Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints 9781400876952

Citation preview

CHEMICAL A Study in

WARFARE Restraints

CHEMICAL A

STUDY

IN

WARFARE R E S T R A I N T S

by Frederic

J.

Brown

Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press 1968

Copyright © 1968 by Princeton University Press A L L

RIGHTS

RESERVED

Library of Congress Card: 68-20868 This book was printed in Linotype Baskerville Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

To F.J.B. and K.R.B.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I should like to extend my appreciation to Professors Louis Halle and Samuel Gonard of the Graduate Insti­ tute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, for their guidance throughout the preparation of my work. This study would not have been possible without the encouragement and assistance of Colonel George A. Lincoln, Professor and Head of the Department of So­ cial Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and of Colonel A. A. Jordan, Professor, Department of So­ cial Sciences. It is impossible to mention all who have aided me, but the following individuals and the institutions they represent have been particularly helpful: Dr. Dale Birdsell, Historian, U.S. Army Munitions Command; Mr. Sherman Davis, Historian, and Mrs. Jacobson, both of the Edgewood Arsenal Historical Office; Mr. W. Nigh and Mr. Hohmann, World War II Records Division, National Archives; Mr. Chamberlain, Military Records Division, National Archives; Captain F. Kent Loomis, Office of Naval History, Department of the Navy; Mr. I. Wice, Office of the Chief of Military History; Dr. E. Taylor Parks, Historical Office, Department of State; Mr. Clyde E. Buckingham, Historian, American Red Cross National Headquarters; the Army Research Or­ ganization; and the George Olmsted Foundation. Special thanks are due to Mr. E. Weiss, Librarian, U.S. Military Academy Library, and to the Assistant Librarian, Mr. W. Kerr; to Miss Charlotte Snyder, Miss L. Feith, and Mrs. S. Offenberg of the Library Staff, and Mrs. H. Rose who typed the manuscript. Words cannot adequately express the depth of my appreciation to my wife and three young daughters who endured an irascible author for many months.

C O N T E N T S Dedication Acknowledgements List of Tables Introduction

ν vii xiii xv

PART I · WORLD WAR I INTRODUCTION

1

1. THE HERITAGE OF WAR

3

A. B.

C.

D.

Record of Use Formation of Restraints Propaganda and the American Public The Administration Responds Military Perspectives Tactical Characteristics Science and Technology A Question of Honor Fears for the Future—Escalation

3 12 12 17 33 33 38 40 42

PART II · THE INTERWAR YEARS INTRODUCTION 2. THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

A. B. C. D.

Drafting the Peace American Industry and Propaganda The Washington Arms Conference Institutionalization Within the Military Congressional Intervention—the National Defense Act of 1920 War Department Hesitation Legacy of the Washington Arms Conference

49 51

52 56 61 72 73 87 93

Contents 3.

T H E EVOLUTION OF POLICY, 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 3 9

A.

External Stimulants Geneva Gas Protocol World Disarmament Conference

97 98 110

B.

Internal Review Military Policy—A New Realism National Policy—Continuing Opposition Military Programs—Continuing

121 121

Unreadiness 4.

123 125

RESTRAINTS AT THE OUTBREAK OF W A R

A.

B. C. D. E. PART

Military Unpreparedness Army—Nonassimilation Navy—Inattention Air Corps—Focus on Survival The Problem of Civil Defense Unrealistic Threat Perception Public Opposition A Tenuous Legal Restraint III • THE

TEST

OF WORLD

149 150 158 162 167 174 176 183 WAR

INTRODUCTION 5.

97

II 189

CONFIRMATION OF RESTRAINTS 1939-1942

191

A. B.

Hesitation 1939-1941 Reevaluation after Pearl Harbor

191 198

C.

British Chemical Warfare Policy Declaratory Policy Restraints on Employment Public Attitudes Threat Evaluation National Elite and Coalition War Military Readiness The Test of Sea Lion

207 208 211 212 213 216 218 226

x

Contents

D.

German Chemical Warfare Policy Declaratory Policy Restraints on Employment Threat Evaluation Elite Attitudes—Hitler's Rationality Military Readiness E. Japanese Chemical Warfare Policy Declaratory Policy Restraints on Employment Threat Evaluation Military Readiness

230 230 231 235 238 246 248 249 253

6. THE CRUCIAL TEST—MID-1945 A. B. C.

The Success of Minimum Deterrence The New Environment in 1945 Restraints on Employment JCS Procrastination Vulnerability of Allies Institutional and Personal Attitudes D. Ineffective Restraints Legal Public Opinion

262 267 269 271 278 281 286 286 287

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

290

GlossaryofAbbreviations

317

Bibliography

321

Index

343

LIST OF TABLES 1. American Gas Warfare Readiness, July 31, 1936

146

2. American Gas Warfare Readiness, June 15, 1942

202

3. Allied Air Attacks on Germany

224

4. German Toxic Agent Stocks, March 1, 1945

241

5. Average Monthly Production of Gas Defense Equipment in Germany

243

6. Japanese Persistent Agent Production During World War II

257

INTRODUCTION Since nuclear weapons have been made available to nation states, deterrence of their employment has be­ come a subject for intensive study and speculation. Yet among the wealth of fine works that have dealt with deterrence, there is little detailed investigation of the nature of restraints as revealed in the most recent global conflict, the Second World War. The nonemployment of toxic agents in World War II provides a contem­ porary example of a mass casualty-producing weapon that, despite initial use in a prior conflict and interwar expectations of employment, was not used in a war which otherwise was largely unrestricted. The purpose of this study is to develop an under­ standing of the nature of restraints that prevent em­ ployment of a weapon in war through a detailed exam­ ination of American chemical warfare policy. The analytical approach is an evaluation of the range of inhibitions and stimulants influencing American decision-makers before and during World War II. While it would be presumptuous to assert that this approach has revealed any fundamental laws of restraint, I do be­ lieve that this study will provide an understanding of restraints sufficient to permit their tentative application to present prospects of nuclear deterrence. Understanding the forces which influence American chemical warfare policy requires far more than a knowl­ edge of wartime decision-making tailored to a mech­ anistic model of rational action. As a weapon possessing diverse characteristics, chemical warfare was applicable across a broad range of military programs—from stra­ tegic counter-city attack or limited tactical employment to suppression of civil disturbances. Views on chemical warfare varied according to the military use postulated

World War I

by the observer—whose opinions, often emotional and irrational, were influenced by stereotypes and individ­ ual and group perceptions, as well as by personal intel­ ligence and ambition. The resulting interplay of mul­ tiple perspectives produced a dialogue of Babel— voluminous discussion but little communication. Influ­ enced by skillful propagandists, civilians—elite decision-makers as well as the general public—saw the spec­ ter of annihilation by strategic attack and searched in vain for formulae to reduce the threat. The profes­ sional military were participants but not contributors to this dialogue. Unable to accept the implications of gas warfare on the ethos of their profession, they lim­ ited their view of gas almost entirely to tactical employ­ ment. But, having been restricted to a subordinate role in decision-making after the military excesses of World War I, they gestured from a secondary stage to an unhearing audience. By the time the military moved again to the center of attention in World War II, chemical warfare had become hopelessly bogged down in a quag­ mire of conflicting objectives, inconsistent policies, and inadequate programs. The organization of this study into three parts reflects the importance of the experiences of toxic agent em­ ployment during the First World War and the subse­ quent pattern of restraints as they evolved during the interwar years. Part I examines the use of toxic agents in World War I as it influenced subsequent national policy decisions. Part II focuses on the evolution of political, military, economic, and psychological re­ straints to American employment of toxic agents from 1919 to 1939. Part III discusses World War II during two critical periods: 1939 to early 1942, when the en­ vironment of the war was being established essentially without the influence of the United States; and during

Introduction

1945, when the United States did not face a credible threat of retaliation to deter its use of toxic agents. Obviously, one reason why the United States did not employ toxic agents was because the other belligerents did not initiate their use. Therefore, Part III discusses restraints on the use of toxic agents by the United King­ dom, Germany, and Japan. A complete analysis of World War II toxic agent decision-making requires mention of the Soviet Union. There is, however, no verified source material available to permit even ran­ dom speculation about its capabilities and intentions. Suffice it to say that each of the other belligerents be­ lieved the Soviet Union to have a credible retaliatory capability. The frustration of research was not limited to the Soviet Union. In the case of both Germany and Japan, many of the original toxic-agent policy documents have been deliberately or inadvertently destroyed in the holocaust of defeat. I have made extensive use of de­ tailed studies conducted by the American Occupation Forces immediately after the war, and wherever pos­ sible, have verified them by supplementary research material. Discussion of British toxic agent policy is equally dependent upon secondary sources, except where documents have been reproduced or extensively cited in the Official History of the War Series. In none of these cases, however, do I see the shortage of source material as undermining the validity of the analysis, particularly with regard to the United States. With the exception of White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff documents, I have had direct access to all United States toxic-agent policy documents. The only serious lacuna exists in the minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are not available for unofficial research. This is not a serious weakness, however, for the sense of jcs

World War I

deliberations is evident in available Operations Divi­ sion, War Department General Staff studies prepared for jcs discussion or for implementation of jcs de­ cisions. The Department of State Potsdam Papers con­ tain adequate documentation on presidential attitudes during 1945. A common problem in the discussion of the implica­ tions of any weapons system is the presentation of tech­ nical characteristics of the weapon. Determined to avoid the pitfalls of overconcentration on technical charac­ teristics, I have referred to the varied physical or physi­ ological properties of toxic agents only when such ref­ erence seems essential to an understanding of some as­ pect of restraints. In fact, to make the study more read­ able, I have taken certain license in military and scien­ tific terminology. Thus the following terms are used interchangeably to describe possession or employment of all agents of chemical warfare except incendiary, smoke, or flame weapons: toxic agents, chemical agents, gas, poison gas, noxious gas, gas warfare, chemical war­ fare, and toxic agent warfare.1 Unless the harassing or temporarily incapacitating effect of a chemical agent is specifically mentioned, all reference to gases infers em­ ployment to produce lethal or damaging effects on man. 1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff dictionary defines chemical warfare as: "Employment of chemical products to produce death or casualties in man, to create a military advantage, or to defend against such action." A chemical agent is defined as: "A solid, liquid or gas which through its chemical properties, produces lethal or damaging effects on man, animals, plants or material, or produces a screening or signaling smoke." This study is limited to effects on man, since this was the primary focus during the period from 1919 to 1945. Toxic is a generic term indicat­ ing injurious but not necessarily lethal effect. In American military usage, a toxic agent may be of radiological, biological, or chemical origin. In this study, the use is restricted to chemical origin. (U.S. jcs, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, ι Dec 64, jcs Pub 1, p. 28; U.S. Department of the Army, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, April 1965, A.R. 320-5, pp. 84-85, 420.)

Introduction

Military organizations or abbreviations used in the study are clarified in the Glossary. The conclusions presented in this study are those of the author writing as an individual and a student of strategic studies and are not to be represented as the views of the author as a serving member of the Armed Forces of the United States or as the views of any agency of the Government of the United States.

PART I · WORLD WAR I INTRODUCTION

World War I occupies a crucial position in the evalua­ tion of American chemical warfare policy. The record of employment, as it was and as it would be perceived by later decision-makers, was the precedent which influenced the actions of each of the major powers in preparing for and fighting the Second World War. The one chapter that treats World War I (Chapter I) focuses upon evolving incentives and restraints to subsequent employment of toxic agents rather than upon the chronology of immediate use. Therefore, em­ phasis is placed upon perceptions of critical elite groups and the evolution of popular sentiment with respect to chemical warfare. In essence, this chapter develops the range of national and group reactions to a brutal and unexpected opening of a veritable "Pandora's Box" of war.

CHAPTER 1 • THE HERIT AGE OF WAR A.

RECORD OF USE

"Ypres, April 22, 1915: Try to imagine the feelings and the condition of the [French] colonial troops as they saw the vast cloud of greenish-yellow gas spring out of the ground and slowly move down wind toward them, the vapour clinging to the earth, seeking out every hole and hollow and filling the trenches and shell holes as it came. First wonder, then fear; then, as the first fringes of the cloud enveloped them and left them choking and agonized in the fight for breath—panic. Those who could move broke and ran, trying, generally in vain, to outstrip the cloud which followed inexora­ bly after them."1 The casualties of this attack were the first of approxi­ mately one million gas casualties of World War I.2 Ypres was a place of horror on that spring afternoon in 1915. The Allied troops facing the German attack, which had been achieved with complete strategic and tactical surprise, were totally unprepared and therefore utterly helpless. Having neither the training nor the protective equipment essential to survival in a toxic environment, they retreated in panic and disorder, and by nightfall were facing a major disaster. The line of trenches had been ruptured, communications were dis­ rupted, and, most important, the enemy had developed a weapon for which there seemed to be no defense. 1 Maj. S.J.M. Auld, Gas and Flame in Modern Warfare (New York: George H. Doran, 1918), pp. 1.1-12. 2 Col. Harry L. Gilchrist, A Comparative Study of World War Casual­ ties From Gas and Other Weapons (Washington: USGPO, 1928), p. 7.

World War I

Yet the Germans did not capitalize on their technolog­ ical advantage. The Allies reinforced and eventually sealed the breach. The lengthy battle precipitated by the first gas attack, the Second Battle of Ypres, ground on until the last week of May, 1915. The Germans were unable to exploit the Ypres salient after more than a month of fighting and a cost of over 100,000 Allied and German casualties.3 Considering the nature of the breakthrough, the Germans could have secured a decisive success in Flanders. It is apparent, however, that they were not prepared to exploit, on other than a limited tactical scale, any success that the use of gas might bring. The attack, which had to be postponed several times due to un­ favorable wind conditions, was not launched until late afternoon. Inadequate reserves prevented the Ger­ mans from capitalizing on the breach in the Allied lines. Although the gas employed, chlorine released from cylinders, could be neutralized through reason­ ably simple protective means, the German troops had not been furnished with defensive equipment. In short, the Germans demonstrated an astonishing lack of thoroughness in initiating the use of gas. Having accepted gas as sufficiently promising to justify experi­ mentation on the battlefield, they used it on a scale adequate to alert the Allies to the reality of toxic weapons, but inadequate to ensure success. Their error was threefold. The General Staff apparently had not evaluated either the importance of surprise, or the cer­ tainty that the Allies could in time develop defensive measures, or the possibility that the Allies could retali3 C. Falls, The Great War 1914-1918 (New York: Capricorn, 1959) , pp. 108-12. For an extensive account of the first gas attack at Ypres, see Dr. Rudolf Hanslian, The German Gas Attack at Ypres, MS, trans. U.S. Army (Berlin: Verlag Gasschutz und Lufschutz G.m.b.h., 1934) .

The Heritage of War

ate in kind. They were to pay dearly for these errors later in the war. As they had done in the employment of the submarine, the Germans had provoked an un­ restricted land war that would, on balance, accrue to their disadvantage. Although the results of the Second Battle of Ypres were indecisive at best and at least represented a sig­ nificant opportunity lost for the Germans, the implica­ tions of April 22, 1915, were major. The experience of Ypres demonstrated in most acute form both the impact of science and technology on the battlefield and the unlimited nature of Word War I. Each, by the horror it aroused, was to contribute to military and civilian rejection of the use of poison gas after World War I. The very nature of chemical warfare inhibited its acceptance by the German military in 1915. The chlo­ rine gas employed at Ypres was a product of the civilian laboratory, developed through the initiative of the bril­ liant German chemist, Fritz Haber, manufactured by a complex industrial process, and employed on the bat­ tlefield by specialists under the supervision of a civilian chemist.4 It was not a weapon in which the army could claim a proprietary interest. On the contrary, it was a weapon promoted by civilians and the reservists to res­ cue the German military professionals, who were handi­ capped by a shortage of conventional artillery units and ammunition and by an inability to devise any more satisfactory means of overcoming the protracted posi­ tion warfare that Germany had to avoid.5 4 Sir E. Thorpe, "Chemical Warfare and the Washington Conference," Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry, in Chemical Warfare, 8:8 (August ig, 1922) , 14-15. 5 Brig. Gen. H. Hartley, "A General Comparison of British and German Methods of Gas Warfare," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, XLVI (December ig2o), 493; Rudolf Hanslian, ed., Der Chemische Krieg, 1, trans. U.S. Army (3rd ed.; Berlin: Verlag Mittler, 1937) ; Interv, CMLHO with Maj Gen William N. Porter, USA (Ret.), 24

World War I

Thus from the first, the German military themselves regarded gas with suspicion and distrust. A characteris­ tic problem in the use of gas—assimilation by the mili­ tary—was in evidence at Ypres as it would be in subse­ quent battles. The decision to initiate gas warfare enabled Ger­ many to make maximum use of one of her most signifi­ cant advantages over the Allied powers—a highly de­ veloped chemical industry. Ypres represented a logical extreme in the employment of the chemical industry: the use of chemicals as an end product rather than as a by-product of conventional armaments. After Ypres, the military establishment had little alternative to ac­ ceptance of scientific expertise. The war had now be­ come a "chemical war" and the German army had not benefited from its initial advantage. While the Germans do not appear to have weighed the importance of the use of gas as a deliberate and wan­ ton violation of conventional law regarding land war­ fare, the British realized the importance of this aspect immediately.® Article 23 of the Hague Convention of Aug 61, EHO. General Porter was the World War II Chief of the cws. This point is also mentioned in the Reich Archives, Der Weltkrieg 1914/18, Vol. 8, in Hanslian, The German Gas Attack, 54: "The attitude of command and troops to the still untested means of combat [gas] was almost downright distrustful, if not absolutely hostile." β The question of which power initiated the use of toxic agents was a subject of charge and counter-charge during the interwar period. Hanslian and Mueller-Kiel assert that the French employed gas-filled rifle grenades and hand grenades in August 1914 (Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, 23; U. Mueller-Kiel, Die Chemische Waffe Im Weltkrieg Und Jetzt, MS, trans. U.S. Army [Berlin: Verlag Chemie, 1932], p. 16) . Mueller-Kiel further states that the Germans fired 3,000 10.5 cm combination dianisidine salt (sneeze-provoking) and high explosive shells in retaliation on October 27, 1914, and that up to 18,000 xylyl bromide shells were fired by the Germans at Bolimow on the Russian front on January 31, 1915 (ibid., 62-63) . Foulkes supports this latter point in referring to three or four unconfirmed reports that the Ger­ mans initiated the use of gas against the Russians between January 31

The Heritage of War

1899 bound the signatories "to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." The same article forbade the use of weapons causing "unnecessary suffering."7 British lack of preparedness for gas warfare in 1915 was due partially to the absence of a developed chemi­ cal industry resulting from the German monopoly of dye stuff manufacture; but it was also a result of British compliance with the Hague Convention and fear of the implications of unlimited war. The British government had considered using incapacitating noxious gases (sulphur fumes) as early as the siege of Sebastapol in the Crimean War.8 But, although the government ap­ proved the projects, gases were not employed. In 1913, foreign press reports of research in gases caused the British government to study the wording of the Hague Conventions. It was determined that a and February 5, 1915 (Maj. Gen. C. Foulkes, "Gas!" The Story of the Special Brigade [London: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1934], pp. 29-31) . In his memoirs, Ludendorft infers that the Germans employed gas against the Russians on January 31, 1915 (General E. von Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story, Vol. 1 [New York: Harper and Bros., 1919], 144) . While this pre-Ypres exchange is interesting in that it indicates overt communication of intent through gradual escalation, it cannot be verified in available archives. Based upon the above and the failure of the Germans to attempt to seize the propaganda initiative immediately after Ypres, the Germans may have been somewhat sur­ prised by the furore after Ypres. The intriguing implications of this possibility are not within the scope of this study—to decision-makers and the general public between the wars and during World War II, gas warfare was initiated at Ypres. 7 II Convention, Hague Conference of 1899. Signed and ratified by the 1915 participants in World War I. The same principles were embodied in the Hague Conference of 1907, IV Convention, Art. 23 (a) and (e), The Convention was signed but not ratified by Serbia and Turkey. Doubtful as to the adequacy of such a restraint in wartime, the U.S. did not sign the 1899 declaration. 8 Sir G. D. Bart and S.G.D. Ramsay, The Panmure Papers, I (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908) , 340-41.

World War I

double-purpose shell, that is, "one which contained a small portion of lachrymatory substance without as­ phyxiating or deleterious effect," was permissible by the wording of the conventions, "although contrary to its spirit." The shell was not adopted by either the Army or Navy.9 The subject was raised again in September 1914, when Lord Dundonald revived the Crimean project that had originally been sponsored by his ancestor. Re­ jected for the Army by Lord Kitchener as ill-suited for land warfare, it was considered by Churchill in the Admiralty. The subject was studied during the winter of 1914-1915 and was finally referred to Colonel Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial De­ fense, for further development. By March 31, 1915, ex­ periments were being conducted with a view to the pos­ sible use of nonlethal gases in the Dardanelles cam­ paign. But these plans were curtailed by Churchill, who realized "that it would not be expedient to intro­ duce into the War, elements which might justify the enemy in having recourse to inhuman reprisals."10 Thus the British were not unmindful of the military possibilities of noxious gases when the Germans initi­ ated their use. The employment of such gases had been 9 Foulkes, 23. The decision was probably based on the low efficiency of the combination round. For German rejection of a similar type round in 1914, see Mueller-Kiel, 62-63. 10 Memo, Mr. Masterson-Smith [Private Secretary to Mr. Churchill] for Lord Dundonald, 31 Mar 15, in W. Churchill, The World Crises, Vol. i, /975 (London: Scribner, 1923), 72. Churchill's fears of the effects of retaliatory action must have been conditioned by his realization of Britain's vulnerability to air attack. In a Memo to the Cabinet of January 1, 1915, he noted the German airship capability (20 airships, each capable of delivering a one-ton bomb) and stated that "the Air Department of the Admiralty must make it plain that they are power­ less to prevent such an attack . . ." (italics mine) . Writing after the war, Churchill stressed that British development was deterred by the knowledge that "the use of noxious or poisonous fumes was explicitly prohibited by International Law" (ibid., 72) .

The Heritage of War

seriously studied and then rejected out of respect for the Hague Conventions, out of fear of the implications of unlimited war, and out of an appreciation of the weakness of the British chemical industry. The British decision to retaliate was of equal or greater importance than the German decision to initiate. The Germans initiated in the hope of finding a palliative to a tactical military weapons problem. The English retaliated with the full realization that the land war had become unlimited. The British appreciated these implications of Ypres, even if the Germans did not. There was no question of the necessity for providing protective devices to the Allied Armies. Crude gauze bandages were immediately dispatched to the front and a crash program was insti­ tuted to develop a protective mask.11 The decision to retaliate was made on May 18, 1915. General Thuillier, a British gas warfare expert, indicates that some of the factors considered beforehand were the ethical question posed by the Hague Conventions, the capability of British chemical science and industry to respond to the challenge, and the morale problem among the troops if the Allies did not respond in kind.12 The first Eng11 The program to develop protective equipment was stimulated by widespread criticism of the government's failure to provide for such a contingency (see D. Lloyd-George, War Memoirs, Vol. I, /9//-7975 [Boston: Little, Brown, 1933], p. 175). The British had made the potentially disastrous error of overlooking German capabilities to initiate gas war due to an assumption that the Germans did not intend to employ gas. 12 Maj. Gen. Sir Henry F. Thuillier, Gas in the Next War (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1939), p. 22. The decision was delayed by the formation of the first Coalition Cabinet. Lord Hankey infers that the decision had been made before May 14, 1915, by his diary entry of that date: "Urged Prime Minister and Grey, personally and in writing, to offer to Germans to desist from the use of asphyxiating gas, if they would. Grey agreed, but, as shell containing gas had already been sent out, the Prime Minister decided to do nothing. I fear they may retaliate with more diabolical devices" (Sir M. P. Hankey, The Supreme Command

World War I

lish gas attack was launched at the battle of Loos on September 25, 1915. Unpreparedness had cost the British six months, but this was to be fully compensated for in the rising scale of gas attacks in 1918. General reaction to Ypres was exemplified by Gen­ eral Pershing's response to the German attack: "the impression was that the Germans had now thrown every consideration of humanity to the winds."13 Gas was never to lose the twin stigmas acquired at Ypres. To the military it represented the encroachment of science which was corrupting the expertise and honor of their profession; to the civilian, it symbolized the ruthlessness and inhumanity of modern war. The period from April 1915 to July 1917 saw the gradual expansion of the use of gas. However, once the Allied and German troops acquired protective equip­ ment, albeit primitive, gas lost its critical role. By De­ cember 1916, the situation had become stabilized to the point where Sir Douglas Haig, the British Com­ mander-in-Chief, was able to note rather smugly in his year-end dispatch: "it is satisfactory to be able to record . . . that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective."14 There was a continuing qualitative arms race between belligerents to find new, more deadly agents and more effective pro­ tective measures, but the characteristics of the gases em­ ployed relegated chemical warfare to a secondary sup1914-1918, ι [London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961], 306-07) . In addition to substantiation of the fear of reprisals, Hankey's entry poses the intriguing question of decision by default on the part of the Prime Minister. is Gen. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, I (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1931), 165. 1« J. H. Boraston, ed., Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915—April 19x9) (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1919) , p. 55.

The Heritage of War

porting role. The gases o£ this period were all nonpersistent and had to be breathed into the lungs to gain their effect. The practical result of this was to place a premium upon the ability to surprise the enemy by delivering large amounts of gas to a selected location before the enemy could react and mask. Research and development was oriented to producing more effective delivery means. Once the enemy was masked, he was safe. Under these circumstances, gas could not compete with conventional explosives. The enormous logistic burden required to surprise an enemy position with a momentarily lethal concentration of gas could be more profitably used for conventional explosives that were not affected by the weather and that could continue to destroy enemy equipment after the soldier had taken passive defense measures.13 This situation changed drastically on July 12, 1917, when the Germans achieved their second major tech­ nological breakthrough in chemical warfare. Again, Ypres was the target. This time the Germans achieved complete surprise by introducing mustard gas—a per­ sistent agent that could disable by coming in contact with the skin. It was particularly dangerous because the soldier did not realize that he has been gased for sev­ eral hours, by which time he had already received a disabling or lethal dose. Under particularly favorable climatic conditions, mustard gas could retain its dis­ abling properties for several weeks. is The logistic burden of gas warfare is indicated by German experi­ ence factors for gas cylinder attacks. The cylinders had to be secretly placed in the front line of trenches and the gas could only be released under wind conditions which would insure that it blew into enemy trenches. The German cylinders weighed 38 kg, of which 20 kg was gas. The Germans found that 10,000 cylinders were required per kilo­ meter of front (Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, 126-28) .

World War I

Mustard gas changed the battlefield environment of World War I. Its use in concentrated doses could make any position untenable. A gas mask was no longer suf­ ficient protection as a soldier could be disabled by vapor or liquid contact anywhere on his body. It would con­ taminate weapons and rations. Casualty figures reflected the new role of chemical warfare after July 1917: the British had slightly over 20,000 gas casualties from 1915 until the initiation of the use of mustard; from July 1917 to November 1918, they had over 160,000.16 B. FORMATION OF RESTRAINTS

By mid-1918, gas was competing with air power and the tank as the most rapidly expanding weapon of land warfare. All belligerents were employing chemical agents to the limit of production capability. As evi­ denced by later plans for the extensive use of gas in 1919, chemical warfare appeared to have been assimi­ lated within the various military establishments. But there were other forces acting during World War I to restrain the future of chemical warfare. It is to these forces that we now turn. PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC / If it Can be said that any group profited from the employment of gas in World War I, that group must have been the propagandists of each side. One of the objectives of propaganda is "to mobilize hatred against the enemy"17; 16 Foulkes, chart opposite p. 332. Gilchrist discusses this extensively. He comments upon the imprecision of casualty estimates of the various belligerents but confirms the significant increase in gas casualties of all armies after mustard gas was introduced. Over 34 per cent of all AEF casualties in October 1918 resulted from gas, primarily mustard (Gil­ christ, 10-22). 17 Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (Lon­ don: Paul, Trench, Trubner 8c Co. Ltd., 1938) , p. 195. Lasswell describes

The Heritage of War

and one effective technique for mobilizing hatred is to "represent the opposing nation as a menacing, mur­ derous, aggressor . . . as satanic; it violates all the moral standards (mores) of the group."18 Each of the belliger­ ents seized upon gas as a cardinal feature of its hate propaganda.19 The British treated gas in a manner par­ ticularly suited to combining the dual objectives of mobilizing the home population and of securing the empathy if not the direct support of the United States. They emphasized World War I as a war in which de­ mocracy had to secure international law and the obli­ gation of treaties against a monster of autocratic mili­ tarism.20 Gas fitted nicely into this image. Germany had wantonly and willfully violated the Hague Conven­ tions by the commission of satanic acts of inhumanity. A typical sample of this propaganda appeared in the New York Times of June 22, 1915. It was introduced as a letter that had "recently arrived" in New York City from a British Major General who had formerly been "on terms of considerable intimacy with the Kaiser." "I am sure the public cannot have as yet the slightest idea of this damnable effort on the part of the Germans to disregard all laws of humanity and civilization. . . . [Referring to a visit to gas casualties in a hospital] They are all sitting bolt upright or swaying backward and forward, gasping for breath; their faces, hands and necks a shiny gray-black color, their eyes glazed, and un­ able absolutely to speak or eat. It takes two days for the other objectives as i) to preserve the friendship of allies, 2) to preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals, 3) to demoralize the enemy. is Ibid., Introduction. ™ Ibid., 85; H. C. Peterson, Propaganda For War (Norman: XJ. of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p. 63. 20 Lasswell, 197. J3

World War I

these men to die. . . . It is the most hopeless, helpless, sickening sight imaginable... ."21 Descriptions of the first attack at Ypres were equally vivid. ".. . we saw . .. figures running wildly and in confusion over the fields. . . . The story they [the retreating sol­ diers] told we could not believe; we put it down to their terror-striken imaginings—a greenish-gray cloud had swept down upon them, turning yellow as it traveled over the country blasting everything it touched, shriv­ eling up the vegetation. No human courage could face such a peril. Then there staggered into our midst French soldiers, blinded, coughing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple color, lips speechless with agony, and behind them, in the gas-choked trenches, we learned that they had left hundreds of dead and dying comrades. The impossible was only too true. It was the most fiendish, wicked thing I have ever seen."22 This was effective propaganda. In fact it was soon judged to be too effective, for it was not compatible 21 New York Times, June 22, 1915, p. 3. 22 Rev. O. S. Watkins, in Methodist Recorder (London), in A. A. Fries and C. J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1921) , pp. 11-12. A further characteristic of the propaganda was magni­ fication of effect. Reports from Ypres stated that the Allies had suffered at least 5,000 gas fatalities in the first attack. Hanslian asserts that a German army doctor in the trenches on April 23, 1915, found no dead from gas. 200 Allied casualties were admitted into German hospitals, of whom 12 died. While Hanslian admits that for many the gas dosage received would have required thirty minutes for death, he estimates that the Allies quintupled casualty figures for propaganda effect (Hanslian, The German Gas Attack, 44-45) . With the more extensive Belgian atrocity hoax to their credit, propagandists would not have hesitated to embellish gas stories. Medical personnel contributed to the magnification (see J. Church, "As to Poison Gas," The Military Surgeon, in Chemical Warfare, 8:9 [September 15, 1922], 14-15) .

The Heritage of War

with Allied use of poison gas. The Allies could and did publicize their employment of toxic agents as just and necessary acts of retaliation, but the inhumane aspect of gas warfare was deleted from the propaganda. They could ill-afford to be tarred with their own brush in American eyes. In mid-1917, when chemical warfare in­ creased in intensity, the French and British imposed a news blackout on poison gas use. To Benedict Crowell, who was in charge of America's munitions program as Assistant Secretary of War, this policy was stimulated by the fear "that if the picture of gas warfare, as it was then developing, should be placed before the American people, it would result in an unreasonable dread of gases on the part of the American Nation and its sol­ diers."23 The final stage in the wartime evolution of gas propaganda was attained in 1918 when there was no censorship of news reports on the employment of gas. In fact, chemical warfare was emphasized in order to demonstrate the superior task performed by American industry in equipping the American Expeditionary Force in France. By the time the Armistice was declared, gas propa­ ganda had run the policy gamut—the illegal and in­ humane act of a murderous aggressor in 1915; just and humane retaliation in 1916; blackout in 1917; and a triumph of Allied industry in 1918.24 Vivid, unreli­ able, and shifting in emphasis, Allied gas propaganda was nevertheless the primary source of information on 23 Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions 1917-1918 (Washington: USGPO, 1919), p. 410. The shifts of propaganda policy are also com­

mented on in Peterson, 63. 24 The propaganda of the Central Powers has not been referred to above because in 1915-1916 it differed from Allied propaganda only in the attempt to prove that gas had been initiated as a "necessity of war," and the Allies seized and held the initiative in gas warfare propaganda during 1915-1916. After U.S. entry into the war, Allied propaganda was U.S. propaganda.

World War I

gas warfare for the United States during 1915 and 1916, and thus was a primary factor in influencing American reaction to the employment of toxic agents.25 To the American public, gas was only one of the many horrors of war. Despite the best efforts of Allied propagandists immediately after Ypres, chemical war­ fare had to share the headlines with other equally seri­ ous events. The primary vehicle employed to convince the world of the beastiality and inhumaneness of the Germans was the Belgian atrocity propaganda that had begun in 1914.26 The climax of this propaganda effort was reached in late May 1915, with the publication of the "official" English report on German atrocities, the Bryce Report. Graced with the name of an eminent but senile personage—"that distinguished liberal, that great authority on American politics, that friendly pil­ lar through so many years"—the Bryce Report was a sensational propaganda coup for the British.27 Gas propaganda faced even more serious competition when the Lusitania was sunk by a German submarine on May 7, 1915. To Arthur Link, "the sinking of the Lusitania had a more jolting effect upon American opinion than any other single event of the World War. 25 Due to the absence of public opinion sampling techniques, it is difficult to evaluate general public attitudes during the First World War. There is little expert agreement on the comparative effectiveness of Allied or Central Powers' propaganda or even on the general effec­ tiveness of war propaganda in influencing American attitudes. For conflicting views on this, see A. Link, Wilson: The Struggle for Neu­ trality (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, i960) , pp. 36-43; W. Millis, Road to War, America 1914-191J (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1935), pp. 63-68; C. Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938) . The problem is aggravated when one attempts to evaluate a specific attitude. 26 For a sample, see P. Nothomb, The Barbarians in Belgium (Lon­ don: Jarrold and Sons, 1915) —294 pages of rape, arson, pillage, dum­ dum bullets, and slain prisoners of war. 27 Millis, 64. President Wilson had been a former student of Lord Bryce.

The Heritage of War

. . . It was a crime of murder on the high seas by order of the German government, a crime with no mitigat­ ing circumstances."28 It was not unreasonable that American attention should focus on the Lusitania. The sinking of the Lusitania climaxed a series of shipping incidents that had served to focus public attention; Ypres occurred as a "bolt from the blue." One hundred twenty-four American civilians were killed on the Lusitania; no Americans died at Ypres. Gas warfare could not compete with this. By the time the furore caused by the Bryce Report and the sinking of the Lusitania had diminished, the Allied powers were shifting the focus of their prop­ aganda in preparation for the employment of gas. Gas warfare propaganda did influence American at­ titudes during 1915-1916; however, due to the chance occurrence of other events that were more effective in stimulating hatred of the enemy, gas warfare was never singled out by the American public as a unique evil of the war in Europe. The dissenting statements made at the Senate Preparedness Hearings in 1916 contained no reference whatsoever to the development of gas warfare in Europe.29 / American decision­ makers reacted to gas in much the same manner as the American people. The use of gas was deplorable but it was one of many deplorable acts of war. Rather than goad the United States into nonbelligerency or even THE ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS

28 Link, 372. 29 See particularly the statement of Mr. Oswald G. Villard in U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Preparedness for National Defense, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, pp. 856-67, 876-83. A leading paci­ fist and President of the New York Evening Post, Villard expressed strong opposition to any increase in the U.S. military establishment. He discussed the internal effects of militarism on America and the dire consequences that would result if America were to enter the war. 1I

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war, chemical warfare reinforced Wilson's resolve that absolute neutrality was the only policy for the United States and that the conflict had to be solved by other means than war.30 so It is extraordinarily difficult to find evidence of Wilson's personal attitude toward gas. His attitude with respect to the war in general and the sinking of the Lusitania in particular are described in the voluminous literature on Wilson. The absence of reference to gas in the secondary literature and in the Wilson papers in the Library of Congress supports the supposition that Wilson was not unusually influenced by gas warfare at any time during the war. In February 1918, the International Committee of the Red Cross appealed to all belligerents to suspend the use of gas. In a joint note prepared by the Military Representatives of the Inter-Allied Council, the Allies described gases as "perfidious, impalpable and cruel . . . abominations" whose use was forced upon the Allies for survival, but indicated that unless the Germans offered "detailed and efficacious guarantees" the Allies would have "recourse to all the means which may seem proper to them to deprive their adversary of the power of doing them injury." Wilson referred to this as "the right answer, distressing as it is to make it" (Ltr, Wilson to S.W., 29 Apr 18, no sub, WPD 2463-108, NA) . Although he was concerned lest Lloyd-George "will rather rejoice in a somewhat crude and cynical rejoinder," Wilson agreed to sign a combined Allied reply (Ltr, Wilson to Sec State, 21 Feb. 18, no sub, 763. 72116/532 in U.S. Dept. of State, Papers Re­ lating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing Papers 1914-1920, 11 [Washington: USGPO, 1940], 103 [hereafter cited as Lansing Papers]).

