Changing gender roles and attitudes to family formation in Ireland 9781526100672

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Changing gender roles and attitudes to family formation in ireland

IRISH SOCIETY The Irish Society series provides a critical, interdisciplinary and in-depth analysis of Ireland that reveals the processes and forces shaping social, economic, cultural and political life, and their outcomes for communities and social groups. The books seek to understand the evolution of social, economic and spatial relations from a broad range of perspectives, and explore the challenges facing Irish society in the future given present conditions and policy instruments.

Series editor Rob Kitchin ALREADY PUBLISHED

Ireland and the Freedom of Information Act Edited by Maura Adshead and Tom Felle Public private partnerships in Ireland: Failed experiment or the way forward for the state?  Rory Hearne Migrations: Ireland in a global world Edited by Mary Gilmartin and Allen White The economics of disability: Insights from Irish research Edited by John Cullinan, Seán Lyons and Brian Nolan The domestic, moral and political economies of post-Celtic tiger Ireland: What rough beast?  Kieran Keohane and Carmen Kuhling Challenging times, challenging administration: The role of public administration in producing social justice in Ireland  Chris McInerney Corporate and white-collar crime in Ireland: A new architecture of regulatory enforcement  Joe McGrath Management and gender in higher education  Pat O’Connor Defining events: Power, resistance and identity in twenty-first-century Ireland Edited by Rosie Meade and Fiona Dukelow

Changing gender roles and attitudes to family formation in ireland Margret Fine-Davis

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © Margret Fine-Davis 2016 The right of Margret Fine-Davis to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for ISBN 978 0 719 09696 9 hardback First published 2016 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

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Contents

List of figures List of tables Series editor’s foreword Acknowledgements 1 Changing gender roles and family formation: overview of key issues and previous research 2 Method 3 Attitudes to gender roles 4 Family formation: attitudes and behaviour 5 Attitudes to having children and childlessness 6 People’s priorities and values 7 Attitudes to social policies relevant to family formation 8 Predictors of family status 9 Predictors of ideal and expected family size 10 The effect of family status on well-being 11 Summary and discussion Appendix References Index

page vi ix xii xiv 1 29 36 61 95 114 125 138 152 161 177 200 207 219

Figures

3.1

Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor I: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement (N = 1,404) page 47 3.2 Summary ‘agree’ responses by gender to items on Factor I: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement (N = 1,404) 48 3.3 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor II: Male Role Ambiguity (N = 1,404) 49 3.4 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor III: Support for Female Financial Independence (N = 1,404) 50 3.5 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor IV: Belief in Traditional Male Support and Protection (N = 1,404) 51 3.6 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor V: Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework (N = 1,404) 52 3.7 Summary ‘agree’ responses by gender to items on Factor V: Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework (N = 1,404) 53 3.8 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor VI: Belief That Mothers Are Best Nurturers (N = 1,404) 54 3.9 Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement: means for significant interaction effect of gender and socio-economic status 56 3.10 Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework: means for significant interaction effect between gender and presence of children 59 4.1 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor I: Belief in Marriage (N = 1,404) 67 4.2 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor II: Belief in Cohabitation (N = 1,404) 72

List of figures Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor III: Perceived Negative Aspects of Marriage/Positive Aspects of Cohabitation (N = 1,404) 4.4 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor IV: Perceived Gender Differences in Being Single (N = 1,404) 4.5 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor V: Perceived Difficulty in Finding a Partner (N = 1,404) 4.6 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor VI: Ambivalence Towards Being Single (N = 1,404) 4.7 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor VII: Perceived Acceptability of Being Single (N = 1,404) 4.8 Perceived Difficulty in Finding a Partner: means for significant interaction effect between gender and socio-economic status 4.9 Perceived Difficulty in Finding a Partner: means for significant interaction effect between gender and family status 4.10 Percentage of people who have ever cohabited, by gender, age and family status 4.11 Belief that cohabitation would lead to a lifelong commitment (N = 873) 4.12 Belief that cohabitation would lead to marriage (N = 873) 5.1 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor I: Belief in Necessity of Having Children for Fulfilment (N = 1,404) 5.2 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor II: Perceived Economic Constraints to Having Children (N = 1,404) 5.3 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor III: Belief in Value of Smaller Families (N = 1,404) 5.4 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor IV: Belief that Men Want Children as Much as Women Do (N = 1,404) 5.5 Perceived Economic Constraints to Having Children: means for significant interaction effect of family status and presence of children 5.6 Belief in Value of Smaller Families: means for significant interaction effect between age and presence of children 5.7 Belief that Men Want Children as much as Women Do: means for significant interaction effect between age and social class (N = 1,404) 7.1 Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor I: Support for Universal Provision of Childcare (N = 1404)

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4.3

74 75 75 76 77 81 82 84 85 86 100 100 103 104 105 107 108 129

viii 7.2 7.3 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6

List of figures Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor II: Perceived Consequences of Part-Time Working (N = 1,404) Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor III: Support for Policies to Support Co-parenting (N = 1,404) Loneliness: means for significant interaction effect between gender, family status and presence of children (N = 1,404) Life satisfaction: means for significant interaction effect between gender, family status and presence of children ‘My life is how I would like it to be’: means for significant interaction effect between gender and socio-economic status Current dating behaviour of single people by gender and age (N = 625) Current dating behaviour of single people by presence of children and education (N = 625) Happiness levels of those in various dating situations (N = 625)

129 130 167 169 170 172 172 174

Tables

1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Married women’s labour force participation in Ireland, 1961–2009 (%) page 7 Total fertility rate, 1960–2007 for selected high- and low-fertility EU countries 11 Relationship between married women’s labour force participation and total fertility rate in Ireland, 1960–2009 13 Fieldwork: frequency and distribution of contacts 31 Comparison of unweighted sample, weighted sample and Central Statistics Office population estimates for key demographic characteristics 32 Factor analysis of twenty-nine items measuring attitudes to gender roles: items from six Varimax rotated factors (N = 1,404) 37 Percentage distributions of attitudes to gender roles, grouped by factor (N = 1,404) 43 Analysis of variance: effects of five demographic characteristics on six factors measuring attitudes to gender roles (N = 1,404) 57 Factor analysis of thirty-five items measuring attitudes to relationships: selected items from seven Varimax rotated factors (N = 1,404) 63 Percentage distributions of items measuring attitudes to family formation, grouped by factor (N = 1,404) 68 Cross-cultural data from ISSP survey on item, ‘People who want children ought to get married’ (percentage agreeing, 1988–2002) 71 ISSP data for item, ‘People who want children ought to get married’ (percentage agreeing by age group; Ireland only, 1988–2002) 72 Analysis of variance: effects of five demographic characteristics on seven factors measuring attitudes to family formation (N = 1,404) 79

x 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1

List of tables Length of time living together in the last three cohabitations (N = 873) Intention of cohabitees to marry in the future by gender, age, presence of children and education (N = 304 unweighted, 160 weighted) Intention of cohabiting people to marry current partner, by gender, age, presence of children and education (N = 304 unweighted, 160 weighted) Factor analysis of thirteen items measuring attitudes to having children: selected items from four Varimax rotated factors (N = 1,404) Percentage distributions of items measuring attitudes to having children, grouped by factor (N = 1,404) Analysis of variance: effects of five demographic characteristics on four factors measuring attitudes to having children (N = 1,404) Analysis of variance: main effects of four demographic variables on actual, expected and ideal family size (N = 1,404) Analysis of variance: effects of five demographic characteristics on importance of four areas of life (N = 1,404) Analysis of variance: effects of five demographic characteristics on satisfaction with five areas of life (N = 1,404) Analysis of variance: effects of five demographic variables on Autonomy (N = 1,404) Frequency of attendance at religious services: cross-tabulations by six demographic characteristics Factor analysis of thirteen items measuring attitudes to work–life balance and related social policies: selected items from three Varimax rotated factors (N = 1,404) Percentage distributions for items measuring attitudes to work–life balance and related social policies, grouped by factor (N = 1,404) Analysis of variance: effects of five demographic characteristics on three factors measuring attitudes to work–life balance and related social policies (N = 1,404) Correlations between attitudes to having children and attitudes to work–life balance and related social policies (N = 1,404) Summary of stepwise multiple regression of predictors of being single vs. cohabiting or being married: males only and females only

85 89 89 96 101 106 111 117 119 122 123 126 132 135 136 139

List of tables Multiple regression analyses: predictors of family status – single vs. married, single vs. cohabiting and cohabiting vs. married for males only and females only 9.1 Summary of stepwise multiple regression of predictors of expected family size 9.2 Summary of stepwise multiple regression of predictors of ideal family size 10.1 Analysis of variance: effects of six demographic characteristics on eight measures of well-being (N = 1,404) 10.2 Happiness levels of those in various dating situations (N = 625) A.1 Perceived facilitators to current cohabitation: percentage responses and means of cohabiting people (N = 304 unweighted; 160 weighted) A.2 Factors perceived by cohabitees as relevant to getting married A.3 Married people’s perceived facilitators to current marriage A.4 Likelihood of having children one day: percentage responses and means by gender, age, family status, children and education (N = 1,404) A.5 Expected number of children, percentages and means by gender, age, family status, children and education (N = 1,404) A.6 Perceived facilitators and constraints to childbearing (N = 1,404)

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8.2

145 155 158 164 173 200 201 202 203 204 205

Series editor’s foreword

Over the past 20  years, Ireland has undergone enormous social, cultural and economic change. From a poor, peripheral country on the edge of Europe with a conservative culture dominated by tradition and the Church, Ireland transformed into a global, cosmopolitan country with a dynamic economy. At the heart of the processes of change was a new kind of political economic model of development that ushered in the so-called Celtic Tiger years, accompanied by renewed optimism in the wake of the ceasefires in Northern Ireland and the peace dividend of the Good Friday Agreement. As Ireland emerged from decades of economic stagnation and The Troubles came to a peaceful end, the island became the focus of attention for countries seeking to emulate its economic and political miracles. Every other country, it seemed, wanted to be the next Tiger, modelled on Ireland’s successes. And then came the financial collapse of 2008, the bursting of the property bubble, bank bailouts, austerity plans, rising unemployment and a return to emigration. From being the paradigm case of successful economic transformation, Ireland has become an internationally important case study of what happens when an economic model goes disastrously wrong. The Irish Society series provides a critical, interdisciplinary and in-depth analysis of Ireland that reveals the processes and forces shaping social, economic, cultural and political life, and their outcomes for communities and social groups. The books seek to understand the evolution of social, economic and spatial relations from a broad range of perspectives and explore the challenges facing Irish society in the future given present conditions and policy instruments. The series examines all aspects of Irish society including, but not limited to: social exclusion, identity, health, welfare, life cycle, family life and structures, labour and work cultures, spatial and sectoral economy, local and regional development, politics and the political system, government and governance, environment, migration and spatial planning. The series is supported by the Irish Social Sciences Platform (ISSP), an all-island platform of integrated social-science research and graduate education focusing on the social, cultural

Series editor’s foreword

xiii

and economic transformations shaping Ireland in the twenty-first century. Funded by the Programme for Research in Third-Level Institutions, the ISSP brings together leading social-science academics from all of Ireland’s universities and other third-level institutions. Given the marked changes in Ireland’s fortunes over the past two decades, it is important that rigorous scholarship is applied to understand the forces at work, how they have affected different people and places in uneven and unequal ways and what needs to happen to create a fairer and prosperous society. The Irish Society series provides such scholarship. Rob Kitchin

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my appreciation to the Family Support Agency for its generous support of the research presented here. In particular, I am grateful to Aideen Mooney, Head of Research for most of the duration of the study, for her contribution to the development of the research and encouragement throughout. I also wish to thank her successor, Brian O’Byrne, who ably steered the project to completion. I am grateful to the Board of the Agency and its Chair, Michael O’Kennedy, and to Pat Bennett, CEO, for their interest in and support of the research from conception to completion. The views expressed in the book are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Family Support Agency. The Steering Committee of the study included Prof James Williams, Economic and Social Research Institute; Dr Stephanie O’Keeffe, National Director, Health and Well-being, Health Services Executive (HSE); Ann-Marie O’Connor, Department of Social Protection; and Deirdre Bodkin, Department of Justice, Equality and Defence. I am most grateful to them for generously giving of their time and expertise to the study, in particular to the design of the questionnaire. I wish especially to thank Prof Williams for his advice on sampling, design and analysis, and would like to thank him and Dr O’Keeffe, as well as the anonymous reviewers, for their most useful comments on earlier drafts of research reports, which formed the basis of this book. The fieldwork and data analyses were carried out by Behaviour and Attitudes. I especially wish to thank Ian McShane, Managing Director, and Luke Reaper, Director, as well as Dean Howlin, who expertly and efficiently executed all of the data analyses, and Louise McGrillen who oversaw the fieldwork throughout the country. We are most grateful to Aidan Punch and Marie Hogarty of the Central Statistics Office for providing advice and special runs on the Census which assisted us in the design and selection of the sample. Appreciation is also expressed to the 1,404 respondents who participated in the main study, as well as the 48 respondents who took part in the qualitative study. Without their cooperation the study would not have been possible. Their views represent the views of many others like themselves and thus their inputs were invaluable.

