Chess Game for Democracy: Hungary between East and West, 1944-1947 9780773587434

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chess game for democracy

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Chess Game for Democracy Hungary between East and West 1944–1947 mária palasik

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2011 isbn 978-0-7735-3849-8 (cloth) isbn 978-0-7735-3850-4 (paper) Legal deposit second quarter 2011 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security). Translated by Mario Fenyo Special thanks are due to György Gyarmati for his careful reading of and detailed comments on the original manuscript. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Palasik, Mária Chess game for democracy: Hungary between East and West, 1944–1947 / Mária Palasik; translated by Mario Fenyo. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7735-3849-8 (bound). – ISBN 978-0-7735-3850-4 (pbk.) 1. Hungary – Politics and government – 1945–1989. 2. Hungary – History – 1945–1989. I. Fenyo, Mario D. II. Title. DB956.P34 2011

943.905 ' 2

C2011-901378-9

This book was typeset by Interscript in 10.5/13 Sabon.

Contents

Acknowledgments vii Introduction

ix

1 Antecedents 3 2 The Transition Period: From War to Peace 3 Consolidation and Confrontation 4 The Takeover in the Coalition 5 Endgame in Hungary Epilogue

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Biographies 157 Notes

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Bibliography Index

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Acknowledgments

This research was generously supported by funding from different sources. I would like to thank the 1945–ös Alapítvány (the 1945 Foundation) for the inspiration they gave me in writing this book and for their generous financial contribution to its publication. The 1945 Foundation, established in 1993, has been most active in disseminating knowledge about the history of Hungary in the aftermath of World War II. It has published relevant literature, in collaboration with Occidental Press. I would also like to offer personal thanks to  István Csicsery-Rónay, Tamás Cholnoky, Róbert Gábor, János Horváth, Bálint Török, and Gyula Várallyay of the 1945 Foundation for their continuing support. I am also grateful for the grant received from the following donors and members of the Hungarian American Coalition, who went beyond the call of duty in raising additional funding towards the publication costs of this volume: László Halmos, Edith Lauer, Imre Lendvai Lintner, Zsolt Szekeres. Thanks are due to the Budapest University of Technology and Economics and its Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, as well as to the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security for supporting me and providing an inspiring work environment. Many thanks also to my reader, György Gyarmati, for his detailed comments. I am grateful to the anonymous peer review team for their helpful and positive remarks. Thanks to Márta Lázár Gelléri for her thorough editing work on the Hungarian manuscript. A special thanks to the translator, Mario Fenyo of Bowie State University in Maryland, USA, who is himself a historian specializing in Central Europe and who helped me with valuable comments and advice far beyond the mere translation.

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I wish to thank in particular the following staff at the Hungarian National Archives: Lajos Gecsényi, Director, Mihály Kurecsko, Anna Kosztricz, István Simon and László G. Vass; Ida Petrik Vámos, Gergő Bendegúz Cseh, and Éva Szakolczai at the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security; and Katalin Zalai, Director, and Julianna Horváth at the Archives of Political History and Trade Unions for their invaluable help. I would also like to express my gratitude to the staff of the Public Record Office in London for their professional assistance. Likewise, I wish to thank Éva Tóth, head of the Library of the Institute of Political History, as well as the institute’s staff, for their ongoing support. I am indebted to many colleagues and friends for their helpful advice and remarks, especially Gábor Baczoni, Bernd-Rainer Barth, Paul W. Birt, Nandor F. Dreisziger, István Feitl, György Földes, Randy Herschaft, Lajos Izsák, Ferenc Katona, Gusztáv Kecskés, Éva Petrás, Sylvia Pilisi, Mark Pittaway, Péter Sipos, Éva Standeisky, Balázs Szalontai, Agatha Schwartz, and Judit Szapor, all of whom generously gave their time when discussing aspects of the draft of this manuscript. I wish to thank my students at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics for their interest and attention, and for the inspiration they gave me with all their questions. I would also like to thank Judy Young of Ottawa, president of the Canada-Hungary Educational Foundation, for her generous support in the process of turning the manuscript into the book it is today. Thanks to the staff at McGill-Queen’s Press, especially Kyla Madden, Joan McGilvray, and Lesley Andrassy, for their kind help in the last stages of the work before publication. Last but not least, my thanks also go to my family, my husband István and my son Márton, for their encouragement and emotional support. This book is dedicated to them.

Introduction

This book is the outcome of ten years of archival research. It deals with the political history of Hungary in the two-and-a-half years following World War II; the records on which it is based – only a fraction of which are known in the pertinent literature – shed new light on various aspects of that history.1 A generally accepted and firmly rooted notion, even in the specialized literature, is that Soviet (or Bolshevik) penetration of this region of Eastern Europe,2 where the Red Army was operating in the last stages of the war, was almost immediate; in other words, that the “takeover” followed some kind of predetermined script with spectacular speed and flowed into the Communist takeover of 1948. However, in the region that formed part of the Soviet sphere of interest the Stalinist version of Communist or one-party rule developed quite independently of the country’s international status at the end of World War II, whether the country was among the secondary winners, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, or among the secondary losers, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.3 This book focuses on a single country and strives to demonstrate that, in the case of the above countries, significant divergences already existed in the pre-Stalinist stage. These differences were evident even within the general categories of secondary winners or losers, albeit they were heading in the same direction, toward a “common fate”: the consolidation of Stalinist state socialism. (I have not included Austria, Finland, and the future German Democratic Republic here because, in their case, during and around the years under consideration, their post-war fate was determined by other great power interests and by geopolitical factors.)

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A number of monographs and documentary publications deal with the post-war years in all of these countries, some published even before the change of regime in 1989–92.4 Before 1989, however, the expectations placed upon contemporary historians always had ideological and political implications, even if, over the decades, these expectations had become less direct and more flexible, depending on the country concerned. One was not allowed to forget the most basic assumption, namely that the dominant ideology of state socialism – whether in its Stalinist or post-Stalinist variant – qualified as humanity’s highest stage of development. Nor could one question the path leading to it: the necessity of breaking up the bourgeois parties and the absorption of the Social Democratic parties by the Communist parties. In most countries of the region, the 1970s signalled the beginnings of factual historiography, so that the historical works of the 1980s could express the idea that the creation and preservation of Communist one-party rule (or state socialism) was not the desire of the majority of people; rather, it was in the vested interest of the great power that extended its influence all the way to the centre of Europe, and of a minority who served as its clients or comprador class, having been placed in a command post by the great power. Among the publications that preceded the transition of 1989 we should not ignore – for the sake of historiographic completeness – the historical activities of the political émigrés and exiles who had found a new home and livelihood in the so-called free world. Their writings – ranging from memoirs to scholarly studies – cover a broad spectrum both in form and quality, but, taken as a whole, they created a “virtual discourse” that transcended the Iron Curtain, a critical opposition point of view, even regarding the history of the aftermath of the war.5 Of course, there is the question of whether and to what degree these contemporary émigré interpretations were confirmed, corrected, or outright refuted by the archival resources that became available after the various Eastern European regime changes. After 1989−92, in most of the countries concerned – and, for the time being, even in the former Soviet Union – many of the hitherto classified sections of public records were opened to the public. Researchers had access to sources that provide details or explanations about the history of the particular countries, or the “Soviet bloc” as a whole, and make possible a more nuanced view of relations between East and West, and among the great powers. The political transition made it possible to overcome or transcend ideological constraints and to research and publish about topics hitherto con- sidered taboo. The younger generation of

Introduction

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historians was exempt from, whereas the older generation was relieved of, the pressures of state or party ideology, and both felt free to reveal the predicament and tribulations of this half of Europe. The authors of works based on newly accessible local or Soviet records include F. Adams Bradley, Anita J. Prazmowska, Benjamin Frommer, Dimitrov Vesselin, Gerhard Wetting, and Laslo Sekelj.6 In his 2005 book, Tony Judt examines what happened on each side of the Iron Curtain, with the West nervously inching forward while the East endured the “peace of the prison yard” until the fall of Communism in 1989 signalled their chance to progress.7 The new approaches found in the international literature have implications for Hungarian historiography as well. Thus I should mention the proceedings of an international conference on the change in Hungary’s international role during the twentieth century, for some of the essays presented there concerning the aftermath of World War II made use of newly opened Russian archival sources. The proceedings, edited by Ignác Romsics, were published in 1995 under the auspices of Atlantic Research and Publication, Inc, headed by Béla K. Király.8 In addition, László Borhi, relying primarily on Western sources, dealt with foreign policy aspects9 and Mark Pittaway examined Hungary as embedded in the history of Eastern Europe over a period of sixty years.10 In contrast, the work of Martin Mevius has a far narrower focus but covers hitherto unexamined aspects: it focuses on the cultural policy and propaganda of the Hungarian Communist Party in relation to Hungarian nationalism.11 Peter Kenez’s book, relying on Hungarian Communist Party records, deals with the events in narrative form.12 The collaborative work of György Gyarmati and Tibor Valuch examines Hungarian political and social history from the end of World War II to the last change in regime.13 These books, in providing a fresh perspective, not only enable us to rethink the often stereotypical image of the region or of individual countries but also contribute significant data to the debate about the Cold War that has been going on for decades among historians and political scientists around the world. In this debate representatives of the traditional and orthodox factions emphasize the Soviet Union’s guilt in the deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations after World War II and for the all-pervasive Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. In contrast, the revisionists blame the United States for the worsening relationship between the two great powers and for the Bolshevization of the occupied lands in Eastern Europe. According to them, although the region was

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bound to become part of the Soviet sphere of influence, if the United States had pursued more flexible policies the Communist takeover could have been prevented. But for this to have happened, the USA would have had to be less threatening toward Soviet strategic interests in Eastern Europe. A number of attempts have been made to find a middle-of-theroad position between these two major standpoints. These are sometimes referred to as post-revisionist or neo-realistic viewpoints, and, on the basis of recently available sources, have provided more nuances in the Cold War debates over the last few decades. However, even the most recent research has failed to bridge the gap separating the two sides – that is, to determine which of the superpowers bears the brunt of the responsibility for the worsening of the Cold War.14 With regard to the history of Hungary in the period, and why it became a protectorate of Moscow, it is important to look at Soviet totalitarian theory as well. There are new developments even in this respect – differences in approaches and analyses between work done before and after 1989, not only because of the flood of new sources that became available with the gradual opening of the archives. These works still influence today’s social scientists, but one author who surveyed the works of the new generation of Sovietologists concluded that: “the heritage of the totalitarian paradigm, namely, ‘the historiography of disclosure’ became part of the new Sovietology – paradoxically enough – precisely when the Cold War came to an end.”15 Although my work relies extensively on primary sources, its objective is not “disclosure.” The details revealed here are meant to lead to an understanding of the events in the sense of Spinoza’s “intellegere,” in the context of the period; that is, to give us a better understanding of European history in the aftermath of World War II and of the reasons for the changes in the relations between the superpowers through the case study of a single country. To unravel the complexities of the period 1944 to 1947, it is not enough to shed light on the dynamics of domestic and cultural policies and their mutual relations. In addition to the customary political, economic, or ideological approaches we usually find in the specialized literature, we need to look at other aspects – primarily the legislative, justice, police, and state security apparatus, as well as the law-making processes – to shed light on the struggle between democracy and dictatorship in Hungary from 1944 to 1947. This book deals with important topics from a fresh standpoint, including the undermining of the leaders of the Independent Smallholders, who had received overwhelming popular support during the first and last free elections in

Introduction

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Hungary (until recently), and how Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was forced out of office. It strives to document and emphasize an interpretation, not generally accepted even today, of the relationship of the first show trials in Hungary to the anti-Communist campaign in Iran, and the consequences of the rejection of Hungary’s application for membership in the United Nations in 1947. The series of show trials – contrary to what is commonly believed – did not begin with the trial of Prince Primate Cardinal József Mindszenty or that of the Communist Minister of the Interior László Rajk in 1949. Based on the most recent findings, this book demonstrates that, in the long series of show trials, the trial of the so-called “conspiracy against the republic” was the first to get such publicity, followed by the trial of those Social Democrats who objected to the merger of the two workers’ parties that prefigured the Communist takeover. The history of this period in East-Central Europe is full of unresolved contradictions even today. The zones of occupation that had evolved by the end of the war predestined the fate of the region, described as a buffer zone between East and West, for decades to come. After Eastern Europe came under Soviet occupation in 1945, Western public opinion as well as historical accounts often considered all the countries of the region in the same light, without regard to the particularities and specific predicaments of individual countries. The Soviet military presence was not enough to homogenize the area in and of itself, especially because some of the countries ended on the losing side, while others were among the winners. But even among the losers, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania were assessed and treated differently by the great powers. As Bulgaria never declared war on the Soviet Union, it was labelled an “enemy” strictly because of Soviet strategic considerations; Hungary, which had been occupied by its own ally, the forces of the Third Reich, was also declared an enemy for mostly strategic reasons. Romania benefitted from more favourable treatment, as the first country in the region to bail out of the war.16 While Poland is counted among the secondary winners, it encountered the same fate as the losing countries because of concealed Western considerations. Historians of Czechoslovakia can also point to a number of peculiarities: the amalgamation of a province that had been absorbed into the Third Reich and an outright ally of Hitler (Slovakia), it was conceded the status of a secondary winner, yet evolved into a Soviet protectorate just the same. Although Soviet troops were withdrawn from Bulgaria, a loser, a winner, Poland, remained under Soviet occupation to the end.

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Stalin even humiliated the Poles by appointing a former general of the Red Army as its minister of defence and deputy prime minister.17 While Yugoslavia was also counted among the winners18 and friends, Albania became a separate category among the winners: Soviet influence over the latter two countries remained limited, while they discovered a different path to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The peacemaking great powers created so-called Allied Control Commissions in the defeated countries, modelled on the commission in Italy, the first country to bail out of the war. All these commissions had unique features as regards their composition and operation, but the chairmanship was invariably in the hands of the country that had dislodged the Axis. On the basis of the sources used for this study, it is clear that while Hungary was the last country to surrender, the American and British delegates to the commission (under Soviet presidency) had slightly more influence than they did in the cases of Bulgaria or Romania; even so, their role was limited to sending unfavourable reports to their respective governments and displaying diplomatic displeasure while watching – one might almost say assisting in – the increasingly expanding Soviet penetration.19 How do we account for this? And why have we not paid sufficient attention to why the great powers, who, by the agreements signed at Yalta, had promised the nations of Europe free elections, found it so difficult to keep their promise? Furthermore, it is not generally known that Hungary was the first country in the region to hold free elections – which the great powers themselves recognized – and, unlike what happened in the neighbouring countries, it was not a Soviet puppet coalition but rather the Independent Smallholders and Bourgeois Party, representing parliamentary pluralism, that carried the day with 57 per cent of the popular vote. All this happened in a country occupied by the Red Army, whereas, if we look at the Western half of Europe, whether at the losers or the winners, the Socialist or Socialist-Communist alliances clearly became the dominant factor in forming governments. When, in the first half of 1947, thanks to the indirect influence of the United States, the Communist ministers were forced out of the cabinet, first in France and later in Italy, the Soviet Union permitted the harassment of bourgeois leaders, forcing many of them into exile or allowing their arrest and execution in the countries under their occupation, all within a few months.20 Besides Hungary, this chain of events occurred in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and even in Czechoslovakia, where the head of state, Edvard Beneš, the most pro-Soviet of the bourgeois leaders, was forced to resign on 7 June

Introduction

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1948. Although the Soviet troops left Czechoslovakia in December 1945, their influence continued to be deeply felt; the careers of the bourgeois politicians and the fate of democracy were also sealed by the coup d’état of February 1948. According to a survey (not lacking in irony), the Pax Sovietica offered the winners in Eastern Europe the same reward that the losers had received by way of punishment.21 The beginnings of the clash between Soviet and Western interests have been examined by many and often; it is a key issue in the debate about the Cold War. This book contributes data to this debate by examining events in Hungary, revealing how the Hungarian Communists and their number one leader, Mátyás Rákosi, did everything in their power to hasten the Communist takeover in Hungary. Rákosi bombarded Stalin with his ideas and wishes, even though Stalin, along with other Soviet leaders, was often reluctant to grant those wishes. While Rákosi tried to be Stalin’s best disciple, Stalin encouraged his enthusiastic disciple to be cautious, as he was only the Communist leader in a defeated country, ranking below not only the Communist leaders among the victors but even the Bulgarian leadership. A different issue is why, in contrast to the other small states soon to become satellites, the Soviet Union started its penetration of Hungary in the economic sphere, using the delivery of reparations as inducement to tempt a government that, as a result of the absolute victory of the “bourgeois” Independent Smallholders, was not necessarily compliant.22 In Hungary, as in most countries of the region, World War II overturned the privileges of the old regime. All of Europe underwent change; the devastation strained and often shattered the old political and social orders. Masses of people appeared on the scene, ready to define the new politics. Liberation and occupation visited most of Europe at the same time. As elsewhere, the political actors were replaced in Hungary; the political parties of the Horthy era were swept aside. From the opposition during the interwar period only the Smallholder Party, the Social Democratic Party, the underground Communist Party, and the National Peasant Party were left and together became the governing force during the period under consideration. In this work I deal with Hungary’s predicament at the birth of this new post-war period and its international ramifications, but at the same time I would like to shed light on the efforts of the generation that led the struggle for democracy. It seems all the more important to discuss these issues because many, even today, question the sense of these efforts, claiming that the democratic forces in Hungary had no possibility

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of constructing a pluralistic, democratic political system in the aftermath of World War II. The moves of the endgame had already been decided in favour of dictatorship by the simple fact that the Red Army was in occupation. My own interpretation, in contrast, shows that the situation was far more complex. We cannot simply argue that the Soviet Union, with the help of the Western powers, established control from the start merely by placing the Communists returning from exile in Moscow into positions of power. The establishment of democratic public institutions was in motion, albeit haltingly, between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1947. We cannot disregard the struggle of the advocates of democracy in those years, who were bent on consolidating the multiparty system wished for by the majority, or ignore their conviction that Hungary had an opportunity to have a truly independent national existence once the peace treaty had been signed. I try to elucidate the simultaneous processes of democratization and pre-Stalinization, without trying to justify a priori the inevitability of the dictatorship, which eventually turned into a reign of terror. The essentially bloodless political and social revolution that took place in 1945 and 1946 resulted in the displacement of the old political, economic, and cultural elite (most of whom had left for the West in any case), and empowered the two strata that constituted the majority of the population – the peasantry and the industrial workers – opening the road to their advancement. It also resulted in meaningful land reform, human rights legislation, and the declaration of a republican form of government backed by an informal constitution. All this is clearly confirmed by the fact that, during the restoration of democracy in 1990, legal principles and paragraphs from 1946 were recycled. At the same time there is an opportunity here to demonstrate the contradictions of those years: the liberation of the country from the horrors of war, while the people were compelled to live as a defeated nation under Soviet occupation; and the parties ruling in a grand coalition, while inter-party struggles for power became the norm. These struggles were marked by the constant conflict between the two most powerful parties in the coalition: the Independent Smallholders and the Communist Party. The history of these processes is like a dramatic game of chess between the two parties. At the beginning of the game no one could have predicted the outcome for certain. Had the outcome been clear – as some social scientists continue to argue – there would have been no need to resort to force in 1947, no need for the Communist Party to insist on Soviet help to take over. Let me reiterate – to achieve the

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takeover the Communist forces needed more than two years of political manoeuvring; furthermore, they needed the serendipitous circumstance that the Americans and the British would risk nothing for the sake of a former German ally. The purpose of this book is to examine these complex factors and the political processes (and policy-making) of those decisive years following the war. How was it possible for the two major parties to work together in a coalition government, while constantly at odds with each other? Which were the defining aspects of this conflict? At the same time, this study analyzes the role of the great powers in bringing this brief and hopeful period of Hungarian history to an end.

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1 Antecedents

In the process of gaining independence from Austria, Hungary lost two-thirds of her territory, and one-third of the population who spoke Hungarian as their mother tongue but found themselves beyond Hungary’s borders as a result of the Peace Treaty of Trianon of 1920. Although monarchy remained the form of government until 1946, the Habsburgs, who had ruled Hungary continuously for almost 400 years, were now deprived of their throne. Thus the country was subject to a unique constitutional arrangement, the so-called kingdom without a king. The highest constitutional office was that of the newly instituted regent, occupied by Miklós Horthy, formerly aide-de-camp to King Francis Joseph and later commander of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. Hungary participated in World War II on the side of Germany. In the midst of the war Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Indicative of the paradoxes involved was a diary entry by Mussolini’s son-in-law and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano. The entry reports on an alleged conversation between the Hungarian chargé d’affaires in Washington and the appropriate State Department official after Hungary declared war on the United States on 12 December 1941: Hungary is a republic, is it not? No Sir, it is kingdom. So you have a king? No, we do not. We have an admiral. So you have a navy? No, since we don’t have a sea. Do you have demands?

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Yes. Against the United States? No. Against England? No. Against Russia? No. Then against whom do you have demands? Against Romania. So you will declare war on Romania as well? No sir. We are allies.1 A major theme of Hungarian foreign policy between the two wars was the return of the lost territories. While Hungary gained independence after the Great War, it was surrounded by an alliance of antagonists, the so-called Little Entente, made up of states that had increased because of territories created by partitioning Hungary (Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Romania). Hungary’s isolation was mitigated only by good relations with Austria, Italy, and, to some extent, Poland, until the mid-1930s when the country became an ally of Nazi Germany in the expectation that this would provide a backer for the recovery of the regions lost under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. Foreign policy aimed at the recovery of lost territories may be deemed to have been successful between 1938 and 1941, given the return of about 80,000 m2 of land with its 46.5 per cent Hungarian population, thanks to the intercession of Mussolini and Hitler. Even so, a numerically significant Hungarian population remained on the other side of the borders. The Hungarian political leadership and Hitler had serious divergences of opinion. A few months after the Anschluss, the occupation and annexation of Austria in 1938, Hitler organized a grand naval review in Kiel in honour of Regent Horthy. He offered to partition Czechoslovakia between the two countries: while the Wehrmacht invaded Bohemia, Hungary was to attack Slovakia, which it could retain. In his response Horthy made it clear that such a move would result in a world war that only the sea-powers could win. Moreover, he did not covet Slovakia. In September 1939 Hungary refused to participate in any attack directed against Poland and even barred the use of Hungarian railroad lines to enable the Germans to surround Poland from the south.

Antecedents

5

How long could Hungary withstand the demands of Hitler in his policy of Drang nach Osten? Was there an alternative? Almost all the countries affected reacted to the policy in different ways. The Czechs surrendered and, under the German occupation, produced war material for the Wehrmacht until the end. The Poles confronted the Germans with their entire military force, and bled on the battlefield. The Romanians adopted the strategy that had already proved to their benefit during the Great War: first they fought against the Soviet Union with the second largest force in the field, then, at the right moment, they switched sides, with the fourth largest force against Germany (within Europe). With almost suicidal heroism the Serbs forced their pro-German government to resign, and the ensuing German occupation inflicted untold suffering on the country. The newly formed states, Slovakia and Croatia, became Hitler’s satellites and uninhibited partners in crime. Hungary lost her sovereignty with the German occupation of 19 March 1944. It was mainly thanks to the policy of armed neutrality, initiated by Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki, that this loss had not taken place even earlier; as a consequence of this policy, for almost four-anda-half years – a nearly unique case in Europe – the government was able to forestall the German occupation. It had to pay a price for that, however: Hungary’s participation in the war on the Soviet Union. The delayed German occupation was assessed as follows by Anne O’Hare McCormick in the 15 July 1944 issue of the New York Times: “It must count in the score of Hungary that until the Germans took control it was the last refuge in Central Europe for the Jews able to escape from Germany, Austria, Poland, and Rumania. Now these hopeless people are exposed to the same ruthless policy of deportation and extermination that was carried out in Poland. But as long as they exercised any authority in their own house, the Hungarians tried to protect the Jews.” From April 1944 the occupying Germans deported the Jews from the provinces to the concentration camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau, with the assistance of the Hungarian administration. In the territory of presentday Hungary, 210,000 Hungarians out of 450,000 fell victim to the Holocaust. In the territory returned to Hungary by the terms of the two Vienna awards, between 465,000 and 564,507 Hungarian Jews perished out of a total of 780,000 to 825,000 – the exact figure is hard to ascertain because of the complexity of the situation.2 Horthy remained as regent after the German occupation but he appointed a Quisling cabinet to serve the Germans. However, once he regained his selfconfidence, it turned out that he had enough manoeuvring room to give

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the order to halt the deportation of the Jews on 7 July 1944 (although several more trains left for Auschwitz after that date3), thus carrying out “the intentions he outlined at the Crown Council meeting of 26 June.”4 But Adolf Eichmann, who had elaborated the plan, and Arrow Cross undersecretary László Baky could not reconcile themselves to the idea of letting about 250,000 Jews get away and planned the deportation of the Budapest Jews within a few days, with the help of real or fake gendarmes. They also resolved that, should Regent Horthy confront them, they would engineer a coup d’état. The Hungarian Independence Movement went into action. It asked Ferenc Koszorús, the chief-of-staff of the First Armoured Division, stationed in the hills nearby, to prevent this operation. Koszorús was aware of the plans of Baky and company and took steps to prepare a counter-move. He offered Horthy a plan that would allow him to disperse the “riff-raff dressed in gendarme uniform” from Budapest. Horthy issued the order and, in the night of 6 July, the division, led by Koszorús, entered Buda and forced Baky and company to evacuate the capital city. Tom Lantos, who survived the Holocaust to become a congressman, told the Congress of the United States on 26 May 1994 that: ”the exemplary act of Koszorús is the one known instance when an Axis power was able to prevent the deportation of Jews by resorting to military force.” He added – referring to the efforts of Swedish, Swiss, Salvadoran, Portuguese, Italian, and even Spanish diplomats and the Papal nuncio to rescue Jews during the next few months – that, had it not been for the action of Koszorús, not a single Jew would have been left in Budapest to be saved.5 An increasingly conservative regime was formed in Hungary in the aftermath of the Great War. Although suffrage was regulated by an act promulgated in November 1919 in accordance with the norms prevailing at the time, it remained in effect for only a short while – the duration of a single election. According to these rules, every male of at least twenty-four was granted suffrage, provided he resided in the same community for at least half a year. Every woman of at least twenty-four years of age who had been a citizen of Hungary for at least six years, who could read and write in any of the recognized languages of Hungary, and who resided or owned a residence in that community for at least half a year also qualified for suffrage. István Bethlen, prime minister from 1921 to 1931, carried out an electoral coup d’état in 1922, regulating suffrage by directives instead of the promised act of law. With the exception of the capital city and other so-called autonomous towns, these directives eliminated the secret

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7

ballot and radically reduced the number of those entitled to vote. Consequently the ratio of those entitled to vote dropped from 40 per cent to 28 per cent.6 (The return to the open ballot of the period before 1918, which affected some 80 per cent of all Hungarian voters, was unprecedented in Europe at the time; it was adopted in the late twenties in Yugoslavia, using the Hungarian procedure as a model.) In the spring of 1922 Bethlen justified the resumption of open voting as follows: “We want democracy, but not the rule of the raw masses, because those countries where the masses rule over the entire nation are likely to perish.”7 The type of democracy based on the conservative principles advocated by Bethlen consistently favoured the aristocracy, the landed nobility, and civil servants from the middle class as uniquely qualified to run the country because of their wealth and level of education. The conditions hardly improved in the thirties: Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös attempted to introduce a Fascist-like regime, as did one of his successors, Béla Imrédy. Gömbös was prevented from carrying out his plan by his untimely death; Imrédy was forced to resign. Between 1920 and 1945 the population of Hungary rose from 7.9 to 9.3 million. Government policies represented the interests of about one-third of Hungarian society. The peasantry, who constituted the majority, was in the worst predicament: almost 2 million peasants were landless, but the majority of the 1.7 million who owned land of between one and ten holds also lived in dire poverty.8 Although in 1922 the peasants were promised a land reform, the objective during the execution of the program was not to distribute good quality land but rather to retain as much as possible of the most productive land for the large estates and to grant the landowners ample compensation for the land they lost, according to Ferenc Nagy, elected prime minister of Hungary in 1946, in his 1932 political essay “Five million Hungarians on Golgotha.”9

2 The Transition Period: From War to Peace

The end of the old regime The basic change in the progress of the war in September 1944 affected Hungary as well. On the twenty-third of that month Soviet troops crossed the country’s borders (as delineated at Trianon in 1920) into the counties of Békés and Csongrád in southeastern Hungary. Now the Hungarian military leadership, allied with the Germans, found itself forced to defend itself at home, against the army of the country on which it had declared war in 1941. The Red Army penetrated deeper and deeper into the plains; at the beginning of October the committee dispatched by Regent Miklós Horthy, led by Colonel General Gábor Faragho, engaged in armistice negotiations in Moscow. On 15 October Horthy announced over Hungarian Radio that he had requested an armistice from the Soviet Union. The armistice was prevented, however, in part because, except for the regent’s bodyguards, the Hungarian units summoned to protect Budapest sided with the Germans. The Germans occupied strategic points in Budapest and armed the masses of Arrow Cross members. That same evening Ferenc Szálasi’s order of the day regarding the continuation of the war was read over the radio. On 16 October, the Germans – having captured Horthy’s son in an ambush the day before – forced Horthy to appoint Szálasi as prime minister, after which he resigned. The National Council, comprising the main dignitaries of the country, appointed Ferenc Szálasi temporary leader of the nation. The Parliament, reduced in numbers, approved both offices at its 3 November session. The rule of the Arrow Cross, brief but catastrophic for the nation, resulted in great harm for the country in every regard. Szálasi and

The Transition Period: From War to Peace

9

company were servile in carrying out every demand of Hitler’s Germany: on 17 October they declared “total mobilization” and the population of both genders, from age 14 to 70, was drafted for labour service. Szálasi force-marched Jews out of the country in November. By the time he grabbed power, the eastern region of the country was in the process of evacuation, but in a haphazard way because of the rapid advance of the Soviet troops. Szálasi’s plan was to follow the tactic of “deserted land” in front of the Red Army by removing the population entirely. He had to give up this idea, reluctantly, because of the resistance of the population and had to be content with removing only government employees and members of the Arrow Cross, first to the western region of the country, eventually to Germany. This move affected about half a million persons. The historian Gyula Juhász noted that this was unique not only in Hungarian history but in all of Europe: practically the entire upper echelon of government – the officers of the armed forces, the police, the gendarmes – left the country as a body.1 On 17 October Szálasi entered into an agreement with Edmund Veesenmayer, the German plenipotentiary, regarding the evacuation of the country and the removal of goods from Hungary to Germany. The latter included all food reserves, industrial machinery, industrial raw materials, hospital equipment, art resources, and even the Holy Crown of Hungary.2 A new agreement followed on 14 November to the effect that “to ensure uninterrupted production, all branches of production necessary for the continuation of the war must be transferred temporarily from Hungary into the Reich.” The agreement also stipulated that these goods could be utilized by the Germans for the common war effort.3 Consequently the German army and the Hungarian government outdid each other in removing goods from the country: entire industrial plants, hospitals, universities, the holdings of banks and savings associations, the gold and hard currency reserves of the National Bank, the railroad stocks, herds of cattle, and stables of horses. (The value of the national wealth carried westward was estimated at $800 million at the Paris peace talks). Somewhat later they ordered the mining and blowing up of factories, bridges, and public buildings. According to estimates, in this period four to eight trains of twenty-five railway cars left the country for Germany daily, not counting the goods removed by ship or loaded on trucks. The damage caused cannot be measured precisely, but, according to notes from the Arrow Cross ministries, 55,000 railway car-loads left for Germany at this time.4

10

Chess Game for Democracy

The birth of new power Szálasi and company, loyal to the alliance with Hitler, did not give Hungary a chance to bail out of the war; on the contrary, they proclaimed and executed a policy of “holding out to the very end.” On the other hand it was in the interest of the anti-Fascist allies to make sure that Hungary – like other countries in the region – would agree to a cease-fire and turn against Germany. To realize this objective, it was necessary to create another source of government power. The antiFascist allies, especially the Soviet Union, applied a good deal of pressure to that end. This was the beginning of a new, transitional period in Hungary that lasted until 4 November 1945, when parliamentary elections were held nationwide. Until that time, however, all measures, whether legislative or executive, had a temporary character. It was also characteristic of the period that the political actors tried to protect the institutions and measures of this transition period by developing some form of consensus. Perhaps their most important contribution is that this peaceful transition did not come to a stop with the parliamentary elections. In the areas under the control of the Soviet army, and in accordance with international agreements, the representatives of the democratic parties, underground until that time, formed a Hungarian National Front of Independence (MNFF) on 2 December. The Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers and Bourgeois Party (FKGP) (hereafter Smallholders, Smallholder Party), the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), the National Peasant Party (NPP), the Civic Democratic Party (PDP), the Social Democratic Party (SZDP), and the Council of Trade Unions were all members of this Front. They accepted the action program of the Communist Party as their own, with minor modifications. The principal points of this action plan were anti-Fascism, opposition to the landholding system of the old regime, and the creation of democracy. This also became the basis of the program of the new government. A number of decisions had already been made during the armistice negotiations between Hungary and the Soviet Union in Moscow at the beginning of December 1944. These included measures regarding the Parliament, the formation of the committee to prepare the Interim National Assembly, the names of the cabinet members and of the officers of the National Assembly, the text of the declaration of the government program, and even the fact that the first session must not extend beyond two days. The negotiations were initiated by the group dispatched at the beginning of October 1944 by Regent Horthy, led by

The Transition Period: From War to Peace

11

Colonel General Gábor Faragho, and including Count Géza Teleki and special plenipotentiary Domokos Szent-Iványi. After the coup of 15 October the delegation was expanded, with the addition of General Béla Dálnoki Miklós, who went over to the Soviets, and later with General János Vörös. Along with the leaders of the Hungarian Communists in exile in Moscow they agreed to form a coalition government that would include, in addition to the former Horthy representatives, the Communists and representatives of democratic parties in Hungary. Beyond decisions on matters of principle, they also made recommendations regarding personnel: Béla Dálnoki Miklós was selected as prime minister, János Vörös as minister of defence, Gábor Faragho as minister of supplies, and Count Géza Teleki as minister of education – all of whom were former Horthyite politicians; Imre Nagy became minister of agriculture, and József Gábor became minister of commerce and transportation – both men representing the Communist Party. They also resolved, in principle, that the Smallholder Party and the Social Democratic Party would be granted two cabinet posts each, while the Peasant Party would receive one. Originally they appointed Domokos SzentIványi as minister of foreign affairs, but he declined. Negotiations regarding the formation of the government continued in Debrecen: the Smallholders picked the minister of foreign affairs (János Gyöngyösi) and the minister of finance (István Vásáry); the Social Democrats received the posts of minister of industry (Ferenc Takács) and minister of justice (Ágoston Valentiny); and the Peasant Party delegated Ferenc Erdei for the post of minister of the interior.5 At the last moment they modified the cabinet list decided on in Moscow by adding one more ministry, the Ministry of Public Welfare (Erik Molnár from the Communist Party), for the sake of balance. The Interim National Assembly met on 21 December and the next day selected the new democratic, albeit temporary, cabinet. Thus, in late 1944, a coalition government was in office.

The role of the Soviet Union It is not possible to thoroughly document the Soviet plans or decisions with regard to Hungary at this time. A memorandum from early 1944, entitled “The basic principles we expect regarding the future world” and drawn up by I.M. Maisky, deputy commissar for foreign affairs from 1943 to 1946, came to light in 1995.6 J.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, L.P. Beria, and A.I. Mikoian were among those who were acquainted

12

Chess Game for Democracy

with this memorandum. The underlying principles are as follows: peace must reign across Europe and Asia for the next thirty to fifty years, to prevent any threat to the security of the Soviet Union; the territories acquired before and during the war must become part of the Soviet Union; the anti-Fascist alliance must be maintained even after the war; the internal conditions in former enemy countries must be transformed to eradicate democracy. Although Maisky could not have known at that point how far the Red Army would reach into Western Europe, he nevertheless formulated plans with regard to individual countries as well. The plan did not attribute particular importance to Hungary: “The Soviet Union is not interested in creating a strong Hungary. Moreover, Hungary must be made to understand ... that the Allies have not exactly forgotten its stand during the present conflict. Hence Soviet policy with regard to Hungary must be limited to preserving the Hungarian state, the boundaries of which must be set in accordance with ethical principles, insofar as possible. If some doubts arise in connection with the application of this principle, the issue must be resolved at the expense of Hungary7 ... Hungary, at least during the first years after the war, must be isolated internationally. Hungary must be made to pay reparations.”8 We cannot know to what extent this memorandum represented the official position. However, the fact is that the Soviet moves in the immediate aftermath of the war were in harmony with Maisky’s views. Furthermore, regarding the formation of the government, the Hungarian Communists in Moscow were instructed, in September 1944, not to attempt to grab power in Hungary and not to talk or even think in terms of dictatorship of the proletariat. The Communists were not to act as revolutionaries but to leave their underground and exile status as antiFascist democrats and become allies of all patriotic forces. They were compelled by Moscow to participate in an Interim Government whose president, as well as several members, would come from among the generals and politicians of the Horthyite period, because this would conform with the accords and policies propounded by the Allies. After 1956 Ernő Gerő, who was second only to Mátyás Rákosi among the Communist exiles who returned from Moscow, spoke as follows in the course of a private conversation when asked why they allowed the formation of a coalition government in 1945: “Stalin summoned me and, as I was waiting in the anteroom, out came de Gaulle, and I found out that a coalition government had been formed in France. There was no need to ask Stalin. I knew that we were expected to do as happened in Czechoslovakia and France.”9 (De Gaulle was visiting Moscow in that

The Transition Period: From War to Peace

13

same period, between 1 and 10 December 1944.) This is confirmed by Gerő’s comment about Soviet tactics at the 23 January 1945 meeting of the central committee of the Hungarian Communist Party: “The Soviet Union wanted to win the diplomatic battle in the case of Hungary, and obtain dominant influence by creating the necessary conditions, which could not be simply military ... in such a way as not to frighten the British and the Americans.”10 With regard to the Communist Party itself, Gerő declared that the party could not expect to dominate for another ten to fifteen years. The records also reveal that during the December 1944 discussions, Stalin enjoined the Hungarian Communists to remain moderate and flexible.11 Gyula Schöpflin made the same assertion in an article examining a speech made by the Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi during a Greater Budapest meeting of the Hungarian Communist Party in February 1945. The meeting dealt with the international situation in the aftermath of the war. Rákosi explained that, as a result of the “great compromise” of the USA and the USSR after the war, the Hungarian Communists had to set aside their revolutionary aims and give up, for the time being, on the socialist transformation of society. Therefore they had to work together, not only with bourgeois forces but even with Horthy’s generals: not only the leaders of the party but the rank and file had to learn to live with the conservative position of the bourgeois side. According to Rákosi, this transformation might take a long time: ten to fifteen years. He emphasized that during this period the Communist Party “can and must take over the leadership with slow, elaborate methods, by parliamentary means and by steady propaganda work among the masses.”12 Charles Gati and Martin Mevius came to the same conclusion in their respective works: Stalin told the Hungarian Communist leaders they would have to wait at least ten to fifteen years for the establishment of socialism in Hungary. According to Gati, this policy would divert attention from the rapid Sovietization of Poland.13 Thus the Hungarian communists had to accept the principle of continuity and collaborate with former – and future – adversaries and enemies. This was necessary because the Soviet Union had to show its allies that it did not intend to Sovietize the political institutions of the countries it occupied. As Mátyás Rákosi was to declare in April 1945: the Soviet Union had to prove to the world that the Hungarian government was not Communist. The Soviet Union was given a key role in Hungary during the war, according to decisions made by the leaders of the Allied great powers

14

Chess Game for Democracy

during wartime negotiations. For instance, the talks regarding the Interim National Assembly and the composition of the cabinet clearly took place against the background of the Stalin-Churchill agreement, the so-called percentage agreement of 9 October 1944. More specifically, during the October 1944 negotiations in Moscow about the political arrangements to be implemented until the end of the war (as related in Winston Churchill’s history of the war) Stalin and Churchill reached an agreement regarding the extent of their respective influence in the countries of Southeastern Europe, including Hungary. On 9 October influence over Hungary was evenly divided, but a few days later it was modified in favour of the Soviet Union, 80 per cent to 20 per cent. “Since Hungary is under the control of Soviet forces, naturally the Soviet Union must be given greater influence” was how Churchill justified the modification.14 This percentage deal, however, was superseded by the Yalta agreement of February 1945. Stalin had to be mindful of the joint declaration of the great powers at Yalta regarding liberated Europe. According to this declaration, even the last vestiges of the Nazi regime and of Fascism had to be eliminated in the course of economic renewal and all liberated nations must have the opportunity to choose their form of government: The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

The Transition Period: From War to Peace

15

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people of any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsible to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration. When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration. By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind. In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.15 The parties in Hungary undertook the rebuilding of life in the spirit of this declaration. In May 1945 all Europe was celebrating victory over Nazism. Europe was liberated! Nor could it be otherwise in Hungary. From September 1944 on, as the front advanced from east to west, the war ended for more and more areas. On 13 February 1945 it was the turn of the capital (18 January for the Pest side of the capital), and in early April for the whole country. Regarding military operations, we might simply note that the Allies captured the capital city, and captured the country, but for the population at large the facts were not so simple, the news not so dry. The common term repeated at the time, “liberation,” meant

16

Chess Game for Democracy

different things to different people. This was the expression used by István Bibó, Béla Dálnoki Miklós, Miksa Fenyő, Sándor Márai, and many others; along with ordinary people they meant by this that they could come up from the cellars and shelters; they could go look for relatives and friends; they could go home and find out whether, indeed, a home was still standing; the dead could be buried without interruption by air-raids; and one could be happy about life in general, after all the horrors. Who would dare gainsay that they were truly liberated? Who would dare deny that those released from the ghetto could now go out on the street, head held high, without wearing the yellow star? On the other hand, who could expect that those who were carried away by the Soviet army of occupation for “malenky robot” (a little work, forced labour) would remember all this as liberation, if they were lucky enough to survive. And anyone whose mother was raped by Soviet soldiers, or who had a parent or brother dragged away to the Soviet Union, did not recall the events experienced by her or his family as liberation.

Ending the war and the role of the Allied Control Commission The Interim National Assembly, made up of delegates elected by voice vote in most villages and towns, has received much criticism, mainly because of the circumstances surrounding its creation. But given those special circumstances, in a country that was plundered and under military occupation, where one could still hear the sound of artillery only 30 or 50 km to the west, where the means of transportation and communications were not working, general elections were not a realistic expectation. The Interim National Assembly authorized the Interim National Government to run the country. In April 1945 both moved from Debrecen to Budapest. The cabinet was meeting continuously and brought about essential measures. On 28 December 1944, the Interim National Government declared war on Germany. By expressing its intention to collaborate with the Allies in a manner accepted by international diplomacy, and by changing sides, it expressly dissociated itself from the previous regime. The government declared that it would continue the war on the side of the Allies with all the resources at the country’s disposal until the Allied powers attained complete victory over Germany.

The Transition Period: From War to Peace

17

The next step was the signing of an armistice agreement on 20 January 1945. This took place in Moscow, with the participation of a Hungarian delegation led by Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov, Ambassador to the United States W.A. Harriman, and the British chargé d’affaires A.J. Balfour. The agreement obligated Hungary to carry out the following measures: the “awards” adopted in 1938 and 1941 granting an increase in territory for Hungary were retracted and declared null and void, and Hungarian troops and officials were expected to withdraw to the boundaries in force on 31 December 1937; Hungary was to commit itself to setting up eight divisions to fight against Germany; Hungary was to pay the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia reparations to the tune of $300 million; she was to disband all pro-German and Fascist organizations and forbid all manner of propaganda directed against the Allies; and she was to accept the Allied Control Commission (ACC) as the organization in charge of the execution of the armistice agreement.16 The ACC, made up of the delegates of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the USA, remained in operation until the ratification of the peace treaty on 15 September 1947.17 In similar bodies created in other defeated countries the office of chairman, and the decisive voice, always belonged to the great power that was occupying a given country or that had pushed the German forces out. Thus the Soviet Union presided over the ACC in Hungary. According to the terms of the armistice agreement and in accordance with instructions of the ACC, the Hungarian government was obliged to allow the use of industrial and transportation plants, the post office, the cable system, the telephone service, the radio, power plants and utilities, and storage places. Moreover, ACC approval had to be secured to publish, import, or distribute periodicals or other publications, to launch theatrical performances, to show films, to issue entry and exit visas, and even to establish political parties. The commission could also require the Hungarian government to provide timely information about all these matters. The chairman of the commission, Marshall Kliement Voroshilov, who stayed in Budapest until early summer 1946, played a key role in all of this. At first, his deputy was Lt General Mihail M. Stachursky; then, from August 1945, Lt General Vladimir P. Sviridov. His political counsellor was the eventual Soviet ambassador to Budapest, Georgy M. Pushkin who, however, did not participate in ACC meetings. We do not know the exact number of the Soviet acc military mission in Hungary, because of gaps in the records, but contemporary accounts estimate it as around 800.18

18

Chess Game for Democracy

Beginning in February 1945, the acc had English and American missions as well. Their primary task was to supervise the execution of the armistice agreements, as well as to represent American and British interests. They could not communicate officially with Hungarian agencies except through the Soviet head of the acc. They had the right to participate in acc meetings, to keep minutes, to query information from the Soviet members, and to present memoranda on behalf of their governments. They were free to travel around the country, provided the acc was informed beforehand. They could determine the numbers of those in their missions, communicate with their respective governments in clear or in code, and determine the amount the Hungarian government had to contribute to enable them to function. The American military mission was led by Major General William S. Key and, from July 1946, by General George H. Weems, while the U.S. political representative was Arthur Schoenfeld, the future American ambassador. In March the American mission had fifty-two members; by October 1946 it had seventy-five. The head of the British mission with the acc was Marshall Oliver P. Edgecumbe. Alvary D.F. Gascoigne functioned as his political advisor until June 1946, followed by Alexander K. Helm. The British mission arrived with a headcount of seventy-eight, but by August 1945 the personnel had reached one hundred.19 When the Americans and British first arrived to join the acc mission, the guiding principle of their policy was alliance with the Soviet Union. This is clear from the political directive the British mission received from London: “to ensure, in the closest collaboration with your Soviet and United States colleagues, that the terms of the armistice with Hungary are strictly carried out.”20 If we look at how many times and in how many ways the Soviet occupation force disregarded the Hungarian armistice agreement, (factories dismantled, civilians transported to the Soviet Union, the rape of Hungarian women), even while the war was still in progress in the European theatre, we see that the Western allies overlooked all such acts and, in general, had no intention of intervening to defend Hungary against any of these Soviet practices. In comparison with other countries in the region, such as Bulgaria and Romania, the activities of the acc in Hungary received little criticism. At the Potsdam conference Prime Minister Churchill had harsh words about the former two: “I have to say, regarding Romania, but even more so regarding Bulgaria, we remain uninformed. Our mission

The Transition Period: From War to Peace

19

in Bucharest has been so isolated that it reminds us of internment.”21 Chapter XII of the closing statement accepted at this conference examined the operations of the acc in Hungary along with the others. As a result of this examination it was declared that, since military operations in said countries had ended, the Soviets were obliged to grant a greater right of intervention to the Anglo–American committee members than previously contemplated. Hungary was expected to pay off the reparations costs in six months, in kind, computed according to prices on the world market. This meant that world prices in 1938 would have to be increased by 10 per cent for agricultural products and 15 per cent for industrial products. This proved to be a great burden on the Hungarian economy: in 1945 and 1946 reparation payments were the greatest expenditures in the budget – 30 per cent of the gross national product. In spite of the limits set on sovereignty by the armistice agreement and the Soviet military presence, the political actors had room to manoeuvre. This was confirmed by Soviet chargé d’affaires, later ambassador, G. M. Pushkin in a speech he delivered on 25 May 1945 at the reburial of Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the Smallholder leader and martyr murdered by the Arrow Cross at Christmas in 1944: “A great man such as Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky can only be produced by a nation that is entitled to independence, to autonomy and to the flowering of its national culture. I am convinced that the memory of the heroic fighter of the Hungarian people, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, will not fade with the passing of years. His name will be mentioned on a par with that of Rákóczi and Kossuth. Let the memory of Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky be glorified forever!”22

Land reform Redistribution of land was among the most pressing needs; it was both a political and an economic task. The country could not afford to allow spring agricultural work to be delayed and the production of wheat jeopardized for the year because of uncertainties about the title of ownership of the land. The military action had already caused enormous disruptions in cultivation. And in the Eastern part of the country the left-wing activists who formed the new local authorities had seized the land even before the land reform decree in a “wild land reform.”23 In accordance with the government program promulgated on March 1945, a directive (600/1945) initiated a radical redistribution of landed

20

Chess Game for Democracy

property in Hungary, as a result of which all estates of more than 1,000 cadastral holds were expropriated, as were the lands belonging to war criminals. Beyond this, all estates between 100 and 1000 holds were expropriated as well, with a promise of indemnification, as well as all land above 200 holds belonging to kulaks. Furthermore, 765,000 of the  62,000 holds of land owned by the Catholic Church were taken over. In total, 9.6 per cent of all land, 30 per cent of all arable land, and 60 per cent of all forests were expropriated. Of those asking for land, 642,000 (along with about 3 million family members) received it but about 100,000 of those entitled remained landless. Almost all of the land that could be awarded to individuals went to the poor of the village, an average of about 5 holds to each farmer. Thus 400,000 new farms were created and 240,000 existing farms were enlarged. In this way the system of landed estates was liquidated in Hungary, and the economic – hence also political – domination of the historic large and mid-sized estates came to an end. The Hungarian peasant, who had waited a thousand years for his just desserts, finally received land. A true social revolution had taken place! In addition to filling an essential need, ownership of land meant prestige and social standing for the Hungarian peasant and could be regarded as political freedom and an indication of social mobility. The vision of the Smallholder Party was to create “another Denmark” by encouraging the formation of voluntary cooperatives from the many mini-farms. As a consequence of land reform, small holdings using individual labour became the norm. Since the amount of land to be distributed varied from region to region, conflicts arose in the process of execution. Occasionally the local committees in charge made mistakes in determining expropriation and execution and often confiscated land from peasant farms of less than 200 holds as well. The propertied peasants resented the process, but they filed appeals in vain, because rarely did the higher committees of appeal decide in their favour. Local committees could not redress the injustice for lack of available land.

Undoing measures against human rights In addition to its land program, the Interim National Government was required by the armistice agreement to dispense with the repressive and anti-democratic measures and institutions of the previous regime and to rehabilitate those who had been victimized. The government took this requirement seriously: they discussed pertinent matters at the cabinet

The Transition Period: From War to Peace

21

meeting of 9 February 1945, which dealt with the proclamation of the armistice agreement. In practice, it had already been decided: on 5 February 1945 all anti-Jewish laws and ordinances were declared null and void. On 9 February the cabinet adopted measures regarding the release, safety, and protection of all those interned for “racial” or religious reasons, as well as those who had been resettled, refugees, Jews, and the homeless. At the same meeting they decided on the dissolution of all parties, associations, and other organizations of a Fascist nature: the activities of twenty-five such groups were thus banned. They also provided for the prohibition and destruction of all anti-democratic and Fascist publications.

