Cases in Organisational Behaviour (RLE: Organizations) 9781135959821, 9780415823357

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CASES IN ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR Roy MCLennan

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY & BEHAVIOUR

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY & BEHAVIOUR

CASES IN ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR

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CASES IN ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR

ROY MCLENNAN

Volume 21

ROUTLEDGE

Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1975 This edition first published in 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1975 William Roy McLennan All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-415-65793-8 (Set) eISBN: 978-0-203-38369-8 (Set) ISBN: 978-0-415-82335-7 (Volume 21) eISBN: 978-0-203-38391-9 (Volume 21) Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

Cases in Organisational Behaviour ROY MCLENNAN

London . George Allen & Unwin Ltd Ruskin House . Museum Street

First published in 1975 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. All rights are reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers. © George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1975 ISB 0 04 658216 8

Printed in Great Britain in 10 point Times Roman by The Alden Press Ltd, Osney Mead, Oxford

To F.A.M.

Acknowledgements

This book rests upon the foundation of the toil and sweat of many others besides myself. I wish to acknowledge my obligation to many people, without whose support this book really could not have been written. I must first thank the many staff members of universities and research institutes in the United Kingdom and abroad for their generous help in clarifying numerous points in the draft versions of the cases based on their published research, and for agreeing to the publication of their work in case form. I am grateful to the editors and publishers of management and social science journals and monographs for their permissions to publish case versions of copyright material. Full acknowledgements of authors and sources are presented below, in alphabetical order of authors. 'Redfield & White Limited' was taken from Pamela Bradney, The Joking Relationship in Industry', Human Relations, vol. 10, no. 2 (1957), and 'Quasifamilial Relationships in Industry', Human Relations, vol. 10, no. 3 (1957); 'HSC Limited' and 'Mr S. L. Blake' from Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (Tavistock, 1961); The Immigrant Steelworkers' from J. K. Chadwick-Jones, The Acceptance and Socialization of Immigrant Workers in the Steel Industry', Sociological Review, vol. 12, no. 2 (1964); The British Steelworks' from J. K. ChadwickJones, 'Managerial Leadership in a Steelworks', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 2, no. 3 (1965); 'Northwestern Bakeries' from W. W. Daniel, 'A Comparative Consideration of Two Industrial Work Groups', Sociological Review, vol. 14, no. 1 (1966): 'Vulcan Tyre Company (A) and (B)' from Norah M. Davis, 'A Study of a Merit-Rating Scheme in a Factory', Occupational Psychology, vol. 27, no. 2 (1953); 'Hull Trawlermen' from P. Duncan, 'Conflict and Co-operation among Trawlermen', British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 1, no. 3 (1963); The Debenham Weaving Mill' and The Radbourne Mill' from Peter J. Fensham and Douglas Hooper, The Dynamics of a Changing Technology (Tavistock, 1964); 'Vauxhall Motors Limited' from John H. Goldthorpe, 'Attitudes and Behaviour of Car Assembly Workers: a Deviant Case and a Theoretical Critique', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 17, no. 3 (1966); The Transport Control Room' from R. A. M. Gregson, 'Interrelation of Attitudes and Communications in a Sub-Divided Working Group', Occupational Psychology, vol. 31, no. 2 (1957); 'Ernest, Drawn from the 8

