China and the Arms Trade 0312132697, 9781032436302, 9781003368175, 9781032436319, 0709933622

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Routledge Revivals

China and the Arms Trade

First Published in 1985, China and the Arms Trade offers a detailed analysis of Chinese arms aid policy to examine Beijing’s changing nature of foreign and domestic policy. Military aid, like war, is a continuation of foreign policy by other means. The previous perception of China offering special and selfless military assistance seems no longer accurate. The nature of these Chinese aid now appears more complex and contradictory. China, now like other great powers, take an active role in the lucrative international arms bazaar. As one Chinese official said about his country’s more hard-headed arms sales policy, ‘we cannot sell at friendship prices all the time’. This book is a must read for scholars and researchers of Chinese foreign policy, strategic studies, Chinese politics, international relations and defence studies.

China and the Arms Trade

Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal

First published in 1985 by Croom Helm Ltd. This edition first published in 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1985 A. Gilks and G. Segal All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact. A Library of Congress record exists under ISBN: 0312132697 ISBN: 978-1-032-43630-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-36817-5 (ebk) ISBN: 978-1-032-43631-9 (pbk) Book DOI 10.4324/9781003368175

CHINA AND THE ARMS TRADE ANNE GILKS AND GERALD SEGAL

GROOM HELM London & Sydney

©1985 A. Gilks and G. Segal Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent BR3 1AT Croom Helm Australia Pty Ltd, First Floor, 139 King Street, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Gilks, Anne China and the arms trade.—(Croom Helm international politics in Asia series) 1. Munitions—China I. Title II. Segal, Gerald 382'.456234'0951 HD9743.C4/ ISBN 0-7099-3362-2

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Billing & Sons Limited, Worcester.

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations

vi

1. Introduction

1

2. The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

6

3. The Nature of China's Military Aid

29

4. Motives for China's Military Aid

84

5. Models of Military Aid

148

Appendices

190

Index

217

ABBREVIATIONS

AAPSO ACDA ANC ASEAN APC BR CAR CCP CENTO COREMO CSM DPRK DRV ELF FAC FAZ PEER FG FLN FNLA FRELIMO IHT IISS KPNLF LDC MET MEED MGB MPLA NCNA NKCP NLC NLFSV NLM NPA NYHT

Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US) African National Congress Association of South-East Asian Nations Armoured Personnel Carrier Beijing Review Central African Republic Chinese Communist Party Central Treaty Organisation Comite Revolucionario de Mozambique Christian Science Monitor Democratic People's Republic of Korea Democratic Republic of Vietnam Eritrean Liberation Front Fast Attack Craft Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung Far Eastern Economic Review Field Gun Front de Liberation Nationale Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola Frente de Libertagao de Mofambique International Herald Tribune International Institute for Strategic Studies Khmer People's National Liberation Front Less Developed Country Main Battle Tank Middle East Economic Digest Motor Gun Boat Movimento Popular de Libertazao de Angola New China News Agency North Kalimantan Communist Party National Liberation Committee National Liberation Front of South Vietnam National Liberation Movement New People's Army New York Herald Tribune

NYT NZZ OAU OFNS OPEC PAC PDFLP PDRY PFLOAG PFLP PKI PLA PLO ref SAM SEATO s/h SIPRI sub SWAPO UNITA UPC VNA WMEAT ZANU ZAPU

New York Times Neue Zurcher Zeitung Organisation of African Unity Observer Foreign News Service Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries Pan-Africanist Congress People's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Communist Party of Indonesia People's Liberation Army Palestine Liberation Organisation Refurbished Surface-to-air Missile South-East Asia Treaty Organisation Secondhand Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Submarine South-West African People's Organisation Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola Union des Populations du Cameroun North Vietnamese Army World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers Zimbabwe African National Union Zimbabwe African People's Union

1

INTRODUCTION

Military aid, like war, is a continuation of foreign policy by other means. Chinese aid is no exception. Indeed, the important changes in the past 35 years of Chinese foreign policy are visible in its pattern of military aid. Therefore, in the 1980s, as the errors of past Chinese foreign policy, and the pragmatism of contemporary policy are recognized, it is time to reassess the nature of China's military aid. The previous perception of China offering special and selfless military assistance seems no longer accurate. The nature of Chinese aid, as with much of its foreign policy, now appears more complex and contradictory. In 1984, China, like the other great powers, takes an active role in the lucrative international arms bazaar. As one Chinese official said about his country's new, more hard-headed arms sales policy, 'We cannot sell at friendship prices all the time.'1 Of course, some excellent studies have already been made of China's general foreign policy.2 They often provide superb reconstructions of the transformations of Beijing's policy from the close Sino-Soviet alliance, through opposition to both superpowers, to anti-Sovietism, and lastly to a more balanced opposition to both superpowers in the 1980s. There have also been analyses of Chinese defence policy and the use of force in Chinese foreign policy.3 Yet, between these two dimensions of Chinese foreign policy — the political and the military — there lies the link of military aid. When direct use of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops is either impossible or inadvisable, and yet political objectives in foreign policy are still seen1 as worth pursuing, then military aid becomes a useful tool of policy. Unfortunately, there have been virtually no studies of China's military aid policy.4 What is worse, in recent years it has become fashionable to see China more as a recipient than a donor of military aid.5 Although China has imported a small amount of military equipment in recent years, the totals have been puny in comparison to what China exports.6 It is true that China's military aid has not been anywhere near the scale of the superpowers, and rarely even approached the level of such middle powers as France and Britain. But a study of Chinese military assistance is still justified on several grounds. First, for students of Chinese foreign policy, military aid policy is an important area where 1

2

Introduction

Chinese words can be compared to actions. Those states and movements that benefit from Chinese aid have been singled out for a variety of reasons, and an analysis of the aid patterns indicates the priorities of Beijing's policy. Second, China's aid policy casts some light on why poor, peasant China is so often seen as a great power. The importance of China in international politics has never been based on the power of its military punch or the success of its economy. By these two measures China would rank as a lowly middle power. But for a variety of reasons, the superpowers and most other states have seen China as being the third most important power in international relations. This (mis)perception seems to be based more on China's potential than its actual power. Similarly, China's military (and economic) aid is (mis)perceived as special. Some suggest that it constitutes a different, and better 'model' of aid; one where the donor does not exploit the recipient and the aid is far more effective than that given by other great powers. Thus even if Chinese aid was not on a massive scale, it offered an important alternative to other states' actions. Therefore the central purpose of this analysis is to assess whether there'was, and still is a consistent Chinese 'model' of military assistance. The question has been tackled from four angles. First, what was the context of Chinese military aid? It would be hard to identify a consistent pattern of military aid, if the general context of Chinese foreign policy kept changing. Second, what type of aid did China give? China's general foreign policy was notable for its mixture of great power aspirations and Third World capabilities. China is not a materially wealthy country, although it has often seen itself as ideologically wealthy. In giving military aid, did China emphasize massive material assistance, or did it stress ideological components? The pattern is in fact confusing, with examples of both types of aid, and in recent years, a new programme of massive arms sales for profit. Third, who received Chinese aid? China's general foreign policy has been through various stages, seeking peaceful coexistence with all states, rejecting any dealing with 'bourgeois' regimes, simple-minded anti-Sovietism, and most recently a return to the peaceful coexistence line. Not surprisingly, Chinese military aid has been through similar transformations. China has aided neighbouring states and distant African ones. It has supported like-minded communist movements and archaic Muslim rebels as in Afghanistan. It has backed radical African states and right-wing dictatorships as in Zaire. It has consistently sup-

Introduction

3

ported one side in combat, and has cynically supplied both sides as in the Iran-Iraq war. Fourth, what are Chinese motives in dispensing this aid? China's general foreign policy motives have of course been far from static. Like all great powers, China has pursued policies that it saw as most useful in assuring its own security and independence. At times this included active support for world revolution, but more recently it has emphasized good relations with established states. At times it has included a belief that China has a useful model for international change, especially in the Third World, but more recently China has acknowledged its past failures and limited role as a model for others. At times China perceived the United States to be the 'primary contradiction', and at other times the Soviet Union earned that designation. Recently, China stressed its role as the leading Third World state in the South's struggle against both the Northeast and the Northwest. These fluctuations in policy have been apparent in the motives for China's military aid. First, there has been a constant concern with aid to enhance China's national security. Like the superpowers, and unlike all other aid donors, China has used military aid both in the form of its own troops and in heavy material aid, to neighbouring states threatened by a superpower also opposed to China. The wars in Korea and Vietnam against the United States threat, and the 1979 war against Vietnam and the Soviet threat are prime examples. Second, China, like the superpowers and some middle powers has also seen military aid as a useful way to enhance political influence. Chinese aid to a wide range of movements and states, extending from merely backing a movement for its nuisance value, to active and positive support for key allies, defies simple categorization. Like the superpowers, China has discovered that such aid is rarely useful as it buys little long-term influence. Yet China, like the superpowers, persists in trying to find lasting friendship at the other end of the aid pipeline. Third, and most recently, Chinese motives for military aid have also become economic. In this respect China parts company with the superpowers, and looks far more like the middle powers and to a certain extent other Third World states. In the past five years China has largely abandoned its policy of offering military grants rather than sales. It has begun to seek profits where possible, even outdoing the superpowers in amorality by selling arms to both Iran and Iraq in a bloody and active war. Some Chinese aid is still extended at preferential rates, but if there ever was a pattern of non-exploitative and subtle Chinese aid, it certainly has ceased to exist in recent times.

4

Introduction

Problems of Evidence This study of Chinese military aid is intended to be as comprehensive as possible. The limited nature of Chinese assistance led us to believe that would not necessarily be a grandiose hope. However, clearly no study of secretive military aid policy can be more than tentative. The problems in gathering and authenticating information are legion. First, what is the definition of military aid? Military aid is used in the sense of any arms transfers from small arms to large arms and including licensed production. It also covers the provision of military training, in China and/or abroad, as well as the dispatch of China's own troops. It does not include dual-use aid that can also serve civil roles, although it is obviously difficult to isolate purely military applications. The aid can be provided for free, or sold. Although we do include training in this study, we have found it next to impossible to price such 'goods and services'. (See appendices for further qualifications.) Further difficulties arise in the various counting methods adopted by many 'independent' analysts. What is more, China is a closed society, especially on military matters. If China's official line were to be taken at face value, you should not be reading this book as there is virtually no Chinese military aid. Yet we know from the results of Chinese power struggles and changes of policy that in earlier times there was a military aid programme. Thus contemporary China's denial of any arms supplies, say to Iran and Iraq, is not to be taken as evidence that such aid is not given. It merely suggests what China wants the world (not) to know. This is not to argue that China is especially duplicitous, for in the secretive arms trade world China has only found its niche in an otherwise nasty business. In the end, there can be little certainty about the figures presented in any study of military aid. The analysis that follows is of course concerned to be as accurate as possible, but to feign accuracy where the reality is more fuzzy, is to mislead. We are primarily concerned with the trends in Chinese aid, and what it tells us about China's foreign and defence policy. Acknowledgements This research project was funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council, to whom we are both deeply grateful. The gathering of basic information was done by Anne Gilks in the year from August

Introduction

5

1983. Several institutions were especially helpful in gathering obscure sources. We are indebted to the staff at the British Library (OPL), the press library at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and above all the staff at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. We are also pleased to acknowledge the assistance of Renie Groves for typing the manuscript and above all for keeping the two authors in touch. Anne Gilks Gerald Segal

Notes 1. China had its first exhibition at an international arms trade fair in Australia in May 1984. The quote, and report on the fair is in The Wall Street Journal, 4 May 1984. China has begun advertising its new arms sales. See for example the centre-fold in Janes Defence Weekly, 24 November 1984. 2. Michael Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978) and Michael Yahuda, China's Foreign Policy After Mao (London: Macmillan, 1983). Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980). J. David Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 3. Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1975). Melvin Gurtov and Byoong Moo-Hwang, China Under Threat (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). Gerald Segal and William Tow (eds), Chinese Defence Policy (London: Macmillan, 1984). Gerald Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985). 4. John Copper, China's Foreign Aid (Lexington DC: Heath, 1976). Also Ch. 5 in John Copper and Daniel Papp (eds), Communist Nations' Military Assistance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983). Copper's work is remarkably comprehensive, but he is less critical of contradictions in Chinese policy, and of course does not include the important changes of the past five years. 5. See, for example, the otherwise superb analysis by Andrew Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) 6. William Tow and Douglas Stuart, 'China's Military Turns to the West' in International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2, Spring 1981. Also William Tow, 'Arms Sales to China' in Segal and Tow, Chinese Defence Policy.

2

THE CONTEXT: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

China's military aid is not an isolated element of policy. It is a component of a general Chinese foreign policy, which in turn is affected by China's domestic policy and foreign pressures. While the entire context of domestic and foreign policy can not be assessed here, some broad components of Chinese policy can be reviewed. Where does Chinese aid fit into the broader context of Chinese foreign policy, and how is it affected by the constraints of Chinese defence policy? It would be convenient to suggest some pithy principles that govern Chinese foreign and defence policy. While some have attempted to outline such generalizations, it seems increasingly clear that Chinese policy is too complex to be fit into such convenient strait-jackets.1 While there may be some broad objectives of Chinese foreign policy, for example, defence of territory or furthering international socialism, there is no route map to those ends. What is more, the objectives remain so distant that latitude in the short term can be justified. Instead, what can be offered is an analysis of central Chinese concerns. These problems of defence policy change in scope and intensity. What is more, the specific policies adopted in each area have varied over the past 35 years.2 Analysts can at most outline the nature of the problem, and assess the options. Hence, the role of military aid must also be seen as flexible. In essence, Chinese defence polcy has been concerned with three types of problems: threats to territorial integrity; threats at the frontiers; and the search for global influence. Military aid has figured in all three dimensions. Yet the analysis cannot be complete without an understanding of the domestic context of Chinese policy. Domestic Decision Making At one level, the question of who makes Chinese foreign policy is simple - it is the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).3 Certainly the Chinese State and Party constitutions of 1982 are perfectly clear on the 'leading role' of the CCP in all areas of policy. Thus an organizational chart of foreign policy making is simple. Yet, in China, as in the similar Party structure in the Soviet Union, the actual

6

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

1

foreign policy making is far more complex. The complexity is derived from several sources, but three seem most crucial. First, there is no single, comprehensive set of ideals shared by all Chinese leaders, on how to govern. Debates on policy are of course normal for any state.4 Second, as the CCP established the People's Republic, there developed political conflict based in part on institutional affiliation.5 In the words of the bureaucratic politics school, 'where you stand depends on where you sit'. China, the mother of bureaucracy, has not escaped the parochialism of institutional politics. Third, with all these divisions, Chinese leaders also split on the basis of personal factions. Chinese political culture seems especially susceptible to vicious personal factionalism.6 This problem is made especially acute since in the generation that made the revolution, the men in charge tended to hold more than one position, thus confusing lines of power and policy. Does a military professional in charge of a machine building industry act in the interests of his faction, his ministry, or the military? Even as the CCP was consolidating power in 1949, its foreign policy was far from clear cut. Some elements of the CCP, perhaps even including Zhou Enlai, did not see an inevitable need to 'lean to the Soviet was far from clear cut. Some elements of the CCP, perhaps even including Zhou Enlai, did not see an inevitable need to 'learn to the Soviet side' in the cold war.7 That Mao eventually led China into the Soviet camp, is as much to do with China's lack of options, as a positive desire to support the Soviet Union. The central point is that foreign policy options were seriously considered. Later in the 1950s, when the Soviet model was called into question in China, debates returned. Did China need to rely on Moscow, or could it afford to stake out a more independent path? The debate was protracted, cutting across almost all sectors of Chinese society. The Soviet model had penetrated so far into Chinese politics that its rejection could not have been anything but difficult. The repudiation of Soviet guidance in internal Chinese politics came first, followed by an interregnum in the early 1960s, and finally an open split on foreign policy in 1963. But all these steps were far from unanimous. In 1966 when Party-to-Party ties were severed, the debate flared once again. The factional lines were complex, linking in with the Cultural Revolution and a strategic assessment of the threat posed by the United States in the expanding Vietnam war. With the winding up of the extreme phases of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, the pressing Soviet threat along the frontier, and the signs of detente from the United States, foreign policy again came under

8

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

debate in China. The purge of Defence Minister Lin Biao in 1971 obviously was more related to domestic politics, but his opposition to the Sino-American detente was not unimportant in the formation of the anti-Lin coalition. Debates simmered through the 1970s as radicals and moderates fought each other in anticipation of the succession to Mao Zedong. Once again, foreign policy was not the prime issue at stake, but it was an issue. The extent to which China's door should be open to foreign influences was a hotly debated topic. Even after the fall of the Gang of Four, foreign policy has continued to figure in leadership debates. The recent modicum of detente with the Soviet Union was at the centre of a strategic debate in the early 1980s. Related issues included concern over the impact of Western 'spiritual pollution' and whether excessive concessions had been made to the United States over Taiwan. Are there any patterns to these debates? It seems not. There are certain themes that recur, although the conclusions reached in the debates are not consistent. For example, there seems to be regular debate on how open China should be to foreign influences.8 Both the Soviet model, and the late 1970s opening to the West, were examples ofreceptiveness to foreign ideas. Yet the Cultural Revolution and the early 1970s are examples of xenophobia and a narrow nationalistic approach. That the open door swings too and fro is clear, but there seems to be no 'natural' place for it to be propped open or slammed shut. Similarly, there seems to be no consensus on whether to be more concerned with the threat from the north, or with regaining Taiwan and fending off capitalist ideas. Both the Soviet and Western options have advantages and disadvantages for China. One emphasizes the socialist nature of the Chinese revolution and the irreconcilable contradictions with capitalism. The other points to the looming Soviet threat to the north, and/or its ideological challenge of 'revisionism.' Whatever the case, there is no natural answer to these questions for China, and debates will continue. There is also a fairly consistent Chinese concern with trends in international politics and the threats or opportunities posed for China. Yet the implications of this globalism are unclear. Does it lead to an interventionist Chinese policy, spreading foreign aid and offering advice on revolution or how to challenge the superpowers? Or does China retreat inward, calculating that the best way to ensure long-term strength against international problems is to develop first a strong China? And even if the latter option is chosen, is spending on the armed forces a primary part of building strength, or is the military forced to wait for

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

9

general economic growth before it can gets its toys? This 'guns vs. butter' argument, as with the others, has no answer. China, like most great powers, seeks both, with the balance regularly shifting. These, and indeed other dilemmas of policy are at the root of foreign policy debates. The specific policies adopted result from a complex web of factors. Personal factional lines cut across ideological debates and institutional politics. Different generations may also share the views of some, but not others. There are those trained under the Soviet model who both have a vested interest in Soviet organizational routines, but who may also loathe Russians on a personal level. There are those of the 'lost generation' of the Cultural Revolution trained to reject things foreign, who may feel alienated from a policy that encourages learning from 'advanced Western technology'. With all these complex pressures on policy, it is difficult to identify a specific rule for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign policy-making. In comparision to the Soviet Red Army, the PLA seems to be excluded from an institutional role in foreign policy.9 The Soviet armed forces derive their influence in part from a wider international Soviet role that requires military power, and an institutional structure that gives them control over key information.10 The PLA has neither advantage. Whereas the Soviet Red Army can be said to participate in many decisions on foreign policy, in China there is almost no PLA influence. To be sure, some PLA men serving on the Politburo have an impact on foreign policy. But they tend to act not as representative of the armed forces. Multiple office holding dilutes institutional power. So does the fact that the PLA has no uniform view, even if it were allowed to express it. In the Soviet case, the armed forces have a greater say in foreign policy. PLA men on the other hand are rarely deployed abroad. Furthermore, the ability to deploy troops abroad is in part a function of economic strength, for only the wealthy can sustain foreign ventures or massive aid. China's poverty, and the equally intractable nature of its domestic problems, will leave it as a Third World state, albeit a big one, for some time. Perhaps as a result of the these realities, or else because of its own revolutionary experience, China also seems to see less need for the use of military power abroad. The belief that revolution and change must stem from indigenous forces gives China less desire to expand PLA power abroad. In sum, the domestic dimension of Chinese foreign policy is crucial. Policy is constantly affected by debates and natural dilemmas over

10

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

options. None of these problems will diminish in importance in the near future. Neither will some of the essential realities of Chinese domestic politics that help shape foreign policy. The poverty of China forces Beijing to choose between more limited options than those faced by other great powers.