Wilson was apparently quite interested in the events at Ypres. He met General Mordacq, a French commander at Ypres, during the peace conference and "bade me insistently to tell him the whole drama down to the last details . . ." (Gen. Mordacq, Le Drame de I'Yser, in Hanslian, The German Gas Attack, 45) . As Commander-in-Chief, Wil­ son avoided involvement in "military affairs." After U.S. entry into a war that had seen extensive use of chemicals, gas warfare decisions would have been matters of military command rather than political control. Wilson appears to have delegated all gas warfare decisions to the War Department. No evidence has been found to refute this suppo­ sition. On Wilson's perception of his military role, see Ε. K. May, "Wilson," in E. May, ed., The Ultimate Decision, The President as Commander-in-Chief (New York: George Braziller, i960), pp. 111-31. If there was any distinction between the attitude of Wilson and the attitudes of those advocates of a more positive U.S. role in the war (Roosevelt, Lodge, House, Lansing, Root, etc.), it would have been on the philosophical point of the legality of chemical war. To Lansing, "the test of guiltlessness in perpetrating an act inhuman under usual conditions is the necessity of that act to the protection of national safety" (Lansing Diary, May 25, 1915, in Link, 46).

The Heritage of War

To Wilson and the other members of the government charged with the formation and execution of policy, the question of chemical warfare must have seemed somewhat academic. Unable to consistently influence the maintenance of law in the sea war, where the United States could employ military and economic instruments of policy, it certainly had neither the capability nor the will to attempt to influence the conduct of the land war. If the United States were to enter the war at some later date, it would join in a war in which the use of gas had become accepted practice. For this contingency, the die was already cast; it would be a gas war. Without the pressure of a groundswell of American public opin­ ion directed specifically against gas, there was nothing to cause the administration to focus its attention on this aspect of the war. While the highest levels of the administration had no reason to devote particular emphasis to chemical war­ fare, this was not the case for all of the executive branch. The military establishment, whose primary function was to prepare the country for war, however remote or unpleasant the contingency might be, failed utterly in the fulfillment of this responsibility by ignoring the question of gas warfare. The Army reacted as if chem­ ical warfare did not exist.31 The Army's lack of awareness of the seriousness of gas warfare was evidenced in Army War College studies on American military policy prepared during the sum­ mer of 1915. These studies dealt with such subjects as siln the fall of 1915, the War Department assigned to the Army Medical Service the responsibility of developing protective respirators. Several observers were sent to Europe but no implementing action was taken to prepare the Army. For extensive reports from Europe, see: wcD O C of S 2463 1-45, sub: Asphyxiating Torches and Gas; and Ltr, Captain Boothby for the Surgeon Gen, 15 Jun 17, sub: A Preliminary Report on an Investigation of Certain Aspects of the Defensive Side of Gas Warfare, WCD O C of S 9967-5, NA.

World War I

requirements for the military force structure, the im­ pact of World War I on European armies, the employ­ ment of commercial and industrial resources in the United States, and industrial mobilization. At no point in the studies was the use of poison gas in Europe stated or even implied.32 The War College studies were followed by legislation to increase the readiness of the military establishment. The lack of Army concern for chemical warfare was also reflected in the Congressional Hearings on Prepared­ ness. Not only did the administration and Army ignore the subject, but the question was not introduced by congressmen or any of the interest groups that testi­ fied.33 The attitude of the military establishment did not change until after the United States had entered the war. 32 U.S. War Department, War College Division, General Staff Corps, Statement of a Proper Military Policy For The United States, Septem­ ber 1915, WCD O C of S 9053-90, ΝΑ. A supplement to this study, pre­ pared in November 1915, dealt with European experiences in the war. Various factors were discussed as the primary causes of change in Euro­ pean armies. They were: magnitude of operations, application of aero­ nautics, and increased use of larger caliber field artillery, machine guns, and mechanical transport. Although this report was prepared well after British gas retaliation at Loos (September 1915), poison gas was not mentioned (War College Division, General Staff Corps, Changes in Organization Found Necessary During Progress of the European War, November 1915, WCD O C of S 4886-23, NA) . 33 U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Preparedness for National Defense, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916. The sole reference to poison gas occurred during the testimony of Colonel Charles G. Treat, General Staff, on new innovations in artillery. After discussion of the effects of shrapnel, the following exchange occurred: Sen. Chamberlain: It is pretty near a war of machinery now, is it not, Colonel? Col. Treat: Very much so. Sen. Beckham: Are they still using the poisonous gases over there, Colonel? Col. Treat: The papers say so, but we have not any actual reports from our observers that they are using them. (Ibid., p. 483.)

T h e H e r i t a g e of W a r

"No preparation whatever had been made during the two years that had passed since gas was introduced and our entry into the war. We had no masks or other pro­ tective devices, we did not know how they were made. Our soldiers had had no gas training and there was no one in this country [U.S.] with sufficient knowledge or training to pass it on to them."34 The situation had not improved when the American Expeditionary Force arrived in France in June 1917. The American Army was generally unprepared for the war, but in no area was the lack of readiness more acute than in chemical warfare. The responsibility for the first condition lay partially in the attitudes of the ad­ ministration and the American people. The responsi­ bility for the second could lie only with the Army, which had seriously misjudged the nature of the threat of chemical warfare.35 American reaction to the employment of toxic agents in 1915 and 1916 was a curious blend of sophistication and na'ivet£. The American public was aroused by the excesses of the war in Europe, but the reaction was not directed specifically at chemical warfare. The adminis­ tration was equally disturbed in principle but in prac­ tice directed its concern to the more immediate political and economic aspects of freedom of the seas. Gas ap­ peared to be an inevitable burden to a land war that the 34 E. Gilman, "Chemical Warfare," Chemical Warfare, 8:5 (May 15, 1923) , 5 (Lectures Delivered to the Reserve Officers Training Corps, University of Cincinnati) . 35 It should be recalled that mustard gas was not initiated by the Germans until July 1917. Prior to this, gas did not appear to be decisive on the battlefield. In addition, the focus of Army planning in 1915 and 1916 was on expansion to provide for the mobile defense of the U.S. rather than to send an expeditionary force to Europe. In the fall of 1915, Wilson had been extremely displeased to learn that the General Staff had made contingency plans for a war with Germany (F. Palmer, Newton D. Baker: America at War, 1 [New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1934], 40) ·

World War I

United States would be able to avoid. This feeling was not, however, shared by a military establishment which did not seem to believe that there was such a problem as gas. In sum, the United States was not apathetic to gas warfare, nor was it indifferent, rather it accepted gas as a deplorable but unavoidable accompaniment to a total war that had to be terminated. These attitudes persisted until the United States en­ tered the war in April 1917. In the case of the one agency that could least afford to be indifferent to the problem—the military establishment—the first six months of 1917 saw little more than perfunctory inter­ est. The first government agency to take an active in­ terest in gas warfare was the Bureau of Mines, in early February 1917. Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane and Van H. Manning, the Director of the Bureau of Mines, initiated research in defense against gas attack based upon the Bureau's previous experience in mine gases. At the initiative of Secretary Lane, the Military Committee of the National Research Council consid­ ered the question of noxious gases and on April 3, 1917, a Subcommittee on Noxious Gases was formed. Composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, and the National Research Council Chemical Committee under the chairmanship of the Director of the Bureau of Mines, the Subcommittee was charged to "carry on investigations into noxious gases, generation, and anti­ dote for same for war purposes."38 By the end of May, the Bureau of Mines had estab­ lished chemical warfare research laboratories in 21 uni­ versities, 3 industrial companies, and 3 government 86 Record of Meeting of Military Committee, NRC, 3 Apr 17, RG 70, NA, cited in L. Brophy and G. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service, Part 1, Organizing For War [United States Army in World War II] (Washington: USGPO, 1959), p. 4.

The Heritage of War

agencies.37 With an increasing tempo of civilian interest and involvement in chemical warfare, the Army began more serious investigation of the problem. Demand for Army action was also building up in Europe. When General Pershing arrived in France with the advance forces of the AEF in June 1917, he im­ mediately realized the threat of gas warfare to unpro­ tected American troops. An AEF General Board was formed to consider the problem. On June 18, 1917, the Board recommended the establishment of gas warfare organizations in the AEF and in the United States.38 The War Department General Staff responded to AEF interest by parceling out the responsibilities for gas warfare readiness within the United States to the exist­ ing service branches of the Army—Medical Depart­ ment, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, and Corps of Engineers. Goaded into activity by the push of civil­ ian interest and the pull of overseas demand, the War Department was not yet prepared to envisage a gas warfare organization.39 At the same time, however, 3T Brophy and Fisher, 5. A national laboratory for "investigation of problems connected with the use of noxious gases in warfare" was authorized under the direction of the Bureau of Mines on June 8, 1917 (F. Martin, ed., Digest of the Proceedings of the Council of National Defense During the World War [Washington: USGPO, 1934], p. 120). 38 Memo, Lt Col Palmer, C Opns Sec, Hq AEF for C of S, AEF, 30 Jul 17, sub: Gas and Flame Serv, Offensive and Defensive, reproduced as App a, History of Chemical Warfare Service American Expeditionary Forces, Part n, MS, n.d. [1919?], EHO. 39 It should be recalled that the Army was under tremendous strain during this period. The requirements of mobilization were immense: expansion of the Army from 200,000 to 4,000,000 men, training of 200,000 officers, organization and equipping of the 42 divisions that served in the AEF, expansion of aviation from 130 to 11,000 flying offi­ cers, etc. For an excellent brief review, see Col. T. Stamps and Col. V. Esposito, A Short Military History of World War I (West Point: USMA, 1954). When the U.S. entered the war, there were only 19 Gen­ eral Staff officers authorized for duty in the War Department—a restric­ tion imposed by the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916 (U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1929, p. 107).

World War I

there was increasing realization in the War Department that gas warfare was a significant problem. The institutional bias of the Bureau of Mines had channeled gas warfare preparations along defensive lines (gas masks). Offensive armaments were sorely lacking. Of the wide range of toxic gases being used in Europe, only chlorine and small amounts of phosgene had ever been prepared commercially in the United States. On November i, 1917, construction was begun on an arsenal for the production of toxic agents.40 Stimulated by the experiences of American troops in Europe, the War Department actively supported gas warfare readiness, and in October of 1917 began super­ vising control of chemical research.41 This was followed by the selection of Major General Sibert to coordinate the activities of the Army services involved in gas war­ fare preparations in May 1918. Finally, on June 28, 1918, all gas warfare preparations were consolidated in a Chemical Warfare Service under the War Depart­ ment.42 The question of American policy with respect to toxic agent use was never an issue. The War Depart­ ment announced plans to employ toxic agents almost as an aside to the announcement that a "gas and flame 4° Crowell, 398. There was a jurisdictional dispute between the War Department and the Bureau of Mines on gas warfare research responsibility (see Ltr, wCD, WDGS for C of S, 26 Sep 17, sub: Military Control of the Chemical Research Work Necessary in Gas Warfare, WCD O C of S 9967/10, NA ) . A Lane and L. Wall, eds., The Letters of Franklin K. Lane (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922) , reflects the attitude of the Bureau of Mines. 12 An engineer with Panama Canal experience, General Sibert had commanded the 1st Division in France. His reassignment to the U.S. to take charge of chemical warfare preparations was indicative of War Department acceptance of chemical warfare and AEF interest in ensur­ ing that an aggressive officer with war experience would control the critical American end of the AEF'S chemical warfare effort. For a more extensive treatment of the growth of the cws in the United States see Fries and West; Crowell. H

T h e Heritage of W a r

service" would be set up in the AEF. After carefully in­ dicating that the decision had been approved by the President upon the recommendation of the General Staff, the War Department justified the decision by adopting the argument long incorporated in Allied propaganda: "The use of such methods by the enemy forces the United States to retaliate with similar measures."43 By 1918, the United States was better prepared for gas warfare. A noncontroversial policy of retaliation had been mated with a still insufficient but rapidly ex­ panding logistic base for chemical warfare. Considering that the Army had not ordered its first gas mask until May 16, 1917, significant progress had been made in the United States.44 The test of combat, of course, lay with the AEF. General Pershing, having realized the gravity of chemical warfare soon after his arrival in Europe, pro­ ceeded immediately to organize an independent gas service. The correctness of his judgment was confirmed when the Germans initiated the use of mustard gas on the night of July 12-13, 1917 45 Concern about the effects of gas warfare mounted, and in August 1917, General Pershing selected Lieutenant Colonel Amos A. Fries to be the Engineer in Charge of Gas, then to be the Chief of the Gas Service, AEF, when it was officially established on September 3, 1917.46 43 New York Times, September 21, 1917, p. 6. The lack of public concern is indicated by the placement of the announcement on p. 6. This was consistent with the general attitude about gas. ** Crowell, 43. 45 During the first three weeks of mustard gas use, the British had 14,276 cases of gas-shell poisoning compared with less than 1,000 dur­ ing the preceding three-week period (H. Gilchrist and P. Matz, The Residual Effects of Warfare Gases: Chlorine and Mustard [Washington: USGPO, 1933], p. 45; Foulkes, 332) . is Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Fries had served under General Pershing in the Philippines in 1905. A USMA graduate in 1898,

World War I

Fries faced an enormous task in preparing the AEF for gas warfare. "When they made me Chief of the Gas Service, we had no masks over there, we had no gases, we had no determined policy as to masks or other de­ fensive appliances or gases, and we had developed no trained personnel." The challenge was immediate as the AEF had 10,000 to 12,000 unprepared troops within 30 or 40 miles of the German lines.47 Fries leapt to the task. He saw that the responsibilities of the AEF Gas Service required it to "sell its method of warfare, train the Army in the field, operate its own supply system, conduct offensive operations with its own troops and advise in the conduct of both offensive and defensive operations by other combat troops . . ."48 While he faced a myriad of problems, there were two that were particularly vexing. The first was that he had to "sell" gas to the combat units: "we had to adopt much the same means of making gas known that the manufacturer of a new article adopts to make a thing manufactured by him known to the public."49 As gas was a new weapon, its capabilities and limitations were not known to the professional army. It was therefore difficult to convince those who drafted training sched­ ules that gas training should replace the conventional subjects that the Army had prescribed for years as the ra­ tionale for its existence—the rapid mobilization of a he had been assigned to the AEF as Director of Roads. He was a dynamic, resourceful commander, and the energizing force behind the Chemical Warfare Service until his retirement in 1929. U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on H.R. 8oy8, An Act to Regulate the Importation of Coal-Tar Products . . . , 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1919, p. 25. 48 Dale Birdsell, "United States Army Chemical Warfare Service Logistics Overseas, World War II" (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1962), pp. 31-32. 49 Fries and West, go; A. Fries, History of Chemical Warfare in France, MS, March 19, 1919, EHO.

The Heritage of War

conscript army. The first three-month combat training program for AEF troops allocated just two days to chem­ ical warfare. This was later reduced to six hours, "not­ withstanding a vigorous protest by the gas service."50 In addition to the difficulties presented to the Gas Service because the officer corps did not understand how to employ gas effectively, training deficiencies caused high combat losses. After an inspection of an AEF Infantry Regiment on March 13, 1918, a senior cws officer reported: "Many soldiers and officers were found without proper gas protection, that is, the respirators either not in the 'alert' position or no respirators at all. None of the dug­ outs were properly protected against gas. . . . No first aid appliances for the treament of gassed men were observed.. ."51 On March 21, 1918, this regiment was attacked with gas for one hour and suffered severe casualties—19 officers and 405 soldiers wounded, including almost 100 per cent casualties in one company.52 With combat losses of this magnitude, commanders were reluctant to use gas for fear that the enemy would retaliate. One Corps Operations Officer "refused to con­ sider a recommendation to use gas on a certain point in the battle of the Argonne unless the gas officer would state in writing that if the gas was so used it could not possibly result in the casualty of a single American sol­ dier." To Fries, "such an attitude was perfectly ab50 Fries, "History of Chemical . . . ," 39. The training was scarcely more complete for Division and Corps Gas Officers. For a description of their 64-hour course, see "The Chemical Warfare School from the Standpoint of a Chemical Warfare Officer," Chemical Warfare, 10:6 (June 15, 1924), 9-10. 51 "Necessity for Defense Against Chemical Warfare As Shown By World War Reports," Chemical Warfare, 10:1 (June 15, 1924), 2. 52 Ibid.

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surd."53 Absurd or not, it was a logical outgrowth of the vicious circle of poor training and high losses.54 It was symptomatic of the crisis of confidence that per­ vaded chemical warfare in the AEF. But this problem could be corrected within the AEF. The second and equally serious problem—the lack of effective support from the United States—could not. Fries was attempting to create an integrated service organization overseas without a comparable organiza­ tion in the United States. Until the Chemical Warfare Service was formed in the summer of 1918, support for the Gas Service had to come from those technical serv­ ices assigned a specified chemical warfare responsibil­ ity.55 There was no organization in the United States which could ensure that the Gas Service was allocated its share of scarce resources—funds and personnel—or that equipment procured met the standards of combat in Europe.56 Colonel Fries was in the unenviable posi­ es Fries, "History

of Chemical . . . ," 53.

Μ For accounts of the Gas Service "sales campaign" at the small unit

level, see Harold Reigelman, "A Chemical Officer At The Front," Chem­ ical Warfare Bulletin, 23:2, 2, 4 (April, July, October 1937), 42-59, 106-16, 151-63. This effort was not unique to the AEF. General Foulkes of the British Gas Service remarked concerning his activities in Janu­ ary 1917: "I had now to occupy myself with the apparently hopeless task of popularising the use of gas with the army staffs and with the troops" (Foulkes, 184) . 55 The Ordnance Department was charged with the manufacture of poisonous gases, but was reluctant initially to fulfill its responsibilities due to the press of conventional requirements; the Medical Department was responsible for gas masks; the Signal Corps for alarm devices. The Director of the Gas Service was "the coordinating agent between the various bureaus . . ." (Memo, C of S for TAG, 25 Oct 17, sub: Gas Service of the Army, WCD O C of S 9967-14, NA) . This weakness severely impaired the efficiency of the Gas Service. Due to the lack of a parent organization, promotions were slow. The Chief Gas Officer, First Army Corps, described the moral problem; "They have no hope of advancement and consequently a few good men who have energy and push that are assigned as regimental gas officers want to get out" (Memo, Chief Gas Officer, First Army Corps for the

T h e H e r i t a g e of W a r

tion of having to educate both the AEF and the War De­ partment in the requirements of gas warfare. By the fall of 1918, the educational problem had been largely solved. Unfortunately for the Allies, the stimulus for correction was in external pressure rather than internal review. The Germans made extensive use of all types of gas in the spring and summer offensives of 1918.57 In March and April of 1918, the British suf­ fered 33,000 casualties from mustard gas alone, a situa­ tion somewhat understated by General Foulkes as "a source of serious embarrassment to us."58 It was gen­ erally agreed that the Germans had used gas "in quan­ tities that had never been dreamed of before,"59 and that constraints on the German supply of gas shells was the primary reason why Allied losses had not been higher. Chief of the Gas Service, AEF, 23 Mar 18, sub: Promotions, History of C WS, AEF, App. K) . The first 25,000 gas masks shipped to Europe in 1917 were defective; tested by the British, they were penetrated in less than one minute. A serviceable American mask was not developed until January 1918, and not issued in Europe until the fall of 1918. British masks were used in the interim (Fries, "History of Chemical . . . ," 4; Crowell, 413) . 57 Somme, March 21-April 4; Lys, April 9-April 29; Aisne, May 27June 6; Nyon-Montdidier, June 9-13; Champagne-Marne, July 15-17. The degree of German use of gas is indicated in the following extract from a German Seventh Army field order for the Aisne offensive, May 27, 1918 [Blue Cross and Green Cross were nonpersistent gases]: a) Counter-battery and long range bombardments. For 7.7 cm field-guns, 10.5 cm and 15 cm howitzers, and 10 cm guns— Blue Cross 70%, Green Cross 10%, HE 20%,—long 15 cm guns fired only HE. The ratio of gas to high explosive was slightly lower for bombardment of infantry positions. For this particular action, no mustard gas [Yellow Cross] was used (Hartley, 498) . In July 1918, the average German Divisional Ammunition Dump con­ tained about 50 per cent gas shell. This was later reduced to 30-40 per cent due to a shortage of gas (ibid., 498) . 58 Foulkes, 333. Statement of General Sibert (Hearings on HR 8oj8, 10) .

World War I

Colonel Fries was quick to employ German use as the rationale for a significant expansion of American gas efforts. The issues were posed in a letter to General Pershing on May i, 1918. Colonel Fries began by not­ ing the critical role of gas in the war. He stated un­ equivocally, "the war will be won by gas," and asserted that gas was in a process of development more rapid than that of aviation. Gas was more effective than high explosives because per pound employed it caused twen­ ty-five times more casualties. The proof of gas lay in the German use. Despite "depleted laboratories, under­ manned factories and scarcity of raw material," German use of gas permitted her to maintain "decisive supe­ riority." The initiative would pass to the Allies only if they adopted extensive use of gas. Colonel Fries then recommended that the Gas Serv­ ice be recognized as a separate branch of the Army, the Chemical Warfare Service, and that one cws regiment be authorized for each Army in the AEF. The formation of a new branch was necessary because gas, as "a new mode of warfare," was "highly specialized," and only formal recognition could ensure personnel policies that would attract the necessary qualified men.60 Coming as it did in the midst of major German offensives, Fries' letter was accepted by the AEF. Fries' success was complete. With Pershing's support, a Chem­ ical Warfare Service was established in the United States as well as in the AEF.61 From that date until the Armistice, Fries had the complete and efficient support of a centralized Service in the United States. The turning point of AEF chemical warfare had been 60 Ltr, Chief of Gas Service for C in C AEF, ι May 18, sub: Reorgan­ ization of Gas Service, History of CWS, AEF, Part 11, App. 37. si The Chemical Warfare Service, National Army, was established in War Department General Order 82, June 28, 1918, and the Chemical Warfare Service, AEF, in Cable 1622R, March to Pershing, June 28, 1918.

T h e H e r i t a g e of W a r

passed. The pace of gas warfare accelerated. Acceptance of gas was indicated by gas shell authorizations, gas pro­ duction figures, and chemical troops. In November 1917, the AEF specified that 10 per cent of all artillery shells be filled with gas.62 Colonel Fries recommended in June 1918 that this ratio be increased to 50 per cent exclusive of shrapnel and antiaircraft ammunition.63 General Pershing accepted an increase to only 15 per cent in June, but by September the ratio was increased to 20 per cent and Pershing authorized a further in­ crease to 25 per cent beginning in January 1919.64 Gas production increased accordingly. The gas program of March 1918 authorized the production of 545 tons of toxic gas per week. By August 1918, the cws was request­ ing 4,525 tons per week. Actual production lagged far behind these demands—675 tons per week in Novem­ ber 1918—but the bottleneck was shell boosters rather than gas. Chemical warfare was receiving a continually higher priority.65 The planning program of 1919 fore­ cast British production of 4,000 tons of gas per month; Fries recommended 14,900 tons per month for the United States.66 In October 1918, the AEF was author­ ized to increase from 1 to 3 gas regiments.67 By every indication, gas warfare had been accepted by the Allied Powers. It had assumed a role of decisive importance on the battlefield, and the constantly growing AEF was mentally and physically prepared to use it in increasing Β2 Cable 268, GHQ AEF for AEWAR, 4 Nov 17, no sub, History of C W S , AEF, Part n. 63 Ltr, Chief Gas Service AEF to C of S AEF, sub: Gas Program, 7 Jun 18, History of CWS, AEF, Part 11. Bi Cable 1367-S, CmC AEF for Director cws, 24 Jun 18, no sub, History of CWS, AEF, Part 11; Cable 1667-S, GHQ AEF for AEWAR, 8 Sep 18, no sub, History of CWS, AEF, Part 11. es Crowell, 407. 66 History of C W S , A E F , Part 11; App. 52. Gas Program. 6T Cable, WD for Pershing AMEX FORCES, 8 Oct 18, no sub, History of CWS, AEF, Part 11, App. 60.

World War I

amounts even as warfare became more mobile in the fall of 1918. What would have been the role of gas if the war had extended into 1919? Several insights have been pro­ vided. In testifying at the 1920 Army Reorganization Act hearings, Benedict Crowell recalled the growth of chemical warfare during the war and stated that "our offensive in 1919, in my opinion, would have been a walk to Berlin, due to chemical warfare. Of course, that was kept as a secret . . ."6S It was secret, but production figures for 1919 traced the handwriting on the wall. Churchill, in describing the plans for the war in 1919, inferred the path that the war was treading: "At the Ministry of Munitions we were the bees of Hell, and we stored our hives with the pure essence of slaughter. It astonishes me to read in these after years the diabolical schemes for killing men on a vast scale by machinery or chemistry to which we devoted ourselves. . . . We denied ourselves nothing that the laws of war with their German applications allowed."69 This was war without limits—the brains and muscle of modern industrial nations applied without restriction to the art of war. In the minds of expert and layman alike, World War I was about to pass a threshold into new levels of violence when it ended. It was the mind that could speculate not the eye that had seen which would project World War I as it could have been in !^9es Statement of Mr. Crowell (Hearings on HR 8oj8, 1804) . es W. Churchill, The World Crises, 11, 208. Sir Maurice Hankey has since described several diabolical schemes such as "an inflammable dust, to be drifted with the wind over the enemy's trenches and then ignited by rockets and incendiary shell," and a device "for attacking the enemy's growing crops, stocks and forests by means of incendiary pel­ lets . . . which it was proposed to drop in great numbers from aero­ planes and free balloons fitted with automatic time release gear" (Hankey, 230-31).

The Heritage of War

C.

MILITARY PERSPECTIVES

Speculation would play a significant role in determin­ ing the future of gas warfare; however, there were more substantial factual inputs that would influence subse­ quent decision-makers—the lessons learned from the experiences of World War I. TACTICAL CHARACTERISTICS / The tactical military lessons

were mixed, a potpourri of individual or unit experi­ ences extremely difficult to evaluate in the aggregate in order to rate gas as "effective" or "noneffective."70 More important to military analysts than an imprecise evaluation of effectiveness were the characteristics of poison gas as observed on the battlefield. By November 1918, it was apparent that chemical warfare had three central characteristics: it was an extremely versatile weapon, tractable to almost any tactical situation; the logistic requirements complicated the battlefield enor­ mously; and its employment demanded unprecedented sophistication of individual and unit training. The tactical versatility of gas was derived from the diverse properties of the gases employed. Gas could be persistent or nonpersistent over a wide range of lethal­ ity—from an extremely toxic cyanic compound to a το The attempt to rate gas effectiveness was common however. A sub­ jective concept, effectiveness is based upon the value systems and objec­ tives of the rater. One frequent criterion was the ratio of casualties to amount of gas employed in comparison with the casualty effects of an equal amount of conventional explosives (see Gen. A. Prentiss, Chemi­ cals in War [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937], pp. 655-62). Assuming the basic validity of the criterion—which may or may not be true, e.g., casualties or increased logistic burden or threat of subsequent escala­ tion as a more relevant criterion—the gas-casualty figures of World War I were not sufficiently precise to derive any meaningful conclusion. See the excellent studies of R. Cochrane, Gai Warfare in World War I, 20 Studies (Army Chemical Center: Chemical Corps Historical Office, 1957^96°) ·

World War I

nonlethal, harassing tear or sneezing gas. The effect of the gas could be immediate or delayed for several hours. These properties gave chemical warfare a role in the offensive or defensive, in mobile or position warfare. A lethal, nonpersistent agent could be placed on enemy positions just before an attack and it would be dissi­ pated before friendly troops arrived. A persistent agent such as mustard could be placed to protect a flank dur­ ing an attack, to deny an area to the enemy, or as a very effective barrage in front of a defensive position.71 Such flexibility applied, of course, to all belligerents, pro­ vided that each could support the logistic requirements of gas warfare. The logistic demands were enormous. Gas substi­ tuted for nothing. Its requirements were an additional load to an already overloaded battlefield. To be effec­ tive, a high concentration of gas had to be maintained over the enemy position. The Germans found that 12,000 kilograms of Green Cross [nonpersistent] shells were necessary to gas an area one kilometer square. Similar consumption figures were experienced by the other belligerents.72 Graver problems were presented to both logisticians and tacticians by the requirements for individual and collective protection in a toxic environment. In addi­ tion to the other stresses and dangers of war, the very air the soldier breathed and the harmless inanimate 71 In one action the Germans desired to deny British occupation of the town of Armentiferes "which was deluged with mustard gas, causing an immediate withdrawal. Although they themselves could not enter for more than two weeks, it enabled the Germans to take the city with practically no loss of life" (Auld, 20) . 72 Prentiss, 502-07. High ammunition expenditure rates were not unique to gas; however, gas required a special infrastructure—meteoro­ logical stations, special purpose units with specialized training, etc.— that was not required for conventional warfare.

T h e H e r i t a g e of W a r

objects he touched had become potential weapons against him. The range of problems posed was infinite: How would the soldier eat, drink, sleep, perform bodily functions, use his weapon, give and receive commands; how would he protect horses, pigeons, and watch dogs; how would he know when his immediate area was con­ taminated? By November 1918, many of these issues had been broached but they had not been solved.73 The battlefield had experienced a quantum jump in sophis­ tication; it had become too "complicated." Nothing indicated the spectrum of new problems better than the gas mask. A highly personal symbol of gas warfare, it was awkward, heavy to carry, and un­ comfortable to wear. An officer in the 3rd Division, AEF, described it: "The mask is safe but it is the most uncomfortable thing I ever experienced. If . . . [anyone wants to] know how a gas mask feels, let him seize his nose with a pair of fire tongs, bury his face in a hot feather pillow, then seize a gas pipe with his teeth and breathe through it for a few hours while he performs routine duties. It is safe, but like the deadly poison which forced its in­ vention, it is not sane."74 73 Captain Μ. E. Barker, the Technical Director at Edgewood Arsenal, the center o£ U.S. chemical development, categorized protection as "one of the unsolved problems of the war" (M. Barker, "The Protec­ tion of Enclosed Spaces from Noxious Gases," Chemical Warfare, 12:1a [December 15, 1926], 2-4). 74 Cochrane, "The 3rd Div at Chateau Thierry, July 1918," Study 14, 34. Restricted breathing was particularly disturbing. "It seemed to me in all my trials and efforts that I should be smothered if I remained longer than three minutes in that gas mask" (Maj. Gen. R. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War [Garden City, N.Y.: Long­ mans, Green & Co., 1925], p. 159). The mask also reduced vision and muffled the voice—two essential requirements to command on the battlefield. The problem is indicated in the following exchange on the

World War I

It was not just that the mask was uncomfortable. The survival of the individual was determined by the qual­ ity of the mask. Either it worked faultlessly or the sol­ dier died. Life was dependent upon 100 per cent re­ liability. This unique and disquieting reliance on sci­ ence and industry, was not the only psychological prob­ lem related to wearing the mask. There was the added trauma of divorcement from the external environment. The gas mask "makes the soldier blind and deaf when he enters into material warfare, despoils him of his feed and drink, his nicotine and alcohol, and then makes war a fearful means for the destruction of morale."75 As well as indirect psychological effects derived from protective measures, fears of gas warfare produced other reactions. One was a psychoneurosis, "Gas Fright." Sol­ diers, hearing a report that gas was in the area, would acquire all of the symptoms of gas poisoning although they had not been gassed.76 Gas could induce severe morale problems among troops already fatigued and dispirited by a difficult tactical situation. The First Army of the AEF was in such a situation facing the Kriemhilde Stellung in October 1918. The history of the 42nd Division commented: ". . . an important cause of the low morale was the mounting fear of the enemy's use of gas ... it was largely floor of Congress during a gas mask demonstration. The command was given to "empty masks." Mr. Hamilton: How can the commanding officer give the order that the gentleman has just given with these masks on? Mr. Tilson: He can do it. It is a very mumbling sort of order, but it can be understood by seeing what the commander himself is doing about this time. . . ." (U.S. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1918, LVI, Part 6, 5419·) 75 Maj. G. Soldan, Der Mensch und die Schlacht der Zunkuft (Oldenberg: Verlag Stalling, 1925), in Hanslian, Der Chemisehe Krieg, 312. ?6See Cochrane, "The 3rd Div . . . ," 91.

The Heritage of War

responsible for creating so great a straggler problem that, as Bullard said, a solid line of MP's back of the fighting front had become necessary to keep the men in the line. The basis of that fear was the gas atmos­ phere that the enemy maintained over much of the front by his regulated gas fire each day. When it did not cause real casualties, it supported apprehension and panic, and hastened the onset of battle fatigue and gas mask exhaustion."77 The combined effects of tactical flexibility, logistical complexity, and adverse psychological response to an alien environment required highly trained units. For front-line troops, instantaneous reaction was required twenty-four hours per day. If the unit was not properly trained, it suffered debilitating casualties.78 In summary, chemical warfare was an enigma from the perspective of tactical military employment. If it could be used unilaterally, there was no question that it was effective. Unfortunately, however, it could not be used unilaterally. Once the enemy retaliated, the game did not appear worth the candle. No transitory advantage justified the difficulties of a chemical battle77 Cochrane, "The 42nd Div Before Landis-et-St. Georges, October 1918," Study 17, 40-41. The Division Gas Officer, 32nd Division reported to the Division Commander on November 9, 1918: "It was said that around mid-October gas evacuations, real, suspected or feigned, reached 'something like 42 percent' of the troops engaged in battle, as 'a gen­ eral average in the AEF' " (Ltr, DGO 32nd Div to CG 32nd Div, 9 Nov 18, sub: Monthly Rpt, in Cochrane, "The 42nd Div . . . ," 42) . 78 All armies experienced roughly equivalent gas-casualty rates, dependent upon the training of troops. Casualties at Ypres in 1915 were estimated at over 30 per cent. Later in the war, the gas-casualty rate declined to less than 3 per cent as training improved. Yet the first attack on U.S. troops in 1918 produced over 30 per cent casualties— not a glowing testimonial to U.S. preparations. "[It] . . . would seem to indicate that after three years of experience, there was a disregard of warnings and the use of protective means which would have averted such a catastrophe" (E. Spenser, "An Historical Lesson," Chemical Warfare, 9:2, 3 [February 15, March 15, 1923], 10; Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, 239).

World War I

field. The problems of fighting in an alien environment appeared insoluble. Science and technology might de­ velop an answer but this was a mixed blessing at best. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY / If it can be said that science and the industrial revolution approached the battle­ field in the American Civil War, it can be said to have arrived during World War I. In no other area was this as apparent as chemical warfare. A General could im­ prove upon or detract from the capabilities of the chem­ ical warfare equipment given to him; but the life and death decisions of strategic magnitude were made in laboratories and industrial plants. Throughout the war, there was a scientific race be­ tween belligerents. The Germans seized the initiative when they introduced chlorine gas at Ypres in April 1915; six months passed before the Allies could retali­ ate. In July 1917, the Germans introduced mustard gas; it was June 1918 before the Allies could retaliate in kind,79 and not until the last month of the war that they had sufficient stocks of mustard gas. This provided a significant advantage to the Germans in the springsummer offensives of 1918. Thirty different chemical substances were tested in combat during the war,80 each of which posed a unique problem for defense. Since no army could afford to find itself in a defenseless position due to a new enemy gas, there were continual efforts at improvement. The Brit­ ish alone issued 7 different masks to their troops—a total of 50 million masks.81 One dramatic example 79 Due to a brilliant manufacturing feat of the French. The British did not have mustard gas until September 1918. so Mueller-Kiel, 49. Over 3,000 substances were investigated for war use. si Dr. J. Mills, "Chemical Warfare," Chemical Warfare, 8:4 (April 15, 192a), 4. For an excellent discussion see Capt. M. Barker, "Gas Mask Development," Chemical Warfare, 12:7 (July 15, 1926), 11-15.

The Heritage of War

will suffice to prove the importance of these efforts. Brit­ ish officers in France during January of 1916 decided that the gas mask currently in use did not offer sufficient protection considering possible German developments. A new model was developed, and went into production within forty-eight hours. "The new helmets [masks] were going out in February, the fighting troops were all equipped by March, and in April, there were three gas attacks anyone of which would have penetrated the respirator with which we were equipped in January."82 The story would have been far different if there had not been extremely close cooperation between the military and industry.83 The role of science was equal to if not greater than the traditional value of physical courage in determin­ ing success on the battlefield. As toxic agents and their methods of delivery became more sophisticated in 1917 and 1918, the necessity for professional-military assimi82 Hartley, 504. Fries was continually unhappy with the American effort, feeling that the slow U.S. response was due to a continual search for the perfect at the cost of manufacturing the good. After the war, he summed up: "Protection in battle is always relative. The only perfect protection is to stay home on the farm. The man who cannot balance protection against legitimate risks has no business passing on arms equipment or tactics to be used at the front" (Fries, "History of Chemical . . . ," 35). 83 The "military" in this case were scientists and technicians drafted into the military service, not professional officers. This was also the case in the other Allied armies. There were very few professional officers in the cws. A less-successful tale of assimilation was related by J. S. Haldane, Professor of Physiology at Oxford. In 1915 Haldane proposed the use of mustard gas to a British General. " 'Does it kill?' asked the General. 'No,' he was told, 'but it will disable enormous numbers of the enemy temporarily.' 'That is no good to us,' said the man of blood, 'we want something that will kill.'" The concept that a wounded man was a greater burden than a dead man in a war of attrition had to be taught by the Germans. The scientist posed the right question but the General did not perceive (J.B.S. Haldane, Callinicus, A Defense of Chemical Warfare [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1925], p. 48; Capt. J.B.S. Haldane [son of Professor Haldane], "Science and Future War," Chem­ ical Warfare Bulletin, 24:1 [January 1938], 11).

