for the center. Finally, in terms of training, apart from completing the annual training tasks, the ATDC can also provide paid training for Chinese-funded enterprises in country M. The ATDC could send its agricultural experts to these enterprises who will pay the salary of experts, thereby easing the burden on the center. These measures and attempts provide a good guarantee for the daily operation and functional sustainability of the ATDC. Given the above design and actual performance of the ATDC and by the standards of the project designers, the ATDC in Country M has fulfilled its functions successfully. As China’s first ATDC in Africa, the ATDC in Country M has set a good example for other demonstration centers. In the first half of 2013, the Ministry of Commerce organized experts to conduct an overall evaluation on the center’s operation. The center’s performance was rated as excellent and was set as the model for the first batch of 14 ATDCs. One of the experts noted that “the ATDC in Country M outperformed all the other demonstration centers and did a great job in all tasks.” It added weight to the ATDC’s excellent performance in carrying out the instructions of the superiors and the mission entrusted by the nation. During the authors’ field survey at the ATDC in Country M in August 2013, the director L of the center said, “We are under great pressure to develop China’s first Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center in Africa. If our ATDC is poorly developed, we would have failed

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at the task entrusted to us by the country. The only way to maintain the sustainability of the ATDC is commercial operation. In this way, the operating units can undertake the public welfare function of the aid project while making profits, naturally leading to the mutual benefits and win-win results.” The construction and operation of other ATDCs in Africa are more or less similar to those of ATDC in Country M, particularly in the site selection, the appearance design and the planted and demonstrated crops. For example, the ATDC in Tanzania is also functionally divided into three parts: office and training area, experimental display area and production & demonstration area. The varieties and technologies from China constituted the mainstay of the crops and vegetables cultivated at the ATDC, which manifests the center’s effort to implement national aid project and fulfill the mission entrusted by the nation.

6.3   The Initiative of Interest-Driven Operators China encourages the ATDCs to explore the path of sustainable development and created space for the operating units and individuals at the ATDCs to act on their own initiative. In addition to fulfill the national mission, the ATDC also has the obligation and motivation to make profits for operating units and the experts stationed there. Like many other foreign aid projects of China, the staff of the ATDC project is not directly managed by the relevant foreign aid departments of the country. Instead, the ATDC’s operating unit (enterprise or scientific research institution) makes all the decisions relating to the selection, dispatch and appointment of staff members and other matters concerning individual development and interests. In this regard, the ATDC project is different from the project of dispatching agricultural experts overseas. Most of the 25 ATDC projects currently in operation or under construction are implemented by companies, except for a few [in Zambia, Rwanda and the Republic of the Congo] by scientific research institutes. The agricultural experts in the ATDCs are mostly staff members of the companies or scientific research institutions. The companies’ nature for pursuing profits would certainly lead to the commercial operation of the ATDC, while the research institutes may also view this project as an opportunity to generate revenue. With a view to motivating the dispatched staff and encouraging them to explore the path of sustainable development, the construction company/ institute assigns them with some profitable tasks during the technical

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cooperation phase. However, in the trade-off between national mission, corporate profits and individual interests, there is ample room for the ATDC operators to act on their own initiative. 6.3.1  Flexibility of Operating Agencies There are many flexible ways for operators to perform their national missions. During the technical cooperation phase, the operating funds of the ATDC are directly allocated to the operating agency who then earmarks funds to the center based on the annual budget prepared by the ATDC managers (employed by the agency). The lower the cost is, the more the operating agency will benefit from the project. For example, a large part of the ATDC’s fund is used for expatriate personnel cost, including round-­ trip air tickets, insurance, salaries, and bonuses. Therefore, the operating agency would prefer a smaller number of Chinese expatriates on the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the center. According to the national regulation, each ATDC should be staffed by 10 Chinese experts, including one director, two financial staff and interpreters, as well as experts in agricultural machinery, planning, planting or breeding. Operating agencies usually reduce personnel expenditure by appointing one employee to multiple posts. For instance, the ATDC director concurrently serves as the expert in agricultural planning, the interpreter simultaneously holds the post of accountant, the planning expert concurrently serves as a cashier, and the agricultural machinery expert work as a driver as well. As such, the number of experts at the ATDC falls short of national standard. In addition, it is stipulated that each expert can take a one-­ month leave each year. Under such circumstances, the experts at the center only have two choices. They either work harder to a tight schedule under great pressure or just muddle through the work. The lack of proper incentives would prompt most experts to choose the latter. This goes some way to explain the phenomena at some ATDCs that experts play mahjong at the center, only grow some vegetables for their daily consumption and enjoy the pastoral life. Moreover, to further save cost, the operating agency may dispatch employees with no work experience or qualification for expatriate experts to perform aid work in the recipient country. This gives rise to uncertainties about the qualifications of expatriate experts. To arouse the expatriate experts’ enthusiasm to generate profits for the operating unit while performing the national mission, the operating unit

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will provide the experts with incentives which usually take the following forms. First, economic incentives. One way is to encourage the demonstration center to generate revenue that can be used at the experts’ discretion to upgrade agricultural machinery or improve their daily life. The other way is to set a goal for the ATDC, requiring the center to generate a certain amount of revenue each year. A part of the revenue will go to the operating company, while the remaining part could be used by the ATDC for allowances and welfare of its experts. Second, political incentives. Those experts who did a great job and won the recognition of all parties could be promoted after returning to China. Third, emotional incentives. For the experts who give excellent performance, the operating unit could help to bring their families together or provide employment to their spouses. If the number of experts at the ATDC falls short of the national standard, the operating company could arrange an expert’s spouse to work for the logistics service of the center, such as a cook at the canteen. The wage is generally lower than that of experts and can be paid with the generated revenue of the center. In this way, the ATDC experts could enjoy better meals, get away from the chores and focus on work more. Fourth, punitive measures. If the center is not functioning well, or is rated unqualified or issued a warning in national assessment, the experts will be subject to punitive measures. They will also be punished for failing to work with others harmoniously or lying about their income. They may face the punishment of getting fired or other penalties. Under the influence of these measures, the experts at the ATDC consume a lot of energy that should have been dedicated to aid work on generating income for themselves and the operating unit of the center or dealing with their relationship with colleagues and their domestic employer. 6.3.2  Incentives for Experts From the personal perspective of aid experts at the ATDC, the income-­ generating incentives provided by the operating unit also create space for them to act on their own initiative. For one thing, they will actively engage in the cultivation of crops with economic benefits in the local area, such as Chinese vegetables and rice, and then sell them locally as commodities mainly to Chinese in Africa. To better manage their Chinese employees, ensure their personal safety and help them overcome barriers in language and transportation, many Chinese companies in African countries rent or build dormitories for Chinese employees in the workplace and hire Chinese

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chefs for them. The chefs will buy vegetables and other foods with Chinese characteristics. Some demonstration centers noticed such market potential and began to grow Chinese vegetables on a large scale, such as cabbage, radishes, leeks, and other vegetables that are only available in China. The main food crops in most African countries are not rice or wheat. Most of the rice or flour sold in their markets is imported, with unguaranteed quality and different taste from that of China. Many Chinese people in Africa desire Chinese rice and flour that are usually available at the demonstration centers with appropriate climate conditions. In the meanwhile, the ATDC operators could adjust the planting area and varieties in line with the market and soil conditions. At the demonstration centers in countries E and M, the authors saw relatively large-scale cultivation of leeks. On October 23rd, 2015, we learned from a Chinese expert at the demonstration center in Country E that leek is the best-­ selling and the price could go up to 100 birr/kg (about 33 yuan). Locals do not eat leeks, but those working at the ATDC in Country M can speak Chinese names of leeks, radishes, cabbages, and other Chinese vegetables fluently, yet knowing not how to say the names in Portuguese or English. It is no surprise that the experts in the demonstration center do not need to go to the local market to sell their products. The vehicles of Chinese companies will come to the center for purchase in large quantities without bargaining over the price. Their purchase time is also relatively concentrated and they will make appointments. The purchases are mostly made during weekends. Such pattern is conducive to largely reducing the personnel cost of the ATDC and does not interfere the daily work of the experts. At the ATDC in Country M, we also saw locals buying cabbages in the center. It turned out that the cabbage was also popular among the locals and they could buy it from the center at half of the market price. Therefore, many locals (almost all female) went to the center to buy cabbage wholesale and then sell them in the local market or at roadside stalls. They pick and pack the cabbages by themselves and then get them weighed and priced by the staff members of the center. Afterwards, the center will send a tractor to help them deliver the vegetables to the bus station on the roadside. The director L of the center said, “We do not make money from them. We only sell one MZN per kilo, which is almost a gift for free. Nevertheless, we sell at a price of 3 yuan per kilo to Chinese.” Every year, the rice grown and processed by the ATDC falls short of the demand. During the survey at the ATDC in Country M in 2013 and August 2014, the authors noticed that many people who come to buy

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vegetables would ask, “Is there any rice?” And every time the center staff would answer, “Rice is not available now.” Under such operating model, the experts of well-functioning ATDCs could get a handsome sum of subsidies from the generated revenue of the center, in addition to the salaries paid to them by the state. This is the most direct incentives for them. 6.3.3  The Effect of Incentives These operating activities have somewhat lightened the burden on construction company in economy and personnel management. The dispatched experts regard the operation of the demonstration center as their own business. The success of the demonstration center can bring the experts direct economic benefits and a sense of accomplishment. To a certain extent, it also avoids the negative impacts on the center that would have been incurred by frequent replacement of experts, while easing the burden on companies to dispatch experts and improve the welfare for them. The national mission of achieving the ATDC’s sustainable development made the center’s operating activities legitimate. This practice, though quite different from that of the Western aid, does not seem unreasonable to the Chinese. Director L of the ATDC in Country M said proudly, “We are exploring whether the demonstration center can operate independently without national funding support. We know from our experience over the last two years that it is possible. Currently, there are some saline-­ alkali lands that need to be washed by rain. After such lands are fully developed, we could follow our design to conduct industrialized operation of the developed project on the one hand, and invite companies for joint development on the other hand. By then, we will be able to achieve the sustainable development of the center.” However, the concept of such sustainable development is not clearly defined in the documents of the demonstration center. Does it mean that the center could sustain its operation under the joint efforts of the Chinese operating units and experts without funding support from Chinese government? Does it mean that the center could sustain its operation after being handed over to the African country for independent operation? There is no answer in the documents. There is another controversy about the sustainable development of the ATDC. That is, does it also refer to the sustainability of the center’s all functions, including demonstration, training, and the function of guiding the recipient country to achieve

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large-­scale agricultural production and food security? There is no answer to this question in the documents either. At present, in the view of the ATDC’s operator, the goal of achieving sustainability is to make the center survive without assistance from the Chinese government. The means to this end is to generate and increase revenues of the center, which ignores the essential public welfare function of the aid project. Under the current operating model, the demonstration center faces a game of interests between the interests of the country, operating units and individual experts. This game involves the state’s direct policy guidance on the operation of the demonstration center, the operating unit’ efforts and achievements by motivating the dispatched experts, as well as the experts’ initiative in implementing the national mission and the operating unit’s instructions. The three parties altogether played a role in shaping the demonstration centers with Chinese characteristics. The operating model of the demonstration center can be understood as the result of the game of interests between the state, the construction company and the individual experts.