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Acknowledgements

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Several colleagues assisted in conducting pilot interviews throughout the country, which were essential in providing insights which contributed to the main study. These were Dr Florence Craven, Amanda Holzworth, Mary McCarthy, Mairead O’Sullivan and Marianna Prontera. Special thanks are due to Amanda Holzworth, who worked closely with me at all stages of the research, from literature review and questionnaire design to preparation of tables and figures. Her expertise and commitment contributed immeasurably to the study. Following the completion of the study, I presented preliminary results at the ISQOLS Conference (International Society for Quality of Life Studies) in Venice in 2012. Liz Eckermann invited me to contribute a chapter (Fine-Davis, 2014) based on my paper, to her forthcoming book, Gender, Lifespan and Quality of Life: An International Perspective, published by Springer in 2014. Some of the figures which appeared in that chapter (Figs. 13.1-13.9) also appear in this book (Figs. 3.2-3.5, 3.7-3.9, 10.1-10.2). I wish to thank Springer for granting me permission to reproduce them here. Also following the study, I completed a book on Changing Gender Roles: Three Decades of Attitude Change, published by Routledge in 2015. In order to bring the data in that book, which primarily focused on the period 1975–2005, up to date, I included some data from the present study on current attitudes to gender roles in Chapter 10 of that book. I wish to thank Routledge for granting permission to reproduce those tables and figures here (Tables 10.2-10.4 are reproduced here as Tables 3.1-3.3; Figs 10.1-10.4 correspond to Figs 3.2, 3.9, 3.7 and 3.10 here). All of the tables and figures used in the chapters for Springer and Routledge originally appeared in my report of the study to the Family Support Agency (Fine-Davis, 2011). It was a pleasure to work with Manchester University Press. I wish in particular to thank Prof Rob Kitchin, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Series Editor; Tony Mason and Thomas Dark, Senior Commissioning Editors; Rob Byron and Alun Richards. I am also grateful to Sarah Kendall of Out of House Publishing; to Liz Hudson of Little Red Pen; and to Judith Lavender for preparing a fine index. Finally, I would like to express my thanks to the Sociology Department, School of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin, which hosted this research. In particular, I wish to thank Prof Daniel Faas, Head of Department, for his support and facilitation of the writing of this book. Warm appreciation is also due to Dr Gerald Morgan, Director, the Chaucer Hub, Trinity College, for his expert editorial comments and ongoing support and encouragement of my work. The book is dedicated to my late father, Meyer Fine, and to my mother, Dinah Low Fine, who taught me what a happy family is. My mother managed to do this while skilfully balancing work and family life, and has continued to raise thought-provoking questions, rooted in her own experience, many of them during the course of the writing of this book. Margret Fine-Davis Trinity College Dublin May 2016

1 Changing gender roles and family formation: overview of key issues and previous research Rationale for study The past several decades have witnessed major changes in gender roles and family patterns as well as a falling birth rate in Ireland and the rest of Europe. While the traditional nuclear family is now being replaced in many cases by new family forms, we do not fully understand the reasons people are making the choices they are and whether or not these choices are leading to greater well-being. Demographic research has attempted to explain the new trends in family formation, yet there has been little research on people’s attitudes to family formation and having children (Hakim 2003). Moreover, the relationship between changing gender role attitudes and behaviour and the new trends in family formation and fertility has not been adequately addressed. We shall address these questions primarily from the point of view of Ireland. However, we shall do so in the context of the international literature and trends. Comparisons of Irish Census data from 1986 to 2006 have revealed major demographic changes which have affected the nature of the family. These include an increase in cohabitation, postponement of marriage, an increased likelihood of remaining single and delayed fertility (Lunn et al. 2009). Yet Lunn et al. point out that ‘despite the centrality of family life to people’s well-being, there has been relatively little quantitative research into the dynamics of union formation in Ireland, or into the underlying causes of changes in fertility’ (2009: 2). While census data can illustrate trends in demographic behaviour, because it does not include information on psychological states other than mental health, ‘it is not possible to relate family structures to well-being, attitudes or other psychological indicators that may be important determinants of family life’ (Lunn et al. 2009: 7). Moreover, while demographic research identifies trends, it does not identify people’s motivations for behaving the way they do or the psychological effects of their choices. Thus, while demographic analyses have contributed much to our understanding of the transitions we are undergoing in family formation and fertility, they are insufficient on their own to understand

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the determinants and effects of the changes in family formation which we have been witnessing in Ireland (Fahey and Russell 2001; Cousins 2006; Lunn et al. 2009) and internationally (Belka 2008). We need other kinds of data to augment the analyses of demographic data to more fully understand the phenomena we are seeing. As Belka (2008), Under-Secretary-General, and Executive Secretary, United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Europe, stated in a paper to the UN Conference on ‘How Generations and Gender Shape Demographic Change’, ‘It is not sufficient to chart demographic changes. It is important to understand the causes of these changes.’

Background and context of present study Since the 1960s, there have been vast social changes which have led to changing gender role attitudes and behaviour and changes in the family in Western developed societies (Inglehart and Norris 2003). These include the increasing wealth of countries and the increasing educational attainment of populations, especially of women (Esping-Andersen 2009). The 1960s saw the widespread availability of contraception through the development of the contraceptive pill, which made it possible to control fertility in many countries (though not in Ireland until the late 1970s). This, in turn, gave women more choices, including the choice to remain in education and to enter and remain in the labour force. Towards the end of the decade of the 1960s the women’s movement began, which reinforced these trends. This period of economic and social change was accompanied by changes in the nature of the family and decreasing fertility. As a result, the traditional nuclear family is now being replaced in many cases by new family forms, including a greater prevalence of cohabitation and an increase in single-headed households. While these trends have been prevalent in some societies longer than others, notably the Scandinavian countries (Wiik et al. 2010), they are now becoming normative even in previously traditional societies such as Ireland (Drew 1998; Family Support Agency 2005; Central Statistics Office 2007; Punch 2007; Fahey and Field 2008; Lunn et al. 2009). A review of the literature in this area reveals a set of interrelated phenomena which have been studied by demographers, sociologists and psychologists. These issues can be broadly characterised as falling under several themes or areas; however, there is often overlap and interplay between them: • changing gender role attitudes; • changing gender role behaviour, e.g., women’s increasing labour force participation; • the relationship between women’s labour force participation and fertility; • demographic changes and the emergence of new family forms;

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• the effects of family policies on women’s labour force participation and fertility; • the economic and social effects of these changes on society; and • the psychological effects of the changing nature of the family on individuals and on society. We shall address each of these areas in turn as they all have relevance for the issues addressed in the book.

Changing gender role attitudes: the international context Before we can address changes in family formation, it is necessary to look at the significant changes in gender role attitudes and behaviour that have been taking place, since these form the backdrop to the demographic changes we are seeing. Changing gender roles constitute a major trend in our societies with vast social, political and economic implications and consequences. Inglehart and Norris have observed that ‘glacial shifts are taking place that move systematically away from traditional values and toward more egalitarian sex roles’ (2003: 9). These shifts in gender roles have far-reaching implications. Esping-Andersen goes further, asserting that ‘women constitute the revolutionary force behind contemporary social and economic transformation. It is in large part the changing role of women that explains the new household structure, our altered demographic behaviour . . . and, as a consequence, the new dilemmas that the advanced societies face’ (2004: v). While these changes came somewhat later to Ireland, the process of change has been very rapid. The heightened international awareness of the role and status of women, beginning in the late 1960s and coinciding with the beginning of the women’s movement, led to a marked increase in research devoted to studying changes in gender role attitudes and behaviour. Social scientists attempted to capture these shifts, along with related shifts in values, through attitudinal studies carried out over time. One of the earliest studies of attitude change was carried out in Finland (Haavio-Mannila 1972), though the vast majority of the research in the early period was carried out in the United States. These earlier studies captured the initial effects of the women’s movement (e.g., Mason et al. 1976; Thornton and Freedman 1979). This train of research continued in the US through the 1980s and beyond and has continued to the present day (e.g., Thornton et  al. 1983; Mason and Lu 1988; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; Cotter et al. 2011). This train of research has also taken place in several European countries, including the Netherlands (e.g., van der Wal and Oudijk 1985), the UK (e.g., Hinds and Jarvis 2000; Scott 2006, 2008), and Ireland (Fine-Davis 1983a, 1988a; Fine-Davis et al. 2005; Fine-Davis 2015) as well as in Australia (van Egmond et  al. 2010). Measures of gender role attitudes have been included in several

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cross-national surveys, including the Eurobarometre, European Values and World Values surveys and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and trends in Ireland have been discussed by several authors (Wilcox 1991; Banaszak and Plutzer 1993; Whelan and Fahey 1994; Hayes et al. 2000; Treas and Widmer 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; O’Sullivan 2007, 2012). The vast majority of the research cited above has found that gender role attitudes have become significantly less traditional over time, and most studies have found that attitudes to maternal employment have become more accepting (e.g., Mason and Lu 1988; Fine-Davis 1988a, 2015; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; O’Sullivan 2007, 2012). Yet several of the studies have shown that men continue to hold more traditional attitudes than women (e.g., Fine-Davis 1988a, 2015; Fine-Davis et al. 2005; Treas and Widmer 2000), and opposition to maternal employment tends to be expressed through concern about its effects on children (e.g., Mason and Lu 1988; Treas and Widmer 2000; Fine-Davis 2015). Mason and Lu (1988: 46) concluded that ‘for many men, support for equal family roles is highly qualified’. Thornton and Young-DeMarco (2001) and Cotter et al. (2011) both conclude that attitudes to gender roles in the US may have plateaued up to the mid-1990s – a trend also found in Australia. Van Egmond et al. (2010) found that gender role attitudes in Australia became more egalitarian up to the 1990s but then flattened and in some cases reversed after that period. These authors asked if it was ‘a stalled revolution?’ (van Egmond et al. 2010). Cotter et al. (2011) explored reasons for the slowing down of change in gender role attitudes in the US, including the possibility of a ‘backlash effect’, a concept introduced earlier by Faludi (1991). Braun and Scott (2009) attempted to answer this question by examining cross-cultural data and also explored whether or not the trend reversal was real, pointing to possible measurement issues in comparative research. They concluded that observed changes in gender role attitudes over time did not in fact support an interpretation of ‘revolutionary change and backlash’, but rather one of ‘egalitarianism reaching a peak and retreat’ (Braun and Scott 2009: 365–6). While this may have been true in the countries examined, it did not hold true for Ireland. Gender role attitudes in Ireland continued to change in a more egalitarian direction beyond the 1990s and into the early 2000s, particularly concerning the issue of maternal employment (Fine-Davis 2015).

Socio-cultural context in Ireland Thus, while many countries experienced significant changes in gender role attitudes and behaviour from the 1960s onwards, for a number of unique reasons, Ireland’s transformation began somewhat later, and, in many ways, Ireland had much farther to go in order to catch up with developments in the status of women in most other developed Western societies. Part of the lag in Ireland’s transition

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may have been due to its island status and consequent geographic isolation from the rest of Europe. It had also been primarily an agrarian society, and its economic and industrial development did not gain momentum until the early 1960s. The agrarian nature of the culture had a historical impact on the nature of gender roles in the society by virtue of economic considerations (Lee 1978). A further important factor influencing the role and status of women in this country has been the strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church, to which 95 per cent of the population belonged in the 1970s; this figure has slightly reduced over the past three decades. Ireland is unique among developed Western societies in relation to the constraints on women’s roles which continued well into the 1970s and 1980s (Commission on the Status of Women 1972; Beale 1986; Galligan 1998; O’Connor 1998; Kennedy 2001) and which still remain concerning the issue of abortion (Smyth 1992; Kingston et al. 1997; Fine-Davis 2015). This was due in large part to the strong influence of the Catholic Church in promulgating and supporting a traditional role for women and in shaping attitudes to gender roles (Flanagan 1975; Robinson 1978; Inglis 1998; Ferriter 2009), as well as in contributing to the social conditions and legal framework in the country. While the influence of religion on the development of gender role attitudes and behaviour has been well documented (e.g., Reuther 1974; Daly 1975; Farley 1976), the influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland was particularly strong (Garvin 2004), surpassing that in other Catholic countries (Chubb 1971), particularly concerning women’s roles (Flanagan 1975; Robinson 1978) and issues related to sexuality and relationships, such as contraception, divorce and abortion. The influence of church teachings on the norms and values of the society have been complemented by laws of the State and underpinned by passages in the Irish Constitution concerning the role of women (Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Article 41.2): 2.1 In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. 2.2 The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers should not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to neglect of their duties in the home. (Article 41.2, Constitution of Ireland, 1937) Attitudes towards the role of women in Ireland are part of a larger belief system in which religiosity is a central component (Fine-Davis 1979a, 1989) and which also has elements reminiscent of the authoritarian personality syndrome (Fine-Davis 1989; Adorno et al. 1950), a feature noted earlier by both Chubb (1971) and Whyte (1971). In spite of the fact that Ireland was a more traditional society relative to many other Western countries, the process of change from the mid-1970s was very rapid.

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The influence of various factors, including Ireland’s economic development, the women’s movement – both internationally and in Ireland itself – and the impact of Ireland’s membership of the European Community from 1973 onwards, served as catalytic forces to affect gender role attitudes and to remove barriers to their full and equal participation in the labour force. These were reinforced by a series of administrative and legislative changes which had major implications for the role and status of women. These included the removal of the marriage bar (1973), which had prevented married women from being employed in the public service, followed in rapid succession by legislation for equal pay (passed in 1974, implemented in 1975), employment equality (1977), contraception (1979) and taxation of married women (1980). All of these issues had constituted deterrents to married women’s employment, and, as a result, women’s increasing role in the labour force is one of the more dramatic social shifts of this period. Legislation concerning equal pay and equal employment were direct results of EU membership, as it followed EU directives. There was extensive public debate on contraception in the early 1970s, and the 1973 McGee case, in which the Supreme Court ruled that contraceptives could be imported for personal use, helped to precipitate legislation in 1979 in this area. Further significant changes followed, including a High Court ruling that declared the then current system of taxation, in which a wife’s earnings were treated as part of her husband’s, to be unconstitutional (Scannell 2000), thus leading to changes in the tax code. Divorce was legalised in 1996, following two national referenda in 1986 and 1995, the latter successful by a very small margin (O’Connor 1998). While in general the attitudinal shifts and legislative developments have been in a liberal direction, an outstanding unresolved issue is that of abortion, which remains an area of controversy (Smyth 1992; Kingston et al. 1997; O’Connor 1998; Fahey et al. 2005; Fine-Davis 2015). In 1983, a national referendum was held which resulted in the addition of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution which recognises the equal right to life of the unborn child with that of its mother. Several cases have been brought to challenge this restrictive legislative situation. In December 2013, legislation was passed which provides for abortion when a woman’s life is in danger, which gave legislative effect to the Supreme Court X Case of 1992. However, public opinion polls and attitudinal studies indicate that a majority of the population is now supportive of abortion on a wider number of grounds (McBride et al. 2012; Ipsos/MRBI 2013; Millward Brown 2013; Fine-Davis 2015), though it would be necessary to repeal the Eighth Amendment in order to allow this to happen. Concomitant with these significant legislative and administrative changes came major shifts in attitudes to gender roles (Fine-Davis 1988a; Whelan and Fahey 1994), which have continued up to the present time (Fine-Davis et  al. 2005; O’Sullivan 2007, 2012; Fine-Davis 2015; see also Craven 2006, 2010, for comparisons of Catholic and Protestant women’s attitudes). Fine-Davis (1988a)

7

Changing gender roles and family formation

found that attitudes to gender roles had become significantly less traditional from 1975 to 1986 among all groups – male and female, rural and urban. This included a greater acceptance of women’s role outside the home, including a greater acceptance of maternal employment. It also included attitude change concerning gender equality in areas such as equal pay, equal taxation and so on. While most of the attitude change took place in the earlier period, attitude change continued into the latter period from 1986 to 2005, particularly in relation to greater support for maternal employment (Fine-Davis 2015). The influence of the Catholic Church on gender role behaviour also began to diminish during this time, as women were now able to control their fertility and increasingly move out of the private sphere into the public sphere (Inglis 1987, 1998; O’Connor 1998; Kennedy 2001; Ferriter 2009).

Irish women’s increasing participation in the labour force The increasing secularisation of Irish society, together with the social policy and attitudinal changes referred to above, were accompanied by a major increase in women’s labour force participation, particularly among married women. Married women’s labour force participation was almost negligible in the 1960s, with only 5.2 per cent employed as of the 1961 Census figures. By 1977, this figure had almost trebled to 14.4 per cent. In the 20 years from 1989 to 2009, a period of economic growth, the figure increased from 23.7 per cent to 54 per cent. In the early period, the increase was due to the spate of administrative and legal changes in the area of gender equality (the removal of the marriage bar, the enactment of equal pay and equal opportunity legislation, changes in the tax code) and the removal of other deterrents to married women working (e.g., legalisation of contraception). In the later period, the increase in women’s participation was associated with economic growth and, indeed, was seen to contribute to the Celtic Tiger (Fahey and FitzGerald 1997). At all points, from the 1970s onwards, the participation of women in the prime childbearing age group (25–34) increased at an even more rapid rate than that of other groups of married women. As illustrated in Table 1.1, by 2009, 72.6 per cent of married Table 1.1  Married women’s labour force participation in Ireland, 1961–2009 (%).