Foreign Policy Objectives China, like most great powers, has three types of foreign policy concern. The scope and relevance of all three are often different for each great power. What is more, the relative importance of each aspect has changed in the past 35 years, and certainly the policies adopted in each case have not been consistent. Thus while it is impossible to speak of principles of Chinese foreign policy, it is possible to discuss certain problems as being of enduring importance. Territorial Integrity China is unique among contemporary great powers in having unresolved problems of territorial integrity. While the Soviet Union has territorial claims against it (from Japan and China) and Great Britain has a secessionist movement in Northern Ireland, no great power faces China's problem of territorial claims against neighbouring states. The importance of unfinished national unification cannot be overestimated. One primary strength of the CCP, in its triumph over the Guomindang, was its credible claim to be able to unite the state and expel foreign influence. The experience of the rape of Qing dynasty China by imperial powers shaped the perspective of those revolutionaries who fought for power after China's 1911 revolution. While the Soviet Union may have been invaded from time to time from Western Europe, the invasions were always short-lived. In China's case, imperial occupation was measured in centuries. If all this foreign exploitation had been terminated by the Chinese revolution in the twentieth century, then the super-sensitivity might have begun to fade. But the implications of foreign occupation are still felt today. China retains three problems of incomplete territorial integrity that play a major role in contemporary foreign policy. First, there is the problem of Taiwan and the associated offshore islands. After 1949 it was plain that the CCP held de facto control, but the Guomindang was able to maintain the fiction of its claim in large part because the Chinese civil war was also an international event. With

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

11

the United States having supported the Guomindang, and the CCP being associated with the Communist bloc in the cold war, the division of China coincided with the division of international politics. The CCP's revolutionary experience was, however, not dependent on its international communist links. Like Tito in Yugoslavia, but on a grander scale, the CCP came to power on its own. Therefore, there was a natural Chinese pride in its special revolution, and its greater relevance to other Third World states. Yet in part the validity of the Chinese claim to international stature depended upon its ability to show that its revolution was not partial, and could overcome all problems left over by the colonial legacy. Therefore, the unresolved Taiwan problem appeared all the more galling to the CCP leadership. The fact that Taiwan was supported by the United States, and the mainland was Communist, soon gave a cold war tinge to the Taiwan problem. Questions of Chinese territorial integrity seemed overtaken by larger events. Yet until the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, globalization of the Taiwan problem was by no means clear. The Korean war and the decision by President Truman to have the United States Seventh Fleet patrol the Taiwan straits ensured that American involvement in the Chinese civil war would continue. It also meant that the CCP had to put off its planned assault on Taiwan. The process of national unification was then in its final stages with the capture of Tibet and Hainan island in 1950. However, the CCP's limited capability, especially in amphibious operations could not overcome American military power. The Korean war not only resulted in a new role for the Seventh Fleet but also necessitated a Chinese military operation. The collapse of the North Korean drive, and the American counter-offensive up to the Yalu river bordering on China, drew a Chinese counter-punch in October 1950.11 Now the notion of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan was clearly out of the question. PLA arms were being used in direct support of an ally in trouble. It was made even more necessary by the fact that the enemy, the United States, had directly intervened in the Chinese civil war and thus constituted China's main foreign threat. The PLA operation in Korea was undoubtedly costly, but then the risks of inaction were perceived as greater, both for Chinese security and for its sense of national pride. With the winding down of the Korean war, China turned once again to consideration of the territorial problem and Taiwan. The first Taiwan straits crisis in 1954-5 was in part a Chinese probe to determine the United States and Taiwanese position. China had regained some

12

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

minor offshore islands since 1949, but such larger islands as Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan straits posed special problems. The Chinese probe of Taiwan's intentions in the 1954-5 crisis was also a test of American intentions as the United States built up alliances in east Asia. The establishment of SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) was clearly a prime purpose behind the Chinese challenge. As a result of this first Taiwan crisis, China learned that the United States was prepared to prevent the loss of territory to the communists. China also learned that its forces were unable and, more to the point, unwilling to run great risks to take the offshore islands. Therefore it was even less likely that China could launch an operation against the main island of Taiwan. This recognition of the realities of power was hard for Beijing to acknowledge. The second Taiwan straits crisis in 1958 was similar. The United States made clear that it was not prepared to tolerate Chinese territorial gains, and Taiwan once again proved its ability to make the costs of any Chinese invasion too high. By the late 1950s, and especially with fading Soviet support for Chinese irredentist claims, Beijing was forced to see the Taiwan problem as long term. This shift of the issue to the back burner did not mean, however, that it ceased to be important. This long-term strategy required a more subtle approach. It was certainly obvious that non-military means had to be tried. Obviously force of arms remained important, if only as a threat, but could not serve as a useful instrument for reunification. The more the sword was brandished, the further off the political goal appeared. Thus the SinoAmerican detente of the 1970s opened up new possibilities for this peaceful, long-term strategy. China sought to isolate Taiwan politically, and starve it of military support. This meant a direct approach to the United States to cut links to Taiwan. Thus China remained especially sensitive to American perceptions that Sino-American detente meant that Taiwan was no longer important. Far from it. It was the Chinese view that Taiwan was as important as ever, but that its method for incorporation into the mainland was to be peaceful. This required the ending of United States arms sales and above all a growing sense in Taibei that it had no choice but to deal with Beijing. On both counts Chinese policy largely failed. Taiwan survives, and indeed flourishes as a pariah, but important trading partner for the West. The United States has reduced but not severed relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan problem has not gone away, and remains the key symbol of China's unsatisfied national integrity. It therefore also re-

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

13

mains the main problem for Sino-American relations. The main cosmetic deals have already been arranged, but the reality of an independent Taiwan remains as real as ever. China's non-military route has failed as clearly as the military option of the 1950s. The return to the military option cannot be ruled out for the future. Taiwan and its associated islands are of course not the only unsolved territorial problem for China. The British and Portugese colonies of Hong Kong and Macao have still not been reincorporated into China. In common with the Taiwan problem, part of the rationale for China's long-term approach to these territories is the belief that peaceful unification is more likely to give China the economic benefits now enjoyed by the colonies. Yet Hong Kong and Macao are also very different from Taiwan. For one thing they are not colonies of either superpower, and thus involve China in less global calculations of how to direct its foreign policy. Both Britain and Portugal seem prepared to return the territories to China, but especially in the British case, they are concerned to 'manage' the transfer as well as possible. Thus the military option is not necessary in either case. Chinese ability to 'turn off the taps' at any moment and force its will has never been in doubt. So why the long-term strategy? Does it mean China does not care about the territorial question? On the contrary. There are two main reasons for China's long-term strategy. First, in economic terms it would be best for (China to engineer a peaceful transition of Hong Kong and Macao. Although these territories no longer provide huge foreign currency earnings for China, they still do provide some important!returns.12 Although the extent has been greatly exaggerated by some Western reports, there is still a real Chinese advantage in maintaining a gradual transition that retains Hong Kong's volatile confidence. Yet the far more more important reason for the long-term approach is related to the Taiwan question. Just as the Special Economic Zones near Hong Kong and Macao are seen as examples of how China will manage the transition of capitalism into a socialist state, so Hong Kong is seen as an example to Taiwan of how its future will be managed. China is even offering Taiwan greater independence than presently promised to Hong Kong, but the example of Hong Kong's transition remains essential. In the end, China seems willing to sacrifice some economic gain in return for political principle and territorial integrity. The precise mix remains uncertain, but what is clear is that the military option is firmly ruled out. The third major set of Chinese territorial claims is against the Soviet

14

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

Union, While China clearly claims that the Soviet Union holds territory above and beyond those agreed in Tsarist treaties, it is unclear whether China actually wants those lands returned. What seems most likely is that China simply insists on an acknowledgement by the Soviet side that these territories were seized in illegal and unfair circumstances when China was weak. Unlike the Taiwan, Hong and Macao problems, China does not really demand that territory should change hands. This emphasis on the political rather than territorial dimension of the question is not surprising. It flows naturally from the fact that the territorial issue was only raised after broader political problems emerged in Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1960s. As the Chinese perception of the Soviet threat grew in the decades after, the frontier issue took on added political significance. When large numbers of troops were deployed by both sides, the issue became transformed into one requiring a general reduction of tension along the frontier.13 For the Soviet Union, the notion of returning territory is clearly out of the question. The Soviet Union did return some territory to China in the 1950s, but this was at a time of close political alliance. Geographic realities, that is, a frontier both long and difficult to defend will always leave both sides wary of any major concessions along the frontier. The importance of this Soviet dimension to Chinese territorial claims seems, in recent years, to be diminishing. With signs of a modicum of detente, China has a more open acceptance of the fact that no actual border modification need take place. By and large the problem remains political. But, as with the Taiwan question, China is aware that it has no viable military option against the Soviet Union. Unlike the Taiwan problem, however, China can have no hope of ever acquiring military superiority that will allow it to take what lands it wants. Chinese foreign policy thus remains concerned with various types of unsettled questions of territorial integrity, but after 35 years seems resigned to leaving the military option sheathed. Even in this most crucial of questions, China lacks power to support its foreign policy. China does have complete control, however, over how open it is to foreign influence. In the imperial past, before Western attacks, China was largely closed to external influence. But the experience of the Qing dynasty, when the Chinese door was pried open by Western traders, did not encourage many Chinese to believe that relations with the outside were good for China. An opposing view, perhaps more prominent in communist as opposed to nationalist China, emphasized that some positive foreign ideas, like Marxism, could be useful for China. However, the essential point is that China was ambivalent about opening itself up

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

15

to the outside.14 The emphasis on economic development, and compromise on allowing in some 'polluting' influences, is similar to that adopted in the Soviet Union over the past decades. It is also related to China's longerterm approach to the question of territorial integrity. The problems of China are now recognized for the difficult and intractable ones that they always have been. Thus the role of brute force and the military option is not stressed. The primary concern is now with longterm economic modernization.15 The new trend towards pragmatism and lower expectations in Chinese foreign policy is naturally derived from this longer term domestic strategy. National Defence Next to regaining Chinese territory, China's main foreign policy objective is to ensure its national defence. Chinese strategies in defence of its territory have often been peculiar, but the need is basic to almost every power. The special aspects of Chinese defence policy are essentially derived from the geographical situation.16 China is not only the thirdlargest state; it also has more neighbours than any other state. Thus there is a basic threat derived from the multiplicity of defence problems, but also opportunity provided for wide Chinese influence. The human geography of China, at once the world's most populous but also a poor peasant state, provides for strengths and weaknesses. Strength in that the population can support massive armed forces and produce a large GDP. Yet the weaknesses are more obvious; the most pressing is the need to feed more than one billion mouths daily and overcome the rural poverty of millions. China is clearly a great power, but it is also a poor power. A more obvious defence dilemma has been the question of whether China should meet threats at 'the gates', or else sit back and allow an enemy to be swallowed in a sea of millions of hostile soldiers. Chinese defence policy has also been of two minds on whether to base defence on poor equipment but rich manpower resources, or else strive to modernize at least parts of the PLA. The bias has clearly been on 'man over weapons'. In 35 years China has faced five major crises which raised these dilemmas. The Korean war (1950-3) showed China's willingness to take on a threatening power beyond China's borders. Despite the farce of Chinese 'volunteers', the PLA was engaged in lengthy combat in Korea. In fact, no subsequent PLA engagement was as costly as the Korean war. The PLA fought beyond the gates in defence of both China's

16

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

national security, and in support of an allied communist regime. The Korean war is instructive in various other important ways. First, it demonstrated China's willingness to run great risks in defence of an ally. To be sure, there were good reasons for China to fear for its own security, but the scale of the reaction indicates that some part of China's calculation was the need to support fraternal regimes. Second, China indicated a willingness to make sacrifices for allies, especially at a time of serious economic need in China itself. Third, the weaknesses of the PLA were also shown up by the war. Despite becoming embroiled beyond its gates, the PLA proved to be a blunt instrument. Especially when confronting the modern United States armed forces, the strategy and arms of the PLA were deficient in many respects. Clearly the circumstances of the early 1950s did not allow China to act as confidently as it might have hoped. If the PLA could not succeed in the Korean war on China's borders, plainly it could not have an effective reach further afield. China's next military engagement in defence of its national security did not come until nearly ten years later, and in the opposite corner of the country. The 1962 punitive war against India began with a Chinese perception of Indian territorial encroachments, and resulted in a Chinese strike into Indian territory.17 The conclusions from this venture outside China's gates are different from the Korean case. In the first place, the PLA acted alone and in support of nothing other than Chinese national interest. Chinese success was also more clear than in Korea, but that was less due to PLA prowess, and more to the pathetic performance of the Indian army. After the triumph of the PLA, Chinese defence policy acquired a new character in the area. India's long standing quarrel with Pakistan helped bring China and Pakistan closer together. This tacit alliance developed despite Pakistani links with the United States. It was based overwhelmingly on the notion that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Chinese aid to Pakistan soon included military transfers and was encouraged during the 1960s by increasing Soviet-Indian alignment and the developing Sino-Soviet split. China thereby showed a willingness to act decisively to support its foreign policy, but even here there were limits. In both the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, China was unable to offer any serious support to its ally in Pakistan. To be sure, there were diplomatic noises, but China was outgunned in threats of action by its Soviet neighbour that matched any Chinese signal with a more credible military threat. Thus Pakistan may have been China's ally, but China

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

17

proved to be a paper ally in times of crisis. The circumstances that allowed China to defeat India in 1962 were special to the time, and did not mark any change in China's basic weakness in threatening military action in support of its foreign policy. During the late 1960s, China faced another defence policy problem to the east. The expanding United States presence in the Vietnam war raised the question of whether China should treat the threat as it did in Korea. China made it plain to the United States that it would regard any crossing into North Vietnam as a threat to China. To that extent, Chinese deterrence extended beyond its gates, but was not tested. However, Chinese deterrence was probed in a peculiar way by extensive United States bombing of North Vietnam. China became involved in the air defence of North Vietnam, firing on American aircraft and suffering casualties. This very mild form of defence beyond the gates, was in response to the controlled American threat to China's neighbour. Thus the parallels to the Korean war are close. China proved itself just as willing to engage the source of threat at an early stage and with serious military action. However, there were important differences from the Korean experience. China's relations with Moscow were more strained in the 1960s, leading to a more independent Chinese military role. China's relations with North Vietnam were also less strong than in the Korean case. Vietnam was more able and willing to act on its own, while receiving aid from its communist allies. Thus China was less able to direct the combat, and the PLA was not called upon to become seriously involved. Thus the Vietnam war was not so much a test of PLA power, as it was of Chinese foreign policy resolve. It should be recalled that China did offer serious aid to Vietnam, and was not asked for more. Military power seemed a useful, if limited instrument of Chinese foreign policy. The fourth major threat to China's national defence is perhaps the most crucial, despite China having suffered the least amount of casualties in combat. The Sino-Soviet clashes of 1969 were in themselves fairly minor, although they were the most important fought by the Soviet Union since 1945. The true significance of these clashes lies in the potential threat they symbolize. By the 1980s both sides maintained over 100 divisions along the frontier. The 1969 clashes along the disputed Ussuri river resulted in a severe Soviet defeat in the first clash, and a massive rout of Chinese troops in the rematch.18 The implications of the combat were felt far beyond the frozen ground on which they took place. China was eventually forced to the negotiating table by Soviet threats. Beijing realized that it had to

18

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

take its northern neighbour seriously, especially in military terms. China was eventually to turn the struggle into a global competition to encircle the Soviet Union.19 Yet China could not simply ignore the extent of the threat along the border and responded by a combination of strategems. Not only did it seek global support for its anti-Soviet campaign, China also concentrated on developing at least a minimal military capability that could raise the cost of a Soviet invasion. This deterrence by denial hinges not only on a threat to engage in people's war, but also relies on a certain degree of military modernization. It is notable that this modernization has little place for large-scale outside help. For such basic aspects of defence, China must continue to rely on itself. Thus defence modernization remains a protracted process. China's weakness when facing the Soviet Union has not led it into entangling alliances. Despite tacit co-operation with the United States, China has no choice but essentially to rely on itself. Thus, when facing superior military power, China chose to take a low key position. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, China expressed concern for a neighbouring state, but could offer no real resistance. China's ambivalence also ensued from Afghanistan being far from core China, and Afghanistan had already been conceded as a Soviet sphere of influence.20 The final threat to Chinese national defence was less pressing than any of the previous four, but still resulted in massive Chinese casualties. The 1979 Chinese attack on Vietnam, was an attempt to 'teach Vietnam a lesson' that it could not invade Kampuchea and threaten Chinese interests at will. It was also an attempt to teach the Soviet Union that its allies could not run amok, especially in China's area of interest. On all counts, the use of Chinese force was unimpressive. While it is true that Vietnam did suffer massive damage in the north and was forced to make some adjustments to its troop deployments, in the end China lacked sufficient military clout to obtain its objectives. In 1974, when China seized the Xisha islands from South Vietnam, Beijing showed that it could effectively use military force in the area. But the capture of those islands, claimed as Chinese territory, was achieved under special conditions.21 The enemy was the decrepit South Vietnamese regime, which was fighting North Vietnam. China's swift operation left little room for communist opposition somehow to manifest itself against another communist state taking territory from the United States-supported South Vietnam. Chinese success was both one of superior arms, and excellent political timing.

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

19

In the 1979 war with Vietnam both ingredients were absent. Chinese action took place after Kampuchea was overrun by Vietnamese troops and left China with the more difficult military task of compelling rather than deterring Vietnamese action. What is worse, Vietnam had tacit Soviet support, thereby forcing China to wage a limited war against Vietnam that it could not win. The political objective of 'punishing' Vietnam hinged on a swift military success, and that was precisely what China could not achieve. The implications of the 1979 war were in part similar to the previous cases. China showed a willingness to use arms to support its national defence, and also back up an ally in need. This use of the military instrument was beyond China's borders and entailed some serious sacrifice in men and material. However, in contrast to Korea, Chinese troops performed poorly. In Korea, they adequately defended North Korea, but in 1979 they failed to punish Vietnam. China's Kampuchean allies were relegated to a sideshow along the Thai frontier, and China was unable to help them break out. China's poor showing in 1979 marked the low point in the effectiveness of the use of China's military instrument. The lessons learned were myriad, including the need for a less hostile view of Soviet power, and the need for thorough defence modernization. Most importantly, China perhaps saw that it was still a great power with not enough punch in the 'power'. The new sense of realism about what China could achieve in foreign policy in general was related to its realistic appreciation of China's military potential. The enduring dilemmas of Chinese defence policy remained. Uncertainty over defence beyond its borders, the question of the pace of military modernization, and the extent to which China needed to compromise with foreign threats, all were as difficult choices as ever. But as long as China remains essentially poor, and a great power with global concerns, these dilemmas will not disappear. Global Influence The third dimension of China's basic foreign policy concerns takes it farther afield. The Chinese communists were interested in far-flung international events well before they assumed power in 1949. Even now, although lacking effective 'reach' in some parts of the world, China sees it as necessary to have a fully developed position. The motives for this desire for a global role are several and often overlapping. At the most basic level, as a large power with many borders, China naturally extends further than any other power except the super-

20

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

powers. The Chinese very much see themselves as 'important', if only because one out of every four people in the world is Chinese. What is more, China is a poor peasant state, and unlike the superpowers, can claim genuine understanding of the developing world. China's efforts to lead the South against the North is largely based on its self-image as the most important Third World state. China is not just a Third World state with Third World problems, it is also a state with a guiding ideology. The precepts of that ideology are essentially universal, if only in urging world-wide revolution towards socialism. The extent to which these revolutionary objectives are pursued is of course a matter of debate, even within China. But the legitimacy of the CCP in China is based in part on its ideology, and the ideology urges an international role. Certainly it was precisely that ideology in the 1940s that gave the CCP a global perspective of the place of the Chinese revolution. Furthermore, the nature of the threats faced by China itself has involved it in international politics. China's major defence policy problems were to be found first with the United States, then with the Soviet Union, and now with both together, which has led China to view its own foreign policy problems in global terms. Struggle against the United States and the Soviet Union involves other regions, in large part because the superpowers themselves see their role as international. Although China may know it lacks the long reach to compete with the superpowers in every distant crisis, China appreciates that what happens in those distant parts does affect China. Lastly, China has an acute sensitivity to what may happen if it ignores the outside world. The legacy of the imperialist's rape of China taught many Chinese leaders that they cannot ignore the outside world and close China's gates. In the end, a closed China is a weak China. Modern communications, and more effective military power deployed at a distance from the home base, means that China is potentially more vulnerable than in the nineteenth century. The solution to such weakness is seen in part by learning what is best from the outside, and creating alliances to deflect or reduce external threat. This concern to avoid new international humiliation involves a basic desire to build up China's internal strength through modernization. But it also seems likely that this desire for a breathing space to develop internally will not result in a new isolationism if modernization should be achieved. Internationalism is not merely a tactic, it is a strategy for the continuing development of China. Yet there remain serious challenges to internationalism as a guide to

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

21

Chinese foreign policy. Certainly it defies much of China's longer historical practice. The Confucian and Sinocentric world view that dominated imperial China's view of the world has of course been overdrawn. But it remains true that China was relatively unbothered by the need for alliances or the complex international politics of Europe. While it seems clear that Chinese foreign policy in the twentieth century has broken away from these narrow ethnocentric perspectives, there remains an enduring Chinese perspective of cultural superiority. The jingoistic element has not been entirely absent from Chinese foreign policy in the past 35 years. Other motives for more Chinese isolation are derived from the economic backwardness of China. Some have argued that excessive concern with external relations only saps China's ability to deal with domestic problems. China lacks basic resources for a global foreign policy, and while it might some day seek a more international role, in the short term it must concentrate on its own affairs. In a country as poor as China, these arguments can be persuasive. On balance, there remains a basic dilemma. Does China seek global influence, or does it concentrate more on domestic problems? This is not merely a matter of ideology versus pragmatism, for there are ideological justifications for both isolationism and internationalsim, for both a closed and open door. The dilemma remains unresolved, and China has experienced various different ways of coping with the choices. In the first phase, after Korea and during the Sino-Soviet honeymoon, China sought as many friends as possible. The drive for international recognition derived from various sources, including a desire to overcome the legacy of pre-revolutionary humiliation, and the need to win friends in order to isolate Taiwan. This brought China into direct confrontation with United States power, but China chose not to confront the threat directly. The Bandung phase of the five principles of peaceful coexistence was best served by a low-key emphasis on Chinese demands, and more enhanced by a broad smile and professions of friendship. This phase had some obvious success. China was not seeking direct aid, or pushing the revolutionary cause very firmly. The minimal desires were therefore more easily satisfied, especially by other Third World states seeking friends in a hostile and polarised cold war world. China did support some revolutionary movements, but they were mostly close to home, and relatively uncontroversial as the opponents were Westernsupported regimes. China certainly lacked any long reach into distant

22

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

parts of the Third World and so, wisely, minimized this aspect of its ideological objectives. Thus it is not surprising that China's gains in this period were swift and relatively easy. China established a reputation in the Third World as sympathetic, if less useful than the Soviet Union. However, the honeymoon did not last long. The developing Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s brought out the sharper side of Chinese policy. The basic drive was still internationalist, but more radical and assertive. China now had to justify its position not only against the 'imperialist' West, but also against the communist Soviet Union. The relatively simple desire for revolutionary change became clouded when China urged 'true' revolution and not the moderate Soviet version. China seemed more concerned with confronting Soviet-supported causes than in challenging Western dominated movements. Most importantly, China's splitting of the revolutionary cause upset many of its former friends in the Third World. While they may have agreed with China's long-term objectives, and felt China was more sympathetic to their problems, they were concerned that Beijing was undermining revolutionary unity. What is more, China lacked the economic clout to support its radical posture, and so left the Third World states and movements with the choice of support from China in words, or arms and aid from Moscow. It is therefore not surprising that Chinese policy suffered. The campaign for recognition was slowed as some states came to see China as the more revolutionary wing of the communist movement. States that supported India and Yugoslavia in their moderate leadership of the nonaligned were disconcerted at China's 1962 war with India and the sharp attacks on Tito in the struggle with the Soviet Union. This Chinese policy was still internationalist, but it was a more radical variant that led to more isolation than global influence. From the mid-1960s the trend became more rather than less radical. In fact, the Cultural Revolution was a time of a virtually non-existent foreign policy. All ambassadors but one were recalled to China, although this did not mean that China ceased to pay any attention to the outside world. But while China had a position on most international issues, it was invariably a radical one that did not last far into the 1970s. But when China returned to an active foreign policy after the double shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Ussuri river clashes, it found the world less sympathetic. During the 1970s, as Chinese foreign policy shifted to a perception of the Soviet Union as the main threat, Beijing was disconcerted to find the going somewhat tough. The reasons were essentially fourfold.