Acknowledgements 9 Life' from A. R. H., 'Ernest, Drawn from the Life: A Study in Supervision', National Institute of Industrial Psychology Bulletin, Spring 1971; The Lanx Factory' from D. J. Hickson, 'Motives of Workpeople who Restrict their Output', Occupational Psychology, vol. 35, no. 3 (1961); 'Multiproducts Limited' from Lisl Klein, Multiproducts Ltd (HMSO, 1964); 'Critical Books' from Michael Lane, 'Publishing Managers, Publishing House Organization and Role Conflict', Sociology, vol. 4, no. 3 (1970); 'The Apprentice Marine Engineer' from Tom Lupton, On the Shop Floor (Pergamon, 1963); 'IDP Limited' from Enid Mumford, 'Job Satisfaction - a New Approach Derived from an Old Theory', Sociological Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (1970); 'Carters Cattlefoods (A) and (B)' from Enid Mumford, Living with a Computer (Institute of Personnel Management, 1964), and 'Clerks and Computers. A Study of the Introduction of Technical Change', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (1965); 'British Merchant Ships' from Stephen A. Richardson, 'Organizational Contrasts on British and American Ships', Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 2 (1956); 'Peek Frean & Company Limited' from J. H. Smith, 'Managers and Married Women Workers', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 12, no. 1 (1961); 'Octane Limited (A) and (B)' from Cyril Sofer, Men in Mid-Career (Cambridge University Press, 1970); 'The Supervisory Training Course (A) and (B)' from A. J. M. Sykes, 'The Effect of a Supervisory Training Course in Changing Supervisors' Perceptions and Expectations of the Role of Management', Human Relations, vol. 15, no. 3 (1962); 'The McKinley Company' from A. J. M. Sykes and James Bates, 'A Study of Conflict between Formal Company Policy and the Interests of Informal Groups', Sociological Review, vol. 10, no. 3 (1962); 'Electronics Limited' from K. E. Thurley and A. C. Hamblin, The Supervisor and his Job, Problem of Progress in Industry No. 13 (HMSO, 1963); 'The Municipal Airport (A) and (B)' from S. R. Timperley, 'A Study of a Self-Governing Work Group', Sociological Review, vol. 18, no. 2 (1970). 'British Coal Industries (A), (B) and (C)' were taken from E. L. Trist and K. Bamforth, 'Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-Getting', Human Relations, vol. 4, no. 1 (1951), and E. L. Trist and H. Murray, 'Work Organization at the Coal Face', Doc. No. 506, Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, London. The cases were written by Gene W. Dalton under the direction of Paul R. Lawrence at the Harvard Business School, and are copyrighted by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, who kindly provided permission to reprint them in this book. In terms of genesis I must acknowledge my debt to casebooks and studies of the case method written by present and past members of the Harvard Business School's faculty. Organizational Behaviour and Administration,

10 Acknowledgements by P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler in collaboration with many others, provided me with my initial appreciation of the possibilities of the case approach, and a beginning model for the structure of this book. Readers familiar with it and the related tradition will realise my indebtedness to the Harvard School in so many respects. I hope this book repays the debt to some extent. I began work on this book when I was a Foundation for Management Education Teaching/Research Fellow at the University of Sheffield. I should like to thank the Foundation for two years' support. Sylvia Shimmin of Lancaster University was a source of continued interest and support for the project from its inception. Gene Dalton, late of the Harvard Business School, helped secure permission to publish the 'British Coal Industries' series, and offered some useful suggestions. David Hall of the School of Management, Cranfield Institute of Technology, made constructive and penetrating comments on the draft preface, and introduction. My colleague Suzanne Richbell also read the supporting material and offered cheering support for the work. Stephen Fineman and George Hespe of the MRC Social and Applied Psychology Unit, University of Sheffield, made perceptive comments on the presentation and content of the introductory material. Steve also read the section introductions. This book is in a significant sense the product of classroom experience. I welcome the opportunity to express my thanks to my post-graduate and post-experience students at the University of Sheffield, who participated wholeheartedly in classroom explorations of drafts of the cases. Their contributions and reactions have helped to improve the quality of the final versions printed here. I am deeply indebted to the University of Sheffield in another sense. The University's Committee on the University Press provided financial support without which the book might not have been published. Multitudinous stencils and photocopies of the many cases were cheerfully and efficiently prepared by the secretarial and library staff of the University of Sheffield. I should in particular like to thank Mrs Maisie Ellis for her stout effort. My wife Felicity bore with me the brunt of checking a much vaster number of draft cases than I was able to publish in one book, and kept things out of the thinning hair of her husband. Christopher Martin and Victor Thorpe of George Allen and Unwin Ltd were always positive and adaptive in approaching the many problems posed by the somewhat peculiar nature of the book. I am deeply indebted to all those who contributed to this book in innumerable ways, and am solely responsible for its final shape, content and faults. Roy McLennan

Preface

This book is intended to help the manager utilise research into human behaviour to improve the performance of his organisation. It demonstrates the relevance and contribution of such research to the formulation and resolution of problems faced by managers, and in part answers the recent allegations of the ivory towerism and irrelevance of management research. The book represents an attempt to meet the demand, often expressed in British management education circles, for a comprehensive casebook which focuses on the various kinds of organisational problems faced by managers in British business and industry, suitable for use in post-graduate and postexperience programmes at universities, polytechnics and training centres. Many of the situations and problems encountered by organisations in any advanced industrial society appear in the cases presented in this book in some form: it is hoped that the book will therefore prove useful for a variety of purposes in centres of management education abroad as well as at home. The book contains some thirty-eight cases of the type associated with the Harvard Business School. Each case is concerned with a situation, issue or problem actually faced by a particular organisation. The cases draw extensively on British empirical research in the social sciences published during the last twenty years. Each item taken from this literature was edited and rewritten by the author in case form. A number of cases will be substantially familiar to many lecturers through their knowledge of the well-known studies from which they have been extracted. Each case is intended to provide the basis for a discussion exercise centred on the analysis of case data, viewed in the light of appropriate concepts and theory drawn from the literatures concerned with organisational behaviour. In this way the cases are intended to provide practice in the analysis and resolution of realistic organisational problems, in the process making explicit use of the fruits of research in a double sense. By successive case discussions over a period of time the student manager can build knowledge of the dynamics of organisational behaviour and develop situational skills for taking management action. Some of the issues which appear in the cases include problems concerning the involvement of men and women in their work; the restriction of output practised by some groups; conflict between ethnic, occupational and organisational groups; the deleterious effect of certain technologies 11