All ages Age 25–34

1961

1971

1977

1981

1989

1994

1997

2001

2004

2009

5.2 4.8

7.5 8.8

14.4 16.7

16.7 21.6

23.7 39.0

32.4 54.5

37.3 58.2

46.4 64.7

49.4 65.5

54.0 72.6

Sources: CSO: Labour Force Surveys (1971–97); CSO: Quarterly National Household Surveys (1999–2009); Callan and Farrell (1991).

8

Changing gender roles and family formation

women in the childbearing age group were employed, as compared with only 54 per cent of married women overall (Central Statistics Office 2009a). The labour force participation rate for all women (married, single, etc.) was also 54 per cent at this time, and, again, the participation rate of those in the childbearing age group was much higher at 77.9 per cent (Central Statistics Office 2009a). Given the increasing patterns of cohabitation and single motherhood, it is apparent that many young mothers of varying family statuses fall into this category. Russell et al. (2009) confirm that this is the case in their examination of labour force participation of parents. These authors found that 60.2 per cent of women with children under 5 years of age were employed, as were 65 per cent of women with children in the age group 5–15 (Russell et al. 2009: 18, Table 2.2a). It is thus clear that both gender role behaviour and attitudes to gender roles have changed fundamentally in Ireland since the 1970s. The attitudinal changes have been associated with social change in women’s roles, notably their increased labour force participation, which reflects significant changes in attitudes towards maternal employment. They have also been associated with changes in legislation in the area of gender equality. What is not clear, however, is to what extent and in what ways changing gender role attitudes and behaviour are associated with the newly emerging changes in family formation.

Demographic changes and the emergence of new family forms Over the past three to four decades there have also been many changes in demographic patterns and in the nature of the family. A primary one has been a change in marriage patterns. Punch points out that the 1970s were ‘a period in which a high proportion of men and women in their twenties were marrying, such that by the mid to late 1980s only one in six males and one in nine females aged 35–44 years were (never married)’ (2007: 4). However, since then there has been a decline in the marriage rate, together with a postponement of marriage. This has resulted in higher proportions of those in the 35–44-year age bracket being single as of the 2006 Census (27.7 per cent of males and 22.3 per cent of females). The average age at which women marry has increased from 24.7 years in 1980 to 31 years in 2005. This has affected the average age at which women have their first child in marriage. While this was 25 years of age in 1980, it rose to 31 in 2005 (Punch 2007), a phenomenal leap of 6 years in just a 25-year period. It is likely that attitudes towards marriage, expectations and social norms regarding the ‘right’ or ideal age to get married and have children have changed. Demographic data suggest that women and men’s lifestyles and expectations regarding family formation and children have shifted. Marriage no longer takes place when a woman is in her mid-twenties but rather in her late twenties or early thirties. Another major reason why the age at marriage

Changing gender roles and family formation

9

and at first birth is rising for women is that they are staying in education longer. This is equipping them to participate at a higher level in the labour market. The lesser prevalence of marriage has been accompanied by a greater variety of living arrangements (Punch 2007; Lunn and Fahey 2011). The traditional nuclear family is now being replaced in many cases by ‘new family forms’ (Drew 1998; Family Support Agency 2005; Fahey and Field 2008; Lunn et  al. 2009; Lunn and Fahey 2011). While having children used to take place primarily in the context of marriage, it is now becoming more common for childbirth and parenting to take place also outside of marriage – either in a situation of cohabitation or single parenthood. Punch (2007) points out that the strong link which formerly existed between marriage and fertility has weakened in the last few decades. Up to 1980 births outside marriage accounted for less than 5 per cent of all births. However, during the 1980s and 1990s the percentage increased rapidly reaching a figure of 31.1 per cent by 1999. The figure has since stabilised at around 31 to 32 per cent. (Punch 2007: 7)

However, Lunn and Fahey (2011) note that among first births the proportion outside of marriage is 44 per cent, suggesting that births outside of marriage are on the increase. The increase in births outside of marriage has been associated not only with cohabitation but also with a greater prevalence of single-headed families. Families consisting of single mothers with children have more than doubled from 1981 to 2006 and now constitute 15 per cent of all families. Far fewer single-headed families are headed by males (2.5 per cent), a figure which has been rather stable for the past 25 years (Punch 2007). The fastest growing category of family is that consisting of couples (whether married or not) without children. Their number increased 130 per cent in the 20 years from 1986 to 2006. Many of these couples are cohabiting. Punch (2007) observes from the 2006 Census data that those who are cohabiting tend to be young: 41 per cent of the males and 53 per cent of cohabiting females were less than 30 years of age. However, he points out that it is not clear to what extent cohabitation is a precursor to marriage or whether it is a more permanent form of relationship replacing marriage. In the 20  years from 1986 to 2006, the average number of children per family decreased from 2.2 to 1.4 during this period (Punch 2007). Women and men are therefore choosing to have fewer children than in previous generations. Another significant demographic change is an increase in the proportion of childless women, which now stands at 17.5 per cent (Central Statistics Office 2007). Among women born in the 1960s, who may be assumed to have completed their fertility, approximately 20 per cent did not have children as of the 2006 Census (Punch 2007). This trend is also apparent in other countries.

10

Changing gender roles and family formation

Hakim (2003) observes that following the contraceptive revolution childlessness is now approximately 20 per cent in most modern societies. In Germany, fully one-third of the cohort of women born in 1965 is childless (Kohler et al. 2002). Factors such as attitudes towards marriage and children, family polices and employment patterns are seen by some authors as contributing to the trend of increasing childlessness. However, Hakim (2003) argues that the contraceptive revolution was in large part responsible for the drop in fertility that we have seen and particularly for voluntary childlessness. As will be discussed further below, the drop in fertility seen in Ireland from the early 1980s onwards, following the legalisation of contraception in 1979, would tend to support this view. A further demographic trend and change in the nature of the family includes an increase in the proportion of divorced and separated people. An analysis of Census data from 1996, 2002 and 2006 showed that not only are divorce and separation increasing but that more women are divorced or separated than men (Punch 2007). In the age group 35–44, 8.5 per cent of males were divorced or separated in 2006, whereas this was true of 11.9 per cent of women. In the age group 45–54, 11.3 per cent of men were divorced or separated, whereas this was true of 14 per cent of women (Punch 2007). The greater likelihood of women being separated or divorced indicates that men in the age group 35–54 are more likely to remarry, although Lunn et al. (2009) suggest that men may be more likely to say they are single rather than divorced and therefore the Census results are not entirely reliable in this respect.

The relationship between women’s labour force participation and fertility Along with the demographic changes cited above – particularly women’s increasing labour force participation – together with the changes in attitudes to gender roles, has come a steep fall in the birth rate in many EU and OECD countries, including Ireland. In most European countries the trend has been for decreasing fertility as female labour force participation has increased (Villa 2002). The decrease in fertility in selected EU countries from 1960 to 2007 is illustrated in Table 1.2. While most countries have shown a decrease in fertility over this period, some countries have managed to maintain a comparatively high level (e.g., Ireland, France and Denmark). Other countries have shown a decrease to ‘low fertility’, considered to be a total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.5, or ‘lowest low’, a TFR of 1.3 (Kohler et al. 2002). It may be seen that Poland has entered the lowest low group, as have many other Central and Eastern European countries and some Mediterranean countries, including Spain and Greece. Italy reached lowest low in 2000, and, while it has slightly increased its fertility since then, it still remains quite low at 1.34. Germany’s fertility has also dropped over this period and its TFR has remained in the low to lowest low range of 1.34–1.39 over most of the past decade.

11

Changing gender roles and family formation Table 1.2  Total fertility rate, 1960–2007, for selected high- and low-fertility EU countries. 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2004

2006

2007

High Ireland France Denmark

3.76 2.73 2.57

3.93 2.47 1.95

3.25 1.95 1.55

2.11 1.78 1.67

1.90 1.88 1.77

1.99 1.90 1.78

1.90 2.01 1.85

2.03 1.98 1.85

Low Poland Hungary Italy Germany EU-15 EU-25 EU-27

2.98 2.02 2.41 2.37 2.59 2.59 –

2.20 1.98 2.42 2.03 2.38 2.34 –

2.28 1.92 1.64 1.56 1.82 1.88 –

2.04 1.87 1.33 1.45 1.57 1.64 –

1.34 1.32 1.24 1.38 1.50 1.48 –

1.23 1.28 1.33 1.36 1.54 1.49 –

1.27 1.35 1.35 1.34 – – 1.53

1.31 1.32 1.34 1.39 – – 1.53

Sources: Eurostat 2006: 76, Table D-4; 2008: 6, Table 4; CSO 2009b: 58, Table 7.9; Lunn et al. 2009: 61, Figure 5.1.

Although there is a general trend of decreasing fertility with increasing labour force participation, there are some exceptions to this trend. The first includes countries that manifest both high female labour force participation and high fertility (e.g., France and Denmark) and the second includes countries with low female labour force participation and low fertility (e.g., Italy, Spain and Greece). These cases, which go against the general trend, have been referred to as the ‘participation fertility puzzle’ (e.g., Villa 2002) or, as Castles (2003) puts it, ‘the world turned upside down’. Those countries with the highest female labour force participation (e.g., France and Denmark) also happen to have the highest fertility (Villa 2002; Fagnani 2000, 2002, 2007). The total fertility rate in Denmark is among the highest in the EU (1.85), and its female participation rate is also among the highest (71.6 per cent). This trend is apparent in other Scandinavian countries as well. France has an even higher total fertility rate than Denmark (1.98 vs. 1.85) together with high labour force participation of women with young children. Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) point to a shift from a negative correlation between labour force participation and fertility to a positive correlation over the years 1970 to 1996 in twenty-one OECD countries, although they agree that this shift is mainly due to changes in the two groups of countries cited above; most countries have maintained the negative correlation. The continuing downward trend in fertility in European countries was reversed in France and Denmark in the 1990s (see Table 1.2), due to the introduction of family policies to support both women’s labour force participation and their fertility (Fagnani 2008). Villa (2002: 16) points out that ‘Among other

12

Changing gender roles and family formation

factors, the increasing burden on women, having to continue paid work with family responsibilities, has played a major role in lowering fertility.’ Yet, those countries which have been able to develop the supply of social services (all personal services, in particular childcare services) and to move towards a more equal sharing of family responsibilities (between men and women) have not only successfully expanded female employment, but they also managed to halt the declining trend in fertility. (Villa 2002: 16–17)

Castles (2003) concurs with Villa (2002) that in those countries with good social supports, such as childcare and family policies (e.g., France and Denmark) as well as flexible working arrangements, women can have children and still work. Those countries that manifest both low female labour force participation and low fertility (e.g., Italy, Spain and Greece) in the region of 1.2 to 1.3 children per woman, are countries with poor supports for families and where women have a lot of caring responsibilities for children and the elderly (Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci 1992; Villa 2002; Symeonidou 2002, 2004). Several of the new members of the European community, e.g., Hungary and Poland, have very low fertility rates because of economic transformations following the collapse of state socialism in 1989. Poland’s fertility fell from 2.04 in 1990 to 1.34 in 2000 and has remained at approximately that level; Hungary displays a similar pattern (Table 1.2). The policies which had supported women’s entry into paid employment began to be rapidly dismantled. These included, in particular, maternity leave and subsidies for childcare (Mishtal 2009). In Poland, discriminatory practices by employers against pregnant women and women with small children were also found to be decisive in women’s decisions to postpone or forgo childbearing (Mishtal 2009). Ireland’s traditionally high fertility rate has fallen from a TFR of 3.93 children in 1970 to 1.90 in 2006, representing a decrease of over 50 per cent during this period. This downward trend reflects the trend in Europe as a whole, which went from 2.38 to 1.54 during the same period. Ireland started from a higher base than most other European countries because the social changes in women’s roles began later in Ireland and also because of the strong influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland at that time which promoted traditional values and pronatalist attitudes (Inglis 1987, 1998; O’Connor 1998; Kennedy 2001). The decrease in fertility in Ireland over the past three decades mirrors the increasing labour force participation of married women during the same period; this negative relationship over time is vividly illustrated in Table 1.3. While Ireland currently has one of the highest total fertility rates in Europe, this still reflects a significant decrease of roughly 50 per cent over the past three decades. It has been predicted by the Central Statistics Office (1999, 2007) that this will further decrease and that Ireland’s birth rate is likely to continue to fall in line with European norms (approximately 1.5) unless policies intervene to change this trend.

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Changing gender roles and family formation

Table 1.3  Relationship between married women’s labour force participation and total fertility rate in Ireland 1960–2009. 1960/61 1970/71 1980/81 1989/90 2000/01 Employment rate (all ages) Employment rate (ages 25–34) Total fertility rate

2004

2009

5.2%

7.5%

16.7%

23.7%

46.4%

49.4%

54%

4.8%

8.8%

21.6%

39.0%

64.7%

65.5%

72.6%

3.76

3.93

3.25

2.11

1.90

1.99

2.10%

Sources: CSO (various) and Eurostat (2006).

While the CSO (1999, 2007) predicted a falling birth rate over the next 20 years, more recent figures have shown that the birth rate actually increased slightly from 1.90 in 2006 to 2.03 in 2007 and 2.1 in 2008 (CSO 2009c). Lunn et al. (2009: 86) observed that this may have reflected ‘the tail end of a positive impact of the economic boom’. Conceptions for births in 2007 took place in 2006, which was an economic boom time in Ireland. Data on birth rates during recessionary periods indicate that they tend to fall (Walsh 2009) as people are less likely to be able to afford to have children (Lunn et al. 2009).