World War I

lation of science and technology became more pro­ nounced. It was not a comforting thought to realize that an enemy with superior technical expertise and indus­ trial capability could introduce a weapon which would overcome one's own superior training and leadership. This was a disturbing reality that the military profes­ sion faced in looking back at World War I. Chemical warfare was the most striking example. A QUESTION OF HONOR / However, there was more to disturb the military profession than science and tech­ nology. Chemical warfare did not fall within the lim­ its of the honor of the profession. The code of war was unwritten, but it was understood. Essentially based upon the code of chivalry, it had varied as mores changed and as the increasing range of weapons changed the nature of the battlefield. In 1914, it was represented by the Rules of Land Warfare in the Hague Conventions. Violation could be tolerated only through necessity of war and even here the accountability rested with the Head of State.84 Two hallmarks of the profession were that war would be limited in its efforts to combatants only, and that the most honorable and heroic way to defeat the enemy was in hand-to-hand combat. In the minds of certain World War I military leaders, gas violated these customs and typified the contemporary degeneration of the profes­ sion in the face of unlimited war. General Peyton March, the Chief of Staff of the si German pleas of Kriegsraison after Ypres were required for mili­ tary professional as well as legal and propaganda reasons. In the post­ war literature, the point is continually made that the initiative for German introduction of gas warfare rested with civilians (see Sir E. Thorpe, "Chemical Warfare and the Washington Conference," Chemi­ cal Warfare, 8:8 [August 15, 1922], 14-15) .

The Heritage of War

United States Army during and after the war, recalled a visit to a hospital in France: "[The hospital contained] . . . over one hundred French women and children who had been living in their homes in rear of and near the front and who were gassed. The sufferings of these children, particularly, were horrible and produced a profound impression on me. War is cruel at best, but the use of an instrument of death, which, once launched, cannot be controlled, and which may decimate noncombatants-—women and children—reduces civilization to savagery."85 While March was primarily concerned about the gassing of noncombatants, two general officers more closely connected with the initiation at Ypres con­ demned the effect on troops. General von Deimling, Commanding General of a German Corps at Ypres, commented: "I must confess that the commission for poisoning the enemy just as one poisons rats struck me as it must any straightforward soldier; it was repulsive to me."86 Lord French, the British Commander in France, expressed the "deepest regret and some sur­ prise" that the German Army claiming to be "the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes. . . ."87 Reactions such as these would be reinforced with time as the rationale of wartime necessity faded from view. A sense of guilt for past actions combined with 85 Gen. P. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, N.Y.: DoubledayDoran, 1932) , P- 333- This passage was written in 1931, but it was not inconsistent with his immediate postwar attitude. 86 Gen. von Deimling, Reminiscences (Paris: Montaigne, 1931) , in Hanslian, The German Gas Attack, 9. 87 The Despatches of Lord French (London: Chapman and Hull Ltd., 1917) , p. 360. In the British Army, the Gas Brigade and gas itself were referred to as "!rightfulness" (Foulkes, 187) .

World War I

the natural desire to enhance the image of one's pro­ fession could make gas an exceedingly unpopular sub­ ject for military discussion. At the end of World War I, the prospects of military acceptance of chemical warfare were unfavorable. On balance, the military characteristics of gas warfare did not justify its use unless the situation ensured unilateral employment. Unless some nation made a significant technological breakthrough in protection, a mutual ex­ change of gas would create a toxic battle environment causing more problems to be raised than could be solved. Nevertheless, the rewards for a breakthrough would be high.... The question was complicated, however, by the side issues that gas introduced. Gas symbolized the encroach­ ment of science and technology into military decision­ making, and became "an affair of honor" to the mili­ tary profession. If the military continued to view gas from these perspectives, its future would not be promising. D.

FEARS FOR THE FUTURE

ESCALATION

The issues that gas posed to the military were dwarfed by the problems it presented to the makers of national security policy. The history of the use of toxic agents in World War I made a near perfect model of escalation: escalation of delivery systems, of weapon capabilities, and of targets selected. In both method of delivery and in quantity delivered, the employment of gas expanded rapidly, particularly in 1916. The first attack in 1915 was delivered from cylinders that had to be manhandled into position. The British improved on this by laying tracks and releasing gas from train-mounted cylinders. In the summer of 1916, the British introduced the Livens Projector—

T h e Heritage of War

a type of mortar that could fire 30-pound gas bombs to a range of 1,500 yards. To regain the initiative, the Ger­ mans adopted artillery gas shells in the winter of 19161917.88 After that, the expansion was in number of guns employed and duration of bombardment. By the time of the 1918 offensive, at least 50 per cent of the artillery shells fired by the Germans were gas shells.89 The last ominous increment to delivery capability was never employed. In 1918, the British contracted for 250 bomb­ ing aircraft each with a 7,500-pound bomb load.90 The effectiveness of toxic agents increased in step with the augmentation of delivery capability. The ex­ pansion was two-fold, in variety and in efficiency. The initial trend was to increased lethality of nonpersistent agents. When mustard gas was introduced in July 1917, different varieties of persistent agents were tested. By the end of the war, a wide range of agents had been de­ veloped that could be mixed for precise tactical effect.91 88 Originally gas had been considered unsuited for shell delivery, presumably because the Artillery did not want to become involved in a "dirty business" that belonged to the Engineers (V. Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine—Chemical Strategy in Peace and War [New York: Chemical Foundation, 1923], pp. 90-92) . The French were the first to use gas in shell form, although the Germans exploited it first on a large scale. 89 Mueller-Kiel asserts that in the Second Battle of the Marne the percentage was at least 80 per cent (Mueller-Kiel, 26). In October 1917, the French continuously bombarded the Laffaux salient north­ east of Soissons with phosgene (nonpersistent lethal gas) for seven days and nights (Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, 36) . 90 The bomber, the Handley-Page, had 4 engines with a crew of 6 and sufficient range to attack Berlin. Only 3 had been delivered by the end of the war (Charles K. Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, 1 [London: HMSO, 1961], 40, 49). Auld asserts that the United States "devised, manufac­ tured and filled" bombs, each containing one ton of mustard gas to be used against Metz (Auld, 22-23) · si The names and physiological properties of the agents are not essen­ tial to this study. For an extensive discussion, see Prentiss. By the end of the war, the Germans employed "Rainbow Shoots," combining agents of varied characteristics (Supra, p. 29η).

World War I

The efficiency of agents varied in relation to the pro­ tective devices employed.92 And there was a continual search for agents which would overcome enemy de­ fenses. In this sense, mustard gas was of infinite effi­ ciency in that no practical defense was developed dur­ ing the war. At the end of the war, the Allies introduced toxic-smoke compounds for which there was no exist­ ing protection.93 As if this were not sufficiently disturb­ ing, it was discovered shortly after the Armistice that the last toxic agent the Germans had employed in the war had been developed in August 1917. Only Prophets of Doom could speculate as to what the Germans had developed between August 1917 and November 1918.94 The last and most foreboding input to the model of escalation was target selection. The initial use of gas was confined to a military target, but as the war devel­ oped and the use of gas increased in intensity, it was impossible to avoid noncombatants. One of the objec­ tions to the release of clouds of gas from cylinders was that the size of the cloud produced significant gas con­ centrations at undesired locations. In discussing this problem, Hanslian referred to effects as far as 20 kilo­ meters behind the front and deaths at a distance of 15 kilometers.95 There is no indication, however, that the belligerents did not tacitly agree that a certain "spill­ over" of gas into towns was an inevitable accompani­ ment to its tactical use in a congested countryside. 92 Lethality of a gas describes its casualty-producing ability when taken into the body. The term efficiency is used here to emphasize the military requirement o£ gas—that it effect casualties on the battlefield. The most lethal gas in the world is of little use if there is easy, certain protection. 93 Capt. M. Barker, "The Protection of Enclosed Spaces From Noxious Gas," Chemical Warfare, 12:12 (December 15, 1926) , 2. '•>* Lefebure, 89. »5 Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, pp. 35, 133. Upon occasion, the odor was perceptible at 30 kilometers.

The Heritage of War

The strategic use of gas was an entirely different question. The delivery system could only be by airplane and the implications were truly frightening. The Ger­ mans initiated strategic bombing on Christmas Eve 1914—one aircraft with one bomb. The bombing effort gradually escalated to two serious raids on London (June 13, 1917 and July 7, 1917) causing 832 casual­ ties.96 After the July 7th raid, the English War Cabinet appointed a committee headed by Jan Christian Smuts to study the air defense of the United Kingdom. In its report, this committee gave serious consideration to the "probability" of the Germans using gas to attack Lon­ don.97 Thus by the fall of 1917, the Germans had initiated unrestricted city bombing and the British had matched the capability of gas with the potential of the airplane, at least in defensive contingency planning. By late 1918, the potential of the airplane was becom­ ing real capability. The bomber force would be avail­ able in 1919. There was no shortage of toxic agent. The Allies were prepared.98 As the capability was being '•»' T. O'Brien, Civil Defense [History of the Second World War, U.K. General Series] (London: HMSO, 1955), pp. 7-11. The Germans conducted a total of 103 bombing raids on England, 51 airship and 52 airplane, dropping 300 tons of bombs and causing 4,820 casualties. »7 Memo, Lt Gen J. C. Smuts, 6 Sep 17, reproduced in H. Jones, "Home Defense," Appendix vi, The War in the Air, ν [History of the Great War Series] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937) , 491-93. "Careful attention should be given to the probability of the enemy resorting in future raids to the use of gas shells on a larger scale than hitherto . . ." (ibid., p. 493 [italics mine]) . A fascinating inference it was that the Germans had used gas against London before September 1917, but there is no other evidence to confirm this. 88 In the spring of 1918, Colonel Fries suggested to General Pershing that the Allies deliver gas by airplane. As the incident was related by General Harbord, Chief of Staff, AEF, General Pershing refused the idea because the AEF would not initiate and "at that time" the enemy was not using gas against civilian populations, although the situation could change. "While our aviators were not allowed to initiate such warfare, we were not unprepared to retaliate if it came to that" (Maj. Gen. J. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917-1919 [Boston: Little, Jirown1 1936], p. 223 [italics mine]) .

World War I

gathered, the Allies made plans for the forthcoming air offensive. The order called for unrestricted bombing." In addition to authorizing the use of high explosives, the order provided a ready case for gas bombing.100 There is no indication that a decision was ever made to initiate strategic gas bombing.101 The mere fact that it had quite obviously been seriously considered was enough to complete a rather terrifying model of escala­ tion that would haunt the makers of postwar policy. During the war there had been two attempts to halt the spiral of escalation. The first was offered by the United States in May 1915—after German initiation at Ypres but before British retaliation at Loos. President Wilson proposed that Germany discontinue submarine warfare against merchant ships and the use of poison 89 Memo, Mar Foch for M. Clemenceau, 13 Sep 18, in Jones, Appen­ dix x, 31-40. I Object To carry the war into Germany by attacking her industry (Munition work) commerce (Economic crises) population (Demoralization) These bombing raids on the German population do not properly speaking constitute reprisals—this like poison gas is a means of war­ fare used by the enemy and which we are therefore forced to use in our turn. [Italics mine.] 100 Note that Churchill used the same terminology in describing the horrors of a war extended into 1919. (Supra, p. 32). Considering these alternatives, gas bombing was not a particularly diabolical idea. 101 Irwin asserted, "the Allies, I can testify personally, did not intend to use this method [gas bombing] 'unless they had to' " (Will Irwin, "The Next War." An Appeal to Common Sense [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1921], p. 45). A skillful propagandist, Irwin is probably correct. His case would have been more effective if he could have proved the contrary. It does not appear logical for the Allies to have made a deci­ sion to use gas unless the high-explosive bombing failed, a situation that could not have occurred until early 1919. The published record of the Supreme War Council does not discuss possible use of gas in igig (Ltr, Mil Rep to Supreme War Council [Bliss] for Sec State, 14 Sep 18, sub. Study by Perm Mil Rep to Supreme War Council with incl: Joint Note 37, General Military Policy of the Allies for the Autumn of 1918 and for the Year 1919, in Lansing Papers, π, 146-53).

The Heritage of War

gas, while England would terminate the blockade of neutral ports. The offer was refused by both powers.102 The other attempt was an appeal against the use of gas by the International Committee of the Red Cross on February 6, 1918. The Red Cross put its finger on the root of the problem when it predicted that the use of gas "threatens to increase to a never foreseen extent."108 The appeal was rejected by both sides in notes de­ signed more for propaganda effect than for serious ne­ gotiation. The atmosphere of distrust could not be over­ come despite a mutual interest in terminating gas warfare.104 Viewed in retrospect, the image of gas was no more encouraging to the decision-maker than it was to the military professional. The other group whose impres­ sions would influence the future of poison gas was the general public. It will be recalled that the Allies had changed the focus of gas propaganda several times dur­ ing the war.105 By 1918, poison gas was being repre­ sented as an unwanted but German-introduced feature of the war in which Allied science and technology was proving its superiority.106 ι"2 E. Franklin, "Chemical Warfare—Its Possibilities and Probabili­ ties," International Conciliation, No. 248 (March 1929), p. 57. 103 Comite Internationale de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) , Documents relatifs a la Guerre Chimique et Aerienne (Geneve: CICR, 1932) , p. 6. Trans, by author. IO4The American position is indicated in WPD 2462/108. German and English attitudes are mentioned in Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, 327, and Thuillier, 163-70. 105 Supra, pp. 15-16. 106 A typical sample: "There are among us chemists who can meet them upon their own ground and go them one better in devilish inventiveness if it is so desired. . . . Before the great war is over it is not unlikely that every fiendish, death-dealing gas known to science will be used on the battlefield as an implement of destruction. But American savants declare they can meet each new horror with a power­ ful remedy. Germany cannot devise that which American ingenuity cannot overcome" ("Poison Gases," Illustrated World, 28 [December 1917], p. 628) .

World War I

Under the circumstances, gas was being presented quite rationally, and it apparently was not the subject of any more unfavorable reaction than that directed at all the new weapons of war. The situation could change rapidly, however, if interest groups, including decision­ makers and the military, desired to use gas as a cause celebre to promote a particular want. Only the future would tell.

PART II • THE INTERW AR YEARS INTRODUCTION

The employment of toxic agents during World War I left postwar decision-makers with a host of complex prob­ lems, rooted as much in projection of future strategic employment as in the record of tactical employment of the immediate past. At the time of the Armistice, gas was on the threshold of escalation to strategic as well as increased tactical employment. Whether this forbidding prospect was realized or prevented in a future war de­ pended on the response of decision-makers. Part II analyses the American reaction, during the interwar years, to what was regarded as the threat of chemical warfare. The intent is not only to trace de­ claratory and action policies but also to examine pro­ grams effected to implement policy, so that we may as­ certain the nature of restraints on decision-makers dur­ ing World War II. To accomplish this, Part II is di­ vided into three chapters, based on a chronological division of the interwar period into the immediate post­ war years, the period 1922 to 1939, and the beginning of World War II. Chapter 2 develops the inconsistent and essentially impulsive American reaction to the problem of formu­ lating chemical warfare policy. Such policy is seen to have emerged as an amalgam of individual and unco­ ordinated responses to the pressures of Allied Powers drafting the Peace Treaty, of domestic commercial in­ terests ensuring a profitable future, and of an adminis­ tration moved to compensate for torpedoing the League of Nations by taking the lead in world disarmament. The origins of military nonassimilation of toxic agents are revealed in the reaction of the Army against insti-

The Interwar Years

tutionalization of chemical warfare capability in the National Defense Act of 1920, and in an overly restric­ tive response to the provisions of the Washington Arms Conference. Most of the interwar period is treated in Chapter 3, which traces the evolution of an unrealistic chemical warfare policy aimed at the prohibition of toxic agents. Gradual awareness of the inadequacies of the policy was stimulated by participation in international con­ ferences; yet the military establishment, faced with in­ stitutional and functional restraints, could not bring itself to adopt more realistic national policies. Chapter 4 explores American chemical warfare capa­ bilities and intentions at the outbreak of World War II. An almost total unreadiness for gas warfare within the War Department is evaluated in terms of objective and subjective restraints, acting primarily on the Army but also on the Navy and the Army Air Corps. Other restraints serving to deter United States employment, such as the lack of passive defense for the civilian pop­ ulation, poor intelligence, adverse public opinion, and legal restraints, are evaluated to portray the "environ­ ment of deterrence" existing in 1939.

CHAPTER 2 - THE AFTERM ATH OF WAR With the end of the Great War, America prepared to return to its prewar isolation. A period of security and prosperity was in the offing; it remained only to patch up the damage remaining from the war. One objec­ tionable legacy of the war which could not easily be forgotten was the memory of unrestricted conflict char­ acterized by the employment of toxic agents. In the aftermath of war, decision-makers faced two problems related to gas warfare: the United States had to determine national chemical warfare policy, and then, in concert with the other Allied powers, develop a joint policy to be applied to the defeated powers. The­ oretically, the resolution of these problems would lead to the formulation of specific policies and programs for the postwar period. Programs to achieve military readi­ ness would be undertaken; communications strategy for chemical warfare information would be worked out; and national positions in bilateral and multilateral ne­ gotiations would be formulated. Such was the proper sequence in decision-making. It was not realized in the immediate postwar period. Specific problems arose—e.g., the drafting of the peace settlement, the passage of domestic tariff legislation, the Washington Arms Conference, the reorganization of the War Department in the National Defense Act of 1920—and were individually resolved without the di­ recting influence of a coordinated chemical warfare policy. As a result, by 1922 United States policy with respect to toxic agents was a melange of imprecise and, in many cases, contradictory policy decisions.

The Interwar Years

Formulated by default more than by deliberate plan, these individual decisions established the pattern of United States policy throughout the interwar period. To understand the fabric of such a policy one must examine the individual threads, each of which was a response to a specific problem perceived by the general public, special interest groups, civilian decision-makers, or the military establishment. A.

DRAFTING THE PEACE

The first problem faced by the United States was to determine chemical warfare policy for the Peace Con­ ference. One basic objective of the Peace Treaty to prevent future German aggression. Since the use of poison gas was associated with German aggression, it was a focal point for Allied attention. The successes the Germans had achieved with the use of gas had been de­ rived from surprise employment in violation of an ac­ cepted international convention (the Hague Convention of 1899), and from the scientific and industrial advan­ tage of a superb chemical industry unequaled by the Allied Powers. The provisions of the Peace Treaty were designed to deny the Germans similar advantages in the future. Denial was achieved by placing an all-inclusive prohibition on German possession of the means of chemical warfare and by destroying their industrial chemical monopoly. There was unusual Allied unanimity on the Treaty article denying Germany the right to manufacture or import toxic agents:1 this prohibition was agreed to 1 Part v, Sec. 1, Chap. 1, Art. 171 of the Treaty of Versailles stated: "The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. "The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufac­ ture, storage and use of the said products or devices. "The manufacture and the importation into Germany of armoured

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

without question. The problem of industrial supe­ riority was by contrast a controversial issue, and it was not considered until one month after the Article 171 prohibition had been accepted. In the course of a meet­ ing of Foreign Ministers on April 15, 1919, the British proposed an amendment to a previously accepted article requiring Germany to surrender all war material in excess of specified armament levels. The British amend­ ment would require the Germans to "put the Allies in effective possession of all chemical processes [including drawings of plants, manufacturing instructions, and re­ ports of research to date] used during the war . . . or for the production of substances from which such things were or can be made."2 Thus stated, the amendment promised to be one of the real plums of the settlement. Before World War I the Germans had controlled 75 per cent of the world cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited." (Allied and Associated Powers, The Treaty of Peace, p. 81.) There was, however, a significant difference between the first draft prepared by the Foch Committee of the Supreme War Council on March 3, igig, and the final article. The draft article was blunt and to the point in stating that chemical warfare was outlawed: "Production or use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, any liquid, any material and any similar device capable of use in war are forbidden." (Chap. 2, Art. 5, Draft Regulations Concerning a Definitive Military Status of Germany, App. A to ic-155 [BC-45], U.S. Department of State, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, iv [Washington: USGPO, 1943], 232) . The draft article was accepted without comment on March 6 and March 10, 1919. The regulations were redrafted to reflect substantive comments on other articles between March 10 and March 17. In the redrafted regulations, approved by the Big Four, Article 5 became Article 13, and the wording was changed to that of the final Article 171. There is no indication that the change in wording was realized to be other than procedural. The intent of the Drafting Committee must have been to reaffirm recognition of the Hague Conventions; however, it greatly weakened the firm prohibition of the original draft. 2 U.S. Department of State, The Paris Peace Conference, iv, 560.

The Interwar Years

trade in dyestuffs. Even divided among the Allied Pow­ ers, possession of German trade secrets would provide a lucrative commercial advantage. The British stated that their interest was solely one of security and supported this thesis with military advisors who stated that gas secrets "should be divulged in order to reduce the dan­ ger of their use in any future wars."3 The United States opposed the amendment from the moment it was in­ troduced. Wilson and Lansing expressed the view that the issue was economic rather than military, and that the amendment would give an unfair commercial ad­ vantage to rival industries. In addition, it would be im­ possible to enforce. Wilson felt that the Allies "would never be certain that they possessed them all [the secrets]."4 While Wilson expressed his opposition to the amend­ ment in Paris, increasing pressure for acceptance was being generated in the United States by the Chemical Foundation, an association of American chemical in­ dustries. The case for American industry was stated by Mr. Francis Garvan, Alien Property Custodian and later President of the Chemical Foundation, in a telegram to the American delegation in Paris. "Explain to President [the objectives of the Chemical Foundation and] . . . the fact that there must be no pos­ sibility of injuring the industry upon which rests, first, our defense against the explosive, gas, and germ future offensive of Germany; second, five hundred millions s Ibid., 561. * Ibid., 480. On April 16, the question was referred back to the mili­ tary advisors for additional study and a statement of the military advantages of the amendment. The advisors were cautioned: "a) That no means of supervision exist capable of guaranteeing the veracity of the statements the Germans might make on this subject "b) That such a demand for the revelation of German secrets of man­ ufacture might give an unfair advantage to rival industries in Allied countries."

The Aftermath of War

invested in the dye industry itself; third, the independ­ ence of all textile, paint, varnish, and other industries dependent upon the American dye industry; fourth, destruction of present espionage system, only partially destroyed by war, through the German dyers' 'agents and representatives' in America; fifth, the general chem­ ical development upon which modern industry so greatly relies; and sixth, the future of chemical medi­ cine in America; in other words, the wresting from Ger­ many of her destructive use of chemical science and turning it to our defense and the betterment of humanity."5 The chemical industries were doing precisely what Wil­ son had feared: the desire for specific commercial ad­ vantage was cloaked in an appeal for national security from the menace of chemical warfare. Nevertheless, Wilson persisted in his opposition to such provisions as made for an excessively harsh "Carthaginian" peace. The issue was raised again on April 28, 1919, by Lloyd George. This time the British military, supported by scientific experts, made the case that German dis­ covery of new gases would enable her to gain a decisive military advantage despite limited conventional arma­ ments. It was a clever association with disarmament. A new British resolution was tabled, as demanding as the original amendment had been.® Wilson responded with 5 Cable, Garvan for Bradley, Palmer, ig Apr 1919, no sub, Exhibit 4874D, U.S. Senate, Hearings, Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry pursuant to S 206, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1936, Part 39, p. 13456 [hereafter cited as Nye Committee]. For other similar telegrams see entire Exhibit 4874, Nye Committee, 13455-13456. β "The German Government will disclose to the Allied Governments the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used both in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used, including the mode of manufacture of the synthetic and nitric acids used in the making of such explosives. As a part of such disclosure the Allied Governments

The Interwar Years

a restatement of his previous objections. He wanted "to avoid . . . an article which could be used in a round­ about way for irritating investigation of all possible secrets."7 After discussion, a compromise amendment was drafted which deleted specific reference to syn­ thetic and nitric acids and any requirement for inspec­ tion. This draft was later incorporated into the Peace TreatyasArticle 172.8 Thus emasculated, the provision satisfied no one. Without inspection or enforcement it did not ensure the Allied military certain knowledge of German chem­ ical warfare secrets, nor could civilian industry be sure that it had access to the most critical processes. Written in response to the pressures of a concerned domestic public, a worried military establishment, and an ex­ panding chemical industry, the Article's primary effect was to antagonize the Germans.9 B. AMERICAN INDUSTRY AND PROPAGANDA

Wilson's reluctance to accede to the desires of the shall have the right to inspect all plants used for the manufacture, and shall receive from the German Government full particulars of the processes of manufacture in such plants" (U.S. Department of State, The Paris Peace Conference, v, 311) . 7 Ibid. s Part v, Sec. 1, Art. 172, Treaty of Versailles: "Within a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the German Government will disclose to the Govern­ ments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used." (Allied and Associated Powers, The Treaty of Peace, p. 81.) a For additional views on the formulation of Arts. 171-72: R. Baker, "America and the World Peace," New York Times, February 5, 1922, vii, pp. 1-2; P. Mantoux, Les Deliberations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars—28 juin 1919), 2 vols. (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955) ; "The Struggle for Domination in the Chemical Industry in the Period Immediately Following the War," Nye Committee, Part 3, 266-69.

T h e Aftermath of War

American chemical industry at Versailles did not ex­ tend to those actions that could be taken within the United States. Despite his insistence that the United States should pursue liberal trade policies, he supported a high protective tariff for the chemical industry based upon the requirements of national security. In an ad­ dress to Congress on May 20, 1919, he called for special consideration to be given to American manufacture of dyestuffs and related chemicals. "The close relations between the manufacture of dyestuffs on the one hand and of explosives and poisonous gases on the other, moreover, has given the industry an exceptional sig­ nificance and value."10 President Wilson's request for protective tariff legis­ lation provided assistance which the chemical industry welcomed. In addition to a high tariff, however, the industry also wanted an embargo on chemical imports into the United States. To promote this objective, the chemical industries launched a massive publicity cam­ paign immediately after the war. The industry in gen­ eral, and the DuPont Company in particular, envisaged the problem as one of education, "first, for the Ameri­ can people as the ultimate consumers; second, for the consuming industries; and third, for the national legis­ lators who face the problem of protecting this in­ dustry."11 The "educational campaign" was massive in scope and lasted until 1925.12 In a 1921 Report of Present and 10 "Message to Congress, May 20, 1919," A Compilation of the Mes­ sages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. xvm (New York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1920), 8718. This support was repeated in subsequent messages of December 2, 1919, and December 7, 1920 (ibid., 8813, 8886) . 11 Memo, C. K. Weston for M. R. Poucher, 4 Jan 1919, sub: Dye Publicity Campaign, Exhibit 4873-H, Nye Committee, 39, 13430-13432. The individuals were members of the Publicity Department of DuPont. 12 DuPont contributed over $370,000 to the American Dyes Institute,

The Interwar Years

Proposed [Publicity] Activities, the Dyes Institute enu­ merated the range of the public relations effort. Special articles were written for the New York papers and dis­ tinguished members of the chemical industry sent fullpage articles to 40 leading Sunday newspapers. Edi­ torials were sent to 1,025 newspapers, and letters offer­ ing speakers were sent to Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs, and national or state conventions. The report announced with pride that over 200 requests for speakers had been received.13 The central theme of the propaganda campaign was magnification of the dangers that the United States would face in the future without a large chemical in­ dustry. The danger to which the American public was most responsive was that exemplified by German use of gas in World War I. The Army as a whole supported the necessity of tariff legislation for mobilization readiness. The Chemical Warfare Service was particularly eager to contribute to the publicity campaign, since increased public support for readiness would serve to ensure their survival. The need for a future cws had not been accepted by the Army. Public recognition of the importance of chemical warfare would provide the cws with additional am­ munition in its efforts to sell itself to the Army and to Congress. What the cws failed to realize, however, was that a sharing of objectives with the dyestuff industry did not imply compatibility of means. While a public aroused to the danger of chemical weapons would sup­ port a tariff and the continuation of the cws, an overly the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the Chemical Foundation during the period 1918 to 1925 (Report of the Activities of the Chemical Industry, n.d., Exhibit 913, Nye Committee, 11, 2400-01, 2563). 13 Memo, Mr. H. Braddock for Mr. Atherton, n.d. [1921 File], sub: Our Present and Proposed Activities, Exhibit 912, Nye Committee, 11, 2562-63.

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

stimulated public could demand and get prohibition of chemical warfare. This would not necessarily effect tariff legislation but it would make it increasingly diffi­ cult to sell the need for a cws. The propaganda used by the dye industries was both virulent and effective. There was something tailored for every taste. Books from overseas that argued for the development of national chemical industries were re­ published in the United States by the Chemical Foun­ dation.14 News stories indicating foreign chemical de­ velopments were fed to the United States to demon­ strate the need for readiness.15 Senior officers from chemical companies addressed fraternal and commer­ cial organizations.16 In short, a continuous stream of gas propaganda was maintained throughout the early 1920's. w Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine. The "riddle" was the con­ tinued existence of the German I.G. chemical trust. Lefebure was par­ ticularly concerned with disarmament problems. He argued that national disarmament would be tantamount to suicide unless a chemi­ cal industry was established to deter a potential aggressor from surprise chemical attack. is It was well-documented by the Nye Committee that a DuPont publicity man was sent to Europe to promote gas-readiness stories. One article in 1920 referred to British tariff legislation designed to permit the development of chemical industries readily convertible to the manu­ facture of poison gas (Ltr, Mr. Weston to Mr. C. Meade, 10 Dec. 20, no sub, Exhibit 909, Nye Committee, 11, 2397; Ltr, Mr. Poucher to DuPont Publicity Bureau, 5 Jan 20, no sub, Exhibit 927, Nye Com­ mittee, 11, 2580-81. ie A typical address was delivered by Dr. William Hale, a VicePresident of Dow Chemical Company, to the Flint, Michigan, Rotary Club on December 16, 1921. He described gas as "the most effective weapon of all time . . . the most humane ever introduced into war by man." Future war would be chemical war. "The old-time military maneuvers must give way to chemical discipline . . . our land armies for future struggles will be officered entirely by trained chemists." Finally, the hard sell: "We need a protecting tariff. . . . In this war after the war our battle cry must be 'To Hell with all German importsl Down with everything opposed to American industries!'" (Exhibit 914, Nye Committee, 11, 2564-68). Extensive literature of this nature was published in Chemical Warfare, 1920-1925, passim.

The Interwar Years

In terms of the short-run objectives of the chemical industries, the campaign was successful. A temporary embargo on dyes and chemicals became law on May 27, 1921, and a high protective tariff on chemical im­ ports was included in the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922.17 The fight for protection begun at Versailles in 1919 had been won. The success of the pressure-group activity was never really in jeopardy. Protection of the domestic chemical industries was a logical implementa­ tion of the policies formulated for the Peace Confer­ ence. Articles 171 and 172 implicitly recognized the dangerous potential of chemical warfare. In fact, Article 172 was meaningless unless the industrial secrets pried from the Germans could be used to stimulate a national dyestuff industry. Since the German production capa­ bility was intact, American industry required time to assimilate the new knowledge acquired through the provisions of the Peace Treaty. The national election of 1920 was more important for the passage of the embargo and tariff than the prop­ aganda. Pledged to "Return to Normalcy," President Harding and the Republican Party were in no mood to pursue free trade policies. A return to protection was implicit in the reactionary trend which had followed the period of reform under Woodrow Wilson. The intensive propaganda campaign aided passage of the legislation, but it was not decisive. What it did do was to mobilize public opinion on the subject of chem­ ical warfare. Unlike any other new method of warfare developed during the First World War, gas became the subject of immediate postwar public concern. The char­ acteristics and effects of the use of gas in war were spot­ lighted and magnified at a time when responsible de" HR 2435, 67th Cong, as extended August 24, 1921, by HR 8107 and November 16, 1921, by HR 8643; HR 7456, September 21, 1922.

The Aftermath of War

cision-makers were searching for ways to minimize the effects of war. Thanks to the determined efforts of the chemical industries, aided by the cws, gas was no longer considered one among many hardships of war. By 1921, it had become the bete noire of World War I, a symbol of the inhumanity of modern war. C.

THE WASHINGTON ARMS CONFERENCE

As a result of continued public exposure during the preceding two years, chemical warfare was a sure can­ didate for inclusion on the agenda of the Washington Arms Conference. Called by the United States in re­ sponse to the perceived threat of an impending arms race in the Pacific and rising public and congressional demands for limitation of armaments, the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments also provided an op­ portunity for the United States to take the lead in limit­ ing the menace of gas warfare.18 Neither President Harding nor Secretary of State Hughes hesitated to in­ clude the question of chemical warfare on the Confer­ ence agenda. To a President who envisaged "an Amer­ ica that can maintain every heritage and yet help hu­ manity throughout the world to reach a little higher plane," the limitation if not the prohibition of chemical warfare was an appropriate subject for Conference discussion.19 The theme of "control for humanity" was evident in the Conference invitations, which expressed the de­ sire of the United States that the Conference "formu­ late proposals by which in the interest of humanity, the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably conis The best general review of the conference is H. and M. Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene 1918-1922 (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1940) . 19President Harding's Address at Valley Forge, June 5, 1921, New York Times, June 6, 1921, p. 1.

The Interwar Years

trolled."20 When questioned by the French on the pre­ cise meaning of this clause, Secretary Hughes further defined the new agencies of warfare as gas, aircraft, and submarines.21 All participating nations accepted the proposed agenda. There was implicit agreement at the outset of the Conference that the existing legal restraint of the Hague Conventions was inadequate. The prob­ lem for the Conference was to determine what new controls or limitations should be instituted. The initial United States position was that advocated by General Fries to the War Department General Staff.22 In response to a request from the War Plans Division, General Fries had recommended: "The only limitation that should be considered by the United States is the prohibition of its use [gas] against cities and non-combatants in exactly the same manner as the use of airplane bombs, high-explosive shells, or other weapons are prohibited."23 Secretary of State Hughes echoed a similar view in explaining to the Conference Committee on Program and Procedure the necessity 20 Telegram, Sec State for Charge in Great Britain, 11 Aug 21, no sub, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1921, I (Washington: USGPO, 1936) , p. 57 [hereafter referred to as U.S. Foreign Relations 1921]. 21 Telegram, Sec State for French Charg6, 20 Sep 21, no sub, in U.S. Foreign Relations 1921, 1, 70. 22 Brigadier General Fries had been promoted to that grade when he was designated Chief of the cws after passage of the National Defense Act of 1920. He was later promoted to the grade of Major General by special Act of Congress. 2^ Memo, C cws for Asst C of S WPD, 17 Oct 21, sub: Use of Gas in Warfare, cws Policy Book, EHO. This recommendation was transmitted to the Secretary of State on November 5, 1921 (Ltr, Sec War to Sec State, 5 Nov 21, no sub, WPD 165-2, NAA) . Implied in this recommenda­ tion was the cws' belief that gas was an accepted weapon of warfare; that the use of gas could be limited; that the U.S. public approved the use of gas in warfare; and that the use of gas was militarily advan­ tageous to the U.S. Gas was described as "powerful, effective, humane, and economical" (Memo, Asst C of S WPD to C of S, 2 Nov 21, sub: The Use of Gas in Warfare, WPD 165-2, NAA) .

T h e Aftermath of War

for organizing a subcommittee of experts to study the problems of gas warfare: "If the civilized world would make a declaration such as that a whole city should not be asphyxiated on any pretext whatsoever, or that women and children—no part of the armed forces—should not be killed by use of bombs against civilians on the pretext that the nation was at war, the Conference would have achieved an important step which would win universal support. A start must be made and jurisconsults consulted, if necessary."24 There was no mention whatsoever of any universal prohibition of the use of poison gases. As initiated by the United States, in closed committee, the question was not whether gas should or should not be used; rather, it was under what conditions it might be used. The Conference did not consider the limitation of chemical warfare until the Sixteenth Meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament on January 6, 1922.25 Hughes started the discussion by summarizing the report of the Subcommittee of Experts. The report was a strong restatement of the views of the Chemical Warfare Service. It stressed the critical advantage of surprise in the use of chemical warfare by an "unscrup­ ulous enemy" if a nation were unprepared "both offen­ sively and defensively," and stated that, since many high explosives produce deadly gases, it would be un­ realistic to attempt to prohibit the use of gas. The American, British, and French members of the Sub24 "Minutes of the Second Meeting, Committee on Program and Procedure, November 23, 1921," Conference on the Limitation of Arma­ ment (Washington: USGPO, 1922) , p. 414 [hereafter cited as Conference . . .]. No verbatim record was made of Committee deliberations. 25 Composed of representatives of the United States, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.

The Interwar Years

committee "were emphatic that chemical warfare gases form a method of waging war similar to the older form." Research could not be restricted or supervised nor could the manufacture of gases be controlled. The Subcommittee summed up by stating that: ". . . the only limitation practicable is wholly to pro­ hibit the use of gases against cities and other large bodies of noncombatants in the same manner as high explosives may be limited, but that there can be no limitation on their use against the armed forces of the enemy, ashore or afloat."26 The import of the Subcommittee findings was clear: poison gas could only be limited, it could not be pro­ hibited. However, Hughes did not stop with the pres­ entation of the report, a document accurately reflecting the sentiment of the United States War Department. He proceeded immediately to quote extensively from a report of the Advisory Committee to the American Delegation.27 The Advisory Committee report was a remarkable testimony to the impact of propaganda on policy-mak­ ing; it was as emotional as the technical Subcommittee report had been rational. The Advisory Committee 2β "Minutes, Sixteenth Meeting, Committee on Limitation of Arma­ ment, January 6, 1922," Conference . . . , 728, 730 [hereafter cited as 16 Coram Arm . . .]. The Chairman of the Subcommittee was Professor E. F. Smith, President of the American Chemical Society, and the American delegate was General Fries (Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Subcommittees [Washington: USGPO, 1922], pp. 280-291 [hereafter cited as Conf Sub . . .]. 27 The Advisory Committee of the American Delegation was one of several stratagems employed by Hughes to insure ratification of the treaties. It consisted of 21 distinguished Americans appointed by Presi­ dent Harding "to represent public opinion" (R. Buell, The Washing­ ton Conference [New York: D. Appleton, 1922]) . Among the members of the Advisory Committee were Herbert Hoover, General Pershing, Rear Admiral Rodgers of the Navy, and J. Mayhew Wainwright, Assistant Secretary of War.