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

23

First, after the radical excesses of the Cultural Revolution, China was no longer seen as stable. This led many states and movements to distrust Chinese reliability. The purge of Lin Biao and the factional politics of radicals and moderates in the 1970s enhanced this image. Secondly, the failure of the Cultural Revolution took the shine off China's revolutionary appeal. The evident inability of Chinese leaders to cope with the problems of making revolution in a Third World state did not attract those who sought a coherent model for revolution. Thirdly, China still lacked the economic and military power to support these revolutionaries. If China was now seen as being as much of a revolutionary failure as the Soviet Union, then it was best to take aid from the Soviet Union who could at least offer far more material than poor China. Fourthly, China's new sharp anti-Soviet foreign policy often upset many Third World states and movements. Unlike the 1960s when China at least opposed both superpowers equally, in the 1970s it was often an uncomfortable associate of the United States simply because it was at the time taking an anti-Soviet position. Support for conservative regimes in Zaire, or Chile, did much damage to China's image. The latest phase of Chinese policy began about 1980 with a series of internal and external policy reassessments. The foreign policy changes towards greater pragmatism and openness had essentially three dimensions. First, Chinese leaders recognized the failure of many of their past domestic experients. The judgement on the role of Mao Zedong meant that China could begin to chart a new future. It meant a policy of retaining certain 'Maoist' elements, but also far greater pragmatism in adopting new, and even foreign ideas. This was then a major motive for a return to a more internationalist perspective, but also one that sought to learn as much as to teach others. It was a return to the Bandung phase, but with less grandiose dreams, and with less basic need to obtain recognition. Unfortunately, the problems were more protracted ones of developing influence, and developing China's own economy. Secondly, China abandoned its one-sided anti-Sovietism in favour of a more balanced challenge to both superpowers. This is not to suggest that China saw both superpowers as equal, and in collusion and contention as in the 1960s. This time, China saw some issues in which the United States' policy was the primary problem, for example, Central America and the Middle East. It also saw other issues, such as Southeast Asia or Afghanistan where the Soviet Union was the major problem. The great advantage of this new dual-adversary posture was that it afforded China far more flexibility. China abandoned any pretence of an overarching theory of international politics, such as the much discre-

24

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

dited Theory of Three Worlds. In its place, China offered merely vague support for the South in its claims against the North, and urged all states to abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China's main focus of attention seemed to be in establishing itself as the champion of the South against the North. Yet China's new concern with the Third World did not go hand in hand with a massive aid programme. Unlike previous phases of involvement in Third World politics, China now recognized more openly the limits to its power. It pleaded poverty like most Third World states, and drew on international monetary arrangements as many other members of the South. To be sure, some Chinese aid programmes were evident, but the scale was much reduced. What is more, Chinese relations with many Third World states, especially in the OPEC sub-category of the Third World, involved more normal economic deals and trade that benefited China's own domestic development projects. China still sees the Third World as important. The old motive of seeking international recognition is no longer present. But the desire to win friends and influence is still relevant. China's renewed concern with international politics focuses on threats posed by both superpowers, and China does see that it can play a role in helping the Third World throw off superpower pressures. Yet China is also far more pragmatic and long term in its approach than in previous decades. The problems of internal divisions in the Third World are now more openly acknowledged by China. Beijing's own limitations in providing aid are also re'cognized, but unlike in the past, China does not try to make grandiose promises or offer confident advice in lieu of real aid.

The Military Instrument In a hostile world, foreign policy inevitably requires a military instrument in support. Yet military power is rarely a compensation for poor policy. In the Chinese case, a similar ambivalence exists. The dilemmas stem from fundamental aspects of China's own recent experience. The CCP came to power in part because it had guns in support. Yet it was also victorious because the guns were in the service of a revolutionary cause that had widespread political appeal. To have had either one without the other would have meant defeat for the CCP. In foreign policy, China sees a similar ambivalent role for military power. This is best seen in the three major functions of the military instrument. First, military power is intended to defend Chinese territory.

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

25

In this respect China has been successful in that it has lost no territory since 1949, and has even won back certain areas. The 'liberation' of Tibet, islands in the Taiwan straits, or the Xisha islands could not have been achieved without resort to force. Neither could territory have been seized from India in 1962. Thus military power does have its central role. Yet, there are serious limts to this military power, derived from several causes. Certainly, when faced with superior forces, the PLA is not very useful. Although China has made use of allies in its defence - first using the Soviet Union to deter the United States, and then vice versa — it has not called in either superpower's armed force in the direct defence of China. General deterrence is often cheap when based merely on words, but it can be no substitute for usable military power to make threats credible. Such credible deterrence can only be provided by the PLA, and therefore Chinese defence has been achieved independently. This self-reliance also extends to the provision of arms to China. The PLA is so huge, and so reliant on low technology, that it cannot be easily and cheaply equipped by foreign military aid. There was a time in the recent past when it was thought by some that China would buy large numbers of Western weapons, but it is now generally recognized that no such deals are likely. Although China may buy selectively, or acquire models for reverse engineering, the basic weaponry for the PLA will have to be provided at home.22 Thus at its most basic level, the defence of China is crucially dependent on military power, but it is indigenous power, with all the weaknesses that go with it. Secondly, the Chinese military instrument has been useful in obtaining and retaining regional influence. Without the PLA, the defence of North Korea would have not been possible. Similarly, the punishment of India in 1962 could not have been achieved. In the 1960s Vietnam was provided with minimal support, but the threat of providing more full-scale backing was made credible by the existence of the PLA and its past actions in Korea. In 1979, the failure of the PLA's didactic war against Vietnam was both a result of poor political planning, and a lack of military power. But in all cases the PLA was an important instrument of policy, even if it was not always successfully used. In most cases, Chinese action was essentially independent of any other state. However, in the Korean and Vietnamese wars, China did co-ordinate with its allies. China itself only received substantial assistance in the Korean case, when Soviet aid made the waging of war possible from 1951 to 1953. But China has generally been willing to take an active military role largely at its own prompting.

26

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

The most serious limit on the use of this regional power seems to have been the shortness of the PLA reach. Victory in Korea was denied because of superior United States power, and the failure in 1979 resulted from Vietnamese strength and Soviet deterrence. In other events, notably the wars waged by Pakistan against India, it is reasonable to surmise that China would have offered more concrete and direct military aid if it could. Success or failure for China in these regional activities is thus dependent on a complex series of factors: the relative strength of the opponent, the timing of the operation, the existence of allies, and the location of each conflict. The further from China, and the stronger the opponent, the weaker is China's military punch. These conclusions are obvious, but bear restating if only to outline the relative weakness of the military instrument for China's regional foreign policy. Military aid of a less direct kind has also been a useful military instrument. In these cases, apart from Korea and Vietnam, Chinese arms have been especially useful for Pakistan, and assorted revolutionaries in Southeast Asia. But even for these states and movements nearby, there are serious limits to China's use of force. They derive in part from China's belief that military technology can be no substitute for independent revolutionary politics. But more importantly, China's poor record in provision of aid stems from its inability to produce the goods. This fact of Chinese economic life is unlikely to change in the near future. Thirdly, China's military instrument has been a factor in the search for global influence. However, in this respect China is much closer to the Soviet than the American model. The United States has often deployed its own troops abroad, with bases in Europe, Asia and now with some forces in the Rapid Deployment Force in the Middle East. The Soviet Union's advent is far newer in this aspect of foreign bases. Certainly there have been scattered, but short-lived cases of Soviet footholds in the Third World, but few survive today. The Soviet bases in Vietnam and its occupation of Afghanistan are, of course, the two most important exceptions, especially since both states border on China. The Chinese have never stationed combat troops abroad except while on active service in support of the local state, for example, Korea and Vietnam. China has invaded its neighbours, but never stayed for more than a matter of a few weeks, except where China claims the territory as its own. Where China is most like the superpowers is in the less direct use of the military instrument. Chinese military advisors have been seconded to various Third World states, and training has been

The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

27

given to states and movements. As with the great powers, this lower level aid has essentially been seen as a tool to gain and retain influence. Also as with the great powers, it has often proved a blunt instrument. The realization of the ineffectiveness of military aid has been slow for China, but by 1980 it was clear that Beijing no longer saw it as a useful instrument of policy. Just as the great powers had moved to arms sales rather than arms aid, so China shifted to this method. It had the benefit of earning extra income for China, and assisting China's own economic and military modernization. This new realism and pragmatism in Chinese policy seems set for a long run. It is based on a recognition of the complexity of the international environment, and above all on the limits of China's own economic potential. It is in contradiction, however, to previous Chinese policy that stressed the need for states to make revolution on their own, and relied primarily on human factors to make social revolution. The notion of simple arms sales, and on the new more massive scales of the 1980s, suggests the profit motive in support of China's own modernization has taken precedence. Much like Stalin's notion of 'socialism in one country', China's priority is clearly its own revolutionary needs. The role of the military, especially at a distance from Chinese territory, has never been as unimportant as it is in the early 1980s. Notes 1. For further details see Gerald Segal and William Tow (eds), Chinese Defence Policy (London: Macmillan, 1984) and Gerald Segal, 'Chinese Defence Policy' in International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 4, Autumn 1983. 2. For a general analysis of Chinese foreign policy see Michael Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978) and Michael Yahuda, Coma's Foreign Policy After Map (London: Macmillan, 1983). 3. Gerald Segal, 'China' in Martin Edmonds (ed.), Central Organizations for Defence (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985). 4. Jonathan Pollack, The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Chinese Security (Santa Monica, California: Rand R-2907-AF, October 1982). Thomas Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism (Santa Monica, California: Rand, R.-1902-NA, July 1977). Kenneth Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970's (Santa Monica, California: Rand R-2342-NA, July 1978). Carol Lee Hamrin, 'China Reassesses the Superpowers', Pacific Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, Summer 1983. Gerald Segal, 'China's Security Debate' in Survival, vol. 24. no. 2, March-April 1982. 5. Paul Godwin, China's Defence Establishment (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983). 6. Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981).

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The Context: Chinese Foreign Policy

I. James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers (NY: Columbia University Press, 1980). Robert Blum, Drawing the Line (London: W.W. Norton, 1982). 8. Yahuda, China's Policy. 9. Segal, 'Chinese Policy' and 'The PLA as a Group' in David Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the PRO (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1984). 10. Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979). II. Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (NY: Macmillan, 1960) and China's Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbour, University of Michigan Press, 1975). 12. David Bonavia, Hong Kong, 1997 (Kent: Columbia Books, 1984). Lucian Pye, 'The International Position of Hong Kong' in The China Quarterly, September 1983. 13. Harry Gelman, The Soviet Far East Buildup (Santa Monica, California: Rand R-2943-AF, August 1982). Generally, Gerald Segal, 'Sino-Soviet Relations After Mao', Adelphi Paper (London: IISS, 1985). 14. Teng Fu, The Policy of Opening to the Outside World and the Building of Spiritual Civilization' in thePeople's Daily, 18 May 1984, BBC. SWB.FE.7652.. BII.5-6. 15. 'China's Foreign Policy', Strategic Survey (London: IISS, 1984). 16. Gerald Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985). Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). 17. Whiting, China's Calculus and Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970). 18. Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980). 19. David Armstrong, 'The Soviet Union' in Segal and Tow, Chinese Policy. 20. Yaacov Vertzberger, 'Afghanistan in China's Policy' in Problems of Communism, vol. 31, May-June 1982. Also Gerald Segal, 'China and Afghanistan', Asian Survey, vol. 21, no. 11, November 1981 21. Segal, Defending China. 22. William Tow, 'Arms Sales to China' in Segal and Tow, Chinese Policy.

3

THE NATURE OF CHINA'S MILITARY AID So it is a programme, as I say, that is really - we'd have to call it insignificant. And yet we say it is successful.1

China's provision of military aid began at the birth of the PRC (indeed, some was a continuation of the aid provided by the Chinese Communists to fraternal parties during the civil war). A year later it made its first, and only large-scale commitment of combat troops to the defence of an ally, fighting outside Chinese territory. This was not, however, the beginning of a sustained military aid programme. It was not until the late 1950s that China's military aid became a continuing policy that was soon to develop into an extensive, co-ordinated programme, encompassing 55 independent states and insurgent organisations throughout Asia, Africa and the Middle East, China's aid has covered a range of arms from small arms to major weapons and has serviced all three branches of the armed forces. China's weapons are almost all copies of Soviet designs, many from the 1950s and, as such, most are outdated compared with the more advanced, sophisticated Soviet and Western weaponry. In addition to this tangible aid, China provides military technicians and advisors to states and insurgent organisations. Chinese training in the use of Chinese weapons and guerrilla warfare has taken place both in China and in third countries where friendly governments provide aid and shelter to national liberation movements. Chinese troops have fought outside Chinese territory, both for the defence of an ally and to ensure China's own security. Until recently, all China's military aid was free: either direct grants or long-term interest-free loans.2 Only in the 1980s has China begun turning military aid into a lucrative source of hard currency earnings. Thus, bearing in mind China's limitations in its production capacity and weak economy, the aid has been generous, and has often involved a degree of sacrifice and privation on China's part. The recipients of Chinese military aid have included both independent states and insurgent movements (from dissident tribal groups to fully-fledged national liberation movements). Geographically they span Asia, the Middle East and Africa, but China has extended no military aid in Latin America. The bulk of China's aid has concentrated on only a few independent states and liberation movements, notably those on or near China's border or further afield, those states which China hopes 29

30

The Nature of China's Military Aid

will be the spearhead of its penetration into the region, in the past, Albania and Tanzania, and at present, Zaire Very recently the largest arms transfers in terms of value have centred upon the oil-rich countries of the Middle East: however, these transactions have all been military sales. In only one instance (Albania) has China's aid accounted for 100 per cent of the weapons supplied to a country; in all but 3 other countries — Pakistan, Bangladesh and Tanzania - China's major weapons amount to less than half of the recipient's requirements. This is in contrast with the USA and the USSR, who often by their own exports, or in conjunction with their allies, supply all, or nearly all, of their recipient's needs. Such a situation refects not only China's own limitations, but also the principle by which it supplies military aid. But before analysing the motives and patterns of Chinese aid, it is necessary to outline the nature of Chinese aid. What follows is largely a chronological survey of Chinese aid, but divided into sections dealing with major categories of arms types. It is of course recognized that all such categories are overlapping, but the distinction between types of weapons is an important one, if only because of China's special trade in small arms.

China's Military aid in Perspective China's percentage share of global major arms transfers is minute when compared with the principal arms exporters. Within the areas where China is active as an arms exporter, its percentage share of the regions' total arms imports has, until recently, also steadily fallen relative to the share of the major exporters. This is true despite the fact that the actual value of China's exports has risen in three out of four regions. Neither has the total value of China's arms transfers shown a steady decline, although this figure for the 1970s is considerably less than the previous decade. The geographical distribution of the principal recipients of China's arms has sometimes coincided with the world-wide trends in major arms importing regions.3 North Vietnam has been a principal recipient of Chinese military aid, and during the decade when the Vietnam war was at its height, 1964-73, East Asia accounted for 31 per cent of global arms transfers. During this period East Asia, particularly North Vietnam, took Ihe lion's share of Chinese aid, SUS915m, compared with SUS312m (Pakistan), $US190m (North Korea), $US85m (Albania), and $US62m (Tanzania), respectively to China's other principal recipients.4 Until the period 1967-76, Vietnam's imports from

The Nature of China's Military Aid

31

China increased, although China's percentage share of East Asia's imports remained at around 6-7 per cent, as both the United States and the USSR increased their, arms transfers to the area. Gradually East Asia ceased to be the Third World's leading arms importer, its share of the world total dropping to 10 per cent by 1975-9. The value of China's exports and its percentage share of the region's arms transfers also declined, thus following the trend. In other regions, however, even if the value of China's arms transfers reflects the trend in the world's leading arms importers, its percentage share of the total value of arms transfers does not. Again, diverging from the trend, the areas which contain China's principal recipients are not the world's leading arms importers, but the reverse. However, recent large-scale tranfers to the Middle East have brought China's arms transfers more into line with those of other major suppliers. The greatest value of China's arms transfers was concentrated in East and South Asia, notably in North Vietnam and Pakistan. Although each of these countries had during the period 1974-8 and 1975-9 received considerably more aid than North Korea, the latter during these years received more aid from China than did the whole of Africa (and during 1974-78 the whole of Africa and the Middle East combined). During these two periods, however, East Asia and South Asia accounted for 10 per cent and 4 per cent respectively of the world's arms transfers, while Africa accounted for, on average, 17 per cent and the Middle East, 35 per cent. Although China's percentage share of arms transfers to South Asia is declining, whilst that of the Soviet Union has, in general, increased, China's contribution is an important one in that it has been Pakistan's principal arms supplier. Although the extent of its aid may be one-tenth of Soviet aid to India, the political effect is much the same. China's arms transfers in this area, therefore, have had a much greater political impact than elsewhere. In other instances, China's recipients do not import large numbers of sophisticated arms and here, too, the limited US$ value of China's aid belies its significance. Reflecting the global interest in exporting increasing numbers of weapons to Africa and the Middle East, the value of China's arms transfers to these areas has steadily increased over the years. Yet its percentage share has declined as others, especially the Soviet Union, have also increased their exports. In general, the value of China's major arms transfers, compared with those of the Soviet Union, the US, France, other European countries, and, indeed, other Third World countries, is small. Recently, however, there have been indications that new trends are emerging in China's

32

The Nature of China's Military Aid

military aid policies, bringing the nature of China's aid more into line with the world's major arms exporters. During the 1970s the main trends in the world's arms trade in major weapons were: (a)

(b) (c) (d) (e)

quantitive increases in general and in trade with Third World countries in particular, including an increase in the number of countries buying and selling arms; increasing frequency of licensed production agreements with Third World countries; Third World states have become suppliers: a qualitative increase towards increasingly sophisticated weapons; a shift from aid to trade.5

From 1979, China's military aid began to reflect these trends, especially the last two. China also began to place more, though still relatively little emphasis on licensed production in other states. It cannot be overemphasised, however, that an important part of China's military aid is not reflected in figures of major weapons transfers. Small arms are not included in the figure collated by most of the major agencies (for example, the IISS or SIPRI). China has supplied more insurgent groups and independent states with small arms/light and medium groundforce equipment, than it has independent states with major weapons. While the value of major weapons transfers is undoubtedly far greater than that of small arms, it could be argued that China's efforts in the latter have in general had a greater political effect. China's Supply of Small Arms6 The Korean and First Vietnam Wars At a time when China's liberation was still to be fully accomplished, with the Communists yet to assert control over Taiwan and Tibet, when the PLA needed its scarce arms and ammunition both for this task and the liquidation of counter-revolutionaries within the PRC; and when the new regime's top priorities were national reconstruction and strengthening China's shattered economy,7 the PRC still used its scarce resources to assist fraternal parties and states: the Vietminh and North Korea. On the eve of the Korean War, the PLA infantry suffered acute deficiencies in heavy artillery and ammunition.8 However, even before

The Nature of China's Military Aid

33

China sent military aid to North Korea, it was supplying arms in no small quantity to the Vietminh (to whom the CP had sent some material support prior to their victory in 19499). Soon after the Communists achieved power, it was claimed that over 30,000 rifles and machine guns had been supplied to Ho Chi Minh.10 The capture of Hainan island in April-May 1950 facilitated the supply of weapons. Their volume increased, and the French reported a significant improvement in the Vietminh's weaponry." The Chinese had found a stock of American weapons on Hainan, surrendered by the Guomindang, including over 60,000 modern rifles.12 By the summer of 1950 about half of the Vietminh forces (29 light battalions and 6-8 heavy battalions) were equipped with US arms obtained in China, including 11,000 rifles, machine guns, mortars, bazookas, and about 25 field guns. In September 1950 the Vietminh were reportedly using Chinese-supplied 105mm guns.13 Large numbers of Vietminh were trained in southern China in the use of both artillery and anti-aircraft guns, all supplied by the Chinese.14 These troops returned to Vietnam well equipped and their numbers give some indication of the extent of the small arms China supplied. By August 1950 over 20,000 Vietminh had been trained in China in three training camps established in Yunnan and Guangxi which housed about 10,000 (trainees.15 Chinese aid did not enable the Vietminh arsenal to equal the French, but it did radically alter the military situation. For the first time the Vietminh began to inflict heavy losses on French troops. The injection of new Chinese aid created a knock-on effect, in that captured French weapons were then given to new Vietminh recruits.16 Once Chinese troops entered the Korean war in October 1950, small arms continued flowing to the Vietminh. During the ensuing two months 7,000 Vietminh reportedly returned to China for re-equipment with new automatic American weapons.17 By March 1951 it was reported that most of the Vietminh weapons were Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, or American but that a few Soviet-designed arms made under patent in China were supplied since these were needed for the war effort in Korea.18 In Korea, Chinese troops relied heavily on weapons made in America, Russia, Japan and by the Guomindang in China. However, some recent, indigenously produced equipment did appear. Soon after China's intervention, volunteers were reportedly using copies of American-designed four-foot rockets, identified by their markings as having been made in China in June 1950.19 In June 1951 Chinese versions of the US 57mm recoilless rifle were reportedly found in an arms cache, along with