The effects of family policies on women’s labour force participation and fertility Much has been written concerning the effects of family policies on women’s labour force participation and fertility. A good deal of this research has been carried out in a cross-cultural framework (e.g., Sleebos 2003; D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005; Gauthier 2007; Fagnani 2008), often under the aegis of international organisations such as the OECD and/or using data from OECD countries. The family policies which have been examined are extensive and vary from country to country. As Brewster and Rindfuss (2000: 283) point out, ‘there are nearly as many ways of classifying family policies as there are authors’. They include cash transfers to families with young children and leave entitlements, such as maternity leave, paternity leave and parental leave. They also include childcare facilities of varying kinds and quality and the availability of various kinds of work–life balance policies. The latter can include flexible working, part-time working, job-sharing, term-time working, tele-working, personal hours and so on. While cross-cultural research has attempted to study the effects of family policies on women’s employment and fertility, it is clear that it is impossible to have strict comparisons, since the policies vary so much from country to country. As Fagnani (2008) points out, referring to Gauthier’s (2007) reference to the limitations of data in this area:

14

Changing gender roles and family formation It makes little sense to conduct cross-national comparisons on a scheme by scheme basis or to assess the impact of parental leave schemes in isolation. It is more relevant to look at the overall organisation and then place it in its respective institutional, historical and cultural context . . . Indeed, what accounts for the variations between countries are the whole range of measures and services provided to parents and the cultural environment (that interacts with family policy) in which these take place. (Fagnani 2008: 10)

She further points out that ‘it is important to see whether the premises of the family policy are actually in tune with the normative attitudes of women and men towards maternal employment and childcare arrangements outside of the home’ (Fagnani 2008). Bearing in mind these caveats, we shall review some of the discussion in the literature about the effects of family policies on fertility and consider this in relation to Ireland. D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005) examined changes in fertility across OECD countries and tried to explain cross-country variation in fertility in terms of labour markets, social and fiscal policies and individual characteristics, and finally explored which policies had the largest effects on fertility rates. They concluded that fertility rates below replacement level are likely to be a persistent feature for most OECD countries in the coming years. They attribute this to women’s higher educational attainment and their increasing labour force participation as well as to changes in their values, which include increased financial autonomy and a less traditional attitude toward family roles. However, they do not see the low fertility rates as inevitable. They point to the US, France and the Nordic countries as exceptions to this trend, all of which have fertility rates close to replacement. They say that the factors which contribute to ‘success’ in these countries include policies that contribute to the lower cost of having children, namely direct transfers and tax advantages but, more importantly, investment in education and childcare facilities, access to a variety of caring arrangement, affordable housing, leave provisions and features of their labour market that do not penalise women for their decision to have children and that facilitate the sharing of family chores and the reconciliation of work and family life for young couples. (d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005: 70)

Ireland seems to represent an anomaly if d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole’s analysis is used. In Ireland, family policy has concentrated on cash transfers, such as child benefit and the childcare supplement, the latter of which has recently been phased out. There is relatively low investment in pre-school education compared to other countries with comparatively high fertility rates, which will be discussed below in connection with childcare later in this section. Leave provisions, e.g., for maternity leave and parental leave, have improved considerably

Changing gender roles and family formation

15

in recent years but do not reach the levels in some other countries which have maintained women’s employment and fertility (i.e. the Nordic countries and France). Work–life balance policies, while supported by the social partners, are not equally available to all employees (Drew et al. 2003; Fine-Davis et al. 2005). Fahey and Field (2008), in discussing the findings of d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005), conclude that the effects of family policy measures are weak compared to effects of labour demand changes (see their Table 3.3, 2005: 41). However, the family-friendly policies to which they refer included only: 1. length of parental leave; 2. percentage of wage replaced during maternity leave; 3. net transfers to families with children. The analysis by d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole to which Fahey and Field refer was a time series analysis of panel data which did not include work–life balance policies or childcare provision, since comparable cross-cultural data for these were not available. In an analysis of cross-sectional data for one point in time, in which data on childcare provision were available cross-culturally, d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005) found that childcare provision was a significant predictor of fertility. Indeed, they conclude that ‘childcare arrangements, transfers to families that reduce the direct cost of children, as well as provisions that allow mothers to better cope with their family and career responsibilities all can help in removing obstacles to childbearing decisions’ (d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005: 69). Further discussing the d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole results, Fahey and Field refer to the fact that countries with a high female employment rate show higher fertility (2008: Table 3.3). Many of the countries for which this is so are those which have state-supported childcare and work–life balance policies (e.g., France and the Nordic countries). These authors also note that an increase in women working part-time leads to some increase in fertility. This illustrates the fact that this form of flexible working is compatible with motherhood and balancing work and family life. Sometimes this is a positive choice, but other times it is the only work that women can undertake if adequate childcare facilities are not available. D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005) emphasise that this part-time work needs to provide the same protection as full-time employment if it is to support childbearing. If it involves lower hourly wages and a lack of pension or health coverage, it is less likely to do so (d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005: 66). The fact that an increase in gender earnings equality is associated with a decrease in fertility may in part reflect the fact that women in senior positions frequently do not have access to flexible working arrangements, such as part-time work and job-sharing, due to prevailing attitudes concerning how such work must be carried out, e.g., the view that ‘management jobs must be full-time’ (e.g.,

16

Changing gender roles and family formation

Fine-Davis et al. 2005), and hence women in such positions often have to make a trade-off of career against motherhood. In her analysis of the effects of family policies for the OECD, Fagnani (2008:  10)  observed that ‘a dearth of formal childcare provision (of both good quality and affordable) and lack of state support will likely push women to reduce the number of children they have in order to stay in employment’. She states that this will be particularly so if the childrearing norms encourage women with young children to stay at home to care for them, as in the case of Germany, which has a low level of fertility and in which a high proportion of women are remaining childless (Kohler et al. 2002). Fagnani (2008) attributes this to the cultural norms in Germany which discourage women to combine motherhood with a career. She contrasts the German experience with that of the French in which combined motherhood with a career is ‘valorised’. Brewster and Rindfuss point out that German family policies are designed to support the breadwinner–homemaker family and ‘do not accommodate women who wish to both pursue a career and raise children’ (2000: 285). As a result, it is clear that many German women have chosen to pursue a career at the expense of having children, hence the high rate of childlessness in Germany (Kohler et al. 2002). As previously suggested, it would appear that at the current time Ireland presents a different pattern using Fagnani’s analysis, as in Ireland the lack of formal and affordable state childcare does not appear to have lowered the fertility level to what one might have expected. However, Ireland’s fertility trajectory is still on a basically downward course, having decreased 50 per cent over the past 40 years so that it is likely that it will decrease further unless social policies, such as increasing state support for childcare, intervene. Fagnani observes that family policies themselves are the ‘expression of the dominant value systems, as well as a reflection of the cultural context that plays a role in creating a more or less guilt-inducing environment for mothers who wish to work’ (2008:  11). Hoem (2005) concurs that it is the whole political culture of Sweden, as opposed to specific policies, that makes the country more family, child and woman-friendly, which may have an impact on fertility (see also Gauthier 2007). Haas (2014) supports this view, pointing out how the provision of generous paternity leave in Sweden is reflected in men’s greater participation in childcare and domestic activities even after the paternity leave is over. It may be that the ‘dominant value system’ in Ireland still implicitly supports women’s role in the home as a carer of children. This view is supported to some extent by some continuing ambivalence towards maternal employment and the belief that mothers are the best nurturers of children (Fine-Davis 2015). It is also reflected in the generous child benefit payments, traditionally paid to the mother, and in the disparity in leave entitlements between women and men, whereby women are entitled to extensive maternity leave benefits while men are not entitled to any paid paternity leave. Parental leave may be shared between

Changing gender roles and family formation

17

both parents, yet this leave is unpaid, and there is extremely low take up by men. Moreover, because it is unpaid, women of lower socio-economic background are also less able to avail of it. The pre-school provision in Ireland in the ‘infant classes’ (for 4- and 5-year-olds) is only available for part of the day, and this dictates that alternative childcare must be found for children of mothers who wish to work more than part-time. All of these policies reflect ambivalence to maternal employment, which is inconsistent with expressed government aspirations in terms of gender equality. Work–life balance policies and childcare are two of the most important family policies that affect women’s labour force participation and fertility (Castles 2003). The importance of these two forms of support has been identified extensively in the Irish context. We shall discuss each of them in turn. The impact of childcare on women’s labour force participation and fertility in Ireland The primary driver for childcare facilities has been the dramatically increased participation of women in the workforce over the past 30 years, and particularly in the past 10 years, fuelling Ireland’s economic boom that began in the 1990s (Fahey and FitzGerald 1997). It was predicted as early as 1998 that the demand for childcare would be likely to increase by 25 to 50 per cent over the period 1998 to 2011 (Goodbody Economic Consultants 1998). This has come to pass, and childcare has become an increasingly important social and political issue during this time (Fine-Davis 2004, 2007). While the trend in most European countries, notably the Nordic countries and France, has been toward greater state provision of pre-school facilities, Ireland is one of the countries with the lowest level of provision, and its expenditure on pre-primary education (for children age 3 and older) is the lowest of all of the EU countries compared by the OECD (2004). The OECD points out that ‘childcare costs can be a barrier to work in Ireland’ (2004). This has particular implications for women, as the National Women’s Council of Ireland (2001) points out, citing the Expert Working Group on Childcare (1999): ‘The availability and cost of childcare and the difficulties around reconciling employment and family lives are the most significant barriers to women accessing and participating in the labour force.’ Childcare costs are a particular barrier to single mothers. For a lone parent with average earnings living in Dublin, ‘the cost of childcare for one child is equivalent to 30% of after-tax net income, and it would be another 30% for a second child’ (OECD 2003: 148). A recent study found that the most important barrier to single mothers entering employment was childcare arrangements (Fine-Davis et al. 2007). This was reiterated in a recent publication by the OECD (2009). The OECD had several years earlier concluded that ‘While the Irish tax/ benefit system largely supports the work/care choice, this is countered by expensive childcare for those without access to other arrangements, to the extent that

18

Changing gender roles and family formation

it may not be financially worthwhile for second earners to work’ (2003: 200). This will act as a deterrent to further maternal employment, as informal modes of childcare become less and less available. Thus, women with young children, both lone parents and those in relationships, are vulnerable to social exclusion from the labour market because of the lack of affordable childcare. In spite of the arguments put forward in numerous government working party reports for a coherent, high-quality childcare programme (see Fine-Davis 2004, for a discussion of these), the main thrust of recent childcare strategy in Ireland has been to subsidise existing childcare services in the community and to only directly provide services to the disadvantaged. Increases in child benefit have been a part of this policy. Recently, the Government provided a free year of pre-school for children aged 3 for part of the day. This marks a departure from previous policy and may indicate the beginning of a shift in policy towards greater direct provision. However, this policy, as well as the infant classes provided for 4 and 5-year-olds in the national schools, which are also on a part-time basis only, do not provide the kind of comprehensive childcare that many working parents require. For parents working full-time, this needs to be augmented by other forms of childcare. For other parents, the availability of part-time childcare means that they are only able to work part-time, often in inferior kinds of employment. The availability of childcare facilities not only impinges on working parents’ ability to reconcile work and family life but also has significant implications for the nation’s birth rate and hence future population. Working is frequently related to economic exigencies. If parents cannot afford to pay for childcare, they may have no choice but to delay childbearing or limit the number of children they have. For many people, work is also related to a desire for personal fulfilment and a wish to use one’s education and training. In this case also, if women must choose between working and having children, many may choose to work and not have children at all or choose to have only one child or perhaps two. The former Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and economist Garret FitzGerald emphasised the connection between childcare, women’s employment and fertility, pointing out that the current situation was: sub-optimal . . . and public policy should . . . be directed towards easing the tensions that women experience so often having to choose between work and child-bearing, for example, by facilitating childcare for working mothers  – the inadequate provision of which is clearly one of the causes of late marriages and late childbirths. (FitzGerald 2007: 16)

It is clear that attitudes towards maternal employment and the impact of childcare costs and financial supports for children will need to be addressed in any exercise aiming to understand family formation and fertility in Ireland.

Changing gender roles and family formation

19

Work–life balance policies: effects on women’s labour force participation and pregnancy decisions The availability of flexible working arrangements and supportive workplace culture are critical to combining work and family life among working parents of young children (e.g., Humphreys et al. 2000; Fine-Davis et al. 2004). Research has consistently shown that men do not contribute to domestic and childcare tasks as much as women do, and, consequently, women are responsible for the majority of domestic work and childcare in addition to their work in the paid labour force (Eurostat 2001; Villa 2002; Fine-Davis et al. 2004, McGinnity and Russell 2007, 2008; United Nations 2008). While 82 per cent of Irish fathers of young children would like to spend more time with their families, they are less likely to avail of many work–life balance policies due to a workplace culture in which such behaviour on the part of men is perceived as indicative of their being ‘less serious about their career’ (Fine-Davis et al. 2004, 2005). Moreover, Irish workplace culture also values working long hours ‘in order to get ahead’ (Fine-Davis et al. 2004, 2005). Research in Ireland has shown that women are more likely to take flexible working options such as job-sharing and part-time work, which has the indirect effect of negatively impacting on their career progression, whereas men are more likely to avail of options such as flexible hours and tele-working, which have no negative impact on career progression or on salary (Drew et al. 2003; Fine-Davis et al. 2005). This has resulted in a twin-track system in which women continue to remain in the lower levels. As O’Callaghan (2002) has pointed out, ‘It would indeed be a travesty if the very arrangements that are intended to allow staff to combine work and family responsibilities were to inhibit the career progression of those availing of these arrangements’ (O’Callaghan 2002: 83). While Fahey and Field (2008) conclude that the availability of part-time employment keeps women in the labour force, it is clear that it frequently does so at the price of their career progression. Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) point out that this varies by country. In the US, women who return to work on a part-time basis often lose pay, seniority, benefits and job security, whereas in Sweden and Norway part-time workers share the same employment rights and benefits as full-time workers, and part-time jobs are also available to those in higher-level professional positions. These authors argue that ‘the negative association between fertility and labour force participation can be expected to diminish as the conflict between work and family responsibilities is reduced – whether by a change in the nature of work life, shifts in the social organization of childcare, or a combination of the two’ (Rindfuss and Brewster 1996: 262). This view is shared by the United Nations, which states that: ‘family-friendly policies aiming at the reconciliation of work with family life can both counteract a decrease in the birth rate to very low levels and augment the employment rate’ (2008: 3). It would thus appear that unless work–life balance policies are made more widely available, young people

20

Changing gender roles and family formation

approaching decisions about family formation and childbearing may postpone childbearing or limit the number of children they have. The effect of work–life balance and childcare policies on pregnancy decisions and well-being Recent research has examined the attitudes of young women and men concerning pregnancy and childbirth and specifically the extent to which the lack of flexible working and lack of childcare facilities influence their pregnancy and childbirth decisions. Redmond et al., in a literature review of issues related to work–life balance, workplace culture and maternity/childcare issues, conclude that ‘many working parents are experiencing increasing levels of stress due to two main factors: the lack of work–life balance arrangements in the workplace and the lack of affordable childcare’(2006: 11). They refer in particular to research by Murphy-Lawless et al. on sexually active women and their attitudes to fertility, sex and motherhood. This research found that the young women in the study who were not currently planning on having children had ‘serious doubts about their ability to cope with the demands of motherhood and the labour market’ (Redmond et al., 2006, p.10). These findings further underscore the fact that inadequate childcare provision and work–life balance policies are already affecting the decisions of young Irish women to have children. The increasing stress of working people has been highlighted by Fagnani (2008), who notes that the pressure of increased demands on time, which she links to the rise in the culture of long working hours, has led to a deterioration in the quality of life. She argues that in light of these tensions and pressures, young couples might reduce their number of offspring. The issue of time pressure in various spheres – commuting time, working time, difficulties in synchronising work with childcare arrangements – were all found to be significant predictors of working parents’ ability to combine work and family life in a comparative study of working parents with young children carried out in Ireland, France, Denmark and Italy (Fine-Davis et al. 2004). It is possible that these stresses in balancing work and family life could impact on childbearing decisions, including the number of children a couple might feel they could cope with. A lack of supportive policies means that women often have to choose between work and having children or else they try to do both, and this results in stress. The stress experienced by the woman herself will also have an impact on her partner and her children. Research carried out in Ireland (Fine-Davis et  al. 2005) and cross-culturally (Fine-Davis et  al. 2004) showed that when inadequate childcare and work–life balance policies were in place respondents experienced lesser well-being in a wide variety of life domains, including satisfaction with health, work, family, partner and life in general. Conversely, when respondents had access to good childcare and work–life balance policies, this was related to greater well-being.

Changing gender roles and family formation

21

If women limit their participation in the labour force due to inadequate family support policies, this has the effect on society of depriving the economy of their talents. The EU has recently pointed out that the adequacy of provision of childcare facilities impinges particularly on women, who faced with inadequate childcare options, are more likely than men to have to give up work or to choose working arrangements which prevent them from fully exploiting their talents . . . the European economy is thus deprived of their productive potential, at a time when it is having to contend with economic and demographic challenges. (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 2)

If women decide to participate actively in the workforce, they may feel unable to manage having children as well if supports are inadequate, or they may feel unable to have as many children as they would ideally like to have. If a woman or a couple limits the number of children they have, this impacts not only on the woman or the couple, but also on society as a whole.