6.4   Local Interactions Under a Dual Mission 6.4.1  The Interdependent and Win-Win Relationship at a Micro Level At the ATDCs dominated by Chinese elements of the country, operating units and experts, one could barely see local Africans, except for security guards and workers hired by the center. In the opinion of the ATDC operator, the most important criterion for the success of the project lies in the satisfaction of the Chinese funders. Therefore, while implementing the project, they focused more on domestic elements and followed domestic instructions, decisions and suggestions. By comparison, the recipient country’s needs become less important. However, this does not mean that the center does not need African natives. In many cases, the normal operation of the center requires the cooperation of local people, especially the local coordination unit and the local government. The demonstration center needs the local cooperation mainly in the following aspects. First, almost all the aid materials and mechanical facilities of the demonstration center are delivered from China. After the goods are transported to the African country, the operating unit needs the help of local department to apply for tax exemption procedure to local Customs and pick up the

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goods. The procedure is quite complicated and time-consuming. Second, prior to being dispatched, the experts need an invitation letter sent by the local coordination unit in Africa to the Chinese embassy in the recipient country. After arriving at the recipient country, the experts need the help of the local cooperation unit to obtain free work permits for working in the demonstration center. To obtain a work permit in Africa, the general foreign corporate personnel have to pay a high fee and their corporate must meet the standard ratio of foreign staff to local staff. Otherwise, they will be imposed a fine. As the ATDC is an aid project, it is not subject to this rule. Third, as the demonstration center has to fulfill the task assigned by the state to train local employees, it needs to rely on the local cooperation department to convene the trainees. As mentioned earlier, the experts of the demonstration center barely have time to go to the villages or fields to provide farmers with technical training. Currently, the center’s training is mainly conducted in the form of classroom teaching. The recipient government convenes local farmers or producers to gather at the demonstration center, and then the experts of ATC gave collective lectures to impart knowledge, combined with filed demonstration and visits. Due to the limit of funds, language and other conditions, the training mostly lasted a short time, without significant effects. Fourth, the security of the ATDC relies on the local government’s help. On security issues, the demonstration center has to rely on the local government. At the ATDC in Mozambique, security guards are employed by the local government and equipped with firearms. Three people are rotated 24 hours a day and their wages are borne by the Mozambican government. As an aid project, the demonstration center will belong to the recipient country after being handed over to the recipient government. Therefore, in addition to the Chinese staff, the demonstration center also set up an office and posts for the local cooperation department. For example, during the technical cooperation period, the director of the center is a Chinese expert, and the recipient government could assign a deputy director and other persons in charge. However, in many cases, the staff of the cooperation department will not come to the center without the instruction from superiors. Nor are they willing to cooperate with the work of the ATDC. For a start, there are indeed some practical difficulties for the personnel of local cooperation department to work at the demonstration center. Although most of the demonstration centers are located in areas with convenient transportation, they are still located in a relatively remote place and far from the cooperation departments. Secondly, apart from the

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inconvenient transportation, the coordination work with the demonstration center does not bring them extra income. The center’s aid funds only cover the salaries of Chinese aid experts and the center’s operating expenses (import of aid materials and investment in local infrastructure), without any direct remuneration to local units or individuals responsible for coordination or other services. Finally, the work of the center often involves coordination with multiple departments, which is very cumbersome in practice. Work permits for Chinese experts require coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Labor. Import of aid materials requires coordination with the Ministry of Commerce and various ports. Animal quarantine requires coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and the animal and plant quarantine departments. If the center is robbed, the center must coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and local security departments. All such coordination is quite cumbersome. Take the ATDC in Country M for example. Unlike many other countries, the authors found during the field survey that the coordinating unit in Country M is the Ministry of Science and Technology, rather than the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Science and Technology is located in the downtown of M city, while ATDC is located in a rural area 23 kilometers away from M city. The ATDC is by the roadside of the No. 1 Highway, but the traffic to and from City M is often severely congested. A distance of 30-minute drive usually takes more than one hour. Moreover, there are no particularly convenient fast-food restaurants around the demonstration center. All these presented practical difficulties to the staff of the Ministry of Science and Technology to work in the demonstration center. Therefore, every time when the lady in charge of liaising with the demonstration center has to go to the demonstration center for work, she will bargain with the director of the center. “My car has run out of gas, so I cannot go today!” “I have no money for lunch today!” “I have an upset stomach today. I need to drink some soup made with carrots grown in your center. Can you prepare some for me? I will go to pick it up!” “The dog in your center really is unbearable. Every time I go to the center, it chases to bite me. It is not even vaccinated!” … Such excuses or complaints from African coordinators with the demonstration center are very common. How to arouse the enthusiasm of the

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local participants is a problem facing many demonstration centers. Chinese experts often complain about the recipient countries’ lack of motivation, procrastination and even irresponsibility. When the operating unit got the aid materials delivered from China to the recipient country and needs the help of the recipient government to go through procedures for tax exemption and other conveniences, the inefficiency of the recipient country’s personnel often gives rise to grievances among the staff of the ATDC. On the other hand, as the operating unit has been endowed by China with the role of a donor, Chinese experts of the center often show a condescending attitude in daily work, expecting the recipient country’s unconditional cooperation with their work. Sometimes, they fail to show due respect while proposing requirements on coordinators or suggestions about the management of the center. Moreover, the language barrier and other factors have all hindered the progress of the project. More often than not, the Chinese staff had to ask for the help of the Chinese Embassy or the Economic and Commercial Office in the recipient country to directly contact the coordinator’s superiors to get things done. Nevertheless, the ATDC also brings resources and political capital to local cooperation agencies and serves as a platform for bilateral exchanges. This has been manifested in the following aspects. First, the hardware facilities of the ATDC have brought them convenient resources. The meeting room, favorable environment and facilities of the demonstration center provide the recipient country with venues for meetings, training programs and international exchanges. Take the ATDC in Country M for example. The Ministry of Science and Technology of Country M, as the cooperation unit with the ATDC aid project, does not have a large conference room, and thus the Ministry holds some important communication conferences in the meeting room of the ATDC.  Meanwhile, apart from China’s aids, Country M, as one of the poorest African countries, also receives agricultural assistance from other countries or international organizations. Nevertheless, the agricultural assistances from other countries rarely incorporate hardware facilities, most of which are in the form of technology transfer. By comparison, the ATDC provides not only training venues for them, but also decent accommodation for international experts participating in the aid projects. During the authors’ survey in the ATDC in Country M in August 2013, a training program funded by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations was conducted in the classroom of the demonstration center. During the three-month program, the trainers from Chile lived in the

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demonstration center and 20 trainees (all agricultural technicians) from 10 provinces of Country M lived in the dormitories funded by China. The program’s cooperation unit is the Ministry of Agriculture of Country M.  According to a trainer, the project funds cover the accommodation costs for him and the trainees and the payment for the demonstration center should have been made directly to the Ministry of Science and Technology. Apart from such programs, the ATDC’s meeting room is also used for activities concerning the visit of Chinese government officials to Country M.  To use the meeting room, they do not need to notify the Chinese staff at the demonstration center in advance. Whenever the two cleaners employed by the Country M show up at the center, Chinese experts would know that the Country M will use the meeting room. Second, the recipient country’s high-level government regards the ATDC as a platform to showcase their achievements. As such, receiving senior government officials constitutes a key part of the work at the demonstration center. In addition, the recipient government also convenes local officials to visit the demonstration center. They would make requests during such visits. On such occasions, Chinese experts need to cooperate and prepare for the display of vegetables with Chinese characteristics and various specialties produced by the center. Every year, Chinese products inevitably become a highlight at the local agricultural fair that is held by the recipient government to show its determination to develop agriculture and its achievements from receiving agricultural assistance from China. During a visit to the demonstration center in the first half of 2013, the President of Country M proposed that the center should also grow local verities, instead of Chinese varieties alone. Under this proposal, the center introduced local maize varieties that year. The trial planting yielded good results, with an output 2–3 times higher than that generated by the local people. Third, the government of the recipient country can make requests to the Chinese government through the ATDC or based on the experience of cooperating with the ATDC. For instance, such requests could be made to send officials or agricultural technicians of the recipient country to China for training or expand the center’s training programs to cover animal husbandry, veterinarian, traditional Chinese medicine, biogas, and so on. The aforementioned biogas project at the ATDC in Country M was initiated based on the Country M’s government’s aid request and proposal to build a biogas-generating pit at the demonstration center. In recent years, the number of agricultural technicians who come to receive

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training in China has been growing year by year (White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, 2014), which has much to do with China’s success in the ATDC project in Africa. Fourth, the repair and maintenance of facilities at the demonstration center rely on Chinese experts. The demonstration center will be handed over to the recipient government after its completion and the property rights will be owned by the recipient government. However, its maintenance and management still rely on China who is responsible for the water and electricity bills and the maintenance of all assistance facilities, even if the facilities were damaged by the trainees. At the ATDC in Country M, all expenses are borne by China, except for the wage for the three security guards that is paid by the government of Country M. As the ATDC in Country E is an open space without enclosing walls, the three security guards employed by the local government are far from enough during the harvest season, and thus the center has to employ about 20 extra local security guards whose wages will be paid by the Chinese side. 6.4.2  Compromises In the overall context of interdependence and mutual benefits, some small conflicts in daily communication can often be ignored or resolved by coordinating with senior officials. Take the ATDC in Country M for example. In 2014, the biogas project aided by the Chinese government was set up at the ATDC. Given its previous failure in the biogas project, the government of Country M specifically assigned four graduating students (two female and two male) from a local university to learn Chinese biogas technology. At the request of the coordinator of Country M, the center provided accommodation for the four students in its living area. However, the government of County M also requested to allow the four students to share the kitchen with Chinese experts on the premise that the students do not disturb the Chinese experts’ dining time. That means to allow the students to use the kitchen facilities when they are not used by Chinese experts. This request made Chinese experts very uncomfortable. The Chinese experts believed that due to the different living and hygiene habits, allowing the students to use the kitchen will cause great inconvenience. Therefore, the Chinese experts proposed to set up another cooking place in the office area or the simple houses at the center. However, the host government rejected the proposal and emphasized that “They are college students and future biogas experts we want to train. We cannot treat them

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as other local workers in the center.” Under such circumstance, the Chinese experts had no choice but to go to the Ministry of Science and Technology, requesting them to understand the differences in culture and life styles between the two sides. The director general of the Information and Technology Innovation Department of the Ministry of Commerce of Country M, who is in charge of the demonstration center, reckoned the request of the Chinese experts quite reasonable. Country M must respect the Chinese culture and lifestyle and ask them to figure out other ways to solve the problem. Such matters that require the coordination and intervention by coordinators are not rare in daily life. Mostly the Chinese experts will respect the coordinators’ opinions. For example, in Country M, the vast rural areas have no access to power supply and it is inconvenient to charge mobile phones. Under such circumstance, to charge more phones, the security guards of the ATDC pulled in a few more plugs in the security room, at the risk of power outage. On such occasions, Chinese experts largely would not offer to help and the security guards had to wait for the coordinators to come for help. After the coordinator negotiated with the director of ATDC, the power supply in the security room can be restored. In 2014, during a training program on local small producers provided by the Japan International Cooperation Agency, a trainee accidentally broke the door glass of the demonstration center during the class break. The Chinese experts at the center made several requests to local government for negotiation on the compensation by the trainee, but failed. Chinese experts had to solve the problem by themselves and commissioned a Chinese company to fix the door. 6.4.3  Increasing Prominent Trust Crisis As the two sides are getting more familiar with each other, the relationship between the coordinator and the ATDC becomes subtle and complicated, giving rising to trust issues. Prior to the inception of China’s aid projects in Africa, China’s project contractor must sign an agreement with the recipient country’s coordinating unit. Otherwise, the project will not be able to kick off. Take the biogas project at the ATDC in Country M for example. After the open bidding, Chinese government allocated the project funds to the contractor that won the tender. And afterwards, the project contractor organized technicians and the supervising unit’s personnel to visit the place and then signed agreements with the responsible