Bringing charges against war criminals The armistice agreement also stipulated that Hungary would cooperate in the arrest of persons accused of war crimes and either initiate court proceedings against them or extradite them to the interested governments. The people’s tribunals expected to carry out these tasks were instituted on the basis of a government directive of January 1945: a fivemember tribunal was set up in every administrative centre. Across the country twenty-four such tribunals were set up and functioned for different periods until April 1950. The coalition parties appointed the members of the tribunals from among those card-carrying partymembers who were not delegates to the assembly. In the case of the National Council of People’s Tribunals – the court of appeals – the members had to be professional judges or licensed attorneys. They too were appointed by the parties. In April 1945 the membership of the tribunals was raised from five to six with the trade unions also entitled to send a people’s judge. This last measure definitely strengthened the representation of the workers’ parties within the tribunals and enhanced the tendency to engage in political struggles over judgments. During the session of the Interim National Assembly 3,174 Arrow Cross and other war criminals were handed over to the tribunals; by the end of August 1945, 901 cases, some 29 per cent of all cases, had been examined. Of the 901, 619 of the accused were detained, while charges were dropped against 282. The number of those charged increased after September 1945 when the Anglo-American authorities delivered to the Hungarian authorities all officials who were deemed to be Arrow Cross or extreme right-wing and had escaped to the West. Between 1945 and 1950, 8,629 persons appeared in court charged with war crimes or

22

Chess Game for Democracy

crimes against the people. Of these, 477 were sentenced to death and 189 were executed, including war criminals such as Prime Ministers Ferenc Szálasi, László Bárdossy, and Béla Imrédy.24

The certification process A committee of certification was created by government fiat to examine the political behaviour of public servants during the war. Certification was a prerequisite for continued employment. Civil servants who did not turn in their certificate declarations lost their jobs and could not accept public employment or even a leadership position in private employment. The members of the certifying committees were delegated by the coalition parties and the delegates, in turn, elected the chairperson. Eventually the certification committees were expanded to include a person with a law degree as well as an individual sent by the enterprise or institution involved. The certification process was as follows: within three days after the measure was issued every official was required to turn in a declaration to the magistrate. The chairperson of the certifying committee was expected to announce the date of the hearings at the civil servant’s place of employment as well as the names of all those scheduled for examination at least eight days in advance, through the press, by poster, or by public announcements through local magistrates’ offices. By the same token they were to announce that those who knew of any act or behaviour inimical to the interests of the Hungarian people were duty-bound to notify the chairperson of the certifying committee (hence anonymous denunciations were not heeded). The discussions in the course of certification were not public. Having examined the past of a given civil servant, the certifying committees had the right to initiate administrative measures such as loss of job or internment. If there was suspicion of a crime having been committed, the case could be transferred for examination by the people’s prosecutor. Firing, however, could only occur if endorsed by the pertinent minister. It was possible to appeal forced retirement or loss of employment to the people’s tribunal in Budapest. The bulk of the certification procedures took place in 1945–46, but the process was not unheard of in 1948. We do not have national summary reports for the decisions reached by these committees. Several tens of thousands of government employees, including officers in military service, had escaped to the West and did not return; thus they were not

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subjected to the process. According to a summary from the capital city for the period 26 March to 26 October 1945, 41,602 legal decisions were reached, in which 34,019 of those examined had “passed.” The summary from January 1946 confirms this pattern: of the 42,136 civil servants and officers examined, 37,351, or 88.6 per cent, were affirmed.25 Of the 4,785 persons who were not confirmed, 825 were dismissed and 264 retired. Sixty-three persons were transferred for public prosecution in this period. Thus government and public enterprises were cleansed of the majority of Arrow Cross and pro-Nazi elements. But the operation of the certifying committees provided opportunities for abuses as well: the left-wing parties used these committees to discharge public employees they described as “reactionary,” whereas the Smallholders did everything possible to retain these employees.

The mechanisms of internment The anti-Fascist reprisal measures adopted early in 1945 enabled the certification committees as well as the people’s tribunals to use internment as a means of punishment; the duration of these sentences could range from six months to two years. “Once the sentence has been completed the detainee may be released provided he or she has exhibited exemplary behaviour in detention. If this is not the case the authorities in charge of the camp may extend the sentence by another six months. Even then the maximum period of internment may not exceed two years.”26 Until the second half of June the internment procedures were based on pertinent ordinances issued under the Horthy regime.27 The execution of these ordinances was entrusted to the political police, who were in the hands of the Communist Party. According to the report prepared by Gábor Péter, the head of the political police section of the Hungarian State Police in Budapest, 1,869 persons were interned in Budapest between 1 February and 12 April 1945, including 1,547 members of the Arrow Cross, 196 members of the Volksbund (an organization of the German ethnic group in Hungary), and 126 other persons for unspecified reasons.28 Another 2,643 persons were interned between 12 April and 30 April 1945.29 Fourteen camps were established for the purpose in Budapest and vicinity.30 The leaders of the Communist Party, however, were not satisfied with the results obtained under the anti-Fascist laws. In May 1945 the administration of the internment process was placed squarely under the

24

Chess Game for Democracy

jurisdiction of the police. Ferenc Erdei, the minister of the interior, was the official who signed the classified directive (which came to light only in the late 1990s) that regulated the procedures to be followed at the time of police detention, during police custody, and during internment.31 Erdei explained that the regulation was needed to bring about uniformity because, as he had noted from the cases filed, the “police authorities followed conflicting procedures.” The directive indicates clearly the purpose of internment: those individuals who, according to the sentences issued by the people’s tribunals “may not be suspected, on the basis of the information available, of any specific crime or contravention, yet are dangerous because of their earlier or present Fascist or anti-people attitude, or those who attempt to hamper the reconstruction of the country in a democratic spirit must also be subjected to administrative measures.”32 Two kinds of measures could be applied in this case: keeping them in police custody – that is, internment – or placing them under police surveillance. The directive expanded the jurisdiction of the political police, making it possible to detain someone without a court order, beyond simply placing the person under preventive arrest. The chief of police could reach this decision on the recommendation of the head of the political police in a particular district. Listed among those who could be subjected to detention were most members of the former ruling party – the Party of Hungarian Life – as well as members of the extreme right-wing Arrow Cross or of National Socialist organizations; also informers and denouncers, innkeepers, tobacconists, and barbers, and others, if they were members of said parties or had disseminated wartime Fascist propaganda, as well as persons sympathizing with the Germans and the Volksbund. The directive was much more lenient in the case of blue-collar workers and peasants owning little or no land, compared to other strata. A party member was defined as a person who paid membership dues for two months or longer. If a person who was formerly a member of the Social Democratic or Communist parties joined one of the above Fascist organizations later on, that would constitute an aggravating circumstance. The directive also made it possible to place someone under police surveillance for economic crimes or abuses. According to another classified directive issued by the Ministry of the Interior, individuals who had been found innocent by the people’s tribunals could still be detained as a preventive measure. Under the leadership of István Ries, Section X, the so-called people’s tribunal division of

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the Ministry of Justice, issued orders that all decisions of the people’s prosecutor’s office as well as the names of all those found not guilty by the people’s tribunals must be forwarded to the political police. Beginning in January 1946, these reports were to be drafted once every ten days. Thus we have a strange practice according to which police personnel were expected to review all sentences passed by the courts. The National Council of the People’s Tribunals made a vain attempt to prevent the internment of those who had been released on appeal.33 The expansion of the powers of the political police with regard to the internment camps elicited fresh tensions on both sides of the coalition. As István Bibó wrote in 1945: Thus the internment apparatus could only function without guarantees; it was certainly subject to individual abuse of power, and became seriously demoralizing, given the uncertainty about the length of the sentences handed down. In other words: it was a bleak, inhumane and powerful corporation, too indirect to serve the ends of popular justice, yet too direct in the legal sense, clearly favouring the police ... Let us note that the persons interned for an extended period were precisely those against whom the people’s tribunals found no grounds ... Moreover, we can fully expect that those who are released from internment camps will turn into deadly enemies of democracy. We must prevent this because, should we wait until it happens, in vain will we deliver commencement speeches regarding the tolerance of democratic regimes to those about to be released.34 By November 1945 the political police section had interned over ten thousand individuals in Budapest alone; this was the period of the greatest number of detainees, for during November and December the number of interned decreased. Countrywide statistics are not available, but the trend is clear from the statistics pertaining to Budapest – namely, that the number of those detained increased in September and October. (It remains a fact, however, that the number of votes cast by all the detainees would not have amounted to a single seat, in either municipal or national elections.)35

Democratic suffrage At the time of its formation the Interim National Government promised to introduce universal, equal, and secret suffrage. This was realized during

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Chess Game for Democracy

the September session of the Interim Assembly. It should be mentioned that in February 1945 the Allies at Yalta resolved that parliamentary elections were to take place in the defeated and liberated countries. Accordingly, on 18 April 1945, the Hungarian government instructed the minister of the interior to draft a new law regarding the right of suffrage. This was an important step in consolidating democratic political institutions, and in ending the government’s “interim” status. The coalition parties accepted the proposal of the Hungarian Communist Party to the effect that before general elections were held, local committee elections would be held throughout Greater Budapest. The deputies accepted the proposed law regarding suffrage on 13 September. Western analysts at the time described Act VIII as the most democratic electoral law in the region, enabling direct voting on the basis of equal rights and the secret ballot. All persons, regardless of gender, were qualified to vote upon attaining their twentieth birthday. Those excluded from the right to vote included persons subjected to proceedings, punishment, or loss of rights in connection with acts committed during the war. In addition to the twenty-five political parties or associations declared “extreme right” in the armistice agreement, there were a further seven such organizations, whose members, whether at the national or lower level, were barred from exercising the vote, as were all those who declared themselves of German nationality. The law did not determine the number of deputies exactly, since the elections depended on local lists; a mandate became valid when the party received 12,000 votes in a given district. In addition to these, fifty more mandates were distributed among the parties, according to their lists. Thus the law made it possible for the National Assembly to elect twelve additional deputies from among nationally known and respected intellectual figures. The writer György Bölöni, Colonel General Béla Dálnoki Miklós, the politician Sándor Juhász Nagy, Mihály (Michael) Károlyi, the president of the first Hungarian republic, the composer Zoltán Kodály, the philosopher of jurisprudence and university professor Gyula Moór, the sculptor Pál Pátzay, the Nobel Prize-winning biochemist Albert Szent-Györgyi, the painter István Szőnyi, the writer Áron Tamási, the attorney and journalist Rusztem Vámbéry, and professor of law Béla Zsedényi thus became deputies. Authorization for a party to participate in the elections was issued by the Inter-party National Committee. Its role was mainly formal, as explained above, for, in practice, authorization came from the acc and the coalition parties. The electoral law of 1945 contributed greatly to the

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fairness of the elections of November 1945. One indication of the high level of fairness was that the Electoral Court had nothing to do: no one had filed a petition denouncing any illegal procedure. On instructions received from Secretary of State James Byrnes, Arthur Schoenfeld, the head of the American diplomatic mission, called on Minister of Foreign Affairs János Gyöngyösi on 22 September 1945 and handed over a note to the effect that the United States was ready to resume diplomatic relations with Hungary, provided the elections were free and unhampered, and that Hungary allowed for the free participation of democratic parties in accordance with the armistice agreement. This prospect was most important, inasmuch as it gave Hungary the opportunity to break out of its diplomatic isolation after the war. However the United States was not the first country to offer diplomatic recognition: the Soviet Union, informed of the American demarche, issued a declaration regarding the unconditional resumption of diplomatic relations with Hungary on 25 September and, two days before the elections, Ambassador Pushkin handed his credentials to the Hungarian authorities.36

Features of the multiparty system The outlines of the multiparty system began to evolve a few months after December 1944, even though there was no real tradition of coalition government in the country. Except for the coalition led by the Independence Party between 1906 and 1910 and the rather fleeting “Christian-National Union” between 1920 and 1922 – both of which had been characterized by undemocratic practices – there was no political precedent. The democratic coalition formed in late 1944 had two basic features: one was the explicit prohibition and dissolution of parties and organizations with Fascist traits; the other was that only democratic parties were allowed, even though there were no regulations governing the foundation of political organizations and associations. In principle the government granted freedom of assembly and union. The practice, however, was far more complex. It became clear to those intending to establish a political party that, in view of the armistice agreement, it was necessary to obtain the approval of the acc to participate in politics. The leaders of the coalition parties, from the Communists to the Smallholders, were in complete agreement over not encouraging the launching of new political parties – but, on the contrary, discouraging them. They feared that many small parties would lead to the

28

Chess Game for Democracy

splintering of the democratic movement and the fragmentation of their social base. In May 1945 they resolved that the Independence Front would have no more than four members, the Social Democratic Party, the Hungarian Communist Party, the Independent Smallholder Party, and the National Peasant Party, de facto excluding the Civic Democratic Party from the coalition. At the same time they resolved to reject applications from further parties. This resolution explains in part why the attempts to establish new parties, either at the turn of 1944–45 or later in early fall 1945, failed. When they announced their formation, and perhaps even their programs, such parties were instantly banned. Despite this, they did authorize the Hungarian Radical Party led by Imre Csécsy and, after considerable hesitation, the Democratic People’s Party associated with the name of István Barankovics. These groups, however, had no impact on the formulation of policies during the period of the Interim National Assembly; the authorization meant merely that they could participate in the elections for parliamentary elections. Thus one of the distinguishing features of the political system was a limited multiparty system, which excluded not only the Fascists and the extreme right wing but even the more traditional conservative nationalist parties. Those excluded from founding parties at the beginning but who insisted on participating in politics were thus forced to join an existing party. Consequently, both supporters and opponents of  the coalition joined the Independence Front. Another feature of the ensuing two years was that the political struggles took place mainly between the two strongest parties, the Smallholder Party and the Hungarian Communist Party. The coalition, notwithstanding the many disagreements, was bent on achieving common goals: destruction of Fascism, conclusion of the war, democratization of the country, and, without a doubt, working cooperatively. To resolve issues they created a forum that operated on the basis of custom, the Conference on Reconciling Party Differences, which became the number one forum between 1944 and 1947. Although this forum did not supplant the Parliament, without it the debates in Parliament would have rendered governance impossible.37 The leader of every single coalition party felt it was important to have inter-party conferences. They recognized the inherent possibilities of such conferences: they could express their positions openly, they could clash with each other or reach consensus, without the danger of committing themselves personally. The party leaders and representatives received their authority from their respective parties. No voting took

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place at these conferences. If agreement was reached, the party leaders felt obliged to act accordingly. They were also required to secure the endorsement of the main members of their own party, namely the political committees in the case of the Communists, the Social Democrats, and the Peasant Party. In the case of the Smallholders, in addition to the  political committee they needed the agreement of the faction in Parliament as well. The agendas of the inter-party conferences included any issue bearing directly on legislation, carrying out the laws, or the parties themselves. More specifically they included drafts of laws, government regulations, and the dealing out of posts to the parties of the coalition. Occasionally they discussed a topic that was already the subject of debate in one of the institutions of parliamentary democracy, asking that the issue be tabled until discussed by the inter-party conference.

The coalition parties The roots of each of the coalition parties could be found in some form in the previous regime. Almost without exception, the party leaders themselves had political experience; they did not suddenly appear out of the blue. The public life of the political elite after the war had begun mostly in the thirties, although in a few cases it reached back to the twenties, but no one seemed to distinguish themselves by their ability. Some enjoyed greater popularity; others commanded greater prestige because of their backgrounds as political prisoners. None was accepted or appointed as a true leader. Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky might have played such a role had he survived: he was sentenced to death by a military tribunal and executed by the Szálasi regime in the evening of 24 December 1944.

The Social Democratic Party The Social Democratic Party (Szociáldemokrata Párt) was founded at the end of the nineteenth century; officially it was termed the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, but was renamed in 1939. This decision to delete any reference to the country was prompted by the need to reject the “slander” that the party was not independent but rather a tool or agent of the Socialist Workers International. The Social Democratic Party represented the main thrust toward democratic principles, one of the most significant movements until the  end of World War II. Yet it always had to adapt to the existing

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Chess Game for Democracy

conditions. Having accepted a major role in the 1919 Republic of Councils, it had to adopt a more moderate program and style when that council government failed, while remaining the one political movement associated with the working class, the one party with a Marxist ideology intent on achieving socialism by reformist, democratic means. Károly Peyer, considered the number one leader of the social democratic movement between 1921 and 1944, signed a secret political deal with Prime Minister István Bethlen in December 1921, enabling the party to function legally, within limits, thanks to mutual concessions. The party participated in the parliamentary elections of 1922 for the first time ever. It continued to function as a legal (and loyal) opposition until the German occupation in March 1944. In 1943 the party formed an alliance with the Smallholder Party. Then, in May 1944, it became part of the Hungarian Front, a nationwide anti-Fascist grouping that included the Communist Party, the Smallholder Party, and the National Peasant Party. In the summer of 1945 the membership of the Social Democratic Party fluctuated between 350,000 and 400,000. Its grassroots support came from the industrial workers, the artisans in the towns, and the petit bourgeoisie; it had little impact on the peasantry. Having been active over many decades it had acquired considerable influence in the trade unions, sponsoring extensive cultural activities for workers. Given its democratic traditions, the party was made up of diverse factions. In the summer of 1945 those on the right wing rallied around Károly Peyer, while Anna Kéthly, Ferenc Szeder, and Imre Szélig belonged to the centre of the European social democratic movement and the left was represented by Árpád Szakasits and György Marosán, both of whom had strong Communist sympathies. At its congress in August 1945 the slogan “For democracy today, tomorrow for socialism!” indicated the party’s principal strategy. This was the party that had fought most determinedly against Hungarian nationalism – which had occasionally been endorsed even by the Hungarian Communist Party. The Social Democrats demanded and initiated examination of the degree of participation and the disclosure of responsibility – even in its moral sense – of not only the Hungarian government during the previous regime, but of Hungarian society and intellectuals in general. The party accepted continuity with its own past and demanded a complete break with the spirit, institutions and traditions of the previous regime. It regarded collaboration with the Soviet Union as its guiding principle in foreign policy, but included in its program the

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principle of “the United States of Europe,” and of the formation of the Danubian confederation advocated by the great powers. The party received sixty-nine seats in the elections for the National Assembly on 4 November 1945.

the independent smallholders, agricultural workers, and bourgeois party The Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party (Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás és Polgári Párt) was formed in 1930 as an opposition party, with a background reaching back to the turn of the twentieth century. By the summer of 1945 it enjoyed considerable influence, with a membership of about 900,000, almost 10 per cent of the entire population. While this number is impressive in itself, note that the Hungarian Peasant Alliance, which formed its social base, had branches in every area; hence we may assume that this party had even greater influence. The alliance was formed in 1941 with the object of educating peasants of outstanding ability for a role in politics, such as competent delegates, competent members of provincial committees, and leaders of cooperatives. Its leaders were prominent politicians of the Smallholder Party: Ferenc Nagy was the chairman of the alliance and Béla Kovács its first secretary. The backbone of the party, in addition to the peasants, was made up mainly of middle-class Christians. The party’s situation was rendered more difficult because of an influx of new members from the conservative and right-wing parties in 1945. This meant that its middle-class elements gained prominence at the expense of its peasant membership. Some of the smaller bourgeois and petit-bourgeois parties of the previous regime also joined the Agricultural Workers: for instance the Kossuth Party chaired by Vince Nagy, the Hungarian Farmer and Worker Party of István Dénes, and the Hungarian Republican Party of Imre Veér. Over the decades three movements are clearly defined: a left wing, a right wing, and a centre. The centre was the strongest and most influential among the masses. It was headed by three peasant politicians: the farmer Ferenc Nagy, the farmer Béla Kovács, and the clergyman Béla Varga, who were close to each other in their views and political background. The overwhelming majority of the peasantry accepted their leadership, regardless of their income. Young intellectuals in their late twenties and early thirties also played a significant role in this centre and filled important backup positions within the party. Among them we

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Chess Game for Democracy

find József Bognár, István Csicsery-Rónay, László Gyulai, Tibor Hám, János Horváth, Pál Jaczkó, Sándor Kiss, Kálmán Saláta, Tamás Szabó, and László Vatai.38 Somewhat older companions include Bálint Arany and Endre Mistéth. Members of the Pál Teleki Workers’ Cooperative39 and of the Populists40 also joined them. The two movements had already worked together during the war, especially during the period of resistance as youthful participants in the anti-war movement, for the realization of revolutionary goals including democracy, land reform, and universal secret suffrage. The party’s left wing, which collaborated more closely with the Communists than the others would have liked, had several representatives. Best known among them were István Dobi and Gyula Ortutay. Their rank and file followers were the party’s left-wing intellectuals and a few landless peasants. The bourgeois wing of the Smallholders was perhaps the least united. Members of the big bourgeoisie, civil servants and professionals, sought a place in this group for want of anything better. The Communists accused this wing of the party of being reactionary and intent on restoring the Horthy regime; to be sure, some among them had reservations about developments in the aftermath of the war, even though their ostensible leaders were liberals or moderate conservatives with anti-Fascist credentials, such as Pál Auer, Gyula Moór, Vince Nagy, Zoltán Pfeiffer, and Dezső Sulyok. After 1945 they became the targets of sharp attacks from the left precisely because they enjoyed prestige within the party and the country. The party chairman, Zoltán Tildy, tried to keep a balance among the three groups. Before 1945 it seemed that he enjoyed the greatest prestige within the party. The guiding principle of his politics after the war, modelled on those of Gábor Bethlen,41 was to shape events. What seemed most important to him was to avoid irritating the Russians, while downplaying relations with the Communists. He assumed that if the Soviets took note of their willingness to cooperate, they would be inclined to be more lenient toward Hungary. A coalescing force within the party was the Christian faith, the essence of which was later summarized by Ferenc Nagy as follows: “I confront hatred ... with Christianity; along with the political and social laws I place the divine laws – this is the solid base of life at any time. In my opinion, hatred cannot be the final motivating force, but rather goodness, love for thy neighbour; these must prevail over all tactics and strategy in politics and in social organization.”42

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Until the summer of 1945 the party was led by a temporary executive committee; as soon as conditions were more or less back to normal, the Smallholders felt it incumbent upon them to take the initiative. Thus they summoned a party congress, which they called the Main Caucus. They met on 20 August.43 Prior to that the centre group decided it would be inadvisable for Zoltán Tildy to lead the party in preparation for elections to the National Assembly, since he was so averse to confrontation. Therefore they decided to persuade Tildy to accept the office of “party leader,” which, however, would entail no real power other than protocol. The actual leadership would be entrusted to a political committee. The tactic paid off: Tildy was chosen party leader, Ferenc Nagy party chairman, Béla Kovács secretary general, and Béla Varga executive chairman. Kálmán Saláta, the young politician of the central group and deputy secretary of the municipal branch of the party, offers a dramatic account of the Main Caucus meeting of 20 August and of the parade of the Holy Right Hand in the afternoon:44 Tildy sat on the chairman’s podium, pale, with bulging eyes, trembling legs. The meeting began on a positive note. Protestant delegates from east of the Tisza objected to the fact that the program envisioned a movie presentation instead of the parade of the Holy Right. They queried the minister of foreign affairs on whether the American authorities had returned the Holy Right. Gyöngyösi – and this is typical – did not have the answer. Then pandemonium broke out. Thereupon Tildy undertook to address the Main Caucus until they were dead tired, but he did not succeed. After that the crowd greeted the proposal of the peasants’ section [created the day before, with the objective of developing self-awareness among the peasantry] with wild enthusiasm, then came the turn of the election of officers, in which Ferenc Nagy was elected with unusual solemnity, so that those present left with the feeling that they had witnessed an event of historical significance ... The news of the return of the Holy Right spread in the morning hours, and an enormous crowd gathered for the parade. It was smaller than ever before, yet had more of an impact than ever before. The entire Main Caucus came out for the parade ... it was a kind of Hungarian Pentecost.45 The key points of the party program covering the next two years were formulated by Kálmán Saláta in his study “Hungary after Potsdam,”

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Chess Game for Democracy

which also discusses the party’s ideology and plan of action. One of its main points was that the influence of the British and the Americans had increased in Hungary, offsetting the Russian influence and, according to him, this gave the Hungarian people the opportunity to shape their own future. As a result of the defeat in the war and socio-economic transformation, the old Hungarian ruling class had splintered, leaving a vacuum behind. The internal political struggle was about who would fill this void. Ferenc Nagy prepared the official party program on the basis of Saláta’s study, with the help of the central group. The main ideas of the document are: “The Hungarian peasantry forms the unshakeable foundation of democracy. For a thousand years the Hungarian peasants have been politically oppressed. Now they intend to assume their proper role in Hungarian political life. Therefore they aspire to free political development. The peasants are the absolute majority of the nation. Thus we must expect that, in a democracy, the peasantry becomes the decisive factor in politics.”46 Nagy made it clear that the party believed in parliamentarism and, if the elections placed power in its hands, “It will strive to govern the country to the best of its ability to ensure the moral and material requirements of the people, and to secure the independence and the  flowering of the country. If the upcoming popular vote should force the party to play the role of a minority, it will carry out its mission as an opposition party, essential in a system of popular representation.”47 The Smallholders accepted the principle of preserving the coalition and carrying out the land reform, but disapproved of interference in the internal affairs of other parties and insisted that their right to judge other parties on their politics must never be questioned. They urged recognition of the rights of the Peasant Alliance, including the right of the peasants to engage in strikes – an entitlement equal to that enjoyed by the trade unions, the interest organizations of the workers. This program favoured the principle of local autonomy, whereas they expected the sociocultural development of the nation to come from the cultural and political circles at the village level. At the 4 November 1945 elections, the party received 245 mandates, although two of them declared, at the inauguration, that they would vote with the Democratic People’s Party (which had no other delegates in Parliament) in accordance with a previous agreement.

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The Hungarian Communist Party The predecessor of the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt) was founded in November 1918. When it finally attained political legality at the end of 1944, it was burdened by the history of the 1919 Republic of Councils, which had been followed by twenty-five years of bitter underground existence, with fiasco upon fiasco. It tried to get the public to overlook its quarter century of failures and rejected its part in the country’s immediate past completely, while not only accepting but trying to appropriate its great historical and national traditions.48 The military victory of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Horthy regime created new conditions for the Communists, who resolutely undertook the tasks of renewal. In the spring of 1945 the Communist Party was assumed to be the most dynamically growing party. It had become an underground organization in the fall of 1919, its leaders forced into exile in the West or Soviet Russia, while others populated the jails in Hungary. The membership of the party oscillated between 400 and 5,000 between 1942 and 1944. However, in February 1945 it registered 30,000 members, in May 150,000, and in October 500,000. Every social stratum could be found among its supporters: industrial workers, landless peasants, and intellectuals. In spite of its original “united front” policies (in 1919 and in the 1940s), those who joined wanted a clean break with the past. As part of its tactics, among these newcomers were “secret Communist moles” who had penetrated other parties; thus, in practice, there were Communist representatives in Parliament from every party. The social base of the Hungarian Communist Party and of the Social Democratic Party was the same, resulting in much tension between the two parties. The national leadership of the Social Democratic Party received many complaints about the aggressive recruiting tactics of the Hungarian Communist Party. On the other hand, problems occasionally arose because the Communist Party refused membership to some people on the grounds that they lacked class consciousness; these persons would then join the Social Democrats. Given its history, two divergent movements had already manifested themselves within the Communist Party at this time. One faction was made up of the émigrés from Moscow, led by Mátyás Rákosi and including Ernő Gerő, Mihály Farkas, József Révai, Zoltán Vas, and Imre Nagy. The other group belonged to the underground movement in

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Hungary and included János Kádár, Gyula Kállai, and László Rajk. A great deal of tension within the party came primarily from their opposing views on how to seize power, although this was not evident to those on the outside; in fact, the Communist Party appeared to be the most harmonious of all the parties at this time. Both factions were convinced that they were the only ones capable of and called upon to reconstruct and lead the country. The motivation for Communist behaviour was undoubtedly the party’s determination to obtain the leading role and, eventually, power, which proved to be more important than preconceived ideas and principles. Indeed, at this time the Communist Party was not clear about its own identity or about what kind of social and political system it contemplated for the country. It resorted to the concept of “people’s democracy” as the term for the regime without having a clear notion of what that concept meant. They were waiting for guidance from Stalin, but Stalin had committed himself, in discussions with the Allies, to a transition period of ten to fifteen years. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership had committed itself, from late 1944, to ensuring that the forces of law and order were under Communist control. The leaders of the Communist Party formulated their plan of action at the May 1945 party congress, making sure that everything was acceptable to public opinion at large. They voted in favour of coalition and cooperation among the democratic parties, reconstruction of the country, and implementation of the terms of the armistice agreement and reparations obligations. In February 1945 they had elected Mátyás Rákosi, the most influential person within the party, as first secretary. Rákosi had been imprisoned in 1926, but a two-party agreement between Hungary and the Soviet Union had provided for his release in 1940, on condition that he leave immediately for the Soviet Union (the flags captured as booty by Russian troops in 1849 were returned to Hungary in exchange). Once in Moscow, Rákosi became the leading figure among Hungarian Communist exiles (partly because Béla Kun had been purged) and one of the coordinators of the Hungarian-language Kossuth Rádió in Moscow. He returned to Hungary on 30 January 1945. Fluent in several languages, he was known at the time for being well informed and for his sharp memory, which many found amazing. Rákosi’s ideas about the near future were revealed in the speech he delivered at a party function on 22 February 1945: Finally, all comrades must understand: The policies we are pursuing today and which are perhaps viewed by many, even at this gathering,

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with ambiguous feelings, these policies are the adaptations of Marxism to the circumstances, to this period in which we work. As we proceed, together not only with the Social Democratic Party but also with the Smallholders, and even the bourgeois parties ... our comrades are not doing this because they have become opportunists, nor because they have lost the Marxist line; to the contrary, they have applied Marxism to the circumstances of the present ... This is the correct line today, this is the line that is disseminated around the world, this is the line taken in the Soviet Union by comrade Stalin ... Let no one believe that by so doing the class struggle has ceased, that the Communists are in coalition with other democratic parties on the National Front of Independence ... To the contrary, the difficulties are still ahead of us. He then added, “I must constantly emphasize that the policy we are pursuing now is not ephemeral, it is not for a day or for a short while, but it is long range, and the comrades must adapt to that. Let them adapt all their actions so that we work together for a long time to come not only with the National Peasant Party but, if it depends on us, with the Smallholders, and even with the Civic Democratic Party. The longer we can preserve this coalition, the more certain the development of democracy.”49 The official policies of the Communist Party were based on the resolution adopted at the first National Congress of May 1945, the underlying principles of which were collaboration with the pro-democracy forces and Hungarian-Soviet friendship. Regarding the latter, Rákosi said something interesting when he agreed with an issue raised by István Szirmai: “when our opponents are constantly confronting us under the national colours, let us not begin every single speech with the phrase ‘the glorious Red Army’!”50 The party received seventy mandates at the national elections of 4 November 1945.

The National Peasant Party Although the National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Parasztpárt) was formed in 1939, only after the war did it become a formal organization. By August 1945 it counted 170,000 members. Its supporters came from the ranks of the poor and middle strata of the peasantry, but it also had significant support among the intellectuals in the provinces, especially in

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Chess Game for Democracy

eastern Hungary. The central point of its platform, elaborated in the summer of 1945, was the consistent execution of land reform. The party chairman was the writer Péter Veres and its general secretary was the sociologist Imre Kovács, also a writer. Its membership may be divided into two groups. The populist intellectuals and agrarian proletarians formed the left wing, headed by Ferenc Erdei, József Darvas, and the famous Hungarian writer, Gyula Illyés, while the other group allied with Imre Kovács and Ferenc Farkas. Chairman Péter Veres’s description of the two factions speaks for itself: “One group considered the more proletarian Ferenc Erdei as its secret leader, the others, the more ‘narodniki’ [populist] Imre Kovács – as for me, well, I understood both sides; I was thinking in terms of the people, in terms of the nation and, although I felt Erdei was the way of the future, I tried, for the sake of the cause, as well as later, to always find a balance between these two forces, which were hampering each other. I too had to bear the stigma of duplicity.”51 Incidentally, all of the personalities mentioned above had participated in the founding of the party in 1939. The party’s social base, its traditional anti-feudalism, its entire ideology, and its system of personal networks often defined the Peasant Party as an ally of the Communists and, by the same token, an opponent of the Social Democratic Party. Some of the leaders of the party, in any case, were closet Communists (such as Erdei and Darvas). On the other hand, the party secretary, Imre Kovács, was a true democrat and a man of political integrity, who stood completely against Communist influence within and outside the party. The party received twenty-three mandates in the 4 November 1945 elections.

Those excluded from the coalition The Civic Democratic Party The Civic Democratic Party (Polgári Demokrata Párt) was the only one that attempted to form a liberal party at the end of 1944. It was a new party, although it had liberal precedents and a political pedigree stretching back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus one group, made up of members of pre-war conservative parties no longer in existence, was led by the son of Pál Teleki,52 Géza Teleki, who became the minister of education and religion in the Interim Government; he was elected chairman of the party. Teleki, in the crosshairs of Communist attacks, soon lost his job as minister and, since this placed the party

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itself in a difficult position, he felt compelled to resign in the summer of 1945. This did not satisfy the leftist parties, however, and that summer, before the elections, the party was ostracized by the Independence Front. The membership of the party was around 60,000; it had a rather modest influence in the capital and the provincial towns. Only the daily Világ, under the editorship of Géza Supka from the left wing of the party, was able to attract a following, with a circulation of 80,000; it followed the freemason traditions of its predecessor at the beginning of the century. Two delegates were elected during the November elections: the Unitarian bishop Sándor Szent-Iványi and the nun Margit Slachta, who, however, resigned from the party in January 1946 and functioned as an independent MP. The Civic Democratic Party constituted the opposition to the coalition, along with the Democratic People’s Party, until the formation of the Hungarian Freedom Party in the spring of 1946. The Democratic People’s Party The need to establish a new Catholic Party manifested itself after the German occupation – provided it could completely dissociate itself from the Catholic Party that had been at the beck and call of the Horthy regime. Count József Pálffy took the initiative, as he had represented Catholic organizations among the national resistance. Christian movements had also participated in the anti-Fascist Hungarian Front. The executive council of the Catholic Social People’s Movement had entrusted Pálffy, a former deputy of the government party, with participation in the Front. The head of the Catholic Church at the time, Prince Primate Jusztinián Serédi, also endorsed this participation in the resistance movement. In late November 1944, Pálffy founded the Christian Democratic People’s Party, which did not participate in the Independence Front in southern Hungary since its leader was in Budapest, on the other side of the frontlines. His later petition to have his party recognized and allowed to function by the Interim National Government was in vain; permission was delayed. Some members of the party, with István Barankovics in the lead, then decided to found a new party under the name of the Democratic People’s Party (Demokrata Néppárt), although the new head of the Catholic Church, Prince Primate József Mindszenty,53 was backing Pálffy’s party.54 During the elections Pálffy’s Christian Democratic Party formed an alliance with the Civic Democratic Party, asking its followers to vote for candidates on the list of the latter. It can be argued that the true opposition to new political structures evolved outside the Independence Front, primarily among conservatives

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Chess Game for Democracy

and Catholics. The principal and most influential entity representing continuity was not a political party but the Catholic Church, beginning with its head, who openly opposed not only radical change but also secular democratic transformation under any guise. Mindszenty’s determined resistance and charismatic personality influenced the masses. Under the circumstances, the group deemed more democratic received official sanction; its leader, István Barankovics, founded the Democratic People’s Party – whose program reflected the ideology of European Christian Democracy – in September 1945, confronting Mindszenty’s associates and the rigid stand taken by the cardinal. György Litván summarized the significance of the movement: “This appeared as an exceptionally great opportunity in Hungarian history: a Christian movement meeting the challenge of the age bearing political promise.”55 This party attained real success in spite of the resistance of the authorities, the political obstacles, and the lack of ecclesiastic support, even though it could not take part in the election campaign because of the Church’s attitude. The Smallholders finally offered two places on their ticket to delegates of the Democratic People’s party. Thus the followers of the party could vote for the Smallholders and, once the two (Sándor Bálint and Sándor Eckhardt) were elected, they acted from then on under the name of the Democratic People’s Party. The Hungarian Radical Party Imre Csécsy founded the Hungarian Radical Party (Magyar Radikális Párt) in November 1944, albeit the organizational work did not really begin until the spring of 1945. The party platform specified that it was striving not for the establishment of a bourgeois democracy but rather for radical democracy, in the republican tradition of 1918. The platform explained, furthermore, that the party was counting not only on “working professionals” but also on the support of every sensible artisan, merchant, industrialist, and entrepreneur who, with an objective view of reality, expected to harmonize their vested interests “with the demands of the time.” This explains why it remained a small party with a largely professional base. Even the party’s distant spiritual leader, Oszkár Jászi – who resided in the United States for several decades – dissociated himself from the party because of its extreme left-wing spirit. The Radical Party was unable to realize its original objective: to function as a loyal and independent opposition, as “the democratic conscience” of those in power. It obtained not a single mandate in the elections of 4 November 1945.

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41

Sharp debates and exchanges within the coalition From late 1944 on, the Communist Party had no choice but to comply with the formal rules of cooperation within the coalition; within the police, however, it strove to build on its already strong position. This effort – with the help of the Soviets – was crowned with success. The most important post in that sphere was that of minister of the interior, occupied by Ferenc Erdei, who, while officially a member of the Peasant Party, was secretly a member of the Communist Party.56 The heads and deputy heads of the political police section within the ministry were also Communists, as was the undersecretary in charge of the police and inspection. Thirty-four of the thirty-six individuals in charge of the political police were also Communists, as were the majority of the detectives. Even in the provinces the post of police chief was not distributed equitably: sixteen were Communists, six were Social Democrats, and three belonged to the Peasant Party, while none were Smallholders.57 According to a survey dated 11 June 1945, of the 13 detectives under the political police in the capital districts, 83 were Communists, 23 were Social Democrats, and 7 were members of the Peasant Party. The police were constantly in the crossfire of party clashes. The prime minister himself declared at the cabinet meeting of 5 February 1945 that, given the abuses noted among the police force, he would summon the minister of the interior and the chief of police. At the cabinet meeting of 28 March 1945 it was suggested that the ministries of the interior and of justice appoint a joint committee to look at the abuses by the police. Béla Dálnoki Miklós asked the minister of the interior to correct the misconduct within the ranks of the police before the government moved to Budapest, “because they will have enough trouble there.”58 Most of the complaints arose because members of the local police and militia were not always of unquestionable morality; they abused their powers, but there was no way to get rid of them, since they were trusted by the Soviet command.59 The prime minister summoned an inter-party conference for 15 May to remedy “the intolerable conditions, the irregularities, the one-sided political activities, and the methods and devices used during investigations, arrests, and interrogations.”60 The leaders of the coalition parties voiced strong reservations. Zoltán Tildy, the Smallholders’ chairman, voiced his objections that “the police intervene as if they were serving the interests of one party only, as if Hungarian society were standing in front of a final decision already taken. In many places the leaders and

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Chess Game for Democracy

members of the Smallholders have been arrested; elsewhere members of the professional class have been turned over to the Soviets, where they accused everyone who is not a member of the Communist Party.”61 Moreover, added Tildy “the police had evolved from the start by mostly refusing to admit members of other parties ... It is also noteworthy that while on duty the police salute each other with the greeting ‘Szabadság!’ [Freedom!], which is the Communist Party’s salutation.”62 Imre Kovács of the Peasant Party also reported cases where the police intervened to prevent the formation of local branches of the party. He too stressed that the police should serve the state rather than party politics. He challenged the entire government to work to realize this objective. He protested against the brutality of the police during interrogations and suggested that “committees be dispatched to all locations where complaints had been registered.”63 The debate regarding the political police continued at the cabinet meeting of 18 May. István Vásáry, Smallholder and minister of finance, deplored the lack of guiding principles regarding the operations of the political police. Erdei retorted that “he did not know about any political police, only the political section of the state police.” Yet he too made use of the term “political police” and admitted that in many places “the political police operate independently.” Minister of Defence János Vörös mentioned that, among the abuses committed by the police, the “nononsense officers of the police are reported and accused by the rank and file, and they are taken away at night.” The prime minister also mentioned “that the political police often resorted to physical punishment, dispensing with investigations,” while these “so-called heroes have no intention of enlisting in the army.” The Social Democrat Minister of Justice Ágoston Valentiny rejected the accusation that the political police were a “state within the state” and insisted that all organizations had to be trained “to operate against the Fascists.” At the same time he directed harsh words against such practices: “This is the irresponsible work of a criminal society, behind which the Fascists are hiding.” He promised to remind the police about their rights, duties, and tasks. Erdei admitted: “since they are amateurs, excesses have been committed, but they are now receiving training here and in the provinces.”64 For the cabinet meeting on 8 June 1945, Minister of Justice Valentiny prepared a draft directive intended as a guide for the operations of the mixed committee monitoring law enforcement. According to this draft so-called “flying committees” of three members each would travel unannounced to the headquarters of police jurisdictions. Each committee

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would be made up of a delegate each from the ministries of the interior and of justice and an examining judge. Its jurisdiction would extend to both the people’s tribunals and the criminal courts. It would examine the validity of the law enforcement agency and of due process against the accused, particularly with regard to whether the accused is transferred, after arrest, to a prison under a criminal court or to a people’s tribunal. The proposal also had provisions in case the examination of the law enforcement activity revealed a crime: “while it is not possible to expect a satisfactory and unbiased procedure from the local prosecutor’s office or the court in every single case, it can refer such cases to the criminal court in Budapest or to the people’s tribunal for their exclusive jurisdiction.”65 At the meeting, Ferenc Nagy raised the issue of why the monitoring of law enforcement should not fall under the jurisdiction of the county chief; Erdei’s answer was that “while the chief of the county did have some monitoring rights, the police are not yet a state agency and only when they are reorganized as part of the state will it become possible to regulate the matter completely.” Ernő Gerő felt it was dangerous to allow other agencies to intervene in police investigations.66 This observation referred to a statement issued by undersecretary Béla Kovács in the 6 June issue of the Kis Újság (the daily newspaper of the Smallholder Party), according to which Kovács had a standing order from the prime minister to cleanse the police wherever there were serious allegations of abuse; furthermore, he was given the authority to use every means available during the examination. Erdei answered in the 7 June 1945 issue of Szabad Nép (the daily newspaper of the Communist Party) that no one may hand down such blanket authorization without the consent of the Ministry of the Interior, not even the prime minister; and he did not consent to empowering Béla Kovács along those lines.67 The matter of setting up a committee was adjourned at this meeting, without further explanation. Erdei himself stated, by way of resolving the issue, that “in several counties they have begun to investigate police abuses, and high-ranking police officers have been sent out to remove the culprits.” Their task was to control the execution of the regulation regarding the organization of law enforcement and to cleanse the police of all personnel guilty of common crimes and of those who may become victims of attempts at bribery. Investigations had been launched in nine counties and two townships, as a consequence of which several officers and captains were removed – for instance in Dévaványa, Szeged, Debrecen, Eger, Esztergom, and Szentes (towns in different parts of

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Chess Game for Democracy

Hungary).68 Of course, these investigations led to further debates among the members of the coalition. Later Valentiny attempted to establish a police force under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, whose task would have been to conduct investigations countrywide, enabling the people’s prosecutors to carry out their task, press charges, or cancel proceedings on the basis of objective, unbiased information.69 According to this proposed rule, the criminal investigation unit, based on the public prosecutor’s office and according to the court schedule across the entire country, should have authority in all areas pertaining to police matters; in other words “if the investigation unit is assigned a particular case, the national police may not continue their own investigation in that matter.”70 In justifying the need for such a measure Valentiny pointed out that he had tried in vain to obtain information from the investigation units by way of the minister of the interior, even with the help of the minister himself. He referred to the murders at Gyömrő,71 saying that he had inquired several times in vain, never receiving an answer. He explained that the delay jeopardized the procuring of evidence. On the other hand, according to the minutes of the meeting, Erdei felt the measure was unnecessary, because the criminal proceedings regulate the investigation and the relationship between agencies of justice. He admitted that mistakes had been made, but said that he was trying to correct these and the proposal presented by Valentiny would only increase the contradictions.72 Gerő, the minister of commerce and transportation, also opposed the proposal, with the following reasoning: “it is conducive to providing ammunition for reactionary interpretations, because the general allegations directed against law enforcement are of a reactionary nature.” The Interim National Government accepted Valentiny’s proposal after an extensive debate, by a vote of six to four.73 As a result of the joint intervention of the Communists and the left-wing Socialists, however, the regulations were not printed in the Magyar Közlöny (Hungarian Bulletin). The 29 June 1945 issue of the Szabad Nép launched a most determined struggle against the implementation of the regulation. The Social Democratic Party discussed the matter at its 5 July 1945 leadership session. With Szakasits in the lead, the party’s left wing attacked Valentiny’s proposal and the latter resigned his post as minister after the session.74 Mátyás Rákosi noted the events in his memoirs: “It turned out one day that Valentiny was trying to create some kind of Ministry of Justice police force with extensive powers, and the cabinet accepted a law [actually, a directive] to that effect, before the Communist ministers had a

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chance to recover; it was only after extensive manipulations that we were able to undo this regulation already accepted by the cabinet.”75 The background of this was that Mátyás Rákosi turned to Pushkin, the political advisor to the acc. We know this from notes Pushkin took during a conversation with Prime Minister Béla Dálnoki Miklós. Dálnoki Miklós asked for an explanation of why the acc prevented the announcement of the draft of the directive. Pushkin answered that the reason was that the draft directive had not been communicated to each of the ministers, let alone to the acc.76 The Smallholders were not the only ones to voice grievances. András Tömpe, the head of the political police section of the provincial police headquarters of the Hungarian State Police, complained about the demonstrations mounted by the Smallholders before the elections of 7 October 1945; in the Budapest precincts they shouted slogans such as “Down with the Communists!” “Out with the Jews!” “No Red Budapest!” He added that the police refused to intervene: “The police vehicle arrived on Szabadság square. The deputy chief of police issued an order: the demonstrators must be dispersed. The police made no move. Only after repeated orders did the officers disperse the crowd, without much enthusiasm. No one was asked to show identification. How can this happen in Pest, where law enforcement is under our control? Around four thousand policemen are on our side.”77 Hence it is understandable that the matter of law enforcement elicited such heated debates already in 1945, and that this issue remained a strain on the coalition, whose members were unable to reach a consensus. In accordance with protocol, the leaders of the various parties invited one another to their respective events. They appeared jointly at state affairs, at large-scale cultural happenings, and occasionally even at major political assemblies. At times the photos from the period reveal a mood of pleasant euphoria. For instance, the Smallholder Party invited Rákosi to its grand assembly of 20 August; his account to the session to the Communist Party reads as follows: I attended the congress of the Smallholder Party, to communicate the opinion of the Communist Party on topical issues. To my surprise, I was greeted with unusual warmth and applause. The applause was as if I had been attending a Communist convention. My first thought was, this is courtesy. As a precaution I asked, how is it that the same Smallholders who voiced bitter grievances against the Communists and the Communist Party indulge in such an ovation.

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I see a contradiction in this behaviour. The person I addressed explained that the leadership of the Smallholders and the Smallholders in the provinces has nothing but respect for the Communist leadership, and especially for me, knowing that my line is different from what the Communists are doing in the villages. They consider the party’s leadership, me in particular, as ones who want to protect them from the excesses of the would-be Communist despots at the village level. Their expression of friendship was sincere, because they hoped that we will continue in this vein in the future, and the villages will be freed from the despots.78 As a frightening example Rákosi mentioned a case from Heves county, in which a quarrel between the Communist Party and the Smallholder Party was resolved by a militant Communist, who “crashed a meeting of the Association of Catholic Women and Girls, slapping the priest and grabbing the chignon of one of the girls.” He added that the incident was investigated, and the “little Corsican” was excluded from the party.

3 Consolidation and Confrontation

The elections of November 1945 and negotiations to form a new government The Allied declaration regarding the liberation of Europe issued at Yalta on 11 February 1945 advocated that in the countries allied with Germany “new governments reflecting the will of the people will have to be formed by way of free elections to be held as soon as possible.” Beyond this international obligation, it was in the interest of all parties participating in Hungarian political life to hold democratic elections for Parliament as soon as possible. An inter-party agreement set the date for the elections for 4 November 1945; furthermore, it announced that municipal elections in Budapest would be held before that date. The press welcomed both decisions with enthusiasm; it had great expectations of democratic, fair elections that would be the first ever held in Hungary on the basis of equal, secret, and universal suffrage.

Dress rehearsal: municipal elections in the capital The fall elections were particularly important for the Smallholder Party, because they were expected to enhance its position and influence within the coalition. In connection with the preliminaries, the Interim National Government had issued two directives (14/1945 and 1030/1945) regarding the reorganization of public administration. In those areas where the fighting had ceased, the pre-war administrative set-up was to be restored, with the help and guidance of the national committees. The National Committee of Budapest had already determined the number of members of the interim municipal committees at its 21 February

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Chess Game for Democracy

session, as well as the makeup and distribution of seats according to party allegiance: the Communist Party and the Social Democrats were to receive thirty seats each, the trade unions and the Smallholder Party twenty-five seats each, the Civic Democratic Party and the National Peasant Party were awarded only ten seats each; the remaining five seats were to be awarded to outstanding individuals selected from Hungarian scientific and public life. After the government moved to Budapest, and upon further consultation with the coalition parties, an interim municipal committee was formed on 16 May. The interim designation indicated that the body had not been elected. According to the Communist politician Zoltán Vas, the influence of the Communists had been overestimated to the point where the Smallholders received a mere twenty-five seats, whereas the workers’ parties and the trade unions were allowed almost three times that number. The situation was quite similar in the provinces. Thus the workers’ parties, taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by the change of regime in 1944–45, secured far more seats in the reorganized administration than did the Smallholders. This allocation of mandates could be confirmed or amended in the capital in late summer 1945. In the course of negotiations before the elections the Smallholders accepted the proposal put forth by the Communist Party to hold elections in Budapest earlier than the elections for the National Assembly (in the hope that a victory for the workers’ parties in the capital would tilt the balance in their favour across the country). In addition, the voting age was lowered to twenty, and it was decided that the Communist and Social Democratic parties would run on a joint list and that the early elections should be held not just in the capital but in adjoining municipalities and villages as well. These villages had working-class majorities, and the left-wing parties expected that most of these workers would vote for them. Since Károly Peyer, Ágoston Valentiny, and their companions among the socialists did not allow their names to be placed on the list, some of the Socialist voters – 9 to 10 per cent according to estimates – opted to vote for the Smallholders. The expectations of the leftist parties were not realized. The new leadership of the Main Caucus of the Smallholder Party, elected at its 20 August session, feverishly prepared for the upcoming elections. The tone for the municipal elections in Budapest was set by Béla Varga, the national deputy chairman. The 30 September 1945 issue of the Független Kisgazdapárt Tudósító (Bulletin of the Independent Smallholder Party) reported as follows:

Consolidation and Confrontation

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The Smallholder Party wants to ensure a decent and safe life for every Hungarian. Under all circumstances [concern for] human beings is the ultimate objective, everything for him or her, rather than the other way around ... We demand respect for God, freedom of religion, the right to life, to good health, to physical integrity, to maximum personal security. It follows from this that no one should be deprived of those benefits which are absolutely necessary for life and the pursuit of productive work as the basis of that life ... Let the rule of force, of hatred, come to an end in this country, once and for all. Let everyone learn that the good of the people cannot be achieved by inhumane means. Varga identified the basic principles of his party as follows: “a multiparty parliamentary democracy, freedom of the press and of assembly, the right to work [meaning the right to employment], basic human rights, respect for private property, and the freedom to nurture our traditions, our culture, and our language.” On the same day Rákosi prophesied at the campaign meeting of the two workers’ parties “that we can see the projected shadow of the overwhelming victory of the workers’ parties.” The municipal elections for greater Budapest took place on 7 October 1945, amidst a lively campaign; the Smallholders obtained 50.54 per cent of the votes in the face of the united front of the two workers’ parties. This result came as a complete surprise. The voters in Budapest voted for the Smallholder Party probably because there was no bourgeois movement they could vote for. Moreover, since it was not possible to vote for the Social Democrats as such, even those who would have voted for the socialist ticket opted for the Smallholders. In other words, the Smallholders were the only alternative to the Communists. Even Zoltán Tildy, the party leader, had not expected such a good showing; he believed his party would receive no more than 25 to 30 per cent of the popular vote. He convinced Rákosi, who reported these figures to Moscow. Thus it was a surprise to everyone that the city, with its proletarian majority, had voted for the Smallholders. Rákosi and company had trouble digesting these results. The electoral loss also meant that the Communist mayor, Vas, had to be replaced. It is typical of the mood of the times that when József Kővágó, the new Smallholder mayor, appeared in his future office on the night of the polling, he found Zoltán Vas packing feverishly. “Are you planning to travel somewhere?” he

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Chess Game for Democracy

asked. Vas paled and responded angrily: “Be aware that the counterrevolution just broke out ... I am not waiting for it to start and begin killing the Communists again.” Kővágó comforted him by suggesting that he must have lost his perspective because of the shock of disappointment and added: “No one voted for any counter-revolution, but rather for the democratic Hungarian civic lifestyle advocated by the Smallholders, which is the living spirit of the city.” Vas assumed Kővágó was simply naïve and told him that he was such an amateur in politics that “he could not assess the true significance of the events.”1

The rejection of a joint list The Smallholders and their followers celebrated, marching on city-hall. The Communist Party issued the slogan: “The reactionaries in the streets!” They held a counter-demonstration and threatened to launch strikes. The Soviet leaders, as the lesson to be taken from this election and in the name of “social peace,” would have liked the various political movements to run as a single block in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 4 November, as was the case in the first post-war elections held in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Finland. Marshall Voroshilov communicated Stalin’s wish in this regard to the Hungarian politicians. The essence of the agreement would have been for the coalition parties to agree on the distribution of seats in advance. Voroshilov summoned Ferenc Nagy and offered him 40 per cent, eventually 45 per cent of the mandates for his party. Thus bargaining was in progress – Voroshilov went so far as to offer 47.5 per cent to the Smallholders (reserving the same proportion for the two workers’ parties, while the remaining percentage was to be divided between the smaller parties). On several occasions Voroshilov raised the spectre of the danger of a civil war in his conversations with chairman Nagy. Soviet pressure on the chairman and the political committee was so heavy that the majority accepted the notion of a joint list. While the political committee of the Smallholder Party was meeting in Zoltán Tildy’s office, a Social Democratic minister and an undersecretary from that party called on Tildy and proposed that both parties reject the idea of a joint list. Tildy, extremely irritated, answered that there was nothing to negotiate: the joint list was already printed and had been accepted by the Smallholder political committee. The leaks regarding this agreement occasioned great indignation within the rank and file. Kálmán Saláta was the first to receive the news, and he immediately mobilized the centre. He dispatched Tamás Szabó to the

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British and American missions while István Csicsery-Rónay notified all officials and members of the party he could reach. The following morning Ferenc Nagy called a conference at party headquarters. There the younger members convinced the party leaders that the agreement had to be changed, no matter what. To achieve this they were to visit the British and American missions, informing them that the Smallholders had accepted this agreement only under pressure; by the same token, they were to request the diplomats to ask their respective governments what they would say if free elections could not be held in Hungary. By the evening they received the British and the American responses, objecting to the joint list.2 The centre group, led by Béla Kovács, had sparked a true palace revolution within the party because of the list. Kálmán Saláta provides the following account of this event: At night there were renewed discussions with Zoltán Tildy, and later with Ferenc Nagy; with the help and backing of Béla Kovács the decision was overturned. According to Kovács’s account, Tildy was screaming, almost in tears, to abide by the resolution. Ferenc Nagy’s formula went as follows: he acknowledged the agreement signed by the party leaders but, as party chairman, given the major import of the resolution, he considered the agreement fully valid only if it was validated by the rank and file. Therefore he would call a meeting of the caucus. Early in the morning he made the announcement in front of the party’s undersecretaries, ministers, executives, other leaders, and forty to fifty members, who listened in stony silence. Ferenc Nagy observed great emotion on the faces of those in attendance. Yet the decision was not without controversy, because everyone who had a grasp of the situation realized that we were standing up to the Soviets, for the first time.3 Already on 22 October Voroshilov, who reported regularly to Stalin and Molotov on Hungarian affairs, asked for Stalin’s instructions, by return mail, regarding what should be done, since the Smallholders refused to go along with the joint list for the elections and Washington and London were raising objections in view of the potential contravention of the Yalta agreements.4 We do not know Stalin’s response, if indeed there was one. The fact remains that neither the acc nor the Hungarian Communist Party insisted on a joint list thereafter. In fact, Hungary could even claim a diplomatic victory before the elections: the

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country was recognized by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Smallholder Party celebrated the opportunity to hold free elections as a victory for democracy. Although the idea of a joint list was now buried, the remainder of the agreement, namely that the coalition government would continue to function regardless of the results of the elections, had to be honoured. The country was facing weighty issues, such as signing the peace treaty, slowing the inflation rate, and coping with the damages inflicted by the war. All political factions assumed that these problems could be resolved more easily if the governing parties worked together. International observers deemed that the elections held on 4 November were the fairest of all elections in the region. The Smallholders obtained 57.08 per cent of the popular vote, and 245 (58.19 per cent) mandates in Parliament; 120 of these seats were occupied by peasant representatives. In its editorial on 7 November 1945, the New York Times commented favourably on the Hungarian elections: “The result was a triple triumph for democracy. Though defeated, war ravaged and under Russian occupation, they nevertheless staged the first free election to be held in Southeastern Europe since the war ... If the Small Landholders are allowed to put these policies into practice they will erect in Europe’s most troubled area a citadel of democracy which should be an inspiration to all those who are fighting for democracy in adjacent lands.”

