Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence [1 ed.] 9780807899618, 9780807834169

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for

Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

Cheddi Jagan

Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

and the Politics of Power

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

Cheddi Jagan Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

and the Politics of Power

British Guiana’s Struggle for Independence

Colin A. Palmer The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

This book was published with the assistance of the H. Eugene and Lillian Youngs Lehman Fund of the University of North Carolina Press. A complete list of books published in the Lehman Series appears at the end of the book.

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© 2010 THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS All rights reserved. Set in Merlo and Myriad Pro types by Tseng Information Systems, Inc. Manufactured in the United States of America. The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. The University of North Carolina Press has been a member of the Green Press Initiative since 2003. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Palmer, Colin A., 1944– Cheddi Jagan and the politics of power : British Guiana’s struggle for independence / Colin A. Palmer. p. cm. — (H. Eugene and Lillian Youngs Lehman series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8078-3416-9 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Guyana—History—1803–1966. 2. Guyana—Politics and government—1803–1966. 3. Great Britain—Colonies—America—History. 4. Jagan, Cheddi. I. Title. F2384.P35 2010 988.1—dc22 2010018132 14 13 12 11 105 4 3 2 1

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

( Contents )

Acknowledgments ixIntroduction 3 (  ) The Imperial Coup d’Etat 13 (  ) Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage 63

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(  ) Taking Stock 95 (  ) Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana 135 (  ) Searching for Cheddi and the PPP 157 (  ) The Politics and Trauma of Race 191 (  ) The Politics of Power 241 (  ) Fairbain Redux 293

Conclusion 309Epilogue 315 ( Appendix  ) Memorandum Issued by the Advisory Committee Appointed by the Governor under the Emergency Order, 1953 317 ( Appendix  ) Allegations against Sydney King and His Response 319 Notes 325Bibliography 347Index 351

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( Tables, Illustrations, and Map )

Tables (  ) Deposits and Withdrawals from the Government’s

Savings Bank, August 19–September 30, 1953 33

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(  ) Estimated Cost of Breakfast [Lunch] for a Family of Five,

1935–1936 and 1948 109 (  ) Estimated Cost of Dinner [Supper] for a Family of Five,

1935–1936 and 1948 109 (  ) Estimated Cost of Tea [Breakfast] for a Family of Five,

1933–1938 and 1953–1954 110 (  ) Estimated Cost of Breakfast [Lunch] for a Family of Five,

1933–1938 and 1953–1954 110 (  ) Estimated Cost of Dinner [Supper] for a Family of Five,

1933–1938 and 1953–1954 111 (  ) Illiteracy Rates by Race, ca. 1946 126

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

(  ) Illiteracy Rates by Age Group, ca. 1946 127 (  ) Illiteracy Rates by Geographic District, ca. 1946 127 (  ) Voters by Constituency, 1957 152 (  ) Sugar Estate Lands in British Guiana, ca. 1951 162 (  ) Trends in Population Growth by Race, 1936–1960 238 (  ) Racial Distribution of the Guianese Population,

December 1964 239 (  ) Results of the December 1964 Elections by Party 239

Illustrations Ministers of the 1953 Jagan administration 20 Jagan and his supporters at a post–coup d’état rally, Georgetown, October 11, 1953 52 Jagan addressing a preelection PPP rally, Georgetown, 1964 287

Map

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British Guiana in the 1950s 2

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( Acknowledgments )

I owe a debt of gratitude to the staffs of the various archives who aided me in my research. They include the fine public servants at the Public Record Office, London; the National Archives at College Park, Maryland; the Walter Rodney National Archives in Georgetown, Guyana; and the Cheddi Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

Jagan Research Centre, also in Georgetown. My good friends and colleagues, Franklin W. Knight, Bridget Brereton, and Nicole Burrowes-Casserly read the entire manuscript and provided me with invaluable criticism. This is a much better book because of their careful reading and their thoughtful, candid evaluation. I thank them most heartily and sincerely. Allison Palmer deserves a special commendation. She deciphered my handwriting, typed several drafts of the manuscript, and took a special interest in it as it evolved into a book. I remain in her debt.

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

Cheddi Jagan

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and the Politics of Power

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

British Guiana in the 1950s

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( Introduction )

“I does watchman at Clarke and Merton by night and I does get a small piece.” Thus began the statement that the frightened young man gave to the police in Georgetown on the afternoon of August 9, 1964. Emanuel Fairbain, alias Batson, had been picked up by members of the Crime Squad allegedly for bombing Freedom House, the headquarters of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), on July 31. Of African descent, Fairbain was thirty-one years old and supported the opposition party, the People’s National Congress (PNC). His arrest and mistreatment in jail and subsequent events revealed the cancer that had been affecting British Guiana’s body politic for the past decade. British Guiana’s politicians and residents took sides in ugly disputes that were as much manifestations of the corrosive effects of colonialism on a society and its people as they were the consequences of mediocre leadership, politically inspired racial animus, and the machinations of outside interests. Fairbain was alone in his room at the Elizabeth guesthouse when about eight policemen dressed in plain clothes burst in at “about 2 or 3 o’clock in the morning.” As he would later confess to a Court of Inquiry, Fairbain had been up drinking and dancing with friends until about midnight. Thereafter, he partied with a girl in his room, but the night of revelry ended on a bitter note as “myself and the girl had a quarrel and I gave her a couple of cuffs be-

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cause when I was upstairs she took more money than she supposed to have. I gave her $4.00 and I had $7.00 on the table and she take that too.” Fairbain had just returned from escorting his guest downstairs when the policemen invaded his room. Obviously on a serious mission, they began to search his belongings. One of them, a man he later identified as Clarke, looked under his bed and discovered “a rice bag.” “Oh God, he got um yah,” Clarke announced and asked Fairbain for his gun since the bag contained ammunition. Fairbain denied that he had a gun; then, “All the eight men started beating me all over the body with their fists. I shouted ‘Oh God, don’t beat me.’ They beat me in the guts and head.” Fairbain reported that the policemen took him in a van to Brickdam, the local jail, and put him in an empty room on the ground floor. “There was no light inside,” he recalled; “they start beating me again and some more come in.” The officers “started kicking me up. They tied my balls with cord and pulled it tight. I then found myself on the ground on the concrete and wet. They had stripped me as I went in. I fainted away when they pulled the cord tight. I started to cry. . . . They actually raised me off the ground with the cord.” The victim said he recognized Officers Hintzen, Powers, and Lambert. When Fairbain declined to cooperate with the officers or “talk upon myself,” Officer Lambert left the room, only to return and proclaim, “Alright he can talk now—he playing harden.” Then, according to Fairbain, Lambert “let go a tear gas shell in the room. They all run out and left me in. I begged them to come and give me water. Nobody came. Some time after the same Lambert came back again and asked me if I am ready to give him a statement. I said, ‘Officer me ain’t know nothing.’” Trying a different tactic, Inspector Grimmond sat on a bench beside Fairbain, telling him: “Boy you best you tell me all you got to tell me because me sorry for you. Them will beat you bad in this place.” Reentering the room, Lambert advised Fairbain to “go there to the pipe and wet your balls there.” Fairbain said that “the sink in the room was a bit high for me” and: My balls were swollen up but even on my toes I would only just meet up to the sink and I tried to put water on myself and then a dark skinned Indian chap named Kandasammy kicked me on my side and then Mr. Lambert said “bring him out here.” I was trembling with the pain from my balls. Lambert said “I will make you talk now.” He then fixed something, told them to hold my hands which they did and I begged him “oh officer, oh officer.” He said “You will get to know me. I’m a very quiet chap but I’m very hard,” and then he discharged a tear gas ()

Introduction

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on my balls. I fall down but they pull me back up and propped me up because I can’t stand up. Then they clap me on both ears the same time then when I catch my breath I start to holler. The abuse continued. When Officer Lambert believed the torture had the desired effect, he asked the detainee, “Are you ready to tell me what you have to tell me now?” The interrogator listed a number of bombings that had occurred in Georgetown, accusing Fairbain of knowing about them. “Me ain’t know nothing about them thing da,” he responded. “You ain’t talk, you going dead here today,” Lambert threatened. “When I done with you, you ain’t good for yourself,” he warned. Eventually Fairbain broke under the physical abuse and interrogation, assuring the officers, “If you all write anything I’m going to sign it.” As he gave his statement, “the Indian Inspector was doing the writing and he write quick and again I was saying what to put down.” Fairbain signed the statement but “I was in too much pain to read it.” Thereafter, the physical abuse ceased but the interrogation continued. Four days later, Fairbain was hospitalized for his injuries.1 The Fairbain case became a cause célèbre, capturing the attention of the public, the governor, the premier and his Council of Ministers, the secretary of state for the colonies, and the American consul general. It laid bare the serious disabilities of the law enforcement system, the central role that violence was playing in the polity, and the crippling burden of the racial politics that had come to define the society. In short, Fairbain became the metaphorical representation of a bleeding Guiana. A descendant of enslaved Africans, his story could have been replicated in any of the Anglophone Caribbean societies. An urban resident, functionally literate, Fairbain existed just outside the margins of destitution in an environment where violence was systemic, where the day-to-day challenges of life were debilitating, and where a better future for people like him seemed an illusory promise. A prolonged colonial experience had ratified social inequity, devaluing the many and privileging the few. A victim as well as a survivor, Fairbain was, however, not a candidate for sainthood. The Guianese society that had produced Fairbain bore the scars of its history, and the tragedy of his life was their cruel incarnation. When it inaugurated its new constitution in April 1953, British Guiana celebrated the promise of a new beginning. But the exhilaration was temporary as the colony’s past was circumscribing its present, and its new leaders were actively stirring the cauldrons of disunity and violence, churning promise into despair. Fairbain was an antihero; his story, with all of its forbidding rawness, was also Introduction

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()

that of his country, reflecting all too well the consequences of the thwarted promise of 1953. Although Emanuel Fairbain opens and closes this book, he is not its subject, however. He remains the symbol of a larger tragedy—that of a society whose travail was the product of a particular history, unkind in its genesis and its passages, made worse by the manipulative excesses of mediocre leadership and the triumph of interested prejudice over principle.

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SITUATED ON THE northeastern coast of South America between the contemporary nations of Suriname and Venezuela, Guyana is approximately 83,000 square miles in area. Previously the largest of the British colonies in the Caribbean, its size is roughly equivalent to that of England, Scotland, and Wales combined. The country is distinguished by the optically pleasing variation in its topography. In addition to a coastal belt with its trade winds and agreeable temperature of ninety degrees or less, it boasts a forest zone and a savannah. Most of the inhabitants reside on the narrow coastal belt, lying between the Corentyne River in the east and the Pomeroon River in the west. It is the economic heart of the country, the locus of its agricultural base and principal industries. But it is a zone that rests below sea level and is subject to the unruly floods caused by a frequently angry ocean. To contain this hostile natural phenomenon, successive governments have constructed extensive networks of seawalls, dikes, and drainage systems. Guyana is a land of spectacular beauty. Adjacent to the coastal belt is a series of dense forests, comprising most of the country’s area. Farther to the west, the Pakaraima mountain range dominates a rugged terrain, the culmination of which is the majestic Mount Roraima which ascends to 9,094 feet. The savannah grassland area is divided into the Rupununi, located in the southwest and adjacent to Brazil. The Intermediate Savannah occupies a strip behind the northwestern coast between the Demerara and Corentyne rivers. It is a land of magnificent waterfalls, with the awesome Kaieteur Fall dropping a breathtaking 741 feet. The country’s unsurpassed physical beauty, however, masks its enormous communication difficulties. The interior, for the most part, is accessible only by air. Guyana’s people are as ethnically diverse as the terrain they inhabit. In 1961, for example, its population was 575,270. Of that number, Indians comprised 279,460 and Africans 190,380. Racially mixed groups accounted for 66,180; Amerindians, 22,860; Chinese, 3,550; people of Portuguese descent, 7,610; and other Europeans, 3,550. When Christopher Columbus traversed the Guiana coastline in 1498, the

()

Introduction

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picturesque land did not immediately capture the imagination of European explorers. A sustained interest developed only when Sir Walter Raleigh, another celebrated explorer, sought to establish an English colony between the Orinoco and Amazon rivers. Intrigued by the legend of El Dorado and its fabled wealth, he undertook a spirited quest to locate it. To advance his search, Raleigh sailed some four hundred miles up the Orinoco in 1595, a reconnaissance mission that led him to write his classic Discoverie of the Large[,] Rich and Beautiful Empire of Guiana, a book that generated much popular interest in Europe. Raleigh did not receive official support from the English for his colonial scheme. The French and the Dutch were not so restrained, and their citizens proceeded to establish settlements in the area before 1620. The Dutch seemed to be the more aggressive of the two, creating a foothold at the Cayenne River in 1614 and a second at Fort Nassau in Berbice, and a third in Essequibo a few years later. This was a continuation of a practice initiated by the Spaniards and the Portuguese whereby the Europeans merely took possession of land to which they had no just entitlement. In 1746 the British settled in Demerara, which would later join Berbice and Essequibo as separate colonies. These three possessions became the foundation of an expanding plantation system, based primarily on the cultivation of sugarcane with the labor of enslaved Africans. Despite their distance from Europe, these colonies were never immune to the conflicts on that continent and the shifting balance of power. In 1814 the Dutch ceded its Guiana colonies to the British and in 1831 Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice were united, obtaining the nomenclature of British Guiana. Two years later the British Parliament passed an act liberating the enslaved Africans, but this did not take full effect until 1838. The ensuing labor shortage on the sugar plantations led to a short-lived scheme to encourage Portuguese immigrants from Madeira. Far more successful and long lived was the importation of Indians from South Asia as indentured workers. Between 1838 and 1917 about 240,000 Indians immigrated to the colony. British Guiana was the prototype of a colony of exploitation. A tiny white minority governed the growing Indian, African, and Amerindian populations in its own interest. In 1847, for example, only 561 persons were eligible to vote in any elections to the representative bodies the British inherited from the Dutch. Recognizing the oligarchic nature of its administration in a changing colonial environment, the British government introduced some reforms in 1891, expanding the franchise but also simultaneously increasing the

Introduction

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()

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power of the British-appointed governor. In 1928 the Crown instituted a new constitution that once again expanded the franchise but retained property and literacy qualifications. It provided for the election of fourteen members to a Legislative Council of twenty-nine and an Executive Committee named by the governor, who could use his reserve power to veto any legislation he did not support. The 1928 constitution was not a significant step in the direction of representative government. Its restrictive franchise, the dominance of nominated members in the Legislative Council and on the Executive Committee, and the governor’s possession of the reserve power meant that effective power rested with the Crown and its vassals, local or foreign. The social conditions in British Guiana and elsewhere in the Anglo-Caribbean colonies were rapidly changing, however, and a nascent nationalism was evident. Several colonies, such as Jamaica and Trinidad, were the sites of social unrest in the 1930s. These protests forced the colonial authorities to introduce a series of constitutional reforms that were intended to place some colonies on the path to self-government. Recognizing that the 1928 constitution was anachronistic, the British government appointed a commission in 1950 “to review the franchise, the composition of the Legislature and the Executive Council, and any other related matters, in the light of the economic and political development of the Colony, and to make recommendations.” Its chairman was Sir E. J. Waddington, a prominent colonial administrator and former governor of Barbados. The commission was greeted with considerable enthusiasm, and many people testified before it or submitted memoranda. This demonstration of interest enabled the commission to conclude that it was able “to become acquainted with all representative shades of opinion.” The Waddington Commission recommended significant changes in the colony’s constitution. The new document provided for universal adult suffrage and the establishment of a bicameral legislature. The lower chamber, known as the House of Assembly, would consist of twenty-seven members, twenty-four of whom were to be elected and the remaining three ex officio members, namely the officials who served as the chief secretary, the financial secretary, and the attorney general. The upper chamber—the State Council—would be comprised of nine members appointed by the governor, six at his discretion, two on the recommendation of the six ministers elected from the House of Assembly, and one recommended by the opposition members of that body. There was also to be an Executive Council composed of ten

()

Introduction

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members: six ministers chosen by the House of Assembly, the three ex officio members of that body, and a minister without portfolio selected by the State Council. The governor served as president of the Executive Council with a casting vote. He retained extensive reserve powers that he could exercise in the interest of “public order, public faith or good government.” The constitution gave the State Council the power to delay money bills emanating from the House of Assembly for three months and all other bills for one year. Introducing the ministerial system, the constitution gave the elected representatives of the people some semblance of power. The six elected ministers were in charge of the various government departments and the subjects that fell under their respective portfolios. But as a check on their authority, the governor could use his reserve powers to kill any legislative measure with which he disapproved. Notwithstanding such limitations, the prospect of elections under universal adult suffrage energized the populace, their wouldbe leaders, and the newly formed political parties.2 Founded in 1950, the People’s Progressive Party was the first modern political party to emerge in the colony. It was the child of an earlier organization, the Political Affairs Committee, that had been created in 1946 by a young, charismatic dentist of Indian ancestry. Of relatively humble origins, Cheddi Jagan attended universities in the United States where he met and married Janet Rosenberg, a Jewish American. Politically conscious and energetic, the couple began to play an active role in the political life of Guiana when Cheddi returned home in 1943. Along with others, they founded the PPP seven years later, with Cheddi as the leader and Mrs. Jagan as the general secretary and editor of Thunder, the party’s organ. The fledgling organization solidified its support when it attracted Linden Forbes Burnham, a brilliant young African barrister, to its ranks. His election as chairman of the party effected a political and symbolic marriage between the Indians and the Africans, the two largest ethnic groups in the society.3 The implementation of the new constitution in 1953 inaugurated a turbulent period in British Guiana’s history. This was a giddy moment filled with the exciting promise of change, emanating not from above but from the folks below. The heady exuberance of the moment was succeeded in short measure by turmoil, dashed hopes, and the paralysis of a divided polity. This book is about the ascendancy to office of the new leaders in the spring of 1953, their removal by means of an imperial coup d’état 133 days later, and the colony’s subsequent crisis of spirit. It is an examination of the ways in which the colonial regime joined hands with the United States and local elites to destroy a

Introduction

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()

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political leader whom they distrusted and feared, further maiming the body politic. But the book also has another emphasis. It addresses the social, racial, and economic roots of the political culture and behavior in Guiana. Cheddi Jagan stands at the center of the book’s story. Resolutely committed to British Guiana’s interests as he saw them, Jagan never wavered from his objectives despite the withering criticisms of his opponents at home and the ignoble machinations of the Americans and the British. Beginning with Jagan’s first electoral victory in 1953, this book traces his political odyssey to 1964, when he succumbed to the combined power of his domestic and foreign opponents. This book is based almost entirely on the extensive manuscript sources located in the Public Record Office in London; the National Archives in College Park, Maryland; and the Cheddi Jagan Research Centre and the Walter Rodney National Archives, both located in Georgetown, Guyana. In an attempt to privilege the voices of the principal actors in the story that I recount, I quote them extensively in the narrative. It is organized both thematically and chronologically, as each chapter is devoted to the discussion of an important issue in the colony’s history between 1953 and 1964. The chapters, particularly those in the second half of the book, begin with a brief review of the context within which its theme is situated. This approach is intended to facilitate the reader’s comprehension of the chapter’s focus and as a reminder of the previous issues discussed. The book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 describes the election of the PPP to office in 1953, its brief tenure and swift denouement. Chapter 2 focuses on the colonial regime’s failed attempts to contain Dr. Jagan, destroy the PPP, and find a scapegoat for the misjudgments associated with the coup that removed the Jagan government from office. Chapter 3 elucidates how the Guianese people struggled to understand themselves in the aftermath of the trauma of 1953. Chapter 4 considers the new Guiana they imagined and Jagan’s return to the seat of government, albeit with reduced executive power. The second half of this book explores the colony’s painful divisions as it struggled to define its future. Chapter 5 excavates Cheddi Jagan’s ideological journeys and their impact on the new society he wanted to call into being. The emergence of a cancerous racial politics is the emphasis of Chapter 6. Chapter 7 captures the agony of a society as it writhes in pain from the blows administered by its leaders and external interests. It chronicles Jagan’s fate as the Americans and the British, in alliance with some local elites, delivered their coup de grâce. The final chapter returns to the case of Emanuel Fair(  )

Introduction

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bain. His tragic story encapsulates all that had gone wrong since 1953 and the perverted promise of a new beginning in British Guiana.

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THROUGHOUT THIS BOOK, I use the nomenclatures Indian and IndoGuianese interchangeably. Similarly, African and African Guianese refer to the peoples of African descent. I also refer to the colony as British Guiana or Guiana until it received its independence in 1966, when it adopted Guyana as its new name. Although I am aware many scholars maintain that “race” is a social construct and lacks a biological basis, I use the term throughout the manuscript in the way it would have been understood in the 1950s and 1960s. There are no heroes in this story, with the possible exception of the Guianese people who were exhilarated by the tantalizing promise of 1953 and who emerged from the trauma of the succeeding decade bruised but not vanquished. It is, for the most part, a dismal chronicle of a people on the verge of social death, and, like the Fairbain atrocity, it is a tale of punishments endured, blood spilled, and the fracturing of a colony’s soul. In many respects, it is also a study of a country’s unrealized promise, the perils of mediocre political leadership, and the diabolical policies of powerful outsiders acting in their own interest with the willing compliance of local enablers. The resulting tragedy was a British Guianese one. But it was, in a wider sense, a colonial tragedy too.

Introduction

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The Imperial Coup d’Etat

There was the eerie suspicion, even a perverse expectation, that something unusual was in the air, but the day itself was ordinary, warm, and sunny. Georgetown was rife with rumors but no one knew how the day would end. The ministers of government were said to be in their offices hurriedly retrieving their papers and destroying some of them. Barely 133 days in office, the young government had outraged the colonial authorities by its unapologetic pugnacity, its noisy assertion of an unrepentant socialism, and the exhibition of a brash independence, at least rhetorically. October 9, 1953, was the day when the fledgling regime would receive a harsh lesson in the exercise of the might of a colonial power. British troops disembarked the day before as a preemptive strike against an imagined resistance to the impending imperial action. The arrival of the British troops on October 8 created a subdued excitement in the capital city as a few curious residents gathered to observe their movements and to speculate about their business in the colony. Some five hundred strong, the soldiers had left Jamaica aboard the HMS Superb a few days earlier. There were no welcoming ceremonies for them as there was no time for such military etiquette. The Colonial Office had prepared the men to expect trouble from the Guianese people, but an uneasy calm and a sense of

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

controlled resignation prevailed. Describing the pulse of Georgetown during those difficult days, American consul general William P. Maddox wrote: The surface scene in Georgetown is orderly and serene. Shopping goes on as usual. The only street excitement is provided by the marching military band assisting in the change-of-guard ceremony at Government House. Hundreds of cyclists follow the band’s procession with unfeigned enjoyment and admiration. At the height of the crisis, a boxing match took place, a horseracing meet was held, and a cricket contest was played with Trinidad. The only alteration of schedule noted in the paper was the postponement of bingo on October 9. Children went to school and played in the street as usual. Of passing note was the greeting of a journalist at the [Cheddi] Jagan threshold by [his] young “Joe” on his fourth birthday, brandishing an atomic-ray play gun!1

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Jai Narine Singh, then minister of local government and social welfare, recalled the behavior of the invading troops on the ninth. “The British forces,” Narine Singh said, “landed in Guyana [sic] armed to the teeth. And, with bayonets fixed on their rifles and armoured cars patrolling the streets of Georgetown, the British soldiers generated an air of hostility towards the inhabitants, seemingly waiting for an opportunity to attack anyone who dared to raise his voice in protest against the military overthrow of the popularly elected Government of the people.”2 The troops, Narine Singh noted, expected to be greeted by “a hostile people,” but they “did not have to fire a single shot, when they landed armed to the teeth.” According to him, the troops were “amazed” by the mood of the Guianese people, who “appeared to be in mourning. The streets were practically deserted with hardly anyone venturing outdoors. Even the curious children were kept in doors by their parents, and guardians, so that the British military, egged on by the few conservatives in the colony, would not have an excuse to demonstrate their firepower.”3 Despite their outward calm, the Guianese people were bracing themselves for a new phase in their political life after their heady experiment in limited self-government. It had begun formally in April 1953, when the colony conducted its first election with universal adult suffrage. This had been accomplished under the aegis of the new constitution recommended by the Waddington Commission. The People’s Progressive Party was the best organized of the parties that contested the election. The other parties included the National Democratic Party and the Guiana National Party. Unlike the others, the National Democratic Party and the Guiana National Party, the (  )

The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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PPP had a colonywide organization and offered an extensive program that promised progressive change. Its leading personages were its founders Cheddi and Janet Jagan, and Forbes Burnham. Although Dr. Jagan had no formally designated position in the party, he was its acknowledged leader. Two weeks before the historic April 27 election, a new governor arrived to assume his duties in the colony. Sir Alfred Savage had been the governor of Barbados, where he had enjoyed cordial relationships with that colony’s politicians, including trade unionist Grantley Adams, who later became the premier and head of government. Savage took comfort from the knowledge that Adams had warmly recommended him to his colleagues in Guiana, clearly an asset in his difficult assignment. The new governor, however, had no deep understanding of the political quagmire into which he had been thrust. Recognizing that the old political arena was going to be transformed, the PPP undertook an aggressive colonywide election campaign. Janet Jagan proved herself to be a genius at political organizing and laid the foundation for a stunning victory. The party nominated candidates in all of the twentyfour constituencies, winning eighteen of them. Its principal opposition, the National Democratic Party, won two seats and independents triumphed in the remaining four. Dr. Jagan faced three opponents in his Port Mourant constituency but won 82 percent of the votes that were cast. Burnham received 74 percent of the votes in his Georgetown constituency. Observing the results from a distance, the American consul general, who resided in Trinidad, noted the “substantial one-sidedness” in favor of the PPP. He thought the party’s success “may be attributed in large measure to cohesive and effective party organization, against which there were aligned only splintered opponents.”4 In its election campaign the PPP presented itself as a reformist party, one that was stridently nationalist in its ideological orientation. But in the context of the British Guiana of 1953, to espouse self-determination and independence for the colony was almost tantamount to engaging in subversive activity in the eyes of the imperial country and its local officials and allies. In its campaign literature, the party characterized the colony as “merely a department, a fragment in the overall pattern of [British] domination extending through the West Indies, Africa, Malaya, etc.” British Guiana, the party maintained, “has no independent voice in its own affairs.” Since “all problems and solutions” in the colony “are subjected to supervision by the imperialist rulers,” the “problems arising in it will always be solved in a way suitable to imperialists.” Understanding that political power resided in the hands of the metropolitan country, the PPP asserted that its task was to formulate “a policy which can work under these conditions of dependence.” ConseThe Imperial Coup d’Etat

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quently, “such a policy will be able to cater only for reforms, for patches on the torn and rugged fabric of colonial reality.” Such obstacles notwithstanding, the struggle for independence must not waver. All over the world the people of the colonies are fighting for independence. In Malaya, in Africa, in Indo China, the fire burns brightly. We who live in the West Indies and British Guiana must consider ourselves one unit in the international colonial liberation movement; we must fight for independence; striking blow after blow at the imperialist stronghold, weakening it and finally breaking loose from the shackles.5

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Such rhetoric had threatening implications for the continuation of British rule in Guiana. But the policy proposals that the PPP issued during the campaign were notably reformist in tone and emphasis. There was, for example, no plan to expropriate land for the benefit of the landless. Instead, the party proposed to “carry out a program of land reclamation whereby large amounts of land along the coastlands and rivers abandoned to bush and swamp can be made available for agriculture.” It promised “an equitable distribution of agricultural lands” and a “special emphasis” on “a more effective utilization” of those resources. The PPP also planned to create an agricultural bank with the capital to provide credit for “the acquisition, development, and maintenance of agricultural holdings.” It endorsed “proper and adequate salaries and wages” for workers and said it “will do everything to encourage the growth of strong and militant Trade Unions to protect and improve the conditions of employment of all workers.” The party announced that it stood for “free education for all” and promised that under its administration “we will see that equal educational opportunities are provided for all regardless of race, creed, social origin, income, or geographical locations.” Deploring the “present rut into which the housing situation all over the colony has been allowed to sink,” the PPP advocated the construction of government-assisted housing. It committed itself to abrogating “the existing laws and regulations which restrict the civil liberties of the people such as banning of individuals, books, films.”6 These and other proposals by the PPP, such as its support for free trade and universal adult suffrage and the “public ownership of all public utilities,” were hardly revolutionary in spirit. Its plans lacked any marked ideological orientation and were responding to the needs of the colony and its people, particularly those whose interests had been traditionally ignored by the imperial authorities. These were the sentiments of young nationalists troubled (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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by the enormity of the problems British Guiana confronted, energized by the challenges they posed, and impatient with the slow pace of change. Noisy and rhetorically pugnacious, the party’s spokespersons frightened the guardians of the status quo, creating in them a paranoia that warped their judgment about its plans for the country. The opposition to the PPP was led most vociferously by the press. In a society where the written word carried excessive authority, newspapers exerted a major influence on the construction and shaping of the political consciousness of the citizenry. The Daily Argosy, perhaps the most stridently anti-PPP, consistently condemned its leaders as communist, declined to endorse any of its candidates for office, and derisively characterized the party’s electoral symbol as “a poison cup.” In addition to the formidable opposition of the press, the PPP confronted the strong resistance of the Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA), the union that represented the workers in the sugar industry. Led by Lionel A. Luckhoo, a prominent barrister of Indian descent, the union funded the publication of a strong indictment of the PPP in a supplement to the daily newspapers just days before the election. The hierarchy of the influential Christian denominations, especially the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, also voiced their opposition to the PPP. The PPP’s spectacular victory at the polls produced anxiety and fear among its opponents. The elite groups viewed it as an aberration, a triumph of evil forces, and the advent of Armageddon. The Daily Argosy blamed the disappointing electoral results on people in the towns and villages who “nurture a kind of dull resentment against authority in all its forms.” The paper recognized that some of the voters nursed grievances, but it wondered “how far these grievances and frustrations are genuine, and how far their own fault does not matter; it is enough that they are resentful and hence lean towards the party that preaches revolutionary change and promises something for nothing.” The Argosy thought the rural people and the sugar industry workers were victims of propaganda directed at the “ignorant.” These people were “isolated by illiteracy and from the vehicles of truth.” It also denounced “the disgraceful apathy” of those who had much to lose in the event of a PPP victory. Such persons preferred their “leisure and cocktail parties to the hard work of political organization and the exposure of the electioneering platform.”7 Many other voices of privilege were contemptuous of the political judgment of the unlettered members of society. These people had been manipulated by the PPP, its critics alleged, and duped into believing that the promised land was at hand. A. G. King, himself a defeated candidate for election, The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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thought the voters had been “swayed by inflammatory speeches and silly promises.” C. Cambridge and C. Beresford, both trades unionists, said the PPP had been swept into office on a wave “of irresponsibility and ignorance.” John T. Clarke, the deputy mayor of New Amsterdam, seemed to agree. He claimed “the people were fooled so much by the PPP that they were not prepared to listen to anyone else but a PPP candidate. . . . When you go among people some of whom are illiterate and make all of these promises and say ‘if I become the government, I would do this and do that’ it would be difficult for people who are illiterate not to accept your promises.”8 Illiterate Guianese had, of course, voted their own interests, as had those who condemned them. Some PPP candidates undoubtedly made electoral promises that could not be kept, but their opponents offered blandishments of another sort to their sympathizers, assuring them that threats to the status quo would be contained. The PPP’s gospel of change was its most important asset. Cheddi Jagan had made a reputation in the old Legislative Council as the voice of a new British Guiana. Charismatic, loved and respected especially by the Indo-Guianese people, Jagan had become a messiah to many. The daily newspapers’ vitriolic assaults on Jagan and the PPP only enhanced his stature among supporters as well as the appeal of the PPP. D. P. Debidin, a solicitor and former member of the Legislative Council, complained that the “silly propaganda of the newspapers was the nutrient, the oxygen, that supplied . . . virility to the party.” Debidin continued:

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The editors and newspaper proprietors were certainly devoid of the most elementary principles of psychology. If a member of the Executive of the PPP coughed, it was published. The columns of adverse criticisms of the PPP which appeared daily, especially in the Argosy, was [sic] grand publicity, and free at that, far better than which the Party could not have hoped. The Graphic newspaper ran daily in the largest type a banner advertisement to the effect that “you cannot be a member of the PPP and be a Guianese.” All the PPP supporters had to do at public meetings was to show who owned the newspapers, and tell the people that the more they criticised them was the greater reason for the people to support them.9 To the Daily Argosy, the Graphic, and other conservative organs of opinion, Cheddi Jagan was an unredeemable communist villain. But to his fervent supporters, he was the champion of the exploited, the dispossessed, and the forgotten. “As soon as Mr. Jagan got into the Legislative Court” [sic], said one

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proponent, “he first considered the poor, the aged.” Seen in this light, the people at the margins of society voted for the promise of a better future.10 Writing to Prime Minister Winston Churchill shortly after the the PPP’s electoral victory, the secretary of state for the colonies, Oliver Lyttleton, admitted that “the situation gives me cause for anxiety.” Still, he noted, “The Governor sees no grounds for undue pessimism provided that the members of the People’s Progressive Party who become Ministers are prepared to work within the framework of the Constitution and to see reason on financial and economic matters.” The secretary of state was reassured that the PPP’s plan for governing “is no more extreme than that of the Opposition [Labour Party] here.” Moreover, “it contains none of the usual communist aims and it advocates industrial development through the encouragement of foreign capital.” Lyttleton was troubled, however, that some of the PPP’s leaders “have been behind the Iron Curtain recently.” He respected the election results and wanted the party to have its chance to govern the colony. Nevertheless, the colonial authorities needed to “keep a close watch” on the ministers and act without delay “if they use their position to further the communist cause.” The secretary assured the prime minister that the governor had reserve powers to act “in the interests of public faith, public order, or good government.” He saw no reason for “seeking American support” if problems arose.11 In spite of these assurances, the Colonial Office’s early distrust of the PPP government was not allayed. Five days before the inaugural session of the new legislature on May 18, the office began to review “the availability of forces in the event of disturbances in British Guiana.” On May 30, Lord Lloyd of the Colonial Office asked Governor Savage to provide him with an assessment of the reliability of the colony’s security forces should riots or other disturbances occur as a result of political developments. N. L. Mayle, also of the Colonial Office, elaborated on this request on June 3, asking the governor if he would include a “further report on the extent to which the P.P.P. has supporters in the Police Force.” He informed Savage that the Colonial Office was considering “in a preliminary and quite tentative way, what outside forces might be available for British Guiana” if conditions warranted it. Lord Lloyd wanted the governor to keep the commanders of the British troops in the Caribbean abreast of developments so they could respond to “a request” for assistance. Clearly, London was bracing itself for violent disturbances in the colony.12 As the PPP prepared to assume office, tensions between the two principal leaders—Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham—came to the fore. Burnham

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Ministers of the 1953 Cheddi Jagan administration and Janet Jagan. Left to right: Dr. Joseph Lachmansingh, minister of health and housing; Sydney King, minister of communications and works; Linden Forbes Burnham, minister of education; Janet Jagan, deputy speaker; Dr. Cheddi Jagan, leader of the House of Assembly and minister of agriculture, forests, lands, and mines; Jai Narine Singh, minister of local government and social welfare; and Ashton Chase, minister of labour, industry, and commerce. (© Corbis)

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demanded that he be declared the leader of the party, proclaiming “leader or nothing.” Although this strategy failed, Jagan had to make concessions to him in the allocation of ministerial positions. The six ministers subsequently named were evenly balanced between Indians and Africans. With the exception of two ministers, all were no older than thirty-five. Dr. Jagan, leader of the House of Assembly and minister of agriculture, forests, lands, and mines, was thirty-five; Forbes Burnham, minister of education, and Sydney King, minister of communications and works, were thirty; and Ashton Chase, minister of labour, industry, and commerce, was twenty-eight. Jagan was the only minister with legislative experience. The PPP’s election triumph was diminished by the widely reported, naked power struggle over the spoils of office. The victory had been a special one for the party and the forces it had unleashed, but ultimately focused on its leaders’ rivalry to inherit the power of the colonial regime. Instead of seizing the exciting possibilities of the political moment, the new leaders revealed their huge limitations by setting the stage for the sordid and corrosive poli-

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tics of the future. The power struggle was resolved in the short run, only to reemerge with devastating ferocity, much to the anguish and pain of the nation in formation. Agreement having been reached on the naming of the ministers and their portfolios, Jagan and Burnham met with the governor on May 5 to discuss the formation of the government and their legislative agenda. Based on his report to the Colonial Office, Savage was more interested in having the PPP issue a statement disavowing any communist-inspired “intentions.” The governor “pressed on them the necessity for a very early statement from their Party that they had no communistic affiliations or intentions and that the party are [sic] seeking self government within the Commonwealth.” He believed that such a declaration was essential “to restore confidence overseas in this country.” Savage told the two leaders that Guiana “would require much capital to be imported and for industrialists to feel that their investments here would be secure.” He doubted whether “any of the world’s financial markets or the World Bank would support a loan” unless the PPP leaders renounced communism.13 It is noteworthy that Savage saw the new government’s first priority as the disavowal of any communist contamination. It was, for Jagan and Burnham, a matter of considerable irritation—a questioning of their national purpose, a distortion of their objectives, and an assault on their political credibility and integrity. Attempting to reassure him as to the probity of their plans, Jagan and Burnham “protested,” Savage said, “that I had been misled by the local press and that they were not Communists nor had they any communistic intentions, and that they wished to stay within the British Commonwealth but on independent terms.”14 In asserting their desire to continue in the Commonwealth “but on independent terms,” the two leaders were indicating that they intended to inaugurate a new political era in Guiana and would play the pioneering role in charting its destiny. The governor concluded that “Burnham was anxious to cooperate with me but Jagan was definitely suspicious. Both were trying to impress me that they were moderate socialists of the type of [Barbadian] Grantley Adams.” Despite the allegations of communism, Savage was convinced that “unless the events of the next few days cause a real crisis in the Party, I think they will endeavour to make the Constitution work, to demonstrate they have no Communistic intent and then to press for full selfgovernment.”15 Neither the British nor the American authorities fully understood the

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deep nationalist sentiments of the PPP and its leaders. Young, brash, and exhilarated by their impressive electoral victory, they thought their country’s future was theirs to shape. Governor Savage nourished the hope that a split in the party’s leadership would weaken its fervor and temper its assault on the status quo. On May 14, nine days after Savage met with Jagan and Burnham, American consul general Maddox speculated on “the status of the JaganiteBurnhamite relationship, and its bearing on the current and future measure of communist influence on P.P.P. policies.” Writing to the U.S. State Department, he noted that there was an “uneasy” truce between the PPP’s two factions, predicting that “the future of which will depend largely on Jagan’s softpedaling of the communist line, and his control of his extremist followers.”16 The consul general believed that Burnham’s “continuing party loyalty will be jeopardized by any attempt of Jagan to advance communist influence.” Maddox cautioned his superiors that “the mistake should not be made . . . of assuming that Burnham and his followers will disagree with Jagan on a number of measures on the direction of socialism and national independence.” Rather, he opined, “What he [Burnham] can be counted on to do is simply to fight any manifestation of allegiance to Moscow and the world’s Communist Party.” He was “reasonably certain” that the Guianese would be requesting “outside investments or aid,” pleading: “Don’t isolate us; help us to develop our economy. If you don’t, we probably will go communist.” “The validity of such an appeal,” the consul general acknowledged, “will be hard to appraise.”17 During the weeks following the PPP’s astonishing victory, the Americans and the British struggled to understand the ideology of the newly elected leaders, how it might shape their behavior in office, and what might constitute appropriate responses. Britain had little experience dealing with colonial leaders in the Caribbean demanding self-government and independence, lambasting the mother country unapologetically. Their language was strident, clothed in the Marxist rhetoric of the times, and designed to intimidate the colonial regime and hasten its departure. As a strategy it was at once bold, but simple, and remarkably effective over the short term. On Monday, May 18, the members of the new government took the oath of office to the cheers of their many supporters. The new speaker of the House of Assembly, Sir Eustace Woolford, a man nominated by the governor, promised he would allow “the greatest latitude and freedom to members in the expression of their views—however vehemently they may do so.” William Maddox believed that the speaker “was following a strategy of conciliation.” He thought the same strategy was being pursued by the governor and his offi(  )

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cial staff “based on the hope of winning the confidence and the responsible participation in the tasks of government, of P.P.P. members.”18 If conciliation was Savage’s objective, it was not reflected in his appointment of the six members of the State Council, or the upper house. Taken together, they represented the colonial establishment against which the PPP had railed so bitterly. They included the Most Reverend Dr. Alan J. Knight, the rabidly anti-PPP archbishop of the West Indies; William A. Macnie, the managing director of the British Guiana Sugar Producers Association (SPA); Lionel Luckhoo, the anti-PPP general president of the MPCA; and Edwin Frank McDavid, who had previously served the colony as attorney general. In contrast, the PPP’s two representatives on the State Council were essentially working-class men: U. A. Fingall, a clerk, and George Robertson, a trade unionist, an apprentice engineer, and a sailor. The governor had told Jagan and Burnham that he “hoped the two nominees . . . would not be dummies but people with ability who would strive to help but not break the Constitution.” Such an admonition, to be sure, was an exercise in imperial condescension.19 Governor Savage, as the Crown’s representative, was genuinely interested in making the constitution function to meet imperial needs and objectives. That was his job and he took it seriously. It was his desire to have a professional as well as a personal relationship with members of the government. He was disappointed, for example, that Jagan had not accepted social invitations to Government House—“and in fact an invitation which I had sent since my arrival had been ignored.” In his meeting with Jagan and Burnham on May 5, he said, “I wanted to make it clear to them that as Ministers of the Crown it was their duty to attend but I hoped they would also attend as friends and later invite my wife and me to their homes.”20 As admirable as this sentiment was, the ministers looked askance at any social interaction with the governor, fearing that this would compromise their passionate anticolonial stance. Shortly after assuming office, the six PPP ministers constituted themselves into what they called the Council of People’s Ministers. In practice, they met before each session of the Executive Council to formulate a united approach to the matters to be discussed. This was anathema to the other members of the council, although there was nothing they could do about it. According to Ashton Chase, the minister of labour, industry, and commerce: “Another irksome matter to the officials but one on which the success of our party depended was the unbreakable unity that existed among the Ministers. We always presented a united front at meetings of Her Majesty’s Executive Council. At all times we met privately in our Council of People’s Ministers (a The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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system and term which they despised and entreated us to change) and hammered out our differences[,] sinking personal opinions in the interest of a common united front.”21 The PPP ministers and their colleagues on the Executive Council operated in an atmosphere of dynamic tension. Seeing the ex officio ministers as representatives of the colonial status quo, the elected ministers distrusted them. When the ex officio members questioned certain policy proposals of the PPP ministers on constitutional or practical grounds, the PPP representatives accused them of being obstructionists and politically motivated. It is conceivable that this had some modicum of truth, but such tensions interfered with serious debate of the issues before the council and the emergence of policies with broad, if not unanimous support. Faced with legislative and other obstacles, the PPP increased its rhetorical assaults on the status quo. These were the party’s only viable weapons as its government did not possess the constitutional autonomy the PPP sought. The colonial officials recognized the political potency of these attacks and monitored the speeches of the PPP leaders with considerable vigor, care, and morbid interest. As the head of a far-flung empire, Britain had much experience in dealing with nationalist stirrings. India, for example, successfully overthrew British rule in the 1940s and Kenya was engulfed in nationalist flames in the 1950s. The nationalist fervor stimulated in Guiana by the PPP, however, paled in comparison to its more virulent expressions in those two countries. Reviewing the political developments in Guiana, colonial authorities confused a growing sense of Guianese nationalism with communism, producing dire consequences for the body politic. The colonial authorities did not stand alone in their demonization of Cheddi Jagan and other PPP leaders as communists. When Dr. Jagan, an elected member of the old Legislative Council, had risen to denounce the new Waddington Constitution as antidemocratic and the colonial regime as serving the interests of an interlocking set of elites, he was excoriated as a disciple of Soviet communism and Stalinism. Jagan argued effectively that the Guianese government was being run “by and for the powers that be,” asserting: “Thus far, we have tried a system of control created by the top, vested in the top, and responsible to the top. The time is long overdue for complete and unrestricted responsibility to be placed in the hands of the people through their representatives.”22 Such threatening rhetoric annoyed and scared the colonial authorities. But as the PPP manifesto revealed, its policy proposals were reformist in nature and stood in strong contrast to the acerbic rhetoric of the party’s leader(  )

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ship. The stark reality was that the PPP leaders had not given much, if any, thought to detailed initiatives when they assumed office and seemed to be consumed by their incendiary discourse. Reporting to the U.S. State Department on July 16, 1953, Consul General Maddox observed: “Aside from the generalized statements in its campaign platform, ostensibly designed, like a railway coach platform, as something you get in on rather than as something you stand on after you are in, no certain clue has been given as to the basic economic program which the new P.P.P. majority will put into effect in British Guiana.”23 This was an accurate observation since Dr. Jagan had admitted to Maddox on June 25 that the government had not yet formulated a concrete economic program. He said his administration had lacked the time to do so. Jagan explained that the previous government had not provided the requisite information that would have facilitated the process. In addition, he awaited some policy recommendations from a visiting World Bank mission. While these were plausible excuses, the truth was that the two-month-old government had not devoted any substantial period to the hard task of planning and drafting legislation. Maddox, reflecting the fears of the time, had a more sinister explanation. Since Mrs. Jagan was away from the colony, “many thought,” he said, that she “would return from Europe with a set of policy directives for the P.P.P.” Maddox was reflecting a point of view expressed by one of his colleagues that “the Jagans’ slavish following of the Moscow line is strong.”24 The notion that the Guianese leaders were Russian puppets was profoundly misguided and constituted a gross misunderstanding of their nationalist aspirations. It reflected, as later developments would amply demonstrate, a failure to accord independence of thought and will to colonial subjects. Centuries of British—and by extension—European domination of colonized peoples had generated a paternalistic impulse in those who exercised power over others. Although by the 1950s colonial authorities had eschewed the use of words that invoked racial prejudice, their condescending attitude to the black and brown Guianese told another story. They would remain children who needed the supervision and tutelage of their white colonial superiors and who required boundaries within which to imagine their future, conduct their affairs, and make their own mistakes. Under the circumstances, colonial authorities had kept “a close watch” on the travels and activities of members of the PPP since its foundation in 1950. This keen interest was also driven by the exigencies of the Cold War. The aftermath of World War II saw an intense competition between the ideologies of capitalism and communism for world supremacy, led by the United The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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States and the Soviet Union respectively. Great Britain’s opposition to communism and its close friendship with America led to its commitment to immunize its colonies from any exposure to, and infection by, the feared ideological virus. In November 1950, for example, London noted the attendance of PPP member Keith Carter at the second World Peace Congress held in Warsaw, a meeting organized by the World Peace Council, which the Colonial Office described as “Communist.” The authorities also noticed that in February 1951 Thunder, the official organ of the PPP, published an article advocating “the abolition of atomic, bacteriological, and other methods of mass destruction.” They saw the hand of communists behind this call, observing that “it followed the lead of the Communist controlled Warsaw Peace Congress.” When the British Guiana Peace Committee was created in late 1951, colonial officials saw it as a communist-inspired organization dominated by PPP supporters. They also noted that Cheddi Jagan attended the third World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace, held in Berlin in the summer of 1951. This meeting, according to the official report, was also attended by thirteen other Guianese who were at the time residing in London. The Colonial Office was undoubtedly offended when Jagan gave a speech on Prague Radio “in which he denounced British imperialism for allegedly exploiting the manpower and plundering the resources of British Guiana.” The Colonial Office was quite disturbed when Jagan attended the general council meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Berlin as an observer in 1951. British officials mistrusted the intentions of this organization because it had a special interest in organizing workers in colonial territories. According to the Colonial Office, V. V. Kuznetsov, a Soviet trade union leader, said the objective of the WFTU was to “expose the warmongers and their agents in the labour movement.” This task should be combined in colonial societies “with the call for a struggle . . . for national liberation and independence.” He wanted the WFTU to “secure the application of new members . . . especially trade union centres in colonial and dependent countries.” Such a stance had a tremendous appeal to Cheddi Jagan, who urged, successfully, the Berlin conferees to create a colonial department of the WFTU to assist in the development of trade unions in colonial territories. British intelligence sources also monitored the writings of PPP leaders. They took note of an article that Dr. Jagan contributed to the “WFTU Bulletin” on the trade union “struggle” in British Guiana. In the piece, Jagan excoriated the new “sham constitution” and called for “independence.” The colonial authorities watched nervously when, in the summer of 1952, the PPP formed a youth wing called the Pioneer Youth League of British Guiana. (  )

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The new organization became an affiliate of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) in February 1953. Five years earlier, the WFDY’s Executive Council had warned: “The imperialists preparations for war have been stepped up. . . . Everything is being put in motion in order to drown in blood the irresistible movement of the colonial peoples for national liberation.” Such invocations did nothing to reassure imperial powers that were facing threats to their continued domination of other peoples.25 The exciting days that followed the founding of the PPP and the espousal of a psychologically liberating nationalism saw vigorous efforts by their leaders to interact with other peoples who supported the anticolonial struggle. These other peoples were invariably to be found in the Eastern Bloc countries and sought to provide assistance to colonial leaders, particularly if they embraced Marxism. The PPP leaders frequently used the popular vocabulary and rhetoric of communism to articulate their grievances, even as they advocated reformist policies and sought economic aid from the imperial powers. Still, the most vociferous expressions of support for colonial nationalists came from communists. Usually strapped for funds and politically inexperienced, those colonial leaders also received emotional support from their allies and interacted with them as visitors to their countries. Guianese leaders were the frequent guests of their political friends in Eastern and Central Europe. In December 1952 Sydney King, the assistant secretary of the PPP, attended the Congress of Peoples for Peace held in Vienna. He then traveled to Budapest and Prague for a WFDY council meeting. When he returned home on March 5, 1953, colonial authorities said “he brought back with him a large suitcase full of communist propaganda, pamphlets and correspondence with communist contacts in Eastern Europe and England.” Two months later, Mrs. Jagan visited Copenhagen to attend the Third World Congress of the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF). The British characterized the WIDF as “communist controlled,” noting that, at its 1949 conference held in Peking, conferees passed a resolution stating that “the WIDF leads women of all the imperialist countries in their struggle against their governments for the immediate termination of the colonial wars and armed intervention in Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, and the southern part of Korea.” Mrs. Jagan created a good impression at the Copenhagen conference and was elected to the Congress Presidium. Her address to the congress was a call for assistance in the anticolonial struggle. “We need guidance and help,” she said. “We in the colonial world are tied economically and politically like the slaves of old. Our people turn their eyes to the great socialist countries which have been moving forward with great rapidity and The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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success. . . . Help us to win freedom for all the oppressed colonial peoples of the world.”26 After the meeting in Copenhagen, Mrs. Jagan visited Romania. Other PPP members also traveled to Europe to attend various conferences. The vice president of the party, Rory Westmaas, had attended a meeting of the World Peace Council in Budapest in June 1952, as well as the Third World Youth Congress and the Fourth World Youth Festival in Bucharest in late July and early August. Other attendees at these meetings included Martin Carter and someone identified simply as “Ramkarran”—probably Boysie Ram Karran, who served as a minister in a later Jagan administration. The British were perturbed by these interactions and the “steady strengthening” of ties between the PPP leaders “and the foremost international communist front organisations.” These connections, they said, had given “considerable impetus to the activities of the PPP and the trade union and youth organisations under its control.” Not surprisingly, officialdom was concerned about the role that the WFTU was committed to play in stimulating unrest in the colonies. Such behavior “indicates the clear intention of Soviet Communism to spread disaffection throughout the Colonial Empire by exploiting labour troubles and in other ways.”27 Not only did the colonial authorities oppose the PPP’s association with the aforementioned organizations, but they also banned literature they considered subversive from entering the colony. The British, who prided themselves on their embrace of free speech and an unfettered exchange of ideas, saw nothing contradictory in their denial of these rights to their colonial charges. An insecure imperial power wanted to insulate the colonized people from ideas that would challenge the status quo or, worse, destroy it. Chafing under the restrictions imposed on what they could read, the new PPP government wasted no time in introducing a bill to repeal the Undesirable Publications ordinance. Dr. Jagan had personal reasons to press for the abrogation of the ban, as in 1951 he was prevented from taking literature deemed to be communist into the colony. The bill, however, encountered strong resistance in the State Council, and it was returned to the House of Assembly for reconsideration. Despite strong opposition, the new government also rescinded the ban on persons identified as communists from entering the colony. The pejorative appellation was, to be sure, applied very loosely and was frequently a term of political abuse rather than a characterization of deeply held ideological positions. As part of its desire to transform the political consciousness of the Guianese people and to have them create new definitions of themselves, the PPP (  )

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administration wanted to exercise greater state control over the content of education provided to the colony’s students. The new Guianese leaders had grown up in a colonial society that used the educational system to promote allegiance to the Crown and the acceptance of the peoples’ role as vassals. The structure of the educational system was complicated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of schools were owned by various religious organizations and were beyond the supervisory gaze of the state. In 1950, for example, the denominational governing bodies controlled 248 of the 263 primary schools in the colony. The new minister of education, Forbes Burnham, strongly opposed denominational control of the schools. He wanted to see “a complete and radical change” in “the present order of society.” Burnham was committed to changing the curriculum and textbooks in order “to give them [students] the true Guianese Socialist and realistic outlook.”28 The government’s intention to assume control of the schools and transform the curriculum encountered opposition from both religious leaders and a partisan press. The Daily Argosy complained that the government wanted to use the educational system as “an instrument to enthrall the minds of the rising generation and stamp them in the government’s own political mould.” The paper charged that “large numbers of the school children of today are being regularly exposed to Communist indoctrination through lectures, film shows, and other forms of propaganda.” It cited as an example a recently held youth demonstration in Georgetown where participants allegedly carried procommunist placards.29 The new government’s legislative agenda, to the degree that one existed, took second place to the extragovernmental activities of the ministers. Energetic, impatient, brash, and frequently astonishing in their political naïveté, they challenged the institutional structures of the imperial regime most sharply with the rhetorical weapons at their command. The police force, the most visible manifestation of the state’s coercive power, became one of their principal targets. To contest the power that the police force exercised on behalf of the existing social and political order, the PPP contemplated the formation of a People’s Police Force. Dr. Jagan shared this information at a public meeting that he addressed on May 3, 1953. “Comrades,” he said, “in the past when we asked for bread we were given bullets and those who fired at workers were honoured by the masters, But when the PPP gets into power, the same bullets which were fired on those poor people will be fired on our oppressors. We shall organise a Police Force; it will be known as the People’s Police. We will see that the Police not only salute their superiors but will The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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also salute the people.”30 When he made this speech, Jagan was slated to be a minister in the government, but he seemed not to have yet made the transition from colonial leader and agitator to member of the new ruling elite. It was one of those ironies of colonialism—a prospective member of the government planning to organize a police force to replace the one he would be constitutionally sworn to support. But, on the other hand, his plan was perfectly rational when seen through the optic of colonial leaders. The traditional police force existed, in part, to defend the status quo and to protect the interests of those who benefited from it. Jagan, the defiant outsider, resisted becoming the uncomfortable insider. As he would later say, “We told our supporters that even though we had won the election, we were really Her Majesty’s Government’s loyal opposition.”31 In the charged atmosphere of 1953, colonial authorities accused the ministers of undermining police loyalty to the regime. They failed to appreciate that both sides—the imperial elites and the colonial leaders—represented competing and often irreconcilable interests and constituencies. Irritated by the role the police force played when labor disputes occurred, Minister of Labour Chase asked the chief secretary to issue a statement that he had prepared for the edification of the officers. “It is nauseating to find that as soon as there is a labour dispute or stoppage of work—no matter how trivial or large—the police intervene,” Chase wrote. “Any repetition of past attitude and conduct by the police will meet with stern action on the part of the elected ministers.”32 Not surprisingly, the colonial authorities were not eager to issue the directive and never complied. The idea was stillborn, but the sentiments that inspired it defied eradication. As part of their desire to reap the spoils of office and exercise power, the PPP ministers wanted to break with British tradition and politicize the civil service. They admired the American system, which allowed elected officials to select and appoint their principal subordinates. According to the Guianese constitution, the civil service fell under the jurisdiction of the governor, assisted by a Public Service Commission composed of politically independent citizens. The new ministers questioned the commission’s independence from the governor and the interests he represented and wanted their allies placed in important administrative positions. “They have appointed a Civil Service Commission because they do not want us to have anything to do with the appointment of civil servants,” Dr. Jagan alleged. “We would like to have power to appoint our own people who would be able to do our work.”33 In a similar vein, the ministers generally appointed their supporters to advisory committees and statutory boards. British authorities were not enamored of (  )

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this approach, charging that this was done “to put these committees under Party control without regard for members’ suitability and experience.” An appointee to the Transport Advisory Council, the authorities said condescendingly, “was a tailor who earns his living by selling PPP literature.”34 Not only was Governor Savage displeased by the political stripe of the new government, but also he was frequently irritated by what he considered the ministers’ disrespect of the Crown and its representatives. When the Jamaican government invited British Guiana to send representatives to Jamaica to greet Queen Elizabeth II on the occasion of her first royal tour, the ministers declined the invitation on the grounds that the funds could be better spent. This act, calculated to demonstrate their independence, was a symbolic rejection of the imperial connection. The governor was hardly amused, regarding this behavior as an unpardonable insult to the new queen and unacceptable coming from the upstart government leaders. The colonial authorities, and whites in general, were offended when the British flag was frequently torn down or anti-British placards were displayed at PPP meetings. Colonial officials were also deeply troubled by the alleged incendiary racist rhetoric of some PPP leaders. The so-called racialized language struck a sensitive note with the British; after all, the entire colonial edifice rested on the naked assertion of white superiority and the inferiority of other peoples. The enslavement of Africans had been justified by the claims of a virulent pseudoscientific racism and protected by the armed might of the state and the planter class. Although PPP leaders did not profess any doctrine of Indian or African superiority, they were unsparing in their denunciation of the oppression of other peoples by Europeans and of the need for colonial peoples to take control of their own destinies. Henry G. Seaford, the local chairman of the Booker Brothers sugar empire, complained in a letter to his boss, Jock M. Campbell, that “the ministers are doing all in their power to cause racial strife. The preeminent theme is the white man must go. They held a big meeting . . . and Burnham’s speech consisted of slanging the Governor, who was to be kicked out and he, Burnham, would have the honour of being the first coloured governor of the colony.”35 Another report alleged that PPP leaders said, during a public meeting at La Penitence on September 18, that the people should “drive out these bloody white bastards” from the colony.36 Forbes Burnham declared that “the Governor and the State Council are reactionary forces which must be expunged by 1957.” Cheddi Jagan’s language was equally strident when he urged his people “to sweep away imperialism and foreign power from our midst. . . . As a matThe Imperial Coup d’Etat

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ter of law we owe allegiance to the Queen; as a matter of morality we owe loyalty and allegiance to British Guiana.”37 Such racialized and nationalist sentiments terrified Savage and his advisers. In a speech delivered in the House of Assembly on September 30, Burnham espoused the essence of this racialized nationalism: All we are asking for is to be dealt with as human beings. We want some of the things God intends us to have. If they do not give us what we want, we are going to fight until we get complete freedom to get everything we want. Let us tell them they are wasting time to oppose us. We must become complete masters of this country. This is only the beginning. We are going to make laws to suit ourselves. They can never get the reins of government out of our hands and back into theirs. Let them know that.38

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One should not underestimate the impact of such language on the Crown’s representatives and the small white elite community. Forbes Burnham, a gifted and passionate orator, was warning colonial authorities that any attempt to suspend the constitution would be met “with sufficient force” and that the Guianese people would be “willing to shed their blood, if necessary, for freedom.”39 This was, of course, an empty threat, being the vituperative language of a political leader whose party lacked the organization, the power, and the resources to execute it. As the year wore on, the political climate simultaneously reflected and exacerbated the tensions in Guianese society. The activities and rhetoric of the ministers disturbed some residents as well as potential foreign investors. Guianese residents who had entrusted their savings to the government’s savings bank began to fear the loss of their investments. Rumors about the insecurity of the deposits abounded, and a marked run on the bank began in August, as reflected in Table 1.40 Conceivably, depositors needed their funds to meet their financial obligations throughout the strikes in the sugar industry that were occurring during these months. But, simultaneously, there was an emerging lack of confidence in the country’s economic future. Colonial officials reported that wholesale and retail trading had decreased by 91⁄2 percent compared to a similar period in 1952. Private firms began to cancel plans to invest in the colony. On June 30 the Kennametals Corporation opted not to explore for columbite/tantalite; the Gulf Oil Corporation acted similarly in August, followed by the New York–Alaska Gold Dredging Company in September. The Ellis Associated Companies abandoned a building project, and Panhandle Oil Canada Limited decided not to continue further exploration for oil. None of these de(  )

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( Table 1 ) Deposits and Withdrawals from the Government’s Savings Bank, August 19–September 30, 1953 Date

Deposits

Withdrawals

Net Withdrawals

August 19–31 September 1–15 September 16–30

$281,264 369,029 338,694

$604,605 1,371,485 712,619

$323,341 1,002,456 373,925

Total

$988,987

$2,688,709

$1,699,722

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Source: FO 371/103121.

velopments augured well for the future of the new administration and the colony. British authorities were worried about these difficulties, but none exercised them as much as the labor disputes that engulfed the territory in September. The year 1953 had opened on an optimistic note as the Sugar Producers Association and the Manpower Citizens Association consumated a wage agreement. There was trouble in May, however, when a Dutch engineer was accused of kicking a female worker at the Leonora sugar estate. The workers went on strike but the engineer was exonerated. Given the active involvement of PPP leaders, colonial officials believed that the strike “illustrated the belief which is now prevalent, particularly among sugar workers, that they have only to call upon the PPP leaders to secure an immediate settlement of disputes in their favour.” A number of minor work stoppages occurred in June and July, but these were soon settled after ministeral intervention.41 The recurrent labor disputes were also an indication of the deep tensions in the society, especially those between an aggressive PPP and foreigndominated industries like Booker Brothers, which presided over abysmal working conditions on the sugar estates. Such was that company’s economic stranglehold over the colony that it earned the epithet “Booker’s Guiana.” Determined to inaugurate a new era in labor relations, Dr. J. P. Lachmansingh and others had founded the Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU) in 1948 in the wake of strikes on sugar estates of the East Coast of Demerara. Five workers had been killed on the Enmore plantation, fueling a demand for the formation of a new union, since the existing one, the MPCA, was deemed by many to be ineffective and corrupt. The SPA, the organized voice of the sugar barons, declined the GIWU’s request for recognition, although its support among the workers was growing. In 1952 the GIWU appealed to colonial officials to intervene in the recognition dispute; when they declined to The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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do so, the union petitioned the International Labour Organization (ILO) for help. Founded in 1919 as an agency of the League of Nations, the ILO survived the demise of that body and was absorbed by the United Nations in 1946. Its function was to develop and oversee international labor standards. In rejecting the petition, the ILO found that nothing in the Conventions of the Right of Association that existed in Guiana “places a duty on the government concerned to enforce collective bargaining by compulsory means which would clearly alter the nature of such bargaining.” It also found that “the complainant has not offered sufficient proof that trade union rights have been infringed.”42 In an attempt to force recognition by the SPA, the GIWU called an industrywide strike in 1952, only to see it fail. The political environment became more sympathetic to the union in 1953 with the election of the PPP candidates to office. Closely allied to the PPP, the GIWU became its voice among sugar estate workers. Consequently, the PPP’s electoral victory strengthened the union’s position politically and gave it access to the halls of government, something it had previously lacked. In the new administration the GIWU’s president, Dr. J. P. Lachmansingh, was appointed minister of health and housing. Sydney King, the minister of communications and works, and Janet Jagan, the deputy speaker, were also strong supporters of the GIWU. With these and other sympathizers in the House of Assembly, the union believed that another strike demanding recognition would succeed. The first salvo in what became a fatal blow for the PPP government was launched on June 13, when W. A. Macnie, the managing director of the SPA, met with Minister of Labour Ashton Chase at Chase’s invitation. The minister told Macnie that he and Dr. Lachmansingh had been overwhelmed by complaints from workers in the sugar industry. These people, he said, had declined to seek the mediation of the MPCA because they distrusted its leadership. Consequently, he was recommending that the SPA recognize the GIWU, in whom the workers had confidence to protect their interests. Chase told Macnie that he did not support legislation putting the question of recognition to a vote, although his party supported such a measure. Should the PPP prevail in this regard, however, he would have no option but to follow the party line. Accepting the changing political context, the SPA’s board of directors met on July 20 to address the matters raised by Minister Chase. The members agreed that “the industry would have to recognise a PPP sponsored union, whatever it might be called.” They would prefer, however, an “amalgamation” of the MPCA and the GIWU. The minister formally wrote to the SPA on (  )

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July 21 requesting recognition of the GIWU, repeating the substance of his meeting with Macnie on June 13. To expedite a solution to the recognition issue, Lachmansingh met informally with Macnie on July 13. He confessed to Macnie that some of his colleagues opposed the prospect of achieving recognition of the GIWU through negotiation, preferring to “win it by fighting for it.” He disagreed with that strategy, and if the GIWU failed to win less than 75 percent in any vote for recognition, he would not pursue the matter. Lachmansingh said his main reason for seeking recognition was not the prospect of increased wages for the workers. Rather, he sought “improved conditions for the workers, for example, a good potable water supply and transport arrangements for field workers. He wanted people to work more but they must do so under better conditions and not necessarily for more money.” According to Macnie, the whole discussion “was frank and not unfriendly,” but nothing was resolved. The SPA did not reply to the minister’s July 21 letter seeking recognition of the GIWU until August 20. Responding on behalf of the SPA, Macnie repeated his association’s view that the two unions should effect an “amalgamation” if they had “the interests of the workers truly at heart.” He emphasized that the SPA had agreements with the MPCA that could not be unilaterally abrogated. Since he did not believe that it was practical for two competing unions to represent the same category of workers, he suggested a compromise. He thought that an arrangement might be made whereby the GIWU would represent the field workers and the MPCA the factory workers “in the first instance.” This could be the initial step to an amalgamation of the two unions, he speculated. The GIWU showed no interest in this potential compromise. It wanted to force a showdown with the SPA, confident that it had the support of the PPP and the government. Accordingly, on August 30 the leaders of the union met and decided to call an industrywide strike beginning the next day, reportedly at the insistence of Sydney King. Strangely enough, the union did not present the SPA with any formal demands or reasons for the strike. Its occurrence also took the labor minister by surprise. It was an irresponsible act since the SPA’s compromise proposal had not been given the attention it deserved and Minister Chase was still trying to achieve a negotiated settlement. As the strike spread, the SPA issued a statement on September 2 accusing “certain political elements” of “endeavoring to obtain by force what the Sugar Producer’s Association have already said they will be willing to consider granting under certain conditions[,] i.e. recognition of the Guiana Industrial Workers Union as a union representing workers.” The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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To protect its interests, the SPA simultaneously posted notices on the affected estates announcing the cessation of operations “until there is a turnout of sufficient workers to permit of normal operations being resumed.” Troubled that the strike threatened the colony’s economy, Governor Savage telephoned Macnie on September 3 to inquire whether the SPA would meet with Minister Chase and the GIWU to begin negotiations. In a rapid response to the governor, the SPA declined the invitation to meet with the GIWU “as long as there are strikes in the sugar estates.” In subsequent weeks the SPA would not budge from its position. It also maintained that it would not negotiate with the GIWU until the question of recognition had been settled. On September 5, seven days after the strike had been called, the GIWU presented its demands to the SPA, but, interestingly enough, recognition was not one of them. They included “increased wages for all categories of workers in field and factory,” a “working week” that would end on Friday, better drinking water for the workers in the field, and so on. None of these demands seemed to be beyond the pale, though recognition was really the central issue, on which the letter from the GIWU was silent. Nor had the union responded to the compromise proposed by the SPA. Continuing his efforts to resolve the strike, Governor Savage invited Forbes Burnham to meet with him on the morning of September 6 and asked Burnham to use his influence to end the strike. But Burnham had a price that would exacerbate the problem. “If the GIWU call[ed] off the strike,” he asked the governor, “would the SPA commence negotiations with the GIWU within 24 hours of resumption of work?” When the governor posed the question to the SPA, it emphasized that it took at least seven days for any sugar estate to return to a state of normalcy after a strike and it would begin negotiations only after that occurred. In any event, it would not negotiate with the GIWU until the question of recognition was resolved. The GIWU, on the other hand, demanded that talks begin within twenty-four hours after the strike ended. Throughout the strike, Minister Chase walked a delicate tightrope between the competing demands of his official position and his loyalty to the PPP and its stepchild, the GIWU. “My impression is that the matter has been taken out of his hands,” W. A. Macnie said in early September, “that he knows all about the GIWU’s plans which are really the plans of his Party—the PPP.” Although Chase’s communications with the SPA were balanced and dispassionate in tone, his party loyalties, in the view of association members, compromised his capacity to be impartial. The minister, however, commanded their guarded respect to a far greater degree than did Lachmansingh, King, and Burnham, all of whom they detested and distrusted. (  )

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While the officials haggled, the strike gained momentum, arousing passions in the process. There were isolated acts of violence and some intimidation of nonstriking workers. Buoyed by the support it was receiving, the GIWU rejected the SPA’s July 20 compromise proposal in a meeting with Minister Chase on September 7. Later that day, six beleaguered representatives of the SPA, including Macnie, met with Chase. The minister opened the discussion by telling the delegation that the government was committed to introducing legislation that would mandate the “recognition of unions chosen by the workers.” Chase admitted, however, that he did not consider such a step “the best type of trade union legislation.” In this regard, he was expressing a preference for the British practice, unlike the American, where there was no legislation requiring employers to recognize unions that had majority support from the workers. Chase was expressing a personal preference, not the government’s policy. This admission was hardly a judicious one to make to the august representatives of the SPA who were united in their opposition to mandatory recognition. But the young, inexperienced minister probably never fully appreciated the political wisdom of not articulating his personal views if they ran contrary to those of the governmental policy he was expected to promote and implement. Continuing the meeting, Chase referred to the SPA’s letter of August 20 outlining the conditions under which it would recognize the GIWU. He believed that the “amalgamation” of the two unions, as the SPA had proposed, was a “suggestion” that “a good trade union would accept since both the MPCA and the GIWU catered for the same class of workers.” He thought, however, that the “bitter feeling” between these unions was an impediment to such a solution. Insofar as a “conditional recognition” of the GIWU was concerned, the minister said the SPA’s proposal was “a fair basis for discussion.” Since the PPP and the GIWU wanted nothing less than the elimination of the MPCA, they were unlikely to find any merit in proposals for their amalgamation; thus, Minister Chase was not being candid on the issue. Chase reported that the GIWU had indicated to him that it “was not enamoured” with the existing agreements between the SPA and the MPCA and wished to negotiate new ones. He said he had hoped to share the SPA’s letter with the commissioner of labor so he could use it as “a fair basis for discussion” by the contending parties, but the strike had intervened. Clearly, Chase thought the strike was premature and had served to complicate a rather difficult situation. Speaking for the delegation, Macnie regretted that the GIWU had rejected the amalgamation proposal and wondered whether it would now The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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cease its competition with the MPCA. This prompted Chase to point out that the GIWU’s view was that there was no question of competition since the MPCA “were a mere shell of a union.” Evidently responding to the minister’s comment, Macnie explained that when the SPA leaders referred to amalgamation, “they had in mind that it might ultimately lead to the absorption of the MPCA by the GIWU.” This seemed to be a tacit acceptance by the SPA that MPCA’s days were numbered and the GIWU’s ascendancy could not be thwarted. Macnie also clarified the SPA’s position on the GIWU’s insistence that new agreements be negotiated, noting that “the existing agreements with the MPCA should be accepted by the GIWU until new agreements could be negotiated with the latter union and not that they should be accepted indefinitely.” He said the SPA “had contemplated” that new agreements with the GIWU would be negotiated and implemented by January 1954. Macnie explained that most agreements were negotiated on an annual basis and that “to enter into new agreements in the middle of a crop would be practically impossible.” Although he wondered whether his clarification would “ease the situation,” Macnie emphasized that the SPA “could never agree to discussions or negotiations under duress.” He thought the “present situation” had been exacerbated by the rhetoric of the strike’s leaders; their utterances “had been so irresponsible that the SPA [leaders] were bound to have some doubt in their minds as to the wisdom of recognising union leaders who could say such things.” Minister Chase hoped the impasse could be speedily resolved in view of the negative impact of the strike on British Guiana’s revenue. He urged the exercise of “tolerance and common sense,” a remark that led Macnie to hope that the minister was not implying that the SPA had not employed such qualities. Speaking bluntly, he told Chase that the SPA found it difficult to “reconcile government’s concern with the fact that certain members of the government had actually participated in fomenting the strike,” a charge the minister ignored. The meeting resolved nothing, although the SPA was moving in the direction of negotiating with the GIWU but insisted that it would not do so until the strike ended and conditions on the estates returned to normalcy. Chase believed that such negotiations should begin within twenty-four hours of the workers’ offer to return, but the SPA stood firm in its judgment that a return to normalcy required from two to four days; moreover, it regarded “work as having been resumed when operations on all estates had returned to the state in which they were when the workers went on strike.”43 Under assault and beleaguered, Henry Seaford, the local chairman of (  )

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Bookers, sought to reassure Jock Campbell, the international chairman, that “there is no question of our panicking or not having confidence in ourselves to handle the present situation.” Writing to Campbell on September 8, he said that “the present situation can only be dealt with effectively by the Colonial Office,” a veiled reference to the potential suspension of the colony’s constitution. Seaford saw a grim future for British Guiana:

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What the majority of ministers is trying to do is to cause chaos in the Colony and then go to the Colonial Office and say that it is because they have not complete control, that these things are happening. Their aim is to get rid of all white officials and make life so unpleasant for other whites that they will get out. Schools are to be taught communism and those Masters [teachers] that don’t agree will be fired. Can you imagine what this colony will be like in 5 years time if this sort of thing continues. Unless something drastic is done, Bookers will cease to exist as a large firm in 5 years.44 Seaford was the voice of the colonial elite which feared for its future. After Governor Timothy Luke of Barbados visited Guiana in early September, he informed Philip Rogers of the Colonial Office that the situation there was “unquestionably most disquieting.” He reported that “the senior officials are completely disheartened and pessimistic; that the public service is approaching demoralization; that the business and commercial community are embittered and frightened and that there is grave anxiety among responsible and fair-minded people like the Anglican Archbishop.”45 Luke was obviously echoing the apprehensions of those who wanted to return to the status quo before Jagan. He found no one “apart perhaps from Savage himself, who now believes that the P.P.P. is seriously trying to work the constitution or is likely to be prepared to do so in the future.” Luke did not volunteer any information on the scope of his survey of opinion in the colony, but it is doubtful that he consulted representatives of the working class and other nonelite groups. Luke saw something sinister behind the organizational efforts of the PPP: I gained the impression that, whatever their longer-term objective, the ministers are united in an immediate determination to extend the power of the P.P.P. so as to gain effective and enduring control of the country. By the creation and multiplication of cells, they are ceaselessly extending and elaborating the party organization, in even the remotest part of the country. They are working to secure a monopoly of representation for the trade unions they control.46 The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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Luke, no doubt repeating what he had been told by the colonial elites, saw such “totalitarian tactics” as “familiar enough” although “it is a shock to find them reproduced in a British colony by a small group of arrogant and ignorant young men.” Janet Jagan, he charged, was “the inspiration” behind this “political movement. . . . Whether or not she is a member of the Communist Party, she is thoroughly trained in Communist tactics and is, in addition, an exceptionably able, ruthless and energetic woman.” Her principal ally, Luke said, was Sydney King, “whom everyone agrees to be the most extreme and offensive of all the ministers.” The “everyone” to whom Luke alluded presumably did not include the majority of Africans and Indians who would have had a different opinion of King’s conduct. Luke wrote somewhat disparagingly of Cheddi Jagan, describing him as “a rather enigmatic figure; superficially, he is the most intelligent, and certainly the most agreeable and courteous of the group. In private talks, he gives the impression of having a reasonable and not particular doctrinaire approach to problems, and I suppose that he may be a weak man driven to more extreme courses than he really likes.” Forbes Burnham, in Luke’s opinion, was “bitterly anti-white and antiBritish.” In general, the ministers constituted “no more than a group of eager but thoroughly inexperienced young men anxious to achieve everything at once.” The “opposition elements,” Luke concluded, “are waiting in paralysed hostility for H.M.G. to rescue them from the consequences of a constitution which they have always disliked and which they are confident must break down.”47 Governor Luke’s report undoubtedly had some impact on the Colonial Office’s plans for British Guiana. In fact, Governor Savage sent a letter to Lord Lloyd repeating the concerns raised in Luke’s report. He said he had advised the ministers to repudiate their election manifesto, which was “a scurrilous document.” Savage reported that the ministers were not willing to cooperate with him, although some of them intended to work “within the framework of the new constitution.” His outlook was ominous: “I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that unless the opposition elements in the country rouse themselves quickly and wake up to their obligations and opportunities, then to retain British Guiana in the Commonwealth we shall have to go back on the new constitution which would mean the use of force and the maintenance of military forces here for some considerable time.”48 Savage was clearly indicating his support for a suspension of the constitution. But his superiors in London were already preparing for such an eventuality. On September 19, the secretary of state informed the governor that the (  )

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“legal and constitutional implications of breakdown have already been under consideration here.” Six days later, representatives from the Colonial Office met with the British government’s Committee on Security. Philip Rogers told the committee of the imminent action in Guiana and said that the governor “was being requested to indicate the assistance he might require from outside the territory in order to maintain law and order.” The Colonial Office anticipated that “the danger in British Guiana was one of mob riots; organized rebellion seemed unlikely.” At the meeting it was decided not to take any “executive action” until “more detailed knowledge of the situation was received,” although the planning for the invasion of the colony would continue with great intensity over the next two weeks.49 Although the GIWU succeeded in paralyzing the sugar industry by September 9, it had no funds to support the striking workers. Some began to withdraw the savings they had in the bank, but most had no such security blanket. To maintain the élan of these strikers, Sydney King, Dr. J. P. Lachmansingh, and Janet Jagan traveled to the estates to provide moral support. When he addressed three hundred strikers at Tulsie Dam on the eighteenth, King encouraged them by observing: “You all are looking well. Look how fat and nice you all are looking.” Offering them advice, he said: “If you all have to eat one meal and put your belly button tighter, try [to] keep the strike up for one week more . . . you all must not understand that you alone are suffering . . . So, comrades, try to keep the strike up, it is history in the world to see the 13 sugar estates strike.” The following day King told the workers at Pin Diamond that the GIWU had called the strike. “We don’t want any part of it to crack up until we give the word to resume work,” he said. “We must show these political gods that the time has come for us to rule and not to be ruled as before.” King was linking the workers’ struggle to the larger fight for political autonomy and selfhood, declaring: “They have given the people or masses the right to choose their representatives and they have chosen well, and the party will never allow these foreign political vampire[s] or stooges, nor those English parasite[s] to divide us and rule for I know their object is to disband or disorganize us.” King assured the workers that “we are not here to take bribe[s], but to work in your interest,” a clear allusion to the rival MPCA. He reminded them that times were changing. As he put it, “Long time ago we had bowed and crunched and kissed foot, but the time for those things are gone and done for, so if you got a pint of rice give your brother some and let the strike go on.” Dr. Lachmansingh added his voice to such blandishments, telling workers in The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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a Georgetown address: “This is a struggle and you must go home and wait until we send and tell you to resume work. You must try and assist yourselves in your farms and eke out an existence. . . . [This] is all part of the movement of the masses and a working class struggle. This is one of the birth pangs of the movement.”50 Such exhortations served their purpose in the short run, but the union’s leaders fully realized that the workers were experiencing severe financial hardships. Moreover, the SPA showed no signs of accepting the union’s demands and there were rumors that the estates might not resume operations for a year, exacerbating the workers’ dire economic condition. As the days wore on, it became increasingly clear that the strike was failing and the potential existed that these laborers might desert the union and return to work. Despite their mutual exhaustion, neither side seemed to have the disposition to concede as the strike dragged on. The SPA proved to be a stronger opponent than the GIWU had expected and showed no sign of capitulating. Its July 20 compromise proposal enabled it to claim the moral high ground, and the GIWU’s summary rejection of the compromise was a tactical blunder. Nor did the union help its cause by calling a strike before making its demands known to the SPA and waiting seven days to do so. This had not been responsible trade union practice. The behavior of the GIWU united members of the elite and opponents of the PPP who saw the strike as communist inspired and as an attempt to establish a dictatorship in the colony. The PPP, these people said, wanted to create satellite unions in all industries to advance its alleged communist agenda. “The Communist pattern and influence are clear,” observed W. A. Macnie.51 In a memorandum that he prepared for the British Cabinet on October 2, the colonial secretary concluded that “the communists had been the moving force behind the strike which had paralysed the sugar industry, and they were evidently seeking to establish a totalitarian dominance over the territory by penetrating the trade unions and local government.”52 A virulent anticommunist animus had clouded the thinking of the Colonial Office. The PPP was in no position to establish a communist state in British Guiana in 1953. The party certainly wanted to consolidate its strength among the workers, and penetrating the unions was one means to that end. But many unions, as time would show, resisted any encroaches by the PPP and, indeed, became its implacable opponents. In August 1953, however, several unions called sympathy strikes to support the GIWU and, by exten-

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sion, the PPP. They included the British Guiana Labour Union, the Sawmill Workers Union, and the Transport Workers Union. Despite such support, there were indications—three weeks after it began—that the strike was certain to fail. Attempts by the minister of labour and the governor to bring the antagonists to the table had not succeeded. Meanwhile, the workers had gone without wages for three weeks and faced the prospect of losing their traditional annual bonus. After discussing the situation with his colleagues, Dr. Lachmansingh broadcast a message to the workers on September 24 ordering them to return to their jobs the next day. The strike had ended after twenty-five days without the GIWU being recognized by the SPA or the union’s demands being considered by management. Its termination was not so much an admission of failure as it was an occasion for the PPP-led government to impose a resolution of the recognition dispute. The PPP election manifesto had promised to introduce legislation to compel employers to recognize any union supported by the majority of workers. This approach departed from traditional British trade union practice, which promoted union recognition through negotiation as opposed to legislative fiat. The PPP’s policy was similar to the American trade union practice of a majority vote, but this was anathema in Britain. The fear was that union recognition as a function of majority vote would lead to instability in the workplace. Workers who were disgruntled with their union could demand a vote to replace it, leading to frequent changes. Trained in the British tradition at Ruskin College, Ashton Chase was one of its disciples in British Guiana. But party loyalties would trump such intellectual refinements. As the GIWU strike progressed, Minister Chase told the SPA that his government retained the option to introduce legislation to resolve the recognition question. The strike having been called off on the twenty-fourth, the House of Assembly met later that day to consider the first reading of the Labour Relations Ordinance, a measure that would require the recognition of a union as a result of a majority vote of the workers. Chase, who piloted the bill, asked the speaker if it could be moved through the entire legislative process and approved that day. Such haste was regarded as unseemly because such a marked departure from trade union practice needed more time for public reaction and careful contemplation by the legislature. The speaker declined to accept the minister’s motion on the grounds that the bill failed to meet the constitutional requirement that it be published five days before it could be considered. The packed gallery erupted into disorder,

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aided and abetted by Sydney King. The pandemonium led to a walkout by all but one of the PPP legislators. The opposition members who kept their seats were harassed by the crowd when they eventually left the chamber. Addressing a large public meeting at Bourda Green that night, Chase declared that he was “persuaded to believe that he [the speaker] took that stand as a result of certain information given him and certain entreaty by the big shots of this country. It showed that although these people had been defeated on April 27, they were not prepared to recognize the rights of the people’s ministers of this country.”53 Chase was in a particularly truculent mood. “So long as my responsibility is not recognized,” he threatened, “so long I shall give them hell.” Those who diapproved of what was occurring could “pack up and clear out.” Chase was not troubled that the new constitution could be taken away. “If they attempt to take it away,” he predicted, “Her Majesty must expect that the next A-bomb explosion will not take place in the hinterland of Australia, but in the mudlands of British Guiana.”54 Governor Savage and the Colonial Office were not pleased with the conduct of the ministers who had called and were leading the strike. On September 4, Secretary of State Oliver Lyttleton told Savage that the conduct of King and Lachmansingh constituted a grave “departure from the code of behavior which . . . is expected of Ministers.” He advised the governor that “in any talk with them you will no doubt bear in mind [the] possibility that it may later be necessary to call Ministers to task for their conduct generally.” This comment hinted at some punitive action against the two men. By supporting the strike, the ministers “will make their own position as responsible ministers impossible particularly in view of Government’s responsibility for conciliation in labour disputes,” Lyttleton asserted. He thought that “as ministers they lay themselves open to charges of blatantly stirring up labour unrest for their political ends.” This was a serious charge but it was not unfounded.55 The secretary of state’s letter was ominous in its tone and implications for the young government. Written five days after the strike was called, it shows that the Colonial Office and the governor were thinking about a coup d’état in the colony. As Lyttleton wrote Savage: “I note that you have repeated your telegrams to [the] governors for Commander Caribbean Area and Commander in Chief America and West Indies Station. You may think it advisable to ask [if ] any preparatory action should be taken now that would help in getting outside assistance to you, if and when you need it, with least possible delay.”56 (  )

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When Governor Savage met with the Executive Council on September 9, he reported that he had told the ministers “in no uncertain terms of my strongest disapproval” of the actions of those who were “deliberately promoting strife.” He said the public viewed the strike as “government sponsored,” noting that Jagan could stop it if he really wanted to do so. But the governor did not threaten the ministers with military intervention to depose them, although he had been told to prepare for that eventuality. He continued to be troubled by developments, however. On September 15, for instance, Macnie reported that Savage had been described “as sick with worry . . . [and] at last he has realised what the PPP really are. . . . It is reported that he has now changed his ideas and is becoming tough.”57 The governor, however, could ill afford to be overly imperious with the ministers. King and Lachmansingh were the only ones who admitted to an active role in the strike, the others merely telling Savage that no amount of “political trumpeting” could have caused it if the workers did not have genuine grievances.58 Thus, Savage had to be careful lest he provoke bellicose behavior among leaders sensitive to any dictates from him and the Colonial Office. In fact, the Colonial Office seemed willing to consider dropping its opposition to the recognition of a union following a majority vote for it. Writing to Savage on September 15, the colonial secretary expressed his preference for the principle “that all unions having a substantial representation in the industry participate in a joint standing negotiating machinery.” If, Lyttleton indicated, “opinion” in the colony supported governmental intervention in the process, he had “no overwhelming objection to the holding of elections by Government officials on each estate to determine which union should represent the workers on it.” He believed that there “should be little difficulty in getting the agreement of unions and employers to the holding of such polls and the acceptance of the results for bargaining purposes.” Accordingly, he saw no need for legislation in the matter and hoped the governor would “persuade the Ministers not to press for legislation.” He would not, “in normal circumstances,” regard such “objectionable” legislation as constituting grounds to use the governor’s reserve powers. But, the secretary added, the “enforcement” of such legislation in British Guiana “might dangerously extend the control of the PPP on totalitarian lines.”59 The fear of the PPP’s intentions drove colonial policy, to the degree that the officials understood them. Secretary Lyttleton, for example, admitted that the labor legislation he opposed had functioned well in Jamaica. The presumed ideological complexion of the Jagan government made all the difference, shaping colonial policy. Having no patience with the PPP ministers, The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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the secretary told the governor that if they were connected in any way to a general strike, the “result may well amount to a breakdown in the constitution calling for its suspension.”60 Clearly, the colonial secretary was linking the labor dispute to broader, more volatile questions such as the fear of a Jagan-led Communist dictatorship and the potential suspension of the constitution. There is no evidence that Governor Savage conveyed to either the SPA or the minister of labour the Colonial Office’s disposition to compromise on the recognition problem. Had this been known, the SPA would probably have been receptive, given its July 20 compromise letter to Minister Chase. The PPP government would have viewed the compromise less favorably in light of its firm commitment to legislation that would achieve its objectives. But this is a matter of speculation since the contending parties never had a chance to consider Secretary Lyttleton’s proposal. There was also the emerging position in the Colonial Office that the constitution should be suspended to save the colony from Cheddi Jagan, the PPP, and their ideological posturings. The potential suspension of the constitution received the implied support of the State Council. In a remarkable development, that body passed a resolution on September 21 regretting that “certain ministers of the Crown in the colony have been actively engaged in various parts of the country in promoting and sustaining this [sugar] strike.” The resolution maintained that “such action by these ministers is a grave danger to the Constitution, a direct threat to the peace and security of the citizens of the Colony and the negation of good and responsible democratic government.” It urged the secretary of state “after due inquiry to take such action as he may deem fit to ensure confidence in the Government and the proper and efficient working of the Constitution.” In moving the motion, His Grace Archbishop Alan Knight, said he was not proposing that the secretary of state should “interfere with the constitution.” Rather, he wanted “to secure that the Constitution we now have shall be preserved and made workable.”61 The State Council was a powerful voice that could hardly be ignored. The archbishop was not being candid in stating the purpose of his motion, but the implication was clear enough. At the local level, the motion’s message was that the PPP’s Labour Relations Bill would receive little support in the upper house. Worse, the State Council was inviting the Colonial Office’s intervention in what was essentially a local dispute, no matter how threatening its implications were for the owners of capital. Buoyed by the potential support of such an important official body, the Colonial Office continued to plan for its armed intrusion in the colony, which was probably an open secret in Lon(  )