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department of country M to specify the rights and obligations of both parties. Only by then can Chinese construction company start construction. During this process, the ATDC project coordinator of Country M needs to contact his/her superior and ask the superior to negotiate on the agreement. The Chinese side deemed it better to hold a groundbreaking ceremony and invite senior officials from the Chinese Embassy and the Government of Country M to attend, but the coordinator never responded to this proposal. Later, the Chinese side had no option but to go to the local cooperation department and waited for the department’s director general who was in charge of signing the agreements. The director general carefully read the agreement drafted by the Chinese side and asked his assistant to make revisions under his instructions, after which he signed the agreement. It was stressed in particular in the agreement that in case of corruption and other illegal practices during the execution of the project, the relevant laws and regulations of Country M shall apply. The Chinese side considered this clause extremely unfair, but given the confidence in their project experience and morality, combined with China’s strict restrictions on the deadline of the project, the Chinese side compromised and came to terms so as to start construction in time. Sometimes the coordinator is dissatisfied with the ATDC’s work, in the belief that the center should give more consideration to their requests instead of insisting on its own operating model. Their requests are mostly based on their personal experience and intentions. For example, the local coordinator with the ATDC in Country M once majored in veterinary science and always hoped that the demonstration center can introduce some projects in animal husbandry and veterinary from China. After communicating with the center’s director for a few times, he did not get a satisfactory response. In 2014, the authors went to the ATDC for field survey. After learning that the authors were from the Agricultural University, the coordinator asked the authors to introduce some experts in treating animals with Chinese herbal medicine. In addition, the coordinator spelled out the high demand of Country M in this field. Afterwards, the coordinator kept sending emails to the author, in the hope that the ATDC could introduce relevant technologies. However, most of the experts at the ATDC in Country M were from farms affiliated with the HB Bureau of Farms and Land Reclamation. Their expertise was in planting and the veterinary or Chinese herbal medicine was indeed beyond their capabilities. Such dissatisfaction was sometimes caused by trivial things. For instance, it is common for the demonstration center to keep the dogs.

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Strangely, the dogs in the demonstration center seem to be able to recognize the Chinese. Whenever an African local enters the demonstration center, the dogs will bark furiously. However, if it is a Chinese, the dogs will wag their tails to show welcome. This undoubtedly also fueled the mistrust between African personnel and Chinese experts. In the eyes of the coordinator who frequents the demonstration center, the dogs at the center are a trouble. At the beginning, the Chinese staff would come out to stop the dogs from barking at the coordinator, but over time they gradually got used to it. Once, a newly adopted dog bit a Chinese employee’s family member who was playing with it. Other than that, there has never been an incident that a local was bitten by a dog in the demonstration center. However, the coordinator would not let it go. During my survey in the demonstration center, the coordinator said to me that “These dogs make me very, very, very scared. I told them (Chinese staff in the center) about it many times and suggested them to keep the dogs shut during the daytime and let them out during the night. But they never listened to me. Moreover, as the dogs are not vaccinated, it would be horrible if someone was bitten by the dogs.” This kind of mistrust and occasional small conflicts will not affect the overall cooperation between the two parties, but they caused great difficulties to the daily work and communication. Over time, it is sure to affect the mutual impression of the two parties and the effect of China’s foreign agricultural assistance. Furthermore, the language barriers added weight to such mistrust and conflicts. The author found in the survey that apart from the local people who have been working in the demonstration center for a long time who can say some vegetable names in Chinese, no other locals can speak Chinese, nor can any Chinese employee speak Portuguese or English fluently. The poor language proficiency of the Chinese staff not only hindered the communication between the two parties, but also added to the difficulties in work of the center.

6.5   Unexpected Aid Effects 6.5.1  Training in a Bind During the technical cooperation period, a most important task for the demonstration center is to train agricultural technicians for the recipient country. China requires the demonstration center to train 500 agricultural

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technicians for the agricultural department of the recipient country during the three-year technical cooperation period. Training funds are included in the annual operating funds of five million yuan. To carry out training programs, most demonstration centers need to rely on the recipient country’s cooperation unit to convene trainees. Due to the huge cost of transportation and accommodation for trainees, along with the pressure of many other functions like demonstration undertaken by the center, the limited number of experts found it difficult to provide training in farm fields or other parts of the country. More often than not, training activities in the demonstration center located in remote places with inconvenient transportation cannot achieve the desired results. Due to the limitations of its size, the number of experts and funds, the demonstration center transfers agricultural technology by providing technical training to local agricultural officials, agricultural technicians and related agricultural producers. The training sessions cover crop breeding, cultivation, water and fertilizer management, prevention and control of diseases, pests and weeds, mechanized farming, processing and storage of agricultural products, raising of breeding pigs, just to name a few. The training mainly takes the forms of classroom teaching, field trials and video teaching. The local government is responsible to organize the training program and the demonstration center is responsible for providing training and classrooms. The trainee’s expenses for accommodations, transportation and others relating to the training are borne by the government of Country M. Therefore, the local government is not active in organizing training programs. The ATDC in Country M is different from that in other countries in that it is affiliated to the Ministry of Science and Technology that faces the problem of insufficient funds itself. Moreover, the extension of agricultural technologies does not constitute a priority of the ministry’s work. As such, its investment in organizing training programs at the ATDC is quite low. A trainee who received a two-week training session at the ATDC did apply the agricultural technology he learned to his small-scale farm that we paid a visit to. Apart from leeks, most of the vegetable varieties in his farm were almost the same with those in the demonstration center. He also grew purple cabbage and pineapple that are not grown in the demonstration center. The trainee told us about the superiority of Chinese agricultural technology and what he learned during the training. Like the technical experts in the demonstration center, he was not a farmer himself and just occasionally went to the field to provide technical guidance to the

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workers. Because of its proximity to the river, the farm adopted simple water conservancy facilities such as pumps, in addition to a large excavator. Nevertheless, such situation was rare around the demonstration center, since there was no water conservancy infrastructure on most of the land in Country M that boasted no agricultural civilization like China. After knowing of Chinese technology, most farmers believed that without the mechanical equipment, it is impossible for the people of Country M to level the land and thus the problems of water storage and drainage in the rainy season cannot be solved. Most small farmers deemed it impossible for the local people to use advanced Chinese agricultural technology. A local employee who had worked at the ATDC for over four years had mastered almost all the knowledge about Chinese agricultural technology demonstrated by the ATDC. The Chinese experts only needed to give him a look and he would know exactly what to do. He could even understand the knowledge about farming in Chinese. When the author asked him why he did not apply Chinese agricultural technology on his own land, he said, “We cannot afford the machines. Nor can we build advanced water conservancy facilities and irrigation conditions like the demonstration center. Therefore, even though I have a plot of land, I cannot apply what I learned in practice. China’s agricultural technology is superb, but the farmers in our country are too poor …” 6.5.2  Recipient Country’s Reflections on Its Self-Development The ATDC was originally intended to transfer and demonstrate China’s advanced agricultural technology. In fact, however, the demonstration effect of the ATDC has been reflected more in the efficient and hardworking Chinese staff. This may be the root cause of China’s development and what the Africa lacks most. In this sense, the ATDC’s significance for African development went beyond the agricultural development, which was unexpected during the project design. As mentioned above, due to the triple incentives of the national mission, the economic interests of individuals and operating units, the Chinese experts at the ATDC demonstrated the high efficiency of the Chinese people to Africa. Even in the dry season when most fields lay fallowed due to lack of water, Chinese experts in Country M kept working to a tight schedule. Every day, they have breakfast at 6 am and start a busy day at 7 am. The machinist would go to the fields for soil preparation. The vegetable experts organize the local workers to pull up weeds. The planning

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experts go to the fields to plan for crop replacement. Some go to sell vegetables. Some go to coordinate government work and equipment import. They would work till 11:30  am for lunch and then go back to work at 2 pm and get off work till 5:30 pm. After dinner, they would get together to have a chat. Before going to bed, the director, cashier and accountant of the ATDC must sit down together to keep accounts of the daily revenues and expenses and then enter into the account book after being signed by the three parties. Chinese experts at the ATDC in the Republic of Congo would get up at night to water vegetables during the busy farming season. The African people witnessed the Chinese staff’s diligence and fruits of labor. A retired general in Country M who owns 250 hectares of farmland went to visit the ATDC at the recommendation of someone from the Ministry of Science and Technology. Almost immediately afterwards, he had the thought of developing a part of his farmland in the ATDC model. He invited Director L of the ATDC to visit his farm and proposed that the ATDC could help make plans for his farm. After Director L told him about the possible difficulties and the huge investments in need, he spoke dismissively of the difficulties. “Machines can be borrowed. For shortage of money, I can apply for a loan from the bank. But most importantly, I need Chinese people like you. I am confident that if I got two Chinese to work on my farm for two months, my farm will change dramatically. Please help me hire two Chinese people. Local people will not be qualified.” Clearly, the ATDC’s demonstration has begun to produce effects. The recipient country began to reflect on its own development dilemmas and came to understand the prominent role of human capital to development. Such reflections led to their emphasis on the development of human resources in their own country. Since the inception of the ATDC project, the training programs provided by China to Africa have expanded considerably both in number and scale. During our interview with an official from the Ministry of Science and Technology in charge of the ATDC in Country M, he attributed the poor agricultural development in Country M to the following reasons. First, the absence of definite agricultural policy and planning. Second, inadequate government investment. Third, no insurance against agricultural risks and no basic technical support, even for minor plant diseases and insect pests. Fourth, lack of business opportunities, mostly self-sufficient. Fifth, no technology and machinery. Sixth, lack of support from other industries. He said, “In Country M as well as many other poor African

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countries, the inadequate investment in agriculture causes the real development bottleneck. In our country, there is no development bank. Some international institutions have intention to cooperate with us to provide local small farmers with microfinance programs. However, it has been quite difficult to formulate and implement relevant policies, mainly due to the poor quality of farmers. For instance, if they are going to implement micro-finance program to provide loans to small farmers, they need to train the farmers on making farming plans. As many farmers are illiterate, there must be thoughtful and meticulous services for them to make sure that they understand the purpose and rules of microfinance, in order to ensure that they will use the money for agricultural production. Country M provides people with 7-year compulsory education for free, but the quality of teachers varies. Many universities are taking shape. In the past, there was only one university in country M. Today, there is at least one university in almost every province. Moreover, there are distance learning programs. However, the industrial conditions for agricultural development are poor, making it difficult for people even with professional technical knowledge to find a niche. In short, the agricultural development still faces many challenges waiting for us to resolve.” It can be seen that the demonstration of Chinese agricultural technology has triggered the local people ranging from high-level government officials to small farmers at the bottom to reflect on their own agricultural development. The Chinese experts did not inculcate any idea of improving governance in Africans, but the ATDC’s demonstration made them realize the constraining factors for their self-development and strive towards the goal of self-development. This may be resulted from the unconscious transfer of Chinese experience to Africans during the implementation of many Chinese projects. 6.5.3  The Scale Effect of Explorations for Sustainable Development As earlier mentioned, with a view to improving the sustainability of China’s foreign agricultural aid, the ATDC is entrusted with a political mission to explore a path of sustainable development. Due to the limited number of experts and countless business activities at the ATDC, coupled with the problems of backward infrastructure and insufficient investment in agriculture in the recipient country, the ATDC failed to bring about desired effects on the recipient country. To overcome this drawback and explore a

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model for the ATDC’s sustainable development, China encouraged the operating unit to use the ATDC as a platform to guide Chinese companies to conduct agricultural cooperation in Africa. The ATDC in Country M tried to realize the economically sustainable development by bringing in Chinese companies to Africa. In 2012, the ATDC cooperated with a company of Swaziland to bring in breeding pigs of South Africa to Country M. They set up a breeding base at the ATDC to raise breeding pigs on a trial basis. (In 2015, the trails were taken over by Company Y). In addition, the ATDC has successively introduced two private grain processing companies and three state-owned farms in China into Country M, encouraging the companies to engage in agricultural investment, improve agricultural infrastructure (especially irrigation systems), carry out large-scale rice cultivation, and the extension of Chinese agricultural technology. As the contractor of the ATDC project, Company L has shown its own advantages and strengths in the management and operation of the demonstration center. Apart from doing a great job of fulfilling the ATDC’s function of demonstrating Chinese agricultural technology, it also created a unique model to guide the Chinese companies to “go global” and transfer technology by relying on cooperation with private companies. It has contributed to develop agricultural resources and expand the development space in Country M.