Formation of a new government The leaders of the Communist Party tried to compensate for the Smallholder majority with political manoeuvring. They could count as a success in the negotiations over the formation of the new cabinet that the Smallholders did not expect to run the country by themselves – albeit many of their members, even within the moderate group, were advocating just that. The cabinet list was ready by 9 November; all the coalition parties had reached consensus except for the appointment to the Ministry of Agriculture. The workers’ parties received all the posts dealing with economics, while the Ministry of the Interior – although coveted by the Socialists and Communists – was given to the Smallholders; they did not even object to Béla Kovács as the new minister. Voroshilov reported this in his dispatch of 9 November and, presumably, it was discussed by the political bureau of the Communist Party of the USSR (CPUSSR), which then made a recommendation to Stalin regarding sending instructions to Voroshilov.5 The chairman of

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the Allied Control Commission (acc) then intervened in the discussions regarding the formation of the cabinet. The top echelon Soviet leadership proposed the following plans regarding the Hungarian government: the Ministry of the Interior must be in the hands of the Communists, and two deputy prime ministerial posts must be created to accommodate the two leaders of the workers’ parties. The Soviets would accept the appointments proposed by the Smallholders and the Social Democrats, but even before the government was confirmed the Communists should try to agree with the other parties regarding a program “that would ensure unconditional friendship toward the Soviet Union.”6 Nevertheless Voroshilov proceeded cautiously in the implementation of these instructions. In his dispatch of 11 November he noted that a Ministry of the Interior in Smallholder control could be acceptable provided the undersecretary in charge of the police would be the Communist Mihály Farkas. About the Smallholder appointee, he told Moscow that Béla Kovács was a “decent person, with whom one could get along.”7 Mátyás Rákosi, the secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, rejected this compromise unilaterally. In the ensuing days the tone of the discussions between Rákosi, Tildy, and Ferenc Nagy became increasingly sharp. At some point the would-be prime minister, Zoltán Tildy, raised the possibility of dividing the cabinet posts in proportion to the votes received and of dividing the Ministry of the Interior between administrative affairs and the undersecretary for police. The former would belong to the Smallholders, the latter to the Communists. The Social Democrats also laid claim to the ministry and all three parties appeared uncompromising.8 At this point Moscow decided to intervene, acting behind the scenes. On 12 November Ambassador Pushkin summoned Ferenc Nagy and on 13 November Voroshilov summoned Tildy. While they committed to keeping the discussions confidential, they were persuaded to accept the principle of parity and to institute two positions of deputy prime minister, one for the Social Democrats and one for the Communists. By way of compensation the Soviets offered the Smallholders a ministry without portfolio and, more importantly, the latter received the Ministry of Finance in exchange for the Ministry of the Interior. Voroshilov accepted Tildy’s request to list Rákosi and the Social Democrat Árpád Szakasits as ministers without portfolio in the cabinet. Tildy would appoint them as deputy prime ministers at the first cabinet meeting, to be confirmed by the National Assembly. The reason for this two-step

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procedure was to make it easier for the Smallholders to sell the list to  the other officials within the party.9 During the discussions on 14  November it was decided to create another cabinet post for the Smallholders, for the sake of parity. Ferenc Nagy would have liked to see a Ministry of Cooperatives. Voroshilov, however, did not agree to this because, as he explained in his dispatch to Stalin and Molotov, the proposal would have given the Smallholders a major opportunity to exert influence not only in the villages but on the proletariat as well.  He convinced the Smallholder leaders to create a Ministry of Information, on the Czech model. Consequently, the cabinet formed by 15 November included nine posts for the Smallholders, four for the Communists, four for the Social Democrats, and one for the National Peasant Party. Instead of the Ministry of the Interior the Smallholders received the Ministry of Agriculture and appointed Béla Kovács as the minister. The elections and the formation of the cabinet form a new chapter in Hungarian history. It came as a major surprise when, in his toast at a dinner offered by the Smallholder Party, Voroshilov explained that they appeared so powerful and reasonable after the elections that the Soviet Union would build its relations with Hungary on the Smallholder Party. This declaration sounded sincere at the time. The nation as a whole felt it had triumphed. Eighty-three per cent of the electorate had opted for democracy; but the Soviet leadership would never forgive Rákosi and company for the fiasco of the joint list. This reaction is revealed in a conversation between Molotov and Rákosi on 29 April 1947. Molotov explained: “I believe you made a big mistake in 1945 when you did not participate in the elections along with other parties, as a single bloc.” “We tried to do just that, but the Social Democrats were the obstacle,” answered Rákosi. “You should have overcome their resistance. Had you started as a single bloc, there was no way one party could obtain the absolute majority. It seems to me that this was your mistake,” continued Molotov. Rákosi did not contradict: “Yes, I believe that was the case,” he answered.10

The proclamation of the republic In his maiden speech as speaker of the house at the opening session, Ferenc Nagy stressed the merits of the voters and of the assembly in the following terms:

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Allow me to declare from my seat as Speaker to the peoples of Europe and to the three great powers who have saved the freedom of the people of Europe that, just as we gave proof of our political maturity and, by the formation of the coalition government, we gave proof of our moderation and of our judgment, so in our parliamentary activities we will also give proof of a pure democracy ... The responsibility of our National Assembly is enormous. It is responsible, for its actions and its omissions, to the greatest power known in a democracy: the people ... This assembly came together not only by the will of the people, but indeed, from the people directly – it is the National Assembly not of the politicians, but of working Hungarians.11 Among its first measures, on 1 February 1946 the National Assembly proclaimed the republic, defined human and civil rights, and adopted a code of laws to protect both. Moreover, it created a whole series of laws of a civil society nature to guarantee the democratic nature of the republic and the expansion of democratic rights: all institutions of higher learning (with the exception of theological schools) were opened up to women, all feudal titles and ranks were abolished, and measures to separate church and state were introduced. In conjunction, all these moves redound to the credit of Hungarian democracy after the war, unique even in Europe. The transformation of the form of government in the aftermath of the war affected every monarchy in the region. By the same token, the dictatorial or anti-democratic regimes were replaced. The people’s republic was proclaimed in Yugoslavia on 29 November 1945, and a republic was proclaimed in Albania on 1 January 1946, in Italy on 17 March 1946, and in Bulgaria on 15 September 1946. The last king to abdicate was Michael of Romania, and the country has been a republic since 31 December 1947. On 1 February 1946, the monarchy was also officially abolished in Hungary; all laws regarding the monarchy and the regency became void. The form of government was declared to be a republic. Act I of 1946, which is considered a constitution, included the first formulation in Hungary of human and civil rights that are in complete harmony with the human rights proclaimed by the United Nations: “Personal freedom; the right to human life free from oppression; freedom from fear and from want; freedom of thought and speech; freedom to practise one’s religion; the right to assemble; the right to own property, to

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security, to work, and to a decent livelihood; the right to education and culture; and the right to participate in the life of the state and of local government. No citizen may be deprived of these rights without due process of law.”12 According to the constitution, the unicameral National Assembly, elected on the basis of general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, was the legislative body. Thus the Parliament was the institution of popular representation, the bearer of the sovereignty of the people. The head of state was the president or chairman of the republic, elected by the National Assembly for a period of four years. The head of state could be reelected once, but not in consecutive sessions. If the president were disabled, the speaker of the house was to take over his function as temporary president of the republic. The constitution adopted the classic principle of separation of powers. The legislators built in certain checks and balances in the institutionalization of the separation of powers to prevent domination by any one of the three bodies. The constitution named the president of the republic as the chief executive officer and he or she was to exercise this power through the government accountable to the National Assembly (unlike in the United States). The president’s measures or directives, however, had to be countersigned by the prime minister or the pertinent minister. The president of the republic was required to endorse the laws enacted within fifteen days or, failing that, he or she had the right to send the act to the National Assembly, with comments, for further consideration. If the law was submitted to him or her a second time, it had to be proclaimed within fifteen days. The president of the republic had the power to name or dismiss the prime minister, as well as the ministers of the cabinet on the basis of the prime minister’s recommendation. The president had to take into consideration the opinion of the political committee of the assembly13 and was required to observe the principle of parliamentary majority. The law obligated the cabinet to present itself to the assembly within eight days. Until this event the president of the republic could not dissolve the assembly. The constitution also provided for calling the president to account and for his or her removal, if and when he or she acted unlawfully. In other words, the president could be dismissed if at least 150 deputies signed a petition to that effect in the presence of at least two-thirds of all deputies, and with the approval of at least two-thirds of those present. In such a case the assembly functioned as a court. The president could only resign with the approval of the legislature, in a statement addressed to

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the assembly. The deputies may ask the president to change her or his mind within fifteen days. If this did not happen the president’s resignation became effective. Act I of 1946 provided no details about the courts of law. It merely stated that the president of the republic appoints all judges of the appeals courts, whereas the courts exercise their power in the name of the republic. On 1 February 1946 the deputies elected Zoltán Tildy as president by voice acclamation. This decision, however, was preceded by a protracted discussion. The office obviously belonged to the Smallholder Party because of its absolute majority in the legislature, but the majority in the party and its leaders – e.g., Béla Varga and Béla Kovács – would have preferred Ferenc Nagy. The left wing of the party and some rightwingers (for instance, Zoltán Pfeiffer) were in favour of Tildy. The Communist Party preferred Tildy – although it did not say so outright – because it believed Tildy was more apt to work with the workers’ parties and the coalition. The Peasant Party and the Social Democrats also preferred Tildy, yet all the votes of the workers’ delegates and the left wing of the Smallholders (about forty) would not have sufficed to offset the majority enjoyed by the Smallholders. Eventually Ferenc Nagy withdrew and recommended Tildy for the post at the meeting of the party delegates. His speech was so persuasive that all members of the Smallholder parliamentary group accepted the recommendation. After 4 February Ferenc Nagy, the chairman of the Independent Smallholders, took on the office of prime minister, following Tildy. The function of speaker of the house was then assumed by Béla Varga.

The democratic state: defending the republic’s code of law During the discussion on the constitution all parties clearly realized that to ensure that these laws were observed, a bill of rights for the citizens of the republic must be enacted. This was all the more necessary because the Horthy regime’s notorious Act II of 1921 “regarding the more effective protection of the state and social order” was still in effect. This act was designed to protect the state and social order of the Horthy regime vis-à-vis those parties and movements that would resort to violence to change it. The law was applied to the Communist Party and to the extreme right parties and movements, but the public perceived it as a means to curtail democratic movements. Hence the new republic had

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to create a new law for its own defence rather than operate on the basis of a law symbolizing the former regime. The need to enact a defence of the republic’s criminal code was also mentioned during the 30 November 1945 debates over the Tildy government program, as interpreted by the Smallholder politician Varga. An article in the 22 January 1945 issue of Kis Újság entitled “Törvényjavaslat készül a köztársaság védelméről” (Draft law in preparation about the defence of the republic) noted that “a human bill of rights would be guaranteed in the draft law about the constitution, and this proposal is called upon to ensure the inviolability of the head of state and the republican form of government.” The Smallholders probably urged such a law because they were hoping to prevent arrests and internments they deemed illegal. Its deputies protested again and again against such arrests through petitions and memoranda filed with the Communist minister of the interior. Furthermore, they expected the new criminal code to forestall a leftwing dictatorship, a Communist takeover. During this period the leftist parties felt that the right was gaining ground, mustering huge crowds for demonstrations and openly cheering Cardinal József Mindszenty in Parliament; they felt that the young Hungarian republic had to be protected against some kind of attack from the right. A new draft was prepared by the constitutional committee of the Social Democratic Party and elaborated by experts from the Ministry of Justice. It was introduced to Parliament by István Ries on 7 February 1946, then the assembly forwarded it to the committee on constitution and law for its appraisal. According to this draft law, now bearing the title “Code of Law in Defence of the Democratic Form of Government and of the Republic,” anyone attempting to disturb or overthrow the democratic order and initiating, organizing, leading, or demanding a movement aiming at the violent overthrow of the republic, or at depriving the president of the republic of his life, personal freedom, or constitutional powers would be committing a felony. The punishment for such a crime would be the death sentence or forced labour for life. Furthermore, the various forms of instigating against the “democratic order and its basic institutions” would include instigating racial or ethnic hatred and praising those who have committed war crimes or crimes against the people. The spreading of rumours or of fantastic or improbable news was also strictly forbidden. The prison sentence for such activities would range from two to ten years. Moreover, the draft specified

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that any act falling under the purview of this law would be judged by the people’s tribunals. When the draft law was announced, opinions were sharply divided. Some felt it was excessively strict, pointing out that even in the Western world democracy is not protected by such stringent laws. The law proposal was debated by the parliamentary committee on constitution and law on 20 February 1946. The debate made it obvious that the leftist parties as well as those deputies interested in civil rights were worried about attacks on the young Hungarian republic coming from the extreme right. While the probability of action by such factions, parties, or persons on the right had already been pre-empted by various enactments, we must recall that the war had ended less than a year earlier; their fears were not unreasonable. Moreover, they also tried to guard the new republic from attacks by each other. According to the view presented by the Smallholder Dezső Sulyok and confirmed by the concepts of Béla Zsedényi, the bourgeois democracy (in the classical sense of the term) had to be protected. The tenor of their intervention implied a fear, carefully veiled, of a Communist takeover. Zsedényi came close to voicing this fear in explicit terms: “Before I entered here I was handed a proposal in the corridor. Among other things this proposal mentioned that those who advocate the disturbing or overthrowing of the parliamentary democratic system in order to establish a government based on common rule or a single party government should be punished.”14 He proposed that this recommendation be incorporated into the draft law. For the left wing, however, protecting a bourgeois republic with democratic institutions based on the ownership of private property was unacceptable. Had they agreed to such protection, their hands would have been tied. They felt that the process of transformation over the past year had already established many institutions and created many measures that stretched the boundaries of bourgeois democracy. These included the council on regulating landed estates, the main economic council, and the police, which already had a leftist, mainly Communist, majority confronting the Smallholder majority in Parliament. The Communist Party strove to extend its influence by means of these institutions, which they felt were part and parcel of the new democratic order. In other words, they hoped to create a type of constitution that would provide maximal opportunities to entrust the execution of the law to the special people’s tribunals, which were one of their power bases and a fundamental institution for the defence of

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the new republic. (Act VII of 1945, regarding the people’s tribunals, did not specify the composition and operations of the special councils. They were composed of five members: lay judges delegated by the Communist Party, the Social Democrats, the National Peasant Party, and the Smallholders, and a professional judge. The jurisdiction of these special tribunals did not extend to judging war criminals or those committing crimes against the people; this continued to be the purview of the six-member tribunals, which included a delegate from the Civic Democratic Party.) Act VII of the following year, 1946, was the outcome of extensive discussions and compromise among the parties. It was by no means clear which paragraph of the constitution could be used by what party against another party within the coalition. The political events that followed demonstrated, unfortunately, that the very vagueness of these articles would provide a legal basis that enabled the leadership of the Communist Party, with the help of the police and the courts, to eliminate other parties and opponents within its own party. At the 20 February session of the committee on the constitution and the law, Dezső Sulyok proposed a friendly amendment according to which those civil servants who contravened the rights enunciated in the constitution should also fall under the jurisdiction of the proposed law.15 Then János Csorba, the chairman of the Hungarian Administrative Court and a member of the Smallholders, submitted a memorandum to the National Assembly on 27 February 1947 pointing out that the civil rights guaranteed under Act I of 1946 had to be protected in the courts, otherwise those laws were in jeopardy. Citizens must be given the opportunity to turn to an independent court to seek protection when deprived of their rights.16 Thus Act X of 1946 came about as a result of inter-party compromise and negotiations in May 1946, bearing the title “For the more effective protection of basic human rights.” On the recommendation of Smallholder Imre Bencze, who read the proposal in Parliament, the deputies accepted the compromise according to which civil servants who in the course of performing their duties “hurt someone’s natural and inalienable right” would be subject to a prison term of up to five years. If the civil servant’s action involved significant material damage as well, the sentence had to be spent in prison. Furthermore, the sentence in either case was to include loss of office and suspension of political rights. Bencze justified the severity of the punishment by arguing that if a citizen abuses his or her civil rights, and

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thus turns against the republic or against democracy, it is natural that a civil servant should be punished severely for unlawfully depriving others of their civil rights. I am not aware, however, of any proceedings against a government official on the basis of this law.17 The operation of institutions that evolved during the process of power-sharing was determined to a large extent by personal and political power relations, party allegiance, the party system, or some other extra-legal circumstance: for instance, Hungary’s still limited sovereignty, even after signing the peace treaty.

The government under Ferenc Nagy Once Tildy had been selected as president of the republic, the parties agreed on appointing Ferenc Nagy prime minister. He was to remain at his post for sixteen months. Nagy took over the Tildy cabinet and its program almost without changes. In his maiden speech to Parliament he  mentioned the following tasks as all-important: reconstructing the country; providing the necessities of life for the population; setting the administration in operation; halting inflation; creating a balanced budget; fighting against the corruption that had surfaced after the collapse; making sure the operation of the coalition government runs smoothly; deepening, defending, and enhancing democracy; and ensuring the benefits of democracy for our people. Nagy emphasized that Hungary had earned the respect and esteem of the international community by the manner in which the elections were held, by the formation of the government, by creating a republican constitution, and by the unanimous choice of the president of the republic. He professed his faith in the coalition government, explaining that it was a guarantee of inter-party collaboration. He argued that “until we resolve the great issues facing our nation, until we can guarantee the necessities of life for our people, there must be no opposition to the coalition government in this country. Let every Hungarian politician and social stratum function as critic, as promoter, as goodwill associate, but let there be no opposition.” He argued, further, that in the Horthy period they had tried to create unity in the nation by cramming all social strata into a single party. He asked that the participants in political life demonstrate that Hungarian democracy was of a higher order because, even when segmented into several parties it could work cooperatively to realize the major national objectives.18

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Among the items on the government agenda Nagy singled out the  expected peace treaty as decisive. He expressed the hope that the great powers would appreciate the processes taking place in Hungary and prescribe fair, tolerable conditions. He explained that the issue of Hungary was not a local issue for Southeastern Europe but an important element of order in the Danubian basin, hence an organic part of European and world politics. Finally, he mentioned that Hungary would like to serve the cause of peace and of the common welfare of humankind, and he was confident that the fate of Hungary would also be judged on these premises. Then he added: “from our democratic system, from our exemplary political direction and, among many other circumstances, from the fact that the government is headed by a man who was born a peasant, it becomes obvious that it is not a sinful, wartime Hungary that stands in front of its judges at the peace negotiations, but rather peace-loving Hungarians welded together in the name of love, awaiting a just decision.”19 Thus Ferenc Nagy was clearly aware of the enormous tasks his party and the coalition had to face in the coming months. He confirmed that the achievement of the government program “depends on the work, sacrifice, patience, and cooperation of the Hungarian peasant, the Hungarian worker, and the intellectuals.” The cabinet headed by Nagy was modified on several occasions; certain ministries were created and others abolished, but they were very careful about one thing: preserving the ratios bargained for in November 1945 within the coalition.

Coalition crises in the spring The cooperation outlined by Ferenc Nagy was greatly hampered by the Communist leaders’ refusal to forgive the Smallholders for their victory in the elections. In the weeks and months preceding the November 1945 elections Rákosi and company had overestimated the influence of their party on the population and regarded the 16.96 per cent of the popular vote it received as an obvious failure. At the end of August 1945 Rákosi had been counting on the alliance between Communists and Social Democrats obtaining 70 per cent of the total vote in the capital; they received less than half. The Communist leaders now felt that the 245 mandates obtained by the Smallholders in Parliament gave them an advantage that could only be overcome by resorting to different tactics. On the other hand, they knew well that the Smallholder majority in

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Parliament meant that they could not pass a single piece of legislation without backing from Nagy and his friends. Soon after the elections the Communist leaders already felt that by excising the so-called right-wing group from the Smallholder Party, and pitting the forces of the right against each other, they could take over power in a parliamentary, legal way. In a note from 1947, Rákosi stated that immediately after the elections their objective became to splinter the Smallholder Party.20 Thus the most important political task for him was to correct the ratio of forces resulting from the elections. Until the summer of 1947 – that is, until the removal of Ferenc Nagy as prime minister – a ruthless power struggle took place within the coalition. The division of power clearly favoured the Smallholders. They occupied the main public offices: the presidency, the speaker of the house, and the prime ministry, in addition to having a majority within the National Assembly. As a consequence of Soviet intervention, however, the balance between the Smallholders and the leftist parties became very shaky. While they ran the government and, one might even say, acted to save the nation, the Smallholder Party had to withstand, occasionally even push back, the permanent assault by the Communists. Rákosi regularly accused the Smallholders of duplicity: of enjoying the advantages derived from being in government while criticizing the government as if they were an opposition party. There was some truth in this, for several Smallholder deputies often criticized the measures taken by government; several times they raised issues in Parliament condemning the policies of the ministries in the hands of the workers’ parties. Rákosi’s plan, however, did not work out. The Communist leaders must have recognized this, for they changed their tactics with regard to the Smallholders: in mid-January 1946 they got ready to attack the Smallholder Party. They resorted to a so-called mass protest and, from mid-February on, the mass movements organized by the Communists became general in the provinces. There were village meetings, people’s meetings, and mass demonstrations countrywide, aimed at taking over the administration of the villages from the Smallholders. These meetings occasionally escalated into uncontrolled demonstrations. In some areas the masses turned on the police; even members of the Communist and Social Democrat parties turned against each other in some instances. The demonstrations that occurred during the winter and early spring of 1946 were most harmful to the fledgling institutions of the young republic and its democratic freedoms, yet they resulted in neither

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prosecution nor even a police investigation. They were dealt with internally, within the Communist Party. The Smallholders keen on observing due process reacted to the events in a series of interpellations in Parliament on 27 February. The lessons of the mass movement as manifested in the peoples’ tribunals were discussed in detail at the 27 February and 12 March sessions of the parliamentary division of the Hungarian Communist Party. Mihály Farkas presented the political report on 27 February, praising the movement in a single phrase, then describing all its shortcomings at great length. Among these he mentioned that at many locations the Communists launched the action by themselves, and even so only a few of the local party members took part. They did not try to include the Social Democrats, or the peasant masses of the Peasant Party and the Smallholders. He also mentioned that in some places, as in Nagykőrös and Érd, the people’s judgments “were aimed against Social Democratic officials.” Moreover, he pointed out that such strong attacks on the Social Democrats could lead to a breakup of the united front, and another front might arise involving the Social Democrats, the People’s Party, and the Smallholders.21 The opening salvo in the nationwide attack against the Smallholders was launched by Rákosi in his speech of 3 March. The essence of his demand was that the Communists were willing to run the government in coalition with the Smallholders if the latter excluded the right wing. To illustrate their determination, Rákosi and company formed the Left Bloc on 5 March, with the participation of the Communist Party, the Social Democrats, the Council of Trade Unions, and the National Peasant Party. This became possible once the leftist fellow-travellers – who were also underground members of the Communist Party – within the Social Democrats and the Peasant Party became strong enough. Thus arose, within the greater coalition, a smaller coalition intent on realizing the Communist goal of striving for political power. Their efforts were directed, for all practical purposes, against the largest coalition partner, the Smallholder Party. To give their demands greater weight, they organized an enormous demonstration in Budapest on 7 March, meant as the culmination of the sentences handed down by the people’s tribunals in February. In the name of the Left Bloc they addressed an ultimatum to the Smallholder Party to back the nationalization program, to complete the land reform, and to decrease the number of civil servants.22 A few days later they also demanded that eighty to eighty-five Smallholder members (including some members of the centre

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group) be excluded and deprived of their parliamentary mandates. (Even if they had complied, the Smallholders would have remained the largest party in Parliament, but they would have lost their absolute majority). The Smallholder leaders assumed the Communists were ready to mount a coup d’état. The demands in the form of an ultimatum had a sharply divisive impact on the Smallholder Party. They could not expect to prevent the coup d’état by force, for they had no forces of law and order under their command; nor could they envision running the country by themselves, for the international situation was not favourable; nor would they be able to deal with the economic difficulties, mainly because the Communists and the Social Democrats could paralyze the operations of the government at any time by declaring a general strike and mobilizing the masses. Only one solution was available: they had to insist on retaining the coalition. The left-wing intellectuals within the Smallholder Party committed the tactical error of using the Communist daily Szabad Nép to publish their denunciation of the right-wing conservative elements within their party, echoing the Communist accusations. The Communist Party resorted to dramatic negotiations – one might say, more crudely, to extortion. In a matter of three days, five Soviet notes reached the desk of the prime minister. The first warned the government that Hungary was falling behind in the payment of reparations: only $12 million of the stipulated $42 million had been paid off so far. The next note was forwarded by the Red Army, reminding the government that after the liberation of Budapest the Soviet Army had donated several hundred wagons of foodstuff to the population of the city – it enumerated the items – and demanding repayment within eight days. The third note also emanated from the Soviet government, reminding the Hungarian government that the German goods left behind in Hungary had been awarded to the Soviets and demanding delivery within eight days. A fourth note from the Red Army complained that within certain areas of Western Hungary the foodstuffs earmarked by the authorities for the Red Army had not been delivered and, unless the situation was remedied within eight days, the Red Army would feel obliged to resort to requisitioning. Finally, the fifth note came from the Soviet government reminding the Hungarian government that in August 1945 a barter agreement had been concluded between Hungary and the Soviet Union involving goods valued at $30 million; while the USSR had already delivered $11 million dollars worth of raw materials to Hungarian industry, the Hungarian deliveries had not even reached $1 million’s worth, and prompt compensation was requested.23

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The Smallholder leaders finally succeeded, in spite of the strong Soviet pressure and Tildy’s pleas for unconditional agreement, in reaching an acceptable compromise.24 Ferenc Nagy persuaded the leftists to be content with the exclusion of only twenty delegates from the party, and even they were allowed to retain their seats. The exclusions affected politicians who enjoyed public respect, such as István Vásáry, who had been minister of finance in the interim cabinet, and Dezső Sulyok who, only a few weeks earlier, was being seriously considered for the office of prime minister. In spite of their exclusion, the so-called Sulyok–Vásáry group remained influential in politics. The majority of those excluded – fourteen of them – founded a separate party, the Hungarian Freedom Party (Magyar Szabadság Párt), and, until 24 July 1946 when it was authorized to function, it was active as a faction in Parliament and voted mostly with the Smallholders. This meant that, including the Civic Democratic Party and the Democratic People’s Party, three political groups, with a total of seventeen delegates, were now outside the coalition. Moreover, a group of nine independents functioned as an opposition. They included, in addition to the blackballed or resigned Smallholders and Margit Slachta, delegates excluded from the National Peasant Party. Rákosi, in his speech of 12 March 1946 at a meeting of Communist MP s, described the movement initiated by his party as a major victory for the Communists, yet, for tactical reasons, he recommended that this triumph not be trumpeted in the press or in public, so as not to hamper “cashing in” on the results achieved. Rákosi appreciated the mass movements of the preceding three or four weeks. He felt that the leaders’ policy of having the central objectives backed by mass movements from below was the right strategy. He must also have felt that, in general, the strategy had been executed correctly; however, he noted that mistakes had crept in and, in many places, had achieved the opposite of what was intended.25 Rákosi discussed in detail the demonstrations he had heard about that had resulted in some crises. For instance, at Orosháza forty-seven of the sixty-two town officials belonged to the Social Democratic Party, including the mayor. The action undertaken by the Communist Party removed the mayor to start with, followed by thirty-two more Social Democrat officials. “It looked as if the Communists were mounting a pogrom against the Social Democrats,” said Rákosi.26 The Communist Party also organized demonstrations in Békéscsaba, but they were taken over by day-labourers of the Peasant Party, who

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beat the officials and pilloried them in front of the crowd. The local branch of the Communist Party was unable to stop it. According to their own admission their 260–man unarmed security group (rendezőgárda) was simply “blown away” by the crowd. Also in Békéscsaba, a member of the Communist Party beat up the father-in-law of János Gyöngyösi, the Smallholder minister of foreign affairs. The injured person testified that the culprit had a personal grudge and that this episode did not occur during the demonstrations but, according to the local Communist leaders, in some cases people took advantage of the demonstrations to carry out personal vendettas.27 Moreover, Rákosi reported on how, in Békéscsaba, the Gypsies (Roma) took over offices, robbed twenty-six apartments, and beat and disarmed the “democratic police force.” At Tótkomlós they were able to rescue four people about to be lynched by the crowd in the nick of time. Then he repeated that “in many places these scenes indicated that our comrades were playing mindlessly with fire, launching actions that they were unable to keep under control.”28 In some instances anti-Semitic manifestations occurred. At Szegvár they beat up nuns and expelled Jews from the village. The Jews were rounded up and told they had to leave the village within half an hour, carrying only a bundle of no more than five kilos. “At first I refused to believe this, but then it turned out that it actually happened and, what’s more, our comrades were the ones in charge of the cleansing operation” said the secretary. Rákosi explained these manifestations by saying that their party was full of radical leftists “who believed that their asinine moves would serve the people and the party, whereas they help nothing but the adversary.” Such activities could do nothing but hurt the party’s reputation. “Moreover, the reactionaries are not idiots, and they take note of what is going on and use the information for their own purposes. The result is that we provide them with powerful weapons against ourselves, and we isolate the party from the masses.” Yet Rákosi was compelled to admit that, “in places, there were openly Fascist elements surfacing within the party, committing anti-Semitic excesses29 that render us unacceptable to the democratic masses and the outside world. Until now we accepted the fact that our party included many small-fry Fascists, but now we have to confront this situation.” Rákosi asked the officials and delegates from the provinces to examine the factors involved wherever such fiascos took place and, if it were proven that the violence was caused by “Fascist or criminal” elements, these must be excluded from the party. Later, in summing up, he called upon the

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delegates, “let us not stick our heads in the sand when these events occur, but take a closer look at those found to have belonged to the Arrow Cross. I fear that the robberies and the anti-Semitic manifestations are the work of minor Arrow Cross members. A hundred thousand former Arrow Crosses cannot benefit the party enough to make up for these excesses.” And how did the Smallholders react to the attack on their party? Even without Sulyok and company, the Smallholders retained 225 of the 420 seats in Parliament; hence its parliamentary majority was not in  jeopardy. Nevertheless, the result was depressing, although it may be  tallied as a victory in relation to the original expectations of the Communists, which was to have eighty-five members of the party excluded. Béla Kovács issued his slogan at this time: “No more 12 March ever again!” In his memoirs Ferenc Nagy remembers the vicissitudes and the doubts that assailed him barely a month after taking office as prime minister: Along with my party I could have rejected the Communist demands, but the consequences of such an action appeared daunting. The workers in Budapest and its environs were issued clubs and iron pipes by way of weaponry. It was rumoured everywhere that the most trusted members of the Communist Party were even given firearms. Of course, the Communist police prevented us from ascertaining whether these rumours were grounded or not. It is certain, however, that any group of a few thousand workers could have taken over Budapest. It is a fact that during the entire two-and-a-half years since the defeat of the Germans it was possible to prevent bloodshed in Hungary. I could not allow thousands or tens of thousands of Hungarians to spill each other’s blood, or allow a Communist minority to take over by preventing a political solution. I could have taken yet another path: to resign from office, since the conditions I had stipulated had not been met. This move, however, would also have amounted to nothing but dodging responsibility, because I would have left my successor in an even worse predicament, assuming I had been able to appoint someone adequate to confront the coalition.30 The general secretary of the party, Béla Kovács, wrote in the 15 March 1946 issue of the Kis Újság, rejecting the accusations against his party and summarizing its objectives:

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Over the course of sixteen years the Independent Smallholder Party made policy to benefit the people, under the leadership of those very members of the party who lead in the coalition today. It would be impossible to explain how these leaders had suddenly become untrustworthy in the service of the people at a time when they could advocate their principles openly and when the time has come for the realization of the party’s consistent demands. If we persisted in our ways in face of the gendarmes, of administrative force and German jails, does it sound plausible that we are now becoming weak and giving up our principles? Of course not. Not even if we were to admit that half of the party is made up of recent arrivals, which is not at all the case. The party has traditions, it has its own radical demands with regard to national objectives, and it refuses to give those up under internal or external pressures. It does not commit violence against itself, when it advocates nationalization in certain areas, because it had advocated nationalization already fifteen years ago. It does not run against the grain when it agrees to state supervision of the banks, because it has never ceased speaking out against the excessive influence of big capital and has always insisted on control of credit institutions in the public interest. It does not need outside stimulation to speak out on behalf of the people’s rights, because one of the most aggressive chapters of the party’s past was in the area of fighting for the secret ballot and for a bill of rights. It does not side with bad public servants – and the worst official is the one who uses his position to impede the progress of democracy – because for fifteen years it has besieged the state apparatus, which is almost as guilty in the demise of the country as the disloyal corps of officers and the many vile, contemptible politicians. The fight against corruption is also part of its tradition. Let no one fear that we might impede land reform, because it makes no sense to assume that we have suddenly become the party of the landlords when, finally, in the spirit of our old demands, the country has succeeded in overcoming the system of grand estates. We did not undertake any adventure in the past, and will not do so in the future. The Communist leaders decided to elaborate new tactics to confront the Smallholder Party: at a session of their party’s secretariat they opted in favour of organizing the left wing of the Smallholder Party “under the leadership of comrade Rákosi” and appointed a committee of three members to execute this plan. Moreover, they decided that certain

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appropriate members of the Communist Party should be mobilized to carry out this new task. Indicating the political atmosphere of the times, they opted for these same new tactics regarding the Social Democrats. Instead of the lukewarm influence they had exerted until then, they decided to resort to more concrete action: to mobilize the second and third echelons of the Social Democrats, beginning in Budapest.31 It seems, though, that the Smallholders had been able to recover from the blow they had suffered in March. Outside pressure and the concessions they had negotiated brought the various factions within the party and the delegates closer together. Ferenc Nagy and Béla Kovács tried to weld all sides together when confronted with the need to energize the party and to popularize the notion of peasant unity. Realizing that the party organizations must consolidate their ties with the county, district, and community organizations, they chose to emphasize organization and to convince the delegates to play a more active role in party life. The source of this initiative was the central group, with Béla Kovács at the helm. To all intents and purposes the party now launched a nationwide counterattack. The Communist leaders were concerned most of all that the issue of local elections would be raised. The composition of the autonomous local governments was based on coalition agreements, which enhanced the position and opportunities of the left. Even the Communist Party admitted that the local governments were “under the leadership of the left wing of democracy.” The Smallholders, however, made up barely one-fourth of the staff in local government bodies. The poorer peasants as well as the wealthier strata were resentful that even after the demise of the Horthy regime they were not given a chance to lead politics in the village. They expected that democratic local elections would give them access to power in the town hall. On 27 April, Béla Kovács wrote in the Kis Újság that his party felt it was necessary to hold elections at the local level. Once again the Communist Party felt prompted to change tactics. They admitted they had misjudged conditions by assuming that the Smallholder Party had lost its role for good, that it could be easily cornered, and that it no longer counted as a rival for power. The facts belied this assessment; it now had to be admitted that the Smallholders had bargaining power once again. The Communist officials were disappointed even in their expectations of backing from the left wing of the Smallholders. The chief Communist ideologue, József Révai, now realized that not only did the left-wing Smallholders not gain ground

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but “their party’s politics were criticized from the right, rather than from the left.” According to Révai the centre, led by Nagy and Kovács, was striving to remain within the coalition until the peace treaty was signed and they were able to consolidate their position during fresh elections after the departure of the Red Army.32 Rákosi felt that the Smallholders were united precisely by their dislike of the Communists. Ernő Gerő went even further, arguing that the Smallholder Party, as well as the Social Democrats, were leaning further right, and that might enable the two to come closer together. Rákosi retorted that the Sulyok group was more dangerous, for that was where the reactionaries found refuge. Being tactically minded, however, he did not build his strategy on such an interpretation: after all, the Smallholders had the power base, therefore the primary goal was to weaken this base by various manoeuvres. Révai even admitted that, for the moment, the Communists could not go on the offensive, “even if the Smallholder Party is rotten to the core. It would be a mistake to assume that they are on the defensive. They are the ones on the offensive.”33 This interpretation seems to be confirmed by Béla Kovács’s continuing rejection in Kis Újság of accusations against his party: We were leftists during the preceding fifteen years, as we continue to be in the new democracy. If we want to rank the democratic parties by party platform and ideology, then it is obvious that the Smallholders would be on the right-hand side, but even then we can include everyone only by making them face left, and the direction of the motion would be leftward. As to how many steps we should take in that direction, and how far we ought to go, the other parties must allow us to decide for ourselves. Our comrades-in-arms in the coalition must realize that they entered into coalition not with Marxists, but rather with a party that has bourgeois overtones, which yearns for a pure people’s democracy in Hungary.34

The Smallholders’ case for “proportionality” and for local elections In the spring of 1946 the Smallholder leaders decided on a new strategy. Their main grievance was the supremacy obtained by the Communist Party in the administration and the police, which dated to even before the elections of November 1945. We have relatively precise data

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indicating that the Smallholders were unable to maintain even the parity that was in force at the time of the formation of the cabinet, on any level; the Smallholders had been short changed and they were now intent on finding a remedy. On 11 May 1946 the political committees of the Smallholders and the Communist Party held a joint session. Béla Kovács and Ferenc Nagy used this opportunity to urge not only local elections but also proportionality in administration; they even brought up the possibility of expanding the authority of Smallholder undersecretaries as well as of the police.35 Since the Communist Party showed no inclination to make concessions, the Smallholder leaders decided on a more aggressive approach. At its session of 20 May 1946, the Smallholder political committee discussed the need for proportional representation, outlined national tasks, and formulated the conditions for continued collaboration. On 21 May Ferenc Nagy, Béla Kovács, and Béla Varga sent a joint letter to the leaders of the Communist Party regarding the consolidation and development of democracy.36 They stressed that Fascist and reactionary actions must be thwarted by means of Hungarian constitutional democracy, making sure that only the guilty parties would be turned over to the democratic courts. They mentioned the need to set up a parliamentary committee of investigation with the task of investigating Fascist and reactionary activities. They reminded the Communist leaders of the atrocities and demonstrations committed early in 1946 when “elements in charge of preserving the democratic order” abused their powers. They also pointed out that people were growing tired of constant mass struggles; therefore, to put an end to these and to stabilize and restore the economy, internal peace had to be achieved. They spoke of the need for a more proportionate distribution of government offices. The Smallholder leaders proposed that the coalition parties jointly prepare a comprehensive political and economic program, considering the major tasks facing the nation, such as the peace treaty and economic stabilization. For tactical reasons, Rákosi proposed that his party and the executive committee of the Left Bloc accept the recommendations of the Smallholders regarding local elections, and advised the Ministry of the Interior to begin to prepare a law on suffrage. The Left Bloc prepared a reply, dated 1 June, that, while approving the principle of local elections, rejected all the other Smallholder demands, including the demand for proportionality. They argued that, given the internal and external problems, these demands were untimely. On the other hand, they requested the

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Smallholder leaders to step up the measures against right-wing, antiCommunist, and anti-coalition factions.37 Ferenc Nagy asked Béla Kovács to negotiate on behalf of the Smallholders at the next inter-party conferences. Nagy felt he could not be as persistent as the party secretary who, by then, occupied no official position in the administration. Thus, on 3 June 1946, tough discussions were held in an attempt to reach inter-party consensus. According to the contemporary minutes, Kovács raised the issues of elections at the commune level first, then the issue of a new distribution of civil service posts, county offices, and local police, in accordance with the memorandum of 21 May. Each party resorted to external pressure to influence the outcome of the discussions. The Communist Party called a meeting of the executive committee of the Left Bloc for 4 June, and Ferenc Nagy wrote in the 4 June 1946 issue of the Magyar Nemzet that his party insisted on the demands of their letter of 21 May, while rejecting the constant attacks directed against his party. On the same day, to underscore their memorandum, Nagy announced that, should the workers’ parties reject their demands, he would resign. That evening ambassador Pushkin summoned Nagy to discuss the crisis. Nagy declared categorically that his party would not entertain further compromises entailing sacrifice. Pushkin acknowledged this declaration and immediately informed Rákosi of the discussion, recommending that they reach an agreement with the Smallholders. Since the Smallholder leaders refused to make concessions on this occasion, the Left Bloc was forced to make concessions to avoid a government crisis. The following day, 5 June 1946, the cabinet held a special meeting. Ferenc Nagy declared that the workers’ parties understood that the collaboration between them and the Smallholders was in jeopardy, so they had finally reached an agreement. He gave no details about the agreement, simply stating that it bore on matters of principle, as well as on practical issues such as local elections, “which every party felt was needed all along anyway, and the date for these elections, now scheduled for September.”38 Thus a compromise had been reached regarding the prompt holding of local elections (without specifying the date), and the minister of the interior agreed to do his best to prepare the pertinent legislation. The Smallholders received promises regarding the fulfillment of most of their demands. In exchange they agreed to honour the March agreement and to examine the mandates of their delegates within the party apparatus. On the other hand, they insisted that they would agree to further

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exclusions only after their own demands had been met.39 Thus Ferenc Nagy desisted from resigning. In the aftermath, however, disagreement surfaced again, the Smallholders saying local elections were scheduled for September, while the leftist parties denied this. The debate continued in the press. A lengthy bargaining process ensued between the majority party and the wing of the coalition led by the Communists. The Left Bloc was a tool in the hands of the Communist leaders, but only as a last resort, when they ran out of ideas that they could carry out themselves. Generally speaking the Left Bloc did not fulfill its obligations to the Smallholder Party. This was also the case with the latest coalition agreement of June: the left remained silent about local elections and the redistribution of government positions. The situation became tense even among the Smallholder leaders themselves. Nagy – perhaps in view of the approaching peace negotiations – wanted to avoid a confrontation with the Communist Party, while Kovács insisted that the promises made to his party should be kept.

Peace preparations The peace preparations also gave rise to intense debates within the coalition. Regarding the borders of Hungary, the council of foreign ministers decided at their conference on 20 September 1945 that, as a general principle, with the exception of the borders between Hungary and Romania, the borders of 1938 should be restored. The fate of Transylvania remained undecided for a few more months. It was even suggested that the Hungarian and Romanian governments should engage in direct talks in accordance with the terms of armistice, which would “significantly decrease the numbers of those living under foreign rule.” At their meeting on 7 May 1946, however, the foreign ministers decided that the Trianon borders should be restored here also. Yet the Hungarian government continued to believe that this solution could be avoided. Although the council of foreign ministers had already dealt with the issue on 20 September 1945, the Hungarian parties waited until December of that year. Foreign minister Gyöngyösi had already appointed István Kertész, the head of the peace preparation section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to engage in the legal and scientific preparations with his coworkers. Thus the work started in the summer of 1945 under the leadership of Kertész, but the government coalition did not reach a consensus regarding the Hungarian objectives. The workers’ parties were

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completely passive, while the Smallholders urged all parties to work together on this issue. Finally, in December 1945, a political debate surfaced within the coalition and the topic became news. At this time, on the initiative of the foreign affairs section of the Smallholder Party, Ferenc Nagy and István Csicsery-Rónay agreed to create a peace preparatory committee within the party. This committee briefed the Parliament via Kálmán Saláta, who was a member of the foreign affairs committee of Parliament. He was not very successful in imposing the Smallholder views, given the resistance of the two workers’ parties. The Smallholder press let it be known that the Romanians were making much greater efforts. The Smallholders rejected the notion of collective responsibility for the war and argued in favour of drawing boundaries along ethnic lines. The polemics in the press pitted the Peasant Party delegates against the Communists. The Communist József Révai, in the Szabad Nép, accused the other side of chauvinism, while the Smallholders were adamant in rejecting collective responsibility. The Smallholder committee’s plan, ready by the end of February, was presented to the inter-party conference on 6 March. The theoretical underpinnings were as follows: “Hungary is asking for a just peace not only on its own behalf but also for its neighbours, because it believes that the Romanian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and Austrian concerns are not distinct, but must be resolved in conjunction with the interests of all parties. If conditions in Central Europe are based on any other premise the region will once again become a hornet’s nest for the world.”40 The guidelines were classified under three main goals: harmonizing the national and territorial principles; defusing antagonism between the  various states and nations; and ensuring the proper conditions conducive to economic cooperation among the countries in the region. Regarding the boundaries, the following proposals were stressed: “Transylvania should be divided along a west-east line in such a way as to ensure that the Szekler Land (Székely Land=Székelyföld)41 belongs to Hungary, as well as to ensure that the Romanian and Hungarian minorities on either side of the border are about equal in numbers. If this should encounter insurmountable difficulties, and only the Partium is returned, Transylvania should be declared a sovereign state divided into cantons (states on the Swiss model).” Regarding Czechoslovakia the plan continued as follows: “Hungary appreciates and would like to assist the strivings of Czechoslovakia and enable Czechs and Slovaks to become nation-states ... Therefore the committee believes it necessary in

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this case that the Smallholder Party announce the basic principles of harmony based on territorial and ethnic considerations.”42 In summary, the plan recommended the return of 33,000 km2 to Hungary. The Communist and Social Democratic parties at first did not even want to hear about territorial demands. For instance, they felt that the return of areas with a uniform Hungarian population to Hungary should not form part of the program of the delegation to the peace conference. Eventually even the Communist Party accepted the need to prepare for peace, for it found that if this topic was ignored it could be accused of being un-Hungarian. Thus, Rákosi proposed to Ferenc Nagy that if they met the demands for a Left Bloc as formulated earlier, in May, he would arrange for Nagy to be invited and received abroad as prime minister. He probably also hinted that the Soviets might back the Hungarian claims at the peace conference. Presumably, this offer – that territorial modification vis-à-vis Romania might have some chance of success in Moscow – was tempting to Nagy.43 But, quite apart from Rákosi’s plans, Nagy’s goal was to personally present the Hungarian peace objectives in all four Allied capitals. This meant that he would do everything to secure a consensus within the government, as soon as possible, for he could not travel until that happened. The need for consensus also became more urgent because the situation of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia was becoming more precarious. In order to bring about a uniform nation-state, Beneš wanted to rid the country not only of its German population but also of the Hungarians; he gave the Hungarians a choice: leave Czechoslovakia or assimilate. The Western allies, however, did not condone the unilateral expulsion of Hungarians from the country; hence, on 27 February 1946, the two countries reached an agreement on the exchange of population, according to which the number of Hungarians who might relocate to Hungary would have to equal the number of Slovaks living in Hungary asking for relocation to Czechoslovakia. Representatives of the coalition parties discussed the peace plan on the eve of visiting Moscow. In reference to the armistice agreement with Romania, they agreed that at the Paris peace conference they would lay claim to 22,000 km2 belonging to the Partium, which was under Romanian jurisdiction. These were the circumstances leading to Nagy’s visit to Moscow, between 9 and 18 April, at the head of an official delegation, in the expectation that he would find backing for this plan and improve SovietHungarian relations.