T h e Aftermath of W a r

felt there could be "no actual restraint of the use by combatants of this new agency of warfare, if it is per­ mitted in any guise." The terrifying potential of air­ plane-delivered gas attacks was emphasized: "The frightful consequences of the use of toxic gases, if dropped from airplanes on cities, stagger the imagina­ tion. . . . If lethal gases were used in such bombs [high explosive bombs used to attack cities during WW I], it might well be that such permanent and serious damage would be done, not only of a material character but in the depopulation of large sections of the country, as to threaten, if not destroy, all that has been gained during the painful centuries of the past." The Advisory Report then invoked the conscience of the American people. "The Committee is of the opinion that the conscence [sic] of the American people has been profoundly shocked by the savage use of scientific discoveries for destruction rather than for construction. . . . The Amer­ ican representatives would not be doing their duty in expressing the conscience of the American people were they to fail in insisting upon the total abolition of chemical warfare. . . ." The Report concluded by submitting the following res­ olution to the Conference: "Resolved, That chemical warfare, including the use of gases, whether toxic or non toxic, should be prohibited by international agreement, and should be classed with such unfair methods of warfare as poisoning wells, in­ troducing germs of disease, and other methods that are abhorrent in modern warfare."38 2816 Comm. Arm . . . ,

732.

The Interwar Years

After reading this resolution, Hughes cited a report of the Advisory Subcommittee on Land Armaments signed by General Pershing and a report by the Gen­ eral Board of the United States Navy. Each supported the sentiments of the Advisory Committee.29 With the call for prohibition thus reinforced by both the Chief of Staff of the Army and the policy-making General Board of the Navy, Secretary Hughes asked Mr. Root of the American Delegation to introduce the American proposal. A French request to adjourn the meeting until the next morning was brushed aside.30 Mr. Root tabled the American proposal, a slightly modified ver­ sion of Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles, and stated in passing that the Versailles provisions "pre­ sented the most extraordinary consensus of opinion The Pershing report recommended: "Chemical warfare should be abolished among nations, as abhorrent to civilization. It is a cruel, unfair and improper use of science. It is fraught with the gravest danger to the noncombatants and demoralizes the better instincts of humanity." The Navy General Board report condemned gas because it caused unnecessary suffering and injured innocent noncombatants. While it recognized the nonlethal character of tear gas, the Board considered that it too caused suffering, and tear-gas use would quickly escalate to the use of lethal agents in wartime. Similar to the Advisory Committee report, the General Board considered gas to be the ultimate weapon." Gas warfare threatens to become so efficient as to endanger the very existence of civilization." The General Board report was signed by Rear Admiral Rodgers, a member of the Advisory Committee (16 Comm. Arm . . . , 734, 736) . so The other delegates were apparently taken completely by surprise by the American policy shift and wanted time to consider the new American position. The delegates had not been furnished with copies of the American Advisory Committee documents quoted by Hughes. Arthur Balfour, Head of the British Delegation, suspected that Hughes had distorted the report of the Technical Subcommittee. Balfour was right. Hughes had tacitly minimized the importance of the undesired report by stressing that it had been agreed to "more or less unani­ mously." Actually there was complete agreement between the American, British, and French representatives. The Japanese and Italians differed only on points of technical feasibility {16 Comm Arm . . . , 736-40; Conf Sub . . . , 382-84).

The Aftermath of War

that one could well find upon any international sub­ ject."31 Root proposed the following treaty: "The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized are parties: "Now to the end that this prohibition shall be uni­ versally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, the Sig­ natory Powers declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between themselves and in­ vite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto." The American resolution was accepted verbatim the following day and was signed on February 6, 1922.32 The representatives of the other signatory Powers did not share the enthusiasm of the American Delegation. They were willing to accede to the American impulse, but as both the British and French delegates pointed out on January 7, the Treaty really provided nothing new. It was a restatement of the Versailles provisions which in themselves were based upon the Hague Con­ ventions33 and had been violated with impunity in 3116 Comm. Arm . . . , 738. S2 Art. v, Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Conference . . . , 1609-10. Although ratified without difficulty in the United States, the Treaty was never in force. The French did not ratify due to the submarine provisions. 33 The weaknesses of the Hague Conventions had been discussed by the Subcommittee on the Laws of Warfare which concluded its delibera­ tions by calling for a new conference on the laws of war and by stating: "Any survey of the field o£ the laws of war would show confused, unsatisfactory and very imperfect provisions to meet conditions under which definite, satisfactory and complete agreements should prevail" (Conf Sub . . . , 344). This report was ignored by Hughes.

The lnterwar Years

World War I. Both delegates observed that the absence of treaty sanctions meant that compliance could only be ensured by national readiness. This disturbing ref­ erence to reality did not appear to mar the enthusiasm of the American Delegation.31 The driving force behind the poison gas negotia­ tions at the Washington Arms Conference was public opinion. The American government, after having pre­ pared an excellent policy based upon military capabil­ ities and national intentions, resisted the unpalatable implications of the policy and based its position on the assumed strength of the power of public opinion. The result was a remarkable atmosphere of near-hysteria. Unwilling to face an intolerable reality, the admin­ istration encouraged the formation of a public man­ date that would justify it in the importance it had at­ tached to public opinion. The Advisory Committee provided the arguments that the administration wanted to hear. The Advisory Committee report was a collection of exaggerations and misstatements. The potential marriage of gas to the air­ plane was presented as a reality. Gas was credited with a lethality unknown in the World War, and the possibility of escalation from the use of nonlethal to lethal agents was depicted as an inevitable development. The seal of authenticity was provided by the statements of General Pershing and the General Board.85 34 16 Comm Arm . . . , 736-38. The Italian and Japanese delegates supported the United States without qualification. 35 Neither reflected the views of the entire military establishment. The cws and the War Plans Division, WDGS, were opposed to the pro­ hibition, one because of a belief in the humanity and effectiveness of chemical warfare, the other from a belief that prohibition was impos­ sible. For varying editorial views see "Chemical Warfare," Army and Navy Register, lxxi:2i64 (January 7, 1922) , 4; New York Times, Janu­ ary 9, 1922, p. 16. An explanation for the actions of General Pershing and the General Board may lie in the attempts being made by the military establishment

The Aftermath of War

To support its arguments, the Advisory Committee conducted a national public opinion survey covering the various subjects on the Conference agenda. Over 13 million opinions were declared to have been re­ ceived during the first two weeks of December 1921. As presented in the press, the public had voted over­ whelmingly against gas warfare—366,975 wanted abo­ lition, 19 wanted retention with restriction in use. It was asserted that this return "shows an overwhelming sentiment among the American people for the complete abolition of submarines and gas warfare."36 The formation of such "overwhelming sentiment" could not be claimed by the Advisory Committee alone. It was also the product of the propaganda campaign sponsored by the chemical industries. Persistent in their efforts to gain a protective tariff, they continued the scare propaganda during the Conference.37 The prop­ agandists apparently did not realize that their campaign during the early postwar period to become integrated into American society as a whole. The employment of poison gas was outside the ethos of the military profession. Support for prohibition of gas warfare could increase rapport with the civilian community and simultaneously rid the military of an unliked weapon. For attitudes of the American military during this period, see Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1959), pp. 283-86; Richard Brown, "Social Attitudes of American Generals, 1898-1940" (unpub­ lished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1951) . se New York Times, January 8, 1922, p. 17. Actual signatures totaled 220,896. For resolutions from organizations, "estimates were made from an approximated number of actual opinions or votes." The survey was released to the press on January 7, 1922—perfect timing to support Hughes in his shelving of the Subcommittee of Experts report. The employment of submarines was not abolished. The final treaty required that "A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety," and contained similar limiting provisions. The "mandate" applied only to poison gas. 37 Ltr, Mr. Weston to Mr. Ship, 25 Jan 22, no sub, Exhibit 1064, Nye Committee, 12, 277g. The Nye Committee asserted, but could not prove conclusively, that Mr. Weston of the DuPont Publicity Bureau was coordinating Conference publicity with Dr. Smith, Chairman of the Technical Subcommittee (Nye Committee, HI, 273) .

The Interwar Years

was turning against them until the middle of the Con­ ference. In a letter to Dr. Parsons, Secretary of the American Chemical Society, Mr. Weston complained that reporters needed to be given "the proper perspec­ tive" and referred to one reporter as "in the mood to be hysterical over poison gas." He concluded by stat­ ing: "It is very evident that there are a lot of writers in Washington who need education and need it quickly."38 The chemical industries were in a dilemma. A defi­ nite danger to the security of the United States had been established so as to justify continuing protection for American chemical companies. Yet oversale of the danger had stimulated near-hysterical support for pro­ hibition. Neither the industries nor the Chemical War­ fare Service could profit from such extreme public ani­ mosity; but neither recognized the danger until it was too late. The administration was consistent in its reliance on public opinion. This was to be the sanction that would deter violation of the Treaty provisions. Mr. Root made this point clear when he presented the draft treaty to a Conference Plenary Session. ". . . We may grant that the most solemn obligation assumed by governments will be violated in the stress of conflict; but beyond diplomatists and beyond gov­ ernments, there rests the public opinion of the civilized world, and the public opinion of the world can punish. It can bring its sanction to the support of a prohibition with as terrible consequences as any criminal statute of Congress or of Parliament."39 ssLtr [Mr. C. K. Weston] for Dr. C. L. Parsons, 2 Dec 21, no sub, Exhibit 1063, Nye Committee, XII, 2849. 30 Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Session, February 1, 1922, Conference . . . , 268.

T h e Aftermath of War

Senator Lodge was even more explicit during Senate debate on ratification of the Treaty. "In some way we want to build up public opinion, and the attempt was made here. . . . If the world is cursed with another such war I dare say they will break out and use poison gas again; but there is always the hope that the opinion of the world may be so crystal­ lized that it will prevent it, as public opinion alone has practically prevented the poisoning of wells or the giv­ ing of no quarter to prisoners."40 American conduct was remarkable on the entire gas warfare question. The United States called the Con­ ference, proposed the agenda, and made the first pro­ posal for gas warfare limitation. Then, in the middle of the Conference, the United States suddenly shifted its policy from limitation, a policy suited to a major chem­ ical warfare power, to prohibition, a policy suitable for a nation without the capability to develop chemical warfare readiness. Whether the shift was due to the de­ cision-makers becoming enmeshed in their own propa­ ganda or to a sudden belief that nothing else would work, the result was the same. The primary sanction to chemical warfare was to be public opinion. This was a dangerous policy for the United States to adopt. Public opinion was an intangible factor that could vary in importance from country to country. In addition, a strong public attitude intended to inhibit the use of gas could also restrict defense preparations necessary for readiness if public opinion failed. 4O U.S. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 1922, LXII, Part 5, 4730. The first test o£ public opinion was successfully passed. The Sen­ ate ratified the Treaty with no dissenting votes. The only negative comments were made by Senator Wadsworth of New York, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and a supporter of chemical warfare. He was concerned that the U.S. maintain its gas readiness in case of Treaty violation.

T1

The Interwar Years

General Fries had recognized this problem as the Conference was meeting: "it is one thing to forbid the use of poison gas against non-combatants, but it is an entirely different thing to forbid a nation to prepare to use gas against enemy soldiers and sailors whenever at­ tacked by them . . ."41 General Fries had feared a treaty provision specifically prohibiting preparation; the ob­ ject of this fear did not materialize. The problem for gas warfare readiness was not to be a treaty restraint but rather adverse public opinion. The efficacy of this re­ straint was determined by the attitude of the military establishment. To an army that did not accept gas war­ fare, adverse public opinion provided a ready excuse for inaction. D.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION WITHIN THE MILITARY

Postwar attempts to provide for chemical warfare preparedness were strongly influenced by the Army's attitude toward gas derived from World War I experi­ ences. Although gas had been used with increasing fre­ quency by both sides, neither the Allied nor the Cen­ tral Powers could accept it. It was dishonorable as an area weapon that maimed noncombatants; it intro­ duced an enormous logistical burden to the battlefield; and its use created unsolved tactical problems of sur­ vival in an alien environment. Nevertheless, no senior officer could deny that poison gas had been an impor­ tant weapon in World War I. Nor could one deny that chemical warfare preparedness was an essential ingredi­ ent of military readiness in the postwar world. General Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary sen­ ior officers when he declared in 1919: "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of con41 Gen. A. Fries, "Disarmament and Poison Gas," Illustrated World, 36 (November gi, 1921), p. 353.

The Aftermath of War

jecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question."42 CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920 / Common recognition of the importance

of chemical warfare in World War I did not create a consensus within the Army as to the proper level of gas warfare preparedness for the postwar Army. Responses varied according to individual perception of both the possibility of use by potential aggressors and the effec­ tiveness of chemical warfare in relation to other con­ ventional weapons. One issue brought the various at­ titudes into the open—the question of the status of the Chemical Warfare Service in the postwar Army. Two questions arose. First, was gas warfare of such impor­ tance that readiness required the continuing concern of a special branch of the Army, or could the responsi­ bility for readiness be satisfied by assigning chemical warfare to some other service such as the Ordnance Corps or the Corps of Engineers as an additional responsibility? The second question was of a more substantive na­ ture. Given some organization with an institutional re­ sponsibility for chemical warfare, what should be its specific mission? Should it be a combat arm with com­ bat as well as logistic responsibilities? What would be the proper division of effort between offensive and de­ fensive capability? What should be the resource allo­ cation for chemical warfare in comparison to the other Army readiness responsibilities? The answers to these two major questions determined the pattern of chemical warfare preparedness during the interwar period. The first question was answered 12 U.S. War Department, "Final Report of General John J. Pershing," Annual Report, 1919, Vol. 1, Part 1, 623.

The Interwar Years

in the National Defense Act of 1920. The second ques­ tion was never really answered; however, the Army's implementation of the provisions of the Washington Arms Conference established a pattern of policy that persisted until World War II. The issue of the future of the Chemical Warfare Service as a separate service was raised by the cws it­ self. Only three days after the Armistice, General Sibert, Chief of the cws, wrote the Chief of Staff of the Army to plead the case for retention. General Sibert based his argument on the certainty of the use of gas in future wars and on the complexity of chemical warfare, which demanded a special expertise that could be pre­ served only in a separate branch.43 In the meantime, General Fries was growing restless in Europe. With nothing more to go on than the known animosity of the Chief of Staff to chemical warfare, Fries surmised that the future of the cws was in jeopardy. He, there­ fore, requested immediate reassignment to the United States "to urge there the establishment of a permanent Chemical Warfare Service in the Army."44 By the time General Fries arrived back in the United States on December 18, 1918, the die seemed cast. As far as the War Department was concerned, the cws had been abolished as a separate branch. General Fries was told that "the Chief of Staff had ordered the complete demobilization of the Chemical Warfare Service and that no poisonous gas should be used, manufactured or experimented with and no researches made and that 43 Memo, C cws for C of S, 14 Nov 18, sub: Military Necessity for a Permanent Chemical Warfare Service, WPD 9967-105, NA. Similar letters were sent to the War Plans Division on November 29 and December 10 (WPD 9967-107, 108, NA) . a Fries, "History of Chemical . . . ," 55.

The Aftermath of War

the defensive work and such research as might go on with it should be turned over to the Engineers."45 The basic policy was established by Secretary of War Baker on December 29, 1918. Baker proposed the estab­ lishment of a chemical warfare research center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia [the Engineer Center], "to prosecute continuously such inquiries as will enable us to defend ourselves against future use of gas by an enemy who may use it against us, and to reply in kind even if we do not ourselves initiate the use of gas in any subsequent war." To do this, Baker envisaged that the research center should maintain a complete record of the work of the cws during the war to give "an historical foundation to the future work to be done there."46 The trend of War Department thought is evident. The United States would not initiate the use of gas in any future conflict but it would be ready to retaliate. Readiness was not considered a problem. A research center satellited on the Corps of Engineers would be sufficient. Lack of concern about readiness was even more pro­ nounced in the guidance provided to the Chief of Engineers by the Assistant Chief of StafiE G-3. The G-3 explained that establishment of a chemical warfare re­ search center would not be an additional burden for the engineers, as "it is not intended to proceed with this work. The research or experimental work . . . is to be merely such as may be necessary or desirable in connec­ tion with the Engineers School. No funds or special « Ibid.., 56. All troop allowances for chemical warfare equipment in the United States were canceled on November 29, 1918 (Ltr, TAG for C cws, 29 Nov 18, sub: Chemical Warfare Material, AG 4.75 (Misc Div), NA RG 175, Gen. Fries File 1918-20, Box 14) . 46 Memo, sw for C of S, 29 Dec 18, no sub, cited in Memo, Asst C of S, WPD for C of S, 25 Mar 19, sub: Abolishment of the Chemical Warfare Service, WPD 9967-111, NA.

The Interwar Years

personnel for Chemical Warfare will be authorized

Assigned to another service as an unfunded additional burden, gas warfare was being deliberately buried by an unreceptive Army—a rather remarkable reaction to a weapon that three months before had caused over 30 per cent of the hospitalized casualties of the AEF.48 It was a reaction consistent with the Army's apprehen­ sions about gas warfare manifested during World War I. General Fries could not accept the Army's actions. Neither his aggressive personality nor his intimate knowledge of the capabilities of gas warfare when used by an unscrupulous enemy against the United States permitted him to accede to this intolerable stricture imposed by the military hierarchy. General Fries made one attempt to resolve the situation within the formal command structure: he requested and was granted an interview with General Peyton March, the Chief of Staff of the Army. When Fries tried to convince March of the need for a separate Chemical Warfare Service, he was told flatly that there wasn't going to be any.49 There was no further appeal within the Army. The survival of the cws as an independent branch would be dependent upon appeal to influential persons outside of the Army. With the alternatives posed in these terms, General Fries did not hesitate. He actively sought sup­ port for the cws from anyone who would hear his case. There were two major problems facing Fries in the 47 Memo: Asst C of S Opns to Chief of Engineers, 21 Feb 19, sub: Chemical Warfare, WPD 9967-110, NA [italics mine], 4SGilchrist, World War Casualties, 21. Interv CMLHO with Gen Fries, 4 Aug 55, EHO. This is substantiated in Ltr, Col S. Fries for author, 10 Sep 64, no sub. It is also consistent with General March's attitude as expressed in his Memoirs (March, 333-35) . At that time, General Fries felt that opposition to chemical warfare was entirely due to the personal attitudes of Newton Baker and General March (Ltr, Fries for C of S, AEF, 10 Jun 19, no sub, NA RG 175, Gen. Fries File 1918-20, Box 15).

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

spring of 1919. The cws was disintegrating before his eyes. By June 30, 1919, its personnel strength had been reduced to less than 3 per cent of the Armistice Day level,60 and the Corps of Engineers was taking over what was left. If something were not done, there would be no cws in existence by the time Congress came to discuss the postwar organization of the Army.51 Fries' strategy was to seek a "restraining order" from Congress to ar­ rest the dismemberment of the cws. Albeit borrowed, the time gained could be used to develop public and congressional support for the Service. If enough support were generated, Fries' second problem—the permanent institutionalization of the cws by Congress in the Na­ tional Defense Act—could be solved. Fries got his "restraining order" by direct appeal to two influential friends in Congress, Congressman Julius Kahn, Chairman of the House Military Affairs Commit­ tee, and Senator George Chamberlain, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee.52 He requested that the cws be granted one year in which to convince Con­ gress of the need for a separate chemical service. The congressmen agreed, and the cws was continued as a separate service until June 30, 1920, by rider to the Fiscal Year 1920 Appropriations Bill.53 Despite its unwillingness to have a separate chemical so C cws, Annual Report, 1920, p. 1858. 51 The Army was preparing its plan for postwar organization throughout the spring and summer of 1919. The War Department pro­ posal was submitted to Congress on August 3, 1919. 52 General and Mrs. Fries had met Representative and Mrs. Kahn on a trip to the Philippines before the war. General Fries had met Senator Chamberlain when he was Governor of Oregon and Fries was assigned to Engineer River and Harbor work (Interv, CMLHO with Gen Fries). 53 This rider also provided for the continuation of the Air Service, the Construction Division, the Tank Corps, and the Motor Transport Corps, creations of World War I that had not been authorized in the National Defense Act of 1916. The extension became law on July 11, 1919 (Ltr, Dir cws for sw, 9 Jul 19, sub: Status of the Chemical War­ fare Service during the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1920, EHO) .

The Interwar Years

service, the Army now had no feasible alternative to continuation of the cws.54 The roles and missions for the peacetime cws were established on November 28, 1919. The Service was charged with responsibilities for continuing research and experimentation in chemical warfare, records, maintenance, contact with civilian industry for rapid wartime mobilization, and the main­ tenance of government plants. Two responsibilities were particularly crucial: "the continuous training of the Army in chemical warfare" and "the maintenance of a supply of chemical warfare material sufficient to meet the initial requirements of the Army in time of war."55 By the terms of this directive, the cws had un­ qualified responsibility for chemical warfare supply and training throughout the Army. This responsibility changed significantly after the Washington Arms Conference. His first objective attained, General Fries then set out to develop support for recognition of a separate cws in the National Defense Act. He embarked on an extraordinary sales campaign in direct violation of Army customs and regulations. He sought the assistance of chemical societies, professional propagandists, and even the other Chiefs of Services within the Army. The objective of the campaign was to induce the Army to support the establishment of a separate cws by internal pressure or, failing this, to convince Congress of the necessity for a cws and thus force the Army to change its position. Fries exploited his contacts with chemists who had n* The Army could have so reduced the area of responsibility of the cws as to nullify the sense of Congress but it would have been hardly sensible to controvene Congress in this minor area when the entire future of the military establishment was being debated. 55 Ltr, TAG for Dir, cws, 28 Nov 19, sub: Activities of Chemical War­ fare Service, cws 322.06, EHO.

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

been members of the Service in the United States and overseas. A typical approach was that employed in a let­ ter to Colonel F. M. Dorsey, Laboratory Manager, Na­ tional Lamp Works, Cleveland, Ohio [later General Electric]. Referring to the Senate-originated version of the Army Reorganization Act, the Wadsworth Bill, and its failure to provide for a separate cws, Fries asserted, "this is a time when all technical men, societies and journals should take the matter up and see what can be done. . . . Anything that you can do to help get this mat­ ter brought strongly before technical societies with a view to their bringing it to the attention of Congress will be much appreciated."56 Inclosed with the letter was a sample resolution for the use of chemical societies. ". . . Therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the opinion of ( ) that chemical warfare is such a complete and distinct science in itself, as well as such a powerful weapon of war, that a strong Chemical Warfare Serv­ ice should be maintained as a complete and independ­ ent department in the United States Army, as a pre­ requisite to any proper national defense of our country."57 Direct publicity campaigns supplemented the resolu­ tions of chemical societies. Fries was frank in his ap­ peal for public relations assistance to influence Con­ gress. He wrote the following to one former associate: ". . . From now on I expect to see the opposition de­ velop more and more. Our only hope is in Congress. At 56 Ltr, Gen Fries for Col F. M. Dorsey, 14 Aug 19, no sub, NA RG 175, Fries File, Box 15. " NA RG 175, Fries File, Box 19. This resolution was without letter­ head or date. Corrections on a draft copy were made in General Fries' handwriting. A similar resolution was sent to the Secretary of War from the American Chemical Society (ibid.).

The Interwar Years

present that body is with us and if we can get any public backing I think we can win out. The more the public however, supports Congress, the better will be our position. "Any suggestions you can make and anything that you can do to wake up the chemical world to the dan­ ger threatening the Chemical Warfare Service, and the public at large to the value of the Chemical Warfare Service to the people, will be greatly appreciated.58 Fries' suggestions were accepted by several of his for­ mer associates who volunteered to finance a publicity campaign.59 The major propaganda effort, however, rested with the chemical industries that gave Fries' various articles wide distribution.60 General Fries was extremely clever in stimulating opposition to the Army Reorganization Bill. Where he could not count on any sympathy with cws objectives, he opposed the control that the War Department Gen­ eral Staff would exert over the technical service branches if the proposed bill were to be passed, hoping that this would unite the Chiefs of Services against the legislation. Indicative of Fries' distrust of a General Staff that did not believe in chemical warfare was a memorandum circulated to the Chiefs of Service branches on July 2, 1919· The War Department Gen­ eral Staff was accused of taking the attitude that "every 58 Ltr Fries for Lt Col Ε. B. Clark, 16 Aug 19, no sub, NA RG 175, 1 Fries File, Box 15. 59 Ltr, Fries for Lt Col E. J. Atkisson, 25 Sep 19, no sub, NA RG 175, Fries File, Box 14. so cws ties with DuPont were brought out in the Nye Committee Hearings. In response to a question from the President of DuPont, one of the company Vice-Presidents referred to the importance of the tie with the cws: "I have no intent to let lapse the connection which has been established by reason of our united effort in legislative work" (Ltr, C. A. Meade for I. DuPont, 2 May 21, no sub, Exhibit 1061, Nye Committee, 11, 2848) .

The Aftermath of War

officer appearing before them, whether from a Staff De­ partment or from another department of the Army, is overenthusiastic, incompetent, or purely deceptive in his statements."61 Each chief was requested to oppose the War Department Reorganization Bill in Congress. The memo was a frank appeal for revolution against the General Staff. While there is no evidence that it provoked any coordinated service action against the legislation, the memo portrays the extent of General Fries' activities against the established policies of the War Department General Staff. Throughout the crucial fall of 1919, Fries was in continuous contact with Senator Chamberlain. He ap­ parently offered comments on various aspects of the pending legislation, provided critical rebuttals of testi­ mony unfavorable to chemical warfare, and even pro­ vided internal War Department documents for congres­ sional review.62 On September 19, 1919, Senator Cham­ berlain wrote General Fries that his views on chemical si Memo, 2 Jul 19, sub: Formation of Policy for Chiefs of Staff Depart­ ments, NA RG 175, Fries File, Box 18. The existence or distribution of this Memo is confirmed in no other file on the cws. The Memo has no letterhead and is not signed; however, it was in accord with General Fries' opinions (Interv, CMLHO with Maj Gen A. H. Waitt, 13 May 1961, p. 3, EHO; Ltr, Fries for Mr. Mayo-Smith, 16 Aug 19, no sub, NA RG 175, Fries File, Box 18). ". . . Just at present we [cws] seem to be the only department with the nerve to fight this stand of the General Staff." 62 ΝΑ RG 175, Fries File, Box 14, Chamberlain File. Fries sent the G-3 letter that stated that no funds would be allocated to chemical warfare preparations to Senator Chamberlain on September 23, 1919 (Supra, p. 75, WPD 9967-110) . To Fries, this letter was firm evidence of the hypocrisy of the War Department's proposal to place the cws under the Engineers. The Fries' files also contain unsigned typed notes dated September g, 1919, extremely critical of General March's testimony of September 3, 1919, and a draft list of 42 questions to be asked General Fries when testifying before Congress. The draft is annotated in General Fries' handwriting with instructions to delete the Edgewood Arsenal letterhead. Considering General Fries' other actions, it is highly prob­ able that this material was provided to selected congressmen, although the Archives do not provide conclusive proof.

The Interwar Years

warfare would be considered before any decision was reached on the future of the cws.63 Due to the efforts of General Fries, the Chemical Warfare Service had the situation under control and, by the time the Army began hearings on the National Defense Act, was confident of the outcome of the final legislation. General March delivered the expected tirade against chemical warfare on September 3. Yet on September 5, General Fries was confident enough to write: "the present outlook for the Service's continua­ tion is exceedingly encouraging to us. We will keep up the fight to the end and take no chances whatever, notwithstanding that it looks now as though we could not be beaten."64 He was right. In spite of the near unanimous opposition of the military establishment, the Chemical Warfare Service became a separate serv­ ice in the 1920 National Defense Act. It was a remark­ able example of pressure-group activity conducted out­ side of the normal constraints of the military bureaucracy. Although the major question had been resolved be­ fore the Hearings began, the testimony of senior offi­ cers provided a useful insight into more long-range problems facing United States policy with respect to chemical warfare. Opinion was uniform on only two points: that the United States had to be prepared for chemical warfare in any future war, and that the main­ tenance of preparedness did not require a special branch. It was debated whether the Corps of Engineers or the Ordnance Corps should exercise chemical war­ fare responsibility.65 β3 Ibid.

Ltr, Fries for Lt Col E. Atkisson, 5 Sep 19, no sub, NA RG 175, Fries File, Box 14. «5 The original Army bill (the Baker-March Bill) placed chemical warfare under the Engineers (HR 8287, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.). General ei

T h e Aftermath of W a r

In testimony supporting Engineer assumption of chemical warfare responsibility, General March re­ flected the Army's distrust of the encroachment of sci­ ence and technology which chemical warfare repre­ sented. The Chief of Staff saw gas-warfare experts to be "like a corps of college professors or men who had been college professors of chemistry who could devote their lives to the study of gas defense." The experts would not be commissioned officers. In March's view, people such as this could be placed only in the Engi­ neer Corps: "the technical corps of the Army. . . . That is a corps which will always have the technical men in it. That is their habit of thought. They are technical men."66 Chemical warfare could not be under Ord­ nance, as Ordnance officers were detailed from the com­ bat arms branches. They were not technical men. To March, the increasing impact of science and tech­ nology meant not that the Army had new training and education responsibilities to fulfill, but rather that ad­ ditional contract civilians were required to perform complex new jobs. As long as this attitude prevailed, chemical warfare expertise would be viewed as the rePershing and General Summerall believed that Ordnance should be responsible if the cws were not to be a separate service. General Pershing's view was probably influenced by the conclusions of the AEF Superior Board called to review the lessons of World War I. The Superior Board recommended that chemical warfare be placed under Ordnance (AEF, "Report of Superior Board on Organization and Tac­ tics," ι Jul 19, par. 10a, MS EHO) . For the testimony on Army Reorgan­ ization, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on S-2J15, A Bill to Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army and For Other Purposes, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 vols., 1919, 1920 [hereafter cited as Senate Hearings, Army Reorganization]; and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on HR 828η, A Bill to Reorganize . . . , 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919 [hereafter cited as House Hearings, Army Reorganization], ββ House Hearings, Army Reorganization, 5.

The Interwar Years

sponsibility of a technician not as one of the manda­ tory skills of the professional leader.67 A second and more serious problem was the thread of irrational emotionalism that pervaded the testimony of the Chief of Staff. General March compared chem­ ical warfare to the poisoning of wells and recalled that "the trend of all humanitarian thought now is to make it so that all unnecessary horrors of war shall be elimi­ nated as far as possible."68 General March applied "hu­ manitarian thought" to the question of testing toxic agents during peacetime, and concluded that the chance of poisoning innocent bystanders was such that the United States could not test gases. Therefore, any study of chemical warfare in time of peace would have to be defensive in nature. Gases could be tested in the lab­ oratory, but "purely as a defensive method, and not as an offensive method."69 From this logic, March deduced that "there is no such thing, from a practical standpoint as [an] offensive Chemical Warfare Service in time of peace."70 The tenor of the testimony reveals that there was much more to the chemical warfare question than the locus of responsibility for preparedness. To those who approached chemical warfare from a humanitarian perspective, it made a great deal of difference how a nation maintained its readiness for chemical warfare. But these emerging problems did not mar the victory of the Chemical Warfare Service. When the Army Reorganization Bill came out of the House Committee in March 1920, it included an amendment to Section 12 of the 1916 National Defense Act establishing the Chemical Warfare Service. 67 The same attitude was applied to communications equipment and maintenance of motor transportation. House Hearings, Army Reorganization, 53. 69 Ibid.., 54. 70 Ibid., 5g.

S4

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

"Sec. 12a. Chemical Warfare Service: The Chemical Warfare Service shall consist of 1 Chief of the Chem­ ical Warfare Service with the rank of Brigadier Gen­ eral, 90 officers in grades from Colonel to Second Lieu­ tenant, inclusive, and 1,500 enlisted men."71 The provision was amended on the floor of the House to indicate the duties of the cws more specifically. This was done to prevent the Chief of Staff from ignoring the legislation by not assigning duties to the cws. The legislation as finally amended added the following to Sec. 12a cited above: "The duties of the Chemical Warfare Service shall com­ prise the investigation, development, manufacture or procurement and supply to the Army of all smoke and incendiary materials, all toxic gases, and all gas-defense appliances; the research, design, and experimen­ tation connected with chemical warfare and its ma­ terial; and chemical projectile filling plants and prov­ ing grounds; the supervision and training of the Army in chemical warfare, both offensive and defensive, in­ cluding the necessary schools of instruction; and the organization, equipment, training, and operation of special gas troops." [Italics mine.] The House proposal was accepted without substantive change by the Senate, and on June 4, 1920, the Chem­ ical Warfare Service was created. The future of the cws seemed assured. Congress had been very specific in outlining its function. The cws was expected to develop and manufacture toxic agents; it was expected to train the Army both offen­ sively and defensively; and it was assured of a combat role through the operation of Special Gas Troops. The "I HR 12775, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 1920.

The Interwar Years

implementation of the provisions of the law remained to be accomplished, but with such a firm mandate from Congress, the Army could hardly persist in its resistance to chemical warfare.72 The summer months of 1920 were the halcyon days of the Chemical Warfare Service. The Annual Report of the Chief of the cws, submitted on August 15, 1920, radiated the confidence of the Service. A large research and development program had been instituted to insure that the United States would not be caught unpre­ pared by some technological advance; plans were be­ ing made to expand the production capability of Edgewood Arsenal and to maintain it in such a state of read­ iness that full production of gas shells could begin within one week of a declaration of war; new, more advanced defense equipment was to be manufactured and dis­ tributed to the standing army. This extensive program reflected cws expectations of becoming a decisive com­ bat arm of the Army. The cws saw its primary mission to be one of deterrence. "The knowledge among other countries that the United States is doing this [research and development, stand-by production capability, training in chemical warfare] will go a long way toward deterring them from forcing hostilities, knowing that the United States with its incomparable natural resources and highly de­ veloped manufacturing possibilities will be able to man72 The Reorganization Act offered promise of future appeals to Con­ gress. The provisions of the Act weakened the statutory control of the Secretary of War over the War Department and in effect permitted subordinates "to try their controversy with their chief before a Con­ gressional committee" (J. Dickinson, The Building of an Army [New York: The Century Co., 1922], p. 320; H. White, Executive Influence in Determining Military Policy in the United States [Urbana, 111.: U. of Illinois Press, 1925], pp. 262-63).

The Aftermath of War

ufacture and to deliver on the field of battle a greater quantity of chemicals than any other single nation, or indeed any other group of nations."73 It was to be more than the deterrence of enemy use of gas. The cws saw its existing capability and future po­ tential as a deterrent to the use of force in resolving conflicts. General Fries and the advocates of chemical warfare had grandiose dreams of the future, but they did not correspond to the realities of the present. Mesmerized by their successful lobbying for the passage of the Army Reorganization Bill, chemical warfare enthusiasts seemed to have forgotten that the War Department owned the future. The realization of the dream rested with successful bureaucratic infighting within the Exec­ utive Department. Major issues could be appealed to a sympathetic Legislative Branch, but it was the indi­ vidually minor, day-to-day "administrative decisions" that would shatter the dream. General Fries and his associates were brought back to reality during the fall and winter of 1920. WAR DEPARTMENT HESITATION / At first, it seemed as if

the War Department had accepted the congressional concept of chemical warfare. The War Department General Orders issued to implement the Reorganiza­ tion Act mirrored the provisions of the Act.74 But then, in rapid succession, the spirit if not the law of the Re­ organization Act was violated in War Department de­ cisions on the combat role of chemical troops, the chem­ ical warfare training to be provided to the Army, and the funds to be authorized to the Chemical Warfare Service. 73 C cws, Annual Report, 1920, p. 1888. 1* Sec. HI, WD General Order 54, 28 Aug 20.