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don’s official circles. In fact, on September 30 the minister of state for colonial affairs, Henry Hopkinson, who was then visiting New York, sought guidance regarding how the United Kingdom’s delegation to the United Nations might explain the impending action in British Guiana. “If our action can be presented as a firm step taken to prevent [an] attempt by communist elements to sabotage [the] new and progressive constitution,” he wrote, “it will be welcomed by [the] American public and accepted by most United Nations opinion.” The reaction would be more hostile if “it is allowed to appear as just another attempt by Britain to stymie a popular nationalist movement,” he speculated. Colonial Officials chose the former reasoning and clung to it for several years.62 Secretary Lyttleton made up his mind four days after the passage of the State Council’s resolution. On September 25 he prepared a memorandum for the British Cabinet declaring that “we must take away the Ministers’ powers, imprison the extremists and suspend the Constitution at the earliest possible moment.” The ministers, the secretary asserted, “have no intention of working the present constitution in a democratic manner nor have they any real interest in the good of the people of British Guiana.”63 The secretary supported his argument in a lengthy memorandum, to which he attached a document, entitled “Evidence of a Communist Conspiracy in British Guiana,” outlining the basis for his recommendation and the Cabinet’s decision. The document provided a window into what the Colonial Office considered communist behavior in 1953. The case against Cheddi Jagan and his government, as stated in the attachment, was largely bereft of substance, vacuous, and an exercise in imperial irresponsibility. It deserves to be examined in its entirety: EVIDENCE OF A COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY IN BRITISH GUIANA 1. The following actions of Ministers show how they have tried to use their position in the Government to increase the power and influence of themselves and their party with the object of furthering the Communist cause: i. They used their majority on [the] Executive Council to obtain the withdrawal of the ban on the entry of certain West Indian Communists in the Territory. ii. There is information that Sidney King, a minister, proposed to call a “Peace Conference” in the autumn to be attended by the West Indian Communist referred to in (i) above. iii. They have moved a Bill to repeal the Subversive Literature OrdiThe Imperial Coup d’Etat

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nance which would permit the uncontrolled entry of Communist literature. iv. They are already using their majority in [the] Executive Council to prevent the banning of certain communist literature which is arriving. v. They have already obtained the right to make appointments to Advisory Committees and have demanded the right to appoint the members of Executive Boards and Committees which, if granted, would give then considerable control over, inter alia, the rice industry and local authorities. vi. The Minister of Labour has proposed a bill which, by repealing the Essential Services ordinance, would permit strikes to be called without warning in certain essential services. vii. The Minister of Labour has published, without the Governor’s permission, a Bill, entitling the Labour Relations Ordinance, 1953, to force employers to recognize a Trade Union in any industry which obtains a majority of 52 percent of the workers voting by ballot. This is intended to give their Unions, such as the G.I.W.U., the control of their industries. viii. Ministers have attempted to seize certain monies intended for capital rehabilitation in the sugar industry and use them solely for workers’ housing. ix. Minister of Education has ordered the re-writing of text books to give them a “nationalist, socialist and realistic outlook”—“to prepare this generation for the take-over we are seeking.” x. Ministers have retained their Presidencies of various important unions and actively speak and negotiate on their behalf.64 The Cabinet discussed and approved the secretary’s recommendation on October 2. It ordered the minister of defense “to arrange for a battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers to proceed at once to British Guiana, from Jamaica with a naval force of one cruiser and two frigates; and to make all the necessary preparations to enable a further battalion to be sent at full strength from the United Kingdom, in an aircraft carrier, if reinforcements proved to be needed.”65 In the aftermath of the decision to invade and effect the coup d’état, the Colonial Office had to consider the diplomatic implications and work out the strategic details. It was particularly concerned about the reaction in the United States, in whose acknowledged sphere of influence British Guiana (  )

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was located. The Americans had not yet demonstrated any significant interest in Guiana’s domestic politics, although they still retained Atkinson Airfield, a base leased from Britain in 1941 during World War II. British officials were assuredly aware of U.S. concerns about the spread of communism in its hemisphere. When Jagan won the election in April, for example, an anxious Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to Secretary Lyttleton suggesting that “we ought surely to get American support in doing all we can to break the Communist teeth in British Guiana,” adding, tongue in cheek, “perhaps they would even send Senator [Joseph] MacCarthy down there.”66 This was a reference to the virulently anticommunist senator from Wisconsin who was then leading a witch hunt against people suspected of contamination by the feared ideology. In 1953 the Americans had no diplomatic presence in British Guiana, a clear indication that the colony was not of serious interest to them. When Henry Hopkinson visited the United States in September, he reported that “opinion in the United States and in the United Nations is totally ignorant of situation in British Guiana and therefore quite unprepared for developments.” The American deputy under secretary of state, the minister said, “expressed ignorance of any communist influence in the territory.” Still, some British officials did not want to alienate the Americans by invading a country in their sphere of interest, even though it was a British possession. Prime Minister Churchill, however, was not worried about a negative U.S. reaction “as in this case their anti-colonialism will be more than balanced by their anti-Communism.” The Americans, the British Cabinet decided on October 3, should “be told about twelve hours before the plan took effect.”67 Colonial officials also discussed how to reveal their plans to the Commonwealth countries and selected friendly governments. On October 3, the Cabinet “proposed” that the Commonwealth government of Canada should be told about the invasion twenty-four hours before it began since that country had “important commercial interests” in the colony. The other whiteled Commonwealth governments of Australia and New Zealand should get twelve hours’ notice, whereas the Asian governments of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon should not be informed until the invasion was in progress. Obviously, members of the British Cabinet had greater confidence in the capacity of the white majority countries to keep the secret but doubted that of the Asians, who shared ties of kith and kin with the Indians of Guiana. The government of Venezuela, a neighbor of British Guiana and a country described by one official as “potentially our best and wealthiest customer” in Latin America, was to be given twelve hours’ notice.68 The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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British officials wanted to retain the element of surprise in the colony, so absolute secrecy about the invasion, its timing, and troop movements had to be maintained. Governor Savage was told that the coup would occur on the morning of October 9 and that he should dismiss the ministers but detain some of them as well as selected leaders of the PPP. Savage disagreed with the instructions to detain anyone, telling his superiors that “such action should not be taken unless developments in the situation demanded it.” The Colonial Office insisted that the governor follow his instructions, prompting him to assert: Whilst I appreciate the risk of leaders stirring up disorders etc., I still feel very strongly that it would be a grave mistake to anticipate action on their part with consequent loss of goodwill and support of [a] large section of the community. Withdrawal of portfolios might well foment overt action by leaders and provide immediate justification for detention. For these reasons I feel bound to adhere to previous views and would urge that the decision be left to me.69

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The Colonial Office did not concede the point completely, but the secretary of state allowed the governor to alter the timing of the arrests—whether they should occur before or after the troops landed. Lyttleton insisted, however, that the “leading figures” should be taken into custody since “only thus can there be any hope of preventing the stirring up of disorder.”70 Although the invasion planners wanted to keep their intentions secret, rumors about an imminent suspension of the constitution abounded in London and Georgetown at the start of October. On October 5, for instance, “sources close to the Governor” denied that the constitution had been revoked.71 The following day the Manchester Guardian reported that troops were on their way to Guiana and that the Caribbean army headquarters had confirmed their deployment. The British government, however, declined to explain the purpose of the troop movements. When the Admiralty of London announced the departure of the cruiser HMS Sheffield for the West Indies, it was quick to explain that “it is a perfectly normal move which had been planned for months. There is no need to get excited about it. It has nothing to do with the situation in British Guiana.”72 Seeking to project an image of controlled calm in the midst of a seemingly impending crisis, Cheddi Jagan responded to questions about the situation the same day by asking, “What’s all the excitement about?”73 This expression of lofty detachment did not last. Belatedly recognizing that there was substance to the rumors, Dr. Jagan introduced a motion in the (  )

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House of Assembly on October 7 designed as a preemptive strike against the arrival of any British troops. The motion read, inter alia: “That this House regards the presence of Military and Naval Forces as an act of intimidation and provocation likely to precipitate incidents and to endanger the peace and harmony of the country, and that an order be made to secure the immediate withdrawal of these troops.”74 Jagan’s motion did not get very far. The speaker of the House of Assembly, Sir Eustace Woolford, overruled it on the grounds that he had not received any official notification regarding the presence of British forces in the colony. In any event, he thought it “improper” to entertain a motion critical of a decision by the queen.75 The PPP, on the other hand, declined to be silenced. It denounced any movement of troops to the colony, declaring: “We cannot see any reason for such intimidation when all Guianese know that conditions in our country are normal and peaceful. There is no disturbance, unrest, or violence. In this hour when the Colonial Office is trying to create hysteria and rob us of our rights, we ask the people of Guiana to remain calm, quiet, and firm.”76 The unexpected publicity received by the potential invasion led Governor Savage to modify colonial strategy on the ground. “In view of the announcements of troop movements,” he told the secretary of state on October 7, “I consider that it is doubtful whether it would be politic to arrest ministers and others on D-Day as previously proposed.” The governor explained that “such action, in cold blood . . . might turn [a] section of public opinion against us.” He emphasized that the planned searches for incriminating material would continue, “but in view of the absence of the element of surprise it is not expected that they will yield much of any value.”77 Subsequent events would prove Savage correct, but probably no seriously incriminating evidence, as seen through the optic of the Colonial Office, ever existed. THE PPP’S WORST FEARS were confirmed when the HMS Superb arrived on October 8 and its troops disembarked on two frigates: the Bigburg Bay and the Barghead Bay. The correspondent for the Daily Gleaner in Jamaica reported that “bayonets bristled in this city [Georgetown] of 80,000 people as the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and Royal Marines marched through the main streets today.” The troops “were warmly received by the populace, business houses put out flags in welcome.”78 Viewing the developments with grave apprehension, the PPP once again asked its supporters to “remain firm and calm.” It assured them that “if our leaders are arrested, new leaders will spring up. If our country is placed under martial law, let our people stay in The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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Jagan and his supporters at a post–coup d’état rally, Georgetown, October 11, 1953. Jagan is in the center, with arm raised; Janet Jagan is to his immediate right and Jai Narine Singh to his immediate left; Forbes Burnham is at the microphone. (© Corbis)

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their houses and go about their several businesses in peace. Let us not be trapped in their attempts to provoke us.”79 The leaders of opinion in the colony were provoked, however. The editors of the three daily newspapers—the Daily Argosy, Daily Chronicle, and Guiana Graphic—issued a joint statement on October 8 accusing the Colonial Office of releasing “equivocal” information and thereby leading them to “mislead” the Guianese people. This was a significant blow to the colonial government since the colony’s major newspapers operated as its unofficial publicity arm and were dependable cheerleaders. The editors’ statement was candid: Since we, the editors of three daily newspapers of British Guiana who have invariably cooperated loyally and faithfully with the administration in all questions of security and of the true welfare of the colony, have not been given the official versions to which we look and are entitled to look for such knowledge, the information that would enable us to inform and guide public opinion at the present grave juncture, but have rather been given such equivocal information . . . but we the aforesaid editors in protest did not publish yesterday and shall not be in a position to publish (  )

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in the future any editorial articles until such time as we have been fully, properly, and truthfully apprised of the existing situation.80 IN JUSTIFYING THE COUP and the suspension of the Guianese constitution, Her Majesty’s Government said it acted “to prevent Communist subversion of the Government and a dangerous crisis in both public order and in economic affairs.” It accused “the faction in power” of having “shown by their acts and their speeches that they are prepared to go to any lengths including violence to turn British Guiana into a Communist State.” The elected ministers and the PPP, the statement charged, “were completely under the control of a communist clique.” The ministers were using their powers “not to further the interests of the whole community, but to pervert the constitution and secure totalitarian control over all aspects of the social, cultural, and economic life of British Guiana.” This was a serious allegation, indeed, and one made without credible evidence. “They have clearly shown,” the statement continued, “that they are prepared to use violence and to plunge the state into economic and social chaos to achieve their ends.” It saw a “communist plot” in the colony and promised that the damage it has done “to the economic and social life of the community must be repaired as quickly as possible.” The statement announced the creation of an independent Commission of Enquiry “to report on what has happened and to recommend a revised constitution.”81 Echoing the charges contained in the statement, Governor Savage told the colony in a radio broadcast that “over recent months there has been a planned and continuous programme of strengthening links with communist countries, with a view to making British Guiana a servile state where the people are compelled, under intimidation, to give up these freedoms that we all cherish.” In declaring a State of Emergency, the governor enjoined the people to maintain law and order and called upon the police and the voluntary force to execute their responsibilities.82 Predictably, a chastened PPP denounced the invasion and the unceremonious removal of its leaders from office. The party issued a statement calling the Crown’s case against it “spurious.” It denied “any attempt at the use of force and violence and the setting up of a satellite state subservient to any foreign power.” On the contrary, the party’s “goal is the removal of subordination to any foreign power.” The PPP challenged all the charges leveled against it, demanded the withdrawal of the invading troops, and appealed “to world opinion in this grave hour to rally in defense of our democratic rights.”83 The action of Her Majesty’s Government had taken the PPP by surprise, and it The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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really had no time to mount any resistance. Its strategy, however, would soon emerge. Members of the elite and alarmist anti-PPP newspapers welcomed the presence of the British troops, although the editors had been critical of the “equivocal” information they had been given by colonial authorities. The Daily Argosy initially described their arrival as an act of “deliverance.” The soldiers “came not as invaders seeking to impose a military regime, but as envoys from the Mother Country whose mission it is to frustrate a scheme which, had it succeeded might have made Guiana subservient to a foreign state, inimical to all their traditions and aspirations.”84 To describe the troops as “envoys” was euphemistic, but the Argosy was the voice of the conservative elite in the colony. Its editor, F. Seal Coon, was an Englishman and a persistent critic of the PPP. Although the Argosy welcomed the troops in what appeared to be a reflexive patriotic exercise, it was later critical of their modus operandi and their designated mission. The warships should not have been dispatched, it declared on October 11. The events of October 9 gave the PPP an opportunity to “cry injured innocence.” They also enabled the party to appeal “to the sympathies of nations, agencies, and persons abroad, and to all the springs of nationalism, resentment, and trepidation at home.” The Argosy did not support Her Majesty’s Government’s response to the crisis in the colony, maintaining that “what has been done we believe to have been politically unwise and politically difficult of justification.” It doubted the wisdom “of such a drastic move without simple and visible necessity.” The paper did not share the Colonial Office’s view that the threat of violence required the presence of troops, observing that “the danger of an armed uprising . . . was remote and we know of no organized plan for such a revolt.”85 The Argosy’s criticisms were not unfounded. Her Majesty’s Government’s coup d’état was based on a misreading of the political situation in the colony, and this invited a hasty overreaction. The nationalist stirrings in British Guiana, clothed as they were in the vacuous Marxist rhetoric employed by some of the leaders and their erratic and unnecessarily divisive behavior in office, produced a greater alarm and panic in London than was warranted. None of Guiana’s presumed problems could have been addressed by a military invasion and the implied threat of official violence. They required a more mature understanding of the changing political ethos of the colony and a capacity to make creative adjustments to the challenges coming from below and marshaled by the PPP. The governor still retained his reserve power,

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which could have been used to thwart any perceived legislative excesses of the new government. The haste with which the British acted to overthrow the Jagan government underscored their belief that the PPP ministers were plotting to establish a communist state. To support their case for the coup, the Colonial Office prepared a lengthy white paper for presentation to Parliament describing the events that precipitated their action as well as the conduct of the PPP administration. According to T. W. Garvey of the Foreign Office, the white paper argued:

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i) The PPP Ministers have since May [1953] demonstrated their inability to govern, ruined the economy, disrupted the administration, etc., and that H.M. Government had in the circumstances no alternative but to intervene and stop the rot; ii) Given the growing disorder in the Colony and the proclivities of the ministers, H.M. Government’s intervention (withdrawal of constitution, dismissal of ministers, etc.) was liable to lead to violence and bloodshed unless it were carried out in commanding force. Hence the troops and warships.86 Garvey noticed that the white paper did not accuse the PPP of fomenting a communist plot. He knew there was no evidence to support such an allegation and was gratified that the Colonial Office had not tried to make that case. “From the Foreign Office point of view,” Garvey confessed, “it would of course have been convenient if the Colonial Office were in a position to justify their action in British Guiana as having been necessary to forestall a communist plot. Since, however, such a view is not tenable, it is a good thing that no attempt has been made to present the case in this way.”87 The suspension of the constitution meant that the governor assumed all the responsibilities for administering the colony. Because it was not the intention of the Colonial Office to prolong this unpalatable situation, it acted quickly to draft and implement an interim constitution. On November 7, less than a month after the invasion, the Official Gazette of British Guiana published a draft of the Order in Council that included its terms. It provided for an Executive Council consisting of ten members, three of whom were ex officio by virtue of their positions in the civil service and the remaining seven were appointed by the governor. The constitution also sanctioned a nominated Legislative Council consisting of twenty-seven members, including the three ex officio members of the Executive Council. In a radio broad-

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cast, Governor Savage assured the colony that, in nominating members of the Legislative Council, his “aim will be for . . . [it] to be fully representative of all sections of the community and of the three counties. I would hope to include representatives of political bodies, of local government bodies, of producers, of trade unions, of trade, commerce, and industry, and of some representative associations.”88 The governor hoped that the new constitution’s life would be about a year. “It is imperative,” he said, “that . . . that period cannot and must not be one of marking time but of constructive and progressive action.”89 In addition to the three ex officio members of the Executive Council—namely, the chief secretary, the attorney general, and the financial secretary—many of the governor’s appointees were stalwarts of the old elite and ardent foes of the PPP. They included Sir Frank McDavid, a barrister and president of the former State Council; Percival Cummings, a barrister and former member of the State Council and a past mayor of Georgetown; and Rupert Tello, the new president of the Manpower Citizens Association. Given its composition, the council was unlikely to receive the support of the nonelites in the society. As one prominent member of the United Democratic Party, which represented the principal opposition to the PPP in the House of Assembly, complained to the American consul general:

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The Executive Council is merely a nodding group of “yes” men. Tello . . . is inexperienced and will be at sea. Cummings is hardly better. He has lost at municipal and legislative elections and would flow with any tide. . . . Except for the six months in the State Council he has no political experience. Then there is [Rahman] Gajraj whose spine is rubber-lined and who will bend over backwards as forward. Careerists? Yes, when the PPP was growing they would neither of them join to fight them. They both said they preferred to remain as independents. When the PPP assumed control, they fawned at them. Yet now, these are the ilk who must govern our country during a period which will determine whether a blow can be dealt to the PPP or whether they will grow in strength.90 Governor Savage also packed the Legislative Council with representatives of the old elite and opponents of the PPP. He appointed five opposition members of the last House of Assembly, as well as six members of the previous State Council. Seven of the appointees had been defeated in the April elections, some of them by large numbers. Eight of the appointees were members of the United Democratic Party, the principal organized opposition to the PPP. Significantly, no members of the PPP were appointed, though it (  )

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is unlikely that any would have accepted. Janet Jagan denounced the governor’s selections as being dominated by business and commercial interests. “There is no opposition in it,” she scoffed, “and this is contrary to the noblest traditions of British political institutions.”91 Excluded from government, the PPP confronted a difficult and uncertain future. It experienced a coup in its leadership in February 1955, when the Burnham-Jagan political marriage of convenience met its denouement. The occasion was the timing of the 1955 party congress. It had not been the best of times for the PPP, since the party had been the object of sustained harassment from the government in the wake of the October 1953 coup. In an editorial comment, the Daily Argosy described the PPP in January 1955 as being “in dire straits, diminished, discredited, and disrupted.” This was an accurate observation, and party chairman Burnham decided to exploit the situation to his advantage. He knew that he had to challenge Jagan for the party’s leadership if he were to consolidate his position in time for the elections that would be called once a new constitution was promulgated. He was also becoming very uncomfortable with Jagan’s rhetorical radicalism. Burnham initiated the imbroglio in early 1955 by announcing, in his capacity as the PPP’s chairman, that its congress would be held in Georgetown on February 12 and 13. Suspicious of Burnham’s motives for calling the congress, Janet Jagan, the PPP’s general secretary, immediately issued a statement emphasizing that the sole authority for convening a congress was the General Council of the party and it had not done so. Burnham insisted that the Executive Committee on which he sat as party chairman could do so on its own volition. The unseemly public wrangling between the chairman and the secretary of the PPP reflected its internal tensions and the divisions over its ideology, future direction, and the potential spoils of power. There had been persistent rumors that Burnham and his supporters, characterized as moderates in the party, were planning to replace those described as extremists at the February congress. Since the moderates were predominantly African, any action by them had potentially troubling racial implications. Acting quickly to diffuse a politically volatile situation, Janet Jagan proposed that the February conclave proceed, but it should be described as “a special congress of party members” as opposed to the regular congress required by its constitution. Burnham agreed to this compromise, and the two leaders issued a joint statement endorsing it because of “the necessity of maintaining unity at this critical time in our nation’s history.” The special congress’s agenda was confined to reviewing the party’s activities since 1953, The Imperial Coup d’Etat

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discussions of the roles of women, youth, and labor in the “nationalist movement,” and the like. These were hardly controversial issues, but the whirlwind was yet to come. The Jagans did not attend the special congress’s sessions held on February 12 but turned up on the second day, receiving an impressive ovation on their arrival. The meeting’s mood soon soured as the Jagans and some of their supporters walked out, objecting to the discussion of issues that were not on the agreed-upon agenda. Burnham, in what the Daily Argosy called “a neatly executed double cross,” permitted the nomination and election of the party’s officers. With the Jaganites caught off guard, the Burnham-dominated special congress proceeded to elect him leader of the party. Cheddi Jagan was demoted to the position of first vice president and Janet Jagan was ousted as general secretary and replaced by Jai Narine Singh. Mrs. Jagan was elected to the lesser office of treasurer, and Dr. Joseph Lachmansingh, the former minister of health and housing and a Burnhamite, became the new chairman of the party. Similarly, Burnham’s supporters dominated the new General Council. This was the second coup d’état that British Guiana had experienced in the commanding heights of its political system in two years. The October 1953 coup had exacerbated the political, ideological, and racial tensions in the colony, helping to pave the way for Burnham’s daring move. His February coup would have even more far-reaching implications than the first one since, over time, it transformed the political culture of the country with devastating and enduring consequences for the body politic and the social order. With the coup a fait accompli, two competing factions—the Jaganites and the Burnhamites—proclaimed themselves the voice of the PPP, each one accusing the other of violating the party’s constitution. The deposed Executive Committee hastily met and expelled Burnham, Lachmansingh, and Narine Singh from what it still maintained was the authentic party. Burnham dismissed his expulsion from “a non-existant body,” describing the act as the work of “eight malcontents.” As the days wore on, it became clear that the coup had destroyed the party the Jagans and others had founded with such enthusiasm and optimism in 1950. “It’s all dead” was Janet Jagan’s pessimistic response when asked about the possibility of a rapprochement between the two factions. Not until 1957 did Burnham found a new party, the People’s National Congress (PNC), thereby making the coup irreversible.92 Burnham’s ambitions and ideological differences with Jagan aside, the colonial regime also played a major role in effecting the coup. “The split in the PPP undoubtedly owed much to the patient work by the Special Branch who deserve the highest praise for this achievement,” the British Foreign (  )

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Office boasted in a memorandum in the aftermath of the rupture between the two men. The document’s exact date is uncertain and some of its contents have been redacted. In an explicit reference to the colonial regime’s intelligence arm, the memorandum explains that the governor “has at his disposal an efficient Police Special Branch under confident and experienced leadership.” This was an astounding admission of British complicity in the acrimonious divisions in the ranks of the PPP. The nature of this interference is not known, but it may have taken the form of financial inducements to dissident PPP members to participate in the coup.93 THE FIRST POSTMORTEM of the invasion was conducted by the American consul general, William Maddox. Washington was never involved in the decision to invade and received only twelve hours’ notice before it occurred. Maddox was not pleased with this treatment, believing that the Americans had a “right” to be told because the United States was an ally; moreover, there were “geographical and other circumstances” that should have been taken into account. Maddox described the events associated with the British action as a “political whirlwind” that “has scarcely any parallel in modern British imperial history.” He said that the British had executed a “bloodless coup d’état” in the colony, “overthrowing a body of ministers and legislators elected democratically in accordance with the provisions of a Constitution decreed by that same authority a few scant months ago.” Maddox criticized “the precipitant haste” with which the British government had launched the coup. “Were conditions in British Guiana such as to necessitate rushed and split-second timing in the arrival of the troops?” he asked. Answering his own question, Maddox acknowledged: “If evidence exists to this effect, it has not been made public, it was not evident to one following the situation closely at the time, nor has it since been communicated to me from any quarter.” He believed that the governor and the ex officio members of the assembly could have found ways to delay the adoption of the Labour Relations Bill, remarking: “It still remains to be proven that a ‘speeded-up’ October 8 or 9 date was indispensable to the action.” Maddox also questioned whether “it was wise on the part of the Governor and the United Kingdom to take such drastic action until a specific, and otherwise uncontrollable crisis had arisen.” He was forced to conclude that “unless evidence, so far undisclosed, develops to show that the P.P.P. planned to precipitate a ‘coup’ of its own . . . the timing of the British action is difficult to justify.” This was a harsh judgment that contained a high degree of plausibility. Maddox placed much of the responsibility for the misjudgment on the shoulThe Imperial Coup d’Etat

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ders of Governor Savage. Savage did not possess, he thought, the kind of tough-mindedness that would have equipped him to deal with the political situation in Guiana. The governor, Maddox said, is a quiet, unpretentious man, patient, tolerant, conscientious, scrupulous, and a good administrator. Sincerely devoted to the cause of bettering the lot of the masses, he wanted only that the government should get on with the task of economic and social development. Believing that men are basically well intentioned, and that another’s errors of viewpoint can be corrected with reasoned argument, patience, and understanding, he felt reasonably confident several months ago that he could, in time, manage to work along with the PPP leadership. Basically, he has no stomach for politics, which are an annoying intrusion in good administration and social programs. He sincerely wanted to cooperate with the P.P.P. and expected cooperation in return. Maddox believed the PPP’s leaders sensed that they could exploit the governor’s personality to their advantage and abused him with impunity. “Sir Alfred suffered during the summer months [of 1953], both in the Executive Council and in public, indignities and abuse which many another man would not have tolerated,” Maddox wrote. “The P.P.P. ministers apparently came to believe that he could be pushed and kicked around at will, and did not spare their talents in this direction.” Savage had come to the conclusion, Maddox maintained, that the colony was on the verge of collapsing:

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A man of peace, he hates violence; he feared, in the face of threats and gestures, that the PPP might offer forceful resistance if he took a determined stand on an important issue. He was afraid he could not count on the full support of the police in such a contingency. Somewhere along the line he apparently came to the conclusion that the situation was beyond his control, and that a surprise troop landing, seizure of incriminating documents, dismissal of the Ministers, etc. was the only course to take.94 Governor Savage, to be sure, was not the only villain in the construction and execution of the coup. It was, for the most part, hatched in the Colonial Office, but Savage’s dispatches had played a critical role in the decision. Maddox was not privy to the deliberations in the Colonial Office, so he was attributing primary responsibility for the coup to the well-meaning but beleaguered governor. As “a man of gentleness and great forbearance,” Maddox said, Savage was ill suited for the position he held in the colony. “I believe,” the American concluded, “that British Guiana needed over recent months a (  )

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Governor of different temperament, talents, and experience than Sir Alfred was able to provide.”95 Savage must bear some of the responsibility for such a serious misreading of Guiana’s political pulse and culture and for the haste to action by the Colonial Office. A relatively new governor, he was influenced by the hysteria of the anti-PPP press, the fears and insecurities of a resident white elite, and the strident, incendiary rhetoric of the emerging colonial leaders. Savage and the British elite in Guiana had to defend the honor of an imperial power that was being assaulted by the rhetoric of the colonized with telling effectiveness and contempt. Speaking in the House of Assembly in early September, Forbes Burnham charged, with his characteristic eloquence:

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It can be said of our masters in these days that they will drive the people to desperation where even a worm will turn, and as soon as the people fight back, as soon as the criticisms of the natives become uncomfortable they are dubbed terrorists and described as being seditious. So as far as we are concerned . . . we shall continue to wear proudly the description “seditious” or the appellation “terrorists.” Those who talk about terrorists will tell you in their history books about a certain man [Patrick Henry] who said “Give me liberty or give me death.” What was good for him is good for us.96 Burnham could not have known that three weeks later the imperial power would commit an act of constitutional terrorism in Guiana. The suspension of the constitution was strong medicine, and its toxins would remain in the body politic for years. It exacerbated the tensions in the PPP and helped to precipitate a split in its ranks, inaugurating the dishonorable politics of race. Operating in the haunting shadow of another coup, the politicians either accepted its circumscribing effect on their behavior or saw it as a safety valve, albeit a potentially unpalatable corrective to their failures. The colonial regime’s coup d’état was an ill-conceived response to the audacious rhetorical noise of the new leaders and their clumsy attempts to consolidate their party’s hold on office. The moment of promise had been lost, not irretrievably so, but the path to recovery would require a kind of steady and enlightened leadership that was markedly absent from those complicit in the tragedy of October 9, 1953.

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Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

Prime Minister Winston Churchill was intrigued by a news report he had just read in the London Times. Dated August 11, 1954, the article said that Dr. J. Lachmansingh, the minister of health and housing in the deposed PPP government, had chosen to go to jail following his conviction for having “subversive” literature in his possession. Lachmansingh had declined to pay the fine of $150 on the grounds that the freedom to read whatever one wanted was an untrammeled right. After reading the report, Churchill wrote to the new colonial secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, requesting a copy of the offending book and the basis for the law that the former minister had violated.1 The prime minister received a rapid response. On August 12, L. B. Johnson of the Colonial Office told him that Lachmansingh had transgressed the British Guiana Undesirable Publications Ordinance, which made it illegal to possess written material banned by the governor. Lachmansingh had had two such publications in his possession. The first was the World Trade Union Movement, published by the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) with headquarters in London. The second was Information Bulletin, a periodical printed in Bucharest also by the WFTU. Perhaps anticipating additional questions from the prime minister, Johnson explained that the legislation banning possession of these and other “subversive” works was

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based on a model ordinance that the Colonial Office sent to the colonies in 1938. Johnson informed Churchill that “colonial governments,” “with their responsibilities for backward and unsophisticated peoples,” feared the impact of communist-inspired literature on their subjects. They thus “make it their policy to prevent so far as is possible the importation and circulation of Communist literature in their territories and almost all have lists of publications which are banned.”2 The prime minister was unimpressed by Johnson’s explanation. “I am not at all convinced by this,” he asserted, “that this was a wise use of existing legal powers.” To Churchill, “circulating is one thing, having in your possession another.”3 Winston Churchill was questioning the efficacy of one of his government’s major ploys to contain Cheddi Jagan and the PPP in the wake of the 1953 coup. Determined to prevent Jagan’s return to office, the Colonial Office expended its energies in constructing various strategies to achieve that objective. This included the introduction of an economic development program to win the support of the people, and blocking Jagan’s attempts, when he returned to office, to obtain economic assistance from all sources, irrespective of ideological orientation. Under the circumstances, Churchill’s skepticism had no resonance in the Colonial Office. Although the United Kingdom did not restrict its citizens’ access to the written or spoken word, the Colonial Office wanted to protect the colonized peoples from virus inherent in the freedom to read. It feared their exposure to ideas that not only challenged the legitimacy of colonial rule but also promoted other ideological constructs such as communism. These “backward and unsophisticated” peoples, as L. B. Johnson described them, lacked the intellectual capacity to make sound decisions based on the ideas to which they were exposed. The entire ideological arsenal of colonialism had been grounded in the self-proclaimed superiority of the colonizers over the peoples they controlled. The time had passed when colonial officials and British intellectuals could publicly invoke overt racist claims to justify the subjugation of black and brown peoples, but those ideas had a more stubborn longevity in private discourse and policymaking. Colonial officials were convinced that Cheddi Jagan and other PPP leaders had been seduced by the deceptive wiles of communist ideology. To prevent further contamination of the colony, the officials had, by March 1954, prepared a long list of “undesirable” and prohibited publications. The ideological content of these writings cannot now be determined given their unavailability. Some of their titles seem innocuous enough, and their presence on the (  )

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list reveals a great deal about the anxieties of a colonial power under ideological assault. The list included: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. ix. x. xi. xii. xiii. xiv. xv.

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xvi.

“British Guiana Workers Fight against Poverty for Independence.” “Terror in Kenya.” “Egypt and the Sudan—the People on the March.” “The Housing Crisis in Capitalist and Colonial Countries.” “W.F.T.U. Campaigns for Social Security.” “Towards the Third World Trade Union Congress.” “Motor Car Industry Faces Growing Crisis.” “Press Communiqué.” “Federation of Vietnamese Youth.” “Hands Off British Guiana.” All past or future issues of the periodical entitled— “World Trade Union Movement.” All past or future issues of the periodical entitled— “Information Bulletin.” All past or future issues of the periodical entitled— “World Youth.” All past or future issues of the periodical entitled— “Third World Youth Congress.” All past or future issues of the periodical entitled— “Information Service.” All past or future issues of the periodical entitled— “Soviet News.”4

To contain opposition to the October coup d’état and to restrict the people’s access to literature he deemed to be subversive, Governor Savage quickly issued an Emergency Order giving colonial authorities broad powers to regulate the public’s behavior. Among other measures, the order mandated that: No person shall a) Endeavour, whether orally or otherwise, to influence public opinion (whether in the colony or elsewhere) in a manner likely to be prejudicial to defence of public safety and order, b) Do any act, or have any article in his possession, with a view to making, or facilitating the making of any such endeavour. Law enforcement personnel had wide latitude to interpret these measures. A police officer was accorded the power to arrest without a warrant “any perContaining Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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son whom he had reasonable ground for suspecting to have committed an offence against the Order.”5 The next several months saw an elaboration of this order, with the issuance of specific, more focused measures to address behavior the government found objectionable. The first casualty was free speech, as the government moved with alacrity to ban all public meetings. On October 9 the governor prohibited the holding of “public processions other than funeral processions without the approval of the Commissioner of Police.” He also forbade “meetings of more than five persons in any public place or in any premises.”6 The ban excluded places of worship. The PPP was the primary target of these regulations, which aimed to control the conduct of its leaders and supporters, if not to silence them. If the authorities had anticipated a PPP-led violent resistance to the coup, they had misjudged the pragmatism of the party. Its leaders knew they lacked the power to contest the armed might of the colonial state; in any event, there was no disposition to do that. As Cheddi Jagan explained: “We are a small colony on the north east coast of South America. We are surrounded by the power of the British Empire with that of the United States behind it. How can we use force? They have the warships, the rifles and the guns. They entered our country with them and now they accuse us of wanting war.”7 At bottom, the astute leaders knew that this was a struggle of competing ideas, of strategy, and of the capacity to maintain the élan of the party in challenging times. The American consul general was not certain that the Guianese people had any appetite for conflict. “The mass of people in British Guiana is docile and law abiding,” Maddox wrote, “but they do respond to symbols and actualities of power. So long as the PPP was ‘riding high,’” they applauded the “showing of power”; but now that the troops were here and the PPP had been put down a “peg,” many are drawing away.”8 The PPP’s first reaction to the coup was tepid and uncertain. A handbill denouncing the colonial regime’s action was distributed in its name but Cheddi Jagan, Forbes Burnham, and Ashton Chase denied any responsibility for it. There was some speculation that Janet Jagan had written it, but the idea really came from Cheddi Jagan and Sydney King. The two leaders had issued the document on their own volition. The “P.P.P. Call to Action,” as the handbill was captioned, urged the people to “stand firm” in “an organized and disciplined manner without violence and terrorism” against the British government. It condemned the invasion of the colony by “foreign troops,” charging that “our just democratic rights have been taken from us.” It urged “a policy of non-cooperation with the present regime,” proclaiming a general (  )

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strike and a boycott of “all goods and supplies coming from the United Kingdom.”9 Believing that Mrs. Jagan had written the document, the Daily Argosy was outraged that it referred to the troops as “foreign,” harshly reminding her that “this is a British Colony and the troops now here are British.” “It is Mrs. Jagan,” the paper said, “who is foreign, except for the paper of citizenship she does not deserve to enjoy.” To sharpen its criticism, the editorial, presumably written by the English-born editor, Frederick Seal Coon, invoked the fact that Janet Jagan was a Jew. Betraying a soft-core anti-Semitism, the editorial stated that Mrs. Jagan “is hardly even American, but stems in fact from the race which throughout its long and tragic history has only found safety and peace under flags which, like the British and the American, stand for ordinary, democratic, government. . . . For her to speak of ‘our beloved country’ as she does in the pamphlet is unpardonable cynicism.”10 The presence of the British troops had the desired intimidating effect and an uneasy peace prevailed. Although by October 13 workers on four sugar estates had walked off the job, the strike and the boycott were acknowledged failures. Most people went about their business as usual and many welcomed the coup. The American consul general reported: “Among Georgetown’s upper and middle classes there was unfeigned relief. Many people, representing all races, approached the Consul General to thank his country for the sympathy manifested. Some with persistence asserted that the United States deserved all the credit—the British, they said, would never have acted without urging.”11 It was unlikely that the boycott and the strike could have achieved the desired goal, because such actions required more time to organize and the PPP had acted spontaneously. But no doubt more importantly, the privileged elite and most newspapers had welcomed the coup; without their support, no boycott of British goods stood much chance of success. The supporters of the coup saw it as an attack on the PPP and its government, not on the Guianese people as a whole. Thus, the colony had a divided response to the event, a development that was a source of strength for the British. Unable to mount an effective frontal assault on the invaders, the PPP tried to hold meetings in violation of the Emergency Order. On October 26, colonial officials responded to such threats to their authority by detaining five PPP leaders: Sydney King, Martin Carter, Richard Westmaas, Ajodha Singh, and Samuel Lachmansingh. The detainees could appeal to an Advisory Committee appointed by Governor Savage under the Emergency Order. This committee consisted of three persons, with the chief justice serving as chairman. It provided each detainee with a document detailing the allegations Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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against him or her. Its proceedings, as outlined in Appendix 1 of this volume, were not open to the public or the press and were conducted as administrative rather than judicial inquiries. Of the five detainees, Sydney King was the most politically prominent and one of the leaders most feared by the colonial authorities. They sought to derive political capital from his detention and discussed how they might best use his admission in his statement to the Advisory Committee that he was a “convinced communist.” King was responding to the detention order that accused him of that infection. Appendix 2 of this volume details the allegations made against King and his response. These documents show the flimsiness of the charges and why they stood little chance of being upheld in any judicial proceeding. Not surprisingly, formal charges were never brought against any of the men who had been detained. Samuel Lachmansingh remained in custody until January 3, 1954, and the other four were released eight days later. Acting under the aegis of the Emergency Order, the police raided the homes of many PPP stalwarts, seizing files, letters, typewriters, and the like, hoping to uncover evidence of communist connections. On December 17, the government banned three organizations deemed prejudicial to public safety: the British Guiana Peace Committee, led by Sydney King; the Pioneer Youth League, accused of being “communist controlled”; and the Demerara Youth Rally, an organization that had called for noncooperation with the governor.12 These Gestapo-like tactics failed to achieve their purpose, as the wellspring of support for the PPP could not be stanched by coercion. In addition, the party’s leaders increasingly became adept at employing creative strategies to oppose the colonial government. In a confidential internal memorandum, W. B. Counett of the U.S. State Department concluded on January 27, 1954, that the PPP remained entrenched: Arrests of its members and limitations on the rights of assembly and expression have failed to break the Party’s power or prestige, although they have caused it to change its strategy. The PPP leaders seem to be adopting a program of civil disobedience, patterned on Gandhi’s teachings, under the cloak of Hinduism, the religion of most of the East Indian population. Political assemblies held under the aegis of Hinduism provide the basis for protesting violations of religious freedom when the authorities break them up.13 Janet Jagan was the local politician the colonial authorities most desperately wanted to detain. On November 18 Lionel Luckhoo reported to the (  )

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Colonial Office that “Janet Jagan is like a bee flitting from place to place. By means of her personal contacts she endeavours to keep the spirit of the party alive.” This was not an exaggeration. Submitted in December 1953, a British intelligence report quoted an unnamed “overseas newspaper” approvingly: “But there is, still operating and still great, a power which moves through the underground of Guiana, without paper authority or public show. This is the very real and undoubted power of Communism, directed by Janet. As of this moment, it still has the moral authority and the British do not have it. Janet also directs a considerable physical force here, how large and how effective no one knows, least of all the British.”14 This was, of course, an overstatement. Mrs. Jagan did not possess the awesome power ascribed to her, but she did serve as a convenient bogey for the British assaults on the PPP and its supporters. Continuing, the “overseas newspaper” noted that “Janet’s physical force does not march in step through the streets, with or without kilts. It moves by stealth and at night and, although it may tomorrow take another name, such as fire or riot, or the assassin’s knife, today its name is terror.”15 As she inspired such imagined but awful fears, it is not surprising that Janet Jagan would receive special attention from the law enforcement authorities. On December 13, 1953, she was arrested along with nine other persons for holding a meeting without the permission of the police. The incident took place at Cornelia Ida, in the West Demerara Judicial District. The defendants said they had been holding a Gita, a Hindu function, but the prosecution claimed that Mrs. Jagan had in her possession Towards Freedom, a book written by India’s Prime Minister Nehru; quotations by Mahatma Gandhi; pamphlets entitled “No Constitution: No Christmas”; and the song sheets for “Army Go Home” and “Fighting Men,” whose lyrics were written by Sydney King. She was, according to the police, heard telling the gathering that “they have taken away our Constitution and brought soldiers on us, we must not be broken hearted.” Mrs. Jagan was dressed in Indian garb, as befitted the purported religious occasion. The magistrate, P. M. Burch Smith, did not believe the gathering was religious in purpose, denouncing it as “an unholy farce.” He accused Mrs. Jagan of wanting “to prey on the credulity of the ignorant persons around—all this, the working of a very subtle brain.” He exonerated the other defendants because they were “dupes” of Mrs. Jagan; he gave her the choice of a $250 fine or three months’ imprisonment. According to the Daily Chronicle, “Mrs. Jagan received the decision with a smile.”16 Although she filed an appeal, Janet Jagan eventually accepted the prison Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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sentence. She served it consecutively with another three months’ sentence, this one for the possession of a secret police riot manual. In his autobiography, The West on Trial, Cheddi Jagan said the manual was “planted” in their house, presumably by the police. He described his wife’s combined six-month prison term as “extremely onerous,” noting: “Completely isolated after an initial period of confinement with some roughnecks, she almost starved. She could not ‘stomach’ prison food, which included salt fish and vegetables, items even outside prison she had found difficult to digest. She survived five months’ imprisonment literally on bread alone until she was released on January 18, 1955.”17 When Mrs. Jagan began serving her sentence, she joined a number of other PPP leaders who chose prison rather than pay a fine. Imprisonment was a badge of honor, producing an aura of martyrdom for those who lost their liberty for a time. Although some PPP members paid the ultimate price for their resistance to the coup through incarceration, others were confined to certain parts of the colony. By restricting the movements of selected PPP leaders, the government placed limits on their ability to communicate with supporters, organize a resistance, or even enhance their influence. Dr. Jagan, for example, was restricted to Georgetown from April 1, 1954, to early 1957. But Jagan declined to be confined without a fight. A day after the restriction was imposed, he requested that it be waived since he had begun to practice dentistry at Machaicony and Rose Hill Villages and needed to visit his clinics four days a week. Calling the penalty “a flagrant violation of my democratic and civil rights as a citizen of Guiana,” Jagan said that if the appeal were denied he “would be forced to disobey the order restricting my movements.” The government refused the request, and Jagan ignored the restriction. He was arrested on May 3, 1954. When the deposed leader appeared before a hearing on May 5, many people gathered to show their support. After he was remanded on bail, an estimated two thousand people cheered him at PPP headquarters. His arrest may have enhanced his popularity, since many regarded it as yet another example of governmental persecution of their leader. The astute Dr. Jagan, of course, did not have an active dental practice, so the grounds on which he made his appeal to the authorities were questionable. Jagan’s visits to these country districts had more to do with his political activities and less with his professional practice.18 Dr. Jagan faced severe penalties if he were convicted. He could be fined $25,000 or spend five years in prison or both. His trial provided the colonial regime with an opportunity to remove him from the political scene for a long time. Fearing that a jury was unlikely to convict the popular PPP leader, the (  )

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authorities arranged for the case to be heard and decided by one judge. At trial Jagan declined to offer a defense, lambasting the judicial system in the colony. He lamented the fact that “today Guiana is a vast prison. Whether I am outside or inside matters little. Prison holds no terror for me. . . . I expect no justice from this or any other court. Justice has been dead since the British troops landed. I am looking to the day when there will be a greater justice in Guiana.”19 Unimpressed by these remarks, the magistrate, Guy Sharples, sentenced Jagan to six months in prison at hard labor. The judgment was greeted with angry disbelief by Jagan’s supporters and perhaps others who viewed it as a travesty. By condemning the PPP leader to “hard labor” for the kind of offense of which he was accused, the magistrate had shown how a colonial state could proclaim the efficacy of its judicial system in theory but disown and dishonor it in practice. Jagan survived his sentence, shortened by one month, and emerged from his confinement as a martyr. Governor Savage, acting under the aegis of the Emergency Order, also found other ways to harass the PPP leaders. Forbes Burnham was confined to Georgetown and his home at Subryanville and required to report to the police twice weekly. On June 12, 1954, Sydney King, Eric Huntley, Brindley Benn, Martin Carter, and others were ordered to report to the police daily between 8:00 and 10:00 A.M., as well as to provide notification of any changes in their address or employment. The police and its intelligence unit kept a close watch on the movements of anyone considered to be a danger to the colonial state, monitoring a wide and elastic net of designated suspects. There was strong support among PPP opponents for restricting the movements of party leaders and prohibiting political meetings. But these measures could not be continued indefinitely. The Colonial Office watched the developments with great interest, and by mid-1955 it was hoping that the Jagans had been so crippled politically that Forbes Burnham would become an acceptable alternative. R. E. Radford of the Colonial Office noted on June 28 that any relaxation of the ban on political meetings should be undertaken only if the political climate were such that it did not facilitate a rejuvenation of the PPP. Radford argued: “We must however remember that of all the measures we have taken, the restrictions on the movements of political leaders and the ban on public meetings have contributed most to the decline, if it is a decline, of the influence of the PPP. It is important therefore to try to assess whether the relaxation of the latter ban will benefit most of the forces which we would wish to encourage or those which we would wish to hamper.”20 Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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The “forces” the colonial government wished to encourage included the United Democratic Party led by John Martin, an African. But this right-ofcenter party did not live up to its expectations and was dismissed by Radford as being “useless.” Burnham appeared to be more promising, but Radford cautioned that “until we have a great deal more evidence of Mr. Burnham’s intentions and sincerity it would be wishful thinking to rely on his attracting support from his right and forming a majority group with whom we could work.”21 To further reduce the influence of the PPP, there was some discussion in British Guiana and in the Colonial Office of the question of exiling its leaders, particularly the Jagans. The Jagans’ removal, some thought, would rid the body politic of two political demons simultaneously. But restricting the freedom of movement of people was one thing; it was quite another to expel them. Cheddi Jagan was, after all, a son of the colony, and he had not been convicted of either sedition or subversive activities, grounds which may have made his forced exile easier to effect. Of the two, Mrs. Jagan was the more despised by the Colonial Office. Since she was American born and a naturalized citizen, her deportation probably could be more easily accomplished, but no one could predict the nature of the local and international responses to it. Many PPP opponents endorsed the decapitation of the party’s leadership through deportation. The Daily Argosy gave voice to the sentiment barely two weeks after the coup. Editorializing on October 26, 1953, the paper maintained that “the PPP must be broken as a party and the ring leaders in the Communist conspiracy neutralized by imprisonment for proven crimes, by banishment or by any other legitimate means. . . . We do not think British Guiana will know true peace as long as Mrs. Jagan is here, and the same might apply to her husband and to Sydney King, if not the rest of the ministers.”22 Writing in June 1954, American consul general Maddox observed that “some Guianese . . . secretly hope” Mrs. Jagan could be deported to the United States.23 He made this comment a few days after the Argosy claimed there was “an organized terrorist gang” operating in the colony and called for the deportation of its leaders. The paper identified Mrs. Jagan as the principal villain, the “capable, organizing brain” of the group. It described her as “determined, able, cunning, and coolheaded,” someone who posed “a danger to the country’s stability.”24 The minister of state in the Colonial Office, Henry Hopkinson, was not averse to considering the exile of the PPP leaders. But he told the American consul general that it was probably not “practicable” because of the potential opposition of the British Labour Party. In October, Maddox reported (  )

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that “banishment . . . is widely favoured” in British Guiana “except among the top officials more immediately responsible to the Colonial Office.” The consul general himself supported the use of “exile” as a weapon, however, since “the stubborn fact remains that the removal of eight or ten or a dozen specific individuals would be a blessing to the Colony.”25 The issue of deportation remained under discussion for as long as the PPP continued to be popular. There was a virtual obsession with Janet Jagan because of her enormous political skills and the difficulty of silencing her or making her ineffectual. After his visit to British Guiana in February 1955, Lord Lloyd of the Colonial Office commented: “Janet Jagan is by common consent the ablest of the PPP leaders. In the opinion of many competent judges she is the organising genius of the whole movement. Indeed, the view was expressed to me that no impact could ever be made upon the minds of the PPP leaders as long as she remained in British Guiana. . . . It was felt that her removal might well bring about the disintegration of the party.”26 Lord Lloyd recognized some “political difficulty” in the “deportation” of Mrs. Jagan. He thought that course should not be considered until “the political situation becomes a good deal clearer.” He saw some merit, however, in the case being made for her expulsion. “She is certainly very clever and a complete fanatic and I think that one should face up to the political difficulties with which her continued presence in British Guiana confront us,” he concluded.27 The presence of the Jagans in British Guiana certainly posed difficulties for the colonial regime. They proved invulnerable to the arrows directed at them, refusing to be vanquished. Those who promoted their exile met with no success, but they continued their campaign. On May 16, 1956, the Argosy published a letter from someone who used the nom de plume “Guyanese,” urging the Jagans to exile themselves voluntarily. Such a move would hasten the restoration of representative government, “Guyanese” said. This could not be accomplished if the existing leadership of the PPP remained, the imperial government had emphasized. Their voluntary exile, “Guyanese” asserted, would allow them to “see for themselves just how sincere is the expressed desire of the British Government to keep us along the road to selfgovernment as rapidly as possible.”28 The Jagans replied to the challenge from “Guyanese” ten days later. They saw no point in leaving, they said, because the PPP would survive under other leaders whom the Colonial Office would find equally unacceptable. The issue, as the Jagans saw it, was not the composition of the PPP leadership, but the party’s anti-imperialism policy, arguing: “The only solution to the problem Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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of British Guiana is to grant the country an advanced Constitution and free elections and let the people decide. If they reject us—and there certainly has been significant propaganda against us to ‘equalise’ our influence—we are quite prepared to accept the decision of the electorate. If the voters put in a majority of members of our party, then let the British adhere to their highsounding declaration of democracy.”29 British officials would have deported Mrs. Jagan if they could have justified it in the world of public opinion. When she applied for permission to visit her ailing father in California, one bureaucrat in the Colonial Office complained that it was “a pity we cannot ensure that it is a one way trip for Janet.”30 In January 1957, as Secretary of State John Profumo was considering revoking the restriction orders against the Jagans, he lamented having to make such a decision because “I should dearly like to keep this pair inside, especially the female of the species.”31 Some individuals who supported the Jagans’ deportation also advocated the prohibition of Thunder, the official organ of the PPP. As the government intensified its campaign against the PPP, Thunder became the party’s principal weapon of resistance. On May 1, 1954, it began to appear weekly instead of monthly, claiming an increase in circulation from 12,000 to 16,000. The paper encouraged its readers to resist the hostile colonial regime and provided moral support to those who heeded its call. “We salute these brave people who have stood up courageously against tyranny and oppression,” declared a column published on May 8. A week later, the lead article praised “the determination of the people to carry out the fight to the bitter end.” On May 22 another column affirmed that “resistance is honorable, submission is dishonorable.” Such exhortations frightened those who feared the PPP and added fuel to the demand to exile the Jagans and ban Thunder.32 The British had no enthusiasm for banning a local newspaper since it ran contrary to their traditional respect for free speech. But this respect for the written word did not prevent the colonial government from denying citizens the right to read what they wanted, as reflected in the Emergency Order’s ban on subversive literature. Nevertheless, on June 9, 1954, the governor authorized the commissioner of police to close for twenty-four hours any printing press that produced literature critical of a constituted authority and that urged the disobedience of certain laws. The governor had the power to close the offending press indefinitely. Forbes Burnham quickly denounced the order as being aimed at Thunder, characterizing it as a “suppression of democratic rights in the name of democracy.” Ironically, the Daily Argosy, which should have been on the side of freedom of the press, wanted to see (  )

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Thunder banned. On June 5, 1954, it accused Thunder of being subversive “of loyalty, of law and order, even of “decency” and expressed its “astonishment” that “its publication is still permitted.” Thunder, the Argosy continued, was “a lying, mischievous, contemptible and Communist publication” that “should be extinguished, squashed like a loathsome insect.” The Argosy did not believe that questions of freedom of the press would arise because “freedom can only apply to responsible journals purveying honest news and opinions sincerely held.” Returning to the issue a month later, the Argosy expressed displeasure that the “poisonous and subversive journal” still enjoyed the right to publish.33 In spite of the sustained assault on the Jagans, their popularity and that of their party did not diminish among their supporters. Janet believed that the PPP survived and succeeded because it continued “fighting for the small local school house while explaining the real big fight with British imperialism.”34 It was a brilliant strategy; the party identified with the needs of the people, thereby earning their support and loyalty, but never lost sight of its larger objectives: self-government and political independence. Alone among the middle-class politicians in the colony, the Jagans blurred the social distance between themselves and the working poor. William Macnie, the managing director of the Sugar Producers Association, bemoaned the fact that “none of the present political leaders among the anti Jagan forces seemed willing to go out into the rural areas and meet and talk with the rice farmers and sugar workers who apotheosized Jagan.” When he suggested they campaign in rural areas, some politicians worried about where they would sleep and whether the sugar estates could provide them with lodging. Jagan, on the other hand, “together with his wife, had spent years going into these same areas eating, sleeping, and talking with the people, and it was this that had won him the affection of the people.”35 A few years later, Governor Ralph Grey described Mrs. Jagan as the “mainspring” of the PPP. Indian women, the governor said, held her in high regard because she, as “a well educated white woman, was willing to go out in the padifields under the sun and above her knees in water to talk, to listen, and to work in the political interests of the rice farmers.” To show her empathy with the people, Mrs. Jagan “dressed Indian style,” and, according to the governor, “this was well received by the sugar-workers and rice-farmers wives.”36 Cheddi Jagan had a similar appeal. “He is darkly handsome with a flashing smile,” observed Grey. He “has something that distinguishes all the idols of the masses and when he speaks to his political following he has an appeal quite unrelated to what he says.” Charismatic and charming, Cheddi Jagan Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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could not be defeated on the political battlefield by the traditional weapons. Teflonlike, his appeal among his followers remained undiminished by the withering rhetorical assaults of his opponents and the coercive arsenal of the Colonial Office.37 The brilliant Barbadian writer and intellectual, George Lamming, recalled that “Cheddi could make you feel his identification with the poor in a way that the black, intellectual ideologue could not readily get across: the AfroGuyanese intelligentsia were not identified with the lower orders of society; not at all.” Jagan “had a fundamental unbroken link with the earth, with people from down there.” Lamming continued: “The business about the man down there remained central to what he [Jagan] was saying . . . when it came to articulating the feeling down there, I think it was his strongest weapon.” Thus the “Indian peasantry saw in Cheddi someone who didn’t only look like them but who identified with them” in a way that other leaders such as Lionel Luckhoo did not. “They were able to make a distinction between the Indian who belonged to them, and one who did not, in the context of Guyana. You could put up any Indian to run against Cheddi, in any constituency, and they could call Cheddi a communist or whatever else they liked, and it made no difference to the voters. Cheddi was their man.”38 The Jagans were never deported and they did not volunteer to leave the colony. Nor was Thunder banned. But containing the Jagans required more than discussions of deportation, restrictions on their movements, their inability to hold public meetings, and the prohibition of Thunder. The appeal of the Jagans did not depend significantly on their articulation of Marxist dogma or their interpretations of it. They possessed that rare but indefinable quality to obtain and sustain the abiding trust of the people in whose name they spoke. Whereas their opponents derided them as calculating, manipulative, and devious, their supporters displayed an affection for them that defied the comprehension of the skeptics. The Jagans had kept faith with their admirers, a quality that meant the efforts by the colonial regime to discredit them failed because the wellspring of their support was deep and suffused by a passionate, religiouslike fervor. “Dr. Jagan,” gushed Mrs. Indra Ramdeem, a PPP supporter, “is earthly Jesus Christ for the working class.”39 Colonial authorities and PPP opponents did not fully understand the complex base of support for the party. Viewing its followers through an optic of extreme superiority and condescension and its victory as a triumph of illiteracy over enlightened judgment, they could hardly introduce effective measures to destroy a party whose wellspring of backers they misunderstood. An editorial from the Daily Argosy captures the sense of righteous indignation (  )

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and deep distrust of the voters that clouded any rational appreciation of the PPP’s support. The Argosy said the PPP leaders won

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because they were active, their opponents supine. Because they worked subtly through indoctrinating cells among the intelligent but grievance ridden; openly by propaganda, wild promises, the unscrupulous exploitation of grievances, real and imaginary, among the stupid, ignorant, and illiterate. Because they flooded the country with subversive literature and stirred up the class hatreds and racial animosities that lie below the surface of a plural population. Because the real issues were kept out of sight and false ones thrown up in their stead.40 This was an exercise in self-delusion. Sharing these views, the colonial government thought that an aggressive public relations campaign would undermine support for the PPP. Consequently, the administration created The Bulletin, a newspaper that appeared weekly. By June 1955, Governor Savage could boast that it had a circulation of 50,000 and that there was “solid evidence that it is well read and generally appreciated in every part of the country.”41 Savage may have exaggerated its circulation, and it is doubtful that the paper had the impact he claimed. Along with its public relations campaign, the colonial government moved quickly to implement a two-year development program. This was based on the belated assumption that some of the PPP’s supporters had justified economic grievances. In early February 1954 the United Kingdom disclosed that it would provide the colony £9.2 million for transport, communications, and other public works; drainage and irrigation schemes; and a resettlement program for farmers. The plan also included a housing program and the creation of a Credit Corporation to grant loans to small farmers and businessmen. These funds comprised loans to the colony as well as colonial development and welfare grants. In making the announcement in the House of Commons, colonial secretary Oliver Lyttleton said that the development plans “were all in being before the suspension of the Constitution,” but the previous government “did nothing at all about those matters.” This was untrue, since no concrete development plans existed before the coup. In any event, the colony’s infrastructure was woefully inadequate to utilize these resources simultaneously, and only one-quarter of the funds had been spent by the end of March 1955.42 The Colonial Office’s new and aggressive interest in Guiana’s economic development was partially driven by public relations imperatives. “We must not leave ourselves open to the charge,” Philip Rogers of the Caribbean Desk Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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asserted, “that having suspended the Constitution we have merely transferred responsibility to those whose enthusiasm for helping the ordinary people was not so clearly established as to win them support at the polls.” He saw the members of the colony’s new legislature as “useful advisers, but no more.” Consequently, during the period of “marking time,” the Colonial Office “must take responsibility for major decisions affecting the economic and social development of British Guiana.” Rogers, and by extrapolation the Colonial Office, was not unaware of the obstacles that stood in the path of change, whether systemic or bureaucratic. He identified “obstruction” in the civil service as one impediment and recommended that it be met with “ruthlessness.” Rogers saw “political opposition not only, but perhaps mainly” from the PPP as another problem. He also recognized that resistance could be expected “from our old friend the vested interests, by whom I mean local political groups who had things their own way in the past—“the old gang.”43 Rogers accurately assessed the political realities in British Guiana at the time. The wholly nominated legislature was an extension of the Colonial Office and served as the public face and executor of its policies. It did not enjoy the support of the majority of the populace, particularly those who were sympathetic to the PPP. Hastily conceived and lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the colony’s vocal leaders and the people in whose name it spoke, the legislature was politically impotent and admirably fulfilled its animating premise of marking time. Its members, for the most part, represented the “vested interests” about whom Rogers had written contemptuously. These people were the guardians of a status quo that was being challenged from below and who had the burden of managing a society in which they had become out of step. “I KNOW THAT NOBODY likes me and no one has confidence in me. . . . If only I had come here three years earlier or six months later,” Governor Savage complained to Booker Brothers chairman Jock Campbell in early January 1954. Campbell had traveled to British Guiana from England to assess the local situation in the aftermath of the constitutional crisis of October 1953. He was also visiting the colony “to try to improve relations” between Savage “and Sugar-cum—Bookers.” Chairman Campbell was by no means a disinterested observer of the untidy developments in Guiana, and Bookers had sympathetic listeners in the Colonial Office. Consequently, on January 10 he hastened to report to Philip Rogers on the substance of his conversation with the governor.44

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The suspension of the constitution, the continuing popularity of the PPP, and the sense that the colony was adrift led the Colonial Office and the local elites to search for scapegoats. Never well liked in the colony, especially among the white upper class, Governor Savage became an easy and inviting target. The sugar producers, especially the powerful Bookers, chafed under the perception that Savage was unsympathetic to their preeminent economic role in the society and treated them with contempt. “I found our Directors . . . and some senior officials who, in strict confidence . . . have been very frank with me, burning with bitter resentment at his attitude to them and to their responsibilities,” Jock Campbell told Rogers. He would not repeat, he said, “the example I have already given you of his destructive criticism, his apparent hostility, his provocative thrusts and his bad manners to sugar and Bookers.” Campbell reported that Savage’s “brother-in-law and a Barbadian protégé of his, both employed by us, who see him—or had been seeing him— en famille were more resentful than any; describing his losing no chance of ‘getting at’ [criticizing] Bookers . . . often in front of outsiders.”45 His conversation with the governor puzzled Campbell. He had been told by a local official that Savage was not “all there,” a stark reference to his mental health. Although he “dreaded” the interview with Savage, Campbell found him “completely disarming . . . friendly and not at all on the defensive from the moment we shook hands.” The two men conversed for “nearly three hours,” and, as Campbell wrote, “he talked mostly about himself—his fears and hopes and anxieties and plans.” The chairman was surprised that the governor “spoke kindly, even at times eulogistically of Bookers, never trotted out any of the criticisms that he certainly broadcast to others.” Indeed, Savage “spoke well of our senior people saying that ‘Bookers’ human relations are far better than any others here and that he had expected.” The governor seemed pleased by the answers that Campbell gave to the questions he asked, “whereas all here tell me he as good as calls them liars in like circumstances.” The chairman confessed that the “extraordinary interview” left him “convinced either that he [the governor] was simply ‘leading me up the garden path’ for reasons of his own or that everyone else here has been suffering from delusions or that he has a split personality.” Campbell said that “in the light of other factors at this revealing interview I unhesitatingly accept the third alternative.”46 Campbell could not resist psychoanalyzing the governor’s personality, although he lacked the requisite professional credentials. His diagnosis was as harsh as it was devastating:

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I am left with the clear picture of an unhappy, anxious man, a man whose emotions overwhelm his reason at times to the extent of clogging his reasoning process and control over speech and action, a man bitterly conscious, deep down, of his ineptitude for his heavy responsibilities. His unbalance, emotionalism, unhappiness, anxieties, frustrations, and all sorts of complexes such as acute inverse colour-conciousness and psychopathic fear and dislike of anything or anybody “big”—lead him to erect these rigid, terse, defenses with everybody out here; to substitute for any attempt at real leadership and government, an immersion in irrelevant detail and this disastrous policy of seeking personal popularity with the people by head-patting, trying to out-Jagan Jagan (which only makes him look ridiculous and makes little or no impression on the people).47

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Jock Campbell’s unflattering assessment of the governor’s personality was shaped in part by the gossip he had heard from the disgruntled white elites. This group included the resident colonial officials, businessmen, and expatriates, as well as representatives of the Bookers empire. Colonial officials complained to Campbell that the governor was “extraordinarily secretive and [had a] suspicious attitude to them.” Members of the business and industrial communities fretted that he was unsympathetic to their interests, and members of the white expatriate community felt that he was pandering to the Indo-Guianese and African Guianese peoples. Taking into account all of these criticisms and his own impressions of Savage, Campbell concluded that he was “a man entirely unfitted to be a Governor—let alone to provide the leadership and inspiration and firm cohesive government that this country so desperately needs at the moment.”48 Campbell regretted that he was “writing in a way most improper for any citizen to write of the Queen’s representative.” Still, he felt compelled to do so because his concern was for “the people of B.G. whom I really mind about.” As a good representative of the sugar interests and a loyal subject, Campbell assured Rogers that he would do nothing to undermine the governor, noting that “all I have said and shall continue to say to my colleagues is ‘H.[is] E.[xcellency] was frank and friendly to me, spoke kindly of you and your efforts, showed no antagonism to Sugar or to Bookers. He is, I am sure, a worried and anxious man, frustrated and isolated.” Campbell promised that he would tell his colleagues that Savage’s “anxieties and frustrations, coupled with his evident emotionalism and complex social attitudes, obviously express themselves in a defensive, and, at times, provocative behavior to Sugar and Bookers.” He would instruct them to “not (  )

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allow yourselves to be thrown off your balance by his manner,” since Savage “is the Governor; you must do all you can, short of sacrificing what you believe to be vital principles, to establish and maintain a friendly working relationship with him.” He would enjoin colleagues to work with the governor “if you possibly can—if you can’t[,] be friendly and pursue your purposes without provocation.”49 Campbell wrote that he had urged the governor “to do all he could to encourage rather than discourage our people.” Ending on a pessimistic note, he said that “nothing I can do can alter the real issue, in fact nothing I can do can be more than making the best of a very bad job.” He would not mind if his report were shown to other colonial officials “if you think it would help and wouldn’t get me shot.”50 Given the critical role that Bookers played in the colony’s economy, Chairman Campbell knew that his voice carried substantial weight at the Colonial Office. His assault on Savage’s competence and personality confirmed what some members of the colonial elite had charged, and his comments had a special resonance in London even if he were not a disinterested observer. Campbell echoed the sentiments of the business interests in Guiana and those of a colonial elite unhappy with the governor’s political and administrative style. His active role in the suspension of the constitution in October 1953 did not silence those critics who believed that he was not sufficiently aggressive in persecuting the leaders of the PPP. Nor did they support his meetings with average Guianese residents to listen to their grievances, doubtlessly to counteract the influence of the PPP. Although aware of these criticisms, the Colonial Office could not precipitously recall the governor. When Jock Campbell made his unflattering report in January 1954, Savage had been in the colony a bare nine months. His removal would have been an acknowledgment of a colossal misjudgment by the Colonial Office in naming him governor, and its bureaucrats would never have advertised their fallibility. Furthermore, Savage was presiding in an unstable political climate in the aftermath of the events of October 1953; to have removed him a few months later would have certainly exacerbated an already difficult situation. Yet there was no doubt that the governor’s days in office were numbered. Campbell’s letter was forwarded to Rogers, who was then in Barbados after having visited Guiana. Rogers told Lord Lloyd in the Colonial Office that Campbell’s “picture” of Savage was “somewhat exaggerated . . . [but] essentially true.” Although he did not “quite agree about the split personality,” he thought “the picture of what Savage is like is otherwise, I believe, Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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near enough.” He admitted that he had traveled to Guiana anticipating that he “might have to recommend that Savage should be moved.” The visit, however, had changed his opinion of the governor “in some details,” and he liked him “much more than I expected.” Consequently, Rogers advised that Savage “should not be removed at present.”51 Rogers confirmed Campbell’s view that the governor was “very unsure of himself.” That defect made him “secretive and obstinate.” Rogers found it “almost impossible to come to grips” with Savage “in discussing anything.” The governor depended on Lady Savage for “moral support,” but she “knows nothing of his plans.” The colonial officer was evidently troubled that Savage had “alienated the sugar people,” although “the faults are by no means onesided.” The governor’s attitude, however, “has made it very difficult for them.”52 Rogers received the impression that “Savage is not carrying his senior staff with him, or having their confidence, because he does not give his to them.” The colonial official was “most worried about the long term effect of this mutual lack of confidence,” Still, he noted, Savage “is not failing altogether.” He “is working intensely hard to gain the confidence of the people.” Rogers recalled, however, that he had been skeptical in London about the governor’s policy “of trying to out do Jagan in his own line” and he was “no less skeptical now.” Savage, he concluded, “does not seem to know the right or best way for a Governor to go about his business.”53 Rogers was concerned that “unless Savage can gain the confidence of his own staff and the more sensible of the business people, that lack of confidence among them may well seep down lower.” Yet he grudgingly acknowledged that Savage’s work in the colony “had some effect” and “his sincerity is generally recognised.” Nevertheless, he “is not in my view up to being Governor of British Guiana in its present crisis,” despite his “considerable qualities, administrative intelligence and deep sincerity.” But Rogers found the issue of removing Savage from office to be more difficult than he had anticipated. Such a course of action, he conjectured, would have “a bad effect” on the colony if the governor “were moved at present.” Although Savage was not “capable” of providing the leadership needed, “he has done enough to impress his sincerity on the country.” Consequently, Rogers predicted that if the governor “were moved now, the people would ascribe the move to the influence of sugar [and] ascribe to Savage all the virtues of being for the ‘common man’ (which he is) and feel that they are being let down.” Under the circumstances, he feared that the PPP would exploit the situation. Rogers thought

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that it might be more judicious “to move Savage later,” although if a credible opportunity to do so emerged he would “be strongly in favour of taking it.”54 Based on the reports from Campbell and Rogers, Governor Savage’s tenure in office seemed precarious indeed. The two men were very sensitive to the needs of Bookers or “Sugar,” as they called the sugar empire. Savage had committed the unpardonable sin of offending the powerful sugar interests. It was not entirely clear what his “sins” were except that he was less obsequious to the bosses of Bookers than his predecessors had been. Savage had, by meeting with the Guianese masses, alienated the enablers of the status quo and, in their eyes, tarnished the office of governor. As the colony continued to drift, the Daily Argosy added its powerful voice to those of other critics of the colonial administration. The governor was not named in the editorial tirade unleashed on July 18, 1954, but the target was unmistakable. The Argosy was troubled by what it saw as a deteriorating security situation in the colony, complaining that “more than nine months after the PPP Government was thrown out of power and the discredited party leaders excluded from a public life they had betrayed, these same ‘leaders’ and their most persistent followers are still inveterately combating order and progress and asserting their own sterile and twisted aims.”55 Continuing its assessment of the state of the colony, the Argosy charged that the PPP and its adherents were “still defying and circumventing every measure taken to control them, still wanting development, still preaching and propagandising, still organising the militancy, still insulting the administrators of the law in their own courts; in short, they are showing beyond all doubt that they are neither dismayed nor weary, discouraged nor repentant, and that at the first chance they will be back where they were, leading the country to ruin down the declivity of Communism.”56 In a veiled reference to the governor, the Argosy wondered if the “authorities” in Guiana and London who are “ultimately responsible for the well being and security” of the colony “have faced seriously the problem of what is going to happen” when the PPP’s leaders are free “to resume their exploitation of the masses’ ignorance and grievances.” Acting without restraint, the party “will still exert undue, disruptive and paralyzing influence through the masses,” the Argosy predicted. The newspaper feared that if its “poisoned seeds” were not prevented from taking root, once a new constitution was introduced, “there will come again the meetings and marches, the shouting at street corners and the slogans in procession, the signs and the cocades, the threats and the hooliganism.” The new elections would result in victory for

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“the hysterical, deluded mob” and “the same slide into disaster and isolation as before.” The Argosy doubted whether the colony could “be rescued a second time,” fearing that it “would be unwise to bank on it.” Such an unhappy development, the paper lamented, would occur after most of the “senior” colonial officials had left the colony, and the Guianese would be the victims of “whatever actions have been done (or have not been done) in their name.”57 The Argosy’s editorial, aptly titled “Face the Situation,” was nothing less than an indictment of the governor’s alleged inertia in the face of dire threats to the status quo. The day after its appearance, R. R. Follet-Smith of Bookers dispatched a copy to Jock Campbell endorsing the paper’s sentiments. Follet-Smith acknowledged that “the present situation depresses me,” adding that he could not see “how it could improve under the present administration.” The country needed a strong leader who could “rid the colony of the half a dozen ring leaders who will bring any plans to nought.” He worried that “our democratic system was never designed to deal with such as these and until we are prepared to take our kid gloves off, I cannot see the future with any clarity.” Follet-Smith reported there were rumors that the PPP had stockpiled dynamite to be used in a campaign of sabotage. In the face of such peril, Governor Savage, Follet-Smith wrote, was thinking of increasing the “Company income tax” to 50 percent. Such an act, he charged, was based on the governor’s desire to “increase his popularity with the masses” in view of the PPP’s claim that he was “in the clutches of big business.” To make matters worse, the voice of Sugar maintained, Savage “suffers from a pathological aversion to businessmen.”58 Such rumblings from the colony, particularly from Sugar, did not pass unnoticed at the Colonial Office. Acutely aware of the criticisms being leveled against him, the governor from time to time provided his own assessment of the pulse of the colony to his superiors in London. But Savage had no defenders in a Colonial Office anxious to find scapegoats for its own ineptitude. In a colony dominated by King Sugar, a governor who lost the confidence of such a powerful interest group stood little chance of survival in office. Savage, by personality, ideological moorings, and temperament, lacked the capacity to ingratiate himself with the economic elites. This was hardly because he wanted to undermine their economic preeminence and political influence. Rather, the governor had belatedly come to understand that the colony consisted of several voices and that he had to listen to all of them, even if he did not fully internalize what the descendants of the enslaved Afri-

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cans and the indentured Indians were saying. They were rejecting the tutelage of the English and claiming the right to chart their future as they saw fit. As the queen’s principal representative in a difficult and rapidly changing colony, Savage confronted problems for which he was not well prepared. Previous governors in the Caribbean islands had faced protests from workers demanding economic justice and constitutional reforms. There were social disturbances in Trinidad, Jamaica, and elsewhere in the 1930s, but none had posed a serious challenge to the survival of colonial rule in the region. Responding to these protests, the imperial government had created a commission to determine their cause and recommend measures to address them. In its report, this commission emphasized the economic roots of the unrest and urged constitutional reforms. The implementation of the reforms, including the introduction of universal adult suffrage in colonies like Jamaica, tempered the unrest and gave the colonial regime a new lease on life. Governor Savage faced a seemingly more volatile political and social situation in Guiana in 1953. London, however, had less understanding of the political ferment than the resident governor. The discontented masses and the leaders who gave them voice commanded little sympathy in the Colonial Office, which perceived them as wayward children to be controlled and chastised rather than as the architects of a new Guiana in formation. Its preoccupation with what it called “the extremist leaders of the PPP” blinded it to an appreciation of the dynamism of the colonial pulse. In a letter to Governor Savage on July 30, 1954, Lord Lloyd set a mournful tone: The general political position [in Guiana] seems to us gloomy. By common consent the extremist leaders of the P.P.P. have lost little of their influence over the last twelve months. Worse still, there seems to be no sign of any effective political opposition to them apart from rare individual efforts. The complacency of the indigenous middle classes from whom political leadership should be coming seems unbroken. The continuation of such conditions must inevitably lead in the long run to a deterioration in security.59 This was a misunderstanding of the conditions in Guiana. Colonial officials wanted to see the emergence of a group of leaders more acceptable to them and blamed a “complacent” middle class when that did not occur. But the day was rapidly passing when the metropolitan power could dictate who should govern the colony. The galling truth was that the masses had already selected their leaders, the sentiments of the Colonial Office notwithstanding.

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Lord Lloyd was disappointed with the ineffectiveness of the interim Legislative Council and the “indication” that “if the political deadlock is broken it is only too likely to be on racial lines.” He was certain, however, that “economic development” could “provide the basis for an improvement in the political situation.” Still, that would not “suffice” unless “it is accompanied by political activity of the right kind.” Although Lloyd complimented Savage on the “strong sense of duty” that he brought to the colony, he left no doubt that the governor bore the major responsibility for “the trend of events in British Guiana.” Eschewing any desire to couch his remarks in a “spirit of destructive criticism,” Lord Lloyd nevertheless lectured Savage on the governor’s role:

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In these most difficult and delicate conditions, everything . . . turns upon the personality and influence of the Governor himself and upon the extent to which, without becoming involved in partisan politics, he can secure the confidence and support of all loyal and moderate elements— both official and unofficial—of the community. To this end it is certainly essential that the Governor should be known to the people and accessible to all without distinction of race or social class. But this does not mean that the Governor should seek to be a popular leader or that he should try in any way to compete with the political protagonists on their own ground or with their own technique. On the contrary, the strength of his position lies very largely in his being above and outside local political rivalries. There is of course great need for open and courageous leadership by him in moral and social matters, but in the detailed question of politics and administration his influence must be exerted indirectly and without the appearance of taking sides.60 This was a blatant, if indirect, indictment of a sitting governor. In framing the governor’s role in this way, Lord Lloyd had skillfully underscored the criticisms leveled against Savage by his detractors without actually accusing him of incompetence. Lloyd, however, told the governor that he had had “reports from more than one reliable source” that Savage had tried “to do too much yourself,” with the result that his administration had been “less effective than it might be.” The governor had “sought to work alone in important matters without taking fully into your confidence either the senior members of your staff or the unofficial leaders of the community.” Such a modus operandi, Lord Lloyd declared, was “the antithesis of sound administration.”61 Lloyd was also concerned that the governor had not been effective in acquainting the public with “the aims and achievements of government,” probably because he was relying too much on himself “as spokesman.” There was (  )

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“serious disgust here about the trend of events in British Guiana, and serious doubt whether . . . you are going the right way about dealing with the situation.”62 Again, this was harsh criticism of a governor who had worked conscientiously to further imperial objectives in the colony but who was being overwhelmed by forces he did not fully understand or could contain. Savage was the hapless scapegoat for colonial policies that had become anachronistic in a rapidly changing society. On the other hand, the colony’s nationalist leaders and their supporters regarded Savage as the untrustworthy representative of a colonial regime that they wanted to destroy. Governor Savage was not pleased with Lloyd’s negative assessment of his administration. In the August 24 reply to Lloyd’s letter, he objected to “the bitter fact that you have accepted the allegations as impartial evidence.” He would welcome a visit by the secretary of state or another minister since “the apparent lack of confidence in London must weaken my position here.” Savage admitted that he had “made mistakes,” but he had “good reason to believe I have the support and confidence of the vast majority of the loyal and moderate elements” in the colony. His presence in Guiana over the previous sixteen months had been “a difficult period” in “a small community full of suspicion, fears and prejudices generally and a lack of confidence in each other, particularly within the better class groups with long standing feuds and jealousies.”63 In defending his administration from the criticisms leveled at it, the governor acknowledged that some representatives of the business elite were disappointed they had not been appointed to the new Executive Council, but such tensions had eased. He dismissed the charges that he did not consult with other colonial officials, emphasizing that “the suggestion that I do not listen to ‘their point of view’ is absolutely groundless.” Savage named the groups and individuals from whom he sought advice from time to time. He saw the Anglican archbishop frequently “and the Roman Catholic Bishop too but the latter is stone deaf and it is almost impossible to carry on a confidential conversation.”64 The governor was aware that his detractors accused him of pandering either to the non-European or the “coloured” groups. He rejected such allegations but conceded that he may “have given the appearance of prejudice, particularly to less liberal points of view.” Savage was clearly referring to members of the white elite who looked askance at his outreach to the African Guianese and Indo-Guianese populations and the fact that he sought their advice on matters of the moment. Whites chafed under the new reality that the governor was recognizing that the previously marginalized peoples Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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had views that should be acknowledged and that they should be placed on the social calendar at Government House.65 In spite of the difficult problems, the governor believed “the tide is changing slowly.” He predicted that “while the P.P.P. is not yet split, the prospect appears brighter than before,” a development that he, his superiors, and important sectors of the colonial elite would welcome enthusiastically and with considerable relief. Savage concluded his defense by quoting from a letter from a grateful and adoring “leader” in the colony. “We owe it to you that the country has so far been spared bloodshed,” the unnamed leader wrote, “and yours must be the credit for the progress we have certainly made towards a recovery of sanity.” The beleaguered governor thought the comment “may be an exaggeration,” but he hoped that “it may be given some weight against the representations” made against him.66 Savage was probably unaware of the supreme irony of his remarks. The all-powerful colonial governor, Her Majesty’s surrogate, was invoking the plaudits of a colonial leader to legitimize his administration and to save his job. Savage’s vigorous defense of his conduct as governor may have bought him some time, but it did not allay the Colonial Office’s doubts about his competence. In late September and early October 1954, Minister of State Henry Hopkinson made a weeklong visit to the colony to assess conditions on the ground. After consulting with a number of groups in Georgetown, on the coast, and in the interior, the minister reported that “practically all the expressions of opinion” he heard were favorable to the governor. The highly respected archbishop of the West Indies, he noted, praised Savage “and subsequently wrote in almost hysterical terms of what he had done to save British Guiana.” Similar sentiments emanated from the attorney general, members of the Chamber of Commerce, and others. Hopkinson was somewhat skeptical about the spontaneity of these expressions of support, suggesting that “their frequency and unanimity seemed to me to have been engineered, probably by the Archbishop.” The dissenters, Hopkinson said, included R. R. Follet-Smith, the representative of Bookers; Sir James Robertson; the chief secretary; and the chief justice.67 The minister found Savage “more cheerful, more lively, and easier to deal with” than on his previous visits. He praised the governor for his “great sincerity and devotion to the cause of the common man.” His outreach to the “common man” was not viewed positively by the local elites, however, and the minister doubted its efficacy. “In his efforts to gain the adherence of the ordinary people,” Hopkinson said, “he has lost dignity and thereby sacrificed

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not only the good opinion of an influential body in the community but also I suspect partly failed to gain the real respect of the ordinary people themselves, though this is difficult to judge.” This comment suggests that the governor’s cardinal sin was his seeming embrace of the aspirations of marginalized colonial subjects. The minister told the governor that “he was losing in dignity and in effectiveness by the way in which he was wooing the common man.” In response, Savage maintained that the opposition to him was really “on the score of his sympathy for coloured people.”68 Although somewhat exaggerated, this was essentially an accurate assessment. Hopkinson attributed the governor’s perceived shortcomings to a personality defect. Presumably, this defect explained his commitment to a degree of racial egalitarianism in the colony. “I believe that . . . he is constitutionally and emotionally incapable of really altering his course of action,” the minister wrote. This exercise in psychology led Hopkinson to declare that Savage “is not the right man for British Guiana during the difficult years which lie ahead.” He did not favor removing him immediately, however, but preferred giving him a breathing space of six months or longer. “His failings have not prevented him from gaining the affection of a number of people in the colony,” the minister admitted, “and his open dismissal might very well be construed as indicating on the part of H.M.G. a lack of sympathy with his aims as opposed to his achievements.”69 Matters took their course rather slowly. The secretary of state, Alan Lennox-Boyd, reviewed the issue in December 1954, indicating to the governor that he had lost the confidence of Her Majesty’s Government. Replying to this bad news on February 16, 1955, an aggrieved Savage said he accepted “that if I have lost the confidence of Her Majesty’s Government, it is my duty to retire.” He was displeased that he had not been given “any clear reason or in fact any reason” for the decision. He felt that he had been “tried and judged without knowing my accusers, the case against me or the evidence submitted in support, which although it may be from influential sources is not without considerable prejudices.”70 Savage maintained that the secretary’s “decision” was “not only doing me a grave injustice but is running the grave risk of setting back to a considerable extent some of my progress which has been made since the crisis in October, 1953.” He blamed the members of the elite Georgetown Club for spreading rumors about his impending departure from office. The governor was certain that if his resignation were announced on “medical or other grounds” while he was in the colony, that “would be generally accepted as artificial.” He

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feared that such an explanation “would cause deep resentment among certain groups in the Colonial Office as well as result in an unearned victory for the PPP.” The governor was alluding to the fact that the PPP and its supporters would see his departure as the result of his unpopularity among the white elites and the business interests. As the Crown’s loyal servant, however, Savage said he would accept the Colonial Office’s decision. But he would leave the colony “knowing that we have made a real contribution to the peace, happiness, and economic well-being of the people of British Guiana and that the prestige of the ‘Governor and his lady’ stands higher than when we arrived.” Savage told the secretary that he was including a memorandum that he urged should be read “in justice to myself and this country.”71 The lengthy memorandum was a detailed account of the governor’s tenure in office; his challenges, frustrations, accomplishments; and his vision for the colony’s future. It was a thoughtful document and reflected Savage’s candid assessment of the political situation in British Guiana, as well as his understanding of the roots of its tensions and the need for the old elite to adjust to changing circumstances. Perhaps his impending recall had freed him to manifest a guarded sympathy for the strivings of the colonized masses. In explaining the PPP’s spectacular victory at the polls in 1953, he concluded— accurately—that “the prolonged period of exclusion from a general participation in the affairs of the government gave some point to PPP allegations of entrenched privilege and enhanced the prospects of a political landslide in the sight of the newly enfranchised.” He thought the PPP “rode to power on the backs of the grievances and bitterness” of the Guianese people. In spite of such insights, however, Savage had little confidence in the judgment of the “newly-enfranchised [members of the] working class,” who “were ready in their immaturity to follow and sustain their new-found champions without question and with the firm expectation that all the promises would be fulfilled with rapidity and without restraint.” In his dealings with the PPP government, however, he had wanted to “err, if it could be regarded as an error, on the side of liberty and tolerance.” His attempts to transcend “the sharp class antagonisms” in the society had encountered opposition from the elite groups. As he put it: Unfortunately, a number of influential members of the community were not prepared to accept this approach—this equality of treatment, or of non-affiliation as it more properly was—and although there were some who realised that this was the only proper course there were others, clinging steadfast to their cherished concept of the role of the Governor, who (  )

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were not equally charitable. Criticism of this nature was, however, necessarily confined to private clubs and drawing rooms and found expression in a whispering campaign.72 The longer he remained in British Guiana, the more Savage came to understand the pulse of the enablers of the unequal status quo. He recalled, for example, that “there were people who regarded the suspension of the Constitution, not only with relief but with exultation.” These people “interpreted it as a victory for the old order of things and whose pervading reaction was one of timely rescue from the dangers inherent in the enfranchisement of the masses.”73 The governor dismissed his critics, charging that their positions “spring from the desire to retain the old order of things and their concepts with regard to the suppression of legitimate hopes and the aspirations of the people and their political advancement.” Such an attitude “is an out-moded approach to the problems which face the country.” Savage was convinced that “it was absolutely impossible to return to the old order.” He recognized that “all Guianese, other than the extremists, whether pro or anti the PPP, are becoming united in the determination that there shall be no return to a stage where an influential or privileged minority control the reins of Government and the affairs of the Colony.”74 Governor Savage was pleased that his “leadership” had “brought much benefit to the colony in the difficult times through which we have passed.” He chastised the Colonial Office for “accepting as valid representations from influential sources” in 1954. This weakened his leadership. He would have welcomed at the time “some indication of confidence or a word of encouragement from the Colonial Office.”75 Savage’s lengthy memorandum did not achieve its purpose. In his reply of March 18, 1955, the secretary of state told him that “there is undoubtedly much in the history of British Guiana since you went there in which you can take proper pride.” He complimented the governor for “the typically logical and generous way” in which he had written the memorandum, and he confessed that his decision was “one of the most painful I have had to take.” But Lennox-Boyd held his ground, informing the governor that “after considering the whole issue de novo, I have most reluctantly come again to the conclusion that I must ask you to return.” As he put it, “My position is that I believe British Guiana today demands certain qualities in its governor . . . [and] I do not feel that you have those required today in the post where you serve.”76 Another four months would elapse before the governor learned his ultiContaining Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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mate fate. Lord Lloyd visited the colony in the spring and returned home convinced that Savage should be removed. Writing to the prime minister on June 22, Secretary Lennox-Boyd declared that Savage did not possess “the qualities now required for British Guiana” since it has “undoubtedly become one of the more difficult colonies.” The colony needed a governor “with a strong personality to tackle its administrative and economic problems with energy and determination. Constitutionally, it needs someone of sound judgment.”77 But there were other reasons for retiring the governor. The secretary wanted to avoid criticism from the other nations in the hemisphere if a seemingly ineffective governor remained in place. “Our administration in British Guiana is,” he said, “ever under the keen and critical eye of the American States, especially the United States, and I feel that we cannot afford to take any unnecessary risks.”78 Jock Campbell had begun lobbying the Americans to take a more aggressive interest in British Guiana to forestall a “communist intervention.” Campbell and Phillip Kecky, the United Kingdom’s minister of food, met with U.S. officials on May 11, 1954, to urge “continued informal discussions on a personal basis between officers of the United Kingdom and United States Governments on situations and problems in the Caribbean of mutual interest.” As the voice of Bookers, Campbell was concerned that a communist-led government in Guiana would nationalize the sugar industry and that Savage was not aggressive enough in pursuing those accused of embracing that ideology. Janet Jagan, “a proved communist,” he said, should be deported, “possibly to a Soviet country.”79 The Colonial Office admitted that unofficial “representations” against Savage “have been mainly from sugar interests.” These, N. L. Mayle said, “have been actuated to some extent by the antagonistic attitude which the Governor displayed from the start towards the local representatives of the sugar industry.” This was a grievous sin for which he was unlikely to receive any redemption, no matter how ardent his penance. Mayle found it “difficult to dismiss completely the opinion of such men as Mr. Jock Campbell.”80 Alfred Savage was never the one-dimensional figure that his detractors in the Colonial Office and in British Guiana depicted. Sir Charles Jefferies, a senior colonial official, once conceded that the governor had “some of the necessary qualities” for his position, namely “sincerity and sympathy with popular aspirations.”81 The colony’s attorney general, F. W. Holder, praised Savage for being “equal” to the responsibilities of his office.82 His Achilles’ heel was that he had been unable to annihilate the PPP and its supporters. The colonial officials, far removed from the situation, did not fully appreci(  )

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ate the passion that drove the support for that party. Their feeling that “it is largely Sir A. Savage’s defects of personality in relation to the present situation which make it impossible to handle it” was a distortion of developments in the colony.83 Governor Savage, according to the secretary of state, “loyally” accepted the request for his resignation. Rumors had been floating around the colony that the governor would be recalled, but the Colonial Office did not provide the real reasons for the action. Fortuitously, Savage was experiencing some health problems, so colonial officials preferred to announce that he had resigned because he was unwell. This reason notwithstanding, the governor was offered a post in London as second Crown agent for overseas governments and administrations. Savage had spent two tumultuous years in British Guiana, and there were few genuine tears when he left. The PPP and its supporters had not welcomed his arrival, and he had played a critical role in their removal from office. The white elites and the corporate and business sectors were among his most persistent and effective detractors because he had not pursued the “extremist” political leaders with more vigor, nor had he exiled them as they recommended. Caught between the darts emanating from the disaffected elites, the sugar interests, and the Colonial Office on the one hand, and those thrown by the PPP and its adherents on the other, Savage epitomized the impotence and the painful thrashing about of a wounded and dying colonial order.