6.6   Conclusions This chapter is based on the authors’ long-term participant observation of a China’s flagship agricultural assistance project and in-depth interviews with relevant subjects. From the perspectives of the country, operating unit of the project, individual project implementers, and the local stakeholders, this chapter presents the launch and operating process of China’s foreign aid project in Africa and analyzes the roles of the country, operating units and individuals in the process of project implementation. Furthermore, this chapter reveals that China, as the world’s largest emerging economy, has been trying to show its image of a major country by virtue of foreign aid projects. In addition, the appearance design and the cutting-edge agricultural machinery and technology displayed at the ATDCs manifest the national intention. Against the backdrop of actual local situations, the project implementers’ initiative exerts an impact on the operating process and effect of the project, while playing a dominant role in the interactions with the local. On the premise of fulfilling the

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national mission, the project implementers make full use of the space and advantages created by the national policy, seek a convergence point between national mission and personal interests, and endow the project with unique characteristics of foreign assistance provided by developing countries. Driven by dual incentives of national mission and economic benefits, the ATDC has established an interdependent and mutually beneficial micro-relationship with the recipient country. Despite conflicts and trust issues between Chinese and local staff, they can be resolved by Chinese compromise and concessions on the principle of mutual benefit, so that the ATDC’s demonstration and exchange functions can sustain. The effect of the demonstration has inspired Africans to reflect on their own development, while the explorations for sustainable development has motivated the ATDC to take on the national mission of attracting Chinese companies to invest in the African agriculture and urge them to engage in large-­ scale technical training and demonstrations. Such efforts aim to encourage the African government and people to learn from China’s agricultural development experience and explore their own path for agricultural development. The study shows that as the world’s largest developing country, China has attempted to shape its global image through foreign aids and demonstrated its determination to help other developing countries solve their practical problems. As a developing country, China contracted the aid projects to domestic companies to create overseas development opportunities for the companies and job opportunities for Chinese people, which is in line with its national conditions. Meanwhile, given low wages and self-conditions of grassroots project implementers in China, it is easy for them to agree with the economic incentive mechanism of the operating unit. Such incentive mechanism demonstrated to some extent China’s development experience to African countries, producing tangible and positive results. The effect of such demonstrations went far beyond that of Western aids under the neo-institutional and neo-liberal systems. Such demonstration has helped Africans feel the driving force of China’s development, take the initiative to improve their governance environment, and figure out their own development needs. This is the power of China’s development demonstration.

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References B. T. Australia et al., 2008, Seized! The 2008 Land Grab for Food and Financial Security, GRAIN Briefing Annex, pp. 1–11. D. Bräutigam, 2010, Do We Have Statistics on China’s Africa “Land Grab”?, China in Africa: The Real Story chinaafricarealstory.com/2010/08/do-wehave-statistics-onchinas-africa.html, accessed on 26 May 2014. T. C. Fishman, 2005, China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World, New York, USA. A.  Goldstein, H.  Reisen, 2006, The Rise of China and India: What’s in It for Africa?, Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. S.  Junger, 2007, Enter China, the Giant, Vanity Fair, http://www.vanity-­fair. com/culture/features/2007/07/china-­200707 (accessed 6 May 2014). G.  Le Pere, 2007, China in Africa: Mercantilist Predator, or Partner in Development?, Midrand and Johannesburg, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue (SAIIS). P. McMichael, 2012, The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring, Journal of Peasant Studies, 39 (3–4), pp. 681–701. D. Moyo, 2010, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa, Vancouver: Greystone Books. R. I. Rotberg, 2008, China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. G. ScribnerMohan, B. Lampert, 2012, Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-Africa Relations, African Affairs, 112/446, pp. 92–110. I.  Taylor, 2006, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise, London: Routledge. L.  Wild, D.  Mepham, 2006, The New Sinosphere: China in Africa, London: Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). X. Tang, 2013, Evolution and Effects of Management Mode of China’s Agricultural Aid to Africa. World Economics and Politics, (5).

CHAPTER 7

Representing the Country: Assistance Provider and Boundary Construction

As an expert offering assistance to foreign countries, what I say and act represents the image of China and the Chinese agrotechnologists. —Fu Hongwei They are the practitioners of Sino-African agricultural cooperation and the envoys on behalf of the Chinese people. Their hard work plays an indispensable role in helping the recipient countries develop agriculture and address food shortages and in strengthening the long-lasting friendship between China and Africa. —He Xintian

7.1   Introduction Since the 1960s, dispatch of agricultural experts has been an important aspect in China’s agricultural cooperation with Africa. This form of aid shows different characteristics and involves varied tasks at different times. We would like to thank Professor Xu Xiuli, Dr. Lu Yan, and Dr. Ma Junle for providing massive amounts of information. Our gratitude also goes to the director and other experts of the China’s ATDC in Country T for their strong support for our fieldwork. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0_7

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From the 1960s to the late 1970s, China deployed agricultural experts to assist African countries like Mali and Guinea with 87 agricultural projects, including agrotechnology experimental stations, agrotechnology promotion stations, and some large-scale farms and water conservancy projects (Wang Cheng’an 1995). In 1986, China, as a participant in the United Nations’ multilateral programs, provided technical assistance such as rice cultivation techniques to forty-two African countries. Since 1994, China has played an active role in South-South cooperation within the framework of the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) launched by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), making great contributions to improving the agricultural productivity and strengthening the food security of the recipient countries. In May 2006, the Chinese government and the FAO signed the “Letter of Intent on Establishing a Strategic Alliance for South-South Cooperation” aimed at improving global food security. China also inked tripartite cooperation agreements with the recipient countries through the FAO to take part in SSC programs, pledging to send a number of agricultural experts and technicians to developing countries, especially those in Africa. In November 2006, the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held, ushering in a new era for China-Africa agricultural cooperation (Li Anshan 2012). At the summit, China announced to send one hundred senior agrotechnologists to African countries as one of the “eight major initiatives” for the development of China-Africa relations. According to the follow-up documents of the Forum, China would continue to dispatch agrotechnologists as an important measure adopted to help with African agriculture. Agricultural experts play an important role in China’s agricultural aid to Africa (Lu and Li 2017). The dispatch of agricultural experts, an important part of China’s aid to Africa, has drawn widespread attention (Bräutigam 2011a). Zhou (2013b) states in China’s Foreign Aid: Sixty Years in Retrospect that Human-related factor remains a dominant advantage in China’s foreign aid. Chinese experts are different from those from the West. They work with local people and win their trust, which helps the work proceed smoothly. However, some scholars point out that as African countries have disparate agricultural patterns compared with the largescale, zonal agricultural layouts in China, Chinese agricultural experts would have trouble finding effective technology extension paths when promoting Chinese agricultural practices among African farmers, making it difficult to have wide-ranging positive effects on African countries

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(Li et al. 2010). Amid widespread discussion about whether China’s agricultural aid to Africa is neo-colonialism, we need to delve into the following issues: What do the dispatched agricultural experts to Africa, especially those at China-aided agricultural technology demonstration centers (ATDCs), think of their mission entrusted by the country? How do they carry out that mission in African countries? The method used for data collection and research in this study include literature review, interviews, and participant observation. In December 2013 and February 2017, we took field trips to China-aided ATDCs to collect data through interviews and observation. In addition, we also had interviews with some agricultural experts sent to Africa.

7.2   Roles of Agrotechnologists 7.2.1  Relevant Concepts 7.2.1.1 Agrotechnology According to Article 2 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Popularization of Agricultural Technology promulgated in July 1993, “agrotechnology” refers to the scientific research results and practical techniques to be applied to crop cultivation, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, including techniques of breeding good strains, fertilization, plant disease prevention and control and pest control, as well as plant cultivation and animal husbandry; techniques of processing, preserving, storing, and transporting products and byproducts of agriculture; techniques of agricultural machinery and agricultural aviation; techniques of irrigation and water conservancy, soil improvement, and water and soil conservation; techniques of water supply and energy utilization in rural areas and agricultural environmental protection; techniques of agricultural meteorology, and techniques of agricultural management and administration. “Agrotechnology promotion” refers to the promotion and application of agrotechnology during the entire process of agricultural production by means of trials, demonstration, training, and consulting services. Basic-level agrotechnology promotion institutions are publicly owned institutions established in administrative townships, towns, and neighborhoods to promote techniques of farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, agricultural machinery, water conservancy, and operation and management.

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7.2.1.2 Agrotechnologists In a broad sense, agricultural technicians refer to technicians at agrotechnology promotion institutions who are responsible for the promotion and application of agrotechnology. Agrotechnology promotion is the transfer and extension of practical agricultural technologies to various fields of agricultural production through trials, demonstration, propaganda, training, and other approaches. Suffice it to say that agrotechnology promotion is a bridge between agricultural research, technology development, and agricultural practices. In China, agrotechnology promotion involves systems and teams at different levels, ranging from agriculture-related departments under the State Council to the publicly owned institutions established by provincial, municipal, county, and township governments to promote techniques of farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, agricultural machinery, water conservancy, and management (Hu 2006). In this study, agrotechnologists include specialists at various levels, such as agricultural researchers to agrotechnology promotion personnel, who are engaged in agrotechnology-related activities. 7.2.1.3 Agrotechnology Promotion In 1953, the Ministry of Agriculture issued the “Agrotechnology Promotion Plan (Draft),” requiring governments at all levels to set up specialized agencies with full-time personnel and gradually build a technology promotion network centered on farms, based on mutual assistance groups, and relying on model workers and technicians, so as to effectively promote agrotechnology from top to bottom. In 1954, the Ministry of Agriculture promulgated the “Regulations on the Work of Agrotechnology Promotion Stations,” which specified the nature and tasks of agrotechnology promotion stations. Later on, agrotechnology promotion institutions were established in all the provinces successively. In the era of the planned economy, agrotechnology promotion institutions not only served as specialized technical service organizations but were also a type of political organizations that performed economic and social functions. From 1958 to 1972, little progress was made in agrotechnology promotion amid the chaos up and down throughout the country. In 1972, the central government proposed to “speed up socialist construction” and “acquire skills, knowledge, and technologies for the sake of revolution and be both socialist-­minded and professionally competent under the leadership of the