The Interwar Years

As soon as the Reorganization Act became law, the War Department General Staff directed that a study be made to evaluate its implications on Army organization. The board of officers selected to make the study, the Lassiter Board, was specifically directed to determine what the proportions of troops should be between the arms and services. In its report, the Lassiter Board recommended: "That no troops of the Chemical Warfare Service should be assigned within the Army as combat organ­ izations, but that this service should carry on research and development. This is a supply service whose prod­ uct should be utilized when necessary by combat troops of all arms of the line."75 Retaining responsibility for the employment of chem­ ical weapons in combat was a core issue for the cws. As long as this responsibility rested with them, General Fries felt that the Service could not be disbanded. His rapid and vehement response to the suggested change caused the recommendation to be dropped—tem­ porarily.76 T5 Report of Special Committee Appointed By the Director War Plans Division to Define the General Plan of Organization to be Adopted For the Army of the United States Provided By the Act of June 4, 1920, 8 Jul 20, MS, HI 1 (m), EHO. The Board was directed to assume that the Army would not fight overseas. General Pershing dissented in several recommendations of the Board but made no comment on the cws recommendations (ibid., App. 1) . Recommended Tables or Organiza­ tion and Equipment were appended to the report. No cws unit was included (ibid., App. 2) . One of the Board members was Major G. C. Marshall, G.S. 78 Ltr, C cws for Dir WPD, 20 Sep 20, sub: Efforts to Make the Chemi­ cal Warfare Service Totally Non-Combatant, EHO. General Fries re­ minded the WPD of the intent of Congress expressed in the Army Reorganization Act. He felt that the cws' World War I record entitled it to a combat mission. "For forty years the line of the Army cursed the staff departments because of their aloofness from the line. Now when a staff department, through the distinguished service of its troops in the field in the World War, has linked up research, development and

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

This issue, as well as the more general question of chemical warfare training for the Army, was decided in a series of War Department letters in November and December of 1920. In rapid succession, no chemical war­ fare officers were authorized for Department, Corps, or Division staffs; no chemical warfare troops could be assigned to troops of the Regular Army for training; no Army officers could be detailed to attend the Chem­ ical Warfare School; no gas ammunition could be em­ ployed for training or target practice by the Air Serv­ ice, Engineers, Coast Artillery, and Field Artillery; and no chemical warfare officers could be placed on de­ tached duty for assignment to Reserve Officers Training Corps, Organized Reserve, National Guard, Service Schools, or the Military Academy.77 General Fries com­ plained bitterly about these decisions, but to no avail. Knowing the attitude of the Army staff, Fries turned to the Secretary of War in letters of December 16, 1920, and May 14, 1921. Newton Baker, the outgoing Secretary of War, re­ fused to take action, but in so doing he indicated a new War Department position toward the 1920 Army Re­ organization Act. The 1920 Act had provided for a standing army of 280,000. The mood of Congress had since changed. In debating the fy 1922 Appropriations Bill, Congress was referring to a standing army of 125,000 to 150,000. After mentioning the atmosphere of economy in Congress, Baker wrote: "If this or any resosupply with the firing line in the most perfect way possible, it is pro­ posed to refuse that service the right to participate in line work in peace, and presumably in war" (ibid.) . η The various decisions are cited in Ltr, C cws for sw, 13 Dec 20, sub: Memorandum on Present Status of the Chemical Warfare Service, EHO; and Ltr, C cws for C of S, 26 Jul 21, sub: Policy of War Depart­ ment concerning Chemical Warfare [certain changes requested], cws Policy File, 1921, EHO.

S9

The Interwar Years

lution of its kind actually passes, the whole question of the organization of the Army with such limited per­ sonnel will have to be studied and determined."78 In effect, the War Department was applying clausula rebus sic stantibus to the provisions of the Reorganization Act. Under the changed conditions, Section 12a no longer provided a protective shield for the activities of the Chemical Warfare Service. The last major area in which the War Department could and did defy the provisions of the Reorganiza­ tion Act was in the allocation of funds. The Chemical Warfare Service requested $8l/£ million in the FY 1922 Budget in order to fulfill its obligations under the Act. The War Department reduced this estimate by $4 mil­ lion.79 In 1920, the cws could have expected Congress to restore some of the cut; not in 1921. The cws ap­ propriation was reduced from $41^ million to $H/£ mil­ lion in committee, and a floor amendment was defeated that would have reduced the appropriation to $1 mil­ lion. The approved appropriation was $11/4 million.80 78 Ltr, sw for C cws, 17 Jan 21, no sub, cited verbatim in Ltr, C cws for C of S, 26 Jul 21. Congress was reflecting the "Return to Normalcy" of the Harding administration. " Ltr, C cws for sw, 13 Dec 20, 4. Most of the nonapproved monies were to be spent to produce a new mask. The old World War I mask had been penetrated by the toxic smoke candle. The U.S. had planned to produce 3 million such candles for use in 1919, yet the 1920 request to equip the entire army with effective protection was rejected (ibid., 4). The $41/2 million approved cws estimate was less than twothirds of 1 per cent of the total War Department estimate for FY 1922. SO U.S. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1921, LX, Part 3, 2662-63. An amendment was submitted by Representative Montague of Virginia who felt that $1½ million was a "very large contribution to a particular military agency of doubtful efficiency, but not doubtful in violating almost the last vestige of civilized warfare" (ibid., 2662). The total War Department appropriation did not fare much better. The Bureau of the Budget approved estimate was $699,275,502. The final appropriation was $328,013,529 (U.S. Senate, Appropriations, New Offices, etc. FY 1922, 66th Cong., 3rd Sess., Doc. 429, pp. 441, 446). Actually, the cws funds were not as severally limited as they seemed. Although the Secretary of War withheld the expenditure of $324,000

The Aftermath of War

There was, however, one favorable aspect to the FY 1922 Appropriations Act. The Act contained the wording: ". . . for expenses incidental to organization, training, equipment of special gas troops not otherwise provided for, including the training of the Army in chemical war­ fare, both offensive and defensive, together with the necessary schools, tactical demonstrations and maneuvers .. ."81 Despite the financial restrictions placed on the cws as well as on the entire military establishment, Congress continued to accept the proposition that the United States required a well-balanced program for chemical warfare readiness. The cws had another reason to be hopeful during the summer of 1921. General March was replaced as Chief of Staff of the Army by General Pershing on July 1, 1921. While his selection did not assure positive sup­ port for chemical warfare, General Pershing was at least rational in his views—a welcome change from the emotional rejection of any form of chemical warfare that had characterized General March's approach.82 of FY 1922 funds, the cws spent an additional $1,253,722 from heldover World War I funds. Total available funds for FY 1922 were ¢2,432,917 (C cws, Annual Report, 1920, p. 284) . si U.S. Treasury Department, Digest of Appropriations . . . Fiscal Year Ending June 30, /922 (Washington: USGPO, 1921) , p. 206. The wording remained the same for every Appropriation Act until the Second World War. 82 General Pershing had not opposed the formation of a separate cws in the Reorganization Act Hearings. He agreed that restrictions on the use of toxic agents would be useful; however, it would not be safe to prohibit gas "because we cannot trust the other fellow." When questioned about the "sportsmanship" of gas, Pershing said, "I cannot see very much difference myself in methods of killing" (testimony to Joint Committee, reprinted in House Hearings, Army Reorganization, 1507-08). For March's approach, see Supra, pp. 83-84.

pi

The Interwar Years

General Fries was quick to test General Pershing's atti­ tude. On July 26, 1921, he requested recision of the stifling War Department directives of November-De­ cember 1920.83 To the great relief of the supporters of chemical warfare, General Pershing approved the rec­ ommended changes. The new War Department policy was stated in Gen­ eral Orders, published on August 17, 1921. The Gen­ eral Orders authorized "training and instruction in chemical warfare, both offensive and defensive," to be conducted for officers of all branches, both in a special chemical warfare school and in the service schools; re­ instated cws representation on Department, Corps, and Division staffs, and permitted the use of the First Gas Regiment for service school instruction as well as dur­ ing Department and Corps area field training exer­ cises.84 A continuing combat mission for the cws was in­ ferred in the reference to the First Gas Regiment. The only unresolved problem was the allocation of chemical ammunition to service schools, but relief of this re­ striction would be consistent with the new War De­ partment attitude on gas. The new attitude was fur­ ther revealed on October 11, 1921, when one company of the Gas Regiment was authorized for the Hawaiian, Philippine, and Panama Canal Departments.85 The future of chemical warfare looked almost rosy in the fall of 1921. The Army, led by the new Chief of Staff, appeared to have accepted chemical warfare. The only shade on an otherwise bright prospect was the 83 Ltr, C cws for C of S, 26 Jul 21. ^ Sec. 111, War Department General Orders No. 42, 17 Aug si, p. 3. 85 Memo, G-3 for C of S, 28 Mar 27, sub: Chemical Warfare Service Functions, G-3/5749, in cws Policy Book, EHO [hereafter cited as cws Functions, 28 Mar 27]. Only the Hawaiian Department unit arrived before Arms Conference restrictions took effect. ρ2

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

problem of adequate appropriations, but that problem was not unique to the Chemical Warfare Service. LEGACY

OF

THE

WASHINGTON

ARMS

CONFERENCE

/

Actually, disaster was just over the horizon. The birds of irresponsible propaganda unleashed by the cws and the chemical industries were coming home to roost. They came home with the Washington Arms Confer­ ence and they "roosted" for the next generation. The prohibition of chemical warfare signed at the Washington Conference caused a complete reversal of War Department policy. General Order No. 24 of June 10, 1922, replaced the now-defunct General Order 42. The new General Order deleted all reference to offen­ sive chemical warfare and confined training "to the use of smoke, incendiary materials, non-toxic gas for train­ ing, and gas-defense appliances"; it also deleted men­ tion of unit "gas officers" and the First Gas Regiment.86 The policy change applied to research, development, and procurement as well as to training. Henceforth, all development would be defensive. "1 The investigation, development, procurement, manufacture, or supply of poisonous gases for the pres­ ent will be limited strictly to the amount necessary for the research and development of gas defense appliances. 2 The filling of all projectiles and containers with poisonous gas will be discontinued, except for the lim­ ited number needed in perfecting gas-defense appli­ ances."87 The provisions of the gas treaty signed at the Wash­ ington Arms Conference did not require that any 86 Sec. 87 Sec.

II, IV,

War Department General Order No. 24, 10 Jun 22. War Department General Order No. 26, 17 Jun 22.

The Interwar Years

nation disarm itself. Nor is there any indication in avail­ able records that any other agency of the Executive Branch requested that the United States Army forsake gas warfare readiness. Nevertheless, the attitude that stimulated General Orders 24 and 26 was also applied to war planning. In November 1922, a Corps Commander requested that one of the war plans provide for the employment of toxic and nontoxic gases. The request was disapproved by the Chief of Staff on December 4, 1922. General Pershing commented: "It is inconceivable that the United States will initiate the use of gases . . . and by no means certain that it will use them even in retaliation. Aside from this, it is quite unlikely that the prospective enemy . . . will invite re­ taliatory measures by using gases in any form. Should he do so, however, the action to be taken will be de­ cided when the time comes."88 The capabilities and intentions of foreign powers were no different in December 1922 than they had been in June 1919, when the Director of the War Plans Di­ vision had written: ". . . Since a purely defensive attitude in chemical war­ fare is impossible, and since recent developments per­ mit the use of line troops in offensive chemical warfare to an even greater extent than heretofore, it is thought that the Army should be trained in both offensive and defensive chemical warfare."89 Yet after the Washington Arms Conference, War De88 cws Functions, 28 Mar 27, 11. 89 Memo, Dir WPD to C of S, 16 Jun 19, sub: Chemical Warfare Service, WPD 9967-112, NA.

T h e A f t e r m a t h of W a r

partment policy stripped the United States Army of all capability and training essential for employment of toxic agents. Despite its specific responsibilities for na­ tional security, the Army appeared hypnotized by the attractive lure of preservation of peace through the sanction of public opinion—a plausible rationale for ignoring the unsolved problems remaining from the use of gas in World War I. But inconsistency was the keynote of American policy with respect to chemical warfare during the interwar years. Article 172 of the Treaty of Versailles and the protective tariffs were results of an agreed requirement for knowledge of the latest chemical warfare develop­ ments; but the Chemical Warfare Service was restricted in its efforts to capitalize upon the new information. The provisions of the Washington Arms Conference gas prohibition rested on an international convention that had failed when first tested and that had been con­ demned as inadequate by the Legal Committee of the Conference. Finally, by its decisions in formulating the 1920 Defense Act and subsequent appropriation bills, Congress had legislated a national chemical warfare policy that the Executive seemed determined not to follow after the Washington Conference. The source of the problem lay not in the Washington Treaty, but in the general atmosphere within the United States. The American people were tired of war. The enthusiasm and hopes for a more perfect world order which characterized America's approach to World War I had given way to a deep disillusionment. War and its distasteful accoutrements had solved little. Neverthe­ less, there was still hope if the United States could in some way compensate for its failure to support peace by joining the League of Nations. The spirit of the times

The Interwar Years

was a "combination of wishful utopianism and impul­ sive idealism."90 Propelled by an effective propaganda campaign, chemical warfare was seized by interest groups and transformed into the villain of the World War. In pro­ hibition of gas war lay atonement for the past and pres­ ervation in the future. By 1922, gas had become the cause celebre of World War I memories. so Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self Interest in America's Foreign Rela­ tions (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 307.

CHAPTER 3 - THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY, 1922-1939 The inconsistencies in chemical warfare policy which originated in the immediate aftermath of World War I persisted throughout the twenties and thirties. By 1926, it had become evident to governmental decision-makers that chemical warfare policies derived during or as a result of the Washington Arms Conference were un­ realistic if not actually detrimental to national security. Yet the gradual realignment of policy which ensued during the interwar period was not matched by a con­ comitant reorientation of programs to ensure imple­ mentation. As a result, by 1939 there was a serious gap between the supposed and actual chemical warfare capabilities. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the pattern of inconsistency and to explore its sources through an examination of the various influences on chemical warfare policy. A.

EXTERNAL STIMULANTS

Throughout this period, decision-makers faced a perpetual dilemma. The United States desired to be the moral leader in the worldwide quest for security through disarmament; a tangible and available mani­ festation of this desire was to offer to prohibit the em­ ployment of chemical warfare. Simultaneously, post­ war administrations became increasinglyly aware that deterrence of future use of gas required more than the sanction of world opinion; the United States had to re­ tain a modicum of insurance in case the declared de­ terrent failed. The problem was how to gain the best of each objective without compromising either, while at the same time formulating policy in an open society al-

The Interwar Years

ready strongly inclined to despise chemical warfare. The requisite balance was maintained at the Geneva Conference of 1925, but it was due to congressional rather than executive actions. GENEVA GAS PROTOCOL / The Geneva Conference was

not intended to consider the subject of poison gas. As its full title—Conference for the Control of the Inter­ national Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War—implied, the Conference convened under the aegis of the League of Nations to restrict if not abolish the private trade in arms (thought by many to be one of the causes of World War I) under terms acceptable to the United States. A similar convention had been signed by 34 countries at St. Germain in September 1919, but the United States had refused for various reasons to ratify it.1 After the Washington Conference, the United States could hardly refuse to participate in any conference in­ tended to reduce the possibility of future conflict. But attendance at the Conference did not infer American acceptance of international control of the arms trade. International regulation of domestic private arms man­ ufacture and exportation was no more feasible, po­ litically, in 1925 than it had been earlier. The Depart­ ment of State did, however, see in the Geneva Confer­ ence an opportunity to strengthen the prohibition on 1 Ltr, Dos to Secretariat, League of Nations, 12 Sep 23, no sub, in League of Nations Preparatory Documents: Conference for the Control of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War, Doc. C.758.M.258 1924 IX cco 2 Geneva, 1925, p. 15 [Preparatory Docu­ ments cited hereafter as L of N, Prelim Doc Geneva Conf]. The U.S. objected to the Treaty of St. Germain for the following reasons: a) it established a system of control between nations but not between a nation and its colonies, b) arms could not be shipped to states not party to the convention, e.g., Latin America, c) the Treaty would regu­ late private arms manufacture, d) the Treaty was too closely "inter­ twined" with the League of Nations.

The Evolution of Policy

chemical warfare initiated at the Washington Conference. Although the draft convention for the Conference did not include mention of poison gases, the Depart­ ment of State desired "to see an article inserted abso­ lutely prohibiting international trade in asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases for use in war."2 In accordance with these instructions, Representative Burton tabled an American amendment to the draft convention on May 7, 1925. In introducing the amendment, Mr. Bur­ ton acknowledged that it posed difficult problems of implementation, since it was almost impossible to dis­ tinguish between gases used for legitimate purposes and gases used for warfare. Equally thorny was the question of military readiness for non-gas-producing countries if they could not import war gases. The United States 2 Memo, Asst C of S WPD for C of S, 20 Dec 26, sub: Instructions Issued by the State Department to the Delegates to the Traffic in Arms Conference in Geneva, WPD 599-50, NA. The suggested phraseology was: [Restatement of Art. v, Washington Treaty] . . . The High Contracting Parties therefore agree absolutely to prohibit the export from their territory of any such asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, intended or designed for use in connection with operations of war." The War Department was not consulted in the preparation of the article on export prohibition. As determined by subsequent War Department investigation, the paragraph on gas warfare was inserted in the final copy of State Department instructions to Conference dele­ gates after a meeting between President Coolidge; Mr. Hoover, Secre­ tary of Commerce; Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State; and Representative Burton, Chairman of the American Delegation to the Conference (Memo, Asst C of S WPD to C of S, n.d. [Dec 26], sub: Attitude of the War Department with reference to International Agreements on the Use of Gas in Warfare, WPD 599-50, NAA. See also WPD 599-27, 28, NAA) . The initiative in support of additional restraints to chemical warfare apparently rested with Representative Burton, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives. As evidenced in later comments in connection with ratification of the Treaty, he was an absolute and outspoken foe of chemical warfare. The cws felt that Burton was individually responsible for the prohibition; however, the cable traffic from DOS to Washington indicates that he was acting with the approval of the Department of State.

The Interwar Years

suggested that these issues be resolved in technical com­ mittee meetings.3 The United States delegation was correct in its evalu­ ation of the "technical problems" of the draft proposal. The Legal and Military Committees could not agree on specific treaty provisions. The Legal Committee merely forwarded to the Military Committee a range of pro­ posals without recommendation.4 The Military Com­ mittee stated that a trade prohibition would not pre­ vent future use of chemical-biological weapons in war, as producers would still possess these weapons systems and it would be impossible to establish a qualitative distinction between war chemicals and industrial or pharmaceutical chemicals. Unable to find a mid-point between absolute prohibition and unrestricted use of chemical weapons, the Military Committee urged that all Powers abstain from chemical-biological warfare. It suggested that a subsequent conference be convened to codify such a prohibition.5 In the face of opposition to any restriction in trade, 3 League of Nations, Proceedings of the Conference for the Super­ vision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, Doc A 13, 1925, ix, Geneva: 1925, pp. 130, 155 [hereafter cited as L of N, Proceedings, Geneva Conf\. The emotional bent of the U.S. proposal was indicated in the draft of the alternative text submitted by the U.S. "To the end of lessening the horrors of war and of ameliorating the sufferings of humanity incident thereto . . ." The Polish-Delegation immediately tabled a proposal to add bio­ logical warfare to the American draft. The practical difficulties of implementing such a treaty, anticipated by Mr. Burton, were evidenced in a Hungarian amendment to the U.S. proposal intended to exclude "methods of defense against asphyxiating . . ." from the trade prohibi­ tion (ibid., 162) . 4 L of N, Proceedings, Geneva Conf, Annex 10, 745. The Legal Com­ mittee posed such alternative solutions as prohibition of exportation; declaration that use in war was contrary to (or prohibited by) inter­ national law; and authorized trade in means of defense only. 5 Ibid., Annex 4, 740. Note that the Military Committee came to the same conclusions as the Military Subcommittee at the Washington Conference, yet it did not accept the feasibility of limiting use to mili­ tary targets (Supra, p. 64.).

The Evolution of Policy

the United States fell back on the provisions of the Washington Treaty. If a new conference was neces­ sary, the United States was prepared to call it; however, expansion of the Washington Treaty to all nations would achieve the policy of the United States "to seek on every appropriate occasion international agreements tending to insure the ultimate universal prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gases as a means of warfare."6 The conference accepted the American draft revised to omit reference to restraints in trade. "WHEREAS the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and "WHEREAS the prohibition of such use has been de­ clared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and "To THE END that this prohibition shall be univer­ sally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; 6 Ibid., Annex 3, 739. Mr. Burton stated: "the President of the United States, Mr. Coolidge, will be glad to extend an invitation for a Conference at Washington with a view to the framing of a Convention for the prohibiton of the use of asphyxiating gas in war . . ." (ibid., 310). There was not the unanimity of sentiment within the govern­ ment that Mr. Burton inferred. The War Department was opposed to any limitation on the use of gas other than a prohibition of its use against cities and noncombatants. Representative Burton's recom­ mendation to reaffirm the provisions of the Washington Conference was accepted by General Nolan, Acting Chief of Staff, on May 20, 1925, without reference to the previous War Department position. War and Navy Department representatives at Geneva "strongly opposed" the limitations proposed by the U.S. during the Conference. "So far as is of record, the War Department per se was not called upon for recom­ mendations and did not make any recommendations" (Memo, Asst C of S WPD for C of S, n.d. [Dec. 26], sub: Attitude of the War Depart­ ment with Reference to International Agreements on the Use of Gas in Warfare, WPD 599-50, NAA) . War and Navy Department representa­ tives at Geneva protested the draft within the Delegation (Report, Maj E. J. Atkisson to WDGS, n.d. [20 May 25], sub: Report on Chemical Warfare, WPD 165-9, NAA) ·

JOI

The Interwar Years

"DECLARE: That the High Contracting Parties, so far

as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibit­ ing such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration."7 The Treaty was advanced by the United States to universalize the prior treaty of the Washington Arms Conference. And in one sense, it did. In contrast to the original American proposal, the Protocol was a pious declaration rather than a binding obligation that would freeze the status-quo between the chemical warfare "haves-and-have-nots"—a treaty of nonproliferation. There was no sanction for noncompliance, nor did the Treaty apply in a war with nonsignatories. But, where­ as other postwar treaties gained their binding force through reference to the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Gas Protocol stood alone. It was not quite as innocuous as it first appeared. With the Protocol duly signed, the American Delegation returned to the United States boasting another substantial contribu­ tion to the American campaign to prohibit gas warfare. All that remained was to obtain Senate consent; but this was to be an impossible task. In contrast to the elaborate precautionary measures taken by Secretary Hughes to ensure ratification of the Treaty of Washington, Secretary Kellogg did virtually nothing to facilitate ratification of the Geneva Gas Pro­ tocol. The Department of State apparently considered that public opinion and the Senate's animosity toward chemical warfare, evidenced in the easy ratification of the Washington Treaty, would apply equally to the ' "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare," L of N, Proceedings, Geneva Conf, 77.

The Evolution of Policy

Geneva Gas Protocol. As it developed, Kellogg's actions invited opposition to the Protocol. No senator was included in the Delegation. The original proposal was coordinated with neither the War Department nor the American chemical industries.8 And with the suppres­ sion of the Technical Subcommittee's report at the Washington Conference, the chemical interests were already skeptical about the State Department's attitude toward gas. The expected provisions of the Protocol in­ creased the skepticism. Opponents of ratification were given ample oppor­ tunity to develop and promote their cases. The Treaty was signed June 17, 1925, yet it was not reported favor­ ably out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until June 26, 1926. Both the Committee Hearings and the first floor debate were held in executive session. The only open debate held before the Treaty was pigeon­ holed occurred on December 9, 10, and 13, 1926. The time was used to good advantage by pressure groups opposed to ratification. Veterans organizations responded to the challenge and opposed treaty ratifica­ tion. The most influential, the American Legion, fully supported the cws in attempts to block ratification throughout the period. The Legion restated its opposi­ tion to the Protocol during its 1927 convention. RESOLVED: That the American Legion reaffirms the

action taken at its Omaha [1925] and Philadelphia [1926] conventions in urging support of the Chemical Warfare Service and in opposing the adoption of the Geneva Gas Protocol.9 β Such was not the case with the issue of conventional arms limitation. See Ltr, Mr. A. Simons for Mr. C. Comeaux, 22 Feb 28, no sub, Exhibit 1040, Nye Committee, 12, 2733. Herbert Hoover denied that there was any improper pressure activity (H. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 11 (New York: Macmillan, 1952) , 357. 9 U.S. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 2, 103

The Interwar Years

The American Chemical Society delivered its expected resolution against treaty ratification while General Fries attempted to mobilize support throughout the Army.10 His efforts were successful because he presented 1825. Other veterans organizations that rallied to the cry against the Protocol were the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Spanish American War Veterans, the Association of Military Surgeons, the Reserve Officers Association, and the Military Order of the World War (U.S. Congres­ sional Record, 6gth Cong., 2d Sess., 1926, LXVIII, Part 1, 152-53) . The support of the American Legion was particularly valuable and was due to the industrious endeavors of Colonel John Thomas Taylor who was simultaneously Director of the National Legislative Committee of the American Legion, Treasurer of the National Association for Chemical Defense, and an officer in the cws Reserve. Colonel Taylor wrote and distributed 25,000 copies of a Legion pamphlet, "The Truth About the Geneva Gas Protocol—America Should Reject It—Preparedness Essen­ tial to our National Security." General Fries was District of Columbia Department Commander of the American Legion from October 1926 until 1927 and was a close friend of Colonel Taylor—a reserve Brigadier General in the cws during World War II. Proponents of ratification were almost apoplectic about the activities of Colonel Taylor. Repre­ sentative Hamilton Fish, one of the founders of the Legion, charged Colonel Taylor with malconduct on the floor of the House: ". . . I charge him with carrying on a tremendous propaganda, financed by the chemical industries to defeat the poison gas treaty in the Senate . . . I charge him with having attempted to bamboozle [the Senate] . . . I charge him with misrepresenting the views of the rank and file of the veterans and misleading our colleagues in the other body into believing that they will incur the wrath of the legionnaires if they vote for the gas treaty . . ." (U.S. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 1927, LXVII, Part 2, 2090. See also Idem., LXVIII, Part 1, 152-54, 226; LXXI, Part 2, 1825, for other Legion activities; M. Duffield, King Legion [New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931]) . 10 Annual Convention, American Chemical Society, 3-8 Aug 25, in U.S. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., LXVIII, Part 1, 365. General Fries wrote Army Corps Commanders to obtain statements supporting the necessity of preparedness against chemical warfare. Responses concentrated on the need for general military preparedness but included appropriate reference to chemical warfare (Chemical Warfare, 1925-1926, passim) . Typical of his efforts to gain support from World War I military leaders was Fries' exchange of letters with Gen­ eral Bliss. Fries obtained permission to quote Bliss on readiness "to the Secretary of War, and I hope he may transmit it to the President for his information at the time he may have the Geneva protocol under consideration" (Ltrs, 4, 6, 16, 19, 22, 23 Jan 26 in File: Views of Various People on Chemical Warfare, cws 411.01, EHO) .

The Evolution of Policy

the fight against ratification as a fight for general mili­ tary preparedness, an argument that no military officer could fail to support. The military was further persuaded against ratification by the fact that the War Department had not been consulted until after the United States was already committed to the Protocol.11 Although the War Department could not express its displeasure pub­ licly, Senators Wadsworth and Tyson carried the ob­ jections of the military establishment to the floor of the Senate during the open debate.12 Probable proponents of ratification were strangely silent. A flurry of resolutions against ratification were presented to the Senate on December 9 and 10; yet there were no calls for ratification. Several Senators did sup­ port the Protocol but they were obviously in the minor­ ity. It is not surprising that the various peace groups misjudged the response of the Senate. The Protocol ap­ peared to be merely a universalized restatement of the n The War Department was not permitted to comment publicly on the lack of coordination. The Secretary of War directed: "As this is a matter incorporated in treaty obligations of the Country, it is not considered proper for the War Department to express an opinion thereon and the matter will be considered as closed" (Memo, SGS for WPD, 9 Dec 26, sub: WPD 599-53, Protocol of the Geneva Agreement relating to Gas Warfare, WPD 599-53, NA) . Chemical-warfare action offi­ cers o£ the War Plans Division were absolutely opposed to ratification of the Protocol. An underlying theme of their opposition was the fear that ratification would permit pacifist organizations to impugn the good faith of the Army if chemical-warfare readiness were maintained (Memo, Maj Bain to Asst C of S WPD, 9 Dec 26, sub: Reasons for Nonratification of the Geneva Gas Protocol, WPD 599-50, NA; Memo, Maj Strong for Asst C of S WPD, g Dec 26, sub: Ratification of Geneva Gas Protocol, WPD 599-50, NA) . 12 Senators Borah and Wadsworth discussed the objections of the military on the Senate floor (U.S. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., LXVIII, Part 1, 143-45). Senator Borah was floor manager for the treaty; Senator Wadsworth, defeated in the November 1926 elec­ tions, was lame-duck Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. Senator Tyson reiterated this point later in the debate (ibid., 151). Upon his request, Tyson had been briefed by WPD officers and had apparently been in contact with General Fries (Memo, Maj Strong for Col Embick, 8 Dec 26, no sub, WPD 599-54, NA) . IO 5

The Interwar Years

Washington Treaty, which had been ratified without a dissenting vote. Further, the Treaty had been reported favorably out of the Foreign Relations Committee. Per­ haps overconfident and certainly inattentive, the peace groups forfeited the opportunity to influence the most significant debate on chemical warfare during the interwar period.13 The lull in the storm of gas propaganda permitted the Senate to consider the question of gas in coldly ra­ tional terms.11 When the Senate returned the Gas Pro­ tocol to Committee on December 13, 1926, it did so on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the requirements of national security. Two major points were raised and reinforced in the debate. In time of war, the United States would not itself, and could not expect others to obey agreed restraints unless they were perceived to be in the national interest. According to Senator Borah, "Even if we should undertake to limit some kind of weapon and in the exigencies of war we should find that that limitation embarrassed us, we would pay no at1S Supporters of ratification reacted but it was too late to affect the Senate (New York Times, January 27, 1927, p. 40) . For the American Red Cross response, see C. Buckingham, "The Geneva Convention Out­ lawing Poisonous Gases and Bacteriological Warfare," MS, 22 Aug 57, ARCL. Representatives Fish and Burton did not conceal their displeasure with the Senate and the cws (U.S. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., LXVIII, Part 2, 1968, 2089). As former Chairman of the Ameri­ can Delegation, Burton was particularly distraught. He attempted and failed annually to reduce the cws appropriations, feeling that the cws was at the root of a conspiracy against peace (ibid., 1965-68; Idem,., Lxix, Part 3, 2640). "Senator Wadsworth noted the absence of the propaganda. In con­ trast to 1922 when "there was much of hysteria and much of mis­ information concerning chemical warfare," by 1926 there was "com­ plete information, with the result that an entirely different picture is afforded" (U.S. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., LXVIII, Part i, 144). The debate was influenced by pro-gas propaganda. Gas was asserted to be more militarily effective and humane than conventional armaments and its use was stated to be economically and industrially advantageous to the United States (ibid., 144-53) ·

The Evolution of Policy

tention to it."15 The point was made by Senator Wadsworth in a slightly different context: "I do not like to see the United States enter into any compact of a solemn kind such as this with a mental reservation such as must accompany the ratification of this treaty, for we know just about as certainly as we know we are sitting in this chamber that it is against all human nature to expect a nation to deny to itself the use of a weapon that will save it."16 Accepting the implications of an international agree­ ment such as the Geneva Protocol on the military read­ iness of the United States presented a second major difficulty. The Senate agreed with General Fries that ratification of the treaty would stultify if not preclude readiness for gas warfare. It would be virtually impos­ sible to allocate scarce military resources to increase chemical warfare readiness when the use of gas in war had been prohibited.17 In refusing to ratify the Geneva Gas Protocol, the Senate was not accepting gas warfare as a desirable method of fighting wars; it was simply acknowledging that, despite agreements to the contrary, gas would probably be used in future conflicts and therefore the United States had to be prepared.18 Acceptance in prin­ ciple of the need for gas warfare readiness did not, how­ ever, insure practical support for the allocation of deis Ibid., 147. 16 Ibid., 149. (An interesting example of oversell by the cws.) 17 Ibid., 157. is One Senator extended preparedness to include deterrence of war through a "balance of terror." Senator Ransdell referred to possible development of a new super gas that could annihilate the populations of cities; he stated: "suppose we knew that there was such a gas in existence. Do you imagine any country would go to war? Surely not. Fear would deter them. The surest means of preventing war would be the development of such a weapon as that—one that would make it infinitely more horrible than it is now" (ibid., 363).

The Intermar Years

fense resources to chemical warfare. Nevertheless, the Senate indicated unequivocally that it did not consider the force of public opinion to be a deterrent sufficient to prevent violation of international agreements. A sim­ ilar view was stated by the Secretary of State: "All governments recognize that it is incumbent upon them to be fully prepared as regards chemical warfare, and especially as regards defense againt it, irrespective of any partial or general international agreements look­ ing to the prohibition of the actual use of such warfare."19 Under the circumstances, Secretary Kellogg could say little else. The administration could not deny the ne­ cessity for preparedness, particularly when chemical preparedness had become a matter of specific Senate attention. Proponents of ratification had been singularly un­ successful. An initiative designed to further seal the prohibition contained in the Washington Conference resulted in explicit Executive-Legislative consensus that the United States had to maintain preparedness for gas warfare and implicit agreement that prohibition would impair readiness. Nonratification of the Geneva Gas Protocol was a signal victory for the advocates of chem­ ical warfare because it clearly indicated that the intent of the United States was to be prepared for the use of chemical weapons in future wars. Senate rejection of the Geneva Protocol marked an important shift in United States policy. Declaratory policy remained in support of efforts to prohibit gas warfare. But action policy changed considerably. Be­ fore 1926, the United States encouraged the develop19 Ltr, Sec State for Mr. C. L. Parsons, Sec American Chemical Society, 7 Dec 26, no sub, EHO.

The Evolution of Policy

ment of world public opinion as the primary sanction against violation of the prohibition. Any actual pre­ paredness for gas warfare was welcome as additional insurance against initiation. After 1926, preparedness was to be the dominant restraint. The United States supported prohibition, but only to the extent that it did not impair military readiness. The European Pow­ ers, on the other hand, despite reservations endorsing chemical warfare readiness announced at the Washing­ ton Conference, supported complete prohibition of chemical warfare in the 1930's. They wanted control of domestic production and trade as well as meaningful inspection. In short, they envisaged effective prohibi­ tion.20 The twenties saw an almost perfect reversal of roles in gas warfare negotiations. From enthusiastic promot­ er of any treaty which would reduce the possibility of gas warfare in 1921, the United States had become a rather skeptical bystander by 1931. The European Powers had assumed the position formerly held by the United States. The result of this shift was to place the United States in a potentially embarrassing position at international conferences. The shadow of vigorous United States support of prohibition at Washington and Geneva hung heavily over negotiators trying to promote the new American policy of "prohibition with preparation." These policy differences were not immediately evi­ dent. They appeared over time as a result of American participation in the preparatory work and sessions of the World Disarmament Conference. Extending from 20 The rise of totalitarian regimes coupled with known developments in airpower and possible developments in gas presented few policy alternatives to Europeans. The U.S., secure from the threat of a devas­ tating surprise attack, could afford to consider and plan for gas war if deterrence failed. log

The Interwar Years

1926 to 1934, these discussions forced the administra­ tion to reevaluate the substance of the policy which had been formulated for the Washington Arms Conference and implicitly modified by failure to ratify the Geneva Protocol. WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE / The stimulant for restudy of gas warfare policy was the Draft Convention prepared by the Preparatory Commission for the World Disarmament Conference.21 Article 39 of the Draft Con­ vention was a slightly modified restatement of the Geneva Gas Protocol:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxi­ ating, poisonous or similar gases, and all analogous liquids, substances or processes. "They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare."22 21 Gas warfare was only one minor aspect of the disarmament negotia­ tions. For analysis of contemporary questions of arms limitation and security particularly, see S. de Madariaga, Disarmament (New York: Coward-McCann, 1929), pp. 97-150. On U.S. policy, M. Tate, The United States and Armaments (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1948) , pp. 73-117. For preliminary work in the League of Nations: L of N, Temporary Mixed Commission For the Reduction of Armaments, Draft Report on the Use of Asphyxiating Gases etc. in Time of War, Doc CTA 164 (Geneva: L of N, n.d. [August 1922]) ; League of Nations, Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, Part iv, Chemical Warfare, Doc A 16 1924 ix (Geneva: L of N, 30 Jul 24) . This report, influenced by military opinion, down­ graded the unique effects of toxic agents. Gas was considered important but no more decisive than other weapons. The tacit focus of the report was support for deterrence through possession of retaliatory capability. 22 Art. gg, Draft Disarmament Convention, in N. Politis, "Future of International Law on Warfare," the Interparliamentary Union, Geneva. What Would Be The Character of a New War? (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1933), p. 400. The Article was proposed by the delegations of Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Roumania. It was adopted by a majority vote, but several nations reserved the right to submit further proposals at the Conference. A point of particular con­ cern to the U.S. was the interpretation of "similar gases." Did it inJio

The Evolution of Policy

The War Department General Staff studied Article 39 throughout 1931. All staff divisions consulted agreed that any treaty provision should not restrict American defensive use of toxic agents, nor should it preclude continuation of cws preparations for gas warfare.23 The War Department views were accepted by the State De­ partment and transmitted to the American Delegation in Geneva in January 1932. They were intended to pro­ vide a basis of discussion for subsequent incorporation in a general disarmament treaty or a separate instru­ ment. The War Department proposed the following treaty restrictions: "The High Contracting Parties undertake, as among themselves, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiat­ ing or lethal gases, except within the boundaries, and in defense, of territory over which they exercised sov­ ereignty or de jure control at the outbreak of war."24 The approved American draft was significantly differ­ ent from Article 39. Reference to "similar gases" had been deleted to reflect the War Department's desire not to be restricted in the use of riot-control agents. In addition, there was no restriction to prevent a nation from initiating the use of toxic agents in the defense of its own territory. At no point in the discussion was the question of American initiation of chemical war­ fare mentioned. The draft article was written to ensure elude lachrymatory [riot-control] agents (Memo, Lt Col G. Strong for C of S, 2 Dec 30, sub: Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, WPD 599-78 to -100, EHO) ? 23 Memo, Lt Col E. Gunner for Asst C of S WPD, 12 May 32, sub: Data Pertaining to cw in connection with the General Disarmament Conference, WPD 599-114 to 148, NAA [hereafter cited as Gunner Study]. 2 sub: Capabilities of Implementing a Decision to Initiate Retaliatory Cml Warfare Against the Japanese, in Brophy and Fisher, 84. Although not specifically stated, it is evident that plan­ ners envisaged strategic retaliation. 20 uscwc 145/3, 4 Aug 45, sub: Implementation of jcs 825 Series, EHO. 21 JCS 825/5, 5 Mar 45, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare, in Brophy and Fisher, 85. 22 JPS 484/5, 28 May 45, sub: Theater Plans for Civil Warfare, in

The Crucial Test—Mid-ipjj

When the jcs considered the gas readiness issue again, on June 19, 1945, they accepted both the necessity of increased production and, in principle, the requirement to move stocks forward to operational theaters; but they deferred implementation of deployment of stocks. They agreed that: "Our course should be to produce sufficient chemical warfare munitions to provide the authorized require­ ments . . . to conduct retaliatory gas warfare on a readi­ ness date of November 1945."23 The jcs authorized and thus tacitly directed procure­ ment of sufficient chemical munitions to provide mini­ mum stocks of 75 days for the Pacific Theater and 90 days for the China-Burma-India Theater. No direction was given to move the stocks to the overseas areas. This question was held for later jcs decision (jcs 825/7). At this point the basic question of increased gas war­ fare readiness was raised for jcs consideration: Did the United States intend to initiate the use of gas against Japan? General Marshall posed the question in a note to Admiral Leahy, sent probably on June 21, 1945. "Because of the very considerable requirements in service troops, storage facilities, port capacity and ship­ ping involved in providing a forward stockage equal to our recent greatly increased capabilities [the in­ creased capability of the B-29], there is a serious ques­ tion in my mind that a military justification exists for moving this stockage forward, principally to the Brophy and Fisher, 85. The JPS and JLC could not agree on the central question of moving stocks forward. 2S jcs 825/6, 13 Jun 45, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare, ABC 475-92 (25 Feb 44) , Sec iC, EHO. Approved by the jcs on June 19.