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In some regards the visit exceeded expectations: the Soviet government extended the period granted for the payment of reparations from six to eight years; backed the government’s wish for the return of goods removed by the Arrow Cross to the West, which was essential to the planned economic stabilization program; and made promises regarding the repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war even before the peace discussions. During the negotiations Stalin asked Nagy whether the Soviet troops were bothering the Hungarian population. The prime minister was diplomatic in his answer: the occupation troops had no issues with the Hungarian population, moreover – he was happy to report – more recently incidents between the occupation troops and the Hungarians had become rare. He added that quite often ill-intentioned Hungarians were the ones who committed abuses attributed to the occupation army. He felt that the burden of provisioning the troops of the Red Army weighed heavily on the Hungarian economy. Stalin made a promise to Nagy to withdraw some of the troops from Hungary, adding that it was impossible to withdraw all of them at once; some troops would have to remain, but the burden on the Hungarian economy due to supplying the Soviet army would be alleviated.44 Regarding Hungarian peace objectives, Nagy, speaking on behalf of  the government, declared: “Hungary has no disagreements with Yugoslavia. As regards the other two neighbours – Czechoslovakia and Romania – the Hungarian government cannot be indifferent to the predicament of the Hungarians living on their territory ... Generalissimo Stalin and Mr Foreign Minister Molotov have probably noted that Czechoslovakia intended to eliminate ethnic minorities, resorting to unspecified methods ... 650,000 Hungarians live in Czechoslovakia, and several hundreds of thousands of them live in a compact bloc along the Hungarian border.”45 He added that the Hungarian government saw two possible solutions: let the peace treaties mandate that Czechoslovakia grant complete equality to the Hungarian minority, or return the areas inhabited solely by Hungarians to Hungary, thus providing space for Hungarians to reside, should Czechoslovakia persist in expelling the Hungarian minority. At Stalin’s request Nagy summarized the essence of the territorial arrangements involving Hungary and Romania. According to the minutes, he said: “In the view of the Hungarian government certain portions of Transylvania should be returned to Hungary to assuage the Hungarian population.” Eventually Stalin agreed that Hungary be allowed to present its demands at the Paris peace conference, building

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up the hope in the Hungarian delegation that the territorial modifications with regard to Romania might bear fruit. Molotov encouraged the Hungarian government to initiate bilateral discussions with its Romanian counterpart to settle territorial disputes.46 Ferenc Nagy’s prestige in Hungary was also enhanced when he led delegations to Washington, London, and Paris. During these discussions, James Byrnes, the United States secretary of state, promised – notwithstanding the decision taken by the Council of Foreign Ministers on 7 May 1946 – that if the Soviet government agreed to raise the issue of  Transylvania at the peace negotiations, the USA would back the Hungarian proposal. American government officials also promised to return the gold reserves of the Hungarian National Bank, estimated at $40 million, which had been removed to the West by the Germans and the Arrow Cross. Furthermore, they proposed that the credit of $10 million granted to the Hungarian government for the purchase of American equipment left behind by the U.S. Army in Europe could be raised to $15 million. This was certainly welcome news regarding economic stabilization. The Hungarian leaders felt the negotiations in London were less successful. The most they were able to achieve was that the British government would give them their blessing, should the Romanian and Hungarian governments reach an agreement on territorial issues. On economic issues they were more successful: Prime Minister Clement Attlee made promises regarding the return of Hungarian goods found in Germany. During the visit to Paris, Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Bidault argued that France was in no position to make its voice heard on important issues at the peace conference. Yet of all the Western powers, France was the only one that showed generosity: it contemplated the return of the entire Partium, 22,000 km2, to Hungary, meeting the Hungarian request. In the long run, however, this issue did not even come up at the negotiations. The peace conference met in Paris between 29 July and 15 October 1946. In spite of the half-hearted promises, the Hungarian government received no support from any of the great powers. At the plenary session of 14 August the head of the Hungarian delegation, János Gyöngyösi, presented the territorial demand regarding the cession of 22,000 km2, with a population of two million, by Romania. It also requested autonomy for the Székely land. On the advice of the Americans, however, the Hungarian demand was lowered to a token 4,000 km2 and 500,000 inhabitants. Even this was rejected by the peace conference, and the Romanian-Hungarian boundary line dating from 1937 was restored.

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Regarding the borders between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the only change was that the area across the Danube from Bratislava (Pozsony) on the right bank of the Danube, including three Hungarian villages with an area of 43 km2, was awarded to Czechoslovakia – allegedly on strategic grounds. The peace treaty was signed on 10 February 1947 and entered into effect on 15 September 1947.47

Soviet interference in Hungarian politics The execution of the coalition agreement of early July was impeded by Soviet interference in Hungarian politics. As an advance tremor, the executive committee of the Left Bloc addressed an “open letter” to the Smallholder Party in the 23 June issue of Szabad Nép. It urged the execution of the agreement of 5 June – i.e., to take action against the “reactionary” members within their own party. In an editorial on 29 June in the Szabad Nép, József Révai repeated all this, urging exclusions and the dismissal of Smallholder governors and of the undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice, Zoltán Pfeiffer. He also suggested changing the party’s press policies. Furthermore, the 6 July issue of the same daily reported that the minister of the interior, to protect law and order more effectively, had decreed the dissolution of over one hundred rightist associations. These events were precipitated when Lieutenant General Sviridov, deputy commander of the ACC, summoned Prime Minister Nagy to his office and, in the presence of Ambassador Pushkin, expressed concerns about demonstrations in Hungary, including attacks on Soviet troops. Sviridov made it clear that he believed the Hungarian government failed to take determined action against those endangering the Red Army and subverting Hungarian democracy. He delivered a copy of a memorandum from the high command of the Red Army to the Government of the Hungarian Republic, which the government was expected to execute for the sake of consolidating democracy. This document was not handed over in the name of the ACC, to avoid intervention by the British and American members of the commission. The Red Army’s high command for Eastern Europe had its headquarters in the Austrian Baden, but its jurisdiction extended over the entire region. The legal ground for the intervention was the armistice agreement of 20 January 1945. The first part of Sviridov’s letter48 stated that a series of attacks had been carried out against members of the Red Army in Hungary. He ascribed the cause of all to some politicians and institutions that had

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explicitly encouraged such attacks. The letter, issued by the high command but actually inspired by the Soviet commander of the ACC, outlined political demands on the Hungarian government. Every one of these demands pertained to the Smallholder Party. The accusation against the Smallholder Party was that “it found legal justification for the operation of all kinds of underground movements involved in propaganda and terrorist activity” or by youth organizations, all considered undemocratic by the Soviets. They called upon the prime minister to dissolve and ban these anti-democratic youth associations, including the Catholic youth associations, the boy scouts, and other similar organizations, on the grounds that these were hotbeds of reaction, and that the youngsters who belonged to them were taught to hate the Red Army. The leaders of these associations, who were guilty of having committed terrorist acts, must be interned. They demanded, furthermore, that the Smallholder Party should exclude Fascist members from its youth organization, that its chairman be replaced, and that new leaders be appointed. The memo also recommended the replacement of four governors, with the argument that the most active agitation against the Red Army took place in their counties. As a further demand, Ferenc Nagy was to relieve Zoltán Pfeiffer of his post as undersecretary, since the latter hampered the expeditious investigation of anti-democratic crimes and the punishment of the guilty parties. The contents of the letter were disclosed at an inter-party consensusseeking meeting in Tildy’s office. The Smallholder leaders recognized that the Communist Party sought the backing of the Soviet authorities to bolster their own demands, but could do nothing to counteract them. In his memoirs, Ferenc Nagy mentions that it might have been advisable to reject the letter with all its contents, but, since the peace negotiations were already underway in Paris, he felt this would be inappropriate; he wished to avoid putting the country in a poor light in front of the great powers. Therefore, they gave in. In his response memorandum, which Nagy submitted to Sviridov on 10 July, he promised to bring about the expected measures, except for the demands regarding personnel changes. In pursuance of the demands, Nagy and Minister of the Interior László Rajk reached an agreement regarding banning the youth associations (1,500 associations were affected) with the stipulation that some of these may be reorganized under new leadership. So it happened: among the youth organizations the Katolikus Agrárifjúsági Legényegyesületek Országos Testülete (KALOT) was reformed within a few weeks, without its former Jesuit leadership,

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under the name Catholic Peasant Youth Association; the boy scout organization was likewise restarted. Of course, the American representative became aware of the contents of the “Sviridov letter”: in his dispatch of 10 July, Schoenfeld reported to Washington, and a response was received from deputy undersecretary Dean Acheson on 11 July.49 Acheson informed Schoenfeld that the British embassy in Washington had already communicated to him the Soviet assertion that there was a revival of right-wing organizations in Hungary. He advised Schoenfeld to remind Sviridov that, at its meeting on 23 April 1946, the ACC noted that Hungary had already complied with the article of the armistice agreement regarding the dissolution of Fascist associations.50 The British member of the ACC acted similarly. A secret cable from the British Foreign Office to Washington, dated 16 July, stated unequivocally: the Russian actions contravened the ground rules regarding the operations of the ACC, as agreed to in Postdam.51 Although the protest was discussed at the 24 July 1946 meeting of the ACC,52 this exchange of notes had no palpable effect on events in Hungary. According to Imre Kovács, the general secretary of the National Peasant Party, the personnel of the U.S. embassy in Budapest assessed the processes in Hungary accurately. For instance, they were well aware of how the municipal and town administrations, the police, the press, and the unions were co-opted to serve the ends of a gradual takeover. In spite of this, “during my visit, ambassador Schoenfeld kept on stressing, while rocking back and forth in his swivelling chair, that we should be good democrats,” wrote Kovács. “I told him with irritation that we would indeed like to be good democrats, but the Communists and the Russians will not allow it. He pondered his answer and said that we should work with the Communists, be on good terms with the Russians!”53 Thus the wing of the coalition that favoured bourgeois peasant democracy received precious little Western backing, and they had little chance of retaining the power they had obtained through elections. After this interlude inter-party conferences continued in Budapest. At the 10 July inter-party meeting, Béla Kovács expressed his position in no uncertain terms; he was ready to confront the leftist parties. In his opinion the Left Bloc was to be blamed for the crisis, because it had disregarded the coalition agreements. At the time of the formation of the cabinets, under both Tildy and Nagy, the choice of prime ministers indicated that the Smallholder Party occupied an important position in state affairs. The facts, however, contradicted this assumption. Admitting that some reactionary elements remained within the party, he noted that

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the overwhelming majority of the Smallholders were dissatisfied with the current situation, and he was among them. “It is inadmissible that the largest party within the coalition be no more than a puppet in the hands of the other parties.” He mentioned the procrastination regarding scheduling local elections. He hinted at giving up the September deadline, provided the Left Bloc complied with the issues raised in the May memorandum.54 Another inter-party conference took place on 16 July regarding economic stabilization within the domestic context. The discussions focused mainly on the Smallholders’ internal affairs, particularly the need to “restore order” within the party; that is, the exclusion of further right-wing delegates. The coalition partners wanted the Smallholders to ensure that the party’s left wing and its “democratic centre” rally behind Nagy. Rajk argued that if Ferenc Nagy and company accepted this, in other words, if this centre should join or follow the Left Bloc, they would issue a proclamation to that effect in the name of the Independence Front. Finally a new agreement was made between the Smallholder Party and the leftist parties, the main points of which were once again local elections, proportionality within the Ministry of the Interior – the police – in favour of the Smallholders, and the cleansing of the Smallholder Party. Béla Kovács, however, did not subscribe to the new compromise, because it did not include guarantees regarding the concessions made to his party. This agreement was not to his liking because he felt that once again the coalition parties had forced his party into making one-sided concessions. In his own irrepressible style Kovács described the prime minister as “wishy-washy” for having given in once again. Therefore, on 18 July, he resigned his position as general secretary of the party, as well as his position as editor-in-chief of Kis Újság, and he left for the countryside. His wife recalls this day, saying she had never seen him so distraught. Ferenc Nagy sent Tibor Hám and Kálmán Saláta after Kovács to persuade him to come back.

Stabilization Despite the extreme tension between the coalition parties, they had to rely on each other day in and day out; they had to govern the country together. One example of such collaboration was coping with the inflation in the aftermath of the war, and creating economic stability. Hungarian society had faced hyperinflation since the day the war ended. By the end of 1945 this had assumed such proportions that the

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revenues of the state amounted to only one tenth of its expenditures. To secure financial coverage the government resorted to the mint, issuing banknotes, and thus exacerbating the rate of inflation. It worked in the short run, but soon backfired, for the balance between currency in circulation and the quantity of goods available on the market was upset. The gap became ever deeper and the value of money deteriorated at a rate never seen before. This is reflected in the oft-repeated joke from 1946: Tuesday around noon we heard the rumour that the price of a kilo of lard has reached 90,000 pengős. The fact that the cost of one kilo of lard is 100,000 pengős demonstrates clearly to what extent the consumers are at the mercy of the black market. Who among us is able to pay 120,000 pengős for one kilo of lard? Because not only does lard cost 135,000 pengős per kilo, everything has become expensive across the board. And even if someone does purchase the lard at 165,000 pengős per kilo, he or she cannot survive by lard alone. It is an impossible situation when one kilo of lard sells for 180,000 pengős and the rise in wages remains far behind. Only the black marketeer can afford to pay 215,000 for a kilo of lard. For the average consumer, 238,000 pengős is indeed a huge sum. One must work long hours for 296,000 pengős and by the time one earns 367,000 pengős to buy the kilo of lard, one is bound to grow tired. There was a time when you could buy a corner house for 470,000 pengős, the price of a kilo of lard. Today, for the price of a kilo of lard, that is, for 540,000, you can buy no more than threequarters of a kilo of lard. Something must be done! The only one who can afford a kilo of lard for 768,000 pengős is the person who can spend 920,000 pengős for a kilo of lard. For indeed that is the cost of half a kilo of lard today.55 In December 1945, to put a brake on the trend, the government reduced the money in circulation by tightening expenditures, but this failed to put even a dent into inflation. The coalition parties decided on a program of economic reform, based on plans devised by the Communist Party. They agreed that the new currency would be called the forint and that, to make the reform meaningful, an adequate quantity of commodities must be made available, enough to satisfy at least the basic needs of consumers. They also agreed that the new currency would be introduced in the summer, following the harvest, when crops become

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available, as this would constitute food in reserve. They resolved the issue of creating the needed manufactured goods by requiring enterprises to pay their taxes with their products. They also backed continuation of the system of food coupons to ensure fair distribution and help the accumulation of reserves. Financial reform was accompanied by a tax reform, as a means for the state to endeavour to increase its revenues. They also decided to introduce new price and wage structures. The adjustment of rents and wages at a low level, either by taxing the accumulation of capital or by controlling prices, and the squeeze on agriculture played a basic role in the success of economic stabilization.56 Compared to the normative year of 1938 (the last year of peace), the wages of industrial workers fell by half, the cost of manufactured goods increased 4.6 fold, and that of food 3.3 fold, on the average. A significant portion of the state’s income derived from the higher tax rate: direct taxes rose by 28 per cent and indirect tax by 75 per cent, in relation to prewar rates.57 The creation of economic stability had international implications. The gold base of the forint was not secured as yet. Although the parties agreed that 10,000 forints would be the equivalent of 1 kg of pure gold, this gold reserve was not available at the Hungarian National Bank, since its bullion reserves had been removed by the Nazis and the Arrow Cross in 1944 and taken to the occupation zones in West Germany. During his visit to Washington the American government had promised Ferenc Nagy that the Hungarian gold reserves would be returned; furthermore, as reported in the 9 July 1946 issue of Szabad Nép, this offer was officially confirmed. These gold reserves, estimated at $40 million, amounting to $35 million after the American demands had been subtracted, constituted a sizable sum. The U.S. did not agree to the return of other Hungarian goods, estimated at $1.5 to $2 billion, that were found in its occupation zones in Germany and Austria. On the other hand, they seemed inclined to raise the credit limit previously offered from $10 million to $15 million, which would enable the Hungarian government to expand its reserves of goods. Equally important was the aid provided by UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), Joint (American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), and other aid agencies, as well as food, clothing, and medicine provided by Denmark, Canada, the USA, Switzerland, Sweden, and other countries, amounting to about $10 million. The Soviet Union also contributed to the program of stabilization by  allowing delays in the payment of the remaining reparations, and

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by  allowing the return to Hungary of Hungarian goods found in the Soviet occupation zones. At the beginning the economic experts of the Smallholder Party doubted whether financial stabilization could be achieved without a sizable foreign loan. But after the USA and the USSR made friendly gestures and after an abundant harvest was forecast in early June, they backed the stabilization plan wholeheartedly. Béla Kovács wrote an article entitled “Fateful National Task” for the 14 July 1946 issue of Kis Újság asking for help for the realization of stabilization from all sectors of Hungarian society. A few days later, on 20 July, Ferenc Nagy turned to the peasantry, asking it to accelerate the harvest for the sake of the success of stabilization, and to turn in the required deliveries as soon as possible after the harvest. Indeed, stabilization would not have been possible without the labour and sacrifice of Hungarian workers and peasants. In the months preceding stabilization the income of those living on rent or wages was barely sufficient to enable those employed to continue to work and keep their family members from starving. As for the peasants, the state felt compelled to take away not only the surplus, but even part of their necessities, without compensation.58 The sacrifices did bear fruit. The worst inflation the world had ever known came to a halt. The former currency, the pengő, lost its value to the point where it could not be used for exchange. The new forint was the equivalent of 400,000 quadrillion pengős, a sum that could not even be imagined! On 1 August 1946, when the forint was introduced, the street-cleaners carted away the useless money by the wagonload. Thus stabilization concluded the worst era of economic trials and tribulations in wartime.

Debate about agricultural interests The achievements of the government and its economic successes provided the opportunity to govern in a calmer atmosphere. Already in his speech in front of the National Assembly at the end of July the prime minister had made unequivocal promises about a constitutional state. On 11 August 1946, in a speech delivered at Bicske (a railroad junction to the west of Budapest) Ferenc Nagy stated categorically: “This nation needs neither revolution, nor counter-revolution.” And he continued: Hungarian public life, Hungarian politics are on an evolutionary path, and this evolution leads toward harmony. In the near future

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we will adopt new rules to show that the Hungarian government no longer feels it has to continue all those measures which had been necessary to safeguard democracy during the period of transition, but which often gave rise to excesses ... One of the first such measures is that the government will issue an amnesty ... The government also wants to promote appeasement, by repealing the order of dissolution directed at religious organizations ... We will hold local elections in the Fall. We will hold these to make sure the people of Hungary realize, down to the smallest village community, that they are now part of the democracy ... Out of the terrible economic chaos we have created a solid base, we have brought about stabilization ... The basis of this stabilization is the work and sweat of the peasants and the workers, and other working social classes.59 Indeed, the young Hungarian democracy could count among its achievements: the closing of the political internment camps; the review of the list of civil servants who had been dismissed, 10 per cent of whom were rehired; the permission for several of the banned youth associations to reform and reorganize; and Parliament’s opening of a discussion of the law on the vested interests of the peasantry. The preparations had begun in July 1945. The work was led by Sándor Kiss, the director of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance, who believed that peasant interests should be represented regardless of political affiliation. Thus the proposal derived from the need to create a unified agricultural vested interest group. Experts studied the examples of countries that already had advanced interest groups and an advanced agriculture to determine how those models were relevant to the Hungarian case. Even though the coalition parties had refused to collaborate among each other, qualified persons from the Peasant Party and the Social Democratic Party did participate in the work. Even the Communist Party did not dare reject the idea of peasant interest groups outright, but attempted to procrastinate by arguing that it smacked of corporatism. Finally, on 23 August 1946, the Smallholder Party itself assumed responsibility for introducing the proposal to Parliament, with Sándor Kiss as the presenter. Kiss explained that an interest group based “on democratic principles” was needed to enable the peasantry to improve its own social and economic standing, and to contribute to its own cultural development. Kiss managed to sway the majority in Parliament. Discussion of the details was not undertaken, but a great

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majority of the members voted to refer the proposal to the agricultural committee for its assessment.60 The committee took up the matter on 28 August. Once again Kiss was the presenter. He stressed two aspects of the motion: one was that the interest group should not limit itself to consulting functions, but rather become an executive organ of the Hungarian peasantry; the other was that the functions of the interest group should include that of a labour pool. Although the latter proposal elicited extensive debate, it was decided, by vote, that the committee would accept the motion in general terms, but discussion of the details should be adjourned for a future occasion. This discussion never took place, because the ACC asked to have a look, on the grounds that the motion had some “corporatist,” i.e., Fascist, elements. Nobody suspected that this was a tactical move, even though the leftists parties quite simply did not want the responsibility of voting the motion down in Parliament, for that would have been quite unpopular; neither did they want to go along with an association in which the interests of the well-to-do and of the poor peasant were represented together. For these reason the ACC “came to the rescue.”61 Of course, this did not mean that agricultural interests were taken off the agenda, so the Smallholders were awaiting the continuation of the debates in Parliament. In the meantime, Béla Kovács had initiated preparations for local elections in the second half of August. In 1946, one hundred and fifty villages held people’s meetings on Saint Stephen’s Day – that is, on 20 August – in preparation for local elections. To show off  the party’s clout, the Smallholders held National Peasant Days in Budapest, between 7 and 9 September. The principal organizers were Béla Kovács and the young members of the centre group. The peasants flowed into the capital by train, by cart, or on foot. Feverish polemics in the press estimated how many may have attended the grand assembly held on Hősök tere (Heroes’ Square): anywhere between 300,000 and half a million. The ten special trains made available by the Communist minister Gerő to enable the country people to travel at a discount proved to be insufficient. In his recollections Mátyás Rákosi minimized the significance of the event: he estimated the number of participants at no more than 50 or 60 thousand. But he too was compelled to note that the grand assembly did not have an anti-worker tone. The colourful parade of the peasantry marching down Andrássy Avenue, the display of folk costumes, and the youth dance groups charmed both the participants and the spectators.

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The enormous crowd gave self-confidence to the speakers. Sándor Kiss, a keynote speaker, deputy in the National Assembly, director of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance, and close collaborator of Béla Kovács, declared: “We are peasants. Centuries of suffering have steeled us. We know that even now, the knife is pressed against our throat, yet we are not afraid ... We are the absolute majority in and of this nation. Yet it is not our ambition to wield class rule. We will guide our own fate, however, in all aspects of social, political, economic, and cultural life.62 The article by Tibor Hám, Smallholder deputy and a leader of the centre group, in the 22 September issue of Kis Újság, struck a similarly determined note. We think it is possible, even necessary, that we, non-Marxists, should be able to get along with parties with a Marxist ideology, that we should jointly carry out the program of our ongoing democracy, yet we declare, in no uncertain terms, that the basis of this program can only be bourgeois type democracy ... We know that the objective of the Marxist parties can be no other than a socialist social order. But we also know, from Lenin himself, from his “Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution,” that in a bourgeois democracy this road can only be covered with the backing of bourgeois democracy and the acceptance of a joint community. Hám explained that, for him, bourgeois democracy meant, amongst other things, a parliamentary regime, a system of popular representation, self-determination, freedom of the press, and civil rights. We may say, in summary, that no matter how hard Rákosi and his friends tried to force the majority Smallholder Party to its knees, up to this time their efforts and their manoeuvres always failed. The party met the challenge at this stage in the evolution of democracy; the decisive issue being whether or not it would be possible to continue the political process along the lines of real parliamentary democracy, of bourgeois democracy.

Diverging interpretations of democracy In spite of all the clashes, the coalition hung together, neither side seriously considering a breakup. For instance, Béla Kovács summed up the profession of faith of the Smallholder Party regarding collaboration in his article “There can be no democracy without us”: “As long as we

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constitute a political factor in Hungary, it is out of the question that the country become a pawn of the Left Bloc, more exactly, of the Communist Party ... If the impatient leaders of the Left Bloc – fortunately they also have some patient and reasonable leaders – truly believe they cannot work together with us in the coalition, and should attempt in some manner to exclude us as a party from the running of the country, we would remain in power alone; but they must know – I should think – that there can be no democracy without us.”63 He reminded the readers that 3 million voters backed the party. Then he noted that one of the foundations of collaboration is trust, that everyone must take seriously the word or the promises given and dedicate all their strength to keeping these. At the congress held by the Hungarian Communist Party between 29 September and 1 October 1946, Mátyás Rákosi once again warned of the expected attacks by reactionary forces. According to him the reactionary right had put national unity and the coalition at risk, hence the political crisis had become permanent. In his keynote address to the congress he also spoke of cleansing the coalition. In his words “the reactionary forces have made such progress that they begin to endanger every achievement of Hungarian democracy64 ... hence we have decided to do some cleansing in this area as well ... We will use whatever tools are necessary for the purpose ... the truculence of the enemies of the people within the coalition can no longer be tolerated.”65 He spoke of his own party as the vanguard of Hungarian democracy, “at the helm of the Hungarian nation.” Throughout his speech he delivered harsh attacks against the victorious Smallholder Party, as if the electoral results had simply been a mistake and it was up to the Communists to correct this mistake. Once again he spoke of mobilizing the masses, but there was a new ingredient: restricting the right of suffrage on political grounds. József Révai made similar pronouncements at the congress: “We will not allow the betrayal by the reactionary right wing of the Smallholder Party to lead to spoiling our Hungarian democracy.”66 The proclamation of the Third Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party leaves no doubt: Whoever stands in the way of the people’s democracy stands in the way of the rise of our homeland ... The reactionary right wing of the Smallholder Party has sold out to the enemies of the people’s democracy, and is breaking up the unity of the government, paralyzing the legislative work, and poisoning public life. It tries to split the

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peasantry from its most loyal ally, the working class. It tries to drive a wedge between the two workers’ parties; it tries to curtail the rights the trade unions have wrested for themselves, in favour of big business! ... The Third Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party calls upon the Hungarian people, the workers, peasants, and progressive intellectuals, [to fight] against the dark manoeuvres of reaction. Down with those who would disturb internal peace! Down with the traitors of national unity! Out with the enemies of the people from the coalition!67 After the congress Rákosi summed up the main lessons learnt: “We pointed out the main reason for our chronic internal crisis: in contrast to the left political parties that make up the majority in our democracy, the Smallholder Party is run by reactionary forces representing a minority of the country, but they want to expand their rule over the entire country by means of their party ... Our party congress made a deep impression on the Smallholders, but it seems that they are not aware of its true significance – a review of the troops before the great battle ... Hungarian democracy, with the Left Bloc in the lead, is determined to radically uproot this obstacle. They have only themselves to blame if they are caught by surprise when this happens!”68 To achieve these goals the Communist Party reactivated the Left Bloc, which delivered its new demands to the Smallholder Party on 18 October 1946; among the things required to resolve the political crisis it mentioned pushing through their law on cooperatives and reexamination of the law on suffrage to introduce new restrictions; furthermore, it called for the leadership of the Smallholder Party to remove further deputies from the party. In its response to these demands, published in the 24 October 1946 issue of Kis Újság, the Smallholder Party distinguished between those demands it was willing to accept, and those it refused (e.g., restrictions on suffrage). Then it listed its own demands: proportionality in the civil service, in the police, and in the military; and making the courts free of partisan politics, etc. It also suggested that the parties of the coalition elaborate a joint government plan. To relieve the tension, Ferenc Nagy invited Pushkin for a hunt on the Hortobágy (nowadays a nature reserve in Eastern Hungary). Béla Kovács was also a member of the hunting party. One of Nagy’s objectives was to clear the air between Pushkin and Kovács, since the latter was increasingly under attack. The Soviet side accepted the invitation; the interpreter Gruber and a Soviet colonel were also in attendance.69

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Nagy describes in detail the topics discussed during this informal event. He explained to Pushkin that there really was no reason why the political crisis needed to become permanent. The pace of development in Hungary was such that no change would enhance their achievements; on the contrary, change might hinder them. He had done a lot personally to relieve the tension, but the Communist Party was adamant about working together, and directed constant attacks against the Smallholder leaders, with increasing vehemence. Pushkin responded by pointing out that some members of the Smallholders were certainly acting in the service of reactionary factors. Upon which Kovács could not contain himself and responded to Pushkin as follows: “For heaven’s sake, what sort of reaction are they talking about all the time? There is a justified feeling of dissatisfaction in the ranks of the Smallholders. Our party came out with an enormous majority in the elections. For the sake of peace, and in consideration of the Allied Control Commission, we have included the minority parties in the coalition. These parties, instead of being content with the space designated for them by the voters, are gradually taking over and, little by little, the Smallholder Party will have no voice in the coalition.”70 Pushkin defended his statement by pointing out that the highest public officials came from the Smallholder Party. Nagy admitted as much, but added that their power was circumscribed. By way of example he mentioned that, as prime minister, he would have liked to have an armed force at his disposal, but he did not; in fact, in case of conflict, the minister of the interior would let the police loose on him. Pushkin argued that Nagy had such outstanding abilities in conflict resolution, that he would have no trouble managing that. He suggested that they – the Smallholders – should not insist on proportionality within administration and the police, for that would only disturb the peace. Kovács lost his cool once again: “Yes, but democracy is democracy, to ensure that the people are right. And, if the people demand proportionality, we have no choice but to meet their demand.” He explained the reasons behind each of the crises, and did not conceal his opinion that the activities of the Communist Party were not in the best interests of Hungarian-Soviet friendship. When the topics of religion and education came up Pushkin explained that a democracy cannot be said to be healthy if the education of its youth is in anti-democratic hands. Kovács reacted to this by saying: “In public education, as elsewhere, there are still some individuals who do not appreciate democracy. But this has to be changed gradually, while being mindful not to hurt the Hungarian people’s respect for tradition. The Hungarian people welcome those

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innovations they feel would benefit them, but all those measures which take away from the values they hold dear, without giving a commensurate value in return, are greeted with feelings of aversion.” Then he added that the law on education must certainly be updated, because the one in force was several decades old, but these changes must not be directed against the churches. A few days later Nagy and Kovács reported to Zoltán Tildy on what transpired during the hunt. They felt that the Soviet leaders were obviously intent on having religious instruction deleted as a requirement. They decided that if it became absolutely necessary to take some steps regarding religion, they would back the elimination of mandatory religious instruction. They also went along with Béla Varga’s formulation, according to which the parent is the expression of God’s will in the life of a child and, if the parent wishes that her or his child should not be taught religion in school, then so be it. The events indicated a new turn in political skirmishing on both sides. The conference of the coalition parties convened again on 30 October, and both sides voiced their fears freely enough. The Smallholders feared the Communists were bent on bolshevizing the country, whereas the Communists and their close allies were talking about the growing danger of reactionary attacks, without going into specifics. Rákosi explained that, in his opinion, reactionary forces were already too strong, and thus would compel democracy, sooner or later, to resort to methods of self-defence that it would prefer not to use and did not intend to use.71 The Smallholders tried to explain that the whole conflict between them and the Rákosi group derived from a divergent understanding of the concept of democracy. József Bognár explained that the Smallholder leaders held that democracy was a political system “which realizes basic democratic principles, by involving the largest possible number of persons, according to the desires, interpretations, and interests of the greatest possible number. Democracy is most perfect, it goes without saying, when it approaches one’s own definition; in other words, persons are deemed to be good democrats if they are closest to their own interpretations.” Then he added: “we must bring up democrats, under basic freedoms, by participating in public affairs and, in our opinion, ... this is the only possible way to make the masses like, appreciate, and enhance democracy.” Béla Kovács used the concept of democracy in the same spirit. Imre Oltványi summed up its essence: “Should any member of the Left Bloc attack a minister, undersecretary, or deputy of the Smallholder Party, that constitutes defence of democracy; if, on the other hand, the

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Smallholder Party attacks some political actor from the ranks of the Left Bloc, no matter how justified, that constitutes reaction ... This is beyond our understanding. Indeed, people cannot conceive that everyone of our actions is stamped as reactionary in your press – for indeed, this is where we stand over the last few months – when simple analysis demonstrates that this is not the case.”72 The debate about the concept of democracy explains the ideas propounded by István Bibó in his essay “A magyar demokrácia válságáról” (About the crisis of Hungarian democracy), written and published in 1945. Bibó described the second half of the year 1945 – although, unfortunately, this remained true even later – as follows: “The Communist Party co-opts and annihilates reaction at the most diverse sites of the country’s social, economic, and political life, and uncovers further and further foci of reaction as the weeks go by. The irony is that the more foci of reaction and Fascism they uncover, the narrower the platform of democracy and the broader the reaction.”73

Coalition at a dead end In spite of the attacks, the Smallholder Party did not retreat. To the contrary, without notifying the coalition partners, it recalled three ministers from the cabinet and appointed new ones in their place on 20 November. On the same day Béla Kovács published another article in Kis Újság, under the title “Holtponton?” (At a dead end?). According to him, in the last months of 1946 the two most prominent partners in political life were at a deadlock. His article was a desperate appeal to work together: “Why would we not want to use that extensive expertise we find in our civil service and among the experts available to the government for the common good? Here too we must break through the wall of distrust at long last. And let the ministry gentlemen begin! Let them realize that the cabinet members, as a body and individually, are responsible for the administration of the state! ... Let us build a police force that the entire nation may call its own!” He drew to the attention of Rákosi and Révai that it would be a thousand times easier to destroy the reactionary forces once the people had regained their trust in the police, in a military free from politics, and in the impartiality of the administrative system. In conclusion, he repeated that the most basic requirements of democracy are proportionality, allowing people more say in the administration of their own affairs, and promoting economic development and political security through a

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concerted effort. Moreover, people must be convinced that every party within the coalition is serious – every party means what it proclaims, and none is striving for exclusivity or disproportionate power. Once agreed on this, they would build the purest democracy in all of Europe. “I am asking for trust, and I am offering trust to my coalition partners in return,” he concluded. By then, however, the peasant and middle-class politicians were considering that, under these conditions, they might have to go ahead and break up the coalition, if necessary. Bálint Arany recalls these arguments as follows: “One evening in early fall of 1946 Domokos Szent-Iványi, Kálmán Saláta, and I went up to the apartment of Béla Kovács, where we found Ferenc Nagy and Béla Varga, in addition to the host. They said that, on the most basic issues, the Smallholder Party was unable to obtain even the most minor results in the face of Communist Party opposition during inter-party conferences. The situation was so acute that they decided that, since the coalition parties did not play by the rules, and took the rules of collaboration as naught, the Smallholders should withdraw from the coalition to form a government of their own, having the absolute majority.”74 But this did not occur. Of course, it was no simple matter to leave the coalition in an occupied country. At this time the idea of bending the political rainbow in a different direction came up. After the success of the peasant days of September 1946 Béla Kovács worked out a concrete plan for the realization of peasant unity, as discussed with Nagy and Varga. The essence of this plan was to transform the Smallholder Party into an “unequivocally” peasant party, to include the wing of the Peasant Party led by Imre Kovács, while the left wing of that party could join the Communists. Ferenc Nagy describes Kovács’s arguments in detail in his memoirs: We might attain several goals by so doing ... First, it would no longer be possible to accuse the Smallholder Party of being reactionary, because once it becomes a purely peasant party, and operates with peasants at the helm, it would have to be seen as democratic. Second, this would in effect put an end to the Left Bloc, and nothing would remain to the left other than so-called workers’ unity, which would be confronted or faced by peasant unity. The peasant leaders would side with the Smallholders in all institutions, and the Smallholders would no longer be a minority on the national committees or anywhere else. Of course, if we were to exclude quite a few of the gentlemen who are against the coalition these might

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outnumber the peasant party delegates we might gain, but this would hardly matter, because our peasant masses would accept this knowing that peasant unity was finally born. 75 These words seem entirely authentic, and they are confirmed by other eye-witnesses who stressed Béla Kovács’s “anti-gentry” attitude. This self-made peasant politician would have gladly sacrificed the nonpeasant forces among the Smallholders, since this would not only have facilitated the unity of all peasants but also enhanced the prospects for a more harmonious party. Such a new combination would inevitably become a more effective interest group on behalf of the peasantry than the present Smallholder Party, which was constantly exposed to attacks from other coalition parties as well as from its own internal anticoalition forces. Ferenc Nagy and Béla Varga promised to back Kovács’s plan. They believed they would be able to build a more meaningful collaboration with the workers’ parties; that is, once peasant unity became secure the Communist Party would not dare to insist on “bringing about Communist rule.” The plan was submitted first to the leaders of the Peasant Party, Péter Veres and Imre Kovács. Neither rejected the plan outright, but they argued in favour of gradualism. They proposed that the Peasant Party come up with a resolution to work together with the Smallholder Party within the Hungarian Peasant Alliance. Subsequently the wing of the Peasant Party under Veres would leave the Left Bloc, at which point the two parties would declare their union. At the same time, the Smallholder Party would exclude those of its members – mostly deputies in Parliament – with whom the Peasant Party could not work together. On the other hand, the group of the Peasant Party under Ferenc Erdei would join the Communist Party. This strategy would have resulted in a realignment of coalition politics. Thus, given the tactics of the Communist Party, it comes as no surprise that its leaders did everything in their power to prevent this realignment. Under pressure from the Communists, Péter Veres backed out from participation in a united peasant party. Nagy and Béla Kovács also held discussions with Árpád Szakasits, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party. The prime minister asked the Social Democrats to place no obstacles in the path of the union of the Smallholders and the Peasant Party. Szakasits did inform the leaders of his party but, according to his account, the leaders did not back this

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union because it was assumed that “the unification would strengthen the hands of reactionary forces, since the kulaks would take over.”76 Thus the debates between the two wings of the coalition became ever more acrimonious. During its Third Congress the Communist Party backed the Socialist interpretation. On the other hand, the Smallholder Party obligated itself to enhance the civil parliamentary regime, rejecting the Socialist approach. These two conflicting approaches resulted in a stalemate. By the end of November or early December inter-party conferences were deadlocked. In an editorial entitled “All signs point to the fact that we are in for a fight,” Ernő Gerő discussed the anti-reactionary struggle of the Hungarian Communists within an international framework. “We are ahead of Greece or Spain, but far behind Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and many other countries. We must overcome this backwardness. Now we are involved in a wrestling match between reactionary forces and democracy ... the Gordian knot must be severed ... Hungarian democracy has enough power to pin down the reactionary forces ... The Third Congress resolved: if necessary, we will call on the truly democratic masses to fight for democracy.”77 In its editorial of 5 December 1946, entitled “About the Ten Points,” the Szabad Nép warned: “Complete clearing of the air ... is unavoidable ... Our predicament, within the country and on the outside, does not leave us much room to hesitate, to experiment, to manoeuvre ... The time for extended discussions has expired.” A few days later Ernő Gerő resorted to an almost threatening tone: “We refuse to be part of the same coalition as the enemies of the people ... Béla Kovács tells us that a front must be organized against socialism ... But such a front would be smashed.”78 The leader of the Social Democrats, Árpád Szakasits, also spoke out on the pages of the Szabad Nép: “The people of our country demand a clear and determined stand, and rather quickly, otherwise events will take an unpredictable course.”79 The tone became more and more aggressive: “This reactionary right wing has to be swept out of the Smallholder Party ... Out with this dirt from the coalition!”80 In a radio broadcast Rákosi explained: “There can be but one solution to the crisis ... join hands to eliminate the reactionary forces – first those that have infiltrated the Smallholder Party – from every branch of government; not only from Parliament, from the provincial assemblies and party organizations, but also from the press and every aspect of public life ... This is the only possible solution to the

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crisis, this is what we struggle for, and for this goal we must muster all the political weapons of Hungarian democracy.”81 The Communist Márton Horváth attacked the leaders of the Smallholder Party personally: “Who is actually leading the deputies of the Smallholders? Is it the party’s chairman, Ferenc Nagy? Is it the reactionary forces? ... The Smallholder leaders have taken on a very heavy burden. They should understand: whoever sides with reactionary forces excludes Hungary from the community of democratic states, and also excludes himself or herself from the democratic community of the Hungarian people ... we will not allow these people to conspire, to increase the misery, and to revile the good name of the country.”82 The dilemma of the Communist leaders was how to overcome the gridlock. Obviously, a radical coup d’état was not in the offing, as Horváth made clear in a speech delivered in December. He openly examined the opportunities facing his party and analyzed how the crisis of the coalition – according to him – had become chronic, even though the Smallholders had already given in to a series of demands. He argued that, although the difficulties of the coalition seemed to have become permanent in many ways, the Communist Party must continue the policy of participating in the government. He argued that their popularity would increase if they went into opposition, but rejected this possibility, because the party had a lot more to lose by giving up its secure position. Then he asked the rhetorical question: “What should our policy be under the circumstances?” His answer was simply to mobilize the masses. He added that although the right wing also had considerable influence over the masses, it was a mistake to assume that the bulk of the Hungarian peasantry could never be persuaded to side with the Communists, even by the land reform. He outlined the pertinent tactics as follows: We managed to become a second peasant party, yet we remain far behind the Smallholder Party. This means that we have to prepare ourselves for the long run. Our main thrust must be to win over these masses, and to diminish the influence of the other side over the masses ... We must engage in steady rather than short-run work with the masses; we must work on the details. Only by hard, persistent, and detail-oriented work can we change the relations of forces, rid ourselves of the present form of coalition, and ensure that the Hungarian coalition government becomes more like the coalition governments in Southeastern Europe. On the one hand, the influence

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of the right wing on the masses and, on the other, the international circumstances prevent us from changing at one blow. The policy of the Soviet Union is to maintain peace and order in the countries it occupies. It is not in our interest to see this policy change, whether for our own sake, for the sake of world democracy, or for the sake of the international workers’ movement. Elections in Europe have promoted the Communist Party to number one. It is not in the interest of the Soviet Union to change its policies simply because we are backward, and thus to provide the West with a trump card. We must make up for our backwardness on our own, and therefore plan at a longer range, plan for slow and steady progress.83

International causes for the change in tactics of Hungarian Communists The Communist Party’s efforts to undermine the Smallholder Party received a boost from the success of leftist forces in the 1946 parliamentary elections in several European countries. During the elections in Czechoslovakia on 26 May 1946, the Communist Party obtained 38 per cent of the votes, and became the largest party in the Parliament. Klement Gottwald, the chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, became prime minister. On 2 June 1946, the Italian Communist Party became the third largest in Italy with 104 seats in Parliament. On 27 October the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria received 364 seats (or 70 per cent of all votes); within the front the Bulgarian Communist Party got 277 seats, so it became the strongest party in Parliament. Here, too, the leader of the Communist Party, Georgi Dimitrov, became prime minister. On 10 November, in France, the Communist Party won 172 seats, beating out the Radical Party and the Socialists. In Romania on 19 November, the Block of Democratic parties received 91 per cent of the seats (albeit “only” 70 per cent of the popular votes). In Romania and Bulgaria, however, the elections had been tampered with, and the Western countries immediately protested against Soviet intervention on behalf of the Communist parties. For the time being, the left could expect no such success in Hungary. The Communist Party was even reluctant to hold local elections, for fear of losing the positions to which it had become accustomed. The level-headed leaders of the Smallholders – such as Zoltán Tildy and Ferenc Nagy – had no desire to confront the Communist Party on the issue of local elections, precisely because of the progress of the left in

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other countries. Thus both sides were facing slow, grinding political struggles. In 1946, in spite of all its persistent efforts, the Communist Party was not able to break up the Smallholders or restrict its influence among the masses. Even the plan of strengthening the left wing of the Smallholder Party from the outside did not work out, because the intelligentsia on the left were becoming increasingly isolated. The plan to back Dezső Sulyok (ousted from the ranks of the Smallholders) in his application for permission to launch a new party failed as well, although the Communists had hoped that such a party would attract a significant number of Smallholders.84 Thus, in practice, a balance evolved between the two parties, albeit the Communists felt this balance was  onerous and did everything in their power to swing it in their favour. The matter became increasingly urgent because, by 15 October, the Hungarian peace treaty was completed at the peace conference, and consequently all political factions were counting on the imminent departure of the Soviet occupation force from Hungary. Hence the Communist Party was intent on securing the most favourable position before that date. Furthermore, it favoured direct intervention in politics, once the leftist coalition parties ran into difficulties at the end of 1946. Within the Social Democratic Party – often hesitant, but eventually siding with the Communist Party – the group led by Károly Peyer became sharply critical of the leadership, blaming it for the loss of the party’s special features and for bowing to the repeated Communist ultimatums in such a servile manner. All this was revealed in a memorandum on 8 December. The National Peasant Party also seemed on the verge of dissolution; the wing led by Imre Kovács was drawing closer to the Smallholders. At the secret inter-party conference of 26 November, Ferenc Nagy offered to break with his party’s right wing, if only the leftist parties would back peasant unity. In this case the two agrarian parties would form an Independent Peasant Party.85 The Communist Party, however, rejected the bargain. Everyone expected some kind of action, but nobody had a clear strategy. The Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute, functioning between 1945 and 1949, continuously carried out surveys in both Budapest and the provinces. In 1946, during the period of permanent crisis within the coalition, it surveyed people in March, September, and December about whether they felt that the coalition government should be retained. The distribution of the responses indicates that, while the coalition government could be deemed popular at the beginning, its popularity waned steadily as a consequence of the incessant internal power struggles.86

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The question was: Do you believe it is necessary to retain the coalition form of government? (Responses given in percentages)

March 1946 September 1946 December 1946

Yes

No

64 48 33

34 50 52

No response 2 2 15

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The leaders of the Communist Party considered two plans to accelerate the pace of transformation of the people’s democracy. The gist of one of these (as the above quote from Márton Horváth indicates) was to enhance the influence of the left by raising the standard of living, to be followed by new elections that would result in the defeat of the Smallholder Party. After these elections a coalition could be formed with a leftist majority. The other plan was to concoct a show trial as a means of delivering a major blow to the Smallholder Party. In all probability Rákosi and his entourage seriously expected that, once the peace treaty entered into effect, the Soviet troops would leave Hungary. Since it was not possible to know in advance just when this withdrawal would take place, Rákosi and his entourage wanted to create circumstances favourable for a leftist takeover as soon as possible. Given that the law enforcement agencies were under the control of the Communist Party, a show trial would provide a more rapid road to success than the first option. As events were to demonstrate, the upper echelon of the Communist leadership opted for show trials.

An excuse for show trials In the midst of their manoeuvres against the Smallholder Party, the news, in mid-December 1946, that the state security services had stumbled on the tracks of “illegal organizing” presented the Communist leaders with an unexpected opportunity. Around Christmastime they became aware of the potential for a purge; here was an opportunity to create the pretence of a trial of the Hungarian Brotherhood Community [Magyar Testvéri Közösség, hereafter Hungarian Community], later designated

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as an “anti-republic conspiracy.” By means of several bold and aggressive leaps of faith they managed to extend the investigation in the direction of the Smallholders and thus use the affair to destroy them. It is obvious to later generations that the Communist action was directed first at the centre group of the Smallholders, then against their upper echelons. It was one of the first show trials in Hungary after World War II. Even at its beginning the main goal – never made explicit – was to topple the leaders, primarily general secretary Béla Kovács and Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy. Show trials have been held since antiquity: their essence is to use the power of the state to punish the enemies of some community, but in reality to discredit or eliminate the political opposition. The goal of such trials had never been to elucidate the truth but rather, by following a prepared script, to achieve a propaganda goal, make life impossible for the adversaries by seemingly legal means, and, finally, to annihilate them. The essence of such a scenario is to use actual facts or events that do not constitute or amount to a crime as arguments to back the trial, and to arbitrarily add the missing elements. Resorting to physical and psychological means, the interrogators, prosecutors, judges, and witnesses would force the victims, selected in advance, to “confess.” This was the scenario adopted in the Hungarian case, and the charge was “armed conspiracy” – even though Rákosi himself had to admit that this was the weakest aspect of the investigation and of the show: “the conspirators, as it turned out, did not have a single weapons cache.”1 The Hungarian Brotherhood Community was one of many secret societies active in the period between the world wars. It seemed to the members of this community that Hungarians were in a minority among the ruling class, or were insufficiently nationalist and completely disorganized. They felt the revision of the Peace Treaty of Trianon was of prime importance, but also stood against the German Drang nach Osten (Yearning for the East). During the war one of this community’s objectives was to defend the country against German expansion, while guarding against Russian imperialism. In 1944 many members participated in anti-Nazi resistance. At the end of the war, however, the movement dispersed and was not reconstituted. This very brief summary of events reveals some of steps by which Rákosi and company were able to deliver the most serious blow against their coalition partner. The first arrests took place in mid-December 1946. At first the victims were part of a small group who had aroused suspicion because one of its members met several times with a British

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spy, a former classmate, sent from Germany. Three members of the small group dubbed “the committee of seven” by the political police were also prominent members of the Smallholders (Domokos SzentIványi, Kálmán Saláta, and Bálint Arany), while the majority had been members of the former Hungarian Community. Rákosi and company felt they had found the excuse they needed to launch an attack against the Smallholder leadership. But the meetings of the group had no collective significance; the intellectual leader was Szent-Iványi, who had been in charge of the Hungarian Independence Movement,2 but who found out about the existence of the Hungarian Community only a few days before his arrest. The community had not been active since April 1944, that is, since the beginning of the German occupation, albeit there was some talk, late in 1946, about openly reviving the association, and they even took some steps in that direction. The case became more complex because two members of the group of seven were also members of a military group made up of retired officers, headed by Lajos Dálnoki Veress. They were also taken into custody.3 The arrest of the Smallholder politicians was insufficient in and of itself for a major attack, so it became imperative to tie them to a “conspiracy.” This was instrumental in raising charges, for the very existence of a secret society was against the law, or would have been against the law had it been in operation. The Communist György Pálffy, head of the military police section of the Ministry of Defence, who ordered the initial arrests, failed to notify his own minister, Albert Bartha, who belonged to the Smallholders, or any other leading personality of the Smallholder Party. The news of the arrests reached the prime minister through unofficial channels. Nagy summoned Bartha, who was also in the dark regarding the large-scale operation launched by a section under his command. Nagy instructed Bartha to investigate and submit an official report. The next day Bartha informed the prime minister that he had visited the jail operated by the military police section to speak with the arrested men directly. When he arrived at the jail Pálffy was not around. His subordinates, all members of the Communist Party, told him that they could not let him in to speak to the prisoners until Pálffy arrived. When Pálffy did arrive the request was rejected on the grounds that the prisoners had already been transferred to the regular state security police, since some of them were civilians.4 Pál Kornis, employed by the military police section at the time and on duty when Bartha came to the site in the company of the Colonel Judge

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Advocate and a military prosecutor, described how they managed to prevent the minister from meeting with the persons in custody by taking them to the banks of the Danube “for a walk.”5 The visit had further repercussions when Pálffy informed Bartha that he could not allow him to see the prisoners because General Sviridov, the deputy chief of the ACC, expressly forbade the visit. Thereupon Bartha went to the political police. He ordered Gábor Péter, the head, to allow him to interrogate those in detention. Péter regretfully rejected the minister’s demand on the grounds that no one was authorized to speak to the prisoners without permission from the minister of the interior. He confirmed that General Sviridov had expressly forbidden it. Next Bartha went to see László Rajk, the minister of the interior. Rajk likewise did not allow the visit, saying it would not be a good idea for Bartha or the prime minister to become involved in the matter.6 Thus the first intimidating threat from a highranking official within the Communist Party was sounded, meant to keep the Smallholder leaders away from the “conspiracy” and force them to play a humiliating game. Although Nagy tried to institute disciplinary action against Pálffy, this came to naught because of the intervention of the ACC. When Nagy visited Sviridov to ascertain whether indeed he and Bartha had been forbidden to interrogate the detainees, Sviridov answered in the negative, and denied having intervened in the affairs of the Ministry of Defence or in the affairs of the police. Nagy apprised President Tildy about the events. Tildy suggested that Pálffy be held to account. An investigative committee, created in the Ministry of Defence, interrogated Pálffy. Rajk and Rákosi demanded that the cabinet put an immediate halt to the investigation, but this time Nagy was determined. General Kondratov – considered the most anti-Hungarian of the officers of the ACC – paid a visit to the prime minister, accompanied by an officer of Sviridov, who served as interpreter to avoid any misunderstanding. The prime minister was told that Sviridov did not instruct General Pálffy not to allow anyone near the prisoners but, at the time of Pálffy’s visit an incompetent interpreter translated Sviridov‘s statement to Pálffy, who misunderstood the instructions. Moreover, the messenger explained, when Sviridov discovered the interpreter’s grave mistake, the latter was immediately arrested. Based on this information the ACC representative asked that the investigation against Pálffy be halted immediately; failing that, he hinted that the Soviet military police might intervene in the conspiracy affair.7

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Attack against the centre group of Smallholders The investigation was in full swing when the first official communication about the “conspiracy” appeared in the 5 January 1947 issue of Szabad Nép. According to this report fifty-five persons were already under arrest, and the “six main culprits” had admitted their guilt. The report was accompanied by an editorial by József Révai, who placed the blame for the entire situation on the Smallholders. He openly declared war on the Smallholder Party, saying they gave cover to the conspirators within the party. He felt it was important to add: “Not that we would attribute excessive importance to the political and military plans of the arrested conspirators. The military coup, scheduled for after the peace treaty and the withdrawal of the occupation forces, and the plan to form a counter-government are nothing more than childish naiveté.” The 12 January 1947 issue of Szabad Nép revealed in bold headlines: “Smallholder deputies among the conspirators.” The Communist press identified the well-known Smallholder politicians involved in the “conspiracy” or in touch with the “conspirators,” one after the other. The names included Pál Jaczkó, the chairperson of the public administration department of the Smallholders; Endre Mistéth, minister of reconstruction and public works; Tibor Hám, the secretary of the party’s political committee; Kálmán Saláta, leader of the party’s caucus in Parliament; László Vatai, philosopher and editor of the Smallholder journal Igazság; Sándor Kiss, the director of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance; János Horváth and Vince Vörös, section leaders of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance; and László Gyulai, the former head of the party’s propaganda section. István Csicsery-Rónay, the head of the foreign affairs section, was the first of the group to be arrested, on 4 January. Csicsery-Rónay and Mistéth were the only ones who had no immunity, since they were not members of Parliament. The younger ones believed in a peasant democracy; they were the heart and soul of the party’s centre, presumably in close contact with the top echelons, more particularly the circle of Béla Kovács. The charges against these men and the charge of antirepublican activity benefited Rákosi and his entourage, because they might lead to compromising the top leaders in public office, if only it could be shown that Ferenc Nagy, Béla Kovács, and Béla Varga knew about the “conspiracy.” As a consequence of these events, Mistéth resigned on 14 January and Saláta and Jaczkó were excluded from the party on the following day.