34

The Nature of China's Military Aid

Soviet machine guns, and over 20 tons of ammunition (according to Nationalist sources).20 Reports of captured weapons show that, on the one hand, China's supply of arms was not great — many were old weapons from the civil war; on the other, that Soviet aid until the armistice in 1951 had been far from generous.21 The heaviest weapons used by the Communist troops in Korea were 122mm guns and 120mm mortars. The Soviets held back from supplying their heaviest material, for example, the 152mm howitzer or the effective 100mm anti-tank gun — so that Communist weapons were no match for UN troops' armour.22 Moreover, the Chinese had to pay for the arms supplied by the USSR. Such Soviet reluctance to commit greater material and financial assistance imposed crushing sacrifice on the Chinese. China suffered casualties not only in manpower, but its economic recovery was also slowed as a result. Furthermore, the weapons and troops used in Korea could not have been used to pursue China's top priority prior to June 1950: the liberation of Taiwan. It is conceivable that China might also have committed more to the support of the Vietminh. By June 1951 China's aid had enabled the Vietminh to arm three divisions, and China had supplied some heavy equipment for two additional divisions. The Korean armistice to an extent freed some Chinese equipment for use by the Vietminh and Chinese supplies gradually increased until 1954. In January 1952, they were reported to be well armed with automatic weapons, bazookas, mortars and Soviet-built rocket launchers. Recent Chinese deliveries also included light artillery, although Vietminh artillery in general was rather sparse. Anti-aircraft guns, probably of Soviet origin were seen for the first time.23 In November 1951 a new rail link was opened, which facilitated supply. In 1952 daily supplies arrived by train across the border from Nanning. Estimates of the volume differ. One source puts the figure at 300-500 tons per month in 1951, and about 1,500 tons per month in 1952, after the railway line opened.24 The extra equipment was estimated to be sufficient to supply six divisions in the spring of 1952. These 120,000 men were equipped mostly with captured old Japanese, and even home-made weapons, but they still lacked armour and heavy artillery.25 When they were able, the Chinese supplied heavier weapons, even though they were desperately trying to modernize their own forces. By early 1953 heavy mortars, 75mm and 57mm recoilless guns and anti-aircraft guns (the latter already seen the previous year) began to arrive from China. French estimates put Chinese aid at 2,000-3,000 tons per month, over double the volume supplied in 1952.26 By mid1953 French reports said the Chinese were supplying 120mm mortars

The Nature of China's Military Aid

35

and recoilless cannon (possibly no longer needed in Korea), or supplied by the Soviets when they began to help modernise China's forces after 1951; 37mm anti-aircraft guns were also arriving in greater quantity, and Chinese supplies soon included 105mm field guns.27 By the autumn of that year the Vietminh had received sufficient light and heavy weapons to outfit heavy artillery units for what was to be a warending offensive.28 In early March" 1954 the Chinese built a special road linking Mengtze with Dien Bien Phu.29 Although estimates of Chinese aid differ widely it certainly reached unprecedented levels prior to Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954, and 15,000 Chinese trained and equipped reinforcements were sent to the area.30 The Vietminh were by now said to be armed with plenty of artillery, 57mm and 75mm guns and mortars, mostly Soviet. At a press conference after the battle, General Navarre said that 1,000 Molotov lorries had carried supplies over from China.31 There were also reports that China had supplied electronically fired multiple rockets, and, by July 88mm anti-aircraft guns.32 These reports may be exaggerations, although it is certainly true that Chinese aid enabled the Vietminh to launch modern warfare on an unprecedented scale in Indo-China. However, none of the heavy equipment was of Chinese manufacture; the artillery shells were Czechoslovakian or Soviet. However, copies of the 57mm recoilless rifle bore Chinese markings,33 demonstrating that China's munitions factories were producing equipment, much of which supplied other countries' war efforts, at a time when China's resources were needed for its own national reconstruction. Between January 1951 and June 1954 American aid to South Vietnam totalled 100,000 tons, while China's aid to the Vietminh totalled 82,000 tons.34 This considerable quantity of equipment, mostly small arms with' some heavy field guns and mortars, enabled the Vietminh to launch a war-ending offensive — and was certainly a factor in deciding the shape of the 1954 Geneva agreement. During the early years of the PRC, China's small arms aid was not the co-ordinated, sustained programme of military aid of later years. Arms were supplied to North Korea, but largely to ensure China's own security — a unique situation which has not occurred since. While considerable aid was supplied to the Vietminh, other insurgent movements, as we shall see in the following section, received no material support. One characteristic of China's aid programme was the willingness to supply aid to fraternal parties or states in need, especially when China's own security was more closely involved, and to suffer some degree of

36

The Nature of China's Military Aid

sacrifice in so doing. At the same time, China probably would have supplied more had it been able to afford it. China's Small Arms Aid 1959-63 There was a virtually complete halt to Chinese arms transfers between 1955 and 1959 and the reasons appear to be threefold. First, in keeping with the Bandung phase of Chinese foreign policy, the emphasis was placed on establishing friendly relations with established states. This meant that most national liberation movements who were most likely to require small arms, were largely ignored. Secondly, those major conflicts, for example, Vietnam, that received the bulk of Chinese small arms, were in a relatively quiet phase during this time. Thus there was little demand for Chinese arms. Finally, this was also the period of the close Sino-Soviet alliance in the military field. Under the aegis of the Soviet model in the PLA, China was concentrating on developing its own modernized armed forces. In addition, at that time the Soviet Union was not keen to have China setting off on its own independent foreign policy of arms transfers to various minor, and uncontrollable, revolutionary movements. The withdrawal of Soviet aid and technicians in 1960 and the deepening rift between the two communist powers meant that while, on the one hand, the ideological basis for a more militant foreign policy was taking shape, on the other, China faced severe limitations on actually producing the equipment that would put flesh and bones to its championship of armed struggle. This is not to suggest that deficiencies and shortages in China's arms production and supply were the reason behind China's militantly anti-imperialist strategy not emerging until 1964, rather that when national liberation struggles received greater emphasis in China's united front policy, its munitions factories had barely developed the capacity to provide extensive assistance. However, as that capacity increased, so did the volume and variety of China's aid. During the political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, which had a debilitating effect on China's industry and the economy in general, and when China's support for national liberation movements became increasingly strident and emphatic, China's small arms, although" not major weapons, continued to flow - mostly to Vietnam, but also to several other revolutionary movements. Although China faced severe economic pressures limiting the supply of military aid, even a modest flow of small arms generally ensured the survival of a guerrilla movement. From the firs: appearance of Chinese arms aid until 1962/3 China's aid was very limited. China's aid was dwarfed by supplies of weapons

The Nature of China's Military Aid

37

from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and included few indigenously produced weapons. This period spans the years following the failure of the Great Leap Forward, when China faced economic retrenchment compounded by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians. China's own armed forces suffered shortages even in small arms and ammunition. China's first small arms aid after the Korean and Vietnam wars of the early 1950s was to revolutionary movements in Africa in 1959. During this year China reportedly gave the Algerian FLN the equivalent of $10 million in credits to buy weapons and agreed to supply quantities of captured US weapons from Korea (including mortars, heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and other artillery), part gift, and part lend-lease agreement. There were reports that such Chinese equipment, mortars and recoilless guns (and also part of an artillery piece) had been found with captured rebels.36 Another report, however, alleged that among captured Soviet bloc weapons at the end of 1960 only one Chinese pistol was found.37 It was reported that the Chinese also supplied arms to the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) at about the same time as they began to aid the FLN38 (some sources maintain that Chinese arms were first seen in the hands of insurgents in Africa in Cameroon39). Evidence of the type and volume of arms supplied to the UPC is sparse, but it was certainly not extensive, and probably amounted to a few rifles and other light arms, while arms were also supplied by the Czechs. There is some indication that the Chinese would have extended a very limited amount of support during 1960 to the Pan Somali movement, led by Mohamud Harbi, who visited Beijing soon after the Afro-Asian summit at Conakry in April. He reportedly received £1% million from China and was said to have made arrangements for the supply of 1,500 rifles and small arms in October. However, Harbi was killed in September and there is no evidence that the arms ever materialized.40 The most significant liberation struggle in Africa outside Algeria in the early 1960s was in the Congo. Here, however, logistical problems prevented the Chinese from delivering any assistance.* The Chinese also faced logistical problems in supplying arms to Algeria. In December 1959, when Soviet support for the rebels was somewhat equivocal, the Russians barred a transhipment of Chinese arms for Algeria from crossing their territory. Supplying aid was no doubt easier once Russia's support was more wholehearted, when the FLN received many of their supplies in Soviet and East-European vessels via Morocco and Tunisia.42 However, although Chinese aid continued up until independence

38

The Nature of China's Military Aid

in 1962, and although by the latter stages of the war it was estimated that 70 per cent of the FLN's armoury was of Communist bloc manufacture, China's aid amounted to only a small portion of the rebels' needs. By far the largest part came from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.43 Nevertheless, the supply of small arms to African revolutionary movements in 1959 was important in that it marked the beginning of China's involvement in, and demonstrated its commitment to, armed struggle in Africa, especially at a time when economic difficulties placed competing claims on China's resources. During the early years of armed struggle in Vietnam, China's aid was again dwarfed by Soviet and East European arms supplies. This probably reflected both China's inability to supply large — or even limited - quantities of arms, but also its views on self-reliance and its opinion that, until American intervention increased, material assistance to the Vietnamese was not essential. At the end of 1961, at least a year after the reactivation of armed struggle in the South, most of the modern arms and equipment in the DRV came from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The only Chinese weapons that had been captured in the South were mines and grenades. Neither did China arm the Pathet Lao during the Laotian crisis.44 By April 1962, some Chinese supplies had reached Hanoi, but not in large quantities. The Soviet Union airlifted supplies to the Pathet Lao and provided increasing amounts of material to the Viet Cong.45 It is likely that Vietnam's complaint that China refused to help with the build-up of its regular army after 1960 would have stemmed, in part at least, from China's own inability to supply the weapons.46 Although some Chinese weapons were used by the Viet Cong, it was believed that these were older weapons supplied to the Vietminh during the war against the French.47 The few supplies reaching the Algerians were also old American weapons — showing that China's domestic production had not recovered sufficiently to supply liberation movements. During the year, however, there were reports of captured weapons which indicated that China had begun to resupply the Viet Cong, albeit on a limited scale, and with a few new weapons. In May Chinese 57mm bazookas, sub-machine guns and recoilless rifles were in use.48 By December an arms cache included 15 automatic weapons, three 60mm mortars, all of which were new, and one ton of ammunition.49 Eighteen months later the Viet Cong arsenal reportedly included a 90mm rocket launcher in addition to 60mm mortars, smaller arms, and seven tons of ammunition, some manufactured as recently as 1962.50 Apart from a few mortars, however, the Viet Cong's arms during 1963 remained less

The Nature of China's Military Aid

39

sophisticated than those of the Vietminh at the end of the first Vietnam war.51 The flow of aid to revolutionary movements in this early period demonstrated the limitations of China's capacity — supplying limited quantities of old American weapons to the FLN (and probably the UPC), and a few of its own mortars, smaller arms and ammunition to the Viet Cong. It also demonstrates a facet which had characterized China's military aid programme from the very beginning — that when China considered a cause to be sufficiently important, it would supply arms that could have been used by its own armed forces. The mid-1960s to early 1970s From 1964 China's military aid became more extensive, both in the number of recipients, the variety of weapons supplied, and the quality. This reflected the increasing emphasis on armed struggle in China's foreign policy and its enhanced capacity to produce and transport weapons. By the mid-1960s China was producing its own light and medium artillery in addition to small arms and ammunition. China was also in a position to transport military supplies by sea to Africa and the Middle East. Although larger quantities and heavier weapons were supplied to Indo-China, increasing numbers of states and revolutionary movements in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia received Chinese small arms. Outside Indo-China, Chinese aid was spread rather thinly over a wide area, largely because China could not afford to supply large quantities, but also because a small amount of aid was sufficient to sustain guerrilla movements for their nuisance value. Some such movements were anyway unable to absorb more than a small quantity of basic arms. During these years China because the principal — in some instances the sole — supplier of small arms to a number of revolutionary movements. Although the Soviet Union was still the major supplier of heavier arms, often the two major communist powers worked in parallel — although not partnership — in their arms supplies. China's military aid to Africa and the Middle East during the 1960s consisted almost entirely of small arms; carbines, rifles — including, towards the end of the decade, Ak-47 automatic rifles — machine guns, ammunition, mines and grenades. These arms were supplied to independent states, who then distributed them to revolutionary movements, or used them in Chinese-assisted guerrilla training centres on their territory. Only in Tanzania did Chinese weapons supply the army, although in Algeria and the Congo (Brazzaville), two other supply

40

The Nature of China's Military Aid

centres for Chinese arms, the Chinese supplied weapons for their newly created militias. In Ghana they were said to have supplied Nkrumah's private army - along with the Soviets. Some arms were supplied to Algeria post-independence in 1962 and used in the training of revolutionaries, mostly from the Portuguese territories.52 Some also continued to trickle through to the UPC via the Afro-Asian Solidarity fund. 53 It was not until 1964, however, that China's offensive in Africa really became a co-ordinated policy, supplying arms and training to guerrilla movements throughout the continent. Both independent African governments and revolutionary movements — increasingly the latter in the mid to late 1960s - became an essential part of the united front against imperialism. China's ability to supply them with arms received a considerable filip with the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964 and the subsequent creation of the new socialist state of Tanzania which, as the official seat of the OAU Liberation Committee, served as a major conduit for supplies to revolutionary movements. Chinese arms reached insurgents in the Congo, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Biafra, among the Watusi tribe, and even in Dhofar, from its ships which unloaded their cargo in Zanzibar. Later that year, the establishment of guerrilla training centres in Nkrumah's Ghana facilitated the supply of arms to guerrillas from several more states, including Niger, Cameroon, Rwanda, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Upper Volta and Malawi, but never on anything but a very small scale. Chinese arms — sub-machine guns and rifles — began to arrive in Zanzibar in May 1964 in a number of crates unloaded from a small 6,000 ton freighter, the 'Heping',54 which called again with rifles and other automatic weapons in September. The arms were probably part - or all — of a $14 million loan which had been extended in June.55 Every two weeks, it was reported, either a Soviet or a Chinese arms shipment arrived with arms for African liberation movements. By March 1966 some 11,000 tons had arrived in ships from China.56 As to the weapons supplied, many press reports simply noted that small arms and ammunition were supplied to insurgent groups. Few give details of the kinds of weapons supplied, or if they did, Chinese arms supplies were often lumped in with Soviet and/or Czechoslovakian arms. The picture is further complicated by the fact that most — or all — Chinese arms were copies of Soviet designs, making their supplier difficult to identify, especially since both Soviet and Chinese supplies originally came via Tanzania. Copies of carbines, machine guns, submachine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers and land mines, accord-

The Nature of China's Military Aid

41

ing to one source, began to reach Rhodesian guerrillas in the early 1960s.57 Most Chinese arms cited in reports were rifles, machine guns, grenades, and ammunition. None positively identified heavier arms, such as mortars or bazookas as being found in the hands of guerrillas. After 1964, Chinese heavy and light machine guns were reported to be in the hands of the Anya Nya rebels in the Southern Sudan58 (whether originally intended for them or not). The Congo revolutionaries were also armed with Chinese machine guns, automatic rifles, revolvers and ammunition.59 Automatic rifles and machine pistols were used by the rebellious militia in the Congo (Brazzaville) during August 1968.60 Rifles, light machine guns and grenades were supplied to the PLO and the PFLOAG in Dhofar during 1966 and 1967.a Although producing light and medium artillery by 1965-6, the Chinese were supplying heavier arms only to the Vietnamese. China would probably have been hard pushed to supply quantities of mortars or bazookas to African liberation movements, many of which were still little removed from their infancy or certainly not well developed by the mid-1960s.62 It is, therefore, perhaps reasonable to assume that of those reports of Chinese, Soviet and Czechoslovakian supplies of small arms and heavier equipment, China's share accounted for some of the former rather than the latter. Certainly, it was the Chinese who were largely responsible for the supply of small arms — rifles and machine guns to the Tanzanian PLA, while the Soviets supplied heavier equipment.63 In 1964 the Watusis were reportedly armed with Chinese and Czechoslovakian mortars and machine guns. The same year Soviet and Chinese weapons including 500 Kalashnikov rifles, 30 Simonov rifles, nine 75mm cannon, nine 82mm mortars and anti-aircraft guns were intercepted in Burundi en route to the Congo.64 Chinese, Soviet and Czech bazookas, automatic rifles, hand grenades and plastic explosives were supplied to Rhodesian guerrillas in 1968, while similar weapons, including bazookas, mortars and rockets were supplied to FRELIMO in Mozambique in 1966.65 A report of the Kenyan government's seizure of a considerable quantity of arms (75 tons in eleven truck loads) in May 1965, presumably en route to the Congo rebels from Tanzania, alleged that the recoilless anti-tank guns, rocket launchers, machine guns and land mines were Soviet, while another stated that they were Chinese.66 Chinese arms were often quite old, certainly for the first two or three years after they began to appear in Africa in 1964. China's first arms supplies to the PLO in 1966 were apparently relatively obsolete

42

The Nature of China's Military A id

rifles and light machine guns originally manufactured in the Soviet Union.67 However, by 1967 there were reports of newer arms, including Ak47s appearing. During the Six Day War the Israelis found Kalashnikovs made in China under Soviet licence in the PLO arsenals in the Gaza strip, and crates of new mines, explosives, hand grenades, machine guns and rockets.68 In 1967, terrorists captured in the Wankie game reserve in Rhodesia were found to be armed with the latest Chinese, Soviet and Czech automatic rifles, bazookas, hand grenades and explosives. The following year the OAU was reportedly sending Rhodesian guerrillas Chinese rifles of new design, while other reports maintained that ZANU were well armed with Chinese Ak-47s, modem grenades and land mines. Some weapons bore dates as recent as 1965.69 During the Biafran civil war, the rebels were armed with China's Ak47s and anti-tank mines, widely believed to have been supplied from Tanzania, possibly from its own supplies of Chinese weapons.70 Since Chinese-made Ak-47s began to appear in Vietnam in quantity by 1968 (there having been only a few in 1966), and elsewhere in Asia, it is likely that China was by 1967-8 producing sufficient Ak-47s to export them to revolutionary movements. The appearance of other more recently produced weapons would also indicate that China was supplying whatever it could — but that was not a great deal. For reasons already explained, it is difficult to estimate the volume or value of China's aid. While there are more indications of the value of the arms supplied, they still give little indication of the actual volume. It is likely that small arms delivered to Tanzania in 1964 were covered by a $14 million aid agreement. The same year a $20 million interestfree loan was extended to the Congo (Brazzaville), much of which was reportedly used to supply arms to rebels in the Congo.71 In terms of the tonnage supplied, by March 1966 11,000 tons of weapons were supplied by both China and the Soviet Union to Tanzania, much of which was passed on to revolutionary movements,72 and a great deal of that to the Congo. In December 1964, 80 tons of weapons and ammunition of Soviet and Chinese origin en route to the Congolese rebels were intercepted in Burundi.73 A further 75 tons, already mentioned, were intercepted in Kenya during 1965. Reports of captured guerrillas in Rhodesia during 1965 indicate that Chinese aid was far from extensive, although by 1968 aid seems to have been rather more generous. ZANU guerrillas were said to be 'well armed' with Chinese Ak-47s and other small arms.74 In Mozambique, by 1967, China supplied only a part of the 2,000 weapons captured by the Portuguese in all their African territories.75 In the Middle East, the estimated value

The Nature of China's Military Aid

43

of Chinese material support to the PLO between 1965 and 1969 was under $5 million.16 Although the extent of China's aid to the Dhofar insurgents is unknown, it probably only amounted to a few rifles and machine guns.77 When compared with aid to Vietnam, China's efforts in Africa and the Middle East appear small, even insignificant. Yet it should not be fogotten that certain movements — notably the PLO and the PFLOAG in the Middle East — were dependent on China for their arms, however limited, until the early 1970s. The PLO were, reportedly, dependent on Chinese arms during the Jordanian Civil War.78 China was also the principal source of arms for ZANU in Rhodesia, while the Soviets fulfilled the same role for ZAPU. While they both supplied FRELIMO, China's aid was probably the more significant, until the mid-1970s.79 It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that China's influence in these movements, and the political effect of even small-scale aid, was considerable. China's small arms aid to Southeast Asia outside Indo-China during the 1960s and early 1970s, like its supplies to Africa and the Middle East, was largely confined to rifles, machine guns, grenades and Ak-47s. Some mortars were reported to be in the hands of insurgents by about 1969. The quantity is, once again, difficult to estimate, but in general, China's aid was not generous, and was minute compared with supplies sent to Vietnam, and the rest of Indo-China. Although Chinese arms were not confirmed to be in other Southeast Asian states until 1967-8, it is possible that some small arms were supplied to Indonesia from about 1964. According to one report, supplies began about 18 months before the coup in September 1965.80 On the one hand this would seem to be borne out by the discovery of arms with Chinese markings during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965, probably supplied to Pakistan by Indonesia under an agreement to furnish surplus military equipment.81 On the other, if Chinese arms were supplied in 1964 it is more likely that they would have been linked to Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia than with arming the PKI (which came later in 1965). Although there was speculation that Chen Yi offered military aid when he visited Indonesia in November 1964, China's support for Sukarno's confrontation was less than wholehearted, and any arms which were supplied would probably have been a token gesture: None of this, however, is confirmed, nor are reports that China supplied small arms (rifles and machine guns) to the PKI prior to the coup on 30 September 1965.82 The supply of small arms in support of China's policy of encouraging revolution in Southeast Asia, however, did not begin until 1967-8

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The Nature of China's Military A id