12 Preface on job performance and human satisfaction; the difficulties of developing appropriate leadership styles within organisational opportunities and constraints; problems of finding a viable fit between the environment within which an organisation operates and its structure and behaviour; difficulties of developing appropriate strategies in effecting successful organisational change and development. The Introduction describes the characteristics of the cases and the case method, and outlines the structure and suggested use of the book. The cases are presented in a number of clusters or sections, each of which offers a set of cases with a prime focus on a particular category or aspect of human behaviour in organisations. There are sections on motivation and development, group behaviour, technology, leadership, organisation structure, and organisational change and development. Each section is introduced by brief notes on the themes of the cases in the section, and references to appropriate concepts and theory in the social science literatures. In combination the sections furnish a systematic-exposure to knowledge and its utilisation in the field of organisational behaviour. By means of the variety of situation, problem, issue and type of organisation the book provides, for the first time, sufficient material to permit lecturers to mount a full post-graduate course founded largely or partly on researchbased cases. The book's comprehensiveness permits selection of appropriate cases, in terms of several criteria, for post-experience courses. The work of editing and writing the cases began in 1969, and was based on the author's two years' experience of using Harvard cases in the classroom at the University of Sheffield. Each case has been tested in draft form with a post-graduate or post-experience class under normal classroom conditions. In the light of the classroom experience each case was revised, where necessary, presented to the author of the original research for his comments, and further revised as appeared appropriate. Nearly all the cases have been successfully used in both post-graduate and post-experience course work; all of them are suitable for use by either kind of student.

Contents

Acknowledgements Preface Introduction SECTION ONE.

page

8 11 15

Human Inputs: Predispositions, Motivation and Development

Introduction Cases 1.1 Bob Mansfield 1.2 Peek Frean & Company Limited 1.3 Jim Moore (A) 1.4 Jim Moore (B) 1.5 IDP Limited 1.6 Octane Limited (A) 1.7 Octane Limited (B) SECTION TWO.

27 31 38 45 50 55 59 66

Social Inputs: Group and Intergroup Behaviour

Introduction Cases 2.1 The Apprentice Marine Engineer 2.2 The Lanx Factory 2.3 The Municipal Airport (A) 2.4 The Municipal Airport (B) 2.5 The Immigrant Steel workers 2.6 Hull Trawlermen 2.7 The McKinley Company 2.8 The Transport Control Room Technical Inputs: Technology and Behaviour Introduction Cases 3.1 Northwestern Bakeries Limited 3.2 Vauxhall Motors Limited 3.3 British Coal Industries (A) 3.4 British Coal Industries (B) 3.5 British Coal Industries (C)

73 76 78 84 87 92 98 103 110

SECTION THREE.

117 119 125 131 149 153

14 Contents SECTION FOUR.

Leadership Inputs: Leadership Style and Managerial Behaviour

Introduction Cases 4.1 Chamberlain Steel Company, Parts 1 to 4 4.2 Ernest, Drawn from the Life 4.3 The British Steelworks 4.4 Electronics Limited SECTION FIVE.

Introduction

Structural Inputs: Organisation Structure and Behaviour in the Organisation as a Whole

Cases 5.1 The Debenham Weaving Mill 5.2 British Merchant Ships 5.3 Multiproducts Limited 5.4 HSC Limited 5.5 Redfield & White Limited 5.6 Mr S. L. Blake 5.7 Critical Books SECTION SIX.