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Although under observation by the political police for days, Kálmán Saláta managed to “disappear” on 16 January. On the news of his escape the Smallholder leaders made further concessions, agreeing to the house arrest of seven young party deputies. The Parliament’s committee on immunity suspended the immunity of the young deputies on 17 January, extended retroactively to the prior arrest. All these actions were approved by Parliament on 21 January. All seven were arrested by the political police on the same day, but Vörös was released a few days later because, as a farmer, he did not belong to the party’s intelligentsia. It is a sign of his decency that Sándor Kiss, who happened to be on a study tour in Western Europe when the affair broke, returned immediately to face the charges and clear his name. Ferenc Nagy and Béla Kovács did not fully perceive the danger of the proceedings involving them; as true democrats they had faith in due process. Their confidence was reinforced by the opinion of the lawyers among the Smallholders. The idea of “conspiracy” rested on confessions obtained in police custody and, if these were retracted, there was no proof, and the proceedings would become shaky. The party leaders were of the opinion that unless the accused retracted their confessions, the fact of “conspiracy” must be accepted.

Béla Kovács, the target On 20 January 1947, Rákosi, accompanied by Szakasits, called on Prime Minister Nagy; they demanded that Béla Kovács resign from his post as general secretary of the party, or take a vacation, because he was politically accountable for what had happened. Rákosi explained that he did not care “what excuse was to be used to force Kovács to leave the top ranks of the party, but let him leave for a while, so that the people will realize that political responsibilities are not to be taken lightly.”8 We know about this conversation between the three from the memoirs of Ferenc Nagy, who rejected the demand. This was the starting point for the full-fledged attack against the general secretary of the Smallholders. A sentence in the minutes of the 23 January meeting of the political committee of the Communist Party leads us to believe that Rákosi and company were quite convinced they would be able to eliminate Kovács from public life: “the Smallholders must be told that even after the departure of Béla Kovács their party cannot follow the same line.” From the summer of 1946 Kovács had been a thorn in the side of Rákosi. He sensed a charismatic rival in this peasant politician who was popular

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throughout the country, and who would be able to unite the Hungarian peasantry. At the same time Kovács defended the value of classical democracy to the end in discussions with the coalition partners. Kovács consistently responded to and rejected the slanders from the left in the Smallholder press. Thus he became the number one target. Ferenc Nagy turned to the Soviets for help, and tried to convince them that the Communist Party was distorting the truth by exaggerating the conspiracy affair. He discussed the arrests and the methods used with Pushkin and Sviridov at a luncheon on 24 January 1947. He blamed the Communists for abusing their privileged position in the investigative agencies by slandering the Smallholder leaders and trying to create a split within the party. Nagy was ready to make concessions: the Smallholders themselves would be willing to initiate the exclusion of persons described as reactionary, mainly to take away this initiative from the Communists. Pushkin and Sviridov, however, gave him no encouragement. The Soviet leaders merely expressed regrets, adding that they had more than once advised Nagy to remove the “reactionary factors,” but he often disregarded their advice.9 Kovács sought out Zoltán Vas, one of the most influential leaders of the Communist Party, to act as intermediary between himself and Rákosi and his friends. Vas gave the following account of Kovács’s arguments: I came to explain to you and to Rákosi and Rajk through you, my most decent and honorable politics ... I want to advance together with you all for the benefit of the country, but only along a parliamentary path. That is what we had sworn to do in the Independence Front. I made an agreement with you about this back in Pécs [a city in southern Hungary]. You do remember, don’t you? I have kept to our agreement ever since. As regards the accusation of conspiracy, please tell Rákosi and Rajk about my request, to allow me to prove my innocence in front of the Parliament’s immunity committee. But if what you all expect me to do, Zoltán, is to stand aside, to resign, all you have to do is tell me. If you wish, I will resign my mandate and return to my village, Mecsekalja, to be a peasant. I refuse, however, to dishonour myself, to betray my own principles.10 That same day Vas spoke to Rákosi, who answered that Kovács could clear himself only in front of the police. Kovács felt crushed between the injustice of it and his impotence; therefore, to avoid making matters worse, he announced in a letter to his party’s political committee that,

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to restore his poor health, he would like to take leave for a few weeks and return to his birthplace. Nagy and Varga finally agreed to back this request, thus hoping to avoid even bigger problems. Yet, at the same time, they feared they were creating an unfortunate precedent by acceding to Rákosi’s demand and starting a domino process within the party. The Communist leaders shocked public opinion daily, claiming that the Smallholder Party did not learn the political lessons from the unmasking of the “illegal Horthyite conspiracy.” In a declaration dated 30 January and published in the Szabad Nép the following day, the political committee of the Communist Party raised the issue of Kovács’s political responsibility in public. The minutes of the interrogation of the arrested Smallholder deputies clearly indicate that the prime objective was to gather incriminating information about Kovács. Gábor Péter told Tibor Hám, who did not even know about the existence of the Hungarian Community, that if he agreed to testify against Kovács, he would be released within two days. Since they did not succeed with Hám, they tried the same ploy on László Gyulai and Pál Jaczkó. Under the pressure of the 30 January statement by the political committee of the Communist Party, the Smallholder political committee endorsed the leave requested by Kovács, hoping that he might return to active politics once the storm had subsided. A four-person committee would take over his functions. The public was informed that Kovács was going on leave in the 2 February issue of the Kis Újság. Kovács’s name was removed from the credits of the daily on 4 February. At the 6 February session of Parliament the Kovács affair was introduced by the Communist Révai. In addition to the insistence on the political guilt of the general secretary of the Smallholders, there was a new element: the need to institute proceedings against him, to bring him to court. Among other things, Révai blamed him for keeping the party on a short leash. In his 1965 memoirs, published in Budapest, Smallholder Ferenc Z. Nagy, the member of Parliament representing the landowning peasant class (no relation to the prime minister), described Kovács as follows: Although Béla Kovács enjoyed great prestige within the Smallholder Party, one could not attribute unlimited powers to him, and Révai knew this just as well as we did. Indeed, in many instances he voiced the stand of the Smallholder Party with more passion and purpose than Ferenc Nagy in the debates and the give-and-take of the coalition, but he did not strike us as an extremist. Sure, he was biased on

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peasant issues, but this was due to his peasant background. Our experience within party life was that Kovács – unlike Béla Varga or István B. Szabó – was usually in favour of maintaining the coalition, and against overestimating the power of the Smallholder majority. He had no liking for “the gentlemen” within the party, but his dislike was the same whether directed against the right or the left. Had it been up to him, he would have preferred to oust some of the leftist intellectuals in the party, but he had a great deal of respect for the broad leftist attitude of István Dobi,11 for his radical activities within the party. As for Sulyok and company – as far as I could tell – he had not much esteem; he felt they were aliens within the party, even though Sulyok had enjoyed prestige as a Smallholder politician even before 1945.12 The charges against the general secretary seemed far-fetched within the party, and the deputies did not subscribe to them. The question of “how to proceed” resulted in sharp debates within the party, but they were agreed on one thing: if they allowed the side-lining of Kovács, Ferenc Nagy and Béla Varga might be next. The article in the Szabad Nép and Révai’s speech were just the beginning; almost every day saw some new turn in the Béla Kovács affair. The basic conflict centred on Kovács’s parliamentary immunity. Therefore Rákosi and his friends tried to have this immunity lifted, trusting that by observing the constitution they would succeed in bringing Kovács to trial. As a first step in this direction, the head of the office of the people’s prosecutor, the state security section of the Hungarian state police – i.e. the political police (ÁVO) – sent a “query regarding the suspension of the immunity of Béla Kovács, deputy in the National Assembly.” Referring to sixty-three records of minutes of interrogations, all the charges against Kovács were grouped under five headings. Perhaps the most severe of these was that “he not only knew of the secret society of the Hungarian Community, of its program directed against the democratic state order, and of its secret organizational structure, but he was actually inducted into the movement, with the help of Bálint Arany; in other words, he approved of the resolution of the illegal movement aiming to form a counter-government and agreed to become a member of this counter-government.” It is important to point out that, when these grave accusations were lodged against Kovács, there was no proof whatsoever that Kovács even had knowledge of any “secret movement.” The pertinent confessions

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were obtained from Domokos Szent-Iványi by force, specifically by torture. Indeed, in his recollections, Arany says that Kovács knew nothing about the existence of the Hungarian Community.13 Hence the five-member council of the people’s tribunal of Budapest formally requested the speaker of Parliament to take measures regarding the immunity of Béla Kovács, including consenting to his preventive arrest.

Resistance in Parliament The Smallholder deputies attempted to include other deputies, except for the Communists, in the investigation. István Kovács, a member of the political committee of the Smallholder Party, delivered an impressive speech in Parliament on 7 February 1947: Honourable members of the National Assembly! Let us try to blunt political warfare. Let us try this at a time when we, the peasants of the Independent Smallholder Party, not for our own sake, but because of our concern for the entire nation, because we witness and see with deep anxiety that some of those who come from among us, have the same lifestyle, the offspring of peasant fathers and mothers with callous hands [the speaker is interrupted]. Today they cast aspersions on Béla Kovács, and unfortunately, I have the premonition, I fear in my heart that tomorrow it will be turn of the leader of our principles, of our companions, Ferenc Nagy. Béla Kovács, Ferenc Nagy, the pure sons of the Hungarian soil, to be besmirched merely because the power of Providence has brought them to the office of prime minister, to the office of general secretary of the party. We will never, but never, consent to this. Then he quoted a famous saying by Kossuth: “Without its intelligentsia the people are like the blind giant who stumbles toward his grave.” And he added, in conclusion: “We, the peasants of the Independent Smallholder Party, do not consent to casting aside the intellectuals of the party.” Before reading out the protest declaration drafted by the Smallholder peasant deputies, István Kovács pointed out: “We object to Ferenc Nagy or Béla Kovács being smeared even by the shadow of suspicion. We empathize with them in good or bad, in bad luck or good, in the rise of the nation or in its death.”

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The proclamation followed: We, the peasant deputies of the Independent Smallholder Party, aware that the enormous masses of Hungarian peasants are on our side, and watching carefully the events of Hungarian political life, have decided to issue the following proclamation. We, peasant deputies, who have condemned from the very start in most determined terms, and continue to condemn, all those who have conspired to overthrow of our democratic state, we take a most determined stand against any and every attempt aimed at the violent dissolution of the present assembly and of our party representing the majority of Hungarians. We also take the most determined stand against any attempt to pit the Hungarian peasantry against the intellectuals and the industrial workers. We take a most determined stand against the baseless slanders voiced against the leaders of the peasantry, one after another; we assure them of our complete trust and, if necessary, the peasantry of the entire country will speak for them as a single voice. The Hungarian peasantry has always been democratic, by its birth and its social standing. Hence we see with considerable regret that often all our efforts to ensure harmonious collaboration within the coalition appear to be in vain. Often we must realize that our earnest good intentions to produce a bigger slice of bread by means of enhanced production, by means of concerted Hungarian effort, have not been sufficiently appreciated by those parties with which we want to work together to rebuild the country. We cannot help but note a lack of understanding when, in connection with the conspiracy, charges and suspicions are voiced against the beloved and honoured leaders of the Hungarian peasantry, who are part of us. They fought with us during the most difficult political struggles of the past, and we refuse to entertain doubts about their democratic trustworthiness under the influence of any suspicions. We, peasants, produce equally for the benefit of all our Hungarian brethren and sisters. We sweat in our efforts to provide a better life for the Hungarian worker. We have always understood why the workers fought so hard for their legitimate demands. All we ask now is that the stand taken by the Hungarian peasant on the side of their leaders not be misconstrued, because this stand in no way

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contradicts the true interests of the workers. We, too, have no intention of defending the guilty parties.14 István Kovács, along with four peasant deputies, presented a separate initiative. Basically they suggested setting up a committee of twenty-five members to investigate matters pertaining to the “conspiracy against the republic.” The charge of the committee would have included the personal and direct interrogation of the detainees and an examination of the investigation reports. Its operations would have been public and its final report was to be presented to the National Assembly. This recommendation elicited considerable debate in Parliament, but the majority of the deputies voted in favour, by voice vote. This caused great alarm among the Communist leaders, as Rákosi reports in his recollections: The Smallholder Party indeed carried out its intention, voting in favour of a resolution demanding that the matter of conspiracy be turned over to a parliamentary committee. The voting took place in a raucous atmosphere. József Révai was seated next to me when the speaker issued the motion for a vote, and the members of the Smallholder Party and the Freedom Party stood up as a single unit. Even those few left-wing Smallholders who sympathized with us voted in favour of the motion. They had almost a two-thirds majority. ‘It was not just a majority, it was a real forest!’ said Révai to me. ‘Well, we will cull it then!’ I answered. After the session, when the right wing of the Smallholders were convinced they had won a major victory, the negotiations with the Smallholder leaders started for real. I told them that our party did not acknowledge this vote, that we would continue to insist that the matter be investigated by the judicial and other authorities who are supposed to do the job. It seemed to us that the parliamentary votes of the Smallholders were aimed at keeping the conspiracy under cover, to enable the guilty parties not only to escape but to continue their criminal ways. Our intervention was so adamant that the resolution of the Parliament was not carried out, and the unmasking of the conspirators continued.15 In other words, the Communist leaders prevented the execution of the Smallholder’s resolution by extra-parliamentary means, as if they still wanted to make sure that the procedure appeared legal. Behind the scenes they persuaded Ferenc Nagy to talk to the parliamentary faction

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of the Smallholders and have them withdraw their motion, with the argument that the Left Bloc would boycott participation in the investigation committee, which would thus be rendered impotent. On 14 February Minister of the Interior Rajk revealed the official charges against Béla Kovács to Ferenc Nagy, István Balogh, and the Smallholder deputies. Kovács showed up at the meeting: he admitted his  political responsibility, but denied having any knowledge of the conspiracy or having participated in it. The deputies received him with demonstrations of support, and clearly had no intention of backing the resolution depriving him of his immunity.

Béla Kovács detained and removed Rákosi had difficulty accepting that events did not follow his script; in his opinion, no significant progress was made in the matter of delivering Kovács. Therefore, at its meeting of 18 February and on his initiative, the political committee of the Communist Party resolved as follows: “We must continue the fight for the delivery and removal of Kovács. We must mobilize the left to protest and to prove to them, in particular, that Béla Kovács is guilty, and the president and prime minister must be informed.”16 From then on the Left Bloc demanded the removal of Béla Kovács. Nagy and friends refused. They were, however, thinking of some sort of compromise, of asking him in a friendly way to resign from his post as general secretary of the party, rather than dismissing him. The political committee of the Smallholder Party reached a decision at its 19 February meeting, and issued a statement emphasizing that there was insufficient evidence to show that Kovács had participated in or had knowledge of the conspiracy. The party would not agree to an arraignment. If the investigation against the general secretary did not follow due process, it would once again insist on a parliamentary investigation. All this did not satisfy Kovács. In his view the party was simply unable to defend him; in accordance with the agreement, he wrote a letter to Ferenc Nagy announcing his resignation as first secretary, as a member of the political committee, and as editor-in-chief of the daily. The letter was published in the 22 February 1947 issue of Kis Újság, stressing: My decision aims to serve, in part, political peace and resolution, but part of it is also due to the recognition that there is political responsibility for the involvement of various Smallholder

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personalities, and I am largely responsible vis-à-vis the party ... My work has at all times and in every role I played served the Hungarian nation, first of all the economic and social advance of my fellow-peasants, the strengthening and progress of our republic, and the flowering of our democracy ... I did not participate in the conspiracy, I do not feel any guilt on that account. I would have failed to live up to my whole life’s work, had I taken part in activities directed against the republic, against the freedom of our people, against the land reform, or against democracy. I feel it is most regrettable, and I denounce it from the bottom of my heart, that several members of our party were inclined to conspire, instead of all of them doing what is the obligation of every honourable, wellintentioned Hungarian under present circumstances: to stand up with all their abilities and their political competence to serve democracy without any reservations. The immunity committee of the National Assembly met on 21 and 22  February in an atmosphere of tension, to take a stand regarding Kovács’s immunity, at the request of the people’s tribunal. The workers’ parties asked for Kovács’s extradition. Kovács himself was able to testify at the session. The debate was protracted; it was adjourned until the afternoon of the following day. After more than five hours of sharp debate the committee decided not to hand Kovács over to law enforcement. The deputies from the Smallholder and Freedom parties – who jointly constituted a majority within the committee – voted against the initiative of the workers’ parties. Once again, the notion of a parliamentary investigative committee cropped up.17 In spite of the resolution of the immunity committee, the Communist Party insisted that Kovács make a statement to the police. He was inclined to comply, but only if promised immunity. The discussions between Rákosi, Szakasits, and Nagy regarding Kovács’s fate continued on 23 and 24 February. Nagy, however, refused to sign the first draft of the agreement proposed by the Communists – which would have turned Kovács over to the political police completely.18 Finally, after extensive bargaining, they drafted another text that was more to Nagy’s liking. The essence of this new agreement was that Kovács could be subject to preventive detention only if the Parliament’s immunity committee consented. Furthermore, the political police could interrogate Kovács, but could not arrest him; the interrogation had to conclude within fortyeight hours; and the documents had to be turned over to the people’s

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prosecutor’s office. The latter was to conclude its investigation in five or six days, during which Kovács could defend himself as a free person.19 Later, in exile, Nagy was often blamed for having contributed to the harassment of Kovács by the above agreement. In his defence, it might be noted that he still had confidence in constitutional solutions, and assumed that the immunity committee would stick to its guns. Indeed, Kovács’s right to immunity was never suspended. The ever-increasing pressure weighing on the Smallholder Party, on Béla Kovács, and on Ferenc Nagy is signalled in a 25 February 1947 dispatch from the British embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office. The cable reported that the Soviet press, which, in the past, had published only facts about the “conspiracy” in Hungary, had added editorial comments over the past few days. The report noted that these comments are written in a very sharp tone, criticizing primarily the Smallholder Party and Béla Kovács, but also hinting that the next victim of pressures would be the prime minister himself.20 When the attacks on Kovács became constant, Ferenc Kapócs, Nagy’s secretary, called on police captain Miklós Jármay (on behalf of the prime minister), asking him to protect Kovács’s apartment and Kovács himself. Jármay even organized his escape abroad, but Kovács refused to even consider such a move.21 According to witnesses, he declared with unshakeable determination: “We will appeal to the courts. Not in order to secure justice, but rather to force them to speak, to give real meaning to their words. Let everyone see, finally, that for a Communist, democracy means the dictatorship of the proletariat, coalition means Communist rule, and Hungarian politics serve Russian ends ... There is no need for you to escort me across the borders. Resistance may take place not only from the benches of Parliament, and not only with weapons. Do not underestimate the value of sacrifice. If it must happen, we will continue what we have started from the prison cells underground. Forces producing results can work from underneath the earth.”22 No matter how much he objected to the party leaders’ agreement, Béla Kovács abided by their resolution. His interrogation began at 10 a.m. on 25 February at AVO headquarters, 60 Andrássy Avenue.23 He himself countersigned the following statement: “In answer to the questions deputy Béla Kovács declares that he did not give up his right to immunity, and does not intend to give it up, but makes himself available not only to the state security section but also to the people’s prosecutor and, should the prosecutor’s office raise charges against him, he will stand in front of the people’s tribunal.”24

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During the interrogation in the morning he was confronted by Domokos Szent-Iványi and Pál Jaczkó, who had been under arrest for several months. Kovács continued to insist that he knew nothing about the conspiracy and took no part in it. The dossier also notes that Zoltán Pfeiffer, Béla Kovács’s lawyer, appeared during the interrogation, at 12.10 p.m., and, after an exchange with Gábor Péter, took Kovács away from 60 Andrássy Avenue. Pfeiffer described what transpired; that is, what Kovács told him about the interrogation: Seeing his collapse I said only: do what I do and, turning to [Gábor] Péter, I declared, now we are leaving. Péter objected, but Kovács and I walked toward the door, saying force does not frighten us. Seeing our determination, Gábor Péter did not bar our way, but pretended to be courteous, escorted us to the staircase, and instructed his stooges to let us pass ... Once in the vehicle Béla Kovács reversed the “documentary film” of what had happened haltingly, groaning. He had entered the police headquarters and was greeted politely by Gábor Péter, who turned him over to an officer. He was escorted to a barely lit space. Suddenly the place filled with people who began to revile him, in deep, increasingly loud voices. Traitor! Reactionary scoundrel! Goodfor-nothing! Stinking peasant! Conspirator of a secret society! He offered up the particular details from his memory as if they were the mosaic stones of a nightmare. When I asked him why he did not attack them, his answer was: I was stunned, could not utter a word. After this shock treatment he was led off to another official, István Timár. He was offered a seat and coffee. He could not drink or even answer the questions asked. He saw a woman with notebook and pencil in hand. He tried to come to himself, but could not, because the boys were brought in (deputies of the Smallholder Party, officials of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance) who told him tearfully that he was the one directing the secret society, he was the political underpinning of the conspiracy. He collapsed from this confrontation, and he was finally beginning to recover his senses only when he met me in Gábor Péter’s office. He still presented a sorry figure when we reached the office of the prime minister, so that, upon entering Ferenc Nagy’s office, when I reported on the inter-party manoeuvres in a not too friendly manner, Nagy collapsed. Indeed, they treated each other as confirmed friends ... Kovács, as he had done earlier in the vehicle, gave a more detailed account of the scenario they put on for him at 60 Andrássy Avenue ... We separated, with the agreement that he

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would go home, and not admit anyone. He would sleep on it, and I was to call on him at 9, so that he could adapt his speech in Parliament to the altered circumstances.25 Pfeiffer’s recommendation was for Kovács to appear at the National Assembly and clear himself of the accusations or, as an alternative, to leave for abroad. In contrast, Kovács insisted on the solution as proposed by the leaders of the party: to go the police, make a confession, then step aside and resign his mandate in Parliament and all political offices. Thus at 2.40 p.m. on 25 February – according to the record of the interrogation – he returned to political police headquarters. Once again he was confronted by Szent-Iványi, followed by Sándor Raffay and László Gyulai. Kovács persisted in his earlier stand, that he knew nothing about the conspiracy. According to the minutes of the hearings, Kovács admitted “that there were certain aspects of the confession which are, in his opinion, valid, and which can be summarized simply as that he, indeed, had engaged in conversations of a political nature with Szent-Iványi and his circle.”26 That very evening Béla Kovács was arrested by the Soviet authorities, who referred to the rights guaranteed to them under the armistice agreement. His interrogation was interrupted when some high-ranking officers of the Soviet state security showed up at 60 Andrássy Avenue and took him back to his apartment at 54 Váci Street, but did not allow him to communicate with anyone from there. Somewhat earlier two Soviet security officers had combed through his belongings, confiscated documents, and prepared an inventory signed by witnesses. A Soviet general comforted his wife, frightened to death, that her husband would be returned within a few days, but asked for a pillow for Kovács in the meantime. Then the soldiers took him away. At a small reception at Tildy’s place in the evening of 25 February 1947, Gyula Ortutay, the head of broadcasting, was called out at 11 p.m. He came back with an opened letter in his hand and only one word on his lips: “Sviridov.” Eventually he continued, reading out the letter in measured tones: “You are called upon to ensure that in its 12 midnight broadcast news the radio station should mention that the Soviet military authorities have arrested Béla Kovács, deputy in the National Assembly, under the charge of conspiracy.”27 The ACC sent the following detailed explanation to the 26 February dailies: “The headquarters of the Soviet occupation forces in Hungary have asked the Hungarian Telegraph Agency (MTI) to issue the following

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communiqué: On 25 February 1947, the Soviet occupation authorities arrested Béla Kovács, the former general secretary of the Independent Smallholder Party, on account of his active participation in the formation of an underground anti-Soviet armed terrorist group and of his spying on the Soviet army. Béla Kovács was most active in setting up underground anti-Soviet armed groups, the members of which committed acts of terrorism and murder on Hungarian territory against members of the Soviet armed forces.”28 Legal measures were inadequate for the removal of the popular Smallholder politicians. Parliamentary immunity protected Kovács, and the Parliament refused to extradite him. Rákosi and company had no recourse other than to turn to the Soviet authorities for help. The jurisdiction of the police and the state security system in the hands of the Communists were not sufficient to eliminate Kovács from public affairs; the existing legal constraints could not be circumvented to that extent. The leadership of the ACC intervened at the express request of Rákosi, under the terms of the armistice agreement. The serious charges spelled out in the press release of 26 February were not mentioned again in subsequent records. Not another word was said about murder or acts of terrorism in connection with either Béla Kovács or anyone else, not even during the actual conspiracy trial. The Soviet intervention clearly highlights the nature of limited sovereignty that Hungary endured after World War II. Under the ceasefire agreements the Soviets could intervene, because they were anxious to ensure that Communists should be primus inter pares in the coalition government and Rákosi enjoyed considerable countervailing power. But parliamentary institutions were prepared to defend democratic principles. At the same time, the Soviet intervention opened the way to the illegitimate political manoeuvres that led to the Communist takeover.

Western protests against the arrest The Western great powers resorted to diplomatic means to try to save Béla Kovács. On 5 March 1947 the government of the United States sent a note to the Soviet government with regard to its unilateral interference in Hungarian affairs. The note complained that the Soviet authorities did this to enable “minority elements” in Hungary to force their will upon the majority elected by the people. The note condemned the forced attempt to take power and the unilateral Communist intervention, and suggested setting up a committee that, in addition to

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representatives of the three great powers, would include the Hungarian prime minister, the speaker of the National Assembly, the minister of justice, the minister of the interior, and the minister of defence. This committee would be charged with investigating Béla Kovács and the conspiracy in general.”29 The American notes were followed by a British one. The dependence of the press on the ACC was demonstrated by the fact that Sviridov forbade the publication of the notes until 9 March, when the Soviet reply was ready. The American argument was rejected by the Soviets on the grounds that it was not the left-wing parties that organized the conspiracy against the constitution and the republic. Even the Smallholder Party conceded that there was a conspiracy and that its leaders had issued several declarations to the press admitting that some Smallholder politicians did participate. The party had even agreed to strip the “conspirators” of their immunity and allow them to be brought to court. According to the Soviet response the matter of the conspiracy was within the purview of the independent democratic courts of the Hungarian republic, whereas, if they were to create a committee of investigation as proposed in the American note, this would constitute intervention in Hungarian internal affairs; on the other hand, the arrest of Béla Kovács on account of his crimes directed against the Soviet occupation authorities could not be considered interference in Hungarian affairs.30 On 17 March the government of the United States delivered another note, protesting that the investigation of the anti-state conspiracy was carried out by police agencies strictly under Communist control and that, moreover, the leftist parties had rejected the Smallholder initiative regarding setting up a parliamentary commission. While the Americans felt arrests for the sake of the security of the occupation troops were justified, they noted that the arrest of Béla Kovács could not be viewed as a matter of course. They pointed out that the arrest took place only after the Hungarian Communist Party failed in its attempts to implement various tactical devices, such as trying to have Kovács’s immunity lifted and have him arrested by the political police. They proposed that the powers in attendance at the Yalta conference meet again to examine the Hungarian situation jointly.31 The Soviet response, however, was once again elusive, arguing that there was no standard procedure for the joint examination of “the present Hungarian situation and of the conspiracy.” Only two weeks after the miscarriage of justice, on 12 March 1947, President Harry S. Truman delivered his famous speech in congress to

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support a democratic government in Greece, known worldwide as the Truman Doctrine. The speech mentioned Turkey and some other countries, but not Hungary: “The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.”32 Considering that the Béla Kovács affair was a hot topic in the world press in those days, and constituted a political and legal scandal, Truman’s omission is noteworthy. There probably were diplomatic reasons for this omission, given that in the Eastern European countries specifically mentioned by name the power struggle had already been decided in favour of the Communist parties, whereas in Hungary the political rearguard action was still going on. Truman may even have hoped that the great powers could get together on the basis of Yalta. This interpretation is confirmed in Robert L. Beisner’s biography of Dean Acheson: “[On 7 March 1947], back in the White House, he [Truman] approved the State’s draft, scheduled the speech for 12 March, and announced his plans to cabinet members. Acheson told them Greece left much to be desired as an object of U.S. solicitude, but the spread of Stalinist rule had to be stopped somewhere. It might be necessary later to help many other countries, even Hungary, where embers of freedom still burned. Truman said he faced ‘a decision more serious than had ever confronted any President.’ The United States would now go ‘into European politics,’ requiring ‘the greatest selling job ever.’”33 According to László Borhi, Truman was outraged at the Hungarian situation and made a public pledge not to sit idly by, yet Washington did not push for an investigation by the United Nations:34 The State Department feared that the smaller European nations would not support Hungary, or any other ex-German satellite against a former ally. Moreover, it seemed unlikely that in a dispute between the Soviet Union and the West, the new Communistdominated government in Budapest would side with the latter. Thus it hardly seemed advisable to put the world organization to such a hard test over a former enemy. Finally and most importantly, the U.S. administration did not want the Hungarian question to divert the attention from Greece, which was being threatened by armed Communist insurgence. For the time being then, the putsch in

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Budapest would not be discussed in the UN forum, although its inscription in the General Assembly was left open for the Fall session.35 Senator Vandenberg summed up the U.S. position, which “cannot deal with Hungary, a former enemy, as it deals with Greece. Hungary had been an enemy, while Greece is an ‘eternal, permanent ally.’ Hungary is under armed occupation by Soviet troops ... Greece is an independent state. Hungary cannot, therefore ask or receive our aid as Greece can. They are parallel tragedies, but cannot have parallel treatment.”36

The consequences of the arrest On 27 February, two days after Kovács was taken away, the series of  trials of the “conspirators” got underway. The first, the case of Dr György Donáth and his twelve associates, was followed by six more trials, in the course of which 260 persons were arrested, some of whom occupied important positions in the Smallholder Party, while other parties, including the Communist Party, were also represented among the detainees. Finally 229 of the accused, mostly high-ranking officials, were arraigned in court. On the basis of the second degree convictions, affirmed by the appeals court, one person was condemned to death, thirteen were condemned to prison terms of more than five years, seventy-five received sentences ranging from one to five years, and one hundred were sentenced to less than one year in jail. The other accused were either released or, in some cases, the charges were dropped.37 The first two trials, the trials of Donáth and of Mistéth, played a special role in the series; they were instrumental in the dissolution of the Smallholder Party. Colonel General Lajos Veress Dálnoki, named “homo regius” by Regent Horthy in October 1944, before his detention by the Germans, and the leader of the military component of the Hungarian Community, was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Donáth, who was a deputy in the government party between 1939 and 1944 and vice-chairman of that party in 1943–44, received the harshest sentence: he was sentenced to death on 16 April 1947 by the people’s tribunal. The sentence was confirmed by the appeals court and carried out on 23 October. The trial of Mistéth served two main purposes. One was to break down the influence of the Smallholders’ social organization, the Hungarian Peasant Alliance; the other was to implicate Béla Kovács and

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Ferenc Nagy. The preparations for the trial were more significant than the trial itself. The arrests of young Smallholder politicians and members of Parliament, starting early January 1947, were a shock for the party. The confessions the detainees were forced to sign were definitely aimed against Béla Kovács and, eventually, against Ferenc Nagy. This became clear at the trial of Endre Mistéth and sixty-four associates, starting on 12 June 1947, for Ferenc Nagy had already been removed from power by a coup d’état. As in the case of Béla Kovács, the interrogations used as evidence against Ferenc Nagy were the confessions extorted by the Hungarian political police and the Soviet interrogators. The records of the detainees’ interrogations clearly show how events that actually occurred but were not against the law could be used by the police and the Soviet agencies to create the appearance of criminal activity, and how pertinent confessions were extorted from the detainees, who thus implicated themselves and their companions. It was not possible, however, to make the accusation of political conspiracy stick. They then decided to shift the emphasis to the connections with the Hungarian Community; thus those who were suspected of participating in this group, accused as seventeenth-order defendants, received more severe punishments than the young Smallholder politicians who were accused as sixth or seventh-order defendants. Hungarian historiography has revealed, as early as the 1970s, not only that Béla Kovács was not a member of any secret society but also that he had no knowledge of such. Kovács was interrogated by the Soviet agencies on at least twelve occasions between 1 March and 22 May 1947. The minutes prepared by the Soviets take the form of questions and answers: the questions are handwritten, and the answers are in the handwriting of the prisoner. These notes make clear the methods used by Soviet agents to gradually break down Kovács. This is particularly obvious in the minutes from 27 March in which Kovács – by then in custody for over one month – stresses most clearly his own responsibility and that of Ferenc Nagy and other party leaders. The question was “Why did members of the anti-republic conspiracy, those close to the leadership, come from the ranks of the Smallholder Party? Are the leaders of the Smallholder Party not responsible?” Kovács answered as follows: “Yes. Of course, the leaders of the Smallholders, myself among them, Ferenc Nagy, and  Béla Varga are all guilty and responsible for the fact that the intellectual leaders of  the anti-republic conspiracy came from our party. Moreover, many of them were in close contact with us, the party

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leaders, in the course of their daily activities, and benefited from our good will and assistance.”38

Rákosi makes a move, the Soviets hold back The new target: Ferenc Nagy During the ensuing two months it may have seemed to the public that the Hungarian Communist Party had relaxed its ongoing offensive against the Smallholder Party. Although the conspiracy trials were in full swing, the mood of the public no longer seemed on the verge of an explosion. Even Imre Kovács of the Peasant Party felt that the danger had passed; the “conspiracy” was no longer expanding. In a speech delivered to Parliament he noted that the past period had been most dangerous for democracy in Hungary: “The Communist Party could have drawn not only the whole of the Smallholder Party, but indeed, the entire country into the conspiracy, for the leaders of the workers’ parties were on the brink of ascribing collective responsibility. They did stop, however, because they felt that this altogether reprehensible, thoughtless attempt could not bear the excess political weight. The political break of the dam deepened and widened to such an extent that one could fear a flood inundating the entire country. The Communists were forging ahead, encountering no resistance, and the Smallholder Party committed its biggest mistake by allowing the opprobrium of the conspiracy to be hung around its neck.39 The same is reflected in A.K. Helm’s report sent to London on 16 April, which said: two or three months after the stress, enjoying the relatively quiet period.40 But relaxation was only an outward appearance; grave actions were being prepared behind the scenes. According to the records, on 9 March 1947 Béla Kovács was first asked about the relationship between Ferenc Nagy and the conspiracy.41 At the 4 April 1947 session of the central committee of the Communist Party, Rákosi made sweeping accusations against Nagy: “there is no doubt that he too bears heavy political responsibility; there is no doubt that he too was aware of the conspiracy.”42 On 5 April Rákosi gave A. A. Kuznetsov, a member of the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party, an account of the Hungarian political situation. This letter outlines the role in the “conspiracy” that the Communist Party meant to assign to Nagy. “Now it has been verified that Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy definitely played a part in the

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conspiracy; indeed, one must assume that lately he was the one offering political advice to the conspirators. The question we now face is how to take action against him. For he is precisely the last bastion of the Smallholder leaders in cahoots with the conspirators, hence there can be no doubt that the struggle over him will be far more arduous than the struggle over Béla Kovács.”43 On 27 April Rákosi travelled to Moscow, asking for an audience, and delivered a letter addressed to Stalin and Molotov. In this letter he once again raised the issue of the disclosure of the “conspiracy and of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy’s involvement. Therefore it would be desirable that Béla Kovács, arrested by the Soviet authorities, be given an opportunity to testify in front of a Hungarian court.” Moreover, he reported on the important tactical moves designed to promote a Communist takeover: “we have created an opposition out of the democratic elements within the Smallholder Party: the leader of this opposition will be Lajos Dinnyés, the present minister of defence. We have to change our tactics vis-à-vis the Social Democrats, with whom collaboration is becoming increasingly difficult, partly because of the pressure from the British and the Americans weighing down on them. We have to point out more clearly their inconsistent politicking and social demagoguery in front of the masses of workers.”44 Molotov received Rákosi two weeks later, on 29 April. During their discussions the general secretary of the Communist Party did not hesitate to assert that Ferenc Nagy was “the leader of one group of conspirators.” He even added: “It is not impossible that Zoltán Tildy, the president of the republic, is mixed up in the conspiracy as well.” From the minutes of the discussions it appears that Molotov was counselling moderation to Rákosi. Molotov argued that the international situation could be said to be favourable for them, because “they will not sign the treaty with Austria this year for sure. This will happen, at best, at the beginning of next year; thus, if our troops are stationed in Austria, they will also be stationed in Hungary and Romania. Even after the ratification of the treaty with Hungary, some of the Soviet troops will remain in Hungary. Thus, the situation during 1947 will remain unchanged.”45 This statement refers to Chapter IV, article 22, of the Hungarian peace treaty signed in Paris on 10 February 1947, which addresses the issue of the withdrawal of allied armed forces from Hungary by 15 September, yet gives the Soviet Union the right “to keep such armed forces as may be warranted to ensure the safety of the supply lines of the Soviet army with the Soviet occupation zone in Austria.”

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Molotov (and the Soviet leaders) did not know at the time that Austria would remain occupied by the Allies until 1955. Even the Soviets were expecting to withdraw from Hungary within a certain period after the peace treaty had been signed. In such a case they wanted to make sure the hinterland remained secure, avoiding the kind of situation they had encountered in Iran. In Iran Gavam-e-Sultaneh had reneged on the agreement with the Soviet Union and, once the Soviet troops had withdrawn, the Communists were excluded from the cabinet and the party itself was eliminated in a bloodbath in December 1946. This figured as a frightening precedent for the Soviet leadership; therefore, however reluctantly, they gave in to Rákosi. In his discussions with Molotov, Rákosi expressed concern about what would happen if the ACC were to leave Hungary: “Then, I am afraid, democracy will be hanging in the balance.” He asked Molotov in direct language: “If we must resort to mobilizing the masses, we would like to know what kind of backing we can expect from you?” “That would depend on the circumstances,” answered Molotov, without much conviction. But Rákosi insisted: “We want to unmask Ferenc Nagy as well. We have at our disposal the compromising confession of Kovács regarding Prime Minister Nagy. But Kovács is in Soviet hands. We would like that he be handed over to us, for at least one day, or even two or three hours, so that he may appear as witness in front of the Hungarian people, and confess. For this we would need your permission. Then we would once again give prominence to the issue of conspiracy and show that Ferenc Nagy was in touch with the conspirators.”46 Molotov once again enjoined moderation: “These are but minute details. Of course, you can make use of Kovács’s confession, but it would make an impression only in the short run. Furthermore, we cannot know what he will say in front of the Hungarian court.” But Rákosi continued to insist: “We need something dramatic.”47 The general secretary left Moscow with advice emphasizing consolidation, rather than instigation of a coup d’état. Nevertheless, preparations for an attack against the prime minister continued. On 14 May the prime minister left for Switzerland on vacation. Before his departure Rákosi called on him to ask that the Smallholders relinquish the immunity covering Béla Kovács and request the ACC to turn him over to the Hungarian authorities. Rákosi informed Nagy that there was only one chance that the Hungarian authorities would have jurisdiction over the fate of Kovács, and that was if the parliamentary committee lifted his immunity. The prime minister consulted his party, and they decided

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that they would have a better bargaining position if they gave up the right of immunity for the sake of keeping Kovács at home in Hungary. With this authorization in hand Nagy engaged in discussions with Lieutenant General Sviridov and ambassador Pushkin. It was probably no accident that the Soviet response regarding the extradition of Kovács was timed for Nagy’s leave in Switzerland, for this response was what set the avalanche rolling. It was only in Switzerland, after he had been forced to resign, that Nagy realized that the whole manoeuvre had been a trap. Sviridov relayed the dossier of Kovács’s interrogation, along with those that officially compromised Nagy. According to Rákosi’s recollections Stalin himself gave the signal for the attack in a letter of less than a page, which reached him in a rather roundabout way. I inquired from the Soviet comrades regarding developments in the Kovács affair, and I soon found out that Kovács delivered a confession in front of the Soviet examining judge not only regarding his own role but also unmasking Ferenc Nagy, who had worked with him in the matter of the conspiracy. Given our familiarity with the affair, we already suspected this was the case, but we had no proof in our hands. While we were debating what to do with this new turn of events, the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Pushkin, urged me to travel to Arad, in Romania, on an important and urgent matter. The matter seemed so urgent that within half an hour of receiving the communication I was in a car, in the company of a high-ranking Soviet officer, who was needed because there was a Soviet patrol at every border-crossing station between Hungary and Romania. Because of the urgency, the patrol where we crossed late at night had not been warned, which resulted in various delays and complications – among other things they almost fired on us. Finally we arrived at Arad in the morning, where Colonel General Susaikov, the chairman of the Allied Control Commission [in Romania], whom I knew personally, was waiting for us. We immediately broached the matter at hand. Susaikov handed me a handwritten, unsigned letter, telling me it was Stalin’s personal communication. The letter was less than one page long. It stated that, according to information received by the Soviets, rather than resting in Switzerland, Ferenc Nagy was engaged in discussing with the enemy the plans by which the Communists were trying to remove him from office. Let us take advantage of his absence, and go into the attack mode, because if we

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miss this opportunity, the situation may become more difficult in the future ... Susaikov wanted me to stay for lunch but I, accepting the advice I had received, did not want to waste a single moment, and merely asked him to ensure our safe return across the border. He did this, so that around noon I was back in Szeged, whence I called József Révai immediately, and asked that the Szabad Nép draft an article for the next day sharply attacking the leaders of the Smallholder Party for their participation in the conspiracy. I also called a meeting of the political committee for that evening.48 We are not aware of any other draft of this letter ascribed to Stalin. Coup against Ferenc Nagy As the deputy prime minister in the absence of Ferenc Nagy, Mátyás Rákosi called a cabinet meeting for 28 May, where he read out the response received from Sviridov regarding the memorandum requesting the extradition of Béla Kovács. Sviridov had rejected the request, in the name of the Soviet government. He pointed out that the investigation in the case of Kovács had not been concluded,49 but attached a few more minutes pertaining to the interrogations and containing damaging testimony regarding Nagy. The following sentence from these extorted confessions was deemed most compromising regarding Nagy: “The leadership of the Smallholder Party, in my person and in the persons of Béla Varga, Ferenc Nagy, and others, is guilty and responsible for appointing conspirators, enemies of the Hungarian people, in the apparatus of the party headquarters.”50 Late in the evening the cabinet decided to recall Ferenc Nagy from Switzerland and ask him to clear his name. Discussions ensued between Bern and Budapest, as a consequence of which Nagy could not return, but he promised to resign, with provisos. It is typical of the aggressive moves and eagerness of Rákosi and company that they did not even bother to wait for the letter of resignation, dated 1 June 1947, to dismiss Nagy. On 30 May they simply made the MTI (Hungarian Telegraph Agency) announce the prime minister’s resignation, and formed a new government the very next day. Nagy sent Zoltán Tildy two letters, one a personal communication, the other an official letter of resignation. The former stated, in emotional terms, that he would not return home. He justified his decision by saying that his friends had warned him that his personal freedom was in jeopardy should he return home. “I would gladly sacrifice my personal

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freedom if that were in the least useful to my country. We must seriously fear that after a certain period of time they would force me to come up with confessions implicating other civil leaders of Hungarian public life, as they have done with Béla Kovács, and thus gradually everyone on whom the Hungarian peasantry and bourgeoisie could rely would end up in jail. I have decided therefore that, accepting the advice of Hungarian government circles, with excruciating pain in my soul, I will remain abroad. In order not to hinder Hungarian political life for a moment, I hereby resign my position as prime minister.”51 In his official letter of resignation he emphasized his innocence: “I declare in no uncertain terms that I had absolutely no knowledge of any conspiracy before its discovery by law enforcement, and I have not sinned in word or in action against the republic, against the coalition, or against the occupying power ... I resign in the knowledge that I have not lost the confidence of the majority of the Hungarian people; I resign in the conviction that I am innocent; I resign because I would like to make matters easier for my country, my party, and Mr President.”52 Ferenc Nagy has been accused of not returning home out of cowardice or fear, the fear of being held responsible. To the contrary, it was simply that it made no sense to return home to become a martyr, that such martyrdom could not have helped the prospects of a civil rule of democracy in Hungary.53 The British suspected foul play. A.K. Helm reported to the British Foreign Office on 31 May: “It can probably be assumed that the ground for Soviet action was well prepared in advance and that it was taken in collusion with the Communist leader. The following seems to lend a measure of confirmation: a A vague remark to me by Rákosi on 17 May ... suggesting that a surprise might be in store while he was acting prime minister. b Rákosi’s abrupt cancellation on 23 May of arrangements for resumption of assembly sittings on 27 May.”54 By forcing Ferenc Nagy to resign Rákosi and company gave the Smallholder Party and democracy their coup de grâce. The cabinet was already reorganized on 31 May: the Smallholder Lajos Dinnyés became the new prime minister, receiving more backing from the Communists than from his own party. Béla Varga, who enjoyed greater prestige among the Smallholders, left Hungary in secret on 2 June, and István Balogh (who took over from Kovács) resigned his position as general secretary on 3 June. Demonstrating the successful activation of the

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“left wing” of the party – as Rákosi had intimated – Ferenc Nagy and Béla Varga were formally excluded from the party on this same day. For the time being Tildy remained at his post as president of the republic. The price he had to pay was to publicly denounce Ferenc Nagy and Béla Varga.55 By using the argument of “in defence of the republic,” making inappropriate use of their rights, and repeatedly resorting to the assistance of a great power, Rákosi and company were able to achieve an interim goal: they got rid of the most prestigious leaders of their coalition partner, even though the latter still had the parliamentary majority. Repeated Soviet intervention elicited hitherto unheard of confusion and panic in the ranks of the Smallholder Party and the bourgeois opposition. Yet they were able to resist for a period of over a year-and-a-half, proof of the strength of the democracy camp. The days of the bourgeois forces in the region were numbered, although it was only by a series of offences against human and civil rights and by exploiting Soviet intervention that the Communist Party was able to turn the tables in its favour. The coup against Ferenc Nagy was the most serious offence affecting democracy in Hungary since 1945. The legally elected prime minister of Hungary was forced to leave his country and his office at the same time, and all this was accomplished while making the resignation appear legitimate. The leaders of the majority party became victims trapped by the democracy they believed in: they always responded to the charges and attacks against them in public, within the rules of the framework guaranteed by democracy and, indeed, they retained a fanatical faith in democratic institutions. Engaged in tactics using the application of laws, the defence of the republic, and their own interpretation of “people’s democracy,” Rákosi and company succeeded in realizing their own script; with the help of the forces of law and order under their command, they got rid of the most prestigious officials among their adversaries. They could not have achieved this by themselves: they had to rely on USSR intervention behind the scenes and, at times, on their open intervention. The Smallholder Party was forced to sacrifice because the others were playing under different rules, without a level playing field. The takeover occurred within the coalition.

Reasons for the changing of Soviet tactics The open attack against Ferenc Nagy took place barely one month after Rákosi’s visit to Moscow at the end of April 1947. What could have occurred in this period to swing the attitude of the Soviet leadership so

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drastically? While there are no such proofs in archival records, it is more than likely that the political developments in Western Europe in May 1947 had something to do with the reversal. As a result of American pressure, the Communist ministers were dropped from the French government on 5 May, and from the Italian government on 13 May. Among other background events, we must note that since the formation of the French cabinet (presided over by Paul Ramadier) in January 1947 tension between the ministers belonging to the French Communist Party and the other coalition partners was growing steadily (e.g., the forceful criticism of government policies in Indochina). On 4 May 1947 the Communist ministers and the Communist delegates in the National Assembly rejected the government’s economic proposal to freeze prices and wages. Although Maurice Thorez, the general secretary of the Communist Party, which had the largest faction in the National Assembly, expected the government to hand in its resignation, on 5 May the president resorted to his constitutional rights, withdrawing his trust from the Communist ministers instead.56 Although the event appeared a matter of domestic policy, it had a profound impact on the relations between the USA and the USSR. Washington disapproved of Communist participation in government. “There are four Communists in government in France,” noted Dean Acheson, the American deputy secretary of state and the president’s number one advisor, on 22 February 1947. “One is the minister of defence. The Communists are in control of the major trade unions, and create political foci in industrial plants and in the military. Almost onethird of the voters vote Communist. Economic conditions are steadily deteriorating. The Russians could activate their traps whenever they please.” President Truman, in a famous speech to congress delivered on 12 March, offered American aid to countries threatened by a totalitarian regime, including France.57 French leaders, other than the Communists, greeted the American commitment to play a role in Europe with considerable satisfaction, for it enabled them to confront the Soviet challenge in Europe and the Communist challenge in France.58 American foreign policy felt it was important to communicate its stand to the French government directly. At the end of April Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador in Paris, called on Ramadier to communicate Truman’s concerns regarding Stalin’s policies of encroachment and his fear that Europe might fall into Communist hands. He also explained that Franco-American relations would improve if there were no Communists in the government.59 The documents indicate that no other

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direct pressure was coming from the USA, nor was there any need for such, since the French and the Americans were in agreement. But other foreign policy factors also affected the French government’s decision.60 At the four-power conference held in Moscow in March and April 1947, French foreign minister Georges Bidault met privately with Stalin, but he was unable to gain Soviet backing for many of the issues that were most important to the French (e.g. the upcoming peace treaties with Germany and Austria, decreasing the numbers of the occupation forces, the issue of reparations, rectification of borders, and political decentralization in Germany).61 International tensions merely increased as a result of the failure of the conference, leaving French policy facing a dilemma. Paris opted for commitment to the West. It seemed impossible, therefore, to continue collaboration with the Communists in internal affairs, while fighting against them in foreign affairs. Ramadier felt the French Communists were merely following instructions received from Stalin.62 Thus the French prime minister’s decision to exclude the Communist ministers from the cabinet met with American approval.63 The Italian situation was similar, as William Blum noted:64 In January 1947, when Italian Premier Alcide De Gasperi visited Washington at the United States’ invitation, his overriding concern was to plead for crucial financial assistance for his war-torn, impoverished country. American officials may have had a different priority. Three days after returning to Italy, De Gasperi unexpectedly dissolved his cabinet, which included several Communists and Socialists. The press reported that many people in Italy believed that De Gasperi’s action was related to his visit to the United States and was aimed at decreasing leftist, principally Communist, influence in the government. After two weeks of tortuous delay, the formation of a centre or centre-right government sought by De Gasperi proved infeasible; the new cabinet still included Communists and Socialists although the left had lost key positions, notably the ministries of foreign affairs and finance. From this point until May, when De Gasperi’s deputy, Ivan Lombardo, led a mission to Washington to renew the request for aid, promised loans were ‘frozen’ by the United States for not very clear reasons. On several occasions during this period the Italian left asserted their belief that the aid was being held up pending the ouster of leftists from the cabinet. The New York Times was moved to

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note that, ‘Some observers here feel that a further Leftward swing in Italy would retard aid.’ As matters turned out, the day Lombardo arrived in Washington, De Gasperi again dissolved his entire cabinet and suggested that the new cabinet would manage without the benefit of leftist members. This was indeed what occurred, and over the ensuing few months, exceedingly generous American financial aid flowed into Italy, in addition to the cancellation of the nation’s $1 billion debt to the United States.65 As far as the Soviets were concerned the events in France and Italy implied that relations between the great powers continued to deteriorate. Since there were no more Popular Front governments outside the Soviet sphere of influence, it was no longer necessary to maintain reciprocity along the western periphery of the Soviet sphere. On 5 June 1947, George C. Marshall, the American secretary of state, officially announced a Recovery Program for Europe.66 When it turned out that this proposal meant a challenge to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and raised the possibility of American intervention in Soviet economic policies, the Soviets not only withdrew from preliminary discussions in Paris but also prohibited the leaders of other East European countries from participating.67 As part of the response, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, A. Vishinsky, paid a series of visits to the so-called “people’s democracies” in June 1947 to discuss with the Communist ministers of the interior ways to weaken the legal opposition to the Communist parties.68 But we can also find comments referring to the same conception. According to the 17 June 1947 issue of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, “a special Commission of the Russian Security Services, under the supervision of expert Reusemann, visits the capitals of Balkan countries to discuss, together with the Romanian, Yugoslavian, and Bulgarian security services, the regulations aimed at eradicating the ‘reactionary movements’.” Thereupon in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, almost at the same time, “counterrevolutionary conspiracies” were unmasked. On 5 June 1947, the head of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, Nikola Petkov, was arrested in Bulgaria, sentenced to death, and executed on 23 August, under the charge of conspiracy; his party was dissolved.69 On 15 July 1947, it was the turn of Iuliu Maniu, the leader of National Peasant Party in Romania, who was arrested at the airport and, on 12 November, sentenced to life in prison on charges of conspiracy.70 His party was dissolved at the end of July. In Poland on 10 September a trial

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of several prominent leaders of the Polish Peasant Alliance was opened in Kraków. They were accused of collaboration with members of the underground opposition. Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, the chairman of the Polish Peasant Alliance, fearing that he also would be arrested and sentenced in a show trial, escaped from Poland to the West on 20 October 1947.71 A month later he was deprived of his citizenship and his party was taken over by “schismatics.” The basic difference between Hungary and the other countries was that, while in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria it was really a matter of annihilating an opposition that was no longer part of the government, in Hungary it was a matter of overthrowing the largest government party and the government itself. Indeed, after the ratification of the peace treaty – on 15 September 1947 – Hungary was the only country in the region that had any prospect of assuming complete sovereignty under a truly civil government.