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proletarian politics” (Hu 2006). On this basis, agricultural departments at provincial, municipal, and county levels across the country were restored, along with agrotechnology promotion stations. In the 1980s, in tandem with the changes and development of China’s rural economic structure and agricultural operations, the agrotechnology promotion system that was born in the era of the planned economy underwent several rounds of reform, but the deep-seated contradictions between agrotechnology promotion services and rural economic development remained unresolved (Hu 2006). Therefore, many scholars started to analyze the influencing factors of the functions and efficiency of agrotechnology promotion institutions. Some pointed out that the low efficiency of the agrotechnology promotion system was because, on one hand, agrotechnology promotion was inconsistent with farmers’ needs (Huang et al. 1999) and on the other hand, agrotechnology promotion institutions were in a dilemma brought about by the increase of staff and reduction of funding. In addition, agricultural promotion institutions, which were under government departments, had a typical bureaucratic structure characterized by low occupational mobility rates, relatively low requirements for specialized competences, and guaranteed benefits (Hu 2006). 7.2.2  Agrotechnologists: Beyond Technical Symbols 7.2.2.1 R  esearch Personnel: Take Academician Yuan Longping for Example Yuan Longping is no stranger to Chinese people. He is a pioneer and leader in hybrid rice research, an esteemed agricultural scientist, and the first person in the world to successfully take advantage of hybridization to increase rice yields. Therefore, he is known as “Father of Hybrid Rice”. Yuan Longping began studying hybrid rice in 1964. Thanks to his achievements, China has been taking the lead in hybrid rice research for over forty years. He has not only helped achieve food self-sufficiency in China but also made great contributions to global food security. After winning eight international awards including the Science Award of the UNESCO and the UN FAO Medal of Honor for Food Security, he also received the 2001 National Science and Technology Award of China, the 2004 Wolf

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Prize of Israel, and the 2004 World Food Prize for the great contributions of his super hybrid rice to global food security and poverty alleviation.1 Academician Yuan Longping’s achievements in agricultural research have earned him high esteem. He is regarded as a pioneer in agricultural research, a scientist with high ethics, and an outstanding representative of Chinese intellectuals with a noble character. As a senior government official commented, he “embodies the patriotic noble sentiment of Chinese intellectuals and the fine tradition of self-reliance of the Chinese nation, the strong sense of national pride and self-confidence of Chinese people, the ambitions of scientific and technological personnel to innovate and work tirelessly for the glory of the Chinese nation, and the lofty spiritual and moral values such as rigorous scholarship, exemplariness, common touch, and indifference to fame and fortune.” “Building an innovation-­ driven country needs more experts like Yuan Longping. Scientific and technological personnel should follow the example of Academician Yuan for his selfless dedication despite all kinds of difficulties, innovative spirit and endless exploration in pursuing truth, truth-seeking spirit and diligence in combining theory and practice, readiness to cooperate with others for the interests of the whole while ignoring personal fame and gains, and foresight and team spirit to cultivate later generations and gather talents” (People’s Daily, 2007). Other reports state that Academician Yuan always “puts the country, career, and dedication first to serve the society and the people with his ingenuity and hard work” and “takes an appropriate attitude toward major issues such as gains and losses, sufferings and joy, and honor and disgrace, and always makes choices that meet the requirements of the Party and the people”; “Yuan Longping’s spirit is the epitome of the Chinese nation’s spirit and character, a poem that adds splendor to the contemporary era, and a vivid practice of the socialist concepts on honors and disgraces…” (Guangming Daily, 2007). In short, Yuan Longping’s achievements, whether in his own eyes or in the eyes of others, add to the prestige of the country (Liu et al. 2006). 7.2.2.2 Staff of Agrotechnology Promotion Stations The staff of agrotechnology promotion stations are closest to farmers in the agrotechnology promotion system. They serve as frontline workers

1  In 2013, the yield of super hybrid rice reached 988.1 kg per mu, setting a new world record. See “Yuan Longping’s Chinese Dream.” Junior School Student, 2014 (5).

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guiding agricultural production and are fondly named “promoters” by farmers. Their main responsibilities are to carry out trials, select crop varieties suitable for local conditions, and promote them through demonstration. As frontline agrotechnology promotion workers, their wish is to “work tirelessly for a bumper harvest and farmers’ bright smiles” (Farmers’ Daily, 2007). Working and living at the basic level, they are in close touch with farmers, and some call themselves “folk experts” (Chaidamu Daily, 2011). They carry out trials, maintain close contact with farmers, and provide technical guidance. Their scope of work includes training, technical guidance, and technical demonstration in a variety of fields such as the growing of crops, vegetables, and fruits. 7.2.2.3 Agrotechnologists: Technical and Political Symbols As mentioned earlier, in China, agrotechnologists ranging from academicians in agricultural research (such as Yuan Longping) to staff of basic-­ level agrotechnology promotion stations not only engage themselves in the development of agrotechnology but are also political symbols. The political mission of agrotechnologists is embedded in all of their activities, whether it is world-renowned Academician Yuan Longping or staff of basic-level agrotechnology promotion stations. This is because, as Professor Liu Lin says, “Since the Qing Dynasty, Chinese technicians have followed the will of higher levels to promote technology. All work related to agrotechnology and promotion is inseparable from the political background. The fundamental reason is that these technicians are paid by the government, so they have to pay attention to what the government thinks of.” Chinese agrotechnologists dispatched to Africa are not only symbols and representatives of China’s agrotechnology but also the epitome of Chinese culture and politics. What they say and act represents the image of the country, making them highly politicized individuals and technicians (Lu and Li 2017). Being an expert stationed in Africa is a great honor not only for the individual but also for the province, city, and work unit they come from. Therefore, they often draw wide attention and are extensively covered by local media (Chaoyang Daily, 2009).

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7.3   Dispatch of Agrotechnologists 7.3.1  Overview As mentioned earlier, China started dispatching agrotechnologists to Africa in the 1960s. So far, a large number of experts in various fields have been sent to a majority of countries in Africa. However, comprehensive statistics in this regard is still unavailable so far. According to China’s Foreign Aid (2014) (the State Council Information Office, 2014), China aims to help other developing countries improve agricultural production capacity and cope with food crisis by establishing ATDCs, dispatching agricultural experts to provide advice, and conducting technical cooperation. The available data shows that from 2008 to 2010, China sent 104 senior agricultural experts to twenty-two African countries. During the three years, they provided more than 400 pieces of information and policy proposals to the recipient countries, completed research reports on African countries and agricultural project feasibility reports with 1.55  million characters in total, and carried out 184 pilot and demonstration projects covering food, vegetables, fishery, animal husbandry, irrigation, and other fields, and held 157 training sessions (China Food Newspaper, 2010). From 2010 to 2012, China assisted with the construction of forty-nine agricultural projects, dispatched over 1000 agrotechnologists, and provided a large number of agricultural materials such as agricultural machinery, improved seeds, and chemical fertilizers. Chinese agrotechnologists mainly carry out such work as trials, demonstration, training, and onsite guidance. They also need to prepare research reports on local agriculture and propose solutions to the problems found in local agricultural production. Their work in Africa seems fairly simple in the eyes of Chinese people, which involves common field management knowledge and techniques such as seedlings, weeding, fertilization and pesticides, but these are “quite difficult” in the eyes of farmers in African countries. The dispatch of Chinese agricultural experts is based on the requests of the governments of African countries, which can help solve local problems in a targeted way. While Western media points to the backward conditions for low agricultural production in Africa, Chinese agricultural experts think that the lack of materials, low productivity, and unfavorable climate are not the main reasons hindering the development of African agriculture; instead, local people’s deep-rooted attitude of “waiting for

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assistance” is the crux of the problem. The degree of backwardness of agricultural production in African countries is even beyond the expectation of Chinese agrotechnologists. There are huge gaps between the extensive agricultural production methods in Africa far lag behind China’s field management techniques. This poses a challenge for Chinese agrotechnologists but also means new opportunities and possibilities. In fact, Chinese agrotechnologists themselves are uncertain whether African locals are ready to accept Chinese techniques, which has to be testified through practice. Therefore, in addition to understanding local cultures as soon as possible, they try to figure out how to demonstrate in their own ways the changes that Chinese techniques would bring to local agricultural production. Zhang Xiaohui, a senior agricultural expert dispatched to Nigeria, showed the differences between Chinese techniques and local methods to local “friends” through his “Chinese field” (Dalian Daily, 2010). In the eyes of Chinese experts, they not only work with Africans but are also their friends. They make friends with local farmers and trainees and even keep in touch with them after returning to China, helping them solve problems in production and life via email and other channels. 7.3.2  China’s Aid to Africa in Retrospect 7.3.2.1 From 1960s to 1980s: The Model of “Learning from Tachai” After China’s first agricultural machinery team was sent to Africa in 1961, the aid program witnessed some changes in forms and characteristics. In the 1960s, agricultural technical assistance to Africa was an important agenda for China, which was closely tied to its political environment and international status at the time. This program was an important countermeasure against the challenges from the United States and the former Soviet Union. After the “Cultural Revolution” broke out in 1966, such assistance grounded to a halt. In 1971, China resumed its aid to Africa. Jiang Huajie (2013) comprehensively reviews and discusses the models and effects of China’s agricultural technical assistance to Africa from 1971 to 1983 using cases, providing an important supplement to relevant literature that only mentions the agricultural assistance provided by Taiwan and Mainland China. It is estimated that from October 1971 to 1983, China deployed thousands of agricultural technicians to eighteen African countries such as Sierra Leone, provided a large number of agricultural materials, and helped to build a host of water conservancy facilities. It can be said

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that Mainland China raced against time to resume its assistance to Africa. Around 1975, China basically completed diplomatic negotiations with various African countries on the replacement of agricultural teams. In 1973, Mainland China already got a basic understanding of the deployment, operation, and management of agricultural teams sent to African countries by Taiwan. At that time, it was believed that these teams failed to steer the recipient countries towards the path of “independent development in agriculture.” As a result, after the withdrawal of the teams of Taiwan, agricultural production in African countries soon fell apart. Enabling African countries to develop agriculture on their own became the core objective of Mainland China. This was consistent with the goals in the eight principles of foreign economic assistance proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai during his visit to Africa in 1964, when the model of “learning from Tachai in agriculture” was sweeping across China. In December 1964, Zhou Enlai put forward in the report on the work of the government the Tachai spirit featuring the “principle of political command and ideological leadership, the tenet of self-reliance and hard work, and the communist style of loving the country and the collectives”, which was deeply embedded in the process of China’s aid to Africa in the 1970s. After replacing their counterparts, agrotechnologists from Mainland China tried to prove the “universal international significance” of the Tachai model, which was implemented against the country’s particular political and economic background at the time (Jiang 2013). However, the practice fell short of their expectations. Instead of helping the recipient countries independently develop agricultural production and achieve food self-sufficiency and security, most of China-aided projects were terminated after the experts left, although farmers in a few countries such as Ghana and Gambia continued to plant Chinese rice varieties on China-aided farms. It is a regret that a majority of projects ended up in failure soon after they produced immediate effects (Yun 2000). In the early 1980s, China adjusted its strategy for agricultural assistance to Africa, putting an end to the aforesaid model, which, however, still born historical significance. To sum up, the agricultural teams sent by Mainland China replaced the modes of government monopoly or operations with hired laborers, helped set up farmers’ mutual assistance cooperatives, and substituted mechanical farming with labors to reduce external dependence. They implemented the eight-character approach to increase farmers’ income, promoted the Tachai spirit, and tried to reduce farmers’ dependence on their governments and the governments’ dependence on

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external assistance until both of them could achieve self-sufficiency. The intentions and measures were highly similar to the experience of Tachai, and the practices had strong political implications. As to Chinese agrotechnologists’ assistance to Africa during this period, Wang Gui still has fresh recollections. Selection and Dispatch of Agrotechnologists in the 1980s2Wang Gui was assigned to a farm in Jiangsu Province after he graduated from college in 1979. He had strong technical capabilities and published an article on the use of combine harvesters. Therefore, he was considered to have made “special contributions”. At that time, “foreign aid is a political task,” he said. “The selection of experts offering foreign assistance was very strict. Especially in the 1960s, when political values were so emphasized that even technical capabilities could be ignored. Of course, it is not that skills did not matter at all; it is just because there were quite few people who were both socialist-minded and professionally competent. In that case, political values had to take precedence over skills.” As a result, some so-called experts at that time did not actually qualify as experts. They were mainly high-skilled workers. With just a few exceptions, most of them did not have high levels of educational attainment. This situation somewhat changed in the 1980s. In 1984, thanks to his outstanding performance in daily work, Wang Gui became one of the technicians selected from 22 farms to participate in China’s aid to Africa. After thorough investigations on political performance, family background, and technical capabilities, the inspection team had a talk with him, saying, “We have inspected everything from the Provincial Agricultural Reclamation Bureau to the basic-level farm, and our investigation is basically over now. We are only here to do research, but you need to be prepared. You need to put your personal affairs aside and follow the arrangements of the organization.” It can be seen that as a candidate, Mr. Wang should overcome all difficulties to subordinate his individual needs to the arrangements of the organization and be proud of this. One month before going abroad, Wang Gui came to Beijing for training. On the basis of understanding the international situation in the 1980s, he had to learn diplomatic discipline and etiquette, including how to eat, tie a bow tie, and speak properly. “As the ‘Cultural Revolution’ ended not long ago, everyone still remembers the warning of ‘rather doubt than trust.’” Following the instruction of Premier Zhou Enlai that “diplomacy is no small matter”, agrotechnologists aid special attention to their own words and deeds for fear that their actions might have any negative impact on the country. Therefore, they even never went out alone. In short, “the guiding principle of China’s foreign

2

 Source: interview with Wang Gui by Professor Xu Xiuli in July 2013.