Attitudes to family formation: an important component In view of the vast changes in family structure and fertility patterns we are seeing, it is critical to understand the attitudes underpinning them. Castles believes that ‘what we are witnessing . . . is a long-term change in preferences concerning family size’ (2003:  211). Caldwell and Schindlmayr ask whether the current emphasis on type of welfare state or kind of family structure are adequate as explanations or whether perhaps we should be looking instead at ‘lifestyles’ and how family building has changed in current times (2003: 242). While it is known that falling birth rates are in part due to economic conditions, availability and affordability of childcare and availability of flexible working, little or no research has examined the social psychological factors that contribute to people living in various types of family units and having fewer children or no children. Such social psychological factors – in particular, attitudes – constitute a set of variables which Hakim (2003) has referred to as ‘preferences’ – an important set of potential predictors which she believes has been overlooked. The notion of preference or choice is a theme echoed by van de Kaa (2002a) who argues that individuals have greater choice in post-modern societies, and this may be affecting their fertility decisions. Sleebos (2003) also points out that with the emergence of post-materialist values, self-realisation and quality-of-life issues may take precedence over wishes to bear children, a view also expounded by van de Kaa in his theory of the Second Demographic Transition (van de Kaa 2002b). Individual preferences may also influence the form of relationships people seek, and this may impinge on fertility. It was the main goal of the study to be reported here to examine precisely these issues, namely people’s attitudes,

22

Changing gender roles and family formation

preferences and choices and how they relate to their decisions regarding family formation and fertility. Other authors have also pointed out that research on the relationship between fertility and employment leaves out important data on attitudes to childcare and attitudes to the ‘impact of childcare constraints’ on fertility and labour force participation rates (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000: 289). D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole compared men and women’s attitudes towards family and gender roles from the World Values Survey (2000) and found that men have more traditional attitudes than women about family and gender roles in most OECD countries, though these gender gaps have narrowed over time. However, these authors also found a widening gap between desired and observed fertility to the effect that people are having fewer children than they would ideally like to have. They concluded that ‘This divergence between desired and observed fertility rates suggests the presence of constraints that prevent women to achieve their expectations about children’ (d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005:  44), a view supported by Esping-Andersen (2009) among others. D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005) postulated that a mismatch in gender attitudes of young men and women might lead to lower rates of partnership formation and lower fertility rates. When they included this variable in an equation with other variables the relationship was in the predicted direction but the coefficient was not significant. However, the authors point out that the results did not allow for country specific effects or for interaction effects with various policies (d’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005: 60–1). These findings further underscore the need to take into account attitudes, preferences, lifestyle choices and perceived constraints in trying to understand family formation and fertility behaviour. The importance of studying attitudes to family formation is central to the design of the Generations and Gender Programme, launched in 2000 by the Population Activities Unit of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (United Nations 2000). The aim of this research programme is to ‘improve understanding of demographic and social development and of the factors that influence these developments’ (Vikat et al. 2007). This research programme was preceded by an earlier one: the Fertility and Family Survey, which sought to determine the causes of decreasing fertility (Klijzing and Corijn 2002; Macura and Beets 2002a). In summarising the results of this coordinated research, Macura and Beets (2002b) and Klijzing and Corijn (2002) conclude that the inclusion of only a limited set of determinants of fertility have contributed to a lack of progress in this area. The extensive use of event-history methods has led to a lack of explanatory power. There is a felt need for more research aimed at ‘explaining behaviour, not just describing it’ (Klijzing and Corijn 2002: 10), a view strongly supported by Hakim (2003). The influence of attitudes on behaviour has been well established in the social sciences. Their importance in understanding partnership and fertility

Changing gender roles and family formation

23

decisions has recently been highlighted by a number of researchers. Writing on the UN’s Family and Fertility project, Cliquet concluded that ‘Despite the number and diversity of the comparative projects tackled so far, there are still some important issues that are under-researched and deserve further attention . . . In particular, these include . . . The influence of values and beliefs on partnership and reproductive behaviour’ (2002: 24). This set of variables is seen as potentially offering greater explanatory power. More recently, Thornton et al. in the US stated that ‘Attitudes, values and beliefs are central factors in theoretical models of family formation behaviour and key elements in understanding changing patterns of family formation’ (2007: 225). Given the vast social changes witnessed in Ireland, particularly in relation to the decreasing influence of the Catholic Church on people’s family formation and fertility decisions, it is increasingly important to understand attitudes and intentions and the factors that influence these. Indeed, it has been argued that ‘As societal tolerance increases and as social control decreases in US society, individual attitudes are likely to become even more important determinants of individual behavior’ (Barber 2001: 124; see also Thornton et al. 2007). While this was said about family formation in the US, the premise is equally likely to be true for Ireland. Research has shown that gender role attitudes can significantly impact on people’s attitudes towards family formation, both in terms of the type of unions they form and their fertility level. Research in the US has found that less traditional attitudes are associated with a greater likelihood to cohabit rather than marry (Clarkberg et  al. 1995; Kaufman 2000). Clarkberg et  al. (1995) found that more egalitarian or liberal sex role attitudes were differentially associated with cohabitation and marriage for men and women. They concluded that cohabitation is attractive as an alternative to marriage not only because it is a tentative, nonlegal form of a coresidential union but, more broadly, because it accommodates a very different style of life . . . cohabitation as an institution allows for flexibility and freedom from traditional gender-specific marital roles, at least temporarily. (Clarkberg et al. 1995: 623)

This view is also shared by Musick and Bumpass (2012). Regarding the relationship between gender role behaviour and fertility, research in West Germany found that couples with a traditional division of household labour had higher birth rates than couples with either a semi-equal division of labour or where men did more of the housework (Henz 2008). Other research has looked at the relationship between gender role attitudes and fertility. For example, Kaufman (2000) found a significant difference between men and women in relation to their gender role attitudes and their fertility intentions. While egalitarian women were less likely to intend to have a child than

24

Changing gender roles and family formation

traditionally oriented women, egalitarian men were more likely to intend to have a child than traditionally oriented men. While the majority of respondents still intended to have a child, the difference between egalitarian women and men’s fertility intentions was statistically significant. Similar findings concerning males were obtained in a cross-cultural study in eight European countries by Puur et  al. (2008) who found that men with egalitarian attitudes seem to have higher fertility aspirations than their traditional counterparts. However, Westoff and Higgins’ (2009) non-replication of the findings suggests that this area still requires more research before any firm conclusions can be reached. Nevertheless, these findings from attitudinal studies suggest that changing gender role attitudes of men and women may significantly impact on fertility behaviour. It is also important to consider the interaction between gender role attitudes, the type of family a person desires and other goals or lifestyle preferences which may compete with either or both of these. For example, Barber and Axinn found that ‘Gender role attitudes have a strong impact on rates of marriage in early adulthood, but this impact is in opposite directions depending on individuals’ commitments to the pursuit of higher education’ (1998: 28). Those who believe that a wife should stay home, yet at the same time are committed to higher education, are more likely to delay marriage. Yet corroborating previous research, these researchers also found that ‘young people become less likely to agree with the idea that wives should be homemakers as they complete more education’ (Barber and Axinn 1998: 28). In addition to attitudes towards education, attitudes towards careers and spending also influence cohabitation, marriage and first birth (Barber 2001; Thornton et al. 2007). Theoretical models and previous research have shown that attitudes influence family forms (e.g., Rhoades et al. 2009; Wiik et al. 2010), which, in turn, have their own characteristics. (For summaries on differences between cohabitation and marriage, see Clarkberg et al. 1995; Barber and Axinn 1998.)

The economic and social effects of decreasing fertility on society The social changes that we are witnessing in terms of the changing nature of the family and a decreasing birth rate will in turn have other effects on society. One of these effects is referred to as the ‘demographic time bomb’ (European Commission 2006), i.e. the long-term effects on society of a lower birth rate. A low birth rate means that there will be fewer young people to enter the labour force, with the result of a smaller base of workers to support the increasing numbers of older people in the population. There are currently four people of working age for every person over 65. Falling birth rates, rising life expectancy and the retirement of the baby boom

Changing gender roles and family formation

25

generation mean that, by 2050, this ratio will have dropped to two workers supporting one pensioner (European Commission 2006). Vladimír Špidla, then EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, said that ‘concerns over the demographic time bomb must translate into action and reform now’ (European Commission 2006). This issue is one faced by many developed societies. If a falling birth rate leads to a higher dependency ratio, it creates the necessity to increase taxes or cut spending or both in order to support pension funds and health care needs of the older population. This not only puts additional strain on disposable income but can contribute to a decrease in economic growth and quality of life – phenomena which people in Ireland and in several other European countries have experienced in recent times. Such negative outcomes could be exacerbated further unless we maintain a reasonable level of fertility to replenish the stock of workers and maintain healthy dependency ratios.

Demographic changes and the changing nature of the family: psychological implications for individuals and society While much research has documented the major demographic changes which have been taking place in our society and in societies around us, little research has examined the attitudinal determinants of these changes or the effects of these changes on people’s well-being. Effect of relationship or family status on well-being While the attitudinal determinants of demographic changes in family formation are less studied, the effect of type of relationship on well-being has been the subject of more research. There has been extensive international research examining the effect of marital status on psychological and physical well-being. Much of the early work was conducted in the US (e.g., Gove 1973; Verbrugge 1979; Gove et  al. 1983). These studies found that marriage was related to greater well-being than being single, divorced or widowed. This research also demonstrated that marriage had more of a protective effect on men than on women. In a review of over 130 empirical studies, Coombs concluded that ‘the evidence is consistent with the protection/support hypothesis’ (1991: 97). Stack and Eshleman’s review of data from seventeen countries, collected in the context of the World Values Study, also supported previous research linking marital status and happiness: ‘In 16 out of 17 analyses of the individual nations, marital status was significantly related to happiness . . . The results offer perhaps the most sweeping and strongest evidence to date in support of the relationship between marital status and happiness’ (1998: 534).

26

Changing gender roles and family formation

Given the increasing rates of cohabitation, research has begun to examine its characteristics and similarities and dissimilarities to marriage. Stack and Eshleman found that while ‘cohabitants, who also have a live-in partner to enhance social integration, were happier than other categories of single persons . . . marriage increases happiness substantially more than cohabitation’ (1998:  534). McKeown et  al. (2003), who examined well-being among parents in Ireland, found that the quality of the relationship did not differ significantly between married and cohabiting mothers and fathers. These authors initially found that women’s well-being was significantly related to family form, whereas the differences in men’s well-being did not significantly differ by family type. They found that married mothers had ‘the highest level of psychological well-being, followed by cohabiting mothers, separated mothers and, finally, single mothers, who have the lowest level of psychological well-being’ (McKeown et al. 2003: 33). However, upon further analysis, they found that the relationship between women’s well-being and family form ‘practically disappears’ when other factors were included, such as personality traits, feeling financially secure and the quality of their relationship with their child. In fact, the significance only remained for single mothers. In a longitudinal study in the US, Musick and Bumpass (2006) concluded that the differences between cohabitation and marriage tend to decrease over time and are not as important as the similarities. Corroborating these findings, Hansen et al. (2007), in a Norwegian study, also found no significant differences between marriage and cohabitation on measures of happiness or life satisfaction and very small differences in well-being. More recently, Musick and Bumpass (2012) found that any union confers well-being outcomes, although some kinds of unions are more likely to add certain outcomes and others other outcomes. Effects of demographic changes and changes in the family on social integration Several social theorists have written about the increasing individualisation in society, which is in part an outgrowth of post-materialist values that focus more on self and self-actualisation and quality of life (e.g., van de Kaa 2002a, 2002b; Bauman 2003). This trend may also be one of the forces contributing to changes in the family, as people pursue their own needs to develop and self-actualise. These motives may contribute to an extension of the period of singleness and postponement of partnership formation, marriage and childbearing. As a result, we see an increase in smaller households, a decrease in the number of children per family and the greater prevalence of single-person households. The potential social psychological effects of these changes in terms of social integration vs. social isolation and well-being vs. ill-being are an understudied phenomenon. We do know, however, from earlier research on the effects of marital status on well-being, that being married is associated with greater

Changing gender roles and family formation

27

well-being than being single, widowed or divorced. There is also literature to indicate that older single people, and women in particular, suffer from some stigmatisation (Byrne and Carr 2005; Lahad and Hazan 2014). Recent research suggests that there are no significant differences in well-being of married and cohabiting people, although this research is still in its early stages (e.g., Musick and Bumpass 2012), as cohabitation has not been prevalent in many countries for that long except in the Scandinavian countries (Wiik et  al. 2010). Some research also indicates that single mothers have significantly poorer well-being (McKeown et al. 2003). Given that we are witnessing an increase in the proportion of single people in the population, together with an increase in single mothers, divorced and separated people, it is likely on the basis of the previous research that we do have that a greater proportion of our society will become vulnerable to poorer psychological well-being. Our society is changing from one which was previously richer in social networks and is now characterised by greater social isolation (e.g., Giddens 1994; Putnam 2000; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001; Bauman 2003). These are issues which have not been studied to any great extent in the context of the recent demographic changes and are explored in the present study in the context of the changing nature of the family.

Purpose and aims of the study The main purpose of the study was to examine people’s attitudes to family formation and having children in the context of changing gender role attitudes and behaviour and the profound demographic changes that are taking place in Ireland. These include an increase in cohabitation, a later age at marriage and at the birth of the first child. They also include a 50% drop in the birth rate over the past thirty years and a consequently smaller family size. The primary aim of the study was thus to better understand the reasons behind the recent social and demographic changes, i.e. why are people making the decisions which are leading to these changes? While demographic data tells us about these trends, little or no research has examined the social psychological factors that contribute to people living in various types of family units and having fewer children or no children. Such social psychological factors – in particular, attitudes, but also choices and preferences – constitute a critical set of potential predictors which have not been examined in the Irish literature to date nor featured to any appreciable extent in the international literature. The second main aim of the research was to explore whether or not recent trends in family formation are leading to greater well-being. The study examined the well-being of people in different family situations (single, married and cohabiting), both with and without children, in order to better

28

Changing gender roles and family formation

understand the psychological effects of the changing nature of the family on people undergoing these transitions. The study also explored attitudes to related social policies, such as childcare and flexible working, to ascertain the extent to which the availability or lack of availability of such policies may be affecting people’s attitudes and decisions in relation to family formation and childbearing.

2 Method

The qualitative study An in-depth qualitative study was carried out in late 2008 and early 2009 as a precursor to the present quantitative study. As well as providing important qualitative insights into attitudes to family formation and childbearing which could not be obtained from a quantitative approach, that study also played an important role in identifying key issues for inclusion in the questionnaires administered in the quantitative study, which is the subject of the present book. The sample used in the qualitative study consisted of forty-eight adults selected to mirror the types of respondents to be included in the main quantitative phase. The sample was stratified by gender, age (20–34/35–55 years), family status (single/cohabiting/married and living with spouse), socio-economic status (SES) and geographic location (Dublin/other towns and cities/rural areas). Most of the questions were open-ended and designed specifically for this study. Interviews were carried out on a one-to-one basis in a variety of locations. They were conducted primarily in the respondent’s home, the interviewer’s home or in Trinity College Dublin. All interviews were tape-recorded. Interviews lasted from 39 minutes to 1 hour and 58 minutes, with the average interview length being 1 hour. The full results of the qualitative study are presented in Fine-Davis (2009). Selected quotations from this study are presented for illustrative purposes in the presentation of the main quantitative results in the book.