Western protests against the dismissal of Ferenc Nagy Peterson, the British ambassador to Moscow, sought out foreign minister Molotov on 9 June 1947, and relayed to him the British declaration regarding the changes in the Hungarian government. Peterson attributed the accusation that former Prime Minister Nagy had actually participated in a conspiracy against the Hungarian Republic to Soviet agencies. He explained that these agencies “operated in Hungary by using secret methods, which inevitably awakened suspicion in the British government regarding the true motives of these agencies.” The 17 June 1947 issue of the Magyar Nemzet also reported that, in the opinion of the British government, the Soviet government had decided in advance to disregard the outcome of the Hungarian elections, and referred to regulations that would make it possible for them to dissolve the Smallholder Party and transfer power to other parties that had received only a minority of votes. The United States sent a memorandum to the USSR, addressed to General Sviridov, on 11 June 1947. The memorandum was signed by Brigadier General Weems, the head of the American mission at the ACC. It analyzed the contradictions in the Soviet arguments in the notes pursuant to the arrest of Béla Kovács. Referring to these notes and to the Yalta agreements, the memorandum requested that the British and Americans be given the opportunity to participate in the investigation. It objected to the fact that the American and British members of the ACC

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had not been briefed on the events in Hungary, as an outcome of which political power was reshuffled in Hungary so that the minority, which received 17 per cent support during the recent free elections, disregarded the expressed will of the majority of the Hungarian people. He emphasized that in this “situation, which has apparently been admitted by the leader of the Communist minority, Rákosi, who is reported to have taken public satisfaction that this ‘iron-fisted’ party, ‘conscious of its aims,’ has thus been able to take over control of Hungary.”72 The note demanded that a three-power committee be set up as soon as possible to investigate the situation. The Soviet response note of 17 June, however, stated that they could not go along with the American proposal; it described the creation of a joint committee to examine the Hungarian situation, or even the intent to do so, as crude interference in Hungarian internal affairs.73 In the spring and summer of 1947 the Western press was replete with news about events in Hungary.74 Western governments and the Western press, for the most part, expressed skepticism about the news regarding “conspiracy” and, after a few weeks, foreign observers simply assumed that the Communists were taking over power by means of a coup d’état. The 6 June issue of the New York Herald Tribune (Paris edition), quoted from a speech Truman delivered in Mexico, under the title “Truman Calls Hungary Red Coup an Outrage.”75 On 11 June the British House of Lords and, on 12, 18, 19, and 30 June, the House of Commons dealt with the events in Hungary, but also mentioned similar trends in several other Central and Eastern European countries. On 11 June the Tory politician Viscount Templewood spoke about the elections of 1945 and analyzed the resulting power politics relations. He concluded that: “There is the usual totalitarian technique in all its phases: the totalitarian technique, the object of which (whether it be Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, or, in this last day or two, Austria, possibly with Czechoslovakia tomorrow) is to face the Americans and ourselves with an accomplished fact. It is the old technique so constantly adopted by Hitler, in which he so often succeeded when he applied it between the two World Wars. I ask your Lordships, can we and the Americans ignore this flagrant flouting of the Yalta Agreement and the Armistice Agreement, and all those clauses that, in the last fortnight, we have actually put into the treaties with the countries of Central Europe?”76 The most moving moment of the 11 June session was when Lord Vansittart, former undersecretary in the foreign office, read out a letter,

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dictated to him on 9 June, over the telephone, by Ferenc Nagy. “This is a turning point in history; make no mistake about that,” commented Vansittart before reading the letter. He agreed with what Nagy was asking from the Anglo-American powers in this instance: “Make a full inquiry into the Hungarian conspiracy, not on Hungarian soil, where the entire administrative apparatus is in Communist hands, but in New York or the Geneva Headquarters of the United Nations, where all the original documents should be transferred. It must be ascertained whether this was an anti-constitutional and anti-republican plot, or whether it was merely the preparation of honest patriots against a Communist coup d’état.”77 At the 13 June session of the central committee of the Communist Party, Rákosi commented on both the American note and Nagy’s letter as read out in the British Parliament. Regarding the latter he said: “Ferenc Nagy tries his best not to let the matter rest by writing stupid letters; for instance, he says that Tildy, the president, could only have consented to a new government, etc., because the Russians called on him and threatened to deport him to Siberia, so that Tildy had no choice but to respond that this was nothing but a base slander.”78 The Soviets considered the matter closed with their memorandum of denial, and the Western governments were unwilling to take further risks on behalf of Hungarian democracy. Even without Hungary, relations between West and East were already rife with conflict because of, among other things, the events in Greece and the unsuccessful negotiations regarding the peace treaties with Germany and Austria. The case of Bulgaria could confirm the impression of American confusion and impotence: there the first U.S. ambassador to Sofia was appointed on 30 September 1947, a week after Petkov’s execution.79

5 Endgame in Hungary

Consequences of the new strategies of West and East Relations among the former Allies were dogged by ever more sources of conflict: the obvious conflicts of interest in connection with the demilitarization of Germany, for example, were bound to delay the signing of peace with that country. In the summer of 1947 the leftward trend came to a halt. To be specific, the launching of the USA’s Marshall Plan in the summer of 1947 resulted in bolstering the bourgeois parties, particularly in the West, while the Communists were gradually squeezed out of government. In Central and Eastern Europe the bourgeois and peasant political movements suffered the same fate. The difference was that not only were they forced out of Parliament and government but also they had no opportunity whatsoever for opposition politics. Acquisition of power by the left was tantamount to discarding the basic rules of democracy. The would-be political opposition in every land was miraculously transformed into the enemy, and the leaders with most influence were declared criminals or forced into exile. These procedures stirred up fears and were used successfully to discredit the popular base of the bourgeois and peasant movements. Europe became spectacularly divided into a West and an East. Of course, Westerners were fully aware of the trials and the takeover of power by the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. The priorities in the strategies of the West, accurately reflected in a document pertaining to the Iuliu Maniu trials in Romania, are revealed in the work of Ferenc Fejtő. Maniu urged Great Britain to intervene more forcefully against Communist terrorism in Romania, of which he

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himself was a victim. Adrian Holman, the British political representative in Romania in 1946 and 1947, then “envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary” in 1947 and 1948, warned Maniu to be careful. To underline his point, he reminded Maniu that primary British interests were centred on the security of the Mediterranean basin − the defence of Greece and Turkey − followed by Germany and Austria ... while Romania came only after that. As for the Americans, their strategic interests coincided with those of Great Britain.1 The Western powers resorted to tactical manoeuvres but, in practice, their decision not to back the applications of Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary for membership in the United Nations signified surrendering the entire region, for at the same time, the Western powers did back the applications of the other two defeated powers, Italy and Finland. Hungary’s application for membership was conveyed by the Ferenc Nagy government to the UN Security Council on 22 April 1947, followed by the applications of the other countries that had already signed the peace. The U.S. and U.K. representatives rejected the applications filed by Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary several times in August, and again in October.2 In the case of Hungary the objection was that the regime in power failed to observe human rights, thereby contravening the peace treaty. From the end of May – that is, after the forced resignation of Ferenc Nagy – it became increasingly doubtful that Hungary would be able to live up to principles of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council also cited the Communist pressure bearing on the opposition and on the Smallholders.3 At the meeting of the General Assembly on 7 November 1947, they returned to the issue of the three countries’ application for membership. Gromyko, the permanent representative of the USSR at the UN analyzed the negative decision of the Western allies as follows: (in the Security Council) “the American and British delegates made it clear that they would not back the application of these countries because they did not agree with the policies pursued by their governments, especially their domestic policies. They repeated the usual trite and unfounded statements, according to which human rights are not respected in these countries, etc. The American and British press repeatedly came forth, almost daily, with the usual ridiculous assertions with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe, although the only transgression of these countries is that they refuse to follow the rules prescribed by the United States, and resolve internal issues as the interest of their people dictates. If the interests of their people demand it, they are not even afraid to

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punish the traitors who are willing to sell out the interests of their people in favour of their foreign masters.”4 The East-West conflict was also instrumental in blocking the admission of new members to the UN. The consequence of the British and American attitude was that the countries were completely at the mercy of the Soviet Union, that is, of Stalin. In Hungary, the Paris peace treaty was ratified, leading to the elimination of ACC authority on 15 September. Despite that, Soviet military units were able to remain in the country on the basis of one article in the peace treaty, which required them to maintain lines of communication with the Soviet forces in their Austrian occupation zone.5 This happened without securing guarantees for the control of Soviet troops’ activities in a sovereign country. In other words, Hungary received no guarantees from the West regarding the members of the Soviet occupation force or the expenses they were likely to incur. On the initiative of the Soviet Union and to harmonize the domestic policies of the countries within their sphere of influence, the Kominform, the information bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, was formed on 22 September 1947 in Sklarska Poreba, Poland. Zhdanov, representing the Soviet Union, made it clear that the world was divided into two camps: the imperialist bloc around the USA; and the antiimperialist bloc around the USSR. According to Zhdanov the imperialists were endangering the world by their aggressive behaviour. The resolution of the meeting declared that, given the international situation, “The Communist parties have to assume a special task. They have to take on the defence of the national independence and sovereignty of each of the countries ... They have to lead all forces that are prepared to defend their honour and national independence.”6 Along with harmonizing the activities of the Communist parties, the Soviets began to draft the mutual aid treaties to be concluded with the states of Central and Eastern Europe − but these treaties could not compete with the Marshall Plan.

Legalized “salami tactics” Rákosi and his friends tried to make the takeover by the Hungarian Communist Party appear legal, while the coalition was steadily dwindling. Zoltán Pfeiffer used the expression “salami tactics” to label Rákosi’s strategies against the adversaries of the Communist Party. Rákosi found newer and newer enemies of the Communist Party. As Martin Mevius says “the MKP’s ‘salami tactics’ amounted to a constant

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reappraisal of the content of ‘National Unity’ and its organizational expression, the Hungarian National Front of Independence, from which the opponents of the MKP were gradually removed.”7 From the middle of 1947, de facto the Communists were in control of events, but de jure the government continued to function as a coalition. The coalition carried out Rákosi’s tactical operations even more than before, until the dictatorship of the proletariat could be openly declared. The Smallholder Party lost its absolute majority in Parliament, even though the Hungarian Freedom Party, with its twenty-one members led by Dezső Sulyok, and the independents, led by the excluded Zoltán Pfeiffer, mostly voted with the Smallholders. Officially fifty-eight names were listed as “independent,” including the members of the centre group of the Smallholders who had been excluded from the party on 4 February 1947. At that time they had been in police custody for almost two weeks, but they had not been deprived of their mandates. The deputy speaker, Imre Kovács, who left the National Peasant Party on 25 February 1947, was also part of this group; he left the party precisely to protest the deportation of Béla Kovács. Rákosi endeavoured to announce fresh elections, expecting that the Communist Party would increase its strength in the next Parliament legally, as had happened in the neighbouring countries. To ensure a Communist majority, almost half a million voters were deprived of their right of suffrage simply because the list of eligible voters was compiled by the Ministry of the Interior, in Communist hands. The exclusions affected mainly the electoral basis of the Social Democratic Party since, after the blows delivered against the Smallholder Party, the Social Democrats were perceived as the Communists’ main rivals. The measures taken to curtail the right of suffrage were designed mainly to marginalize the opposition outside the coalition, as well as the Social Democrats.8 In spite of all this, voters may have had the feeling that their choices were greater than ever before, since ten parties campaigned and competed for their votes. Unlike in 1945, neither the Communist Party nor the other coalition parties set up obstacles to the formation of new parties or to their participation. The Hungarian Independence Party (Magyar Függetlenségi Párt – MFP), led by Zoltán Pfeiffer, and the Independent Hungarian Democratic Party (Független Magyar Demokrata Párt – FMDP), led by Father István Balogh, were formed at this time. Both leaders had been members of the Smallholder Party. Of course, by increasing the range of their adversaries the left expected to render the unity of the middle class more difficult. With the modification of

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the law on suffrage, for instance, Dezső Sulyok was simply deprived of his passive right to vote.9 Another opportunity for abuse was provided by the so-called “blue slip” voting. These blue slips were excerpts from official registers that enabled a citizen to certify that she or he was entitled to vote in a particular district. They were so called because the regular registration form was on white paper, whereas the provisional excerpt was on blue. Both had already been in use during the parliamentary elections of 4 November 1945, at which time only those collecting the votes and the judges at polling stations who were serving outside their own district were entitled to blue slips. In 1947, however, anyone who knew they would be outside their own district on election day could secure a blue slip. Most law-makers had not foreseen that these blue slips could be abused, since that had not been the case in 1945, but the Communist Party did misuse them. In the elections held on 31 August 1947 the votes given on blue slips illegally gave the Communist Party more seats, or about 60,000 more votes, than they were entitled to; this translated into two or three unearned seats in Parliament. But even this device did not suffice for a  spectacular victory, for 77.7 per cent of the voters did not vote Communist. The parties formed out of the Smallholder Party mustered 35 per cent, and they became the spine of the opposition. If we add the 15.4 per cent of the Smallholder votes, we may conclude that the attitude of the voters towards the parties and political movements had not changed much. But the political circumstances did not enable the Smallholders to collaborate with their successor parties. The political atmosphere was such that the party had to remain within the coalition. Its surviving leaders were weak and were no longer able to influence events as Nagy and his companions had done earlier. However, Rákosi and company were not content with 22.3 per cent of the votes; they used the Electoral Court to modify the results a posteriori. They launched an attack on the mandates obtained by the Hungarian Independence Party under Pfeiffer by claiming that the signatures on the party lists had been forged. The outspoken Pfeiffer and his friends became increasingly embarrassing to the Communist Party; hence the party launched a coordinated attack against them, with the objective of banning their party and depriving its delegates of their mandates in Parliament. A press campaign was initiated against Pfeiffer, in the course of which the Communist and Social Democratic press repeatedly labelled him and his supporters

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as “Fascists,” although they repeatedly rejected that label. In the meantime the delegates of the party participated in the work of the newly elected National Assembly, and consistently shocked the leftists leaders with their interventions. They published their views on the government program announced on 6 September. While they approved the proposed administrative reforms, the development of local autonomy, the adoption of laws regarding agricultural vested interests, and the fight against corruption, they opposed the nationalization of the large banks. They criticized the Communist Party for their lack of interest in instituting referenda, for their inaction regarding the uncertainties of the legal system, and for the creation of a new law on suffrage. They objected to administration by means of directives and to the revisions to the B-list.10 While criticizing the measures introduced by the government at the 8 October session of the assembly, law professor Gyula Moór stressed the need for collaboration among the opposition parties.11 The Communist leaders repeatedly resorted to police intervention to neutralize their opponents. The political police prepared confidential reports about Pfeiffer’s Hungarian Independence Party for the benefit of the Communist leaders. According to a report dated 6 September 1947, Pfeiffer was no longer interested in creating a serious organization in the countryside, because he was sure his men would face arrest. He was afraid of building up his party, because he feared that his followers would soon be accused of “conspiracy.” According to Pfeiffer, not much could be done other than to “furl my sails, anchor in a safe harbour, and sit on deck playing cards.”12 A report from 11 September summarized the party’s debates at their conference two days earlier. Here too it was stressed that Pfeiffer and his supporters had decided to halt organization and political activities in general, and even to refrain from intervening in Parliament. “We definitely want to wait until February 1948 when the Russian troops are withdrawing.” An anonymous reporter stated that they believed that “A month later they will make the government fall, and the united bourgeois party will achieve complete victory.”13 Apparently Pfeiffer and his friends got wind that the political police were preparing to arrest twenty-seven politicians, hence the need to refrain from activities. Harsh reprisals were directed against those who had signed their party’s petition, prompting Pfeiffer to turn to the prime minister, in a letter dated 25 September, protesting that those who backed his party were being harassed and that the political police had taken in many of them for interrogation in the middle of the night. He asked: “why were no measures taken against those who deleted

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hundreds of thousands of names from the electoral list, or against those who voted with forged voting cards or gained access to the police seal by stealth.” He also pointed out that the measures taken against them were contrary to the obligation signed at the peace treaty and contrary to human rights.14 In spite of all the protests (or maybe because of them) the administrative secretary of the Hungarian Independence Party was taken into custody; at the beginning of November 1947, the chief prosecutor of the Budapest courts applied to the National Assembly for Pfeiffer’s extradition. Pfeiffer got wind of this and, on 3 November, with American help, he managed to escape from Hungary, accompanied by his wife and daughter.15 Without its leader, the party rapidly disintegrated. The national committee, in charge of authorizing participation in elections, recommended that the Hungarian Independent Party be dissolved. The election committee reached its decision on 10 November. The government dissolved the party on the recommendation of the minister of the interior. The two seats won by the party were awarded to the Democratic People’s Party and the Independent Hungarian Democratic Party. As a consequence of the changes, the number of seats in Parliament decreased from 411 to 364, and the ratio of the coalition parties grew thereby from 65.9 per cent to 74.5 per cent, while the opposition parties dropped to 25.5 per cent.16 The next target was the Social Democratic Party. The Communist strategy was to combine the two parties to unite the working classes, as advocated by Rákosi. Once again the Communist Party resorted to scare tactics to decimate the ranks of their opponents. Popular Social Democrats who had opposed the union of the two parties became the accused and the victims in the next round of trials. The first victim was Károly Peyer, who was already in exile, followed by Gyula Kelemen. Next the left wing of the Social Democrats executed a coup within the ranks of the party itself. The leftists planned every tactical step in detail, according to Rákosi’s memoirs. The coup was carried out on 18 February, two days after the sentence in the Peyer trial had been announced, and when Árpád Szakasits happened to be in Moscow. The “all-leadership” meeting of the party in Greater Budapest was called – in disregard of the ground rules – in such a manner that the undesirable party leaders were not even invited or, if they showed up, were refused admittance. At the meeting the (forced) resignation of over forty leaders was announced; furthermore, they were excluded from the party. They included leaders with prestige, such as Anna Kéthly and Antal Bán. On 6 March, at the 36th Congress of the party, the intimidated Social

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Democrats authorized the remaining leaders to undertake negotiations to unite with the Communist Party. Further “undesirable” leaders and members were excluded from the party. Kéthly was warned against trying to organize any kind of demonstration against unification; if she tried, Gyula Kelemen, who had been arrested in January 1948 on trumped-up charges, would be sentenced to death and shot.17 The unification, carried out on 12 June 1948, was followed the very next day by the naming of the combined party, the Congress of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja − MDP). Although Anna Kéthly retired from public life, the show trials against the Social Democratic did not overlook her either. She was imprisoned on 9 June 1950 without due process; sentence was passed only on 20 January 1954 when she was sentenced to life in prison, but in November she was granted a pardon as a result of international pressure, while she remained under observation by the authorities. In November 1947 Károly Peyer’s immunity was lifted, but he did not wait to be arrested; he left the country on 19 November. On 16 February 1948 he was sentenced to eight years in prison, in absentia, falsely accused of conspiracy and spying. By the second half of 1948 even Zoltán Tildy, the president of the republic, was deemed an obstacle to the new political order. Tildy’s loyalty had been of great service to the Communists in their struggle for power during the rivalries of the coalition, but the decision had already been made; it was just a matter of finding a justification to make the move appear necessary in the eyes of the public. Hence it was decided to launch judicial action against Dr Viktor Csornoky, Tildy’s son-in-law, who had advanced extremely rapidly in his political career, without any political experience, after 1945. He was accused of disloyalty and of crimes against the people; furthermore, speculation with foreign currency and other economic crimes were part of the charge-sheet, as was the attempt to help his father-in-law to escape abroad.18 Tildy was then asked to resign, and his letter of resignation was published in the press at the same time as the arrest of his son-in-law. No trial was fabricated against Tildy, but he was under house arrest until 1956. His son-in-law, however, was executed.19 In compliance with the Communist Party’s script, the Parliament accepted the president’s resignation on 3 August 1948 and Árpád Szakasits was elected as the new president of the republic. Not for long, for the political career of Szakasits ended tragically also. Though he was the head of state, he was taken into custody on 14 April 1950 on orders from Rákosi and, on 24 November, sentenced

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to life in prison on charges of war crimes, spying, and organizing to overthrow the democratic state order. He was released at the end of March 1956, and rehabilitated in July. As we saw above the other Social Democratic leaders suffered a similar fate. In the second half of 1948 it was the turn of churches to see their public and political activities destroyed (their economic power had ended, for all intents and purposes, with the land reform of March 1945). On 16 June 1948, some days after the formation of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, the proposed law placing all schools under state control was adopted. The education system had been transformed in 1945: the system of four years of elementary school plus six years of middle school was dismantled along with public schools. Eight years of a new type of public school became mandatory but, until then, about two-thirds of the elementary schools and one-half of all high schools had remained in the hands of various churches. The nationalization of schools, long overdue and true to the bourgeois democratic spirit, elicited passions across the land from the moment the proposal was announced in April 1948. Prince Primate Cardinal József Mindszenty, the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, protested most vehemently, in an attempt to mobilize churchgoing parents. The government initiated action against the leader of Actio Catholica (a movement of laymen supporting the Church and backed by the Church).20 Dr Lajos Ordass, the bishop of the Lutheran Church, was also placed under arrest on 8 September 1948. He too was indicted, since he refused to hand over the Lutheran schools to public education. The pretext against Ordass was that his church had deliberately failed to disclose that they had financial claims on foreign debtors; he was sentenced to two years in jail.21 Then came the turn of the most adamant opponent of the regime, the arrest of Cardinal Mindszenty. Mindszenty, the bishop of Esztergom, was a royalist; he had objected even to the measures adopted by the coalition government, he had attacked the prominent politicians of all parties – even the Democratic People’s Party, which tried to participate in the elections of 1945 and 1947. In fact, he was unpopular with all the parties of the coalition. It would have been possible to indict Mindszenty even earlier on the basis of the law enacted in 1946, but the government refrained from doing so for fear of alienating the masses. Nevertheless, charges were filed against him around Christmastime of 1948. The specific charges filed and the trial were crude and unworthy of the man. Mindszenty was far too significant and influential to be accused of

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spying and of currency manipulation, in addition to organizing against the republic.22 He was sentenced to life in prison at the original trial; the sentence was confirmed on appeal.23

The risk of freedom of speech To document public opinion in the aftermath of World War II, we have a unique set of sources at our disposal. Although Act I of 1946 included a bill of rights for citizens of the Hungarian Republic, among which we find the natural and inalienable right to freedom of thought and opinion, the right of association and assembly, and the right to personal safety, court proceedings were initiated against tens of thousands, simply because they reacted to the political processes taking place around them. They represent the public, or at least that segment of the public that had seen fit to voice a critical opinion. This segment of the public was made up, for the most part, of ordinary “little” people; they could be considered as political non-entities. Simply because they voiced criticism of the ill-defined basic institutions of the republic and because they had enemies who denounced them to the police, investigations were launched, and the non-entity became an entity. For the most part the persons charged were outspoken women or more or less inebriated men, and the charge was mostly the crime of agitation. In other words, these people made public statements regarding the “achievements of democracy” that were not to the liking of the powers that be. This sufficed to initiate police action, often resulting in prosecution. Such an investigation entailed hearing a number of witnesses and recording their testimonies. Sometimes it was deemed necessary to obtain a medical report regarding the person’s physical or mental health. To be fair, it should be pointed out that the people’s prosecutors were not satisfied if the critical statements were heard or overheard by only one person; this was not deemed sufficient proof. If such was the case the investigation was halted, and no charges were filed. In some cases an investigation, having lasted over a period of several months, ended in acquittal; even in these instances, however, the victims had already suffered. Granted that in 1946–47 the main preoccupation of Hungarian society was not freedom of opinion, or its curtailment, we must still ask ourselves, given the archival sources at our disposal, how was it possible to systematically disregard and completely destroy the principle of free speech.

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The sources reveal other information as well: they tell us about contemporary politics, how certain strata of society experienced the period of the coalition government, and how they felt about the transformation in the aftermath of the war.

Crimes, misdemeanours, and charges In creating a typology of the cases that came to the attention of the people’s tribunals, I started out from Act VII of 1946, to determine what paragraph of the law the prosecutors and judges referred to in their charge-sheets and sentences.24 In the materials I examined I encountered no case where anyone was charged with inciting to overthrow the republic (paragraph a of section 2 of Act VII).25 On the other hand, I found a number of cases where charges were based on inciting against the democratic state order or its basic institutions (paragraph b of section 2 of Act VII). This paragraph reveals the responsibility of the lawmakers and of those carrying out the laws. Indeed, the concept of “basic institution” is entirely too vague and fluid; it was entirely up to the interpretation provided by the prosecutors and judges. Only on the basis of the sentences can we know which institutions were considered “basic.” There was general agreement that these included the police, the new army, the land commissions, the land reform, the people’s tribunals, the new currency (the forint), the public schools, and eventually the agricultural cooperatives. In most cases the verbal attacks were directed at the police. Astonishingly, the majority of the “controversial” statements emanated from the poor, the destitute, and persons with many children. In the examples cited below we have omitted last names, since the accused may be among the living. Mrs Balázs O. was sentenced to three months in prison and three years of loss of civil rights by the people’s tribunal of Debrecen, because, in May 1946, she said that she “had been robbed by the Hungarian police”; furthermore, “the governor should have stayed at the plane [kept to his original occupation]; these are the kinds of people who ended up among the higher ranks.”26 The National Council of People’s Tribunals confirmed the sentence.27 Lajos H. was investigated because, in mid-August 1946, while a guest in someone’s home in the village of Patak, he banged his fist on the table and berated two individuals – also guests in the house – for singing the Internationale: “Stop it, the whole democracy should be screwed, we are not slaves.” The police investigation was continued and the people’s

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prosecutor specified the charges, but the people’s tribunal dismissed the case on 8 June 1947, because it did not find the argument that the accused had indeed voiced those opinions convincing.28 László H. of Pestszentlőrinc, a military officer who had been cleared by the certifying committee for service under the new regime, but was nevertheless dismissed from his post, reacted as follows to the housesearch conducted in his home on 20 October 1946: “There will be a dog’s world in this democracy; the roles will switch once again, and then the police informers will live to regret what they are doing ... They place me on the B-list29 as a lieutenant, and dirty proletarians are hired in my place.” After dragging on for a whole year, his case was dismissed by the people’s tribunal, without explanation, on 17 September 1947. The chief prosecutor raised no objection, because the only witness, the one who made the denunciation, withdrew his testimony at police headquarters.30 In November 1946 József C. spoke out as follows in his own tavern at Sajószentpéter: “Instead of sending foreign minister János Gyöngyösi to Paris [for the peace talks] they should have sent Tibor Eckhardt31 who resides in the United States ... The Hungarian government is completely under Communist control, and they look only to the East.” He was sentenced to a year in prison.32 Mrs István E. avoided the charges against her because the medical examiner ruled that she was mentally ill. She had been under investigation because, in August 1947, she uttered the following comments about police officers, according to the people’s prosecutor’s notes: “Police today are no police, they are shit; they are good only for ...” while making lewd gestures with her hand and lower body.33 József E., custodian–shepherd of a mountain, was sentenced to a month in prison by the people’s tribunal of Győr because, according to the charge-sheet, “he instigated feelings of hatred against the democratic Hungarian state and one of its basic institutions, the resettlement [of the German-speakers]”34 at Pornóapáti, in October 1947. On 4 June 1949, the National Council of People’s Tribunals raised the sentence to three months.35 In December 1947, Imre B. of Sarkadkeresztúr declared at the mill: “I know what they are doing in Parliament, none of them are interested in the lot of the poor; one has a private car, as does the other. Rákosi has so many cars he rides one in the morning, another in the afternoon ... You all know nothing – Rákosi has a six-storey mansion, with ninety rooms; why doesn’t he live in a house with a thatched roof, like you

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do?” The people’s tribunal of Debrecen sentenced him to two years in prison, and the loss of one-tenth of his possessions,36 but the National Council of People’s Tribunals raised the sentence to three years in prison, and the loss of one fourth of his possessions.37 In the cases listed below, the charges came under paragraph c of section 2 of Act VII of 1946, which punished those who agitated against any person or group “on account of their democratic or republican convictions.” Note that most of the charges and most of the sentences fall under this heading. In most cases the offensive statement was directed at the Communist Party or its members, or against Mátyás Rákosi in person. On 12 May 1946 provocateurs from the Communist Party went to look for Ferenc Sz. at his apartment. They tried to persuade him to subscribe to the Szabad Nép, the party daily. During the exchange he stated: “I will not join any party as long as such scoundrels are in charge.” He was sentenced to three months in prison, loss of civil rights for ten years, and complete loss of possessions, even though the local mayor issued him a certificate of indigence.38 In July 1946 János K.P. was summoned by two police officers and two witnesses, at Egerszólát, to contribute a bull for reparations purposes. He refused on the following grounds: “Let the Communists feed the Russians; they liberated them, not me.” He was sentenced to six months in prison, five years of loss of civic rights, and the loss of one-fourth of his possessions.39 Between 9 September and 18 October 1946 farmer László T. was under preventive arrest. The charge against him was that he declared, in April 1946, at Érd, that: “This will not stay this way for long, the Hungarian workers are dumb as earth, because they allow themselves to be misled by a crackpot Jew like Rákosi. He will soon be running, along with the Russians.” He was among the luckier ones, since the witnesses withdrew their testimony and so the tribunal acquitted him.40 In November 1946 Vilmos K. referred to Rákosi as Matyi (nickname for Mátyás) Rosenfeld, then declared that he “would never even touch the party membership booklet of the Communist Party, and would not enlist in any Jewish party.” He was sentenced to six months in prison, loss of employment, five years loss of civil rights, and forfeiture of all his belongings.41 On 23 May 1949 the National Council of People’s Tribunals reduced the sentence to one month and a half, and declared the sentence had already been served.42

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On 24 November 1946 (on the local party day) at Gyula, Mrs Tibor B. made the following comments during the speech of the speaker for the occasion: “Mátyás Rákosi goes on drawing his big salary; he couldn’t care less about the little person ... If he had to live on 230 forints a month, as I do, with eight children, he would not be talking this way.” The case dragged on until, finally, in March 1949, the following memorandum was sent down from the Ministry of Justice to the chief prosecutor’s office in Szeged: “considering the time that has elapsed, and because she claims to be mentally challenged, and has expressed contrition following the incident ... please advise the state prosecutor’s office to halt the investigation.”43 Mrs Pál H., a mother of five, was sentenced to six months in prison, five years loss of civil rights, and the confiscation of the seven holds of land allocated to her during the land reform because, in November 1946, she was berating the Communists in the presence of others at Tormoslődpuszta.44 The National Council of People’s Tribunals mitigated the sentence by confiscating only half the allocated land, as her husband was a prisoner-of-war (in the USSR), and half the land belonged to him.45 Péter B., a farmer from Kecskemét, was sentenced to five years in prison and the confiscation of his goods because, as a speaker at a Smallholder rally in the spring of 1947, he spoke as follows: “the present regime is not democratic, because a handful or minority wants to force its will on the majority from another party ... Our democracy is like a building erected on sand or on marshland, sooner or later it will collapse.” The National Council of People’s Tribunals reduced the sentence to one year and four months, on the grounds that the crime could not be described as agitation against the state.46 The people’s tribunal in Szeged sentenced three women: one to a year in prison, the others to pay a fine of 2,000 forints each. The charge against them was that, in July 1947, one of them, sitting on the porch of her house in the evening, uttered the following statements: “May God fuck the mother of Mátyás Rákosi. He came to Bácsalmás only to carry away the sheep, yet the POW s47 are not coming home. These motherfucking Communists, if they like Communism so much, why don’t they just go to Russia. The prisoners returning from Russia are but skin and bones. Even if they do come home, they are good only for the litter and the casket.”48 The Social Democrat Ödön C. was sentenced to three years in prison, the loss of his civil rights for ten years, and loss of his job, because he

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was agitating against Communist mailmen in Nyíregyháza, declaring, in August 1947: “Let us not talk so much because, by spring-time, the Communists will hang.”49 In April 1948 Mrs Sándor E., part-time worker, received a prisonsentence of one month, suspended for a three-year probation period. The charge against her was that after the elections on 31 August 1947, at Hajdunánás, she declared: “The Communists won, they will set up the kolkhoz, it will be right there on the Horváth ridge, but I will not be the one to carry the canteen to them.”50 In September 1947, at Mezőkövesd, a collection was taken for the restoration of the cupola of the Basilica in Budapest. When someone inquired who set it on fire, János B. declared: “The Communist gang.” The people’s tribunal sentenced him to a year and a half in prison.51 The National Council of People’s Tribunals reduced the sentence to a year and two months.52 Quite a few cases came under paragraph d of section 2 of Act VII of 1946. This charge was agitating or committing acts against “civil rights or equal rights, or hate-mongering because of ethnicity, race, or religious faith.” In practice, such offences were limited to anti-Semitic remarks. The number of such cases in the immediate aftermath of the war was astonishing. Judging from the charge-sheets, the culprits were mainly drunks. They were sentenced by the people’s tribunals to anywhere between two months and one year of jail-time.53 According to the charge-sheet, in October 1946 Mrs Lajos V. declared in a doctor’s waiting-room in Somogyvár that the Jews told the Russians to carry away her younger brothers; Hitler did not finish the job and, had it been up to her, there would not be a single Jew left.” The people’s tribunal sentenced her to eight months in prison.54 Lumber merchant Antal O. was sentenced to eleven months in prison, and the forfeiture of half of his wealth, because he told two lumberjacks at the lumberyard of Vecsés: “Once again the Jews come first. A  Hitler will come, and hang all of you, along with the Jews.” The National Council of People’s Tribunals reduced the sentence to eight months in jail.55 The cadet policeman László Sz. was charged by the people’s tribunal in Pécs because, in December 1946, he told his classmates in the classroom: “Look around, and see if you see a cadet who is a Jew or an Israelite. As you can see, the Jews are still not working; they are all sitting and occupying the top positions.”56

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Few documents relate to section 3 of Act VII, regarding lauding war or lauding a crime committed against the people. A man was sentenced to three months in prison because he was “praising” the conspiracy of the Hungarian Community and, since this was done in front of a considerable crowd of workers, “it could have significance under the present circumstances.”57 The charge against police sergeant Sándor R. was also “that he approved of the objectives and work of the conspirators, thereby praising persons engaged in organizing for the overthrow of the state.” All this was allegedly uttered at Szentes, in the mess-hall of the police force, and in debate with a cadet. The people’s tribunal of Szeged sentenced the accused to two years in prison.58 The sentence was confirmed by the National Council of People’s Tribunals.59 In several cases sentences were handed down for singing songs in praise of Hitler or Szálasi, or for praising them in words.60 Quite a few cases contravened section 4 of Act VII of 1946, to-wit: “A crime is committed by anyone who, in the presence of two or more persons, disseminates an unlikely fact or repeats facts in such a manner as to elicit contempt ... against the public order or the republic, or to damage its international reputation.”61 What might fall under this heading was once again up to the prosecutor or the judge. On 23 June 1946 I. Sz., deacon of the reformed church at Kiskunfélegyháza, delivered a speech to the youth organization (the Independent Youth) of the Smallholder Party, which he headed: “We did not become democrats only when democracy became fashionable ... We do not want to become the satellite state of a foreign nation, we do not want such individuals to run our country ... We will not allow the minority to run the country once again. Some parties have expropriated democracy ... We do not want and will not tolerate the counts and barons to run the country, nor will we allow the shirkers to lord it over us.” The case dragged on until November 1947, when he was absolved on the grounds that he participated in “higher politics” only for a few months, then returned to his ecclesiastic duties.62 In August 1946, at Hódmezővásárhely, organ-grinder Imre N. assessed the prevailing conditions: “The leaders of the previous regime were scoundrels, as are those of the present regime. They care naught for the people; their pockets are loaded, while the people eat inferior bread.” He was sentenced to prison for one month on account of this statement, but in September 1948 the National Council of People’s

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Tribunals declared the sentence null and void, because the people’s prosecutor was mistaken; this case should have been referred to a regular court, as a simple case of slander.63 Lajos K.I. of Balf was charged because, in the course of a conversation in his apartment in January 1947, he said: “The old police force has been reconstituted, it will take over the posts, the democratic police will sit on the bench of the accused, and the heads of the top ranking ones will roll.” The people’s tribunal of Győr sentenced him to three months in jail, loss of office, and the suspension of his civil rights for two years.64 Also in January 1947, Nándor B. announced in a restaurant in Hódmezővásárhely that, during the organizational grand meeting of the Hungarian Freedom Party, the participants and Dezső Sulyok shouted: “Let Rákosi and the Jews hang. Rákosi will be hanged, Rákosi and Szakasits, these two old scoundrels will not shine for long, but will fly.” The people’s tribunal of Szeged sentenced him to one month in jail, on the grounds that he was disseminating “unlikely facts which have the potential of eliciting contempt toward the Hungarian Republic.” The culprit had been a member of the Social Democratic Party and of the union for many years, but had joined the Communist Party in 1945, which counted as a mitigating circumstance. Nevertheless, the accused spent ten months under arrest.65 In rare instances persons were charged under section 7 of Act VII. This section concerned slanders voiced against the president of the republic while in office, or thereafter. In one case Ilona V. of Budapest declared in the summer of 1946: “The present government will not last, pretty soon all of them will hang, along with Tildy.” The twenty-sixyear-old woman remained in custody while awaiting sentencing. The two witnesses, however, withdrew their testimony, and the people’s prosecutor halted the proceedings.66 During a conversation in August 1946 in the apartment of the judge in Egerbocs, Zoltán G.R. made the following remark: “You are all screwed, from the petty judge all the way to the minister. This is not democracy, this is nothing. You trust in Rákosi, that he will protect you, but you are all scoundrels just like him.” Although the name of Zoltán Tildy or his office were not even mentioned, the people’s tribunal felt that the president of the republic was a victim of slander and sentenced the man to two months in jail, and three years’ loss of civil rights. The sentence was suspended for a probationary period of three years.67 The National Council of People’s Tribunals confirmed the sentence.68

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The action initiated against Julianna H., a resident of Rákoskeresztúr, was halted by the people’s prosecutor on the following grounds: “On 5 December 1946, while safe passage was ensured for the president of the republic, the accused declared that they must be greeting some ‘big dog’ [big shot] again. In Hungarian, the expression ‘big dog’ may be used without any deprecatory intent. Since the accused did not use any other expression that might lead one to believe ill-intent, and given the statement of the accused that she did not even know who was about to travel that way, the investigation must be halted, since no criminal act was involved.”69 In a special type of case that came to the attention of the people’s tribunal and the people’s prosecutors, the suspects had made remarks about the Red Army, the Soviet political system, or Stalin. The official agencies proved tentative in such cases since there were no legal guidelines to enable them to launch an investigation. Although the police did take action, the prosecutor’s offices usually halted the procedure. For instance, at Gyula, Mátyás Rákosi jokingly said: “Until Jesus Christ is left hanging, we must greet with ‘glory to the Lord’; if Stalin is hanged, we must greet by saying ‘freedom’.”70 Or, according to the words of Imre N., already mentioned above: “In Russia Stalin keeps the people in bondage; people eat food from a canteen, and they have to queue up even for that.”71 In the first case the prosecutor sent his decision to halt the proceedings to the ministry, with the comment, “there is no legal guideline that envisions punishment for attacking the honour of a foreign head of state.”72 Immediately after the war, the coalition government’s decision to declare freedom of speech and, at the same time, to place serious obstacles in front of that freedom, was quite understandable. Although the strict legal preventive measures were prompted by a fear of the repetition of recent events, in practice it became a political tool for the Communist Party, which was determined to take over power. From 1946 on, Rákosi and company tried to pressure people by means of intimidation, and by teaching people how and what to think, as well as how and where to express an opinion. There was a network of informants, since to initiate such a large number of court cases, spies and witnesses were needed. The cases briefly described above show to what degree public opinion became polarized in this period, with left and right sometimes intermingled.

Epilogue

Elections for the Parliament were held anew on 15 May 1949, expressly to legitimize the power of the Hungarian Workers’ Party. According to the plan, 70 per cent of the deputies would have to come from the Workers’ Party, whereas the other seats were to be assigned from a socalled popular front list made up of persons who accepted the lie of the Workers’ Party without reservations. Given the enormous political pressure weighing on the population, the outcome was never in doubt. Close to 30 per cent of the new deputies did not belong to the Workers’ Party, and a few Smallholder and Peasant Party members were included in the cabinet but, by then, they had no influence whatsoever. Although neither the Smallholder Party nor the Peasant Party were banned – they were even allowed to maintain an office in Budapest – their activities ceased for all practical purposes. A few of their members occupied leadership positions in the Rákosi era. Both parties were revived during the days of the 1956 revolution. By 1949 the leaders of the Hungarian Workers’ Party had a monopoly of power, and its rule seemed so entrenched that part of society – namely those inclined to believe that the party was indeed building socialism – was willing to contribute to realizing the dictatorship of the proletariat. Rákosi and company abused the trust of the people, awakening vain expectations of a better world. Public opinion, however, could not be misled for long. By 1951–52 the dictatorship was clearly a burden on workers and peasants alike. The totalitarian power of Rákosi – with a brief interruption in 1953 following the death of Stalin for the so-called “new line” policy ascribed to Imre Nagy – lasted until 18 July 1956. At that time the central leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, with the consent of the Soviets,

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relieved Rákosi of his post as general secretary and of his membership on the political committee, ostensibly for health reasons. Until then, the dictatorship was a calamity. During their usurpation of power Rákosi and his clique did not content themselves with liquidating coalition partners and the bourgeois opposition. Between May 1949 and 1951 they arrested the leaders who had led the underground Communist movement between the two wars. The first victim was László Rajk, who was minister of the interior at the time of the “anti-republic conspiracy.” He paid with his life. Others, such as János Kádár and Gyula Kállai, were kept in jail for years. The former was minister of the interior, the latter minister of foreign affairs, at the time of their arrest. By 1949–50 the Hungarian Workers’ Party had succeeded in eliminating every institution of the democratic republic, including shared governance, to establish the dictatorship of the one party state. Once again the situation became absurd: the followers of bourgeois democracy, those leaders of the former bourgeois parties who were “left standing,” were still trying to hold on to the network of democratic institutions that were set up in 1945. After 1950 this was no longer possible. The Hungarian Workers’ Party could now openly declare the dictatorship of the proletariat but, since the former ruling classes had been liquidated, the only victims of the oppression were now the enemy that was supposed to have “infiltrated their own party,” that is, the workers and the peasants themselves. This became part of the background of the 1956 revolution. After the 1956 revolution the domination of those Communists who had been exiles in Moscow before 1945 came to an end. Their ultimate fates diverged considerably. Imre Nagy, the prime minister at the time of the 1956 revolution, who enjoyed general respect, was executed on 16 June 1958. None of the others could ever again assume a political role; the match was definitely over for them. The leaders of the former coalition parties had dispersed around the world, or had chosen retirement within the country, preserving the democracy of 1944–47 only in memory.

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Biographies

bajcsy-zsilinszky, endre (1886–1944) was the anti-Fascist martyr of World War II Hungary. Having completed his studies in law he was associated with the extreme right until the late twenties. Then he gradually veered toward democratic opposition forces. In 1930 he formed the National Radical Party. On 15 March (a national holiday, sometimes official, sometimes not) in 1932 he launched an anti-Nazi weekly titled Szabadság (Freedom), which became a forum for intellectual and political resistance to Nazis. In 1936 his party united with the Smallholder Party. In 1939 he was elected to Parliament from the Tarpa district. As a counterpoint to the spread of German influence he favoured the federation of nations in the Danubian basin. He was in touch with representatives of the Social Democratic Party as well as the underground Communist Party, publicly supported those persecuted for political and racial (ethnic) reasons, and became the leading figure of the anti-Nazi resistance. He was captured by the Gestapo on 19 March 1944, after an exchange of fire that lasted several minutes. Subsequently the government, headed by Prime Minister General Géza Lakatos, asked the Gestapo for his release on 11 October, and set him free on 15 October. At the beginning of November 1944 he was elected chairman of the Hungarian National Uprising Liberation Committee to organize resistance against the Germans, elaborating a plan for armed resistance. On a tip, he was captured at his hiding place in the morning of 23 November by the men of the Arrow Cross “liquidating” office, and was tried by court-martial at the prison on Margit Boulevard, along with General János Kiss. Because of his amnesty rights, his case had to be tried separately; hence he was transported to Sopronkőhida, in Western Hungary. Once the Arrow Cross Parliament turned him over to

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the military courts, he was given the death sentence and hanged on Christmas Eve 1944. As István Bibó wrote: “Here is a man who was predestined by his class, upbringing, and culture to be confined to the dead-end street of unproductive mortification over the injustices suffered by Hungary [by the Peace Treaty of Trianon in 1920], yet he had the courage to stand up for democracy, entirely lacking retrograde mass passions such as irredentism ... Under such circumstances it is not easy to be a democrat.”1 Bán, Antal (1903–1951) joined the youth movement of the Social Democrats in 1917. In November 1919 he escaped to Yugoslavia with his family, where he worked as a machinist, but continued his studies on the side. In 1922 he joined the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party. In 1931 he was appointed the deputy chairman of the party’s branch in the Voivodina. He moved to Budapest in 1941, acting as liaison between the Budapest headquarters of the party and the branch at Novi Sad (Újvidék). In 1943 he became the head of the secretariat of the party, skilled workers section. From January 1945 he was the head of the interim executive committee in charge of reorganizing the Social Democratic Party and, from 2 April 1945, a deputy in the Interim National Assembly. From 1 June 1945 he was minister of industry. Between 1945 and 1948 he was a member of the party’s leadership and of its political committee. From 1945 to 1947 he was deputy general secretary of the party. On 26 February 1948 he was forced into exile and ostracized by his party because he opposed the merger of the two workers’ parties. He settled in Switzerland. Dobi, István (1898–1968), an agricultural labourer, joined the Hungarian Red Army under the Republic of Councils and was captured and interned. He entered the Independent Smallholder Party in 1936 and became the leader of the landless peasant section. As a member of the party’s national caucus, then chairman of the agricultural labourer section within the party from 1937, and from 1941 founding secretary of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance, his activities took him to all corners of the country. In 1944 he joined the resistance movement, but was drafted into the regular army and was captured once again. He returned to Hungary in the summer of 1945 and was minister of state from 15 November 1945 to 23 February 1946. From that date he became minister of agriculture, and once again minister of state between 18 December 1946 and 24 September 1947. From 3 June 1947 he was chairman

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of the Smallholders. Between April and December 1948 he was once again minister of agriculture, then prime minister until September 1949, and president of the council of ministers until 14 August 1952. From 14 August 1952 to 14 April 1967 he headed the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic as chairman. He applied for membership in the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party in the fall of 1959, and became a member of its central committee. Eckhardt, Tibor (1888–1972) was a lawyer, politician, and member of Parliament. He joined the Smallholder Party in 1930, and was its chairman from 1932 to 1940. After 1935 he took a stand against the pro-German forces in favour of an Anglo-American oriented foreign policy. He travelled to the United States in the summer of 1940, entrusted by Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Pál Teleki with the mission of establishing a network of contacts. He never returned to Hungary. He died in New York. Erdei, Ferenc (1910–1971) was an agrarian economist and sociologist. As a university student, he participated in the “village researcher” movement. His sociological study, Futóhomok (Blowing dust), which focused on the study of the life of the peasantry in the region between the Danube and the Tisza rivers, made a lasting impression. Other ethnological and sociological works followed in quick succession, making him a pioneer in Hungarian sociology and ethnography. He helped launch the National Peasant Party in 1939. He was an outstanding personality of the intellectual resistance movement during World War II. He took an active part in reorganizing the nation after the fall of 1944 and became minister of the interior in the Interim Government, as well as a deputy in Parliament. He was an advocate of close collaboration with the Communist Party, and this was – as it turned out – no coincidence: at the end of 1944 he had applied for membership in the Communist Party and had been accepted, but the Communists decided to keep his allegiance secret. In 1945 he became deputy chairman of the National Peasant Party and, from May 1947, he was its first secretary. He was elected to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1948. Between 1949 and 1955 he was minister of agriculture twice, as well as minister of justice for a time. From November 1955 to 21 October 1956 he was deputy chair of the council of ministers. In the days of the revolution he was a member of Imre Nagy’s kitchen cabinet. On 2 November, he headed the Hungarian delegation negotiating the withdrawal of

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Soviet troops and on 3 November, during the negotiations at Tököl, he was arrested by the KGB, but released a few weeks later. After 1957 he became involved in public affairs again, becoming secretary of the Academy of Sciences, and later of the Patriotic People’s Front. From the 1960s he was a promoter of economic reform. farkas, mihály (1904–1965) was a member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 1921. In 1925 he was sentenced to six-and-a-half years in prison for political activities. He fought in the Spanish Civil War in 1936–37. Thereafter he became the second secretary of the Communist Youth International. He was transferred from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the Hungarian party at the request of Mátyás Rákosi. He arrived in Szeged in southern Hungary from Moscow in November 1944. He was entrusted with the direction of party finances and police and military affairs. In May 1945 he became a member of the secretariat of the Communist Party, then of the political committee. From 15 July to 23 November 1945, he was undersecretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, his most important assignment being the reorganization of the police. Between 1945 and 1948 he supervised the organization section of the Communist Party, its propaganda, economic, police, and military offices, intelligence, the committee on women’s affairs, and youth and sports. From 9 September 1948, as minister of defence, he was in charge of the accelerated buildup of the Hungarian military. After the arrest of László Rajk he, along with Rákosi and Gerő, became part of the secret top threesome that completely controlled the country. At the April 1955 meeting of the Hungarian Workers’ Party he was removed from the top echelon of the party, and sent to attend a military academy in the Soviet Union. In March 1956 the central committee of the Workers’ Party initiated an investigation against him, and in June he was ostracized by the party on account of his participation in unconstitutional procedures. He was demoted from marshal to recruit and subsequently arrested (on 13 October). He was treated as a military prisoner and kept under strict guard. On 23 March 1957 he was sentenced to six years in prison, but his case was revisited on 19 April and his sentence was increased to sixteen years. He was granted a pardon on 5 April 1960. He became a foreign language editor in the social sciences for Gondolat publishing house. Ger ő , Ern ő (1898–1980) was a member of the Communist Party from 1918. He escaped to Vienna after the fall of the Republic of Councils. In

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1922 he was sent to Hungary to take charge of Communist organization. He was arrested in September and sentenced to fifteen years in jail in May 1923, but was extradited to the Soviet Union in 1924. He carried out party work in France, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal. Between 1939 and 1941 he represented the Hungarian Communist Party in the Communist International. After the dissolution of the International, and as a member of the Red Army, he carried out propaganda work and went on missions as an agent behind enemy lines and among POW s in the hinterland. In November 1944 he participated in the negotiations with the Hungarian armistice delegation dispatched to Moscow. Soon afterward he arrived in Szeged in southern Hungary where, along with others, he formed the central committee of the Hungarian Communist Party. After 1945 he was appointed to key roles in government, in decision-making on economic issues. He became minister of commerce and transportation, of transportation, of finance, of the state, and of the interior, as well as deputy prime minister. In 1954–56 he led the actions aimed at reversing the reforms introduced by Imre Nagy. After Rákosi was removed he became the general secretary of the central committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party from July to 25 October 1956. In his speech broadcast over the radio on 23 October 1956, he spoke out bluntly against the uprising, opposing any and all concessions. On October 25 he was removed from all the offices he held and took refuge in the Soviet Union. On his return in 1960 he was blamed for all the illegal activities during the period 1948–56, including the political abuses, and excluded from the party. Thereafter he lived in complete retirement, making a living from translations. Kádár, János (1912–1989) was a typewriter technician who joined the Communist Party of Hungary in 1931. He was sentenced to two years in jail for Communist recruiting. Upon the dissolution of the Communist International (Comintern) he dissolved the Communist Party of Hungary and set up the Peace Party to replace it. Dispatched to Yugoslavia in 1944 to contact the Communist leaders in exile, he was detained at the border. Although he was able to conceal his identity, he was detained as a deserter and sentenced to two years in jail. He escaped in November 1944 and returned to Budapest. After the siege of Budapest, in 1945, he was appointed deputy chief of police. Between 1945 and 1951 he occupied leadership positions in the Communist Party, then in the Hungarian Workers’ Party: he was secretary of the central committee, a member of the political committee, secretary of Budapest,