Containing Cheddi and Scapegoating Savage

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Taking Stock

The charge was simple enough, but the task it set its recipients was both daunting and complex. Fresh from its successful coup in October, the British government was now ready to examine the circumstances for its unprecedented action in British Guiana and chart a new direction for the colony. On December 2, 1953, Oliver Lyttleton, the secretary of state for the colonies, announced the appointment of a Constitutional Commission to visit Guiana. It was enjoined “in the light of the circumstances which made it necessary to suspend the Constitution of British Guiana to consider and to recommend what changes are required in it.”1 The commission’s terms of reference made it clear that the Colonial Office saw the colony’s troubles in narrow constitutional terms, a position that seemed profoundly misguided and myopic even at the time. The Constitutional Commission consisted of three persons: its chairman, Sir James Robertson, an Englishman and former governor general of Nigeria; George Woodcock, assistant secretary of the British Trades Union Congress; and Sir Donald Jackson, the Guianese chief justice of the Windward and Leeward Islands and judge of the West Indian Court of Appeal. The choice of a Guianese to sit on the commission was greeted positively in the colony, but

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

reservations were voiced about the other two men. With both Robertson and Woodcock virtually unknown to the Guianese people, there was some apprehension about the roles they were likely to play on the commission. The organ of the conservative elite, the Daily Argosy, was harshly critical of the appointees. “Frankly,” its editorial of December 6, 1953, complained, “We do not think that the Commission as now constituted carries sufficient weight to command the requisite respect on all sides, or to capture the imagination of those who are now predisposed against the recommendations such a Commission might make.” The paper lambasted Lyttleton’s choices as “one more in the series of blunders and mishaps that has characterized the whole situation from the start, to an extent possibly unparalleled in history.”2 Assuming its duties with alacrity, the Constitutional—or Robertson— Commission held its first meeting in Georgetown on January 7, 1954, approximately three months after the October coup d’état. Its first order of business was to respond to criticisms of its narrow terms of reference by a number of influential Guianese residents. Fifteen organizations, under the chairmanship of W. J. Raatgever, a former colonial official, had petitioned the secretary of state to modify the commission’s terms of reference to include “the economic, educational, and political development of the colony.” These organizations also wanted a commission comprised of five members instead of three.3 In a press conference that he held on January 9, Chairman Robertson assured the Guianese people:

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We consider that in order to appreciate “the circumstances which made it necessary to suspend the constitution” we must acquaint ourselves with all aspects of the country’s life. The constitution in our view must be related to the general conditions of the country and is not a thing existing in vacuo quite unrelated to the social, economic, and educational environment in which it has to function. It is in this sense that we interpret our terms of reference and we propose to try to get as clear a picture of the general background as we can. We visualize the possibility that in our report we may have to make observations upon these aspects of the situation, while not making specific recommendations about them.4 The Robertson Commission faced strong opposition from the People’s Progressive Party. Still smarting from the suspension of the previous constitution and the removal of its government, the PPP denounced the narrowness of the commission’s terms of reference and maintained that it lacked the authority to examine the reasons for the events of October 1953. The party had no confidence in its credibility and its ability to prepare an objective report. (  )

Taking Stock

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It was in the party’s interest, to be sure, to distance itself from that body. The PPP’s behavior in government had been a precipitant of the British coup, and its leaders and membership were the continuing objects of official harassment. The party stood to score political points by refusing to cooperate with a commission that was the creation of an imperial system it was committed to oppose. Noting the stance of the PPP, Chairman Robertson stressed at the news conference on January 9 that “the Commission is a perfectly free body, we have been given no directions regarding our recommendation, we are not committed to any solution—nor are we bound to accept any suggestions made by anyone.”5 Such assurances did not placate the PPP leadership; it rejected Robertson’s request that it terminate its formal boycott, although it would cast a blind eye on the party members who submitted memoranda to the commission or testified before it. Prior to the commencement of its formal hearings, the commission asked members of the public to submit memoranda outlining their views. Those who declined to do so could, however, still appear and give oral testimony; those who gave oral testimony had the option of doing so publicly or privately, but most would choose the former. The response to the commission’s request was highly impressive as 220 persons submitted memoranda, 160 of whom testified orally; 80 people appeared before the commission without submitting memoranda. These individuals represented a broad cross section of the colony’s residents, including government officials, business interests, trade unionists, and civic organizations. The residents who participated in the work of the commission hailed from all ethnic groups, occupations, and classes. The commission also heard from the clerk of the legislature, director of education, commissioner of labor, commissioner of the interior, attorney general, and other important officials. Business interests were represented by the Demerara Bauxite Company, Limited, Shipping Association of Georgetown, Georgetown Chamber of Commerce, and Sugar Producers Association (SPA). The trade unions had a significant presence, comprising the British Guiana Trades Union Council, British Guiana Mineworkers Union, British Guiana Domestic Helpers and Workers Union, Clerical Workers Union, and others. The civic, religious, and professional organizations represented were equally numerous; they included the Afro-American Association and League of Colored Races, British Guiana Sanatana Dharma Maha Sabha, Professional and Administrative Officers Association, British Guiana Teachers Association, Berbice Ministers Fraternal, and British Guiana Social Council. The Most Reverend Dr. Alan J. Taking Stock

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Knight, the influential archbishop of the West Indies, also testified. In order to hear from as many residents as possible and from different regions in the vast colony, the commission held sessions in Georgetown, Bartica, Lethem Suddie, Anna Regina, Charity, Christianburg, Mackenzie City, and New Amsterdam. The hearings began on January 18 and ended on March 8. Their high degree of participation was a clear manifestation of the vibrant political consciousness of the residents. The commission was pleased with the “many well written and sensible memoranda [that were] submitted.” It was also struck by the “fact that many witnesses had obviously given the whole matter anxious and careful thought.” On the other hand, it complained that it had to provide “the audience for a number of cranks and seekers of publicity and listen to a great deal which was not apropos to our enquiry.” But there were lighter moments as well: “The highlights were a gentleman who claimed that the sun, planets, and stars went around the earth and another who was greatly interested in Pope Joan.”6 Although not one of its objectives, the Robertson Commission served as a catharsis for the troubled colony. It gave the people an opportunity to take stock of the state of British Guiana after its constitutional crisis, assigning blame or praise as well as imagining their country’s future. The powerful and the powerless alike, the privileged and the marginalized, the learned and the illiterate, the black, the brown, and the white—all appeared to voice their opinions about their homeland, its problems, failures, successes, and promise. Their testimony illuminated the corrosive tensions in the society, the raw and ugly wounds inflicted by the colonial experience. Bleeding and painful, these wounds lent themselves to no easy treatment, starkly exposing the ills of a Guiana in search of itself. This painful soul-searching, however, did not begin with the commission’s hearings. It really began in the immediate aftermath of the PPP’s electoral victory in April 1953. Disappointed and frightened by the results, members of an insecure colonial elite began to question why the voters had elected a party that threatened to transform the status quo to its disadvantage. SOME OF THE MOST passionate defenders of the colonial status quo were the locally born elites. These people—by either privileged birth, hard work, guile, or mere luck—were the beneficiaries of colonial rule and opposed any attempt to generate fundamental change in its structure. Change, if it came, must be gradual, orderly, and managed by the elites. The working class, in their estimation, hardly knew what was in its best interests and should follow the lead of its enlightened betters. (  )

Taking Stock

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Lionel A. Luckhoo epitomized the native-born colonial elite at midcentury. Born in New Amsterdam in 1914, the intellectually gifted young man studied in London and graduated as a barrister-at-law. Returning home in 1940, he identified with the plight of the working class and founded the Headmen’s Union, holding the office of general president for four years. Luckhoo also served as president of the British Guiana and West Indies Federated Seamen’s Union, helped to found the Sawmill Workers Union, and was general president of the Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA) from 1950 to 1953. In addition to being a successful barrister, he was a member of the old Legislative Council, the Georgetown Council, the ill-fated State Council of the deposed government, and the new Legislative Council appointed by Governor Savage. Given his achievements, Luckhoo was unquestionably a member of the colonial power elite. As a beneficiary of the colonial experience, Luckhoo took pride in his status as a loyal subject, noting in his memorandum to the Robertson Commission that “as British subjects, we enjoy the protection of the British and, in return, we give allegiance to the throne.” He deeply regretted that the “Ministers of the P.P.P. and their adherents have sought every opportunity to belittle the sovereign and to ridicule established custom.” Luckhoo feared that Guianese workers were susceptible to contamination by communist-inspired literature and believed that such works should be banned. In 1952 Luckhoo had successfully sponsored a bill in the Legislative Council to prohibit the entry of “subversive” literature—“filled with hate and propaganda”—to the colony. The PPP had flooded the county [sic] with books, literature, etc., all freely distributed, which extolled the might of the U.S.S.R and proclaimed revolution as the solution to all troubles . . . and those with little education were courted and injected with the idea that they should become crusaders. To the average worker in British Guiana, the written word possesses some peculiar sanctity—“It is written in the books, so it must be true.” They read, they heard, they believed.7 Luckhoo was so convinced of the gullibility of the less privileged members of Guianese society that he felt compelled to police what they read. A politically conscious working class, particularly one infected by communist ideology, posed a threat to the survival of the British Guiana he knew. After all, he said, “the web which the P.P.P. was spinning was aimed at destroying [British] allegiance, breeding hate, clothing themselves with power, dominating the labour movement, indoctrinating the youth of the country and lastly, to win Taking Stock

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the support of the Police Force which was the sole instrument between themselves and absolute dictatorship of the country.”8 Although Luckhoo had led several unions, he seemed more the benevolent guardian of the workers and less their vigorous advocate and partner. He had little confidence in their judgment, for “the people had been seduced by the PPP” because of their “ignorance” and “poor living conditions.” The party had evinced “sympathy for the workers; sowing seeds of discontent; exaggerating their grievances, and making the most extravagant promises if the workers would only support them.” Luckhoo, the trade union leader, accused the PPP of “belittling any attempts made by employers to improve conditions and wages by ridiculing their efforts; twisting the facts, and advising strikes and unrest. . . . They made the workers feel that they were enchained slaves and that they, as liberators, would free them.” Comfortably esconced among the elite, Luckhoo feared the workers’ potential to destroy the status quo under the tutelage of the PPP. “British Guiana in its strategic position could be the spring board for Communist activity spreading to South America,” he worried. To him, the constitutional changes recommended by the Waddington Commission had come to a colony wholly unprepared for the “consequential shock” that resulted. Guiana “was not yet ready for adult suffrage” and “the clock must be set back.” To support his recommendation, Luckhoo recalled a conversation with an officer of the Argylls, one of the ships that brought British troops to the colony after the Waddington Constitution was suspended:

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My reason tells me that we are not yet ready for adult suffrage. I remember mentioning this to an officer of the Argylls shortly after they arrived and he disagreed strongly with me. Then one of the soldiers was involved in an accident and died. At his funeral, there were very large crowds. They behaved disgracefully, followed the bier dancing calypsos and hurling insults at the dead. That Argylls officer told me that his men spoke to him after the funeral and said “Even our enemies would not have treated our dead in such a fashion. Are these the people who are accorded the privilege of the vote?”9 Embarrassed by what he heard from the officer, Luckhoo seems not to have understood the passions that drove the demonstrations, even if he did not approve of them. To suggest that such behavior disqualified the people from enjoying the franchise demonstrated his emotional distance from his fellow Guianese, regardless of their social standing. Luckhoo was criticized for the coziness of the union that he led—the MPCA—with the barons of the (  )

Taking Stock

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sugar industry. In fact, the workers’ lack of confidence in Luckhoo’s leadership and the effectiveness of the MPCA facilitated the growth of its rival, the Guiana Industrial Workers Union. Luckhoo was not, in retrospect, the stereotypical colonial subject who was wholly allied with the colonizer to the detriment of his people. He was a more complex figure. Brilliant, highly respected, hard working, and successful, he had been served well by the colonial experience, rendering him, and others like him, an active enabler of the status quo. Trusted by the colonial authorities and dutifully loyal, these exemplars of the elite were not necessarily resistant to change but they wanted to be its careful initiator and primary beneficiary. Lionel Luckhoo was not an enemy of the workers in whose name he spoke. Rather, he was the prototype of indirect rule, the native leader who served the interests of the colonial regime, placing limits on its intrusions into local life at times, but ultimately the privileged agent and voice of the external rulers. To Luckhoo, Cheddi Jagan and the PPP constituted unacceptable threats to a society that functioned in his interest and were unrepresentative of his people. “The Indians and Africans,” he said, “are simple folk, unaware of political guile and cunning, whose loyalty to the Throne springs readily and genuinely.”10 Unlike Lionel Luckhoo, who was an Indian, Arthur G. King descended from one of the oldest English families in the colony. By 1954 its members had been residents for 150 years. King’s father, Joseph, had held the offices of Crown solicitor and official receiver and public trustee; he “had always taken the greatest possible interest in affairs concerning the welfare and development of the colony.” Arthur said he had been “imbued” with his father’s “ideas and ideals” and had done “everything possible at all times for the welfare of the Colony and the advancement of its people.” The son boasted many significant professional accomplishments. He served as a solicitor for the Supreme Court; as director and secretary of, and solicitor for, the Demerara Bauxite Company, Limited; and as director of and solicitor for Sprostons Limited and other companies. From 1935 to 1944 he had represented the Demerara River constituency in the old Legislative Council.11 Clearly, King, like Luckhoo, belonged to the colonial elite. Although one was Caucasian and the other Indian, both were successful members of the legal profession and both had served in the old Legislative Council. Luckhoo had been nominated to that body by the governor whereas King had faced the electorate. These two privileged Guianese subjects were proud of their service to the colony. Arthur King shared Luckhoo’s preference for rule by an elite group. “I am Taking Stock

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definitely of the opinion,” he admitted to the Robertson Commission, “that unrestricted Adult Suffrage in this colony will be the ruination of the colony.” He asserted that “the people of this colony are not sufficiently mature and not sufficiently educated to be granted unrestricted Adult Suffrage.” He thought “it was ridiculous for people to have to vote at an election by means of symbols, which brought the whole election down to a farce.” And King, like Luckhoo, viewed the majority of Guianese through an optic that reflected his privileged class position. In his eyes, they were incapable of making rational judgments. “The illiterate and under-privileged people of the colony are in the majority in most constituencies,” he observed, “and they are easily carried away by inflammatory speeches.” It was his opinion that in 1953 the people had elected individuals incapable of governing and committed to turning Guiana into a colony “in which the more responsible citizen would not be wanted.” To prevent “the irresponsible and illiterate” people from electing a similar government in the future, the Waddington Constitution should not be restored.12 As a child of the English elite, King was impressed by the “tremendous development of the people and of the colony as a whole” over the previous four decades, noting: “People, who many years ago were satisfied with food of a lower class, such as salt fish, salt beef, and pig tails now use fresh fish, fresh beef, eggs, poultry and a considerable quantity of canned goods.” Pointing to the “increased expenditure on rum, cinemas and expensive clothes,” he suggested that “the need was to educate people to use their money wisely and not waste it on non essentials.” If they would stop listening to “inflammatory speeches and senseless promises,” he opined, “they would realise that their lot has greatly improved and that continued improvement on that basis would mean that in another 25 years or less, their children would enjoy [an] even greater measure of prosperity and a greater chance of living a happy and decent life in this colony.”13 Observations such as these underscored the existence of two Guianas, divided most distinctly along class lines. As the voices of the privileged elite, Luckhoo and King, though they belonged to different races, shared the same class interests and attitudes regarding the less privileged. King placed himself among “the better class of people in the community,” and he would most certainly have included Luckhoo in that select category. But King was also conscious of the fact that he was a white man and that race fostered a significant divide among Guiana’s peoples. He was, he said, aware of the existing “unrest and the racial feeling.” But at midcentury these divisions were not yet toxic enough to destroy the fragile racial coalition that had swept the PPP into office in April 1953. (  )

Taking Stock

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F. D. Widdup, a native Guianese of English descent, drew fundamental differences between himself and other Guianese. Educated in England, Widdup served in the police force in Guiana and Trinidad for twelve years. Having mixed with “all classes of the population,” he was persuaded that the “so called masses are at heart good people, but at the same time they are very ignorant, fickle and easily swayed.” The people, Widdup said, “are peculiar in their mode of living.” Among the Guianese, presumably not the native whites, “promiscuity is the rule and illegitimacy very high.” Widdup continued:

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The negro has a passion for a good time and will spend all he can on women, liquor, and clothes. The Indian is more thrifty but on the Estates will stop work after he has earned enough for his immediate needs. After two days of public holidays, the rate of non attendance is very high as the people rest and get over their festivities. Rum shops are full from early in the morning. Most of the expensive items in shops are bought by the so called “exploited.” . . . The economic situation is not all the trouble and . . . more money would only go the same way.14 Ethnic and racial stereotypes were the stock-in-trade of colonial societies, and British Guiana was no exception. Widdup was articulating the stereotypes that the ruling elite held of those they governed, just as the IndoGuianese and the African Guianese held stereotypes of each other as well as of the whites. The fundamental difference, however, was that the white ruling elite—and the Crown it represented—exercised the power to make policy based on these stereotypes and the two other groups did not. Their strength resided in their numbers if they acted in tandem, a tantalizing possibility that gave every indication of becoming painfully elusive at the time. Although the local elite did not necessarily speak with one voice, most of its members were fearful of any devolution of power to the nationalist leaders. Their voices and doubts were reinforced by those of the expatriate white elite. F. Seal Coon, for example, was one of the most influential members of the expatriate elite at midcentury. He first came to British Guiana in 1942 as defense security officer, with the principal duty of gathering intelligence in the colony. Two years later he was transferred to Trinidad to serve in a similar capacity, but with additional responsibility for Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands. In 1947 Seal Coon returned to Guiana and in the next year became editor of the influential Daily Argosy, where, he said, he was “permitted practically unfettered control of the newspaper’s policy.”15 Taking Stock

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Seal Coon came to know—if not to understand—the people of British Guiana reasonably well but manifested an uncharitable perspective on their condition at the time. By 1954, he had edited the Argosy for six years and was conversant with the configuration of the society and the issues of the moment. Seal Coon’s optic was unquestionably that of the privileged and condescending colonizing elite. He told the Robertson Commission: I consider that the Colony’s present problems are partly traceable to a long semi-isolation of place and people, on account of which rancors have simmered, grievances grown out of proportion and personalities become over-inflated. Given a background of slavery, indenture, “colonialism” and domination by “big business” (even up to a couple of decades ago or less), it is perhaps unsurprising that the people as a whole suffer from an inferiority complex, a chip-on-the shoulder and the delusion that they are still being exploited on every hand. Racial fears and jealousies, which have undoubtedly long existed under the surface even though some claim that they are of recent growth, and an unrealistic nationalism which is of late growth have also played a part; as has the myth of the country’s “vast potentialities,” on which is based a fairly general belief that Guianese have been “held down.”16

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This was obviously the colonizer’s voice. Contemptuous of the notion that the Guianese had been “held down,” Seal Coon was also dismissive of the “unrealistic nationalism” that was animating the people of a changing British Guiana. As editor of the Daily Argosy, Seal Coon was using that platform to shape political attitudes in the colony. His view of the Guianese people, however, was unabashedly pejorative and reeked of the racism that had characterized the observations about African peoples in the Caribbean by Englishmen Thomas Carlyle, Arnold Toynbee, Lord Macaulay, and a host of others.17 Seal Coon had little respect for the Guianese peoples. To him, Guianese generally are peaceable, not to say apathetic, and such disturbances as have occurred in the past have generally done so on sugar estates whose East Indian populations are volatile but easily enough curbed. There is a general lack of outstanding personalities, little sense of urgency, a repugnance for responsibility and effort; these characteristics have tinged every facet of life, not least the Administration, in the past and are still influential. They have had considerable effect on the course of the Colony’s recent history, which might have been very different had more colourful and energetic characters come forward and been met by greater (  )

Taking Stock

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interest on the part of the general population. As it is, the impression is one of amiable mediocrity.18 Coming from a leader of opinion in the colony, these were reprehensible comments, indeed, but Seal Coon spoke for many whites. In what appeared to be a defense of slavery, he thought it “quite possible that had it not been for the ‘plantation system,’ British Guiana would not now be a populous and civilized country at all.” Seal Coon had little confidence in the rationality of the Guianese people, as reflected in their support for the PPP. “It is very probable,” he said, “that the Guianese masses, avid for notice of any kind, took pleasure in a sense of ‘belonging,’ as well as being bemused by propaganda and dazzled by unscrupulous promises.” Not surprisingly, he doubted the efficacy of universal adult suffrage in Guiana, but felt its revocation would create a “shock” that “would be too drastic a one for the body politic to suffer without permanent impairment.” As a compromise, Seal Coon suggested that the voting age be raised to twenty-six.19 These four members of the elite—Luckhoo, King, Widdup, and Seal Coon—represented the face of privilege in a society that elevated inequality to a virtue. Reveling in their superior economic and social status, they ascribed the worst qualities to the less privileged members of the society. They were seemingly insensitive to the appalling conditions of the working class and the systemic barriers to their upward mobility. Lacking empathy with the strivings of these people, their hopes and aspirations, the four privileged men could be callously dismissive of them without an empathetic or understanding glance. Arthur King and other members of the elite thought that the Guianese poor were experiencing an improvement in their condition at midcentury. But those at the bottom of the economic order, and others who spoke in their name before the commission, contested this rosy assessment. Moreover, the extant statistics on wages and the cost of living did not support it. To complicate the situation, those who existed at the societal margins complained about the mistreatment they received from the agents of the colonial state or from the local elites. Fearful of reprisals, some suffered in silence, declining to seek any redress of their grievances. Harry Nauth, of the East Coast of Demerara, who described himself as “an observer of these things,” told the commission that “poor people . . . have so many grievances. . . . They can’t talk for their own right, go to any Authority, [such] as the District Commissioner, because they will be treated like dogs, only left to received [sic] kicks, from the landlord, or Proprietor, so the poor Taking Stock

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people have to sit down, and take all these serious and ugly [dis]advantages that come to them.” Nauth complained that the people “get no work to do in this area . . . works [sic] very hard to get.” He detailed the high cost of land on which to plant rice and the abuse the workers or tenants endured at the hands of the farmers and landlords. “When the rice farmer reap their crop, the landlord don’t make full settlement with the people, he takes almost the whole year to pay them bit by bit.” Tenants, he charged, “get no receipts for the money they pay.” These people “cannot say notting, because the master will put them off the land.”20 Under the circumstances, Nauth declared, the people received nothing but “sufferment.” Consequently, they did not earn enough to support their families. The incidence of floods exacerbated the situation. “These bad conditions and no progress is among East Indian proprietors, they press poor people, very hard, and these people remain future less and die beggers.” Nauth said that “the trash roof and mud houses” in the colony are the residences of the “workers and slaves.”21 This dismal picture of rural deprivation and poverty contradicts the more positive assessments of elites such as Arthur King. Karan Singh, who characterized himself as a “poor worker,” maintained that the government “is not running this country, sugar is big boss.” In his opinion, there was “force labour in B.G. because a worker has to work 14 hours a day to earn a living, that is systematic slavery.” He claimed, perhaps with some exaggeration, that “each one of us take our wife and sons from 4AM to 8PM 7 days [and] we earn about $30 . . . that is about 96 hours, isn’t that semi slavery?”22 Barrister M. S. H. Rahaman, who was a candidate in the 1953 election, captured another dimension of the people’s struggle for survival. He called attention to the fact that those who lived in the coastal area were fighting an endless battle against their three “greatest enemies”: drainage, irrigation, and sea defense: These forbidding environments have made of the people of this country a really hardy lot but heartbreaks from crops lost, now by excessive rainfall, then by drought or still again by incursions of the sea, are perennial. Each time, the farmer goes back to planting with a philosophical approach born of frustration and helplessness. Undernourishment of his children, rags and a hovel are the compensation for his efforts. His heritage also includes malaria, filaria, tuberculosis, typhoid, hookworm and a few others to which his undernourished body offers little resistance.23 (  )

Taking Stock

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For residents such as Harry Nauth, British Guiana was not a success story. When he testified before the Robertson Commission, Richard Ishmael, a teacher and trade unionist, captured the despair of those Guianese whose dreams were never fulfilled: CHAIRMAN: [You said] there is no real opportunity in this country for the young men and that a number of them go abroad to find opportunities rather than stay here and build up the nation? ISHMAEL: This country is a graveyard for ambition. Ambition is born and it dies here. CHAIRMAN: People cannot get on? ISHMAEL: In this country if you are not above average you cannot get on. CHAIRMAN: But that happens all over the world. Unless a man is above average, unless he is ambitious he is inclined to remain more or less in the status in which he was born? ISHMAEL: I agree with you but usually a person is able to secure enough to live on. Here in British Guiana it is not so. CHAIRMAN: They all die young? ISHMAEL: Not that they die; their ambition dies. CHAIRMAN: You said they don’t get enough to live on? ISHMAEL: They don’t CHAIRMAN: Well then, they must die! ISHMAEL: Well, they die inside. Man can live and yet die. CHAIRMAN: And you were unable to get a job as a teacher? ISHMAEL: You see, I was a “coolie boy.” CHAIRMAN: What does that mean? It is a new one on me. ISHMAEL: You know, coolie is someone who carries weight but they give the name to East Indians. I like it.24 Ishmael’s quiet eloquence captured the rage of those who marched in place or backward in Guianese society. The chairman’s incredulity regarding the impact of opportunities denied its victims was a window into the different optics of the privileged and those who struggled at the society’s margins. Having lived in Guiana for sixteen years, Archbishop Alan Knight could speak with authority about the economic travails of some of its people. Since he traveled a great deal to visit the churches under his jurisdiction, Knight said he could “claim to meet more of a cross section of the people than anybody else.”25 Highly respected as the spiritual leader of Anglicans in the Caribbean, the archbishop’s opinions carried considerable weight. And Taking Stock

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he understood very well the economic hardships of many of the Guianese people. As he told the commission: One cannot but be surprised at the appalling amount of unemployment. There is not only unemployment but those in employment are suffering because of those who are not employed. One example, a young man earning $67.08 per month and has a wife and child and lives reasonably and comfortably in the little quarters where he is if that is all, but he has two grown-up brothers who are unemployed, one having a wife and four children, and also his parents to maintain. That young man is not only supporting himself and wife and child, but supporting his unemployed brothers and his parents. He has to pay the rent of two houses. It is no wonder that he gets into debt. The poor people are suffering.26

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The economic plight of the majority of the Guianese people at midcentury can be best captured by the purchasing power of the wages paid to workers in Georgetown. In 1935–36, for instance, breakfast [lunch] for a “working man’s” family of five, “one of the lowest state and living frugally,” cost 17 cents. By 1948, it had jumped to 56 cents. Tables 2 and 3 show the changing cost and the composition of the meals of the working class. Similarly, the cost of tea [breakfast] for the same family increased from 15 cents in 1935–36 to 35 cents in 1948. Over the same period, the cost of providing one school uniform for a child rose from $1.05 to $3.40 and schoolbooks for a child in the sixth standard [the last grade in primary schools] from $1.08 to $6.85. Based on these cost-of-living statistics, the British Guiana Trades Union Council estimated in 1948 that unskilled workers needed a basic wage of $2.00 per day to survive and skilled workers, $3.00. It gave no explanation for the difference, but it may have been a function of class imperatives. Another way to measure the economic condition of workers is to determine the time it took a worker to earn enough to purchase a pound of sugar or a coconut. Fortunately, these estimates are available for the years 1933–38 and 1953–54. The average hourly wage had increased from 18 cents in the 1930s to 53 cents in 1954. Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the amount of time an individual would have to work in 1933–38 and 1953–54 to purchase certain food items. These estimates indicate that the cost of one day’s supply of food for the average worker in Georgetown had increased from 61 cents in the 1930s to $2.76 in 1953–54, or about 450 percent. In the 1930s the provider, usually a man, had to work for three hours and thirty-five minutes to feed his family of five for a day, but by 1953–54 his working time had escalated to six hours and (  )

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( Table 2 ) Estimated Cost of Breakfast [Lunch] for a Family of Five, 1935–1936 and 1948 (Constant Value) 1935–36

1948

( Table 3 ) Estimated Cost of Dinner [Supper] for a Family of Five, 1935–1936 and 1948 (Constant Value)

1 pt. split peas 1 lb. rice 1 lb. salt meat 1 coconut Shrimp Butter Onions (piece begged for) Wood

4 cents 5 3 1 1 1 —

15 cents 10 12 5 4 3 2

2

5

Plantains Eddoes Sweet potatoes Sweet cassava Salt fish [salted cod] Cooking oil Butter Tomatoes Wood

Total

17 cents

56 cents

Total

1935–36

1948

4 cents 4 2 2 6 3 1 1 2

10 cents 6 7 4 22 6 3 4 5

23 cents

67 cents

Source: “Memorandum from the British Guiana

Source: “Memorandum from the British Guiana

Trades Union Council,” CO 891/6.

Trades Union Council,” CO 891/6.

twenty-five minutes to feed the same family. These dismal statistics underscore the declining economic condition of the working class. Wages had not kept abreast of the increase in the cost of living, a fact that contradicted the claims of the more privileged members of society that the condition of the working poor was steadily improving. Indeed, one authoritative observer noted that by 1952 the cost-of-living index for Georgetown had increased 167 points since 1939 and the Guianese dollar was worth only 371⁄2 cents in purchasing power compared to its prewar counterpart.27 The standard of living of a worker in the sugar industry was probably worse than his urban counterpart, but this does not lend itself to any simple determination. In 1954, the SPA reported that “the average wage paid in the industry was about $16 to $18 per week.” This did not mean that most people were employed for 50 weeks annually, since the SPA admitted that “it was true generally that weeding gangs, cane cutters and women workers might work only 36 weeks in a year.”28 This was a high rate of unemployment and underemployment in an industry that employed 33,000 persons and was the economic lifeblood of the country.29 The relatively modest weekly wage would have been barely enough to feed a family of five in Georgetown, but, unlike Georgetown residents, rural workers were more likely to cultivate some of the food they and their families consumed. Economic deprivation reflected stark differences in access to the colonial pie. The contrasts were visible to those who had the capacity, the willingness, Taking Stock

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( Table 4 ) Estimated Cost of Tea [Breakfast] for a Family of Five, 1933–1938 and 1953–1954

(Constant Value) 1933–38 (wage rate: 18 cents per hour)

1953–54 (wage rate: 43 cents per hour)

1 lb. bread 1 lb. sugar 1/2 pt. milk 1/2 oz. butter 2 oz. coffee Wood

6 cents 3 2 1 5 1

20 minutes 10 6.6 3.3 16.7 5.4

20 cents 7 6 4 12 4

27.9 minutes 9.8 8.4 5.6 16.7 5.6

Total

18 cents

62 minutes

53 cents

74 minutes

Source: “Memorandum from the British Guiana Trades Union Council,” CO 891/6.

( Table 5 ) Estimated Cost of Breakfast [Lunch] for a Family of Five, 1933–1938 and 1953–1954 (Constant Value) 1933–38 (wage rate: 18 cents per hour)

1953–54 (wage rate: 43 cents per hour)

2 pts. rice 1 pt. split peas 1/4 lb. salt meat 1 coconut 1/2 oz. butter Shrimp Wood

5 cents 4 3 1 1 1 2

16.7 minutes 13.3 10 3.3 3.3 3.3 6.7

20 cents 18 14 6 4 8 5

27.9 minutes 25.1 19.5 8.4 5.6 11.2 7

Total

17 cents

56.6 minutes

75 cents

104.7 minutes

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Source: “Memorandum from the British Guiana Trades Union Council,” CO 891/6.

and the sensitivity to see them and to understand their causation. Barrister Rahaman was sensitive to the “miserable living” that some of his people endured. This, he said, “must sound very exaggerated to the visitor” who lands in Georgetown and is “passing through the magnificent shopping centre and the streets where the merchant princes and the privileged few live, but the preponderant slums of Georgetown tell a different tale and so do the hovels that clutter the countryside, and the lean, hungry and ill-clad appearance of the dwellers in these hovels must wring with pity the hearts of the visitor from America, Canada or Europe which by contrast are paradise.”30 ALTHOUGH THEY WERE seldom publicly addressed in the British Guiana of midcentury, racial tensions festered below the surface calm. The Waddington Commission had been cognizant of this developing problem and its (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

( Table 6 ) Estimated Cost of Dinner [Supper] for a Family of Five, 1933–1938 and 1953–1954

(Constant Value) 1933–38 (wage rate: 18 cents per hour)

1953–54 (wage rate: 43 cents per hour)

4 lbs. plantains 2 lbs. eddoes 2 lbs. sweet potatoes 2 lbs. sweet cassava 1 lb. salt fish 1/2 pt. cooking oil 1/2 oz. butter Tomatoes Wood

4 cents 2 2 2 6 6 1 1 2

13.3 minutes 6.7 6.7 6.7 20 20 3.3 3.3 6.7

32 cents 16 18 14 32 18 4 8 6

44.7 minutes 22.3 25.1 19.5 44.7 25.1 5.6 11.2 8.4

Total

26 cents

81.5 minutes

148 cents

206.6 minutes

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Source: “Memorandum from the British Guiana Trades Union Council,” CO 891/6.

potential to destroy the body politic. “Race is a patent difference,” the commission concluded in 1951, “and is a powerful slogan ready to the hand of unscrupulous men who can use it as a stepping stone to political power.” The Africans in Guiana had “absorbed the traditions of a European civilization” and “have won their way by effort and education to professional and public advancements.” Although the Indo-Guianese people formed “a very valuable element in the life of the country, their occupations, the exercises of their religion, which led them to eschew education provided by denominational schools, and for a long time the professedly temporary nature of their residence, and the special protection afforded them by the terms of their indentures, have all reinforced their inclination to resist assimilation.”31 The Waddington Commission questioned the strength of Indo-Guianese allegiance to the colony. The Indians had “remained a community within a community with an allegiance to their motherland of India.” Still, there had been a change in their attitude. Their “aloofness [is] now giving place to realisation of their permanent place in Guianese life and to a demand for equal participation in it.” This “challenge” from the Indians had “stimulated the other races into closing their ranks.” India’s achievement of political independence, according to the commission, had given “a particular stimulus” to the identification of the Indo-Guianese with their ancestral homeland. Some of the Indians, the commission speculated, “may be inclined to pay homage to their heritage merely as a cover under which to condone racial attitudes.” The Indian government had repudiated this tendency, emphasizing that “those of Indian race who have settled permanently in an overseas Taking Stock

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territory owe to it their main allegiance.” The commission warned that “if Indians seek a free and equal participation in the life of British Guiana, it is manifestly wrong that they should look continually over their shoulders towards a Mother Country with which their present life and polity has little contact.”32 Obviously the Waddington Commission was very concerned about what it regarded as the divided loyalties of the Indo-Guianese and their potential for creating a racialized disharmony in the body politic. It saw no such threat from the “assimilated” Africans. Interestingly, whites received little attention in the commission’s report except for a comment on the dimunition in their political influence. “The European,” it observed, “few in numbers but economically powerful, is at a political disadvantage as the legatee of the old sugar plantocracy.” Despite their historical dominance in the society and their position of privilege, whites were somehow racially invisible. The racialized Indians and Africans were the peoples whose presence and behavior posed threats to societal harmony, peoples whose condition and presence were, to be sure, consequences of the power of the invisible whites. But more than being invisible, whites were raceless in the commission’s eyes; the problem of race was the creation, the child of Indians and Africans. But this flew in the face of Guiana’s history and that of the rest of the Caribbean societies. Race and racial difference had been a defining feature of their lives since Christopher Columbus invaded in the 1490s and initiated the European hegemony over the indigenous peoples, and later the Africans and the Indians. Blissfully blind to the role of whites in the construction of a racialized social order, the Waddington Commission proclaimed that “racialism has its roots in economic fear, although a system of government under which political life carries prestige rather than responsibility may have stimulated its growth.” This was a surprising observation for a society where, in 1951, the majority of the people were denied the franchise and Cheddi Jagan was the sole elected member of the Legislative Council who was not Caucasian. If “economic fear” produced racialism in Guiana, then the white minority that controlled the commanding heights of the economy were its consummate practitioners. The commission was reassured that “racialism spoke with a hesitant voice in public” and that no one had advocated “communal representation.” In an assertion that the British government chose to ignore when it introduced proportional representation in 1963, the commission held that “communalism is too often the confession of a failure to live together in mutual respect and gives rise to greater problems than those it seeks to com(  )

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pose.” It drew comfort from the “amity with which people of all races live side by side in the villages, where mutual dependence is, of necessity, recognized.”33 The tenor of these observations, once again, suggests that the virus of racialism was harbored only by those who were not white. Ignoring the privileged position of whites and the societal tensions that resulted therefrom, the Waddington Commission maintained that if “overriding loyalty is given to the community as a whole, racial distinctions, expressed in a pride in culture, tradition, and history, can be a source of enrichment and strength.” It was confident that what it called “this comprehensive loyalty” would be fostered in British Guiana “by the challenge of responsibility, and that the handicap of racialism can be diminished as the people of British Guiana devote their energies to the manifold problems in their country.” The commission’s report was silent on the imbalance of power between whites on the one hand and the other groups on the other and how this constituted a barrier to the racial nirvana it imagined. Nor did it appreciate the pulse of a colonized people who were strangers to the exercise of political power and whose energies could be turned ferociously against one another, and where differences of skin color and heritage could generate fear, hate, and violence.34 Shivsudh Gangadeen, a farmer and resident of Weldaad, understood the racially induced disease that wracked his patrimony. “Practically all the contact the masses have had with British culture and civilization,” he told the Robertson Commission in 1954, “has been through the medium of the white elements in the sugar industry.” Sugarcane, the enabler of so much pain and death, the destroyer of dreams for African slaves and Indian indentured workers, and the source of wealth for a few, had poisonous tentacles that reached beyond the plantations. “It is hardly surprising that the non-white people of this country,” Gangadeen wrote, “even the educated ones outside the [sugar] industry, many of whom are less than one generation removed from life on the estates look upon the British (and, indeed, whites in general) as enemies to be ‘liquidated’ as quickly as possible.” He knew that “the masses . . . always harboured a latent hatred for the white man and all his works.”35 But the masses also had their internecine conflicts. Indians and Africans shared the same colonial space and appeared to live in amity, as the Waddington Commission had concluded, but the divisions between them were ominously transparent. “There have practically always been deep antagonism between the two largest racial entities: Indian and African,” Gangadeen wrote, “antagonisms which have been sedulously fostered by ignorant and irresponsible ‘leaders’ on both sides, each group seeking dominance over the other.” Taking Stock

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He doubted the depth of nationalist feelings in Guiana, maintaining that these sentiments “are subordinate to racialist ones: their only point of agreeable contact is a common hatred of the white man.”36 These were perceptive observations from someone who understood the systemic nature of the racial divides. Closer to the ground than members of the Robertson Commission, Gangadeen wrote some ugly truths about the colonial society that nurtured him. C. O. Patterson, a teacher at the New Market Anglican School, shared some of Gangadeen’s sentiments but wrote from the perspective of an African Guianese. In his opinion, the Indo-Guianese posed a serious threat to the body politic. Their “aggressive nationalism” was “insidious” and “dangerous.” The Indians wanted to make Guiana “a dependency of ‘Mother India,’ . . . by a.) political control, b.) economic control, c.) physical control.” The majority of the Indians were illiterate and stooges of their “astute leaders [who] are brainy and ruthless. . . . The Indian by various artifices tries to supplant the coloured man who may be placed above him.”37 Indians, the teacher charged, were committed to societal advancement, to the detriment of the Africans. They had become the privileged members of the society, aided and abetted by the government, the church, and employers in general. Patterson feared the destruction of the colony if Indians assumed control of it: “With political control, the economic control, the physical control, the wealth behind them, the consciousness of the backing of ‘Mother India’ and the unity produced by common language, custom, and culture[,] who can make light of their ambition to make this colony a dependency of India?” The Indian’s primary loyalty was to India: “He is Indian first and Guianese after.”38 In spite of its stereotypes and exaggerations, Patterson’s tirade against the Indo-Guianese cannot be easily dismissed. His was the voice of the Africans who felt distanced from Indians and were threatened by them. There were Indians who viewed Africans negatively as well, complicating the misunderstandings and misconceptions that characterized social relations in the colony. J. K. Merkle, who described himself as “of negroid origin” and “a Guianese by birth,” said he wanted to comment from a “racial angle.” A former sanitary inspector and schoolteacher, Merkle boasted that he was familiar with all the races in the colony, “their habits and customs.” He had served the government for forty-five years in both rural and urban areas.39 Merkle was the prototype of the loyal colonial subject. He condemned the PPP government for its “disloyalty” to the Crown. He approved of the governor’s “timely action” in the 1953 constitutional crisis and welcomed “the advent of (  )

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British troops to protect the lives and interests of her majesty’s peace loving people.” He regretted that among young African Guianese men, “disloyalty is rife, there being no regard for God or [anything] emblematic of the dignity of the throne.”40 Merkle saw Guianese society as a collection of diverse peoples rather than as one with shared values. Each race possessed different characteristics, strengths, and disabilities. Caucasians, he said, “are the capitalist class” and the leaders of the society. They were its privileged members and “cannot be looked upon as the exploited,” but they were victims of “propaganda” that led the working class to regard them as “oppressors” of “the people.” Although Merkle did not classify those of Portuguese descent as white, he recognized their contributions to society in business, the civil service, the professions, the banking industry, and so on. They were “thrifty,” “generally literate,” and some were “politicians of high calibre.”41 The Chinese, Merkle said, formed a “small but conservative class.” They were not an exploited group because “with oriental astuteness and fine business acumen” they became merchants and landowners. Indians, on the other hand, “are temperamental and can be easily led by power hungry individuals especially those of their own race . . . especially if there is a promise of financial gain.” The “thrifty” Indians had made significant strides in agriculture, industry, the professions, and business. They could be found in “anything that offers gainful employment,” and when “he enters he makes a place for another of his race thereby displacing the Negro, who in the past looked upon such areas of gainful occupation as his right.” Indians on the sugar estates, Merkle said, could not claim “exploitation and oppression” in view of their “increased wages and working facilities.” Unlike the Indians, the Amerindians “suffered exploitation” by their employers and were not “politically minded.” They were mainly illiterate and “various religious bodies” were attempting “to civilise them.”42 Merkle was scathing in his assessment of the African peoples of whom he formed a part. “Power hunters or trouble makers,” he alleged, were blaming the English for the “pernicious system” of slavery, but the Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch were “the original sinners.” Africans constituted “the backbone of the labour supply.” Their “brawn and muscle” were at the disposal of all employers. Africans could be found in a variety of skilled, unskilled, and professional pursuits. They had lost much of their land, having sold it “to the energetic and far seeing Indian.” Most Africans were literate, but being “somewhat temperamental” they fell prey to any leader with “oratorical powers,” particularly “if the cry is reformation from the oppressor.” Most Taking Stock

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working-class blacks were “thriftless,” though hardworking, “frittering their resources.” Africans “love the bright lights of the city and fill the cinemas and dance hall while gambling is a very large sideline among middle class young men.”43 Continuing his evaluation, Merkle was displeased that “sport of any kind will have its full complement of Negroes: and under such conditions there could be no upliftment—leaders and led being alike.” He was contemptuous of the work habits of some African Guianese, observing: “The Negroes are the most garrulous, the great grousers and complainers of unemployment or underemployment which in some measure may be true, but yet one wonders where the able bodied young negroes get the money to visit the cinemas daily between 1 and 3PM, thereby wasting valuable hours instead of seeking gainful employment. These are the ones that if offered employment seek some excuse to shirk work and complain.”44 In addition, Merkle bemoaned what he saw as a tendency toward “lawlessness” among the young African Guianese, noting that “they have no stake in the country and desire to have none.” Some of them were “a parasitic breed.” He was aghast that “these malcontents, the wasters, non producers, non workers are [said to be] the oppressed and exploited people of the colony.”45 Merkle was the voice of the colonial subject who had internalized some of the most negative stereotypes about the others with whom he shared the society. He had nothing negative to say about the colonizing whites, even seeming to absolve the English of their significant role in the Atlantic slave trade. Indians and Africans, Merkle seemed to suggest, manifested characteristics that were not environmental in their causation but derived from their racial architecture. This essentialist nonsense could have been articulated by some of the classic European and American racists of the nineteenth century. That there were disciples of that dogma in mid-twentieth-century Guiana is probably not too surprising. But Merkle and the other Guianese who held such negative views of their own and other colonized groups were hardly aware of their racist pedigree. The disease that would later destroy the colony’s racial health had a fertile host in these corrosive stereotypes. Along with the prevalence of such faulty characterizations was a belief that the Guianese people were incapable of transforming their condition. Shivsduh Gangadeen, for example, saw a continuing need for “British tutelage”:

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.

In our present and foreseeable circumstances our dominant need is an adequate volume and variety of on-the-spot British leadership in Agri(  )

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culture, Farmers’ Organisations, Sociology, Civics, Manners, Trade Unionism—in brief, all the aspects of human life which make up a Civilization. We need the settlement here of large numbers of Britons of the right type who will, by sincere manifestations of an enlightened attitude towards the masses of this colony, implement practically the spiritual, cultural, sociological, civic and material implications of the Commonwealth concept. Unless we get such leadership, this country will shortly become a place unfit for decent people to live in.46 The British, of course, had been the masters of the colony for over a century, and nothing in their plans suggested that they wanted to remain there for another hundred years. Gangadeen and those who thought like him were simply out of step with the rising nationalist sentiment in the colony. The racially inspired divisions were exacerbated by those that derived from stark class distinctions. The distinction between class-induced or racially inspired animus cannot be easily drawn since the two frequently overlapped. James Richardson, for example, believed in the existence of “utter racial dislike which was carried out to its utmost by the upper classes who arrayed themselves like an army in a cold war against the people’s representatives, continually placing obstacles in their path. This army with a stick in the mud policy fought incessantly.”47 In this rendering, Richardson pitted a racially homogenous upper class against the raceless “people’s representatives.” The reality, however, was that issues of race and class intersected in the behavior of the upper class and that of the “people” and their representatives. Richardson’s seeming identification with “the people,” for instance, did not prevent him from referring disparagingly to “a few of the blind ignorant masses,” demonstrating thereby his own class prejudices.48 There was an enormous gulf in British Guiana between the economic condition of the elites and those who struggled at the societal bottom. Colonial societies were not structured to be exemplars of egalitarianism or democratic rights, and Guiana was no exception. Constructed largely by the energies of Amerindians, African peoples, Chinese, and Indians, British Guiana was an example of a society that manifested economic growth without development. But it was also a society where the elite groups were blind to the deprivations of the poor, those who worked so hard for so little. “This country is dictated by a few Big Shots,” declared Edward Lynch of Demerara. He supported the PPP, he said, because “we always wanted a chance to raise us out of this squalor and backwardness.”49 Taking Stock

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Twenty-nine years old in 1954, Lynch was acutely aware of the injustices generated by the colonial relationship. Surveying the dire unemployment reality of British Guiana, he painted a grim picture of “boys with qualification, [who] walk the streets no work, women same, hence we produce prostitutes.” Lynch stressed to the Robertson Commission that “we need more money for our labour, better working conditions, less unemployment, and underemployment, open the interiors. We have everything but nobody tries to explore and develop, sugar and rice generally bias the foreigners’ minds: like the dog in the manger.”50 Accustomed to being governed by outsiders, some Guianese distrusted those of their own in positions of authority. This tendency, although not peculiar to the Guianese people, was exacerbated by the racial tensions between the Indo-Guianese and the African Guianese. Speaking on behalf of himself and “others,” Dr. M. H. Rahat, an Indo-Guianese, told the commission: We would like to explain that the intention of the Government is very good but we want it specifically recorded that on account of racial feeling we find that Indians and Africans as District Commissioners and Inspectors of Police introduce personal feeling which has brought the Administration to its present state. We feel that Europeans in those positions are more cultural people and we get better justice from them. They cannot be bribed so easily.51 Intrigued by this observation, the chairman questioned Dr. Rahat:

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CHAIRMAN: You think it would be better to have European officers? RAHAT: Yes sir, and we know it is the voice of the masses. Most of the leaders say that Guianese should have responsible posts. We are not against Guianese holding responsible posts but we would like that type of Guianese to get those posts through election, because they would have to serve the people well, and that would help to reform them. . . . As soon as a Guianese is appointed to a high position he feels that he is a European. CHAIRMAN: A terrible thing to say, isn’t it? RAHAT: Yes sir.52 Rahat’s comment that a Guianese became a “European” once he assumed a position of authority had tantalizing implications. It suggested that the Guianese developed a posture of superiority in his relationship with his fel-

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low subjects, aping the demeanor of the whites. In this instance, the colonized became the oppressor, the fount of power, the privileged being. By mimicking the colonizers, the colonized became a caricature, an object of derisive contempt. On the other hand, Rahat may have been ascribing to the Europeans a natural superiority independent of their social and political status, a pinnacle beyond the reach of the Indian, African, and Amerindian peoples of Guiana. C. B. L. Osborn, who described himself as someone with “a fair skin,” told the Robertson Commission that “it would seem that race hatred has now reached its peak . . . with the two majority races (the Indians and the Negroes) fighting for supremacy, the former fast taking over the entire situation.” Osborn claimed that when “brown skinned men,” as opposed to black men, were placed “in high executive posts,” they discriminated against other phenotypes by appointing only “men of their colour to key jobs,” and “racial feeling and corruption has become the order of the day.” He urged the appointment of Englishmen to these senior positions, although “it is just as important to give us the right type.”53 T. Fox, who called himself “an old man, [whose] nerve and brain are badly going,” also drew attention, unwittingly, to the complexity of the intersection of race and class in the colony. Explaining the reasons for the suspension of the 1953 constitution, Fox argued that it resulted from a conspiracy of the powerful and their racial animus to the “insignificant races”: “The Government, the merchant, and chiefly King Sugar men held a conference and have decided upon this, these two insignificant races, Africans and East Indians, are to run a Government over us, [these] sons of slaves, and sons of indentures, no we must not allow it, so in any way possible we must defy it.”54 The notion of “us” versus “them” informed racial and class divisions, but it also found expression in the developing sense of Guianese nationalism. It was manifested in the demand for more self-government and political independence. This desire for political autonomy was one manifestation of the level of political consciousness of some sectors of the colony, and it was aggressively promoted by the PPP leadership. These people were part of the larger struggles by their counterparts in India, Kenya, Indochina, Algeria, and elsewhere for self-affirmation and independence. The nationalist sentiments in Guiana, to be sure, were arguably weaker at midcentury than those in the aforementioned countries, but they certainly had the potential to disrupt the old order. The nascent Guianese nationalists were inspired by the long history of

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such struggles, but their modus operandi and style would be shaped by the local context, as reflected in the testimony by an unnamed person appearing before the Robertson Commission:

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QUESTION: You speak of a paramount Guianese national loyalty. How do you see such a loyalty in relation to loyalty to the Crown? ANSWER: Where the interests of the British Government conflict with ours we regard ours as paramount. QUESTION: What do you mean by Guianese nationalism? ANSWER: We mean the feeling we have that we belong to this country and this country belongs to us the people who were born in it or have adopted it and who must make their living out of it. We mean the sense of common interest we have because of this common country; we mean a common loyalty based on this community of interest. QUESTION: This struggle between Guianese nationalism and colonialism, tell us about it. First of all what do you mean by colonialism? ANSWER: We mean the system whereby the British government exercises control over our local [government?] and uses this control in its own interests. The struggle we refer to is taking place in the minds of men and women—the conflict is a conflict of ideas. QUESTION: What do you mean when you say the P.P.P. exploited Guianese nationalism? ANSWER: We can illustrate our meaning from the sugar estates. In attacking the system of private enterprise—the so called Capitalist system, the P.P.P. leaders called the labourers’ attention to the disparity in living standards between the labourer and managerial staff— housing for instance. They blamed this on the system. But they go further. They call the labourers’ attention to the fact that these people— capitalist employers—are people who mostly do not belong to the country—they are not Guianese, they are Pukka Sahibs from another country throwing their weight about and holding jobs which Guianese should hold. This introduces a new element distinct from the attack on Capitalism but [is] used to reinforce it. It is an appeal to the nationalist sentiment of the labourer. It voices a grievance in its own right—a grievance which is not necessar[il]y mitigated by reducing the disparity in standards. QUESTION: Would not you agree that this is merely an appeal to racial hatred? ANSWER: Not at all. The essence of the appeal is the difference in coun(  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

try, not the difference in race. I recall Canadians of English descent expressing strong Canadian nationalist feelings directed against Englishmen in Canada.55 This dialogue captures the developing sense of difference between those who claimed Guiana as their homeland and those who were considered outsiders. The best jobs in the sugar and bauxite industries, in particular, were reserved for white foreigners, creating resentment among the colonized peoples who felt they were qualified for these positions. Although Shivsudh Gangadeen did not consider himself a nationalist, he voiced the views of those Guianese who had been frozen out of jobs because of their skin color:

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[A] factor which contributes towards dissatisfaction is the obvious unwillingness of the sugar industry to give employment preference in certain “reserved” categories to non-whites. . . . There are several competent and experienced non-whites who can fill satisfactorily—perhaps even with distinction—certain senior technical positions which are denied them solely because they are members of a “wrong” race. . . . Even in the rare instances where non-whites are employed in senior positions, the treatment accorded them is usually inferior to that enjoyed by white employees in similar or equivalent positions.56 Dominating the best positions in industry and government, those representing the tiny European minority were unquestionably the lords of the land. But such power contained within it the seeds of its own vulnerability, its own ultimate destruction. The British elite were imprisoned by anachronistic constructions about the relationships between Europeans and other peoples and those between the colonizers and the colonized at a time when these conventions were under serious assault. Although he was not sympathetic to the nationalist strivings of his Guianese compatriots, Gangadeen understood very well the passions such behavior generated. “There is a trifling amount of nationalist feeling among practically all classes,” he observed, and the people were responding to “the accumulated effects of an appalling lack of foresight and realism on the part of the white element.” Gangadeen condemned the British for seeking “to rule and exploit . . . meanwhile holding themselves as aloof as the gods on Olympus and as exclusive as a race of supermen.”57 Reflecting on the elections of April 1953, he concluded that “the masses voted for the PPP largely because they believed they were VOTING AGAINST THE WHITE MAN: that they were voting for the Party which would kick out the white man, hand over his industries and prospects to Taking Stock

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them, and generally give them a joy-ride to untold opulence unhampered by any white so-and-so anywhere.”58 This was an exaggeration, but it captured some of the racial ingredients in the construction of Guianese nationalism. Yet it is erroneous to conclude that Guianese nationalism was essentially a reaction to European privilege and mistreatment. Guianese nationalism had many parents. The worldwide anticolonial sentiment that came in the aftermath of World War II had its disciples in Guiana and elsewhere in the Caribbean region. After a lengthy colonial experience, the people had become psychologically ready to assume the challenges of independence. Mr. Khan, a member of the House of Assembly, captured the essence of the changing times when he addressed his colleagues on June 17, 1953. Khan was speaking on a motion to thank the queen for her traditional message on the occasion of the opening of the legislative year: Sir, in her message to the members of this legislature and to the people of the Colony of British Guiana . . . the Queen has said that she watched the progress of British Guiana with deep and sustained interest. I do sincerely hope that the Queen will not watch us with the same interest as her ancestors. . . . I also do hope that the Queen will watch our affairs as well as those of the people of Malaya, Kenya, the Sudan and other colonial-territories, in a different way from the way she has been watching them.59

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Khan was, of course, calling attention to the independence movement in the places he named, taunting the monarch in the process. Similarly, when Governor Savage was booed on his way home from a legislative debate in 1951, Cheddi Jagan sought to explain the sentiment that inspired the hostility to him, noting: “Sir, I notice that certain honourable members deplored the fact that last evening you were booed on your way from this Council. As a representative of His Majesty’s Government in this colony and the symbol of British rule here, a rule which has been responsible for a great deal of misery in this colony, no doubt you will realize that what occurred last evening is merely a symptom of what is public opinion today.”60 Unlike other members of the pre-1953 legislature who were ostensibly the voices of the status quo, the young Jagan was in the vanguard of a new Guiana he was helping to call into existence. As the leader of the new legislature elected in April 1953, Dr. Jagan emphasized that “I owe allegiance only to British Guiana and to my party.”61 Utterances like this one disconcerted the powerful vested interests in the colony who saw them as expressions of disloyalty to the British throne and as communist inspired. They saw such acts (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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as the desecration of the Union Jack, as harbingers of a new Guiana that was beyond their capacity to imagine. Nor could they accept with equanimity the taunts of “Limey go home” that were sometimes directed at whites, or the characterization of British soldiers as “foreign troops.” These were insults, interpreted as such by those who hurled them and the recipients alike, but they reflected the pain of an infant Guiana being delivered. The nationalist fervor espoused by the leaders of the PPP and others represented only one sector of the Guianese populace. There were others who expressed a lingering affection for the British Crown and the continuation of colonial rule. Hubert Durant, a retired primary school principal, sent a memorandum to the Robertson Commission chastising the PPP “for violently criticizing and abusing the British government [and] the governor of the Colony.” He supported the suspension of the 1953 constitution and wanted to express “my profound admiration of and humble but sincere gratitude to Her Majesty’s Government, and to His Excellency the Governor, Sir Alfred Savage, for their prompt and decisive action in arresting a situation which was rapidly leading to chaos, and filling the minds of all loyal subjects of her Gracious Majesty the Queen and all right thinking Guianese with grave anxiety and alarm.”62 Colonial subjects like Durant wanted to strengthen the British presence in the colony and were suspicious of those who sought to sever ties with the metropolitan power. In his memorandum to the Robertson Commission, Rashad Iman identified himself as “a true subject of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, having faith in British rule and do enjoy the freedoms offered under [the] British Democratic form of Government.”63 Many other residents of the colony, to be sure, would not have agreed with the claim that they lived under a democratic form of government where so much power rested in the hands of an appointed governor. Iman wanted to “most humbly” support the suspension of the 1953 constitution and was effusive in his praise of the actions of Governor Savage. He wished to “congratulate His Excellency for his patience, his desire, his tact, his never ending urge [encouragement], cooperation and cheerful assistance towards the unseated Ministers in order to make the Constitution work and live; in spite of the vicious assaults; rude threats and disrespectful compliments hurled at his Excellency from the aforesaid ministers and P.P.P. minded public.”64 The People’s Progressive Party, Iman alleged, displayed “unloyalty” to the Crown and disrespected the British flag.65 These sentiments were repeated by Manoel Gonsalves, who accused the PPP of seeking to make British Guiana “a puppet state of Russia.” “All loyal subjects of Her Majesty Queen Taking Stock

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Elizabeth the 2nd,” he affirmed, “shall only want to remain under the wings of the United Kingdom.”66 Heartfelt affirmations of loyalty to the Crown were deeply rooted and widespread. To support the PPP did not mean, ipso facto, that one opposed the presence of the British or looked askance at any expression of allegiance to the Crown. Socialized into being loyal colonials, these people could not exorcise this condition, even if they wanted to do so. Mrs. Matilda Glenn, a supporter of the PPP, maintained that “the people of BG is [sic] loyal to H.M. the Queen, her throne, and love and respect her Majesty’s laws as well as other members of the Commonwealth do.”67 R. St. Clair Pillai, however, was not satisfied with the depth of the loyalty shown to the mother country. He saw “the dire need for greater and rigid ‘control’ of our primary educational system. Discipline leading to the principles of Loyalty and the necessity to appreciate and understand the British way of life is sadly needed among primary school teachers and school children alike.”68 Although the colonial educational curriculum had been designed to foster what Pillai was recommending, he obviously desired a greater emphasis on the production of loyal subjects.

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THE UNEXPECTED BUT sweeping victory that the PPP achieved at the polls led members of the colonial elite to consider the election results an aberration. The party’s base of support rested significantly on the working class and the poor. At one level, the elite distrusted the capacity of those at the bottom of the social order to make responsible electoral judgments. By voting for the PPP in such large numbers, they were certainly privileging their own interests and demonstrating their independence from those who formed the ruling elite politically, economically, and socially. Augustine Fernandes, a woman of Portuguese descent, expressed enthusiastic support for Cheddi Jagan because he was “born here and he knows the suffering of the poor, also the injustices and the advantages that is taking on them by their opressor’s [sic]. I will class him as a great leader of the poor.” She believed that “if he could have changed the colony over-night, he would have done so; only for the relief of all those who are suffering.”69 The distrust of the nonelites sprang from the view that they were incapable of understanding the issues of the moment and could be easily manipulated by politicians. In his testimony before the Robertson Commission, J. Leach insisted that candidates for elective office should be required to pass a literacy test. Identifying himself as “a member of an unfortunate race,” presumably someone of African descent, Leach said he did “a little farming and I (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

work on the sugar estates and on the public road or anywhere I can get something to do.” In response to questioning by Chairman Robertson, he amplified his position on the literacy test:

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CHAIRMAN: And you think that candidates should have the same qualification as in the suspended constitution and they must be made to make sentences using eight words representing the eight parts of speech in the English language? LEACH: Yes. CHAIRMAN: On nomination day? LEACH: Yes. CHAIRMAN: And if they cannot do that they should not be allowed to be candidates? LEACH: I say that because a lot of candidates came the last time and took advantage of the English language. CHAIRMAN: You want them to be able to read it properly? LEACH: They speak it in a very nasty manner. If I had power I would have charged some of them. CHAIRMAN: What would you have charged them with? LEACH: Ill treating the Queen’s language.70 Leach’s testimony may have provided some comic relief, but illiteracy constituted a major social issue in the colony reflecting the failures of the colonial administration. The evidence is incontrovertible that there was significant illiteracy among the peoples of British Guiana at midcentury. Illiteracy was defined, in the Guianese context, as “the inability of persons 10 years of age and over to read and to write.” As Table 7 shows, the illiteracy rate in 1946 varied substantially according to race. The Indo-Guianese and the Amerindians had the highest illiteracy rates at 43.9 percent and 49.3 percent, respectively. Since 21.36 percent of the people classified as illiterate were self-identified, it is very likely that their number was higher. As E. J. Farley, the official who compiled the statistics, noted: Census figures for illiteracy represent confessed literacy. But they do not indicate the true size of the problem. . . . Those who admitted that they were “X-markers” were undoubtedly fewer than the actual numbers who could not even sign their names. One can print or write any kind of nonsense, and not a few persons of . . . the labouring class in the estates and Taking Stock

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( Table 7 ) Illiteracy Rates by Race, ca. 1946 Population

No. of Illiterates in

% of Illiterates in

Total

10 Years of

Population 10 Years

Population 10 Years

Race

Population

Age and Older

of Age and Older

of Age and Older

Amerindians Asians other than Chinese Chinese Indo-Guianese Mixed or Colored Negroes Portuguese Whites

16,322 236

7,176 202

3,541 19

49.3 9.4

3,567 163,434 37,685 143,385 8,543 2,480

2,897 113,558 26,246 112,032 6,904 2,110

191 49,855 845 3,019 240 23

6.6 43.9 3.2 2.7 3.5 1.1

Total

375,652

271,125

57,733

21.3

Source: “Illiteracy and Its Implications in Relation to a Constitution for British Guiana,” CO 891/8.

other rural districts who have been classified in the Census as literate, will not realise it if they have to depend on reading skill to find out what is printed or written.71

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The degree of illiteracy also varied according to age, as Table 8 demonstrates. With the exception of those between ages five and nine, those in the age groups 45 to 54 (28.5 percent), 55–64 (34.4 percent), and 65 and over (32.4 percent) had the highest levels. Many of the children younger than ten would probably have become literate over time. While there were significant disparities in the literacy rates according to age, these disproportions were even greater between the urban and rural areas of the colony, as shown in Table 9. The relatively high illiteracy levels in the three essentially rural counties invited the condescension of many of the more literate urban residents. Equating literacy with superior judgment, the literate and more privileged members of society supported a franchise with literacy qualifications. Edward Lynch, although literate himself, contested this position: “[We] need no illiterate test because if a person can’t read or write and an intelligent person speaks to them its [sic] definite they can see the sense or nonsense . . . because he must know their sufferings, troubles, and grievances.”72 Lynch was, in his own way, suggesting that illiteracy was no impediment to an individual’s comprehending the issues and acting in his best interests. The Robertson Commission concurred with this judgment, noting that “in (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

( Table 8 ) Illiteracy Rates by Age Group, ca. 1946 Age Group

No. in Group

No. of Illiterates

% of Illiterates

5–9 years 10–14 years 15–19 years 20–24 years 25–34 years 35–44 years 45–54 years 55–64 years 65 years and over

46,590 40,760 32,217 36,353 52,808 43,434 30,539 19,960 14,736

18,115 3,525 6,131 5,654 11,453 10,579 8,698 6,873 4,777

38.9 8.6 19 15.6 21.7 24.4 28.5 34.4 32.4

Total

317,397

75,805

23.9

Source: CO 891/8.

( Table 9 ) Illiteracy Rates by Geographic District, ca. 1946 Population

No. of Illiterates

District

Age 10 and Over

Age 10 and Over

% of Illiterates

County of Berbice County of Demerara County of Essequibo Georgetown and Environs

68,194 92,032 38,194 72,729

18,668 25,451 9,752 3,865

27.4 27.7 25.5 5.3

Total

271,149

57,736

21.3

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Source: CO 891/8.

British Guiana it would be wrong to assume that illiteracy is generally associated with less than average intelligence.”73 A group of people calling themselves “The Illiterates of Bush Lot Village” heartily agreed. In a memorandum to the commission, they affirmed that “illiterates possess sufficient common sense to know good from bad.”74 The oft-repeated claim that illiterate and unlettered people were manipulated by the PPP into voting for the party’s candidates was an easy, selfserving, and convenient illusion. The illiterates, a dismissive and contemptuous appellation, were thought to lack independent agency and judgment, but their very survival in a harsh and difficult society indicated otherwise. Barrister M. S. H. Rahaman, who contested the 1953 elections and was virtually annihilated by his opponent, Janet Jagan, concluded that “the people did not vote for the P.P.P. because illiteracy made them dupes to these cunTaking Stock

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ning leaders of the P.P.P.” He thought the people voted “solidly for change from bureaucratic oppression.” They had been “subjected to the control of a powerful bureaucracy which ruled the country in the interest of the powerful vested interests[,] e.g. Sugar and the Chamber of Commerce.”75 Rahaman was hardly bitter about his defeat by Mrs. Jagan. He recalled that the people liked his election manifesto, but they told him that he alone “could not fight the wicked government; that it would take the collective strength of ‘The Party’ to do that. These were opinions expressed to me by these same illiterate voters. In the local language they put it to me this way, in short, ‘Sorry Sah, but if the party sen a dag [dog], a go vote fo de dag.’”76 ALTHOUGH IT APPEARED to recognize some of the grievances of the Guianese people as legitimate, the Robertson Commission was particularly sensitive to criticisms of the mother country. When J. Castello-Edwards, an evangelist, observed that “England only took money from the colonies,” Chairman Robertson responded:

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CHAIRMAN: What money England took from the Colonies? CASTELLO-EDWARDS: In sugar and other products. CHAIRMAN: Do you know the British people are paying more for West Indian sugar than they need to pay as they can buy it cheaper elsewhere? CASTELLO-EDWARDS: We are their colonies and we have to buy their goods at their price. We can buy from another nation much cheaper but we are bound to pay the price England asks. CHAIRMAN: You make these sweeping statements which are not true? CASTELLO-EDWARDS: I am an ex soldier and have traveled, and I have seen.77 Castello-Edwards was on secure ground in stating that the British economy benefited from the exploitation of the colonies. A decade earlier, Eric Eustace Williams had written his classic book, Capitalism and Slavery (1944), underscoring the role that the profits from the slave trade and slavery played in the construction of the British economy. Williams’s conclusion that those profits contributed significantly to the rise of British capitalism remains an important contribution to the historiography of the Caribbean.78 Although the commission gave a respectful hearing to the views of the elites who testified before it, the members were at times contemptuous of the views of the less privileged and insulted the witnesses. When Mr. Hoosein, a self-described “half illiterate,” testified, he volunteered the opinion that the (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

minimum voting age should be set at eighteen, Chairman Robertson sought to ridicule him:

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CHAIRMAN: Don’t you think that is too high and you ought to have it at twelve? HOOSEIN: At eighteen you can carry a gun and therefore you should have a vote. That might be argued against but my contention is this: that in a country that is so rife with poverty at eighteen the boys and the girls have to start to look for work and at that very age they become fathers and mothers and start to bear burdens of the world. CHAIRMAN: Do they become mothers and fathers before they find work? HOOSEIN: They become mothers and fathers at an early age especially the Indians. They marry before they are eighteen. CHAIRMAN: Before they even work? HOOSEIN: Sometimes[.] When they are at home if they have to contribute to these things at that very early age they should be allowed to vote. Another point too is that the laws of British Guiana make provision that in the case of any bastard child his father must support him up to the age of fourteen. If that child is not too young and has to support himself and his mother at fourteen he should be allowed to vote at eighteen. CHAIRMAN: So you say this bastard child was on his own at the age of fourteen and therefore he should be allowed to vote at eighteen. Why at eighteen and not fourteen? HOOSEIN: Because eighteen is the normal age.79 Sensing that the chairman was ridiculing him when he asked if he had “other points” to make, Hoosein declined to take the bait. “Sir, it seems that you are not interested so why waste time?” the witness retorted.80 Robertson’s verbal abuse of Hoosein reflected the attitude of the colonizing elites toward the mass of colonized peoples. As a working-class man, Hoosein had taken the time to perform his civic duty by testifying, only to be ridiculed. The witness was raising serious issues before the commission, but in the chairman’s eyes he appeared not to possess the requisite class and intellectual credentials. Unwittingly, Robertson was revealing, by the condescending tenor of his questions, why the PPP had such an emotional appeal for so many Guianese. The party’s pugnacity had a resonance with those people who saw themselves as victims of mistreatment by the colonial overlords. Taking Stock

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When J. Heywood appeared before the commissioners, he was treated rudely by George Woodcock. Heywood had written a memorandum to the commission in which he endorsed the PPP’s boycott of its work. Evidently displeased, Woodcock chastised the witness for his appearance: WOODCOCK: If you thought it was a good thing to boycott the Commission why didn’t you take their advice? HEYWOOD: The British Government accepted the allegations made against the Ministers and suspended the Constitution, so there is no sense a man being sent to prison without trial and then evidence in his defense taken. WOODCOCK: I am still wondering why you bothered to come here to give evidence if to boycott the Commission is the right thing? HEYWOOD: I am not a party member. WOODCOCK: It is not a question of whether you are a party member or not. You say it is right to boycott the Commission, yet you come and spread yourself in front of us.81

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Sir Donald Jackson also berated Heywood for his support of lowering the voting age to eighteen. Heywood argued that since a young man could be called upon to defend his country at eighteen, he should have the right to vote. Obviously irritated, Sir Donald denounced Heywood’s reasoning as “fatuous” because “the two things are completely remote.” A vote, he said, “requires judgment and responsibility,” whereas in the army “you are deprived of all judgment but have to do as you are told.” The commissioner then admonished Heywood for making a proposal that “would strongly favour a particular political party,” namely the PPP.82 It was not, of course, the commissioners’ job to berate those who testified. But Chairman Robertson, in particular, had probably never before encountered black and brown working-class people who refused to be intimidated by him. Consequently, he asserted his sense of superiority by making them appear ignorant and foolish. When Edgar Haynes, a laborer, testified that the deposed government had encountered opposition because “they are Black and East Indians,” Robertson could hardly resist the temptation to make light of a very serious allegation: HAYNES: I can remember one instance [of racially based opposition]. The Minister of Labour asked the sugar producers to attend some sort of conference and they refused to sit under his chairmanship. CHAIRMAN: Why did they refuse? (  )

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HAYNES: I take it that it is because he is a black man. This country has got racial discrimination more than any other part of the world. CHAIRMAN: Have you been to other parts of the world? HAYNES: No, but I read of it . . . CHAIRMAN: You can go anywhere here, can’t you? HAYNES: We can walk anywhere but where offices [jobs] are concerned it is only since the war I have seen one or two negroes holding office and so on. But in this country we are in a sort of semi slavery. CHAIRMAN: Who are semi slaves? HAYNES: We the Blacks and East Indians CHAIRMAN: Are you sold and bought? HAYNES: We are not sold and bought but it is the way we are treated in this country. CHAIRMAN: How—explain yourself ? HAYNES: In certain offices a black boy, no matter how much education he has, cannot get a job unless he has got some Portuguese gentleman to recommend him. CHAIRMAN: Perhaps he is not good enough? HAYNES: Yes. Some of the boys are quite qualified.83 Despite the differences in educational levels between Robertson and Haynes, the latter held his own in the dialogue with the chairman. But, interestingly enough, Haynes’s testimony drew the wrath of Elfreda Clarisse Kailan, who characterized his observations on job discrimination against blacks as “false and malicious.” Ms. Kailan, presumably an Indo-Guianese, dispatched a memorandum to the commission, arguing that “the most important positions [in Guiana] are held by negroes and Africans.” She supported her claim by identifying the African Guianese who held consequential governmental positions, noting also “the large percentage of negro Doctors . . . negro Lawyers and barristers and Dentists etc.” To her, Guiana “is like an African Country instead of a British Country, and at times we do feel we are living in Africa, more than anywhere else on earth, we are being ruled and domineer[ed] over by the African Race more than the White Race.” Ms. Kailan recommended that only “English officers” should be appointed to head governmental departments. She reasoned: “This is not an African Country, and we do not want to be ruled and dominated by the Africans or negroes in this country, if we are to be ruled, than we must be ruled by the British, and the British alone, that is, by the White race (or by my own race), and the negro must always take second place or we won’t be ruled at all.”84 Taking Stock

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The commission’s lack of respect for the views of the nonelites in Guiana, especially those who were sympathetic to the PPP, was on ugly display in its treatment of Samuel Grenada. Describing himself as a journalist, Grenada ran afoul of the commission when he accused the colonial administration of corruption, saying that “big business and sugar ran the country.” He further alleged that a Guianese man, Alan Creigan, had been held in jail for eleven months without trial. An exasperated chairman demanded evidence for this and other allegations by Grenada, eventually declining to continue his questioning. The hapless Grenada received no better treatment from Commissioner Woodcock, who resumed the interrogation:

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WOODCOCK: Can you give us some proof of your statements or keep quiet about them? GRENADA: What I have said here I can vouch for as far as it happened. It can be found in statistics which are very easy to get. WOODCOCK: Mr. Grenada, do you know me? GRENADA: Save for your comely manner I know nothing beyond that. WOODCOCK: Well, I spent all my life studying this business and I would tell you this, that if many more people like you come before the Commission and give evidence such as you have been giving I am going to have the utmost difficulty in remaining convinced that this country is entitled to adult suffrage and a democratic constitution. GRENADA: Perhaps you will be. WOODCOCK: You come here and make the most general and the most outrageous statements. You have not had even the decency to submit a memorandum. GRENADA: But you said we could come without.85 Grenada was eventually excused but not before Sir Donald Jackson told the other two commissioners that a check of the details in the Creigan case found his allegations to be in error. “You must get your facts straight,” Sir Donald admonished the witness. Samuel Grenada did not take his treatment before the commission lightly. He dashed off a letter to the chief justice of British Guiana complaining about “the outrage that I received from the Commissioners generally and Sir Donald Jackson in particular.” He charged that “the Commissioners did not make any attempt to conceal their displeasure for my version of the suspension of the Constitution, but in addition became very acting [agitated] and hostile. One would have expected that even if the Gentlemen did disagree

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with my version, they should not have shown such marked hostility to my expressing them.” Grenada asserted that Donald Jackson went “out of his way to discredit and to humiliate me . . . telling me off and giving the audience the belief that I was a worthless, irresponsible and scandalous citizen.” He questioned Jackson’s integrity, suggesting that he did not deserve his knighthood and was an example of a prevailing belief that colonial honors were being bestowed upon certain individuals “so they can have them handy to molest and invade their own people and their rights, privileges and immunities.”86 Commissioner Robertson also appeared to be unsympathetic to those who spoke on behalf of the poor. When trade unionist Richard Ishmael spoke passionately in favor of retaining the franchise for the working poor who were “illiterates,” the chairman was quick to challenge his argument:

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ISHMAEL: I feel that the people who are illiterate produce the things which give the country the largest percentage of its revenue. I am thinking particularly of the sugar estate workers. The largest percentage of them are illiterates, and if you remove from them the right to vote the country would have no right to receive revenue from their sweat. CHAIRMAN: I served for 30 years in the tropics and did not have a vote. ISHMAEL: If you were not making money in the tropics you might not have remained there. CHAIRMAN: Many people go to the tropics, not to make money but to do a job and earn a livelihood. One did not merely get a vote because one sweated.87 The chairman neglected to add that he enjoyed the franchise at home and that as a British citizen he could vote anywhere in the British Empire, provided he was living or working there. To infer that one did not deserve the vote merely because one “sweated” constituted an insult to the working peoples of Guiana and, for that matter, those in England. The Robertson Commission’s work was essentially a postmortem of the imperial coup. But it did not examine the role of the governor and the Colonial Office in the events of October 1953. The animating assumption was that the PPP government was the villain and the colonial regime’s behavior was above reproach and should receive an uncritical endorsement. This was, to be sure, a flawed assumption, but it was the prerogative of the colonial regime to take refuge in its lofty claim to infallibility. Still, the commission’s

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meetings afforded the residents of the colony an opportunity to take stock of their country’s realities and to imagine a future to their liking. Not surprisingly, there was much disagreement, reflecting divisions resulting from race, class, ideology, and economic interests. This was a healthy exercise in societal introspection, however, and probably the only positive consequence of the October coup.