161 164 170 173 181

189 192 200 206 212 216 225 222

Changes of Inputs: Organisational Change and Development

Introduction Cases 6.1 The Radbourne Mill 6.2 Vulcan Tyre Company (A) 6.3 Vulcan Tyre Company (B) 6.4 Carters Cattlefoods (A) 6.5 Carters Cattlefoods (B) 6.6 The Supervisory Training Course (A) 6.7 The Supervisory Training Course (B)

239 242 249 252 257 262 269 276

Introduction Knowledge, without the skill to use it, is inert and surplus baggage to the practitioner. J. C. BAILEY 1

Management education is a process concerned with both the acquisition of appropriate knowledge, and its utilisation to solve organisational problems of one kind or another. Lecturers working in management education are faced with the problem of somehow making the generalisations of research usable by the manager facing individual, somewhat peculiar problems in his organisation. There is a problem of the relation of the general to the particular. Traditional lecture courses, concerned with abstract generalisations, are not by themselves very helpful to managers in meeting particular problems on the job, problems which characteristically involve many related variables and are to some degree unique. We ask the impossible of the manager when we encourage him to study some major theories, and without further ado expect him to apply them in his work. Explicit attention must be paid to the transference and application of that knowledge to particular on-the-job situations. This book proposes a solution to this problem in the field of organisational behaviour. The solution proposed lies in the symbiosis or union of the generalising, theory-building efforts of social science and concrete organisational experience. The theoretical element is indicated by references to the literature of social science. The means of providing the concrete 1

In P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, Organizational Behaviour and Administration, revised edition (Homewood, Irwin-Dorsey, 1965), pp. 3-4. 15

16 Introduction organisational experience consists of the reports of researchers, skilled in making direct observations of human behaviour in organisations, in case form. The symbiosis is fostered by the clustering of references and cases which converge on a major topic, and which are intended to be studied together. The book thus focuses on the relation between the general and the particular, theory and the individual instance, and the tension between the two. The ultimate objective is to transfer knowledge about human behaviour in organisations from textbooks, journals, cases and experience into the mind and behaviour of the practising or aspirant manager. Characteristics of the Cases Each case appearing in this book is a somewhat dehydrated representation and summary of a situation, issue or problem concerning human behaviour in a particular organisation. The idea of the book is to use each case in the classroom as the basis for reconstituting and recreating the organisational situation, by this means providing a vicarious experience of its exploration and resolution. In the process of pursuing this exploration the class will be expected to try to apply appropriate theory and conceptual schemes. The cases in the book are direct descendants of a considerable number of published research reports, which appeared in various academic journals and books.1 In writing the cases the data that appeared in the original publications have been edited and presented in a different form. This is necessarily so: academic research cannot be assimilated by practitioners of management as it stands. The original research was, of course, neither conceived in the first place nor executed in terms of potential utilisation of the sort suggested here, but rather as contributions to specialist literatures, for other researchers, lecturers and students to study. To be used at all for the present purposes the material had to be reformulated, keeping the specific practical purpose and audience steadily in mind. The cases are presented in a form which substantially follows the conventions of organisational behaviour cases recently written at the Harvard Business School. They are written in the past tense. All personal names and most company names have been disguised. Case writing amounts essentially to accurate reporting of facts, opinions, interpretations, attitudes and other data drawn from real-life situations. The reportorial nature of the task indicates the techniques employed in case presentation. The cases were written with careful attention to reproducing what was going on in the organisational situation in question, including any obvious or less obvious contradictions or confusions in the data. 1

The book also includes a handful of cases based on the present author's research.

Introduction 17 Care was taken to avoid selecting or writing the cases in such a way as to offer 'proof' of some or other particular hypothesis about human behaviour in organisations. The sheer number of researchers whose work was drawn upon in preparing the cases, and their manifestly different interests in organisations, surely inoculates the book as a whole against this particular pitfall. There are two major differences between the cases presented here and the published studies upon which they are based. The first lies in the consistent attempt made to focus on the data gleaned by the researcher at the expense of discussion of methodology, his presentation of data in the context of a particular research tradition, or comparison or contrast with other researchers' findings.1 It is concrete organisational data that is needed for case purposes, not the academic's intellectual apparatus. Second, all the cases are open-ended. As far as practicable the cases do not take someone's perception of a situation at face value, and provide data from which one is supposed to arrive at a solution in terms of the perception. The opinions and interpretations of people in the cases are wherever possible presented as such, explicitly or implicitly, and are not reported as facts. The judgements and inferences of researchers and the present author have, as far as practicable, been either kept out of the cases or, where they seemed indispensable, included and labelled as such. Of course the practice followed in presenting each case varies somewhat according to the nature of the material. But the principle adopted was that the interpretations and perceptions presented in a case are themselves data requiring analysis, part of the situation one must try to understand. These editorial practices were adopted in recognition of the educational and training needs of managers, which differ from those of organisational researchers. In his work the manager must necessarily interpret and weigh facts, behaviour, attitudes and opinions for himself. The cases are intended to provide a means of obtaining practice in doing this. Despite these efforts to emphasise objectivity in writing the cases, they inevitably present a somewhat simplified and selective portrayal of organisational reality. This is a shortcoming we have to live with. As Tagiuri et al. comment, 'it is difficult to imagine how a completely 'true-to-life' representation of anything could be achieved, for any description is inherently selective. The [researcher or] casewriter acts as a filter in that he observes and records only those aspects of the phenomena he encounters that are relevant to his interests and to his tasks.'2

1 In the belief that it will widen the usefulness of certain cases, sophisticated statistical analyses have not been included in the data presented. 2 Renato Tagiuri et al., Behavioural Science Concepts in Case Analysis (Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1968), p. 4.