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Biographies

head of the cadre section, leader of the section of party and mass organizations, and deputy general secretary of the party. He was a member of Parliament between 1947 and 1951, and also minister of the interior from 5 August 1948 to 23 June 1950. He participated in the preparations for the trial of Rajk in 1949. In late April 1951, however, he too was arrested and stripped of all titles and memberships. He was sentenced to life in prison on fabricated charges in December 1952, but released in July 1954. From October he was given party assignments once again: general secretary of the Workers’ Party in District XIII of  Budapest, then in Pest County. After Rákosi was forced to resign he became once again a member of the party’s leading factions. On 25 October 1956 he was chosen to replace Ernő Gerő as general secretary of the party’s central committee. Between 30 October and 4 November 1956 he was minister of state in the Nagy cabinet (in name only). From 30 October 1956 he became a member of the executive committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt − MSZMP) that replaced the dissolved Hungarian Workers’ Party. Travelling to Moscow in secret he held discussions with the heads of state and party leaders of several Communist countries regarding the situation in Hungary. In the meantime the Soviet party leader Nikolai Khrushchev was consulting with Tito on the Brioni Islands; Khrushchev accepted the latter’s recommendation that Kádár be appointed to head the regime that came to power as a result of Soviet armed intervention. A so-called revolutionary worker-peasant government was formed on 4 November in Szolnok under Kádár’s leadership. He arrived in Budapest as part of a convoy of Soviet tanks and armoured cars. He became number one leader of the party until 1989. He was minister of state between 1958 and prime minister again until 1965. In spite of his repeated promises to the contrary, in 1958, under Soviet pressure, he agreed to the trial, sentencing, and execution of Imre Nagy, eliciting international condemnation. During the early 1960s he gradually put a halt to the unbridled terror that followed the defeat of the revolution of 1956 and resorted to  more subtle forms of dictatorship. At the national congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party in May 1988 his name was omitted from the political committee and he was not re-elected as first secretary, although a figurehead chairmanship office was created for him; a year later he was relieved of even this function. Kelemen, Gyula (1897–1973), a technician, joined the Social Democratic Party in 1918. He became part of its national leadership on

Biographies

163

20 August 1945. He was a member of Parliament from 2 April 1945 to 1948 and undersecretary in the Ministry of Industry from 8 June 1945 to 22 January 1948. He was arrested in January 1948 on fabricated charges and sentenced to life in prison, first on 4 March, by the people’s tribunal in Budapest, then on 22 July by the court of appeals. He was pardoned in 1956. He was elected general secretary of the reorganized Social Democratic Party in October 1956. In November he became minister of state in the Imre Nagy cabinet. In 1963 he was absolved of the charges raised against him in 1948. Kéthly, Anna (1889–1976) enjoyed considerable prestige within the Social Democratic movement. She was a clerical worker who joined the National Association of Clerical Workers and Commercial Employees in 1913. She became secretary of its women’s auxiliary in 1917 and joined the Social Democratic Party in the same year. After 1919 she became, for a while, the secretary of the party women’s committee. Between 1926 and 1938 she was the editor-in-chief and publisher of Nőmunkás (Women-workers). From 1922, until excluded from the party in March 1948, she was a member of the party’s national leadership and of its parliamentary section. She was editor-in-chief of the party’s monthly paper, Világosság (Light), and chairperson of its National Women’s Organization. She was locked up in 1950 without due process, and kept under house arrest from 1954 to the summer of 1956. She became chairperson of the reconstituted Hungarian Social Democratic Party on 31 October 1956, and minister of state from 3 November. She was forced into exile, but represented the Hungarian cause in front of the UN for years. Kovács, Béla (1908–1959), a moderate income peasant, was a politician and a member of the Smallholder Party from 1933 on. A friend of Ferenc Nagy, he was deputy party secretary from 1939 and general secretary of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance from 1941. He was political undersecretary in the Ministry of the Interior from 23 December 1944 to 15 November 1945, minister of agriculture from 15 November 1945 to 23 February 1946, general secretary of the Smallholder Party from 20 August 1945, and editor-in-chief of the party paper Kis Újság from March 1946. Considered the most popular peasant politician, he was a charismatic individual, capable of uniting the country’s peasants. In the evening of 25 February 1947, he was dragged away by the Soviet occupation authorities and sentenced to twenty years, without due

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process, in the Soviet Union. He was returned to Hungary in 1955, only to be detained by the political police at Nyíregyháza, and later at Jászberény. He returned to his family on 2 April 1956. The news of the events of 23 October reached Kovács at Mecsekalja; yet he did not leave his town Pécs, in southern Hungary, until 31 October, even though he had been appointed minister of agriculture in the Imre Nagy cabinet a few days earlier. He became minister of state on 2 November. After 4 November he devised or participated in the preparation of several plans for the future and negotiated with János Kádár on several occasions. He was deputy from November 1958 until his death, but, because of illness contracted while he was in Soviet captivity, he was no longer able to perform his duties. Kovács, Imre (1913–1980) was an economist, a writer, a journalist, a Peasant Party leader, a founder of the March Front, and the editor of the Szabad Szó from 1938. He studied economics after 1931, residing in the Pro Christo College. This was the origin of his activities as a “village researcher.” His study, Néma forradalom (Silent revolution), a sharp critique of Hungarian society, was written after his tour of the country in 1937. The outcome of his trial for subversion was three months in jail; although unable to obtain his university diploma, he did complete his studies. He became one of the founders of the National Peasant Party in  1939 and participated in the resistance movement led by BajcsyZsilinszky. After his liberation from Soviet captivity he became a member of Parliament in April 1945 and was general secretary of the party, then deputy chairman. He advocated the formation of a peasant-petty bourgeois alliance based on close collaboration between the Peasant Party and the Smallholders. On 25 February 1947, the day Béla Kovács was deported, he resigned from the party. He was elected to Parliament upon joining the Independent Hungarian Democratic Party of István Balogh on 31 August 1947. Avoiding the limelight, he went into exile in November 1947. Marosán, György (1908–1992) was a baker’s apprentice and a popular politician affiliated with the left wing of the Social Democratic Party. He joined the Union of Bakers and Service Sector Workers in 1922 and the Social Democratic Party in 1927. He became general secretary of the National Association of Food Workers in 1939, and their chairman in 1943. In 1941 became a member of the party’s leadership in the capital city, and its organization secretary for the provinces as of 1943. He was

Biographies

165

arrested during the German occupation. He was national secretary of the party until August 1945, then general secretary in charge of the socalled provincial section, and a member of the Interim National Assembly from 2 April 1945. He was considered an eloquent speaker who could speak the language of the working class. He believed in close cooperation with the Communist Party and favoured the merger of the two parties in 1948. He occupied leadership positions in the Social Democratic Party, then in the Hungarian Workers’ Party, until his arrest in July 1950. He received the death sentence in a show trial in NovemberDecember, but this was commuted to a life sentence without further trial. He was released in March 1956, became a member of the political committee of the Workers’ Party in July 1956, and eventually deputy prime minister. After the revolution he became a member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party’s interim executive committee, then a member of the Kádár regime. In 1957 he was both a deputy to Kádár and secretary of the Budapest Party committee. In 1962, after the conclusion of the illegal trials against members of the movement during the 1950s, he incurred Kádár’s wrath by expressing an extreme left-wing private opinion. In October 1962 the central committee of the party removed him from office. He resigned from the party in 1965, but rejoined in 1972. Mindszenty, József (1892–1975), originally József Pehm, a Catholic priest, was appointed bishop of Veszprém by Pope Pius XII on 4 March 1944. After the death of Cardinal Jusztinián Serédi, he became archbishop of Esztergom on 16 August 1945, and cardinal on 21 February 1946. He was sentenced to life in prison in a show trial by the people’s tribunal in 1949 and freed on 30 October 1956. He acted as head of the Catholic Church in Hungary from then until 2 February 1974 and considered himself as such, but was removed thereafter by the Pope. He was granted asylum at the American embassy in Budapest from 4 November 1956 until 28 September 1971, when he left for Rome. He chose the Pazmaneum in Vienna as his final abode. In accordance with his will his body was laid to rest at Mariazell; however, in 1992, after the regime change in Hungary, he was re-interred in the Episcopal crypt at Esztergom. Nagy, Ferenc (1903–1979), a farmer and a politician, founded the Independent Smallholder Party, along with Zoltán Tildy and others, in 1930 and remained its leader until the end of May 1947. He was the party’s general secretary until 20 August 1945, then its chairman. He

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Biographies

was elected to Parliament in 1939. For six months during the German occupation, he was a prisoner of the Gestapo. He was the founder, then chairman, of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance. He became minister of reconstruction in May 1945 and was prime minister of Hungary from 4 February 1946 to 2 June 1947. While he was on vacation in Switzerland, the Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi mounted a coup against him. Nagy and his family went to the United States at the end of June and settled in Herndon, Virginia, near Washington DC, where the royalties from his book enabled him to purchase a farm. The book, Struggle be­ hind the Iron Curtain, his recollections written in 1947–48, was published in English by Macmillan of New York. Nagy believed that his mission was to acquaint the West with the building of democracy in Hungary in 1945, and how this process was interrupted in 1947 by Soviet intervention in disregard of the Yalta agreements. He felt that he must inform the public about the situation in East-Central Europe in  general. Nagy was received with distrust by the earlier waves of Hungarian emigrants, particularly those from 1945, who were made up, for the most part, of former members of the Arrow Cross and other pro-Hitler elements – precisely those who stood by Nazi Germany to the very end – who blamed him for collaborating with the Communists. Nagy, however, did not bother to debate with them. He participated in the creation of the Hungarian National Committee, founded in 1949 and chaired by Béla Varga, becoming a member of its executive committee and heading its economic and financial sub-committees. Between 1955 and 1957 he acted as vice-chairman of the committee. In 1947 he participated in the creation of an International Union of Peasants, acting as its vice chairman from 1948 to 1964, and as its chairman from 1964 to 1970. In October 1956, during the days of the revolution, he attempted to return to Hungary, but was prevented from so doing by the government of Austria, on the grounds of neutrality. On 2 November he made a phone call to Minister of State Zoltán Tildy, offering to serve the country at the United Nations, but the Hungarian government did not avail itself of his offer. After the repression of the revolution, he assumed a further mission: to inform the Western world about the Hungarian revolution, and about the Soviet intervention, as well as to nurture the memories of the revolution and help the refugees gain acceptance in the West (the total number is said to have been 160 or 170,000 – about 30,000 of whom changed their minds and went back to Hungary). On

Biographies

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5 through 8 January 1957, the most recent refugees formed a Hungarian Revolutionary Council in Strasbourg, with Anna Kéthly as chairperson, while Nagy was elected to its executive committee. This council did not function for long, because they did not wish to create the impression that Hungarian exiles were divided among themselves. Hence the Hungarian National Committee and the Hungarian Revolutionary Council united to form the Hungarian Committee, once again with Béla Varga as chairperson; the Social Democratic Party, however, with Anna Kéthly in the lead, refused to join. This committee presented a “united front,” on behalf of Hungarian causes, at international venues. For instance, in the summer of 1958, a committee made up of Béla Varga, Ferenc Nagy, Imre Kovács, Pál Auer, and Béla Király undertook a tour of Western Europe with the objective of informing the governments and the media about the Hungarian revolution. Gyula Borbándi, who wrote a history of Hungarian emigration, summed up its activities during Nagy’s years in exile as follows: “Ferenc Nagy evolved into a statesman of international significance. I might even add that he became an expert on foreign policy, although back home he was known mostly as a domestic politician. In his homelessness, however, the arena of his activities was foreign policy, and he grew into his role. He learnt English and spoke it fluently; he became well informed on world events, and felt at home at international venues. This former peasant represented the Hungarian people with dignity and commanded respect. He travelled around the world, held discussions with important leaders, spoke at international gatherings, and took part in many important initiatives.”2 In 1954, 1955, and again in 1962, sponsored by the state department, he toured the Far East. He was convinced that the countries of the Third World were assuming increasing importance. First he visited Japan and India, developing ties of friendship with Prime Minister Nehru in India. His most significant feat in the context of the Third World was exerting a decisive influence over the participants of the Bandung conference in Indonesia in 1955 – the first great meeting of the “neutral” countries. Nagy’s influence can be seen in the draft of the final resolution of the conference, in which the participants denounced every kind of colonialism. Note that Washington was almost in a state of panic at the idea that the countries of the Third World would turn against the West. At that time, Nagy came up with the proposal that the state department should organize a conference where he would explain how such a disaster could be averted. In his draft for the conference he warned that the

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two Communist leaders who attended the conference in Bandung, Chou En-lai and Ho Chi Minh, would do everything in their power to encourage an anti-Western atmosphere. Indeed, this would be easy since all participants were united in their opposition to colonialism. Yet this attitude could be modified by persuading them to condemn the new Soviet colonial system along with Western colonialism. He offered to travel alone to the area and try to influence the conference from behind the scenes. He set out with an invitation from the Pakistani Foreign Affairs Society to hold a series of talks in Pakistan regarding the role of Asia in international affairs. At the same time he and some colleagues prepared a pamphlet about how the countries of Eastern Europe were colonies of the Soviet Union, and he distributed copies of this pamphlet everywhere. Before his trip to Pakistan he visited the Philippines and held discussions in Hong Kong, Bangkok, Rangoon, and New Delhi. When he reached Karachi, it became his headquarters, since many of the delegations headed for Bandung stopped there on their way; he was able to meet with most, and to draw their attention to old colonialism and the new type of colonialism. He sent his brochure on Soviet colonialism to the ambassador of Sri Lanka (Ceylon at the time), intended for Prime Minister Sir John Kotewala. Nagy did not make it to Bandung, but was kept informed by the Pakistan ambassador. It came as an enormous surprise when Kotewala explained that they were united against all forms of colonialism, most obviously against Western colonialism, but he added: “There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us would perhaps not agree to apply the term colonialism at all. Think, for example, of those satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe – of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Are not these colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?”3 Then he challenged Chou En-lai, who was also in attendance, to take a stand against Communist colonialism. An extended debate ensued, and Nehru was only able to calm the passions by including the condemnation of all forms of colonialism in the final document. Thus Nagy’s mission was successfully achieved.

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Nagy was a member of many international organizations. Between 1963 and 1970 he delivered talks at more than 400 institutions of higher learning and secondary schools regarding conditions in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. He received honorary doctorates from the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Indiana (Bloomington). In 1970 he retired from political activity because of his wife’s health. From the 1970s he watched events in Hungary with a degree of optimism. As a pragmatic politician he assessed the economic reforms introduced in 1968, and worked for abiding by the Helsinki Accords accepted in 1975, since these implied improvements in the standard of living for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the expansion of their human and civil rights. In 1977 he advocated the return of the Hungarian crown – carried away in 1944 by the Arrow Cross – to the Hungarian people, over the objections of many Hungarian-American interest groups. The World Association of Hungarians laid the groundwork for his return to the country, but this never happened; he died in Herndon. Nagy, Imre (1896–1958), an automobile fitter, agronomist, and politician, was taken prisoner by the Russians in the Great War. He became a member of the CPUSSR in 1920. On returning to Hungary in 1921, he became active in the work of the Kaposvár branch of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, but was barred in 1925. In the same year he became a founding member of the cover organization for the underground Communist Party, the Socialist Workers’ Party of Hungary. He was arrested in 1927. Upon his release he went into exile, first in Vienna, then in the Soviet Union. He worked at the International Agrarian Institute of the Comintern, then in the Central Statistics Office of the Soviet Union, and finally as the editor of the Hungarian language broadcasts of Radio Moscow. He helped to elaborate the agrarian program of the Hungarian Communist Party, but was not a member of the party’s top echelon. He returned to Hungary in November 1944 on assignment from the Communist Party. In December he was appointed minister of agriculture in the cabinet of Béla Dálnoki Miklós. He became minister of the interior in the cabinets of Tildy and later of Ferenc Nagy, until 20 March 1946. The land reform of 1945 was mainly his work. Between 1947 and 1949 he was speaker of the National Assembly. Because he objected to the rapid and forced pace of collectivization in agriculture, he came into conflict with the party leadership and was temporarily

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excluded from the political committee. He worked as a university professor for a year and then, in April 1950, he was appointed head of the administrative section of the central committee. He became minister once again in December 1950: first minister of supplies, then of collections; deputy prime minister after November 1954; and prime minister from 4 July 1953 – a position he owed to the new leadership in the Kremlin. The politics of “the new stage” led to a change in economic policy, an end to arbitrary rule and to the internment camps and deportations to the countryside, and amnesty for some. It became possible to withdraw from collectives, and half of the peasants availed themselves of this opportunity. In April 1955, as the group around Rákosi regained influence, the new movement faltered. Nagy was replaced, and then ostracized by the party. He refused to indulge in auto-criticism and persisted in continuing the politics he had introduced; as a result he became the leader of the anti-Stalinist faction within the party. On 13 October 1956 he was readmitted into the party and was appointed prime minister on 23 October, at the demand of the demonstrators. At a night session of the leadership he was co-opted into the party’s leading groups. Between 28 and 31 October he was part of the six-member chairmanship of the Hungarian Workers’ Party; when that party was dissolved, he became part of the executive committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. During the revolution, on 28 October he declared a ceasefire, intervened in favour of the departure of the Soviet troops, declared the return to a multiparty system, and formed a coalition cabinet. In response to the re-entry of Soviet troops on 1 November he announced Hungary’s neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw pact. As Soviet troops poured into Budapest at dawn on 4 November he sought refuge at the Yugoslav embassy, whence he left with his companions and family members upon receiving safe-conduct from the Kádár government. The Soviet authorities, however, detained him and took him to Romania. On 14 April 1957 he was arrested in Snagov and transported to Budapest. During his political trial he consistently refuted all the items on the charge-sheet, but did not defend himself. He was sentenced to death, after several adjournments, on 15 June 1958. He did not ask to be pardoned, and the sentence was carried out the next day. On 16 June 1989 Imre Nagy and his martyred companions were ceremonially reburied in lot 301 in the public cemetery of Rákoskeresztúr in Budapest. This became the key event of the change of regime in 1989–90.

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Ortutay, Gyula (1910–1978) was a politician, ethnologist, and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He joined the Smallholder Party in 1942 and was chairman of the Hungarian Telegraph Agency between 1945 and 1947. He was a member of the national committee in Budapest from its inception, and became, in October 1945, a member of the Budapest administrative committee. He participated in the reorganization of the Smallholder Party. He was a member of Parliament from 1945 until April 1953, and one of the leaders of the party’s left wing. He became a professor of ethnology in 1945, and was minister of religion and education from 14 March 1947 to 24 February 1950. Between 1957 and 1964, he was general secretary of the reorganized Patriotic People’s Front; from 1957 to 1963, chancellor of Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest; and from 1958, a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His scholarly achievements were significant. Peyer, Károly (1881–1956) was a fitter, and politician of the Social Democratic Party. In the months following the collapse of the Hungarian Republic of Councils Peyer became minister of the interior in the government of Peidl and minister of welfare and labour in the government of János Hadik. Between 1921 and 1944 he was considered the number one leader of the Hungarian Social Democratic movement. In 1921 he signed a pact with Prime Minister István Bethlen, according to which the Hungarian Social Democratic Party could function once again, within limits. Elected to Parliament in 1922, he led the party’s parliamentary committee from 1932. In 1927 he was elected general secretary of the Council of Trade Unions. He consistently argued for the maintenance of the legal status of the party and of the trade unions. He objected to the one-sided pro-German orientation of the country and the rightist drift. Among the first to be arrested by the Gestapo, he was taken to the concentration camp in Mauthausen on 19 March 1944. He returned to Hungary late after the liberation of Hungary, in May 1945, so he could not participate in the reorganization of the party during the last months of the war. In the summer of 1945 he was deputized to the Interim National Assembly as a representative of the unions, and then became a member of Parliament. He was opposed to the union of workers. In December 1946 he protested, along with others, against the increasingly pro-Communist orientation of the Social Democratic Party. He was expelled from the party’s leadership and its parliamentary section. He

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resigned from his party during the elections of August 1947, but was returned on the ticket of the Hungarian Radical Party. In November 1947 his immunity was suspended, but he did not wait to be arrested; he left the country on 19 November and was deprived of his citizenship the following day. He was sentenced in absentia to eight years in jail on 16 February and 6 July 1948, on trumped-up charges of conspiracy and spying. He took part in the formation of the International Socialist Bureau comprising Social Democrats forced into exile from Central and Eastern Europe. In June 1948, as the workers’ parties were united in Hungary, he established an organization called Hungarian Social Democrats while in exile in Paris, and created the Free Hungarian Trade Union Council. He edited periodicals entitled Szabad Világ (Free world) and Szabad Magyar Munkás (Free Hungarian workers). In 1949 he settled in New York. In 1950 he was elected to the executive body of the Hungarian National Committee, and became the head of the section on labour and union affairs. He died in New York. Pfeiffer, Zoltán (1900–1981), one of the leaders of the bourgeois wing of the Smallholder Party, was a lawyer and the owner of a papermill. He entered the Smallholder Party in 1931, became prosecutor for the party in 1936, and eventually chief prosecutor. He led the party’s campaign in the elections of 1939. During the German occupation, he went into hiding and helped form the Hungarian Front. He joined the armed resistance movement after 15 October 1944, as a member of the Hungarian National Uprising Liberation Committee. From April 1945 he was deputy in the Interim National Assembly, and from August 1945 he was a member of the executive committee of the Smallholder Party. He was political undersecretary in the Ministry of Justice from 22 November 1945 to 31 December 1946. Because of the leftist attacks against his party during the show trial for “anti-republican activity,” he resigned his party membership on 10 March 1947, at Ferenc Nagy’s behest. In the summer of 1947 he founded and chaired the Hungarian Independence Party, an opposition movement that was allowed to run in the elections of 1947, but was deprived of the seats it won. He went into exile in November 1947, and lived in New York City thereafter. Rajk, László (1909–1949) was a teacher of Hungarian and French who joined the Communist Party in 1931. Arrested several times for illegal political activity, he was one of the organizers and leaders of the great construction workers’ strike in 1935. He fought in the Spanish

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Civil War, and became the political commissar and party secretary of the Hungarian battalion of the International Brigade. On returning to Hungary in 1941, he was arrested and interned. After his release in September 1944 he became one of the leaders of the resistance movement. He was rearrested by the Arrow Cross in December 1944 and taken to Germany, whence he returned in May 1945. He rejoined party and national politics, becoming a member of every leading group in the Hungarian Communist Party: from May to November 1945 he was secretary of the Budapest party committee; from November 1945 to March 1946, deputy general secretary of the party; then minister of the interior until August 1948; and minister of foreign affairs until 20 May 1949. He was arrested on 30 May 1949 on trumped-up charges, sentenced to death, and executed. Rehabilitated posthumously in 1955, he was reburied on 6 October 1956, under ceremonial circumstances, in the Kerepesi cemetery (Budapest). Rákosi, Mátyás (1892–1971) held a merchant certificate from the Eastern Commercial Academy. He was sent to the Eastern Front as an aide-de-camp at the beginning of 1915, but was captured by the Russians soon thereafter, in April. He escaped in early 1918, and returned to Hungary in May. He became a founding member of the Communist Party in Hungary in November 1918. When the Republic of Councils was proclaimed in 1919 he was appointed deputy commissar for commerce, and became a member of the governing revolutionary council. On 1 August 1919 he escaped to Vienna, where he was interned along with other Communist refugees. He was released in 1920 but, after a speech he delivered on 1 May, he was expelled and banned from Austria for life. He went to Soviet Russia. In 1924 he re-entered Hungary illegally. He was arrested in September 1925 and, in August 1926, was sentenced to eight-and-a-half years in jail as a common criminal, under the charge of revolt by the sentencing tribunal of Budapest. At the conclusion of his jail term he was once again taken to court for his activities during the Republic of Councils, and was sentenced to life in prison in February 1935. As a consequence of the inter-state agreement between Hungary and the Soviet Union he was released in 1940 on condition that he depart for the USSR immediately. He returned to Hungary at the end of January 1945. After he was replaced as general secretary, officially on grounds of poor health, at the 18–21 July 1956 session of the central committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, and also lost his membership on the

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political committee, he travelled to the Soviet Union for “treatment.” He stayed in Moscow at the time of the 1956 revolution. The chairman of the central committee of the CPUSSR resolved on 5 November 1956 to remove him from power for good. Thereafter he turned to the central committee and even to Khrushchev, in letters begging for reinstatement. The interim central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party resolved, in February 1957, not to allow Rákosi back into Hungary for the next five years. On 18 April 1957 the central committee of the CPUSSR endorsed the decision of the Hungarian leaders; consequently Rákosi was even forced out of Moscow in June 1957. Between 1957 and 1962 he was resettled in Krasnodar, in the Kuban region; later, from 1962 to 1966 in Tokmak in the Kirghiz region; and finally in Gorky. Practically entirely out of favour, he lived the life of an average Soviet retiree, and was never able to return to Hungary. In May 1957 he was deprived of his seat in Parliament. On 1 November 1960, the political committee of the Hungarian Party suspended his membership; at its session of 14–16 August 1962, he was suspended from the party’s central committee on account of his arbitrary actions and the wide-ranging criticism of his behaviour. The plenary meeting of the central committee in April 1970 would have authorized his return provided he stated, in writing, that he would not become involved in politics again, that he accepted house arrest, and that he agreed not to speak in public. Rákosi did not agree to these conditions. He died in Gorky on 5 February 1971. His ashes were secretly returned to Hungary on 16 February. Révai, József (1898–1959) attended university in Vienna and Berlin. He was a founding member of the Communist Party in Hungary; at the time of the Republic of Councils he became a member of the Central Workers and Soldiers Soviet. He fled to Vienna in the fall of 1919, returning surreptitiously to Hungary on occasion. He was arrested in Hungary in 1930 and sentenced to three-and-a-half years in jail. In 1934 he immigrated to the Soviet Union. He returned to Hungary in November 1944. From January 1945 his mission was to take care of propaganda and agitation, as well as the affairs of the National Assembly and of the national committees. In March 1945 he became editor-inchief of Szabad Nép, where he remained until 1950. From April 1945 he was the head of the propaganda and press office of the central committee of the Communist Party. He was minister of education from June 1949 to July 1953. After the 1956 revolution he became a member of the central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.

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Ries, István (1885–1950) was a lawyer and a Social Democrat. He was a member of the national leadership of the Social Democratic Party in 1934 and 1935, and again after 1939. From 20 August 1945 he was a member of the political committee of the Social Democratic Party, and from 21 July 1945 to 17 July 1950 he was minister of justice. He was arrested on trumped-up charges in 1950 and beaten to death in jail. Saláta, Kálmán (1917–1958) was a white-collar worker and a Smallholder politician. Upon completion of his university studies he worked for the Institute of Hungarian Economic Research. He participated in the resistance movement. He was a member of the Smallholder national leadership in 1945, a deputy in the National Assembly, an official in the Ministry of Reconstruction, and later in the national council and the secretariat of the prime minister’s office. He elaborated the land reform program of the Smallholder Party and became the closest confidant of Ferenc Nagy. He escaped abroad to avoid arrest in connection with the detention of members of the Hungarian Brotherhood Community. He settled and died in the United States. Slachta, Margit (1884–1974) was the abbess of a convent and a royalist politician. A member of the Christian National Union Party, she was elected to Parliament in 1920 as its first woman deputy. She organized her own movement, the Christian Women’s Camp, and was founder and abbess of the Society of Social Brotherhood and Sisterhood (1923–49). During World War II she led protests against ethnic hatred and the persecution of Jews, saving many of the persecuted. She ran on the Smallholder Party slate for the 7 October 1945 municipal elections in Budapest, but was elected to the National Assembly from the Civic Democratic Party slate and, in 1947, represented the Christian Women’s Camp. She left Hungary in 1949 and settled in the United States. Suly o k, dezs ő (1807–1965), a lawyer, was another influential leader of the bourgeois wing of the Smallholder Party. He was elected to Parliament as a deputy of the National Union Party, the government party, in 1935, but, a few weeks later, disappointed with the politics of Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, he resigned. He joined the Smallholder Party in 1937. In 1938 he challenged Prime Minister Béla Imrédy, who was about to introduce the first anti-Jewish law, on account of Imrédy’s Jewish ancestry, as a consequence of which the prime minister was forced to resign. He was arrested and interned on 3 April 1944, because

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of his anti-Nazi attitude. He was released two months later on the intervention of József Mindszenty, bishop of Veszprém, but he was forced to go into hiding again after the Arrow Cross takeover in October. He became mayor and chief of police in Pápa from April to September 1945. In June 1945 he became a member of the Interim National Assembly – eventually the National Assembly. He was also a member of the national executive committee of the Smallholders from August 1945. He was the prosecuting attorney at the trial of Béla Imrédy in November 1945, and chairman of the Central Monetary Institute from 1945. He was ostracized by the Smallholder Party, along with twenty companions, on 12 March 1946. He became founder and chairman of the Hungarian Freedom Party. He resigned his seat on 22 July 1947, left the country, and settled in the United States, where he accused Béla Varga and others of being Communist agents. Szakasits, Árpád (1888–1965) was a stone-cutter and a politician, who joined the Social Democratic Party in 1903, and the National Association of Construction Workers of Hungary in 1907. He was the head of the latter for a decade, beginning in 1928. His writings on political topics, poems, and short stories appeared regularly in the press from 1908. He worked for the Népszava, the press organ of the Social Democrats, as a correspondent from 1910, and as a member of the staff from 1918. He was elected to the Budapest executive committee of the party in 1910. He was arrested at the time of the general strike in June 1918 and drafted into a conscript regiment, whence he escaped. In April 1919 he was elected member and secretary of the central revolutionary workers and soldiers’ council of Budapest. After the collapse of the Republic of Councils he became editor of the Népszava. He was arrested several times between 1920 and 1923 and spent a total of two years in jail for “agitation.” From 1925 to 1948 he was a member of the Social Democratic Party and of its leadership. He was general secretary of the party between 1938 and 1942, but had to resign because of repeated arrests. From the beginning of 1940 he was editor-in-chief of  Népszava and played a significant role in publishing the famous anti-Fascist Christmas 1941 issue. He was a member of the Hungarian committee on historical monuments, and a founding member of the Hungarian Front. As chairman of the latter’s executive committee he elaborated the memorandum delivered to Regent Miklós Horthy. He went underground on 19 March 1944, at the time of the German occupation. On 10 October he signed the agreement regarding collaboration

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among the workers’ parties. On 11 October, along with Zoltán Tildy, he held discussions with the Regent regarding preparations for bailing out of the war. In February 1945 the reconstituted leadership of the Social Democratic Party elected him general secretary once again. He became a member of the National Assembly in April 1945, for the first time. After 1945 he occupied a number of important posts: general secretary of the Social Democratic Party; member of Parliament throughout the coalition period; chairman of the national committee of Budapest between 1945 and 1949; co-chairman or executive director of the national committee of Hungary; chairman of the administrative committee of Budapest until August 1948; minister of state from 15 November 1945; deputy prime minister from 4 February; and minister of industry from 26 February to 5 August 1948. On 3 August 1948 he was elected president of the Hungarian Republic, but this office was incompatible with others; he had to give up the chairmanship of the administrative committee. By then he was chairman of the Hungarian Workers’ Party. He remained head of state until 23 April 1950, as well as chairman of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic from 24 August 1949. He was arrested on fabricated charges on 24 April 1950 and sentenced to life in prison. His family was harassed as well. He was released on March 1956 and rehabilitated in July. During the revolution of 1956 he appealed for calm over the radio. He was left out of the reconstituted Hungarian Social Democratic Party led by Anna Kéthly because of his role in the Hungarian Workers’ Party. In 1958 he became deputy in the National Assembly again and a member of the presidential council. He became a member of the central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party from 1959 until his death, but was not given political assignments. From 1958 he was chairman of the association of Hungarian journalists and deputy chair of the national peace council, then its chair from 1963. He was also president of the World Association of Hungarians between 1959 and 1963. He died in Budapest on 3 May 1965. Szeder, Ferenc (1881–1952), an agricultural labourer, participated in peasant protests in Eastern Hungary from 1896, becoming exposed to socialist ideas. He travelled across the country as part of his work as a journeyman. He became secretary of the Miskolc branch of the Social Democratic Party in 1910. Some of his articles were published in the party press. In 1920 he was elected secretary of the Peasant Alliance of Hungary, later its chairman. In 1922 he became a deputy in the National

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Assembly, a leader in the Social Democratic movement, and a member of the leadership from 1928 on. He was re-elected deputy in 1931 and 1939. In 1942 he was even general secretary of the party for a while. In 1945 he was delegated to the Interim National Assembly. From the second half of February he was appointed deputy general secretary and, in August, he was voted into that office. He was excluded from the party in February 1948. In 1950 he was arrested on trumped-up charges and he died in prison. Tildy, Zoltán (1889–1961) was a clergyman of the Reformed (Protestant) church and a politician. He joined the National Independence and 48 (a reference to the revolution of 1848) Farmer’s Party led by István Nagyatádi Szabó in 1917. In 1929–30 he organized the opposition Smallholder Party along with Ferenc Nagy and others; he became its executive vice chairman. From 1936 to 1944 he was a delegate of the party in Parliament. His interventions in Parliament on behalf of the landless peasants elicited much response. After the departure of Tibor Eckhardt for the United States in 1940, he took over the direction of the party. He was active in the resistance and in bringing about anti-Fascist collaboration during the war. On 11 October, along with Árpád Szakasits, he held discussions with the Regent Miklós Horthy regarding preparations for bailing out of the war. At the conclusion of the siege on the Pest side of Budapest he became active in politics. On 20 August 1945 he was elected leader of the Smallholder Party and soon became nationally known. From April 1945 he was once again a member of Parliament. After the elections of 4 November 1945 he became prime minister and a member of the national council. On 1 February 1946, he was elected president of the republic by acclamation. He was often under attack even from within the party, accused of selling out to Rákosi’s ambitions. On 30 July 1948 he was forced by the Communists to resign. The excuse was the arrest of his son-in-law, Viktor Csornoky, ambassador to Cairo, on trumped-up charges in Budapest. Until early May 1956 he and his wife were kept under house arrest. Upon regaining his freedom he tried to participate in public life. From 27 October 1956 to 4 November 1956 he was minister of state in the Nagy cabinet. He initiated the reconstitution of the Smallholder Party in late October, but his relations with the short-lived new government were not friendly. He voted in favour of withdrawal from the Warsaw pact. On 4 November, when the Parliament was already surrounded by Soviet tanks, he instructed the guard to cease resisting, to avoid bloodshed. He was arrested in May

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1957. The courts sentenced him to six years in prison during the trial of Imre Nagy, but he was released in April 1959 on account of his age and the state of his health. He lived in retirement until his death. Valentiny, Ágoston (1888–1958) was a lawyer and Social Democratic official. He joined the party in 1918 and became a leader of the party branch in Szeged. He became a deputy in the Interim National Assembly and in the regular Parliament in 1945. From 22 December 1944 to 21 July 1945 he was minister of justice. Thereafter he opened a law office in Budapest. He was arrested in 1950 on trumped-up charges and sentenced to life in jail. He was granted a pardon in December 1955. He became a member of the reconstituted Hungarian Social Democratic Party at the end of October 1956. His sentence was voided in 1962 (after his death). Varga, Béla (1903–1995) was a Catholic priest and a papal prelate. He was parish priest of Balatonboglár from 1929 to 1947. Regarded as the founding father of the Smallholder Party, he was its vice chairman from 1937, and a deputy in Parliament from 1939. During World War II he was active on behalf of the Polish refugees. He was chairman of the Budapest branch of the party from 1945, and in April 1945 became member of the Interim National Assembly, then of the regular National Assembly. He was a member of the national council from 7 December 1945 to mid-January 1946 and speaker of Parliament from 7 February 1946. After Ferenc Nagy was forced to resign on 3 June 1947, he emigrated to the United States. At the time of his arrival in the USA the Hungarian immigrants belonged to diverse movements, grouped more or less according to the date of their arrival. The democratic parties felt a government in exile should be formed and they selected Varga as their leader, since he was speaker of Parliament and had never resigned his office; thus he was considered temporary head of state, on the basis of  Act I of 1946. Varga had important contacts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and was quite popular among the rather large group of Polish exiles. The Hungarian National Committee, officially established in 1949, was recognized not only by the democratically inclined Hungarian exiles, but also by the United States government and all the various agencies of the United Nations. The committee’s leadership included the most prominent Hungarian exiles. Thus Varga was known to almost all important American and Western officials and gained their trust; his opinion on Hungarian issues was usually accepted.

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He was instrumental in the Free Europe movement and in setting up Radio Free Europe. The national committee convinced the UN committee on forced labour of the existence of forced labour camps in Hungary and Eastern Europe. Although Hungary had no official representation in the UN until 1955, it was represented by the Hungarian National Committee. Once Hungary was admitted to the UN, the Hungarian National Committee was no longer consulted officially, but it continued to receive financial backing from the U.S. government, which consulted the committee even more than before. In the days of the October 1956 revolution every member of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council faced heavy responsibilities. While they were organizing aid for the revolutionary cause, they were fully aware of the consequences, given the Soviet dominance and the inevitability of defeat for the uprising. The Hungarian revolutionary council was formed in Strasbourg in January 1957 and united with the Hungarian National Committee to form the Hungarian Committee. Béla Varga was elected chairperson. The new organization was formed by democratic politicians from previous waves of emigration and the representatives from 1956. It played an important role in the work of the UN committee entrusted with the examination of the Hungarian revolution and its violent repression. It was largely responsible for the UN’s declaring the Soviet Union to be an aggressor in its dealings with Hungary. In those years the name of Béla Varga was often on the front page of the world press. He also enjoyed considerable prestige within the Hungarian Committee. His calm demeanour and good sense were often decisive in resolving all kinds of debated issues and in enhancing the committee’s prestige. The committee’s activities decreased only when Hungary (under the Kádár regime) was readmitted into the UN after announcing an amnesty in 1963. Varga received the news of the results of the parliamentary elections and the victory of the pro-democracy forces in April 1990 with great satisfaction. It was a great moment in his life when he was able to resume his office as speaker and return to the freely elected Parliament. This concluded his years in exile, but also signalled the end of the Hungarian committee, which he had headed (with its predecessor organizations) for 44 years. In 1991 he resettled in Hungary for good, first at Balatonboglár, at the parish house, then, due to ill health, in Budapest. In recognition of his meritorious actions during World War II he was granted honorary

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Polish citizenship. He died on 13 October 1995; his ashes rest at the church in Balatonboglár.4 Veres, Péter (1897–1970), a writer, journalist, and politician, participated in the agrarian unrest in the Hungarian plains from 1914. He acquired his broad culture as an autodidact. He served in the Great War. He became a member of the council in his town of Balmazújváros during the Republic of Councils. He joined the Social Democratic Party and was arrested several times because of his political activity. His writings dealing with the peasantry and land reform began to appear in left-wing and progressive papers from 1930 on. He belonged to the movement of populist writers. In 1944 he went into hiding from the Germans and the Arrow Cross. By the end of the war he had earned the respect not only of the landless peasants, whose spokesperson he had become, but also of the intellectuals and the younger generation. He became one of the founders of the National Peasant Party and was elected chairman of the party at the beginning of 1945, in Debrecen. As one of eight outstanding personalities, he was selected for the Interim National Assembly in April 1945. He remained a member of Parliament to his death. In 1945 he was the chairman of the national council for land reform. He accepted an appointment as cabinet minister twice: from March to September 1947 he was minister of reconstruction and public works, and from September 1947 to November 1948 he was minister of defence. In 1954 he became the chairperson of the Hungarian Writers’ Association. On 31 October 1956, at the founding of the Petőfi Party, he resigned all the posts he had held previously. After 1956 he intervened often on behalf of arrested writers and other intellectuals. He remained active as a writer until his death.

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Notes

Introduction 1 The archival sources and records are from the Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár [Archives of Political History and Trade Unions], the Magyar Országos Levéltár [National Archives of Hungary], the Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára [Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security], the Tudománypolitikai Intézet Kisgazda Levéltára [Smallholder Party Archives], the Csongrád Megyei Levéltár [Csongrád County Archives], Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Levéltár [Hajdu-Bihar County Archives], and the National Archives of the United Kingdom. Among others I was able to examine the records of the political parties, the Parliament of Hungary, the government of Hungary, the ACC, the documents of the National Council of People’s Tribunals, the office of the people’s prosecutor, the records pertaining to the political police, the records of the show trials, and the reports of the Hungarian public opinion survey service of 1945–48. 2 Scholars do not agree on either the definition or the exact borders of this region of Europe. In Hungary, according to the typology of the historian Jenő Szücs, it is called “East-Central Europe.” In the English-speaking world, however, it was called “Eastern Europe” for a long time, but recently it has become widely accepted that “Eastern Europe” is an inaccurate socio-economic and cultural stereotype and the region should not be so labelled. In German-speaking countries they traditionally use the term “Süd-Ost-Europa” or “Ostmitteleuropa.” In any case, descriptive terms give only interpretative assistance for understanding the specifics of the region. Petrás, Nacionalizmus és politikai romantika, 13. 3 The concept of “secondary winner/secondary loser” was introduced in Fülöp, A befejezetlen béke; Gyarmati, Európa alkonya.

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4 About the Hungarian historiography between 1945 and 1989 see Trencsényi and Apor, “Fine-Tuning the Polyphonic Past,” 1–8. 5 Here I will mention only three contemporary works by Hungarian exiles which, while published before the transition of 1989, are still relevant today: Nagy, Ferenc, The Struggle behind the Iron Curtain; Fejtö, Histoire des démocraties populaires; and Kertesz, Russia and the West. 6 Abrams, The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation…; Prazmowska, Civil War in Poland; Frommer, National Cleansing…; Dimitrov, Stalin’s Cold War; Wetting, Stalin and the Cold War; Sekelj, Yugoslavia. About the results of the post-Communist period of historiography in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania, see Antohi et al., eds, Nar­ ratives Unbound. 7 Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. 8 Romsics, ed., 20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers. 9 Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War. 10 Pittaway, Eastern Europe, 1939−2000. 11 Mevius, Agents of Moscow… 12 Kenez, Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets. 13 Gyarmati and Valuch, Hungary under Soviet domination. 14 For a synopsis of the debate and additional information, see Hogan, “State of the Art,” 3–19; Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1–16. 15 Bartha, “A sztálinizmus a régi és az új historiográfiában,” 15–40. 16 As already mentioned, this book does not cover the “Austrian issue”; yet Austria, as a consequence of the inconsistent, even cynical, “creation of peace” by the great powers and their interpretation of sovereignty, became a victim. Austria was the first victim to be absorbed by Hitler’s Third Reich, in March 1938. Only in May 1955, a decade after the guns fell silent, did Austria regain its national sovereignty. 17 Paczkowski, Pól wieku dziejów Polski. 18 The Yugoslav federal state also included a Third Reich ally, Croatia. 19 Cseh, ed., Documents of the meetings of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Another issue, unresolved in some Hungarians’ minds, even those of social scientists, is why, after the hard-fought common victory, should the Anglo-American allies back Hungary, on the opposite side during the war, against their former ally, the Soviet Union. 20 Ferenc Nagy, the Hungarian prime minister, was forced into exile at the end of May 1947. Nikola Petkov, the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, was arrested on 5 June 1947, received the death sentence on charges of conspiracy on August 23, and was executed, whereupon his party was dissolved. Iuliu Maniu, the leader of National Peasant Party in

Notes to pages xv–12

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Romania was arrested on 15 July 1947 and sentenced to life in prison on November 12, on charges of conspiracy. His party was dissolved late in July. Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, the chairman of the Polish Peasant Alliance, escaped from the country in October 1947. A month later he was deprived of his citizenship and his party was taken over by “sectarians.” 21 Gyarmati, Európa alkonya, 8. 22 Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 139–97.

CHAPTER ONE 1 Gibson, The Ciano Diaries 1939–1943, 484. Entry for 11 May 1942. 2 Stark, Magyarország második világháborús embervesztesége, 42–4; Szita, Együttélés, üldöztetés, holokauszt, 257; Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary, 1144. 3 Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary, 771–4. 4 Ibid., 762. 5 Congressional Record 103rd Congress, Page: E1109. Available at http:// thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r103:126:./temp/~r103oRK6FM:: Downloaded 4 August, 2010. 6 Romsics, István Bethlen, 178–9. 7 Bethlen István, Bethlen István gróf beszédei, 228. 8 A hold is a measure of land. One cadastral hold corresponds to 6882.5 square yards or 5,754.64 m2. The counts 2 million and 1.7 million in-

clude family members. 9 Ferenc Nagy, Öt millió magyar a Golgotán, 13–67.

CHAPTER two 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Juhász, Magyarország külpolitikája, 452. Berend and Ránki, Magyarország gyáripara, 537. Ibid., 541. Ránki, ed., Magyarország története, 1201. Ferenc Erdei was officially a member of the Peasant Party, but in fact he was secretly a member of the Communist Party. Volokitina, ed., Sovietsky faktor v Vostochnoy Evrope, 23–48. First publication: Isztocsnyik, 1995/4. 124–44. Regarding the resolution of the issue, see Sándor Balogh, Magyarország külpolitikája, 21, and Fülöp, A befejezetlen béke, 25–32. Sovietskiy faktor v Vostochnoy Evrope, 23–48. Ságvári, Mert nem hallgathatok, 29.

186

Notes to pages 13–23

10 Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár [Archives of Political History and Trade Unions] (Hereafter PIL) 274. f. 2/11. 11 Ernő Gerő’s notes on Stalin’s comments, PIL 274. f. 7/8. 12 Schöpflin, “A magyar kommunista párt útja 1945–50,” 241. 13 Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Block, 37; Mevius, Agents of Moscow, 48. 14 Churchill, The Second World War, 2: 503. See also Vida, “Az 1944. októberi Sztálin–Churchill találkozó és Magyarország,” 149–64. 15 Yalta (Crimea) Conference, February, 1945, II. Declaration of Liberated Europe, http://wiretap.area.com/Gopher/Gov/US-History/WWII/yalta.cnf Downloaded on 13 March 2009, and Halmosy, Nemzetközi szerződések 1918–1945, 656, 666. 16 Executive Agreement Series 456, 1945, 59 Stat. 1321. 17 Moreover, the Yugoslav and Czech missions also functioned to ensure the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. 18 About the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, see A Magyarországi Szövetséges Ellenőrző Bizottság jegyzőkönyvei. 19 See also Cseh, Amerikai és brit részvétel, 148–52; Figder, “British Political Attitudes towards Hungary,” 129–38. 20 National Archives, Kew, Foreign Office (FO) 371/48478. 21 Teherán, Jalta, Potsdam, 298. 22 Reported in Kis Újság, 29 May 1945. Ferenc Rákóczi, ruler of Transylvania, was the leader of the war of independence waged against the Habsburgs between 1703 and 1711, and Lajos Kossuth was the most prominent personality in 19th century Hungarian politics and the prime leader of the Hungarian revolution and war of independence in 1848–49. 23 Donáth, Demokratikus földreform Magyarországon, 28–38. 24 Zinner, “Adalékok az antifasiszta számonkéréshez,” 150–1. 25 Zinner, “Háborús bűnösök perei,” 130. 26 “Directive 81/1945 from the prime minister’s office” 5 February 1945, Magyar Közlöny. 27 The legal basis for the first internments and for the police surveillance was founded on the directives 4,353 and 30,035 issued by the Ministry of the Interior in 1920, as well as on regulations 8,130 of the prime minister and 760 of the Ministry of the Interior in 1939. 28 PIL 274. f. 11/10. Gábor Péter’s report to Mátyás Rákosi, dated 22 April 1945. This is confirmed in another source – NY. V-150342 of the Ministry of the Interior. According to the latter, 8,260 “Fascists and other reactionary individuals” had been taken into custody, of whom 1,608 were released, 1,869 interned, and 1,607 placed under police surveillance, whereas 809 were handed over to the people’s tribunals, and 1,437 were subjected to investigation (the fate of 1,477 detainees is not mentioned).

Notes to pages 23–33

187

29 PIL 274. f. 11/10. Gábor Péter’s report to Rákosi, 30 April 1945. 30 Ibid., report of 22 April 1945. 31 Magyar Országos Levéltár [National Archives of Hungary] (Hereafter MOL) XIX-A-1-e. 4. “Confidential directive of the Ministry of the Interior” 138000, dated 21 June 1945. See Palasik, “Bizalmas belügyminiszteri rendelet,” 87–94. 32 Ibid. 33 Major, Népbiráskodás–forradalmi törvényesség, 161. 34 Bibó, Válogatott tanulmányok, 2: 40–1. 35 PIL 274. f. 11/12. Meeting of representatives from political police divisions in the provinces, 28 February 1946. 36 Kertesz, “Soviet and Western Politics in Hungary,” 58–9; Bulletin of the Department of State 13, 1945, 478. 37 For the Conference on Reconciling Party Differences, see Horváth et al., eds, Pártközi értekezletek, 1–453. 38 Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security) (Hereafter ABTL), 3. 1. 9. V-2000/21. 39 The Pál Teleki Workers’ Cooperative was formed in 1943 to provide an anti-Nazi alternative for Hungarian society. It was to play a significant role in the Hungarian Independence Movement during the Nazi occupation the following year. 40 A scientific approach to the social and existential conditions of the peasantry in Hungary had already been undertaken in the second decade of the twentieth century. The so-called “populist” writers – the most significant literary, sociological, ethnographic, and political group - turned this trend into a nation-wide movement, beginning in the early 1930s. See Borbándi, A magyar népi mozgalom. 41 Gábor Bethlen (1580–1629), ruler of Transylvania, elective king of Hungary, is an outstanding figure of Hungarian history. 42 Vatai, “Beszélgetések Nagy Ferenccel,” 81. 43 20 August has been designated as the day for the celebration of the founding ruler, King István I (St Stephen), since the second half of the eighteenth century. 44 The Holy Right Hand is a religious relic, the embalmed right hand of King St Stephen, who established the Hungarian state at the beginning of the 11th century. The Holy Right Hand was housed in several chapels in Hungary. In 1944 it was carried away by the Arrow Cross, along with the crown jewels, in the winter and spring of 1945, and hidden in a cave in the vicinity of Salzburg. It was discovered by the United States army and brought back to Hungary by three members of the American military mission, in time for the 20 August festivities in 1945.