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aid is free assistance; while Europeans often start with culture trying to influence the recipients, we Chinese start with free assistance.”

7.3.2.2 After the 1990s: Diversified Dispatch Programs After the 1990s, with the changes in the political and economic landscapes at home and abroad, the forms of China’s agrotechnology dispatch programs in support of African countries have become more diversified, the number increased significantly, and the effects improved notably. Especially since the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, the dispatch of agrotechnologists to Africa, including those to ATDCs, has become a regular type of China’s agricultural assistance to Africa. However, due to the lack of independent aid systems, unified plans, and policy coordination mechanisms at the national and international levels (Liu 2009), China’s aid has been basically carried out in the form of programs. The selection, dispatch, and daily management of experts sent to Africa are handled by multiple government departments in China. Specifically, Foreign Economic Cooperation Center of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for agricultural experts of the South-South cooperation programs, International Exchange Center of the Ministry of Agriculture for senior agricultural expert teams, and the domestic related institutions or units for experts of ATDCs. 1. Agrotechnologists of South-South cooperation programs China has participated in the special action framework for food security initiated by the FAO since 1996 to provide agricultural assistance for developing countries within the framework. Currently, there are three main ways: first, by signing tripartite cooperation agreements with the FAO and third-party countries, the Chinese government sends agricultural experts at its own expenses to third-party countries according to the selection criteria and management procedures of the FAO.  Second, Funded by the FAO and the unilateral trust funds of third-party countries, China dispatches experts to third-party countries, such as agricultural cooperation between China and Nigeria. Third, China sets up trust funds to dispatch agrotechnologists to Africa, carry out micro-level projects, and hold training programs. By the end of 2015, China had completed 20 agricultural assistance projects within the above-mentioned framework and deployed more than 1000 agricultural experts and technicians to 24 countries in Africa, Asia, South Pacific, and the Caribbean (Han 2015).

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The Foreign Economic Cooperation Center of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the dispatch of experts for the South-South cooperation programs within the multilateral framework. 2. Senior agricultural experts/agrotechnology teams At the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, Chinese leaders announced the plan to send 100 senior agrotechnologists to Africa, with each batch staying for one year. China has also dispatched agricultural experts to African countries through other means. The experts not only help the governments of the recipient countries with agricultural development plans, promote food security, and enhance agricultural economic development, but also go to the rural areas to provide technical guidance and trainings for local farmers and technology promotion personnel, winning high praises from local governments and farmers. The Center of International Cooperation Service of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the dispatch of agrotechnologists. In accordance with the instructions of the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Foreign Assistance Department of the Ministry of Commerce, it held selection examinations for agricultural experts and non-English translators. At the end of 2007, thirty-seven senior agricultural experts were selected, and another sixty-three in 2008. By then, one hundred agricultural experts with deputy senior titles and over twenty intermediate translators were determined. Three to six agricultural experts would be sent to each country (some teams were staffed with one translator). In 2008, three batches with over ten people were dispatched, and the remaining in the first half of 2009.3 On November 16, 2007, the ceremony for the dispatch of 100 Chinese senior agricultural experts to Africa was held in Beijing. State leaders and officials of the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented them with flags to see them off. On November 12, 2010, the Ministry of Agriculture convened a project summary meeting. The leaders of the Ministry of Agriculture spoke highly of the work of these senior agricultural experts. As he pointed out, since August 2008, China had dispatched 104 senior agricultural experts to 3   International exchanges and cooperation information network of the Ministry of Agriculture. http://www.cicos.agri.gov.cn/Sites/MainSite/List_2_1_879.html, August 14, 2014.

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thirty-three African countries; completed research reports on African countries and agricultural project feasibility reports with 1.55  million characters in total; launched 184 pilot and demonstration projects covering food, vegetables, aquatic products, animal husbandry, irrigation, and other fields; held 157 training sessions of various types for 3788 participants, provided onsite guidance for 922 people, and delivered 124 training handouts to the African side, with a total of over 900,000 words. The agrotechnologists sent by China can be divided into senior agricultural experts and agricultural technicians. Generally, the Chinese side selects experts at the request of the recipient countries in terms of number and fields. The experts are mainly from universities, agricultural research institutes, and agrotechnology departments at all levels. Their services are focused on planting and agricultural product processing, covering vegetables, horticulture, agricultural machinery, breeding, water conservancy, animal husbandry, and agricultural policy planning. The purpose of the dispatch is to impart practical agricultural production techniques and management experience to African countries, and improve their macro-­ control capabilities and independent development capabilities in agriculture. The selection of experts is conducted through various channels such as online announcement and local recommendations. These experts usually work in African countries for more than one year, and all the expenses are borne by the Chinese government, including round-trip international travel expenses, medical insurance, living allowances, and various subsidies. They usually work with the agrotechnology research and promotion personnel of local agricultural departments and related institutions. From the “100 senior agricultural experts” in 2009 to agrotechnologists in 2012, all the experts need to go through a rigorous selection process and are subject to the management and supervision of relevant departments. In addition to specialties, the recipient countries also have certain requirements on the levels of the experts. For example, they may demand that experts in processing, irrigation, agricultural machinery, and veterinary medicine hold either senior titles or intermediate titles, while senior titles are a must for experts in rice and cotton. The Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture are responsible for guiding the selection of experts, formulating relevant management policies, and reviewing and determining the candidates. The Center of International Cooperation Service of the Ministry of Agriculture

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undertakes the selection and management of experts.4 The notice on the selection of experts for 2012 was issued in March 2012, and the recipient countries included Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Sudan, Djibouti, Botswana, and Egypt. The Ministry of Agriculture distributed the notice to the provincial agricultural departments, which was then passed on to the municipal and county-level departments in the form of internal document and made public online. The requirements of African countries and the criteria for experts were also included in the notice (See Table 7.1). From 2014 to 2018, the Ministry of Agriculture will dispatch agricultural experts to some African countries in two batches. Each agrotechnology team will be composed of eight experts, including one team leader with a senior title, two members with senior titles, two with deputy senior titles, and three technicians. 7.3.2.3 Agrotechnologists of ATDCs By the end of 2014, China had established ATDCs in twenty-six African countries, all equipped with agrotechnologists. Although the Foreign Economic Cooperation Center of the Ministry of Agriculture are responsible for the project launch, evaluation, and supervision of these ATDCs, the selection, dispatch, and management of experts are carried out by the operators of the ATDCs, such as universities, research institutes, and enterprises. The main responsibility of the ATDCs is to promote China’s advanced and practical agricultural production techniques among local people through trials, demonstration, and training. The agrotechnology experts are recruited by Chinese organizations that help build the ATDCs. Based on the three major functions of the ATDCs, namely, experimental research, personnel training, and demonstration and promotion, the work of agrotechnology experts also focus on these aspects. Take the China-aided ATDC in Tanzania as an example. There were eleven experts during the technical cooperation period, all 4  To implement the tenet of the summit and the instructions of the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Foreign Assistance Department of the Ministry of Commerce, a number of meetings on the dispatch of 100 senior agricultural experts have been convened since the end of 2016, and the inter-ministerial coordination mechanism has been established. The two ministries discussed and communicated with each other to steadily advance the dispatch of experts and finally determined that the Center of International Cooperation Service would take charge of the specific implementation.

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Table 7.1  Plan for the dispatch of agrotechnology teams 2014–2018 Recipient country

Field

Ethiopia

Rice, cotton, crop processing, fungus, wood anatomy,tropical forest cultivation, bamboo processing, wood machinery, etc. Fishery development and planning, farmland irrigation, rice production and marketing, etc. Agricultural irrigation, farmland water conservancy, horticulture, agrotechnology promotion Agrotechnology promotion, dry farming planning, rice production and sales, fruit tree cultivation, etc. Agricultural microbiology, agronomy, etc. Crop farming, vegetables, livestock and poultry breeding, etc. Prevention and control of fish diseases, genetic breeding, aquaculture, aquatic feed nutrition, etc. Vegetables, agricultural products processing, molecular biology and animal husbandry; two translators are needed as Mozambique speaks Portuguese Agriculture (rice), agricultural machinery, etc.; two French translators are required as Morocco speaks French Livestock breeding, crop farming, irrigation, aquatic products, machinery, horticulture, etc. Clinical veterinarian, mariculture, forestry, etc.; two translators are needed as Djibouti speaks French Vegetables, food crops, and animal husbandry

Zambia Tanzania Sudan Sierra Leone South Sudan South Africa Mozambique

Morocco Zimbabwe Djibouti Congo Brazzaville Eritrea Burundi

Botswana Egypt

Grain and beans, mycorrhizal technology, oil crops, etc. Agricultural irrigation, water conservancy, horticulture, and agrotechnology promotion; two translators are needed as Burundi speaks French Agricultural policy analysis, irrigation and water conservancy, agricultural machinery, etc. Agricultural machinery, heavy machinery maintenance, agricultural machinery actuator maintenance, etc.

Note: Based on the data of the Foreign Economic Cooperation Center of the Ministry of Agriculture

from the research institute affiliated to the Chongqing Academy of Agricultural Sciences or Chongqing Zhong Yi Seed Co., Ltd. They were responsible for food crops such as rice, and corn, vegetables like loofah, cucumber, cowpea, winter melon, and balsam pear, banana tissue culture, and chicken farming, respectively.

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7.3.2.4 Agricultural Education Experts In addition to the above-mentioned types, there is also a special type of experts, namely vocational education agrotechnologists sent by China to Ethiopia. In 2001, China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Ethiopia’s Ministry of Agriculture signed the Letter of Intent on Cooperation in Agricultural Vocational and Technical Education and Training and Green Certificates, and China began to help Ethiopia build an agricultural vocational education system. Before 2012, the program was carried out in the form of cooperation, where Egypt covered the expenses of Chinese experts and teachers. Since 2012, this program has been included in China’s foreign aid initiatives, with relevant funds provided by the Chinese government. The subsidy standards are based on those for agricultural experts. By the end of 2013, China had dispatched a total of 370 teachers, who held forty-eight courses in six fields including crop cultivation, animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, agricultural machinery, housekeeping, and natural resource development, training a total of 66,000 local students (Center of International Cooperation Service, Ministry of Agriculture, 2012). By the end of 2016, China had organized seventeen agricultural vocational and technical education and training programs in cooperation with the Ethiopian government. Agrotechnologists and teachers are selected to teach in Ethiopia every year. This program has helped Ethiopia establish a relatively complete agricultural vocational and technical education system. Currently, there are twenty-eight three-year training colleges with seven departments and twenty-seven majors, 600 teachers, and 15,000 students.