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Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

In the report of its findings, the Robertson Commission was pessimistic about British Guiana’s potential for economic change. “We do not believe that there can ever be built up in British Guiana the El Dorado which the masses seem to believe can easily be obtained by a re-distribution of wealth: a country can only reach that standard of living which it can support by its own labour and its own natural resources,” it maintained. “British Guiana is deficient in the latter, and it must therefore depend all the more on the former.” The commissioners concluded: “We cannot but stress as main features the difficult and unpromising nature of the country: the undoubted dissatisfaction and ‘frustration’ of the people generally at their social and economic environment: and their desire for speedy changes and improvements.”1 Although the commission recognized that many Guianese people were frustrated with their economic condition, it felt compelled to remind them that their “labour” was the indispensable ingredient of their advancement. But the Guianese—at least those who were black and brown—were no strangers to unremitting toil. The problem was that their labor, often coerced and uncompensated, had benefited the colonial masters at their expense, a fact that constituted one of the fundamental bases of their nation-

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alist struggle. This reality was evidently lost on the commission; hence its implied criticism of “the masses” and their expectations. The Robertson Commission, however, was not asked to report on social and economic conditions in the colony. Yet its members wisely concluded that “the economic and social environment in which a Constitution is to work is of relevance.”2 The commission was silent on the importance of the political climate to the successful operation of a constitution, a surprising omission since the Waddington Constitution had been an anachronism in a politically changing and maturing Guiana. The Waddington Commission had recommended a constitution that reflected the fears of the elite in its checks and balances, rather than Guianese realities and projections for the future. As representatives of the Crown, the commission’s members crafted a constitution that granted the colonized people the promise of political power but not its reality. Rejecting the commissioners’ premise that the Guianese people were not ready for political autonomy and needed the continuing tutelage of the governor, the PPP was able to put the constitution’s weaknesses on full display while it held the reins of government. The Robertson Commission operated in a volatile political environment, one still reeling from the removal of the elected government by imperial fiat. The colony was consumed by the need to assign responsibility for that unprecedented political development, many blaming the PPP and others Governor Savage and the imperial government. When the commission began its deliberations in January 1954, the political wounds inflicted by the constitutional crisis were still raw; for many, the prospect of a return to power by the PPP produced fits of political apoplexy. Nevertheless, as we shall see, many Guianese had prescriptions for the path their country should pursue. The commission of 1954 undoubtedly was tempted to recommend a return to the somewhat authoritarian document that the Waddington Constitution replaced. But times had changed in British Guiana, as trade unionist Richard Ishmael forcefully told the commissioners: I beg to remind you that you must weigh and consider well the sources of all recommendations made to you, determine what interests those individuals or groups are serving. . . . For there are many who will come before your Commission, wolves dressed in sheep’s and patriot’s clothing, who have tested of the use and abuse of power and will attempt to recommend solutions which, if accepted, will result in a return of power to their hands, against the people’s will, and increase the bitterness in the hearts

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Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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and minds of the people. . . . The day when such people would have been able to get away with injustice is DEAD.3 The commission’s work was dominated and simultaneously circumscribed by the need to contain the PPP and to consign it to political oblivion. The white paper issued to justify the suspension of the 1953 constitution had proclaimed the PPP infected by communism, a conclusion that the commissioners seemed to accept uncritically and without further inquiry. Operating within the confines of this a priori conclusion, the commission was sympathetic to proposals to thwart the PPP’s return to office and to craft a constitution that would achieve that outcome. The new constitution would be punitive in its construction and retrogressive in its intent. As the commissioners admitted in their report: “We would . . . hope that the contrast presented towards self government elsewhere would lead the people of British Guiana to realise that, notwithstanding the exceptional difficulties of their country, the extremist leaders of the P.P.P. and the policies for which they stand are the sole barriers to constitutional progress.”4 This was a colossal blunder, shortsighted, and a classic case of an entire people being held ransom for the alleged misdeeds of their leaders. Such myopia seemed to guarantee that the new constitution would, without tender nurturing, suffer the fate of its predecessor. Guided by the obsession to contain or destroy the PPP, the commission—and the administration it represented—recommended a constitution that would help to divide the PPP, ultimately producing the politics of race that would scar the emerging nation’s soul. As they began their deliberations, the commissioners considered three options: whether the Waddington Constitution should be retained in toto, whether it should be modified in light of changing circumstances and challenges, or whether a totally new constitution should be devised. The three men listened to a variety of conflicting opinions on these options and struggled to construct a workable document. But any imagination they possessed was tempered by their obsession with the PPP. “We can find no escape from the logical conclusion,” they wrote, “that so long as the present leadership and policies of the People’s Progressive Party continue, there is no way in which any real measure of self government can be restored in British Guiana without the certainty that the country will again be subjected to constitutional crisis.”5 The question of who should be allowed to vote was the most contentious

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issue that the commission confronted. Many opponents of the PPP blamed a gullible, unsophisticated electorate for voting the party into office. They directed their venom at the illiterate voters and sought to deny them the franchise altogether. Englishman Vincent Roth, who had lived in the colony for forty-six years, was one such person. Roth had served in the colonial government for almost three decades and had been a nominated member of the Legislative Council for ten years. For his service to the colony, the queen had named him an Officer of the British Empire (OBE). But Vincent Roth had little empathy for the colonial subjects. He was certain that they had been unprepared for the constitutional changes recommended by the Waddington Commission. Indeed, the events of October 1953 were “the consequence of Britain forcing on a people only four generations away from serfdom a system of democracy which it took Britain a thousand years of trial and error to achieve [and] analogous to feeding a four-month old infant on pate de-foie-gras and chicken-in-aspic.”6 In Roth’s opinion, “the Guianese people had shown their “unfitness for Universal Adult Suffrage,” and “it would be criminal folly to restore it in the immediate future.” Should the British succumb to such folly, however, he recommended that a system of plural voting be introduced. He did not believe that “it is fair or reasonable that every man’s vote should be equal” in “a community such as this one where there exists such a wide range of upbringing and outlook.” Roth proposed that an individual’s vote should “vary in proportion to his use to the community.” Expressing the view of a privileged member of society, he argued that “to claim that an illiterate labourer is the political equal to a large merchant or well established professional man is an absurdity.” But he would grant the franchise to any British subject who had lived in the colony for not less than a year, who was twenty-one years old, and who was “neither a certified lunatic nor convicted felon not having purged his crime”; these individuals would have “one basic vote.” Those who possessed “any of the five following qualifications [were] to have an extra vote for each qualification”: a) Persons holding degrees from any Empire or Commonwealth university. b) Judges, Magistrates, and Queens Counsel. c) Persons who for 2 years immediately preceding registration have paid not less than $750 in yearly personal income tax. d) Persons who, unsupported by the State or private charity, have

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raised three legitimate children to age of sixteen without divorcing their spouse. e) Priests of Christian denominations recognized by the State.7 This was an extraordinary recommendation coming from a veteran legislator and honored servant of the Crown. There were no precedents anywhere for such qualifications for the franchise, but the proposal reflected the fears of the elite that unrestricted universal adult suffrage was not in their best interest. Vincent Roth may have stood alone in his advocacy of plural votes, but there were other influential voices that recommended restrictions on the franchise. The Shipping Association of Georgetown, described as “a loose Association of employers of waterfront labour,” also proposed a literacy test for voters:

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The Association were driven to recommend a literacy test, not because they believed that literacy was a guarantee of mature political judgment, but because they felt that illiterates were peculiarly vulnerable to unscrupulous propaganda. An illiterate might listen to speeches by rival candidates but could not keep everything in his head: he could not sit down and read and compare the election address of each candidate and then make up his mind.8 The association suggested that the test of literacy should be the ability to read or compose a sentence in English. A. G. King, an Englishman and a defeated candidate in the elections of April 1953, shared these sentiments. He thought that “the illiterate and under privileged people of the Colony are in the majority in most constituencies, and they are easily carried away by inflammatory speeches.”9 The powerful Demerara Bauxite Company, Limited, added its voice to that of the opponents of unrestricted universal adult suffrage, proposing an “efficient literacy test.”10 Similarly, the Sugar Producers Association (SPA) endorsed a franchise restricted by a literacy test.11 It is not surprising that business interests sought to protect themselves from what they perceived to be the votes of an unfriendly electorate. The exclusion of illiterates from the franchise meant, in effect, that more than onefifth of the potential voters would be affected. The Indo-Guianese people and the Amerindians would suffer a disproportionate impact given their illiteracy rates of about 44 percent and 49 percent respectively. Such a restric-

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tion, in the opinion of some, would be an expression of “racialism.” Under the circumstances, it is noteworthy that all the recognized unions in the sugar industry supported a literacy test for the franchise. Four recognized unions represented the 33,000 sugar estate workers. They included the Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA), the B. G. Headmen’s Union, the B. G. Sugar Estates Clerks Association, and the B. G. and W. I. Sugar Boilers Union. These four unions comprised the Joint Trade Union Committee which spoke in their name. The latter body, accordingly, proposed a restricted franchise that would “include either a property qualification of three thousand five hundred dollars . . . [in] immovable property, or an income qualification of eighty dollars per month, together with an educational qualification of at least the sixth standard level.”12 The proposal of the Joint Trade Union Committee must be viewed in the context of the monthly earnings and literacy levels of the sugar estate workers. In its memorandum to the Robertson Commission, the SPA estimated that the average worker in the sugar industry, when offered employment, earned from $16 to $18 weekly. The committee was, therefore, proposing a franchise for which most of its members would not qualify. In its memorandum, it admitted that the “Sugar Estate workers. . . . have a very determining vote in at least ten (10) constituencies and it is only natural to understand that people who are neighbors to the Sugar Estates feel for the sufferings of the Sugar Estates workers and vote in such a way they believe will improve their standard of living.”13 The Joint Trade Union Committee thus fully appreciated the enormous impact the sugar industry workers could have on the outcome of any election in the colony. That being said, it is astonishing that the workers’ representatives would suggest restrictions on the franchise that would dilute their electoral impact. The joint committee’s proposal was even more stringent than that put forward by the SPA, which was confined to an unspecified literacy test. The union chiefs had betrayed the workers in whose name they spoke, raising serious questions about their integrity and probity. Leaders of the MPCA had long been suspected of being in the pay of Sugardom. Since sugar industry workers supported the PPP, it is conceivable that the unions wanted to use the Guianese constitution to dilute the party’s strength. In addition to the franchise, there was much division over the nature of the representative institutions to be constructed. The suspended constitution had allowed for a House of Assembly comprised of elected and official members, a State Council consisting of nominated members, and an Executive Committee made up of ministers chosen by the Assembly and offi(  )

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cial members. The Robertson Commission was not bound by this structure, hence its willingness to hear a variety of opinions. The fundamental issues revolved around whose interests would be represented in these bodies, where power would ultimately reside, and what checks and balances should be established. There was considerable discussion as to whether there should be a unicameral or a bicameral legislature. Proponents of two chambers generally supported an Assembly that had a majority of elected members and a Council that was wholly nominated. The presumption was that a nominated Council would provide a check on any excesses of the Assembly, would represent groups not included in the Assembly, and would act more responsibly in the conduct of the colony’s affairs. Although he entertained the idea of a unicameral legislature with proportional representation, F. Seal Coon, the editor of the Daily Argosy, voiced the argument of the conservative elites for a nominated Council in the absence of proportional representation in the lower house. He predicted that “the average elective thrown up by any system of adult suffrage at the Colony’s present stage will need a nominated leaven both to speak for some major interests of a general nature and to supply a leaven of knowledge, ability and good sense that the electives will probably lack.”14 The powerful SPA proposed a unicameral legislature, similar in composition to the one it endorsed before the Waddington Commission in 1951. In that scenario, the legislature would consist of one nominated member for every two elected members, in addition to three ex officio members: namely, the chief secretary, the attorney general, and the financial secretary. The speaker would be appointed by the governor, and a deputy speaker would be named by the legislature. This structure, in the opinion of the SPA, would be a temporary one and would not become permanent until 1958. If this trial period proved successful and “the necessary environment” was created “for the emergence of responsible leaders” and the rise of a party capable of countering “the efforts of the irresponsible PPP,” the Waddington Constitution could be restored in 1962.15 The Demerara Bauxite Company, Limited, left no doubt in its memorandum as to whose interests Guiana should serve. The company admitted that it was “not particularly concerned with the exact form of Government in the Colony, so long as it is a stable Government which recognises the need for security of capital, including imported capital and which recognises that industrial and commercial interests must be allowed to operate unhampered by political issues or by excessive or discriminatory taxation.” The company Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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seemed to be advocating that corporations and the business community generally constitute a state within a state, immune to regulation by the body politic. It noted that “certain checks are necessary which will make it impossible for a nescient [nascent?] and unbalanced majority of elected members to misgovern the Colony and ruin the economy.”16 To make British Guiana safe for business, Demerara Bauxite proposed a unicameral legislature comprised of 16 elected members, down from the 24 that existed in October 1953; 3 official members (chief secretary, attorney general, and financial secretary); and 14 additional members nominated by the governor as well as a speaker. The governor would nominate 4 members at his discretion and select the remaining 10 from names submitted by each of the major industries, the Chamber of Commerce, and the unions. It recommended that the 14 nominated members be apportioned as follows: • 2 to represent labour • 2 to represent the Sugar Industry • 1 to represent the Bauxite Industry • 1 to represent Commerce • 1 to represent the Minor Industries • 1 to represent the Cattle Industry • 1 to represent the Rice Industry • 1 to represent the Timber Industry • 4 nominated by the Governor at his discretion.17

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The company’s proposed Assembly with its fourteen nominated members and three official members would ensure that the elected members formed a permanent minority. Power would still remain in the hands of the business community and its supporters, guaranteeing that the colony would continue to be governed by business in the interest of business. Of the ten nominated members who represented the named interest groups, only two would represent the workers, who were the indispensable engines of production. The Shipping Association of Georgetown also wanted an Assembly with “a strong nominated element.” The number of members, it advised, “would depend on the success achieved by a ‘dangerous’ party.” These nominated legislators would “provide a real check” so “extreme or subversive measures could not get through.” The association based its proposal on the fact that British Guiana “is not yet ready for self government by an all-elected legislature because a sense of responsibility, either political or economic, has not developed to a sufficient extent among the working peoples of the colony.”18 These and other pejorative comments by the elites belied the political (  )

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reality. The much-maligned electorate had chosen people such as Janet Jagan, Forbes Burnham, Ashton Chase, Dr. J. P. Lachmansingh, and others—all of whom were capable. That the voters rejected candidates who were the enablers of a political status quo they despised was a sign of their enlightened self-interest and maturity. Those who felt they had an entitlement to govern hardly understood the decisions and choices that came from below. The support for a nominated State Council came principally from those persons and business interests who wanted checks on the potential “excesses” of the House of Assembly. F. Seal Coon, for instance, believed such a body would offer protection from the “foolish if not un necessarily disruptive legislation” emanating from the lower house. The results of its deliberations, he said, “would be more productive than if dissipated in wrangling with electives in a single chamber.” To make the State Council more effective, however, Seal Coon “would give it more of a technical advisory character by the choice of members, though without curtailing in any way its due legislative faculties.”19 The Shipping Association of Georgetown recommended that the Council represent “a good cross section of all races, classes and activities of the colony,” and that it be vested with “initiating, revising, and delaying powers” where legislative matters were concerned.20 Articulating a different point of view, barrister M. S. H. Rahaman saw no need for a State Council, dismissing it as “outmoded and redundant.”21 In an attempt to give the Guianese people more responsibility to conduct their own affairs, the Waddington Constitution had introduced the ministerial system. Six ministers chosen from the Assembly and three ex officio members along with a minister without portfolio comprised the Executive Council. In the aftermath of the constitution’s suspension, critics of the PPP blamed the ministerial system for the colony’s agony. The Guianese people were not ready for such responsibility, they asserted. While most of these critics did not want to abolish the ministerial system altogether, they wished to give the governor the power to name and dismiss individual ministers as he saw fit. In his memorandum to the Robertson Commission, Attorney General F. W. Holder, himself a Barbadian of African descent, recommended an Executive Council with the governor as president, three ex officio members, and seven unofficial members. He wanted the governor to nominate all the unofficial members—five to be chosen from the Assembly and two from the State Council. The governor would be authorized to revoke any appointment he made, a power he lacked under the Waddington Constitution, where a minister could only be removed by the Executive Council itself or by a twothirds vote in the House of Assembly.22 Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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Although the suggestions for the composition of the Executive Council varied, there was significant support for giving the governor the power to appoint and remove its members. There was hardly any dissent from the governor possessing a reserve power, allowing him to veto any action of the Executive Council with which he disagreed. In other words, the ultimate power would remain in the hands of the governor, with an abiding trust in his impartiality and beneficence. In fact, the people who proffered such advice wanted to enhance the governor’s power in the colony rather than to reduce it. The fear of a return to office by the PPP with the prospect of confronting a governor with reduced power clouded their judgment and heightened their belief in the inability of the Guianese to assume full responsibility for their governance. They wanted to strengthen the power of an imperial government that many other colonies were trying to diminish. Ironically, many people who expressed their views to the Robertson Commission urged that certain criteria be established for individuals running for office, including educational qualifications, stiff property and income requirements, and an increase in the deposit paid to get their names on the ballot. Thus, while these people sought to enhance the power of the governor, they also hoped to temper the vibrancy of a newly enfranchised electorate. If the testimony and memorandum received by the Robertson Commission are taken as one measure, the Guianese people were not hopeful about their future. Their unhappiness with economic conditions and their sense of being victims of a profound injustice leap from the numerous pages of handwritten memoranda submitted by members of the working class, some barely literate but all moved by a spirit of civic consciousness to make their views known. There was nary an optimistic voice among them; their observations focused on a litany of wrongs inflicted, reflected the pain of deprivation quietly endured, and demonstrated that the balm of hope was a luxury. While those at the bottom of the social order could not ignore the ubiquitous presence of the privileged in their lives, the reverse was seldom true. In their testimony and memoranda, the voices of privilege spoke principally of the threats to their position from an illiterate populace susceptible to the virus of communism and of the ways to contain or eradicate them. Hardly anyone celebrated the promise of the colony or the need to heal its wounds. This did not augur well for the future. It was obvious that Guiana needed leaders of outstanding caliber to invite and welcome a better future. Approximately six months after the Robertson Commission completed its hearings, it delivered its report to the secretary of state. The document was eagerly awaited in British Guiana; even members of the PPP could not con(  )

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ceal their anticipation. There was no serious expectation that the commission would recommend fundamental or rapid changes in the constitution. The testimony of influential witnesses had emphasized that the colony required time to recover from its trauma before confronting the challenges of a new constitution. For some, this need stemmed from the fear that the PPP could return to office and establish a communist state. A breathing space, in their view, would allow an interim government to introduce the kinds of policies that would address the grievances of the working class and render more difficult a PPP victory in a new election that was certain to be held. In addition, it was hoped that an opposition party, strong enough to compete effectively with the PPP, would emerge. The Robertson Commission Report represented an apologia for colonial rule in British Guiana and the suspension of the 1953 constitution. In providing the context for its recommendations, the report invoked the objectives of British colonial policy at the time. “That policy,” it said, “is to advance the peoples in the Colonial territories to the goal of democratic self government as speedily as their political development and economic viability will allow. . . . It is a policy involving an orderly advance from the completely authoritarian Crown Colony type of Constitution. . . . Step by step power is transferred.”23 For such transfer of power to be effective, “a healthy political environment” must exist, the report affirmed. Such an environment would produce “a sound growth” of political parties, trade unions, and voluntary associations. But it must also possess “an informed articulate public opinion.” In the commission’s opinion, “These conditions for sound constitutional advance do not exist in British Guiana today.” It repeated the mantra of an unsophisticated electorate electing the PPP to office, opening the way to “one party rule” in the colony.24 Whatever its sins may have been, the PPP had won three-fourths of the Assembly seats and during its brief tenure in government it had not declared Guiana a one-party state. When Jamaica gained universal adult suffrage in 1944, the Jamaica Labour Party, led by Alexander Bustamante, won 22 of the 32 seats in the House of Representatives, amounting to 68 percent. The principal opposition party, the People’s National Party, won 5 seats and the remaining 5 went to independents. There were no allegations at the time that Jamaica had become a one-party state or that its electorate was “immature and undiscriminating,” as the Robertson report described the Guianese voters. The elephant in the report was, to be sure, the People’s Progressive Party. The commissioners were guided less by the imperative to construct a new Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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and appropriate constitution for British Guiana and more by the need to cripple or destroy a political party feared by the colonial regime. The PPP had to excise its communist spots before it could function legitimately in the body politic. But there were distressing signs that this was not likely to occur anytime soon. The report noted: The implications of Communist influence in the present leadership of the Party are not yet fully understood by the ordinary people in British Guiana, and although some of the more discerning may have withdrawn their support it is the general belief that the P.P.P. could retain all the characteristics which make it incapable of intelligent government and yet still rely on securing a majority if elections were held in the near future on a similar franchise.25

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Faced with that dismal prospect, the commissioners called for a split in the PPP. They confessed that “we can find no escape from the logical conclusion that so long as the present leadership and policies of the People’s Progressive Party continue[,] there is no way in which any real measure of self government can be restored in British Guiana without the certainty that the country will again be subjected to constitutional crisis.”26 Driven by its obsession to destroy the PPP, the Robertson Commission was openly inviting an internecine war within its ranks. It could hardly have imagined at the time the horrendous consequences of such a split and the bloodbath that would follow in its wake. As long as the real prospect of the PPP’s return to office existed, the commission saw no need for the introduction of a fundamentally new constitution. It recommended, instead, “a period of marking time in the advance towards self government.”27 This would provide the colonial administration with the requisite time to pursue plans for “social and economic development” with the expectation that this “would help to bring about a change in the political outlook of the electorate.” In time, the people of British Guiana would come to realize that “the extremist leaders of the P.P.P. and the policies for which they stand are the sole barriers to constitutional progress.” Clearly, the commission hoped that the PPP would be ultimately perceived as working against the colony’s best interest and would lose its popular appeal. The report neglected to identify the policies of the PPP that it found objectionable and to explain how an electorate it described as “immature and undiscriminating” would suddenly mature and support other parties. The commission was unable to predict the duration of the period of “marking time.” It wanted, however, to retain the basic structure of the Wadding(  )

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ton Constitution if and when the time came for the colony to receive a new constitution. The House of Assembly would consist of twenty-five elected members as well as two officials, namely the attorney general and the financial secretary. The commission also recommended a ten-member State Council comprising the governor, the chief secretary, and the newly created office of development secretary, five persons appointed by the governor acting in his own discretion, and two members named by the ministers elected by the House of Assembly. Finally, the Executive Council would consist of the financial secretary, the chief secretary, the attorney general, the development secretary, four elected ministers with portfolio chosen by the elected ministers of the State Council, and one minister without portfolio selected by the nominated members. The governor would serve as president of the Executive Council and would have a casting vote.28 As proposed, the ten-member Executive Council would include four official members and a member chosen by the nominated members of the State Council, who together with the governor’s casting vote would provide a majority in the event of a deadlock. This arrangement guaranteed that the elected representatives of the people would not dominate the Executive Council as they did during the PPP’s administration, when they held six of the ten seats. That these provisions were directed at the PPP was shown by the report’s pessimistic admission: “We do not pretend that they in any way meet the difficulties presented by a party not prepared to accept a limited constitution.”29 The commission’s report reflected the official view of British Guiana’s constitutional and political future. But this was not necessarily in concert with that of a significant segment of the Guianese people, particularly those represented by the PPP. Whereas their leaders demanded self-government, the report recommended a constitution that gave the elected representatives less power than did its predecessor. It represented a backward step, one guaranteed to exacerbate the divisions in the colony. Predictably, the Robertson Commission Report met with a diverse reception in the colony. “It stinks,” observed Dr. Cheddi Jagan.30 Forbes Burnham thought it reflected the point of view of the Colonial Office, that “by bribery and threats Guianese will be transformed into spineless adulators of imperialism.” He promised that “we shall continue undeterred and without any illusions the struggle for national liberation.”31 The leader of the fledgling United Democratic Party, John Carter, accused the commission of putting Guiana “in the rear of the constitutional race to self-government.” On the other hand, the Guiana Graphic saw grounds for optimism, welcoming the Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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prospect that the PPP would no longer be able “to play with the lives and interests of the people of the country.”32 The Daily Argosy was disappointed that the report did not recommend the expulsion of the “extremists.” “Why,” it asked, were they not “removed from the political scene—banished and disenfranchised?”33 As the Guianese people imagined the future, many of them remained imprisoned by their history. The privileged elites were captives of the already achieved promise of the past and could not beckon a future filled with so many threatening uncertainties. Cheddi Jagan was their bête noir and the PPP, with its politically aroused supporters, their nemesis. The Guianese did not yet constitute a people united by a nationalist fervor that trumped debilitating particularities. Potentially crippling divisions produced principally by the cancers of ethnicity, class, and colonial policy simmered, waiting to become cauldrons of conflict. The times required leaders who could create passageways in these treacherous societal minefields, avoiding the temptations of the politics of ethnicity in favor of the good of the commonweal.

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THE PERIOD OF “marking time,” as recommended by the Robertson Commission, was not expected to last indefinitely. As the new governor, Sir Patrick Renison, observed in 1956, “Nobody ever went forward by marking time.”34 By mid-1955, the Colonial Office had begun to discuss the prospect of the colony’s return to representative government and a relaxation of the ban on public political meetings. These officials were disappointed, however, by the fact that no political force capable of challenging either wing of the PPP had emerged. The Jaganite wing had actually improved its organization and strength in the rural areas, R. E. Radford of the Colonial Office lamented, and was seeking to “gain a controlling voice in the rice industry.” “One detects in this the skillful hand of Janet Jagan,” he complained.35 Although colonial officials had expended a great deal of energy in trying to contain or destroy Cheddi Jagan and the PPP, they had little to show for their efforts. Radford believed that the relaxation of the ban on public meetings “would certainly enable us to make a closer assessment of the relative strengths of the various groups.” Such a point of view led him to recommend that the ban be relaxed “not with a view of facilitating discussion of topics such as Federation but from the broader perspective of how it will affect the development of rival political forces in the colony.” This was the official optic at work; the ban was not to be lifted to facilitate the free expression of ideas but to stimulate the emergence of groups that would collectively weaken Jagan’s appeal. Not surprisingly, Radford did not urge a return to (  )

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self-government given the colony’s existing political configuration. “I can see no advantage,” he said, “in granting limited Constitutional powers to people to whom we could never contemplate transferring full control of the colony’s affairs.”36 Unencumbered by the need to defend previous decisions of the Colonial Office, Governor Renison urged a speedy return to some form of representative government. He made that recommendation ten weeks after he assumed office in the colony because he wanted “to win this battle without sacking ministers, deporting Janet Jagan, or proscribing or disenfranchising the P.P.P.” He wanted to couple a relaxation on the ban on public meetings with an announcement about new elections to force the politicians to reveal their hand. If new elections were not announced, Renison argued metaphorically,

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the minnows will bleat the old slogans and catchwords; the minor cogs, without provoking police action, will keep emotions fanned to a malleable heat and themselves in the political limelight, we shall get the usual worm’s eye view of corrupt and inefficient Imperialism; but the major cogs, I mean Burnham or Jagan themselves and possibly both, will stay on the fence and carry on organising for the elections which must come one day.37 Renison pressed the colonial regime to “lead and control events rather than follow them.” He wanted to prevent “a genuine reconciliation” between Jagan and Burnham, as distinct from their “willingness to work in uneasy coalition.” Renison distrusted Burnham, seeing him as “an unlovable and unreliable creature.” He very much hoped that “if Jagan has not for ever gone too far for you and the U.S.A., and if Janet can be kept out of the picture, I may find myself, in the absence of better alternatives, working with Jagan rather than Burnham.”38 Despite his belief that marking time only seemed to enhance Jagan’s support, the governor still clung to the illusion that a new party would emerge to undermine Jagan’s electoral strength. He called the founding of the National Labour Front by Lionel Luckhoo “promising,” hoping that it might find common cause with the “nearly defunct” United Democratic Party. Renison recommended to his superiors that the date for elections should remain vague “so that the timing could be arranged to coincide with the build up of antiJagan forces.” But Janet Jagan and her organizational brilliance remained an impediment to the success of the regime’s efforts to destroy the PPP. Renison confided to the Colonial Office that “to be rid of Janet Jagan would help Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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enormously, but deportation would be difficult to justify unless some obvious new cause appeared.”39 Recognizing that its containment strategy had failed, the Colonial Office accepted Renison’s proposals for a return to some form of representative government. The governor and the Colonial Office braced themselves for Jagan’s potential return to office, crafting constitutional provisions to ensure that the elected representatives of the people would have little power. The Office’s refusal to restore the Waddington Constitution surprisingly precipitated a debate in the Legislative Council demanding that the 1953 constitution be restored. It also unintentionally united the parties temporarily. On July 28, 1956, for example, a nine-person delegation representing the newly created All Party Conference waited on Governor Renison. Eschewing their political differences for the moment, they urged restoration of the Waddington Constitution and a repeal of the ban on the freedom of movement. The governor could not be persuaded, explaining in a radio address that the new constitution was designed “to encourage the defeat of communism and thereafter to ensure quick advances to people who try to make a success of the constitution and to uphold the democratic processes. It will firmly prevent those who don’t,” he emphasized.40 The governor frankly admitted that Cheddi Jagan was the target of the restrictive constitutional provisions. Observing that Jagan’s writings, speeches, and conduct since the 1953 coup had not changed, Renison said: “I cannot fail to believe that he is a Communist, who if he had the chance would again attempt the Communist one-party system of rule. . . . I fear that Great Britain would only believe in a change of heart [by Jagan] if it were proved by deeds over a long period rather than by words.”41 In other words, Jagan should prove by his “good behavior” that he deserved more authority if invited to lead the government. It was a Faustian bargain that he would ultimately accept and regret. The Renison Constitution allowed for a Legislative Council consisting of 28 members, of whom 14 would be elected, 11 nominated by the governor, and 3 to be ex officio members, as well as a nominated speaker with a casting vote. If the governor chose to nominate all 11 members, the elected members would not have a majority. Similarly, the Executive Council would consist of 5 elected members, 2 members nominated by the governor, and 3 ex officio members. The governor was not bound by any decisions taken by the two bodies and could use his reserve power at his discretion. Accordingly, Renison remained firmly in charge, ready to disallow any legislative measure with which he disagreed. The period of “marking time” had not ended. (  )

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The Renison Constitution provided only the semblance of constitutional advance. It was more akin to a return to the authoritarian Crown colony status, disguised by the trappings or veneer of representative politics. The elective representatives of the people had no autonomy, since the governor could veto any measure of which he disapproved. Governor Renison, who had declared that “you cannot mark time for ever,” had helped to craft a constitution that was designed to thwart the political influence and power of one man. It was a testimony to the fear Jagan continued to generate within the Colonial Office and among elite groups in the colony. But it was also an extraordinary moment in British colonial history to see the metropolitan power framing its policy around the imperative to discredit and defeat a single politician. It was not a military policy as it was in Kenya when the Mau Mau were threatening the colonial edifice. Rather, it was one based on using the carrot via the development plan to obtain the people’s support; using the power of the state to harass, contain, or destroy the PPP; and using the constitution to ensure that Jagan and the PPP would be paper tigers if they returned to office.42 The strategy failed. In any contest between the Crown and Cheddi Jagan for the soul of British Guiana, the Indian population, in particular, would side with “Our Cheddi” despite their loyalty to the mother country. One of the most naked maneuvers to contain Jagan and the PPP was the gerrymandering of the constituencies in preparation for the August 1957 elections. The number of constituencies had been reduced from the twenty-four the colony enjoyed in 1953 to fourteen. This required a reconfiguration of the boundaries of the constituencies, and the colonial regime appointed a three-person commission headed by Sir John Waddington to accomplish the task. The result was a travesty. Using the 1953 boundaries as the points of reference, the commission left three constituencies—Georgetown North, New Amsterdam, and the Northwest District—virtually unchanged. It reduced the size of Western Berbice and combined the others in such a way that the PPP’s strength in the rural areas would be diluted. With the exception of Georgetown South, the largest constituencies were the ones deemed to be PPP strongholds. Table 10 shows the number of voters each constituency included and the wide disparity between some of them. Eastern Berbice, a Jaganite stronghold, for example, had 31,947 voters, while New Amsterdam, an area that was expected to support Burnham, had 5,879. Despite its vigorous protest of the commission’s recommendations and its denunciation of their “sinister intent,” the PPP contested and won the AuImagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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( Table 10 ) Voters by Constituency, 1957 % of Total Constituency

No. of Voters

Voters

Berbice River Central Demerara Demerara-Essequibo Demerara River Eastern Berbice Eastern Demerara Essequibo River Georgetown Central Georgetown North Georgetown South New Amsterdam Northwest District Western Berbice Western Essequibo

5,429 25,135 15,182 26,972 31,947 18,295 13,649 12,472 10,444 22,241 5,879 3,450 8,324 11,215

2.6 11.9 7.2 12.8 15 8.7 6.5 5.9 5 10.6 2.8 1.6 4 5.3

Total

210,634

100*

Source: PREM 11/1727. * Rounded.

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gust 1957 elections. Disappointed by these results, officials at the U.S. State Department summoned the British ambassador, Sir H. Caccia. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy told Caccia that the United States “had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of British territories, but had a hemispheric interest in preventing a base for Communist activities on the American continent.” He reminded the ambassador that the United States had done its best to work with the British to remedy “the situation in British Guiana.” In what appears to be a veiled reference to the start of U.S. covert activities in the colony, Murphy said he regretted Britain’s reluctance to cooperate with his country “in all fields.” He wanted to know if the British were satisfied that they had done “all that was possible . . . to build up forces opposed to Jagan before the election.” In reply, Caccia admitted that “the principal impediment to our efforts to weaken Jagan’s position had been the absence of persons of comparable stature among any other of the political groups.” In a telling moment of reticence, Caccia declined to say if “we had intervened directly to secure the build up of alternative political parties.” The truth was that the colonial officials had done so, with no success.43 Cheddi Jagan survived electorally despite the efforts of the British and the Americans to defeat and silence him. But he recognized the continuing (  )

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potential of these two powerful countries to derail him. When Governor Renison consulted with him on the composition of the Executive Council after the PPP won the election, Jagan assured the governor that there would be “no question of any fundamental changes in policy,” given the problems the government was confronting. Chastened by the trauma of the 1953 coup and subsequent events, Jagan admitted to Renison that he knew that he and his party “were suspect in the eyes of the world.” According to Renison, Jagan said he “hoped to be able to demonstrate that they were capable of effective and reasonable government, [since] the responsibility had been placed squarely on their shoulders. He thought it was in the interests of British Guiana and H.M.G. to give his party this opportunity under the present constitution with all of its safeguards against mis-rule.”44 This was hardly the voice of the firebrand of 1953. The ideological pragmatism Jagan displayed in this instance characterized his behavior until his defeat in 1964. He retained his Marxist rhetoric but he never governed as a Marxist, or even attempted to do so. The colonial government would never have allowed him such latitude anyway. A rhetorically inchoate Marxism or communism, however, remained at Jagan’s ideological core. Forbes Burnham observed in 1962 that questioning Jagan’s communism was “like asking why is a man a Christian.” “Without his faith in Communism,” Burnham surmised, “Jagan as a whole would fall apart.” And the chairman of the Bookers Group, Anthony Tasker, volunteered the opinion in March 1962 that Jagan was “a maverick” who professes to be a Christian Communist.”45 But, as we shall see, Cheddi was the architect of “Jaganism,” a set of eclectic beliefs that defied any ideological label. In spite of his Marxist rhetoric, the pragmatic Jagan welcomed economic assistance regardless of the ideological source. It was his deeply held view that his country needed help from the “have” countries so it could “take off into a period of sustained growth.”46 He wanted the lender countries to offer long-term loans with low interest rates, preferably at 2 percent and with a ten-year moratorium on interest payments. But Jagan did not exercise a free hand on the amount he could borrow or from whom. Since Guiana was a colony, the metropolitan country had to approve any such initiatives, and it showed no enthusiasm for Jagan’s plans. Governor Ralph Grey, who succeeded Renison in 1958, believed that expatriate officials were responsible for persuading their governments to place unreasonable limits on the amount the colony could potentially borrow. “The unduly conservative advisors from the United Kingdom, from the United States and from the International Bank,” according to Grey, “say that British Guiana ought not to borrow more than Imagining and Constructing a New Guiana

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such-and-such an amount because it cannot support the debt-charges on any greater figure.” Hearing such voices of caution, the governor said Jagan was wont to respond: “Ah! . . . That is at the rates that the United Kingdom and the United States charge—6 or 7 percent. If we could get the loans for longer terms at lower rates, say 2 percent, or even at no interest at all, then we could borrow two or three times as much.”47 Jagan, the governor reported, “longs for freedom, principally so that he can put this economic thinking into practice.”48 British economic policy in Guiana since 1953 had been designed primarily to win public support and to contain Cheddi Jagan. The metropolitan government also wanted to prevent the Guianese government from having any relationship with the Eastern Bloc countries, regardless of how advantageous those contacts would be for the colony. British Guiana became a victim of the Cold War politics between East and West and the fear of communist subversion in the Americas. In 1959, when Dr. Jagan applied to the Colonial Office for permission to seek financial assistance from Russia and Eastern Bloc countries, he was refused. As a government report explained, “We turned down his request, but we undertook to assist him in any approaches which he might wish to make for assistance from other, non communist sources.”49 Colonial authorities also maintained that if British Guiana accepted “Russian or Soviet bloc loans,” it would alienate the Americans and “would probably also put paid on any prospects of US aid and he [Jagan] would probably scare off external private investors.” Driven by such self-serving ideological considerations, the British government disallowed a loan to Guiana for US$5 million by the Cuban government in 1960. The loan was to be secured for ten years at a 2 percent rate of interest, repayable by timber products.50 In addition to obstacles placed in his path by the Colonial Office, Jagan faced the mines dug by his domestic opponents. Forbes Burnham never wanted Jagan’s efforts to succeed, and he tried to persuade the Americans to withhold funding for the Jagan government, suggesting instead that aid should be offered to the trade unions and other nongovernment bodies. John Carter, a legislator representing the People’s National Congress, advised U.S. officials in 1962 to “let Jagan stew in his juice” and refuse assistance to the colony “at present.” Thus both Burnham and Carter were willing to sacrifice their country’s economic development on the altar of political expediency.51 Guiana’s modest five-year economic development program for 1960–64 was financed entirely from traditional sources. It proposed an expenditure of BWI$110,505,000 or US$64.5 million, focusing mainly on the creation of jobs and improvements in the people’s standard of living. The financing was to (  )

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come principally from the resources generated by the Guianese government, local borrowing, grants and loans form the British government, and external sources. The latter included potential loans and grants from the United States and Canada. Jagan failed to raise all the funds he needed for his development plan. American and Canadian assistance did not materialize, and he was forbidden to seek support from the Eastern Bloc. Governor Grey was not convinced that this imperial prohibition was based on a defensible premise. He doubted whether “international communism” had any serious interest in the colony, speculating that it had “fatter fish to fry elsewhere.” He thought it probable that “British Guiana is not, apart from the psychological advantage of a ‘triumph’ in a British territory, . . . a very promising base for wider operations.”52 This was a realistic view at the time, one that the Americans did not share. Frustrated by the obstacles placed in his path by his foreign and domestic opponents, Jagan exhibited signs of despair. “Jagan looks like a discouraged and beaten man these days,” observed the American consul general in mid1964, adding that “both publicly and privately he holds the United States responsible for most of his problems.”53 Although this was an exaggeration, Jagan was not fantasizing.

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Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

The premier was on his way to Government House to bid farewell to the departing governor, Sir Ralph Grey. As he left the Public Buildings (the name given to the government’s offices) on that March morning in 1964, a schoolgirl booed and lifted her skirt at him, one of the most humiliating forms of insult to anyone, much less a head of government. “This was sad,” he said on relating the incident to Grey. Jagan also confided in Grey that he was spending his time writing a book. “It was no use trying to do anything,” said the beleaguered premier. The government’s coffers were empty, he lamented. Unsympathetic to Jagan’s obvious plea for understanding, Grey declared rather imperiously that “it would be a good idea if he did some governing.”1 Cheddi Jagan enjoyed writing, so it was no surprise that he sought refuge in that endeavor when times got tough. Although comfortable in the world of ideas, Jagan was never a political theorist or an original thinker. He could cling tenaciously to a political theory as he did to Marxism, often applying his understanding of its tenets mechanistically to the British Guianese context. But he could also be ideologically elastic, simultaneously embracing and articulating political positions that had a variety of roots. These existed in dynamic tension and constituted what can be properly called “Jaganism.” His ideological eclecticism was not always recognized by Jagan’s detractors, who

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preferred to see him as a Marxist purist or, worse, as a communist. It is doubtful whether Jagan himself engaged in any deep introspection of his theoretical constructs, given the bewildering grammar of his rhetoric over time. His seemingly endemic tendency to conceptual fuzziness complicated the problem of defining him ideologically at any particular moment in his political career. But beneath all the rhetorical fulminations, vacillations, and incoherence, Cheddi Jagan’s consuming commitment to the welfare of British Guiana was never in doubt and shone through with admirable consistency and passion. Jagan returned to British Guiana from the United States in 1943, when India was on the cusp of achieving its independence after a prolonged struggle with Great Britain. India’s assertion of a pugnacious nationalism had a deep resonance in Trinidad and British Guiana, both of which had significant populations of Indian descent, as well as among nationalist leaders in the colonial world. When in 1945 the great African American scholar W. E. B. DuBois organized a conference in Manchester, England, under the aegis of the Pan-African Movement that he helped to initiate in 1900, it was dominated by young nationalists from the colonies in Africa. Many of the attendees would, in subsequent years, play important roles in the fight against colonialism and the making of the new nations that their struggles produced. The Anglophone Caribbean islands had their share of nationalists, but British Guiana was the site of the most vocal, noisy, and aggressive expression of their cause in the region. King Sugar had so dominated the economic and political life of the colony that it would have been surprising if this had not, in time, generated internal opposition. The intolerable living conditions on the sugar estates offended the sensibilities of a new generation of Guianese and sensitized them to the need for fundamental changes in the economic and political structures in the land of their birth. They chafed under the domination of a tiny white minority and the suzerainty of a distant monarch. Yet the nationalism of this new generation should not be viewed solely in reactive terms. To do so is to suggest that if the colonial regime had been more responsive to the needs of the Guianese people and had afforded them more latitude in the conduct of their affairs, they would have accepted their condition passively. Colonial systems contained the seeds of their own destruction. Their foundations rested on coercion, as well as on the capacity to socialize a people into accepting the legitimacy of their subjugation and the normalcy of their condition. But colonized peoples, along with others, have never remained an inert, unchanging mass over time. Beginning in the 1770s, for example, the (  )

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North American colonies fought the British to achieve their independence. In 1791 the enslaved peoples in Saint-Domingue began a prolonged struggle to claim their liberty, doing so in 1804. Spain’s colonies in Latin America undertook the same mission in 1810 and won their freedom at different times over the next several decades. Of the Guianese nationalists, including Forbes Burnham, Martin Carter, Sydney King, Ashton Chase, Eric Huntley, and many others, Cheddi Jagan was the best known. It would be a mistake, however, to focus only on those who held elective office or aspired to do so. The remarkable fact was that nationalist stirrings were much in evidence among the urban and rural working classes, the people who devoured the articles in Thunder, gathered in groups to discuss the domestic and international issues of the moment, denounced the sugar bosses, or shouted “Limey go home!” at the British. The receptivity to nationalist sentiments was a function of the lived experiences of the people, the impact of the messages they received from their leaders, and certainly the consequence of a people discovering themselves and their power, as well as wanting to construct a different and better future. The nationalists in Guiana and elsewhere were operating at a moment when Marxist theoreticians were leading the assault on colonialism. Their mission included the provision of support—inspirational, tactical, and financial—to liberation movements in the colonial world. These ideologues, located principally in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the United Kingdom disseminated their literature to sympathetic organizations and groups in the colonies. The Jagans had close ties with many of these organizations and distributed their literature in Guiana under the aegis of the PPP. In fact, the high degree of political consciousness in the colony and the ferocious anticolonialism and boisterous Marxism of so many young Guianese were directly related to the availability of this literature and the discussions it stimulated. This literature was “all we read,” recalled Eric Huntley.2 Fearing that the Marxist ideas in these books, articles, and pamphlets would contaminate the Guianese people, the Legislative Council passed the Subversive Literature Act in March 1953, only to infuriate the PPP. The first Jagan administration attempted to repeal it, but the State Council withheld its approval. After the October 1953 coup, the colonial regime tried to suffocate the PPP intellectually by introducing a list of prohibited books and punishing those who insisted on reading whatever they wanted. The battle for Guiana’s soul, therefore, was as much ideological as it was physical. The Jagans and the PPP relied on the potency of the ideas they embraced and their organizational acumen to promote their struggle. On the other hand, Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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the British depended on coercive mechanisms such as restrictions on the freedom of movement and the holding of meetings, constitutional measures, security agencies, the intimidating presence of troops, and so on to arrest or destroy the nationalist stirrings from below. But in any contest between the power of transformative ideas in oppressive environments and coercive enablers of the status quo, the latter stood little chance of success over the long haul. Cheddi Jagan proclaimed himself a Marxist loudly and consistently in those heady years after returning home from the United States. He had become familiar with the theoretical principles that informed Marxism, repeating them with great passion and the certitude of a true believer. Many of the beliefs to which he subscribed linked the anticolonial struggle to Marxism and vice versa. For Jagan and others, therefore, Marxism legitimized their battles against colonialism. But such a struggle needed no sanctioning ideology derived from the experiences of other societies that were hardly applicable—in many respects—to the Guianese milieu. Doctrinaire Marxism was an import, a humbug, in a society that needed to focus more of its energies on the injustice of its situation and less on theory emanating from Prague, Moscow, London, or Budapest. In an observation relevant to most PPP leaders, educator Robert J. Moore said that “Guyana was one of the most colonial parts of the Caribbean, yet in 1953 it produced a cadre of people who were versed in Marxism. Martin Carter knew Marxism at the philosophical, dialectical and grassroots level. It’s intriguing that this cadre of people should, as Marxists, take a philosophical rather than a practical or political view of what they were doing.”3 The complicated racial situation in British Guiana and the geography of the working class made nonsense of the ideological paradigms imported from other societies with dissimilar experiences and configurations. “In a real sense Dr. Jagan’s electoral base in the Indian population is essentially hostile to his ideology, because the sugar workers, the only proletarianised elements within that base, are not totally proletarian,” concluded Rupert Roopnaraine, a Guyanese writer, literary critic, and film producer. “Most of them are also part-time peasants, rice farmers, fishermen and other types of workers.”4 Roopnaraine believed that Jagan was too doctrinaire in his modus operandi when the times demanded pragmatic leadership. As he expressed it: In the 1950’s the problem of Dr. Jagan was one of pragmatism: how to deal with the oppressor in terms of his Marxist/Leninist ideology? In this respect, Dr. Jagan’s view has always been doctrinaire, and I think that if (  )

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there is a weakness in his politics, it has to do with his inability to ground international science in indigenous experience. There is a real sense in him of an exotic ideology imposed on [a] domestic, indigenous reality, and where it did not fit, he trimmed the reality, not the ideology.5 Forbes Burnham agreed with this assessment, although he himself was never known for ideological originality. Speaking of his colleagues in the PPP in 1953, Burnham recalled: “There was in our Party, a number of individuals of spirit, courage and ability, but whose intellects and minds were clouded and befogged with dogmas coined from books which they accepted as Bibles. Every fact, every incident had to suit these dogmas which for those who uttered them had some mystic quality.”6 This was true enough, at least for a while. Cheddi Jagan could be frustratingly doctrinaire but there was a pragmatic side to him as well, as he would demonstrate over time. Never adept at the art of governing, he nonetheless understood the systemic bases of his people’s condition, the power relationships in the society, and the compelling need to transform the status quo. More than any other Caribbean leader of his time, Cheddi Jagan provided trenchant analyses of the colonial status quo. Writing in January 1951, for example, Jagan voiced his criticism of the economic exploitation of British Guiana by Britain. Entitling his paper “On the Economic Consequences of a Reactionary Constitution,” Jagan wanted to show “the basic weakness of our government being run by a conservative Governor and administrative heads of departments; and by and for the ‘powers’ that be (especially sugar) behind the throne.” It was a well-researched piece, in which Jagan was determined to show the “one-sided” nature of the colony’s economy. He denounced agricultural policy in British Guiana as being “determined not so much ‘in conjunction with sugar’ as ‘after sugar.’” Sugar, he asserted, impeded the diversification of the agricultural economy, resulting in the country having to import food items that it could produce for itself. In the fiscal year 1948–49, for example, British Guiana spent US$90,000 to purchase Canadian soybean oil. Had land been available to Guianese peasants, Jagan argued, they would have been able to produce enough coconuts to meet the demand for cooking oil.7 To substantiate his argument that the sugarcane industry dominated his country’s economy, Jagan cited the relevant statistics. First, he demonstrated that the sugar estates held most of the cultivable land in the colony. At the time, the sugar estates controlled 171,078 acres, comprising 82,205 acres under freehold and 88,873 under leasehold. Only about 60,000 acres were under cultivation at any one time, while 20,000 acres remained fallow. The estates, Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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( Table 11 ) Sugar Estate Lands in British Guiana, ca. 1951 Acres Held in

Acres Held in

Estate

Freehold

Leasehold

Albion Bath Blairmont Diamond Enmore Houston Leonora Lochaber Lusignan Ogle Port Mourant Providence Ressouvenir Estates Ltd. Rosehall Ruimveldt Skeldon Uitvlugt Versailes and Schoonard Wales

4,878 3,619 4,200 11,816 3,135 1,145 2,708 625 2,180 2,933 2,833 4,219 2,377 13,290 565 4,686 6,162 6,230 4,604

7,591 3,731 6,729 3,543 10,440 1,050 4,943 195 7,870 4,345 12,740 3,150 6,367 166 525 5,035 5,349 2,011 3,093

Total

82,205

88,873

Source: CO 891/10.

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as Table 11 shows, varied in size and in the ratio of acres held in freehold to those held in leasehold. Although the estates had enormous acreage at their disposal, the managers used substantial amounts of land for purposes other than sugarcane cultivation. In 1948, for example, the Ogle estate reported that it used 30 percent of its acreage as grazing land, though Jagan charged that it owned “only a few head of cattle.” Similarly, Ressouvenir Estates Ltd. used 28 percent of its land for dams and trenches and as “waste.” Reviewing these statistics, Dr. Jagan concluded that the estates engaged in a policy of land accumulation to deprive the peasantry of the opportunity to acquire their own land. He charged the estates with implementing “a deliberate restrictive policy to maintain a large surplus labour force around the sugar estates.” As Jagan alleged: “The farm lands given to the worker for farming are barely enough to keep him from becoming too disgruntled with his present wages, his insecurity, and to keep him from migrating during the periods of seasonal un(  )

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employment. Too much land must not be given . . . lest the workers become economically self sufficient and independent of even the part time work provided at sugar estate wage rates.”8 Jagan’s paper also addressed the interlocking relationship between the three daily newspapers and the colony’s radio station. By carefully examining the list of shareholders of these companies and their board of directors, Jagan was able to demonstrate that they were controlled by the same people. This led him to conclude that “for too many years now the ruling classes have operated without any constitutional check being exercised over their will.”9 Such rhetoric did not endear Cheddi Jagan to the ruling elites in British Guiana. In fact, he became the lonely voice of the dispossessed as he represented their cause in the legislature. “THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN efficiently administered, but not in the interest of the people—in the interest of the gods who rule it—the powers behind the throne—the whisky and soda people of the clubs—the white oligarchy of bankers and planters,” Jagan declared in the Legislative Council on January 18, 1952, while his colleagues listened in irritated silence.10 The young member from Central Demerara was making his contribution to the debate on the Waddington Report, which had recommended a new constitution for the colony. “It cannot be denied that justice is in the interest of the stranger who makes the laws and rules the colonies and has been making the law all these years,” Jagan continued. “The framers of this constitution have devised things in such a way as to make the people feel that they are getting something—something which would change the economic set up in the colony and improve their standard of living—but that is only meant to lull the people to sleep.”11 Jagan used the occasion of his speech to chastise the regime and to accuse the framers of the new constitution of “really and truly trying to perpetrate the old imperialist order, the old system of exploitation and plunder of the colonies, in a different form.” In his opinion, the new constitution did not put “real powers” in “the hands of the people.” It was “merely a fake and a trap to delude the uninformed, to fool the masses of this country.” Asserting that “the gods in British Guiana . . . have had unrestricted sway and political power has really been held by them for too long,” Jagan emphasized that “what we want is self government.”12 Cheddi Jagan’s two-hour speech did not get a favorable reaction from his colleagues. Captain G. H. Smellie, a nominated member of the Legislative Council, accused him of giving “his peculiar ideologies full play.” William Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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Macnie, of the Booker Brothers sugar empire, was most unsparing in his condemnation of the address, denouncing Jagan for treating the Council “to a song of distrust, guile and hate, which he and his party have been preaching throughout this country.” Jagan, he asserted, “supports certain ideologies, and there is no question as to what part of the world those ideologies come from.” To discredit the member from Central Demerara, Macnie linked his ideology to Stalinism and quoted extensively from books that showed “what human beings suffer in countries behind the Iron Curtain.” Instead of taking Jagan’s critique of the colonial status quo seriously, the representatives of the ruling elite engaged in a vicious form of name-calling and associated him with the worst features of Stalinism.13 Although no one knew it at the time of the debate, the broad contours were being set for a bitter struggle between the forces of change as exemplified by Jagan and the representatives of an increasingly anachronistic order epitomized by Smellie and Macnie. Jagan’s rhetoric and his contacts with communists overseas convinced many people in British Guiana that he was a communist. He did little to disabuse them of that notion. In fact, he seemed to have worn that pejorative appellation with pride, recognizing that it disoriented the colonial regime and its powerful supporters. The reality, however, as the PPP’s election manifesto in 1953 showed, was that Jagan embraced policies that were reformist and decidedly not revolutionary. Taken together, these policies, if implemented, would not have produced any structural change in the colony. In fact, when the PPP won the elections in 1953, Dr. Jagan said that his first order of business was the repeal of the Subversive Literature Act and the lifting of the ban on the entry of “progressive” West Indian leaders to the colony. The PPP would create “a real people’s government.” Nevertheless, the legislative priorities he outlined were designed less to address the immediate problems of “the people” and more exercises in ideological imperatives.14 The PPP’s victory in the April elections and Jagan’s elevation to political office did not slow his ideological journeys. His public rhetoric carried enormous shock value in a colonial society unaccustomed to having a high government official inviting change by using the language of Karl Marx and genuflecting before the altars of socialism and communism. Dr. Jagan was becoming adept at promoting the politics of rhetoric, rather than of substance, in a society not yet fully prepared to embrace such bombasts. In a radio broadcast to the colony on August 9, he proclaimed himself “a confirmed socialist—perhaps too real and outspoken for some people.” Giving the people a history lesson, he emphasized that capitalism had replaced feudalism in Europe and predicted that socialism would triumph internation(  )

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ally over capitalism. Eventually, he said, “socialism itself will evolve into the higher communist stage of society.” Jagan expressed his admiration for “the Soviet Union, the People’s China, and the People’s Democracies,” asserting that “efforts at human regeneration in those countries deserve the sympathetic consideration of all peoples.”15 Continuing his broadcast, Jagan denounced the “propaganda about Soviet imperialism and slave camps,” reminding his listeners that the Russian Revolution sought “not to bring about oppression, but to end it.” Turning to British Guiana, Jagan said the new development program he was contemplating would depend on the energies of the people, namely “the workers, the farmers, and others who must work to live.” If the colony lacked the resources to support his plans, “we must undertake to do these things again with our bare hands. This has been done in China. It is being done in India.” Aware that his rhetoric would create anxiety among those who worried about the role of private capital in the new Guiana, Jagan reassured them: “I do not want to give the impression that capitalists have no place in our community. For a good many years to come, it is true that capitalists—particularly our local capitalists—have a progressive role to play. We will offer them every protection. For their part they must regard themselves as partners in a joint common program of development. The emphasis must be on not what they take out, but on what can be contributed.”16 Jagan’s talk was a combination of textbook Marxism and an outline of the new Guiana he imagined. American consul general William Maddox was accurate in saying that in terms of Jagan’s ideological position, the speech “was more forthright and forceful than usual.” It had the desired shock value, leading the voice of the elites, the Daily Argosy, to denounce it as communistinspired. Singling out Jagan’s promise to protect local capitalists in the short run, it asked: “Will he continue to ‘protect’ them or will they suffer the same fate as they have suffered in every Communist country—extortion, appropriation, and final ‘liquidation’?”17 Ideological posturings such as those reflected in Jagan’s broadcast led the British government to justify its October coup on the grounds that the young government was infected with communism. But its short term in office was characterized more by rhetorical noise and less by any sharply defined ideological focus. When Dattatraya P. Wagle, a citizen of India and the New York correspondent for Reuters Trust of India, visited Georgetown in October 1953 and met with several PPP members of the House of Assembly, he characterized them as “a bunch of immature schoolboys, lacking practical experience and wrapped up in a lot of lofty theories.”18 Moreover, the young govSearching for Cheddi and the PPP

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ernment had yet to introduce a bill that indicated any ideological orientation in terms of economic and social policies. American consul general Maddox was on sound footing when, in August 1953, he observed: “The P.P.P. is still operating largely on propaganda levels. The ministers are promising, threatening, glorifying, cajoling, but in actual performance there is as yet little on either the positive or negative side to report. . . . Four months have now elapsed since the elections. It is hard to see that the PPP can yet point with pride to anything concrete in the way of improvements for the colony.”19 The PPP administration’s thin record in office does not give much credence to the charge that it was introducing a communist dictatorship in British Guiana. But even granting the most elastic definition of what constituted communist behavior in 1953, that charge lacked credibility. Six years later, Jan Carew, the celebrated Guianese writer and novelist, was asked, “What did you think of, to use your own words, ‘the agony of 1953’?” He responded:

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The official view as stated in the White Paper was, I thought highly imaginative. It would have made horror comic reading for not too bright children. Communism never was, and is, not an important issue in British Guiana. . . . The issues here are poverty, inertia, and the fight for freedom from Colonial rule. The troops arriving to entertain the populace with their rituals of “showing the flag” and “shows of strength,” with the house searching, the banning of books, the field days for petty informers, all these things I was sure would have created greater unity, because those who shout Communism at anyone daring to explain the truth of our condition, remind me of wolves shouting “tiger” at sheep, when the sheep can see the wolves but have never seen a tiger.20 The wolves in this rendering were the British, the sheep represented the Guianese people, and the invisible tiger was communism. Having deposed an elected government for allegedly being communist, the British administration became a prisoner of that misjudgment. It confused Jagan’s rhetoric and genuflections to communist-inspired overseas organizations with the bewildering substance of Guianese domestic politics. Successive colonial administrations had the burden of defending the 1953 coup d’état and of expending their energies to contain the invisible tiger. By persecuting the leaders of the PPP, they made martyrs of them, enhancing their popularity and support among numerous sectors of the population. Although Dr. Jagan described himself as a Marxist, he never admitted to being a communist. His critics and detractors always hurled that epithet at (  )

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him, seeking to damage his credibility and destroy any potential electoral support. Jagan skillfully dodged questions about his alleged communist sympathies. His answer to a query posed by a reporter in Holland after the 1953 coup demonstrates his intellectual gymnastics on this issue:

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QUESTION: Are you a communist or are you sympathetic toward communism? ANSWER: I am sympathetic towards anyone who supports the cause of British Guiana.21 When he visited British Guiana in 1956, Sir Charles Ponsonby, a prominent member of the Royal Empire Society and of the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party, reported that, in contrast to Forbes Burnham, Jagan “declined to answer the direct question: ‘Dr. Jagan are you a Communist?’ and, after much hesitation and evasion, said he did not think the question was ‘relevant.’” This response notwithstanding, Ponsonby concluded that the “Jagans are ideological Communists who will never change their spots.”22 Cheddi Jagan’s most detailed articulation of his ideological positions in the 1950s appeared in a paper he presented to the PPP’s annual conference in 1956. It was delivered three years after the 1953 coup and a year after the split with Burnham. The paper constituted a lengthy thematic and partisan discourse on international developments and the British Guiana political context. In Lenin-like fashion, Jagan wanted to provide a succinct exposition of his party’s ideology, one that would foster unity and animate its policy initiatives. He described the PPP as “a national party, a broad alliance of various democratic sections—working class, peasantry, middle class, native businessmen and capitalists—opposed to imperialism. As such, communists, social-democrats, native capitalists, civil servants, professional men can all play their part in, and belong to, such a party.”23 Jagan rejected that part of the party’s constitution that implied the PPP “is a socialist party.” “Such a formulation,” he said, “has the danger that it will drive away from the party native capitalists opposed to imperialism, but mortally afraid of socialismcommunism.”24 In redefining the PPP’s ideology, Jagan thus pragmatically strove to create one that was all-inclusive, seemingly embracing groups that had contradictory interests. This was Jaganism, a crude variant of Marxism loosely adapted to the social and political realities of British Guiana. Its broadly based, inclusive approach had considerable appeal theoretically, but the delicate balancing of so many competing groups under the party’s umbrella would ultimately prove elusive and guarantee its failure as a strategy. Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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In keeping with the temperament of its architect, Jaganism had no sharp ideological fangs. It was simultaneously Marxist and nationalist in its inspiration, and rejected, at least in 1956, the experiences of more developed countries as exemplars for British Guiana. It had no patience with those who manifested “left deviationist tendencies.” These were the “comrades” who behaved in a mechanistic fashion; copying wholesale revolutionary tactics and slogans of left parties in the metropolitan, capitalistically advanced countries, without bothering to study carefully our concrete conditions and historical stage of development. Some communists in our party tended to act as communists in a communist party and, to make our party into a communist party of an advanced country. They failed to distinguish between the revolution in imperialist countries, to make the necessary modifications as leaders of a mass national party.25

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Jagan’s statement clearly indicated that the PPP was not conceived as a Communist Party, an assertion that would alienate those communists who had found a home there. Denouncing “left deviationism and adventurism,” Jagan proposed the formation of a “united broad national front” in the cause of independence. Such a front “must necessarily include the anti-imperialist parties and a party of the nationalist capitalists.” Ideally, such a front would not mean an electoral alliance, but “if our ‘friends’ insist on an electoral alliance, then we will have necessarily to make the united front of struggle into an electoral front also.”26 Such tenets of Jaganism found no favor with the acknowledged communists in the PPP. But its architect genuinely wanted to create a coalition of all Guianese people who supported national independence, even at the risk of dividing the party leadership. Jagan’s ideologically eclectic stance, in contradistinction to that of his colleagues who embraced a more aggressive communism, was lost on his detractors. The Daily Chronicle, which published the complete text of Jagan’s paper, observed that it gave “a clear insight into the motives of Jagan and his followers.” The newspaper charged that “the new Communist plot, with its intrigues and subterfuges, has been bared, posing a challenge to the democratic forces in the country and the British Caribbean.”27 This was a gross misrepresentation, one that American consul general Maddox repeated: “The statement reveals Jagan in his true light as an unrepentant communist.”28 Jagan’s delineation of his ideological position had done little to temper his domestic and international image as a communist. Dr. Jagan’s address to the 1956 PPP convention produced some internal dissension and several Africans left the party. Sydney King was one of the (  )

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most prominent. Described by the Guiana Graphic as “the one-time fire eating Communist,” the former PPP minister broke from the party because of Jagan’s failure to embrace the concept of a federation of the British Caribbean colonies and what King called Jagan’s theoretical adherence to communist dogma. King admitted that he had become disenchanted with the behavior of the Russians. He had come to the realization, he said, that “the word Communist had now a sinister significance.” The Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956 to crush an insurgent movement had shown him “clearly that the so called people’s democracies are not free.” King admitted that “my attitude toward the Western powers has now completely changed. I believe that what Britain has said about the Stalin atrocities to be true.”29 Sydney King’s volte face demonstrated some degree of ideological fluidity in the PPP and the colony. “I was an intellectual Communist,” King said, noting that he had been under “no organisational control.” “I was the home grown product,” he conceded. King’s intellectual metamorphosis allowed him, by 1957, to advocate “a coalition of all parties, left and right, on the basis of adherence to the British Commonwealth of Nations and the principles of parliamentary democracy as in Britain, America, India, and Ghana.” He believed that such a coalition would create the conditions necessary for Guiana’s “development by free enterprise, both foreign and local.”30 Jagan never repudiated his beliefs, as King did, but when he returned to office in 1957, he tempered his ideology in practice. Governor Patrick Renison, no admirer of Dr. Jagan or the PPP, grudgingly observed that “since taking office, whatever their feelings of frustration and confinement, the ministers have pursued a moderate policy in spite of their communist leanings, and their administrative inexperience; in the face of considerable financial difficulties and of growing political criticism they are trying hard to govern sensibly and to avoid crisis.”31 The government’s chief secretary, F. D. Jakeway, also noticed that Jagan had become “less aggressive, more moderate, and mature in presenting his arguments.” He was displaying “a reasonable and satisfactory attitude in his dealing with the government and the British officials,” Jakeway noted. His observations of Cheddi and Janet Jagan had led him to believe that they “complimented each other with notable effectiveness.” Cheddi was the theoretician and Janet was “the accomplished organizer and administrator.” Jakeway did not believe that Mrs. Jagan dominated her husband in “ideological and political affairs.” In fact, in the meetings of the Executive Council, Janet “frequently looked to Cheddi for guidance and her cue. When differences of opinion occurred, Janet generally deferred to Cheddi,” the chief secretary reSearching for Cheddi and the PPP

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marked. Jakeway also noticed a change in Janet Jagan’s demeanor. It was not a political change, but one that reeked of sexist condescension. The minister, he said, had “become a bit seedy in appearance” before the elections but “has undergone a striking change for the better.” Jakeway thought that Mrs. Jagan’s ministerial income now allowed her “to dress well.” Continuing with evident sexist relish, he concluded that “her official position requires that she pay attention to her appearance and the recognition and status she enjoys have undoubtedly boosted her spirits and contributed to what might be called her transformation. She appears to enjoy social activities and the fuss which is generally made over her. Her charm and lively nature are now evident.”32 This may have been true, but the Jagans had more serious concerns. “I have found him sincere in his belief that it is his job in life to lead his country; he is exceedingly hardworking; and he does not use his position for any personal gain other than the gain of political power,” noted Governor Grey in 1961. In his opinion, although Jagan’s experiences in office “have not made him more practical[,] they have taught him that it is easier to criticise than to manage and that . . . running a country is a hard task.” The governor remained unimpressed, however, by Jagan’s talents as an administrator. “I think that the root of his unsuitability as a leader is in his lack of capacity for responsibility rather than in any inborn taste for violence,” Grey ventured. In addition, Jagan’s “lack of practicality” could lead him to “persist in measures that the bulk of his electoral followers do not want.”33 Almost alone among senior colonial administrators, Governor Grey seemed not to be overly perturbed by Jagan’s ideological rhetoric. “Whether or not he is a Sino-Soviet Communist, he is a muddle headed MarxistLeninist socio-economist, who dazes himself with hard work and too much turgid reading and many of his public utterances are arrant nonsense as well as tediously dull,” the governor asserted. “Intelligence material” had revealed that “the Jagans effectively control the PPP . . . and they may not be ‘Communists’ in the sense that they are dedicated, practical and obedient Communist[s] who will blindly follow the (Moscow or Peking) line.” Grey believed that an intelligence report concluding that the Jagans “are not friends of the West is somewhat beyond the mark.”34 Breaking with past official assessments of British Guiana as a communist state in embryo, the governor reported: “My personal opinion is that the dangers to the health of this part of the free world that are to be apprehended in British Guiana result from the administrative ineptitude, lack of capacity for decision and general incompetence of Jagan and his associates (other than Mrs. Jagan) rather than from his ideology and his friends.”35 (  )

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Grey had no patience with those who exploited the communist bogey. “I deplore the facile sticking of a Communist label on anything and everything my government does that offends anti Communist thought here,” he lamented. Grey did not believe the Jaganites had the capacity to create a communist state in Guiana. “If international Communism gets a good foothold in British Guiana,” he remarked, “it will be because the PPP are muddlers and will be unable to cope with harder headed men of sterner purpose rather than because they are led now by Communists of some design or other and have a host of Communist contacts.” Grey painted an unflattering picture of the “effective people” in the PPP, again clearly indicating that incompetence was their most notable attribute. Brindley Benn, the minister of natural resources, was “an African school teacher who made no success of teaching” and who, “probably just because he is an African and thus an advertisement for multi-racialism in the party, is chairman of the party.” Benn “has become the mouthpiece for the party’s worst pro Communist and anti-religious utterances,” but he “has no great popular following.” The governor was unsure whether Benn’s communist sympathies were a function of “conviction or because Jagan and the PPP are his bread ticket.” Benn’s wife, Mrs. B. H. Benn, although “outwardly pleasant,” was “thought by some who know her well to be more dangerous and more anti-West than her husband.”36 Governor Grey characterized Boysie Ram Karran, the minister of communications and treasurer of the PPP, as “being utterly devoted to Jagan,” adding that “it is doubtful if he has any ideology.” Grey’s description of the minister of community development, Balram Singh Rai, was particularly harsh. “He has a strangely mixed personality,” the governor wrote, “at times appearing sincere in his undoubted application to his official tasks, but seemingly incapable of resisting the temptation to meddle and be mischievous.” Grey was certain that Rai was “no communist, but an intense individualist, and he has impressed many . . . as probably cherishing an ambition to supplant Jagan.” Claude Christian, who served as office manager for the PPP and later as minister of home affairs, was a “bread and butter communist,” but “it is very doubtful if he is a man of any particular intellectual convictions.”37 Grey was no more charitable in his depiction of the other members of the PPP hierarchy. Ranji Chandisingh, then editor of Thunder, had been an active member of the British Communist Party but “has been something of a disappointment to the Jagans, being less assiduous in his duties than he ought to be and rather fond of the bottle.” Chandisingh had “recently married and so far forgot his Communist indoctrination as to have a ‘white wedding’ in church, with a ‘champagne reception’ at the Jagans.” Moses BhagSearching for Cheddi and the PPP

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wan and Neville Annibourne were young “journalists” who “have not lived abroad but have recently been on “international Communist Junketings . . . and are probably willing to do any Communist work to which they are set.” On the other hand, Fenton Ramsahoye was “a clever young barrister”; yet he “is facile and conceited and though he probably has no deep convictions will serve the Jagans for his own ends.” H. J. M. Hubbard, chairman of the British Guiana Electricity Corporation, was “an outwardly respectable, rather dull Afro-European Commission Agent” who did “Jagan’s bidding.”38 The governor was equally scathing in his assessment of R. B. Gajraj, a successful Indian businessman and generally seen as a potential speaker of the House of Assembly. “He is certainly no Communist,” observed Grey, but unlike many wealthy Indians, he “supports Jagan and the PPP . . . publicly.” Gajraj, a former mayor of Georgetown and a nominated member of the Legislative Council, was “suave and continues to give his public support without committing himself to any outrageous views that would be held against him if his present favourite horse . . . [shows] any signs of losing the race [and] he wished to switch his bet.” He “is moved solely by a desire for personal reward. . . . [He] is said to be hopeful for a knighthood.” In his list of functionaries, the governor mentioned Jai Narine Singh, minister of local government and social welfare in the 1953 administration, “because of his seeming to be persona grata in Latin American circles opposed to Britain.” Singh allied himself with the Burnham wing after the 1955 split in the PPP but “later quit the party to form his own Guianese Independence Movement, of which he is (as he cheerfully admits) the head, body, limb, and outer vestments.” Grey observed that when Singh was not “rabble-rousing, he is the pleasantest and most amusing of revolutionaries.” He “is dismissed by most Guianese as a ‘lunatic’ and there is much that is odd about him: but he is not so mad that he does not prosper as lawyer, rice farmer and entrepreneur. . . . He votes with the PPP on ‘Nationalist’ issues but is, as Jagan confesses to me, an unpredictable and unreliable ally.”39 Janet Jagan was the clear exception in the governor’s disparagement of the PPP leadership. Grey thought she was much “more intelligent and practical” than her husband. He recognized that there were several hardworking party functionaries “out in the country districts,” but “none is of any particular consequence and in so far [as] there is any direction of the PPP it rests on those I have named.” But, he added uncharitably, “Gajraj is the only one among them with any capacity for affairs and he would be unlikely to exercise it except for his own benefit.”40

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Governor Grey did not demonize Cheddi Jagan in the way in which Governor Renison had done. He poked fun at the “unpractical” Jagan, recalling that on one occasion the premier said suddenly in the Executive Council, “‘Sir, this country must be industrialized.’ I agreed wholeheartedly, but he went on, ‘I have instructed my Permanent Secretary to concentrate on it. After all, Sir, if he starts only one new industry each month, that would be twelve by the end of the year.’”41 On another occasion, when Jagan was angered by the strike of some airport personnel, he exulted: “We must train more of these people. We must not only train enough to fill the jobs in the Public Service; we must train more so that if any of ours lets us down we can at once replace them.”42 In response to the comment, the governor “pictured some kind of human cold storage with experts neatly binned waiting only to be thawed out and put to work when needed.” Jagan, Grey said, “has no glimmering of an idea of how a Cabinet style government should be run, no sense of joint responsibility with his own colleagues, let alone with the Governor.” Still, Grey noted, Jagan had changed his personal style over the years. Writing in 1961, he said he had been told Jagan was “better behaved now than he was in 1953.” Eight years earlier, Jagan “was an intolerable colleague, now at least it is possible to work with him cheerfully enough.” The governor thus concluded: “He is eight years older and the times have changed; there is no need to be such an uncomfortable firebrand, even if he felt inclined to be.”43 When the PPP returned to office in August 1957, its executive power had been much diminished. Jagan did not hold the title of premier; rather, among the ministers he was the first among equals. The ministers were essentially apprentices operating under the close control and scrutiny of the governor, who exercised effective power in the administration. As then governor Sir Patrick Renison reminded the Colonial Office in early 1958, he had “sufficient power . . . to counterbalance irresponsibility if necessary.”44 Recognizing that his government had only limited power, Jagan was wont to complain that the ministers were in office but not in power. A little more than three years later, Governor Grey had much criticism for the administration’s overall performance. In mid-1961 he observed that “nothing that the Government has thus far touched in the field of ‘business’ has prospered. Railway and ferries lose money; B.G. Airways loses money; milk pasteurization and government fish and vegetable marketing lose badly; rice-milling loses badly.”45 The governor, however, did see a silver lining in this catalog of mismanaged ventures. “The greatest limitation on the gov-

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ernment’s capacity for harm is, unhappily, the limitation on its capacity for good—its own ineptitude and inability to take decisions and carry them through,” he wrote.46 Grey never doubted Jagan’s earnestness, telling Sir Hugh Foot, the British ambassador to the United Nations Trusteeship Council in 1961, that “I do still feel that he is genuine in his anxiety to help his people.” But Grey was still bothered by what he saw as the premier’s character flaws. “One of Cheddi’s basic and ineradicable faults,” he said, “is that he is so easily moved to rail against fate. If an obstacle appears in his path, he stops, not to think how to remove it, circumnavigate it or climb over it, but to bellyache about its being there and to think of some human agency to blame for its being there.”47 Grey delighted in recounting his moments of exasperation with Jagan. When the premier told him that he planned to attend a meeting of the World Peace Council in Stockholm after having made a trip to Washington seeking aid, the governor said he spent “lots of time and energy telling him profanely that was plain lunacy.” Grey told Jagan that

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he had invested a lot of sweat and agony in North America last month and had, on the whole, done it well; he was proposing to meet the new Secretary of State and convince him that he was fit to be trusted with an independent British Guiana; before either investment could mature, let alone pay off, he proposed to wreck them by going to some nonsense Communist-front organization in Stockholm. “Oh,” says he, “This is important—the peace of the world and disarmament.” I said that even with the fullest respect for my Premier I knew that it would not affect the fate of the world a two penny damn whether little Cheddi Jagan went to Stockholm or not, but it would do him and his country a lot of harm. He said that there were times when he took my advice and times when he didn’t; but he would “think about it.” I said that was his usual pleasant way of ending a conversation politely and meant that he would persist in his folly. However, I shall keep at him.48 This detailed excerpt from Grey’s lengthy letter to Hugh Foot shows the premier’s naïveté pitted against the governor’s practicality. It also reveals the texture of the relationship between the colonial governor and “my Premier.” Jagan, in this context, was the colonial who needed the sympathetic understanding and guidance of the wiser imperial overlord. He appears in these encounters not as the stereotypical calculating Marxist but as the charming, vulnerable leader operating above his limits and, as Grey uncharitably observed, demonstrating a “crowded and jumbled mind.”49 (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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Despite his negative assessments of the PPP leaders and the checkered performance of the government, Governor Grey was the quiet architect of a change in colonial policy. Although he distrusted the PPP and its leadership and harbored deep anticommunist sentiments, he understood their nationalist impulses. Unlike his predecessors, Grey did not believe the People’s Progressive Party was capable of creating a communist state in British Guiana. He realized the propaganda value of the Jagans’ visits to countries like Cuba, recalling that Mrs. Jagan’s most vivid impression of Cuba was of “those splendid, virile young men with their flashing eyes and carling beards.” Governor Grey believed that the world had acquired “an unnecessarily bad picture of British Guiana . . . and in the over simplification that is inevitable in a big, busy, and sadly-troubled world, British Guiana is labeled Communist.” Grey clearly saw the political reality in Guiana as being much more complicated than did his predecessors, the Colonial Office, and the Americans who were taking an aggressive interest in the colony’s affairs.50 The frequent assessments of the character and competence of Guiana’s leaders by colonial officials could vary, even be contradictory, depending on who made them, the context, and the moment in the politician’s career. They were significant, however, because they helped to determine the United Kingdom’s attitude to that individual, sometimes with profound implications for colonial policy. In April 1960, for example, R. J. Ballantyne, the second secretary of the American Embassy in London, reported to his government that “the Colonial Office found the BG politicians to be an uninspiring lot.” Cheddi Jagan, according to colonial officials, “was the most capable and reliable.” In contrast, Forbes Burnham was “hopelessly slothful, poorly equipped and ill prepared for leadership.” At a recent constitutional conference, Burnham earned the sobriquets “tricky” and “playboy.” F. W. Essex, an Englishman who was serving as British Guiana’s financial secretary, told Ballantyne that “we have our troubles with Jagan, but if Burnham were to take over the government, BG would simply break down.” Essex believed the motive forces in “Burnham’s political life were egocentrism, envy of Jagan and a racial chip-on-the-shoulder.” Essex, who worked closely with Jagan, described him as “ambitious” and “intelligent.” In an assessment shared by others, he characterized Jagan as “largely incapable of taking a decision.” That defect, he said, explained why Mrs. Jagan played such an important role in the colony’s political life. “She could and would take a decision,” Essex said, “and once she had, Jagan’s inertia, doubts and procrastination, would fall away and he would apply himself to the path Janet had chosen.” Not everyone, as we have seen, agreed with the view that Cheddi Jagan followed Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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his wife’s lead. Essex detected the toll that the rough-and-tumble Guianese politics had taken on Jagan. He guessed that there were times when “Cheddi thought to himself that he probably could have done more for the Guianese by maintaining his practice as a dentist and lowering his fees to the poor than by opening himself up to every ne’er-do-well who wished to button-hole him on the street.”51 Governor Renison, the second governor with whom Jagan served, shared some of the views expressed by Essex. To him, Jagan and Burnham were “two unreliable leaders”; Jagan, he said, “is a theorist, not a practical administrator.” He blamed “an unthinking electorate” for voting them into office. As he put it, “A country which has . . . entrusted its choice of leaders to the ballot box must not despair however comic the figures which that jack-in-the box throws up.”52 Governor Grey, as noted earlier, also never had much respect for Dr. Jagan’s judgment or administrative competence. When Jagan met with him on February 8, 1963, to discuss a number of subjects, the premier told him that he had instructed the attorney general to arrest two contractors for failing to meet the terms of their contract. According to Grey, “I asked what they would be locked up for and Jagan said, ‘Oh, I don’t know. Ramsahoye [the attorney general] had some law he was looking at—I don’t understand these things—breaches of contract is it called? I told him to go ahead and get them locked up.’” Astonished, Grey observed: “That isn’t Castroism; it is just ignorance and unfitness for the job and bewilderment and Cheddism. But it is a profitless business trying to deal with such a Premier.”53 During the same conversation, Jagan proceeded to lecture the governor on the “failure of the Capitalist system in Canada” and on American imperialism, leading Grey to remark: The trouble with this chap is not that he is a Communist or a Communist sympathizer, etc., but he just is not cut out to be a Premier or a Minister or anything else of a practical nature. (We also got back to the old business of how he could train a dozen dental assistants in a short time—though it has risen to a year, since last we talked—who could work under his supervision without the need for elaborate University treatment? I began to wonder if he is cut out to be a dentist either.)54 The Foreign Office also had little admiration for Jagan and his management skills. In an internal memorandum prepared on November 1961, officials described Jagan’s ministers as “a clique of personal friends or followers of Jagan or minor opportunists who are clinging to his coat tails. . . . None of (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

those in office has any practical experience of affairs.” Jagan, the memorandum said,

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is madly industrious and probably sincerely devoted to his country’s cause; but he is hopelessly unpractical [sic]. . . . He is already infected with exaggerated ideas of his importance as a “world figure” and having had a taste of meeting with Prime Ministers and Presidents, is all for more of the same, rather than the painful (and less politically rewarding) business of trying to solve the problems on his desk. Dreams multiply and deeds diminish. . . . It is this lack of practical ability, rather than any ideology, that will cause Jagan to bring his country into trouble.55 Colonial secretary Anthony Greenwood was another who doubted Jagan’s competence. In fact, in a conversation with American consul general Everett K. Melby in Georgetown on February 13, 1964, he confided: “I don’t subscribe to the view, you know, that Cheddi is a Communist. Some of the people around him are bad though.” Melby told him that “one astute officer once remarked that Cheddi was the case of a nice guy who joined the wrong church about 20 years ago and it was now too late. . . . I said I found Cheddi like a tape recorder: you press the button and you get the line.” “Greenwood seemed to agree,” the consul general wrote, “but expressed [the] thought [that] Cheddi was in his own way brilliant although rather incompetent.” Greenwood then commented: “On the other hand, here is this other guy [Burnham] who knows so quickly relationships, where British Guiana fits into the wider scheme of things, procedures, etc. whereas Cheddi does not grasp those things.”56 When he led the British Guianese government, the relationship between Cheddi Jagan and the four governors with whom he served was, at best, a complicated one. As the Crown’s representative, the colonial governor wielded the most power and was not hesitant to remind the elected representatives of the people of that fact and of his prerogatives. Jagan had to sit through numerous lectures from the various colonial governors as they upbraided him for alleged misdeeds, ranging from the content of his speeches to failure to reach a modus vivendi with his opponents, his neglect of official duties, exceeding his authority by making foreign policy pronouncements, and so on. These admonitions all occurred in private meetings, and Jagan probably never shared his resentment of such treatment with his colleagues. Jagan, as the wayward student, had to be chastised by the headmaster who was conscious of his power to belittle. The premier was not the only one so chastised and reminded about the Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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locus of power in the colony. Individual ministers could be reprimanded for behavior the governor disliked. In 1962, for example, the very accomplished attorney general, Dr. Fenton Ramsahoye, angered Grey when he criticized Sir Henry Wynn Parry, chairman of a commission investigating social disturbances that had occurred in February. Addressing a public meeting at Port Mourant, Ramsahoye declared: “I have been practising in the courts for 10 years and I have never met a political illiterate like the Chairman of the Commission.” He said that if “the Commission was like a court which had recourse to appeal, his report could be upset in ten minutes. . . . So anti-communist he was, that he allowed unfair questions to be put to the Premier, and when I objected, he ruled that the answer must be ‘yes’ or ‘no.’”57 After reading a newspaper account of the speech as well as similar comments by Brindley Benn, the infuriated governor summoned Dr. Ramsahoye to meet with him. According to Grey’s report to the Colonial Office, the attorney general “appeared looking like a sick cat and obviously thought he was in for a wigging.” But “I was very quiet with him,” assuring Ramsahoye that “I was [not] going to rebuke him for misbehaviour as a Minister; I was just going to tell him personally, as one that belonged to the same profession, that he had behaved scandalously and that he was a fool. . . . No barrister of standing, least of all the Attorney General, would permit himself criticism in such terms.” Grey emphasized that Ramsahoye had “demeaned himself by talking in such a way to a street-corner crowd.” As the minister “sat shamefacedly and wriggled,” the governor continued:

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The years of learning and of sacrifice by his family to give him his learnings, in which he had attained some distinction were being thrown away by his political follies. If he had not the courage to get out, he ought at least to preserve the shreds of honour while he stayed in. If he could not bring himself to get out of the PPP, he could at least decline to take part in dirty business. The time must come when, if he wished to have any future in the law as Britain knows it, he must cease to run with the PPP pack[;] when asked to do something against conscience, he must get out or else sacrifice any claim on the regard of decent men.58 At the time, Ramsahoye was thirty-three years old. Although the governor’s words were paternalistic, rude, and condescending, he spoke from a position of imperial privilege and undoubtedly believed he could insult colonial underlings without an apologetic glance. Both sides—the colonizers and the colonized—found it difficult to abandon old habits of mind and behavior. In this instance, an imperious white colonial governor with the power of the (  )

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state behind him thought he had the right to berate the brown-skinned subject with impunity. According to Grey, Ramsahoye sat through the tonguelashing from the imperial overlord and “made little protest.”59 Mr. Haijsman of the Colonial Office took a special interest in Brindley Benn’s and Dr. Ramsahoye’s criticisms of the Wynn Parry Commission. He dismissed Benn’s remarks, saying they could be ignored since “he knows no better.” But he sought the advice of A. J. Grattan Bellew, another official, to determine whether it would be appropriate to bring Ramsahoye’s “scurrilous remarks” to the attention of the British legal profession. Haijsman thought it would be desirable to do so since Ramsahoye “is thinking of setting up practice in this country.” The Bar Association should be made aware of “his attitude to the judiciary.” In his reply, Grattan Bellew declined to advise any action by the Colonial Office since he felt Governor Grey’s reprimand was sufficient.60 The incident thereby ended but not before demonstrating the potential harm that could come to a critic of the colonial administration if he or she transgressed the etiquette that the overlords had set. In spite of their vigorous assaults on colonialism and at times on American imperialism, Guianese leaders—with the notable exception of Janet Jagan— had no hesitation in seeking the counsel of British and American officials. They were probably unaware of the fact that the substance of their conversations was reported to London and Washington. The larger meaning of these interactions, to be sure, was that the products of the colonial experience were still psychologically bound to the colonizers and could liberate themselves only with considerable difficulty. Only time would reveal whether their psychological dependence was harder to sunder than their political ties. Writing in February 1964, American consul general Everett Melby accurately noted: The mentality of Guianese politicians and people is still strongly colonialist, despite the fervor of their nationalist sentiments. The most ardent nationalists still run to Government House for advice (even if they generally ignore it). Guianese implore foreigners to help them against their domestic enemies, and seem genuinely shocked when told that freedom is something they must fight for themselves. The psychology of colonialism will take years to fade away, and the “Big House” apparently, must be closed down before Guianese will begin to think for themselves and stand on their own feet.61 There were signs, of course, that at least at the rhetorical level some of these leaders were beginning to sever their psychological ties with the coloSearching for Cheddi and the PPP

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nizers. But this was a monumental task for a people who were socialized by educational and social systems designed to foster allegiance to the British Crown, promote the superiority of all things British, and legitimize the status quo. Such internalized constructs did not lend themselves to an easy exorcism, and the process could be slow, frequently contradictory, and painful. Even as Jagan, Burnham, and others criticized the colonial bosses and boycotted welcoming ceremonies for the governors, many Guianese greeted them enthusiastically and expressed their fealty to the distant sovereign and her government. Successive governors were gratified by the loyalty to the British throne expressed by most Guianese, enjoying the comfortable thought that Cheddi Jagan and those who criticized the colonial regime were unrepresentative and disloyal upstarts. Although the Jagan government had declined to send representatives to Jamaica to greet the newly crowned Queen Elizabeth II in 1953, her coronation was celebrated with considerable enthusiasm in the colony. The Daily Argosy welcomed this expression of loyalty as “a heartening sign coming after the General Elections when it was felt that the people were slipping away from a system and way of life which they have known and enjoyed.” The descendants of African slaves and Indian indentured servants who still eked out an existence on the societal margins would not have agreed that they “enjoyed” the colonial system. “The people of this colony,” the Argosy continued, “have demonstrated their love for their sovereign and their faith in monarchical government” by their participation in the coronation ceremonies. It hoped that “the monarchy will always remain with us.”62 Despite the trauma of 1953 and the uncertainties that followed, the rankand-file Guianese still cherished their connection to the Crown. “In this country of contradictions with its unenviable reputation for Communism and disorder,” wrote Governor Grey in 1961, “there is abundant evidence of the value that Indians, as well as Africans, attach to the British connection.” He noted that “a gubernatorial visit to a village is the occasion for a plentiful display of flags and bunting and much singing of two verses of ‘God Save the Queen,’ and the offering of touching personal kindness.” The governor told of the great pleasure felt everywhere when Princess Margaret visited in 1958, and he had seen “the enthusiasm and loyalty delightedly shown when Her Royal Highness the Princess Royal visited us in early 1960.” He thought it “is easy to exaggerate such matters; [but] it would be equally wrong to play them down too much.” Grey was convinced that there was “very little anti-British feeling for agents of disaffection to work on.” He believed that “even among the many who would vote for Jagan because he is an Indian and ‘their man,’ (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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there are many who have no desire to live under a system other than to which they have been used to in British Guiana.”63 These expressions of loyalty observed by the governor and others coexisted with those that showed disrespect for the Crown. In January 1953, for example, some patrons of the cinemas in Georgetown were declining to stand while the British national anthem was being played. Incensed by this “apparent disloyalty,” J. R. Moss, the honorary secretary of state of the Society for the Promotion of Refinement among Children, issued a statement condemning such conduct. “This loyal observance,” he said, “is certainly not a servile one for it merely shows the respect we have for our Queen . . . [someone] who sets us noble examples of dignity, decorum and culture.”64 Seen through the optic of the colonial regime and its enablers, the behavior in the cinema constituted an act of disloyalty. But it could also be interpreted as a manifestation of a nascent Guianese nationalism, a case of people using the weapons at their disposal to make deeply held political statements. Such sentiments grew in intensity and vigor over time; by 1963 a minister of government, Senator H. J. M. Hubbard, could assert that the Guianese people “have lived on the edge of barbarity” imposed by the colonial regime, but they bore such “griefs” and “cruelties” with pride. “They are a price that we must pay,” he said, “and when the price is fully paid, we will walk like men, not beholden to others and not genuflecting to any monarch or president across the seas.”65 This was a bold expression of nationalist sentiment from a would-be capitalist, a man described by the American consul general as “an ineffectual and unsuccessful African American Commission Agent.” The irony was not lost on Melby, who observed: “For Hubbard, whose capitalist girth would qualify him as one of the most successful of imperialist oppressors, to speak in these terms, is a little ludicrous.”66 But this was one of the contradictions of the colonial experience: nationalist sentiment could trump naked personal gain or advantage. The most unlikely person could become the angry apostle and vehicle of change. BY 1961, LARGELY INFLUENCED by the reports from Governor Grey, prominent officials in the Colonial Office had come to view Dr. Jagan as “ideologically muddle headed” rather than as a communist. Still, they believed that his ideological fuzziness made him vulnerable to the fearful machinations of Cuba and the Eastern Bloc countries. Jagan had an opportunity to explain his ideological position when he addressed the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., in October 1961. Doing so at considerable length, he said: Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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I am, I believe, generally dismissed in this country as a Communist. That word has a variety of meanings according to the personal views of the man who makes the charge. Some people, for example, said that General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower was a Communist. To others a Communist means simply a person who is in favour of a certain pattern of economic organization in which the State plays a direct and active part. Still others mean when they call you a Communist that you are a dedicated agent of what they call an “international conspiracy.” . . . First of all I am a passionate anti-colonialist. I, like your forefathers, believe that colonialism is wicked. I believe so strongly that colonialism is utterly wrong that I would gladly accept any help from whatever quarter to help me in my fight against it. . . . I wish to see my country prosperous and developing, its people happy, well-fed, well-housed, and with jobs to do. Too many of them at the present time lack these elementary essentials. Continuing his address, Jagan affirmed his nationalist principles:

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Second only to my passion for the independence of my people is this dedication to their economic advancement, so that their lives may be more abundant. Now, in this I am a socialist. By this I mean that I am in favour of the workers reaping the full fruits of their labour through public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. . . . I believe ideally in the nationalization of all the important means of production, distribution and exchange. This will ensure a fairer distribution of a country’s wealth than any other system. But I also have to recognize things as they are. While I reserve our right, as any sovereign nation does, to nationalize whatever industry we think should be nationalized in the public interest we have explicitly stated that we have no intention of nationalizing the existing sugar and bauxite companies. . . . If on the other hand it ever became necessary to nationalize any industries, fair and adequate compensation would be paid. . . . I place myself in company with other nationalist leaders of Asia and Africa. I believe like these nationalist leaders that the economic theories of scientific socialism hold out the promise of a dynamic and social discipline which can transform an underdeveloped country into a developed one in a far shorter time than any other system. Jagan also emphasized his commitment to parliamentary democracy and neutralism on the international stage: I believe in parliamentary democracy, by which I recognize the rights of opposition parties, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, regular and (  )

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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honest elections, an impartial judiciary and an independent civil service. . . . I mean to pursue a policy of active neutralism. Because of the immensity of our problems I am forced like India and some other underdeveloped countries to seek aid from all possible sources. I have however made no secret of the fact that I will not accept any aid upon conditions which limit the sovereignty of my people. We do not intend to be a bridgehead or a base for anyone. I am not the agent for what some call an international conspiracy. I take no orders from anyone. I am concerned only with the urgent problems of the social and economic development of my country. I am not interested in the cold war in which in any case my small country can play no effective role.67 In this speech, Dr. Jagan had, once again, declined to characterize himself as a communist, underscoring his anticolonialism and his credentials as a Guianese nationalist. This may have been a strategic calculation, given the audience and the locus of the speech. But the address merely brought together in a coherent form the ideas that Jagan had espoused in British Guiana since his return in 1943. His failure to embrace a communist doctrinal label did not satisfy his critics who equated the positions he articulated with communism. Jaganism had many roots, defying any traditional ideological categorization. Cheddi Jagan had another opportunity to discuss his ideological positions when he appeared before the Wynn Parry Commission in 1962. This body was investigating the social disturbances that had paralyzed the colony the previous February. Premier Jagan was subjected to a withering cross-examination by the eminent barrister and his inveterate foe, Lionel Luckhoo, who was representing the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce: JAGAN: I believe the tenets of Communism to be “From each according to his ability to each according to his needs.” I believe that. LUCKHOO: That is your conceptualization of the tenets of Communism and you believe in that? JAGAN: Yes LUCKHOO: That represents your Communist belief ? JAGAN: Yes.68 In this instance, Jagan went further than he had ever done in publicly acknowledging any communist beliefs. He would clarify his answer in a statement he made to the commission a few days later. It was an important window into the complex ideological world of Jaganism. It was neither classic Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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Marxism, communism, nor capitalism but an amorphous conglomeration of ideas borrowed from different ideological streams. Jaganism was nothing if not ideologically eclectic. Thus, Jagan could affirm in his statement to the commission that “my party does not believe in the abolition of private ownership” at the same time he espoused “from each according to his ability to each according to his need.” He said that “under the suppression of Communism Act in South Africa, to criticise the attitude to Apartheid is regarded as Communism. In such circumstances I would describe myself as a communist.” Elaborating, Jagan reasoned that, “by saying that I am a Marxist, I could be at one and the same time anti-communist, an anti-imperialist, a Democrat, a Socialist, a Humanist and a Communist.” His ideological eclecticism was clearly manifested in this explanation of his beliefs: As a passionate anticolonialist, I am interested in the independence of my country—political independence; as an anti-imperialist, I am interested in putting an end to the domination and subjection of the economy of my country; as a Democrat, I am interested in preserving liberties and freedom of all the people—not only in preserving but in enlarging them; as a Socialist, I am interested in the creation of a new society which will lay the basis for the end of exploitation.69 The Wynn Parry Commission was not convinced by Jagan’s assertions of his commitment to democratic ideals. It concluded:

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In the course of his examination at the enquiry Dr. Jagan evaded answering the question whether he was a communist and began to give lengthy explanations. In his case it is time to say qui s’ explique se complique and ultimately the discussion may be reduced to nothing more than the bathos of semantics. . . . [But] the utterances of the Premier had conveyed to many people in British Guiana and to the outside world that he was indeed a communist. . . . There is very little doubt that many of his speeches and some of his deeds gave rise to the apprehension that despite his evasions and profession to the contrary he was acting as a communist. The commission’s report then provided a catalog of what it considered Jagan’s communist-inspired conduct: On returning from a visit to Tanganyika, he said he admired the system of one party government without an opposition. He banned the Daily Chronicle from government offices and, in order to exercise control over the Press, he drew up a scheme of setting up a Press Council. In July 1961 (  )

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he took over as many as 51 denominational private schools which were controlled by churches. He frequently expressed admiration for the way Russia was being governed and the way in which Fidel Castro had conducted himself in Cuba. . . . An article was published in the Los Angeles Times in which Dr. Jagan was listed among the twelve most important communists of the world. . . . His wife, who is supposed to be a confirmed communist[,] was believed to exercise a great deal of influence on him and to shape his policies and course of action. . . . Young men who were members of Dr. Jagan’s political party were being given scholarships and sent to Russia, Tanganyika and Cuba for training . . . and . . . the sole object of sending them there was to give them some form of military training so that they could take up arms on behalf of Dr. Jagan’s political party. This summary of Jagan’s alleged misdeeds did not constitute an especially persuasive indictment against him. As if to strengthen its accusations, the commission’s report included an appendix containing excerpts from speeches made by Jagan and other members of the PPP. Taken together, they illuminated what the commission, and undoubtedly others at the time, believed to represent “Communist leanings.” The excerpts were as follows:

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Big Business will always be opposed to this government because it will mean their ultimate destruction. Ultimately we will destroy them and that is why Big Business are [sic] afraid of us. (Statement by Mr. Mann, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Communications in the Legislative Assembly, May 15, 1962) It is easier to stop tomorrow than to stop Communism. (Mr. [Brindley] Benn) To call a man a Communist is to pay him the highest compliment you can.” (Mr. [H. J. M.] Hubbard) My Hon. Friend . . . has attempted . . . to refute Marxism. This is a futile attempt. Learned University Professors, of course of the bourgeois tradition, professional mercenaries, politicians, common vilifiers, have all tried to refute the assailable logic of Marxism. They have all failed. (Dr. [C. R.] Jacob, Hansard, October 20, 1961) The poverty in this country and in the countries like ours is due to the fact that the economies are tied to those of the capital-exploiting countries of Europe and North America. (Dr. [C. R.] Jacob, Hansard, October 20, 1961) Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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We will attempt to build a new society—a society which exists in more than one-third of the world today; a society in which there will be freedom and plenty for everybody. That is a genuine socialist society. (Dr. [C. R.] Jacob, Hansard, October 20, 1961) The great weapon of the Fascists is anti-Communism. Hitler built up a ghastly fear of Communism. He was bitterly anti-communist. Under the hysteria of anti-communism, people forget the real dangers embodied in the Fascist himself. (Moses Bhagwan, Hitler’s Force in British Guiana, p. 6; published by the P.P.P. from Freedom House) We must not be divided on the issue of Communism. Communism is winning throughout the world—it will win everywhere. (Speech by Dr. Jagan to P.P.P. Annual Congress, April 1962, reported in Sunday Times, May 13, p. 4) We are a socialist party and nationalization of the sugar industry, and indeed of all major industries[,] is our objective. In the interim, while British Guiana is still tied to British Imperialism, with limited constitutional powers, certain reforms should be undertaken to break the back of imperialism. (Dr. C. B. Jagan, Forbidden Freedom, p. 29; published by Lawrence and Wishart, 1954)70

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The findings of the Wynn Parry Commission notwithstanding, it must be said that Jagan’s elaboration of his ideology when he appeared before it was much less doctrinaire than the address he had delivered to the PPP’s congress in 1956. The ideological stridency of parts of that speech had divided the PPP, precipitating the departure of some of its prominent leaders. Time had tempered Jagan’s rhetoric. By 1962 ideological pragmatism had largely trumped Marxist shibboleths, but they had not been entirely vanquished. The burdens of government, as well as external and internal opposition, ultimately took their toll on Jagan and the party that he led. Faced with the prospect of losing the 1964 general elections as a result of the newly introduced electoral system of proportional representation, the PPP began to examine its ideological stances and policies in the summer of that year. Prepared in August, the PPP document entitled “The Time Has Come” fell into the hands of the American consul general, Delmar Carlson. He received it from the Trinidadian commissioner, Carl Tull, who claimed to have an informant in the PPP. Tull gave a copy to the Canadian commissioner and to the West German ambassador to Trinidad. The governor also received a copy, but from a source other than Tull. (  )

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The consul general’s first instinct was to doubt the document’s authenticity. In essence, it argued for a rapprochement between British Guiana and the United States—hence the interest it created among the Americans. Consul General Carlson speculated that the document was either “a working paper of the Party or a document deliberately designed to fall into the U.S. hands.” He believed “the best support for the hypothesis that it is a genuine working paper is its text; it rings true, especially the section recommending “‘the issue of a reasonably unequivocal statement on communism by the Premier.’” If the document were a plant, it seems likely that it would have contained a statement designed to convince the United States that the PPP had decided to make a genuine and final break with communism.71 Carlson had made a plausible case for the document’s authenticity. “The Time Has Come” called for an “agonising re-appraisal of the party’s strategy.” It noted the existence of “elements” hostile to the party and their success in securing international assistance to “overthrow the government.” The PPP, it said, had tried to effect social and economic reform “before power had been consolidated.” American disfavor was mainly a consequence of the fact that “certain aspects of the party’s programme have led to the charge of communism.” The party’s experience had demonstrated “that overseas assistance which derives from ideology or sympathy is negligible in its effect on the course of events.” Thus, the document complained, sympathetic Commonwealth members had shown “no great inclination to make an issue of British Guiana.” In addition, it had to be recognized that “Russia would be unwilling to risk nuclear war over an independent Guyana.” The paper noted, soberly, that “British Guiana is a very small pawn on the chessboard of power.” In fact, “the handling of the British Guiana question has . . . illustrated the hard truth that power and self interest are more important considerations on the world stage than ideology.” This “hard truth” led the document to propose that if “the distribution of hemispheric power remains as of now,” there is an “urgent need for a settlement with the USA.” It suggested that an “oblique approach” to the American government be made on the party’s behalf by the Canadian government. To allay American fears, the premier should issue “a reasonably unequivocal statement on communism.” The paper also recommended a modus vivendi with representatives of private enterprise and the religions in the colony.72 The PPP document was probably written by Janet Jagan, the party’s principal strategist. There is no evidence that it was ever discussed by the party’s executive, but its timing was somewhat inopportune. The colony was confronting a general election, and discussion of such a strategic volte face would Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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have been predictably divisive at a time when party unity was an imperative. The document’s existence was a sign that the PPP was willing to modify its ideological core if that meant it could temper the American animus to it. It had taken the party some time to refine its ideology and, as the paper said, its members had been “subjected to hardship and humiliation.” But they were beginning to accept the uncomfortable reality that more powerful countries could impose limits on the behavior of weaker ones.73 It is probably no coincidence that shortly after the document’s existence became known, Jagan shared his moments of despair with Governor Richard Luyt. Meeting with Luyt on September 4, 1964, the exhausted premier spoke of the “position of frustration in which he had found himself.” Jagan admitted that he “had lost any pleasure or satisfaction” in his present position “by being unable to achieve results.” He regretted that he had taken office in 1957, saying that perhaps that was the “biggest mistake” he had made in his career. He now had a record “of failure to achieve the objectives of his supporters,” doubting “whether there was purpose in carrying on.” Jagan confessed that he had offered to resign the leadership of the PPP after the disastrous constitutional conference of October 1963, but was dissuaded from doing so. Janet, he said, “was facing much disillusionment.” Individuals in Georgetown treated her with “rank discourtesy,” making life “in the capital almost intolerable for both of them.”74 An unsympathetic governor blamed Jagan for his misfortunes, telling him he “could hardly complain that he had critics and opponents when the image of B.G. that he allowed to be created was one which was certain to be utterly disliked in the hemisphere in which he lived.” This was certainly unfair to the premier since the Americans and the British had in some cases helped to create and exacerbate the problems he confronted. Responding to Luyt’s comment, Jagan told him that he “seemingly did not know the problems of leadership and how impossible it was in his circumstances to do that which he genuinely wished to do, namely to follow the middle road.”75 This was the voice of an ideologically chastened Cheddi Jagan, a leader whose public rhetoric was not always consistent with the pragmatism of the policies he had to embrace and the compromises he had to make. Weather-beaten and worn by September 1964, Cheddi had come to understand well the politics of power and the strength of the forces that could thwart changes they did not like. As he prepared for the December 1964 elections, Jagan sought to highlight his anticommunist and anticolonialism credentials. In a radio broadcast on October 17, he quoted colonial secretary Iain Macleod’s comment about him with approval: (  )

Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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There is an irony we all recognize in the fact of America urging us all over the world towards colonial freedom except when it approaches their own doorstep. I believe their fears are exaggerated. I do not think Dr. Jagan is a communist. The American attitude seems dangerous because in my experience if you put off independence because you fear you may get a left wing government, the most likely thing is that you will get a government even further to the left.76 Jagan said the notion that he intended to establish a totalitarian state in his country was “fantastic.” He doubted whether anyone seriously believed that America would permit the establishment of “a communist dictatorship on its doorstep.” He continued: “If the Americans cannot succeed in Vietnam in the Communist sphere of influence how can Russian Communists, if they had such intentions, succeed in British Guiana in the United States sphere of influence? But whether the PPP can set up a totalitarian regime or not, the fact is that the PPP has no wish to do so. Let me state categorically that the PPP has no intention of establishing an authoritarian regime or a dictatorship of any kind.”77 Jagan’s radio address emphasized that the “PPP is not a Communist party.” He affirmed its belief in and commitment “to parliamentary government, free elections, political democracy, the fundamental rights of the individual and a foreign policy of non-alignment.” He reminded his listeners that “I have said these things before at the United Nations and elsewhere; I repeat them now.” The premier stressed that “our policy is to pursue a mixed economy,” noting that his government had “given substantial tax and other concessions to private firms to establish industries.”78 Cheddi Jagan’s unequivocal assertion of his party’s commitment to essentially social democratic principles hardly changed the perception of his critics. The American consul general agreed with Jagan that the PPP was not a Communist Party, although his comment implied that it was led by a communist. Peter D’Aguiar, the leader of the United Force, a conservative political party founded in 1960, was more forthright. “It is just like Castro, a Communist, leading the Cuban people who are not communists into the communist camp by promising them democracy,” he scoffed.79 The belief that Jagan wanted to transform British Guiana into a communist state was so deeply imprinted on the consciousness of many people that his assertions to the contrary made little difference. His domestic detractors had a stake in fanning the flames of this issue because it earned them the goodwill and support of the United States. Searching for Cheddi and the PPP

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The ideological search for Cheddi Jagan and the PPP remains an exercise in eclecticism. Jaganism had many forebears, and it was always in a process of dynamic evolution and transformation. It was not characterized by intellectual depth, and, except for the grammar of Marxism, it was not static in its content and its praxis. Jaganism in its many formulations was an ideological humbug, a sideshow, in a colony that needed to expend its energies less on such divisive ideological posturings and more on the hard task of effective nation building.