- and none found their way into the hands of the PKI (perhaps vindicating allegations that China had supplied them with weapons in 1965). A few reports of captured Chinese light machine guns, carbines, rifles, grenades and grenade launchers indicate that China extended a modicum of military assistance to the White Flag Communists in Burma during 1967.83 (China may previously have given some small arms to the movement during the early 1950s, but little or none since.)84 By 1968, at the same time as the Ak-47 was established as the standard weapon of the NLFSV, the Chinese began to supply these automatic rifles, along with other small arms to communist insurgents, and dissident hill tribes in Burma and Thailand. Ak-47s were supplied to the Kachins in Burma, along with mortars and recoilless rifles in 1968.85 In the same year the Communist Thai Patriotic Front and Meo tribesmen were armed for the first time with Chinese Ak-47s and light machine guns, supplied through Laos, either directly from China or from North Vietnam's arsenals.86 China continued to supply small arms to insurgents in Burma and Thailand during the 1970s (the latter only during the early years). Arms also continued to flow to Africa. Although the volume was unchanged, the arms were not spread quite so thinly as before. China chose to concentrate on fully-fledged national liberation movements and independent governments, rather than spreading a small number of arms among barely developed guerrilla movements. China's aid to insurgents in Burma and Thailand continued on a relatively small scale — but heavier weapons were supplied, and as the White Flags swelled their numbers, China's aid must have increased, since the guerrillas were largely armed by the Chinese. China was not the sole supplier of the Thai Peoples' Liberation Army, since weapons also came through Laos from North Vietnam. But in 1972 China was said to make a greater material contribution than the DRV.87 In 1973 the White Flags were armed with Chinese automatic weapons, recoilless rifles and light mortars and the following year mustered 4,000 well-armed men, supported by artillery and communications units for a single campaign.88 While in 1972, an estimated 5,000 Thai guerrillas were reportedly armed with B-40 rockets, 50 calibre machine guns and 60mm mortars — probably supplied from China, although their Soviet-made 80mm and 100mm mortars and atomic rifles were clearly supplied by the DRV.89 Together North Vietnam and China furnished about half the guerrillas with Ak-47890 - perhaps something in the order of 1,000 weapons each, which is hardly a vast number. Although China's material aid to the Thai guerrillas soon began to wither, arms continued to flow

The Nature of China's Military Aid

45

into Burma. By 1980 rebel activity had reached its highest level, and China's support had enabled their numbers to increase to an estimated 14,000, double their number in 1975.91 Aid finally dried up by mid1981.,92 after the crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations and China's perceived need to isolate the Vietnamese by strengthening regional ties and emphasising state-to-state relations. In Africa, too, small arms and slightly heavier equipment continued to flow to those states, and also revolutionary movements, whom the Chinese considered to be worth supporting: ZANU in Rhodesia; FNLA/ UNITA in Angola; and FRELIMO in Mozambique. China's aid still largely consisted of small arms, although on a much larger scale than previously. This probably reflected both the increased capabilities of the revolutionary groups, and also China's enhanced capacity to supply weapons — especially after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. In late 1974 a shipment of 400 tons of-Chinese arms arrived for the FNLA. China's military advisors in Zaire were to train the guerrillas to form a regular army of 15,000 men, two-thirds of whom would be equipped by China.93 Reports of the type of arms supplied are sparse. However, the principal rifle for both Soviet and Chinese supplied groups in Angola was the Ak-47.94 The same was probably true in Rhodesia and Mozambique, while FRELIMO were reported using Chinese rocketlaunchers in 1974.95 ZANU continued to rely mainly on the Chinese for arms. In early 1976 China began to ship large supplies of modern weapons to guerrilla training camps in the newly independent Mozambique. Soviet and Chinese weapons were used to supply an estimated 12,000 guerrillas of the combined ZANU-ZAPU Zimbabwe Liberation army operating from) Mozambique.96 While the Chinese continued to supply the African revolutionaries with light arms, the Soviets competed with similar arms and also supplies of heavier equipment, which included SAM-7s supplied to FRELIMO, the MPLA in Angola from 1974, and to the Rhodesian guerrillas operating from Mozambique from 1976.97 This almost certainly accounted for China's loss of influence in Mozambique by the time of independence, despite its continued training and arming of FRELIMO's guerrillas. The Chinese, however, maintained their influence among Robert Mugabe's Rhodesian guerrillas. This was despite an influx of heavy Soviet arms to the Zimbabwe Liberation Army largely because despite their united army, ZANU and ZAPU maintained their separate identities. In a renewed determined effort in 1979 (after ZANU reportedly complained of a relative lack of support from the new Chinese leader-

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The Nature of China's Military Aid

ship after 1977), the Chinese sent more arms and automatic weapons.98 By this time, these were probably the only Chinese weapons in the hands of a Chinese-sponsored liberation movement in Africa. Chinese weapons reported seized from the UNITA forces in 1980 were probably obtained on the international market — as early as 1976 Chinese Ak-47s were a popular mercenary weapon after Chinese material support to the FNLA and UNITA had ceased." However, one source maintains that China's aid to SWAPO has increased recently, but there have been few reports of material assistance reaching the movement. However, Premier Zhao Ziyang met with ANC and SWAPO leaders in Zambia during his January 1983 tour.100 During the 1970s — and into the 1980s - China has supplied light arms to an increasing number of independent states, equipping their armed forces rather than the militias of the previous decade. Thus China's arms tend to be supplied on a larger scale. At the same time, small arms were often accompanied by heavier or even major weapons. During 1970-1 China supplied large numbers of mortars, light arms and ammunition to Tanzania when it took over training Tanzania's armed forces.101 Somalia also received Chinese mortars in 1970, and light weapons and ammunition continued to be supplied in 1981.102 The quantity of China's small arms supplied to Africa increased during 1977 when it equipped Botswana's small, new defence force and 10,000 men of the Sudanese army. China also supplied machine guns and artillery — all or part of 30 tons of equipment pledged — to Zaire's armed forces fighting rebels in the Shaba province. (The equipment was delivered in five military aircraft which were believed to contain American and Chinese supplies.)103 Chinese anti-aircraft guns began to arrive in Africa in 1974 — probably because America's withdrawal from Vietnam had released the pressure on Chinese supplies to the DRV, or perhaps because China's own production capacity was increased. The Congo Republic received 37mm and 57mm anti-aircraft guns (and 57mm anti-tank guns) in 1974. In the following year, Tanzania was noted to have 50 14.5mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns (although the 14.5mm gun had been supplied in 1974. Botswana received them in 1977 (although the calibre was not specified), and soon after ten twin-barrelled self-propelled 37mm anti-aircraft guns were offered to Rwanda.104 Heavier artillery also began to be supplied — probably for the same reasons. Tanzania first received such Chinese aid in June 1971, when recent deliveries reportedly included 24 field guns and 6-8 howitzers (all with spare parts and ammunition).105 By 1974-5 the armed forces possessed 30

The Nature of China's Military Aid

47

120mm mortars and 8 122mm howitzers; and by 1976 the arsenal had increased to 50 120mm mortars and 30 122mm howitzers.106/Zaire received Chinese self-propelled guns and artillery in 1974-5,107 while in 1977 the Egyptians were reportedly given long range ground-to-ground rockets.108 Although it supplied heavier equipment after the mid-1970s, China was unable to keep pace with the perceived needs of its recipients. In the case of Tanzania China lost influence to the Soviet Union. As early as 1968, Tanzania signed an agreement with the Soviets for the supply of SA-2 Guideline missiles. Soviet field artillery was also in evidence in 1970, and in 1973 Tanzania had 24 Soviet 76mm guns. By 1976-7 the Soviet Union had become a major source of weapons for all the African front line states.109 In 1979, with the reordering of China's defence priorities under the Four Modernizations, China's capacity to supply heavier or more sophisticated weaponry was further limited. Li Xiannian said in January 1979 during a visit to Tanzania that China could not supply the sort of weapons Tanzania and Zambia needed because China also needed tanks, missiles and electronic early warning systems. At best China could only offer the guerrilla-type weapons it had supplied to national liberation movements 15 years previously.110 However, this did not prevent China from supplying 130mm cannon with a 17-mile range, and 200 AT-3 anti-tank missiles to Kampuchea in 1978. Supplies also included 57mm, 75mm and 82mm recoilless rifles, capable of stopping Soviet tanks. Nor did it prevent the appearance of 20 130mm guns in the Sudan in 1983.m When they consider it worthwhile, the Chinese will supply equipment needed by their own armed forces to friendly states. During the 1980s China's supply of small arms to revolutionary movements has been severely curtailed, both because of a reassessment of China's world view, and it claims, because, it cannot afford it. However, the Afghan and Kampuchean resistance movements — and recently Yasser Arafat's PLO - are considered sufficiently important to merit what support China feels able to give. Guerrilla movements in the 1980s receive much the same equipment as they have done in the past two decades, if perhaps a greater percentage of new equipment. Thus the Afghan rebels were armed with plastic mines from an early stage. A few Chinese mortars, and copies of Soviet SKS carbines and RPG-7 rocket launchers were seen in 1981,m although the bulk of Chinese arms were recoilless rifles, Soviet-designed rifles with folding bayonets, and light machine guns. By 1982 journalists reported seeing Chinese manufactured Ak-47s. At the end of the year more sophisticated

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The Nature of China's Military Aid

weapons were seen: in one truckload a few Chinese 82mm mortars, four 82mm recoilless rifles, anti-tank cannons, each brand new, with Chinese markings.113 Although aid increased slightly over the year, the fact that the rebels were still short of arms, notably anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft weapons, which the rebels said they desperately needed, shows that in general, China's aid has been spread very thinly. True to the Chinese revolutionary model, the Mujeheddin have equipped themselves largley with captured weapons. Aid on a small scale has also been extended to the Palestinians in 1983, for the first time in over a decade. Although the details of the weapons supplied are available, it is likely that the two shipments in August and October were part of a $ 1 million emergency aid package announced by the Chinese in 1982.114 Further arms supplies were agreed during Arafat's visit to Beijing in May 1984.115 The one area to have been well supplied with Chinese small arms has been Kampuchea, where the Khmer Rouge force (estimated at about 30,000) were supplied with new B-40 rocket launchers and 60mm mortars by December 19791K|across the Thai border. By 1981 Ak-47s, B40 rocket launchers and other small arms were supplied, enough to equip 1,500-3,000 men of the KPNLF (Khmer People's National Liberation Front). The following year Sihanouk announced that his men would be armed with automatic rifles, machine guns and bazookas, sufficient for 3,000 guerrillas. Although China's aid to the two smaller resistance groups is limited, it supplies enough weapons to keep the Khmer Rouge well stocked.117 Rebel numbers by the end of 1983 were estimated to have recently increased from 30,000 to 40,000 men, and substantial arms continued to flow in January 1984.118 All of China's military aid has been given free of charge — until recently, when China reportedly began delivering small arms (and major weapons, as we shall see later) to the belligerents in the Iran-Iraq war. In January 1983 US intelligence sources reported that China had become a major source of military supplies to Iraq — and was said to be balancing these arms with supplies to Iran. While there is no estimate of the precise inventory or volume, it is believed that China supplies light arms, artillery and ammunition.119 The trend towards arms sales rather than aid, however, tends to apply to major weapons rather than small arms. In the first place, the former constitute an important source of foreign exchange, while the latter, in comparison, by their very nature, can contribute relatively little. Secondly small arms are usually supplied to revolutionary movements. In any case, the movements can rarely afford to pay.

The Nature of China's Military Aid

49

It would appear from recent and current small arms aid to Kampuchea and Afghanistan that China's aid programme is likely to continue, and might conceivably expand if, or when, China feels itself to be in a position to supply more arms. Certainly, recent supplies have tended to contain a higher proportion of new weapons than in the previous decades, and this trend is also likely to continue. Aid to Vietnam: 1960s-l9 70s China's small arms aid during the 1960s and up until the mid-1970s was dominated by its aid to Vietnam and also Cambodia, which not only received far greater quantities of Chinese aid, but also weapons, notably anti-aircraft guns, which were not supplied to other recipients — either revolutionary movements, or independent states. China's total military aid during the 1960s has been estimated at $1,100 million, of which $680 million went to Vietnam. North Korea and Pakistan were also major recipients, leaving $105 million to be distributed among African states and guerrilla movements, Albania (who also received considerable military aid), and revolutionary movements in Asia.120 Liao Zhengzhi, a member of the Politbureau inner circle, was reported to pay visiting freedom fighters in used £5 notes - an indication of the limited extent of China's aid.121 Compare a typical shopping list he would reportedly have discussed with guerrilla leaders with China's account of its total supplies of small arms to Vietnam. Liao's guerrillas might have requested 100 tropical battledresses; 200 medical kits; 2 landrovers; 2 dozen pairs of binoculars; 50 automatic rifles with ammunition; and £500 for propaganda and administration.122 Between 1964 and 1971 the Chinese claim to have provided the Vietnamese with 2 million rifles, over 270 million rounds of ammunition, 37,000 artillery pieces, and 18.8 million artillery shells.123 The heavier Chinese arms were supplied only to Vietnam during the 1960s. While guerrillas in Africa received largely supplies of rifles and machine guns, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles and 7.92 calibre antiaircraft guns were captured in South Vietnam during 1964, and by the end of the year, the North was equipped with 37mm radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns, an old Soviet design, adapted and produced in China.124 By 1968 about 6,000 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm anti-aircraft guns and thousands of air defence machine guns had been supplied by China and the USSR. China's share probably accounted largely for the smaller guns, while the Soviets supplied the larger artillery.125 Light 50-1B rockets from China also formed part of the Viet Cong arsenal, while few, if any, were reported in the hands of

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The Nature of China's Military Aid

guerrillas elsewhere.126 On the whole, though, China's small arms in the hands of the Viet Cong were much the same as those supplied to insurgents elsewhere: pistols, rifles, recoilless rifles, machine guns, hand grenades and a few mortars. The only difference was in the quantities. Where an arms cache in Africa might yield a few dozen rifles and boxes of ammunition, 900 Chinese rifles and 30 tons of ammunition were found in the hull of one ship, which had reportedly made six trips to the South Vietnamese coast before it sank.127 By 1967 the Chinese had supplied over 750,000 small arms to the DRV, which had mostly been passed on to the Viet Cong.128 Apart from sending supplies down via the North, Chinese aid also arrived by ship via Sihanoukville. In two and a half years, until mid-1967, Chinese arms for 50,000 troops had arrived by this means.129 When the Cambodian sanctuaries were invaded in 1970, 80 per cent of the ammunition found was Chinese and 60 per cent of the weapons, while 25 per cent of the latter were Soviet,130 indicating that the Chinese were responsible for a good deal of the Viet Cong's small arms. The Ak47 automatic rifle figures largely in China's small arms supplies to several guerrilla movements. In early 1966 only a few were reportedly in use by the Viet Cong, but by early 1968, the automatic rifle was standard issue in the DRV and among the Viet Cong.131 Thus, despite the ravages of the Cultural Revolution, China, along with the Soviet Union, was still able to supply many of the DRV's 13 infantry divisions, or about 10,000-12,000 men with Ak-47s, while supplying them in much smaller quantities to the PLO, Tanzania and insurgents in Burma and Thailand. Many of China's supplies to the Viet Cong were sent via Cambodia, which also received considerable quantities of arms, especially when compared with China's aid to other recipients in Africa and elsewhere in Asia. Again, largely small and medium arms were sent. In May 1964, 1,600 automatic weapons were delivered, and the following year Lon Nol having led a military delegation to China, reported that his meetings with Lin Biao and Mao Zedong had resulted in promises of light and heavy arms for 20,000 men.132 It is likely, therefore, that of the arms for 50,000 men delivered via Sihanoukville, almost one-third went to equip the Cambodian armed forces.133 Aid continued to flow in no mean quantity to Sihanouk's resistance forces after Lon Nol's coup in April 1970. By July Chinese rifles, anti-tank guns, mortars and anti-aircraft artillery was already reported arriving through Vietnam and Laos.134 Again, this equipment was somewhat heavier than that supplied to guerrillas outside Indo-China. By early 1971 Sihanouk

The Nature of China's Military Aid

51

claimed that he had arms for 30,000 men. That year China's military aid totalled $10 million, and in 1972 would reach S15 million (altogether, Sihanouk claimed that $27 million had been supplied since May 1970).135

Chinese Military Aid in the Form of Troops Sent to Aid Fraternal States China's military aid in the form of troops committed in the defence of fraternal states has only applied to Korea and Indo-China. The Chinese have always held very strong views on sending troops abroad. They maintain that sending troops abroad is only necessary for imperialist powers, which maintained their hold of ex-colonial nations by means of neo-colonialism, establishing military bases and conducting military infiltration through aid. Commenting on Vietnam in 1961, Chen Yi asserted: 'China has not sent a single soldier to any foreign country, nor has China established any military bases in foreign soil, nor has China seized a single inch of another country's territory . . . Being a socialist country, China needs no colonies'.136 Combat troops in Korea were strictly termed 'volunteers'. However, two and a half million were committed in total, and during the course of the war, China suffered 900,000 casualties.137 These troops were fighting not only for the preservation of a fraternal neighbouring state, but also to defend the security of China itself. In other words, China has committed combat troops only when it has perceived a direct threat to its security, and has shown that it will incur considerable sacrifice and privation in so doing. Combat troops have not been dispatched in great quantity since Korea, and it is unlikely that offers of volunteers to Egypt in 1956, Indonesia in 1958, and the Algerian FLN in 1960 were intended as anything other than symbolic support.138 Volunteers would only be dispatched at the request of a friendly state in need — as had been the case in Korea; thus, China offered to send volunteers at Indonesia's request in 1958, and its offers of volunteers to Vietnam during late 1964 and 1965 were qualified in the same way.139 Chinese troops were sent to help North Vietnam, although these only engaged in combat with anti-aircraft batteries. In September 1965 Chinese troops were sent into North Vietnam in response to American escalation (notably after several months of threatening/offering to send volunteers; the actual commitment of troops was accompanied by no

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publicity). A total of 35,000 military personnel arrived in September. By early spring their number had reached 50,000. At the height of America's bombing campaign in 1967 the anti-aircraft divisions increased from two to three, but after the bombing halt in 1968 they gradually returned to China.140 Some of these reinforcements were reported to have been sent to relieve more North Vietnamese troops for active combat in the South during the Tet offensive. However, most were not combat troops and were engaged in repairing roads, railways and bridges damaged by American bombs. Some troops did man the anti-aircraft batteries which fired on American planes and were themselves fired on in return.141 During the Vietnam War China sent considerable numbers of troops to Laos — again, they were largely engineering troops building a network of strategic roads linking China with Vietnam - and also Thailand - but they also manned anti-aircraft batteries to protect their men on the roads. Chinese road building activities began in the early 1960s, after an agreement in 1962 under which the Chinese would build a road linking Phong Saly in northern Laos with China and North Vietnam. In 1968 another road was begun, an all-weather road from Meng La in the North, South to Muong Sai, and a spur struck northeastwards up to Dien Bien Phu. Road building activity began again in 1971, with the advent of America's expansion of the war into Laos, and the use of Thai troops. The road was now being extended from Muong Sai to Pak Beng, near the Thai border. It was estimated that 4,000-6,000 Chinese troops were involved by 1971, equally divided between engineering troops and anti-aircraft batteries, firing 37mm guns.142 Their number increased to 14,000-20,000 in 1972 and by 1973, reportedly to 30,000, at the time when the number of Thai troops in Laos had also risen considerably and was estimated at 15,000-20,000. By 1974, however, their number had been reduced to 5,000, and although the continued road building in Laos was said to be the only sign of any expansion in China's military presence in 1974,143 China's presence in Laos soon declined and became virtually non-existent with Vietnam's victory in 1975. The end of the war, and of Thailand's activity in Laos, in any case reduced the need for China's anxiety, and also led to a scaling down of its support for the Thai communists, who had reportedly been supplied by China.1*4 The commitment of Chinese troops to Vietnam was carried out in order to help defend Vietnam — and to safeguard China's own security — as was the case with Korea. The presence of Chinese troops in Laos seems not to be concerned with the defence of Laos, but rather to

The Nature of China's Military Aid

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extend China's options if the need arose in future for it to take stronger action - presumably to safeguard its security. China has only committed troops in this capacity to countries on its borders - because these states are most essential to China's security and because there would be considerable difficulties in sending them further afield. However, there have been reports recently that Chinese troops have been in Kampuchea and Pakistan. Recently, Chinese military advisers assisted the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea after 1975, and in 1978 the Vietnamese claimed that Chinese manned some anti-aircraft batteries, and that some Chinese had been captured. These reports were denied by the Chinese.1*5 In Pakistan Chinese troops have built the all-weather Karakoram highway, linking the two countries, with bridges capable of carrying lightweight tanks. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese built a string of small military bases along the road to protect it against sabotage. For these duties there were reportedly 3,000 Chinese troops in Pakistan.146 Aside from Vietnam's claims, however, China is holding to its policy of not sending combat troops outside her frontiers. It is also continuing the policy of sending advisors and non-combat troops to important neighbouring states. This is likely to continue, since it is a fairly inexpensive means of offering support, bearing in mind China's huge manpower resources. Military Training

China's military training programme has been extended to more recipients than its supplies of small arms. Relatedly, and on a more limited scale, China has also provided military advisors. Many revolutionary movements, if they have not received Chinese arms, have received guerrilla training. Military training invariably accompanies the supply of both small arms and major weapons, and often precedes it. In some instances guerrillas trained in China have returned — with or without arms — to begin their revolutionary struggle. However, this would not suggest that China was responsible for fomenting revolution. Rather that training and instruction in the Chinese revolutionary model can enable guerrillas to take advantage of social and political discontent and develop their struggle more fully. In the case of embryonic or very small movements, the provision of guerrilla training can sustain armed resistance, given the internal social and political roots of the movement, without the need to commit China's prestige or valuable arms to the cause. Guerrilla training, with its emphasis on self-reliance can be a cheap and effective