The Test of World War II

Marianas and Ryukyus, unless we are contemplating its use on other than a retaliatory basis."24 At least in General Marshall's opinion, the jcs decision on deployment of munitions would be the crucial de­ cision on initiation of gas warfare. This decision was to be made at the jcs luncheon on July 3, from which would come a firm recommendation to be submitted to the President.25 The jcs directive to move stocks forward was dis­ cussed on July 3, but it was decided to delay the deci­ sion. Admiral King felt that production rather than shipping would be a critical bottleneck and wished fur­ ther discussion of the decision to increase gas produc­ tion.28 As a result of Admiral King's concern, the jcs re­ turned to the problem of production and received an 24

Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm Leahy, n.d. [21 Jun 45], no sub,

OPD 385 TS Sec I-1945, EHO. The basic assumption of jcs 825/6 was use

o£ gas only in retaliation (Memo, Asst Sec War for C of S, 15 Jun 45, no sub). The War Department had already studied the contingency option of gas warfare initiation (Memo, Col Johnson S&P, OPD for Brig Gen Lincoln, 4 Jun 45, no sub; Memo, Gen Lincoln for Asst C of S OPD, 9 Jun 45, no sub, ABC 475.92 [25 Feb 44], Sec iC). The subject had been discussed informally with other jcs members (Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm King, 14 Jun 45, no sub; Memo, Adm Leahy for Gen Marshall, 20 Jun 45, no sub, OPD 385 TS I-1945. All in EHO) . For additional discussion of the War Department position see Brophy and Fisher, Chap. IV, "The Question of Initiating Gas Warfare," 86-88. The cws was not consulted during preparation of these studies. Gas warfare was not discussed in the extensive review of Pacific War strategy conducted at the White House on June 18, 1945 (Memo, OPD for C of S, 17 Jun 45, sub: Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President, OPD 381 TS, Sec I, Case 135, EHO) . 25 Memo xo War Plans and Theater Div O C cws for Asst C cws for Field Opns, 29 Jun 45, sub: Conference with Colonel Roberts [OPD] on jcs 825/7, EHO· 2e Memo, Gen Marshall for Gen Hull [Asst C of S OPD], 8 Jul 45, no sub, OPD 385 TS, Sec I, 1945, EHO. By the tenor of the note, neither General Marshall nor Admiral King considered that jcs 825/6 had called for production of gas warfare means. 274

The Crucial Test—Mid-1945

exceedingly favorable readiness report. On July 6, the Joint Chiefs were informed that existing production of chemical munitions stocks would ensure adequate sup­ plies to fill theater stockages about twice as large as those specified in jcs 825/6 and that gas warfare initiated on November 1, 1945, could be maintained at the maximum rate directed in 825/4 for approximately nine months.27 Although it was later discovered that the readiness stated in this report (jcs 825/8) was a gross exaggera­ tion of production capability, the jcs left discussion of the July 6 logistic report with an extremely favorable impression. Neither production nor transportation ap­ peared to pose significant problems. Yet none of the other actions that would have been required to initiate gas warfare were taken. If the United States seriously intended to employ toxic agents, a timely recommenda­ tion had to be approved by the President. When the President departed for the Potsdam Conference on July 6, the jcs had just agreed that initiation appeared logistically feasible within existing programs; but the desirability of initiation had not been seriously de­ bated. Without presidential approval, a new gas warfare policy could not even be discussed in those military talks held at Potsdam to coordinate the defeat of Japan.28 Almost two weeks before the successful test of the atom bomb, the jcs had effectively, if uncon27 Memo, Gen Marshall to jcs, 6 Jul 45, sub: Theater Plans for Chemical Warfare, OPD 385 CWP TS, Sec II, 1945, NAA; Memo, Fld Opns cws to Asst C cws for Fld Opns, 18 Jul 45, sub: 825/8 (6 July 1945), EHO.

28 Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, as a Joint Staff Planner, a member of the U.S. delegation at Potsdam, and Chief of the Strat­ egy and Policy Group, OPD, in 1945 states that to the best of his recol­ lection, gas warfare policy was not discussed at the Potsdam Confer­ ence (Interv, Col G. A. Lincoln with author, 5 Nov 1965). 275

T h e T e s t of W o r l d W a r II

sciously, removed initiation of gas warfare as an alterna­ tive course of action for the invasion of Japan.29 The primary reason for a tacit decision not to employ gas against Japan was jcs unwillingness to make a timely decision to discuss revision of toxic agent policy at Potsdam. No decision was, in effect, a decision not to employ gas. It appears highly unlikely, however, that gas would have been employed if there had been no atom bomb and Operation Olympic had actually oc­ curred in November 1945. The various restraints on initiation were too great. In spite of jcs belief to the contrary, on July 6, the logistical problems of gas warfare were still far from solution. Air Force toxic agent requirements, based on jcs 825/4 expenditure rates, rose dramatically.30 By July 17, the error of the optimistic estimate of July 6 had been realized. Army Service Forces pointed out that at approved expenditure rates, the first thirty days of gas warfare would require 1,139,000 persistent and nonpersistent toxic agent bombs, yet only 248,000 were available in the Pacific area. Under existing policy this discrepancy was not being corrected. Army Service Forces commented: "At the present time, the available stocks are only a small part of the total levels authorized and negligible production is presently programmed because sufficient bomb cases are not being produced prior to gas warfare to fill both the HE and incendiary programs and the 2β The atom bomb (S-i device) was successfully tested on July 16. The test is described in Memo, CG Manhattan District Project for Sec War, 18 Jul 45, sub: The Test in U.S. Department of State, Potsdam Papers, 11, 1361-68. 30 The cws had not anticipated the effect on munitions requirements of the B-29 with a payload four to five times greater than previous bombers. The decreased readiness for air-delivered gas attack was rela­ tive to available delivery capability only (U.S. cwc Readiness Report as of 1 Jul 45, iv, EHO) .

2j6

The Crucial Test—Mid-ipjj

toxic bomb program. Further, no policy of contem­ plated diversion from HE and incendiary production to toxic bomb production has been established for use in planning production after gas warfare has been initiated." The failure to direct shipment of munitions was con­ sidered to place "effective retaliatory preparedness in considerable jeopardy."31 The discrepancy between re­ quested and available stocks had not been resolved at the end of the war. Toxic agent bombs competed di­ rectly with a highly successful incendiary bomb program.32 By early August 1945, planners' estimates were not in accord with logistic capability. The moment was rapidly approaching, if it had not already passed, when actual gas warfare readiness as of November 1 was no longer feasible, except at the cost of significant diver­ sion of resources from conventional force requirements for Olympic.33 SI Memo, Dir Requirements and Stock Control Div, ASF, to Dir Plan­ ning Div, ASF, 17 Jul 45, sub: Comments on jcs 825/6, 13 Jun 1945, EHO. A Chemical Warfare Committee meeting of the same date produced a draft memo to the jcs stating that even with a decision to ship gas munitions on August 1, the maximum amount available in the Pacific would total only 75 per cent of jcs 825/4 requirements by December 1. Current stocks and production rates would permit jcs 825/4 expendi­ ture rates for only one and a half months (Draft Memo, C of S for jcs, 17 Jul 45, sub: Availability and Production of Chemical Muni­ tions, EHO) . 32 Ltr, C cws to CG ASF, 28 Jul 45, sub: Readiness to Conduct Gas Warfare, EHO; Memo, Chief Log GP OPD for Chief, OPD, 9 Aug 45, sub: Availability and Production of Chemical Munitions, OPD 385 CWP, Sec 11, 1945, NAA. The Air Force launched the devastating low-level incendi­ ary attacks in March 1945. In the first raid on Tokyo on the night of March 9, 1,667 tons incendiaries destroyed 15 square miles of Tokyo, killing 72,000 and wounding 21,000 (USSBS Summary Report [Pacific War] No. 1, 1 Jul 46, pp. 15-17; USSBS 11, 231-33) . 33 Senior officers in the cws felt that supply deficiencies could have been made up at the last minute but they did not consider alternative costs to other Olympic programs (Interv, CMLHO with Maj Gen A. Waitt, 16-17) · As of July 1, authorized supply levels for the active

The Test of World War II

VULNERABILITY OF ALLIES / Exaggerated intelligence

estimates of Japanese gas capability would have been a further restraint on initiation. American chemical war­ fare planners did not realize the extremely low level of chemical warfare preparedness in Japan. The Japanese were considered "capable of initiating large scale gas warfare ..." and of "sustaining gas warfare but on a smaller scale than the Allies."34 Both offensive and defensive readiness were believed sufficient for the Jap­ anese to consider initiation in order to repel the inva­ sion force.35 In addition, the Japanese were estimated to have a limited capability to retaliate against the Philip­ pines, China, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa in the event that gas warfare began.38 Limitations in Japanese air power did not make the threat of gas attack against the totally unprotected Philippine population credible; but it could have been a far different situation in China. The theaters were short approximately 312,903 ship tons [48 ship loads] of chemical warfare offensive and defensive equipment. Total Army sup­ ply and equipment shipments to the Pacific-Asiatic Theaters during the last six months of 1945 were estimated to be 22 million ship tons (U.S. cwc Report, 18 Aug 45, sub: Periodic Report of Readiness For Chemical Warfare as of 1 July 1945, SPCWW, pp. ii, iii, EHO) . The effect of a sudden diversion of 1½ per cent is speculative. 34 U.S. cwc Readiness Report as of 1 Jul 45, 2. The cws, acting through U.S. Chemical Warfare Committee Readiness Reports, tended to magnify the threat of Japanese employment in order to stimulate American preparedness. In addition to the July 1945 Report, see U.S. cwc 91/3 Report on Readiness For Chemical Warfare as of 1 July 1944, 2 Sep 44; and U.S. cwc Readiness Report as of 1 Jan 45, EHO. 35 U.S. cwc Readiness Report as of 1 Jul 45, 2-4. There is no indica­ tion in available records that the U.S. expected the Japanese to initiate. Nevertheless, as an aspect of readiness for all contingencies, the Olympic Operation Plan called for maintenance of 23,500 tons of air toxicchemical munitions and a floating reserve of 8,500 tons of mortar and artillery munitions—to be used for retaliation only. These stocks were intended to suffice for sixty days, but constituted only 25 per cent of the Washington-estimated expenditure in the event of American initiation (Ltr, AG GHQ USAFPAC to TAG, 6 Jul 45, sub: Theater Plans for Chemical Warfare (SWPA) , AG 321 [3 Jul 45] GC, NAA) . MIbid.., 3.

27S

The Crucial Test—Mid-1945

Chemical Warfare Service considered the Japanese capa­ ble of conducting "large scale gas attacks against Chinese troops" that had little protection. Significant air-deliv­ ered gas attacks against civilians were also feasible, but only in areas already occupied by Japanese troops.87 In sum, Japanese chemical warfare capabilities were sufficient to hold China hostage against the possibility of unilateral American initiation.38 Relations with Allies also placed significant restraints on American initiation. The primary difficulty would have been Japanese retaliation against large Chinese population centers, a threat which had already forced a Sino-American agreement that any Allied retaliation for Japanese counter-city attacks in China could be on a tactical level only.39 It had been agreed that even after the Japanese initiated the use of gas, retaliation would not be undertaken except "upon a joint declara­ tion" by the United States and Chinese governments authorizing it.40 This restraint would certainly have ap­ plied before the United States could initiate. The British also had a string on American employ37 Memo, C cws for Brig Gen Peabody MIS, WDGS, 24 May 45, sub: Use of Gas Against the Japanese, SPCWO, EHO. The questions were raised in connection with a contingency study on the possible use of non toxic harassing agents. 38 General Marshall recognized the problem in a note to Admiral King: "the problem of Japanese [gas] retaliation against civilian popu­ lations, particularly in China, including Manchuria and Korea, . . . must be recognized" (Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm King, 14 Jun 45, no sub, opD 385 TS, Sec 1, 1945, EHO. 39 (Memo, No. 541, Lt Gen A. Wedemeyer for His Excellency, The Generalissimo, 28 Apr 45, no sub, OPD 385 TS, Sec 1, 1945, EHO) . Wedemeyer's Memoirs discuss problems of this period but do not refer to this policy or the danger that stimulated it (Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958], pp. 321-43). This Chiang-Wedemeyer agreement appears to have been made without the prior knowledge or consent of the War Department General Staff (Memo for Record, A.J.G. [Lt Col A. J. Goodpaster], 5 Jun 45, OPD 385 TS, Sec i, 1945, EHO) . 40 Ibid.

T h e T e s t of W o r l d W a r I I

ment. Although their role in decision-making had di­ minished greatly in the final phases of the Pacific War, the ccs agreement of 1942 was still in effect, by which it was implicitly agreed that the United States could re­ taliate unilaterally, but could not initiate without Brit­ ish consent.41 With British forces planning future cam­ paigns against Japan in the Southeast Asia Theater, uni­ lateral United States initiation in violation of a ccs pol­ icy was unthinkable. In both the China-Burma-India and Southeast Asia Theaters, logistic preparation for military employment of toxic agents as well as protec­ tion of the civilian population would have been an im­ mense if not insoluble problem. For the invasion of Japan, a third ally had to be con­ sidered, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would have entered the war before Operation Olympic began. The United States had little information as to the chem­ ical warfare preparedness of the Soviet Far Eastern Army. Any decision to initiate gas warfare would have had to be coordinated with the Soviet Union in suffi­ cient time for the Soviet troops to be fully readied for the employment of toxic agents.42 It is inconceivable that the United States could ini­ tiate the employment of toxic agents without the prior consent of these three Allies. Such unilateral action would not only mock Great Power unity but could place Allied forces at a serious military disadvantage. The locale for discussion of a question of such import was the Potsdam Conference, but jcs procrastination preilSupra,

pp. 205-06. 42 At no stage in the war were the Russians direct participants in Allied chemical warfare policy formulation. On inter-allied coordina­ tion late in the war, see H. Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1957), pp. 638-55. On jcs awareness of the necessity of coordination with the Soviet Union, see Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm King, 14 Jun 45, no sub, OPD 385 TS, Sec I, 1945, EHO. 2So

The Crucial Test—Mid-1945

eluded this discussion. Yet even if the Allies had agreed to initiate gas warfare, it is doubtful that the logistical preparations could have been completed by November 1, 1945.43 INSTITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL ATTITUDES / The atti­

tudes of elite decision-makers toward the use of toxic agents was a further restraint on American initiation. In the summer of 1945, the initiative of decision rested with the military establishment rather than with civil­ ian leadership. If the jes had unanimously recom­ mended initiation, President Truman would probably not have demurred.44 The rationale by which Truman justified employment of the atomic bomb could have applied with equal validity to the strategic use of toxic agents. His overriding objective was the employment of overwhelming force to shock the Japanese into sur­ render and thus terminate a long and costly war. jes portrayal of gas as an effective weapon to speed surren­ der would have ensured presidential consent.45 43 Supply to military forces in the Southeast Asia and CBI Theaters was a problem throughout the war. Civil protection against the proba­ bility of Japanese retaliation would have been particularly difficult. Gas masks could have been collected from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia; but collection, transportation, and distribution to allied Asian populations would have been difficult and time-consuming. Such actions would also have alerted the Japanese to Allied intentions. While they might act as additional inducement to Japanese surrender, they could also trigger Japanese initiation at a time favorable to Japan. « Due to a lack of source material, this analysis is highly specula­ tive. Available documents do not indicate that gas warfare was ever considered in sufficient depth to develop institutional and personal positions. It is my feeling that civilian thought processes revealed in the decision to employ the A-bomb are generally transferable to toxic agents. The best general treatment of this decision is in Feis, Japan Subdued, 28-47, and L. Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Foreign Affairs, xxxvn (January 1957), 334-53. Memoirs pro­ vide a wide range of primary source material. « Admiral Leahy stressed President Truman's attitude in a memo to the jes prior to the June 18 White House Conference on the con2Si

The Test of World War II

The probable response of President Truman and his civilian advisors is largely academic, however, for it is extremely doubtful that the jcs would have ever de­ cided to initiate. The combination of personal and in­ stitutional dislike of toxic agents and the estimated marginal overall effectiveness of gas as a weapons system were insurmountable restraints on employment.46 Al­ though jcs discussion of gas warfare prior to the end of the war was oriented toward preservation of a mili­ tary capability that would enable later decision, two schools of thought as to methods of employment had al­ ready taken embryonic form. If employed, was gas to be employed as a tactical or as a strategic weapon? To the Army, gas was a tactical weapon to be em­ ployed to facilitate the invasion of Kyushu. General Marshall had introduced the subject for jcs considera­ tion based upon this assumption. Preliminary studies within the Operations Division were oriented to battle­ field use. In a memorandum to Admiral King proposduct of the war against Japan. "It is his [Truman's] intention to make his decisions on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives" (Memo, Adm Leahy to jcs, 14 Jun 45, no sub, in "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan 1941-1945" [Washington: Department of Defense, 1955], Processed, NAA) . This is discussed by H. Truman, Memoirs, 1 (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955), 415-21. In Presi­ dent Truman's 1964-1965 television series on major decisions during his term of office, the transferability of the rationale is particularly evident (H. Truman, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, I and II," presented in the New York area, 5 and 11 Feb 1965). Stimson was as anxious as Truman to end the war: "the only road to early victory was to exert maximum force with maximum speed . . . the dominant fact of 1945 was war . . . the dominant objective was victory . . ." (H. Stimson and M. Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War [New York: Harper and Bros., 1948], p. 629 [quote from Bundy describing Stimson's postwar reaction to criticism]) . McCloy favored the study of initiation as a contingency option. The probable reaction of Forrestal and Grew is undetermined. 46 For discussion of the relationship between Marshall, King, Arnold, and Leahy, see Ehrmann, Grand Strategy, v, 342-44.

The Crucial Test—Mid-1945

ing discussion of initiation within the jcs, General Marshall referred to targets for gas as the mountain passes, island strongholds, and fortified strongpoints that would be defended fanatically and would result in slow, costly operations.47 Effectiveness of gas as a weapon in land warfare was the sole criterion influencing General Marshall's acceptance of the employment of toxic agents.48 From a purely tactical viewpoint, gas was of debatable value. If the United States could selectively employ it against cave defenses, it was a worthwhile weapon.49 On the other hand, initiation after November 1, 1945, would have subjected subsequent amphibious opera­ tions on Kyushu or during the invasion of the Kanto Plain to Japanese use of gas. During the critical initial stages of an amphibious landing, enemy use of gas would complicate command and control as well as in­ crease the logistic infrastructure. The alternative view of the use of gas concerned its employment as a strategic weapon against Japanese pop47 Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm King, 14 Jun 45, no sub, opd 385 Sec I, 1945, EHO. 48 General Marshall had been interested in gas warfare throughout the war. David Lilienthal describes Marshall's attitude in his memoirs: "He had definitely favored the use of gas . . . 'We were all ready to use it on some of the islands.'" Lilienthal also mentions that Marshall was prepared to use gas on Okinawa (D. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, 11 [New York: Harper and Row, 1964], pp. 198-99). Proposed use of gas prior to Olympic is not supported in available documents. Lovell asserts that a plan to use gas in the invasion of Iwo Jima was formulated, based upon a British study (the Lethbridge Report), and subsequently accepted by the jcs, but then vetoed by President Roosevelt (S. Lovell, Of Spies and Stratagems [Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963], pp. 70-75). While thorough contingency planning should have included an examination of all alternatives, it seems doubtful that the jcs would have concurred. The U.S. was not logistically prepared to initiate in early 1945. Lovell also asserts that the U.S. had nerve agents during the war and knew of German nerve agents. The inaccuracy of this assertion undermines the statement that the jcs approved the "Lethbridge Report." 4» Supra, p. 269η. ts,

28}

T h e T e s t of W o r l d W a r II

ulation centers. Although this use does not appear to have been explicitly discussed within the jcs, the pro­ duction program authorized in jcs 825/6 was designed to increase preparedness for strategic delivery by B-29. cws contingency planning was oriented to strategic use and predicted extremely high casualty rates.50 The basic assumption, however, was that all other air operations would cease in order to permit maximum use of gas. Both the highly successful incendiary bombing and coastal waterway mining would have had to be dis­ rupted in favor of a weapon that had not been em­ ployed in the war and for which there was no assured effect.51 The Navy was strongly opposed to the use of chem­ ical agents; until 1945 its position remained consistent with that taken by the Secretary of the Navy on the Geneva Protocol immediately after the start of the war.52 In March 1943, the Navy authorized procurement of chemical munitions to ensure readiness to retaliate, but with the firm restriction that "the Navy will not procure chemical munitions for use against civil popu­ lations."53 Gas was not to be employed against civilian targets and it was relatively ineffective against military objectives. ". . . hit for hit and pound for pound, no so C cws, g Jun 45, A Study of the Possible [Retaliatory] Use of Toxic Gas in Operation Olympic, CMLHO 415.01, EHO. It was estimated that extensive use of toxic agents could result in as many as 5 to 10 million Japanese casualties. 51 Increased use of incendiaries would also be eliminated as a future possibility due to diversion of bomb casings from incendiaries to toxic agents. The Air Force felt that current and projected HE and incendi­ ary air attacks against Japan would prove decisive (W. Craven and J. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, ν [Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1953], 645-76; Gen. H. Arnold, Global Mission [New York: Harper and Bros., 1949], pp. 567-70) . The Air Force considered dropping 80,000 tons of bombs on the first day of Olympic. 52 Supra, pp. 198-99. 53 Ltr, COMINCH for Vice CNO, 8 Mar 43, sub: Chemical Warfare Munitions Program, COMINCH FF1/S77/A16-3, Ser 00 403, NAW.

The Crucial Test—Mid-1945

service chemical is considered to offer as great effective­ ness as high explosive."54 There was no incentive for the Navy to recommend employment of a weapon not con­ sidered to be a "universally accepted method of warfare."55 Institutional unwillingness to employ toxic agents was matched by the firm personal opposition of Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, whose attitude was essentially that of Roosevelt. Leahy classed poison gas as a "barbarous weapon,"56 and felt that any consid­ eration of United States initiation was absolutely pre­ cluded by Roosevelt's 1943 statement.57 Admiral King's personal attitude toward the use of toxic agents is not known.58 These various currents and eddies of institutional and personal sentiment were awaiting any serious dis­ cussion to initiate the employment of gas. As of the end of the war they had not surfaced because the only con­ scious jcs action had been to preserve flexibility for a future decision. In actuality, a decision of considerable importance had been made. When the jcs agreed that the date of preparation for gas warfare would be No­ vember 1, the Air Force and Navy were tacitly commit­ ting themselves to abstain from the use of gas during the interim months before November, when they be54 Ibid. 65 Ltr, CINcpoA for COMINCH, 14 Aug 45, sub: Policy on the Use of Chemical Agents for the Destruction of Japanese Food Crops, COMINCH 77/8-904, Ser 0005106, NAW. 56 Leahy, I Was There, 440-41. 57 Memo, Adm Leahy for Gen Marshall, 20 Jun 45, no sub, OPD 385 TS, Sec I, 1945, EHO. Leahy was willing to have the question raised with the President "by anyone who believes in gas warfare. . . ." 58 King was a lukewarm supporter of land invasion, feeling that air power and sea power would prove sufficient. He saw the Marshall pro­ posal and apparently passed it to Leahy. This incident is not discussed in King's memoirs (Adm. E. King and W. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952], pp. 604-08, on Olympic).

The Test oj World War II

lieved that air and sea power would force Japan to ca­ pitulate.59 Like the jcs decision to move toxic agents forward in early July 1945, the absence of a decision to initiate in September or October 1945 was in effect a decision not to employ toxic agents against Japanese population centers. D. INEFFECTIVE RESTRAINTS Thus far, evaluation of the factors that inhibited American initiation in the last days of the war has con­ centrated upon effective restraints. In addition, there were two ineffective restraints: the legal restraint and adverse public opinion, both of which had been so heavily relied upon during the interwar period. LEGAL / In mid-1945, no conventional legal restraints

existed to prevent American employment of gas. Neither the United States nor Japan were bound by the Geneva Protocol. And before the war the United States had quite openly denied the existence of any binding obligation derived from the Hague Conventions. Presi­ dent Roosevelt had made it clear that he, as Head of State, recognized an obligation not to initiate; however, he at no time denied the right of the United States to retaliate in massive degree if the Japanese used chem­ ical agents. The United States possessed conclusive proof that the Japanese had employed toxic agents. The criterion for the employment of force in 1945 was ne­ cessity—the necessity to end the war in the most expedi­ te There is no indication that the jcs attitude toward gas warfare was stimulated by expected success of the A-bomb. Until its effect in war was realized in August 1945, the jcs treated it as another weapon. Leahy was skeptical of its effectiveness and Marshall saw it as a tactical weapon to assist in establishing a beachhead in Japan (Leahy, I Was There, 440; Lilienthal, Journals, 11, 198-99). As far as I know, no at­ tempt was made to weigh the use of the A-bomb as an alternative to strategic employment of gas.

The Crucial Test—Mid-1945

tious manner with a minimum additional loss of Ameri­ can lives.

PUBLIC OPINION / Nor was public opinion a significant restraint on initiation. By 1945, the American public was becoming increasingly anxious to end the war. The record of Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa had stimu­ lated press comment that the United States should em­ ploy toxic agents.®0 American public opinion polls indi­ cated rising acceptance of the use of gas. A September 1944 poll revealed that 23 per cent of respondents sup­ ported the use of gas against Japanese cities. By June :1945, opinion had shifted perceptibly. The poll asked: "Would you favor or oppose using poison gas against the Japanese if doing so would reduce the number of American

soldiers

who

are

killed

and

wounded?

(AIPO) ."Β1 Favor 40%

Oppose 49%

No opinion

11%

This poll was a significant indicator of public interest since the government had exerted no effort whatsoever to encourage public support of initiation.62 A deliberate 60 "We Should Have Used Gas at Tarawa," Washington Times Her­ ald, 20 Dec 43; "We Should Gas Japan," New York Daily News, 20 Nov 43 [advocating HE and incendiaries followed by gas against major Japanese cities]; E. Lindley, "Thoughts on the Use of Gas in Warfare," Newsweek, 20 Nov 43; "You Can Cook 'Em Better With Gas," Wash­ ington Times Herald, 1 Feb 44; Maj. G. F. Eliot, "Should We Gas the Japs," Popular Science Monthly (August 1945). All in cws Gas War­ fare File, EH0. For Hanson Baldwin and the Japanese response, see Supra, p. 301. 61H. Cantril, ed., Public Opinion 1935-1946 (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1951), p. 249. Size of sample unknown. It was asserted that a classified Gallup poll made sometime before May 1945 indicated that over 70 per cent of those questioned favored the use of gas. No evi­ dence has been found to support this claim (Ltr, A. J. Higgins for Col Harry Vaughn [White House Aide], 8 May 45, no sub, EHO) . β2 The cws was distinctly unhappy during the war because it was seldom given the opportunity to sell itself or the humanity of toxic agents. The limited cws propaganda that was permitted dealt with 28η

The Test of World War II

propaganda campaign could have increased popular support to well over 50 per cent. At least one senior official believed that even without stimulation by the administration, American public opinion would de­ mand the use of toxic agents. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy suggested that the administration recon­ sider toxic agent policy "in the face of the public pres­ sure for the use of gas, which may develop as our casual­ ties rise due to the Okinawa cave type of Japanese de­ fense."63 Four years of war had transformed prior public abhorrence of the horror and inhumanity of toxic agents from a restraint into a potential stimulant to employment. Contrary to expectations of the interwar period, World War II ended without the employment of poison gas. Deterrence of American initiation had been effec­ tive but the restraints were far different from those pos­ tulated before the war. Neither a legal prohibition, nor the sanction of public opinion, nor the threat of retali­ atory attack on the United States had proven effective. The sources of restraint rested in a lack of assimila­ tion of toxic agents within the military profession and in an erroneous conception of Japanese policy based upon an assumed parallel between Japanese and Amer­ ican value systems. The military services never accepted the use of toxic agents. The image of gas as an insidious, dishonorable weapon had been formed during the First World War and this image remained throughout the Second. Gas was not given an opportunity early in the war to demonstrate its efficiency as a weapon and employment of the chemical mortar, smokes, and incendiaries (Interv,

CMLHO with G. O. Gillingham, 12 Jun 50, EHO; Memo, G.O.G. [Gillinghaml for Deputy Chief TInfo Branch O C cwsl, 1¾ Nov 44, sub: The Gallup Poll, EHO) . β3 Memo, Asst Sec War for C of S, 15 Jun 45, sub: jcs 825/6 and 825/7 Abc 475-92 (25 Feb 44), EHO. 288

The Crucial Test—Mid-1945

there was little incentive to emphasize gas warfare preparations at the expense of other combat-proven weapons. Thus, when the critical time arrived for possi­ ble employment of toxic agents, there was not sufficient logistic readiness to stimulate serious consideration. The effect of nonassimilation was reinforced by the American conception of Japanese capabilities and in­ tentions. Decision-makers assumed that the Japanese would act as the United States acted when faced with a threat of gas warfare. Intelligence estimates agreed that the Japanese had a chemical warfare retaliatory capability. The postulated but minimal capability to retaliate against America's Asian allies was sufficient to make the marginal cost of initiation greater than the marginal benefit to be gained. Minds predisposed to a negative view of gas warfare had imagined objective conditions that confirmed sub­ jective impressions.

2 8p

CHAPTER

7 ·

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

To advocates of chemical warfare, World War II re­ peated the pattern of World War I. Toxic agents had been on the verge of acceptance as a major strategic weapons system but then were not employed. In both cases, the war ended before chemical warfare had the opportunity to display its potential. In the former case, realization of the potential effectiveness of gas was im­ peded due to the unavailability of a delivery system (the long-range bomber) commensurate with the capabilities of the weapon. The situation was totally different in World War II. The supporting infrastructure required for effective employment had been developed. Non-use resulted from the interaction of a variety of objective and subjec­ tive restraints. For the first time since the advent of the nation at arms a major weapon employed in one con­ flict was not carried forward to be used in a subsequent conflict. Can this be considered a favorable indicator of inhibitions on the employment of nuclear weapons in general war, or is it an accident unlikely to recur? It is extremely difficult to predict the future employ­ ment of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, I believe that a study of American chemical warfare policy can pro­ vide an understanding of the nature of restraints which should prove as valid in the present and future as it has in the past. In conclusion, I shall attempt to project an appreciation of restraints derived from the study of chemical warfare forward to the contemporary problem of deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons. To do this, I shall summarize the major restraints on the use of gas, then apply these restraints to the present. 29Ο

Summary and Conclusions

Three general areas of restraint have emerged in this study. First, there are those forces which were expected to restrain but which were proven generally ineffective in the heat of war. Second, there is the problem of nonassimilation by the professional military—a significant but little-appreciated subjective inhibition on employ­ ment. Last are the agreed components of deterrence —cost, capability, and credibility; this study evaluates their effectiveness as an element of restraint and em­ phasizes several critical aspects of deterrence developed from the study of chemical warfare. Overestimation of the influence of public opinion was a serious fallacy of interwar prognostication. In the belief that adverse public sentiment was a major hope of preventing war, the United States actively encouraged anti-gas propaganda in the immediate post-World War I period. During World War II, however, this restraint was ineffective. Without government encouragement, American public attitudes toward the employment of gas shifted from opposition to passive acceptance if not support of initiation. The combination of bitter, costly island invasions in the Pacific Theater, and the identi­ fication of the entire enemy population as evil created an environment wherein the primary criterion for weapon use was rapid termination of the conflict rather than the "humanity" of a particular weapon. Although public opinion per se was not a direct re­ straint on the use of gas, indirect effects of public atti­ tudes in the interwar period were operative throughout the war. Due in significant measure to its awareness of the abhorrence with which the public viewed gas dur­ ing the twenties and thirties, the Army never seriously pressed for gas warfare readiness; an Army desiring in­ tegration into the mainstream of American life would not burnish its image by meaningful support of a weap-

Summary and Conclusions

on so distasteful to the public. Public opinion, there­ fore, contributed to the nation's low state of readiness for chemical warfare at the outbreak of war. Public opinion also had an impact on the decision­ making elite of World War II. Profoundly influenced by the anti-gas propaganda, President Roosevelt would not even consider the possibilities of American initia­ tion or preparation beyond the minimum amount re­ quired for retaliation. Anti-gas propaganda conditioned the attitudes of other leaders, both military and civilian, as well. Chemical warfare was consistently associated with a normative qualifying expression. State Depart­ ment as well as jcs papers on chemical warfare referred to "this inhuman method of warfare" or "this particu­ larly inhuman form of warfare."1 The other great hope of opponents of gas warfare lay in the creation of legal restraints, which turned out to have no greater direct effect than had public opinion. No power considered any treaty restriction or limiting declaration of a belligerent to be more than a statement of intent, which could be violated if the exigencies of unlimited war required. The legal restraint was moderately effective; but in an unanticipated sense. The numerous interwar at­ tempts to codify prohibition served to focus public and elite group attention on the problems and prospects of chemical warfare. Due to extensive conferences, specific national decisions had to be made on chemical warfare policy at times when national capability and popular sentiment created environments of unreality. Particu­ larly in the United States, ratification of the chemical warfare prohibition of the Washington Conference es­ tablished a questionable precedent for future negotiai Cable 925, Am Emb Bucharest for Sec State, 30 Oct 41, no sub, 740.00196 EUROPEAN WAR 1939/455, BF,' jcs 176 Series, EHO.

Summary and Conclusions

tion and made it exceedingly difficult to promote actual chemical warfare readiness. A comparable effect developed in Germany. Readi­ ness was impeded by the legal prohibition of Versailles and the Geneva Protocol; in addition, there were the specific arms control measures of the Peace Treaty. The Germans lost ten years in the international race to de­ velop more effective chemical warfare weapons, and this hiatus provoked a serious "crisis of confidence." Ironically, the Germans made the major offensive chem­ ical warfare breakthrough of the interwar period— nerve agents—yet forfeited the advantage by presum­ ing that the Allies had made a similar advance. Thus, a former legal restraint helped indirectly to negate a major technological breakthrough. Similar to the case with public attitudes, the legal restraint gained its limited effectiveness in an indirect and unanticipated manner. Based upon this experience, it would appear that the primary value of the legal re­ straint rests in its tendency to reinforce other existing restraints. Treaty prohibition, though imperfect, rein­ forced both public and military dislike and fear of chemical warfare and provided a ready excuse for lack of substantive preparation. Any legal restraint derived from custom or a general principle of law prohibiting weapons causing unnecessary suffering—if such exists and can be applied—should be even more effective, in that each would represent a more universal consensus of expert and lay attitudes. Acceptance of a weapon within the military estab­ lishment is a prerequisite to employment. Influenced by the counter-propaganda writings of articulate military proponents of chemical warfare, most civilians assumed that the military accepted and was eager to employ chemical weapons. This assumption was false. Aside

Summary and Conclusions

from those military leaders institutionally committed to toxic agents, the military establishment as a whole was opposed to their use. As an area weapon developed by scientists to strike insidiously and from afar, gas did not accord with the honor of the profession. In addition, the immense logistical and training burden unique to gas warfare required greater battlefield effect than could be attained with other weapons in order to justify resort to such a high-cost weapon. It could not be proven that the use of gas would provide any quantum jump in probability of battlefield success, particularly when the enemy could be expected to retaliate in kind. With major financial restraints imposed throughout the De­ pression, no national military establishment was in­ clined to emphasize weapons of doubtful effectiveness when Artillery, Infantry, and the Air Force were faced with acute shortages in conventional weapons. Since gas warfare was not assimilated into the mili­ tary establishment of any major power, its use was pre­ cluded in World War II. Without professional support for meaningful gas warfare readiness, no nation was pre­ pared to employ toxic agents when it entered the war. For the Axis Powers, during the successful first half of the war, there was no incentive to commit the resources required for increased chemical warfare preparedness when other weapons of proven utility were in constant demand. The same logic, albeit reversed in its time se­ quence, applied to the Allied Powers. This lack of assimilation was particularly evident in the United States response to the extreme asymmetry of readiness existing between the United States and Japan toward the end of World War II. Despite its awareness that the Japanese could not retaliate, the United States did not employ toxic agents. The central reason for this lay in the general military disinterest in gas which had

Summary and Conclusions

retarded readiness sufficiently to preclude timely, seri­ ous consideration of initiation. Decades of conditioning to a second-strike philosophy prevented such logistic preparedness in the forward areas which could have pro­ vided an incentive to striking the first blow. The implication here is that lack of assimilation is a more fundamental inhibition to initiation than fear of retaliation. No major belligerent in World War II ac­ cepted gas warfare. As a result, a defensive aura sur­ rounded the entire area of toxic chemical warfare. Aside from Japan, each nation maintained a credible retalia­ tory capability, yet the capability was in each case more potential than real. There was never sufficient readiness to provide the incentive for immediate initiation. Even if any nation had developed a material capabil­ ity adequate to make initiation feasible, fear of the costs of enemy retaliation would have remained as a restraint sufficient to deter it. Whether the prospective victim actually possessed sufficient retaliatory capability to inflict intolerable levels of punishment is essentially irrelevant. Partially due to poor chemical warfare intel­ ligence on the part of all belligerents, which credited the enemy with a capability commensurate with the assumed diabolical nature of his intentions, each nation saw asymmetrical chemical warfare capabilities as favor­ ing the enemy. When the potential initiator realized his superiority and his invulnerability to direct enemy retaliation, as was the case of the United States, in the last stages of the Pacific War, initiation was deterred by threat of retaliation against an ally, China. In World War II, the restraint of enemy retaliation was magnified in effect by the demands of coalition warfare. The pres­ ence of allies that were hostages for the good conduct of the coalition leader increased the stability of mutual deterrence.