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The Politics and Trauma of Race

The leader of the opposition was obviously in a reflective mood. Cheddi Jagan had lost the election the previous December and the politics of race had played the principal role in the voting. Writing in the World Marxism Review in October 1965, Jagan admitted there was a “tendency of anti-African racism” in the People’s Progressive Party that he led. This racism, he said, had emerged “almost as a reflex action” to “the racist anti-Indian putsches engineered since 1962 by the People’s National Congress and the Imperialists.” The PPP was “forthrightly combating racism in the party since it realized that racism is not only reactionary, but a device of the imperialists to divide the working class and thus maintain colonial rule and exploitation.” His party’s “first objective” was “the achievement of national unity and racial harmony.”1 Dr. Jagan was not being insincere when he articulated the objectives of his party. Bedeviled by a decade of overt racial disharmony, most Guianese would have echoed his sentiments about the divisive nature of racism even if their political and social relationships contradicted them. On the other hand, many would have disagreed with his partisan explanation of the racial climate and its origins. In 1965 British Guiana was the most racially tense society in the Anglophone Caribbean, for which its leaders bore a significant responsibility.

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Neither Cheddi Jagan nor Forbes Burnham nor Peter D’Aguiar created Guiana’s racial cauldron. A racialized colonial order developed in the wake of the arrival of the Europeans; it was enhanced by the introduction of African slavery and later the system of indentured labor. A tiny European minority had presided over the colony for decades, invoking white supremacy as the ideological justification. The society was held together by the use of, or the threat of, force. British Guiana, as it came into being, possessed no shared sense of common history among its peoples. It was, after all, a colony of exploitation based on racial difference for its legitimacy, and that reality was a recipe for disunity and social unrest. When the PPP was founded in 1950, the Jagans invited Burnham to join it, recognizing that the Indo-Guianese and the African Guianese peoples needed one another to achieve political independence and maintain harmony within the colony. It was a recognition of the centrality of race in the colony’s zeitgeist, the proverbial elephant in the room. The collaboration of the leaders from the two ethnic groups in the PPP augured well for the colony’s future, and the spectacular victory the party achieved in the elections of April 1953 was an expression of its efficacy. After the constitution was suspended, there was intense speculation that Britain’s action would precipitate a break between Jagan and Burnham. In answer to a question posed to them at the Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam on October 21, 1953, Jagan emphasized that “this division between the natives and the British, between black and white and as far as [that] goes, between Indians and Africans, is being kept alive by the British themselves, not by us. Look at both of us. I am Indian, Burnham is African. That difference does not affect us. Moreover my wife is a white American woman.”2 Jagan exaggerated when he ascribed the vitality of the racial “division” to the British, but they certainly bore a major responsibility for the racial cauldron the society was to become. The political alliance between Jagan and Burnham survived, temporarily, the trauma of the coup d’état. Their final break in 1955 was essentially the product of political rivalry, underlying ideological and racial differences, and the colonial regime’s mischief. Eric Huntley, a PPP stalwart, believed that the split “wasn’t significantly racial. It was Cheddi’s radical politics they [Burnham and his supporters] were against.”3 Brindley Benn, an African minister in the deposed government, maintained that “personal ambition was the main thing,” an observation directed at Burnham.4 Martin Carter, who helped found the PPP, saw the rupture as being both “racial and cultural because there were Indo and Afro-Guyanese party members, and those who (  )

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belonged to Georgetown, generally Afro-Guyanese, were against those from the countryside who were generally Indo-Guyanese.”5 Dr. Jagan himself denied that the breach was racially inspired since “both Blacks and Indians joined in the split,” adding, with an unmistakable reference to Burnham, “it was plain opportunism.”6 The alliance between Burnham and Jagan had been an uneasy one from its inception. Although they were products of the same generation, their different social backgrounds shaped their worldviews and political styles. Cheddi Jagan was a child of rural Guiana; he spent his formative years on a sugar plantation, observing and experiencing the travails of poverty. As the son of a school principal, Forbes Burnham was a member of the colony’s middle class and of the African Guianese elite. Seeking to exploit these differences in their social backgrounds, Jagan asserted that Burnham’s pedigree “has resulted in his closer association with professionals, school teachers, civil servants, other sectors of the middle class and away from the soil, from direct contact with the toiling masses.”7 When he returned home after completing his studies in London, the urbane Forbes Burnham chose Georgetown as the site of his law practice and residence. The city became his political base, and, according to his associates, he disliked campaigning in rural areas. “He never went out of Georgetown for long,” said Brindley Benn. “If he went out of Georgetown, he would stay only a short while before returning.”8 On the other hand, as Eric Huntley observed, “Cheddi was a stranger to Georgetown.” The Jagans “did not know the cultural, political, or social scene in Georgetown.” Huntley noted that “most of the other Indians who were active in the PPP had lived sufficiently long in Georgetown to become creolised. Cheddi was never creolised.”9 These contrasts, to be sure, can be overdrawn, but they do contain elements of plausibility. Some have suggested that the two men’s experiences overseas helped to fashion their political behavior back home. Schooled at the elite Queens College in Georgetown, Burnham won the highly coveted Island Scholarship which was tenable in the mother country. Queens College, like other elite secondary schools in the Anglophone Caribbean, were incubators for talented colonial subjects. The curriculum was designed to produce British gentlemen in black and brown faces to become the enablers of the regime in the civil service, the classroom, and the professions. Those who were fortunate enough to receive tertiary education went to England, as did such luminaries as Norman Manley of Jamaica and Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago. Forbes Burnham arrived in England at a time when nationalist movements were emerging all over the colonial world and students from The Politics and Trauma of Race

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the territories were especially vociferous in promoting the cause of independence, particularly in London. Burnham did not insulate himself from these ideological currents, even to the degree of becoming a member of the British Communist Party. Burnham’s sojourn in England and his interactions there liberated him from a parochial perspective on political questions. He became international in his vision and worldview. But seemingly the British political zeitgeist made him both a gradualist and a moderate in his modus operandi. Brindley Benn recalled that, unlike his associates in the early 1950s, Burnham “did not write in the papers, he didn’t want to be associated with Leftism.”10 Eric Huntley thought “Burnham and other middle-of the road, middle class leaders . . . accepted the British way of doing things, moving gradually to constitutional change and self government.”11 Given Burnham’s background and training, Robert J. Moore, a Guianese educator and diplomat, asserted: “The British upper-class thought they could admit Burnham to their club but they couldn’t see themselves admitting Cheddi because he would be all too ready to give them a sermon on dialectical materialism.”12 As the son of workers in the sugar industry, Jagan’s educational trajectory differed somewhat from Burnham’s. After attending three local schools, his father made the supreme financial sacrifice of enrolling him in Queens College. “There,” Jagan recalled, “I was a country boy in a big city, a tiny ‘patwa’ in a big pond.”13 After graduation, he left for Howard University, the famous historically black university in Washington, D.C. Two years later he received a scholarship to Northwestern University, where he earned a degree in dentistry in 1942. During his stay in the United States, Jagan developed a deep understanding of racial segregation in situ. No doubt he became familiar with some of the programs that had been introduced under the aegis of the New Deal and the role of the government in addressing social problems. Some argue that Jagan’s political style was shaped by his experiences in America. He rejected gradualism as a modus operandi, preferring a more aggressive approach to effecting political and social change. Eric Huntley spoke of Jagan’s “American style of radical politics.”14 Those influenced by Cheddi, he said, “spoke of self determination and national independence,” unlike others in the other territories who spoke about “self government if at all.”15 George Lamming said he had “a feeling” that Jagan’s stay in the United States played a role in his desire “to break down existing social or political structures.” Had Jagan studied in London, Lamming ventured, “I suspect he would not have been quite the same Cheddi as the one who went from Guyana to Howard University, Chicago, and Harlem where he confronted all (  )

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of the negatives and positives of American civilisation.”16 Other Caribbean leaders, Lamming noted, lacked this life-altering experience:

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They did not know what it meant to study at a University and work to make sure you could go back for the next semester. They did not have to deal with the racist character of American State power, identify with American Blacks in certain kinds of situations, or make a choice of whether to go Jim Crow with the others, or pass as something different from the others. Cheddi lived through that, and I believe that the radicalisation of his sensibility, his humanisation, was partly formed by this American experience.17 The differences in the background, temperament, and style of Jagan and Burnham suggest that theirs was an alliance of political convenience. But the two men needed each other if the new Guiana they envisaged were to emerge under their combined leadership. Yet their fragile alliance would flounder on the altars of competing racialized nationalisms and competing political ambitions, as well as on their enormous weaknesses in character. The brilliant, arrogant, self-assured, calculating, self-centered, and overly ambitious Burnham and the passionate, ideologically confused, naive, impractical, but earnest Jagan were not destined, even under the best of circumstances, to have an enduring political marriage. The split between them forced their associates to take sides. The realignment, when it occurred, crossed—for the most part—racial lines. Predictably, Burnham attracted the more ideologically conservative members of the PPP, a group consisting of both Indians and Africans. Jagan had the support of those who were identified as Marxists. The two factions muddled along after the formal break, each one confronting an uncertain future. As the reality of the rupture sank in, the Guianese people began choosing the faction that appealed to them emotionally and to a much lesser extent ideologically. In their public pronouncements the two leaders eschewed racial appeals for support, but their private behavior suggested otherwise. To his rural-based adherents who were primarily Indian, Jagan remained “Our Cheddi,” an appellation that symbolized deep affection. Burnham, similarly, was the repository of the pride and respect of the African Guianese, and it is hardly surprising that most embraced him as their leader. But the contours and texture of the support for these two leaders was not frozen and was always in a dynamic process of definition and redefinition. At the outset of their split, neither Jagan nor Burnham saw much advantage in exploiting racial difference. But there is no doubt that they were painThe Politics and Trauma of Race

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fully aware of its potential to harm the commonweal and to serve partisan interests. On addressing a meeting at Bourda Green on March 27, 1955, Burnham confronted the racial question directly: There are some of my race group [African] who express such sentiments as “black man must be on top” and a similar tendency on the part of Comrade Lachmansingh’s race group [Indian] to say “Coolie man must be on top.” Such sentiments are inspired by enemies of our party and movement and the British Government will give anything to them to gain wide currency. . . . If the racialist feelings latent or patent in these sentiments are allowed to spread, they will have a ruinous effect.”18

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Burnham reminded his audience that the PPP had united Africans and Indians under its umbrella, but “when we brought the races together our masters trembled.” He thought racialism threatened the unity that had been forged. “If we are to continue in unity,” he said, “we must banish racialism. Each racial group is entitled to feel pride in its cultural traditions and heritage, but we must not have racial differences reflected in the politics of our country. Our masters want these differences, they encourage them, they play upon them. . . . Ours is not a fight for one race or another, it is a fight for Guiana. Only one race we know, that is the Guianese race.”19 Jagan would, at the time, have expressed similar sentiments. Alfred Savage, then governor, was worried about any stimulation of what he called “racial consciousness” in the colony. For many years, the government of India had appointed a representative to the Anglo-Caribbean colonies, with headquarters in Trinidad. Known as the “Indian commissioner,” this official promoted the interests of Indians in the region and served as a liaison between them and their ancestral homeland. This office, in principle, was admirable in its intent, but far less so in its execution. The first Indian commissioner, Shri Badir Nath Nanda, had run afoul of the British authorities in Trinidad by interfering in the politics of the island and had to be recalled in 1954. When the new commissioner, Mahatam Singh, visited British Guiana in November 1954, he violated the terms of his appointment by engaging in political activity. Governor Savage complained that Singh “has been traveling the Colony widely, giving talks to predominantly Indian audiences which in a veiled way tend to encourage loyalty to “Mother India.” Savage said that Singh’s speeches in Hindi “go much further.”20 The governor was perturbed that the Indian commissioner was inflaming racial politics. “The whole purpose of his visit is contrary to Government policy,” he said, “which is to discourage all activities leading to racial con(  )

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sciousness and separatism.” The colonial regime had, in the previous year, tried to temper the emergence of Indian racial nationalism by ceasing to subsidize the teaching of Indian languages in the schools, as well as initiating radio broadcasts directly aimed at Indians. “The political effects of this stimulation of racial consciousness are bound to be wholly bad,” the governor asserted.21 Under the circumstances, Governor Savage said, “there is a very real danger that the present political vacuum will be filled by parties aligned on racial divisions.” He opposed the establishment of an “Indian office” in Georgetown since he thought that would stimulate Indian racial nationalism. It would also alienate the Africans who were already “deeply distrustful of the intentions and activities of the Indian Commission.” In addition, the presence of an “Indian office” might encourage a “flirtation” with the PPP “in the belief that this party, although multiracial, is under Indian guidance and could fairly be easily brought under Indian dominance.”22 The governor was acutely aware of the delicate racial balance in the colony and sought to avoid giving his approval to anything that might disrupt it. But the underlying tensions were hardly subject to colonial control. The first tangible indication that racially driven party alignments were deep and enduring appeared in Dr. Jagan’s 1956 address to his party’s annual conference. The speech included a denunciation of the Burnham “clique” and its alleged middle-class base. “One of the main characteristics of the middle class is its opportunism,” Jagan charged, “its tack-and-turn, its vacillation, putting itself always in the best position to get the greatest political gains.” These were people attracted by the “prestige and spoils of the office” who had seen “a barrier to the fulfillment of their ambition to the top rounds of the civil service.” To Jagan, “the basis of the split in the PPP was a deal with the imperialists.” The imperialists would call an election, and Burnham would form a compliant administration. To “broaden” its support, “the opportunist Burnham clique” had, among other acts, appealed “to African racialism.” But this did not succeed because “rational understanding is slowly but surely piercing the racialist emotional curtain caused by the split.” Jagan blamed Burnham for a decline in “revolutionary ardour” within the PPP due to his refusal to “support actively our policy of non-cooperation” with the colonial regime. This had “opened the door to racialism” as “Indians began to grumble that the Africans, symbolized by Burnham, do not want to make any sacrifice.”23 Jagan also used the occasion to discuss the politically sensitive issue of British Guiana’s entry into the West Indies Federation. Forbes Burnham had The Politics and Trauma of Race

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declared his support for doing so, whereas Jagan was more diffident. Because the federation was expected to allow freedom of movement between the participating units, Jagan, it was said, feared that a large influx of black people seeking to settle in Guiana could potentially dilute the strength of the IndoGuianese voters. If that occurred, obviously Burnham would be the political beneficiary. The two men’s approach to the federation question, therefore, seemed to have been driven by narrow partisan interests.24 In his speech, Jagan noted that the federation concept had general support in the West Indies “with the exception of Trinidad’s 1⁄3 Indian population.” As he expressed it, the imperialists endorsed federation “for better economic, political and administrative control, the native capitalists want it for protection, and the people want it because their leaders want it.” Speaking specifically of Guiana, Jagan asserted that the Indians “feeling as they do a sense of national oppression are almost 100 percent opposed to Federation.” He denounced the middle classes for supporting the idea because it would enhance their “economic rounds.” He added: This explains why the middle-class Negro who predominates in government services, Portuguese and mixed race groups support federation. This also explains why an Indian, J. I. Ramphal, supports federation. The position of the African working class is somewhat different. I would say that about half support federation because their leaders—the League of Coloured Peoples, John Carter, L. F. S. Burnham—support federation. The other half is opposed to federation, fearing undercutting and loss of jobs from [black] West Indians who are prepared to migrate to our country.25 Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

Given the divisions on the federal question, Jagan suggested that the people should decide it in a referendum. This was disingenuous since, as Jagan said, 100 percent of the Indo-Guianese people opposed federation, and, as they constituted the majority of the voters, the outcome of such a referendum was a foregone conclusion. Jagan’s address elicited a strong reaction from many Afro-Guianese and others who supported the colony’s entry into the West Indies Federation. George Lamming said that, at the time, some considered the speech racist in tone. He also thought it alienated the “non-Indian” PPP supporters of the federation, including people like Eric Huntley, Rory Westmaas, and Martin Carter.26 PPP legislator Moses Bhagwan thought that “from 1957–59 the party . . . found that it had been degraded into an instrument of service to the Indian sector of the population.” But, he added, “Cheddi was never in favour of not having a multiracial party.”27 Eric Huntley suggested that Jagan’s posi(  )

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tion on the federation question circumscribed his ability to provide effective leadership on the race issue. “I think that Cheddi had a choice,” he ventured. “He could have held the party together, and racism need not have raised its head in as ugly a manner as it did. The question of West Indian Federation illustrates why he failed to do so.”28 Overwhelmed by the murky racial politics of the colony, Jagan jettisoned some of his principles “intellectually,” Lamming concluded. Jagan “agreed with his non-Indian party colleagues” on federation, but the imperatives of political advantage made him obfuscate the issue, Lamming maintained.29 As the colony began to bleed from its racial wounds, neither Burnham nor Jagan could absolve themselves of responsibility for the developing tragedy. The racial configuration of the colony and its racialized history provided fertile ground for political mischief by those who sought to gain a short-term advantage from the situation. This included a colonial government that was not insensitive to the advantage it stood to gain if it exploited the race issue to weaken support for the two men it did not admire, hastening their political demise. In particular, the colonial regime wanted to encourage the emergence of an Indian-based political party to compete with the Jaganite wing of the PPP and dilute Jagan’s strength and influence. British Guiana, more than anything else, required a high degree of statesmanship from its leaders to counteract and negate the racially centrifugal elements in the colony, but that imperative remained unmet. RECOGNIZING THAT INDEPENDENCE and a stable Guiana could be jeopardized by the split in the PPP, Jagan expressed the desire for a rapprochement of the two factions. In late April 1957, he noted that “unity of the Party and the development of British Guiana was essential.” Responding to Jagan a few days later, Burnham equivocated. “I am for unity . . . but not domination or eventual liquidation,” he said. “He [Jagan] must convince me of a change of heart and approach.” Burnham denounced his former comrades as “adventurers,” emphasizing that “the national movement whose aim is political independence” would not benefit from any unity with “the dogmatists whose aim is communism and who abuse everyone with whom they do not agree.”30 This was not the last time that Burnham would ignore or reject invitations by Jagan to work together. That Guiana was on the edge of a racial abyss was starkly revealed from the campaign and voting patterns of the general election in 1957. During the bitter campaign the Jaganite faction of the PPP invoked the phrase “Apaan Jhaat,” a Hindi expression for “Vote your own race,” to obtain the support of The Politics and Trauma of Race

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Indian voters. Undoubtedly, the Burnhamites used a similar refrain. Although this was reprehensible conduct by the two factions, it was hardly surprising. Bereft of significant differences in their policy proposals and manifesto, the appeal to race was an instinctive act in a society structured on the competing interests of black, brown, and white. That blacks and browns failed to recognize that they had more in common than that which divided them was a testimony to the irrational capacity of racial difference, fanned by unscrupulous leaders, to wound and ultimately maim a people. The victory of the Jagan-led faction of the PPP represented the electoral triumph of brown over black, but it was a Pyrrhic one and it came with a price. Moses Bhagwan’s assessment of the consequences of that victory was devastatingly accurate. Between 1957 and 1964, he observed, the PPP “had decayed in ideological terms, and it produced the contradiction of a Marxist/Leninist leader—Cheddi Jagan—who became a leader only of Indo-Guyanese.” Worse, Jagan “ended up a symbol of ethnic disunity when he became a leader of Indians only.”31 Had Forbes Burnham won the election, he too would have become a prisoner of racial politics, but he was spared such a fate, at least for a while. The increasingly pungent racial divisions did not fundamentally alter the ability of the society to function. Although the politicians slung racial mud among themselves, this did not mean that the society as a whole consisted of racially hostile camps with no social interaction. “We found little evidence of any racial segregation in the social life of the country and in Georgetown,” wrote the Commission of Enquiry that investigated the social disturbances occurring in 1962. “East Indians and Africans seemed to mix and associate with one another in terms of the greatest cordiality.” It found, however, that “the recent disturbances and the racial twist given to them by some of the unprincipled and self serving politicians had introduced slight, but it is hoped, transient overtones of doubt and reserve.”32 The commission had identified the fragile nature of social relations in the colony and the potential that existed for politicians to exploit it. In fact, racial tensions were at their peak during election campaigns, when politicians used racial appeals, overtly or covertly, to attract electoral support. But racial animus could emerge at other times as well, such as when political leaders wanted to invoke it to achieve a short-term advantage, even if such invocation would harm the colony’s and emerging nation’s soul. The spectacle of colonial leaders, to their discredit, exacerbating racial tensions—instead of trying to create a new, united nation—was testimony enough of their lack of vision and of the triumph of personal ambition over the compelling interests of the commonweal. The remarkable truth was that British Guiana (  )

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had no dearth of leadership talent in the 1950s and later, but many capable individuals were disheartened by the demands of the politics of race and vacuous ideology and retreated into oblivion, escaped to other countries, or withdrew from one party or the other to throw darts from the margins. The politics of race met the needs of both Jagan and Burnham, but the colony and emerging nation would pay the price. Writing in July 1960, the American consul general concluded that Indians “will not vote for an African or a party such as the PNC [People’s National Congress] associated with Africans.” The Africans, he said, “are reluctant to form a united front under a non-African.” Similarly, “many Europeans, Portuguese, Chinese, and Amerindians are reluctant to support the PNC, particularly under the present leader, L. F. S. Burnham.” The consul general’s somber conclusion was that “racial feelings run deeper than antipathy toward the PPP or toward Communism.”33 Such feelings intensified in succeeding years. Writing in April 1964, Governor Richard Luyt noted: “The greatest blight on this land is the bitterness between the two major racial groups with the almost total containment of each group in a separate big political party being an aggravating factor. East Indians now prefer even Communism and Dr. Jagan’s inefficiency to African hooliganism and Mr. Burnham’s alleged racism.”34 On the other hand, Luyt said, Africans “fear East Indian dominance, oppose the PPP Communism and accept Mr. Burnham’s leadership even if only because it is African.” He was dismissive of the capacity of the United Force (UF), the new party founded in 1960, to bridge the racial divide. “The United Force,” the governor wrote, “associated with white and foreign over-lordship and privilege, is unlikely even to attract sufficient Asians and Africans away from the big parties or to become a genuine, recognised, non racial party.”35 The governor’s assessment was certainly credible; racial divisions were crystallizing, and Burnham and Jagan remained prisoners of their political ambitions, unable to meet the challenges of responsible leadership. THE RACIAL POLITICS OF British Guiana became even more complicated with the formation of the UF, led by the wealthy Portuguese businessman, Peter D’Aguiar. Although he was never as prominent a personage in the political life of his country as Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham, D’Aguiar played a significant role in enhancing the politics of racial division. He was the voice of an amorphous group of privileged whites, successful business interests, racially mixed groups, some members of the middle class, and the Amerindian people. As Roman Catholics, the Amerindians supported D’Aguiar because of their shared religious beliefs, not primarily because of his The Politics and Trauma of Race

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political positions. In the opinion of Governor Patrick Renison, he was “inexperienced as a politician . . . , is an unattractive speaker and the very sources of his strength—success as a businessman, the confidence of the middle class and the favour of the Roman Catholic Church—are also sources of weakness when he claims the suffrage of the mob.”36 Renison’s condescension was stark. Africans and Indians constituted “the suffrage of the mob,” people to whom D’Aguiar could not relate. Governor Luyt was also not optimistic about the electoral promise of D’Aguiar and the UF, describing the party as “associated with white and foreign overlordship and privilege, [and] is unlikely to attract sufficient Asians away from the big parties or to become a genuine, recognized, non-racial party.”37 Governor Ralph Grey was even more harshly critical. “As D’Aguiar clearly feels that he was divinely called to save his country,” the governor wrote, “he does not even pause to think whether he ought to have any scruples.”38 American diplomats welcomed Peter D’Aguiar’s formation of the UF and gave him a sympathetic ear. His zealotlike anticommunism guaranteed him Washington’s support as well as that of U.S. organizations that opposed communism with missionary fervor. Moreover, American diplomats related to D’Aguiar—as a white man—more easily than they did to Jagan and Burnham. They were citizens of a country where the mistreatment of black people was a fact of life and white supremacy prevailed. When D’Aguiar founded the UF in 1960, racial segregation was still legal in many parts of the United States. Not until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were African Americans guaranteed the right to vote everywhere. The British authorities viewed D’Aguiar as the least of the three political evils, but their embrace of him was not particularly enthusiastic. They were realistic in their belief that a white man of privilege stood little chance of leading Guiana successfully given the racialized nature of the colony’s politics and the history of a white-dominated colonial experience. Moreover, D’Aguiar’s insistent opposition to independence, when Britain was committed to moving the colony to that goal, was out of touch with the changing times. D’Aguiar, and the elites he represented, feared independence led by either Burnham the African or Jagan the Indian. Still, the British saw much merit in a coalition of the PNC and the UF, if only because that might keep Burnham, whom they instinctively distrusted, in check. D’Aguiar took pride in his favorable image in the United States and had no hesitation in courting its favor, unscrupulously at times. Cecil King, a prominent newspaper publisher in England who put out the Graphic in British Guiana, said D’Aguiar struck him “as unbalanced, a troublemaker with a (  )

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party on which nothing can be built.”39 D’Aguiar could be a troublemaker, given to making serious but unsubstantiated allegations against the PPP in particular. When D’Aguiar and Senator Ann Jardim, a prominent member of the UF, visited the United States in August 1963, for example, they brandished copies of checks that they said indicated the PPP was receiving money from the Soviet Union. These documents purportedly showed that the PPP obtained WI$127,958,75 from that country in the previous two months. In addition, the two leaders alleged, the PPP had brought hundreds of communist agents to the colony, which the PPP denied.40 Aware of the bank documents’ potential to impair their already questionable reputation overseas and locally, the PPP dismissed them as forgeries. The manager of the bank in which the checks were allegedly drawn issued a statement declaring that “no such transactions have passed through our books.” In denouncing “the viciousness and immorality” of the UF’s actions, the PPP recalled that D’Aguiar’s newspaper, the Daily Chronicle, had previously concocted a story that Cuban arms had been sent to Guiana to support the PPP, an allegation the legislature had condemned as prejudicial to the interests of British Guiana. Peter D’Aguiar was the only legislator to vote against the motion.41 Such unscrupulous behavior by the UF exacerbated the divisions in the polity, undoubtedly tarnishing D’Aguiar’s credibility. At times, however, he was more of a political sideshow in the colony, lacking the capacity to wield the same influence as his two rivals. Jagan, however, was never able to dispel allegations that he and his party were on the payroll of the Soviet Union and Cuba, though no credible evidence has appeared to substantiate those charges. Neither the Americans nor the British made such claims, and presumably they would have done so if they had possessed the requisite information. Jagan confronted stories of other detractors at home and abroad that he was receiving arms from the Cubans and the Russians. These allegations appeared in the Evening Star in Washington, D.C., and Life Magazine, as well as in other parts of the American news media. The UF, PNC, and right-wing politicians in the United States repeated such accusations, while Forbes Burnham further alleged that Cubans were visiting the colony in large numbers.42 With Guiana confronting such imaginary threats, Ann Jardim requested financial help from the U.S. State Department so the UF could counteract them. The Americans declined to do so, at least officially.43 Jagan recognized that the charges damaged him both at home and abroad. Calling them “fictitious,” he told American consul general Everett Melby that he had “great difficulty in understanding why the damaging allegations are The Politics and Trauma of Race

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not immediately refuted by the Government of the United States.” To determine the truth, he recommended that the United States send a fact-finding mission to Guiana, saying he would welcome investigative visits by representatives of America’s press as well as its major political parties. Governor Grey endorsed these sentiments. “I have always thought it unfortunate,” he said, “that the picture of this country that has the widest circulation oversees is of conditions very different from those that are apparent on the spot.” Grey could have added that his comment also applied to the colony’s image of itself. The Americans never sent the official mission that Jagan requested, but it had covert means of verifying the allegations made against the premier and his party.44 The election campaign of 1961 reprised that of 1957. The presence of the UF complicated voting patterns somewhat, but race rather than ideology and party platform determined how most people voted. Officials at the Colonial Office expected a PPP victory; they were unhappy about it but could not prevent it. Governor Grey blamed Forbes Burnham for the disappointing results. He reported to his superiors that “if anyone had been found who could have made Burnham sacrifice his own selfish interests to the country’s cause a party could have been formed that could have beaten the PPP.” Burnham, the governor said, “broke with everyone who sought to make an alliance and then concentrated on race.” Consequently, the “reaction of the Indians was to vote race.” This was plainly an overstatement, as Burnham was not the only practitioner of the politics of race. When Grey met with him after the elections, he gave him “stern warnings . . . to cut out racialism, which I said had lost him the election.”45 Grey did not reveal Burnham’s response, if any, to his lecture. The governor, however, shared with the colonial officials the unguarded, human side of Burnham as he tried to cope with his defeat. This merits being quoted in full: Burnham had once told me that if Jagan won the election, he would leave the country with all his assets under his hat. I reminded him of this. He said he was staying and would fight on. I asked about his professional practice and he said that it was ruined. As he was clearly speaking not only about loss of work during campaigning but about something longer lasting, I asked for more information. He said that he knew the PPP as I did not; he knew from them in confidence in days gone by of things they had never told me; he knew that they would, no matter what the Constitution said, get control of the judiciary and thus his professional future was (  )

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doomed. I think that this is mostly just a Burnham act—I hope so. But it was interesting that he should produce this aspect of his affairs—and with greater energy than he had shown in the rest of a long talk that clearly found him very tired and dispirited.46

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These remarks to the governor reveal Burnham’s distrust of the PPP leadership and help to explain why efforts to form a coalition government with Jagan were unlikely to succeed. His fears that the PPP tampered with the judiciary were not misplaced and, if unchecked, posed a major threat to a healthy body politic. THE INDIANS AND THE Africans in British Guiana tended to receive almost all the attention when racial questions were addressed. But the Amerindians, who numbered some 22,000 persons in 1960, were also a significant, if largely ignored, presence in the land of their birth. Stephen Campbell, a member of the Legislative Council, was an Amerindian who represented the Northwest District. Born in 1897 in Santa Rosa, of that district, he attended the local mission schools for four or five years. Essentially self-educated, Campbell became a schoolteacher before standing for election as a candidate for the National Labour Front, founded by Lionel Luckhoo. The American consul general described him in 1958 as someone who “makes an unimposing appearance.” He “is a very short and slight man who dresses in the ‘country’ manner,” Melby said. “His features are of the classic American Indian type. His face is weather beaten and wrinkled.” Despite these defects, as the consul general saw them, Campbell “shows a perceptive mind . . . but in taste and philosophy by choice he is a simple man.” Echoing the stereotypical characterizations of Native Americans by white observers, the consul general said Campbell possessed “a certain amount of stoicism and fatalism.” Campbell’s views may be taken as generally characteristic of the attitudes of the people he represented in the Legislative Council. Unlike the leaders of the PPP and the PNC, Campbell embraced an unabashedly pro-British stance. According to Melby, Campbell “subscribes wholeheartedly to the western (English) way of life and to the Christian approach.” He had no criticisms of the colony’s progress toward self-government and believed in the United Kingdom’s sincerity in working toward that goal. Campbell admitted that there was “an historical antipathy: between Africans and Amerindians dating back to when his people served as slave catchers.” The Amerindian legislator noted that race was at the center of the colony’s political life. Amerindians, he said, voted as a racial group and had to choose The Politics and Trauma of Race

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between the “white man,” the “black man,” and the “coolie man.” Faced with such a choice, they preferred the white man since he was a “known factor.” According to the consul general, Campbell admired the Indians’ economic proficiency but expressed “a lower opinion” of the African. He disdained those Africans who “are more English than the English” and believed that “the masses” of Africans and Indians were very “immature politically.” Campbell’s lingering affection for the British was matched by his distrust of his fellow colonized subjects, the Africans and the Indians. He showed, as a major spokesperson for the Amerindians, that the colonized did not speak with one voice and that Guiana’s racial environment was complex indeed.47 Whites also worried about their future in the colony. Senator Ann Jardim, who represented the UF and described herself as a white Portuguese, thought whites were an endangered species in British Guiana. “The day when a white Guianese can exist in his own country—to say nothing of making a good living—is practically gone,” Jardim complained to Consul General Melby in February 1963. “An African Guianese,” she said, “has the prospect of a satisfactory and perhaps honorable, livelihood in this country but it [he?] will never go above second class status.” “The future belongs to the East Indian—and even he has to find himself ” was her dismal conclusion. Senator Jardim admitted that her generation of “white, Portuguese Guianese” was “incapable of realizing that any social situation could exist here except one in which the white men ruled.” If these people achieved “the impossible” and accepted “this changed world,” no “African nor East Indian could look on a white Guianese without seeing a white overseer behind him.” The senator did not see any unity emerging among the Africans and the Indians. Short-term coalitions would constitute mere palliatives, but, she predicted, “this is going to be an East Indian Country.” She suggested that only when the East Indian has unquestioned numerical superiority, and through that acquires the self-confidence which he does not now have, will peace be possible. Then if he rises to the responsibility, he will offer a generous understanding to the African, in which the African can live well. But the African must recognize that it will always be on the East Indian terms. The white Guianese in the process will disappear and indeed must disappear. This was a most pessimistic prediction from a person who, Consul General Melby said, had been described as “having more brains than sense.” Yet he regarded her as “among the more intelligent and better educated of British Guiana’s politicians.” Melby believed that the senator “correctly sees British (  )

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Guiana’s problems as largely insolvable.” Indeed,in time her gloomy forecast would be realized.48 Although Ann Jardim looked upon the people of Portuguese descent as “white,” they were hardly accepted as such by the English lords of the land, and to some extent by the Indians and the Africans. The colony’s Portuguese residents lacked the social prestige of the English, who sat unchallenged at the top of the racial hierarchy. Peter D’Aguiar, who claimed a Portuguese heritage, may have thought of himself as “white,” but the English arbiters of such weighty matters adjudicated otherwise. “The English do not consider D’Aguiar, a Portuguese, as being white at all, but someone more negro but less than white,” observed Consul General Delmar Carlson in April 1964. As a white American, Carlson was undoubtedly familiar with such delicate assessments and with the use of race and phenotype to determine human worth.49 Some Africans were also disenchanted with the developing texture of race relations in the colony. Sydney King, a former minister in the deposed PPP government, had, by 1961, come to embrace partition as a solution to the racial problem. Acting on behalf of a group called the African Society for Racial Equality, King and Herbert Nicholson, a teacher, called on the governor on August 30, 1961, to present him with a resolution that the group had adopted at a public meeting held at Buxton on August 25. The resolution noted that the recently held election was marked by racial voting and that by virtue of their numbers “Indians will have a permanent advantage over the rest of the population.” The Indians “consider themselves first and foremost Indians and their mother country India” and saw themselves as “conquerors” in British Guiana. The resolution proposed a dual premiership for the colony, shared by an African and an Indian, or partitioning as an alternative.50 Governor Grey was not impressed by the resolution. He reported to the secretary of state that “the delegation’s views seemed to have progressed beyond the resolution to a point where they consider some form of partition the only solution to the problems of racial disharmony between Indians and Africans.” The governor said he told the delegation’s members “forcefully” that he “deplored” their views and urged them “to devote their energies and talents to the building of a country in which all Guianese, whatever their origin, would work together.” King, according to Grey, said that after seeking harmony between the races for fourteen years, he was “now convinced that it was impossible for Guianese of African origin to secure the cooperation of Guianese of Indian origin.”51 Sydney King may have been speaking for a small number of Africans in his advocacy of partitioning, but there were Indians who shared this view. The Politics and Trauma of Race

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It was certainly a position worthy of some respect, coming as it did from a former minister, assistant secretary of the PPP, and general secretary of the PNC. The delegation presented the governor with a memorandum from the African Society and asked that it be sent to the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Ghana, the USSR, and the United Nations. Representing a vituperative assault on the Indians, the lengthy memorandum inquired: “Torture, rape, fire, murder—could this be our dream of independence? The African people in the land of British Guiana at this time live in fear, fear of the present, fear of the future. In villages and estates where the Africans are outnumbered by the East Indians, especially in the Corentyne, the birthplace and stronghold of Cheddi Jagan, the hatred of Indians, [and] their fiendish cruelty is at its worst.”52 The memorandum consisted of a catalog of grievances against the Indians. The 1961 election, it argued, “was none other than an Indian victory over the other races and especially over the Africans.” Their dream “was to set up an Indian post in British Guiana.” Moreover, Cheddi Jagan’s “socialism is no more than dust in the eyes of the foreigners to disguise himself and to hide his clever scheme for Indian domination of the country and its people.” Ending on a note of defiance, the document asserted: “We do not care whether Jagan is a capitalist, fascist, anarchist, fire-worshipper or a socialist. Jagan is an Indian, and he and all the other Indians wish to rule over us. They say they will never accept a black leader. We should never accept an Indian one.”53 Sydney King and the African Society had brought the racial question into the public discourse, using strident and provocative language. Their presumptions and assertions were, to be sure, unpalatable to many people, but there can be no doubt that they would have elicited some privately expressed support as well. Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar never publicly associated themselves with such sentiments. To do so would have been politically injudicious and would have been a repudiation of the united Guiana to which they said they were committed. King and the African Society had unwittingly identified the locus of the racial disharmony. The fundamental cause was not that Africans and Indians could not share the same space because they disliked one another. The root cause was a struggle for political power, a struggle to inherit the colonial mantle and the spoils of office. “We hope the British are not giving British Guiana independence so that we become slaves of the East Indian people,” the memorandum said. “We shall be masters of our country.”54 In June 1955, Governor Alfred Savage had noted that “the basic trouble with the Guianese is that they have not yet developed a national conscious(  )

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ness which could overcome the differences of race and creed.” He recognized that there had been a “political awakening” in the colony in recent times, but “the great tragedy has been that this new zest has been exploited by irresponsible leadership.” He believed that “hope for the future must lie in the emergence of balance and courageous leaders determined to channel this new enthusiasm to nobler and more beneficial ends.”55 Savage had provided a perspicacious assessment of Guiana’s political condition in 1955, its challenges and its prospects. Ten years later his assessment was still eerily valid. Not surprisingly, British Guiana experienced significant social disturbances from time to time, demonstrating the centrality of race to the colony’s psyche. But racially inspired unrest cannot be understood in the abstract, removed from its enabling roots. The colony’s historical exploitation of Amerindians, Africans, and Indians stood at the center of its racial politics, as those at the lower rungs of the racial hierarchy competed against one another for the scarce spoils they wanted to come their way. Essentially economic in origin, the resulting conflagrations reflected the racialization of economic greviances. These tensions were exacerbated by powerful outsiders and domestic interests. CHEDDI JAGAN’S STEWARDSHIP of the government between 1961 and 1964 was an exercise in crisis management. His apprenticeship in office between 1957 and 1961 had not been marked by any serious disturbances. Racial divisions, however, manifested themselves most starkly in the social unrest that occurred in February 1962 and again in 1963 and 1964. The incidents in 1962 had some economic roots, but they also represented a continuation of the 1961 election campaign by other means. Jagan’s victory in that election had been a profound disappointment to the PNC and the UF, and these parties sought to accomplish through direct means what they failed to do at the ballot box. Dr. Jagan’s record as head of government between 1957 and 1961 was not a particularly distinguished one. British Guiana, Governor Grey said in 1959, has “faced difficult financial circumstances mainly owing to the fall in the world price of sugar and the recession in the aluminum industry.” He painted a somber picture of the country’s economic situation, hardly concealing his impatience with Jagan’s leadership. “He fills his head with Marxist politico-economic theories,” the governor observed. “They seem to mean more to him than present realities.” “But,” Renison added sympathetically, “with all his theories and arguments, and with all his obsessions and conceits, he has not insisted on any action which seems calculated purposely to The Politics and Trauma of Race

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disrupt the present economy and way of life.” Yet, since Jagan returned to office, “there has been no new major investment in the country.”56 Two years later, in a speech opening the new session of the legislature, Grey reviewed the achievements of the government over the preceding three years. According to the governor, the ministers were very pleased. “Jagan said, ‘I did not know till I read it that we had done so much.’ But, as I told them, a much better speech should have been written about what we have not done,” Grey responded.57 The economic prospects for British Guiana were never optimistic. A survey conducted in 1956, for example, revealed an unemployment rate of 18 percent, or 30,000 people. It predicted that the number of unemployed would increase to 80,000 or 90,000 by 1966. Attempting to address the colony’s intractable economic difficulties, Dr. Jagan introduced a five-year development plan in 1960, but, given the shortage of funds, it was not as bold as he would have liked. He had failed to attract overseas loans from the United States, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The United Kingdom also declined to guarantee a loan from a Swiss bank. In addition, there was a flight of local capital, resulting from fears that Jagan was a communist who would pursue policies opposed to the interests of the wealthy and the privileged. The result of these disappointments was that his development plan was experiencing a serious financial shortfall, jeopardizing Jagan’s plans for an economic transformation of the colony. To stanch the capital flight, in December 1961 the government introduced restrictions on the export of currency and suspended the convertibility of the Guianese dollar into sterling. These two measures were widely unpopular. There was also enormous public disquiet over the government’s inability to meet in a manner satisfactory to public service workers the recommendations of a salaries commission that it had appointed. Public service workers, who had not received salary upgrades since 1954, were becoming receptive to the idea of going on strike to force the government to accept the commission’s recommendations. That the Jagan regime would face enormous economic challenges in 1962 was, therefore, an understatement. Governor Grey was not impressed by the new minister of finance—Dr. C. R. Jacob Jr.—whom Jagan had named after his electoral victory in 1961. Grey said that Jacob was “as near mad as makes little difference.”58 Dr. Jacob had recently visited Havana “and disconcerted the Marxists by out-Marxing them in his speech.”59 Grey was worried about the impact on the Americans and potential investors of the appointment of Jacob and others whose names “will show up in indexes of Communist traces” to ministerial positions. The outsiders, the governor concluded, (  )

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“were more likely to take heed of this list of names than of the careful assessments and detailed reasoning of those who conclude, as I still do, that Jagan is a nationalist, Marxist thinker but not a Soviet-sympathizing and Sovietdominated Communist doer.”60 Grey’s assessment of Jagan’s ideological position was accurate. The new minister of finance approached his responsibilities with considerable seriousness, if not with political wisdom. In December 1961 the Jagan government invited an internationally famous tax expert, Nicholas Kaldor, to advise it on revenue-related issues. Kaldor had previously assisted the governments of Turkey, India, Ceylon, Ghana, and Mexico. He had also served on a United Kingdom tax commission. When Dr. Jacob made his budget presentation on January 3, 1962, the new taxation he proposed had been recommended by Kaldor. Jacob’s budgetary initiatives were driven by the need to make the government solvent. His was an austerity budget, one that involved some sacrifice by the privileged elite and the middle classes. The minister’s analysis was characterized by considerable depth, a command of the colony’s economic condition, and a series of sober measures for its development. In his policy speech, Jacob was not the “near mad” legislator that Governor Grey had disparaged. That the policy measures he hoped to introduce aroused angry passions reflected the unthinking animus of the newspapers to initiatives associated with the PPP and the demagoguery and irresponsibility of the opposition leaders. Dr. Jacob began his important budget speech in the legislature by proclaiming that “the ground is now being laid to strengthen our economic position and raise living standards by accelerating the rate of economic growth through our own efforts.” Acknowledging the necessity for external help, the minister cautioned that the country must make sure “that such aid is not used to create an economy which is slavishly complementary to, or merely an appendage of that of the lending countries.” Expanding on this assertion, he explained that “many colonies and former colonies know, to their cost, that foreign investment and foreign aid in the past have often meant no more than the creation of new sources of supply to suit the needs of the foreign powers; the metropolitan colonial relationship was left unchanged and there was contributed little, if anything to the alleviation of the poverty and backwardness of the native populations.”61 “But,” he warned his colleagues, “foreign aid is no substitute for self determination, either economic or political.”62 Jacob’s detailed budget presentation, generously supported by statistics, revealed that the projected revenue for 1962 would be $2 million higher than The Politics and Trauma of Race

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in 1960, but recurrent expenditures would be increased by $15 million, composed as follows: Debt charges $2.5 million Agriculture, drainage, irrigation, etc. $2 million Sea defenses, roads, buildings $1.5 million Education and social services $4 million Salary increases for civil servants $3.5 million Miscellaneous $1.5 million

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The minister of finance proceeded to make a case for increasing taxes to meet the government’s needs, emphasizing that “taxation must . . . not only be an efficient producer of revenue to finance public services and desirable economic activity, but also serve the subsidiary purpose of redistributing wealth and income.” He called for an equitable distribution of the tax burden, noting that “the owners of capital” did not bear as much burden as those who “get their incomes from work.” Jacob declared that a major impetus for fiscal reform “is to curb economic inequality by redistributing wealth and income in the interests of social stability and the constitutional evolution of a peaceful, democratic society.”63 Such objectives, to be sure, were not destined to find favor with those who were benefiting from the existing tax system and those who feared any redistribution of wealth in the colony. Giving substance to his government’s objectives, Jacob proposed a capital gains tax, a tax on net property owned, and a tax on gifts. A capital gains tax, he said, would constitute a step toward an equitable system of taxation because “such gains are an important source of income of the large owners of property.” He explained that “a tax on net property owned (assets minus liabilities)” would also enhance fairness in the tax code. The gifts tax would ensure that there would be no transfers of property inter vivos—that is, while the owner was alive. This was normally done to avoid paying the estate duty tax, which was owed if the transfer occurred upon the owner’s death. In addition to these three tax initiatives, the minister proposed a dazzling array of new taxes on what he called “non essentials.” The government increased import duties on alcoholic drinks, tea, perfumery, cosmetics, jewelry, electrical appliances, cars, and so on. It raised excise duties on rum and other spirits and imposed a variety of taxes on companies operating in the colony. Jacob estimated that these additional revenues together would yield $10.5 million and produce a budgetary surplus of $3.4 million.

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To help finance the government’s five-year development plan, Jacob announced a scheme of compulsory savings, similar, he said, to that used in some Latin American countries. He indicated that the rate of contribution would be 5 percent of wages and salaries and 10 percent of other income. Incomes less than $1,200 annually were excluded. Companies would make a contribution of 10 percent on all profits. These funds would be repaid in government bonds at the end of seven years, earning a tax-free interest rate of 3.75 percent. Jacob estimated that the plan would yield $6 million annually, stating: “I wish to point out . . . that the scheme outlined must not be considered in the same way as taxation, since the amounts taken are fully repayable with accrued interest. The contributor will benefit doubly by saving for his own and his family’s future and by helping to make a future for himself and his family by the country’s development.”64 Concluding his exhaustive presentation, the minister told the legislators that the budget he presented was “in keeping with the policy of a people’s Government elected to dismantle privilege, and exploitation, and lift up those living at or below the threshold of poverty.” The government’s “activities,” he said, “are directed not only toward stimulating economic development, but also toward maximum social welfare and effecting a net distribution of purchasing power in favour of the working class.”65 Dr. Jacob’s budget speech commanded a great deal of attention in British Guiana. It was the first time in the colony’s history that an elected representative of the people had presented a budget to the legislature. No one foresaw the storm of protest that would emerge in its wake and the degree to which it would reveal the fault lines in the society. In response to Jacob’s address, Peter D’Aguiar, Forbes Burnham, and their supporters took to Georgetown’s streets to demonstrate for the government’s overthrow. Never known for their objectivity, the city’s newspapers inflamed emotions by brazenly distorting many of Jacob’s proposals and opening their pages to opponents of Jagan and his administration. Members of the press fired their first salvo on February 1, the day after Jacob’s presentation. “Government to Squeeze Dollars from Workers” read a headline in the D’Aguiar-owned Daily Chronicle. The short-lived Post ran a front-page story entitled “Budget—It’s Staggering”; an article in the inside pages was captioned “Budget Is in Keeping with Government—Marxist Bottle of Rum Will Now Cost $3.10.” On February 3, the Chronicle published a front-page letter to Burnham and D’Aguiar from one E. S. Phillips suggesting that “you both appear on one platform . . . a general uprising against this bud-

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get will force Jagan’s government to either amend their ideas or resign.” Similar headlines, editorials, letters, and articles filled the pages of the colony’s newspapers in succeeding days.66 The alarmist tone of the press coverage fed the fires of opposition to Jagan and his government. The strength of this resistance was confined essentially to Georgetown, a stronghold of the PNC and to a lesser extent the UF. Sensing the potential vulnerability of the government, Burnham and D’Aguiar sought to create a political crisis and to exploit it to their advantage. D’Aguiar sprang into action because the budgetary proposals threatened the economic position of the wealthy, of which he was their most visible representative. Burnham who, under different circumstances would have been sympathetic to Jagan’s desire to redistribute wealth in the society, was driven by a desire to replace Jagan as head of government. It was a disservice to the colony he aspired to lead and whose best interests he claimed to represent. As members of the House of Assembly, Burnham and D’Aguiar could have mounted their opposition to the budget during the scheduled debate. But they made the tactical decision to take the matter to the streets, expecting to force the government to retreat. Meanwhile, the PPP launched its own campaign to gain popular support for the government’s proposals. The party held a public meeting in Georgetown on February 1, another on February 4 at La Penitence Market, and an additional eight meetings in rural areas. Premier Jagan was heckled repeatedly at the gathering at La Penitence Market, and some in the audience threw bottles and stones at the speakers. On February 6 the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce expressed its opposition to the budget and appointed a committee to prepare a more detailed analysis of it. The next day Jagan was slapped by someone as he left the Public Buildings. The large, noisy crowd attacked the premier’s car and hurled abuse at him.67 The street demonstrations were accompanied by a vigorous propaganda campaign. On February 6, for example, the UF issued a leaflet linking the budget to the creation of a dictatorship in the colony. “Our beloved country of British Guiana,” it said, “is now on the threshold of complete subjugation to Soviet Socialist Imperialism. Few, if any, of our people want a MarxistSocialist Dictatorship forced upon us.” The UF, largely recognized as the voice of the colony’s privileged residents, reinvented itself as the defender of the working class. It did not concede that its objections to the budget were driven by the proposed taxes on the wealthy. Rather, it claimed: Dr. Jagan and his Government have introduced a budget calculated to destroy all free enterprise, cause mass unemployment and bring down (  )

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wages to starvation level. Farmers will be forced to give up their lands, industries to close down by reason of excessive taxes. The free press and radio will be forced out of operation within six months. The doors to foreign investment from the free world have been closed. The result will be mass appropriation of land and property—we will have become slaves of the state.68 This was a deliberate distortion of the government’s proposals to generate vehement opposition to them, as well as an undisguised attempt to use the working classes who predominated in the country to serve the interests of the privileged. The link between the proposed new taxes and Marxism was spurious at best and an exercise in the politics of shameless deception at worst. Propaganda appeals such as these inflamed passions, which opposition legislators both shaped and exploited. When the legislature convened on February 9 to discuss the establishment of a Constitutional Committee to plan for the colony’s anticipated independence, D’Aguiar and Burnham used the occasion to embarrass the administration. Recognizing the seriousness of the protests against the budget, the minister of finance opened the session by announcing that the budget debate scheduled to begin on February 12 would be delayed to give the government time to study the representations made against the tax measures he had outlined. Obviously, he must have hoped that this respite would provide time for sober reflection by supporters as well as opponents of the budget, resulting in an easing of tensions. The session was filled with high drama. Forbes Burnham opposed the motion on the composition of the Constitutional Committee, charging that the government had lost the confidence of the people. After concluding his speech, Burnham ostentatiously led a walkout by the PNC members of the Assembly. His supporters, who had packed the gallery, brought up the rear. Following Burnham’s example, D’Aguiar led a walkout of UF members once he had delivered his speech opposing the motion. In his contribution to the proceedings, Cheddi Jagan read a statement disclosing that “certain elements acting for a minority group” were planning violence “on a general scale” and that “attempts against the Premier’s life and the lives of certain of his Ministers and supporters are contemplated.” Jagan told his colleagues that the contemplated violence was intended to overthrow the government and that the conspirators were using the tax proposals in the budget “as a screen” for the plan. He was aware of the “plotters” intention to call a general strike on February 12 and deplored such behavior. “This small clique is determined to preserve their positions of privilege,” he declared. The premier did not supThe Politics and Trauma of Race

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port his statement with any evidence, but coming from such an authority his charges had to be taken seriously.69 Before this session of the legislature ended, the demonstrators outside had grown to an estimated five thousand persons. Jagan and his ministers emerged to face the taunts of the angry crowd, and the police had to provide them with escorts, but not before the premier was assaulted. Later that day, at a public meeting at Bourda Green, D’Aguiar urged his supporters to “unite and fight.” Two days later, he addressed a crowd from the balcony of his office in Brickdam, saying that “the purpose of this demonstration is to bring down the budget . . . [it] is to bring down the government.” Addressing another meeting at Bourda Green, Burnham assured those assembled that “the battle for survival has begun—who is broken now is broken forever.” When he asked the crowd, “Will you fight?,” the resounding answer was yes. “They will bring soldiers,” Burnham warned. “Will you still fight?” The response was a thundering yes.70 Aided and abetted by the leaders of the opposition, the protests accelerated, culminating in a strike by the civil servants on February 13. The beleaguered premier was forced on the defensive but endeavored to educate the populace on the reasons for the new taxes through a series of radio broadcasts. Responding to the lockouts of workers that began on February 12 at D’Aguiar Brothers Aerated Water Factory and at Fogarty’s, a major business enterprise, Dr. Jagan addressed the country. Situating the crisis in class and racial terms, he noted that the owners of the businesses that locked out workers on Water Street, the commercial nerve center of Georgetown, were primarily of Portuguese ancestry. The premier said: Mr. D’Aguiar who now poses as a friend of the workers was known for many years to resist trade union recognition. Workers of the country should ask themselves how many of them, or how many of their children have any chance of getting jobs above the grade of sweepers or porters in these Water Street firms, and some others. You have only got to see the people who went around intimidating other workers and who were carrying pickets this morning, to realise that what you have here is a small privileged group who has always had the best jobs on Water Street and who are now fighting desperately to maintain their position.71 Dr. Jagan had a point, one that should have earned him Burnham’s support. The premier continued: “If it was true that the present budget was against the workers, why are the big shots so angry today, and why are they now using lock outs as a political weapon against the workers and against the (  )

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government? This should make it plain to you that the present budget is in fact aimed specially at the privileged and those who are best able to pay. The budget is an attempt to redistribute wealth in this country.”72 In a separate broadcast on February 12, Jagan explained the rationale for the capital gains tax. He made his argument by using transactions by D’Aguiar Brothers as telling examples. The relevant portion of the radio address made an unassailable case for the imposition of the tax and deserves to be quoted in full:

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We delved into the records and this is what we found. On the 4th of April 1956, D’Aguiar Bros. bought from the Demerara Co. Ltd, 6.09 acres— 6 acres call it—at $4,516.60 per acre—in other words call it 41⁄2 thousand dollars per acre—$4,500.00 per acre. On the same day D’Aguiar Bros. sold to Bank Breweries 4.229 that is about 41⁄4 acres of the 6 acres at 9,458.50 per acre. Now this in other words was practically more than [a] 100% increase. To be exact, it was [a] 109% increase in price. This gave D’Aguiar Bros. a profit of $20,904.00—nearly $21,000 profit was made in one day, and not one penny [of ] taxes out of this comes to the Government. . . . Indeed we found out that Demerara Co. Ltd. bought from Ruimveldt Co. Ltd. in 1910 the same land for $32.42 per acre. . . . They sold it in 1956 for $4,515 per acre and the same day D’Aguiar Bros. sold it for $9,458 per acre. This is how this class lives at your expense and this is why they are agitating, making all this demonstration and so on, using you the working class to fight their battle.73 This and other broadcasts failed to silence the protests, and the government was forced to make a partial retreat. On February 14, Premier Jagan announced significant modifications in the tax proposals. The increase in duties on most of the imported items would be withdrawn, excluding cars, spirits, tobacco, and coffee extracts and concentrates. The lower limit in the Compulsory Savings Scheme would be increased from $1,200 annually to $3,600. Most notably, Jagan left untouched the taxes on capital gains, estates, and gifts—the core of the tax proposals. The attempt at compromise did not temper the protests. A government under siege had demonstrated its willingness to compromise, but the momentum was going the other way. Jagan was beginning to appreciate his administration’s vulnerability and asked Governor Grey to prohibit demonstrations and meetings in a large area around the Public Buildings. Burnham and D’Aguiar challenged the government by leading demonstrations in the prohibited areas, in violation of the ban. As Georgetown descended into anarchy, Cheddi Jagan decided to ask the governor to bring in the British troops The Politics and Trauma of Race

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stationed at Atkinson Airfield, with expected reinforcements from Jamaica and the United Kingdom, to help restore order to the city. The Jagan government first asked for the support of the armed forces when the minister of home affairs, Balram Singh Rai, met with the governor on the morning of February 14. Acting on a decision made by the Council of Ministers, Rai asked for the assistance of the British Guiana Volunteer Force. Grey assented to this request and prepared a proclamation to that effect. Rai asked whether the Volunteer Force could be used “to keep law and order” if they were not all needed to defend “vital points,” but the governor reminded him that they were not trained for riot duty. Rai then said the Council of Ministers wanted the British troops at Atkinson to be placed on alert in case they were needed in Georgetown. Rai admitted to Governor Grey that he had dissuaded his colleagues from making an immediate request for the troops and warships, reminding them that they had opposed the presence of such symbols of British power in the past. “Things are different now” was their response, Rai said.74 Governor Ralph Grey must have enjoyed Jagan and the PPP’s volte face. He chose the occasion to remind Rai that since the colony enjoyed internal self-government, it was the ministers’ responsibility to maintain internal security. He lectured Rai on his government’s duties:

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They must realize the seriousness of the situation and of their own acts in it—not avoid their responsibilities by looking to me to bring in troops and the Royal Navy to keep order and to run essential services, thereby relieving themselves of a burden and provoking their opponents (or enabling them to claim that they were provoked) by the use of British military strength to keep an unpopular government in office against the wishes of the populace.75 When the premier met with the governor on the morning of the fifteenth, Grey repeated what he had told Rai. He assured Jagan that “British Troops were not to be used to impose unpopular policies on the country.” Jagan and Rai returned to see the governor that evening, informing him that the police were expected to strike, possibly to bolster their request for military support. Grey stood his ground, telling the two men that “if that were true, then it seemed to me that the Government could not carry on and would have to resign.” Jagan insisted that the troops were needed because “the Opposition should not behave as a mob and throw the government out by force.” Grey blamed Jagan and his administration for the crisis, suggesting the two min-

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isters “take careful thought how they would remedy the result of their admitted political miscalculations and faults.” British troops, he said, “would only be used if all Guianese resources proved or were likely to prove inadequate.” The governor left no doubt that he would welcome the resignation of the Jagan government, saying: “If the government was so much at fault that it aroused such opposition in Georgetown that it could not contain it, then the government ought to leave office.”76 Jagan had no desire to submit his resignation and hoped the troops would help to keep him in office. On the afternoon of February 15, as tensions increased, Governor Grey asked Burnham if he would urge the crowds in the street to disperse and refrain from resorting to violence. He wanted Burnham to use his loudspeakers to ask the people to go home. Burnham told the governor that he would have to consult with his party’s executive. In a remarkable show of petty partisanship and poor leadership, the PNC’s executive declined to help. Burnham would later explain this inaction as follows: “We could not help. There were two main obstacles, one was that we were very short of petrol and we felt that if we went all around Georgetown using up this petrol at the Governor’s request, we would have no petrol for the vehicles to carry out Party work. We also considered it ill advised to tell people to desist from what they were doing when we had nothing to do with the starting of it. The man who calls off the dog owns the dog.”77 The Commission of Enquiry before which Burnham made this admission concluded: “This callous and remorseless attitude is reminiscent of Mark Anthony’s observation ‘Mischief thou art afoot. Take thou what course thou wilt.’”78 Peter D’Aguiar behaved similarly when the governor requested his help. The commission said that all D’Aguiar “could think of was to ask the Governor to give protection to his wife and family. He telephoned the Governor to say that he could not see his way to making an appeal for peace to the riotous crowds of Georgetown.”79 Although Georgetown was in chaos by February 15, the government seemed helpless and the leaders of the opposition were too busy fanning the flames of unrest to restrain their supporters. Burnham and D’Aguiar led thousands of protesters into the prohibited area in front of the Public Buildings, but there was no violence. The police declined to arrest anyone even though the gathering violated the ban. According to Grey, he had an “unsatisfactory discussion” with Burnham that afternoon about “the policy aims his party was seeking to serve.” “He spoke to me,” the governor said, “about the solution to local troubles coming through violence.” Grey continued:

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He said that he was a man of peace and had urged his followers that there should be no violence, but he thought it inevitable that violence would come, provoked by Dr. Jagan and his party. He asked me whether I was going to be advised by Dr. Jagan to give orders to British troops “to shoot the natives.” I warned him of the folly of basing his policy on thoughts of this kind and rebuked him for flouting the law by joining and leading the illegal assembly before the Public Buildings in defiance of the Proclamation.80 The deepening crisis produced a tenuous alliance of convenience between Burnham, D’Aguiar, and Richard Ishmael, president of the Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). This was political opportunism at its worst. Burnham and D’Aguiar met at PNC headquarters on the afternoon of the fifteenth, presumably to coordinate their efforts. Later in the day, according to the governor, Burnham “spoke to me contemptuously of D’Aguiar and said this was the latter’s last appearance.”81 Protesters gathered in front of the premier’s residence in the late afternoon and ended the day at the Parade Ground, where they listened to speeches by TUC and PNC representatives. Burnham was at his rabble-rousing best when he told the crowd that slogans such as “resign” or “Down with Jagan” would not be enough to achieve their objective:

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Those are useful and helpful slogans, but much more than slogans are required in the present circumstances. Comrades, first of all, let me say this, that the People’s National Congress sees the way clearly, step by step, and phase by phase. All I can tell you is this, that it is no sense taking part in this explosion which has happened at this moment if you are going to peter out or turn back halfway. You have to see it through. . . . I believe the PNC knows what we all want and knows how we will seek to achieve what we all want; but one thing I know you do not want, one thing I know the PNC will not countenance, and that is violence . . . let others start it, but comrades, they shall not pass.82 Toward the end of his speech Burnham urged the protesters to take a day of rest on Friday, February 16. When they rejected the suggestion, he replied: “I have heard what you had to say and I have noted very carefully what you prefer and want and therefore, comrades, you will be informed what exercises may be necessary tomorrow. . . . I do not want to make any suggestions here tonight what that exercise should be . . . tomorrow we shall meet again

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some place, somewhere, somehow.”83 This was not a direct invitation to resort to violence, but the speech was tantalizingly ambiguous in its meaning. Governor Grey may have disliked the tactics used by Burnham and D’Aguiar and the behavior of the crowds in the streets, but he shared their objectives. He wanted to be rid of the Jagan government. The troops, he kept repeating to Jagan and Rai when they met on the evening of February 15, would not be used to keep them in office. If the government could not maintain law and order, “it must go.” Jagan and Rai must consider “how to get themselves out of the mess their own faults and failures had got themselves into.” This must have been a very tense meeting, and Dr. Jagan seemed to have had no creative response to the challenge his government faced. Grey said the premier “talked unpractical nonsense about recruiting ‘special constables’ from the coastlands and giving them basic training. I said the need was for a supervisory force to maintain order now.”84 In 1953 Jagan had vehemently denounced the coup d’état that removed his government from office. But much had changed since then. At that crucial 5:30 P.M. meeting on February 15, 1962, the governor reported that Jagan “spoke also of my right to advise H.M.G. to suspend the constitution and probably hopes that I shall solve his problems in that way.” Grey had no plans to oblige Jagan in this regard. This was an astonishing volte face by the premier; had his implied endorsement of a second suspension of the constitution come to light, it would have destroyed his credibility as a staunch advocate of independence, with unpredictable consequences for his political future.85 Dr. Jagan and Minister Rai left the meeting with Governor Grey believing that troops would be called out early the next morning. But the governor failed to act, probably hoping that Jagan would be forced to resign if the disorder continued. The crowds began to assemble very early on the sixteenth. By 7:30 A.M., hundreds had gathered on Water Street. Some joined Ann Jardim of the United Force in a march to the Parade Ground while others protested in front of the Electricity Power House, where strikebreakers had been hired. The crowd at the Parade Ground heard a fiery address from D’Aguiar, who, according to the Commission of Enquiry’s report, “dwelt on his customary theme of opposing, exposing, and deposing the government.” Trouble later developed at the Power House as a crowd of some three thousand people threw bottles and stones at the building. The protesters had to be dispersed by the use of tear gas, and one child suffering from its effects was treated at the hospital. Matters took an ugly turn when D’Aguiar erroneously told the crowd at the Power House that the child had died.86

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D’Aguiar’s announcement was irresponsible at best, given the frenzied mood of the crowd. He would later deny that he had made such a statement, but after hearing several witnesses the Commission of Enquiry concluded otherwise. Its rebuke of D’Aguiar’s behavior was harsh: We are inclined to take the view that Mr. D’Aguiar did not exercise any restraint upon himself and that he, in fact, announced the death of the child to the crowd and not its mere illness. We are constrained to observe that his being wedded to truth did not impose so stern a cloisteral isolation upon him as not to permit an occasional illicit sortie, in order to taste the seductive and political rewarding adventure of flirting with half truths. We found more than one instance of this lack of ingeniousness on his part.87

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After being dispersed, the crowd reassembled at the Parade Ground, throwing stones and bottles at the police. Protesters also went to Freedom House, the headquarters of the PPP, and attacked it with stones and other missiles. According to the Commission of Enquiry, the crowds “by now were in a very angry mood and had been worked up into a state bordering on frenzy by the spreading of the rumour that the police had murdered a child.” After violence ensued, Superintendent Mcleod of the Police Department was wounded by gunshots from which he later died; five other police officers were injured. The violence spread rapidly to other sections of Georgetown, with the protesters setting fire to many stores and participating in widespread looting. Electrical poles were burned, effectively shutting off power in the city. Between two and five o’clock there was no water available in the mains because there was no power to operate the waterworks. Faced with the mayhem, the commissioner of police requested military assistance at 1:35 P.M. Unable to reach the governor at the time, the commissioner acted without his approval. The troops arrived an hour later, and by eight o’clock some semblance of order had been restored. Apart from the loss of five lives, including that of Superintendent Mcleod, the disturbances had taken a serious toll in property damages and persons wounded, as well as on the health of the body politic. Fifty-six buildings were destroyed, and eighty-seven more were damaged. In addition, numerous premises were looted. The cost of these damages was estimated at WI$11,405,236. Forty-one civilians and thirty-nine police officers were injured.88 The protest against the Jagan administration assumed a racial tone when violence began to engulf the city. The protesters, predominantly African, singled out the business premises of PPP supporters, principally Indian, for (  )

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destruction. Fearing the wrath of the protesters, Jagan and some of his ministers requested and obtained personal protection from British troops. Burnham was protected by armed guards. On February 17 an exasperated governor reported to the secretary of state that Jagan “still shows no disposition to resign despite the calamities his policies have brought on Georgetown.” Grey was disappointed that Jagan was weathering the crisis, bemoaning the fact that “whether we can bring disorder under control if he clings to office is doubtful.” He reported that Rai had told him that “there had been wild talk of setting up a government on the Corentyne and other nonsense.” The governor stated that D’Aguiar “is all for a suspension of the constitution and various impractical steps to follow it such as the banning of communism and the disenfranchisement of the Jagans.” Burnham and D’Aguiar agreed, Grey said, that Jagan would welcome disenfranchisement as it would give him “another easy martyrdom and better electoral prospects in future.”89 The violence on “Black Friday”—as February 16 came to be called, though somewhat pejorative and insulting to those who bore that phenotype—represented the highwater mark of the anti-Jagan protests. By the nineteenth the governor could report that the “return to quiet is alarmingly abrupt.” “Newspapers,” he noted, “devote space to social whirl and minds turn to cricket.” Still, Grey reported, “There is great bitterness underneath among those who have suffered and among Opposition Party activists who have failed to bring down the Government.” Rumors abounded, however, including one that said Indians from the Corentyne were heading to Georgetown to avenge the violence directed against their people on “Black Friday.”90 Although Georgetown was returning to normal, the governor was concerned that Dr. Jagan was not exercising leadership in his capacity as the premier. Two days after the violent disturbances, Grey had written him a stinging letter reminding him that it was not the governor’s responsibility “to run the Government, but it certainly is my duty to advise you about your tasks.” Grey had become “increasingly worried,” he said, “that the Government is not giving priority attention to the proper matters.” He told the premier that “this is no time for party politics—on the Government side.” Jagan “must show your fitness to continue in office . . . by providing the whole community, supporters and opponents, with the governing that they need.” The Guianese people “must have the services that are normally to be expected of a Government even at so serious a time as this—and you must be seen to be providing them.”91 The governor also was dismayed by the lack of “realism” shown by government employees and the unions for the consequences of the February 16 The Politics and Trauma of Race

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disaster. “But,” he told the premier, “whether or not others realise the situation, you as government must do so.” Jagan’s task was not “the mending of political fences out in the countryside.” Rather, he “must remember that you are bound to provide a government for all people in British Guiana.”92 The high-minded leadership that the governor demanded was not forthcoming. Jagan had been badly shaken by the ferocity of the opposition to him and his government and by the violence that Africans directed at the Indian businessmen in Georgetown. The elections of 1957 and 1961 had been marked by racialized voting, but nothing had revealed so starkly the depth of the racial divide as did the disturbances of February 16. To save his government, Jagan appealed to his Indian base for support, a politically understandable strategy but ultimately one that portended future trouble for the emerging nation. The minister of home affairs told the governor on February 19 that the PPP had distributed leaflets asking its supporters to “rally round the party” and that he had complained to Jagan that such “ambiguous stuff ” was making the discharge of his responsibilities as minister more difficult.93 The PPP had become essentially an Indian party and in the context of the events of February 1962, any appeal to its members to support the government had profound racial implications. In spite of the political imperatives, however, Premier Jagan had a responsibility to transcend the racial divide and forge some degree of societal unity. Grey found Jagan to be “depressingly unrealistic” when he saw him on the nineteenth. The beleaguered premier complained that no one trusted him. He told the governor that “if he were the leader of an independent country people would cease to prophesy worse to come and if some in the country did not like what he did then if civil war came that would be the price to be paid.” These were the words of an emotionally exhausted man, but the governor chastised him nonetheless. Grey told Jagan that “he and his opponents talked all too readily of a violent solution.” Yet “this pathetic country,” he observed, “could not stand a General strike let alone a Civil War.”94 Jagan had no plan or strategy to extricate Guiana from its crippling dilemma. When Grey suggested on February 19 that the premier meet with D’Aguiar and Burnham to discuss the crisis, Jagan said he needed his party’s approval to do so. Two days later Jagan reported to the governor that the PPP leaders were opposed to such a meeting, referring to their opponents as “vagabonds” and “criminals.” In a telegram to his superiors, Grey noted: “Jagan seems to see no need to seek a political solution. He is in power and has an elected majority to give him legal title to this premiership and British troops to give him practical security in it.”95 (  )

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The governor could not conceal his contempt for the premier. “All he needs now is money,” he wrote, “and he expects the rest of the world to give it to him.” In his contest with the opposition, however, Grey believed that Jagan was legally correct: “Both opposition parties have committed themselves to unlawful attempts to bring him down even if responsibility for the disorder and arson and looting can not yet be sheeted home to them. We thus have the absurdity that Jagan though incompetent is legally right and the opposition are legally wrong and British troops are here to uphold the law.”96 The uprising of February 16 did not topple the government and the colony continued to bleed. In order to determine the causes of the uprising, Secretary of State Reginald Maudling appointed a three-member commission to inquire “into the recent disturbances in British Guiana and the events leading up to them and to report thereon.” The chairman was the Englishman Sir Henry Wynn Parry, who was joined by Justice E. O. Asafu-Adjaye, a Ghanaian, and G. D. Khosla from India. Between its first session on May 21 until June 28, the commission received testimony from witnesses—among them, government ministers and officials, the police, businessmen, trade unions, and insurance companies. There was much public interest in the proceedings and the levying of charges and countercharges by those who were involved in the uprising. Burnham, for example, suggested that the events of February 16 had been planned by the PPP “in the tradition of Hitler and the Reichstag fire.”97 The celebrated fire that damaged Germany’s parliament, according to some, was set by the Nazis and played a central role in the foundation of Nazi Germany. The Wynn Parry Commission’s exhaustive report was released on October 3, 1962. It concluded that there were many sources of opposition to the Jagan administration in February 1962: We therefore see that in the beginning of February there were arrayed against the Government the political parties in opposition and also a very large body of the workers and civil servants, all carrying their respective grievances against the Government. It was not long before these forces combined to form a veritable torrent of abuse, recrimination and vicious hostility directed against Dr. Jagan and his Government, and each day gave fresh vigour to the agitation.98 This was certainly a plausible conclusion. The government’s budget and tax proposals created the opportunity for the forces opposing Jagan to coalesce. Jagan’s budget, the report said, contained “nothing deeply vicious or destructive of economic security.” It pointed out that the New York Times The Politics and Trauma of Race

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and the London Times had written approvingly about it. Sir Jock Campbell, the respected international chairman of Booker Brothers, also thought the budget was reasonable, the report noted. “It clearly was in intention a serious attempt by the Government to get to grips with the formidable economic problems of the country with a hard program of self help,” Chairman Campbell had asserted. Senator Anthony Tasker, the chairman of Bookers in Guiana, concurred. “We assessed it as a realistic attempt to grapple with the economic problems of British Guiana,” he said. In light of such positive appraisals of the budget, the report concluded, the opposition to it “is to be sought in the political rivalries and a feeling that Dr. Jagan had strong communist tendencies and that if he were left in power his Government would proceed to enact measures injurious to the proprietary rights of the upper classes and businessmen.”99 This was a fair assessment of the motives of Peter D’Aguiar and the privileged groups that supported him. But it does not explain why members of the working class took to the streets, particularly on February 16. Rather, D’Aguiar, Burnham, and the newspapers had convinced these workers that the budget was confiscatory, communist inspired, and a harbinger of what independence would mean under a Jagan government. The Wynn Parry Commission’s report condemned Burnham and D’Aguiar’s hypocrisy in proclaiming that the budget “was an oppressive measure and the clearest proof of Dr. Jagan’s Marxist ideology and his dictatorial methods.” In a tone critical of the leaders but condescending to the workers, it asserted: “The contradiction implicit in a measure being both Communist in substance and oppressive of the workers was not a matter which troubled Dr. Jagan’s opponent[s], for political slogans are not infrequently lacking in logic and the multitude to whom they are addressed does not possess the faculty of discerning an incongruity or fallacy in what their leaders expound before them.”100 Outraged by the nihilistic violence on display on February 16, the commission denounced the participants using highly pejorative language. “The outburst of February 16,” it reported, “was comparable to an act of spontaneous combustion when some highly fermented substance is subjected to long pressures. The mass of discontented and idle workers on strike was inexorably driven by the sheer force of bored monotony to find release in rowdyism and rioting.” The looters belonged to “the category of irresponsible individuals consisting for the most part of hooligans and criminals, who in moments of excitement and mass hysteria throw away the inhibitions of a civilised society and seize the opportunity of preying upon their fellow citizens.”101 This was a somewhat strong and superficial characterization of all who took part in the (  )

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disturbances. Not all of the demonstrators engaged in the mayhem. But the violence and the arson were symptomatic of a larger problem. The participants were essentially people who had been unable to find a secure place in the land of their birth. Marginalized and lacking in societal opportunities, these people were assaulting a status quo that had diminished them as individuals. Their actions were antisocial expressions of despair, directed less at Jagan and his government and more at the accumulated failures of Guianese society. Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar were criticized for their failures of leadership during the crisis. The report blamed Jagan for his inability to address the issues that ostensibly precipitated the violence. “Dr. Jagan was not endowed with the breadth of vision,” it said, “which could have enabled him to foresee that his purpose was progressing towards a lamentable end.” He did not “possess the nimbleness of intellect or the dexterity of political maneuvering which allows a politician to change his plan of action without incurring the odium of his supporters or inviting the derision of his opponents.” The premier, “with all his energy and his honesty of purpose, lacked the experience of a practical politician.”102 This characterization was not unfair. The premier’s commitment to the welfare of the working class in British Guiana was not an issue. But Jagan was temperamentally unable to recognize the intractable systemic obstacles in his political path. His failure to accept the maxim that politics is the art of the possible sometimes led him to cling tenaciously to some objectives that were unachievable, at least not at the moment. The Wynn Parry Commission reserved some of its harshest comments for Forbes Burnham and Peter D’Aguiar. Burnham’s conduct was driven by “a desire to assert himself in public life and establish a more important and more rewarding position for himself by bringing about Dr. Jagan’s downfall.”103 His refusal to accept the governor’s request to help restore calm on February 16 was a despicable exercise in political expediency. D’Aguiar was seen as representing his own interests and those of the colony’s privileged groups. Moreover, the commission questioned his intellectual probity: “Before us he posed as one of those individuals who as Shakespeare says, have greatness thrust upon them, for he was at pains to emphasize that it was not he who led the crowd, but the crowd who wanted to be led by him.”104 D’Aguiar “had a special predilection for the spectacular and the flamboyant.”105 The leaders of the Trades Union Congress were also found culpable in stimulating the crisis, “some of whom e.g. [Richard] Ishmael had personal grievances against Dr. Jagan and his ministers.” The “businessmen and members of the propertied class were in entire sympathy with the strikers and their attitude encouraged and fostered the strike.”106 The Politics and Trauma of Race

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The Wynn Parry report concluded that racial animus was not the motive force of the February riots. “The real origin of the riots,” it declared, “lay in political rivalries and jealousies which finally found expression in the criminal acts of a few groups of hooligans.” It underscored the fact that those who participated in the disturbances came from every race in the colony. “The first few stores to be looted,” it observed, “no doubt belonged to East Indians, but the reason for this was that these were the stores which seemed to offer the best loot, and also they were the stores of which the employees had been extremely tardy in joining the strike.”107 The report’s failure to recognize the role of race, if not its centrality, in the origins and development of the crisis was its principal weakness. The groups that opposed the Jagan budget consisted of diverse races and interest groups. But it must be recalled that the election that returned Jagan to office in August 1961 had been the most racially divisive in the colony’s history, and those passions had not subsided. Despite the fact that the Jagan government included three African ministers, the perception existed that it was an Indian government. Despite D’Aguiar’s high profile in the disturbances, Africans comprised the principal shock troops against Jagan, and Indians provided the mainstay of his support. Indian-owned commercial establishments in Georgetown were major targets of arson and looting. A desperate Cheddi Jagan also made undisguised appeals to his Indian base in the rural areas for support. It is true, as the commission’s report claimed, that “there were no clashes between exclusively racial groups” and that “victims were certainly not members of one race or group.”108 But the racial specter was present in all of the events leading up to and during the crisis, and no one attempted to exorcise it. In his review of the report, Consul General Everett Melby concluded that “the racial characteristic of the disturbances is toned down to such an extent that one has the feeling the Inquiry Commission would like to have reported that it did not exist at all.”109 The events of February 1962 represented a profound failure of leadership in the colony. Neither Jagan nor Burnham nor D’Aguiar placed Guiana’s welfare above narrow partisan advantage. The Jagan budget, however, was a serious attempt to grapple with the economic challenges and to redress existing inequities in the tax code. D’Aguiar’s opposition to it represented a determined effort to maintain the privileges of the economic elite, of whom he was their most successful son. Forbes Burnham should have been expected to support the budget given his embrace of socialism and his commitment to social change. Instead, he sought to exploit the situation to achieve what had eluded him in the August 1961 election. Jagan had given Burnham the open(  )

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ing he needed by introducing so many tax proposals in one fell swoop. He had misunderstood the pulse of the colony, or at least Georgetown, and was clearly surprised by the venom the budget generated. Had the more pragmatic Janet Jagan been in the colony when the budget was introduced, it “never would have seen the light of day,” asserted Ronald Mahadeo, the manager of the Rice Development Corporation.110 The commission’s report was silent about Ralph Grey’s conduct during the disturbances. The governor was not disposed to calling out the troops, maintaining that their function was not to help keep an unpopular government in office. Dr. Jagan was insistent that the troops be deployed, telling Grey in a letter on the afternoon of February 15 that

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the resignation of myself and my government is not a solution to the problem. The only solution is to use sufficient military force to maintain law and order so that the duly elected government can remain in office to govern without threats and intimidation and use of force by the Opposition. The present situation demands firmness. The Opposition should be clearly told by you what are their constitutional powers, privileges and obligations. They should also be told that they should not continue their agitation and incitement under the illusion that the British Government will not act with sufficient force to restore law and order and they should be advised that the British Government will not suspend the constitution so long as the Government is governing with integrity.111 Jagan, as noted earlier, would have welcomed a suspension of the constitution if that worked to his political advantage. And he actively supported the use of British troops to keep him in office. The governor reneged on the promise he made on the evening of February 15, leading Minister Rai to claim that “had the troops arrived as arranged and agreed upon there would have been no rioting, no arson, no looting, nor loss of life.”112 Rai was accurate in his assessment of the consequences of the governor’s behavior. That said, no one emerged from the trouble with his reputation for effective and decisive leadership enhanced. The February crisis did not create the divisions in Guiana’s society; it merely reflected and exacerbated them. The colony had experienced physical and psychological traumas, and its leaders offered no curative balm. Six months after the rampage of February 16, Consul General Melby said Georgetown still had a “scabrous appearance.” The areas of the city where arson and looting occurred “have evolved into the general appearance which they can be expected to have for the next several years.” Stressing that “the physical The Politics and Trauma of Race

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picture is not attractive,” Melby attributed the situation to “the lack of commercial activity and the combination of fear and conservatism in BG’s entrepreneurial class.”113 The physical restoration would, in time, prove easier to accomplish than a spiritual and psychological renewal. Unwilling to mute their differences to forge some semblance of societal unity, the three leaders competed for political advantage. In the aftermath of the February crisis, British Guiana would have profited from the kind of leadership that recognized the fragility of social relations in the colony, eschewed pandering to racial groups, minimized ideological posturing, and engaged in creative nation building. Instead, Guiana’s foremost leaders expended their energies in internecine wrangling even as the country once again faced major traumas in 1963 and 1964. The 1963 crisis was precipitated largely by the actions of the PPP government. It was a product of the party’s long-standing desire to consolidate its support among the sugar workers and create a union affiliated with the sugar industry to represent them. Founded in 1937, the Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA) was the union recognized by the Sugar Producers Association (SPA), though it was widely regarded as corrupt and unacceptably cozy with employers. In 1948 Dr. J. P. Lachmansingh had organized the Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU) to compete with the MPCA, but it failed to receive the recognition of the SPA. In 1953 the PPP engineered a strike to force recognition of the GIWU, a development that helped to precipitate the suspension of the constitution. The GIWU floundered in the wake of the Jagan-Burnham split in 1955. In 1956 the Guiana Sugar Workers Union (GSWU) was founded with the PPP’s blessing, but most workers in the sugar industry remained loyal to the MPCA.114 Determined to destroy the MPCA, the Jagan administration—in another act of apparent political misjudgment—tabled a Labour Relations Bill in March 1963 similar to the ill-fated one that had been introduced in 1953. The bill, like its predecessor, would have required employers to recognize any union supported by the majority of workers in a particular industry. On the face of it, this was a reasonable proposal, but it galvanized opposition to the Jagan government, as it did in 1953. The TUC, MPCA, PNC, UF, and others quickly organized demonstrations to protest the bill, charging that it was designed by the PPP to control the labor movement. Worse, it was a precursor to communist domination of the country. On April 18 the TUC called a general strike, which paralyzed the country for the next eighty days. The Labour Relations Bill and the general strike provided the occasion for another assault on the government. As in February 1962, there were wide(  )

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spread acts of violence, arson, looting, and racially based attacks. British Guiana, particularly its capital city, descended into disorder once again as the country’s leaders displayed their enormous incapacities. The crisis ended, or so it seemed, when the House of Assembly was prorogued in June and the bill lapsed. The twelve-week strike sputtered to an end on July 6, but not before the colony’s psyche had been badly scarred. Nine individuals died as a result of interracial violence. Indians killed three Africans, Africans killed three Indians, two Indians died at the hands of the security forces, and another Indian blew himself up with a hand grenade.115 Less than a year later, Guiana experienced a similar trauma with a racial bloodbath at Wismar. BRITISH GUIANA’S MOST devastating eruption of racially inspired violence began in April 1964. Once again the Jagan administration had introduced a bill to get the PPP-backed Guiana Sugar Workers Union recognized as the voice of sugar workers. This union would replace the management-friendly MPCA. Fearing that a GSWU victory would lead to the PPP’s domination of the sugar industry, the Trades Union Congress called an industrywide strike. The anti-Jagan TUC was acting in its capacity as the umbrella organization for the colony’s unions. The strike precipitated some violence in West Demerara between the supporters of the competing unions and the Indians. The disorder intensified when African strikebreakers were imported from Georgetown. In the racially volatile climate of British Guiana, Indian workers viewed the presence of the Africans as a provocation and reacted with violence. Predictably, West Demerara soon became a race war zone. The mayhem intensified in May, as beatings, murder, and arson spread to other parts of the colony. Newspapers provided ample coverage of the atrocities, understandably producing a climate of fear in the colony. Reporting to the U.S. Department of State on May 4, the new American consul general, Delmar R. Carlson, accused the Jagan government of doing “little or nothing” to stop the violence, declaring that “such positive actions as it has taken are in response to direct pressure from the Police Commissioner or Governor.” He noted that the opposition did not support violence because that invited a delay in the highly anticipated general elections. Their leaders, he said, were frustrated at not being able to “do little more than counsel peace and patience.” Governor Richard Luyt, who had arrived in Guiana only two months earlier, wondered whether “[the] lunatic fringe especially among Africans will continue to be restrained.”116 The fear created by the violence led Indians and Africans in such troubled areas as West Demerara to segregate themselves. Governor Luyt, who visited The Politics and Trauma of Race

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the area on April 29, reported that the villages were now “entirely Indian or African.” He was struck by the intensity of the fear and hatred that he encountered. Luyt and law enforcement authorities were very worried that the rural unrest might spread to Georgetown and other urban areas. Such conflagrations would be difficult, if not impossible, to control. Consequently, the governor and the commissioner of police, according to the American consul general, warned Jagan “privately and often that if Africans are stirred by violence [the] police cannot protect the Indian community especially in Georgetown.” They also wanted the premier to agree to the appointment of new magistrates in order to expedite the trial of those persons who had been arrested for their roles in the unrest. Consul General Carlson reported that the “regime has been reluctant [to] agree” unless the magistrates were deemed to be “politically acceptable,” a proposition “the Governor has resented and refused.” Luyt told him that such posturing was unworthy of the colony’s leadership, suggesting that the judiciary was a suitable candidate for political interference and corruption.117 When the violence did not abate, the Council of Ministers advised the governor to declare a State of Emergency, which he did effective May 22. Georgetown saw some scattered incidents that afternoon and evening as “teenage Africans began roaming [the city] . . . assaulting and robbing East Indians as well as trying to loot markets and shops.”118 The most serious and despicable acts occurred at Wismar, a village located up the Demerara River, on May 23. Gangs of marauding Africans razed the residences of Indians, looting houses and shops, beating their victims, and murdering at least two people. This outrage precipitated the resignation of the minister of home affairs, Janet Jagan, on June 1. In a statement, Mrs. Jagan charged the African-dominated Police Department with “countless” examples of partiality and a failure to protect the Indians at Wismar. She was resigning because she “could not continue to bear responsibility for the maintenance of public safety and public order.” When the premier declined to nominate her successor, Governor Luyt had to assume responsibility for internal security.119 The destruction at Wismar shocked the colony, and it would be several weeks before an uncertain calm emerged. On July 1, for example, two Africans were ambushed and killed at Mahaicony Creek; three days later three more suffered a similar fate at Buxton. By the time some semblance of order was restored in late July, 166 people had been killed and over 800 wounded. About 1,400 buildings, principally houses, were destroyed by fire in addition to cane fields.120

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The racialized violence that engulfed the colony in the terrible months of April, May, June, and July was predictable. Racial difference was central to the colony’s construction and existence, and white supremacy stood at its ideological core. But the racially inspired violence that was becoming a feature of the colony’s culture was not a direct function of imperial policy. The unhappy events of 1964 must be attributed principally to the political rivalry between the PPP and the PNC and their leaders’ success in exacerbating the racial fault lines that existed. Covert activities by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had helped to stimulate the unrest, but the CIA was operating in an already fertile ground. By exploiting racial sentiment for political gain, the Guianese leaders were crudely manipulating their followers, nurturing racially inspired fears and helping to create the passions that were unleashed so devastatingly in those awful months. The first acts of violence should have been met by quick and vigorous action by the law enforcement authorities to contain them. As the violence spread and its ugly racial character became clear, the premier and the Council of Ministers should have given the governor the necessary authority to introduce the security restrictions that the crisis demanded. The failure to do so gives credence to the conclusion that the PPP wanted the violence to continue in order to force a postponement of the elections that were going to be held under the system of proportional representation that it disdained. The premier, as the head of the elected government, had the responsibility to set a dispassionate and balanced tone for the country regardless of any racial imperatives or perceived political advantages. But Cheddi Jagan was never able to project the image of being the premier of all the people. On June 18 Jagan announced the formation of a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the atrocities at Wismar, to determine the nature and extent of the violence, and to examine the conduct of the police and the Volunteer Force.121 Such a move was, at one level, commendable, but at another it showed why the country’s racial divisiveness would continue. Instead of enjoining the commission to examine the incidence of racial violence throughout Guiana, Jagan restricted its charge to Wismar, the locus of the main atrocities against Indians. The commission could have become the first step on the path of racial reconciliation if its scope had been colonywide and included an analysis of the terror directed at both Indians and Africans. Accordingly, the investigative body was as flawed in its conceptualization as it would be in its modus operandi. Jagan made matters worse by his choice of the commission’s members. In-

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stead of appointing distinguished and recognizably independent Guianese or foreigners, he selected three PPP sympathizers. The chairman was J. Oscar Haynes, a lawyer; the other two were Dr. Harold Drayton of the University of Guiana and Mrs. Rajkumarie Singh, head of Maha Sabha, a Hindu religious organization. Governor Luyt reportedly opposed these partisan appointments but lacked the constitutional authority to block them.122 The partisan composition of the commission compromised its credibility from the outset. Predictably, Forbes Burnham denounced its formation, declaring that it was “yet another act of partiality and discrimination by the incompetent and partisan PPP government” and that the PNC would boycott it. He also expressed his displeasure that its members were not being asked to investigate the atrocities perpetuated by PPP supporters on the West Coast.123 Reviewing this Guianese exercise in partisanship at a time when the colony needed the best in its leaders, the American consul general was harshly critical of the premier’s motivations in creating the commission: [The] Commission is stacked and the Jagan regime will try to make [the] most of it. [A] parade of well coached victims of atrocities is to be expected and much effort designed [to] show security forces negligent and biased (Incidental side effect may be to stimulate African resentment). . . . Janet Jagan [has] reportedly made emotional speeches in [the] countryside describing Wismar atrocities and had several victims participate with her on [the] same platform.124

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Consul General Carlson believed that Wismar “did tend [to] draw Indians together.” He reported that Dr. Jagan had given an incendiary speech in the area emphasizing that “if Wismar could happen while he is in office, think how much worse it will be for Indians if he should be out of office.”125 Although he had appointed a Commission of Enquiry, the premier did not distance himself from its work. In September, for instance, he delivered a number of statements from Indians in the Wismar/Mackenzie areas to the governor for submission to the secretary of state for the colonies. These documents described in horrifying detail the beatings, arson, and general violence directed at its victims. They also underscored the dereliction of duty by security and law enforcement personnel. Skeptical about the overall veracity of these complaints, Governor Luyt asked Jagan to provide additional details such as the names and addresses of the individuals who recorded the statements, medical certificates to support claims of injury, the names of the hospitals where the wounded were treated, and so on. Jagan replied that much of that information was already included in the statements, but, in any event, (  )

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“in the light of the suffering of the persons concerned, the request for the information sought was an insult to the injuries suffered by them.”126 The premier had a point. But the governor knew that Jagan submitted the statements to the Colonial Office in order to obtain some political advantage from the horrific episode in the colony’s history. No doubt he would not have earned Luyt’s skepticism and may have enhanced his own statesmanship had he provided similar statements from African victims on the West Coast. That he failed to do so created the impression that his motives for collecting and submitting the statements were neither racially neutral nor principled.