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The Nature of China's Military A id

means of encouraging revolution. Even with the provision of arms, training is equally important. The numbers of trainees involved are quite small. Between 1956 and 1977, 3,075 trainees from less developed countries went to China, compared with a total of 50,050 trained in all communist countries. Of these, 2,675 came from Africa, out of a total of 15,850 Africans trained in communist states.147 The supply of major weapons has led to an increase in the number of personnel who go to China to train in their use. Between 1955 and 1975, 1,025 Tanzanians trained in China, many in the 1970s. Naval personnel first went to China for training: the first group of 80 left in December 1969, while in 1971 China agreed to train 250 pilots and technicians who would shortly be working with Chinese MIGs.148 Seventy-five Zairians trained in China in 1975, and a further 100 in 1978, mostly on tanks and patrol boats.149 Smaller numbers were sent to China during the 1960s for guerrilla training. Tutsis were sent in groups of ten for courses lasting 7-14 months during 1963-4.150 White Flags went in groups of 100 for sixmonth courses by 1968.m Between 1952 and 1969 approximately 700 Thai Communists recieved training in China — most of them after 1962 (since even by 1965 there were only estimated to be about 200300 rebels operating in Thailand).152 With guerrilla training, however, trained revolutionaries can return to their homelands and pass on their knowledge to others. This is less true when training involves major weapons or more sophisticated equipment. Similarly, Chinese advisors abroad can train greater numbers of guerrillas than they can regular military personnel in the use of, say, tanks or aircraft. Considerable numbers of Chinese advisors assisted the Tanzanians. By 1971 an estimated 200-500 Chinese were reported to be in the country - compared with eleven who arrived with Chinese small arms in 1964 to train onethird of Zanzibar's army (and this team was to complete its training scheme in six months).153 Regarding guerrilla warfare, between 1964 and 1966 17 Chinese advisors were responsible for training about 300 guerrillas, assisted by Ghanaians who had returned from training in China. (The arrival of Chinese instructors in October 1964 was kept secret at China's request.)154 Returned Tanzanians and Congolese in Brazzaville also trained guerrillas alongside Chinese advisors.155 Some Africans trained in China prior to 1964, notably members of the Algerian FLN; the UPC; ZANU; and Mulele's Congolese guerrillas. Although the Chinese did set up a training school in Algeria after independence, where revolutionaries from the Portuguse territories received instruction in guerrilla warfare, China was not able to provide extensive

The Nature of Chim 's Military Aid

55

guerrilla training until 1964, when it developed bases in Tanzania, Ghana and the Congo Brazzaville. From guerrilla training camps in these states, the Chinese extended training to many revolutionary and dissident groups.156 The Chinese arrived in Ghana in October/1964, 18 months after the Russians left their camp in June 1962, after a none-too-successful attempt at guerrilla warfare instruction. China ran a three-and-a-half-month course, which 260 students completed in April 1965.1S7 Guerrillas came from Nigeria, Gabon, Upper Volta, Niger, Cameroon, Swaziland, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Congo (Brazzaville), Mozambique and also the Canary Islands. In Tanzania the Chinese trained in some camps while Russians and Cubans controlled others. Kongwa, a large training camp West of Dar es Salaam was reported to be staffed by 20 Chinese and Cuban advisors, who also operated together, training FRELIMO forces at Mbeya, in the South West, near Zambia. Unlike Ghana, where the Chinese virtually replaced the Russians in Nkrumah's guerrilla warfare training programme, the Russians and Chinese operated together in Tanzania — each training their particular liberation groups — at different camps. Needless to say, there are conflicting reports as to whose advisors were where, but they are unlikely to have shared the same camps.158 In the Congo (Brazzaville) a training camp was reportedly run under the direction of Col. Kan Mai, counsellor at the Chinese Embassy. Pierre Mulele was said to be one of the trainees (after his spell in China), but although Mulele and a few of Gaston Soumaliot's army (especially Tutsis) had received training in China, or from Chinese — in the Congo (Brazzaville) or Burundi, none of their men had received such training and were all local products'.159 There must be some question, therefore, as to the extent of China's training given to certain revolutionary groups, although the training that was received probably enabled the leadership to capitalise on the discontent that did exist. The impact of China's combined programme of arms and training has probably been most effective in the movements fighting for liberation from colonialists or of white supremacist regimes — notably in Mozambique and Rhodesia. In both, there was widespread discontent and the national liberation movements could increase their momentum with external support. In Southeast Asia, as well as training centres in Yunnan in Southern China, the Chinese trained Thai Communists at camps in Laos. In the Middle East, China's contacts with the PFLOAG in Dhofar was considerably increased with the establishment of a friendly regime in South Yemen after 1969 through which China trained the Dhofari guerrillas,

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The Nature of China's Military Aid

and supplied their arms.160 In general, Chinese training in guerrilla warfare has been accompanied by the supply of arms - however limited. The exception being UNITA, and the Thai Communists. Some UNITA guerrillas probably trained in Ghana after Savimbi split from Holden Roberto's FNLA in 1964, and a few of the movement's leaders may have trained in China.161 Thai Communists, although trained in China since 1955 - and in greater numbers since 1962 - received no arms until 1967. Guerrillas from neighbouring states trained in Ghana (for example, Niger, the Ivory Coast and Gabon) probably received no arms, or very few. (Although there are unconfirmed reports that an unsuccessful coup attempt in Niger in October 1964 was financed by Chinese money, deposited in banks in Brussels, Geneva and Accra.)162 Training has often preceded the supply of weapons. In some cases, the guerrillas have returned with arms; in others arms arrive later. In 1959 some Algerians were reportedly already training in China after Oussedik's military delegation arranged for Chinese aid in the spring of 1959,163 and tangible aid followed later. Mulele trained in China during 1963 before the revolt in 1964, when China's arms began to flow into the Congo. One report maintains that Mulele was not in China for over two months and that he did not maintain contact after his return in the summer of 1963 — which hardly implies that China's revolutionary model spurred the Congolese rebellion. However, in February 1964 the Chinese were said to be running a training camp for Mulelist guerrillas at Etena in Ifondo territory. Another report alleges that China's African expert, Peng Zhitang, was helping the rebels, and actually sponsored their plan.164 ZANU guerrillas first went to China for training in November 1963 (after Sithole's visit to Beijing), returning the following August. They also received training in Ghana after 1964, and by 1966 Chinese arms were captured in Rhodesia.165 Chinese military advisors numbered an estimated 3,500 in the DRV in April 1962.166 before Chinese weapons began to appear in even limited quantities. As with all aspects of China's military aid with the exception of major weapons transfers, the greatest number of advisors in other countries and personnel training in China is accounted for by the Vietnamese. In comparison with China's aid programme in Vietnam, its aid — advisors and guerrilla training — would appear to pale into insignificance. However, because of the relative immaturity of most insurgent groups in Africa — and elsewhere in Asia — China's military training programme and the supply of limited quantities of arms has been of considerable importance. The advisors had begun to arrive in Vietnam in 1960. However,

The Nature of China's Military Aid

57

guerrilla training per se was rather less important, since the Vietnamese were themselves experienced fighters. The Vietnamese, too, ran their own guerrilla training centres for Thai communist cadres, training the rank and file, while the Chinese trained their officers.167 Once the Chinese had supplied major weapons to the Vietnamese, they had to train the armed forces in their use. Thus it was reported that North Vietnamese pilots trained in China to fly MIGs and a Chinese mission had been training in Vietnam. Chinese troops also arrived to train Vietnamese troops in the use of 37mm radar controlled anti-aircraft batteries, and then, in some cases, returned to China.168 After 1965 Chinese personnel were principally troops, working on engineering repairs, or manning anti-aircraft batteries, rather than pure advisors. Indeed, it is well known that the Chinese were not always happy with the strategy and teaching employed in the South.

China's Major Arms Aid China's major arms transfers account for a very small percentage of world totals (2Vz per cent during 1970-6).169 None of its major weapons exported has accounted for over 12 per cent of world exports. However, recent increases, though small in global terms, represent a significant expansion in China's aid programme. During the 1960s the real value of China's major arms exports was estimated at $1,100 million. By 1970-6 the figure had doubled to an estimated $2,150 million.170 Another set of figures puts China's military supplies exports between 1958 and 1981 at $3.9 billion, embracing 52 states. Between 1958 and 1982, the figures had risen by $1 billion to $4.9 billion (about a 25 per cent increase), embracing 53 states. Military sales rather than grant aid accounted for much of this increase.171 Thus, while China's military aid programme has expanded considerably, this expansion is largely due to military sales rather than an expansion of China's earlier programme of delivering all supplies free of charge (donations or interest-free loans). In general over the last decade (1973-82) the volume of China's exports has increased. Some items have steadily increased in volume, while others declined, then increased again during the years 1978-82 as China's export drive got under way. Supersonic aircraft exports have shown a steady increase over the years, while there has been a dramatic increase in the exports of field and anti-aircraft artillery. Almost four times the volume of field artillery was exported during

58

The Nature of China's Military Aid

1977-81, and six times in 1978-82, compared with 1973-7. Antiaircraft artillery exports increased about fourfold in 1978-82 compared with 1975-9. Exports of tanks, APCs and naval vessels declined after large deliveries during 1973-7, but increased again in 1978-82, as did exports of all items,172 reflecting the success of China's export drive. It is likely that numbers will increase still more as China fulfils more offers for sales rather than grants. Naval vessels have not accounted for a large share of China's major arms aid, and the ratio is likely to remain much the same.173 The dramatic increase in artillery exports is a reflection of the shift in emphasis from supplying revolutionary movements to independent states. As China modernises its ground forces, a number of weapons are surplus to domestic requirements. Since 1976 China has concentrated on such areas as anti-tank missiles and associated electronic equipment; air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles.174 The steady increase in aircraft exports, rather than a dramatic rise, is due in part to the fact that, although China has produced improved models of jet interceptors and bombers, these have only been in limited numbers.175 Thus, though some of the other designs are surplus to requirements and F4s and F-6s are gradually being phased out, China's production capacity is not leaving great numbers of surplus — or newly produced models. However, numbers of exports are increasing, and MIG jet fighters form an important part of China's aid programme. Although all of China's major weapons exports are copies of earlier Soviet models, many from the 1950s, this does not necessarily limit their usefulness or efficiency. It is not always necessary to have the most modern equipment in order to have a useful fighting force. 'Low' technology equipment can prove more robust in combat, and thus may be preferable to high technology. According to one commentator, 'evidence from the Iran-Iraq war suggests that Chinese equipment is at least reliable in a war where attrition takes a heavier toll on more modern and delicate hardware'.176 Chinese weapons, for example, the F-6 (copied from the MIG-19) can be deployed effectively by a country which faces an adversary equipped with weapons of only slightly later concept.177 While most of China's aid consists of equipment whose basic design is 20 years out of date, in recent years one or two more modern designs have formed a very small part of its aid programme. All Chinese equipment — with a few notable exceptions — has been second, even third hand, or refurbished. All, until recently, has been given, either as an outright gift or as a long-term interest-free loan. When the Egyptians offered to pay for MIG engines and large quantities of spare

The Nature of China's Military Aid

59

parts given by China in 1976, they received the perhaps somewhat offended reply: 'We are not weapons traders.'178 The pattern of China's provision of major arms is not altogether consistent with that of its small arms transfers. The most notable difference, which applied especially during the 1960s, but to a lesser extent thereafter, concerned the number of recipients. Whereas China's small arms were distributed among over 20 states and insurgent groups, only five received major arms as part of a sustained aid programme.179 During the 1970s, when China cut back aid to small insurgent groups and the number of recipients of small arms fell, the recipients of major weapons almost trebled. Many of them already received, or began to receive light and medium arms. This changing pattern is related to China's changing world view and also to developments in its production capacity. While there is a link between China's provision of small arms and its ability to produce them, the link in the case of major weapons is much stronger and far more obvious. Thus, while both small arms and major weapons were supplied for the first time since the era of the Korean and Vietnam wars in 1958-9, and while small arms continued to be supplied — albeit on an ever-increasing scale throughout the 1960s, China's major weapons did not become part of a sustained, co-ordinated aid programme until the middle of the decade. This reflected production problems following the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and severe economic retrenchment. One trend in China's major arms aid concerns the small, but growing move towards granting licensed production during the 1970s. The scope in this field is inevitably limited by the fact that the bulk of China's recipients are underdeveloped countries, who lack the facilities to produce major weapons. However, a few licenses have been granted for the production of Chinese equipment in the more developed states, for example, Pakistan, Romania and North Korea. This trend may well continue and increase as China develops more modern weapons required by other states, and at the same time needs the remuneration to fund its research and development projects. The Chinese have not supplied revolutionary movements with major weapons and have always counselled guerrilla warfare when facing an occupying army or colonial, or 'puppet' troops, for example, in Vietnam, Portugal's African territories, or Israel (occupied Palestine). Indeed the June 1967 war gave the Chinese an ideal opportunity to emphasize the uselessness of major weapons in what they believed should be a people's war.180 A situation of a people's war, however, fought by a national liber-

60

The Nature of China's Military Aid

ation movement, is very different from that of an independent state defending its security against an agressor. Thus, when they were the subject of or threatened by aggression from imperialist powers - or states supported by imperialists — China supplied its allies with major weapons, aircraft, tanks, and also naval vessels, for defensive (but, China would maintain, not offensive) purposes. Finally, there is no evidence that China has provided military aid in the form of nuclear weapons to any states.181 Aircraft All China's aircraft are copies of Soviet designs. In some instances, however, incremental developments over the years have made them superior to the original; in others, notably most recent models, they are probably inferior. The F-6, which forms 95 per cent of China's airforce, and a good part of its exports, has been described as 'the most highly perfected obsolescent fighter on earth - vastly better than the best Soviet MIG-19, but two generations behind current technology'. Pakistani pilots who have flown the F-6 in combat said it was 'a highly effective ground-attack weapon' and a 'useful air-superiority fighter'.182 However, matched against the more sophisticated MIG-23, the F-6 would be in a difficult tactical predicament due to its slower speed and lower altitude capacity.183 The F-7 may be an improvement on the MIG-21 from which it was copied.184 However, the usefulness of Chinese aircraft depends very much on the context in which they are used. F-7s may be quite adequate for the defence needs of states in, say, sub-Saharan Africa, where they will not be pitted against more sophisticated Soviet or Western fighters. Those recently supplied to Egypt, on the other hand, according to one source, will on present plans be used only for training, albeit advanced training.185 During the early years of the PRC, the Chinese did not produce major weapons. Thus, the large quantity of MIG-15s (possibly as many as 100) supplied to the North Koreans in 1950-1 were built in the Soviet Union,186! but undoubtedly paid for by China. The Korean war spurred a drive to modernize the Chinese armed forces, during which a variety of aircraft — MIG interceptor fighters, trainers, transports and bombers — were produced under licence from the USSR. By the end of the decade, the Chinese were in a position to supply 300 Shenyang F-4s (MIG-17) and 20 Shenyang Yak-18s to North Korea between 1958 and 1960 in addition to four Fong Shou No. 2 transports delivered in 1957. The 80 MIG-15s, 40 IL-28s, and 20 MIG-19s also supplied during those years (1958-60) were probably secondhand from the Soviet

The Nature of China's Military Aid

61

Union.187 These quantities indicate that, at a time when China was embarking on a more independent, forward foreign policy, it was also conducting a fairly large scale military aid programme, albeit confined to just two neighbouring states (North Korea and North Vietnam). China's military aid programme in major weapons came to an abrupt halt in 1960, when the Soviets withdrew their technicians, and economic retrenchment caused grave problems for China's munitions factories. Some leaders, notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, argued for a sharp cut-back in foreign aid in order to concentrate more fully on China's own development needs. However, their advice was not heeded by Mao,188 and in view of the fact that both economic aid and small arms aid continued, albeit on a small scale, it is likely that this sharp curtailment was due more to the blunt fact that China simply was not able to produce major weapons in sufficient quantities for its own armed forces let alone military aid. By 1964-5 limited supplies of aircraft, and by 1966-7 much larger quantities, indicate that China began to export major weapons as soon as it was able. China's major weapons aid got under way again in August 1964 with the supply of a small, yet significant, number of MIG-15s and MIG-17s to North Vietnam.189 Their significance lies in the fact that Soviet arms were not supplied until 1965. The following year Pakistan received four MIG-15 UTI trainers, while Albania was supplied with 30 MIG-17s and spares for Albania's air force of about 60|planes.190 It was not until 1966-7 that China's programme expanded with the supply of greater numbers of MIG-17s and, now, MIG-19s. In the autumn of 1964 it was estimated that China's airforce had almost 2,000 planes, with only approximately 60 MIG-19s; the rest being MIG-17s and MIG15s,191 of which it was able to supply only a small number as military aid. By 1966 China's airforce strength had risen to 2,300 and production of MIG-19s (F-6) was later reported to be about 120 per year.192 Increased production, therefore, enabled China to give 80 to Pakistan between 1966 and 1968 and 35 to North Vietnam, between 1967 and 1972.193 China's development and production of the MIG-21 - which had not previously been produced under licence from the USSR, testifies to the efficiency and tenacity of its aircraft industry. Their reported appearance in North Vietnam in 1966 testifies to the spirit of self-sacrifice in China's military aid programme. In 1966 it was estimated that China's airforce had 35 F-7s (MIG-21s), whereas there had only been a very few in December 1964, when the aircraft first flew. It was reported that the Chinese kept a squadron of about 25 F-7s

62

The Nature of China's Military Aid

on duty in the DRV at intervals, rotating them from six bases in South China and Hainan Island. Their presence served to act as a deterrent against the expansion of America's bombing campaign.194 Apart from their assistance to North Vietnam, F-7s did not become part of China's military aid programme until the early 1970s. Bombers, being an offensive aircraft, did not feature greatly in China's major arms aid. However, about 40 IL-28s were exported to North Korea in 1958-9 and a small number did form a part of China's aid to Pakistan in 1966,195 perhaps intended to serve as a deterrence by making some attempt to parallel Soviet arms aid to India. During the 1960s, China supplied almost 200 aircraft to just three countries. Of these over half went to the DRV (the Chinese claim that they supplied their ally with a total of 119 planes between 1964 and 1971),196 whose supplies increased over the years, while supplies to Albania and Pakistan were not augmented until the early 1970s, when China's aid programme recovered after the Cultural Revolution. During the early 1970s China's principal aid recipients suffered further aggression, and increased threats to their security. America renewed bombing in IndoChina in 1970; Pakistan was again at war with India; Albania faced a more serious Soviet threat after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; while in Africa Tanzania came under further threat from the Rhodesian and Portuguese security forces for its support of Africa's liberation movements. All received supplies of Chinese aircraft. Although aircraft production continued during the Cultural Revolution, it had not increased, and until the early 1970s, China still faced problems of supply. Thus, Albania was seen to be threatened by the Soviet Union in 1968, but although other military aid was supplied, the Albanians did not receive aircraft until 1972. During the 1970s the bulk of China's aircraft supplied were the older MIG-based designs — F-2, F-4 and F-6 — with a smaller number of F-7s. These were supplied to existing clients; it would also appear that increased production enabled China to take advantage of global realignments and step in to supply aid when the Soviet Union abandoned its erstwhile allies (or they, feeling threatened, turned to China, in the case of Bangladesh). Thus, during the early 1970s China supplied a total of about 80 F-4s (MIG-17) to the DRV, Tanzania, Albania and the Sudan; about 180 F-6s (MIG-19) to the DRV, Tanzania, and Pakistan (which received about two-thirds); and 36 F-7s (MIG-21) to Tanzania and Albania.197 All or most would be second-hand or refurbished. Deliveries expanded again from 1977 into the 1980s as China's exports helped to keep some production lines open, since domestic

The Nature of China's Military Aid

63

requirements for many dated items had been filled and the military were probably reluctant to procure more old items.192 Thus supplies of obsolete MIG-17s continued in the late 1970s and early 1980s as some recipients found them useful to supplement their trainers. Pakistan received 24 in 1978 with T-33 trainers. Sudan received 5 with two FT-5 trainers in 1981.199 The F-6 fighter (MIG-19) has been produced in larger numbers than any of China's other domestically produced aircraft.200 This aircraft has continued to dominate China's military aid programme in recent years. Over 400 F-6 were delivered, or on order between 1977 and 1983 - over twice the number supplied in the earlier part of the decade. While production of the F-6 continues, it is expected that the later generation aircraft, such as the F-7 (MIG-21) will dominate the industry throughout the 1980s,201 a development already reflected in China's aid programme. During the early 1970s only 36 F-7s were supplied (to Tanzania and Albania — all refurbished). By the early 1980s China had delivered, or had on order 105, of which 100 had been ordered by Egypt for local assembly. However, by 1983 only ten of these had been delivered, and the delivery of Zimbabwe's 25 secondhand F-7s remained unconfirmed.202 Two other relatively new designs featured in China's aid programme after the late 1970s: the BT-6 (a development of the Yak-18 trainer in production since 1961); and the F-6 bis, A-5, or Fantan A. In contrast to China's other aircraft, which are in general secondhand or refurbished, most of these have been supplied new. Approximately 30 BT-6s have been supplied to three countries since 1970 (Bangladesh, Zambia and North Korea receiving about ten each during 1978-9).203 The F-6 bis first appeared in the early 1970s and was reported to be in service in 1975. In 1981 China supplied about 65 to Pakistan, and in 1982 a further 20 (some sources report 40) to North Korea.204 North Korea's F-6 bis were new, and in February 1983, Dawn reported that Pakistan had just purchased its first squadron of six F-6 bis, albeit for half as much as comparable aircraft would cost in the West. Furthermore, the aircraft had been especially built to meet the Pakistani airforce requirements.205 This represents a new departure in China's military aid, and confirms a trend apparent since 1979. This would be the first time that China has specifically built aircraft - or any major weapon - tailored to a client's needs, while the trend towards military sale rather than grant aid has been in evidence for a few years. Of the 400 odd F-6s delivered or on order up to 1983, 100 were ordered by Iran in December 1982, which

64

The Nature of China's Military Aid

were to be paid for.206 Sixty were delivered to Egypt between 1979-80, reportedly at low cost, although it is is rumoured that Egypt gave China a MIG-23S as part payment. 207 China's F-12 is based on the MIG-23 allegedly built with Rolls-Royce Spey engines. It was given its prototype flight in 1980 and was reported by the Chinese press at the end of the year to be in full-scale production.208 None has yet been ordered or supplied, but if deliveries of the F-6 bis have set a precedent, they may well be in the riot too distant future. A spinoff from China's aircraft aid programme has been the extension of aid to construct airfields capable of taking aircraft which China will supply. Thus in 1973 China completed a new airfield near Morogoro in Tanzania (although said to be poorly equipped with radar and vectoring equipment, which China itself lacked in any quantity); soon afterwards 21 F-4, 20 F-6 and 16 F-7s arrived.209 Later, in 1978, it was reported that China was helping the Kampucheans build a new airport capable of handling jet fighters, of which 19 were delivered that year (3 F-4s and 16 F-6S).210 Tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers Like its aircraft, China's domestically produced tanks are copies, or developments of, Soviet equipment of the 1950s and are thus ten to twenty years out of date. China had produced the Soviet model T-54 main battle tank during the late 1950s, and after the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisors, continued to produce a modified version, the Type 59 during the 1960s and Type 60, a copy of the Soviet PT-76 light amphibious tank, slightly modified with the provision for mounting a 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun in the turret. A redesigned version of the Type 60 appeared as a Type 62, while the Type 63 light tank was a scaled down version of the Type 59. There appears to be some confusion in identifying whether Type 62s or 63s have been exported.211 As with aircraft production and exports, tanks did not form a significant part of China's aid programme until 1966. Indeed, none were supplied prior to this date, and even then Type 59s were supplied to only one state (Pakistan), albeit in considerable quantity. However, it was not until the 1970s that tanks were supplied in quantity to several states. It would seem, therefore, that China's limited production capacity and resources prevented it from exporting tanks to even its more important clients. Albania, notably, was not reported to have Chinese tanks until 1972. A few Type 62s, however, were given to Tanzania in 1967. The end of the Cultural Revolution, enabling production to increase,