Summary and Conclusions

These restraints, proven in war, varied considerably from interwar predictions. Neither public opinion nor legal restriction were directly effective; but, on the other hand, lack of assimilation and fear of retalia­ tion proved to be significant restraints. In World War II, the lesson was clear; the loci of decision-making with respect to gas warfare lay within the professional military establishments themselves. Military lack of in­ terest kept the issue of initiation from reaching civilian elite groups. American experience with toxic agents during World War II revealed several general characteristics of suc­ cessful deterrence. Readiness to retaliate was communi­ cated through statements of heads of government backed up with overt chemical warfare preparations. The unrestricted nature of war, exemplified by the un­ limited bombing policy, gave credibility to the threat to employ toxic agents in response to enemy initiation. No nation doubted that the potential target nation pos­ sessed a retaliatory capability sufficient to punish the initiator, directly, or indirectly, through a coalition partner, and general military dislike of toxic agents was sufficient to restrain any inclination to develop a possible disarming first-strike capability. Each belligerent saw escalation of toxic agent em­ ployment as an inevitable effect of initiation. Once World War II began, there does not appear to have been any serious consideration of initiation solely for tactical success. It was tacitly assumed that any use of gas would immediately escalate to the strategic level and, therefore, that any initiation should itself be at the strategic level. Essentially the same logic applied to the choice of chemical agents. It was assumed that there was no effective limiting point between the employment of nonlethal and lethal agents. For this reason, nontoxic

Summary and Conclusions

chemical agents were not employed in a combat environment. Based upon Japanese actions, however, the validity of both assumptions is questionable. The Japanese em­ ployed nontoxic and toxic agents against the Chinese both before and after United States entry in the war, yet the United States ignored the situation. Due to lack of readiness and unwillingness to employ, the United States preferred to overlook a situation that, in terms of declaratory policy, would have required retaliation. As long as Japanese violation of tacitly agreed limits did not affect a core interest of the United States as defined by decision-makers or by reaction of the general pub­ lic, there was no automaticity of escalation. The effect of this American response was to diminish the credi­ bility of the American policy which enabled the Japa­ nese to reallocate their chemical warfare readiness resources.2 World War II also saw in the United Kingdom and Germany the establishment of the most extensive and costly passive defense systems yet developed. In neither case did civil defense measures act as a destabilizing ele­ ment in the maintenance of mutual deterrence. Each accepted civil protection as a necessary component of readiness for a nation continuously under the threat of surprise strategic attack. If it had any specific effect, the existence of effective civil defense acted as a stabilizing element by reducing the expected reward, and thus in­ centive, for a surprise first strike. A further element of restraint demonstrated in the Second World War was the impact on decision-making 2 There is no indication that, despite attendance at interwar inter­ national conferences, the Japanese thought that in initiating they were doing anything other than field testing a new weapon. One can only speculate that it was their inexperience with chemical warfare which prevented them from realizing the implications of initiating em­ ployment. 2 97

Summary and Conclusions

of an irrational leader. Hitler was accepted by the Al­ lied Powers as a national leader likely to make irrational decisions. This image was in itself a stimulant to British preparations for gas warfare and thus indirectly con­ tributed to deterrence. With his back to the wall, Hitler apparently decided to initiate gas warfare, but the in­ evitability of defeat was so obvious by early 1945 that he had lost authority over his key military subordinates. The result was failure to implement his decision. This development would suggest that the critical time for one belligerent's initiation of a mass-casualty weap­ on is during that period when it is becoming obvious that eventual victory is improbable unless a new ele­ ment is introduced into the war to restore the momen­ tum of the offensive, but before it is obvious to the mili­ tary establishment that the initiative has passed to the enemy and that eventual defeat is certain. In short, the decision would have to be made before the national leader has, by failure, undermined his power to have such a momentous decision implemented. It remains one of the ironies of the Second World War that toxic agents, considered sufficiently humane to be used for the execution of convicted prisoners, were not employed in a war which saw the extensive use of another weapon with enormous destructive pow­ ers—the atomic bomb. The heritage of World War I was responsible—poison gas was a weapon too techno­ logically demanding and psychologically disquieting to be assimilated by the military profession. It was an un­ acceptable anachronism, born too early out of a unique marriage of science and war. Added to this primary and most effective restraint of nonassimilation was mutual possession of a credible deterrent force. In retrospect, the reasons for the rejection of chemical warfare in World War II appear to have been clearly

Summary and Conclusions

evident well before the war. How could the prophets of world annihilation by gas war during the interwar and prewar periods have been so wrong? Obviously, the an­ swer is that truths so evident in retrospect are seldom perceived as they evolve. They are masked by mutual suspicion and distrust, deliberate propaganda and genuine misunderstanding. The same conditions pre­ vail today, yet the indicators of the future are most cer­ tainly present. The task is to discover them and to relate them to present actions and future policy. The utility of this study rests in applying the understanding of past restraints to the problems of today and tomorrow. The basic assumption is that nuclear weapons have not caused a discontinuity in history—that, properly qualified and modified to the contemporary world, char­ acteristics of restraint on chemical warfare present dur­ ing World War II are equally valid on nuclear warfare today. Critical areas of restraint selected for analysis in relation to nuclear weapons are public opinion and legal restraints; assimilation within the military and civilian leadership; and several specific problems of de­ terrence—escalation, proliferation and irrational de­ cision-making. Public attitudes with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons appear similar on the surface to atti­ tudes about gas warfare. Propaganda has been directed at portraying the indiscriminate destructive power of nuclear weapons in order to excite popular opposition to their use as well as to discourage the use of force in resolving future conflicts between nations. The propa­ ganda has been, in large measure, successful, particu­ larly when it has presented virtual annihilation by un­ limited strategic exchange between superpowers as the inevitable result of any employment of nuclear weap­ ons. In other words, much of its effectiveness is based

Summary and Conclusions

upon popular acceptance of the theme that any use of nuclear weapons presupposes unlimited use through automatic escalation.3 This was precisely the situation with anti-gas propaganda, for the success of propaganda directed against gas was based upon general acceptance of the inevitability of escalation and the destructiveness of chemical weapons. However, apparent parallels between anti-nuclear and anti-gas public attitudes conceal a fundamental difference in assumptions. During the interwar period, there were no mitigating circumstances which could justify resort to chemical warfare. Despite the efforts of chemical warfare supporters to demonstrate the bene­ fits of controlled employment of selected weapons, pub­ lic and elite attitudes denied the possibility of any jus­ tifiable recourse to gas.4 Public attitudes with respect to nuclear weapons have never been as dogmatic. The ideological nature of the confrontation between West and East has created an environment of acceptance of the employment of nu­ clear weapons—reluctant acceptance as a measure of last resort, to be sure, but acceptance nevertheless. The origins of this attitude lie in the immediate postwar period from 1947 until 1952. The rapid demobilization of American military forces after World War II left the West without conventional military capability to op­ pose Soviet expansion. During the Truman and Eisen­ hower administrations, the threat of nuclear war was considered to be the force that prevented Soviet expan­ sion. Revulsion at the horror of Hiroshima was muted by belief in the totality of destruction of basic values if the ideological struggle with Communism were lost. In 3 Much of the contemporary debate on escalation has resulted from this relationship to anti-nuclear propaganda and public attitudes. 4 This uncompromising opposition was particularly evident at the World Disarmament Conference in 1932 and 1933 (Supra, pp. 110-21). JOO

Summary and Conclusions

a sense, the totality of the end—certain destruction of the political values in the event of defeat—justified total means of defense—thermonuclear weapons. Acceptance of the possible employment of nuclear weapons has not been limited to the superpowers. Western European acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was based upon tacit acceptance, in fact expectation that the United States would employ nuclear weapons to preserve the independence of West­ ern Europe. National nuclear capabilities have since been developed just to ensure that nuclear weapons would be used in case of extremity. Public abhorrence of nuclear weapons within the democracies should pre­ vent precipitous use or use in other than the gravest national emergency; but it would not impede the em­ ployment of nuclear weapons in general war. Public attitudes would act as even less of a restraint in authori­ tarian or totalitarian regimes, where public opinion plays a tenuous and indirect role in decision-making. It is doubtful that the general public acceptance of nuclear weapons will change in the future. An impor­ tant deterrent to the employment of nuclear weapons is communication of willingness to employ in response to certain acts, and no government would deliberately undermine the credibility of its deterrent. Also, the emotional popular image of defense and the expecta­ tions that the state will defend its citizens, both of which are integral to nationalism in the Western de­ mocracies and national communist states alike, prevent implementation of a virulent anti-nuclear propaganda campaign similar to the effective anti-gas propaganda of the 1920's. In short, it seems highly unlikely that pub­ lic attitudes will present a significant restraint to initia­ tion in the face of frustration over a definitive solution to extended low-level conflict.

Summary and Conclusions

The legal restraint appears equally unpromising. There is no direct conventional law restraint. There may be a customary law restraint insofar as states be­ lieve themselves obligated not to initiate nuclear weap­ ons, but the effectiveness of such a restraint is ephem­ eral as it is based upon a highly subjective sense of obli­ gation. No nuclear nation has disavowed the use of nu­ clear weapons to ensure national survival. The ineffec­ tiveness of the customary law restraint against the use of gas in World War II caused by changed attitudes dur­ ing the heat of world conflict does not augur well for similar restrictions against the use of nuclear weapons. Similar to the case with chemical warfare, the most effective legal restraint could be the indirect effect of a treaty dealing with a peripheral problem of nuclear war. One example is the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. If implementation of the Test Ban Treaty has increased uncertainty as to the reliability and performance of new, increasingly complex weapons systems, there could be decreased willingness to employ the untested weap­ ons. Lack of intelligence on weapons effects can have a double result: uncertainty as to operational character­ istics of one's own weapons, and uncertainty as to a po­ tential enemy's capabilities. What is unknown must be assumed to present advantages to the enemy. Germany's "crisis of confidence" with respect to chemical weapons in World War II indicates an extreme example of this. While the test ban has not prevented continued atmos­ pheric testing by nations presently acquiring a nuclear capability—France and the Chinese People's Republic —it does serve as a restraint to additional proliferation.5 Examination of the two traditional restraints, public 5 In a similar sense, a nonproliferation treaty or the creation of nuclear free zones by convention could be violated, but not with impunity, for the presence of the legal restraint, albeit without treaty sanctions, invites retorsion.

Summary and Conclusions

opinion and the legal restraint, presents a pessimistic view. A third restraint is assimilation of nuclear weap­ ons within the military establishment and by the hier­ archy of civilian control. Before this can be evaluated, it is essential to appreciate the military estimate of nu­ clear weapons.6 Nuclear weapons provide contemporary military establishments with a far more potent weapon than was ever the case with chemical weapons. By varying the yield, height of burst, and composition of the weapon, a nuclear weapon can be tailored for specific missions with variations in effects very similar to the persistency / lethality variations in chemical weapons. However, at the extreme of very great destructive power, there is a significant difference. Chemical warfare in World War II could not ensure massive destruction such as is fore­ seen today from strategic employment of megaton ther­ monuclear weapons. The most optimistic cws projec­ tions of strategic use of toxic agents against Japanese population centers required the concentrated use of most of the United States strategic air forces against single targets, and the expected destruction did not approach the devastation which can be inflicted by several hydro­ gen weapons.7 Employed strategically, chemical weap­ ons are less efficient than nuclear weapons, as they re­ quire many more resources to achieve a desired level of casualties, and less reliable, as they depend heavily on specific conditions of climate and weather.8 The relative β This analysis will be limited to the United States, whose attitudes, in the context of discussion, were representative of military attitudes among other Western nuclear powers. The Soviet Union is not dis­ cussed, but available information does not indicate any significant differences of view. 7 For cws contingency planning on strategic employment of gas against Japan, see Supra, p. 284η. 8 The difference is even greater when one considers the combined blast, heat and radiation destruction of nuclear weapons.

3°3

Summary and Conclusions

efficiency of nuclear weapons may diminish consider­ ably if the enemy counters in kind, but this is not con­ sidered a significant factor in assimilation within the military, for civil defense and post-attack recovery are not, strictly speaking, military problems—they are na­ tional political problems.9 Viewed from the perspective of tactical employment, it is doubtful that nuclear weapons are more efficient than chemical weapons. The nuclear weapon permits an unprecedented massing of firepower in time and space to ensure overwhelming local tactical superiority —an extreme magnification of the advantages offered by the use of gas. However, when the enemy responds in kind, there are unprecedented problems of training, individual and unit protection, and logistics—an ex­ treme magnification of the disadvantages of using gas.10 The military officer who considers recommending the use of tactical nuclear weapons must evaluate the im­ mediate impact of enemy retaliation on the local battle­ field. Realization that it will instantly and irrevocably change the environment of his battlefield is certain to influence his recommendation.11 Acceptance of nuclear weapons within the ethos of the profession does not present the same inhibition to assimilation that was the case with chemical weapons. This is undoubtedly the result of several factors: the indiscriminate bombing precedent of World War II; 9 This does not infer that effects of retaliation are ignored by the military, but rather that their attention focuses on the military prob­ lems of offense and defense while the destruction is born by the civilian community. 10 See experiences in World War I, Supra, pp. 33-37. This point is crucial but self-evident when one considers survival in an alien radio­ active environment, dispersion of logistical facilities, etc. 11 Note the difference in perspective between the commander who recommends tactical use and the one who recommends strategic use. The tactical advocate bears the consequences directly, the strategic advocate, indirectly.

Summary and Conclusions

the continuing portrayal of the diabolical enemy nation characteristic of an ideological conflict; and the lack of sufficient experience in the employment of nuclear weapons to evoke professional revulsion or indignation. Unlike gas, nuclear weapons seem to have been received within the military as an honorable way to defeat an enemy. The extent of military assimilation is indicated in current readiness to employ. Again, the distinction must be made between strategic and tactical. There can be no doubt that the United States as well as all other nu­ clear nations maintains instant readiness to employ strategic weapons. The infrastructure of employment of both offensive and defensive weapons systems is devel­ oped and maintained. In the United States, the basic rationale of one military service, the Air Force, is tied closely to the employment of nuclear weapons. Delivery vehicle procurement had been so oriented to delivery of nuclear weapons that the Air Force has been criticized for insufficient capability to deliver conventional weap­ ons.12 The nuclear powers are ready to employ strategic nuclear weapons. The status of readiness to employ tactical nuclear weapons is not so clear-cut. The United States main­ tains offensive capability in each of the military serv­ ices as an accepted component of nuclear deterrence. It is questionable, however, whether defensive prepara­ tions are much more comprehensive than they had been for chemical weapons. Within the Army, individual and collective protection or decontamination of the soldier for more than a brief period and realistic service school instruction on problems of the nuclear battlefield are two areas of dubious readiness. Unlike the situation for strategic nuclear employment, there is no military serv12 A deficiency that has since been corrected for the Vietnam conflict.

Summary and Conclusions

ice institutionally committed to the use of tactical nu­ clear weapons. As an additional readiness requirement imposed upon the military services, it would not be sur­ prising if tactical nuclear readiness were somewhat slighted, as services have concentrated on preparation for fighting another war similar to the one most recently fought. For the United States Army, World War II, Korea, and now the Vietnam conflict. Assimilation of the employment of nuclear weapons within the United States military is mixed. Strategic use has been accepted by the United States Air Force. The demonstrated effectiveness of the weapon provides the Air Force with a capability to influence war com­ mensurate with the most grandiose dreams of air power enthusiasts. It is prepared and willing to employ these weapons as directed by the civilian leadership. Tactical nuclear weapons present another story. The readiness is present. However, maintenance of tactical nuclear capability as directed by political authority in order to provide a deterrent to enemy employment or to reinforce conventional defensive capability if deter­ rence fails, is one matter; eagerness to open up Pan­ dora's box on the battlefield is quite another. Question­ ing the overall effectiveness of nuclear weapons and facing continual strife at the limited conventional and revolutionary warfare levels, the Army has assimilated the employment of tactical nuclear weapons only as a necessary reinforcement to conventional arms in certain general war situations, e.g., forward defense in NATO. Assimilation is not unqualified; it is restricted to a spe­ cial and increasingly unlikely situation. The distinction between the perspectives of the Army and the Air Force should be reflected in the military input to national security policy formulation. While the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a presiden-

Summary and Conclusions

tial decision, the impact of assimilation within the mili­ tary upon decision-making should be a subtle pressure toward the employment of strategic nuclear weapons by the Air Force and a definite reluctance to use tactical nuclear weapons by the Army.13 The effect of these military service attitudes toward nuclear weapons would vary depending upon national leaders and the world environment. Due to the destruc­ tive capability and resource costs of these and allied weapons systems, civilian leadership has assumed a role in the direction of national military strategy totally dif­ ferent from that evidenced with respect to chemical weapons. Facilitated by the technological revolution in command communications capability, military decision­ making has been centralized at the highest levels of gov­ ernment. Military assimilation remains important as a determinant of actual readiness at the unit level and as a source of recommendations, but the crucial deci­ sions are made at Department of Defense if not presi­ dential level. Frequent crises since World War II have established and confirmed a national and elite convic­ tion that true national security depends on maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent force. Driven by the re­ sponsibilities of defense in the nuclear age, civilian de­ cision-makers have assimilated nuclear weapons to an extent unequalled by chemical weapons. Elite assimilation does not materially increase the probability of employment as long as there is stable de13 This is an interesting extension of the paradox of chemical war­ fare thinking during the interwar period. The Army continually saw gas as a tactical weapon and, disliking its effects on the battlefield, opposed its use. When the Army pushed for gas warfare readiness, it meant readiness for tactical employment. The civilian leadership and general public on the other hand considered and opposed strategic employment, since that was what most affected their personal and institutional interests. Neither group ever really addressed the problem that most concerned the other. 3°7

Summary and Conclusions

terrence. It seems certain that no rational Head of State would ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the face of certain retaliation—retaliation of such magni­ tude as to ensure equal or greater punishment than the foreseeable reward of initiation. This, after all, is the heart of deterrence. It has been successful in the past and appears promising of success in the future, particu­ larly as long as there is the stability of mutual vulner­ ability between the two superpowers. As long as both the United States and the Soviet Union possess an in­ vulnerable second-strike capability, a vulnerable civil­ ian population, and an advanced and prosperous social and economic structure, there is no incentive for either to initiate nuclear war. But there is nevertheless a continuing if not increas­ ing danger of nuclear war. The danger lies in three areas: escalation of some lower-order conflict to strategic nuclear exchange; proliferation of nuclear weapons from status quo to revolutionary nations; and the un­ expected decision of an irrational leader. The record of restraints to the employment of chemical warfare pro­ vides an insight into the nature and possible evolution of these problems. The fear of escalation of conflict to unlimited nuclear exchange has been the single greatest force influencing policies and programs of the United States and the So­ viet Union for the past fifteen years. The possibility of deliberate or unintentional escalation provides the fear that gives substance to strategies of deterrence and compellence.14 In no area has escalation had greater impact than that of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The fear that any employment of nuclear weapons, however Μ CompelIence is the term employed by Thomas ScheIling to describe strategies designed to make the opponent act, as opposed to deterrence which, if successful, prevents action (Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence [New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1966], pp. 69-91).

Summary and Conclusions

limited the yield, would escalate to use of megaton hydrogen weapons has prevented the employment of small-yield tactical weapons despite situations where their employment would have been militarily advantageous.15 The rationale is that only clearly defined and immedi­ ately understood limits will endure in the heat and haste of conflict. The only obvious limit between conven­ tional weapons and strategic thermonuclear weapons is the distinction between conventional and nuclear. The irreversible threshold to annihilation has been passed once the first nuclear weapon is employed. The record of the use of chemical weapons in World War II does not support any inevitability of escalation. Although none-versus-some is admittedly the most dis­ tinguishable boundary, there are no indications that discrete boundaries to the use of a feared mass-casualty weapon cannot be established and maintained during actual conflict. Japan engaged in the tactical employ­ ment of a lethal persistent chemical agent both before and after American entry into the war. This use was publicized and was in direct defiance of the American policy of retaliation.16 An additional example exists in the current Vietnam conflict. Both Free World Mili­ tary Assistance Forces and Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces have employed nonlethal, nonpersistent agents, yet there has been no escalation to lethal or per­ sistent agents.17 is Interdiction of a solely military sanctuary such as War Zone D in the Republic of Vietnam. This analysis concentrates on yield as the criterion of distinction. !β Supra, pp. 250-51. w It is relevant to note the extension of most World War II restraints to the current situation in Vietnam. Tactical employment of nontoxic agents produced strong public protest, focused on apparent injury to noncombatants and the danger of further escalation. The old paradox is still present: riot-control agents used in Vietnam typify the horrors of unlimited war, yet similar agents used to quell civil disturbances

Summary and Conclusions

Examples of employment of a publicly condemned mass-casualty weapon are not limited to the major pow­ ers. Italy employed a lethal, persistent agent (mustard) against Ethiopia in 1935 and there are reports that Egypt used a form of mustard gas in Yemen in 1967. Each is an example of the use of a "prohibited" weapon by a minor power in a local conflict without retaliation or escalation. However, in neither case could the target state retaliate or escalate in kind on its own, and major power weapons and technical assistance were not pro­ vided. It would appear that in each case, the support of the major powers was restrained by fear of further esca­ lation—subsequent employment did not occur. This discussion should not be construed to indicate a personal feeling that tactical nuclear weapons should be employed in any particular situation. A number of factors enter into a calculus of such a recommendation —factors such as: the impact on world attitudes of em­ ployment by a nation professing to be the leader in the search for peace through law and the military adin the United States are condoned as a necessity for preserving law and order. The two major restraints on expanded use of these weapons appear to be lack of effectiveness and public opinion. Their marginal military utility acts as a further deterrent. The tactical advantages of employ­ ment are less than the disadvantages resulting from diversion of delivery systems from more conventional payloads and the tactical problems of control and friendly protection in a tropical climate. Lethal persistent agents, however, would be very effective for the limited role of neutral­ izing captured jungle base camps and tunnels. The areas could be cleared o£ all personnel, surrounded by warning signs, then contami­ nated to prevent reuse. By the nature of the conflict, particularly the logistical capabilities of the enemy, retaliation is not a significant restraint. Nor should assimilation within the military be a restraint if the use were restricted to jungle sanctuary denial. The legal restraint is as it was during World War II—a customary law restraint that rein­ forces other existing inhibitions. The restraint to introduction of persistent lethal chemicals is popular opposition—a transitory restraint in unlimited war but quite effective in the partial commitment atmos­ phere of limited conflict.

Summary and Conclusions

vantages and disadvantages, which would include the possibility that the enemy will respond in measure or greater; i.e., escalate. The answer should rest in a rea­ soned weighing of the current situation, not in a blind acceptance of the proposition that escalation from tac­ tical to strategic use is inevitable, that there are no lim­ its once a tactical nuclear weapon is employed. The rec­ ord does not support such a presumption. A second danger area of nuclear war is the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. To simplify and limit the problem, new nuclear states are divided into two categories: acquisition by "responsible," politically stable, developed nations desiring a nuclear capability to ensure at least retention if not enhancement of their current status by joining the "nuclear club"; and ac­ quisition by revolutionary less-developed nations totally unsatisfied with an unjust status quo. The first group of nations—France, Japan in the future?—will not be con­ sidered further. Despite the ever-present possibility of initiation to trigger super-power support, their wealth and prosperity ensure a stake in maintenance of the present world order which in turn should dampen pos­ sible nuclear adventurism. The second group of na­ tions, of which there are numerous examples, presents an extremely dangerous problem. They desire nuclear weapons not only for prestige but also as an additional increment of military power to resolve regional disputes through deterrence or compellence or, if that fails, through use. The problem has two aspects: initiation from mis­ understanding, and initiation from frustration. Initia­ tion from misunderstanding is further defined as initia­ tion resulting from a genuine lack of comprehension of the calculus of deterrence. This could be caused by a non-Western value system that invalidates or reinter-

Summary and Conclusions

prets the assumptions that must be viewed similarly to permit deterrence; i.e., reward and punishment, per­ missible variation between declaratory and action pol­ icy, the roles of bluff and "face" in international poli­ tics, etc. A superb example of this problem is found in Japanese initiation of the use of toxic agents prior to and during World War II.18 As discussed earlier, the Jap­ anese were operating from a different set of rules than the other major powers, and Japan's view was based upon more than the perspective of a revolutionary pow­ er. Germany under Hitler was a typical revolutionary power yet Germany understood and pursued a deter­ rence policy similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. Initiation by frustration is equally possible—frustra­ tion in the face of inability to modernize at a rate suffi­ cient to satisfy the soaring aspirations of an increasingly disenchanted public, frustration at the inability to re­ solve an ideological or racial dispute by conventional force, frustration at unsuccessful political attempts to overcome extranational tribal demands, frustration at any of the many, many problems faced by the less-de­ veloped transitional societies. It is becoming increas­ ingly evident that the military establishment plays a critical if not preeminent role in most of the develop­ ing nations. It is equally evident that military force is assuming an ever-increasing role in the formulation and implementation of policy. Whether the source be mili­ tary leadership resorting to an instrument of policy that it understands best or a manifestation of the externally fomented War of National Liberation, the result is the same. Once the enormous investment in nuclear weap­ ons has been made, either by national development or 1 ZSupra, pp. 250-51.

Summary and Conclusions

by debt to a sponsoring nation, there is high probability that the investment will be realized. The possibility of the initiation of the use of newly acquired nuclear weapons by a less-developed revolu­ tionary state is very high. Whether the use would ex­ pand into regional or global nuclear war between the superpowers is difficult to predict; however, the example of chemical warfare presents a picture of successful limitation. The problem now is one of escalation, not proliferation. It is also a problem of avoiding irrational decision-making! What is an irrational decision? First, what is not ir­ rational? The discussion of decision by misunderstand­ ing or frustration assumed rational decision-making— rational in the sense that the decision to initiate could represent the conclusion of a faultlessly logical thought process from the value structure of a non-Western cul­ ture or from the perspective of a fiercely proud, newly independent yet threatened developing nation. The decision may appear irrational to the policy-maker in Washington because he does not appreciate the environ­ ment or thought processes of the local decision-maker, but the basic problem is faulty communication not ir­ rationality. For this study, an irrational decision is one made in desperation, with very little prospect of success and with very high probability of resulting in national suicide. The distinction is clarified by two examples from World War II. The first was the apparent decision of the United Kingdom to initiate the use of toxic agents as a measure of last resort if the German invasion of Eng­ land were successful and other means of defense failed. As a decision taken against the background of military capability, both offensive and defensive, and of effective

Summary and Conclusions

civil defense, it would have been rational.19 Hitler's ap­ parent decision to initiate the use of nerve agents in 1944 was an irrational decision; it had very little pros­ pect of seriously disabling the Allied Powers and Germany would have been saturated with gas in retaliation.20 These two examples from chemical warfare policy in World War II do not present an encouraging picture for the future. Most discouraging is the model of Hitler's irrationality. Particularly since nuclear deterrent forces must be maintained in a state of instant readiness by all nuclear powers, the possibility that a desperate national leader could initiate appears high. The critical time is not when all appears lost; it is during the gray period when damaging defeats have made victory appear dis­ tant and questionable but eventual defeat is by no means certain. It is at this stage that the nation begins to look for alternative leadership to lead it to victory. Faced with possible ouster or worse, the national leader looks for a miracle weapon. He may just have it im­ mediately available.21 The British example really presents nothing new. It is but a recent historical example supporting the prop­ osition that in the nuclear age there cannot be war for total ends unless one wants war with total weapons. No nation will accept unconditional surrender while main­ taining unused a very expensive weapon that might pos­ sibly save the day. Problems of irrationality are not a very reassuring note on which to end this study but they are representa­ tive of the treacherous and potentially explosive world is Supra, pp. 226-30. 20 Supra, pp. 237-38. 21 One does not have to research long for a plausible scenario: the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. Recall that the Japanese apparently con­ sidered initiation of chemical war in the mid-Pacific in 1044 (Sutra, pp. 259-60. 3Z4

Summary and Conclusions

situation in 1968. As this is written, there is the con­ tinuing crisis in the Middle East, in Nigeria; the Viet­ nam conflict continues, the Chinese People's Republic rushes headlong into missile-delivered thermonuclear weapons, and the superpowers may be on the verge of another exceedingly expensive arms race in mutual de­ velopment of ABM systems. These current crises will be resolved and the world will face new and equally serious problems. Yet with each series of crises the United Nations and the rule of law which it represents are further weakened and fundamental instability in­ creases in a world of very very rich and very very poor. But if the restraints impeding use of chemical weap­ ons in World War II are relevant to the employment of nuclear weapons in the future, the prospects are reason­ ably favorable. It is doubtful that there will be an ex­ change of thermonuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the employment of strategic nuclear weapons has been assimilated, the present assured destruction-damage limitation ratios are stable. They should remain stable in the future as there are parallel "momentums of readiness" in each nation and there is fundamental consensus of fear against disruption of the current world order. Employment of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States or the Soviet Union is more likely than strategic exchange but still quite improbable, particu­ larly when conflict involves a major ally of the other. The combination of lack of assimilation and fear of retaliation/escalation should ensure continuing deter­ rence. However, atomic weapons will be employed in con­ flicts between lesser powers, particularly the less-devel­ oped transitional nations, unless there is an immediate

Summary and Conclusions

and effective nonproliferation treaty.22 This is and should be a major policy objective; but it is doubtful that a nonproliferation treaty can be completely effec­ tive. A very high assurance of effectiveness requires the credible threat of sanctions including as last resort the use of overwhelming force. Such credibility would seem to require the quite explicit and overt establishment of joint United States-Soviet Union hegemony. Such fundamental accord appears neither feasible nor de­ sirable in the immediate future. There is, therefore, very high probability of minor power nuclear weapon employment in the mid-term, but low probability of escalation to the superpowers. The record of the United States chemical warfare policy provides a little solace to anyone concerned with the evolution of deterrence, but it is precious little. 22 There is here an implicit and perhaps overly optimistic assump­ tion that the Chinese People's Republic will, in time, become a statusquo nuclear power.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AAF ABC ACTS AEF AFPAC (USAFPAC) AGF AGO ARCA ARCL ARP ASF Asst C of S A SW BF BW CBI CCS CCWC CG CICR (ICRC) C in C CINCPAC Cml CMLHO

Army Air Forces American British Conversations Air Corps Tactical School American Expeditionary Forces (1917-18) U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Army Ground Forces Adjutant General's Office American Red Cross Archives American Red Cross Library Air Raid Precautions (British Civil Defense Planning) Army Service Forces Assistant Chief of Staff Assistant Secretary of War Notes from files of Dr. Dale Birdsell Biological Warfare (Bacteriological Warfare) China Burma India Theater (World War II) Combined Chiefs of Staff Combined Chemical Warfare Committee Commanding General International Committee of the Red Cross Commander in Chief Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Chemical Chemical Corps Historical Office

Glossary of Abbreviations

C of S COMINCH Coronet CWS D C of S DOS EHO FDRL FY G-i G-2 G-3 G-4 GO HE IJA IND JAG JB JCS JDA JLC JPS L of N MA M Day NA

Chief of Staff Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet Assault planned for 1946 on Tokyo Plain Chemical Warfare Service Deputy Chief of Staff Department of State Edgewood Arsenal Historical Office Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York Fiscal Year Personnel Division, War Department General Staff Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff Operations and Training Division, War Department General Staff Supply Division, War Department General Staff General Orders High explosive Imperial Japanese Army Indorsement Judge Advocate General Joint Board Joint Chiefs of Staff Japanese Defense Agency Joint Logistics Committee Joint Staff Planners League of Nations Military Attache Day when general mobilization of forces should begin National Archives

Glossary of Abbreviations

NAA

NA FDRL

NAW NDRC OCAC O C CWS OCD OCMH Olympic OPD Plng PMP POA RAF R8cD SGS SOS S&P

Sphinx

sub

National Archives World War II Records Division, Alexandria, Virginia National Archives Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York Naval Archives, Washington National Defense Research Committee Office o£ the Chief Air Corps Office of the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service Office of Civilian Defense Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army Assault planned for November i, 1945 on Kyushu Operations Division, War Department General Staff Planning Protective Mobilization Plan Pacific Ocean Areas Royal Air Force Research and Development Secretary of the General Staff Services of Supply Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff An Army project concerned with testing of equipment and tactics for detecting and reducing Japanese field fortifications Subject

Glossary of Abbreviations

SW SWPA TAG TWX USCWC USSBS WCD OCS WDGS WPD XO

Secretary of War Southwest Pacific Area The Adjutant General Teletype message United States Chemical Warfare Committee United States Strategic Bombing Survey War College Division, Office of the Chief of StaSE War Department General Staff War Plans Division, War Department General Staff Executive Officer

32 ο

BIBLIOGRAPHY The majority of the source materials for this study were obtained from various government files located in the National Archives. The War Plans Division contains the most useful files—Operations Division Records in the World War II Records Division. Comparable studies for the World War I period are included in the War College Division, Office of the Chief of StafiE Records. Other valuable documents were found in the Archives of the Historical Office, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. I was granted full access to verbatim extracts of docu­ ments and interviews prepared by historians writing the Chemical Warfare Service volumes of the Official His­ tories of the U.S. Army in World War II. In addition, the Historical Office has a near-complete collection of World War II gas warfare planning documents in its holdings of United States Chemical Warfare Com­ mittee deliberations. I.