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THE LETTER WAS TYPED and addressed to “Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.” It was not the first letter that the writer had sent to the queen. The first one had been sent on May 27, 1963, but its contents are unknown since it has not yet been discovered. The writer, Thakson[?] Singh, hailed from the village of La Jalousie, West Coast Demerara. He had witnessed the turmoil in his country and wanted Her Majesty—the fount of all power and the repository of the people’s abiding trust—to intervene, along with the colonial secretary, “to give or make any solution until the time of election or the talk of independence.” Dated November 13, 1963, Singh’s letter said he could “give one of the best information” on the situation in his country. Singh wrote: I know that the Governor is here to give all information to her Majesty and Mr Sandys but remember he is in office and he is not moving around like me in British Guiana. I will assure you that I will swear to the Governor or to you that this information will be true and correct. I am not siding with none of the party, I am just doing this for the sake of our country. Any kind of information you need, you write me secretly and I will give it to you all. I can assure you that no one would know anything about this information. I am quite sure that I will get all the main proposals from the leading party and send to you in details. . . . I don’t want you to call me a spy, I am just doing this for the sake of my country. I don’t want no one to come and dominate our country. . . . If I could afford to come to London last month, I would have explain everything to you, so you can understand what I mean. Singh told the queen that the “time is now to give my service to you being the son of an ex soldier of World War I.” Of humble origins, Singh’s was a voice of those who had suffered most from the violence that was destroying the body politic. His letter could be read as an expression of distrust in Guiana’s leaders and of a fervent, albeit naive, belief in his ability to help The Politics and Trauma of Race

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solve his country’s problems. Singh did not visit London, nor did he meet with the queen, but his heartfelt missive reflects the colonized subject’s confidence in the power of the distant monarch.127 Singh did not stand alone in his distrust of Guiana’s leaders. On July 26, 1963, 1,032 Indians from the Corentyne submitted a petition to Governor Grey requesting a partitioning of the colony. The question of partition was not new, but previously its principal advocates had been Africans, such as Sydney King. Other Indians asked for a return to direct rule or Crown colony status. “We are tired of politics; remove the three leaders and let the Queen rule,” pleaded a letter from five Indians on the West Coast. A letter from the chairman of a village on the East Coast was marked by its urgency. “We are desperate; we live in fear; we cannot continue like this; 1,000 or more of us wish to come and see you,” the letter informed the governor. “We want no politics, you rule until the country becomes peaceful.”128 Wearied by the chaos and the bloodshed, these people wanted peace; they recognized that their elected leaders had failed them. The archbishop of the West Indies, who had lived in Guiana for many years, was convinced that the violence was essentially premeditated and organized by people with malicious intent. In July 1964 Consul General Carlson reported that Archbishop Alan Knight made an “apparent reference to [the] Jagan regime” when he wrote in the July issue of his diocesan magazine: “Not a few of these wicked men and women have made themselves notorious and their names have been household words. I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that . . . all such evil minded persons be identified, isolated, and denounced.”129 These were strong words, but the archbishop was not an admirer of the premier. Consul General Carlson agreed with Knight that the “greatest cause of violence here is not race but premeditated and politically motivated acts which keep [the] pot boiling and lead to racial violence in retaliation.” The archbishop and the American consul general were both accurate in their assessment. Carlson laid the blame at the feet of the PPP. “While the extent to which PPP-PYO [Progressive Youth Organization] activists may still be engaging in terrorism in order [to] induce widespread racial disturbances is unknown,” he wrote, “it is probably substantial and there is little or no doubt that violence started in this way.”130 The bloodbath in the summer of 1964 demonstrated the terrible human and societal cost of racial animus and a racialized politics. It presented Jagan and Burnham with an opportunity to transcend narrow partisan politics and to work together to heal the colony’s wounds. A jointly conducted tour of the affected areas would have been of enormous symbolic importance. But the (  )

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two men could not summon the courage to put aside their differences when the health of the commonweal demanded it. It was an appalling lack of farsighted leadership and a manifestation of the price many societies have paid for rewarding seriously flawed personalities with high political office. Wismar, and all the horror that it represented, would continue to haunt British Guiana’s collective psyche. THE GENERAL ELECTIONS of December 1964 were held in an atmosphere poisoned by the violence of the preceding spring and summer. Indians still felt aggrieved by the events at Wismar and were expected to give their support to the People’s Progressive Party. Although much of this enthusiasm for the PPP sprang from racial sentiment, the party did not depend on that factor alone. It had an impressive organizational structure, a function of the hard work and genius of Janet Jagan. In 1963, for example, the PPP had 158 groups across the colony. These were the workers who kept their ears to the ground, disseminated information about their party, recruited new members, and helped to maintain élan. The 158 groups had 1,507 members, of whom 88.4 percent, or 1,332, were Indians. The East Coast of Demerara boasted 30 groups and the Essequibo area, about the same number; East Bank Demerara, 11, and Georgetown and New Amsterdam, 17. The activities of these groups were supplemented by those of the party’s youth arm, the Progressive Youth Organization.131 Founded in 1953, the PYO had 92 groups comprising about 813 active members in 1963, with an additional 3,000 sympathizers. The organization was male dominated, having only 27 women members in 1963. Similarly, it drew its overwhelming support from Indians, who comprised 87.1 percent of its membership in 1962. Twenty-seven of its groups were on the Corentyne and West Coast Berbice, 28 in the areas of East Coast Demerara and East Bank Demerara, and 14 on the Essequibo. The organization helped to procure scholarships for Guianese youth, particularly from the Eastern Bloc countries; sponsored social and sports activities for its members; and opened libraries in several communities. The PPP also had a women’s auxillary, the Women’s Progressive Organisation (WPO). Founded in 1961, it had 14 groups by 1963 with a confirmed membership of 115 women. The groups located in the rural areas were almost 100 percent Indian, while those in urban areas were roughly 40 percent Indian. Taken together, the party groups, the PYO, and the WPO constituted the organizational face of the PPP, representing it to its constituency and helping to provide the basis of its electoral success.132 Its organizational structure not withstanding, the PPP had the demoThe Politics and Trauma of Race

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( Table 12 ) Trends in Population Growth by Race, 1936–1960 % Increase/Decrease,

PO PU L ATIO N

Race

1936

1945

1960

1936–60

Africans Amerindians Chinese Europeans other than Portuguese Indians Mixed Race Portuguese

129,648 8,774* 3,283 2,188

137,442 9,516* 3,548 2,370

190,380 22,860 3,550 5,230

46.8 — 8.1 139

140,768 39,664 8,573

164,522 47,853 8,247

279,460 66,180 7,610

98.5 66.9 –11.2

Total

332,898

373,498

575,270

72.8

Source: PREM 11/3666. * Classified as aboriginals in these years, so not comparable with the 1960 figure.

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graphic trends on its side in a colony where racialized voting trumped every other variable. Table 12 provides a breakdown of the trends in the growth of the colony’s population. It shows that the Indian population was increasing at twice the rate of the African. Between 1936 and 1960, the number of Indians had increased by 98.5 percent and the Africans by only 46.8 percent. These statistics help to explain why Jagan’s enthusiastic support for lowering the voting age to eighteen was matched by the intensity of Burnham’s opposition to it. The racial distribution of the population in 1964 also suggested a PPP electoral advantage in the context of racialized voting. In that year Indians constituted 50.2 percent of the population and Africans 31.3 percent. Table 13 provides an informative breakdown of the distribution of races in the colony. The election results of December 1964 confirmed the entrenched pattern of racial voting in British Guiana. In addition to the three leading parties, the election was contested by two anti-PPP, East Indian–based parties, namely the Justice Party and the Guiana United Muslim Party. The two other contestants were the Peace, Equality, and Prosperity Party and the National Labour Front. Of the 247,495 registered voters, 240,120—or 96.33 percent—went to the polls and 1,590 ballots were rejected. Table 14 shows the percentage of votes received by each party and the number of seats it won. According to the formula used under the terms of proportional representation, one seat was assigned for every 4,500 votes the party received. Of the three main parties, only the PPP increased the percentage of the votes it received in the elections of 1961, winning 42.7 percent of the votes (  )

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( Table 13 ) Racial Distribution of the Guianese Population, December 1964 % of Total Race

Male

Female

Total

Population

Africans Amerindians Chinese Europeans other than Portuguese Indians Mixed Race Portuguese*

97,070 14,760 2,230 1,130

102,760 14,670 1,680 1,290

199,830 29,430 3,910 2,420

31.3 4.6 0.6 0.4

162,190 37,860 2,870

157,880 38,130 3,510

320,070 75,990 6,380

50.2 11.9 1

Total

318,110

319,920

638,030

100

Source: CO 1031/4617. * In official statistics, the Portuguese were considered a separate racial group.

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( Table 14 ) Results of the December 1964 Elections by Party Party

No. of Votes

% of Votes

Seats

People’s Progressive Party People’s National Congress United Force Justice Party Guiana United Muslim Party Peace, Equality, and Prosperity Party National Labour Front

109, 332 96,657 29,612 1,334 1,194 224 177

45.8 40.5 12.4 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1

24 22 7 0 0 0 0

Total

238,530

100

53

in 1961 and 45.8 percent in 1964. In contrast, the PNC’s share of the vote fell from 41 percent in 1961 to 40.5 percent in 1964. The UF had a more drastic decline, dropping from 16.3 percent in 1961 to 12.4 percent in 1964. After analyzing the election returns, the American consul general concluded that “the most striking characteristics of the election results were the strictly racial division of the voting and, . . . on the East Indian side, polarization was especially marked with the PPP getting virtually all of the Indian votes.” The UF, he said, “probably received the vote of virtually all Amerindians and Portuguese” in addition to “a substantial portion of the votes of the mixed or creole element.” The PNC, he speculated, “gained the votes of almost all the pure Africans” as well as members “of the creole element.”133 Consul General Carlson was not surprised by this pattern of racialized The Politics and Trauma of Race

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voting, especially by the Indians. He reported that in many constituencies the votes the PPP received were the “same as the number of registered Indian voters.” Indians, Carlson observed, feared and distrusted an African-led government. They had not forgotten “the Wismar disaster,” which increased their distrust of their African countrymen. As he put it: “The PPP campaign was well run, and the Party exploited every opportunity presented, especially the Wismar incident and a supposedly secret police document based on unevaluated information which blamed the PNC for most of the violence in Georgetown. Even many educated Indians were heard to say, “If the PNC does such things now, what will they do to us if they become the Government.”134 Carlson was convinced that Indians were “more docile and physically weaker than Africans,” and this presumably made them inviting targets for assault. Ignoring the horrendous white violence directed at African Americans who were struggling for their civil rights in his own country at the time, Carlson characterized Guiana’s blacks as having “[a] latent streak of savagery which can be aroused.” Indians were so scared that they had become “impervious to reason,” rejecting the multiracial appeals of the UF and that of other parties such as the Justice Party.135 The new premier, Forbes Burnham, inherited a polity with serious racial divisions. Recognizing that he had to act quickly to heal his country’s wounds, he delivered a major address at a rally in Georgetown on December 13. He assured the Guianese people that

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this Government holds that all the people of this country are equally important, whether they belong to a large group or to a small group. To us the Amerindians are important. To us the Chinese are important. To us the Portuguese are important. To us the Europeans are important. To us the mixed races are important. To us the Africans are important. To us the Indians are important. In short all Guianese are important and valued members of our community and we cherish them. . . . We can assure our Indian citizens here and now that rather than cause for fear they have much to hope for from the new government.136 This was a good beginning. But the racially administered wounds were deep and painful, and soothing words were no elixir, no balm. Only the future would reveal whether Forbes Burnham had inaugurated a new, healthier era in the racial politics of his country or whether he would pour more salt on its gaping wounds.

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The Politics of Power

Cheddi Jagan’s defeat in December 1964 represented the triumph of AngloAmerican policy in British Guiana. Forbes Burnham became the new premier and the head of a coalition government, subsequently leading his country to independence in 1966. But Jagan remained a powerful force in the country, and it was not at all certain that Burnham would win any more elections, a prospect that worried the Americans. Harry Fitzgibbons, a functionary in the U.S. State Department, proposed to his colleague, a Mr. Sayre, a fanciful scheme that he hoped would rid Guyana of Jagan. Writing to Sayre on December 15, 1966, Fitzgibbons made his case: I think that if we are anxious to build a case against Cheddi, and if we would prefer not to have to do it artificially, then the following approach will encourage Cheddi to indulge directly in the kind of activities which would support (politically if not legally) a move to exile him. Assumption: If Jagan is convinced that Burnham has decided, with UK-US national and moral support, to rig the next elections, so that Burnham may well be successful in doing so, then Jagan will involve himself directly in subversive activities including terrorism.

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Proposal: A. Leak through GOG [Government of Guyana] to Jagan the correct information that the US and UK recently held talks in London on the political and economic outlook for Guyana and what the two governments can do about it. B. Leak through GOG to Jagan the incorrect information that the US and UK have decided that only rigged elections can guarantee Burnham’s remaining in power, and that the two governments have agreed to commit effectively unlimited resources—in money and man power—to see that fraudulent elections take place successfully. C. Leak through GOG to Jagan the incorrect information that coordinated operations toward successfully rigged operations will begin in earnest imminently. Conclusion: I suspect that Cheddi will decide that he can’t afford the luxury of insulating himself from the planning and preparation, if not the execution of the PPP’s counterattack.1 Fitzgibbons’s memorandum reflects the Machiavellianism that had characterized America’s attitude toward Cheddi Jagan and its policy in British Guiana since 1961, when it began to take an active interest in the affairs of the colony. Much of the unrest that engulfed Guiana between 1961 and 1964, as will be shown, can be attributed to U.S. subversive activities. British Guiana’s interests and its future needs took second place to the national imperatives of the Americans, with the acquiescence of the British.

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“WE MUST NOT ALLOW ourselves to be deluded. Freedom will not be granted on a platter,” Cheddi Jagan wrote in the Mirror, the organ of the PPP, on December 20, 1963. The ardent champion of Guiana’s independence was making one of his bitter assaults on colonialism in the waning months of his premiership. “British Guiana is the acid test of the wickedness of the imperialists,” he declared. “They talk about democracy and freedom but openly sabotage and reject these principles here.” Jagan’s lament was dramatically poignant: he was not destined to lead his country into independence, and he probably knew it at the time. “British Guiana proves one thing,” Jagan said with some resignation. “The colonialists will give freedom if they are forced to do so as in Algeria and elsewhere or if they can find willing stooges to carry on their policy under a new guise of neocolonialism.”2 Jagan would never have volunteered to be a willing stooge of the colonialists, nor would he have allowed himself to be so designated. He admired (  )

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those colonial leaders who used violence to advance the cause of their country’s independence but did not advocate such a strategy for British Guiana. American consul general Everett Melby interpreted Jagan’s piece in the Mirror as an “implied threat of violence,” on the one hand, or “a pathetic bluff,” on the other. Melby could not avoid diminishing Jagan’s sustained contribution to the independence movement in Guiana. “Jagan has often talked of violence and compared himself to revolutionary leaders,” the consul general observed, “but in his 20 years of political activity, Jagan has mainly talked and acted very little; his heroes have generally moved before they began talking.”3 Cheddi Jagan was the most committed Guianese nationalist who sat in the Legislative Council after the 1947 elections. In claiming his victory at the polls, the young leader proclaimed, “We, the people have won. Now the struggle will begin.”4 For the next five years Jagan engaged in a sustained assault on the bastions of privilege in the colony—big business, the Chamber of Commerce, and the plantocracy. His was the unwavering voice of the dispossessed, the marginalized, and the interests of Guiana versus those of the bauxite and sugar barons who dominated the economy and manipulated it to their advantage. Supported by a sympathetic legislature and the Colonial Office, these powerful interest groups behaved as if the colony’s resources and its people existed for their benefit. Jagan’s nationalism was not confined to articulating the concept of Guiana for the Guianese; it prescribed, at least in theory, a fundamental reconstruction of the country’s economic arrangements and political structure. Jagan began his long battle against colonialism by demanding selfdetermination for the people of British Guiana. He invoked the principles of the Atlantic Charter to help legitimize this demand. On August 14, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom issued what became known as the Atlantic Charter, endorsing the “right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live.” The two leaders wished “to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” In their testimony before the Waddington Commission in 1950, members of the PPP, voicing the principles of the Atlantic Charter, urged the acceptance of self-determination for British Guiana, recommending the granting of internal self-government as the first step on the road to independence. The commission declined to support the request, but this did nothing to still the voices of a nascent Guianese nationalism. In late 1950 Jagan attended a conference on the Caribbean held in Curaçao, in the Netherlands Antilles, where he introduced a motion demanding independence for the colonies of the The Politics of Power

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Caribbean region. The following year he met with Secretary of State Alan Lennox-Boyd to discuss the question of independence for his country. He would later address a public meeting in London, where he urged independence for the Anglophone Caribbean as a whole.5 The British coup d’état of October 1953 interrupted the colony’s progress toward self-determination. It was a naked expression of imperial might and a stark reminder that British Guiana was not in charge of its own destiny. The Robertson Commission put the colony on notice that its leaders had to be circumspect in their behavior if it were to be rewarded with any degree of selfdetermination. The cause of independence became temporarily secondary to the struggle of Jagan and the PPP to survive in the wake of Britain’s attempt to destroy the party and its leadership. Meanwhile, the worldwide anticolonial movement continued to gain momentum. In 1955, twenty-nine African and Asian nations met in Bandung, Indonesia, to advance the drive for selfdetermination for all peoples. Organized by Egypt, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India, Iraq, and Japan, the Bandung Conference denounced “colonialism in all of its manifestations.” The demand for independence became the mantra of British Guiana’s two principal political parties, particularly after the colony’s return to electoral politics in 1957. It was politically popular among the supporters of the PNC and the PPP but anathema to some elites who remained suspicious of both parties and their leaders. Although the British were favorably disposed to granting independence to Guiana, they would only do so when they were convinced it was ready to manage its own affairs responsibly. This was, to be sure, a matter of opinion, and Jagan and Burnham never agreed with the Colonial Office on the criteria for the colony’s independence. In a discussion with representatives of the U.S. State Department, J. D. Hennings of the Colonial Office underscored the principles that would guide Britain’s decision to grant Guiana its independence. He wanted the Americans to believe that we were anxious to achieve a stable and democratic conclusion to our stewardship in British Guiana; we were proud elsewhere that all the independent countries which had once been British colonies were reasonably stable and non-communist, and we had no wish whatever to spoil this record over a relatively insignificant place like British Guiana. Having succeeded in bigger and more difficult things, we certainly did not want to fail in a small one.6 The Renison Constitution, so named for Sir Patrick Renison, then governor of the colony, was intended to be the first fledgling step on the new (  )

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road to independence. Not surprisingly, it fed the desire for a more accelerated pace by leaders anxious for greater political autonomy. The anticolonial movement was gaining momentum and achieving successes in Africa and Asia. British Guiana was the most active arena for these sentiments in the Americas, with Cheddi Jagan as articulator-in-chief. Led by Jagan, the British Guiana Legislative Council approved a motion in 1958 asking the secretary of state for the colonies to receive a delegation to discuss:

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I. Constitutional reform with a view to the granting of British Guiana of the status of a fully self governing territory within the Commonwealth. II. The working out of an agreement between the British Guiana Government and the United States Government for a transitional period whereby the United Kingdom Government would exercise control over defense and give guidance in foreign relations other than trade and commerce.7 Responding positively to the motion, the colonial secretary requested that Governor Renison create a committee to consider and make recommendations on the nature of the constitutional advance. The governor acquiesced, appointing the speaker of the House of Assembly as chair of a Constitutional Committee consisting of all elected members of the Legislative Council and the official members as nonvoting advisers. Significant differences between the PPP and the PNC soon emerged, with the PPP supporting immediate independence and the PNC advocating internal self-government as a first stage and independence as a part of a larger West Indies Federation. These differences remained unresolved when the constitutional conference assembled in London in March 1960. In his opening address, Jagan urged independence in what one British newspaper called a “fiery” and “truculent” tone. If independence were denied, he asked, “are Guianese people to come to the conclusion that freedom can be won, as in Cyprus . . . by violence and bloodshed?” Forbes Burnham expressed his support for independence but admitted differences in the colony on whether it should be “independent, going on its own” or as a part of a larger unit, namely the West Indies Federation. Jai Narine Singh, the leader of a party named the Guianese Independence Movement, demanded immediate independence outside of the British Commonwealth. As the sessions continued, Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod characterized the atmosphere as “unbelievable.” According to the American ambassador to the United Kingdom, Macleod “expressed [a] rather low opinion of Jagan, not so much for semi-communist leanings, but because Jagan [was] of no great ability.” Burnham, Ambassador John Whitney said, “who The Politics of Power

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[was] much more able, showed himself so incredibly conceited that it [is] also difficult [to] discuss problems reasonably with him.”8 Miraculously, the conference did not collapse due to the wrangling among the Guianese leaders and their paralyzing distrust of one another’s motives. The delegates, however, accepted “the principle of independence within the Commonwealth for British Guiana” and agreed to meet again after the next scheduled election to consider a new request for independence. This should come from both houses of the British Guiana legislature, the second house coming into being as a result of decisions made at the conference. Known as the Senate, the second house would consist of thirteen members appointed by the governor.9 The parties were elated that the British had decided to grant the colony independence “in principle.” But two of the unresolved issues had threatening implications for the future. Jagan wanted the voting age lowered to eighteen, a change that would benefit the PPP because of the growing Indian population that constituted its electoral base. Protecting his own electoral base, Burnham advocated proportional representation. He was not the first to raise the question of proportional representation, as it would come to be called. The Robertson Commission had dismissed it as a solution to the colony’s representational problems. “If some system of proportional representation was now introduced,” the commission concluded in 1954, “it could hardly be represented as other than a device to mitigate the present dominance of the People’s Progressive Party. To enshrine in the constitution such a device would be wrong.” This was a principled assertion, one that would, in time, be tempered by Guianese realities and powerful external interests.10 CHEDDI JAGAN’S MARXIST rhetoric framed his external image. The man who had spent his entire political career promoting the needs of British Guiana’s marginalized peoples became best known overseas, pejoratively, as a misguided Marxist theoretician. Despite the criticism of his detractors, Jagan had kept faith with the vow he had made in 1948, when he attended the funeral of the five workers who had been killed during the strike at the Enmore sugar estate: “At the graveside the emotional outbursts of the widows and relatives of the deceased had been intensely distressing, and I could with difficulty restrain my tears. There was to be no turning back. There and then I made a silent pledge—I would dedicate my entire life to the cause of the struggle of the Guyanese people against bondage and exploitation.”11 Jagan’s image as a subversive figure in the Western Hemisphere had been created by Britain’s coup of October 1953 and its justification for it. For much (  )

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of the 1950s, the Americans left it up to the British to contain their colonial renegade. Shortly after it took office in January 1961, however, the John F. Kennedy administration turned its attention to the Guianese question. Although President Kennedy had shown a deeper understanding of nationalist sentiment in the colonial worlds than his Republican colleagues, he shared their conclusion that much of it was communist inspired. Overall, the new administration in Washington was just as fervently anticommunist as its predecessor and committed to its containment in the Americas and elsewhere. Fidel Castro had come to power in Cuba in 1958 as a result of the revolution he led. His embrace of communism and developing friendship with the Soviet Union invited American animus and efforts to overthrow him, particularly the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Seen through this anti-Castro and anticommunist lens, Jagan became the second most aggressive target of America’s crusade against communism in the hemisphere. Ironically, the American assault on Cheddi Jagan began at a time when the British were reconsidering their view of him as a communist. Years of experience in dealing with Jagan had led them to make distinctions between his use of the language of Marx, his associations with countries such as Cuba and the Eastern Bloc, and the reformist political agenda he pursued in British Guiana when he returned to office, albeit with diminished power, in 1957. Jagan’s Marxism lacked teeth, they reasoned. “We think the most important thing to stress,” noted M. H. Revell of the Foreign Office in 1961, “is our belief that Dr. Jagan is not the ‘dedicated’ communist that world opinion makes him out to be.”12 Under Secretary of State Hugh Fraser would later compare Jagan to the American Founding Father, Thomas Jefferson. “I have made it clear [to the Americans],” he said, “that a line can be drawn between . . . international communists and what I would call the anti-colonial type of communist which as I pointed out to them Jefferson might well have been if the communist manifesto had been written in 1748 instead of 100 years later.”13 Not all of the colonial officials shared these assessments. But, in general, they had come to be more sensitive to the multidimensional ingredients of Jagan’s political philosophy, a bewildering and dynamic blend of nationalism, anticolonialism, and Marxism. The Americans seemed incapable of such understandings, placing Jagan into a communist straight jacket and framing their attitude toward him and policy for his country accordingly. Three weeks after Kennedy assumed office, U.S. officials initiated discussions with their British counterparts on the political conditions in Guiana and their fear that communists would dominate the country when it achieved its independence. Their suggestion that an Anglo-USA Working Party be created The Politics of Power

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to assess the situation in the colony from time to time, and to frame and coordinate policy was accepted by the British. The Americans favored direct intervention to build up anti-Jagan forces and to ensure that he would be defeated in the forthcoming elections. They urged that Britain delay Guiana’s independence until an alternative to Jagan could be identified, supported, and brought to office.14 At its first formal meeting in April 1961, the Anglo-USA Working Party examined a detailed report entitled “Prospects for British Guiana,” prepared by the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), an agency of the U.S. government. The report focused on “aspects of the political situation giving rise to anxiety in Washington.” This included an analysis of “evidence” of Jagan’s communism, his “communist contacts” abroad, and the “Marxist proclivities” of some PPP leaders. The report also addressed the bases of the PPP’s support in the colony, predicting victory for the party in the forthcoming elections.15 The members of the Working Party spent most of their time considering ways to neutralize Jagan’s support and to mobilize opposition to him. America’s fear of a communist takeover after independence dominated the discussions. The British representatives did not share this fear to the same degree and resisted the U.S. proposal to strengthen the opposition to Jagan during the election campaign. They were concerned that these anti-Jagan activities would become known and “would provide the PPP a trump card which would strengthen its appeal.” Overall, the Working Party concluded: “As in the case of economic aid, so in other fields of external relations, it is considered that the wise course will be to give every encouragement to British Guiana’s political leaders to feel that they are fully accepted and welcomed by the West and not regarded with suspicion. . . . It is equally important that the moderate elements in British Guiana should not be allowed to feel that their country is neglected by the West.”16 These voices, reflecting the power of the two nations that stood behind them, regarded Guiana’s internal affairs and destiny as fit subjects for external manipulation. Neither the British nor the Americans could imagine a situation whereby Guiana could select its own political path with its own interests being paramount. There was nothing Cheddi Jagan could do to contest the Ango-American resolve to destroy him except to completely renounce his political beliefs, temper his socialist rhetoric, and supinely acquiesce to the wishes of the outsiders. That he declined to do any of these things to the satisfaction of the Americans meant that the struggle for Guiana’s soul was joined. Despite the Working Party’s conclusion that “encouragement” should be (  )

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given to Guiana’s leaders so they would feel that the West embraced them, this did not mean that the Americans had decided to initiate a modus vivendi with Cheddi Jagan. They remained uneasy about the British claim that Jagan was “salvageable for democracy,” entertaining the vain hope that he would lose the August 1961 elections. But, in fact, they would have preferred that the British use their power to thwart a victory by the PPP. In August, just days before the voting, the British foreign secretary declined to endorse a request by the American secretary of state to manipulate the ballot. Such an intervention, Lord Home told Dean Rusk, would “only make matters worse.”17 Jagan’s victory at the polls was unwelcome news to the Americans. Accordingly, when the Working Party met in London from September 11 to 16, there was an urgency to its deliberations. Jagan had won two successive elections, and there was no indication that his electoral base was waning. The Working Party had the option of either seeking ways to work with Jagan or to engineer his immediate downfall. It preferred the former option because “of the impracticality of available alternative courses and the dearth of political leadership in British Guiana apart from Jagan.” Still, the Working Party noted the “uncertainties and risks” involved in pursuing such a course. It thought it “only prudent to combine certain safeguards” with it.18 ALTHOUGH THE WOUNDS that British Guiana received in 1962, 1963, and 1964 were essentially self-inflicted, the Americans were enthusiastic enablers of the colony’s pain. Shortly after Jagan’s victory in August 1961, U.S. officials developed an “extraordinary interest” in British Guiana, according to Consul General Melby. In a meeting with Governor Grey on September 4, Melby told him that “Washington are much interested in the possibility of covert work here.” The Americans had first proposed the idea to the British the previous June and were told that “H.M.G. would have another look at what could be done in the covert field after the election.” Grey hoped that he would be kept informed about developments in that regard and that no authority should be given to the Americans “to undertake covert work here” until he had had a chance to make some recommendations.19 Later in September U.S. officials made a formal request to begin their covert activity but the British were not convinced that it was a good idea, fearing the worst if Jagan became aware of it. The nature of what the Americans planned to do in Guiana cannot be ascertained since the document in question is significantly redacted. There is no question, however, that they were insistent and threatened to deny aid to the colony if their plans for covert action were not approved. “They have made it clear to us,” a memorandum to Prime MinisThe Politics of Power

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ter Harold Macmillan read, “that their new program must be considered as an integrated whole and that its positive aspects of political friendliness and economic aid will only be implemented subject to our acceptance of their covert proposal.” The writer of this Foreign Office memorandum was satisfied that the Americans “are not bluffing on this.” The Foreign Office was gratified that they have made it much easier for us to accept their proposals by having agreed that their representation in British Guiana would be governed by the provisions which govern C.I.A. representation in other dependencies, save only that the appointment would be covert. This would give us “controls” in regard to the appointment of individuals and their activities which our own security services consider satisfactory and reduce to a minimum the risk of embarrassment to us or the Governor.20 The British authorities agonized over the U.S. request, fearing the unpalatable repercussions if such activity came to light. The Americans had no such scruples, having recently used covert measures to remove governments they disliked in Guatemala and Iran. These were not the methods the British preferred to employ against Jagan; they did not welcome U.S. interference in their colony, covert or otherwise. On September 6, 1961, W. F. Dawson of the Colonial Office expressed his department’s unease with the prospect of U.S. covert action in British Guiana:

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We have less liking than before for covert measures or indeed any readily detectable propaganda in the information field designed to undermine a government properly and freely elected by the Guianese and (so far) behaving in an unimpeachable democratic way. We regard it as fundamental, if we are to influence the BG government and to keep BG in the Commonwealth, that our relationship must remain as immaculate and as fair-minded as possible. Accordingly, we feel we cannot run the risk of being party to anything which could go wrong and do harm to this relationship. We are sincerely convinced that covert measures will never serve our policy or that of the US as well as honest sympathy and help.21 Despite such misgivings, the British reluctantly agreed to the U.S. request. The Americans never ceased to remind them that they needed reliable information about subversive activity in the colony in order to protect their country and the hemisphere from the virus of communism. They threatened to withhold aid for Guiana unless the United Kingdom approved their covert activity. Had the British declined to do so, the Americans would likely have (  )

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gone ahead with their plan given their virulent fear of communism and the increasing arrogance with which they were exercising the power they possessed. Washington also hoped that the British would sanction another election in the colony before independence, thereby giving them time to “eliminate” whom they called “unsavory” members of the PPP.22 Not only were the Americans interested in containing communism in British Guiana, but also they were committed to removing Cheddi Jagan from office. Officials in Washington had told Melby that one goal of their covert activity was to replace Jagan with Balram Singh Rai, but Rai had dismissed the idea. The United States was interested in creating chaos in the colony if that would hasten Jagan’s departure. Jagan obviously suspected that the Americans were deeply involved in British Guiana’s internal affairs. During the February 1962 crisis he blamed the difficulties on U.S. covert activity, an allegation that Melby vigorously rejected and Grey dismissed as “rubbish.” Grey later admitted to Melby that “his blood ran cold when Jagan made the charge.”23 Hugh Fraser, a prominent member of the British Conservative Party and under secretary of state for the colonies, reported to the Colonial Office in March 1962 that John McCone, the head of the CIA—“not a brilliant but an entirely honest man”—had assured him that the spy agency was not active in British Guiana. This may have been a polite deception.24 The CIA continued its meddling in British Guiana’s body politic until Cheddi Jagan left office in December 1964. A distinction must be made, to be sure, between the covert activities of the United States in British Guiana and the other methods that it employed to effect Jagan’s downfall. There is evidence that the Americans, in collaboration with the British, tried to bribe two PPP legislators to cross the floor and join the PNC, thereby denying Jagan a workable majority in the Legislative Council and precipitating his fall. In a June 1963 meeting between President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, and their respective advisers, British colonial secretary Duncan Sandys “thought we ought to make a really effective effort to get the two members of the PPP to cross the aisle. He said that this might mean that we would have to increase the bribe. Lord Home [the British foreign secretary] asked what would happen if it should quickly become known that we were doing this. The President said this wouldn’t bother us at all; we would just deny it.”25 The United States also covertly provided funds to the PNC and the UF to assist in their election campaigns. In a memorandum he wrote in 1965, J. H. A. Watson of the Foreign Office admitted that the Americans had been subsidizing Forbes Burnham.26 When he visited Guiana in November 1964, J. W. Stackpoole of the Colonial Office had observed that “Mr. Burnham’s party The Politics of Power

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headquarters evidenced ample funds.” He also said of Peter D’Aguiar that “he—or somebody—is spending heavily on the UF campaign,” an oblique reference to U.S. support.27 In fact, in the 1964 elections the PNC reported expenditures of $54,562; the UF, of $36,229; and the PPP, of $33,023. Much of the financial support of the PNC, in particular, was of U.S. origin, probably from a combination of governmental and private sources.28 If the CIA represented official American intervention in Guiana’s internal affairs, the labor unions were the unofficial meddlers. Because Cheddi Jagan drew much of his electoral support from members of the working class, they became the target of his opponents. Staunchly anticommunist, organized labor in the United States provided advice, training, and financial support to trade unions in British Guiana to defeat the PPP and its leader. Many unions in the colony had U.S. or international affiliates. These overseas affiliates were energized by Jagan’s victory in 1961, visiting Guiana to conduct seminars and train trade unionists in organizational methods, and sponsoring visits by Guianese unionists to the United States to receive training. Jagan charged that “the plan is to place trainees in key positions in the trade union movement in British Guiana to harass the Government by go slow, strikes, sabotage and other subversive activities, and if possible to overthrow the government.”29 Dr. Jagan had a point. Stephen Rabe has noted that in 1961 William Howard McCabe, a CIA agent who “used the cover of the Public Service International, . . . an affiliate of the AFL-CIO,” organized a strike against the Jagan government by the Commercial and Clerical Workers Union. The strike that paralyzed the colony in 1963 was abetted by the AFL-CIO, which served as the organization through which the CIA funneled money to the Guianese unions. McCabe was the director in chief of the AFL-CIO’s activities in British Guiana, providing advice on strategy and propaganda campaigns.30 The Jagan government claimed that “American sources,” namely unions, were providing $125,000 weekly for strike relief in 1963. American unions also helped Guianese unions to purchase property; paid the salary of their leaders; donated motor vehicles, films, books, office supplies; and so on.31 In the calendar year 1961, for example, the British Guiana Trades Union Council spent $15,429, of which $11,876 came from overseas donors. U.S. citizens, driven by anticommunist fervor, were also accused of interfering in British Guiana’s domestic affairs. The most prominent of these were Dr. Fred Schwartz and Dr. Joost Slais, both of whom acted on behalf of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade. Dr. Jagan and other members of the PPP accused

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the two men of having spent $76,000 on behalf of the UF in the 1961 elections and of helping to stimulate the disturbances of February 1962.32 Between 1961 and 1964 the leaders of the trade unions in British Guiana became the willing and enthusiastic enablers of American interference in the internal affairs of the country. Some acquiesced because of a fear of communist contamination of the colony; others were driven by a visceral hatred of Jagan and those around him, and still others by personal gain. The unions became extremely politicized, leading Jagan to allege in 1963 that they were more “preoccupied with political rather than industrial questions.” While Governor Grey did not endorse Jagan’s accusation that trade unionists were being trained to oppose his government, he wrote: “It is obvious that the aims and aspirations of the free trade union movement and those of the Government of British Guiana do not coincide.” Jagan’s government was, of course, the most prolabor in the Anglophone Caribbean at the time, far more sympathetic to its endeavors than the administrations in Jamaica, Trinidad, or Barbados. It is ironic that Guiana’s trade unionists would so vehemently oppose a government that was unabashedly on their side. Jagan’s rhetorical Marxism alienated and blinded them as much as it did others. But there was also the additional complications of Guiana’s racial politics and personal animus to the premier. “Jagan seemed incapable of realizing that he has no need to be heard by those who love him,” said Grey at the height of the February 1962 crisis, and “what fury he rouses in those who hate him.” His stellar credentials on behalf of workers notwithstanding, some labor leaders despised the man so much that they were willing to plunge the country into chaos if that meant their bête noir would disappear. Cheddi Jagan was not the demon that labor leaders such as Richard Ishmael made him out to be. Nor was he the innocent victim of unscrupulous enemies. The truth rested somewhere in between.33 The compelling truth about British Guiana during those difficult years is that it was not free to choose its political path. Despite the vaunted invocations of democratic rights for all peoples, the imperatives of U.S. and British national interests circumscribed or prevented the actualization of such principles in Guiana. British Guiana was unimportant in itself, particularly to the Americans. Its significance to the Americans lay only in the fact that their leaders feared that it would become a communist-dominated country and would thereby pose a security threat to the United States. Jagan and his government chafed under such perceptions and the boundaries that the Americans, acting in concert with the British, were setting on their political behavior. As the overlords, linked to the colony by years of contact and

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sentiment, the British were more sensitive to the emotions of the Guianese peoples and their leaders. Intoxicated by its power and dismissive of the black and brown residents of British Guiana, the United States was blind to their aspirations, seeing them as supplicants who were vulnerable to the wiles of communism. American consul general Melby epitomized these attitudes. He dismissed the PPP legislators as “zealots, political hacks, opportunists—or combinations thereof—in varying degrees.” To him, Guiana’s leaders represented a threat to American security “and as such should be removed.” He asserted that “the longer the delay in firm action which will remove Jagan, the greater must be the eventual U.S. efforts required to correct the damage.” The longterm objective for the United States “is the replacement of the PPP in office.” After Jagan was removed from office, the Americans should implement certain projects the consul general was proposing, which “may be effective in discrediting Jagan with some of his supporters.” Melby was coldly recommending the removal of the colony’s elected government by the powerful outsider and the provision of economic blandishments to placate its people.34

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THEIR OCCASIONAL DOUBTS notwithstanding, the Americans never lost their faith in the efficacy of coercive mechanisms to bring Jagan to heel. They hoped that the U.K. would use its power by Order-in-Council to suspend the British Guiana constitution as a last resort to prevent the emergence of a communist or Castro type regime. Such an act, American officials promised, “would receive full and public U.S. support.” The British were not enthusiastic about this proposal, telling them that suspension of the constitution could be contemplated only “in a grave emergency and that the difficulties of so doing would be far greater than in 1953.” Still, they agreed to consult the Americans “regarding the possible use of such powers.” Despite such assurances, Washington never abandoned the hope that the British would find some excuse to suspend the constitution and assume direct rule of the colony. To expedite this process, it was prepared to stimulate unrest in the colony with the objective of forcing the hands of the British.35 Their distaste for the Jagan government also led the Americans to propose at the September 1961 meeting of the Working Party that Britain prolong “the period prior to independence.” This would, in their judgment, give the Western countries more time to demonstrate their friendship for Jagan, presumably through economic aid to the colony. The Americans also pushed for new elections in Guiana, since that would “provide an important barometer by which to evaluate the situation immediately prior to independence.” (  )

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Their motives were starkly transparent. A prolongation of the preindependence period and a new election would facilitate a U.S.-inspired buildup of opposition to Jagan and his consequent political demise.36 The British representatives in the Working Party resisted these American attempts to disrupt British Guiana’s constitutional march to independence. They indicated that they still planned to meet with the Guianese to fix the date for independence. Although the colonial officials thought it unlikely that fresh elections would be held, they reserved the right “to judge the situation” in light of changing circumstances. The members of the Working Party agreed “that the UK and the US should not be deterred in their program by foolish and disquieting things the British Guiana Government would almost [certainly] say or do.” Realizing the value of propaganda, the British and U.S. representatives agreed to expand their information services in the colony.37 Members of the Working Party urged their two governments to avoid giving the impression that they were acting in concert. “American effort in terms of political cooperation and economic aid,” they suggested, “should be seen as a spontaneous development independent of the existing policy and commitments of the U.K.” No impression “should be given that a policy of cooperation is being followed as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Jagan.” Moreover, “care should be exercised to avoid inflating Jagan’s ego[,] thus encouraging him to increase his demands for aid or to endeavour to play a role on the world stage between East and West.”38 No doubt Cheddi Jagan was unaware that his political fate was the subject of regular discussions by British and U.S. officials meeting in London and Washington. He would, in time, begin to harbor such suspicions, but officials of the two countries consistently denied any such joint policy, elevating diplomatic mendacity to a principle. The British, in particular, promoted a public image of high-minded circumspection in its dealings with Guiana, but this was a calculated deception. To keep Jagan in the political fold of the West, the Americans were disposed to offer economic assistance to his country. Such potential aid was not an expression of humanitarian concern for the welfare of an economically deprived colony, but rather a manifestation of realpolitik, American style. After receiving such aid, a grateful Jagan and his people were expected to reject the Marxism the Americans so despised. Rich and powerful, the United States never quite understood that some nationalist leaders, such as Cheddi Jagan and Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, were not for sale. These leaders confronted the dilemma of seeking foreign assistance to develop their countries on the one hand and not compromising their principles on the other. The Politics of Power

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Eric Williams maintained that Britain’s colonies and former colonies in the Caribbean had a moral claim on the British treasury since they had made substantial contributions to the economic development of the imperial country. Slavery, and the slave trade, he argued, constituted the foundations of Britain’s industrial growth. Williams railed against economic assistance that required the recipient country to spend the funds on goods and services provided by the donor country. Such restrictive provisions, he said, redounded to the benefit of the donors. But Eric Williams never compromised his political principles when he made his demands.39 British Guiana had no moral claim on the U.S. treasury since it was not colonized by that country. Consequently, any economic assistance from the Americans would be a function of their enlightened self-interest. Cheddi Jagan believed, naively, that under his leadership his country would be the beneficiary of America’s altruism. This was an illusion, but Jagan never lost his optimism even as U.S. promises failed to materialize. Jagan’s need for external economic assistance became urgent with the promulgation of his $110 million five-year plan in 1960. It contained a shortfall of several million dollars that was expected to be met by foreign assistance, especially from the United States and Canada. With the encouragement of the Colonial Office and the governor, Jagan began to prepare for a visit to Washington and Ottawa in October 1961. He had high expectations that the Americans would be generous in their provision of aid as he prepared to meet with President Kennedy and other officials. But Jagan did not fully appreciate the depth of U.S. hostility to him and the government he led. Nor did he comprehend the unease he created in an American society socialized to distrust and demonize those described as Marxists, communists, or socialists. During his visit, Jagan appeared on the Sunday television news program Meet the Press, a performance that helped to solidify his negative image in the country. On the program Jagan declined to criticize the Soviet Union and did not renounce his Marxism, positions that were anathema to American politicians and many citizens. His meetings with Kennedy and other officials were cordial, though Jagan received no firm assurances of economic assistance. The State Department issued a statement at the completion of the talks declaring that they “resulted in a fuller understanding of British Guiana’s problems.” Washington had decided to provide technical assistance for “specific development projects” and promised to make funding decisions later, conditional upon the submission “of suitable projects.” On returning home, Jagan confessed to Governor Grey

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that he “had a considerable feeling of deep disappointment” in the result of his visit. He wondered whether there would be enough support in the U.S. Congress for “the giving of substantial aid to countries that do not fit into the American socio-economic pattern.”40 Jagan was more gratified by his visit to Canada even though he received no promise of substantial aid. The Canadians offered some technical assistance but said they lacked the financial capacity to do more. Jagan observed, however, that the Canadian government “seemed more whole-hearted in its recognition of Guianese aspirations.”41 The premier’s visit to the two countries was a failure in the sense that the economic assistance he needed was not forthcoming. But he learned a valuable lesson in the politics of power. Guiana was significant to the Americans only to the degree that it was perceived to be a battleground in the contest against communism. If Jagan’s political sympathies and allegiances were in doubt, there would be no U.S. economic aid if that would enhance his support in Guiana. On the contrary, he would be targeted for removal from office by constitutional or other means. Sensitive to the charge that he was a communist, Jagan had sought to assure his American and Canadian hosts that he was committed to democratic principles. He did so in an address to the National Press Club in Washington and repeated it at a press conference in Montreal. He also told his audience in Montreal that the economic assistance he requested “should be completely without strings and should not result in any increased foreign control of British Guiana’s resources.” Jagan threatened that he would not hesitate to seek aid from the Eastern Bloc countries “if he did not receive enough from the West.”42 Statements such as the latter were not helpful to his cause in the United States. The Americans, despite their earlier commitment, postponed their decision to send an economic mission to the colony. Disappointed, Jagan began to think seriously about alternatives. He would have liked to turn to the Eastern Bloc for assistance, but he knew that Britain would use its reserve power to disallow it. To him, the most viable option was to seek immediate independence so Guiana could act as a sovereign nation, theoretically free to pursue its own economic and political path. The two chambers of the British Guiana legislature had passed a resolution requesting independence in 1962. Acting on the basis of that resolution, Jagan met with Reginald Maulding, the colonial secretary, on December 13, 1961, “to give effect to the resolution.” The secretary declined the request. He did so, he later said, in “view of Her Majesty’s Government’s undertaking

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to consult further with the United States Government (which could not of course be disclosed).” But Maulding promised Jagan to consult his colleagues and report the government’s decision in January 1962.43 Rebuffed by the Colonial Office, or so it seemed, Jagan decided to bring international pressure on the British, reprising the appeal he had made to the United Nations for assistance in 1960. In response to Jagan’s request, the Fourth Committee of the United Nations passed a resolution supporting independence for his country and recommended that the Special Committee on Colonialism consider the matter. Reacting quickly to these unwelcome developments, the Colonial Office informed Jagan that the independence conference would be held in May 1962. This announcement preempted any interference by the United Nations. Britain had always maintained that the Guiana question was an internal matter not subject to the United Nations’ intervention.44 The Colonial Office had reluctantly concluded that “in so far as readiness for independence is concerned, British Guiana’s claim is as good, if not better than that of certain other territories that have recently attained independence or are about to do so.” It worried that a delay in granting it autonomy would further damage relations with Guiana and might lead to “anti-British agitation,” which “would provide a happy hunting ground for those elements whose aim is to exacerbate racial tension in the colony.” The Colonial Office anticipated that independence would be granted by the end of 1962 and hoped the Americans would endorse the decision.45 Colonial secretary Reginald Maulding was able to inform Prime Minister Macmillan on January 10, 1962, that the Americans had agreed with the proposal.46 A day later Commonwealth secretary, Duncan Sandys, told the prime minister that he welcomed the decision by the Colonial Office. “The sooner we get these people out of our hair the better,” Sandys wrote. But he was less enthusiastic about an independent Guiana joining the British Comonwealth, the fraternity of former British colonies. “I do not know whether they are seriously thinking of becoming a member of the Commonwealth,” he said. “If so, we should not, of course, lead them to assume that we shall necessarily be willing to sponsor their application.”47 British Guiana had outlived its usefulness to the mother country and had become expendable. The U.S. endorsement of the expedited independence conference was short lived. On February 20, Secretary of State Dean Rusk dispatched an angry letter to Foreign Secretary Lord Home. “I must tell you now,” he wrote, “that I have reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent Guiana under Jagan.” He reasoned: (  )

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We have no real success in establishing a basis for the understanding with him due in part to his grandiose expectation of economic aid. We have continued to receive disturbing reports of Communist connections on the part of Jagan and persons closely associated with him. Partly reflective of ever growing concern over Cuba, public and Congressional opinion here is incensed at the thought of our siding with Jagan. The Marxist-Leninist policy he professes parallels that of Castro. . . . Current happenings in British Guiana indicate Jagan is not master of the situation at home without your support. . . . Thus, the continuation of Jagan in power is leading us to disaster in terms of the colony itself, strains on Anglo-American relations and difficulties for the inter-American system.48

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Secretary Rusk then asserted that it was now “mandatory that we concert on remedial steps.” He wanted new elections to be scheduled and hoped “that we can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again.”49 Rusk’s belligerent tone shocked Lord Home. His response was candid, as he rebuked the American for his country’s hypocrisy. “It was your historic role to have been for long years the first crusader and the prime mover in urging colonial emancipation,” he reminded Rusk. He did not think it was possible “to beat” the communists “by canceling the ticket for independence and particularly if this is only to be done in the single instance of British Guiana.” Then he inquired: You say that it is not possible for you “to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan” and that “Jagan should not accede to power again.” How would you suggest that this can be done in a Democracy? And even if a device could be found, it would almost certainly be transparent and in such circumstances if democratic processes are to be allowed, it will be extremely hard to provide a reasonable prospect that any successor regime will be more stable and more mature.50 His government, Lord Home asserted, would not “go back on the course” it had set for British Guiana. Then he rebuked Rusk: “You will realize that while territories like British Guiana may be of special concern to you in your hemisphere, there are others of at least equal importance to us elsewhere.”51 Prime Minister Macmillan read Rusk’s letter to Home with “amazement.” He found some of the language “incredible,” particularly that suggesting Jagan should be removed. In a note to the foreign secretary, he wondered: “How can the Americans continue to attack us in the United Nations on colonialism and then use expressions like those which are not colonialism but The Politics of Power

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pure Machiavellianism?” He thought that the letter to Home showed “a degree of cynicism which I would have thought Dean Rusk could hardly put his pen to.” He added, sarcastically, “After all, [Rusk] is not an Irishman nor a millionaire; he has the reputation of being an honorable and somewhat academic figure.”52 The two diplomats, however, buried the hatchet rather quickly. Meeting in Geneva on March 12, Rusk told Home that President Kennedy thought their communication was “sharp” in tone. Home’s congenial response was that “it was lucky I had not sent my first reply but I hoped he [Rusk] would never hesitate to write to me as frankly and forcibly as he liked and I would do the same. He could reassure the President that this was the normal practice as between Oxford men.”53 The Rusk/Home exchange of letters revealed the depth of American anxieties about Jagan and British sensitivity about the developments in their colony. To heal the bruised feelings and explain Britain’s policy, the Colonial Office dispatched Under Secretary of State Hugh Fraser to Washington to meet with senior U.S. officials and the president. Fraser saw the objectives of his mission as being:

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I. To tone down any excitement caused by the Rusk/Home exchange of letters II. To get the Americans to accept our policy of a fairly swift withdrawal from British Guiana as the best; and III. To endeavor to change the American attitude in two fashions: a) To damp down the importance of British Guiana, and b) To abandon their present policy of boycotting the Jagan government and reneging on the various pledges of which the Americans made to Jagan during his [1961] visit to Washington.54 Fraser had cordial discussions with the U.S. officials, spending more than two hours with President Kennedy. He reported that “the problem of British Guiana in American eyes is regarded as one of critical importance.” Fraser said that the Congress was using “British Guiana as a crow bar with which to attack the foreign aid program,” complicating the issue of assistance to the colony. He explained to his American colleagues that “the problems of British Guiana are dangerous in the following order[:] (i) racial (ii) economic (iii) the threat of communist penetration.” Fraser emphasized to the Americans that “British Guiana was really now [more] their responsibility than ours and would increasingly become so.”55 Fraser’s comment did not mean that the British were abandoning their re(  )

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sponsibilities in Guiana altogether. Rather, it indicated that they were willing to follow the American lead in the formulation of policy. Prime Minister Macmillan expressed a similar point of view when he met with President Kennedy in Washington in May 1962. In a minute to Sir Norman Brook, a senior British official, Macmillan observed that the “Americans attach great importance to achieving . . . a satisfying solution in British Guiana.” He surmised that “they are probably moved by internal political considerations as much as by general fear of communism.” Since he knew that the Americans “will have to carry the burden of British Guiana” eventually, he believed “it is only fair that they should have a share in shaping its future.”56 The constitutional conference that the British had scheduled for May 1962 became a casualty of the social disturbances that had occurred in the colony the previous February. A Commission of Enquiry had been appointed to examine the causes of the unrest, and the Colonial Office did not think it prudent to hold the conference before its report was submitted. Consequently, the conference was postponed to July 16, a decision that both Jagan and Burnham criticized. The constitutional conference had to be postponed a second time because the commission had not completed its work. The three major political parties protested the decision by holding public meetings and picketing various government buildings. While the PPP and the PNC demanded independence at these protests, Peter D’Aguiar of the UF wanted to put on record that there were some segments of the British Guianese people “that did not support ‘immediate independence.’” Cheddi Jagan took “a serious view” of the postponement, charging that, in its justification of the delay, the British government was setting a “premium on disorder and violence organized by the minority opposed to independence.” He intended to invite the United Nations Committee of Seventeen to investigate “the steps which are apparently now being taken to perpetrate colonial rule in the territory.”57 Making good on his promise, Jagan undertook a ten-day visit to New York in July and appeared before the United Nations Committee of Seventeen. He received a sympathetic hearing from such countries as Ethiopia, India, Mali, Yugoslavia, and Tanganyika (Tanzania). The committee adopted a resolution urging Britain to resume negotiations with British Guiana “with a view to reaching agreement on the date of independence.” Returning home on August 1, Jagan was greeted by cheering supporters and garlanded several times.58 This was good theater, but the real action was occurring in Washington and London. The Americans had begun to take a guarded interest in Forbes Burnham as a potential leader of an independent Guiana. If they could not The Politics of Power

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prevail upon the British to delay independence, at least they could try to install a leader in whom they had confidence and who would make his country safe for U.S. interests as Washington defined them. Burnham was beginning to receive a cautious American embrace by mid-1962, and he gave no sign that he was averse to it. In Washington on May 3, 1962, Forbes Burnham met with thirteen U.S. officials at their invitation. Their conversation lasted for ninety minutes. Seeking to ingratiate himself with the Americans, Burnham described the PNC “as a democratic-socialist party” as opposed to the “communist” PPP. He said he knew “from personal experience” that the PPP received “instructions via the international communist movement” up to 1955, when he left the party. He stressed that if the PNC won the next elections, he would not tolerate communists in the party. Burnham reported that there were several communists in the leadership of the PPP and that these individuals had close ties with Cuba. Guianese students were being sent to Havana, East Germany, and the Soviet Union to be indoctrinated and trained by the communists. He expected the Jagan administration to fall “within a month or so,” but he would not join a coalition government with the PPP except on his own terms. Burnham assured the Americans that the PNC supported free enterprise.59 Burnham burnished his anticommunist credentials in his conversations with U.S. officials, undoubtedly impressing them as a good alternative to Jagan. In his interviews with American newspapers he emphasized similar themes, alleging that there were a thousand Cuban tourists in the colony and implying that they were communist agents. He asserted that the Jagan administration was incapable of “utilizing” the economic assistance it was expected to receive from the United States. When he became aware of these published statements, Jagan denounced them as “wildest and most irresponsible,” noting that “if Burnham is correctly reported, it shows beyond doubt he is now prepared to damage the country’s reputation abroad.” The premier said that only eleven Cubans had traveled to British Guiana since January 1962, and only two still remained. The American consul general doubted the accuracy of Burnham’s charges about the Cuban presence, observing that “Odo’s [Burnham’s] growth in knowledge, wisdom and political stature during the past twelve months is depressingly close to zero.”60 Burnham’s agenda was to discredit Jagan in the United States, to his own advantage. He met with officials of the Department of State a second time in September to discuss the political situation in his country, repeating his allegations about communist penetration. Burnham expressed his support for the adoption of a system of proportional representation in the colony, pre(  )

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dicting that the PNC and the UF would form a coalition after the next election. In a request for financial assistance from the United States, Burnham stressed that his party needed money “to penetrate the wall of racial prejudice and the PPP has 35 paid organizers, whereas PNC has 2” The record remains silent on whether Burnham received the money he sought.61 Burnham’s two conversations with the State Department personnel gave him an opportunity to convince them of his anticommunism. He made sharp distinctions between himself and Jagan on matters of policy, seemingly designed to court the favor of Americans who were desperately trying to identify a compliant yet popular Guianese leader whom they could support. Although Burnham had made a good impression on his hosts, an alliance of convenience had not yet been forged. Thereafter, he refrained from criticizing the United States publicly and his contacts with the U.S. consulate in Georgetown became more frequent. Fortified by this goodwill in Washington, the premier-in-waiting began to boast about his American contacts, attempting to strengthen his domestic appeal. The long-delayed constitutional conference, rescheduled for October 1962, tested the leadership skills of Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar. The Colonial Office was aware of their deep political differences and sought to exploit them for dishonorable reasons. With Macmillan’s approval, colonial secretary Duncan Sandys planned to precipitate a breakdown of the talks by focusing on the divisive issue of proportional representation. Once the expected stalemate occurred, Sandys would send the delegates home with instructions to resolve their differences. Recognizing the impossibility of their task, Sandys would then have a free hand to announce a referendum to settle the question. He assured the prime minister that he would confide in the Americans “so that they may give such support as they think fit to Burnham.”62 This elaborate charade was unseemly for a colonial power that cultivated a public image of principled conduct. It is not known whether Burnham was privy to the scheme, of which he was likely to be the principal political beneficiary. In any event, by the time the conference opened the Americans and the British had agreed on a common policy on British Guiana. A brief prepared for Macmillan by the Colonial Office stressed that since the disturbances of February 1962, the “aim” of the two governments in Guiana “had altered from ‘making the best of Jagan’ to the achievement of independence under a government not led by Jagan.”63 The conference was convened at Lancaster House, London, on October 23 and continued until November 6. At the opening session, Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar delivered speeches outlining their positions on the various The Politics of Power

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issues. Under Sandys’s chairmanship, the conferees met for eighteen sessions but failed to resolve the three major questions. The first was whether a system of proportional representation should replace the existing first-past-the post or single-member constituencies. The PNC and the UF were as adamant in their support of proportional representation as the PPP was in opposing it. D’Aguiar and Burnham knew that, taken together, the votes received by their respective parties under proportional representation would exceed 50 percent, thereby allowing them to form a coalition government. Jagan anticipated this outcome and resisted the introduction of proportional representation. The second issue was the voting age. Jagan wanted it lowered to eighteen to take political advantage of the growing Indian population that constituted his base. The other parties insisted on keeping it at twenty-one, since that worked to their benefit. Finally, the conferees could not reach agreement on the third issue, namely whether fresh elections should be held before the achievement of independence. Jagan opposed new elections, arguing that the people had gone to the polls only a year earlier and his government should be allowed to serve out its five-year term. Jagan obviously feared that he would lose a new election and was not prepared to take any chances. His two opponents were convinced that they could defeat him, hence their support for the measure. The three leaders declined Sandys’s offer to act as an arbitrator. Sandys, of course, followed his script. As planned, he adjourned the conference and enjoined the leaders to have “further discussions” at home. If they were unable to reach a consensus, the British government “might have to consider imposing a settlement.”64 The conference failed, in part, because the three leaders were less concerned with constructing constitutional provisions that would meet the long-term needs of the nation-in-the-making and more with gaining short-term political advantage from them. The conference was also unsuccessful because the Colonial Office manipulated the agenda and discussions in accordance with Sandys’s plans. Although unaware of the secretary’s deception, Jagan blamed the failure on the Guianese opposition and on the British who have “destroyed entirely the faith which I have placed in British claims of justice, fairplay, and democracy.” He accused Britain of “certainly sowing the seeds of future trouble” and reiterated his objection to holding a referendum on proportional representation: “You do not hold a referendum among children to see if they want candy if you know that candy would not be good for them.” Predictably, the three parties also blamed one another for the failure of the conference, continuing (  )

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a debilitating modus operandi and engaging in name-calling. When Moses Bhagwan, a PPP delegate to the conference, had a public spat with Burnham on the question of preindependence elections, Burnham ended the argument in an imperious tone. “I have spoken,” the PNC leader said, “I will not bandy words with an underling or kill a flea with a hatchet.”65 The failure of the October 1962 conference was an important watershed in Guiana’s constitutional evolution. The three leaders’ inability to reach an agreement—made more difficult by the machinations of the British—handed effective control of their future to outsiders yet again. Sensing an opening it could exploit, Washington renewed its pressure on the British to use their imperial power to remove Jagan from office, preferably by suspending the constitution and imposing direct rule. The Americans had recently intervened in Guatemala and Iran to depose regimes they objected to and had trained and supported Cuban exiles in the attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in April 1961. They believed that the British inclination to remove Jagan by constitutional means was an expression of weakness. John Hennings, the British attaché in Washington, reported that his conversations with State Department officials such as William Burdett, an assistant secretary of state, and John Knox, “are becoming more and more like tutorials in constitutional law.” Hennings said it was hard for the U.S. officials “to realise how unimportant the colonial power is.” He believed the Americans did not understand that “the wonder of the Revolutionary war is not that the Americans won but that it went on so long before they did.” He would have thought “that a nation that resented imperial legislation as vigorously as they did would be among the first to recognize the consequences of legislating by Order in Council over the head of Dr. Jagan.”66 Hennings was careful to say nothing to the Americans “which might lead them to conclude that it was not the ability to suspend [the constitution] that we lacked, but the will.” He believed that although U.S. officials were beginning to understand better the constitutional limitations within which the British operated, some “are still inclined to hanker after some vigorous and dramatic action.” When Knox told Hennings that he detected a softening in Jagan’s attitude to the West, he “sounded a warning against applying too much Kremlinology to bear on the interpretation of what Jagan and his colleagues might do or say.”67 Hennings was certainly accurate in warning the Americans not to view British Guiana through the optic of Kremlinology. British Guiana should be seen on its own terms, as a society with leaders who articulated the interests of their people as they saw fit. Not fully understanding the pulse of the GuiaThe Politics of Power

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nese people, Washington regarded them as the supine disciples of the Soviet Union and Cuba. There was no evidence that this had any basis in fact, and the British knew it. But the Americans clung to it with a blind and lingering affection, warping their policy toward the would-be nation with disastrous consequences. There is incontrovertible evidence, however, that they were fomenting unrest in Guiana with a view to removing Jagan from office. In a meeting with British officials on June 28, 1963, Dean Rusk admitted his government’s covert activities in the colony. According to an official summary of the meeting, “After discussing various alternatives, Mr. Rusk said that it seemed that a reversion to direct rule [in British Guiana] provided the only really satisfying solution. The attempt had been made to bring about a change of government by clandestine action, but this had failed and appeared to hold no prospect for the future.”68 Rusk did not indicate the nature of the clandestine action, but his government was deeply implicated in the disturbances that wracked the colony in 1962 and 1963. The Jagan government was rescued on both occasions by the proclamation of a State of Emergency, actions that displeased and disappointed Jagan’s opponents, including the Americans. The British had no stomach for resuming direct rule in Guiana and assuming the responsibility such a move would engender. The stark reality was that the British wanted to wash their hands of the colony as quickly as possible. They had become tired of its troubles and intended to make a graceful exit as soon as the situation permitted. Dr. Jagan insisted his country be granted its independence, but the domestic crises he helped to create in 1962 and 1963 had been counterproductive, producing conditions that delayed rather than advanced his objective. British Guiana had become a virus from which the British wanted to be immunized. Continuing their periodic oversight of developments in Guiana, the Working Party met in London on June 25, 26, and 27, 1963, to examine the “various possible courses” of action. The officials began their three-day meeting by repeating the “determining factors” that animated the policy of their respective governments for the colony. The British reiterated their position that their government “has no economic or strategic interest in retaining British Guiana; on the contrary her specific interest lies in the earliest possible withdrawal from the territory.” They wanted to see the colony proceed to independence in such a way “that the risks of racial conflict and of the territory coming under communist control are minimized.” The officials emphasized that they did not rule out the possibility of granting independence to a government led by Cheddi Jagan.69 (  )

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The American officials, on the other hand, maintained that “the emergence of an independent government under Communist leadership in British Guiana would have profound and lasting effects on Anglo/US relations in the Western hemisphere and on the overall position of the West.” They believed that Jagan would “seek to establish after independence a Castro/Communist Government with close ties with the Soviet Bloc.” The British disagreed with this assessment, arguing that the internal opposition to Jagan was strong enough to prevent such a development. Their American counterparts stuck to their government’s stand that “an independent British Guiana under Jagan was unacceptable.” The “immediate policy objective” of the British, they insisted once again, should be Jagan’s removal from office prior to independence. The officials discussed the advantages and disadvantages of Britain’s and America’s policy options in British Guiana. These included:

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1. To give British Guiana independence under Jagan as soon as possible, 2. To work for the early defeat of the Jagan government with a view to granting early independence under Burnham/D’Aguiar, 3. To resume direct British rule, 4. To introduce proportional representation as a means of removing Jagan from office.70 British Guiana was the subject of further discussion when Dean Rusk flew to England to meet with the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, and the Commonwealth secretary, Duncan Sandys, on June 28. Rusk emphasized to the British representatives that an independent Guiana, led by Jagan, was “distasteful” to the U.S. government. The Commonwealth secretary argued that Jagan “though an incompetent minister, would be more formidable in opposition than in office.” He opposed a return to direct rule since it would arouse considerable opposition within and outside the colony. It was undesirable, he said, “for Britain to expose herself in this way for the sake of a territory in which she had no profound interest.” Rusk challenged the latter assertion, noting that Britain “had a very large interest in British Guiana in the context of wider Anglo-American relations.”71 When Rusk insisted on a return to direct rule in British Guiana, Lord Home said such an action “would destroy Britain’s image as a decolonising power and would create the greatest possible difficulties for the British Government in dealing with its remaining problems in Africa.” On reflection, however, British officials seemed prepared to consider the imposition of direct rule if the United States would agree to give “generous financial and The Politics of Power

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economic aid to the colony.” Sandys wanted to know if the Americans would enter into defense and economic aid agreements with a “non Jagan” government. This, he said, would give the United States a locus standi for intervention if Jagan returned to office or if there were a tangible communist threat. Rusk did not find this “an attractive solution,” preferring a course “which enabled the British government to exercise the essential powers in British Guiana.”72 These discussions were immediately followed by a meeting between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy at Birch Grove, the prime minister’s country home. Held on June 29–30, it was attended by senior officials from both countries, including Dean Rusk, Lord Home, and Duncan Sandys. Conducted in a relaxed setting, the meeting proceeded in a spirit of cordiality, if not compromise. In opening the talks, Rusk emphasized that a “Castro type” communist regime was “unacceptable” to the U.S. government. Accordingly, there were only two “possibilities” for the colony’s political path: either the imposition of direct rule by the United Kingdom or a Burnham-D’Aguiar coalition government. Speaking on behalf of the British government, Sandys did not reject Rusk’s proposals but identified four potential courses of action by the two countries that were conspiring to determine Guiana’s fate. According to the summary of the secretary’s remarks, the options were:

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1. To muddle on as we are doing . . . 2. To move forward by granting British Guiana independence now . . . 3. To suspend the constitution and institute direct colonial rule, 4. To establish a Burnham-D’Aguiar government and then grant British Guiana independence.73 Sandys noted that if the “present exercise” succeeded, Britain could “perhaps give British Guiana independence.” He was referring to the covert attempts to get two PPP legislators to cross the floor and give the opposition parties a majority. He was not enthusiastic about direct rule since this had financial implications for his government. In addition, he was unsure that “after five years we would be any better off than we are now.” Sandys also feared that a disgruntled Cheddi Jagan would lead an underground resistance movement. He did not know “whether in this case the Indians and the Negroes would fight against each other, or band together against us.”74 Lord Home was concerned about Britain’s international reputation if direct rule were resumed. “Its image would be pretty severely tarnished,” he predicted. He also worried about charges of a double standard in Britain’s (  )

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treatment of developments in Southern Rhodesia and in British Guiana, two colonies with internal self-government. The white-dominated government in Southern Rhodesia was pursuing a policy of white supremacy, denying basic rights to the majority of the people who were black. In the face of international pressure to intervene in the situation, Britain declared that such an action would contravene the principle of internal self-government. Critics argued that Britain’s refusal to act on behalf of the black majority was driven more by an affinity to the whites and that the constitutional principle the government invoked was a transparent dodge. If the United Kingdom assumed direct rule in Guiana, ventured Lord Home, “people would say . . . why would it not be able to do the same thing in Southern Rhodesia.”75 While British officials were concerned about the constitutional implications of their behavior in Guiana, the Americans once again dismissed such irritating niceties. Such obstacles, President Kennedy said, “paled in comparison with the prospect of the establishment of a communist regime in Latin America.” He predicted that the problem of communism in Cuba would be the major issue in the 1964 U.S. presidential election and that “adding British Guiana to Cuba could well tip the scales and someone would be elected who would take military action against Cuba.” Kennedy was convinced that the American public “would not stand for a situation which looked as though the Soviet Union had leapfrogged over Cuba to land on the continent in the Western Hemisphere.” When Sandys asked him whether the United States was prepared to “give the United Kingdom real support in the United Nations and publicly, if the United Kingdom were to resume direct rule in British Guiana, he responded, “It would be a great pleasure,” adding, “We would go all out to the extent necessary.” To provide cover for any British activity in the colony, Kennedy urged that the two countries stress “its instability and the danger of racial strife.”76 The Birch Grove summit did not result in any firm agreement on the modus operandi in British Guiana. It was clear that the Americans saw the colony primarily through the prism of anticommunism and wanted Cheddi Jagan removed speedily. Having led a coup in the colony in 1953, the British were unwilling to repeat that action. They looked askance at the prospect of making Jagan a martyr by once more removing him from office on the one hand and assuming the obligations of direct rule on the other. The summit had attempted to craft an Anglo-American solution to a British Guiana problem, an anachronistic approach to the challenges of a rapidly changing colonial world and to transformations in the relationships between the colonized peoples and the colonizers. The Politics of Power

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Harold Macmillan had spoken about the need to embrace “the winds of change” in the colonial world. In spite of these sentiments, the peoples of Guiana constituted an invisible presence in the Birch Grove discussions. Neither the American nor the British officials bothered to consider their interests or what they wanted. As colonial subjects, they were victims of the politics of power; London and Washington never doubted their right, acting in concert, to determine the fate of the Guianese from a distance. There was probably a racial dimension at work as well, although the ugly language of racism does not appear in the official records. Still, the American and British officials who met to decide the fate of British Guiana were the products of societies that had no clean hands on the treatment of peoples who were black and brown. The imperious tone and conduct they displayed in their dealings with Guiana’s leaders and its people generally may have been more than just a function of the imbalance of power between the colony on the one hand and Britain and the United States on the other. Africans and Indians had been brought to British Guiana to work for whites; while the dogma of white supremacy was under assault, it had not been vanquished by the 1960s. The inaction and crippling partisanship of the Guianese leaders helped to facilitate the exercise of power by the British and Americans in their country. In the summer of 1963, colonial secretary Sandys visited the colony and encouraged the formation of a coalition government to ease the violence and racial divisions and restore some degree of harmony. He held talks with the three leaders with the objective of forming an “emergency” government but soon discovered that such a goal was elusive given “the mutual suspicions rife in the colony.” Each race, Sandys said, “has a deep rooted fear of the prospect of living under a government controlled by the other, after independence.”77 When Sandys met with Jagan and Burnham on July 13, Jagan said he knew that Burnham “might have fears and suspicions about him.” He admitted that he also had “genuine fears about the opposition, in particular the fear of violence.” Burnham reportedly expressed surprise at “Dr. Jagan’s ‘Falstaffian’ fear of violence from the opposition,” since there was “substantial” evidence to show that there was “a readiness on Dr. Jagan’s part to commit violence.” The PNC, Burnham said, was “innocent of violent intentions.” These leaders had become skilled practitioners of the blame game.78 The three Guianese leaders failed to reach agreement on the terms of a proposed coalition government. Jagan even declined to attend any meeting that included D’Aguiar since the UF’s policies were “too divergent from his own.” On the other hand, D’Aguiar expressed a willingness to join a coalition, if invited. Burnham was interested only in a coalition that was a “holding (  )

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operation” until a new electoral system was introduced. Jagan rejected this idea, proposing as a precondition for alliance that the PNC and the PPP first agree on the programs to be pursued. Although the two men consented to meet to formulate plans for a coalition, nothing came from the effort. A reconciliation of the differences between Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar and the cultivation of an atmosphere of mutual trust among them would have placed limits on the ability of the British and Americans to manipulate and exacerbate the political conditions in the colony. Yet, in view of the discussions that had taken place at Birch Grove, a Jagan-Burnham coalition would have been unacceptable to the Americans under any circumstances. They were exercising undue influence over British policy and engaging in covert activity to promote their interests in the colony as well. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE scheduled to begin on October 22, 1963, was another exercise in Anglo-American Machiavellianism. American and British officials met in London on October 14, 15, and 16 to plan their strategy. The British anticipated that the conference would be deadlocked on the first day, allowing the colonial secretary to announce his intention to impose a system of proportional representation on the colony. He then would adjourn the meeting for two or three days so the delegates could respond to the announcement. Expecting Jagan to reject the proposed electoral system, the British officials in the meantime were preparing to amend the constitution “to give the Governor the necessary executive powers” to depose the premier and administer the affairs of the colony himself. The summary of the meeting’s deliberations stated: “If . . . Dr. Jagan were genuinely ready to cooperate, the new electoral system could be introduced without revoking the present constitution. If he feigned cooperation to gain time, it would be necessary to suspend the constitution as this became apparent.”79 The Americans were elated at the prospect of the imposition of direct rule even though the Birch Grove summit had seemingly ruled it out. In fact, they wanted to provoke Jagan into summarily rejecting the secretary of state’s proposals. According to the summary of the discussions, “American officials hope that everything possible would be done, including perhaps a statement that it would be necessary to resume direct control over internal security and finance, to ensure that Dr. Jagan resigns or rejects the proposals, so that H.M. Government would feel justified in amending the constitution.”80 The British officials did not find the suggestion worthwhile, arguing that there would be “considerable presentational difficulty in relating the resumption of control over internal security and finance to the new electoral The Politics of Power

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proposals.” Sticking to their position, the Americans said they would be unable “to undertake an assistance programme” if Dr. Jagan regained control of the government and assumed responsibility for internal security.81 U.S. officials agreed not to make any public comment on Guiana and “to avoid disclosing the prior understanding between the two governments.” When the decision was announced, however, the Americans promised “they will come out clearly in support.” The British strategy was to deceive the public as to the real motives behind the resumption of direct rule. They planned to deny any U.S. role in the decision and to claim that direct rule was partly intended to “curb racialism” in the colony. As the summary of the discussions noted: British official . . . comment will avoid any reference to Dr. Jagan’s communist sympathies and actions, and will maintain that the British government’s action was motivated solely by their desire to resolve the uncertainties and difficulties which are holding up the progress of British Guiana towards independence and to curb racialism. This approach is all the more important in that the British action will be misinterpreted in some quarters as having been influenced by the U.S. government. If asked the direct question whether the British action had been taken in order to prevent the adherence of British Guiana under Dr. Jagan to the communist bloc, British spokesmen should reply on the lines that Dr. Jagan’s ideological sympathies were well known but that the motive for the British Government’s actions was as stated above.82

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Several British officials, as had been noted, had developed by 1963 a more nuanced understanding of Dr. Jagan’s ideological position. Since they had become less inclined to view him as a communist and a pariah, it is surprising that they did not contest the Americans’ definition of him at the October meeting. It was a clear indication that they were preparing to give the Americans a free hand in the colony and were following their lead. The British, however, were concerned that their potential action in Guiana could be seen as directed at Cuba or the Soviet Union. They emphasized “the undesirability of taking the line (even in confidential diplomatic exchanges with friendly governments) that the British action should be seen as a counter-strike against Castro/Soviet plans in the Caribbean and South America.” The Americans, on the other hand, indicated that their government would cite its opposition to communism as one reason for its support of the British action. The U.S. government, they promised, would “do everything to dampen charges of collusion with the British.”83 (  )

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British Guiana’s delegation to the October conference was unaware that the meeting was a farce. When it was convened on October 23, Secretary Sandys went through the motions, holding individual discussions with the Guianese leaders to explore potential areas of agreement. The three principal issues to be resolved included, first, whether the voting age should be reduced to eighteen, a measure that Jagan supported and D’Aguiar and Burnham opposed. The second issue, proportional representation, was even more contentious; Jagan opposed and the other leaders endorsed it. Jagan and the other two leaders also disagreed on the third issue: whether there should be new elections before Guiana achieved its independence. The meetings between Sandys and the three leaders began on October 23 and ended on the twenty-fifth. Anxious to save the conference, Jagan offered a number of concessions when he met with Sandys. He confessed that he was looking at the problems the conference was confronting “from the angle of meeting American apprehensions.” The secretary pretended not to understand what Jagan meant, inquiring whether he had “any evidence of American apprehensions.” Jagan responded that the Americans had been encouraging the opposition groups in his country. He had no firm idea that Sandys was engaged in a conspiracy with the Americans to bring about his downfall. Unlike the duplicitous Sandys, Jagan made several proposals to advance the constitutional discussions. According to the summary of their conversation: The idea [Jagan] had for meeting American apprehensions was for an independent British Guiana to be guaranteed by treaty, along the lines of the Austrian Treaty. Under this treaty Austria undertook to remain permanently neutral and not to join any power bloc. As a further step he was prepared to have Commonwealth or United Nations’ officers to lead an independent British Guiana’s defense force. He would also be agreeable to having a Commonwealth or United Nations’ “presence” in British Guiana after independence with the function of seeing that the Constitution was fairly operated.84 These were not timeless constitutional principles, to be sure. Rather, they were pragmatic safeguards that the premier proposed to allay the anxieties of those who feared an independent Guiana under his leadership. Jagan repeated his objection to proportional representation, saying it would lead to the “fragmentation of the political parties.” To accept it now, he admitted, “would be to cut his throat politically.” Jagan knew that proportional representation would mean his political death.85 The Politics of Power

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Failing to craft a consensus among the three men and one that fitted his script, Sandys faced two options: he could either adjourn the conference or impose a solution. There is no doubt that he welcomed the latter option, because it gave him an opportunity to implement the plan the Americans and the British had concocted. Accordingly, on the twenty-fifth Sandys declared the conference deadlocked. Faced with the prospect of its collapse, a potential delay in the granting of independence, and returning home emptyhanded, and probably believing in Sandys’s essential impartiality, Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar signed a letter asking Sandys to settle their differences. It read: At your request we have made further efforts to resolve the differences between us on the constitutional issues which require to be settled before British Guiana secures independence, in particular, the electoral system, the voting age, and the question whether fresh elections should be held before independence. We regret to have to report to you that we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that there is no prospect of an agreed solution. Another adjournment of the Conference for further discussions between ourselves would therefore serve no useful purpose and would result only in further delaying British Guiana’s independence and in continued uncertainty in the country. In these circumstances we are agreed to ask the British Government to settle on their authority all outstanding constitutional issues, and we undertake to accept their decisions.86

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The letter was drafted by Sandys or, probably more accurately, by officials in the Colonial Office. The three leaders dutifully signed it, placing their country’s future in the hands of the colonial masters. It was a colossal abdication of leadership; the three principal leaders could not agree on issues fundamental to their country’s future, relying on the colonial power to exert its authority and to decide for them. It was also a profound expression of their crippling mistrust of each other. If this decision can be taken as one measure, nothing much had changed in the psychology of the three leaders vis-à-vis their relationship with the colonial masters. Their trust was misplaced; the Colonial Office exuded a veneer of fairness and balance to mask the fact that Anglo-American interests, as opposed to those of the Guianese, had already determined the decision. Duncan Sandys announced his prepackaged decision on October 31. It took the form of a lengthy statement delivered at the last plenary session of the constitutional conference. After commending the Guianese leaders for inviting the British government “to settle on your behalf ” the unresolved (  )

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issues, Secretary Sandys observed that “there is one problem that transcends all others [in Guiana], namely the growth of racialism.” The “trouble” rested, he said, “almost entirely in the development of party politics along racial lines.” There was no single remedy for this development, he asserted. But, he continued, “I have tried to examine the problem with complete objectivity and with one aim only, namely to assess what electoral system would be most likely to give to your country peace and good government.” His consideration of the problem, “with complete objectivity,” led him to decide in favor of proportional representation, since it “would be likely to compel the formation of coalitions between parties and races, which . . . would be most desirable.” Handing Jagan’s opponents a complete victory, the colonial secretary announced that the voting age would remain at twenty-one and that there would be fresh elections before independence was granted.87 Despite the high-minded principles that he invoked in favor of proportional representation, Sandys’s statement was deliberately deceptive. The decision to impose it had been made in concert with the Americans before the conference convened, and it had little to do with the politics of race in the colony. The two governments had decided that proportional representation was the best strategy to remove Jagan from office. To the Americans in particular, Jagan was a communist and a Jagan-led government was unacceptable. Sandys was invoking racialism in British Guiana to disguise and legitimize a policy decision that was rooted in the implacable U.S. opposition to Jagan and the political ideology he was thought to represent. Jagan and Burnham were, therefore, not the only ones who exploited Guiana’s racial sores to their advantage. When British and American officials met on December 13–14 to continue their discussions on British Guiana, they praised Sandys for his performance at the October conference. As the summary of the proceedings stated: “It was agreed that the general reaction to the conference had been gratifying and reassuring. American officials voiced their admiration for the skillful way in which the Colonial Secretary set the stage at the Constitutional Conference for the imposition of a solution involving proportional representation likely to affect the PPP’s electoral prospects.”88 Burnham and D’Aguiar were gratified by Sandys’s announcement since they got the decision they wanted. But it was a Pyrrhic victory because British Guiana’s domestic future could hardly be dictated from the outside. The decision served Anglo-American needs in the short run but fed Guianese tensions over the long haul. Dr. Jagan’s supporters—mostly Indians—felt disenfranchised by the proportional representation system, which only fed their grievances. Proportional representation was not a panacea for Guiana’s sysThe Politics of Power