7.4   Agrotechnologists of ATDCs: Take Country T for Example 7.4.1  Brief Introduction of China-aided ATDCs in Country T At the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-­ Africa Cooperation in November 2006, China announced that in order to build a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and advance China-­ Africa cooperation on a larger scale and at a higher level, the Chinese government would launch eight major initiatives, including helping African countries establish fourteen distinctive ATDCs in the coming

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three years. The China-aided ATDC in Country T is one of them. The ATDC was approved by China’s Ministry of Commerce in 2007, and started construction on October 16, 2009. After passing the inspection and acceptance by the Ministry of Agriculture of Country T in November 2010, it was officially transferred to the government of Country T in April 2011, marking the beginning of the technical cooperation stage, which lasted till May 2015. After that, it entered the sustainable development stage (commercial operation stage). The township where the ATDC is located is 225  km away from the capital city of Country T and enjoys convenient transportation. The ATDC covers a total area of sixty-two hectares, twelve hectares of which are the core experimental demonstration zone and fifty hectares the production demonstration zone.5 The core experimental demonstration zone includes three parts: office and training, experimental demonstration, and production demonstration, which are composed of facilities and infrastructure such as the expert residential area, offices, conference rooms, canteen, and trainee dormitory. The main functions of the ATDC cover experimental research, technical training, and demonstration and promotion, which specifically include field crop experiment and demonstration, tissue culture experiment, breeding experiment and demonstration, processing experiment demonstration, and agricultural machinery display. Since the ATDC was put into operation, it has carried out trials and demonstration regarding rice, corn, vegetables, chicken farming, and banana tissue culture. The specific work includes vegetable seedling breeding, virus-free banana tissue culture, chicken farming and chick hatching, as well as the introduction of new rice and corn varieties for trials and demonstration. In addition to trials, demonstration, and training, the ADTC also conducts collaborative research with the nearby agricultural research institutes (under the Ministry of Agriculture of Country T) and also cooperates with well-known local agricultural colleges. For example, it provides internships for college students to understand and learn about Chinese techniques. The dispatch and management of experts for the ATDC is in the charge of Company C of China, which has undertaken the assistance tasks. From December 2010, Company C began to send agrotechnologists to the 5  Part of it is used for vegetable growing experiments and demonstration. As the water conservancy facilities promised by the government of Country T were not in place, the land was not put into full use.

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ADTC to conduct trials, demonstration and training. In March 2012, all of the eleven agrotechnologists were in place, including three experts in rice, three in corn, two in vegetables, two in tissue culture, and one in chicken farming. During the technical cooperation stage (2011–2015), there were eleven Chinese agrotechnologists at the ATDC.  After the ADTC entered the sustainable development stage in 2015, there were six experts, including one in rice, one in corn, two in chicken farming, one in vegetables, and one in banana tissue culture. 7.4.2  Within the ATDC: Daily Work of Agrotechnologists The key working areas of ATDC in the technical cooperation stage and sustainable development stage are different. In the technical cooperation stage, the agrotechnologists carried out a lot of trials, demonstration, and training concerning the above-mentioned five crop varieties and submitted monthly reports to the administrations and organizations back in China. At the end of each year, they submitted annual progress report to Chinese authorities such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Commerce. Specifically, the daily work of agrotechnologists in the ATDC includes the following aspects. 7.4.2.1 Material Collection and Screening Chinese experts at the ATDC cooperates with agricultural experts in Country T to carry out experimental research, personnel training, demonstration, and technology promotion. For example, they conduct surveys on the agricultural diversity and climate conditions in Country T and collect agriculture-related information and resources, so as to pave the way for deepening technical cooperation, tapping into germplasm resources, and cultivating new combinations. 7.4.2.2 Experimental Research on New Varieties and New Techniques Agrotechnologists in different fields mainly carry out trials and demonstration on rice, corn, vegetables, banana tissue culture, and chicken farming. According to them, the yields and quality of these crops are satisfactory, reflecting that their work has “produced significant effects.” Up to now, the ATDC has carried out trials on 190 new varieties, including fifty rice varieties. Among them, three new varieties of rice, two of corn, and twelve of vegetables can be promoted locally. In addition, they have cultivated a total of 10,000 banana test-tube seedlings of seven varieties and trained

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two technicians, enabling the ATDC to cultivate up to 100,000 banana tissue culture seedlings per year. The number of laying hens has exceeded 7000, with an egg production rate of 80  percent to 97  percent and a capacity of 10,000 hens, and the ATDC has trained two technicians in this regard. 7.4.2.3 Receptions and Participation in Exhibitions From 2011 to August 2016, experts at the China-aided ATDC in Country T received more than 50 visiting groups. Officials of the Ministry of Agriculture of Country T and senior experts in farming and aquaculture also visited the ATDC to learn about China’s varieties and techniques. As a former president of Country T once said, the China-aided ATDC, which takes the lead in research and training, has taken agricultural development in East Africa up a notch and is timely support for the “agriculture first” strategy of Country T. The Minister of Agriculture of Country T emphasized that the ADTC is one of the achievements of long-term cooperation between China and Country T in the field of agriculture and is the largest agricultural research demonstration center in Country T. A Chinese academician commented during his visit to Country T and the ATDC that Chinese agricultural experts have brought China’s cutting-edge agrotechnology to Country T and Africa, writing a good chapter in Country T. In addition, the ADTC provides a platform for international exchanges, and its visitors also include ambassadors of the United States, Japan, Kenya, Comoros, and other countries, experts of international organizations such as the FAO, the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, Japan International Cooperation Agency, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and International Food Policy Research Institute, professors from Yale University, Cornell University, the University of Hong Kong, and Tokyo Agricultural University, as well as teachers and students from an agricultural university of Country T and University of Groningen. The International Rice Research Institute and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) also conducted training at the ATDC.  China’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture and China’s economic and commercial representative stationed in Country T also visited the ATDC. The Farmers’ Day, which falls on a fixed calendar date, is an important national holiday in Country T. On this day, agricultural products exhibitions will be staged across the country, and the president will also attend in person. At the Farmers’ Day events, the experts from the ATDC present

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the achievements of rice, corn, vegetables, and laying hens to promote Chinese varieties and techniques among local farmers. The ATDC also participates in other activities to showcase the varieties and techniques of Chinese crops, such as the reception of the Chinese ambassador held by the Chinese Embassy in Country T (the achievement exhibition of China-­ aided ATDCs) in 2012, the Chinese Brands in Africa in 2013, and the international trade fair held in the capital city D of Country T in 2014. 7.4.2.4 Training and Promotion Within the ATDC, agrotechnologists have conducted nearly thirty technical training programs, provided concentrated training for about 1500 technicians and local farmers and targeted training and guidance for 2450 farmers, instructed forty-one college students in seven batches, and trained over ten key agricultural workers. Additionally, it hired five local college students. In terms of technology promotion, the ATDC pairs with a number of villages to promote agricultural techniques among rural households, which mainly involves rice, corn, and vegetables. It has provided targeted guidance for about 500 farmers distributed in multiple agricultural production areas, including some villages in the River R basin and five villages near the ATDC.  In these villages, the agrotechnologists promote the ATDC’s achievements in the growing of rice, corn, and vegetables and chicken farming, hold training for growers and raisers, and give out free agricultural materials. According to the director of the ATDC, the agrotechnologists have provided over 3600 consultations for local farmers through onsite guidance, receptions, telephone, and email. In the technical cooperation stage, Chinese agrotechnologists at the ATDC also cooperated with local agricultural experts, especially those from local agricultural research institutes, technicians, local government departments, and local farmers. 7.4.3  Outside the ADTC: Work in the Fields As mentioned earlier, to introduce Chinese techniques to local agricultural institutions and farmers based on the needs of the government of Country T and local farmers is one of the main tasks of the ATDC. It is found in our field survey that farmers in Country T welcome China’s agricultural production techniques, especially rice and corn cultivation techniques that are closely related to their daily agricultural practices. In the subsequent

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sustainable development stage, the agrotechnologists gradually shift their focus from trials, training, and demonstration within the ATDC to onsite guidance in the fields and the countryside. Case 1: Large-scale Grower Mr. M 1. From business to agriculture Mr. M was born in the capital city D and is the eldest of seven children in his family. After graduating from high school, he engaged in various types of business, such as opening a barber shop and buying and selling sea prawns and soaps. Later, he expanded his business to other countries like Kenya and China. Mr. M’s farm was put into operation in 2013. At first, he only cultivated some local varieties of Country T and employed local cultivation technicians, but his large-scale farm showed no advantage over smallholders in terms of yield. The yields of the local rice variety SARA5 and Indian variety were 500 kg per acre and 1200 kg per acre, respectively, falling short of the expectations. Therefore, Mr. M kept looking for new techniques and possible solutions to increase the yield of rice. In 2014, he learned about Chinese rice varieties and techniques at the Country T’s Farmers’ Day activity. He asked the director of the China-aided ATDC why their rice grew so well, and the experts of the ATDC gave him an introduction. He then became even more interested and drove from City D to visit the ATDC. After comparing the rice at the ATDC and that on his farm, he decided to invite the experts of the ATDC to his farm to provide onsite technical guidance. 2. Experimenting with Chinese techniques and varieties At the invitation of Mr. M, the experts of the ATDC took Chinese rice varieties to the delta region of River R. The director of the ATDC signed a technical guidance agreement with Mr. M and introduced QU6 to him. Under the guidance of the experts of the ATDC, the rice yield of his farm reached 4400 kg per acre (10.8 tons/ha).6 “The difference is huge,” he said. To let Mr. M better understand the advantages of Chinese techniques and varieties, the agrotechnologists of the ATDC also suggested that he grow both the local variety and Chinese variety on the farm by using the same Chinese planting techniques. It turned out that the plots that grew the Chinese variety and adopted Chinese techniques outperformed with the highest yield. In order to ensure compliance with the cultivation requirements of the ATDC, the agrotechnologists came to  1 ha = 2.47 acres. However, the experts said the yield per ha was 9.3 tons, so there was some difference between the numbers due to conversions. 6

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his farm to provide guidance throughout the process ranging from seedling raising, seedling transplanting, and management to harvesting. Based on his own experience, Mr. M summarized the advantages of the Chinese rice variety and techniques, including shorter terms of planting and maturity periods, higher yield, and easy mechanization. In addition to rice, Mr. M also grew some Chinese vegetable varieties on his farm, such as winter melon, pepper, eggplant, cowpea, and jack bean. The experts of the ATDC provided not only vegetable seeds but also but also onsite guidance. It turned out that the vegetables on Mr. M’s farm grew better than those of other farmers and had higher yields. 3. Popularizing Chinese varieties and techniques After benefiting from Chinese rice varieties and Techniques, Mr. M got greater aspirations, hoping more local villages and farmers to adopt Chinese rice varieties and techniques to increase rice output, address food problems, and increase farmers’ income. It was inspiring that when the villagers learned of Mr. M’s story, they spontaneously visited his farm and hoped to get a grasp of Chinese techniques like him. As of February 2017, Mr. M had set up “Farmer Business Schools” (FBS) in twenty-five villages in the delta region of River R. He brought farmers together at the FBS and introduced them to the potential and strengths of agricultural development, with a focus on the advantages of Chinese rice varieties and techniques. So far, a total of 120 farmer groups have been established in eighteen of the twenty-five villages, each group composed of fifteen to thirty people. On this basis, trials and demonstration of Chinese rice varieties and techniques have been carried out, covering 1000 rural households with a total of 2900 people. They provide two to three acres of farmland per person to grow Chinese rice varieties by using Chinese techniques. Case 2: “Development Demonstration Village” Program in Township D Experts of the China-aided ATDC helped the surrounding five villages build a demonstration field of 1000 mu each to promote Chinese corn and rice techniques. During the rice planting season and the mid-term management process, the agrotechnologists of the ATDC went to the fields to provide onsite guidance. According to the director of the ATDC, the ultimate goal of the “Development Demonstration Village” program is to, in accordance with the requirements of the China-Africa agricultural modernization and poverty reduction cooperation initiatives, integrate government, enterprise, and private resources and establish village-level demonstration sites to spread Chinese agricultural tech-