Pilot study Following the development of an extensive questionnaire, a pilot study was carried out in the summer of 2010 on a stratified sample of 150 respondents throughout the country. The results of the pilot were used in developing the questionnaire used in the main study. Factor analyses were carried out to identify underlying dimensions of attitudinal items and to provide an empirical basis for retaining the best items for inclusion in the main questionnaire.

30

Method

Research design, sampling and fieldwork for main study Research design and sample The population under investigation was adults of childbearing age (20–49 years) in the Republic of Ireland. A stratified sampling design was employed. This was based on gender, family status (single, cohabiting, married), age (20–34 and 35–49  years), having one or more children or not, and rural vs. urban location. ‘Single’ was defined as not living with a partner; it did not refer to marital status per se, and ‘married’ was defined as married and living with one’s spouse. Presence of a child was defined as the respondent having given birth, fathered or adopted one or more children; it did not require that the child be resident with the respondent. This design was employed so that the sample would include people in all possible combinations of these characteristics, including married with children, married without children, single with and without children, etc., as this would enable us to use analysis of variance – one of the main multivariate statistical techniques used in the study. This technique enables one to identify significant ‘main effects’ of each of the independent demographic variables on key dependent measures of attitudes while simultaneously controlling for each of the other demographic variables. It also enables one to identify significant interaction effects between two or more independent variables in predicting the dependent variables. The technique is analogous to multiple regression, with the additional advantage of providing simultaneous information on interaction effects. A major goal in creating this design was to allow us to examine differences between single, cohabiting and married people while controlling for the effects of gender, age and other key demographic variables. The sample for the main study consisted of 1,404 respondents. A multi-staged quota-controlled sampling design with randomly selected starting addresses from the Geo Directory was used. This was based on a total of 200 randomly selected sampling points throughout the country with six interviews conducted per point. A ‘random walk’ from the random starting point was adopted within each sampling point. A total of 1,254 interviews were conducted during the main fieldwork phase, with the additional 150 pilot survey questionnaires boosting the sample to 1,404. Because of the comparability of the questionnaires and the quality of responses elicited at the pilot stage, the pilot data were thus incorporated into the final dataset prior to analysis. In order to obtain the final sample of 1,404, a total of 10,596 contacts were made. Of these, 38 per cent were ineligible, 32 per cent were not at home and 1 per cent were derelict properties. Twenty-eight per cent of the total contacts were eligible, i.e. they fulfilled the characteristics of the quota sample design. Of these eligible respondents, there was a 51 per cent response rate in urban areas and a 42 per cent rate in rural areas, for an overall response rate of 47 per cent, as shown in Table 2.1.

31

Method Table 2.1  Fieldwork: frequency and distribution of contacts. Contacts Absolute numbers Not eligible Not at home Derelict Refused Achieved Total Total eligible respondents, either refused or achieved Total response rate (achieved as a percentage of all eligibles)

Total

Urban

Rural

4,073 3,434 97 1,588 1,404

1,923 1,452 74 760 795

2,150 1,982 23 828 609

10,596

5,004

5,592

2,992 47%

1,555 51%

1,437 42%

38% 32% 1% 15% 13%

38% 29% 1% 15% 16%

38% 35% 0% 15% 11%

100%

100%

100%

28% 47%

31% 51%

26% 42%

Distribution Not eligible Not at home Derelict Refused Achieved Total Total eligible respondents, either refused or achieved Total response rate (achieved as a percentage of all eligibles)

Fieldwork methodology All interviewing was conducted on a face-to-face basis in respondents’ homes by experienced and pre-briefed interviewers. Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI) was utilised. Some of the sections of the questionnaire were self-completed by respondents on the laptops (Computer Aided Self-Completion Interviewing (CASI)). This protected the privacy of the respondent in providing answers to more sensitive questions and, accordingly, enhanced data quality. Fieldwork for the main survey took place from mid-August to early November 2010. The average interview time was 45 minutes.

Weighting of the sample and comparison with population estimates In line with best practice in all sample surveys, the completed sample was statistically adjusted or re-weighted to ensure that it reflected the socio-demographic structure of the relevant subgroup of the population under investigation. Table 2.2 presents details on the structures of (a) the unweighted sample, (b) the

newgenrtpdf

Table 2.2  Comparison of unweighted sample, weighted sample and CSO population estimates for key demographic characteristics. A. Unweighted sample

B. Weighted sample

Occupational Status

%

Total

100% 1,404

Professional workers

Sample (n)

%

Weighted sample (n)

100%

1,404

8%

107

8%

111

Managerial and technical

24%

338

29%

412

Non-manual Skilled manual

29% 19%

403 267

22% 22%

303 305

Semi-skilled Unskilled All others

16% 5% 0%

225 64 0

15% 5%

205 68

Gender

%

Sample (n)

Total Male Female

100% 1,404 49% 691 51% 713

C. CSO population estimates (Census 2006)

% 100% 50% 50%

Total Professional workers Managerial and technical Non-manual Skilled manual Semi-skilled Unskilled All others

Weighted sample (n) 1,404 706 698

Total Male Female

%

Population estimate (n)

100%

1,916,814

7%

128,878

8%

25%

479,715

29%

18% 18%

352,530 354,492

22% 22%

12% 4% 15%

238,308 78,944 283,947

15% 5%

Excluding ‘All others’

%

Population estimate (n)

100% 50% 50%

1,916,814 964,396 952,418

newgenrtpdf

Age

%

Total 20 to 34 35 to 49

100% 1,404 56% 780 44% 624

100% 54% 46%

Family status

%

%

Total

100% 1,404

Single Married Cohabiting

42% 36% 22%

Sample (n)

Sample (n) 590 510 304

Presence of children

%

Sample (n)

Total

100% 1,404

%

Weighted sample (n) 1,404 759 645 Weighted sample (n)

100%

1,404

45% 44% 11%

625 619 160

% 100%

1,404

52%

735

54%

753

With child

48%

669

46%

651

%

Sample (n)

Total Urban Rural

100% 1,404 43% 609 57% 795

% 100% 40% 60%

Total Single Married Cohabiting

Weighted sample (n)

Without child

Location

Total 20 to 34 35 to 49

Total Without child With child

Weighted sample (n) 1,404 556 848

Total Urban Rural

%

Population estimate (n)

100% 54% 46%

1,916,814 1,035,825 880,989

%

Population estimate (n)

100%

1,916,814

45% 44% 11%

853,319 845,442 218,053

%

Population estimate (n)

100%

1,916,814

54%

1,027,689

46%

889,125

%

Population estimate (n)

100% 40% 60%

1,916,814 759,251 1,157,563

34

Method

weighted sample and (c) the relevant subgroup of the population. Forty-eight individual weighting variables were set that reflected the population breakdown of 20–49-year-olds in terms of gender, age, family status, presence of children and area. Additional educational and SES (occupational status) weights were applied. All population figures were derived from the 2006 Census of Population. A comparison of Sections A and C of Table 2.2 illustrates that the completed sample, notwithstanding the quota controls, was slightly under-represented in terms of family composition by single and married respondents and over-represented in terms of cohabitees. This is due to the fact that certain groups, including cohabitees, were oversampled in order to have sufficient respondents in each cell of the design to make it possible to carry out analyses of variance. Other groups are represented in the completed sample, largely in line with the population figures.1 Comparison of Columns B (the re-weighted sample) and C (the Census figures) shows that the structure of the re-weighted sample is very close to the population figures. Thus, we may be confident that the re-weighted data is representative of the population in the childbearing age group. In the final weighted sample there are 50 per cent males and 50 per cent females. There are 54 per cent in the age group 20–34 and 46 per cent in the age group 35–49. The final weighted sample consists of 45 per cent single people, 44 per cent married people and 11 per cent cohabiting people. The breakdown by occupational status shows that 8 per cent of the re-weighted sample consists of professional workers, 29 per cent managerial and technical workers, 22 per cent non-manual workers, 22 per cent skilled workers, 15 per cent semi-skilled workers and 5 per cent unskilled workers. The proportion of rural and urban respondents is 40 per cent urban and 60 per cent rural in the final re-weighted sample. Again, this was adjusted somewhat by the weighting to conform to the proportions of these groups in the population. The final re-weighted sample includes 54 per cent people without children and 46 per cent with children, reflecting a minor readjustment from the original sample.

Instrument of main study The questionnaire used in the main study included sections measuring the following sets of variables: • • • •

demographics; attitudes to relationships; relationships and relationship history; factors leading to the decision to cohabit;

Method • • • • • • •

35

factors leading to the decision to get married; dating behaviour; attitudes to having children; factors contributing to having children; attitudes to gender roles; attitudes to work–life balance and related social policies; happiness and well-being.

Most of the items were developed on the basis of the qualitative study, while others were replications of items used in previous research by the author and others. Some of the items concerning gender role attitudes were replicated from Fine-Davis (1983b, 1988a), and some items measuring attitudes to work–life balance were replicated from Fine-Davis et  al. (2004, 2005). Selected items measuring attitudes to childcare and other family policies were replicated from Fine-Davis (1983a, 1983c) and Fine-Davis et al. (2004, 2005). Some of the items measuring decision to cohabit were replicated from Rhoades et al. (2009). Items measuring social isolation and social integration were replicated from the UN Generations and Gender Survey (Vikat et  al. 2005), and other measures of well-being were replicated from the NESC (National Economic and Social Council) (2009) and the Second European Quality of Life Survey (Anderson et al. 2009). Likert items were used extensively. These were presented on seven-point scales ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. Within each set, items were presented in a randomised order for each respondent so that there would be no ordering effects.

Note 1 Note that the Census figures on social class contain an undefined ‘Other’ category which was not in the survey data.

3 Attitudes to gender roles

Dimensions of attitudes Gender role attitudes and behaviour have been changing dramatically over the past 40 years in Ireland. This has included a marked increase in women’s participation in the labour force, including that of married women and women with children. The dual-earner household is now commonplace. One of the prime questions which the present study addressed was whether or not changes in gender role attitudes and behaviour were affecting family formation. Because gender role attitudes and behaviour have been changing so rapidly, it was necessary to develop new measures that adequately captured how people view these issues at the present time. On the basis of the qualitative study, we developed a new set of measures that captures how people view gender roles and gender relations today. Six dimensions or ‘factors’ emerged from a factor analysis. Factor analysis is a technique that summarises a larger number of attitudinal items into fewer underlying factors or clusters which have a common theme. It is based on patterns of correlations between items. The advantages of factor analysis are (1) that it summarises a larger number of items into a fewer number of more manageable factors; (2) these factors are more robust and reliable than individual items; and (3) that it identifies underlying dimensions among the items that add to our understanding of the relationships among the items. Several factor solutions were identified in this process, and we selected the solution with the greatest psychological interpretability and the one with the best statistical characteristics. The set of six new factors, presented in Table 3.1, thus reflects people’s current attitudes to gender roles, and these attitudes have been grouped empirically into meaningful dimensions. Factor I: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement The first factor concerns women’s increasing participation in the labour force and taps people’s attitudes to this. The factor is entitled ‘Perceived Threat of Women’s

37

Attitudes to gender roles Table 3.1  Factor analysis of twenty-nine items measuring attitudes to gender roles: items from six Varimax rotated factors (N = 1,404). Item No. Factor I: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement 7. Some men feel threatened by women’s advances in the workplace. 9. Men don’t really like it that much that women are getting higher positions – and climbing the scale. 17. Career-oriented women can be more threatening to men. 14. Most men would find it intimidating to go out with a woman who has a high-powered job. 10. There would be a proportion of men who would feel women may be taking their jobs. 27. Men can be uncomfortable if women are too assertive. 6. Most men could find it difficult taking orders from women at work. *11. Men feel a little redundant because there is so much competition from women. *29. Women can be so independent sometimes that it makes men feel like they’re not needed anymore. *Item not composited on this factor because of split loading on Factor II. % Var.: 15.16 Cum. % Var.: 15.16 Cronbach Alpha: .85 Factor II: Male Role Ambiguity 28. With all the changes in gender roles, it’s hard to know who’s supposed to do what. 25. A lot of men are confused about their roles because they are less defined than they used to be. 26. As a result of change in women’s roles, men are not sure where they stand. 12. It’s more difficult for a man to find a partner now because women are putting careers ahead of relationships. 11. Men feel a little redundant because there is so much competition from women. 8. Women’s gains in the workplace have sometimes been at the expense of men. 29. Women can be so independent sometimes that it makes men feel like they’re not needed anymore. % Var.: 11.73 Cum. % Var.: 26.89 Cronbach Alpha: .83 Factor III: Support for Female Economic Independence 22. It’s good for a woman to be financially independent in a relationship. 21. Most men are happy for women to pay their own way. 16. I think men nowadays like intelligent women who know what they want out of life. 4. Both men and women should contribute to the household income.

Varimax rotated loading .74 .69 .67 .65 .64 .64 .64 .49 .48

.73 .71 .63 .57 .54 .52 .49

.68 .63 .62 .60

38

Attitudes to gender roles

Table 3.1  (cont.) Item No. 19. A woman who has a job she enjoys is likely to be a better wife and mother because she has an interest and some fulfilment outside the home. % Var.: 7.43 Cum. % Var.: 34.32 Cronbach Alpha: .61 Factor IV: Belief in Traditional Male Support and Protection 5. Most men need and want to give the kind of protection and support that they have traditionally given to women. 2. Most women need and want the kind of protection and support that men have traditionally given them. 1. Being a wife and mother are the most fulfilling roles any woman could want. % Var.: 5.79 Cum. % Var.: 40.11 Cronbach Alpha: .50 Factor V: Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework 3. There’s an awful lot of lip service paid to ‘sharing responsibilities’, but it’s still a man’s world at the end of the day. 15. While men recognise that women have to spend less time on housework, they don’t recognise that they have to contribute more than they used to. 13. Men respect women more at work than at home. 20. If a woman is financially independent it can lead to difficulties in a relationship. % Var.: 5.59 Cum. % Var.: 45.70 Cronbach Alpha: .62 Factor VI: Belief That Mothers Are Best Nurturers 23. Caring for children is best done by mothers. 24. Fathers can be as nurturing to children as mothers can. 18. It’s bad for young children if their mother’s go out and work, even if they are well taken care of by another adult. % Var.: 5.53 Cum. % Var.: 51.23 Cronbach Alpha: .49

Varimax rotated loading .52

.76 .70 .52

.62 .52 .43 .41

.74 −.58 .47

Career Advancement’, to be consistent with the directionality of the statements; however, as in the case of all factors, the factor also measures the opposite of this, since factors measure a continuum of attitudes from ‘disagree’ to ‘agree’. The high-loading items contain statements such as ‘Some men feel threatened by women’s advances in the workplace’, ‘Men don’t really like it that much that women are getting higher positions – and climbing the ladder.’ The factor also includes items that suggest that women’s increased participation in the workplace may negatively impinge on their relationships with men. For example, the factor includes the statement, ‘Career-oriented women can be more threatening to men’, as well as the statement, ‘Most men would find it intimidating to go out with a