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temic problems; it merely became one of several sources of division in the polity. Fighting for his political life, Cheddi Jagan moved quickly. Writing to the new prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, on November 7, he complained that Sandys’s decision “constitute[s] a breach of faith and is a betrayal of trust placed in the British Government.” When he signed the letter to the colonial secretary, he said, he had “expected that the British Government would act in good faith by transferring residual powers to my government and resolving differences on the basis of sound constitutional principles and precedent.” Incredibly, and naively, Jagan seemed to have thought that Britain would have given his government authority to resolve the disputed electoral issues. Jagan also strongly protested Sandys’s failure to set a date for independence.89 An angry Jagan questioned the integrity of the secretary, accusing him of “rigging the constitution with the sole purpose of destroying the People’s Progressive Party.” He had acted neither on the “basis of principle nor precedent.” Jagan said his government and party “do not feel honour bound to accept the decision of the Colonial Secretary.” Ending on an ominous note, he predicted: “The Guianese people may well question whether they can ever hope to fulfill their aspirations via the electoral and parliamentary road.”90 Dr. Jagan never recovered politically from having signed the letter to Sandys. It was a gross miscalculation on his part, stemming essentially from a naive belief that the colonial secretary would be fair in his adjudication of the dispute and that the long-term interests of the Guianese people would be paramount. There was, of course, the complication of what constituted fairness in these matters, and, under the best of circumstances, the secretary could not have pleased all of the stakeholders. But Sandys was not guided by principle and followed his script. Neither Jagan nor his supporters understood that the October conference was essentially a charade. But by signing the letter, Jagan gave moral legitimacy to Sandys’s decision. Many members of the PPP viewed Jagan’s assent to the letter with incredulity; it unquestionably damaged his prestige in the party. The colonial secretary’s decision having been made, Jagan spent the next twelve months trying to undo the damage to him and his party. Launching an aggressive public relations campaign, he charged that he had been mistreated and betrayed by Sandys. In an attempt to lay the secretary’s decision directly at the feet of the United States, Jagan released on November 24 a scathing comment on what he saw as Anglo-American complicity in his be-

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Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

trayal and Sandys’s refusal to have the Commonwealth nations mediate the dispute:

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Mr. Sandys said that he came to his decision without any pressure of any kind from any quarter. One can hardly believe this. Everyone knows that Washington has been insistent that no Independence must come to British Guiana, that the Constitution must be suspended and the system of voting changed. Mr. Sandys’ below-the-belt foul blow, and refusal to permit Commonwealth mediation can be traced only to one main factor, namely U.S. dictation.91 Jagan condemned American “dictation,” but he lacked the requisite proof. He did know, however, that the Colonial Office adopted a double standard in its policy toward Southern Rhodesia and British Guiana. On November 28, Jagan wrote another letter to Douglas-Home pointing out his government’s inconsistency in its attitude toward the two colonies, one dominated by a white minority and the other by a black and brown majority. The premier told the prime minister: “We therefore hold the view that the British Government’s decision to legislate on matters including a change of the electoral system, which have already been entrusted to the British Guiana Government, would be inconsistent with the position held in the case of Southern Rhodesia.”92 Nothing came of Jagan’s protest; indeed, there is no evidence that his letter was even acknowledged. But he had made an important point by underscoring the imperial government’s double standard in its dealings with the two colonies. Led by Ian Smith, the Southern Rhodesian government declared its independence from Britain rather than accept any interference in its racially based policies. This precipitated a very long and acrimonious dispute between the colony’s white leadership and the imperial power. Jagan, however, never contemplated a unilateral declaration of independence in spite of his difficulties with the mother country. The British would never have allowed such a rupture to stand, and in this case they would have had the strong support of the United States. Jagan was not alone in criticizing Sandys’s decision on proportional representation. On November 15, Arthur Bottomley, the British Labour Party’s spokesperson on colonial affairs, pronounced Sandys’s decision a “blatant piece of constitution making for political ends.” He predicted that proportional representation would exacerbate racial tensions in the colony, claiming that it was introduced to produce “a new party political set up.” Sandys,

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Bottomley said, “assured me that he was under no pressure from the United States, but perhaps the United States argument rather influenced him.” In his contribution to the debate in the House of Lords, Lord Watson, a Labourite, said the decision seemed to be a “devious means of ensuring that there shall be a change of government there; and that a party, perhaps rather more acceptable not only to Her Majesty’s Government, but possibly to the American Government, may take the range of power.” Responding to criticisms that he had “been told what to do from Washington,” Sandys brazenly misinformed his colleagues. “I came to my decisions,” he asserted, “without pressure of any kind from any foreign quarter.”93 The decision to introduce proportional representation did not diminish U.S. advocacy of direct rule in British Guiana. When Anglo-American officials met in Washington during December 13–14, 1963, to continue their monitoring of developments in British Guiana, U.S. officials believed that “the chances of defeating the PPP without direct rule were too uncertain” and that the creation of an “alternative” East Indian party “would provide the needed margin of safety.” Efforts to launch such a party, however, “have yielded disappointing results”; furthermore, the preferred candidate to lead it—former minister of home affairs, Balram Singh Rai—demonstrated little interest in doing so.94 The officials agreed that if Jagan impeded the implementation of Secretary Sandys’s decision or failed to discharge his governmental responsibilities, direct rule could be justifiably imposed. Should such an occasion for the imposition of direct rule not emerge, “a deliberate effort might have to be made to confront him with a concrete issue forcing him into an act of non cooperation.” If the premier interfered with voter registration under the new electoral system, they reasoned, that would provide “a suitable” reason to impose direct rule. The Americans urged that “an appropriate occasion for the resumption of direct rule” be sought as quickly as feasible to achieve the common objectives of the two nations. The British were, once again, not enthusiastic about that course of action, although, they revealed, the legal and staffing preparations for such an eventuality had been completed.95 Shell-shocked by Sandys’s “decision,” Jagan had remained in London for a week contemplating his future course of action. Although resignation was an option, the premier declined to pursue that path. Sandys confessed that “Jagan’s reactions had not worried him once the political leaders had signed a piece of paper asking him to arbitrate.” He knew that “the longer Dr. Jagan delayed his resignation, the less he could derive popularity from it.” Sandys’s “main concern” had been to avoid making a “martyr or a hero of Jagan.” He (  )

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recognized that the premier was “an able agitator” and one should not “put him in a position whereby he would gain popularity in opposition.” This was an accurate reading of Jagan’s political talents, but he had failed to capitalize on the moment by some dramatic act such as the resignation of his government. The colonial secretary was encouraged that “there had been no violent reaction—only violent language” since the conference ended.96 Cheddi Jagan had been the survivor of many political battles since 1953. He had withstood the attempts by the British to destroy him politically in the coup d’état of 1953 and its aftermath, the gerrymandering of constituency boundaries in 1957 to effect the defeat of the PPP, the social disturbances that came in the wake of the 1962 budget, and the racial crises of 1963 and 1964, among others. The fight against proportional representation represented another battle, but it was unlike any of the others in which he was previously engaged. Jagan’s enemies could not be identified with certitude; their strategy was Machiavellian yet flexible and concocted secretly in London and Washington. Their weapons were meetings and agreements made by powerful co-conspirators, financial support and other favors to accomplices, the passage of legislative measures in London, and the power to threaten, cajole, and control. Jagan’s opponents were as ubiquitous as they were frequently invisible. In their exercise of the politics of power, the Americans, the British, and their local foot soldiers never used traditional military weapons to achieve their objectives; though often indiscernible, their arsenal could be devastatingly effective. Dr. Jagan was never quite sure what strategy to employ to obtain a reversal of the decision on proportional representation. Unaware of the agreements and understandings between London and Washington, he could hardly have developed an efficacious approach. Although he had his suspicions about American complicity in the assaults on him, he had no idea that the United States had pledged so passionately not to permit him to lead an independent Guiana. How could he fight a dubious enemy, one he was repeatedly asking for help? Jagan’s ambivalence vis-à-vis the Americans, his attacks on their crass capitalism on the one hand and his supplication for aid on the other, revealed the pathology of the colonial experience. And it explained his inability to forge a consistent response to those who held out the promise of a helping hand while simultaneously unleashing a dagger. Eschewing any decision to resign and failing to persuade Prime Minister Douglas-Home to reverse the colonial secretary’s decision on proportional representation, Jagan thrashed around for another workable strategy. Somehow he had to create and maintain a momentum against the measure among The Politics of Power

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his supporters. The PNC and the UF saw proportional representation as their lifeline to political power and their followers embraced it with considerable enthusiasm. Jagan seemed to believe that his best course was to fan the flames of social unrest, making it impossible to hold the impending elections on schedule. In February 1964, the PPP-backed Guiana Agricultural Workers Union called a strike to gain recognition as the voice of workers in the sugar industry. The strike exacerbated racial tensions, and the colony’s fragile social fabric reeled from an onslaught of violence. When the uproar, murders, and arson increased, Jagan invited Dr. Eric Williams, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, to mediate the crisis. Beginning his deliberations in May, Williams admitted failure after six weeks’ work. He blamed the colony’s leaders for the upheaval, finding that “there was no readiness on any side to subordinate sectional interests or perceived antagonisms or ideological vagaries to the over riding national interest.”97 The violence led some, including Governor Richard Luyt, the American consul general, and the intelligence units, to ascribe more responsibility for its continuation to Jagan and the PPP than to Forbes Burnham and the PNC. Using his emergency power, the governor detained more members of the PPP as a threat to the public order than those associated with the PNC. As the colony’s social fabric became more damaged, Burnham made a speech in the Legislative Council on June 4 urging the creation of a national government that included the three political parties. This would be a holding operation that would end after new elections were held under the system of proportional representation. The government, among other initiatives, would require that all arms be turned in and an amnesty declared for unlawfully held weapons. It would take steps to reduce unemployment in the rural and urban areas of the colony, changing budgetary priorities where appropriate. The government would compensate all those who sustained damages to their property during the unrest.98 Dr. Jagan expressed an immediate interest in Burnham’s proposal, repeating his willingness to consider a coalition that would extend beyond the elections. D’Aguiar was pessimistic that such an alliance was feasible and said he wanted no part of it. Serious problems quickly emerged, however. The U.S. government was intransigent in its opposition to a PNC-PPP coalition, insisting that Jagan be removed entirely from the governmental stage. It also feared that a coalition might lead to a delay in the date of the impending elections under proportional representation and prolong Jagan’s tenure in office. The Americans must have persuaded Burnham, as their preferred choice for the next head of government, to withdraw his support for a coalition with (  )

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the PPP. On July 5 he issued a statement stressing that “the PNC uncompromisingly insist[s] on elections this year as planned under proportional representation.” Burnham emphasized: “As for coalitions let it also be understood that the PNC will consider these after elections when the atmosphere is clear and electoral support crystallized.” He thought that “any such arrangements now are merely part of delaying tactics and amount to tilting at windmills.” This was not a statesmanlike position to take at that time, given the enormity of the colony’s problems and bleeding wounds. Burnham’s volte face on the matter was characterized as “stupid” by Governor Luyt. “He will appear to the outside world to be the obstructionist,” Luyt said, “and his publicized attitude will promote further local unrest.”99 By July 1964, the concept of a coalition government had won important support from Richard Luyt. In late April, forty-five days after assuming his duties as governor, he had dismissed any talk of a PNC-PPP coalition in a lengthy memorandum to the Colonial Office. “I am satisfied,” he wrote, “that there is nothing to be gained by so doing and that there might be a loss.” He argued that a coalition “would not be based on a genuine desire to work together and the two parties would continue to fight each other with undiminished vigor and intensity during the electioneering period.” Luyt did not believe that a coalition “would be likely to win either [a] short or long-term advantage, however attractive it might seem at first glance.”100 The new governor noted that Jagan was “an enthusiastic protagonist” of a PNC-PPP administration. The premier was offering the PNC “seemingly generous” terms, projecting a coalition government that would last well beyond the forthcoming election. Burnham, Luyt said, was refusing such an alliance on the grounds that “Jagan, seeing defeat ahead, merely wishes to control and destroy the PNC.” Burnham “wishes to have no part of an unhappy government in its dying months in a near bankrupt state.”101 Luyt remained skeptical about the wisdom of a PNC-PPP coalition when Jagan made a new proposal to him on May 30. Reflecting what he said was the PNC’s position on the matter, Luyt told Jagan: “Every African believed that the PPP was playing for time in order to avoid a P.R. government general election. A coalition government would give the opportunity, with or without an early P.R. election, of perpetuating the dominant Indian position or of depriving the African, perhaps in collaboration with the other non-Indian people, of having a period of control of the Government.”102 Luyt believed that a “standstill” coalition government would be unacceptable to Africans if they saw Indian “future dominance becoming more and more assured.” With a faster growing population, a coalition governThe Politics of Power

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ment would provide a breathing space for the Indian population to become an absolute majority, guaranteeing the PPP’s dominance at the polls. This helped to explain Jagan’s enthusiasm for a long tenure for such an administration and Burnham’s opposition to his proposal.103 These problems notwithstanding, Luyt soon came to realize that a coalition government would best serve the needs of the colony. He had observed the racially inspired horrors of the spring and summer and feared for the country’s future. Writing to the colonial secretary on July 6, he predicted that “peace is unlikely to return to British Guiana even after the elections if the two racial groups continue to stand solidly opposed.” Luyt rejected the U.S.driven anticommunist policy that a PPP-PNC coalition was unacceptable. As governor, Luyt was making the needs of the Guianese people paramount. Unlike the Americans and the Colonial Office, he seemed not to view them solely as objects to be toyed with to satisfy external imperatives. “I trust that we are not allowing opposition to coalition’s possibilities,” he warned, “to become entrenched too firmly for too far ahead.” He believed that “a coalition under reasonable conditions may yet prove the only salvation for British Guiana and for Britain.”104 Surprisingly, the Colonial Office saw considerable merit in Luyt’s proposal and experienced an epiphany on the matter. Secretary Sandys hastily dispatched a message to Dean Rusk announcing Britain’s support for coalition talks with Dr. Jagan. The statement began by assuring Rusk that “it remains our objective to secure as soon as possible a change of government in British Guiana . . . through a general election under proportional representation.” But, it continued, “racial strife” might prevent holding the election on schedule. “The only way of checking inter-racial violence is by bringing about a temporary coalition between Jagan and Burnham to tide over the period between now and the elections.” The colonial secretary made clear that the motive force behind the policy shift was not the needs or interests of the Guianese people. “I am sure it is in the interests of our common objective to do all we can to secure a coalition before the situation gets out of hand.” If a coalition did not emerge, “we may be faced with the indefinite postponement of elections and the continuation of the Jagan regime.” Recognizing that Burnham’s political positions were now being dictated by the Americans, Sandys hoped that he could count on the cooperation of Dean Rusk and that “you will ask your people to do all they can to influence Burnham to accept a temporary coalition.”105 The Foreign Office did not oppose this shift in strategy by the Colonial Office, but it was not enthusiastic about it. J. O. Rennie emphasized that (  )

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his department was only interested in “the effects” of a political coalition on “our relations with the United States and on our joint efforts to prevent the spread of communism in the area.” This was yet another indication that British Guiana’s interests were secondary to those of Britain and the United States. Rennie doubted that a coalition would survive for a long time, and this was likely to temper the U.S. reaction to it. His government intended, however, to put “the responsibility for continuing bloodshed squarely on Dr. Jagan’s shoulders.” Jagan would be demonized regardless of whether a coalition emerged or not.106 Richard Luyt seems to have been a lonely voice in his articulation of the interests of the Guianese people. As a new governor, he had not been a part of the earlier Anglo-American discussions that had been Machiavellian in tone and largely indifferent to British Guiana’s needs. The exasperated governor had cause to doubt that the Americans gave any thought to the impact of their behavior on the Guianese people. Writing to the secretary of state on July 7, he suggested that a coalition government was probably “the only alternative to endless strife and bloodshed after the elections.” He warned the colonial secretary not to “mislead the Americans on this point[;] otherwise the Americans will again feel that they are free to sabotage any possible PPP-PNC cooperation regardless of the local consequences in terms of lives and money and British military commitment.”107 This was an unmistakable reference to U.S. covert activity in the colony. Ten days later, Luyt expressed his frustration about not receiving orders to help craft a coalition: I still, of course, find it odd that I am not allowed to attempt to implement Britain’s declared policy of bringing the two parties (which is virtually the same thing as saying the two races) together. I also find it unfortunate that I cannot try to take the action which might save some lives even if my chances of success are poor. However, I recognize that my view is inevitably much confined within British Guiana’s frontiers and influenced by the terror here.108 Luyt’s optic was focused sharply on the Guianese people and the “terror” they were experiencing. But he was not ignorant of the fact that U.S. opposition to a PPP-PNC coalition could kill the idea. Luyt knew that “a coalition of a sort acceptable to us has only a small hope of achievement and has no chance against American opposition.” In an internal Colonial Office minute, one official agreed with the governor. “There would be no point in the Governor trying to bring the party leaders together,” the official wrote, “since The Politics of Power

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Burnham will not budge, until they [the United States] tell him he is free to do so.” He thought the first step to be taken in any coalition talks was “to ask Mr. Rusk to take the whip off Burnham.”109 Another internal memorandum warned that it would be “useless” to pursue the formation of a coalition government “if the Americans were influencing Burnham against it.” Sir A. H. Poynton, the British attaché in Washington, also suspected that Burnham’s opposition to a coalition government was dictated by the Americans, “though of course, we cannot prove it.”110 The leader of the PNC had, seemingly, abandoned any independence he enjoyed and was now in the service of the United States. Nothing tangible emerged from these talks about a potential coalition. Governor Luyt was still anxious to pursue them and “to be assured that he would not have to contend with American opposition if he did so.” The Americans, presumably never permitted Burnham to participate in such negotiations. Meeting in London on June 16 and 17, Anglo-American officials agreed that “there is little in a coalition on terms acceptable to Britain, the U.S. or the opposition leaders to attract Dr. Jagan.”111 In other words, Britain, the United States, Forbes Burnham, and Peter D’Aguiar were following the same drummer. American officials had an ingenious explanation for opposing a preelection coalition that included Jagan. It would, they said “provide a dangerous precedent for the period after the election, and after independence, enabling Jagan to argue that peaceful and effective government was not possible unless both the main parties were included in the government.”112 This was an astonishing argument. The Guianese people were to be denied the possibility of peace in order to satisfy American fears that a JaganBurnham coalition might provide “effective” government in the colony. In the end, a coalition government had no chance of becoming a reality given the intransigent opposition to Cheddi Jagan by the Americans and their prior understandings with British officials to get him out of office. Anticipating a PNC-UF coalition to emerge from the forthcoming elections, Anglo-American officials began to discuss what would be needed to ensure that it “held together.” The Americans were prepared to provide US$10 million in grants, US$5 million of which would be available to the new government immediately. In addition, they would furnish grants of US$13.1 million annually for a period of five years thereafter. But they would do so only if “the Government were not a Jagan government, or that Jagan were not a member of the government.” Britain promised to contribute approximately £2.5 million per year. In the event of a Jagan victory, British officials (  )

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said they would stand by their commitment to grant the colony its independence regardless of American opposition. Based on their statistical survey of the electorate, no one predicted a PPP victory.113 To ensure a Jagan defeat at the polls, Anglo-American officials again urged support for the formation of Indian-based parties to compete with the PPP. Governor Luyt promised to “strive with all energy” to support such endeavors. He thought that it “is in really positive assistance to new parties and to PNC and UF organisations that the Americans can make an effective contribution.”114 With such British and U.S. power arrayed against him, to say nothing of his domestic opponents, Jagan’s chances of remaining in office appeared slim. Consequently, he sought a rapprochement with the Americans. On July 1, 1964, the premier met with Luyt to propose that Attorney General Fenton Ramsahoye visit Washington to initiate the talks. He handed the governor a memorandum describing the four issues that were to be discussed “between the delegate of [the] British Guiana Government and [the] State Department in Washington.” Jagan’s initiative was as much an act of desperation as it was a desire to save his political life. This extraordinary document shows a wounded and chastened Cheddi Jagan trying to mend fences with his archenemy to the north. It read: There can be little doubt that an important element in the present disturbed situation in British Guiana is the distrust with which the British Guiana Government is viewed by the United States government. In recognition of this fact, the Government of British Guiana is prepared to enter into confidential discussions with any representative of the United States Government on the following matters. It is hoped that the discussions will lead to a mutually agreeable resolution of the outstanding problems which would warrant the moral support of the United States in encouraging a coalition between the two major political parties involving the cooperation of the two major groups—East Indians and Africans. 1. Agreement with the principle that any Guianese Government must include appropriate representation from Africans and Indians. 2. Discussion of the appropriate guarantees which would make such a coalition a meaningful and enduring arrangement. 3. Discussion of ways and means to safeguard and promote capital investment and any agreement which may be entered into between the Government of the United States and the Government of British Guiana for the reconstruction and development of the country. The Politics of Power

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4. The support of the United States as the leader of the Organisation of American States in promoting the continued recognition of the frontiers of British Guiana, long settled by international arbitration and internationally accepted.115

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The governor was not enthusiastic about Ramsahoye’s potential visit to Washington, although he saw no good reason for opposing it. American consul general Delmar Carlson hoped that reasons would be found, presumably in Washington, “for resisting Jagan’s request.”116 Washington discouraged the visit so it never materialized. Cheddi Jagan did not fully realize that AngloAmerican officials had already decided his political fate and were buying time until the elections. The hostility to him in Washington was deep, irrational, and unwavering. By genuflecting before the reality of its power, however, Jagan was dramatizing the humiliation that smaller, less powerful countries often experienced in pursuing policies that invited the opposition of more powerful enemies. Chastened by such experiences, many leaders had to swallow their pride in order to survive. Whereas the Americans kept Jagan at a distance, they welcomed their growing rapport with Burnham. The PNC leader needed U.S. support to replace Jagan, and the Americans needed him to preside over a Guiana that was unreservedly anticommunist and compliant to the dictates of the northern republic. But it was most certainly not a match made in heaven. After observing and working with Burnham for a year, Consul General Carlson concluded that he “is not really comfortable around white people and does not normally seek their company except for specific purposes.” Carlson said Burnham “is more favorably disposed towards the United States than any other foreign country. This is due to the fact that the United States has supported him . . . and that the United States is powerful.” He thought Burnham can “be overbearing, arrogant, and on occasion has shown a tendency to bully.” Although some people saw in his personality “the seeds of dictatorship,” Carlson believed that “intellectually he is opposed to dictatorship in principle and in fact.”117 Anxious to maintain the support of the Americans, Forbes Burnham shaped his policies to achieve that objective. He met with Carlson during the waning weeks of the election campaign to assure him “categorically” that: 1. He would not recognize the USSR; 2. He would not recognize or associate in any way with the Castro regime; 3. He would cut off all trade with Cuba if asked to do so, provided that (  )

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Jagan addressing a preelection PPP rally, Georgetown, 1964. (© Corbis)

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the United States arranged an equally good market for British Guiana’s rice; 4. He would join the OAS [Organization of American States].118 According to Carlson, Burnham “denied any intention to permit racial considerations to decide policy, to take over the trade union movement, or to establish a dictatorial regime.” Such assurances were welcomed by the Americans, but they clearly revealed a Burnham who was accommodating U.S. fears and needs. He even promised Carlson that he would denounce Jagan as a communist, announce his rejection of a PPP-PNC coalition, and express regret that a “non communist party,” the PPP, “had communist leadership and therefore no real future.”119 Concerned about its political future, the PPP decided in late August— after months of vacillation—to contest the election. The acting chairman of the party, Senator Ashton Chase, and the general secretary, Janet Jagan, issued a statement announcing that the party would contest the election under duress. It remained opposed to proportional representation but was convinced that it would obtain the support of the majority of the people. Its supporters “will confound and frustrate the diabolical plans of the imperialists and their local agents,” the statement asserted. These leaders were expressing a feigned confidence since they knew that the stage was set for the PPP’s first electoral loss.120 The Politics of Power

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The PPP, or at least Cheddi Jagan, still entertained the illusion that the decision on proportional representation would somehow be reversed. The British Labour Party was expected to win the elections scheduled for October, and Dr. Jagan was confident that the new prime minister, Harold Wilson, would be sympathetic to his position. Individual members of the Labour Party had expressed varying degrees of support for the PPP since the 1953 coup. These politicians had a more empathetic understanding of the strident anticolonial impulses of the PPP’s leadership and its Marxist and nationalist rhetoric. The Labour Party had criticized the Sandys decision on proportional representation, but it did not commit itself to reversing the decision if it came to office. In early 1964 it had sent John Hatch, a party functionary, to British Guiana to study conditions there and submit a report to Harold Wilson. In an article that he published in the May 15 edition of the New Statesman, Hatch wondered how “the Americans can deceive themselves that Jagan is a dangerous communist, when his seven years of office [1957–64] have not led to any socialist planning, and when he has no armed forces.”121 Ben D. Segal of the International Union of Educational Workers informed U.S. officials that he “noted a coolness to proportional representation among UK Labour people, a relatively relaxed feeling about Jagan, and a widespread view that Burnham and his associates were under the thumb of the CIA.”122 Heartened by the Labour Party’s victory and its presumed understanding of the PPP’s aspirations, Jagan hurried to London to meet with Prime Minister Wilson in late October. This was his last chance to obtain a reversal of the proportional representation decision and remain as head of government in British Guiana. As was customary, Wilson must have been briefed by officials on the nature of the existing Anglo-American agreements on policy in the colony. Armed with this knowledge, his meeting with Jagan was more a courtesy and less an honest discussion of the future of British Guiana. The meeting between the two men lasted for a paltry forty-five minutes on October 29. It did not take long for the prime minister to puncture the premier’s optimism that the decision on proportional representation would be reversed. Wilson told Jagan that although he had criticized the Guianese constitution when it was prepared, he had never given an assurance that his party would change it in office. “Her Majesty’s Government,” Wilson emphasized, “had now to deal with the facts as they found them.” If his party had assumed office in June, “it might have been possible to do something different; now it was too late and H.M.G. saw no alternative but to let the elections go forward.” Wilson told Jagan three times during the meeting that Guiana would (  )

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not receive its independence until its people demonstrated that they could live together in harmony.123 Since racial peace in Guiana was not the issue that drove the timing of independence, the prime minister was being disingenuous. He must have known that the previous government had acquiesced to U.S. pressure not to grant independence to a Jagan-led government. A dejected Cheddi Jagan returned home to face an electoral fait accompli orchestrated in London and Washington. A month later, Wilson assured George Ball of the U.S. State Department that “it was inconceivable that British Guiana could receive independence for a good many years to come.” Ball responded that the president would be “very glad” to get that information, adding that the Americans viewed “the possibility of independence for British Guiana with great trepidation.”124 ELECTION DAY 1964 in Guiana did not pass unnoticed in Washington or London. Meeting in Washington, the U.S. secretaries of state and defense and the British foreign secretary, secretary of state for defense, and ambassador to the United States all worried about the outcome. The new British foreign secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, assured the Americans that “whatever the outcome, HMG would not go toward independence in the foreseeable future.” Yet he did not rule out a coalition government with Burnham if Jagan won. Since this position was at variance with previous Anglo-American understandings, it undoubtedly disappointed the Americans. Gordon Walker affirmed the desire of his government, however, to cooperate with Washington. It thought that both Jagan and Burnham “were bad, and that the US government had an excessively favourable estimate of Burnham.”125 Walker was probably unaware of the depth of the U.S. animus to Jagan and its courtship of Burnham. Although the PPP failed to gain an absolute majority at the polls, Jagan refused to resign as premier. This prompted an urgent letter to him from Anthony Greenwood, the new secretary of state for the colonies, pressing him to resign because the “continued uncertainty may lead to further bloodshed and unhappiness.” If Jagan did not vacate his office, Greenwood would have no alternative but “to resort to [a] constitutional amendment” to remove him. In his response to the secretary, Jagan explained that his refusal to resign should not be regarded “as obstruction” but “merely a continuation of our protest.” The premier raised the horrible specter of the partitioning of the colony along racial lines since the elections potentially excluded “the major section of the people” from representation in the government. “AlThe Politics of Power

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ready,” Jagan wrote, “there is evidence of a rising tide of demand for partition of this country. Unless your government intervenes to work out an amicable solution, I fear that this demand will grow and create even further problems.” Greenwood found this argument unpersuasive, and on December 14 Her Majesty’s government issued an Order in Council authorizing the governor to appoint a new premier. Luyt invited Jagan to call on him that afternoon, and at 3:55 P.M. he ceased to be the premier of British Guiana. Jagan asked to be permitted to convey the news to members of his government personally, and the governor readily acceded to the request.126 The two men terminated their governor/premier relationship on a cordial note. Luyt thanked Jagan for “the courteous attitude which he had brought to bear on most of our relationship over the last nine months.” Jagan emphasized that he had never had “any anxieties” about his personal dealings with Luyt. Rather, his “quarrels” had been with Luyt in their capacities as premier and governor. Nevertheless, the deposed premier said, there were recent occasions on which he had “unworthily and unjustifiably allowed himself to depart from proper standards of courtesy” and he wished “to make a full apology for such departures.”127 There is no evidence that Governor Luyt responded in kind; that would have subverted the unequal relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Jagan left Government House shortly thereafter to begin a new and lengthy phase of his remarkable political life. Jagan’s denouement was not unexpected, and an exuberant Forbes Burnham was anxious to assume the responsibility of government. The American consul general found him “serious and eager” to proceed with many “immediate tasks.” Burnham expressed “long range thoughts on means to overcome what he called Jaganism.” But an eerie tone of vengeance and retribution marked the conversation. Burnham wanted Consul General Carlson to persuade the U.S. government to influence the British to grant his country early independence. This, Burnham ventured, would allow his administration to “deal more effectively with [the] PPP and not be hampered by British ‘Red Tape’ or their undue concern for fair play.” Then Burnham added, “If we do not down the ‘ogre Jagan’ before too long we will never be able to do so.”128 These were intriguing comments, indeed; their full implication was not understood on that December afternoon in Georgetown. Nine months after Burnham became premier, the Americans were still gushing about their successful policy that had brought him to power. “The experience of the Consulate General,” wrote Delmar Carlson, who still held that position in Georgetown, “has confirmed ever more strongly the correctness of the U.S. policy to work toward the ouster of Jagan from power.” The (  )

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United States, he said, “has probably been the greatest single factor in making Burnham successful.” But he doubted whether Burnham could remain in office without U.S. support. Continued American “influence and manipulation will be required,” Carlson concluded.129 A year later, Harry Fitzgibbons of the U.S. State Department concocted his scheme to goad Jagan into taking extralegal action against the Burnham administration, behavior that would precipitate his exile. British Guiana had become a de facto American colony, theirs to manipulate and, with Burnham’s active compliance, to maim.

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Fairbain Redux

The summer of 1964 was not a pleasant one for the people of British Guiana. The society was still experiencing aftershocks from the accumulated violence of the preceding months. Although the disorder abated by August, peace had not been restored. Emanuel Fairbain’s arrest and the horrible aftermath had divided Georgetown and the rest of the colony. Forbes Burnham would find himself in trouble with the law and feared for his political future. Premier Jagan continued to preside over a fragile government, unable to control the tide of events and peering into a crystal ball that foretold his political demise. The Emanuel Fairbain case had become emblematic of the tensions and divisions in the polity. It contained all the elements of crime, violence, governmental corruption, racial politics, political expediency, and intrigue. It was an exemplar of all that was wrong in the troubled colonial society. With the declaration of three successive States of Emergency between 1962 and 1964, the political system was clearly dysfunctional. The politics of race had corroded the social mores, producing an unhealthy atmosphere of distrust among the races and an absence of common purpose. British Guiana’s institutions had ceased to function effectively, and its leaders were paralyzed by the problems they had helped to create. The law enforcement and judicial systems were not immune to the corro-

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sive forces at work in the society. The judicial system had never been a fount of equality in Guiana. The infamous slave codes had once defined enslaved Africans as property, and indentured workers from India seldom fared better before the law. With emancipation, and over time, Africans came to dominate the system of law enforcement, even if the higher ranks in the constabulary were reserved for Europeans and the administration of justice was not exactly color blind. Indians were never attracted to positions in law enforcement, leaving those jobs essentially to the Africans. The Colonial Office attributed this racial imbalance to the fact that “Africans in general have better physique and are more attracted to disciplined service.”1 The issue of racial imbalance in the security forces assumed increasing importance as the distrust between Indians and Africans crystallized. Police officers became a symbol of African domination of the Indian, and charges of official misconduct were leveled against them with regularity. Premier Jagan shared these concerns. In 1964 he proposed, unrealistically, that parity could be achieved in six months if the government recruited candidates of Indian descent from East Africa, India, Pakistan, and other Commonwealth countries. Although he did not oppose the idea, Governor Luyt believed that 40 percent “Indianisation” could be achieved in five or six years, not in six months.2 Burnham was harshly critical of Jagan’s initiatives, having accused him in March 1963 of packing the police force with Indians and of “a deliberate lowering of the physical and educational qualifications” to meet that objective.3 The extant statistics do not support Burnham’s charges. In July 1957, for example, Indians comprised 9.7 percent of the police force; in 1961, this figure climbed to 13.5 percent and in 1963 to 16.5 percent. Africans, on the other hand, constituted 83.4 percent in 1957, 77.4 percent in 1961, and 75.4 percent in 1963. In response to Burnham’s criticism, Jagan did admit that his government had abolished the minimum height requirement of 5′8″ for admission to the constabulary. But he charged that “misrepresentations of the type made by Mr. Burnham, which attribute imagined grievances to alleged racial prejudices of the present government, are calculated to intensify racial feelings, and to incite the hooligan elements of the population to acts of violence under certain circumstances.”4 Acts of violence abounded, and none of the political parties could claim clean hands. The PNC, with its urban base, seemed to have become by 1964 more deeply implicated in violence to achieve its objectives than did the PPP or the UF. The Colonial Office absolved the PNC of responsibility for the violence in February 1962 but concluded that “the sabotage in 1963 was, with(  )

Fairbain Redux

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out much doubt, inspired by the PNC.” Similarly, it conceded that the 1964 bombings in Georgetown “were also, without a doubt, PNC inspired.” The Colonial Office maintained that the PNC’s violence was “in retaliation for the killing of Africans by Indians,” but it also asserted that “neither side has a credible record”5 The violence that occurred in 1963 led the Police Department to monitor what it called “the terrorist organization” of the PNC. The result was an extremely detailed report implicating the PNC and Burnham in the planning and execution of a large number of violent acts in Georgetown and elsewhere. It established connections between the police force, the volunteer force, and the terrorist organization. The report listed the names of numerous members of that organization, some of whom held leadership positions in the PNC and trade unions. The terrorists’ aim, it said, was to overthrow the Jagan government.6 Although the Police Department’s report was prepared in 1963, it did not generate much attention in official circles until the following year. The commissioner of police said he submitted it to Governor Ralph Grey and to Janet Jagan, then minister of home affairs, as soon as he received it. Grey presumably left the matter to his successor to handle, but Mrs. Jagan later denied having seen it. When Premier Jagan became aware of the report’s existence sometime in 1964, he accused the Police Department and the new governor—Richard Luyt—of deliberately keeping his government in the dark. “The then British Government,” Jagan charged, “apparently suppressed this evidence for political purposes.” He declared that the failure of the police to prosecute those accused of criminal conduct had led to the loss of lives and to the horror at Wismar. In a letter to Prime Minister Wilson in September 1964, Jagan taunted the British and the Americans for supporting their “protégés,” the PNC activists, “who are a gang of criminals.”7 Jagan used the existence of the police report to proclaim the innocence of the PPP in the disturbances of 1963 and 1964 and to demand that the governor be advised by the Colonial Office: (i) To release immediately the members of the People’s Progressive Party who are wrongly detained for acts now clearly known to be the acts of the People’s National Congress Terrorist Organization; (ii) In the interest of justice, to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that those members of the People’s National Congress Terrorist Organization named in the security papers against whom there is evidence of murder, conspiracy, and terrorist and other illegal activities are Fairbain Redux

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prosecuted; and to detain at once the other members named in the papers as being involved in the activities of the Organisation; (iii) To dismiss all civil servants, government employees and teachers recorded as being members of the Terrorist organization; (iv) To disband immediately the Volunteer force, which is drawn from the Opposition strongholds of Georgetown, New Amsterdam, and Mackenzie; (v) To recruit a new force of Volunteers consisting of twelve companies from twelve recruiting areas scattered throughout the country, thus ensuring that the force reflects a broad cross-section of the community; (vi) To take immediate steps to correct the racial imbalance in the Police Force, not in the next five to seven years, but in the next few months, and to seek a grant from the United Kingdom for this purpose; (vii) To revoke the Order for the recall of licensed firearms and to return all such arms to their owners; (viii) To dismiss the Commissioner of Police, Mr. P. G. Owen, for withholding vital information relating to the security of the country from the Government, for failing to take action against a Terrorist Organization which he knew was carrying out acts of terrorism, subversion and murder, and for acting generally against the interests of the country; (ix) To bring to the attention of Her Majesty’s Government the state of affairs in the country, and the consequences of foreign intervention, particularly the existence and activities of widespread terrorist organisations which have led to the political arrangements and constitutional innovations (failure to grant independence, the imposition of Proportional Representation, the rape of the constitution and the efforts to force the government into an election before the expiry of its normal term of office) aimed at the defeat and destruction of the Government; and to request that an attempt be made to bring about a political and constitutional settlement acceptable to the great majority of the people of this country.8 Neither the governor nor the colonial secretary responded affirmatively to these demands. In a meeting with Jagan, Governor Luyt explained that a leading member of the bar, Mr. J. O. F. Haynes, Q.C., had been hired to review the security materials. Haynes concluded “that there might be a case against up to five persons,” but “no prominent” PNC members were among them. In a second review, Haynes had advised that “no charges were likely to succeed against anybody.” The senior legal adviser to the commissioner of police had concurred with Haynes’s findings, the governor said. Haynes had based his (  )

Fairbain Redux

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second finding on the fact that the “key informer witness” had refused to testify in court. In addition, the police report was “based on information of which the quality and integrity was in many cases seriously open to doubt.” Obviously displeased and disappointed, Jagan told the governor that he was “sick and tired of the whole thing.” According to Luyt, he also said:

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This question of documents was not in itself fundamental but was merely a manifestation of the fundamental problem in British Guiana, This fundamental problem was that there was a huge conspiracy to ensure defeat of the PPP. This meant that the PPP could not receive justice in any direction. The documents themselves and what they revealed were important only in that they were evidence of this conspiracy.9 The premier was certainly correct in emphasizing that he was the victim of a conspiracy to remove him from office, since the Americans and the British had joined hands with Jagan’s domestic opponents to effect his demise. In retrospect, it is simply astonishing that so much energy was expended by so many people over so long a period to destroy Cheddi Jagan. That he survived so long was testimony enough of his fortitude, political skills, and popular support, particularly among the Indians from whom he came. That said, Jagan’s pose of injured innocence in the terrorist campaigns was not credible. The PPP was as deeply involved as the PNC in the use of violence as an instrument of political policy, and its youth arm—the Progressive Youth Organization—could hardly claim to be a paragon of virtue, even by Guianese standards at the time. Cheddi Jagan cannot be faulted for believing that justice was ill served by the failure of the authorities to pursue the evidence contained in the police report. In his view, he and the PPP were denied vindication and a moral victory over his opponents. But arrests and trials inspired by the police report would have had an explosive effect, exacerbating the already deep divisions in the body politic,; they might have produced even more violence. No trial was really needed to establish the complicity of the PPP and the PNC in the violence that had become a chronic part of the colony’s political culture. The existence of the police report was, understandably, the subject of much discussion in the colony. An article entitled “War of Secret Reports in British Guiana” published by the New York Times on November 9, 1964, gave it wide international publicity but not the kind that the PNC welcomed.10 Burnham, whose reputation was tarnished by the report, dismissed it by saying that “most, if not all of it is totally false.”11 The PPP, or its sympathizers in London, arranged to mail hundreds of copies of the report to individuFairbain Redux

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als in British Guiana, presumably obtaining their names and addresses from the telephone directory. Since this was a secret official document, the governor used his emergency powers to instruct the post office to cease delivering the copies and ordered the police to seize those that were already in circulation. “This appears to be a disreputable PPP electioneering trick,” Luyt observed. Recipients of the document were given four days to turn it in or face a penalty of five hundred dollars or six months’ imprisonment. An angry Cheddi Jagan denounced the governor for using his emergency power “to cover up the Opposition’s terrorist activities.”12 Attempting to exploit the situation for political advantage, the premier sought the help of a number of international bodies. He telephoned the Universal Postal Union, the secretary general of the United Nations, the chairman of the United Nations’s Committee of Twenty-four and others, charging that Luyt had abused his emergency power to “compel postal officers to seize and open postal packages” and requesting the assistance of these bodies to secure an “immediate withdrawal of this totalitarian measure.” The Council of Ministers also contested the governor’s order by downgrading the report to “unclassified,” implying that it was not illegal to be in possession of the document. This was a ploy that failed. The governor stuck to his guns, noting: “The fact that any particular document was secret or not secret did not affect the particular [emergency] regulation.”13 Meanwhile, Burnham and the PNC stood above the conflict, issuing a statement proclaiming the innocence of members of the party and expressing their disinterest “in the whole affair.”14 The imbroglio over the police report once again demonstrated the volatility of race relations in the colony. British Guiana had become, by 1962 at least, a polity in which its ethnic components shared a crippling mutual distrust. The colony lacked any credible claim to a societal consensus as its centrifugal tendencies overwhelmed any unifying bonds, producing tattered threads in their place. Lacking the desire and the will to subordinate their political ambitions to the larger good, Guiana’s leaders bore much of the responsibility for the divisions that had become suffocatingly normative. The conscience of the colony had been shaken in early summer 1964 by an alleged terrorist attack on the Georgetown home of Arthur A. Abrahams, the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Public Works. The incident occurred on June 11, when Abrahams and seven of his children were consumed by the flames that engulfed the house. Mrs. Abrahams and a daughter escaped by jumping from a second-floor window, receiving serious injuries in the process. Two days later, a shocked Governor Luyt announced emergency regulations giving him the power to restrict the movement of people suspected of (  )

Fairbain Redux

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subversive activity and to detain them. Because the Council of Ministers had previously declined to recommend such measures, the colonial secretary had to issue an Order in Council authorizing them. Armed with this authority, the governor ordered the arrest of a number of prominent politicians, including Brindley Benn, deputy premier; Moses Bhagwan, chairman of the youth organization of the PPP; Henry Lall, president of the Guiana Agricultural Workers Union; R. J. Jordan, a member of the PNC; and Victor Downer, a member of the PPP. The arrests continued in subsequent weeks, and by August 14 seven members of the PNC security unit had been nabbed for bombings going back to 1963. The commissioner of police told the American consul general, confidentially, that Burnham might be implicated in the bombing of Freedom House for which Emanuel Fairbain had been arrested. A “tense and unhappy” Burnham visited Consul General Carlson to deny that he knew Fairbain, although an incredulous Carlson noted that he had been a watchman at Burnham’s office. Burnham complained that his supporters were being tortured in jail and that “he did not know what these men would do under torture but some of them might name him.” Burnham predicted that if he were “picked up or mistreated . . . his people would be in the streets.” Carlson believed, however, that Burnham was “too clever to have directed specifically any violence but he has been under provocation and pressure for months and possibly he may have done so.” But, he continued, a “considerable number [of ] British officials here, including some expatriate police officers dislike Burnham and would love to nail him.” Even the governor had “no particular liking for Burnham.”15 Burnham was picked up on August 17 after the police conducted a search of PNC headquarters, his home, and the residences of other senior PNC officials. The PNC leader was arrested for having shotgun ammunition in his home, in contravention of an Emergency Order. Several hundred persons gathered to observe the search of PNC headquarters but dispersed peacefully. Burnham was released on his personal bond soon after his arrest “and shortly thereafter was seen going horseback riding.” He obviously wanted to demonstrate his unflappability on what must have been a very stressful day. Carlson speculated that Burnham could receive a light punishment, but “there is always the outside possibility of having [the] book thrown at him which could mean two years.” He thought “Burnham’s lack of care and discretion in this whole affair is amazing especially for [a] man supposed to be clever.”16 The arrest of Forbes Burnham, the American–designated premier-inwaiting, for violating the Emergency Order was serious enough. But that of Fairbain Redux

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Emanuel Fairbain and subsequent events provided a more telling diagnosis of British Guiana’s systemic cancer. A semiliterate carpenter and ne’er-dowell, Fairbain would come to command the interest of the secretary of state for the colonies, the governor of British Guiana, the premier, the Council of Ministers, the leader of the opposition, and the populace in general. Occurring near the end of the Jagan administration, Fairbain’s case revealed the role that violence had come to play in the political culture; the corruption of the institutions of government; the interplay of politics, class, and race; and the unholy machinations of the country’s political leaders. When the news of Fairbain’s arrest and alleged mistreatment by the police became public knowledge, Burnham confessed that he was “boiling mad” over such conduct.17 The New Nation, the official organ of the PNC, reported that Fairbain’s condition was “so grave that doctors have instructed that he be given [a] liquid diet only.” Based on the official medical report, the governor described Fairbain’s injuries in a dispatch to the Colonial Office: “Fairbain sustained second degree burns to his face, chest, abdomen, shoulders, and upper back. In addition, he had second degree burns to the scrotum, inner aspect of both thighs and the under surface of the penis. There were also some ‘streaking’ burns down the front of the chest and middle of the back.”18 The commissioner of police said the sensational stories appearing in the press about the nature and extent of Fairbain’s injuries were exaggerated. The considerable public interest in the case led the governor to surmise that it “may develop into a major public scandal.” Luyt reported to the Colonial Office that Fairbain “is being built into a public hero by PNC propaganda and there is no doubt that the allegations of brutality will be put to maximum use by Burnham who is widely believed to be afraid of [the] consequences of being linked to [the] recent bombing campaign.”19 Sydney King, the former PPP minister, was one of the individuals who took a strong interest in the case. On August 17, he telegraphed British Labour MP Fenner Bruckway that Fairbain was being detained without charges, was “gravely ill,” and was being tortured “by native officers under [a] white superintendent.” King, a black nationalist, was adding a racial dimension to an already explosive issue.20 Confronted by the intense public interest, the commissioner of police appointed a two-person Court of Inquiry on August 17 to examine “the circumstances surrounding the injury or injuries sustained by Fairbain allegedly while in police custody between 9th and 13th August, 1964.” The chairman of the inquiry was A. Jenkins, the deputy commissioner of police, and the (  )

Fairbain Redux

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second member was S. Facey, a senior police officer. Jenkins and Facey, who began their work on August 18, heard from a total of sixty-four witnesses— both civilians and police officers—and submitted a detailed report on September 4.21 The Court of Inquiry’s first task was to determine whether Fairbain had suffered the injuries before or after he was taken into police custody. Fairbain maintained that he had been beaten “all over the body with their fists” by eight policemen at the Elizabeth guesthouse. The officers who testified at the inquiry all denied the charge, seeking to demonstrate that Fairbain had been hurt when he scuffled with the woman in his room before his arrest. Constable Gulbatoor Singh said that he observed Fairbain limping at the time he was apprehended and that he had complained, “Man, me seed hurting me.” Detective Assistant Superintendent Hintzen stated that Fairbain appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and that his face was swollen. Assistant Superintendent Barker saw “superficial injuries” on Fairbain’s cheeks. On the other hand, Fairbain’s landlady, Mrs. Sampson, as well as another resident at the guesthouse, denied that any assault on Fairbain had occurred. This was contradicted by another witness who said he heard Fairbain shout “Oh God, oh God . . . murder.” Vernie Cox, the prostitute with whom Fairbain had spent a part of that fateful night, testified that “it was not true that she had held on to Fairbain’s private parts or that she had told any policeman that she had done so.” The evidence of the policemen notwithstanding, it is clear that mistreatment of the detainee began with his arrest at the guesthouse and became worse at the Brickdam police station to which he had been taken.22 Police officers alleged that when Fairbain arrived at the station, he violently resisted their attempts to search him. They admitted that on three occasions during the course of the day, they discharged tear smoke to control him. In his review of the testimony, Mr. M. Shuhabuddeen, the colony’s solicitor general, concluded that “even if it be true that the prisoner, partially incapacitated as alleged in his recent struggle with [Vernie] Cox, nevertheless dared to offer violence to a number of policemen, the use of tear gas could never have been justified.” The solicitor general ridiculed the conduct of the policemen, observing: “If the police knew anything about their business there must surely have been a lot of less drastic ways of dealing with so comical a situation as a half-disabled [man] terrorizing a whole section of the Crime Prevention Squad in their own sanctum armed with nothing mightier than a steel chair.”23 The claim that Fairbain was an obstreperous detainee was, of course, not credible. The truth was that the police officers had tortured him to obtain his Fairbain Redux

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confession for complicity in the bombings. The torture began shortly after Fairbain arrived at the police station. Several officers observed his condition throughout the day, and their testimony gave credence to the charge that he had been severely abused. Fairbain was described by one officer as appearing “normal” at 8:15 A.M. Three hours later, another officer testified that Fairbain’s scrotum “was swollen but not very big, and I assumed by his position, as he had one leg held far apart from the other, that it was paining him.” Others observed that his left eye was swollen and that there were blisters filled with fluid on several parts of his body. Two officers testified that a cord was tied around Fairbain’s testicles, and they lifted him off the ground with it. Several witnesses admitted to hearing anguished screams emanating from the room where Fairbain had been confined. “Murder,” “Help,” “Ow, Ow,” or “choking screams” were heard with distressing frequency during the course of the day. The systematic abuse took its toll on the detainee, and on August 13 he was rushed to the hospital for treatment.24 The torture of a poor working-class suspect by the police would not have become the object of official and popular attention if it were not for its political implications. The bombings for which Fairbain was suspected were serious enough, but the fact that he was an employee of Forbes Burnham and a member of the PNC security detail enhanced the public’s interest in him, as did the crime for which he was a suspect and his treatment in jail. There was much speculation that Fairbain might implicate Burnham in the atrocities that he was alleged to have committed, though no one could predict the consequences for the PNC and its leadership. The PNC had cause for concern. When he testified before the Court of Inquiry, Constable Singh said he had found papers on Fairbain that linked him to the PNC. “I saw a quantity of correspondences addressed from the People’s National Congress . . . the majority were addressed to Batson [Fairbain]. . . . Among the documents were some membership cards . . . and a letter congratulating Dear Comrade from the People’s National Congress.” These papers, the police contended, mysteriously disappeared after Fairbain’s detention.25 The implication was that the papers were destroyed or removed to protect the PNC and its leaders. The disappearance of these potentially incriminating documents fueled the charge that the Police Department was essentially an arm of the PNC. It was yet another indication of the way in which party politics had begun to corrode the country’s criminal justice system. The racial virus was not absent from this sordid affair. The two men who allegedly tied a cord around Fairbain’s testicles were Africans. Fairbain had (  )

Fairbain Redux

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identified Constable Robertson and Superintendent Lambert as the villains. But as the incident was reconstructed, the villain became Constable Kandasammy, an Indian. Constable Griffith testified that he had heard someone exclaim on the day of the torture, “Man you see how the Coolie bitch cruel— he tie the string round the man seed and jerk it.” As the solicitor general observed, “It is astonishing that the tendency to reconstruct events after individual, political, or other persuasions should have manifested itself at so early a stage.”26 In its report, the Court of Inquiry found that Fairbain had received his injuries while in police custody. It concluded that many police officers “willfully” tried to mislead the Court of Inquiry, and it condemned the authorities for denying medical care to Fairbain on August 9 despite his “dreadful physical condition.” The report was silent on the political implications of the case but recommended that all the papers associated with the inquiry be forwarded to the director of public prosecutions to determine whether the police officers involved should be subject to criminal or administrative sanctions.27 Recognizing the political significance of Fairbain’s arrest and treatment, Governor Luyt kept the Colonial Office informed of developments. Consul General Carlson also maintained an active interest in the case. Burnham seems to have held his tongue, but Dr. Jagan seized the opportunity to condemn the Police Department for its mistreatment of Fairbain and its alleged political partisanship. After the Council of Ministers reviewed the court’s report, the premier told his colleagues that the evidence “had revealed that the police force was lacking in honesty and integrity, and abounded in lying, favouritism, spite, venom, and racial and political partisanship.” Jagan faulted the police for not keeping Fairbain under surveillance since the infamous police report of 1963 had declared him to be a terrorist. To support his argument that the police force “was partial, corrupt, and rotten to the core,” he referred to testimony received by the Court of Inquiry involving the behavior of Constable Clarke when Fairbain was arrested: It would appear that when Constable Clarke thought that Fairbain was a member of the Progressive Youth Organization (Fairbain had said that he had been given the explosives by Mrs. Jagan to blow up Mr. Burnham) he had said he would not mind taking him to the station: “He would let him run and then shoot him dead because these were the bitches who had been doing all the bombing up.” When it was clear, however, that Fairbain was a member of the People’s National Congress, Clarke’s attitude Fairbain Redux

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changed: he would have nothing to do with the interrogation: “Not me, boy, not me. I out of this.”28 Cheddi Jagan was trying to get as much political mileage out of the Fairbain tragedy as he could. Although his empathy concerning Fairbain’s plight was probably genuine, it invites suspicion of political expediency. Fairbain had, after all, been accused of bombing the PPP’s headquarters, and the premier had used the case to link the Police Department to the PNC. The minister of finance, Dr. C. R. Jacob Jr., had a very perverse theory of the Fairbain case and the conduct of the police. According to the minutes of the Council of Ministers, Jacob “wondered whether Fairbain might not have been beaten so that his statements associating him with the People’s National Congress would be inadmissible in the law-court.” The minister asserted that “the policemen who were responsible for removing the incriminating documents linking Fairbain with the People’s National Congress would as readily ill-treat him to render worthless any statement he might have given which would link the People’s National Congress with his criminal and terrorist activities.”29 This ingenious, albeit frightening, speculation spoke volumes about the state of Guianese politics, its paranoid style, and a developing lack of trust in the colony’s institutions.

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MR. JUSTICE P. A. CUMMINGS was in a somber mood. He had, in previous days, admonished the spectators in the New Amsterdam Court to refrain from verbally abusing the officers of the court or the witnesses. It was clearly a partisan crowd, and Emanuel Fairbain had his noisy supporters among them. The trial had been moved from Georgetown because of the fear that the accused policemen were not likely to receive justice in a city where emotions ran high against them. During the trial of the ten officers, which had begun on March 18, 1965, Justice Cummings had conducted himself professionally, balancing well the objections of the prosecution and defense teams. But his dramatic halt to the proceedings on April 9 caught everyone by surprise. The preliminary inquiry into the charges leveled against eleven policemen had opened on November 20, 1964, in a Georgetown magistrate court. The men were accused of assaulting Fairbain while he was in their custody with the intent to maim, disable, or disfigure him. The defendants denied the charges, and their counsel characterized Fairbain’s evidence as “a concoction.” Nevertheless, the judge found that there was sufficient credible evidence against ten of the accused to warrant a formal trial.30 When the trial (  )

Fairbain Redux

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began on March 18, Mr. J. Gonsalves-Sabola, the Crown prosecutor, declared that “the Crown’s only interest is that Fairbain is a citizen. He is not any particular person, or of any particular importance, nor is this a case of Fairbain against the officers. It is a case of the Queen against them.”31 Cognizant of the political implications of the trial since Fairbain was an acknowledged member of the PNC, the prosecutor told the jurors that the victim’s political allegiances were irrelevant to the case. The matter to be resolved was whether the accused officers had used appropriate techniques in their interrogation. He said that Fairbain had not been tortured because of his race or his membership in the PNC. The prosecutor’s assertions were undoubtedly accurate, but the case had been identified as much with police abuse as it was with the persecution of an African member of the PNC.32 As the trial progressed, several witnesses for the prosecution corroborated Fairbain’s charges of brutality, although none of them took responsibility for the abuses. Policewoman Winifred Williams, who admitted having worked for the PNC, testified that Fairbain had asked her after being tortured, “Man, Winnie, you think this is right? Deh tek a man by his scrotum and string him up. You think this is right?” Inspector St. Clair Fraser said he did not witness the torture, but he had heard the victim scream “oh God, why all you don’t kill me and done?”33 Fairbain’s four-day-long testimony was dramatic and riveting. He recalled that when the cord was tied around his scrotum, he “saw stars and felt giddy. . . . I felt the noose tighten around my scrotum and I felt as if my life was leaving my body. I gave as much ease as I could. I went as far as possible on the tip of my toes, then fell backwards and fainted.”34 Realizing that he was in extreme discomfort and that the torture had gone too far, Fairbain remembered, Superintendent Lambert gave the order to “Loose he quick, loose he quick.”35 The case took a suspicious turn on April 2, when the prosecutor announced to the court that statements taken by the police from Fairbain while he was in custody had mysteriously disappeared. The prosecutor did not reveal the nature of these statements, merely saying they were “in connection with certain matters.” It may be recalled that items seized in the raid on Fairbain’s room at the Elizabeth guesthouse had also disappeared; these allegedly had included documents linking him to PNC officials. This latest revelation added to the suspicion that the Police Department was engaging in a coverup of the alleged mistreatment of the accused and perhaps the protection of the PNC.36 Fairbain was still in the witness box when Justice Cummings made an unFairbain Redux

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expected announcement. He had received statements from various individuals and from a policeman that the jurors and the accused were seen drinking and consorting with one another after the previous day’s proceedings had been adjourned. “There are other allegations in those statements of a disturbing nature,” the judge said, “but I do not think it would be proper for me to refer to them in any detail.” These were tantalizing comments indeed, and the judge had no choice but to declare a mistrial.37 Cummings’s decision effectively brought an end to the charges against the policemen. There is no evidence that the director of public prosecutions scheduled a new trial. Fairbain, too, did not have to face trial for the death of Michael Forde when Freedom House was bombed. The director of public prosecutions had signed a writ of nolle prosequi on February 9, 1965, indicating his decision not to pursue the case.38 It remains a matter of conjecture whether he acted because he had insufficient or questionable evidence against the accused policemen, or whether the new Burnham government had pressured him to drop the case because of Fairbain’s associations with the PNC. Fairbain himself may have been of “no particular importance,” as the Crown prosecutor said of him, but the proceedings in which he was involved were clearly significant. Their raison d’être depended on police abuse of a suspected thug in the service of the PNC, an attempted police coverup, and the intersection of race, politics, and institutional corruption. Seeking to derive political gain from the case, Premier Jagan linked Fairbain’s mistreatment to his broader allegations of partisan misconduct by a PNC-dominated police force that declined to prosecute those who perpetrated attacks on members of the PPP and their property. A bleeding “citizen” Fairbain epitomized the wounds that had been inflicted on the polity by its leaders, the British, and the Americans. Fairbain could be seen as either the victim or the beneficiary of political and judicial systems that had come to rest not on the principles of justice and fair play but on political expediency. In this regard, these systems had absorbed well the lessons the political leaders had taught. Fairbain was, on the one hand, a victim because he had been maimed by the agents of a corrupt institution, and, on the other, a beneficiary of that corruption because he was not brought before the bar of justice for the crimes for which he was accused. The corruption of those systems did not augur well for Guiana’s future, but this was hardly understood at the time. Emanuel Fairbain had obtained notoriety for his alleged misdeeds and abusive treatment in jail. But ultimately the case was as much about the pulse of a colony on the verge of political independence as it was about him. Fair(  )

Fairbain Redux

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bain had become the poster boy for the political violence that was corroding the colony’s soul as a result of the machinations of leaders who employed violence and race as substitutes for principled and enlightened direction. Guiana’s unhappy state in 1964 was also the product of Britain’s collaboration with the United States to defeat a government it had demonized, grievously scarring the body politic in the process. As the leader of an impoverished colony with a population of 575,270 in 1961, Cheddi Jagan was powerless to withstand the interference of the colossus to the north, despite the negative consequences for the local populace, as Governor Luyt had charged in 1964. Having given its reluctant blessing to such dangerous meddling, Britain was by no means an innocent partner. The core of Guiana’s tragedy, however, was the colonial experience. Britain had presided over a society created to serve its interests, one legitimized by its coercive power and lubricated by the ideology of its superiority of white over black and brown. The grammar of a racially sanctioned colonialism had become sanitized by the mid-twentieth century, but the unholy edifice that it had built in British Guiana was still standing. Although the emerging nationalist leaders voiced their commitment to the construction of a new Guiana, an ubiquitous racial virus and the violence of the colonial experience found a receptive host in the body politic, with devastating consequences. Emanuel Fairbain came of age in a society that was crassly inegalitarian, one that diminished him as a working-class person of African descent. But these were politically exciting times, as leaders of the PPP and later the PNC imagined a different social and political order for people like him. The birth pangs of the new Guiana would test the capacity of its leaders, but no one foresaw the degree of societal tension and disruption Guiana would experience. Political rivalries found expression in racial terms, and violence became an instrument of politics. Fairbain and others like him were the violent foot soldiers of modern leaders who sought to call a new Guiana into being, but who themselves manifested serious disabilities in character and national vision. The Fairbain case, involving as it did violence, police abuse and corruption, allegations of political interference, racial politics, and mediocre leadership, was a microcosm of the country’s travail. And it had become, unwittingly, a signifier of its immediate future.

Fairbain Redux

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( Conclusion )

Guiana, whose rich feete are mines of golde, Whose forehead knockes against the roofe of starres, Stands on her tip toes at faire England looking, Kissing her hand, bowing her mightie breast, And every signe of all submission making, To be her sister and the daughter both Of our most sacred maide. Writing in 1596, George Chapman, the English playwright and poet, celebrated Sir Walter Raleigh’s encounter with Guiana in his quest for the fabled El Dorado. This ode to the new promised land reflected the optic of the colonizer and his bizarre fantasies about the colonized peoples’ submission and acquiescence to the domination of outsiders. There is no record that the indigenous peoples sanctioned their colonization. Nor had the African peoples agreed to cross the Atlantic in order to join the colony as enslaved persons. The Indians had come voluntarily as indentured workers, but their treatment was hardly better than what slaves received. The peoples of Guiana’s raison d’être was to serve the colonial masters and to do so with pride and gratitude. But much would change over time as new leaders emerged and demanded

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control of their destinies. Even as Britain showed some disposition to end Guiana’s colonial bondage, it would do so only on its own terms or on those dictated by the United States. Chapman’s celebration of the colonial enterprise had a hollow ring in December 1964, as Cheddi Jagan met his political denouement and Forbes Burnham was poised to become the prime minister of an independent Guyana. The Guianese maiden had lost her innocence, showing the scars of years of exploitation, abuse, and denigration. But she was never reduced entirely to a state of passivity. There had been violent struggles against slavery, strikes by workers for social justice, and the noisy, fighting rhetoric of the colony’s intellectuals. By the mid-twentieth century, Guiana had become the most politically volatile British colony in the Caribbean. The People’s Progressive Party had emerged as an insistent voice for political independence, frequently using a Marxist rhetoric to articulate its claims. But the party’s domestic plans were essentially reformist and politically pragmatic. The young leaders of the PPP—Cheddi and Janet Jagan, Forbes Burnham, Ashton Chase, and others—were impatient for change and used a language that unsettled the powerful enablers of the status quo. The legislation they pursued in the aftermath of the PPP’s spectacular victory in April 1953, such as rescinding the Subversive Literature Act, were seen as incendiary by some. But to these young leaders, who were the products of a British educational system that promoted unfettered intellectual inquiry, those restrictions were galling and unacceptable. The act was a graphic reminder of their inferior colonial status and of the perceived need to protect them from the wider world of ideas. The fact that the author of the offending legislation was Lionel Luckhoo, a fellow Guianese, confirmed in them the view that colonialism had warped the minds of some of its victims. Jagan and his ministers had no experience in running a government and introduced no major legislative initiatives in the immediate aftermath of their elevation to office. Theirs was the urgent message of change, but the bills that would give expression to that imperative languished. The stridency of their rhetoric, embroidered with the language of Marxism, unnerved the privileged elites and the Colonial Office alike. Their friendship with individuals and organizations in the Eastern Bloc countries, in particular, sounded an alarm in Georgetown and London. The press, long the voice of business and corporate interests—with its incessant song of impending doom—gave the new government no latitude, no breathing space. A communist-inspired Armageddon was at hand. Undeterred by the drumbeat of criticism, the young government precipi(  )

Conclusion

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tated a crisis by aiding and abetting a strike in the sugar industry. By alienating such a powerfully entrenched group and their allies, it provided London with the opportunity to effect a coup d’êtat against it, only 133 days after it assumed office. This was a traumatic experience for the colony, and the ghost of the coup would haunt it and its leaders for the next decade. When he returned to office in 1957, Dr. Jagan tailored his rhetoric and his policies to avoid another coup, but the threat of one remained a British trump card as much as it became the wistful hope of Jagan’s opponents. The British coup of 1953 had been a colossal misjudgment, one that reflected the excesses of an overweening imperial power. The justification for the military intervention lacked credibility since Jagan and his party could not have called a communist society into being by the power of their rhetoric, even if that had been their intention. The newly appointed governor, Alfred Savage, had not yet come to understand the Guianese political culture, and he was influenced by an alarmist press and an elite suspicious of any change, particularly if it were to have a Marxist rhetorical imprimatur. The colonial officials, far removed from Guiana, confused their imaginary fears with reality and rushed to assert their power. The precipitous action by the Colonial Office in 1953 laid the foundation for the colony’s subsequent unhappy history. It became the cause of much discord as the Guianese tried to make sense of what had occurred by ascribing blame to an assortment of villains, including the PPP, Governor Savage, the Colonial Office, and the Americans. The Robertson Commission, which investigated the events leading up to the coup, openly invited members of the PPP to remove their alleged communist leaders. The PPP soon experienced a permanent split as Burnham departed to form a new party. It was a bitter parting of the ways, portending the emergence of the cancerous politics of race. In the aftermath of their takeover, the colonial authorities undertook a campaign to dilute Jagan’s appeal to the Indians and to encourage the formation of competing Indian-based parties. This was to no avail and the polity bled from these activities. The coup had interrupted the constitutional development of the colony and exacerbated its internal divisions. Guiana was destined to “mark time” for the next four years. But perhaps the deeper significance of the coup was that it caused some Guianese to lose confidence in their capacity to govern themselves. To them, the events of October 1953 were the result of incompetent leadership, the triumph of a party that depended on illiterates for its support. Some wished for a return to Crown colony government, expressing the fervent hope that Guiana would never Conclusion

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be free since independence would invite chaos or worse. To others, the coup represented a safety valve, a potential corrective to the misdeeds of the local politicians. If matters went too far, the British would dispatch troops, they reasoned. Under the circumstances, the Guianese leaders would never have to live with the consequences of their decisions. This was a recipe for irresponsibility and for the continuation of a psychological dependence on the mother country for protection and succor. Because it was a colony, the most important decisions about British Guiana were made in London. But this process became more complicated after 1961, as Washington began to take a serious interest in developments in the colony. Fearful that it would succumb to communism and become a second Cuba in the hemisphere, the United States became the de facto imperial master of British Guiana. The British ceded their suzerainty to the Americans, who had developed an irrational opposition to Cheddi Jagan based on their rather flawed understanding of his ideological positions. Paying laserlike attention to the colony, Washington used a variety of methods—covert and otherwise—in its attempt to remove the Guianese nationalist from office. The Americans had many local accomplices, of whom Forbes Burnham was the most prominent. Jagan’s denouement occurred when the people voted in December 1964 and the Burnham-D’Aguiar coalition was born. Cheddi Jagan emerges as the classic tragic hero in these pages. He was never the demon that his detractors loved to excoriate and plotted to defeat. Committed to his country’s welfare to a fault, Jagan never lost that passion. He was, arguably, the most outstanding leader his country produced in the twentieth century, although his enormous limitations interfered with any claims to greatness, particularly during the difficult years covered by this study. All too frequently Jagan appeared as a prisoner of Marxist rhetoric, even if the ideas he embraced so tenaciously had many fathers, ultimately creating the bewildering ideological hybrid of Jaganism. Despite his ideological sloganeering, Jagan never attempted to mortgage his country’s future to any external power. He was an equal opportunity supplicant but looked askance at any quid pro quo, at least any that would seriously undermine the political autonomy he sought for Guiana. Neither the British nor the Americans, with their intelligence-gathering prowess, discovered any convincing evidence that tied Jagan to a conspiracy to make the colony a communist state. Although the Americans feared Cuba’s influence on British Guiana, they were unable to document any nefarious designs by Fidel Castro because none existed. Cuba had, by 1961, become America’s nightmare in the hemisphere; (  )

Conclusion

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an independent Guiana led by Cheddi Jagan was for U.S. leaders too unpleasant to contemplate. That this prospect became an obsession for the Americans was largely a product of their own domestic fears, insecurities, and apprehensions. As the leader of an emerging Guiana, Jagan had the responsibility to create the passageways for its development. Unwilling, for the most part, to make the political compromises necessary to achieve that objective, he created local and foreign foes who conspired to expedite his demise. By 1961, the once mighty British had become almost an American sidekick willing to sacrifice Guiana on the altar of Anglo-American comity. Large in area but small in population and politically powerless, British Guiana—and by extension Cheddi Jagan—were no match for the poisonous arrows emanating from London and Washington. Still, Cheddi Jagan possessed the proverbial nine lives. The general elections of December 1964 had concluded one chapter in his remarkable political career. Twenty-eight years later he returned to office, becoming Guyana’s president in 1992. It was a long wait. Although it was not the eventual triumph of good over evil or of retributive justice, in the context of his country’s history it came very close.

Conclusion

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( Epilogue )

Guyana is a country of enormous economic promise and blessed with enterprising citizens. But it is also a land with a racially divided polity and a history of internecine conflicts largely created and manipulated by some unscrupulous leaders. Forbes Burnham’s assumption of the premiership in December 1964 began his two-decade domination of the political life of the emerging nation, ending only with his death in 1985. His party, the People’s National Congress, managed to remain in office until the People’s Progressive Party won the general election held in 1992. An aging Cheddi Jagan became the new president and held the position until his own death in 1997. Janet Jagan succeeded him, remaining in office until declining health and strong opposition to the leadership of a white foreign-born person forced her to retire in 1999. Mrs. Jagan’s retirement brought an end to the Burnham-Jagan era in Guyana. Their successors represented a new generation of leaders born in the second half of the twentieth century but still imprisoned by the racial disharmony of the past. Forbes Burnham, premier and first prime minister, was diminished from the outset of his tenure because of the questionable circumstances of his election in 1964. His victory represented the triumph of Anglo-American machinations, tarnishing his claim to office and depriv-

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ing him of moral legitimacy. As Jagan and the PPP waited in the wings for a restoration, Burnham consolidated his hold on power, undermining and ultimately destroying the coalition with the United Force, and gaining an outright majority for the PNC by manipulating the elections held in 1968. The PNC emerged from that contest with 30 seats in the 53-member parliament. With Guyana’s destiny now completely his to shape, Burnham pursued the politics of power, seriously maiming the institutions of his infant nation. He declared Guyana a “cooperative republic,” embraced the language of socialism, drew closer to nations that practiced that ideology, and nationalized such pillars of the economy as sugar and bauxite. Burnham became increasingly intolerant of his opponents, persecuting some of them at home and precipitating the flight of others. Cheddi Jagan, on his part, thrashed about for a viable strategy to confront Burnham, supported his nationalization ventures, and proclaimed his fealty to communism. This was hardly a surprise, as it represented yet another of Jagan’s excursions into the politics of rhetoric and the quixotic embrace of the grammar of an ideology but not its substance. By the time he returned to office in 1992, the Soviet Union had collapsed and international communism was in active retreat. Jagan governed as a social democrat, introducing policies more akin to capitalism than communism, much as he had done prior to 1964. Guyana’s descent into economic chaos in the 1970s and the 1980s was a consequence of Burnham’s mismanagement, exacerbated by weaknesses in the global economy. But something else of more enduring significance was occurring. Guyana’s collective psyche was damaged by the assaults on its young institutions, the battering and circumscribing of dissent, the flight of some of the most productive citizens, and a worsening of the cancerous racial tumors. When Dr. Walter Rodney, a talented historian and founder of the multiracial Working People’s Alliance was murdered in 1979 allegedly by Burnham’s henchmen, Guyana’s societal wounds were painfully exposed and its anguish dramatically manifested. Contemporary Guyana shows the political, racial, and emotional scars of its troubled and unhappy past. But its future need not be burdened or circumscribed by them. The accumulated wrongs and missteps described in these pages will not be easily made right, but the tantalizing promise of societal reconciliation, peace and harmony among its people, a common national purpose, and economic development must remain alive with its leaders and citizenry.

(  )

Epilogue

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( Appendix  ) Memorandum Issued by the Advisory Committee Appointed by the Governor under the Emergency Order, 

(10 November 1953) PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR UNDER SECTION 13(2) OF THE EMERGENCY ORDER 1953 In exercise of the power to regulate our own procedure vested in us by Rule 5(2) of the Emergency (Advisory Committee) Rules 1953 we the above-mentioned Advisory Committee intend to adopt the following procedure in considering objections made by persons detained under Section 13 of the Emergency Order 1953. This procedure is based substantially on that followed in the United Kingdom and the Colonies in operating Advisory Committees similar to the British Guiana Advisory Committee.

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1. The Committee which is merely an Advisory Committee and is in no sense a Court of Law, will not be bound by the rules of practice, procedure or evidence which are normally applied in Courts of Law. 2. The proceedings of the Committee will (a) not be open to the Press or the public; (b) be conducted as administrative rather than judicial enquiries; (c) be quite informal in character 3. As the Committee will have perused all relevant documents before the hearing, the case against the detainee is not presented on behalf of the Government. 4. No formal charge will be preferred against the detainees but with due regard to the interests of security, the Committee will give each detainee a document informing the detainee of the grounds on which the order has been made against him and containing such particulars to enable him to present his case, as are, in the Chairman’s opinion sufficient. 5. No witnesses will be called on behalf of the Government though the Committee is free to consult with the Defence Security Officer, who will be in attendance. 6. The names of informants will not be disclosed nor any information by which they might be identified.

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7. Documents furnished for the Committee’s use will not be made available to a detainee or his Counsel or Solicitor or agent, but in the course of the hearing, extracts from documents may be read out by the Committee at its absolute discretion. 8. A detained person may give oral evidence if he so desires and may call witnesses to give oral evidence. No oath or affirmation will be administered to any detainee or witness. 9. A detained person may, instead of giving oral evidence or in addition thereto or in addition to the evidence of any witness he may call, hand to the Committee a written statement of his case or part of his case. 10. The case of each detainee will be heard separately and in the absence of all other detainees. 11. The Committee may question (a) any detainee who gives evidence or in respect of whom a written statement is handed in; (b) any witness called on behalf of a detainee. 12. Points of procedures not covered by this memorandum will be provided for by future Memoranda or decided by the Committee as and when they arise and the Committee is, of course, free at all times to depart from or vary the procedure set out in this Memorandum. 13. From time to time the Chairman will give the Press such information with regard to the work of the Committee as in his opinion can be given without infringing the spirit of the Committee’s procedure and in particular no disclosure will be made of (a) any evidence given; (b) the names of any persons who give evidence; (c) any recommendation made by the Committee to the Governor. 14. The public will not be informed of the Committee’s recommendation to the Governor nor will it be communicated to the detainee. PETER BELL Chairman Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

H. A. BECKLES Member CARLOS GOMES Member 10th November, 1953

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Appendix 1

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( Appendix  ) Allegations against Sydney King and His Response

Detention Order against Sydney King (21 November 1953) THE EMERGENCY ORDER, 1953 GROUNDS OF DETENTION 1. Activities prejudicial to public safety, order or defence committed since the suspension of the Constitution on the 8th October, 1953: (a) On the 17th October, 1953, at Enmore Estate you were present and took part in the holding of an illegal meeting of more than five persons, contrary to the Governor’s Directions of the 9th October, 1953, made under the Emergency Order 1953, prohibiting meetings of more than five persons in a public place.

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(b) On the 24th October, 1953, at Plantation Blairmont, County of Berbice, you were present and took part in the holding of an illegal meeting of more than five persons, contrary to the Governor’s Directions of the 9th October, 1953, made under the Emergency Order 1953, prohibiting meetings of more than five persons in a public place. (c) On Sunday the 11th October, 1953, in Plaisance Village you distributed pamphlets entitled “P.P.P. Call to Action” which, after making the untrue and provocative statement that British Guiana had been “invaded by foreign troops” went on to call for an illegal general strike and other conduct, namely non-cooperation and non-fraternisation and boycotting of all goods and supplies coming from the United Kingdom, of a kind which, in the then existing state of the Colony might have been prejudicial to public safety, order and defence. (d) In October 1953, you assisted Mrs. Janet Jagan (Secretary of the People’s Progressive Party) and Martin Carter and Rory Westmaas (Members of the Party) in the organising of selected members of the Party into a Resistance Movement aimed at (a) inciting dissatisfaction against the lawfully constituted authorities in the Colony; (b) the commission of arson on sugar estates in the Colony. (c) In the month of October 1953, you arranged with members of the People’s Progressive Party to make bombs for use against opponents of that Party. 2. Background and past conduct In addition to the activities set forth under paragraph 1 above, your background and past conduct, as set hereunder, were taken into account in coming to the decision to detain

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

you under the powers conferred on the Governor by Section 13 of the Emergency Order 1953: (a) You have identified yourself with extremist politics in the Colony and have been, since the inception of the People’s Progressive Party in 1949, a close associate of Dr. Cheddie Jagan and Mrs. Jagan, who are leading members of that Party. That Party has been active in the dissemination of orthodox Communist propaganda materials obtained from Eastern European and British Communist Party sources, and, as was said in the statement by Her Majesty’s Government read over Radio Demerara on the 9th October, 1953, by the Honourable John Gutch, Chief Secretary, was a Party “completely under the control of a communist clique.” (b) You have shown yourself to be a strong admirer of the Soviet Union and by your actions and words have raised a strong suspicion that you are a convinced Communist. This view is borne out inter alia by the Manifesto handed in by you to the National Printery, Georgetown, in May, 1953, with a view to its publication, and by the fact that you had in your possession at your home at Buxton, on Tuesday, 13th October, 1953, a quantity of Communist propaganda material. (c) You have maintained contacts with world Communist organisations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. (d) You have, since 1949, distributed Communist propaganda material in the Colony. (e) You have been an active member of the British Guiana Peace Committee from its inception in late 1951. That Peace Committee, which is known to be affiliated to the Communist controlled Peace Movement, was started in British Guiana by Dr. Cheddie Jagan when he returned to the Colony from Eastern Europe in September 1951. (f ) You have been an active member of the Pioneer Youth League and the Demerara Youth Rally, which are youth sections of the People’s Progressive Party and which are affiliated to the World Federation of Democratic Youth which is a Communist controlled body.

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(g) Between December 1952 and March 1953, you visited Communist dominated countries in Eastern Europe and attended the Peace Conference in Vienna representing the British Guiana Peace Committee. (h) In March 1953, on your return from Vienna, there were seized from you a number of photographs of negroes being lynched and maltreated in the United States of America. The fact that these photographs were found parcelled with Communist propaganda documents and that they were brought to the Colony just before the General Elections, raises, in the light of the rest of your past conduct, the presumption that your purpose in bringing the photographs into the Colony was to foster racial hatred in the Colony. (i) On the 7th March, 1953, at Buxton, shortly after your return from Vienna, you made a provocative public speech alleging inter alia that British troops were “murdering the people of Kenya” in order to steal their land and that American troops in Korea were resorting to germ warfare and “fighting the women and children” there. (j) In September 1953, you arranged for a man to commit arson on Skeldon Estate.

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Appendix 2

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

(k) During the recent general strike in September 1953, and at a time when you were a Minister of the Crown, you visited sugar estates and incited labourers to prevent other labourers from working. (l) Early in October 1953, you were party to a plan to commit arson in Georgetown. (m) While the police were attempting to control the crowd outside the House of Assembly on the 24th September, 1953, you exhorted the crowd to rush the building. In the result, the building was soon packed with an unruly crowd. (Sgd.) PETER BELL Chairman of the Advisory Committee Date: 21st November, 1953.

Statement by Sydney King to the Advisory Committee for Detained Persons [No date on document—but believed to be 28 November 1953] OBSERVATIONS ON “GROUNDS OF DETENTION” It appears from a perusal of the document presented to me on Saturday evening 21st November 1953 that there are two main grounds on which I have been apprehended and detained:— (a) A recitation of offences alleged to have been committed by me since October 8th.

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(b) A brief review of my activities previous to the suspension of the constitution and an estimation of my political views. I want to make it quite clear at the outset that I ask no mercy for beliefs which I hold nor for activities actually undertaken by me. At the same time I must express my indignation at the allegations that I am an organiser of arson, thugs, and incendiaries. I should like with your indulgence to deal first with the section headed “Background and past conduct.” This document contains a number of truths, one slander, two lies and a number of halftruths and inaccuracies. The slander lies in paragraph (h), namely, that the photographs of negroes being lynched and maltreated in the United States were to be used to “foster racial hatred in the Colony.” Out of this slander arises a contradiction, which will immediately appear. I am accused of being a “convinced communist” and, together with this, of planning to “foster racial hatred.” But all the world knows that the philosophy of Communism is hostile to all forms of racism and race hatred.

Appendix 2

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

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The two lies are contained in paragraphs (j) and (l). I cannot while there is breath in me permit myself to be accused of organising such obviously foolish forms of struggle. These two lies again give rise to a further contradiction. All the world knows that the communist views of proletarian revolution reject out of hand such forms of “struggle” as arson, incendiarism and the killing of individual leaders. Now for the half-truths and inaccuracies:— (d) I have been distributing communist propaganda material since 1948 and not since 1949. (e) The Guiana Peace Committee is not affiliated to the World Peace Council—to which I believe the (illegible word ) to refer—for the reason that the World Peace Council does not accept affiliates. (f ) I am not a member of the Pioneer Youth League. The Demerara Youth Rally is not a youth section of the People’s Progressive Party. (m) This is a serious distortion. I walked past a policeman at the main entrance of the Public Buildings with a view to discussing the accommodation situation with the Police and Chamber authorities, since I had received complaints of discrimination. I actually did so. It appears that the crowd, inspired by my success in passing the entry proceeded up the stairs and occupied the balcony of the Public Buildings, the public gallery being already filled. Turning now to the other paragraphs in “Background and past conduct.” I should like to confirm my close association with Dr. and Mrs. Jagan. I am an admirer of the Soviet Union. I am in fact an admirer of all peace-loving peoples and of the finest in the cultures of all peoples. But in the Soviet Union I see the first country to break the imperialist chain, a staunch defender of peace and the liberation of all oppressed humanity.

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It is charged also that I am a convinced communist. Now “conviction” alone is not enough to make one a communist. V. I. Lenin says that a communist must have a fair mastery of all human knowledge, of the sciences, art, philosophy, of history, of economics, anthropology, etc. I cannot pretend to have reached this eminence. However, with this reservation, I am a convinced communist. I am also an ardent partisan of peace, a pursuit in which I will not be daunted by the present inquisition. As for my having visited countries in Eastern Europe (and also Western Europe), this is a historic fact. I do not deny historic facts. My only regret is that those who will read this document may not have enjoyed that privilege. I now turn with your permission to the grounds of Detention—Part the first, which purports to deal with my activities subsequent to October 8, 1953. Permit me to state that paragraphs (a) (b) (d) and (e) are foul (illegible word) lies, pointing to intentions on the part of the ruling classes which have been without equal since the days of John Smith—a shameless frame-up against the defenders of peace and genuine working class militants, supported by witnesses who cannot be presented, by police agents whose consciences, by their very nature, can be purchased for dollars. I have refrained from attending a sitting of the committee and from calling witnesses. How can a person call witnesses to prove that he did not, on dates unstated and at places unmentioned, conspire to commit given offences?

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Appendix 2

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

So far as the committee itself is concerned it is more in the nature of a Star Chamber. It has been set up, moreover, with the aim of deceiving the people, leaving them to suppose that some sort of justice is being done. The rules and terms of reference of the committee are scandalous and indicate a hidden dictatorship lurking somewhere in the background. I challenge the authorities concerned to bring these hearings into the open. I declare that the task of proving criminal charges against me rests upon the accusers and not myself. I reaffirm my undying loyalty and patriotism to my country, to the cause of peace, proletarian internationalism, equality for all nations great and small, the right of these nations to self-determination, and to the cause of friendship among all peoples of the world.

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(Sgd.) Sydney King

Appendix 2

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( Notes )

Abbreviations CDF CFPF CO DO FO NA-DS PREM

Central Decimal File Central Foreign Policy File Records of the Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London Records of the Dominions Office, Public Record Office, London General Political Correspondence of the Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London National Archives, U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, College Park, Maryland Records of the Prime Minister’s Office, Public Record Office, London

Introduction

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1. For Fairbain’s quotations and additional details on his case, see “Report of the Court of Inquiry, 1964,” CO 1031/4591. 2. For the commission’s charge, its modus operandi, and its report, see Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1951. 3. For aspects of the history of British Guiana, see “Report of the Court of Inquiry, 1964,” CO 1031/4591; Smith, British Guiana; Adamson, Sugar without Slaves; and McGowan, Themes in African Guyanese History.

Chapter 1 1. William P. Maddox to U.S. Department of State, October 20, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 2. Narine Singh, Guyana, 62. For a scholarly discussion of the Jagan administration and its removal from office, see Fraser, “The PPP on Trial.” 3. Narine Singh, Guyana, 63. 4. William P. Maddox to U.S. Department of State, May 4, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 5. PPP manifesto, copies of which were forwarded to the U.S. Department of State by Maddox. 6. Ibid. 7. Daily Argosy, editorial, May 3, 1953. 8. Testimony of C. Cambridge, C. Beresford, and John T. Clarke, CO 891/7. 9. D. P. Debidin, memorandum, March 4, 1954, CO 891/19. 10. J. Fox, memorandum, January 25, 1954, CO 891/9.