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INDEX Α-Bomb, see nuclear weapons Advisory Committee to American Delegation, 64-65, 68-69. See also Washington Arms Conference, propaganda, public opinion air-delivered gas attack, 8n, 43, 45-46, 65, 68, 162-65, 169, 173, 179-80, 262; U.K. fear of, World War II, 209. See also air power, Douhet, Mitchell, strategic use of gas air power, 45, 65, 117, 151, 163-65, 183, 206, 210, 213-14, 236, 265η; strategic bombing, WW II, 22324, 227, 232, 236, 237η, 258η, 277η, 284η. See also Army Air Corps, readiness-offensive, Roy­ al Air Force, Strategic Bombing Survey, strategic use of gas, U.S. Air Force Air Raid Precautions (ARP), 219η, 220, 225· See also civil de­ fense, United Kingdom American Chemical Society, 64η, 70, 79η, 104. See also chemical industries American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 21, 23, 25-26, 28-31, 45η, 46; Superior Board, 83η: See also Fries, Pershing American Legion, 103, 104η American Red Cross, 106η, 168η, 171-72. See also International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report, Chief of Staff, 1919, 73η; /922, 138η; 1929, 23η, 137; *933, Hin- 1735 *934· 144η; J£?5, 144η, 156; 1941, 192η appropriations, see financial re­ straints Arab-Israeli conflict, 314 armored warfare, 151, 153, 183η, 192η. See also financial restraints arms control, see disarmament Army Air Corps, 50, 77η, 151, 156-57, 163-66, 187, 192η, 268,

270, 276, 284η; Air Corps Tacti­ cal School, 166. See also air power, air-delivered gas attack, Douhet, Mitchell, strategic use of gas, U.S. Air Force Army Service Forces, 276 Army War College, studies, 19, 20 Arnold, General Henry, 282η assimilation of gas: during WW I, 5, 6, 10, 12, 19-23, 26, 28, 28η, 35-36, 40-41, 41η, 43η; interwar years, 49-50, 72, 75, 82, 84, 87, 89-90, 113-15, 121, 126, 129, 132, 134, 148, 150-52, 159, 160η, 164η, i66, 179; WW II, 291, 293-94, 296; in Germany, 231, 235-37, 245; in Japan, 247-48, 254, 254η, 256; in U.K., 245; in U.S., 203-04, 264η, 267η, 269-70, 273-74, 28l82, 284; in Vietnam, 310η; serv­ ice school instruction, 147, 148η, 152, 182. See also humanity of gas, MacArthur, March, Mar­ shall, psychological effects "Baedeker Offensive," 237η. See also escalation, Germany, Hitler Baker, Newton, 75, 76η, 8g Baldwin, Stanley, 209η, 214η. See also United Kingdom Biak, 269η biological warfare (BW), 65, 100, ioon, 102, 110, 112, 120, 267η Bolimow, 6n. See also initiation Bonin Islands, 272 Bormann, Martin, 237η Brandt, Professor Karl, 242, 243. See also civil defense, Germany Briining, Chancellor Heinrich, 116 Bryce Report, 16, 17. See also propaganda Bureau of Mines, 22-24 Burton, Representative, gg, ggn, 101η, 106η. See also Geneva Gas Protocol Butt Report, see Royal Air Force

Index casualties from gas: WW I, S' 12, 12n, 25n, 27, 29, 33n, 37n; interwar projections, 76, 155, 168_ See also projections of future, propaganda centralization of decision-making, 151, 205, 244n, 245, 25 1n , 307 Chamberlain, Senator George, 77, 77n, 81_ See also Fries, National Defense Act of 1920 Changkufeng Incident, 252n_ See also Japan, Soviet Union characteristics of gas, 11, IS-14, 33-35, 44, 63, 68, 85, 153-54, 15 8 _ See also chlorine gas, limitation by agent, mustard gas, nerve gas Chemical Foundation, 54, 57 nf , 59- See also chemical industries chemical industries, 6, 24, 30 , 53, 56n, 80, 86, 115; American Dyes Institute, 57n, 58; developmental role, 5; embargo, 57, 60; German competition, 54, 233; pressure activity, 49, 51-52, 5455, 59n , 69-70, 78-79, 103; tariff, 57-58, 60, 69, 95, 183_ See also American Chemical Society, Chemical Foundation, DuPont, Geneva Gas Protocol, Germany, Nye Committee, Paris Peace Conference, propaganda, United Kingdom chemical warfare, see U_S_ chemical warfare Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) , 26n, 28, 30, 58, 86, 160n, 1818S; combat functions, 24, 3 1, 73, 78, 92, 192-93, 266; comparison with Air Corps, 135; organization, 73-74, 85; interwar readiness, 111, 127, 130 -33, 135, 14448; WW II planning, 273-79, 284. See also Fries, logistics, National Defense Act of 1920, Porter, preparedness for use of gas, readiness-defensive, readiness--offensive, Sibert, training Chiefs of Staff, attitudes on chemical warfare, 83n, 84, 86, 152n. See also Annual Report, Chief

of Staff, assimilation, Craig, MacArthur, March, Marshall China, 200, 246-48, 250n, 251, 25556, 278-79; Chiang-Wedemeyer Agreement, 279n. See also Ichang China-Burma-India Theatre, 280 Chinese People's Republic, 216n,

30 2 chlorine gas, 4, 5, 24, 38 Churchill, Sir Winston, 8, 32, 46n, 206n, 210, 216-17, 223-24, 228, 228n, 263 civil defense, 50, 166-73, 297; costs, 168-69, 171,242; Germany, 17on, 241-43; International Red Cross Committee, 167-69; International Red Cross, Committee of Experts, 168, 17on, 171; Japan, 254; in U.K., 173n, 212-13, 21819, 229n , 241; in U.S., 168, 17173, 195-96, 280, 281ll. See also ARP coalition warfare, effects of, 295; in Germany, 253; in Japan, 253, 261; in U.K., 217-18, 227; in U.S., 251, 251ll, 263-64, 266, 268, 279-80. See also U.S. chemical warfare code of war, 40-42 Combined Chemical Warfare Committee, Ig6, 196n Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) , 204-05, 263; CCS I06/2, 204-06, 218, 226n, 280; CCS 890/I, 268n; CCS 81)0/2, 268n; CCS 900/), 27 0n communication of intent, 7n, 25051, 296, 301, 313. See also deterrence, escalation, rational leadership compellence, 308, 308n congressional attitudes on chemical warfare, 71, 77, 85, 90n, 91, 105-06, 113, 115, 116n, 130; Geneva Gas Protocol, 105-07, 121; support during Depression, 136, 142-44. See also Chamberlain, financial restraints, Fries, National Defense Act of 1920

344

Index grams: air power, 151, 156-57; armored warfare, 151; prewar, 156; W W II, 191, 272, 277, 284, 294; cost-effectiveness, 143, 155, 225, 27711, 294, 296; See also characteristics of gas, nuclear weapons Eisenhower, President Dwight, 300 England, see United Kingdom escalation, automaticity of, 296, 299, 309, 311, 316; during interwar years, 66n, 68, 169; W W I, 7n, 9, 10, 12, 32, 42-46; in Germany, 245; in Japan, 259; in U.K., 227, 228n, 245. See also nuclear conflict—sources, deterrence Ethiopia, 145, 181, 185n, 209, 310

Coolidge, President Calvin, 10m, i24n Craig, General Malin, 132, i32n, 145, i52n; Craig Study, 132, i32nf. See also W a r Department Crimean War, 7, 8 Crowell, Benedict, 15, 32. See also logistics D-Day, 244n Dardanelles, 8 decontamination, 154-55 defense against gas, see readinessdefensive Depression, see financial restraints deterrence, 85-86, 189, 199, 204, 206, 291, 308; "balance of terror," io7n; credibility, 296-97; minimum (finite), 207, 262-63, 266; non-western perspective, 260-61; prospects, 315-16; requirements for, 296; shared assumptions, 312; stabilization, 293> 295> z97< 3°2> See also communication of intent, escalation, initiation, intelligence, rational leadership, readinessdefensive, readiness-offensive, retaliation, U.S. chemical warfare disarmament, 49, 55, 5gn, 151, 183, 293, 302; control of new weapons, 61-62; production controls, 171; qualitative, 116, 160; unilateral (Japan), 260; verification, 54, 56. See also W o r l d Disarmament Conference, Nonproliferation Treaty, Nuclear Test Ban Douhet, Giulio, 164-67, i8on, i83n DuPont, 57, 59n, 6gn, 8on. See also chemical industries

fear of gas: during W W I, 3, 6n, 27-28, 36-37, 41; interwar years, 177, 178n, 179. See also assimilation, propaganda, psychological effects financial restraints, 87, 90; Appropriations Acts: 1920, 77; 1922, 89-91; 1929, 136; 7933, 140; 1934, 116, n 6 n , 140-42; '935, 142-44; 19)6, 144nf; 1937, 144nf;

1939, 157;1940,156n;1941,157;

1942, 157n; Depression, 127, 130, 135-36, 139-40, 142, 144n, 1 6 m , 294. See also assimilation, congressional attitudes, effectiveness of gas, Fries France, 165, 170n, 198, 210n, 213n, 217, 228n, 234, 235n, 302, 311 Fries, Major General Amos: during W W I, 25-28, 30, 31, 3911, 45n; interwar years, 62, 64n, 72, 76, 78-82, 87-89, 92, 103nf, 104, 105n, 107, 130-31, 133n, 134-35, 136n, 140n, 157n, 164n, 180n, i82n; W W II, 233. See also American Expeditionary Force,

Eden, Sir Anthony, i7gn, 209, 2ion, 214. See also United Kingdom effectiveness of gas: during W W I, 30-31. 33. 33«. 37. 42-44; interwar years, 73, i4on, 153; W W II, 225, 256, 269, 282-83, 285; competition with other pro-

345

Index Chemical Warfare Service, U.S. chemical warfare Gallop Poll, 287η. See also public opinion Garvan, Francis, 54. See also Chemical Foundation "Gas Fright," 36. See also fear of gas, gas mask, psychological effects gas mask during WW I, 9, 19η, 21, 25, 29η, 35-57; interwar years, gon, 129, 133-34, 142. 4 >~ 47, i53nf, 155, 161η, 173η; WW II, 196η, 197, 22°, 233η, 842, 244η, 255, a59< s8m. $ee also assimilation, readiness-de­ fensive, technological advantage Gas Service, AEF, 23, 85-28, 30. See also American Expeditionary Force, Fries, Pershing gas troops, 92-93, 127-28, 131, 132, 135, 266. See also Chemical Warfare Service, Fries, readi­ ness-defensive, readiness-offen­ sive, U.S. chemical warfare gas war, see Germany, Japan, U.K., U.S. chemical warfare General Board, 66, 66n, 68n, 15962. See also assimilation, Geneva Gas Protocol, chemical warfare, Navy Department Geneva Gas Protocol, 171, 181, 184η, 185η, ι86η, 199, so8a, 284, 286, 293; congressional ratifica­ tion, 102-08; origins, 97-98, Pro­ tocol, 101-02; status, WW II, 198; U.S. objectives, 99-101; foreign attitudes: Germany, 230, 231, 837η; Japan, 248-50; U.K., 209-10, gig, 227; U.S., 121, 123. See also legal restraint, pro­ hibition Germany, 165, 245, 351, 253, 26667, 312; WW I, 4, 6, 29; WW II, 198-253; assimilation, 233, 836-38; civil defense, 241-42; coalition restraints, 853; legal l

r

restraints, 198; policy, 336-37, 240, 243, 244, 246; readiness, 21314, 215η, 231, 233-34, 835η, 237η, 238-40, 84in, 244; threat per­ ception, 231-32, 234-36, 244. See also air power, chemical industries, deterrence, escala­ tion, Hitler, initiation, propa­ ganda, retaliation, Sea Lion Gibson, Hugh, 112, 116. See also World Disarmament Conference Gilchrist, H., 12η. See also casual­ ties from gas, characteristics of gas Goebbels, Joseph, 237η. See also initiation, rational leadership, retaliation Haber, Fritz, 5. See also chemical industries, Germany, technolog­ ical advantage Hague Conventions, 7, 9, 13, 40, 52, 53η, 62, 67, 102, 167, 184, ig8, 248, 286; Article 23, 6; U.S. reaction, 7η. See also humanity of gas, legal restraints, prohibi­ tion Haig, Sir Douglas, io. See also United Kingdom Haldane, John, 39η, 183η. See also assimilation, United Kingdom Hankey, Sir Maurice, 8, 9η, ion, 32η. See also Churchill, escala­ tion, United Kingdom Hanslian, Dr. Rudolf, 4η, 5η, 6n, 11η, 37η, 44· See also charac­ teristics of gas, Germany Harding, President Warren, 60-61, 64η, gon, 124η. See also U.S. chemical warfare Harris, Air Marshal Arthur, 223η. See also air power, escalation, Royal Air Force, United King­ dom Hines, General John, 152η Hirohito, Emperor, 254η. See also Japan Hiroshima, 300. See also nuclear weapons Hitler, Adolf, 120, 213, 214η,

Index 216, 227, 230, 231, 235-38, 239n, 241-43. 245. 253n, 298, 312, 314. See also Germany, initiation, rational leadership, retaliation Hoare, Samuel, 207n. See also United Kingdom Hoover, President Herbert, 64n, 103n, 116, 117, 124, 136, 150. See also disarmament, W o r l d Disarmament Conference Hughes, C. E., 61-64, 66, 67n, 69n, 102, 124n, 177. See also U.S. chemical warfare, Washington Arms Conference humanity of gas during W W I, 10, 13, 41, 44; interwar years, 59n, 61, 62n, 66n, 72, 84, io6n, 153, 18411; W W II, 264, 285, 292; gas warfare, 61, 177. See also assimilation, legal restraints, propaganda, public opinion Ichang, 247, 247n. See also China, initiation, Japan incendiary bombs, 2o6n, 207n„ 2 7 m , 272, 277, 284. See also air power, effectiveness, logistics, U.S. Air Force initiation: use of gas: during W W I, 6n, 45; interwar years, 75, 94, 111, 122, 127, 137, 138n, 160, 186; W W II, 200, 205-06; crucial period, 298, 314; in Germany, 230-31, 237n, 243-44, 261, 298, 312; in Japan, 249n, 309, 312; in Soviet Union, 235n, 252; in U.K., 225-26, 228, 22gn, 313; in U.S., 266, 273, 274n, 283, 289, 295 nuclear weapons, 311, 312; from frustration, 311-14; from misunderstanding, 311. See also deterrence, U.S. chemical warfare intelligence, 166, 174-75, 295; WW I: in U.K., 9 n ; in Germany, 189; interwar years, 50; in U.K., 175. 189;

347

WW II: in U.K., 223, 27811; in U.S., 200, 266, 278, 280 Inter-Allied Control Commission, 233. See also disarmament, Germany, Paris Peace Conference International Committee of the R e d Cross, 18n, 47, 220; civil defense, 167-71, 181; propaganda, 177. See also American R e d Cross, civil defense, Geneva Gas Protocol Italy, 198; use of gas, 145, 185n. See also Ethiopia, initiation Iwo Jima, 265n, 268, 278, 283n, 287. See also initiation, Japan, Lethbridge Report, U.S. chemical warfare Japan, 198, 226n, 246, 266, 268, 272, 278, 279, 294, 297, 309, 311, 312; interwar years, 120; WW II: assimilation, 247-48, 254, 256; civil defense, 254; coalition restraints, 253, 261; employment, 185n, 200, 247; legal restraints, 248-49, 252, 260; policy, 248-49, 254-55, 258-59, 260-61; public opinion, 254; readiness, 247-50, 254-58, 260; threat perception, 246, 249, 25054, 260, 26m; U.S. planning for defeat of, 269-70. See also deterrence, Hirohito, initiation, Olympic, Potsdam, retaliation Joint Board, 122, 125n, 146n, 151n, 162n, 205. See also U.S. chemical warfare Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), xv, 1 5 m , 270, 273, 275, 276, 285; JCS J76, 205n; JCS 825/4, 272n. 275-76, 277ns JCS 825/5, 272ns JCS 825/6, 262n, 273n, 274n, 275, 277n, 284; JCS 825/7, 273n, 274ns JCS 825/8, 275, 275n. See also U.S. chemical warfare Joint Staff Planners, 272. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff

Index justification, use of gas by Allies, WW I, 15, 18η; U.S., 25. See also initiation, Kriegsraison, pro­ hibition, restraint Keitel, Field Marshal, 253η. See also Germany Kellogg, Frank, 102, 103, 108. See also Geneva Gas Protocol, U.S. chemical warfare King, Admiral Ernest, 274, 274η, 279η, 282η, 285η. See also as­ similation, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Department, U.S. chemical warfare Kitchner, Lord, 8. See also United Kingdom Kriesgsraison, 40, 106, 107, 184, 282η, 286. See also justification, legal restraint Krueger, General Walter, 148. See also U.S. chemical warfare Kwantung Army, 255, 255η, 257. See also Japan Kyushu, 271, 282. See also Japan, Olympic, U.S. chemical warfare Lansing, Robert, 18η, 54. See also U.S. chemical warfare, Wilson, World War I. Lassiter Board, 88. See also assimi­ lation, Chemical Warfare Serv­ ice, preparedness Lasswell, Harold, 12η. See also propaganda, public opinion League of Nations, 98, 120. See also legal restraint, public opin­ ion, World Disarmament Con­ ference Leahy, Admiral William, 264, 267η, 273, 88ιη, 282η, 285, 286η. See also assimilation, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. chemical warfare legal restraints, 8n, 13, 46, 50, 61, 63, 67η, 70, 7i, 98η, ioon, 101, 102, 122, 123, i83nf, i84nf, 186; impact of Ethiopia, 145; on nuclear weapons, 302; public opinion, 70-71, 109, 171, 183,

264; Shimoda Case, 185η; in Vietnam, 310η; weaknesses of, 102, 106, 107, 161, 171; sources: conventional law, 6, 40, 52, 53, 67, 161, 167, 184, 286, 293, 302, 302η; customary law, 18η, (ICRC), 123, 18386, 293, 302; general practice, 185, 264, 285; WW II, 198; effectiveness, 292-93; Germany, 216, 231, 233; Japan, 249, 252, 260, 298; U.K., 209, 210, 215, 227, 228. See also Churchill, Geneva Gas Protocol, Hague Conven­ tions, justification, Kriegsraison, prohibition, Roosevelt, Wash­ ington Arms Conference, World Disarmament Conference Lend Lease Act, 195η, 251, 252η. See also coalition warfare, U.S. chemical warfare Lethbridge Report, 283η. See also Iwo Jima, United Kingdom, U.S. chemical warfare limitation by type agent, 100, 151, 159, 279η, 297- See also disarma­ ment, escalation, nontoxic gases, readiness-defensive, readinessoffensive limitation of target, 40, 41, 44, 46, 62, 100, 101η, 106, 107, 140η, 149η, 151, 162, 210, 211η, 227η, 2 37> 279> 282, 284, 296, 308, 309, 315-16. See also assimilation, disarmament, escalation, legal restraint, prohibition, strategic use of gas Lincoln, Brigadier General George, 271η, 275η. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. chemical warfare Livens Projector, 42. See also characteristics of gas, United Kingdom Lloyd George, David, 18η, 55. See also United Kingdom logistics, 1 in, 25, 31, 33, 34, 72; munitions: 265, 265η, 271-73, 275-76, 276η, 277η. See also Ger­ many, Japan, United Kingdom;

Index policies, Pacific, WW II, 27378, 280-81; problems-. Germany, 239; Japan, 250; U.S., 133, 147, 153-55, 158, 191, 194, ig6n, 270, 272, 275-77, 281, 289; procurement: Germany, 239; Japan, 250; U.S., 129, 140, i43n, 157, 203-04, 206, 273; production priorities-. Germany, 239; U.S., ig7n, 204, 272, 277; War Production Board, ig6n. See also assimilation, Olympic, readiness-defensive, readinessoffensive, U.S. chemical warfare LudendorfE, General E. von, 7n. See also Germany Lusitania, 16, 17. See also propaganda, public opinion

liam, 157n, 164n, 166, 167. See also air power, strategic use of gas Mueller-Kiel, U., 6n, 8n, 3811, 4311. See also characteristics of gas, Germany, W o r l d W a r I Munich, 148, 179n, 220. See also civil defense, Germany, United Kingdom mustard gas, 11, 12, 2in, 25, 29, 34, 38, 43, 143n, 146n, 169n, 185nf, 194, 202-03, 225, 22gn, 233, 24on, 241, 247, 257, 310. See also characteristics, limitation by type agent, readinessdefensive Nanonhan Incident, 252n. See also Japan, Soviet Union Narashino, 256n. See also Japan National Defense Act, 1920, 32, 50, 51, 62n, 73-74, 77-80, 82, 84, 85, 86n, 88-90, g i n , 129, 130, 135, 138n, 150. See also assimilation, Chemical Warfare Service, congressional support, Fries, readiness-defensive, preparedness National Research Council-Military Committee, 22. See also gas service, U.S. chemical warfare Navy Department, 50, 157-62, 187, 199, 270, 274, 284. See also General Board, Joint Chiefs of Staff, King, U.S. chemical warfare nerve gas, 234, 283n, 293, 314; Sarin, 237n; T a b u n , 234n, 237n, 239n, 240n, 241. See also disarmament, escalation, Germany, initiation, technological advantage

MacArthur, General Douglas, i i 2 n , 113, 115, 116, 139, i4on, 1 4 m , 144, 145, i52n, 265. See also assimilation, financial restraints, preparedness, readiness-defensive, U.S. chemical warfare McCloy, John, 200, 282n, 288. See also coalition warfare, initiation, public opinion, readiness-defensive, U.S. chemical warfare MacDonald Plan, see W o r l d Disarmament Conference McNair, General Lesley, 204. See also assimilation March, General Peyton, 3on, 40, 41, 76, 76n, 82, 83, 91, i52n. See also assimilation, Fries, National Defense Act of 1920, U.S. chemical warfare Mariana Islands, 259, 26on, 274. See also initiation, Japan, U.S. chemical warfare Marshall, General George, 88n, 14811, i52n, ig3, 205, 273, 274, 27gn, 282, 282n, 283, 286n. See also assimilation, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. chemical warfare Mitchell, Brigadier General Wil-

Neutrality Acts, 195n. See also U.S. chemical warfare Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 265. See also assimilation, Navy Department Nonproliferation Treaty, 302n. See also deterrence, legal restraints, nuclear conflictsources nontoxic gases, 8, 66n, 68, 111, i i 2 n , 121, 131, 139, 159, 27gn.

349

Index See also limitation by type agent, U.S. chemical warfare nuclear conflict-sources escalation, 308-11, 316; proliferation: to "responsible" nations, 311; to revolutionary "less responsible" nations, 31116;

irrational leadership, 308, 31314; See also escalation, initiation, nuclear weapons, rational lead­ ership Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 30a. See also disarmament, nuclear conflict-sources nuclear weapons, 290, 299-316; Abomb, 271η, 275, 276η, 281, 286η, 298; tactical nuclear weap­ ons, 305, 306, 308-10, 315; ther­ monuclear exchange, 315; comparison with chemical weapons·, assimilation, 304-06, 307; civilian attitudes, 307; effi­ ciency, 304; logistics, 304; pro­ tection, 304, 305; readiness, 305; retaliation, 308; strategic em­ ployment, 303-05; tactical em­ ployment, 305, 306; training, 304.

See also deterrence, nuclear conflict-sources Nye Committee, 55, 56η, 58η, 59η, 69, 7θ, 80η, 103η. See also chemi­ cal industries, propaganda Okinawa, 268, 278, 283η, 287. See also Ryukyu Islands, U.S. chemi­ cal warfare Olympic, 271, 272, 276, 278η, 28ο, 283η, 284η; chemical warfare planning, 278η, 284η; logistical requirements, 272-73, 277, 277nf, 281; tactical considerations, 279, 283. See also coalition warfare, initiation, Japan, readiness-of­ fensive, strategy (Pacific War, !945) · U.S. chemical warfare Paris Peace Conference, 49,

51-52,

Article Treaty of Versailles, 52nf, 53, 66; Article 172, Treaty of Versailles, 56, 56η, 95. See also chemical industries, disarma­ ment, Inter-Allied Control Com­ mission, legal restraints Pearl Harbor, 197, 198. See also Japan, readiness-defensive, readiness-offensive, U.S. chemi­ cal warfare Pershing, General John J., 10, 23, 55, 60, 67, 233, 248, 293;

171,

25. 3°, 31. 45n> 64η, 66, 68, 72, 73n> 83η, 88n, 91, 92, 94, 152η.

See also American Expedition­ ary Force, assimilation, Fries, gas service "Phony War," 237η. See also Ger­ many, United Kingdom policy, see Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, U.S. chemical warfare Portal, Air Marshal, 224. See also air power, Royal Air Force Porter, Major General William N., 5η, 152η, i66, 193, 195, 201,

See also Chemical Warfare Service, pre­ paredness, readiness-defensive, readiness-offensive, U.S. chemi­ cal warfare Potsdam, 268η, 270, 275, 28ο; Declaration of, 271η. See also Japan, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. chemical warfare preparedness for use of gas, 21, 293; in Germany, 233, 238-44; in Japan, 253-59; U.K., 7, 218-26; in U.S.: during WW I, 21-22, 25-27, 29η; interwar years, 202, 2o6nf, 292, 292η.

73, 97, 107, 112-13, 121, 128-29,

!31. »35. 139. 144-48, 151. 152, 157-59; WW II, 191, 193-95, '97" 98; 1942, 201-02. See also chemi­ cal warfare service, readiness-de­ fensive, readiness-offensive, re­ search and development, train­ ing, U.S. chemical warfare, Ypres Preparedness Hearings, 1916, 17, 20. See also U.S. chemical war­ fare

Index prohibition, use of gas: WW I, 8n; interwar years, 50, 53η, 59, 61-63, ®5· 67· 68η, 69η, 7i, 72, θ1». 93. 95. 96. 98· 100-02, 10709, 112, 113, 115-17, 149, 160η, 167, ι68η, 177, 183, i84nf, 185η; WW II, 238, 248, 249, 264, 288, 292; impact of Ethiopia, 145; importation, 52, 57, 58, 98η; MacDonald Plan, 120; U.S. ac­ ceptance, 123, 125. See also Geneva Gas Protocol, Hague Conventions, legal restraints, Roosevelt, Washington Arms Conference, World Disarma­ ment Conference projections of future gas war: during WW I, 32, 43η, 45, 46η, 49, 6o; interwar years, 155, 161, 169-70. See also propaganda, public opinion proliferation, see nuclear conflictsources propaganda: during WW I, 12, 13, 13η, 14η, is, 15η, ι6, 17, 46η, 47; interwar years, 56-60, 64, 69, 70, 78, 103, 104η, io6n, 137, 164, 165, 171, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179-183; WW II, 212, 220, 288, 301; effect in Germany, 233; in U.K., 212-13. See also Advisory Committee to Ameri­ can Delegation, Douhet, H. G. Wells, International Committee of Red Cross, Lasswell, legal restraints, public opinion, U.S. chemical warfare Protective Mobilization Plan, 194. See also Chemical Warfare Serv­ ice, Marshall, Porter psychological effects (of gas), 36, i53, 178η, 22o. See also fear of gas, propaganda public opinion: during WW I, 17, Si, 47; interwar years, 50, 58, 60, 69, 70-71, 95, 108, 109, 176, 17879, 187; WW II, 195, 291; in 1941, 197; cause of secrecy, 152, 173, 183η; civil defense, 170, 221; difficulty in assessing, 16η;

Geneva Gas Protocol, 103, 105; Germany, WW II, 231, 245; in 1930's, 123, 157η; indirect effects, 291; impact of ideology, 300; Japan, 254; on nuclear weapons, 299-301; as sanction, 70-71, 109, 171, 177, 183; U.K., WW II, 212, 219, 229, 245; U.S., late WW II, 248, 250, 287-88; in Vietnam, 310η; Washington Arms Con­ ference, 68. See also Gallup Poll, propaganda rational leadership, 235, 237, 298. See also nuclear conflict-sources, Hitler readiness: defensive: during WW I, 4, 9, 24, 27, 28η, 29η, 34-35, 45; inter­ war years, 59η, 68, 72-73, 75, 8386, 93, 107, "1-14. »20, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133-35, 139, 142, 145-48, 152, 155, 159, 161, 162η, i6g, 187; WW II, 192, 201, 202, 263, 265, 272, 295, 310η. See also Germany, Japan, limitation by type agent, preparedness, readi­ ness programs, research and de­ velopment, training, United Kingdom offensive: during WW I, 28η, 31, 42, 45; interwar years, 73, 75, 85, 114, 120-21, 129, 133, 135, 145-48, 150, 152, 159, 161, 187; WW II, 192-94, 197, 201-03, 263, 265, 272-78, 294. See also Chemi­ cal Warfare Service, Germany, initiation, Japan, preparedness, readiness programs, research and development, retaliation, stra­ tegic use of gas, United King­ dom readiness programs, 263; 1936, 144η, 145-47, !50: J942· 202-03. See also Chemical Warfare Serv­ ice, effectiveness, Porter, readi­ ness-defensive, readiness-offen­ sive 1Reorganization Act, see National Defense Act, 1920

Index research and development: dur­ ing WW I, ii, 38, 39; interwar years, 64, 86, 93, 128, 132, 142, 143η, 144, !46, i53n> !55. i56n157, 161η; WW II, 208η, 234η; in Germany, 232, 234, 236; in Japan, 254; in U.K., 208η. See also chemical industries, dis­ armament, gas mask, readinessdefensive, readiness-offensive, technological advantage restraints: nature of: functional, 166-76; institutional, 150-66; objective, 50; subjective, 50, 150. See also Germany, Japan, United King­ dom, U.S. chemical warfare effectiveness in World War II, 292-99 extension: to nuclear conflict, 299-316; to Vietnam, 309η, 310η. See also assimilation, communi­ cation of intent, deterrence, dis­ armament, escalation, initiation, legal restraints, nuclear con­ flict-sources, preparedness, prop­ aganda, public opinion, retalia­ tion retaliation: during WW I, 8, 9, 15; interwar years, 75, 120η, 121-22, 127, 170η, i86n; WW II, 199, 206, 211, 217, 264; in Germany, 231; in Japan, 249η; in U.K., 226η, 229-30, 244η; in U.S., 264, 268, 272η, 273, 279, 288-89, 295; in Vietnam, 310η. See also Churchill, Hitler, initiation, in­ telligence, preparedness, Roose­ velt riot control gases, see nontoxic gases Roosevelt, President Franklin, 120, 124, 125, 14m, 145, 149-51, 186, 195η, 198η, 200-01, 218, 249, 250, 263-67, 283η, 292. See also U.S. chemical warfare Root, Elihu, 18η, 66, 68, 70 Royal Air Force (RAF), 222-24, 226η, 228. See also air power,

Churchill, Harris, strategic use of gas, United Kingdom rules of land warfare, 123η, 184. See also legal restraints, prohi­ bition, U.S. chemical warfare Russia, see Soviet Union Ryukyu Islands, 272, 274. See also Okinawa St. Germain, Treaty of, 98η. See also chemical industries, Geneva Gas Protocol, prohibition Saipan, 268. See also Japan, U.S. chemical warfare science and technology, impact of, 5, 6, 36, 38, 39, 40, 53-57, 100, 140η. See also assimilation, chemical industries, March, re­ search and development Sea Lion, 226, 227η, 228, 244η. See also Germany, initiation, retalia­ tion, United Kingdom Sibert, Major General William, 24, 29η, 74, 196η. See also Ameri­ can Expeditionary Force, Chemi­ cal Warfare Service, Gas Service Smuts, Jan C., 45, 222η; Smuts Report, 221. See also air power, strategic use of gas, United Kingdom Soviet Union, 210, 234, 235η, 836η, 246, 251, 252, 252η, 26I, 261η, 271η, 28ο, 28οη, 3°ο. 303η, 315. 316; German-Soviet Union nonaggression pact, 227; JapanSoviet Union neutrality pact, 252. See also retaliation, U.S. chemical warfare, United King­ dom Speer, Albert, 237η. See also Ger­ many, Hitler, rational leader­ ship State Department, 123, 126, 158η, i86, 292; Geneva Gas Confer­ ence, 98-103; Paris Peace Con­ ference, 53-56, 95; prewar plan­ ning, 125-26; Washington Arms Conference, 61-67; World Dis­ armament Conference, 111-21; WW II planning, 198-99, 262-66

Index Stimson, Henry, 111, 115, 119η, igg, 201, 282η. See also U.S. chemical warfare Strategic Bombing Survey, 224η, 241η, 258η, 277η. See also air power, Germany, Japan, stra­ tegic use of gas strategic use of gas: during WW I, 8n, 45-46, 49; interwar years, 65, 117, 122, 149-50, 162-65, 169, 179, 189; WW II, 202, 207, 282, 284, 286η, 297; civil defense, 169-70; comparison with nu­ clear weapons, 303-04; vulnera­ bility to, in Germany and U.K., 245. See also air power, Douhet, Harris, Mitchell, projections of future gas war, propaganda strategy, Pacific War, 1945, 269-70. See also coalition warfare, U.S. chemical warfare Summerall, General Charles, 133η, 138η, 152η, 182η. See also as­ similation Survey of the Military Establish­ ment, 1929, 136-38, 175η. See also Chemical Warfare Service, Fries, Hoover, readiness-defen­ sive tactical employment, see effective­ ness, limitation of target, tacti­ cal characteristics tactical nuclear weapons, see nu­ clear weapons Tarawa, 287. See also U.S. chemi­ cal warfare Taylor, Colonel John, 104η. See also American Legion, chemical industries, Chemical Warfare Service, Fries, propaganda technological advantage: during WW I, 6, 11, 38, 39; interwar years, 53, 56, 63, 86; WW II, 233, 234. See also disarmament, Ger­ many, preparedness, readinessdefensive, research and develop­ ment, science and technology, U.S. chemical warfare Tojo, General, 260. See also initia­ tion, Japan

training, gas warfare: during WW I, 21, 27, 33, 37; interwar years, 85, 114, 128, 131, 134, 137, 142, 146-47, 152, 155; WW II, 266; civil defense, 170. See also as­ similation, Germany, intelli­ gence, Japan, readiness-defen­ sive, readiness-offensive, United Kingdom Truman, President Harry S., 267, 281, 282η, 3oo. See also U.S. chemical warfare United Kingdom, 245, 268; 313-14; Geneva Gas Protocol, 208η, 209io, 215, 227; Peace Conference, 52-56; Washington Conference, 63, 66n, 215; World Disarma­ ment Conference, 119-20, 208η; WW I, 7, 8, 13, 28η, 41η, 45; WW II, 198-230; assimilation, 225, 228, 229η; civil defense, 212-13, 218-20, 225, 229η; coali­ tion restraints, 217-18, 227; legal restraints, 198, 209-10, 215-16, 227-28; policy, 207-08, 210-11, 2i7, 225-29, 244η, 246; public opinion, 212-13, 219-21, 227, 229; readiness, 209, 213-15, 218-25, 228-29; threat perception, 207, 209, 213-16, 224, 227, 229-30. See also Churchill, Harris, initia­ tion, retaliation, Royal Air Force, Sea Lion United Nations, 266, 315 unrestricted war: WW I, 5; WW II, 210, 249, 314. See also as­ similation, disarmament, limita­ tion by target, limitation by type agent, projections of future gas war, propaganda U.S. Air Force, 305. See also air power, Army Air Corps, Stra­ tegic Bombing Survey U.S. Chemical Warfare Committee (USCWC), 272, 278η; readiness reports, 1 Jul 44, 278η; ι Jan 45, 265η, 266η; ι Jul 45, 276η, 277nf, 278η. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. chemical warfare

Index U.S. chemical warfare: appropriations, 89, 90, n 6 n , 136, 136n, 140-44, 156; assimilation, 10, 12, 39f, 40, 71, 72. 150-57. 284, 285. 291, 296, 298, 306; civilian attitudes, 16, 17, 21, 32, 47, 48, 67-71, 267, 280-83. See also Roosevelt, Hoover, Hughes, Wilson; effectiveness, 3, 10, 11, 24-29, 33-37. 44. 152-57. 269n, 282-85; escalation, 9-12, 30-33, 37, 38, 41-47, 163-66, 299; intelligence, 174, 175, 200, 266, 278, 280, 283; military attitudes: Air Corps, 163-66, 284, 285; Army, ig-23, 26, 27, 35, 37, 40, 41. 62, 63, 75, 76, 80-86, 88-92, 99n, 104, 105, 110-15, 117-27, 134-38. 151-57. 193, 196, 202, 283, 285, 288, 291, 292-97; Navy, 66n, 68, 75, 112n, 115, 122, 158-62, 199, 284, 285; planning: W a r Department General Staff, 62, 63, 99, 100, 111-13, 117-22, 128-31, 137, 138, 151, 152, 193, 195, 201, 263-81; Joint Board, 122, 125n, 146n, 151, 205; JCS, 1 5 m , 157, 268-83, 285; CCS, 204, 205, 218, 226n, 268n, 270n, 280; policy: W W I, 24, 45n, 1585g; interwar years, 51, 75, g2-94, 108-13, 117-18, 121-22, 131, 13839, 149-51, 159-60; p r e - W W II, 149-52, 160, 162-64, 186-91; W W II, 193, 199-201, 204-07, 249-51, 262-85; problems of employment, 3339. 152-55; readiness: W W I, 7, 10, 19-21, 25; interwar years, 107, 127-48, 155-57.

187.

194.

195;

W W

II,

197, 198, 200-04, 265, 272-78, 293-95; Navy, 158-62; Air Corps, 163-67; research and development, 11, 22, 23, 38, 131, 132, 142, 143, 155, 157;

354

training, 26-29, 37, 128, 130, 134-35, 147, 201, 203, 266 Versailles, see Paris Peace Conference, Navy Department "Victory or Destruction" Program, 237. See also Germany, Hitler, rational leadership Vietnam, 305n, 309, 310n Waitt, Major General Alden, 166, 277n. See also Chemical Warfare Service W a r Department, and CWS: postW W I, 73-93; interwar years, 126-48; expansion problems, 23n; Geneva Gas Protocol, 99n, 10m, 105; Washington Arms Conference, 62, 68n; W o r l d Disarmament Conference, 111-20; policy, 75, 94, 113-14, 118, 12223. 152-53; G.O 54. 1920, 87; G.O. 42, 1921, 92; G.O. 24, 7922, 93; G.O. 26, 1922, 93, 146n; National Defense Act, 1920, 84-85; Policy 467, 1924, 127, 127n, 131, 131n; Policy 566, 1930, 138-39; roles and missions, 78. See also assimilation, Chemical Warfare Service, readinessdefensive, readiness-offensive W a r of National Liberation, 312. See also Vietnam Washington Arms Conference, 50, 51, 61-71, 78, 93, 95, 97, 98, 101, 102, 106, 108-10, 113, 123, 126, 127, 149, 160, 177, 175n, 215, 246, 292. See also Fries, legal restraints, prohibition, propaganda, public opinion Wedemeyer, General Albert, 27gn. See also China Wells, H . G., 180. See also propaganda William II, Emperor, 13, See also Germany Wilson, President Woodrow, i6n, 18, 19, 21n, 46, 54-60. See also U.S. chemical warfare

Index Woodring, Harry, 195. See also readiness-defensive W o r l d Disarmament Conference, 149, 174, 185n, 300n; Draft Convention, Article 39, 110; European positions, 109, 2o8n; MacDonald Plan, 119-20; State Department position, 111, 113-15, 118; W a r Department position,

355

112. See also disarmament, legal restraints, prohibition W o r l d W a r I, 1-46; employment of gas, 7-46 W o r l d W a r II, 191-289 Yemen, 310 Ypres, 3-6, 9-11, 14, 16, 17, 18n, 37n,38, 236