Attitudes to gender roles

39

woman who has a high-powered job.’ The Cronbach alpha for this factor is .85, which is unusually high and indicates that this is a very robust and reliable factor.1 This is notable, since we are not aware of any similar measures in the literature. Factor II: Male Role Ambiguity Factor II is entitled ‘Male Role Ambiguity’. This factor taps an attitude cluster concerning men’s perception of their own role in light of changes in women’s roles. Those high on the factor tend to agree that ‘With all the changes in gender roles, it’s hard to know who’s supposed to do what.’ This is consistent with the next statement to the effect that ‘A lot of men are confused about their roles because they are less defined than they used to be.’ Similarly, those high on the factor tend to agree that ‘As a result of change in women’s roles, men are not sure where they stand.’ As one young man said in the qualitative study in relation to changes in women’s roles: I think it’s changed men’s roles a lot. Over the past 30 years women have been empowered a lot, whereas the offset of that is that men are disempowered. Guys don’t know where they stand. The identity of a man at the moment is a bit ambiguous. (Male, 29, single, business analyst, Cork)

The factor also includes a statement concerning family formation: those high on the factor are more likely to think that ‘It’s more difficult for a man to find a partner now because women are putting careers ahead of relationships.’ The element of the workplace is clearly represented by the item ‘Women’s gains in the workplace have sometimes been at the expense of men’ and ‘Men feel a little redundant because there is so much competition from women.’ Thus, male role ambiguity is connected to an increasing lack of definition of gender roles and to women’s increasing role in the workplace, which may be perceived as having some negative consequences for men. In addition, the factor includes a statement that suggests that male role ambiguity may in part be related to a feeling of not being needed as a result of women’s changing role: ‘Women can be so independent sometimes that it makes men feel like they’re not needed anymore.’ This factor also has a high Cronbach alpha of .83, indicating it is very robust and reliable. As in the case of the first factor, this factor is also, as far as we are aware, tapping a new dimension in the literature. Factor III: Support for Female Financial Independence Financial independence was seen by respondents of all social classes as a key element in women’s new role and a key component of the changing nature of the relationship between men and women. This is illustrated by the views expressed in the qualitative study: In the past a woman had to ask a man for money. Now you don’t ask the man for money. (Female, 36, cohabiting, architect, Dublin)

40

Attitudes to gender roles Women are more independent, and they pay for more things. Men used to think they had to pay for everything. I’d have no problem paying for the pictures and he pay for something to eat. If we are at the nightclub I pay for my own drinks. I wouldn’t be sending him up to the bar. That’s what I have my own money for. (Female, 20, single, hairdresser trainee, Dublin)

A factor measuring ‘Support for Female Financial Independence’ emerged in the main study. It expresses the view that ‘It’s good for a woman to be financially independent in a relationship’ and ‘Most men are happy for women to pay their own way.’ It also contains the belief that ‘Both men and women should contribute to the household income.’ This factor also includes an item about maternal employment: ‘A woman who has a job she enjoys is likely to be a better wife and mother because she has an interest and some fulfilment outside the home.’ Linked with support for financial independence appears to be an admiration for women: ‘I think men nowadays like intelligent women who know what they want out of life.’ In contrast to some of the items loading on Factors I and II, this factor expresses a positive view about women’s financial independence in the context of relationships. Further, this factor contains an item about maternal employment, reflecting the view that ‘A woman who has a job she enjoys is likely to be a better wife and mother because she has an interest and some fulfilment outside the home.’ Factor IV: Belief in Traditional Male Support and Protection Factor IV measures a belief in traditional gender roles, with an emphasis on male support and protection of the female. It includes three items, two of which have been used extensively in previous research, e.g., ‘Most women need and want the kind of protection and support that men have traditionally given them’ and ‘Being a wife and mother are the most fulfilling roles any woman could want’ (Fine-Davis 1983a, 1983b, 1988a; Fine-Davis et  al. 2005). For the first time, a male counterpart to the first item was designed, i.e. ‘Most men need and want to give the kind of protection and support that they have traditionally given to women.’ Factor V: Male Reluctance to Share Housework Factor V concerns male participation in domestic activities and is entitled, ‘Male Reluctance to Share Housework’. The highest loading item is ‘There’s an awful lot of lip service paid to “sharing responsibilities”, but it’s still a man’s world at the end of the day’. The next highest loading item is ‘While men recognise that women have to spend less time on housework, they don’t recognise that they have to contribute more than they used to.’ The factor captures the essence of one of today’s most difficult problems, that is, how to facilitate sharing of domestic responsibilities in light of women’s increasing labour force participation. One

Attitudes to gender roles

41

young woman in the qualitative study expressed this view about men’s response to women’s changing roles: I think men feel a little lost. I  think they recognise that women have to spend less time on housework but don’t recognise that they have to contribute more than they used to. Men’s roles used to be synonymous with bringing home an income. Women are saying that’s not enough anymore – so they might be confused. (Female, 28, married, investment executive, Dublin)

The two other items on the factor add further nuances to this issue. The item ‘Men respect women more at work than at home’ suggests that while women are earning greater respect in the workplace, this does not necessarily translate to the private sphere. This is illustrated by the following quotes from the qualitative study: Men’s attitude towards women has changed. There’s slightly more respect for them than there was in the past – in work terms. But I think there’s still a misogynist streak in most men, definitely. You hear it expressed by people with regard to women. Men wouldn’t take women as seriously in the workplace as they would take other men because they feel they have other responsibilities or the possibility of other responsibilities – home, children, so on . . . Thirty years ago women basically stayed barefoot and pregnant – certainly down the country which is where I started life. That would have been the prevailing attitude. (Male, 55, married, landscape gardener, Dublin)

When he was asked if he thought changes in women’s roles had affected men’s roles, he said: Not an awful lot. Not hugely. There’s an awful lot of lip service paid to, you know, ‘sharing responsibilities’ in inverted commas, but I’m not sure that men’s attitudes – it’s still a man’s world really, isn’t it, at the end of the day? Certainly men would like to perpetuate that, I  think. (Male, 55, married, landscape gardener, Dublin)

This view was echoed by a woman in the qualitative study: I do think that men don’t take women working that seriously. They still, I think, perceive that they’re more important in the workplace. Men leave getting the meal on the table to the woman, as if it’s more the women’s role. (Female, 49, single, one child, company owner, Dublin)

The lack of concrete helping in the home was also echoed by another woman: I just think that women have a much rawer deal. Women in the workforce go home to childcare. Men have nice meals and golf. (Female, 43, cohabiting, three children, teacher, Dublin)

42

Attitudes to gender roles

The final item on the factor, ‘If a woman is financially independent it can lead to difficulties in a relationship’, suggests again that women’s labour force participation is somehow unsettling the delicate balance of male–female relations, including in the personal sphere, as illustrated by this male view in the qualitative study: I think they’ve challenged them big time, and I think it’s brilliant . . . no longer do women have to take a second place within a household. It has threatened men, and I know a lot of men who feel threatened by the situation of women working. They would say that first of all the income becomes a challenge for them. The fact that the woman would be earning as much as them would be a problem for them because they’ve always seen themselves as the breadwinner, as in providing the household. Now women can put down the same amount of money on the table and match that. (Male, 51, married, university student, Co. Carlow)

Factor VI: Belief That Mothers Are Best Nurturers The final factor concerns the belief that mothers are the best nurturers of children. In light of women’s increasing labour force participation, men’s role in childcare has come to the fore, and such attitudes are, therefore, increasingly important. Those high on the factor tend to think that ‘Caring for children is best done by mothers’, and they tend to disagree that ‘Fathers can be as nurturing to children as mothers can.’ Those high on this factor also tend to feel that ‘It’s bad for young children if their mothers go out and work, even if well taken care of by another adult.’ Conversely, those low on the factor tend to think fathers can be as nurturing as mothers and do not feel that maternal employment is detrimental to children.

Prevalence of attitudes to gender roles Participants responded to each of the items on seven-point scales ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The detailed percentage responses to each of the items, grouped by factor, are presented in Table 3.2. For simplicity’s sake, we are also presenting the summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ percentages in a series of figures below. The following figures also present the individual attitudinal items grouped by the six factors discussed above, using the weighted data representative of the population in the childbearing age group. In some cases, we also present gender differences in the figures. Any difference between the summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses is due to the ‘don’t know’ responses. Factor I: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement In the qualitative study, while women’s progress was noted in positive terms, this was accompanied in some cases by reference to the fact that women’s gains have sometimes been at the expense of men. While many men were

newgenrtpdf

Table 3.2  Percentage distributions of attitudes to gender roles, grouped by factor (N = 1,404). Disagree Strong Moderate

Agree Slight

DK, etc.

Slight

Moderate Strong

Factor I: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement 7. Some men feel threatened by women’s advances in the workplace.

10 –

9 (34%)

15 –

8

33 –

17 (59%)

9 –

9. Men don’t really like it that much that women are getting higher positions – and climbing the scale.

12 –

13 (44%)

19 –

9

23 –

15 (45%)

7 –

17. Career-oriented women can be more threatening to men.

11 – 15 –

8 (37%) 14 (49%)

18 – 20 –

6

32 – 24 –

15 (57%) 14 (45%)

10 – 7 –

10 (31%) 9 (30%) 12 (39%)

13 – 13 – 17 –

8

6. Most men could find it difficult taking orders from women at work.

8 – 8 – 10 –

37 – 33 – 24 –

18 (62%) 21 (64%) 17 (54%)

7 – 10 – 13 –

Factor II: Male Role Ambiguity 28. With all the changes in gender roles, it’s hard to know who’s supposed to do what.

14 –

14 (47%)

19 –

11

23 –

13 (42%)

6 –

25. A lot of men are confused about their roles because they are less defined than they used to be.

15 –

12 (47%)

20 –

10

25 –

14 (44%)

5 –

14. Most men would find it intimidating to go out with a woman who has a high-powered job. 10. There would be a proportion of men who would feel women man be taking their jobs. 27. Men can be uncomfortable if women are too assertive.

6

6 7

newgenrtpdf

Table 3.2 (cont.) Disagree Strong Moderate

Agree Slight

DK, etc.

Slight

Moderate Strong

26. As a result of change in women’s roles, men are not sure where they stand.

15 –

14 (52%)

23 –

9

24 –

10 (39%)

5 –

12. It’s more difficult for a man to find a partner now because women are putting careers ahead of relationships.

12 –

12 (43%)

19 –

8

26 –

16 (48%)

6 –

11. Men feel a little redundant because there is so much competition from women.

15 –

14 (52%)

23 –

9

23 –

13 (40%)

4 –

8. Women’s gains in the workplace have sometimes been at the expense of men.

14 –

12 (44%)

18 –

11

26 –

13 (44%)

5 –

29. Women can be so independent sometimes that it makes men feel like they’re not needed anymore.

12 –

11 (42%)

19 –

7

29 –

15 (52%)

8 –

Factor III: Support for Female Financial Independence 22. It’s good for a woman to be financially independent in a relationship.

1 –

2 (6%)

3 –

4

21 –

31 (90%)

38 –

2 – 3 –

4 (15%) 4 (12%)

9 – 5 –

7

26 – 31 –

30 (79%) 31 (82%)

23 – 20 –

21. Most men are happy for women to pay their own way. 16. I think men nowadays like intelligent women who know what they want out of life.

6

4 – 10 –

2. Most women need and want the kind of protection and support that men have traditionally given them.

1. Being a wife and mother are the most fulfilling roles any woman could want.

9 (31%) 17 (55%)

13 – 7 – 17 –

15. While men recognise that women have to spend less time on housework, they don’t recognise that they have to contribute more than they used to. 13. Men respect women more at work than at home.

11 (40%)

8 (35%)

6 (21%)

3 (14%)

5 (17%)

2 (8%)

3. There’s an awful lot of lip service paid to ‘sharing responsibilities’, but it’s still a man’s world at the end of the day.

Factor V: Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework

3 –

4 –

19. A woman who has a job she enjoys is likely to be a better wife and mother because she has an interest and some fulfilment outside the home.

Factor IV: Belief in Traditional Male Support and Protection 5. Most men need and want to give the kind of protection and support that they have traditionally given to women.

2 –

4. Both men and women should contribute to the household income.

21 –

15 –

16 –

17 –

11 –

8 –

8 –

4 –

13

8

8

13

7

7

8

5

16 –

29 –

23 –

21 –

31 –

33 –

26 –

18 –

11 (33%)

19 (60%)

15 (52%)

18 (52%)

27 (73%)

30 (79%)

26 (74%)

26 (88%)

6 –

12 –

14 –

13 –

15 –

16 –

22 –

44 –

newgenrtpdf

Table 3.2 (cont.) Disagree Strong Moderate 20. If a woman is financially independent it can lead to difficulties in a relationship. Factor VI: Belief That Mothers Are Best Nurturers 23. Caring for children is best done by mothers. 24. Fathers can be as nurturing to children as mothers can. 18. It’s bad for young children if their mothers go out and work, even if they are well taken care of by another adult. Note: Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ percentages in parentheses.

Agree Slight

DK, etc.

Slight

Moderate Strong

23 –

20 (64%)

21 –

7

14 –

10 (28%)

4 –

15 – 2 –

11 (41%) 2 (10%)

15 – 6 –

7

21 – 19 –

17 (52%) 31 (87%)

14 – 37 –

26 –

18 (63%)

19 –

17 –

7 (30%)

6 –

3 7

47

Attitudes to gender roles

aware that women’s increasing equality posed a threat to some men, they themselves did not appear to be threatened. However, some of the results of the qualitative study suggested that this was a sensitive issue, as illustrated by the quote below: Some of the men that I know, one of their biggest concerns is that women can match them with income now. And the second consideration that men have is that women can match them intellectually. I’d say that’s a huge transformation in men’s thinking, or having to adjust to that. Now sometimes women are better read, better educated. (Male, 51, married, Co. Carlow)

Factor I, ‘Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement’, was the strongest factor in this set and contained nine items. All were phrased in the direction of the name of the factor. Overall, a majority agreed with six of the nine items and 40–45 per cent agreed with the other three items, indicating that there is a consensus that women’s career advancement is perceived to be posing a threat to at least some men (see Fig. 3.1). For example, 59 per cent agreed with the statement, ‘Some men feel threatened by women’s advances in the workplace.’ However, it is interesting to note that women were more likely to think this was the case than Disagree

Agree

Factor I: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement 1. Some men feel threatened by women’s advances in the workplace.

34% 59%

2. Men don’t really like it that much that women are getting higher positions - and climbing the scale 3. Career oriented women can be more threatening to men.

44% 45% 37% 57%

4. Most men would find it intimidating to go out with a woman who has a high-powered job.

49% 45%

5. There would be a proportion of men who would feel women may be taking their jobs.

31%

6. Men can be uncomfortable if women are too assertive.

30%

7. Most men could find it difficult taking orders from women at work.

62% 64% 39% 54%

Figure 3.1  Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor I, Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement (N = 1,404).