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11. Oliver Lyttleton to Prime Minister, May 5, 1953, CO 1031/946. 12. The correspondence on security issues is reproduced in “The Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution—1953,” declassified British documents edited by Odeen Ishmael, 〈http://www.guyana.org/govt/declassified_British_documents_1953.html〉 (hereafter referred to as Ishmael, “Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution”). See esp. “Internal Colonial Office Memorandum on the Availability of Forces to Prevent Disturbances in British Guiana, May 13, 1953,” and N. L. Mayle to Governor Savage, June 3, 1953. 13. Note of a meeting between Savage and Jagan/Burnham on May 30 at 10:30 A.M., CO 1031/946. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. William Maddox to U.S. Department of State, May 14, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 17. Ibid. 18. William Maddox to U.S. Department of State, May 29, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 19. Note of a meeting with the governor, May 5, 1953, CO 1031/946. 20. Ibid. 21. Chase, 133 Days towards Freedom in Guiana, 53–54. 22. Excerpts from Legislative Council Debates, January 18, 1952, CO 1031/317. 23. William Maddox to U.S. Department of State, July 16, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 24. William Maddox to U.S. Department of State, May 29, 1953, ibid. 25. The surveillance of PPP activities described in the last three paragraphs is from the white paper, “British Guiana: Suspension of the Constitution,” FO 371/103121. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Quotations are from William Maddox to U.S. Department of State, August 20, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 30. For the text of Jagan’s speech, see F0 371/103124. 31. Jagan, The West on Trial, 122. 32. For a copy of the statement, see F0 371/103124. 33. For Jagan’s quotations, see ibid. 34. For the British authorities’ quotation, see ibid. 35. H. G. Seaford to J. M. Campbell, September 19, 1953, CO 1031/60. 36. “Meeting of P.P.P. at La Penitence,” CO 1031/60. 37. “Current Political Notes on British Guiana,” CDF, 1950–54, NA-DS, box 3542. 38. For this excerpt from Burnham’s speech, see FO 371/103121. 39. Cabinet minute, October 2, 1953, PREM 11/287. 40. See FO 371/103121. 41. “Extracts from British Guiana Political Reports, January to July, 1953,” CO 1031/60. 42. Case no. 57: “Complaint Presented by the GIWU against the UK Government,” CO 1031/60. 43. The preceding account of developments in the sugar industry is based, in part, on a detailed report by W. A. Macnie, entitled “The Reasons for the Strike,” September 15, 1953, in CO 1031/62. The appendix to the report contains copies of the communications with (  )

Notes to Pages 19–38

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Chase. I have used these critically to arrive at my own conclusions. For Chase’s account, entitled “General Strike”: Labour Unrest Commencing 31st August, 1953,” see CO 1031/60. 44. Ishmael, “Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution,” 17–27. 45. Timmy Luke to Philip Rogers, September 12, 1953, in ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Governor Savage to Sir Thomas Lloyd, Colonial Office, September 13, 1953, in ibid. 49. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Savage, September 19, 1953, and Minutes, meeting of representatives of Colonial Office and Committee on Security, September 25, 1953, in ibid. 50. For excerpts from the speeches by King and Lachmansingh, see ibid. 51. See W. A. Macnie, “The General Strike, Part 2,” CO 1031/62. 52. Memorandum to Prime Minister from Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 2, 1953, PREM 11/827. 53. For excerpts from Chase’s speech, see CO 1031/60. 54. Ibid. 55. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Savage, September 4, 1953, CO 1031/60. 56. Ibid. 57. W. A. Macnie, “The Reasons for the Strike,” September 15, 1953, CO 1031/62. 58. Governor Savage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 9, 1953, CO 1030/60. 59. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Savage, September 15, 1952, CO 1031/60. 60. Ibid. 61. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954, 65. 62. Minister of State for Colonial Affairs to Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 30, 1953, FO 371/103119. 63. Secretary of State for the Colonies, memorandum, September 27, 1953, PREM 11/287. 64. “Evidence of a Communist Conspiracy in British Guiana,” October 2, 1953, PREM 11/827. 65. Cabinet minutes, October 2, 1953, PREM 11/827. 66. Prime Minister minute to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 2, 1953, PREM 11/827. 67. Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 27, 1953, PREM 11/827; Cabinet minutes, October 3, 1953, ibid. 68. Cabinet minutes, October 3, 1953, PREM 11/827. See also Cabinet minutes, September 3, 1953, ibid., and T. W. Garrity to Foreign Office, September 30, 1953, F0 371/10319. 69. Governor Savage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 7, 1953, PREM 11/827. 70. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Savage, October 7, 1953, PREM 11/827. 71. Daily Gleaner, October 6, 1953. 72. Manchester Guardian, October 6, 1953, clipping in FO 371/103119. 73. Daily Gleaner, October 7, 1953. 74. Daily Gleaner, October 9, 1953. 75. Ibid. Notes to Pages 39–51

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76. Daily Gleaner, October 8, 1953. 77. Governor Savage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 7, 1953, PREM 11/827. 78. Daily Gleaner, October 9, 1953. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. “British Guiana: Statement by Her Majesty’s Government,” October 10, 1953, FO 371/103119. 82. Governor Savage, radio address, October 10, 1953, FO 371/103119. 83. Statement by the PPP, October 10, 1953, PREM 11/827. 84. Daily Argosy, editorial, October 9, 1953. 85. Daily Argosy, editorial, October 11, 1953. 86. “Draft White Paper: British Guiana Suspension of the Constitution,” FO 371/103121. 87. Ibid. 88. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, November 19, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid.; American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, January 12, 1954, ibid. 91. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, November 19, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543; American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, January 12, 1954, ibid. 92. This brief summary of the Burnham coup is taken from editorials and news reports in the Daily Argosy. See “The Next Move,” editorial, January 18, 1955; “Disagreement Apparent within the People’s Progressive Party,” February 6, 1955; “Congress Off: Special Members Conference Today,” February 12, 1955; “Known ‘Reds’ Ostracised from PPP Executive,” February 14, 1955; “Wrangling in PPP Ranks over Elections,” February 15, 1955; “PPP ‘Reds’ Expel Burnham, Lachmansingh, and J. N. Singh,” February 16, 1955; “PPP Expulsion Decision Made by Non-existent Body, Says Burnham,” February 17, 1955; “War Drums Throb More Loudly in PPP Camp,” February 18, 1955; and “Where Are the ‘Honest Men’?,” editorial, February 20, 1955. 93. Foreign Office to Washington, n.d., FO 371/126078. 94. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 20, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 95. Ibid. 96. Excerpt from speech by Forbes Burnham, FO 371/103121.

Chapter 2 1. Prime Minister, minute, August 11, 1954, PREM 11/684. 2. Prime Minister, minute, August 12, 1954, ibid. 3. Prime Minister, minute, n.d., ibid. 4. List of Prohibited Publications, March 29, 1954, Walter Rodney National Archives, 178. 5. See CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 6. Ibid. 7. The Hague to U.S. Department of State, October 23, 1953, ibid.

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Notes to Pages 51–66

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8. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 13, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 9. Ibid. 10. Daily Argosy, editorial, October 12, 1953. 11. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 13, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 12. The details on these raids may be found in the Daily Argosy, October 14 and December 18, 1953. See also Ishmael, “Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution,” 149–50, 167– 69. 13. Political Forecast for British Guiana, January 27, 1954, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 14. British Intelligence Report, WO 321/16251. For Luckhoo’s comment, see Ishmael, “Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution,” 163. 15. British Intelligence Report, WO 321/16251. 16. The proceedings of the trial were reported in the Daily Chronicle, December 29, 1953. 17. Jagan, The West on Trial, 163. 18. This account appears in American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, April 15, 1954, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 19. Jagan, The West on Trial, 160. 20. R. E. Radford, minute, June 26, 1955, CO 1031/1431. 21. Ibid. 22. Daily Argosy, editorial, October 26, 1953. 23. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, July 11, CDF, 1954, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 24. Daily Argosy, editorial, June 4, 1954. 25. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 21, 1954, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 26. Report by Lord Lloyd on visit to British Guiana, February 1955, CO 1031/1425. 27. Ibid. 28. Daily Argosy, May 16, 1956. 29. Daily Argosy, May 26, 1956. See also American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, June 6, 1956, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3205. 30. Internal minute, February 28, 1956, CO 1031/1426. 31. John Profumo, minute, January 31, 1957, CO 1031/1426. 32. Excerpts from these articles may be found in American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, June 11, 1954, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 33. Ibid.; Daily Argosy, editorials, June 5, July 25, 1954. 34. London to U.S. Department of State, July 21, 1955, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 35. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 20, 1955, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS box 3205. 36. “British Guiana in 1961,” Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 13, 1961, DO 161/53. 37. Ibid. 38. Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 95. 39. Indra Ramdeen, memorandum, CO 891/9.

Notes to Pages 66–76

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40. Daily Argosy, editorial, October 14, 1953. 41. Governor Savage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 1, 1955, CO 1031/1431. 42. British Guiana, Official Report (Hansard) of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council, February 8, 1954, 828–88. 43. Note on Policy for British Guiana by P. Rogers, July 7, 1955, CO 1031/1432. 44. Jock Campbell to Philip Rogers, January 10, 1954, CO 967/254. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. Jock Campbell was himself a victim of mental problems from time to time. See Seecharan, Sweetening Bitter Sugar. 47. Jock Campbell to Philip Rogers, January 10, 1954, CO 967/254. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Philip Rogers to Lord Lloyd, n.d., CO 967/284. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Daily Argosy, editorial, July 18, 1954. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. R. R. Follet-Smith to Jock Campbell, July 19, 1954, CO 1031/1439. 59. Lord Lloyd to Governor Savage, July 30, 1954, CO 967/285. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Governor Savage to Lord Lloyd, August 24, 1954, CO 967/285. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Henry Hopkinson to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 18, 1954, PREM 11/827. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Governor Savage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 16, 1955, CO 967/285. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Savage, March 18, 1955, CO 967/285. 77. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Prime Minister, June 22, 1955, PREM 11/827. 78. Ibid. 79. Memorandum of a conversation with U.S. officials in London, May 11, 1954, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 80. N. L. Mayle, minute, July 20, 1954, CO 967/285. 81. Colonial Office minutes, July 10, 1954, CO 967/285. (  )

Notes to Pages 77–92

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82. F. W. Holder, memorandum, CO 891/13. 83. Philip Rogers, minute, July 22, 1954, CO 967/285.

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Chapter 3 1. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954 (hereafter referred to as Robertson Commission Report), Introduction. 2. Daily Argosy, editorial, December 6, 1953. 3. Robertson Commission Report, 5. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Lionel Luckhoo, memorandum, CO 891/5. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Arthur G. King, memorandum, CO 891/7. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. F. D. Widdup, memorandum, CO 891/3. 15. F. Seal Coon, memorandum, CO 891/9. 16. Ibid. 17. For a discussion of these men’s ideas, see Eric Williams, British Historians and the West Indies. 18. F. Seal Coon, memorandum, CO 891/9. 19. Ibid. 20. Harry Nauth, memorandum, CO 891/3. 21. Ibid. 22. Karan Singh, memorandum, CO 891/9. 23. M. S. H. Rahaman, memorandum, CO 891/9. 24. Testimony of Richard Ishmael, CO 891/2. 25. Archbishop Alan Knight, memorandum, CO 891/1. 26. Ibid. 27. Russell Rickford, memorandum, CO 891/9. Rickford was an accountant employed by Messrs. Fitzpatrick, Graham and Co., chartered accountants. 28. “Note of Private Session with the SPA,” CO 891/5. 29. In 1947, 69,281 Guianese lived on the sugar estates; in 1953 the figure had risen to 83,921. Of these people, less than 50 percent were actually employed. See ibid. 30. M. S. H. Rahaman, memorandum, CO 891/9. 31. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1951 (Waddington Commission), 14. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid., 15. 34. Ibid. 35. S. Gangadeen, memorandum, CO 891/14. 36. Ibid. 37. C. O. Patterson, meorandum, CO 891/5. Notes to Pages 92–114

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38. Ibid. 39. J. R. Merkle, memorandum, CO 891/8. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. S. Gangadeen, memorandum, CO 891/14. 47. James Richardson, memorandum, CO 891/4. 48. Ibid. 49. Testimony of Edward Lynch, CO 891/4. 50. Ibid. 51. Testimony of Dr. M. H. Rahat, CO 891/4. 52. Ibid. 53. Testimony of C. B. L. Osborn, CO 891/9. 54. T. Fox, memorandum, CO 891/9. 55. Testimony of [?], CO 891/8. 56. Testimony of S. Gangadeen, CO 891/14. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Excerpt from speech by Mr. Khan before House of Assembly, CO 891/5. 60. Excerpt from speech of Cheddi Jagan, delivered on January 5, 1951, CO 891/5. 61. Jagan quoted in memorandum by Lionel Luckhoo, CO 891/5. 62. Hubert Durant, memorandum, CO 891/9. 63. Rashad Iman, memorandum, CO 891/9. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Manoel Gonsalves, memorandum, CO 891/9. 67. Matilda Glenn, memorandum, CO 891/9. 68. R. St. Clair Pillai, memorandum, CO 891/9. 69. Augustine Fernandes, memorandum, CO 891/3. 70. Testimony of J. Leach, CO 891/8. 71. “Illiteracy and Its Implications in Relation to a Constitution for British Guiana,” CO 891/8. 72. Testimony of Edward Lynch, CO 891/4. 73. Robertson Commission Report, 29. 74. “The Illiterates of Bush Lot Village,” memorandum, CO 951/40. 75. M. S. H. Rahaman, memorandum, CO 891/9. 76. Ibid. 77. Testimony of J. Castello-Edwards, CO 891/7. 78. For an elaboration of this thesis, see Williams, Capitalism and Slavery. 79. Testimony of Mr. Hoosein, CO 891/7. 80. Ibid. 81. Testimony of J. Heywood, CO 891/4. 82. Ibid.

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Notes to Pages 114–30

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

83. Testimony of Edgar Haynes, CO 891/9. 84. Elfreda Clarisse Kailan, memorandum, CO 891/4. 85. Testimony of Samuel Grenada, CO 891/8. 86. Samuel Grenada to His Lordship, the Chief Justice, March 5, 1954, CO 891/8. 87. Testimony of Richard Ishmael, CO 891/2.

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Chapter 4 1. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954 (hereafter referred to as the Robertson Commission Report), 24–25. 2. Ibid., 25. 3. Testimony of Richard Ishmael, CO 891/2. 4. Robertson Commission Report, 70. 5. Ibid. 6. Vincent Roth, memorandum, CO 891/9. 7. Ibid. 8. “Testimony in Private from the Shipping Association of Georgetown,” CO 891/7. 9. A. G. King, memorandum, CO 891/7. 10. Demerara Bauxite Co., Ltd., memorandum, CO 891/7. 11. Joint Trade Union Committee, memorandum, CO 891/9. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid.; SPA, memorandum, CO 891/10. If the Guiana Industrial Workers Union had testified, it almost assuredly would have supported the retention of universal adult suffrage. 14. F. Seal Coon, memorandum, CO 891/9. 15. SPA, memorandum, CO 891/10. 16. Demerara Bauxite Co., Ltd., memorandum, CO 891/8. 17. Ibid. 18. Shipping Association of Georgetown, memorandum, CO 891/7. 19. F. Seal Coon, memorandum, CO 891/9. 20. Shipping Association of Georgetown, memorandum, CO 891/7. 21. M. S. H. Rahman, memorandum, CO 891/9. 22. F. W. Holder, memorandum, CO 891/3. 23. Robertson Commission Report, 66. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., 68. 26. Ibid., 70. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., 73. 29. Ibid. 30. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 21, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Governor Renison to Philip Rogers. January 5, 1956, CO 1031/1355. 35. Colonial Office minutes, n.d., CO 1031/1453.

Notes to Pages 131–48

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36. Ibid. 37. Governor Renison to Philip Rogers, January 5, 1956, CO 1031/1355. 38. Ibid. 39. British Guiana Constitution: Note of discussion with Sir Patrick Renison, March 20, 1956, CO 1031/1355. 40. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 3, 1956, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3205. 41. Ibid. 42. Governor Renison to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 6, 1956, CO 1031/2213. 43. Washington to Foreign Office, August 16, 1957, FO 371/126078. 44. Governor Renison to Secretary of State for the Colonies, August 16, 1957, PREM 11/1727. 45. Memorandum of conversations, American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, March 26, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. 46. “Possible Expansion of British Guiana’s Development Program,” FO 371/155725. 47. Governor Grey to Colonial Office, June 13, 1961, DO 16153/206475. 48. Ibid. 49. “Possible Expansion of British Guiana’s Development Program,” FO 371/155725. 50. Ibid. See also “Memorandum by the Government on the Background to the February 1962 Disturbances,” CO 887/11. 51. Memorandum of conversation, American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, April 17, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. 52. Governor Grey to Colonial Office, June 13, 1961, DO 16153/206475. 53. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 10, 1954, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1947.

Chapter 5

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1. Jack Rose to R. W. Piper, March 6, 1964, CO 1031/4406. 2. Conversation with Eric Huntley, April 19, 2007. 3. Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 111. 4. Ibid., 157. 5. Ibid., 156. 6. Burnham’s speech at Bourda Green, May 5, 1957. It was published in Thunder by the Burnhamite faction, May 18, 1957. For a very brief time the Jaganites also published an organ called Thunder. 7. Cheddi Jagan, “On the Economic Consequences of a Reactionary Constitution,” January 1951, CO 891/10. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Excerpt of Jagan’s speech in the Legislative Council, January 18, 1952, CO 1031/317. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. See Daily Argosy, April 30, 1953.

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Notes to Pages 149–64

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15. Radio address, August 9, 1953, excerpts in Daily Argosy, August 10, 1953. See also American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 20, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 16. Radio address, August 9, 1953, excerpts in Daily Argosy, August 10, 1953; American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 20, 1953. 17. Daily Argosy, editorial, August 12, 1953. 18. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 30, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 19. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 20, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3542. 20. Thunder, February 28, 1959. 21. The Hague to U.S. Department of State, October 23, 1953, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 22. Report by Charles Ponsonby, March 7, 1956, CO 1031/1433. 23. “Dr. Jagan’s Address to the Party Congress, 1956,” FO 371/161951. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Daily Chronicle, December 22, 1956. 28. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 28, 1956, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. 29. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, June 28, 1957, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3205. 30. Ibid. 31. Governor Renison to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 6, 1957, CO 1031/2213. 32. “Political Notes on British Guiana,” July 9, 1958, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3205. 33. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 13, 1961, DO 16153/206475. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. “British Guiana in 1958,” Governor Renison to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 6, 1958, CO 1031/2213. 45. Governor Grey to Colonial Office, June 13, 1961, DO 16153/206475. 46. Ibid. 47. Governor Grey to Sir Hugh Foot, November 14, 1961, FO 371/155725/206475. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid.

Notes to Pages 165–74

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50. Ibid. 51. Memorandum of conversation, R. J. Ballantyne to U.S. Department of State, April 5, 1960, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. 52. “British Guiana in 1958,” Governor Renison to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 6, 1958, CO 1031/4377. 53. Governor Grey to Colonial Affairs Office, February 8, 1962, CO 1031/4377. 54. Ibid. 55. Internal memorandum, November 1961, FO 371/155725. 56. Memorandum of conversation, American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, February 15, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948. 57. “Ramsahoye Attacks Sir Henry,” Guiana Graphic, July 23, 1962; Governor Grey to Colonial Affairs Office, February 8, 1962, CO 1031/4377. 58. Governor Grey to Colonial Office, July 1962, CO 1031/4377, 1031/4042. 59. Ibid. 60. Haijsman, minutes, August 1, 3, 1962, CO 1031/4042. 61. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, February 17, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1949. 62. Daily Argosy, editorial, June 7, 1953. 63. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 13, 1961, DO 16153/206475. 64. Daily Argosy, January 3, 1953. 65. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 29, 1963, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 66. Ibid. 67. This excerpt of Jagan’s speech is from Halperin, “Racism and Communism in British Guiana,” 107–8, and 〈http://www.marx.org/archive/jagan/1961/towards-understanding.html〉. 68. See Thunder, June 30, 1962. 69. Ibid. 70. Report of a Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962, 42, 58–59. See also 〈http://www.guyana.org /govt/wynnparryreport.html〉. 71. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 24, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1947. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Governor Luyt to Colonial Office, September 4, 1964, CO 1031/4406. 75. Ibid. 76. American Consul General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 19, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid.

Chapter 6 1. London to U.S. Department of State, October 23, 1965, CFPF, Guyana, NA-DS, box 1947. 2. Press interview with Jagan, October 21, 1953, and The Hague to U.S. Department of State, October 23, 1953, both in CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3543. (  )

Notes to Pages 175–92

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3. Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 74. 4. Ibid., 77. 5. Ibid., 54. 6. Jagan, The West on Trial, 164–70. See also Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 31. 7. “Dr. Jagan’s Address to the Party Congress, 1956,” FO 371/161951. 8. Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 58. 9. Ibid., 75. 10. Ibid., 60. 11. Ibid., 75. 12. Ibid., 107. 13. Jagan, The West on Trial, 21. 14. Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 75. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., 107. 17. Ibid. 18. Governor Savage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, May 26, 1955, Walter Rodney National Archives, 184. 19. Ibid. 20. Governor Savage to Philip Rogers, February 9, 1955, DO 35/5226. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. “Dr. Jagan’s Address to the Party Congress, 1956,” FO 371/161951. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. James Ramphal, a prominent member of the Guianese elite, was appointed to the Legislative Council by the governor in the aftermath of the 1953 coup. An opponent of Cheddi Jagan and the PPP, John Carter had served in the old Legislative Council and was general secretary of the National Democratic Party. 26. Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 97. 27. Ibid., 115–16. 28. Ibid., 77. 29. Ibid. 30. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, May 1, 1957, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3205. See also Thunder, May 11, 18, 1957. 31. Birbalsingh, People’s Progressive Party, 115–16. 32. Report of a Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962 (hereafter cited as Wynn Parry Commission Report), 28. 33. “Review of the Communist Question in British Guiana,” American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, July 6, 1960, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. 34. “British Guiana: Report by Sir Richard Luyt on the First Weeks of His Governorship,” April 21, 1964, CO 1031/4406. 35. Ibid. 36. “British Guiana in 1961: Report by Governor Renison,” DO 161/53. 37. “British Guiana: Report by Sir Richard Luyt on the First Weeks of His Governorship,” May 27, 1964, CO 1031/4406. 38. Governor Grey to Amber Thomas, August 22, 1961, CO 1031/3766. 39. David Bruce to U. Alexis Johnson, November 13, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. Notes to Pages 192–203

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40. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 18, 1963, ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Jagan to E. K. Melby, February 16, 1963, Walter Rodney National Archives, 220; American Consul General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 18, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 43. Ibid. 44. Jagan to Melby, February 16, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 45. Governor Grey to Amber Thomas, August 22, 1961, CO 1031/3766. 46. Ibid. 47. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, January 8, 1958, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3205. 48. “The Agony of Ann Jardim or Who Is a Guianese?,” American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, February 3, 1963, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3039. 49. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, April 6, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1947. 50. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 3, 1961, Walter Rodney National Archives, 212. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Governor Savage to Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 1, 1955, CO 1031/1431. 56. “British Guiana in 1959,” March 10, 1959, CO 1031/2213. 57. “British Guiana in 1961,” June 13, 1961, DO 161/53. 58. Governor Grey to Sir William Barnes, August 28, 1961, CO 1031/3766. 59. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 5, 1961, CO 936/633. 60. Ibid. 61. Budget speech by Dr. Jacob, January 31, 1962, CO 887/11. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Memorandum by the government on the background to the February 1962 disturbances,” CO 897/11. 67. Ibid. 68. Leaflet issued by UF, February 6, 1962, CO 887/11. 69. Statement by Premier, February 9, 1962, CO 887/11. 70. Officials in Georgetown kept the Colonial Office abreast of developments. They sent newspaper clippings to their superiors as well as their own assessment of the situation. For a collection of their reports, see CO 887/11. The Wynn Parry Commission Report also contains excerpts from speeches by Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar. 71. Cheddi Jagan, radio address, February 12, 1962, CO 887/11. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. “Use of Military and Naval Forces in Support of the Civil Power,” February 1962, CO 887/13. 75. Ibid. (  )

Notes to Pages 203–18

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76. Ibid. 77. Wynn Parry Commission Report, 35. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. “Use of Military and Naval Forces in Support of the Civil Power,” February 1962, CO 887/13. 81. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 16, 1962, FO 371/161948. 82. Wynn Parry Commission Report, 24. 83. Ibid. 84. “Use of Military and Naval Forces.” 85. Ibid. 86. Wynn Parry Commission Report, 30. 87. Ibid., 26. 88. Ibid. 89. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 17, 1962, FO 371/161947. 90. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 19, 1962, ibid. 91. Governor Grey to Cheddi Jagan, February 18, 1962, CO 1031/4028. 92. Ibid. 93. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 19, 1962, FO 391/161947. 94. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 19, 1962, CO 1031/4028. 95. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 21, 1962, FO 391/161947. 96. Ibid. 97. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, June 22, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. 98. Wynn Parry Commission Report, 67. 99. Ibid., 45–46. 100. Ibid., 51. 101. Ibid., 147. 102. Ibid., 120, 46. 103. Ibid., 51. 104. Ibid., 76. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid., 147, 80. 107. Ibid., 116–17. 108. Ibid., 116. 109. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 5, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. 110. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, March 29, 1962, ibid. 111. Statement by Governor of British Guiana, CO 887/13. 112. Statement by Minister of Home Affairs, June 14, 1962, CO 887/15. 113. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 19, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. Notes to Pages 219–30

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114. “Note on Relations of the PPP with Trade Unions in the Sugar Industry,” CO 1031/3421. 115. For an account of the disturbances, see Jagan, The West on Trial, 225–49. 116. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, May 4, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1949. 117. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, May 5, 1964, ibid. 118. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, May 23, 1964, ibid. 119. Statement by Mrs. Janet Jagan, Minister of Home Affairs, June 1, 1964, CO 1031/4362. 120. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, July 7, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1949. See also Palmer, Eric Williams, 225. 121. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, June 19, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1949. 122. Ibid. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid. The commission’s rather superficial report found that the disturbances “were politically and racially inspired. . . . The thorough going destruction of East Indian property, and the fact that the security forces were in no case able to apprehend arsonists, force us to conclude that the destruction was not ‘spontaneous’ but was organized, and well organized.” Report of the Wismar, Christianburg, and Mackenzie Commission, n.d., 20. A copy of this report may be consulted at 〈http://www.guyana.org /features/wismarreport.html〉. 126. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 24, 1964, Walter Rodney National Archives, 224. 127. Thakson[?] Singh to Her Majesty, November 13, 1963, CO 1031/4748. 128. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, July 20, 1964, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1949. 129. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, July 7, 1964, ibid. 130. Ibid. The PYO was the youth arm of the PPP. 131. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, November 21, 1963, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 132. Ibid. 133. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 14, 1964, CDF, British Guiana (1964–66), NA-DS, box 1947. 134. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 14, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana (1964–66), NA-DS, boxes 1947, 1948. 135. Ibid. 136. “Policy Statement of Premier Designate of British Guiana,” American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 20, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948.

Chapter 7 1. Henry Fitzgibbons to Mr. Sayre, December 15, 1966, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1947. 2. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 29, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 3. Ibid. 4. Jagan, The West on Trial, 73. (  )

Notes to Pages 230–43

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5. Ibid., 109–10. 6. J. D. Hennings to Ambler Thomas, February 15, 1963, CO 1031/4866. 7. Report of the British Constitutional Conference, March 1960, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. 8. American Ambassador in London to U.S. Department of State, March 19, 1960, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. 9. Ibid.; Report of the British Constitutional Conference. 10. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954, 70. 11. Jagan, The West on Trial, 101–2. 12. M. H. Revell to P. A. Carter, October 11, 1961, FO 371/155723. 13. Hugh Fraser to Secretary of State for the Colonies, March 20, 1962, PREM 11/3666. 14. For useful discussions of Anglo-American policy toward British Guiana between 1961 and 1964, see Sillery, “Salvaging Democracy?; Fraser, “The ‘New Frontier’ of Empire”; Rabe, United States Intervention in British Guiana; and Seecharan, Sweetening Bitter Sugar. 15. Anglo-U.S. Working Party, minutes, April 1961, DO 161/53. 16. Ibid. 17. Sillery, “Salvaging Democracy?,” 73–76. 18. Report of Anglo-American Working Party, September 1961, DO 161/206475. 19. Governor Grey to A. R. Thomas, September 4, 1961, CO 1031/3766. 20. Memorandum to Prime Minister, DO 161/53. 21. Report of Anglo-American Working Party, September 1961, DO 163/55. See also “Brief for the Colonial Secretary for Talks with the US Ambassador,” September 6, 1961, FO 371/155721. 22. British Guiana Memorandum, September 12, 1961, DO 161/53. In his important book, United States Intervention in British Guiana, Stephen Rabe presents a persuasive argument that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in the disturbances of 1962. 23. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 19, 1962, CO 1031/4028; Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 20, 1962, CO 371/161947; American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. 24. Hugh Fraser to Secretary of State for the Colonies, March 20, 1962, PREM 11/3666. 25. Meeting between American and British Officials, minutes, June 30, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 26. J. H. A. Watson, minute, October 22, 1965, FO 277/274. 27. Report on a visit to British Guiana, CO 1031/4407. 28. Report on the House of Assembly General Election, 1964, CO 1031/4797. 29. Governor Grey to Piper, June 21, 1963, CO 1031/4412. See also Note on the Trade Union Movement in Guiana, ibid. 30. Rabe, United States Intervention in British Guiana, 86. 31. Ibid. 32. Dispatches to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Walter Rodney National Archives, 3170; Richard Smith to George Ball, June 19, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 33. Dispatches to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Walter Rodney National Archives, 3170; Richard Smith to George Ball, June 19, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839; Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 19, 1962, FO 371/161947. 34. “Time and Jagan: The Consulate General’s Appraisal,” March 14, 1963, CFPF, NA-DS, box 3839. Notes to Pages 244–54

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35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. See Palmer, Eric Williams. 40. Text of the statement released by U.S. Department of State, October 28, 1961, FO 371/206475; Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, November 6, 1961, ibid. 41. Governor Grey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, November 6, 1961, ibid. 42. United Kingdom Mission, New York to Governor of British Guiana, October 20, 1961, FO 371/155723. 43. British Guiana Independence, January 12, 1962, DO 161/206475. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Prime Minister, January 10, 1962, PREM 11/3666. 47. British Guiana Independence, Commonwealth Secretary to Prime Minister, January 11, 1962, PREM 11/3666. Duncan Sandys became colonial secretary in July 1962, holding that office until October 1964. 48. Dean Rusk to Lord Home, February 20, 1962, PREM 11/3666. 49. Ibid. 50. Lord Home to Dean Rusk, February 28, 1962, ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Prime Minister Macmillan to Lord Home, February 21, 1962, ibid. 53. “Conversation with Secretary of State and Mr. Rusk,” March 12, 1962, ibid. 54. “Conversation with the Americans in Washington about British Guiana,” March 20, 1962, ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Prime Minister to Sir Norman Brook, May 3, 1962, ibid. 57. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, July 26, 1962; “Reaction of Political Leaders to Delay in Independence Talks”; and American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, July 8, 1962—all in CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. 58. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 3, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. Consul General Melby disdained the maneuvers of the three leaders as they prepared for the independence talks. Writing to the State Department on August 24, he observed: “The spectacle of British Guiana leaders today in their drive for independence leaves the distinct impression that, for varying reasons and with varying degrees of intensity, they are all happily engaged in spinning a gigantic Penelope’s web in the blind belief that it will never have to be finished because some unknown Ulysses will suddenly and miraculously appear on the muddy waters of the Demerara, bringing a political solution which they themselves have been incapable of devising.” American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 24, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. 59. Memorandum of conversation regarding situation in British Guiana, May 3, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. 60. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, May 11, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. 61. Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Burnham, September 14, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1669. (  )

Notes to Pages 254–63

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62. Sillery, “Salvaging Democracy?,” 173. 63. Brief for prime minister’s talks with President Kennedy, n.d., CO 1031/4866. 64. Communiqué of the British Guiana Independence Conference, American Embassy, London, to U.S. Department of State, November 7, 1962, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1668. 65. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 9, 1962, ibid. 66. John Hennings to Ambler Thomas, February 15, 1963, CO 1031/4866. 67. Ibid. This was the second letter Hennings wrote to Thomas on February 15. 68. British Guiana: Record of a meeting held on Friday, June 28, 1963, CO 1031/4866. 69. British Guiana, June 27, 1963, CO 1031/4866. 70. Ibid. 71. British Guiana: Record of a meeting held on Friday, June 25, 1963, ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. British Guiana: Meeting at Birch Grove, June 30, 1963, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. American Consul to U.S. Department of State, July 18, 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 78. Memorandum of meetings with Jagan and Burnham, July 13, 1963, CO 1031/4588. 79. “British Guiana: Anglo-US Consultations on Future Cooperation,” October 1963, CO 1031/4866. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Note on meetings held in Commonwealth Relations Office, October 23–25, 1963, DO 200/62. 85. Ibid. 86. Report: British Guiana Conference, 1963, DO 200/62. 87. Ibid. 88. “British Guiana: Anglo-US Exchange on Status and Prospects of Political Developments,” December 13–14, 1963, CO 1031/4866. 89. Cheddi Jagan to Prime Minister, November 7, 1963, CO 1031/14405. 90. Ibid. 91. “Further Comment by Jagan on Sandys’ Decision,” American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, November 24, 1963, CDF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 92. Cheddi Jagan to Prime Minister Douglas-Home, November 28, 1963, CO 1031/14405. 93. “British Guiana: Debate in Parliament,” November 1963, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 3839. 94. “British Guiana: Anglo-US Exchange on Status and Prospects of Political Developments,” December 13–14, 1963, CO 1031/4866. 95. Ibid. 96. Minute of a meeting in Secretary of State’s room, December 9, 1963, ibid. 97. For Eric Williams’s mediation, see Palmer, Eric Williams, 198–234. 98. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 5, 1964, CO 1031/4406. Notes to Pages 263–80

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99. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 6, 1954, CO 1031/14867. 100. “British Guiana: Report by Sir Richard Luyt on the First Weeks of His Governorship,” April 21, 1964, CO 1031/4406. 101. Ibid. 102. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, May 31, 1964, CO 1031/4406. 103. Ibid. 104. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 6, 1964, CO 1031/14867. 105. Colonial Office to Washington, July 8, 1964, CO 1031/4867. See also Washington to Foreign Office, July 10, 1964, FO 371/173552. 106. British Guiana: Minute by J. O. Rennie, July 8, 1964, FO 371/173552. 107. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 7, 1964, CO 1031/4867. 108. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 17, 1964, ibid. 109. Internal minute, “British Guiana Talks with US Officials,” July 21, 1964, ibid.; “Anglo American Talks on British Guiana,” n.d., ibid. 110. A. H. Poynton to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 6, 1964, FO 371/173552. 111. “British Guiana: Anglo-US Consultations,” June 1964, CO 1031/4867. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid. 114. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 1, 1964, FO 371/173552. 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid. See also British Guiana minute, July 6, 1964, FO 371/173552. 117. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 20, 1965, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948. 118. “Foreign Policy of Possible Burnham Administration in British Guiana,” American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, November 5, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1947. 119. Ibid.; American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, October 24, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948. 120. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 25, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1947. 121. New Statesman, May 15, 1964. 122. “UK Labour Views on British Guiana,” April 13, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1949. 123. Record of a conversation between Prime Minister and Cheddi Jagan, Thursday, October 29, 1964, PREM 13/137. 124. Extract from record of a conversation between Prime Minister and George Ball, November 30, 1964, ibid. 125. Memorandum of conversation, December 7, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948. 126. “Exchange of Letters between the Colonial Secretary and Jagan over Latter’s Refusal to Resign,” American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 15, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948. 127. Governor Luyt to Colonial Office, December 14, 1964, CO 1031/4407. 128. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, December 10, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1948. 129. “Annual Politico—Economic Assessment: British Guiana,” September 17, 1965,

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Notes to Pages 281–91

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American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, September 17, 1965, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1947.

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Chapter 8 1. Internal Minute, October 1964, CO 1031/4590. 2. Ibid. 3. “Appointments to the Public Service and Police Force in British Guiana,” CO 1031/4412. 4. Ibid. 5. Internal minutes, CO 1031/4590, CO 1039/4591. See also “Research Paper on the Activities of the People’s National Congress’ Terrorist Organization,” Cheddi Jagan Research Centre, uncataloged. 6. Ibid. 7. Cheddi Jagan to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 20, 1964, and Jagan to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, September 12, 1964, CO 1031/4591. 8. Cheddi Jagan to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 24, 1964, ibid. 9. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, November 29, 1964, CO 1031/4665. 10. “War of Secret Reports in British Guiana,” New York Times, November 9, 1964. For a copy of a clipping from the newspaper, see CO 1031/4592. 11. “War of Secret Reports in British Guiana,” New York Times, November 9, 1964; CO 1031/4592. 12. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, November 10, 1964, CO 1031/4592; “Luyt Calls in Secret Letters,” Daily Chronicle, November 13, 1964. 13. “Premier Down Grades Secret Letters, Daily Chronicle, November 14, 1964; “Luyt— Ban on Secret Letters Stands,” Daily Chronicle, November 15, 1964. 14. “All Members Innocent,” Daily Chronicle, November 14, 1964. 15. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 12, 1964, CFPF, British Guiana, NA-DS, box 1949. 16. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 18, 1964, ibid. 17. American Consul General to U.S. Department of State, August 12, 1964, ibid. 18. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, August 24, 1964, CO 1031/4727. 19. Governor Luyt to Secretary of State for the Colonies, August 19, 1964, ibid. 20. Sydney King, telegram, August 17, 1964, CO 1031/4727. 21. “Inquiry into the Circumstances in Which Emanuel Fairbain Came by His Injuries,” CO 1031/4591. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Daily Chronicle, November 21, 1964.

Notes to Pages 294–304

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31. Daily Chronicle, March 23, 1965. 32. Ibid. 33. Daily Chronicle, March 25, 1965. 34. Daily Chronicle, March 27, 1965. 35. Ibid. 36. Daily Chronicle, April 3, 1965. 37. Daily Chronicle, April 10, 1965. 38. Daily Chronicle, February 10, 1965.

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Notes to Pages 305–6

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina

( Bibliography )

Primary Sources This study is based almost entirely on manuscript sources located in the Public Record Office, London; the National Archives of the United States in College Park, Maryland; the Walter Rodney National Archives in Georgetown, Guyana; and the Cheddi Jagan Research Centre in Georgetown, Guyana.

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MANUSCRIPT AND ARCHIVAL MATERIAL Cheddi Jagan Research Centre, Georgetown, Guyana, uncataloged Ishmael, Odeen, ed. “The Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution—1953,” declassified British documents, 〈http://www.guyana.org/govt/declassified_ British_documents_1953.html〉. National Archives, College Park, Maryland U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, Decimal File and Intelligence Reports Public Record Office, London General Political Correspondence of the Foreign Office Records of the Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices Records of the Dominions Office Records of the Prime Minister’s Office Walter Rodney National Archives, Georgetown, Guyana, catalog AC3 NEWSPAPERS Daily Argosy Daily Chronicle Daily Gleaner (Jamaica) Guiana Graphic

London Times Mirror New York Times Thunder

PUBLISHED SOURCES British Guiana. Official Report (Hansard) of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council. Georgetown: Government Printer, 1954. 828–88. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1951. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1951. Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, 1954. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954. Report on British Guiana’s Independence Conference. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962. Report of a Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962.

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Report on Racial Problems in the Public Service. Geneva: International Conference of Jurists, 1965.

Selected Secondary Sources

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Adamson, Alan H. Sugar without Slaves: The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838–1904. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. Birbalsingh, Frank. The People’s Progressive Party of Guiana, 1950–1992. Hertford, United Kingdom: Hansib Publications, 2007. Burnham, L. F. S. A Destiny to Mould: Selected Discourses by the Prime Minister of Guyana. Compiled by C. A. Nascimento and R. A. Burrowes. London: Longmans Caribbean, 1970. Chase, Ashton. 133 Days towards Freedom in Guiana. Georgetown: New Guyana Co. Ltd., repr., n.d. Collins, B. A. N. “The Civil Service of British Guiana in the General Strike of 1963.” Caribbean Quarterly 10 (1964): 3–15. David, Wilfred. The Economic Development of Guyana, 1953–1964. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. Despres Leo A. Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967. Esedebe, P. Olisanwuche. Pan Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1963. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982. Farley, Rawle. “Kaldor’s Budget in Retrospect: Reason and Unreason in a Developing Area, Reflections on the 1962 Budget in British Guiana.” Inter-American Economic Affairs 16 (1962): 25–63. Fraser, Cary, Ambivalent Anticolonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940–1964. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994. ———. “The ‘New Frontier’ of Empire in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in British Guiana, 1961–1964.” International History Review 22, no. 3 (September 2000): 583–610. ———, “The PPP on Trial: British Guiana in 1953.” Small Axe 15 (March 2004): 21–42. Halperin, Ernst. “Racism and Communism in British Guiana.” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 7, no. 1 (January 1965): 95–134. Hintzen, Percy C., and Ralph Premdas. “Race, Ideology, and Power in Guyana.” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies 21 (1983): 175–94. Hope, Kempe R., and Wilfred L. David, “Planning for Development in Guyana: The Experience from 1945–1973.” Inter-American Economic Affairs 27 (1974): 27–46. Jagan, Cheddi: Forbidden Freedom: The Story of British Guiana. United Kingdom: Hansib Publishing Ltd., 1955. ———. The West on Trial: My Fight for Guyana’s Freedom. 1966. Reprint, Ontario: Harpy, 2004. Langley, Lester D. The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989. Laurence, K. O. A Question of Labour: Indentured Immigration into Trinidad and British Guiana, 1875–1917. New York: St. Martins Press, 1994. McGowan, Winston. Themes in African Guyanese History. Georgetown: Free Press, 1998. Narine Singh, Jai. Guyana: Democracy Betrayed: A Political History, 1948–1993. Kingston Publishers Ltd., Kingston, 1996. (  )

Bibliography

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Newman, Peter. British Guiana: Problems of Cohesion in an Immigrant Society. London: Oxford University Press, 1964. Palmer, Colin. Eric Williams and the Making of the Modern Caribbean. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. Premdas, Ralph. “Elections and Political Campaigns in a Racially Bifurcated State: The Case of Guyana.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (August 1972): 271–96. ———. “Guyana: Communal Conflict, Socialism and Political Reconciliation.” InterAmerican Economic Affairs 30 (Spring 1977): 63–83. Rabe, Stephen. United States Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. Rodney, Walter. A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Rose, James G. “British Colonial Policy and the Transfer of Power in British Guiana, 1945– 1964.” Ph.D. diss., Kings College, Oxford, 1992. Schlesinger, Arthur. A Thousand Days. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Seecharan, Clem. Sweetening Bitter Sugar: Jock Campbell: The Booker Reformer in British Guiana, 1934–1966. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2005. Sillery, Jane L. “Salvaging Democracy? The United States and Britain in British Guiana, 1961–1964.” Ph.D. diss., Queens College, Oxford, 1996. Sires, Ronald. “British Guiana: Suspension of the Constitution.” Western Political Quarterly 7 (1954): 554–69. Smith, Raymond T. The Negro Family in British Guiana. London: Routledge and Paul, 1956. ———. British Guiana, London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Spinner, Thomas. A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945–1983. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. St. Pierre, Maurice. The Anatomy of Resistance. Warwick, United Kingdom: Warwick University Press, 1999. Thorne, A. P. “British Guiana’s Development Programme.” Social and Economic Studies 10 (March 1961): 6–17. Tomasek, Robert D. “British Guiana”: A Case Study of British Colonial Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 74 (1959): 393–411. Williams, Eric. Capitalism and Slavery. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944. ———. British Historians and the West Indies. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964.

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( Index )

Abrahams, Arthur A., 298–99 Adams, Grantley, 15, 21 AFL-CIO, 252 Africa, 267 African Guianese people: political alliance with Indians, 9, 103, 192, 195, 196; ministerial positions of, 20; and Sydney King, 40; and working poor, 76, 115–16; Savage’s outreach to, 80, 84–85, 87–89; elite groups’ attitudes toward, 101, 102, 103; assimilation of, 111, 112; conflicts with Indians, 113–14, 115, 118, 119, 131, 207–8, 228, 231–33, 240, 294; and popularity of Burnham, 195; and law enforcement, 294 African Society for Racial Equality, 207–8 Afro-American Association, 97 Agriculture: and People’s Progressive Party’s land reclamation proposals, 16; and tenant farmers, 106; and Cheddi Jagan, 161. See also Sugar industry Algeria, 119, 242 All Party Conference, 150 Amerindians: in Guiana society, 115, 117, 119; historical exploitation of, 115, 209; literacy rate of, 125, 139; D’Aguiar supported by, 201–2; and racial politics, 205–6, 239; and Burnham, 240 Anglican Church, 17, 39, 87 Anglo-USA Working Party, 247–49, 254–55, 266 Annibourne, Neville, 172 Anticolonial struggles. See Colonial liberation movements; Nationalism Anti-Semitism, 67 Apartheid, 184 Asafu-Adjaye, E. O., 225 Atkinson Airfield, 49 Atlantic Charter, 243

Australia and coup d’état in British Guiana, 49 Ball, George, 289 Ballantyne, R. J., 175 Bandung Conference, 244 Banking, 32–33 Barbados, 253 Barker (police assistant superintendent), 301 Bay of Pigs invasion, 247 Benn, Brindley, 71, 171, 178, 179, 185, 192, 193, 194, 299 Berbice Ministers Fraternal, 97 Beresford, C., 18 Bhagwan, Moses, 171–72, 186, 198, 200, 265, 299 Booker Brothers: and racial politics, 31; tension with People’s Progressive Party, 33; and sugar industry strike, 38–39; tension with Savage, 78–79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 88 Bottomley, Arthur, 277–78 Britain: governance of British Guiana, 7–9; alliance with U.S. against Cheddi Jagan, 9–10, 49, 152–53, 155, 241–42, 247–48, 249, 251, 253, 255, 258–60, 263, 265–67, 269, 271–72, 273, 275, 276–77, 279–80, 284–86, 289, 297, 307, 311, 312, 313; reaction to independence movements, 22, 24; opposition to communism, 26; banned literature, 28, 47–48, 63–65, 74; trade unions of, 37, 43; nationalism stymied by, 47, 54; economic benefit from imperialism, 128 British Guiana: colonialism’s effects on, 3, 5, 7–10, 15; constitution of April 1953, 5–6, 8–9, 11, 14, 24, 26, 39, 40–41, 44, 45–48, 50, 53, 59, 136, 137, 141, 146–47, 150, 163;

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British governance of, 7–9; constitution of 1928, 8; and banned literature, 28, 47–48, 63–65, 74, 99, 159; and State of Emergency, 53, 232, 266, 293; constitution of November 1953, 55; economic conditions of, 135–36, 158, 161–62, 209– 10; and Renison Constitution, 150–51; economic development of, 154–55; social disturbances in, 209; population of, 238; and Commonwealth membership, 258. See also Colonial Office; Colonial officials; Guyana British Guiana and West Indies Federated Seamen’s Union, 99 British Guiana and West Indies Sugar Boilers Union, 140 British Guiana Domestic Helpers and Workers Union, 97 British Guiana Headmen’s Union, 140 British Guiana Labor Union, 43 British Guiana Mineworkers Union, 97 British Guiana Peace Committee, 26, 68 British Guiana Sanatana Dharma Maha Sabha, 97 British Guiana Social Council, 97 British Guiana Sugar Estates Clerks Association, 140 British Guiana Teachers Association, 97 British Guiana Trades Union Council, 97, 108, 252 British Labour Party, 72, 277, 288 Brook, Norman, 261 Bruckway, Fenner, 300 Bulletin, The, 77 Burch Smith, P. M., 69 Burdett, William, 265 Burnham, Linden Forbes: and People’s Progressive Party, 9, 15, 192; tension with Jagan, 19–21, 57, 58–59, 149, 154, 167, 192–93, 195, 199, 203, 205, 236–37, 270–71; inexperience of, 20, 40; as anticommunist, 21, 22; relationship with Savage, 23; as education minister, 29; and racial politics, 31, 32, 200, 201, 204, 208, 214, 223, 234, 238, 240, 246; and sugar industry strike, 36; colonial officials’ lack of respect for, 36, 40; reaction to coup (  )

d’état, 61, 66; restriction of movement, 71; colonial officials promotion of, 71–72; and banned literature, 74; capabilities of, 143, 175, 176, 177, 245–46, 262, 310; on Robertson Commission Report, 147; and Renison, 149; on Cheddi Jagan’s communism, 153; and nationalism, 159, 193–94; ideology of, 161, 167, 195; education of, 193–94; and West Indies Federation, 198; Grey on, 204–5, 219–20, 221; demonstration of, 213, 214–16, 219–21, 223, 224, 226, 227; and election of 1961, 228–29; and voting age, 238, 246, 264, 273, 274, 275; and coalition government, 241; and independence, 241, 245, 261, 263–64, 267, 268, 290; and proportional representation, 246, 262–63, 264, 273, 274, 275; U.S. subsidizing of, 251–52, 261–63, 280–81, 282, 284, 286–87, 288, 289, 291, 312, 315–16; and new elections before independence, 273, 274, 275; and election of 1964, 290, 315; political future of, 293; and law enforcement report, 294, 297, 298; and violence, 295, 299; Fairbain as employee of, 299, 302, 303, 306; and Freedom House bombing, 299; as premier and prime minister, 315–16 Bustamante, Alexander, 145 Caccia, H., 152 Cambridge, C., 18 Campbell, Jock M.: and Seaford, 31, 39; and Savage, 78–82, 83, 84, 92; lobbying of Americans, 92; on Cheddi Jagan’s budget, 226; mental problems of, 330 (n. 46) Campbell, Stephen, 205–6 Canada, 49, 110, 121, 155, 176, 256, 257 Capitalism, 115, 165, 167, 181, 184, 210, 279 Carew, Jan, 166 Carlson, Delmar: and Jagan’s communist beliefs, 186–87; on racial distinctions, 207; and violence of April 1964, 231, 232, 234, 236; and election of 1964, 239–40; and Burnham, 286–87, 290–91, 299; and Fairbain case, 299, 303 Carter, John, 147, 154, 198, 337 (n. 25) Carter, Keith, 26

Index

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Carter, Martin, 28, 67, 71, 159, 160, 192–93, 198 Castello-Edwards, J., 128 Castro, Fidel, 185, 189, 247, 254, 259, 265, 272, 312 Central Europe, 27 Ceylon, 49 Chandisingh, Ranji, 171 Chapman, George, 309–10 Chase, Ashton: inexperience of, 20, 37, 310; and Council of People’s Ministers, 23; and police force, 30; and sugar industry strike, 34–35, 36, 37–38, 43, 44; reaction to coup d’état, 66; capabilities of, 143; and nationalism, 159; and election of 1964, 287 Chinese people, 115, 117, 240 Christian, Claude, 171 Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, 252 Churchill, Winston, 19, 49, 63–64, 243 Civil service, 30–31, 78, 216 Clarke (constable), 4, 303–4 Clarke, John T., 18 Class issues: and power relations, 117, 118–19; and People’s Progressive Party, 193. See also Elite groups; Middle class; Working poor Clerical Workers Union, 97 Cold War, 25–26, 154 Colonialism: effects of, 3, 5, 7–10, 15; ironies of, 30; U.S. anti-colonialism, 49, 259; Coon on, 64; ideology of, 64, 307; and class structure, 117, 119; nationalist perspective on, 120; psychology of, 179–80, 310; neocolonialism, 242. See also Imperialism Colonial liberation movements: and People’s Progressive Party ideology, 16; and Marxism, 27, 159, 160; and Janet Jagan, 27–28, 159; and Soviet Union, 28, 159, 272; and Pan-African Movement, 158; and Bandung Conference, 244. See also Nationalism Colonial Office: distrust of People’s Progressive Party, 19, 39, 46, 71; suspicions of communism, 26, 39, 42, 47–48; and Luke’s report, 40; and suspension of con-

stitution, 40–41, 44, 45–47, 50, 53, 55, 59, 61, 77, 78, 79, 81, 91, 95, 119, 123, 137, 145, 192, 254; and trade unions, 45, 46; public relations imperatives of, 77–78; Legislative Council as extension of, 78; Savage as scapegoat of, 79, 84, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93; and Robertson Commission, 95, 133; and representative government, 150; views of Cheddi Jagan, 181–82, 258; and election of 1961, 204; and criteria for independence, 244; and U.S. covert action, 250, 251, 256, 274; and constitutional conference, 258, 261, 263–65; and Africans in law enforcement, 294; and violence, 294–95. See also Coup d’état of 1953 Colonial officials: and nationalism, 24; condescending attitude and racial politics, 25, 40, 64, 76, 85, 199; and communism, 26; racist rhetoric of People’s Progressive Party, 31; and wholesale and retail trading decline, 32; and labor disputes, 33–40; and split in People’s Progressive Party, 58–59; attempts to undermine support for People’s Progressive Party, 77, 93, 148; economic development program of, 77–78; and proportional representation, 112; and D’Aguiar, 202 Columbus, Christopher, 6–7, 112 Commercial and Clerical Workers Union, 252 Commission of Enquiry, 53, 200, 219, 221– 22, 228, 233–34, 261, 340 (n. 125) Communism: Cheddi Jagan accused of sympathies with, 18, 22, 24–26, 28, 46, 49, 64, 72, 150, 158, 164, 165, 166–71, 175, 182, 183–87, 189, 201, 210, 211, 226, 247, 248, 257, 259, 287, 288, 316; and People’s Progressive Party, 19, 21, 22, 27, 42, 47, 53, 55, 64, 137, 145, 146, 175, 185–88, 262; U.S. concerns about, 19, 49, 92, 152, 154, 155, 187–88, 189, 203, 247, 250–51, 253–54, 256, 258–61, 267–69, 272, 282, 288, 312; Guianese nationalism confused with, 24; Colonial Office’s suspicions of, 26, 39, 42, 47–48; and education, 29; and sugar industry, 42, 92; as justification for coup d’état, 53; and banned literature, 64–65, Index

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99; Janet Jagan accused of sympathies with, 69, 72, 92, 167, 170, 185; elite groups’ concerns about, 99, 100, 144 Congress of Peoples for Peace, 27 Conventions of the Right of Association, 34 Coon, F. Seal, 54, 67, 103–5, 141, 143 Council of People’s Ministers, 23–24, 47–48 Counett, W. B., 68 Coup d’état of 1953: and crisis of spirit, 9; misjudgments associated with, 10, 311; and arrival of British troops, 13–14, 51–54, 100; planning for, 44, 46–50; diplomatic implications of, 48–49; U.S. reaction to, 48–49, 59–61; and secrecy of invasion, 50; rumors of, 50–52; justifications for, 53, 54, 55, 59, 60, 66, 165, 166, 246–47, 311; People’s Progressive Party’s reaction to, 53–54, 57, 66–67; political implications of, 58, 61, 244; opposition to, 65; Robertson Commission following, 96–97, 133, 136; Cheddi Jagan’s reaction to, 153, 279 Cox, Vernie, 301 Credit Corporation, 77 Creigan, Alan, 132 Cuba, 185, 203, 247, 250, 262, 265–66, 269, 312 Cummings, Percival, 56, 304–6

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D’Aguiar, Peter: on Cheddi Jagan as communist, 189, 203, 223, 226; and racial politics, 201–2, 207, 208, 219; and independence, 202, 261, 263–64, 267, 268; and Cheddi Jagan’s budget, 213–16, 226; and violence of February 1962, 219, 221–23, 224, 227; U.S. subsidizing of, 252, 284, 312; and proportional representation, 264, 273, 274, 275; and voting age, 264, 273, 274, 275; Cheddi Jagan’s refusal to meet with, 270; and new elections before independence, 273, 274, 275; and coalitions, 280 D’Aguiar Brothers Aerated Water Factory, 216–17 Daily Argosy: opposition to People’s Progressive Party, 17, 18, 57, 67, 72, 76–77, (  )

83–84; opposition to Cheddi Jagan, 18, 73, 165; and education policies, 29; and coup d’état rumors, 52; and coup d’état reaction, 54, 67; Coon as editor of, 54, 67, 103–4; on People’s Progressive Party’s congress, 58; and banned literature, 74–75; criticism of Savage, 83–84; and Robertson Commission, 96; on Robertson Commission Report, 148; and Elizabeth II’s coronation, 180 Daily Chronicle, 52, 168, 203, 213 Dawson, W. F., 250 Debidin, D. P., 18 Demerara Bauxite Company, Limited, 97, 101, 139, 141–42 Demerara Youth Rally, 68 Downer, Victor, 299 Drayton, Harold, 234 DuBois, W. E. B., 158 Durant, Hubert, 123 Eastern Bloc countries, 27, 154, 155, 247, 257, 310 Education: People’s Progressive Party’s policies on, 16, 29, 48; elite groups’ opinions on, 102; and imperialism, 124, 180. See also Literacy Eisenhower, Dwight D., 182 Elite groups: opposition to People’s Progressive Party, 17–18, 56, 61, 148; competing interests of, 30; and racial politics, 32, 102, 104, 112–13; and sugar industry strike, 39, 42; and coup d’état reaction, 54, 67; and Executive Council members, 56; Savage as scapegoat of, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87–91, 93; attitudes toward working poor, 98, 99, 103, 105–6, 107, 109, 117, 124, 129; and election of April 1953, 98, 124; opposition to universal adult suffrage, 100, 101–2, 105, 132, 137–39; and proportional representation, 141; and Jacob, 211, 214; and United Force, 214–15, 216; and D’Aguiar, 228; opposition to independence, 244 Elizabeth II (queen of Great Britain), 31, 180 Ellis Associated Companies, 32

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Emergency Order, Advisory Committee, 67–68, 71, 74, 317–18 Enslaved Africans: descendants of, 5; and plantation system, 7, 309; and slave codes, 294 Essex, F. W., 175–76 Ethiopia, 261 Executive Committee, 8, 140–41 Executive Council: establishment of, 8–9, 55–56; and Council of People’s Ministers, 23, 24, 48; dynamic tension in, 24, 45; recommendations on, 143–44, 147; and Renison Constitution, 150; and Cheddi Jagan, 153 Facey, S., 301 Fairbain, Emanuel: arrest of, 3, 293, 299– 300; law enforcement’s treatment of, 3–5, 300–304, 306–7; as symbol, 6, 10–11; trial of, 304–6 Farley, E. J., 125–26 Fernandes, Augustine, 124 Fingall, U. A., 23 Fitzgibbons, Harry, 241–42, 291 Follet-Smith, R. R., 84, 88 Foot, Hugh, 174 Forde, Michael, 306 Foreign capital: and industrial development, 19, 21, 153, 210, 211; and political rhetoric, 32 Fourth World Youth Festival, 28 Fox, T., 119 Fraser, Hugh, 247, 251, 260–61 Fraser, St. Clair, 305 Freedom House, 3, 222, 299, 306 Gajraj, Rahman, 56, 172 Gandhi, Mahatma, 68, 69 Gangadeen, Shivsudh, 113–14, 116–17, 121 Garvey, T. W., 55 Georgetown Chamber of Commerce, 97, 183, 214 Gerrymandering constituencies, 151–52, 279 Glenn, Matilda, 124 Gonsalves, Manoel, 123–24 Gonsalves-Sabola, J., 305

Government-assisted housing, 16, 77 Grattan Bellew, A. J., 179 Greenwood, Anthony, 177, 289–90 Grenada, Samuel, 132–33 Grey, Ralph: on Janet Jagan, 75; on Cheddi Jagan, 153–54, 155, 157, 173–74, 176, 204, 209, 210, 211, 217–19, 221, 223–25, 229, 253; on People’s Progressive Party, 170–73, 175, 178; on Ramsahoye, 178–79; and lack of anti-British feelings in Guiana, 180– 81; on D’Aguiar, 202; on Burnham, 204–5, 219–20, 221; and racial politics, 207; on Jacob, 210–11; and petition for partition, 236; and U.S. subversive activities, 249, 251; and U.S. aid, 256–57; and law enforcement report, 295 Griffith (constable), 303 Grimmond (police inspector), 4 Guatemala, 250, 265 Guiana Agricultural Workers Union, 280, 299 Guiana Graphic, 18, 52, 147–48, 169, 202 Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU), 33–38, 41–43, 48, 101, 230, 333 (n. 13) Guiana National Party, 14 Guiana Sugar Workers Union (GSWU), 230, 231 Guiana United Muslim Party, 238 Guianese Independence Movement, 172, 245 Gulf Oil Corporation, 32 Guyana: ethnic diversity in, 6; geography of, 6; Cheddi Jagan as president of, 313, 315; economics of, 316. See also British Guiana Haijsman (Colonial Office), 179 Hatch, John, 288 Haynes, Edgar, 130–31 Haynes, J. Oscar, 234, 296–97 Headmen’s Union, 99 Hennings, J. D., 244, 265 Heywood, J., 130 Hinduism, 68, 69 Hintzen (detective assistant superintendent), 4, 301 Index

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Hitler, Adolf, 225 Holder, F. W., 92, 143 Home, Lord (Alec Douglas-Home), 249, 251, 258, 259–60, 267, 268–69, 276, 277, 279 Hopkinson, Henry, 47, 49, 72, 88–89 House of Assembly: establishment of, 8–9, 140; Cheddi Jagan as leader of, 20; and Undesirable Publications bill, 28; and trade unions, 34, 43–44; and coup d’état rumors, 51; Savage’s appointments to, 56; recommendations for, 143, 147 Hubbard, H. J. M., 172, 181, 185 Huntley, Eric, 71, 159, 192, 193, 194, 198–99

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Iman, Rashad, 123 Imperialism: and People’s Progressive Party ideology, 15–16, 31, 73–74, 75, 167, 197; and condescension toward People’s Progressive Party, 23, 25; paternalism of, 25, 85, 178; Cheddi Jagan’s denouncement of, 26, 31–32, 73–74, 75, 122–23, 163, 182, 183, 184, 242–43, 247, 270, 279; and assertion of white superiority, 31, 64, 192, 233, 270; and Robertson Commission, 97, 145; Britain’s economic benefit from, 128; and Reniston Constitution, 151; and colonial systems, 158–59. See also Colonialism; Coup d’état of 1953 Independence: and People’s Progressive Party ideology, 16, 21, 75, 245, 261; Britain’s reaction to, 22, 24; Cheddi Jagan’s calls for, 26, 242–46, 248, 257–58, 261, 263–64, 266, 267, 276, 289; and D’Aguiar, 202, 261, 263–64, 267, 268; and Burnham, 241, 245, 261, 263–64, 267, 268, 290; and U.S. covert actions, 254–55, 257–59, 261– 62, 272, 289; and election of 1964, 289 India: independence of, 24, 111, 119, 158; and coup d’état in British Guiana, 49; and British Guiana’s independence, 261 Indochina, 119 Indo-Guianese people: as indentured workers, 7, 294, 309; political alliance with Africans, 9, 103, 192, 195, 196; support of Cheddi Jagan, 18, 76; ministerial positions of, 20; and Sydney King, 40; (  )

ties to other Asians, 49; Savage’s outreach to, 80, 84–85, 87–89; elite groups’ attitudes toward, 101, 102, 103, 104–5; lack of assimilation, 111–12; conflicts with Africans, 113–14, 115, 118, 119, 131, 207–8, 228, 231–33, 240, 294; and literacy rates, 125, 139; and popularity of Cheddi Jagan, 151, 160, 195; and racial politics, 207 Industrial development and foreign capital, 19, 21, 153, 210, 211 Intermediate Savannah, 6 International Labour Organization (ILO), 34 International Union of Educational Workers, 288 Iran, 250, 265 Ishmael, Richard, 107, 133, 136–37, 220, 227, 253 Jackson, Donald, and Robertson Commission, 95–96, 130, 132–33 Jacob, C. R., Jr., 185, 186, 210, 211–14, 304 Jagan, Cheddi: and People’s Progressive Party, 9, 15; U.S. and British alliance against, 9–10, 49, 152–53, 155, 241–42, 247–48, 249, 251, 253, 255, 258–60, 263, 265–67, 269, 271–72, 273, 275, 276–77, 279–80, 284–86, 289, 297, 307, 311, 312, 313; objectives of, 10; alleged communist sympathies, 18, 22, 24–26, 28, 46, 49, 64, 72, 150, 158, 164, 165, 166–71, 175, 182, 183–87, 189, 201, 210, 211, 226, 247, 248, 257, 259, 287, 288, 316; reputation of, 18–19, 22; tension with Burnham, 19–21, 57, 58–59, 149, 154, 167, 192–93, 195, 199, 203, 205, 236–37, 270–71; relationship with Savage, 23, 122; and economic program, 25, 154, 155, 161, 165, 182, 189, 210, 243, 256–57; anti-imperialist rhetoric of, 26, 31–32, 73–74, 75, 122–23, 163, 182, 183, 184, 242–43, 247, 270, 279; and independence, 26, 242–46, 248, 257–58, 261, 263–64, 266, 267, 276, 289; on police force, 29–30; and civil service, 30; Luke’s opinion of, 40; and sugar industry strike, 45; on coup d’état rumors, 50–51; coup d’état overthrowing, 55; colonial offi-

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cials’ containment of, 64, 154; on coup d’état tactics, 66, 221; reaction to coup d’état, 66–67; autobiography of, 70; restriction on movements of, 70; writings of, 70, 157–58, 161–63, 167, 191; trial of, 70–71; proposed exile of, 72–74, 76, 92; campaigns among working poor, 75–76; popularity of, 75–76, 151, 297; Savage’s attempts to imitate, 80, 82, 86; and Legislative Council, 112; working poor’s support for, 124; capabilities of, 143, 310; on Robertson Commission Report, 147; elite groups’ opposition to, 148, 151, 164; and Renison, 150, 153, 169, 173, 176, 209–10; Grey on, 153–54, 155, 157, 173–74, 176, 204, 209, 210, 211, 217–19, 221, 223–25, 229, 253; and Marxism, 153, 157, 158, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 174, 184, 190, 195, 209, 210, 214, 226, 246, 247, 248, 253, 255, 256, 259, 310, 312; ideology of, 153, 157–58, 159, 160–61, 164, 167–68, 170, 173, 183–86, 188, 190, 195, 247, 272, 312; and nationalism, 159, 168, 179, 182–83, 210, 243, 247; on land use, 161–63; and National Press Club, 181–83, 257; and parliamentary democracy, 182–83, 189, 249, 257; and proportional representation, 186, 246, 264, 273, 274, 275, 277, 279, 281, 287–88, 296; and election of 1964, 186, 290, 313; education of, 194; and racial politics, 199–200, 201, 208, 209–10, 216–17, 222– 23, 224, 233–36, 238, 246, 264; budget of, 213–18, 225–26, 228, 229, 279; and demonstration, 215–16, 221, 222–24, 227; and voting age, 238, 246, 264, 273, 274, 275; and U.S. covert actions, 252, 254–59, 266, 273, 312; and new elections before independence, 255, 259, 264, 273, 274, 275; and partition, 290; and Africans in law enforcement, 294; and law enforcement report, 295–98; and Fairbain case, 304, 306; as Guyana’s president, 313, 315 Jagan, Janet Rosenberg: and People’s Progressive Party formation, 9, 15; and People’s Progressive Party policy, 25, 40, 187, 229; and colonial liberation movements, 27–28, 159; and trade unions, 34;

and sugar industry strike, 41; on Savage’s appointments, 57; and Burnham, 57, 58; reaction to coup d’état, 66, 67; and regulation of public behavior, 68–70; alleged communist sympathies, 69, 72, 92, 167, 170, 185; proposed exile of, 72–74, 76, 149–50; campaigns among working poor, 75; popularity of, 75; and election of April 1953, 127–28; and People’s Progressive Party organization, 148, 149, 172, 237, 310; relationship with Cheddi Jagan, 169–70, 175–76, 185; resignation as minister of home affairs, 232; and election of 1964, 287; and law enforcement report, 295; as president of Guyana, 315 Jagan, Joseph, 14 Jakeway, F. D., 169–70 Jamaica, 8, 13, 45, 51, 85, 145, 253 Jamaica Labour Party, 145 Jardim, Ann, 203, 206–7, 221 Jefferson, Thomas, 247 Jeffries, Charles, 92 Jenkins, A., 300–301 Johnson, L. B., 63–64 Joint Trade Union Committee, 140 Jordan, R. J., 299 Justice Party, 238, 240 Kaieteur Fall, 6 Kailan, Elfreda Clarisse, 131 Kaldor, Nicholas, 211 Kandasammy (constable), 4, 303 Karran, Boysie Ram, 28, 171 Kecky, Phillip, 92 Kennametals Corporation, 32 Kennedy, John F., 247, 251, 256, 260, 261, 268, 269 Kenya, 24, 119, 151 Khosla, G. D., 225 King, Arthur G., 17–18, 101, 105, 106, 139 King, Cecil, 202 King, Joseph, 101 King, Sydney: inexperience of, 20, 40; and communism, 27, 47, 68, 72; and trade unions, 34, 35, 44; colonial officials’ lack of respect for, 36, 40, 44; and sugar industry strike, 41, 45; reaction to coup Index

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d’état, 66; and regulation of public behavior, 67, 68, 69, 71; allegations against, 68, 319–23; and nationalism, 159; break with People’s Progressive Party, 168–69; and racial politics, 207–8; and partition, 236; and Fairbain case, 300 Knight, Alan J., 23, 46, 97–98, 107–8, 236 Knox, John, 265 Kremlinology, 265–66 Kuznetsov, V. V., 26

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Labour Relations Bill, 230–31 Labour Relations Ordinance, 43, 46, 48, 59 Lachmansingh, J. P.: and sugar industry strike, 33, 34–35, 36, 41–42, 43, 44, 45, 230; and People’s Progressive Party, 58; jailed for subversive literature, 63; capabilities of, 143; and Burnham, 196 Lachmansingh, Samuel, 67, 68 Lambert (police superintendent), 4–5, 303, 305 Lamming, George, 76, 194–95, 198–99 Land use: and People’s Progressive Party, 16; and tenant farmers, 106; Cheddi Jagan on, 161–63 La Penitence Market, 31, 214 Law enforcement: corrosive forces affecting, 3–5, 294; Fairbain’s treatment by, 3–5, 300–304, 306–7; and regulation of public behavior, 65–66, 67, 68, 69, 70–71, 148–49, 150, 160; and demonstrations, 222, 232, 233; and African Guianese people, 294; report of, 294, 295–98 Leach, J., 124–25 League of Coloured Races, 97, 198 League of Nations, 34 Legislative Council: nominated members of, 8, 55; and Cheddi Jagan, 18, 24, 112, 163, 243, 245, 251; Savage’s appointments to, 56, 99; and Rogers, 78; interim, 86; and restoration of 1953 constitution, 150; and Stephen Campbell, 205 Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 63, 89, 91, 92, 244 Literacy: and condemnation of illiterate people, 17–18, 76, 102, 124–25, 127, 138, 144; test for franchise, 124–25, 139–40; (  )

rate of, 125–27; and sugar industry workers, 133. See also Education Lloyd, Lord (Colonial Office), 19, 40, 73, 81, 85, 86–87, 92 Luckhoo, Lionel A.: and Manpower Citizens Association, 17, 23, 99, 100–101; on Janet Jagan, 68–69; and working poor, 76, 99–101, 102, 105; and Subversive Literature Act, 99, 310; and National Labour Front, 149, 205; and Cheddi Jagan’s communist beliefs, 183 Luke, Timothy, 39–40 Luyt, Richard, 188, 201, 202, 231–32, 234–35, 280–85, 290, 294, 296–99, 303, 307 Lynch, Edward, 117–18, 126 Lyttleton, Oliver: and People’s Progressive Party, 19, 45, 47, 49; and sugar industry strike, 44, 45; and coup d’état preparations, 50; and economic development program, 77; Robertson Commission’s visit, 95, 96 Macleod, Iain, 188–89, 245 Macmillan, Harold, 250, 251, 258, 259, 261, 263, 269–70 Macnie, William A.: and Savage, 23, 45; and sugar industry strike, 34–35, 36, 37–38, 42; and working poor, 75; and Cheddi Jagan, 163–64 Maddox, William P.: on coup d’état, 14, 59–60, 66; and conciliation strategy of Woolford, 22–23; on People’s Progressive Party, 25, 166; and proposed deportation of Janet Jagan, 72–73; on Cheddi Jagan, 165, 168 Mahadeo, Ronald, 229 Mali, 261 Manchester Guardian, 50 Manley, Norman, 193 Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA): opposition to People’s Progressive Party, 17; and Luckhoo, 17, 23, 99, 100–101; and sugar industry strike, 33, 34–35, 37, 38, 41; and literacy test for franchise, 140; corruption of, 230 Margaret, Princess, 180 Martin, John, 72

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Martyrdom and People’s Progressive Party member imprisonments, 70, 71, 166 Marxism: and People’s Progressive Party rhetoric, 22, 54, 248; and colonial liberation movements, 27, 159, 160; and Cheddi Jagan, 153, 157, 158, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 174, 184, 190, 195, 209, 210, 214, 226, 246, 247, 248, 253, 255, 256, 259, 310, 312 Maudling, Reginald, 225, 257–58 Mayle, N. L., 19, 92 McCabe, William Howard, 252 McCone, John, 251 McDavid, Edwin Frank, 23, 56 Mcleod (police superintendent), 222 Meet the Press (television program), 256 Melby, Everett K.: and Cheddi Jagan’s communist beliefs, 177, 203–4; on psychology of colonialism, 179; on Hubbard, 181; on Stephen Campbell, 205; on Jardim, 206–7; and racial politics, 228; and violence of February 1962, 229–30; on Cheddi Jagan’s implied threat of violence, 243; on U.S. involvement in British Guiana, 249, 251; on People’s Progressive Party, 254; and independence talks, 342 (n. 58) Merkle, J. K., 114–16 Middle class: and sugar industry strike, 67; Cheddi and Janet Jagan as, 75; complacency of, 85; and gambling, 116; and People’s Progressive Party, 167; and Burnham, 193, 194, 197, 198; and D’Aguiar, 201–2; and Jacob, 211 Mirror, 242–43 Moore, Robert J., 160, 194 Moss, J. R., 181 Murphy (U.S. State Department), 152 Nanda, Shri Badir Nath, 196 National Democratic Party, 14, 15 Nationalism: and People’s Progressive Party, 15, 16–17, 22, 24, 25, 27, 120, 123, 243; communist support for, 27, 247; and racial politics, 32, 114, 119–22; Britain’s attempts to stymie, 47, 54; and Savage, 87, 122; elite groups’ attitude toward, 103,

104; and Robertson Commission, 119–23, 244; and economic conditions, 135–36; and Cheddi Jagan, 159, 168, 179, 182–83, 210, 243, 247; and Burnham, 159, 193–94; expressions of, 181 National Labour Front, 149, 205, 238 National Press Club, 181–83, 257 Nauth, Harry, 105–6, 107 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 69 New Deal, 194 New Nation, 300 New York–Alaska Gold Dredging Company, 32 New Zealand, 49 Nicholson, Herbert, 207 Official Gazette of British Guiana, 55 Osborn, C. B. L., 119 Owen, P. G., 296 Pakaraima mountain range, 6 Pakistan and coup d’état in British Guiana, 49 Pan-African Movement, 158 Panhandle Oil Canada Limited, 32 Patterson, C. O., 114 Peace, Equality, and Prosperity Party, 238 People’s National Congress (PNC): and Fairbain, 3, 303–5; and Burnham, 58; and John Carter, 154; and racial politics, 191, 201, 202, 203, 214, 219, 220–21, 233; and election of 1961, 209, 249; and election of 1964, 239, 252; and independence, 245, 261; and U.S. and British alliance against Jagan, 251, 270, 280–81; U.S. subsidizing of, 252, 262, 263, 284, 295; and proportional representation, 264, 275, 280; and violence, 294–95, 297, 299, 302; and law enforcement report, 298 People’s National Party (Jamaica), 145 People’s Police Force, 29–30 People’s Progressive Party (PPP): bombing of headquarters, 3; founding of, 9, 27; tenure of, 10; and election of 1953, 14, 15, 19, 20, 49, 90, 98, 102, 121, 124, 136, 145, 164, 192; organization of, 14–15; ideology of, 15, 16, 45, 46, 57, 159–60, 167, 168, Index

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169, 188, 189, 190, 200; and nationalism, 15, 16–17, 22, 24, 25, 27, 120, 123, 243; antiimperialism policy of, 15–16, 31, 73–74, 75, 167, 197; and independence, 16, 21, 75, 245, 261; and reformist policy proposals, 16–17, 18, 24–25, 27, 164, 310; opponents of, 17, 56, 72, 76, 99, 101, 114–15, 123–24, 143, 144, 148–49, 151, 153, 244; and political autonomy, 19; and communism, 19, 21, 22, 27, 42, 47, 53, 55, 64, 137, 145, 146, 175, 185–88, 262; power struggle within, 20–21, 57–59, 61; economic program of, 25, 27, 55, 64, 77, 165–66; youth wing of, 26–27, 236, 237, 297; and civil service structure, 30–31; and racial politics, 31–32, 102, 191, 197–99, 204, 224, 233, 236, 238; and coup d’état rumors, 50–52; and coup d’état reaction, 53–54, 57, 66–67; congress of, 57–58; pragmatism of, 66; as target of regulation of public behavior, 66, 67–69, 70, 160; base of support for, 76–77, 124; colonial officials’ attempts to undermine, 77, 93, 148; popularity of, 79, 117, 129; influence of, 85; Robertson Commission opposed by, 96–97, 130, 144–45; and working class, 100; Robertson Commission’s opposition to, 137, 145–47; and election of 1957, 151–52; Grey on, 170–73, 175, 178; and proportional representation, 186, 233, 264, 287–88; and election of 1961, 204–5, 238; budget of, 213–14; and election of 1964, 237, 238–40, 252, 287; and demographic trends, 238–39; and U.S. covert actions, 251, 252; and U.S. and British alliance against Jagan, 251, 276, 278, 280–81, 297; and law enforcement report, 295–98; and violence, 297 Phillips, E. S., 213–14 Pillai, R. St. Clair, 124 Pioneer Youth League of British Guiana, 26–27, 68 Plantation system, 7 Police. See Law enforcement Political Affairs Committee, 9 Ponsonby, Charles, 167 Portuguese people, 115, 206, 207, 239, 240 Power relations: and racial politics, 113, (  )

208, 270; and class issues, 117, 118–19; and constitution of 1953, 136; and Robertson Commission, 142, 145; and nationalism, 159; and Cheddi Jagan’s return to office, 173; and U.S. concerns about communism, 257, 267, 286, 312; and Burnham, 316 Powers (police officer), 4 Poynton, A. H., 284 Press: and opposition to People’s Progressive Party, 17, 18, 21, 54, 61, 211; opposition to Jagan, 18, 213–14; and education policies, 29; and coup d’état rumors, 52–53; and coup d’état reaction, 54, 67; Cheddi Jagan on, 163. See also specific newspapers Professional and Administrative Officers Association, 97 Profumo, John, 74 Progressive Youth Organization (PYO), 26–27, 236, 237, 297, 303 Public Service Commission, 30 Raatgever, W. J., 96 Rabe, Stephen, 252, 341 (n. 22) Race relations, tensions in, 110–19, 192, 272, 275, 298 Racial politics: burden of, 5; emergence of, 10; and colonial officials’ condescending attitude, 25, 40, 64, 76, 85, 199; and Burnham, 31, 32, 200, 201, 204, 208, 214, 223, 234, 238, 240, 246; and People’s Progressive Party, 31–32, 102, 191, 197–99, 204, 224, 233, 236, 238; and Savage, 32, 89, 196–97, 208–9; and elite groups, 32, 102, 104, 112–13; and nationalism, 32, 114, 119–22; and coup d’état, 58; and sugar industry, 113; and power relations, 113, 208, 270; and class issues, 117, 119; and Robertson Commission, 137; and United Force, 189, 201–2, 206, 214–15, 240; and People’s National Congress, 191, 201, 202, 203, 214, 219, 220–21, 233; and election of 1957, 199–200; and Cheddi Jagan, 199– 200, 201, 208, 209–10, 216–17, 222–23, 224, 233–36, 238, 246, 264; and D’Aguiar, 201–2, 207, 208, 219; and election of 1961, 204, 207–8, 228; and social disturbances,

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209–10; and demonstration of February 1962, 221–22, 226, 227, 228, 229–30; and Wismar, 231–32; and demonstration of April 1963, 231–33; and election of 1964, 238–39; and proportional representation, 238–39, 275–76, 280; and trade unions, 253; and social mores, 293; and law enforcement, 294, 302–3 Radford, R. E., 71–72, 148–49 Rahaman, M. S. H., 106, 110, 127–28, 143 Rahat, M. H., 118–19 Rai, Balram Singh, 171, 218, 221, 223, 229, 251, 278 Raleigh, Walter, 7, 309 Ramphal, J. I., 198, 337 (n. 25) Ramsahoye, Fenton, 172, 176, 178–79, 285–86 Religious leaders and education policies, 29 Renison, Patrick: as governor, 148–49, 173, 244; and Janet Jagan, 149–50; and Cheddi Jagan, 150, 153, 169, 173, 176, 209– 10; and D’Aguiar, 202 Renison Constitution, 150–51, 244–45 Rennie, J. O., 282–83 Revell, M. H., 247 Richardson, James, 117 Robertson (constable), 303 Robertson, George, 23 Robertson, James: on Savage, 88; and Robertson Commission, 95–97, 130, 132, 133 Robertson Commission: members of, 95–96; People’s Progressive Party’s opposition to, 96–97, 130, 144–45; and Sugar Producers Association, 97, 140; memoranda submitted to, 97–98, 99; elite groups’ memoranda to, 101–5, 144, 145; working poor’s memoranda to, 105–7, 117–18, 128–33, 144; and race relations, 110–19; and sugar industry, 113; and nationalism, 119–23, 244; and illiteracy, 126–27; and criticism of Britain, 128; and societal introspection, 133–34; report of, 135–37, 141–42, 144–48, 311; Demerara Bauxite Company’s memorandum to, 141–42; and representational problems, 246 Rodney, Walter, 316

Rogers, Philip, 39, 41, 77–79, 80, 81–83 Roman Catholic Church, 17, 87, 202 Roopnaraine, Rupert, 160–61 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 243 Roraima, Mount, 6 Roth, Vincent, 138–39 Rupununi Savannah, 6 Rural people: press’s opinion of, 17; and literacy rate, 126; and Jagan, 193, 195, 228 Rusk, Dean, 249, 258–60, 266, 267, 268, 282, 284 Sandys, Duncan, 251, 258, 263–64, 267–68, 270, 273–79, 282, 288, 342 (n. 47) Savage, Alfred: as governor of British Guiana, 15; and security forces, 19, 45; concern for communist-inspired intentions of People’s Progressive Party, 21, 45, 53; and People’s Progressive Party’s leadership split, 22, 88; appointments to State Council, 23, 56; social invitations to Jagan and Burnham, 23; and People’s Progressive Party ministers’ disrespect for Crown, 31, 44; and racial politics, 32, 89, 196–97, 208–9; and sugar industry, 36, 45–46, 78–82, 83, 84, 88, 92, 93; and Luke’s report, 40; and coup d’état preparations, 45, 50, 51; reserve power of, 54–55; appointments to Legislative Council, 56, 99; and American reaction to coup d’état, 60–61; responsibility for coup d’état, 61; regulation of public behavior, 65–68, 71; attempts to undermine support of People’s Progressive Party, 77, 81, 92, 93; as scapegoat, 79–83, 86–91, 92, 93, 136, 311; and nationalism, 87, 122; defense of administration, 87–88, 89, 90–91; support for, 88, 123 Sawmill Workers Union, 43, 99 Schwartz, Fred, 252 Seaford, Henry G., 31, 38–39 Segal, Ben D., 288 Sharples, Guy, 71 Shipping Association of Georgetown, 97, 139, 142, 143 Shuhabuddeen, M., 301 Singh, Ajodha, 67 Index

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Singh, Gulbatoor, 301, 302 Singh, Jai Narine, 14, 58, 172, 245 Singh, Karan, 106 Singh, Mahatam, 196 Singh, Rajkumarie, 234 Singh, Thakson, 235–36 Slais, Joost, 252 Smellie, G. H., 163–64 Smith, Ian, 277 Socialism, 13, 21, 22, 164–65, 167, 182, 184, 186, 208, 228, 256, 316 Southern Rhodesia, 269, 277 Soviet Union: and Cold War, 26; and colonial liberation movements, 28, 159, 272; and Cheddi Jagan, 165; and Sydney King, 169; and People’s Progressive Party, 203, 262; and Cuba, 247, 269; and U.S. view of Guianese people, 265–66; collapse of, 316 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), 248 Sprostons Limited, 101 Stackpoole, J. W., 251–52 Stalinism, 164 State Council: establishment of, 8–9, 140; Savage’s appointments to, 23, 56; and Undesirable Publications bill, 28; and suspension of constitution, 46, 47–48; recommendations for, 143, 147 Status quo: threats to, 17, 18, 22, 24, 39, 84, 98, 100; police force defending, 30; guardians of, 78, 83, 91, 98, 101, 122–23, 143, 160; transformation of, 161; legitimization of, 180 Subversive Literature Act, 159, 164, 310 Sugar industry: workers in, 17, 106, 109, 140, 331 (n. 29); strikes in, 32–38, 41–43, 45–46, 67, 230, 280; and Savage, 36, 45–46, 78–82, 83, 84, 88, 92, 93; communism as threat to, 42, 92; and racial politics, 113; and literacy, 133; and nationalism, 158; Cheddi Jagan on, 161; cultivable land held by, 161–62 Sugar Producers Association (SPA): and State Council, 23; and Guiana Industrial Workers Union, 33–38, 42, 43; and People’s Progressive Party, 46; and Robertson Commission, 97, 140; and em(  )

ployment rates, 109; and literacy test for franchise, 139; type of legislature proposed by, 141 Tanganyika, 184–85, 261 Tasker, Anthony, 153, 226 Tello, Rupert, 56 Third World Youth Congress, 28 Thunder: Janet Jagan as editor of, 9; Colonial Office’s fears of communist influence on, 26; on mass destruction methods, 26; proposed banning of, 74–75, 76; and nationalism, 159 Trades Union Congress (TUC), 220, 227, 230, 231 Trade unions: People’s Progressive Party’s support of, 16, 33–35, 36, 38, 39, 42–43, 45, 48, 100, 120, 230; and opposition to People’s Progressive Party, 17, 18, 42; organization of colonial trade unions, 26; and police force, 30; and sugar industry strikes, 32–38, 41–43, 45–46; and Robertson Commission, 97; and working poor, 99–101; and literacy test for franchise, 140; U.S. covert actions with, 252, 253; and racial politics, 253. See also specific unions Transport Advisory Council, 31 Transport Workers Union, 43 Trinidad, 8, 85, 103, 158, 186, 196, 198, 253, 255, 280 Tull, Carl, 186 Undesirable Publications ordinance, 28, 63 United Democratic Party, 56, 72, 147, 149 United Force (UF): and racial politics, 189, 201–2, 206, 214–15, 240; and People’s Progressive Party, 203; and election of 1961, 204, 209, 253; and election of 1964, 239, 240, 252; U.S. subsidizing of, 251, 252–53, 263, 284; and proportional representation, 264, 280 United Nations, 34, 47, 258 United Nations Committee of Seventeen, 261 United States: alliance with British colonial regime, 9–10, 49, 152–53, 155, 241–42,

Index

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247–48, 249, 251, 253, 255, 258–60, 263, 265–67, 269, 271–72, 273, 275, 276–77, 279–80, 284–86, 289, 297, 307, 311, 312, 313; and communist concerns, 19, 49, 92, 152, 154, 155, 187–88, 189, 203, 247, 250–51, 253–54, 256, 258–61, 267–69, 272, 282, 288, 312; State Department, 22, 152, 256– 57, 262–63; and Cold War, 25–26; and civil service structure, 30; trade unions of, 37, 43; coup d’état reaction in, 48–49, 59–61; and Savage’s performance as governor, 92; Jagan’s experiences in, 194–95; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 233, 250, 251, 252, 288, 341 (n. 22); civil rights conflicts, 240; subversive activities in British Guiana, 242 Universal adult suffrage: and Waddington Commission, 8, 14; and constitution of 1953, 9, 14; and People’s Progressive Party, 16; and Savage, 85; elite groups’ opposition to, 100, 101–2, 105, 132, 137–39; restrictions on, 138–40 Venezuela, 49 Violence: and Freedom House, 3, 221, 299, 307; and law enforcement, 3–5, 307; and sugar industry strike, 37; as justification for coup d’état, 53, 54, 55, 60, 66; and demonstration of February 1962, 219–22, 223, 224, 225–29, 253, 261, 263, 266, 294; and demonstration of April 1963, 230–31, 266, 279, 294–95; and Wismar, 231–32, 233, 234, 237, 240, 295, 340 (n. 125); and demonstration of April 1964, 231–33, 234, 236, 279, 293; and U.S. subversive activities, 242, 249, 262, 266, 280, 283; and Jagan’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, 243, 270, 279 Voting Rights Act of 1965 (U.S.), 202 Waddington, E. J., 8 Waddington, John, 151 Waddington Commission: and universal adult suffrage, 8, 14; and structure of colonial government, 8–9, 141; and racial tensions, 110–13; and elite groups, 136; impact of constitutional changes of, 138;

report of, 163; and People’s Progressive Party testimony, 243 Wagle, Dattatraya P., 165 Walker, Patrick Gordon, 289 Watson, J. H. A., 251 Watson, Lord (Labour Party), 278 West Indies Federation, 197–99, 245 Westmaas, Rory, 28, 67, 198 Whites: as racially invisible, 112, 113; as capitalist class, 115; and racial politics, 121–22, 192, 206–7. See also Racial politics Whitney, John, 245–46 Widdup, F. D., 103, 105 Williams, Eric Eustace, 128, 193, 255–56, 280 Williams, Winifred, 305 Wilson, Harold, 288–89, 295 Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF), 27 Women’s Progressive Organisation (WPO), 237 Woodcock, George, and Robertson Commission, 95–96, 130, 132 Woolford, Eustace, 22, 51 Working poor: Cheddi and Janet Jagan blurring social distance from, 75, 76; and Luckhoo, 76, 99–101, 102, 105; Savage’s lack of confidence in, 90; elite attitudes toward, 98, 99, 103, 105–6, 107, 109, 117, 124, 129; economic conditions of, 108– 10, 115–16, 117; and People’s Progressive Party, 124; and nationalism, 159; geography of, 160; and United Force, 214–15, 216; and demonstration, 226 World Bank, 21, 25 World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), 27 World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), 26, 28, 63 World Festival of Youth, 26 World Peace Congress, 26 World Peace Council, 28, 174 World War II, 122 Wynn Parry, Henry, 178, 225 Wynn Parry Commission, 179, 183–86, 225, 226–28, 229 Yugoslavia, 261 Index

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Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Prince and Emperor, 1859–1900 (1989). Carolyn Merchant, Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New England (1989). Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang, Etched in Memory: The Building and Survival of Artistic Reputation (1990). Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (1992). Robert L. Dorman, Revolt of the Provinces: The Regionalist Movement in America (1993). Peter N. Stearns, Meaning Over Memory: Recasting the Teaching of Culture and History (1993). Thomas Wolfe, The Good Child’s River, edited with an introduction by Suzanne Stutman (1994). Warren A. Nord, Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma (1995). David E. Whisnant, Rascally Signs in Sacred Places: The Politics of Culture in Nicaragua (1995). Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Emperor and Exile, 1900–1941 (1996). Jonathan Hartlyn, The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic (1998). Louis A. Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture (1999). Yaakov Ariel, Evangelizing the Chosen People: Missions to the Jews in America, 1880–2000 (2000). Philip F. Gura, C. F. Martin and His Guitars, 1796–1873 (2003). Louis A. Pérez Jr., To Die in Cuba: Suicide and Society (2005). Peter Filene, The Joy of Teaching: A Practical Guide for New College Instructors (2005). John Charles Boger and Gary Orfield, eds., School Resegregation: Must the South Turn Back? Copyright © 2010. University of North Carolina Press. All rights reserved.

(2005). Jock Lauterer, Community Journalism: Relentlessly Local (2006). Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (2007). Michael Lienesch, In the Beginning: Fundamentalism, the Scopes Trial, and the Making of the Antievolution Movement (2007). Eric L. Muller, American Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in World War II (2007). John McGowan, American Liberalism: An Interpretation for Our Time (2007). Nortin M. Hadler, M.D., Worried Sick: A Prescription for Health in an Overtreated America (2008). William Ferris, Give My Poor Heart Ease: Voices of the Mississippi Blues (2009). Colin A. Palmer, Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power: British Guiana’s Struggle for Independence (2010).

Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power : British Guiana's Struggle for Independence, University of North Carolina