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niques, help local villages develop modern agriculture, raise the level of agricultural development, increase the value added of agricultural products and farmers’ income, and improve the conditions of rural communities. In February 2017, we went to the rice fields along with the agrotechnologists of the ATDC, local agrotechnology promotion officials, and agricultural technicians and farmers of Village S. The agrotechnologists gave villagers an introduction to the China-aided ATDC in Country T and explained to them how to ­cultivate rice and corn during the rainy season, including leveling the land, applying plantar fertilizers, planting at the right time, choosing varieties with shorter growing periods, and setting up reservoirs in case of water shortages. While explaining, the experts, together with the farmers, leveled the land, sprinkled fertilizers, sowed seeds, and filled the holes with soil, hoping that the rainy season would come in time to nurture the seedlings. Case 3: A Rice Growing Story of Local Worker at the ADTC C is a local farmer who has four children. The family’s income mainly comes from three hectares (about seven acres) of rice fields. In the past, three to four tons of rice could be harvested each year. Part of the harvest was for their own consumption, and the income from selling the rest could hardly cover the daily expenses of the family, who therefore struggled to make a living. He used to be an English teacher at a local elementary school, and after the ATDC was built, he gave up his teaching job and worked for the center as a security guard. As he is familiar with the local situations and proficient in English, he soon became head of the security team, earning basically the same as when he was a teacher. In 2013, C participated in a training program at the ATDC to learn China’s rice cultivation technology. With the help of Chinese experts, he applied the Chinese rice planting techniques he had learned to his own rice fields, and rice yield doubled to seven to eight tons per hectare that year. C said, “In the past, I just went to the fields and sprinkled the seeds directly. That was terrible, because while the rice was growing, there were a lot of weeds. After I adopted the Chinese planting techniques, I can hardly see any weeds in my fields this year. This also saves money, because previously I spent about 800,000 shillings (about 2400 yuan) a year to get rid of weeds.” More than three years has passed. C now has access to and can quickly master the latest varieties and techniques of the ATDC. In just several years, by growing rice on the same three acres of fields, his family can get an annual net income of more than seven million shillings (about 22,000 yuan). They no longer have to struggle financially. He has even sent his son to college. Now, he is looking forward to an even better life in the future. With the income from selling rice, he plans to build a decent new house, start a pig farm, and expand the scale of farming. All these will make him the envy of locals.

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7.4.4  Agrotechnologists of the ATDC: Providing Aid or Doing Business? Under the arrangements of Company C, the experts of the China-aided ATDC in Country T carried out a lot of trials, demonstration, and training. In the technical cooperation stage, they mainly worked and lived within the walls of the ATDC. In the sustainable development stage, some agrotechnologists “go out” to the fields working with local officers and farmers to promote Chinese agrotechnology and crop varieties (such as rice and corn), so that they can be accepted by more local farmers to help improve local crop production and increase farmers’ income. Undoubtedly, just like the ATDCs in other African countries, the ATDC in Country T was built based on the needs of Country T for agricultural development and its desire to learn from Chinese experience. When selecting agrotechnologists and implementing agencies, China attaches great importance to how to combine its aid with the agricultural resource endowments and agricultural production conditions of the recipient countries. The agrotechnologists dispatched are experts and technicians who have long worked on the frontline and mastered agricultural techniques. Based on the functions of the ATDCs, the primary responsibility of agrotechnologists is to fulfill the plans as specified in the agreement between China and Country T, including the trials, demonstration, and training to be conducted concerning the specific crop varieties and quantity in the technical cooperation stage. This is not only the commitment and requirements of Chinese companies within the framework of “pairing one recipient country with one province” but also an important platform and path for the ATDCs to demonstrate Chinese agrotechnology and varieties in African countries. Although the personalities, work units, professional backgrounds, job titles, and intentions of the experts vary (Lu et al. 2015), their identity as Chinese agrotechnologist is the same. Different groups in the developing world are often aware of their opportunities in policy discourse and may adjust their entrusted role strategically and instrumentally (Rossi 2006). In Country T, these agrotechnologists gain a sense of identity through social interaction with local officials and farmers. As they find, as long as they can demonstrate Chinese techniques to African people through effective means or help them increase agricultural productivity and income, they can win their trust and respect. Therefore, in the sustainable development stage, even there are no sufficient funding, they still “go out” to help farmers who need them.

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However, the agrotechnologists have to face the confusion between their identity as expert and their individual perception of reality. Although they somewhat learned about the working and living environments they would face via the Internet or acquaintances before arriving on the African continent, they would still encounter some difficulties and struggles in practice. In addition to the hot weather and threat of malaria and other diseases, experts, as aiders, have to engage in some commercial activities, which bothers them most. Specifically, an inevitable question is how to properly deal with the agricultural products that come from the ATDC such as bananas, corn, and eggs, i.e., the by-products of aid. In other words, if the function of the ATDC is to provide aid, both the government of Country T and the agrotechnologists themselves will think that commercial sales of agricultural products is not what the ATDC should engage in as an aid agency. However, in the face of the problem of how to handle the agricultural products except those for their own consumption and the financial pressure of the ATDC during its operation, the agrotechnologists have to regard the sale of agricultural products as part of their job, which poses a risk of being held accountable by the local government of Country T. This is because in the eyes of the recipient government, the function of the ATDC is to provide aid alone rather than carry out any commercial activity. Therefore, compared with the distinct “national agent” characteristics of experts in the agrotechnology teams dispatched by China to Africa (Lu and Li 2017), the identity of agrotechnologists of the ATDC is relatively vague. This is mainly because of the ambiguity of aid and business functions of the ATDC. However, it is undeniable that, in any case, the agrotechnologists of the ATDC have fulfilled the important mission of transferring Chinese agrotechnology to Africa and won recognition from the government and farmers of Country T through their own practices. They actually provide a valuable path and direction for increasing the yields of rice, corn, and vegetables and the income of local farmers. To sum up, to understand the identity of agrotechnologists of China-aided ATDCs requires multiple perspectives such as the background, development status, and effects of the ATDCs.

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7.5   Conclusions and Discussions In the realm of international development, experts generally include development consultants, policy makers, aid managers, and managers (Mosse 2005). A lot of studies have discussed the work of international development experts in the West. Some scholars regard them as “agents” and brokers (Lewis and Mosse 2006b). Most of these studies focus on the structure and tension at the micro level from the perspective of political anthropology, highlighting how these social actors, as active agents, construct their social, political, and economic roles without bending to standardized requirements (Bierschenk et al. 2002). Some studies point out that those who are working on the frontline of international development interpret technology between different subjects and are partly involved in projects as foreign planners (Long and Long 1992; Lewis and Mosse 2006). However, they ignore knowledge practice and instead pay more attention to the reproduction of power, production of knowledge hierarchy, and the stability of the boundary between development experts and development subjects (Long 2001). In the academic world of the West, Lewis and Mosse have a significant influence on the analysis of development experts. According to them, development experts are regarded as brokers between development agencies and local farmers, and they have specific capabilities, strategies, and “careers”. They focus on how development programs translate into facts in practice under unforeseen circumstances (Lewis and Mosse 2006). Meanwhile, some studies are concerned with the identity of experts, pointing to the tension between the thoughts and identities of experts and the environment in which they live. In other words, on one hand, experts need to flexibly handle the relations with local people, local knowledge, and local cultures in order to maintain their position and achieve work objectives; on the other hand, they must support global knowledge and bureaucratic knowledge and introduce such knowledge to local people. Their expert status and professionalism are created by turning particularity to globality and deriving technical bureaucratic knowledge from informal relations (Riles 2004). Basically, Western countries extend aid to African countries based on morality, where religion plays an important role at both the national and individual levels. In comparison, China’s aid to Africa is tied to its political and cultural needs, which is based on Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries and aims to achieve mutual benefit.

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Therefore, as an important part of China’s agricultural aid to Africa, the operation of the ATDCs and dispatch of agrotechnologists inevitably have strong political and cultural implications. Chinese agrotechnologists are different from missionaries. They undertake the mission of the country and represent the efficiency and utility of Chinese agrotechnology. On the other hand, as individual actors, they are also driven by individual interests and have their own initiative and space for action, and embody their own competencies and value. As a leader pointed out, foreign aid is a complex and systematic project, and it is necessary to care about the expats politically, support them at work, and take care of them in life (Wang 2012). As an important carrier of agrotechnology transfer, agricultural experts build trust between China and African countries with their own actions, including trust in Chinese techniques, Chinese people, and Chinese culture. The professionalism and dedication of agrotechnologists of China-aided ATDCs is also a great asset for governments and farmers of the recipient countries, touching the hearts of local people. “As a saying goes, to lift one out of poverty, the first and foremost thing is to help them build confidence and develop abilities. During my work in Africa, I always keep in mind that I should influence and inspire others with my sincerity and hard work, so that they can change the mentality of waiting for and relying on assistance and realize that agriculture and agricultural machinery has to be modernized through one’s hands rather than the mouth,” said Zhang Jianxun, an agricultural expert dispatched to Africa (Fu 2010). There are few studies at home and abroad as to Chinese agrotechnologists deployed to assist Africa. A study by Buckley (2013a) on Chinese experts of the ATDC in Senegal demonstrates how Chinese experts “translate” the cooperation memorandum of understanding and take actions in a flexible manner based on the actual situation. The study also shows, from the perspective of experts, the fracture between individuals and the whole of China’s foreign aid programs. It should be noted that the role, identity, and actions of Chinese agrotechnologists still needs to be considered from the perspective of Chinese history and culture. As we have noticed, the practical process of Chinese agricultural experts in work and life is also the process of extension and diffusion of China’s internal management models and the reproduction of the tension between the country, institutions, and individuals in the process of China’s development. Chinese agrotechnologists are different from Western independent development experts who work in Africa to get paid or Western

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missionaries aimed at spreading their beliefs and culture. As ordinary individuals and social actors, they have personal economic motivations and also serve as a vehicle for the political mission of the country and the Chinese Dream. Everyone is part of the country, an envoy of China to Africa, and a representative of the national image. Just like other practices, what the experts of China-aided ATDCs present in Africa shares the same cultural pattern as social changes within China, which is reflected in political and social systems, technology demonstration, and other aspects. Defying the harsh natural conditions and environment such as unfavorable climate and poor sanitation, they have, through their own wisdom and dedication, conveyed to Africa Chinese perceptions of work, endeavor, and perseverance and promoted China’s practical agricultural techniques among local people, thus strengthening the friendship between China and the recipient countries.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Li et al., Chinese Agricultural Technology Aid in Africa, China and Globalization 2.0, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9396-0

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