48

Attitudes to gender roles

men were: 50 per cent of men agreed with this statement, whereas 67 per cent of women did (see Fig. 3.2). Overall, 62 per cent of the sample felt that ‘There would be a proportion of men who would feel women may be taking their jobs.’ While 58 per cent of men felt this way, a slightly higher proportion of women thought they did (65 per cent). Almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of the overall sample felt that ‘Men can be uncomfortable if women are too assertive.’ The factor indicated that almost half of the sample (45 per cent) felt that ‘Men don’t really like it that much that women are getting higher positions – and climbing the scale.’ However, a closer examination shows that only 36 per cent of men feel this way, whereas 56 per cent of women think they do. In light of the fact that women are now more likely to be in supervisory positions, it is noteworthy that over half of the sample (54 per cent) felt that ‘Most men could find it difficult taking orders from women at work.’ However, a closer inspection of the results shows that while 43 per cent of men feel this way, 66 per cent of women think they do. The attitudes to women in the workplace appear to spill over into the personal sphere, as indicated by the fact that close to half of the sample (45 per cent) felt that ‘Most men would find it intimidating to go out with a woman who has a Male

Female

Total Agree

Factor 1: Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement 50%

1. Some men feel threatened by women’s advances in the workplace. 2. Men don’t really like it that much that women are getting higher positions - and climbing the scale

67% 59%

36%

56% 45% 48%

3. Career oriented women can be more threatening to men. 4. Most men would find it intimidating to go out with a woman who has a high-powered job.

66% 57%

35%

55% 45% 58% 65% 62%

5. There would be a proportion of men who would feel women may be taking their jobs.

60% 69% 64%

6. Men can be uncomfortable if women are too assertive. 7. Most men could find it difficult taking orders from women at work.

43% 54%

66%

Figure 3.2  Summary ‘agree’ responses by gender to items on Factor I, Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement (N = 1,404).

49

Attitudes to gender roles

high-powered job’ and over half (57 per cent) felt that ‘Career-oriented women can be more threatening to men.’ However, some of women’s fears concerning the potential negative effects of their success in the workplace would seem to be unfounded as women were more likely than men to agree with most of the items on this factor. For example, 55 per cent of women felt that ‘Most men would find it intimidating to go out with a woman who has a high-powered job’, whereas only 35 per cent of men actually felt this way. While more than two-thirds of women (66 per cent) felt that ‘Career oriented women can be more threatening to men’, only 48 per cent of men felt this way. Factor II: Male Role Ambiguity Factor II, ‘Male Role Ambiguity’, is the second strongest factor in this set of attitudes to gender roles. The responses on this factor indicate that the sample is quite divided in its views. For example, 42 per cent agree that ‘With all the changes in gender roles, it’s hard to know who’s supposed to do what’, while 47 per cent disagree (Fig. 3.3). Similarly, 44 per cent agree that ‘A lot of men are confused about their roles because they are less defined than they used to be’, while 47 per cent disagree. Two of the items reflect a feeling of ‘redundancy’ on the part of men. For example, 40 per cent felt that changes in the workplace have left men feeling ‘a little redundant because there is so much competition from Disagree

Agree

Factor II: Male Role Ambiguity 1. With all the changes in gender roles, it’s hard to know who’s supposed to do what.

47% 42%

2. A lot of men are confused about their roles because they are less defined than they used to be.

47% 44%

3. As a result of change in women’s roles, men are not sure where they stand. 4. It’s more difficult for a man to find a partner now because women are putting careers ahead of relationships. 5. Men feel little redundant because there is so much competition from women. 6. Women’s gains in the workplace have sometimes been at the expense of men. 7. Women can be so independent sometimes that it makes men feel like they’re not needed anymore.

52% 39% 43% 48% 52% 40% 44% 44% 42% 52%

Figure 3.3  Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor II, Male Role Ambiguity (N = 1,404).

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Attitudes to gender roles

women’. This notion of redundancy was echoed in another item which related to the personal sphere, i.e. ‘Women can be so independent sometimes that it makes men feel like they’re not needed anymore.’ It is notable that a majority (52 per cent) agreed with this. This suggests that an element in male role ambiguity resulting from changing gender roles relates to a feeling on men’s part that they are not needed. This would seem to be an important psychological element in this cluster of attitudes. Factor III: Support for Female Economic Independence Factor III, ‘Support for Female Economic Independence’, shows a high level of agreement with all of the items on this factor, indicating strong support for women’s financial independence. The vast majority of the sample (90 per cent) agreed that ‘It’s good for a woman to be financially independent in a relationship’ (Fig.  3.4). There was also very strong agreement (88 per cent) that ‘Both men and women should contribute to the household income.’ Most people (79 per cent) thought that ‘Men are happy for women to pay their own way.’ Interestingly, an item about maternal employment loaded on this factor concerning financial independence. A  majority (74 per cent) endorsed the view that ‘A woman who has a job she enjoys is likely to be a better wife and mother because she has an interest and some fulfilment outside the home.’ The juxtaposition of this item with items about financial independence indicates the emergence of integrated thinking about women’s fulfilment, child welfare and the economic well-being of the family unit, something which has

Disagree

Agree

Factor III: Support for Female Financial Independence 1. It’s good for a woman to be financially independent in a relationship. 2. Most men are happy for women to pay their own way. 3. I think men nowadays like intelligent women who know what they want out of life. 4. Both men and women should contribute to the household income. 5. A woman who has a job she enjoys is likely to be a better wife and mother because she has an interest and some fulfilment outside the home.

6% 90% 15% 79% 12% 82% 8% 88% 17% 74%

Figure 3.4  Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor III, Support for Female Financial Independence (N = 1,404).

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Attitudes to gender roles

not been seen in previous research in which maternal employment was primarily viewed in relation to children’s welfare (e.g., Fine-Davis 1988a, 2015; O’Sullivan 2007, 2012). The factor further extends to the personal sphere in the sense that women’s economic independence is associated with other positives, i.e. 82 per cent agreed that ‘I think men nowadays like intelligent women who know what they want out of life.’ It is thus apparent that there is strong support for female economic independence yet also a recognition on the part of the sample that female economic independence is having an effect on some men’s sense of security in the workplace, as reflected in Factor I, and may be generating a degree of male role ambiguity, as indicated by the responses to items in Factor II. Factor IV: Belief in Traditional Male Support and Protection Factor IV, ‘Belief in Traditional Male Support and Protection’, contains three items, all of which would appear to tap into traditional gender roles. A large majority (73 per cent) agree that ‘Most women need and want the kind of protection and support that men have traditionally given them’ (Fig. 3.5). This item has been used in several Irish studies over the past 35 years and has been found to be quite stable. For example, in 1986, 75.4 per cent agreed with this statement (Fine-Davis 1988a, 2015) and in 2005 a high proportion (69 per cent) did also (Fine-Davis et al. 2005; Fine-Davis 2015). While other measures of gender role attitudes have changed dramatically over time, this item has remained at a high level. This suggests that it may be tapping into a psychological need rather than into gender roles per se. As noted above, we added for the first time a male counterpart item. It may be seen that an almost identical proportion (73 per cent) agreed that ‘Most men need and want to give the

Disagree

Agree

Factor IV: Belief in traditional male support and protection 1. Most men need and want to give the kind of protection and support that they have traditionally given to women. 2. Most women need and want the kind of protection and support that men have traditionally given them. 3. Being a wife and mother are the most fulfiling roles any woman could want.

14% 79% 21% 73% 35% 52%

Figure 3.5  Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor IV, Belief in Traditional Male Support and Protection (N = 1,404).

52

Attitudes to gender roles

kind of protection and support that they have traditionally given to women.’ There is also much agreement (52 per cent) with the item ‘Being a wife and mother are the most fulfilling roles any woman could want.’ In a nationwide study in 1978, 77.6 per cent agreed with this statement, whereas by 1986 the level of agreement had dropped to 54.5 per cent (Fine-Davis 1988a, 2015). However, in 2005, the agreement had somewhat increased again to 66 per cent (Fine-Davis et al. 2005; Fine-Davis 2015). While some of this difference may be attributed to slight differences in the samples, what is notable is that relatively large proportions in all studies agreed with the item over time, whereas other items showed larger changes in a less traditional direction. What this suggests is that this item, as well as the item concerning the need for protection and support, is tapping into basic needs and beliefs which are not changing to any great degree as a result of social changes in gender roles. Factor V: Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework Factor V, ‘Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework’, is a new factor that taps into attitudes towards sharing domestic work. There is majority agreement (60 per cent) that ‘while men recognise that women have to spend less time on housework, they don’t recognise that they have to contribute more than they used to’ (Fig. 3.6). This item elicited major gender differences, as shown in Figure 3.7. While just 48 per cent of men agreed with the item, fully 73 per cent of women did, indicating that the majority of women feel that men are not pulling their weight in this department. This is supported by responses to the item, ‘There’s an awful lot of lip service paid to “sharing responsibilities”, but it’s still a man’s world at the end of the day’, to which 52 per cent agreed. Again, there was a large discrepancy in male and female responses: while 64 per cent of

Disagree

Agree

Factor V: Perceived male reluctance to share housework 1. There’s an awful lot of lip service paid to ‘sharing responsibilities’ but it’s still a man’s world at the end of the day. 2. While men recognise that women have to spend less time on housework, they don’t recognise that they have to contribute more than they used to. 3. Men respect women more at work than at home. 4. If a women is financially independent it can lead to difficulties in a relationship.

40% 52% 31% 60% 55% 33% 64% 28%

Figure 3.6  Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor V, Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework (N = 1,404).

53

Attitudes to gender roles Male

Female

Total Agree

Factor V: Perceived male reluctance to share housework 39%

1. There’s an awful lot of lip service paid to ‘sharing responsibilities’ but it’s still a man’s world at the end of the day.

64% 52%

2. While men recognise that women have to spend less time on housework, they don’t recognise that they have to contribute more than they used to.

48%

73% 60%

24% 3. Men respect women more at work than at home. 4. If a women is financially independent it can lead to difficulties in a relationship.

40% 33%

24% 33% 28%

Figure 3.7  Summary ‘agree’ responses by gender to items on Factor V, Perceived Male Reluctance to Share Housework (N = 1,404).

women agreed with the statement, only 39 per cent of men did. These findings indicate that men think they are contributing more than women think they are, a phenomenon which has been observed cross-culturally (in France, Denmark, Italy and Ireland) in a previous study (Fine-Davis et al. 2004). Recent research by McGinnity and Russell (2007) shows that men carry out significantly less domestic work and childcare than women do. The co-loading of items on this factor shows that the issue of housework is linked in people’s minds with men’s respect for women, suggesting that lack of helping may be related to a lack of respect. While most people (55 per cent) disagreed that ‘Men respect women more at work than at home’, 33 per cent supported this view. Women were more likely to think that men respected women more at work than at home; 40 per cent of women felt this way, while only 24 per cent of men did so. It has already been shown in Factor III, ‘Support for Female Economic Independence’, that a large majority favours women’s economic independence. Yet an item on Factor V taps into the view that ‘If a woman is financially independent it can lead to difficulties in a relationship.’ The vast majority of the sample (64 per cent) also disagreed that this was the case, with just 28 per cent agreeing with it. However, the fact that this item loaded in the same direction as the other items in this factor indicates that for some there is a link between women working, difficulties in a relationship and men’s contribution to housework. These co-loadings on Factor V suggest that some of the difficulties which may arise in a relationship when a woman is employed outside the home relate to housework and also to respect or lack of respect for women’s role in the home, as distinct from the workplace.

54

Attitudes to gender roles

Factor VI: Belief That Mothers Are Best Nurturers Factor VI, ‘Belief That Mothers Are Best Nurturers’, shows that the vast majority of the sample (87 per cent) thinks that ‘Fathers can be as nurturing to children as mothers can’, yet at the same time half of the sample (52 per cent) thinks that ‘Caring for children is best done by mothers’ (Fig. 3.8). While this shows an increasing support for male caring, it still reflects an underlying ambivalence and vestiges of traditional views of caring. In the qualitative study, some men expressed reservations about maternal employment. These were frequently framed in terms of a concern for the well-being of children and also the belief that women were more suited to taking care of children: I understand the idea behind women working – it’s that they can do anything men can do and of course they can, but . . . I think women are better equipped to be mothers than men . . . It’s much the same for a man to stay home as for a woman to stay home but it’s clear women are better equipped to deal with emotional issues and relationship issues, and I  think that stands to them dealing with children. (Male, 33, cohabiting, software engineer, Galway)

The item on the effects of maternal employment on children (‘It’s bad for young children if their mothers go out and work, even if they are well taken care of by another adult’), which elicited little support (30 per cent) and majority disagreement (63 per cent), shows that attitudes in this area have clearly changed in recent years. This is evident when we compare these attitudes with those of earlier years. In 1978, 69.7 per cent of a nationwide Irish sample agreed that ‘It’s bad for young children if their mothers go out and work, even if they are well taken care of by another adult.’ This level of agreement decreased to 57.3 per cent agreement in 1986 and further fell to 39.1 per cent by 2005 (Fine-Davis

Disagree

Agree

Factor VI: Belief that mothers are best nurturers 41% 52%

1. Caring for children is best done by mothers. 2. Fathers can be as nurturing to children as mothers can. 3. It’s bad for young children if their mothers go out and work, even if they are well taken care of by another adult.

10% 87% 63% 30%

Figure 3.8  Summary ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ responses to items on Factor VI, Belief That Mothers Are Best Nurturers (N = 1,404).

Attitudes to gender roles

55

2015). A similar downward trend was seen in the ISSP studies of 1988, 1994 and 2002 using a comparable item ‘A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’ (O’Sullivan 2007).

Effects of demographic characteristics on attitudes to gender roles Table 3.3 presents results of an analysis of variance that looked at the simultaneous effects of sex, age, family status, having or not having a child and SES on the six factors measuring attitudes to gender roles. These factors are based on composite scores for the items on each factor. This analysis also tells us if there are any significant interaction effects between two or more of the demographic characteristics on the dependent variables, i.e. the measures of gender role attitudes. One of the main things we were interested in exploring was whether there were differences between single, cohabiting and married people, as we wanted to see if differences in attitudes to gender roles were related to family status. We were also interested of course in gender differences. We included the other independent variables as controls so that we can see not only the ‘pure’ effects of family status and gender but also any interaction effects that might be occurring with these other key demographic variables. On Factor I, ‘Perceived Threat of Women’s Career Advancement’, there is a strong effect of gender (F = 86.89; p < .001). Contrary to what might have been expected, and as we saw in the percentage results, women are significantly more likely to think that men are threatened by their advancement in the workplace than men actually are. The fact that men’s scores on this factor are lower than women’s (mean for men = 3.84; mean for women = 4.51) indicates that women may be overestimating the extent to which men are threatened by their career advancement. There is a significant interaction effect between gender and social class indicating that working class men are more likely to perceive the threat of women’s career advancement than men in the middle and higher SES groups, as illustrated in Figure 3.9. This interaction effect also shows that there is a greater gap between men and women in the middle and higher SES groups than in the lowest SES group, indicating that women in the two higher groups have significantly more anxiety about the perceived threat of their career advancement relative to the men in their own social class and less reason to do so, whereas women in the lowest social class, while having a comparable level of anxiety, are more realistic in that the men in their social class are in fact threatened by their advances in the workplace. Returning to the main effects, as shown in Table 3.3, there is also a slight tendency for older people to be more likely to think that men are threatened by women’s career advancement (p < .05). An effect for family status indicates that single people are somewhat more likely than married and cohabiting people to

56

Attitudes to gender roles

4.9 4.7

4.56

4.56 4.43

4.5 4.3 4.1

4.07

3.9

3.73

3.7

3.71

3.5 Male Female

Male Female

Male Female

Skilled/Unskilled

Non-manual

Prof/Manag/Tech

F=3.44; p