188 45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52

53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

Notes to pages 33–43

Saláta, Fejezetek a Független Kisgazdapárt 1945–os küzdelméből, 47–8. Kis Újság, 22 August 1945. Ibid. Litván, “Koalíciós közjáték 1945–1948,” 40–6. Rákosi, A magyar demokráciáért, 27–33. PIL 274. f. 2/32. Minutes of the 11 October 1945 meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. About the nationalist side of the Hungarian Communist Party, see Mevius, Agents of Moscow. Izsák, Rendszerváltástól rendszerváltásig, 35. Pál Teleki (1879–1941) was a geographer and a prime minister of Hungary. At the outbreak of World War II he ignored the German request to allow German troops to transit through the country, adopted the stand of “armed neutrality,” and offered a haven to Polish refugees. He signed a treaty of “everlasting friendship” with Yugoslavia. After the anti-German coup d’état in Belgrade in March 1941, Hitler asked for military cooperation against Yugoslavia, offering the possibility of further territorial revisions to Hungary. Unable to avoid reneging on the terms of the treaty with Yugoslavia, he committed suicide, denouncing the action in his farewell note to the Regent Horthy. About the life of Mindszenty see Margit Balogh, Mindszenty József. Izsák, Rendszerváltástól rendszerváltásig, 47. Litván, “Koalíciós közjáték 1945–1948”, 40–6. In late 1944 Erdei applied for membership in the Communist Party, but the Communists decided to keep this a secret. In a letter to Rákosi dated 28 December 1944, Gerő briefed Rákosi as follows: “Our decision was to accept him as member, but to keep it a secret.” Moszkvának jelentjük, 13. PIL 274. f. 7/186. Summary from 23 May 1945. Szücs, Dálnoki Miklós Béla kormányának, A: 302 and 304. Ibid., A: 13. Tudománypolitikai Intézet Kisgazda Levéltára (Smallholder Party Archives) 285. f. 10/30. Pártközi értelezletek, 70–73. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 71–2. Szücs, Dálnoki Béla kormányának, A: 422–4. Ibid., A: 530–1. Ibid., A: 510–12. The reporter from Kis Újság sought out both Béla Kovács and Ferenc Erdei the very same day. The disagreement was cleared up as follows: Kovács had indeed received instructions from the prime minister to investigate one

Notes to pages 44–51

68 69 70

71

72 73

74

75 76 77 78

189

particular case, and had received Erdei’s consent to that effect. Erdei added, however, that an investigation was already underway in that case, carried out by a committee formed by officials from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice. See Kis Újság, 8 June 1945. 68. Szücs, Dálnoki Béla kormányának, A: 510–22. PIL 253. f. 1/4. and Szücs, Dálnoki Béla kormányának, A: 591–2. See draft directive 522/1945 of 22 June 1945, among the documents of cabinet meeting of 27 June 1945. Dálnoki Miklós kormányának, A: 601–2. Gyömrő was an important village in Pest county. It fell into Soviet hands on 15 November 1944. Between early March and early May in 1945 the “people’s police” deported and usually killed, under various pretences, the prominent and not so prominent personalities from the Horthy era in Gyömrő and the surrounding villages – notaries, priests, government officials, landowners, a district judge, the owner of a restaurant, the superintendent of an estate, and even a postmaster. These persons were humiliated, tortured, and, in most cases, buried in the graves they were forced to dig. See Palasik, A jogállam megteremtésének, 84–94; Palasik, Félelembe zárt múlt. Szücs, Dálnoki Miklós kormányának, A: 591–2. Ibid., A: 592. Valentiny, Gyöngyösi, Teleki, Vásáry, Ferenc Nagy, and Faragho voted in favour of the proposal; Gerő, Molnár, Erdei, and Bán voted against it. Népszava, 8 July 1945. István Ries, who belonged to the left wing of the Social Democratic Party, became minister of justice on 21 July 1945. See Bölönyi, Magyarország kormányai, 95; also, Ferenc Nagy, Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött, 1: 154. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, 1: 175. Vida, ed., Iratok a Magyar­szovjet kapcsolatok történetéhez, 124–5. PIL 274. f. 2/32. The 11 October 1945 session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. PIL 274. f. 2/31. 23 August 1945, session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

chapter three 1 Kővágó, “Az 1945–ben tartott budapesti,” 63–4. 2 Oral information provided to the author by István Csicsery-Rónay, 10 March 2008. 3 Saláta, Fejezetek a Független Kisgazdapárt 1945–os küzdelméből, 71.

190

Notes to pages 51–67

4 Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Federacii (AVP RF) F. 06. Op. 7. P. 28. D. 371. 6. In Islamov and Volokitina, eds. Vostochnaya Evropa, 1, 272–4. 5 Dispatch by Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, and Mikoian to Stalin, 10 November 1945, in “K.J. Vorosilov marsall jelentései,” 85–6. 6 Cable by Molotov to Marshall Voroshilov in Budapest, 10 November 1945. Ibid., 86. 7 Dispatch of 11 November 1945 to Stalin and Molotov regarding negotiations surrounding the formation of the Hungarian government. Vostochnaya Evropa, 1, 294. 8 Dispatch of 13 November 1945. Ibid., 299–300.. 9 Dispatches dated 12, 13, and 14 November 1945. Ibid., 88–92. 10 Vida, ed., Iratok a Magyar­szovjet kapcsolatok történetéhez, 263. 11 Az 1945. november hó 29–ére összehívott Nemzetgyűlés Naplója, 1: 14. 12 Act I of 1946 in Magyar Törvénytár 1946, 3–12. See Palasik, A jogállam megteremtésének, 98–110. 13 The political committee of the National Assembly was appointed during the first session of the National Assembly – on 29 November 1945 – and its membership was raised to thirty-six. Of these nineteen were Smallholders, seven each came from the Communist and the Social Democratic parties, one from the Peasant Party, and two were independents. The committee remained active until 1949. 14 MOL XVIII-l. 10.d. 15 Ibid. 16 PIL 283. f. 10/241. 17 Proceedings of the National Assembly, session 1–30, 1030–4. 18 Ibid., 381. 19 Ibid. 20 PIL 274. f. 7/123. 21 MOL XVIII-7. 1.d. Minutes of 27 February 1946 meeting of the Communist MPs. 22 See Gyarmati, “Harc a közigazgatás birtoklásáért,” 497–570. 23 Nagy Ferenccel készült interjú, 1959, 1945–ös Alapítvány, Forum Film, no date. 24 Palasik, A jogállam megteremtésének, 147–9. 25 MOL XVIII-7. 1.d. Minutes of 12 March 1946, meeting of the Communist MP s. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.

Notes to pages 67–81

191

29 Ibid. The issue of anti-Semitism within the ranks of the party was discussed by the central committee at its 22 November 1945 meeting: “We must not overlook anti-Semitism that has surged within the party. For instance, in Baja, where name-calling was evident quite recently, and even at the level of the county committee, where three Jewish comrades were forced to resign. The excuse was: if they bring up the Swabian [ethnic German] issue, we will bring up the Jewish issue.” Intervention by Emánuel Safrankó. PIL 274. f. 2/33. 30 Ferenc Nagy, Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött, 1: 261–2. 31 PIL 274. f. 3/30. The 20 March 1946 session of the party committee. 32 MOL XVIII-7. 1.d. Minutes of the 3 May 1946 meeting of the Communist MP s. 33 PIL 274. f. 2/34. Minutes of the 17 May 1946 meeting of the central committee of the Communist Party. 34 Kis Újság, 1 May 1946. 35 Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, 174. 36 PIL 274. f. 7/151. It was published in Magyar Nemzet on 4 June 1946. 37 Ibid. 38 Szücs, Nagy Ferenc első kormányának, A: 760–3. 39 Tudománypolitikai Intézet Kisgazda Levéltára (Smallholder Party Archives) 285. f. 2/12. 40 Csicsery-Rónay, A történelem szolgálatában, 44; and Pártközi értekezletek, 204–11. 41 Szekler Land, inhabited by the Székely, descendants of Hungarian frontier settlers living in Eastern Transylvania. 42 Horváth et al., eds, Pártközi értekezletek, 204–11. 43 Békés, “Dokumentumok a magyar kormánydelegáció,” 161–94. 44 The British were also aware of the planned gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops. National Archives, Kew, FO 371/67170. 45 References to the negotiations in Moscow are from the 10 April dispatch by Grigoriev to Stalin regarding the discussions with the Hungarian officials in Moscow. See Vostochnaya Evropa, 1: 408–10. Also Iratok a magyar–szovjet kapcsolatok történetéhez, 195–206. 46 Ibid. 47 See contemporary press reports. Romsics, Magyarország története a XX. században, 295–303. 48 Tudománypolitikai Intézet Kisgazda Levéltára (Smallholder Party Archives) 285. f. 6/160.; PIL 274. f. 7/152. 49 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VI: 318–24. 50 Ibid., 324–5.

192

Notes to pages 81–92

51 National Archives, Kew, FO 371/59063. Report by A.K. Helm, 4 July 1946. 52 National Archives, Kew, FO 371/67170. Annual reports, Hungary 1946. 53 Imre Kovács, Magyarország megszállása, 298–9. 54 Tudománypolitikai Intézet Kisgazda Levéltára (Smallholder Party Archives) 285. f. 2/12. 55 László Tabi, “Bulletin on the price of lard.” Ludas Matyi, 1945, and His­ toria, 1980/1. 25. 56 Pető and Szakács, A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története, 58–66. 57 Berend, A szocialista gazdaság fejlődése Magyarországon 1945–1968, 41–53. 58 Balogh et al., Magyarország a xx . században, 293. 59 Kis Újság, 13 August 1946. 60 Az 1945. november hó 29–ére összehívott Nemzetgyűlés Naplója, 3: 215. 61 Sándor Balogh, Parlamenti és pártharcok, 322–3. 62 Kis Újság, 11 September 1946. 63 Kis Újság, 28 September 1946. 64 Both the Communist and the Smallholder leaders often resorted to the term “democracy” as a major weapon against the other’s argument. The contradiction stems from the fact that the meaning of the term was the opposite in each case. 65 “Megkezdődött az MKP III. kongresszusa!” [The Third Congress of the Communist Party is now open!] Szabad Nép, 29 September 1946. 66 József Révai, “A népi demokrácia és szocializmus viszonyáról, a parasztdemokráciáról és a munkás-paraszt szövetség új útjáról” [The new road to a relationship between people’s democracy and socialism, peasant democracy and the workers/peasant alliance], Szabad Nép, 1 October 1946. 67 “Az MKP III. Kongresszusának kiáltványa a magyar néphez!” [The call of the Third Congress of the Communist Party to the Hungarian people], Szabad Nép, 2 October 1946. 68 “Rákosi Mátyás: Kongresszus után” [Mátyás Rákosi: in the aftermath of the Congress], Szabad Nép, 6 October 1946. 69 László Komáromy, the head of police in the provinces and a member of the Smallholders, and his subordinate, police captain Miklós Jármay, took part in the preparations for the strictly confidential meeting. According to Jármay the objective was for Nagy and Kovács to convince the Soviet leaders not only to listen to the Communists but also to consider Smallholder opinion once in a while. See ABTL, 3. 1. 9. V-77995, Dr Imre Tarnóczy and company. 70 Ferenc Nagy, Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött, 1: 392–3. 71 Reference for the inter-party conferences: PIL 274. f. 7/154.

Notes to pages 93–102 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

79

80 81

82 83 84

85 86

193

Ibid. Bibó, Válogatott tanulmányok, 2: 27–8. Arany, Koronatanú, 23. Ferenc Nagy, Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött, 1: 372–3. PIL 283. f. 3/65. 1–2. The kulaks, or well-to-do peasants, became the “enemy” in the former socialist countries. Szabad Nép, 26 November 1946. Ernő Gerő, “Vigyázzanak, akik a fasizmus fegyvertárából kölcsönzik fegyvereiket!” [Let those who borrow their weapons from the Fascist armory beware!], Szabad Nép, 10 December 1946. Árpád Szakasits, “A kisgazdapárttól komoly politikai biztosítékot akarunk kapni” [We want meaningful political guarantees from the Smallholder Party], Szabad Nép, 10 December 1946. Szabad Nép, 11 December 1946. “Rákosi Mátyás rádióbeszéde. A válság egyetlen megoldása: ki a reakcióval a kisgazdapártból, a kormányzatból, a sajtóból, a politikai élet minden területéről” [Rákosi speaks over the radio: the only solution to the crisis: the reactionaries must be ousted from the Smallholder Party, the government, the press, and from all areas of public life!], Szabad Nép, 12 December 1946. Márton Horváth, “A reakcióval – vagy ellene?” (With the reactionaries, or against them?) Szabad Nép, 15 December 1946. MOL XVIII-7. 1.d. The 19 December 1946 session of the Communist MP s. According to the note concerning the discussions between Korotkevich and Sviridov at the beginning of April 1947, Rákosi sought to promote the rift within the Smallholder Party by asking the ACC to grant quick recognition to the party headed by Dezső Sulyok. He assumed that half of the members of the Smallholders would join Sulyok instead. See Vostochnaya Evropa, 1: 602. Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, 225. Reports by the Hungarian public opinion survey service, Országgyűlési Könyvtár [Library of Parliament], B3/2024. See also Palasik, “A Magyar Közvélemény-kutató Szolgálat jelentése,” 487–92.

chapter four 1 Recorded notes on the discussion held by Molotov and Mátyás Rákosi, on 29 April 1947. In Moszkvának jelentjük, 20. 2 Regarding the career of Szent-Iványi, see Török, Farkas esz meg, Medve esz meg.

194 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25

Notes to pages 103–17

ABTL 3. 1. 9. V-2000/58. Ferenc Nagy, Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött, 2: 7–12. Kornis, Tanúként jelentkezem, 143. Ferenc Nagy, Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött, 2: 12. Ibid., 2: 13–19. Ibid., 2: 58–9. Note by Pushkin. Recorded in Islamov and Volokitina, eds, Vostochnaya Evropa, 1: 561. PIL 867. f. V-62. Vas Zoltán visszaemlékezése (Recollections by Vas), 2: 552. István Dobi was a leader of the leftist group of Smallholders. Ferenc Nagy Z., Ahogy én láttam, 246. ABTL 2.1 64–135/14, 1970. Az 1945. november hó 29–ére összehívott Nemzetgyűlés Naplója, 5: 214–21. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, 1: 354. PIL 274. f. 3/73. Szabad Nép, 23 February 1947; A Reggel, 24 February 1947. Tudománypolitikai Intézet Kisgazda Levéltára (Smallholder Party Archive) 285. f. 6/34. Ibid., 285. f. 2/9. National Archives, Kew, FO 371/67170. ABTL V-77995 Dr Imre Tarnóczy and companions. See also the interview of Mrs Béla Kovács by Péter Bokor, Manuscript, Pécs, 1990. Csicsery-Rónay, Horváth, and Török, A demokrácia fellegvárának építői, 225. The building was erected according to the design of Adolf Feszty in 1881, on the site of an iron foundry. The three-storey apartment building was acquired by the Perlmutter family, the most famous member of which was Izsák Perlmutter, a popular artist of his age. In his will he bequeathed all his wealth, including the building, to the Jewish congregation of Pest, upon the death of his widow and his adopted daughter. That was not to be, however. Ferenc Szálasi, the leader of the anti-Semitic Arrow Cross Party installed his party’s offices on the second floor of this Jewish property; hence the building became known in common parlance as the House of Loyalty. After the Arrow Cross takeover Szálasi moved into the palace in Buda, but, as the main collection point for Jewish victims, 60 Andrássy Avenue remained a centre of Arrow Cross terror activities until the liberation of the city. ABTL 3. 1. 9. V-2000/28. Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, 303. This account corroborates the account in Ferenc Nagy’s memoirs.

Notes to pages 117–28

195

26 ABTL 3. 1. 9. V-2000/28. 27 Account by Zoltán Pfeiffer. In Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, 304. 28 Szabad Nép, 26 February 1947. 29 Magyar Nemzet, 9 March 1947. 30 Ibid. 31 Magyar Nemzet, 20 March 1947. 32 Halmosy, Nemzetközi szerződések 1945–1982, 119–26, and http:// avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp downloaded on 7 August 2009. 33 Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, 58–9. 34 Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 120. 35 Memorandum by the director of the office of East European affairs, 1 July, 1947. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, IV: 329–32. 36 Ibid., and Congressional Record, 80th Congress, vol. 93, part 5, 306–7. The speech was published in the 4 June New York Times. 37 For a list of the final sentences handed down by the appeals court see Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, 247–53. 38 Memorandum by the Soviet interrogators on the confessions of Béla Kovács, 27 March 1947. ABTL 3. 1. 9. V-2000/61, 71–6. 39 Az 1945. november hó 29–ére összehívott Nemzetgyűlés Naplója, session 7: 704. Intervention on 18 April 1947. 40 National Archives, Kew, FO 371/67174. 41 ABTL 3. 1. 9. V-2000/61. 60–65. 42 PIL 274. f. 2/45. 43 Moszkvának jelentjük, 159–62. 44 Ibid., 194–5. 45 Ibid., 198. 46 Ibid., 203. 47 Ibid. 48 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, 1: 376–7. The events described took place on 26–27 May 1947. 49 MOL XIX-J-1-k 18.d. 50 Fehér könyv, 115–17. 51 Ferenc Nagy, Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött, 2: 248–51. 52 Ibid. 53 One indication that he had not anticipated this final departure from his country is that he left his five-year old son behind; the boy was delivered to him by the Hungarian authorities only in exchange for his letter of resignation.

196

Notes to pages 128–33

54 National Archives, Kew, 371/67174. The 126th session of the National Assembly ended on 22 April 1947. The following session was summoned for 10 June, when the Dinnyés cabinet was introduced. 55 Világ, 24 June 1947. 56 Sirinelli et al., eds, La France de 1914 à nos jours, 249. 57 Rioux, La France de la IVe République, 1: L’ardeur et la nécessité, 1944– 1952, 160; According to Elgey (La république des illusions, 1945–1951 ou la vie secrète de la IVe République, 249.), Acheson’s statements were discussed on 27 February. 58 Allain, Guillen et al., Histoire de la diplomatie française, 2: De 1815 à nos jours, 381. 59 Ramadier did not provide an account of this visit to the members of his cabinet. The information comes from General Georges-Marie-Joseph Revers, chief of the general staff, who in turn cites personnel employed at the United States Embassy. See Elgey, La république des illusions, 278. 60 Ibid., 278–9. 61 Rioux, La France de la IVe République, 1: L’ardeur et la nécessité, 1944– 1952, 160–1. 62 Elgey, La république des illusions, 279. 63 Ibid. I am grateful to my colleague, Gusztáv Kecskés, for his assistance in interpreting the text of French monographs. 64 Blum, Killing Hope – US Military, http://killinghope.org/bblum6/italy1. htm, downloaded on 1 August 2010. 65 “Dissolving the cabinet” New York Times, 21 January, 26 January, 3 February, 5 May, 13 May, 14 May, 29 May, 2 June 1947. 66 Speech by George C. Marshall, “European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery”, 5 June 1947, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVI, Number 415, 1159–1160. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate= 1947-06-05&documentid=8-7, downloaded on 1 August 2010. 67 The Hungarian government seriously considered participation in the program, but ended up by rejecting the idea. Horváth et al., eds, Pártközi értekezletek, 533. 68 Subin, “SSSR i rezhimi ‘narodnih demokratiy’,” 393; MOL XIX-b-1j 2.d./17. 69 Vesselin, Stalin’s Cold War, 171. In 23 June 1947 the most prominent of Petkov’s followers were forced to resign. 70 Durandin, A román nép története, 337–8. Maniu died in prison in 1953. 71 Prazmowska, Civil War in Poland 1942–1948, 204–5. Mikołajczyk fled from Poland with three other members of the party leadership. First he went to the UK, then in 1948 he settled in the USA. He died in 1966.

Notes to pages 134–42

197

72 MOL XIX-J-1-k 22.d. The note verbale or communiqué addressed to Molotov was also delivered by the American chargé d’affaires in Moscow, Foy D. Kohler, on 12 June. MOL XIX-J-1-k 3.d. 73 Magyar Nemzet, 17 June 1947. The American note verbale and the Soviet response. 74 For a selection from their communications, see Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, 376–85. 75 Regarding other reports in the American press, see Mills, Winning the Peace, 30. 76 House of Lords, Official report 1946–47, 148: 509–11. Regarding the circumstances that enabled the British to obtain information on Hungary, see Figder and Palasik, “Brit jelentés a magyar politikai rendőrségről,” 168–9. 77 House of Lords, Official report 1946–47, 148: 534–7. 78 PIL 274. f. 2/46. 79 Vesselin, Stalin’s Cold War, 2007, 171–2.

CHAPTER FIVE 1 Fejtö, Histoire des démocraties populaires, 1: 124. 2 Security Council Official Records, Second Year, Special Supplement no. 3, 18–55. 3 Ibid., 44–5. 4 Magyar–szovjet kapcsolatok 1945–1948, 240. 5 European Peace Treaties, 273–98. 6 A tartós békéért, a népi demokráciáért, 9. Zhdanov’s keynote speech, ibid., 11–36. 7 Mevius, Agents of Moscow, 163. 8 Gyarmati and Valuch, Hungary under Soviet domination, 63–4. 9 Izsák, Polgári pártok és programjaik, 81–2. The law that became known in Hungarian history as “Lex Sulyok” also affected delegate Győző Drózdy of the Hungarian Freedom Party. 10 Ellenzék, 13 September 1947. 11 Az 1947. évi szeptember hó 16–ára összehívott Országgyűlés Naplója, 1: 146. 12 PIL 283. f. 10/208. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 By then Pfeiffer was followed by two detectives every step of the way. On 3 November he and some companions entered the small coffeehouse in the E.M. Kovács grocery store, at the corner of Ferenciek place and Curia

198

16 17 18 19 20 21

22

Notes to pages 142–5

Street, in Budapest. The store had two entrances, but it also had an exit from the storage room to the courtyard, of which the detectives were apparently unaware. While the two detectives stood guard at each of the entrances, Pfeiffer left via the courtyard. His companions remained for a few more hours; it was only when they departed that the detectives realized the one they were supposed to follow was no longer among them. Thus Pfeiffer escaped and managed to get out of the country with American assistance. I am grateful to Imre Del Medico for this story. Randy Herschaft and Cristian Salazar published the details of Pfeiffer and his family’s escape (ap impact : Archives uncloak the Pond, secret US intelligence group predating the cia . Available at http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_ SPY_AGENCY_THE_POND?SITE=CAFRA&SECTION=HOME&TEMP LATE=DEFAULT, downloaded 4 August 2010.) McCargar, a state department official who was secretly the Pond’s agent in Budapest, had been ordered to find a way to get Pfeiffer and his family – along with another couple – out of the country, hidden in four large crates. McCargar coordinated the escape with the help of fellow state department employee, Edmund Price, also identified in the papers as working for the Pond. But it was McCargar, armed with a pistol, who drove them out of Budapest, past four road blocks. At one, a Russian guard asked to see what was in the four crates. McCargar bribed him with cigarettes. They arrived in Vienna, a hotbed of international intrigue, where the U.S. shared control with their allies, the French and the British, as well as with the Soviets. Against this politically fraught backdrop, Pfeiffer and his family were taken to an airfield and spirited away to Frankfurt and on to New York. They arrived in the U.S. on 12 November as heroes of the anti-Communist opposition. National Archives in College Park, Md, Personal Papers of John Grom­ bach; Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Entry P 12, Series I, Subject and Country Files, 1942–45, Box 1, (folder titled PP, 1946–48.) A magyar parlament, 1944–1949, 254. Gábor, Az igazi szociáldemokrácia, 290. Eventually the people’s tribunal sentenced Kelemen to life in prison. He was pardoned in June 1956. Palasik, “Tildy Zoltán eltávolítása a hatalomból,” 152–61. See Tildy, under Biographies. MOL XX-4-b 119.d. The bishop was released on 30 May 1950. MOL XIX-E-1-z. He was rehabilitated on 5 October 1956 by the Supreme Court, since he had committed no crime. Gergely and Izsák, eds, A Mindszenty­per, 8–9.

Notes to pages 145–9

199

23 PIL 276. F. 54/51. He spent six years in confinement and was released on 30 October 1956. After the revolution he spent fifteen years within the American Embassy building in Budapest, essentially still a prisoner. 24 The summary of the research I conducted on this topic should be viewed as tentative. The National Archives of Hungary alone houses over twentythree feet of relevant records. Moreover, the provincial archives also hold much relevant material. The sampling allows us to assert that we have come up with a valid classification; the only unresolved issue is how many hundreds or thousands of each type might there be? See Palasik, “A szólásszabadság deklarálása,” 585–601. 25 Of course, only with regard to freedom of speech. 26 MOL XIX-E-14 82.d. 27 MOL XX-4-b 70.d. 5 October 1948. 28 MOL XIX-E -44 82.d. 29 The so-called “B-list” included the names of civil servants whose services were terminated. 30 MOL XIX-E-14 82.d. 31 See Eckhardt, under Biographies. 32 MOL XIX-E-1-1 118.d. Sentence on 7 October 1947. 33 Records of the people’s prosecutor’s office, Csongrád County Archives, XXV. 6. 16.d. 34 MOL XIX-E-1-1 118.d. Sentence on 9 April 1948. 35 MOL XX-4-b 91.d. 36 MOL XIX-E-1-1 118.d. Sentence on 26 February 1948. 37 MOL XX-4-b 84.d. Sentence on 22 March 1949. 38 MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Sentence on 20 September 1947. 39 MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Sentence on 25 July 1947. 40 MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Sentence on 18 November 1947. 41 MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Sentence on 16 May 1947. 42 MOL XX-4-b 69.d. 43 MOL XIX E-1-1 82.d. 44 Ibid. 45 MOL XX-4-b 76.d. Sentence on 10 November 1948. 46 MOL XX-4-b 78.d. Sentence in the first instance, 22 October 1947. On appeal, December 21, 1948. 47 In July 1945, 425,319 Hungarian POWs resided in the Soviet Union. According to Russian archival materials, the first group of POWs was sent home to Hungary in June 1945. By 10 November of that year, 234,445 Hungarian POWs remained in the USSR. In the fall of 1946 the treatment of POW s took a sudden turn for the worse because of the drought and the

200

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

Notes to pages 149–68

poor harvest; the prisoners released were mostly weak and in poor health. Only about half of all POWs released in 1947 were able to work. By the end of 1948, 7,506 Hungarian POW s remained in Soviet custody. Between 51,000 and 55,000 Hungarian POW s perished in prisoner of war camps. See Varga, ed., Magyar hadifoglyok a Szovjetunióban. MOL XIX E-1-1 126.d. Sentence on December 20, 1948. Hajdú-Bihar County Archive, XXV. 21. 10.d. MOL XIX-E-1-1 118.d. Ibid. Sentence on 8 November 1948. MOL XX-4-b 93.d. Sentence on 7 November 1949. Records of this type were found in every source I examined. MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Sentence on 15 October 1947. MOL XX-4-b 82.d. MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Sentence on 29 March 1947. See also Palasik, “A jogállam csapdái,” 1305–31. MOL XIX-E-1-1 118.d. Sentence on 17 April 1948. MOL XIX-E-1-1 85.d. Sentence on 21 March 1949. MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Records of the people’s prosecutor’s office in Szeged, Csongrád County Archives, XXV. 6. 16.d. Magyar törvénytár [Hungarian law digest], 1946, 23–4. MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Ibid., 83.d. MOL XIX-E-1-1 82.d. Sentence on 13 March 1947. Ibid., 83.d. Sentence on 19 March 1947. MOL XIX-E-1-1 83.d. Ibid. Sentence on 21 June 1947. MOL XX-4-b 71.d. Sentence on 4 October 1948. MOL XIX-E-1-1 83.d. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 82.d.

BIOGRAPHIES 1 Bibó, Válogatott tanulmányok, 2: 284–5. 2 Borbándi, “Nagy Ferenc emigrációban,” 101–8. 3 http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/tamileelam/56sir_john.htm, downloaded on 10 September 2009; and Csicsery-Rónay, “Nagy Ferenc missziója a bandungi konferencia idején,” in Nagy Ferenc miniszterelnök, 112.

Note to page 181

201

4 “Varga Béla pápai prelátus, apostoli protonotárius, a Nemzetgyűlés egykori elnöke, Balatonboglár díszpolgára részletes életrajza” [Detailed biography of papal prelate, apostolic protonotary, former speaker of the National Assembly, honorary citizen of Balatonboglár, Béla Varga] compiled by Gábor Tompos and Zsolt Horváth. http://www.bbkvtar.hu/konyvtar/ szemelytar/v/varga per cent20bela.html, downloaded on 30 June 2007.

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Index

ACC. See Allied Control Commission Acheson, Dean, 81, 120, 130, 195n33, 196n57 agricultural interests, 85–8 Albania, xiv, 55, 168 Allain, Jean-Claude, 196n58 Allied Control Commission, 53, 79– 82, 84, 87, 91, 104, 117–19, 125– 6, 133, 138, 183n1, 184n19, 186n18; American military mission, 18; British mission, 18; chairman of, 17; role of 17–19; Soviet mission, 17 American notes, 118–19, 133, 135, 197n73 anti-Nazi resistance, 102–3, 157, 171, 187n39 “anti-republic conspiracy.” See Hungarian Community Apor, Péter, 184n4 Arany, Bálint, 32, 94, 103, 109–10, 193n74 armistice agreement, 17–21, 26–7 , 36, 76, 79, 81, 118, 134 Arrow Cross, 6, 8–9, 19, 21, 23–4, 68, 77–8, 84, 157, 166, 169, 173, 176, 181, 187n44, 194n23

Association of Catholic Women and Girls, 46 Attlee, Clement, 78 Auer, Pál, 32, 167 Austria, ix, 3–5, 75, 79, 84, 124–5, 131, 134–5, 137–8, 166, 173, 184n16 AVO. See political police Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Endre, 19, 29, 157 Baky, László, 6 Balfour, A.J., 17 Bálint, Sándor, 40 Balogh, István, 113, 128, 164 Balogh, Margit, 188n53 Balogh, Sándor, 185n7, 192nn58, 61 Bán, Antal, 142, 158, 189n73 Barankovics, István, 28, 39–40 Bartha, Albert, 103 Bartha, Eszter, 184n15 Beisner, Robert L., 120, 195n33 Bencze, Imre, 60 Beneš, Edvard, xiv, 76 Berend, T. Iván, 185nn2, 3ch2, 192n57 Beria, L.P., 11, 190n5 Bethlen, Gábor, 32, 187n41

222

Index

Bethlen, István, 6–7, 30, 172, 185nn6, 7 Bibó, István, 16, 25, 93, 158, 187n34, 193n73, 200n1 Bidault, Georges, 78, 131 B-list, 141, 147, 199n29 “blue slip” voting, 140 Blum, William, 131, 196n64 Bognár, József, 32, 92 Bokor, Péter, 194n21 Bölöni, György, 26 Borbándi, Gyula, 167, 187n40, 200n2 Borhi, László, xi, 120, 184nn9, 14, 185n22, 195n34 Bradley, F. Adams, xi Braham, Randolf L., 185nnn2, 3, 4 British notes, 118–19, 133 Bulgaria, ix, xiii-xv, 18, 50, 55, 96, 98, 120, 132–5, 137, 168, 184n20 Byrnes, James, 27, 78 Caffery, Jefferson, 130 Canada, 84 Catholic Peasant Youth Association, 81 Central Workers and Soldier Soviet, 174 Chou En-lai, 168 Christian National Union Party, 175 Christian Women’s Camp, 175 Churchill, Winston, 14, 18, 186n14, 207, 219; agreement with Stalin in Moscow, 14 Ciano, Galeazzo, 3, 185n1 citadel of democracy, 52 Civic Democratic Party, 10, 48, 60; introduction of, 38–9 Cold War, xi-xii, xv, 184nnn6, 9, 14, 185n22, 195nn33, 34, 196n69, 197n79

Communist Party. See Hungarian Communist Party Communist Party of the USSR, 52, 169, 174 Communist takeover, ix, xii-xiii, xv, 58–9, 118 Conference on Reconciling Party Differences. See inter-party conferences Council of Trade Union. See trade unions CPUSSR. See Communist Party of the USSR Csécsy, Imre, 28, 40 Cseh, Gergő Bendegúz, 184n19, 186n19 Csicsery-Rónay, István, 32, 51, 75, 105, 189n1, 191n40, 194nn22, 25, 195nn27, 37, 197n74, 200n3 Csorba, János, 60 Csornoky, Viktor, 143, 178 Czechoslovakia, ix, xiii-xv, 4, 12, 17, 116, 134, 160, 186n17; peace preparations, 75–9 Darvas, József, 38 defending the republic’s code of law, 57–60 De Gasperi, Alcide, 131–2 de Gaulle, Charles, 12 Del Medico, Imre, 198n15 Democratic People’s Party, 34, 64, 66, 142–4; introduction of, 39–40 Dénes, István, 31 Denmark, 20, 84 Dinnyés, Lajos, 124, 128, 196n54 Dobi, István, 32, 109, 158, 194n11 Donáth, Ferenc, 186n23 Donáth, György, 121 Durandin, Catherine, 196n70

Index East-Central Europe, xiii, 166, 183n2 Eastern Europe, ix-xi, xiii, xv, 79, 120, 137, 168, 172, 180, 183n2, 184n10 Eckhardt, Sándor, 40 Eckhardt, Tibor, 147, 159, 178, 199n31 Edgcumbe, Oliver P., 18 Eichmann, Adolf, 6 Electoral Court, 27, 140 Erdei, Ferenc, 11, 24, 38, 41–2, 95, 159, 185n5 Estonia, 168 Faragho, Gábor, 8, 11, 189n73 Farkas, Ferenc, 38 Farkas, Mihály, 35, 38, 53, 64, 160 Fejtő, Ferenc. See Fejtö, François Fejtö, François, 136, 184n5, 197n1 Fenyő, Miksa, 16 Feszty, Adolf, 194n23 Figder, Éva, 186n19, 197n76 Finland, ix, 50, 137, 213 first woman deputy, 175. See also Slachta, Margit FKGP. See Smallholder Party France, xiv, 12, 78, 98, 130, 132, 161, 179, 196nnn56, 57, 61 Francis Joseph, King, 3 free elections. See general elections of November 1945 Free Europe movement, 180 Free Hungarian Trade Union Council, 172 Frommer, Benjamin, xi, 184n6 Fülöp, Mihály, 183n3, 185n7 Gábor, Róbert, 198n17 Gascoigne, Alvary D.F., 18 Gati, Charles, 13, 186n13

223

Gavam-e-Sultaneh, 125 general elections of November 1945, xii, xiv, 15–16, 33–4, 37–40, 47; democratic suffrage, 25–7, 144, 178; New York Times commented on, 52; rejection of a joint list, 50–1, 54, 61–2, 74; Viscount Templewood on, 134 Gergely, Jenő, 198n22 Germany, 3–10, 14, 16–17, 47, 78, 84, 103, 131, 135–7, 166, 173 Gerő, Ernő, 12–13, 35, 43–4, 71, 87, 96, 160–1, 162, 186n11, 188n56, 189n73, 193n78 Gibson, Hugh, 185n1 Gömbös, Gyula, 7, 175 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Greece, 96, 120–1, 135, 137 Gromyko, Andrei, 137 Gruber (interpreter), 90 Gyarmati, György, vii, xi, 183n3, 184n13, 185n21, 190n22, 197n8 Gyöngyösi, János, 11, 17, 27, 33, 67, 74, 78, 147, 189n72 Gyulai, László, 32, 105, 108, 117 Harriman, W.A., 17 Helm, Alexander K., 18, 123, 128, 192n51 Herschaft, Randy, 198n15, 211 Hitler, Adolf, xiii, 4–5, 9–10, 134, 150–1, 166, 184n16, 188n52 Ho Chi Minh, 168 Holman, Adrian, 137 Holocaust, 5–6, 185nn2, 3 Holy Crown of Hungary, 9, 169 Horthy, Miklós, xv, 3–6, 8, 10, 121, 159, 176, 178, 188n52 Horthy regime, 23, 32, 35, 39, 57, 61, 70, 189n71

224

Index

Horváth, János, 32, 105 Horváth, Julianna, 187n37, 191n42 Horváth, Zsolt, 201n4 Hungarian Brotherhood Community. See Hungarian Community Hungarian Committee, 167, 180 Hungarian Communist Party, xi, xvxvi, 10–11, 13, 23, 26, 28, 30, 41– 3, 45–6, 48, 50–2, 57, 60, 64–8, 70, 72–4, 76, 80, 83, 86, 89–91, 93–4, 96–9, 101, 106–8, 113, 119, 121, 123–4, 129, 138–43, 148, 152, 157, 159–61, 169, 173–4, 185n5, 188nn50, 56, 189nn77, 78, 191n33, 192nn65, 67; attack against the centre group of Smallholders, 104; and the coalition crisis in the spring 1946; introduction of, 35–7; and the joint list, 50–1 Hungarian Community, 101–3, 108– 10, 121–2, 151 Hungarian Freedom Party, 39, 139, 152, 176, 197n9 Hungarian Front. See Hungarian National Front of Independence Hungarian Independence Movement. See anti-Nazi resistance Hungarian Independence Party, 139, 141–2 Hungarian National Committee, 167, 172, 179–80 Hungarian National Front of Independence, 10, 28, 37, 39, 139, 171, 176 Hungarian National Uprising Liberation Committee. See antiNazi resistance Hungarian Peasant Alliance, 31, 34, 86, 88, 95, 105, 116, 121, 158, 163, 166, 177

Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute, 99, 183n1 Hungarian Radical Party, 28, 172; introduction of, 40 Hungarian Republic of Councils, 35, 158, 160, 171, 173–4, 176, 181 Hungarian Revolutionary Council, 167, 180 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, 159, 162, 165, 174 Hungarian Telegraphic Agency, 117, 127, 171 Hungarian Workers’ Party, 143–4, 154–5, 160–1, 165, 170, 173, 177 Hungarian Writers’ Association, 181 Illyés, Gyula, 38 Imrédy, Béla, 7, 22, 175–6 Independence Front. See Hungarian National Front of Independence Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, 139, 164 Independent Smallholders. See Smallholder Party Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers and Bourgeois Party. See Smallholder Party inflation, 52, 61, 82–3, 85 interest of the peasantry. See agricultural interests Interim National Assembly, 10, 14, 16, 21, 28, 158, 172 Interim National Government, 16, 20, 25, 39, 44; declared war on Germany, 16 International Brigade, 173 international reasons for changing of Soviet tactics, 129–33 International Socialist Bureau, 172

Index internment, 19; the mechanisms of, 22–5; 58, 86, 170, 186n27 inter-party conferences, 28, 73, 81, 94, 187n37, 192n71 interpretation of democracy, 89–93 Iran, xiii, 125 Iron Curtain, x-xi, 166, 184n5 Italy, xiv, 4, 55, 98, 131–2, 137, 196n64 Izsák, Lajos, 188n51, 197n9, 198n22 Jaczkó, Pál, 32, 105, 108, 116 Jármay, Miklós, 115, 192n69 Joint (American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), 84 Judt, Tony, xi, 184n6 Juhász, Gyula, 9, 185n1ch2 Juhász Nagy, Sándor, 26 Kádár, János, 36, 155, 161–2, 164–5, 170, 180 Kapócs, Ferenc, 115 Károlyi, Mihály, 26 Kecskés, Gusztáv, 196n63 Kelemen, Gyula, 142–3, 162, 198n17 Kenez, Peter, xi, 184n12 Kertész, István, 74, 184n5 Kéthly, Anna, 30, 48, 99, 142–3, 171 Key, William S., 18 Khrushchev, Nikolai, 162, 174 Király, Béla K., xi, 167 Kiss, Sándor, 32, 86, 105–6 Kodály, Zoltán, 26 Kominform, 138 Kondratov, Anatoly N., 104 Kornis, Pál, 103, 194n5 Kossuth, Lajos, 19, 110, 186n22 Kossuth Party, 31 Koszorús, Ferenc, 6 Kotewala, John, 168

225

Kovács, Béla, 31, 33, 43, 51–4, 57, 68, 70, 71–4, 81–2, 85, 87–8, 102, 105–6, 108–10, 113–14, 116, 121– 6, 127–8, 133, 139, 163–4, 188n67, 194n21, 195n38; arrested by Soviet authorities, 117–18; discussion with Pushkin, 90–2; general secretary of the party, 68; parliamentary immunity of, 109, 118; Rákosi’s attack against, 106–11; removed, 113–15; undersecretary, 43; Western protest against the arrest of, 118–20 Kovács, Imre, 38, 42, 81, 95, 99, 123, 139, 164, 167, 192n53 Kovács, István, 110, 112 Kővágó, József, 49–50, 189n1 Kun, Béla, 36 Kuznetsov, A.A., 123 land reform, xvi, 7, 19–20, 32, 34, 38, 64, 69, 97, 114, 144, 149, 169, 175, 181 Lantos, Tom, 6 Latvia, 169 Left Bloc, 64, 72–4, 76, 79, 81–2, 89– 90, 92–5, 113 Lithuania, 168 Litván, György, 40, 188nn48, 55 Lombardo, Ivan, 131–2 Maisky, I.M., 11–12 Major, Ákos, 187n33 Maniu, Iuliu, 132, 136–7, 184n20, 196n70 Márai, Sándor, 16 Marosán, György, 30, 164–5 Marshall, George C., 132; Recovery Program for Europe, Marshall Plan, 132, 136, 138, 196n66, 214

226

Index

McCormick, Anne O’Hare, 5 Memorandum of United States. See American notes Mevius, Martin, xi, 13, 138, 184n11, 186n13, 188n50, 197n7 Miklós, Béla Dálnoki, 11, 16, 26, 41, 45, 169, 188nn58, 64, 189nnnn68, 69, 70, 72 Mikołajczik, Stanislaw, 133, 185n20, 196n71 military police, 103–4 Mindszenty, József, xiii, 39–40, 58, 144, 165, 176, 188n53, 198n22 Mistéth, Endre, 32, 105, 121–2 MKP. See Hungarian Communist Party Molnár, Erik, 11, 189n73 Molotov, V.M., 11, 17, 51, 77–8, 133, 190nnn5, 6, 7, 193n1; conversation between Molotov and Rákosi, 54, 124–5 Moór, Gyula, 26, 32, 141 municipal elections in Budapest, 47–9, 175 Mussolini, Benito, 3–4 Nagy, Ferenc, xiii, 7, 31–4, 43, 50–1, 53–4, 57, 61–3, 66, 68, 70–7, 78, 80, 82, 84–5, 90–2, 94–5, 97–9, 102–10, 112–13, 115–16, 122–9, 133, 135, 137, 140, 163, 165–9, 171, 175, 178–9, 184n20, 185n9, 189nn73, 74, 191n30, 192n70, 193n75, 194nnnn4, 6, 12, 25, 195n51; coup against, 127–9; prime minister, 61–2; resignation of, 127 Nagy Z., Ferenc, 108, 194n12 Nagy, Imre, 11, 35, 154–5, 159, 161– 4, 169–70, 179

National Assembly, 26, 33, 48, 53, 60, 63, 85, 88, 110, 112, 117, 119, 130, 141–2, 169, 171–2, 174–9, 190nn13, 17; Immunity Committee of, 114 National Committee of Budapest, 47 National Council of People’s Tribunals. See people’s tribunals National Peasant Party, xv, 10–11, 15, 28–30, 41–2, 48, 54, 57, 60, 64, 66, 75, 81, 86, 94–5, 99, 123, 132, 139, 154, 159, 164, 181, 184n20, 185n5, 190n13; introduction of, 37–8 National Women’s Organization, 163 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 167–8 new currency. See stabilization occupation troops. See Soviet occupation Oltványi, Imre, 92 Ordass, Lajos, 144 Ortutay, Gyula, 32, 117, 171 Pál Teleki Workers’ Cooperative (Teleki Pál Munkaközösség), 32, 187n39. See also anti-Nazi resistance Palasik, Mária, 187n31, 189n71, 190nn12, 24, 193n86, 197n76, 199n24 Pálffy, György, 103–4 Pálffy, József, 39 Paris peace treaty, 124, 130, 138; conference, 76–8, 80; talks, 9, 80, 147 parliamentary elections. See general elections of November 1945 Patriotic People’s Front, 160, 171 Pátzay, Pál, 26

Index Peace Treaty of Trianon, 3–4, 8, 74, 102, 158 Peasant Party. See National Peasant Party. peasant unity, 70, 94–5, 99 people’s prosecutors, 25, 145, 153 people’s tribunals, 21, 23–5, 43, 59– 60, 64, 146–52, 163, 165, 183n1, 186n28; certification process, 22–3 Perlmutter, Izsák, 194n23 Péter, Gábor, 23, 104, 108, 186n28, 187n29; interrogation of Béla Kovács by, 116 Peterson, Maurice, 133 Petkov, Nikola, 132, 135, 184n20, 196n69 Pető, Iván, 192n56 Petőfi Party. See National Peasant Party Petrás, Éva, 183n2 Peyer, Károly, 30, 48, 99, 142–3, 171–2, 216; memorandum of Peyer’s group, 99 Pfeiffer, Zoltán, 32, 57, 79–80, 116– 17, 138–42, 172, 195n27, 197–98n15 Pittaway, Mark, xi, 184n10 Poland, ix, xiii-xiv, 4–5, 13, 120, 132–3, 138, 168, 184, 196 Polish Peasant Alliance, 133, 185n20 political police, 23–5, 103–4, 106, 109, 114, 119, 122, 141, 164, 183n1, 187n35; debates regarding political police, 41–2; interrogation of Béla Kovács, 115–17 Prazmowska, Anita J., xi, 184n6, 196n71 Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic, 159, 177

227

proclamation of the republic, 54–7 Pushkin, Georgy M., 17, 19, 27, 45, 53, 73, 79, 90–1, 107, 126, 194n9 Radio Free Europe, 180 Raffay, Sándor, 117 Rajk, László, xiii, 36, 80, 82, 104, 107, 113, 155, 160, 162, 172–3 Rákóczi, Ferenc, 19, 186n22 Rákosi, Mátyás, xv, 12–13, 35–7, 45–6, 49, 53–4, 62–4, 66–7, 69, 71–3, 76, 87–90, 92–3, 96, 101–9, 112–14, 118, 123–9, 134–5, 138– 43, 147–9, 152–5, 160–2, 166, 170, 173–4, 178, 186n28, 187n29, 188nn49, 56, 189n75, 192n68, 193nnn81, 84, 1ch4, 194n15, 195n48; and attack against the Smallholder leaders, 101, 102, 105–6; coup against Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, 124–9 Ramadier, Paul, 130–1, 196n59 Ránki, György, 185nn2–4ch2 Red Army, ix, xiv, xvi, 8–9, 12, 37, 65, 71, 77, 79–80, 153, 158, 161 rejection of the joint list, 51–2 Reusemann, expert, 132 Révai, József, 35, 70–1, 75, 79, 89, 93, 105, 108–9, 112, 127, 174, 192n66 Revers, Georges-Marie-Joseph, 196n59 Ries, István, 24, 58, 175, 189n74 risk of freedom of speech, 145–53 Romania, ix, xiii-xiv, 4–5, 18, 50, 96, 98, 120, 132–4, 136–7, 168, 170, 184n6, 185n20; peace preparations, x, xi, 184n8, 185n6, 191n47

228

Index

Safrankó, Emánuel, 191n29 Ságvári, Ágnes, 185n9ch2 Saint Stephen’s Day, 20 August, 87, 187n43; Holy Right Hand, 33, 187n44; King St Stephen, 187n44 “salami tactics,” 138–9 Saláta, Kálmán, 32–4, 50–1, 75, 82, 94, 103, 105–6, 175, 188n45, 189n3 Salazar, Cristian, 198n15 Schoenfeld, Arthur, 18, 27, 81 Schöpflin, Gyula, 13, 186n12 Sekelj, Laslo, xi, 184n6 Serédi, Jusztinián, 39 show trials, xiii, 101–2, 122, 143–4, 183n1 Sirinelli, de Jean François, 196n56 60 Andrássy Avenue, 115–16, 194n23. See also political police Slachta, Margit, 39, 66, 175 Slovakia, xiii, 4–5, 184n6 Smallholder Party, xii-xvi, 10–11, 20, 28, 30–1, 45–9, 52, 54, 57, 63–6, 69–71, 74–6, 79–82, 85–6, 88–91, 93–9, 101, 103, 105, 108, 110–13, 115–16, 118–19, 121–4, 127–9, 133, 139–40, 151, 154, 158–9, 163, 165, 171, 175–6, 178–9, 188n60, 191nn39, 48, 192n54, 193nn81, 84, 194n18; centre of, 31–2; introduction of, 31–4; National Peasant Days, 7−9 September, 1946, 87–8; resistance in Parliament, 7 February 1947, 110–13 Smallholders. See Smallholder Party Social Democratic Party, 10, 15, 28– 9, 35, 37–8, 58, 66, 86, 95, 99, 139, 142, 152, 157–8, 162–4, 167,

169, 171–2, 175, 177, 181, 189n74; coup within the, 142–3; introduction of, 29–31 Society of Social Brotherhood and Sisterhood, 175 Southeastern Europe, 14, 52, 62, 97, 136, 169 Soviet occupation, xiii, 77, 85, 98, 101, 117–19, 124–5, 138; and “malenky robot,” 16 Soviet Union, x-xi, xiii-xiv, 3, 5, 8, 10–14, 16–18, 27, 30, 35–7, 53, 65, 84–5, 98, 120, 124–5, 129–30, 133, 137–8, 149, 160–1, 164, 168– 9, 173–4, 180, 193, 184n19, 199n47; and formation of a new government in November 1945, 52–3 stabilization, 82–5 Stachursky, Mihail M., 17 Stalin, J.V., xiv-xv, 11–14, 36–7, 50– 2, 54, 77, 124, 126–7, 130–1, 138, 153–4, 170, 184n6, 186n11, 190nn5, 7, 191n45, 196n69, 197n79; Stalin−Churchill agreement, 14 Sulyok, Dezső, 32, 59–60, 66, 71, 99, 109, 139, 152, 175, 193n84; and the independents, 66; “Lex Sulyok,” 140, 197n9; Sulyok-Vásáry group, 66 Supka, Géza, 39 Susaikov, Ivan Z., 126–7 Sviridov, Vladimir P., 17, 79, 104, 107, 117, 119, 126–7, 133, 193n84; letter of, 79–81 Sweden, 84 Switzerland, 84, 125–7, 158, 166 Szabó, Tamás, 32, 50 Szakács, Sándor, 192n56

Index Szakasits, Árpád, 30, 44, 53, 95–6, 106, 114, 142–3, 152, 176–7, 178, 193n79 Szálasi, Ferenc, 8–10, 22, 29, 151, 194n23 SZDP. See Social Democratic Party Szeder, Ferenc, 30, 177 Szélig, Imre, 30 Szent-Györgyi, Albert, 26 Szent-Iványi, Domokos, 11, 94, 103, 110, 116–17, 193n2 Szent-Iványi, Sándor, 39 Szirmai, István, 37 Szőnyi, István, 26 Szűcs, Jenő, 183n2, 217 Tabi, László, 192n55 Takács, Ferenc, 11 Tamási, Áron, 26 Tarnóczy, Imre, 192n69, 194n21 Teleki, Géza, 11, 38 Teleki, Pál, 5, 32, 38, 159, 187n39, 188n52, 189n73 Templewood, Samuel Hoare, 134 Thorez, Maurice, 130 Tildy, Zoltán, 32–3, 41–2, 50, 53, 61, 66, 80–1, 92, 98, 104, 117, 124, 127, 129, 135, 152, 165–6, 169, 177, 178–9, 198nn18, 19, 215; and joint list, 50–1; president by voice acclamation, 57; prime minister, 53; resignation of, 143; son-in-law executed, 143 Timár, István, 116 Tito, Josip Broz, 162 Tömpe, András, 45 Tompos, Gábor, 201n4 Török, Bálint, 193n2, 194n22 trade unions, 10, 21, 30, 34, 48, 64, 90, 130, 172

229

Trencsényi, Balázs, 184n4 Trianon. See Peace Treaty of Trianon Truman, Harry S., 119–20, 130, 134, 196n66; Truman Doctrine, 120 Turkey, 120, 137 United Kingdom, 14, 17, 136–7, 179, 183n1 United Nations, xiii, 15, 55, 84, 120, 135, 137, 179; Hungary for membership in, 137 United States, xi-xii, xiv, 3–4, 6, 13, 17–18, 27, 31, 40, 52, 56, 78, 84– 5, 118–20, 130–2, 136–8, 147, 151, 166, 175–6, 178–9, 187n44, 191n49, 196nn59, 71 UNRRA, 84 USA. See United States USSR. See Soviet Union Valentiny, Ágoston, 11, 42, 44, 48, 179, 189n73 Valuch, Tibor, xi, 184n13, 197n8 Vámbéry, Rusztem, 26 Vandenberg, Arthur H., 121 Vansittart, Robert G., 134–5 Varga, Béla, 31, 33, 48–9, 57–8, 72, 92, 94–5, 105, 108–9, 122, 127– 29, 176, 179–80, 200n47, 201n4; speaker of the house, 57 Vas, Zoltán, 35, 48–50, 107, 194n10 Vásáry, István, 11, 42, 66, 189n72 Vatai, László, 32, 105, 187n42 Veér, Imre, 31 Veres, Péter, 38, 62, 95, 181 Veress, Lajos Dálnoki, 103, 121 Vesselin, Dimitrov, xi, 196n69, 197n79 Vida, István, 186n14, 189n76, 190n10, 191n35, 193n85

230

Index

Vishinsky, A., 132 Volokitina, T.V., 185n6ch2, 190n4, 194n9 Vörös, János, 11, 42 Vörös, Vince, 105–6 Voroshilov, Kliement J., 17, 50, 52–4, 190n6 Warsaw pact, 170, 178 Weems, George H., 18, 133 Western allies, 18, 76, 137 Western protest, 118–21, 133–5 Wetting, Gerhard, xi, 184n6 “wild land reform,” 19

World Association of Hungarians, 169, 177 Yalta agreement, xiv, 14, 26, 47, 51, 119–20, 133–4, 166, 186n15 Yugoslavia, ix, xiv, 7, 17, 50, 55, 77, 96, 132, 158, 161, 184n6, 186n17, 188n52 Zhdanov, Andrei, 138 Zinner, Tibor, 186nn24, 25 Zsedényi, Béla, 26, 59