The Nature of China's Military Aid

65

and bringing changes in China's world view led to an expansion in China's tank supplies. The Middle East war of 1973 also had an impact on China's perceptions. High technology weapons and a well-developed logistical base had been critical to the outcome of the war, and this influenced the decision not to resort to quantity production of other weapons.222 Type 59s were exported for the first time in 1966, when Pakistan received 100 over the next two years.213 The ravages of the Cultural Revolution or China's perception of Pakistan's security needs - or both — may well have been the reason for the fact that no more were supplied until a delivery of 110 in 1970-1.2M However, the fact that the Soviet Union supplied 150 T-54 and T-55s in 1969 would suggest that limited production capacity was the more to blame. (In July 1968 Pakistan's Commander-in-Chief negotiated an arms agreement in Moscow for these tanks, and also for spare parts for China's tanks and aircraft,215 indicating that the Cultural Revolution was also having an effect on China's aircraft aid to Pakistan.) One notable exception as noted above, however, was the export of 14 Type 62s to Tanzania in December 1967, presumably to protect China's considerable economic investment in the Tazara Railway.216 Leaving this apparent anomaly aside, deliveries of tanks began again in 1970 with 110 Type 59s to Pakistan.217 Over the following two years, China's aid programme expanded considerably to include a further 100 Type 59s to Pakistan, 20 to Tanzania, 10 to the Sudan218 and an unconfirmed 200 intended for the PLO which seems rather unlikely as the transfers to Pakistan were only replacements for the Pakistani losses in the recent war with India.219 Albania, one of China's principal clients, only received tanks in 1972, perhaps 10 Type 59s.220 In 1975 China gave its first tanks to Zaire: 25 Type 59s which were used in Angola.221 North Korea may also have received some at about the same time. China also began to export a greater variety of models. Type 62s were supplied to Tanzania, and Albania, who by 1975 had a total of 40.2M The Sudan and Congo Republic also received Type 62s, 20 and 14 in 1972 respectively. Somalia obtained 12 Chinese light tanks, conceivably Type 62s in 1970.223 North Vietnam received about 100 Type 62s in 1971, which it used during the latter stages of the war in the South.224 The Type 62s Pakistan reportedly used in the 1971 war with India were probably supplied earlier that year.225 China's tank exports have followed the same pattern as aircraft. After 1977, and especially in the 1980s, they were exported in greater volume. The K-63 APC was supplied to some of China's principal

66

The Nature of China's Military Aid

aid recipients for the first time, although it had been in production in China for a decade and some had probably been given to the DRV in 1971. Thus, in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased numbers of Type 59s were supplied, perhaps 500 in all. Pakistan having ordered 1,000 in 1975, received 50 annually beginning in 1978. By 1983 it had a total of 900 Type 59s226 Some of North Korea's total of 175 Type 59s recorded in 1982-3 may have been supplied during this period227 while Bangladesh received some in 1981, all of which were secondhand.228 Type 62s were supplied in fewer quantities, about 80, of which 60 refurbished tanks were given to Zaire. The remainder were divided between the Sudan (7-10) and Mali (12).229 A significant number of Type 60s (100) were given to Kampuchea in 1978.230 K-63 APCs began to appear in China's aid programme in 1977. However, once again Hanoi received China's recently produced arms before China's other major recipients, and probably before China's own PLA was adequately equipped. The K-63 was first produced in China during the late 1960s; During the early 1970s the VNA reportedly used Type 62s in armoured cavalry battalions, in conjunction with K-63s.2a By 1981 K-63s had been supplied to six more states.232 The fact that most of China's major recipients possess some — Pakistan, North Korea, Albania, Tanzania, Sudan,233 and Zaire which used them in Angola234 — seems to point to China's willingness to supply arms to important clients while China's own armed forces were being reequipped. Production of China's Type 56 and Type 55 APC is probably complete. However in 1982 they were reportedly in service in Kampuchea, Tanzania and Vietnam, and may well have been supplied to others.235 Egypt received 40, secondhand in 1984. About 50 Type 56s were given to North Vietnam by the USSR and China in 1960-2.236 Others were probably not supplied until the 1970s. As with aircraft, new tank models began to appear in China's aid programme in one case as a military sale, in the 1980s. A total of 260 Type 69 main battle tanks, only recently produced in China and valued at $ 1,000m were to be supplied to Iraq under an agreement in February 1983. The Type 69 had first been seen in China just the previous September.237 Because of near record Chinese sales of $90m to LDCs in 1978 (and East European sales of $465 m) the Soviet Union failed to maintain its usual 90 per cent share of communist arms to LDCs.238 But even with these and later increases in China's exports, its share of arms transfers

The Nature of China's Military Aid

67

remained small in comparison to the Soviet Union. However this does represent a significant change in China's policy, and in the light of its participation for the first time in 1984 in the international arms trade market, may well mark a trend for the future.239 Surface-to-air Missiles The production and supply of China's surface-to-air missiles has been limited. China has been producing copies of the Soviet SA-2 since the mid-1960s, but like its other newly produced major weapons, China only had a few at this time. It was not until 1966 that exports might have begun, and then to only one ally. Albania was reported to be operating batteries of Chinese SAMs in April 1966. By 1967 the Italians claimed that China had helped set up missile bases and that SAM launching ramps had been installed.240 The evidence, however, is sketchy and would lead to the conclusion that, if the Chinese did supply SAMs, they were stretching their own limited stocks in order to support a vital ally who had no alternative weapons-supplier. The Chinese supplied none to its other principal clients. All of North Vietnam's SAMs (SA-2s) mostly deployed around Hanoi and Haiphong were Soviet. Tanzania signed an agreement with the Soviets for jet fighters and SA-2 missiles in 1968,241 to protect it against Portuguese and Rhodesian air incursion. Even Pakistan, who had no alternative supplier after 1965, received no Chinese SAMs. The Chinese reportedly increased their supply of SAMs and rockets to Albania after 1968 - probably spurred more by anxiety after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the growing Soviet naval presence in the area, than by increased production capacity. By September 1970 there were said to be 500 Chinese specialists supervising the construction of missile installations after reports of more SA-2s and naval rockets arriving.242 Unlike China's other major weapons, supplies of SAMs did not increase at all during the 1970s. China aparently learned a lesson from the 1973 Middle East war, when the portable SA-7 proved so lethal and effective. However, although China was convinced of the need to re-equip its ground forces with more modern weaponry, it took a long time to translate these ideas into action. In the interim, China lost much of its influence in Mozambique, and the side it supported in Angola lost the war, in part because China could not supply the type of weapons and missiles — for example, SA-7s — furnished by the Soviets. By 1979 production of China's version of the SA-2 (CSA-1) was reportedly declining243 — presumably to make way for more sophis-

68

The Nature of China's Military A id

ticated models. It would not appear coincidental that in 1979 Pakistan ordered about 20 CSA-ls (all new) which were deployed in July 1980, and Egypt ordered new missiles in January 1980.244 Thus, it seems that China exported a few outdated SAMs which were surplus to domestic requirements. However, since production of SAMs remains limited (annual production stood at 100 between 1978 and 1982)245 and more modern designs are yet to enter production, it is unlikely that this aspect of China's aid programme will expand significantly. In 1979 the Chinese were still producing their copy of the AT-3 anti-tank missile, first produced by the Soviets in 1965. In 1978 only 300 had been produced, but that year a considerable number — 200, all new, with 33 secondhand launchers — were supplied to the Kampucheans.246 Type 52 75mm anti-tank guns first appeared among China's exports in the 1980s. North Korea possessed an unspecified quantity in 1982, as did Pakistan soon after.247 It may be that China is exporting anti-tank guns while its ground forces concentrate on more modern missiles. By 1983 China's production of anti-tank guided missiles had reportedly surged ahead.248 Artillery Light and medium mortars have been among the weapons supplied to certain national liberation movements since China's aid programme began in 1960. However, artillery production suffered from the withdrawal of Soviet aid, and following the pattern of other major items, China's exports of heavy artillery — with one or two exceptions — did not feature in its aid programme until the 1970s. By 1965 China's ground forces were adequately equipped with indigenously-produced light and medium artillery, although heavy field engineering equipment and self-propelled artillery were still reported to be in short supply in the early 1970s.250 The Chinese claim that between 1964 and 1971 they supplied Hanoi with 37,000 artillery pieces and 18.8 million artillery shells.251 While this figure may well be exaggerated, China was probably responsible for most of the 6,000 or more anti-aircraft guns, from 37mm to 100mm reportedly defending Hanoi and Haiphong in 1968.252 In addition, although the Chinese were themselves short of self-propelled artillery, Hanoi received supplies of twin 37mm Type 63 self-propelled antiaircraft guns after 1965. North Vietnam, Pakistan and Albania were China's only clients to receive artillery during the 1960s. This included 85mm anti-tank field guns, 100mm and 130mm field guns. In addition, 107mm multiple

The Nature of China's Military Aid

69

rocket systems, 60mm and 82mm mortars were supplied to these states, and to certainly one guerrilla organization, the Burmese White Flags. Obsolescent 90mm andl 120mm mortars were also given to Vietnam and probably Pakistan. It is difficult to put anything but a very rough figure on the quantities, but mortars were probably given to North Vietnam, Pakistan and Albania in thousands while the White Flags received hundreds. By the 1970s other guerrilla groups and national liberation movements received mortars, many of which were new. At the same time recipients in Africa began to obtain Chinese artillery. Until the end of the 1970s, medium and heavy artillery rarely numbered more than 50 per state. Tanzania received 30 and then further shipments of about 20 mortars and 22 howitzers.253 Apart from anti-aircraft artillery, 85mm field guns were exported to the most states. In 1982 they were reportedly in service in Albania, Mozambique, Vietnam, Congo, Cameroon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Zaire. Heavy artillery has been supplied to China's principal clients, notably Albania, North Vietnam, Pakistan, North Korea, Tanzania, Congo, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire and Zimbabwe.254 Exports of artillery increased dramatically after 1979, accounting for a significant portion of production.

Naval Vessels China's production of naval vessels has always been heavily geared towards coastal defence. The bulk of China's military aid programme consists of patrol boats with some submarines. As with its production of the major items, China produced some naval vessels of Soviet design during the late 1950s, and supplied a number to neighbouring states: over 30 to North Vietnam and 24 small (20-ton) inshore minesweepers to North Korea.257 By the mid-1960s the Chinese were producing Swatow- and Shanghai-class patrol boats of up to 120 tons displacement, and Huchuan hydrofoils. However, apart from deliveries to Vietnam, which the Chinese claim to have supplied with 147 vessels between 1964-71 (at least 20 Swatow-class boats replaced North Vietnamese losses after the Tonkin Gulf incidents), and an unspecified number to Albania in 1968, only a very few — no more than 15 in total — were given to other states. Cambodia received three small patrol boats in 1968, and the Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania each four boats in 1968 and 1966 respectively. (These may well have been Yulin river patrol craft.) North Korea received four Shanghai patrol boats in 1967.258 China's aid programme did not develop into an extensive effort until

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The Nature of China's Military A id

Table 2.1: Number of Artillery Pieces Delivered255 A/A (over 20mm) 1975-9 1976-80 1977-81 1978-82

Field Artillery - (over 100mm) 470 490

660 630 ?

1,300 2,000

2,400

Table 2.2: Annual Production of Artillery 256

sp Field artillery (100mm+) Towed field artillery (100mm+) Towed field artillery (100mm-) Towed A/A artillery Artillery-type rocket launchers

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

20

20

50

10

100

100

500

300

200

250

400

500

100

100

100

100

0

1,900

2,100

2,200

1,500

1,500

400

450

450

450

450

400

the 1970s. Apart from China's changing perceptions and decision to supply aid to more independent states, its increased production probably enabled this expansion. Annual growth in China's shipbuilding by the early 1970s had doubled that of the previous decade. The figures being 1950-60 (18.3 per cent); 1960-70 (10.9 per cent); 1970-4 (23 per cent). In 1974 China still only possessed 2.7 per cent of the world's stock of fighting ships. Stocks of torpedo boats and motor gunboats which constituted the bulk of China's exports, had risen from 150 in 1960 to 697 in 1974.259 China's expanded aid programme began with an agreement in 1970 to supply six Shanghai-class patrol boats to Tanzania, who had sent its first group of trainees to China by the end of 1969.260 In 1971 Pakistan received nine Shanghai-class motor gunboats (120-ton displacement), of which four might be converted for missile firing in Pakistan.261 By 1975 eight Swatow- and 15 Shanghai-class boats were a part of North Korea's total of 54 MGBs,262 while six Shanghai-class MGBs were supplied to Albania following a new military aid agreement in 1975.263 Small numbers of these vessels were given to a number of

The Nature of China's Military Aid

71

African states: Sierra Leone (two in 1975 and one more in 1978); Guinea (four in 1972, with 40 advisors, and a further two in 1977, all of which were new); Equatorial Guinea (two in 1975); Cameroon (two refurbished, in 1977). None of these states received other Chinese major weapons, except artillery, while some states which were already recipients, also began to receive the patrol boats: Zaire (two in 1978-9, along with Chinese advisors); and the Congo Republic (three in 1978). In South Asia, too, more Shanghai-class MGBs were supplied to a greater number of states: Pakistan's stock had increased to twelve by 1981; five were given to Sri Lanka in 1972, and a further two in 1980; and Bangladesh received four in 1981.264 Tunisia, which received no other Chinese military aid, received two secondhand Yulin river patrol craft in 1977, the only state to have received these small vessels since the late 1960s. Following the trend in China's other major equipment, more and different types of vessels were exported during the later part of the 1970s all, with one exception, to China's principal recipients. Four Huchuan hydrofoils were supplied to Tanzania by 1976, while a considerable number (32) were supplied to Albania between 1974 and 1978. In 1974 Romania received three, prior to setting up licensed production; and Pakistan received four by 1981.265 Hainan-class large patrol boats were supplied in small numbers to Pakistan and North Korea (three and four, in 1978 and 1979 respectively); Egypt received two in 1983, and Bangladesh received one.266 Hoku (fast attack craft) were supplied to only one state — Pakistan (four) — and then only in 1983.267 While China has extended military aid in the form of patrol boats to a number of states, submarines have only been supplied to a very few. Again, this is probably due in large part to its own limited stock of patrol submarines. In 1960 China had 12; in 1965, 22; 1970, 27; and by 1974 stocks had increased by over 30 per cent to 46.268 In 1977 China's submarine force was the third largest in the world.269 Thus, when it was able, China supplied its principal clients with submarines. The first delivery was to Pakistan in 1970: two or three dated *W' class submarines,270 extended as grant aid, at a time when China's own stock was yet to be built up, but at a time when the Chinese were particularly anxious about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean. Submarines, however, did not feature in China's aid programme until it had augmented its stocks considerably. A small number of 'Romeo' class submarines were supplied to Pakistan in 1976; it is unknown whether these were a gift or sale.271 A further two secondhand

72

The Nature of China's Military Aid

vessels were supplied in 1980. Two submarines, again secondhand 'Romeo' class, were given to Egypt in 1982.272 By far the largest number have been supplied to North Korea, who received six new 'R' class submarines in 1978 prior to producing them under licence.273 Bangladesh received its first submarine (a secondhand 'R' class) from China in 1984.274 Since submarines have only been supplied to China's most favoured recipients, and since China is endeavouring to build up and modernize its navy and is unlikely to be able to export many such expensive items over the next few years, it is unlikely that this aspect of China's military aid programme will expand greatly. It is, however, conceivable that older models may be supplied in greater quantity. So far Pakistan has been the only state to receive Chinese destroyers: one or two were given in 1976. However, recent reports of a large naval deal with Egypt indicate that Cairo has ordered four Luda-class destroyers.275 The Chinese have in rare instances helped to construct naval bases for some of its principal clients, notably Tanzania and Albania, when they were threatened. As early as 1963, the Chinese were reportedly supervising large-scale construction work at Valona in Albania. There were unconfirmed reports that Chinese submarines used the base, and, also, by 1967 the naval base at Sassemo.276 Alarmed by the growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and by events in Czechoslovakia, the Chinese, in 1969, were supervising the construction of another base, at Scutari (equipped with dated radio and radar installations,277 which they themselves lacked in any quantity). The Chinese assisted the Tanzanians in building a naval base at Dar es Salaam in 1970,279 when the latter decided to build up their navy, partly in response to threatened retaliation from Rhodesia and Portugal for its support of national liberation movements. Licensed Production During the 1970s China's military aid programme followed the trend in global arms transfers and began to include licences for the production of Chinese arms in other countries. The scope in this regard is limited since many of China's principal recipients do not have the ability, or facilities, to produce major items. However, in recent years it would appear that the Chinese have begun to look on licensed production as a means of supplying their most favoured recipients with those major items which China is unable to produce in sufficient quantities for export. Thus, in 1973 North Korea was granted a licence to produce

The Nature of China's Military Aid

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'Romeo' class submarines, at a time when China was building up its own submarine stock. Production started in 1976, and by 1978 five had been produced.279 In 1973 negotiations for the production of the SAM-6 system in Pakistan were at an advanced stage. However, almost a decade later it was reported that the Chinese were probably still developing more modern SAM systems, and so, even if a licence has been granted, production is unlikely to have gone ahead.280 Similarly, during 1978 there were negotiations for granting licensed production of anti-tank missiles in Pakistan, but by 1980 they were not yet in production.281 Other licences have been granted to Romania: in 1971 for the production of Shanghai-class patrol boats, which began in 1973. By 1978, 18 had been produced.282 Production of Huchuan hydrofoils began in 1974; about 17 had been produced by 1983.283 Since it was said in 1977 that China had more shipbuilding capacity than it had used over the years, possibly because of shortages of special steels and trained manpower,284 it is possible that China granted the licences to Romania in order to take the strain off China's own domestic production. The same would apply to Korea producing Chinese 'R' class submarines. It is perhaps likely that the Chinese would hope to expand their licensed production, since it could take the strain off its own production capacity. This is especially the case for weapons that China would need for modernizing its own forces, that is, rather than outdated equipment, such as older MIGs or tanks. Negotiations with Pakistan have shown that the further China's development of more modern equipment proceeds, the greater the attraction — to both sides — of licensed production. However, China's modernization programme is likely to be lengthy, and China is further limited by the fact that few of its clients are able to produce major items — and the possibility of finding new clients is somewhat limited. Romania alone has joined the ranks of licensed producers over the last decade. Notes 1. Senator Proxmire, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, Subcommitee on Priorities and Economy in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1980, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1981, p. 98. 2. SIPRI notes that very little is known about Chinese credit terms and forms of payment, and that there is no way to substantiate China's claims that the PRC is the only government to give weapons away free. SIPRI Yearbook, 1980, p. 74.

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The Nature of China's Military A id

3. The following is based on US ACDA figures. 4. US ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1964-73. 5. SIPRI Yearbook, 1981, p. 118. 6. This section covers small arms, mortars (up to 122mm), anti-aircraft guns (up to 100mm), anti-tank guns and other heavy artillery, including 130mm guns. 7. China Under Threat, Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 25, 31. 8. Ibid., p. 33. 9. In 1947 the Vietminh arranged the purchase of twelve million piasters' worth of equipment from the Chinese Communists. King C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-54 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 189. 10.NYT, 18 March 1950. ll.NYT, 16 May 1950. 12. CSM, 23 September 1950. 13. The Times, 4 November 1950; CSM, 23 September 1950. 14. NYHT, 13 August 1950. 15. NYHT, 13 August 1950; The Times, 31 July 1950. 16. Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat, p. 13. 17. Guardian, 29 December 1950. 18. The Times, 8 March 1951. 19. NYHT, 15 December 1950;NYT, 16 December 1950. 20. South China Morning Post, 6 June 1951. 21. Alexander L. George, The Chinese Army in Action (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 4. 22 A Chinese volunteer was issued with 80 rounds of small arms ammunition - his total supply. Artillery and mortars were so limited they had to be reserved for the front line. Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 180-2. Captured arms in Korea show that the Soviets were not prompt in the supply of weapons, and that Chinese arms formed only a small percentage of the total: Origin Chinese Russian Japanese US Origin Chinese Russian Japanese US

Nov. 1950-Jan. 1951 4.78% 20.12% 15.0 % 26.0 % CPV 3rd Field Army 7.10% 4.30% 18.50% 50.00%

Feb.-Mar. 1951 6.7 % 6.85% 12.20% 31.48% CPV 4th Field Army 6.70% 6.84% 12.20% 31.48%

Source: Simmons, The Strained Alliance, pp. 180-1. 23. CSM. 19 January 1952; NYHT, 29 January 1952. 24. Chen, China and Vietnam, p. 276. Another estimate is about 1,000 tons per month by July 1952.NYHT, 27 July 1952. 25. Daily Telegraph, 1 April 1952. 26. The Times, 28 January \953;Straits Times, 24 April 1953. 21.NYT, 11 June 1953; Observer, 14 June 1953;NYT, 30 August 1953. 28. Melvin Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, (New York: Columbia University Press 1967), p. 15.

The Nature of China's Military Aid

75

29. Chen, China and Vietnam, p. 297. 30. One French report estimated the flow of Chinese aims at 3,000 tons per week during March 1954; CSM, 24 March 1954. Chen cites another French report of 4,000 tons per month in 1954; others put the figure at 6,000-7,000 tons per month. NYHT, 4 July 1954. 31. Observer, 23 May 1954. 32.NYT, 10 May 1954;Daily Telegraph, 8 July 1954. 33.NYHT, 18 July 1954. 34. Chen, China and Vietnam, p. 278. 35. The Reporter, 17 September 1959;7Vrr, 7 November 1959. 36. Sunday Times 10 April 1960. 37. Daily Telegraph, 15 November 1960. The weapons included 6,494 Czechoslovakian Mauser rifles; 186 automatic weapons; 26 Soviet weapons; and 12 Polish weapons. 38. The Times, 12 November 1964. 39. Ian Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa (Parow, Cape: Cape & Transvaal Printers Ltd, 1974), p. \19;FEER, 1 November 1968. 40. The Reporter, 2 February 1961. 41. The Lumumba-Gizenga government approached the Chinese Ambassador in Cairo in early 1961 requesting food, medicine, arms and money, of which the Chinese were only able to provide the latter. An initial grant of £1,500 was given to the Congo representative in Cairo. NYT, 16 January 1961; Sunday Telegraph, 26 February 1961. 42. NYT, 28 December 1959; Greig, Communist Challenge, p. 175. Although Soviet and East European ships unloaded in Tunisia, President Bourguiba was reported to have objected to China's arms going through Tunisia. The Reporter, 17 September 1959. 43. Ibid. (Greig), p. 175. 44. Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates (New York: Columbia UP, 1968), p. 42. 45. NYT, 22 April 1962. 46. SRV Foreign Ministry, White Book on Relations with China. BBC SWB, 6 October 1979, FE/6238/A3/13. 4T.NYT, 6 December 1962. 48. NYT, 1 July 1962, SVN note of complaint to the ICC. 49. NYT, 6 December 1962. 50. U.S. Information Service, 26 March 196 4 .reporting on an arms cache found in December 1963. 51. Military Balance, 19634, p. 10. 52. Bruce D. Jerkin China and Africa 1949-70 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 171.1,500 guerrillas were trained at the guerrilla training centre in 1963. 53. Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71 (London: Cambridge University Press 1974), p. 172. 54. NYT, 15 June 1964. 55. Daily Telegraph, 3 September 1964;Le Monde, 10 June 1964; John F. Copper, China's Foreign Aid (London: D.C. Heath & Co., 1976). The loan was designated for project aid, but since Chinese arms arrived soon after, it is likely that they accounted for all - or most - of the loan, p. 97. 56. Daily Telegraph, 23 November 1964; NYT, 17 March 1966. In 1967 it was reported that Chinese ships unloaded their cargo directly into the Embassy cellars in Zanzibar, where others boats were loaded up to take the weapons to their destinations elsewhere in Africa. Guardian, 15 August 1967. 57. Ian Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa, p. 179. 58. Observer Foreign News Service, 3 December 1965.

76

The Nature of China's Military Aid

59. Washington Star, 25 November \964;Daily Telegraph, 1 January 1965; Asia Magazine, 20 November 1966. (This magazine reported that the rifles and revolvers were positively identified by their factory markings as having been made in China.) 60. Le Figaro, 10 August, 1966;7Vrr, 3 August 1968. 61. NYT, 29 September 1966; Hashim S.H. Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World: Three Case Studies (London: Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1981), p. 176. 62. ZANU guerrillas training in Ghana in 1964 used Chinese hand grenades, but spent little time using rifles or sub-machine guns, since they were not to engage in positional warfare. Sunday Times, 23 March 1968. 63. NYT 2 May, 1964; The Times, 8 June 1964. Soviet equipment was displayed at a parade, towed by 18 trucks. 64. Guardian, 12 and 15 February 1964; Rene Le Marchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p. 394. 65. Guardian, 9 October 1968; 28 October l966;Daily Telegraph, 8 September 1966. 66. NYT, 17 May 965;Sunday Telegraph, 21 May 1965. 67. NYT, 29 September 1966. 68. Ze'ef Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, Fedayeen (London: Valentine & Mitchell, 1977), p. 209. 69. Guardian, 8 August 1967; 9 September 1968; 19 March l968;Sunday Telegraph, 28 July 1968. 70. Alan Hutchinson, China's African Revolution (London: Hutchinson, 1975), p. 159-60. 71. John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp (eds), Communist Nations'Military Assistance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 120. 72. NYT, 17 March 1966. 73. Le Marchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 394. 74. Guardian, 14 May 1966;Sunday Telegraph, 28 July 1968. 75. The Times, 8 August 1967. The Portuguese claimed to have captured almost 2,000 Czechoslovakian, Soviet and Chinese weapons, including 592 mines, 10 mortars, 21 grenade throwers, 1 cannon; they had also captured 4,000 grenades and 400,000 bullets for light weapons. 76. New Middle East, May 1971. 77. Yitzak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 154. 78. Behbehani, Arab World, University Press, p. 83. 79. In 1972 it was estimated that the Chinese accounted for 90 per cent of FRELIMOs equipment. Daily Telegraph, 25 September'1972. 80. NYT, 19 October 1965. 81. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (London: Penguin, 1975), p. 198. 82. Weapons were said to have been supplied in crates with supplies for the Conference of the New Emerging Forces building. David Mozingo, China's Policy Towards Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 242. The procommunist air force commander, Dhani, said at his trial that he had made arrangements for 25,000 arms to be slated for the air force after discussion with Zhou En-lai. Jay Taylor, China and South-East Asia, 2nd edn (New York: Praeger 1976), p. 113. Another unconfirmed press report claims that 15,000 weapons were distributed to the PKI. NYT, 25 October 1965. 83. Melvin Gurtov, China and South East Asia: The Politics of Survival (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 152. One press report that the

The Nature of China's Military Aid

11

White Flags were sustained mainly by raids on army posts, and that there were no signs of Chinese weapons would indicate that China's support was minimal at most. Washington Post, 5 September 1967. 84. Ibid., p. 93. Gurtov maintains that had China wished to encourage the White Flags during the Korean war years, it would only have taken minimal verbal and material support, but none was extended. On the other hand, Taylor, China and South-East Asia, p. 242, states that China supplied some arms and training during these years. 85. CW, 9 October 1968. 86. OFNS, 3 February 1972; Washington Post, 5 March 1968. This report cites the Thai Prime Minister as saying that the guerrillas were well equipped with modern weapons - both Chinese and American — supplied through Laos. 81. NYT, 27 November 1972. 88.NYT, 20 September 1973; CSM, 9 April 1974. 89. OFNS, 3 February 1972;Daily Telegraph, 8 February 1972. 90. NYT, 18 March 1972. 91. Ibid., 7 August 1980. 92.IHT, 26/27 June 1982; Japan Times, 16 May 1981. 93. Observer, 24 August 1914-JHT, 3 June 1974. 94. Guardian, 24 June 1975. 95. Daily Telegraph, 5 January 1974. 96. Observer, 15 February 1976. 97. IHT, 16 May 191'4;Military Balance, 1976-7, p. 43;Daily Telegraph, 24 February 1977; SIPRI Yearbook, 1976, p. 55. Soviet small arms to the MPLA included 3" mortars, recoiless cannons, mobile bazookas and light firearms. 98. Sunday Telegraph, 21 January 1979. 99. OFNS, 16 July 1980; CSM, 5 January 1976. 100. Copper and Papp, Military Assistance, p. 122. Daily Telegraph, 6 January 1983; OFNS, 13 January 1983 speculated that Zhao's meeting with Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe might lead to an increased number of South African guerrilas going to China for training. 101. Daily Telegraph, 20 June 1971. 102. Military Balance, 1970-1, p. 48; Guardian, 7 February 1981. 103. Communist Aid to LDC's of the Free World, 1977, CIA, National Foreign Assessment Centre (Washington, DC: USGPO, ER-70-10478U, November 1978), pp. 20, 22;Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1977,12 April 1977. 104. Military Balance, 1974-5, p. 41,1975-6, pp. 44-5; Communist Aid to LDC's, 1977, p. 20; Warren Weinstein Chinese Aid and Policy in Central Africa in Warren Weinstein and Thomas Henrikson (eds), Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 163. 105. Daily Telegraph, 20 June 1971. 106. Military Balance, 1974-5, p. 44; 1975-6, p. 44. 107. SIPRI Yearbook, 1976, Arms Trade Register. In 1978 Rwanda was offered enough light towable artillery to form a battalion on the PRC model. Weinstein and Henrikson, Soviet & Chinese Aid to African Nations, p. 163. However, there is no evidence that such equipment was actually supplied. 108. Daily Telegraph, 29 September 1977. 109. Military Balance, 1969-70, p. 61; 1971-2, p. 38; 1973-4, p. 42; Communist Aid to LDC's, 1976, p. 19, and 1977, p. 16. 110. FAZ, 10 January 1979. Li's visit was an attempt to shore up China's relations with Tanzania, especially since Nyerere had reportedly been seeking Soviet arms from Libya. Sunday Telegraph, 21 January 1979. 111. SIPRI Yearbook, 1979, p. 184, China's aid reportedly enabled Kam-

78

The Nature of China's Military Aid

puchea to increase its army from three divisions of 5,000 men to 20 divisions. IHT, 4/5 March 1978, Military Balance, 1983-4, p. 62. The supply of AT-3 missiles in quantity in 1978 is of particular significance in that the Chinese had only recently begun production. In 1978 only 300 antitank guided missiles had been produced (500 by 1979). Allocation of Resources, 1983,p. 104. 112. Observer, 1 February 1981;FEER, 8 May 198l;Daily Telegraph, 8 July 1981. The 7.62mm carbines were obsolescent, while copies of the RPG-7 Rocket launcher were first seen in China in 1972. 113. IHT, 21 December 1982. In the truckload of weapons, 300 plastic mines, and 150 new Chinese Ak-47s were also seen. Supplies had reportedly doubled or trebled in 1983. 114. IHT, 27 October 1983;Xinhua news agency, 21 June 1982. 115. Guardian, 8 May 1984. 116. Sunday Times, 9 December 1979; Guardian, 4 May 1981. 117. In August 1983, Son Sann said that China had just sent 1,000 new weapons, mainly automatic rifles and mortars; however, the KPNLF claim to have 10,000-12,000 armed men, with another 6,000 awaiting arms, which would imply that China's assistance is not overgenerous. Sihanouk's men number 3,000-5,000, with another 5,000 unarmed - dependent on China for further supplies. The Times, 19 August 1983, IHT, 22 November 1983. By May 1984 Son Sann claimed 13,000 armed men and 7,000 unarmed. The Times, 2 May 1984. 118. IHT, 22 November 1983; Guardian, 9 January 1984, reported that the Khmer Rouge hadreceived substantial quantities of arms from China in recent weeks. 119.7^7,13 January 1983. 120. SIPRI Yearbook, 1980, p. 74. 121. Hutchinson, African Revolution, p. 247. 122. Sunday Telegraph, 4 May 1969. 123. NYT, 13 July 1979. Report cites Yang Gongsu, the deputy head of China's delegation conducting talks with the Vietnamese. 124. Straits Times, 14 April 1964;7Vyr, 17 January 1965. 125. Military Balance, 1968-9, p. 13. However, some heavier equipment was from China. One report cites long-range anti-aircraft batteries of over 100mm installed in Hanoi and Haiphong to supplement Soviet SAMs. NYT, 24 January 1966. 126. Sunday Times, 12 April 1970 notes that China was the principal supplier of basic weapons: rifles, light 50-1B rockets and ammunition in the Laotian and Cambodian bases. 127. NYHT, 22 February 1965. 128. IHT, 26 July 1967. 129. Japan Times, 11 May 1967. See also note 133 below. 130. NYT, 22 June 1970. 131.NYT, 9 February 1968. 132. NYHT, 15 May 1964; The Times, 29 November 1965. 133. Sihanouk confirmed that one-third of these arms went to the Cambodian army and two-thirds to the Viet Cong. NYT, 4 July 1973. 134. IHT, 11-12 July 1970. 135. Le Monde, 19 December 1972. 136. BR, 14 July 1961. Chen Yi in interview with Canadian journalists at Geneva. 137. Simmons, Strained Alliance, p. 212; Copper and Papp, Military Assistance,p. 103. 138. Mozingo, China's Policy Towards Indonesia, p. 146; Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, p. 100.

The Nature of China's Military Aid

79

139. Chen Yi sent a letter to Xuan Thuy soon after American combat troops were sent to South Vietnam, reassuring him that "The Chinese people will exert every effort to send the heroic South Vietnamese people the necessary material aid, including arms and all other war material, and stand ready to despatch their men to fight shoulder to shoulder with the South Vietnamese people when the latter so requires'. (Emphasis added.) NCNA, March 28 1965. 140. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 186. 141. Ibid., p. 186; CSM, 18 April 1968. 142. The Times, 23 March 1971. 143. SIPRI Yearbook, 1974, p. 14; CSM, 18 March 19^'4; Allocation of Resources, 1975, p. 75. 144. Japan Times, 20 September 1972. 145. The Times, 4 January 1978. The South China Morning Post reported that the Chinese were helping to slow down the advance of Vietnamese troops, but had not been in battle. IHT, 4 January l91S;Daily Telegraph, 18 January 1978. 146. Copper and Papp, Military Assistance, p. 109; Yaacov Vertzberger, The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistan Relations, Asian Survey, XXIII, no. 5, May 1983, p. 643. 147. Communist Aid, 1977, p. 4 148. Communist Aid, 1975, p. 31, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, June 1970; Daily Telegraph, 20 June 1971. 149. Communist Aid, 1975, p. 31; 1978, pp. 5-6. 150. Rene Le Marchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 205. 151. Sunday Times, 20 October 1968. 152. Gurtov, The Politics of Survival, p. 196, p. 27. 153. CSM, 17 May 1971; Observer, 30 August and 13 September 1964. The team consisted of seven instructors and four interpreters to train approximately 300 Zanzibaris (one-third of the army) at a training camp in Matoni. 154. Larkin, China and Africa, p. 133. After the coup in 1966, 13 guerrilla warfare instructors left; Ghanaian Government Information Service, Nkrumah 's Subversion of Africa (Accra-Tema: State Publishing Corporation, 1966), pp. iv, 8. 155. The Times, 2 July 1964. The reported number of 100 Chinese instructors at a training camp near Moshi in Northern Tanzania may, in the light of the number known to be training in Ghana, seem exaggerated. The report was carried in the Asia Magazine, 20 November 1966. 156. Nkrumah's Subversion, pp. 7, 8,18; Larkin, China and Africa p. 133; African Review, July 1966. 157. USNews & WorldReport, 12 December 1966. 158. Chinese, Russian and Cuban advisors reportedly trained and assisted Mozambique guerrillas (who went on hit-and-run raids into Northern Mozambique) at camps in Mbamba Bay, Songea and Newala, while the Tanzanians themselves trained FRELIMO at Nachingwea. Bagamoyo was the base from which the OAU Liberation Committee allocated arms; Soviet, Algerian, Ethiopian, and Czech arms were reportedly sent there in quantity in 1964 - although this report does not mention Chinese arms. Daily Telegraph, May 4 1961 ;NYT, 31 December 1964. 159. Observer, 27 September 1964; OFNS, 24 November 1964. 160. Shichor, The Middle East, pp. 153^. Washington Post, 3 May 1970. 161. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A study in Soviet Policy in the Third World, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 103-4. Klinghoffer states that some Chinese arms were provided, but Colin Legum disagrees. After Angola (London: Rex Ceilings, 1976), p. 12. He maintains no Chinese arms

80

The Nature of China's Military Aid

arrived until 1975. 162. Larkin, China and Africa, p. 184 163. The Reporter, 17 September 1959. 164. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, p. 175; Larkin, China and Africa, pp. 71-2; Greig, The Communist Challenge, p. H9;LeProgres (Leopoldville), 27 February 1964. 165. Guardian, 17 July 1969; 8 April 1968. 166. NYT, 28 April 1962. It was estimated that most of the 16,000 North Vietnamese troops among the VC had received training from China. 167. Taylor, China and South East Asia, p. 289; Gurtov, Politics of Survival, p. 17. 168. Aviation Week, 17 August 1964;7VKr, 17 January 1965. 169. SIPRI Yearbook, 1978, p. 226. 170. SIPRI Yearbook, 1980, p. 74. 171. Allocation of Resources, 1982, p. 68; ibid., 1983 p. 106. 172. US ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-77, p. 159; 1970-9, p. 131; Allocation of Resources, 1982, p. 112; 1983, p. 107. 173. Thomas W. Robinson, China's Military Modernisation in the 1980's in China Under the Four Modernisations (Joint Economic Committee, Washington, DC: US GPO, 87-1990), 13 August 1982, p. 586. 174. Ibid., p. 586. 175. Ibid., p. 586. 176. Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (eds), China's Defence Policy (London. Macmillan, 1984), p. xvii. 177. Bill Sweetman, Air Forces in ibid., p. 77. 178. The Times, 23 March 1976. 179. These five were North Vietnam, Pakistan, Albania, Tanzania and North Korea. Algeria did receive a one-off delivery of four transport planes in 1965, however, and Cambodia received four transports, four trainers and three MIG 17s in 1968 - promised since 1965. Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, p. 155; NYT 5 January 1968. 180. See, for example, Red Flag article on the lessons of the Arab War. NCNA, 23 August 1967. While people's war would probably have been the best path for the PLO to follow, the Chinese seemed to display a certain amount of naivety in advocating a strategy clearly unsuitable for the Arab states fighting against Israel. 181. Despite its strident denunciation of the partial Test Ban Treaty and continued opposition to any non-proliferation agreement, China has been restrained in transferring nuclear technology. Reports in 1965 that China had given nuclear secrets to Nasser, and that Sukarno was about to accept Chinese aid for a nuclear explosion on Indonesian territory have not been substantiated. Daily Telegraph, 9 April 1965; Sunday Telegraph and NYT, 25 August 1965. Once Sino-Egyptian relations had cooled, Egypt said that China had refused to share its nuclear technology, CSM, 11 July 1967. 182. Yitzhak Schichor, The Middle East in Segal and Tow, China's Defence Policy, p. 20. 183. Ibid., Sweetman, p. 77. 184. The F-7 was based on the MIG-21 delivered to China before 1960. This early model MIG-21 has no search radar and a very small combat radius. Later versions, in production in the Soviet Union and India, are very much better equipped. Ibid., p. 84, n. 12; Jane's, All the World's Aircraft, 1982-83, (London: Jane's Publishing Co.), p. 37. According to other estimates, however, the Chinese F-7 has better capabilities than the Soviet MIG-21. Segal and Tow, China's Defence Policy, Shichor, p. 270. 185. Ibid., Sweetman, p. 77; Jane's, Aircraft, 1982-83, p. 37.

The Nature of China's Military Aid

81

186. SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers (London: MIT Press, 1975), p. 10. The register gives the number supplied as 100, although there is some uncertainty as to the exact number of aircraft delivered. 187. Ibid., p. 10-11. There is some uncertainty as to the exact numbers supplied. The MIG-15s, MIG-19s and IL-28s, although supplied by China, do not appear form the register to have been built in China under licence (although some of these aircraft were produced in the PRC) and it thus seems likely that they were originally supplied to China and then passed on, secondhand, to the Koreans. 188. Michael Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 173, 175. 189. The numbers were 10 MIG-15s and probably 5 MIG-17s. SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, p. 27. 190. Interavia, February 1968. 191. NYT, 30 December 1964. 192. SIPRI Yearbook, 1979, pp. 114-5; Military Balance, 1966-7, p. 10. 193. Military Balance, 1967-8, p. 53; SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, p. 27. 194. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, (London: Penguin, 1975), p. 183, Jane's, Aircraft, 1982-3 estimates the number of F-7s at 60-80 when production ended in 1966; it was halted until the 1970s, p. 36. NYT, 24 January 1966. 195. SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers;, p. SS.'gives the number as four; SIPRI, Arms Trade With the Third World, eight; while the Military Balance, 1967-8, p. 53, cites ten. 196. NYT, 13 July 1979. 197. Egypt also received 30 MIG engines in 1976. Daily Telegraph, 26 March 1976. SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, 1973, l914;Arms Trade Registers, pp. 28, 38, 88; Military Balance, 1973-4, p. 83. 198. Allocation of Resources, 1982, p. 105. 199. Military Balance, 1981-2, p. 57; SIPRI, Computer Printout. 200. Allocation of Resources, 1982, p. 108. 201. Ibid., p. 108. 202. SIPRI, Computer Printout. 203. Ibid. 204. Ibid. 205. Dawn, 12 February 1983; PEER, 7 April 1983. The aircraft had been specially modified for high-speed, low-level missions. International Defense Review, 5 September 1983. 206. Military Balance, 19834, p. 129;IHT, 4 April 1984. 207. SIPRI Yearbook, 1980, p. 129; Schichor in Segal and Tow China's Defence Policy, p. 268; CQ no. 73, June 1978, p. 476 (quarterly documentation). 208. SIPRI Yearbook, 1981, p. 75. 209. CSM, 26 December 1973; SIPRI Yearbook 1974, 1975. 210. Straits Times, 7 November 1978; SIPRI, Computer Printout. 211. Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1982-3 states that the Type 63 is in service in Zaire Mali, Sudan and Tanzania, while SIPRI statistics give Type 62s as having been exported to these states. 212. Thomas W. Robinson in China Under the Four Modernisations, p. 585. 213.Military Balance, 1967-8, p. 53. 214. SIPRI Yearbook, 1972; 1970-1, Arms Trade Register. 215. SIPRI Yearbook, 1968-9, p. 79. 216. SIPRI Arms Trade Registers, p. 88;Sunday Telegraph, 11 February 1968. 217. SIPRI Arms Trade Registers, p. 40.

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The Nature of China's Military Aid

218. Ibid., pp.40, 87, 88. 219. SIPRI Yearbook, 1973, pp. 3034; The Jewish Observer, 9 September 1971, reported the Syrians had seized 200 tanks, armoured cars and troop carriers at Latakia, supposedly en route to the PLO. 220. Military Balance, 1974-5, p. 27 reported Albania possessed 15 T-54s and Type 59s. 221. SIPRI Yearbook, 1976; 1975 Arms Trade Register; lane's Armour and Artillery, 1982-3, p. 135 states that Zaire used Chinese Type 63s in Angola. 222. Military Balance, 1972-3, p. 25;1975-6 p. 27. 223. Ibid,7P75-