18 Introduction Again, however, the different orientations and frames of reference of the various researchers whose work was drawn upon in writing the cases does provide some guarantee against myopic concentration on any particular frame of reference. No case contains all the data which might conceivably be considered relevant to perfect analysis of the situation in question. At first blush this consideration may seem to point to an impairment in the utility of cases as the basis of an educational strategy. It is in fact, however, a strength or at least a weakness that faithfully mirrors reality. For in his organisational environment the manager must necessarily adopt a satisficing - not optimising - approach to problem exploration and solution. No manager has at his fingertips all the data he might consider relevant to impending action. He nevertheless still has to analyse the situation, to decide and take action as best he can. Problems have to be tackled and decisions made, often within severe constraints imposed by time, money and hence information. Besides, it seems to the present writer not immodest to assert that most of the cases presented here contain rather wider and more searching data than the operating manager often possesses. Characteristics of the Case Method Cases are intended for use as a basis for mounting small or large group discussion exercises. Detailed consideration of practices and procedures implicated in the use of cases are available from various sources, and will not be outlined here.1 It is useful at this point, however, to explain how cases are in practice used as the central device in the somewhat distinctive educational strategy called 'the case method'. The student is confronted with a case, an account of a concrete organisational situation. He is asked to study the case on his own, to analyse the situation in terms of what is going on in it, why it is going on, what is likely to happen next, and what should be done about it, if anything. The student is asked to 'diagnose' - to conclude from any symptomatic evidence available - the nature of any organisational issues or problems. In an appropriate case he may be asked to arrive at a 'prognosis', to forecast the future course of the problem if left unchecked, and to elaborate or 'prescribe' some treatment, some plan of action for managing the situation in terms of the diagnosis. When the student studies the case on his own he discovers a variety and 1 See, for example, A. R. Towl, To Study Administration by Cases (Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1969); M. P. McNair (ed.), The Case Method at the Harvard Business School (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1954).

Introduction 19 complexity of interacting variables operating in the situation, some or all of which he connects, via some frame of reference, with what happens in it, and what may be done about it. Subsequently he discusses the case in a small or large student group. He discovers, often with unconcealed surprise, that other students place different emphases on the symptomatic evidence, that they have, indeed, spotted some things in the case he has missed. He finds, often to his confusion and dismay, that different or even similar clusters of bits of symptomatic evidence apparently support different diagnoses of problems, and action prescriptions. As the discussion continues the group reviews the evidence in the case, and the alternative diagnoses, prognoses, and action prescriptions based on it. In this way alternative perceptions, cognitions, values, assumptions, action plans and inconsistencies are in some way explored and reviewed. Individual and group study of a case permits the student to compare his analysis with those of others, encourages him to probe the inevitable differences between them, and to learn from the experience. Perhaps the most fundamental point about the case method as an educational strategy is that it is concerned with learning rather than teaching. All recognised methods of using cases emphasise the placing of most of the burden for the interpretation and analysis of the case on the student, with the lecturer adopting a supportive, not dominant role. Case methods place the ball of learning squarely in the learner's court, and provide support of various kinds for the learner's attempt to improve his game. The lecturer's task is to set up and maintain an environment conducive to learning. Learning is conceived as a largely self-generating activity, to be encouraged and supported. The essential spark which touches off learning is the student's interest in and curiosity about the case, aroused by his intuitive recognition of the reality of the situation, and the implicated conclusion that the case is worth studying. The case method contrasts fundamentally with the traditional lecture method of teaching. Under the latter the lecturer is assumed to have superior subject knowledge. Students are expected to absorb what the lecturer has to offer. The layout of the lecture theatre, the structuring of the class and their behaviour recognise this. The lecturer holds the centre of the stage at the apex of a centralised, one-way communication net. Students are placed in a position of dependency in relation to the lecturer. The method is, in brief, essentially hierarchical and authoritarian. Under the case method, by contrast, most of the burden of case analysis is placed on the student, not the lecturer. All members of the class - as well as the lecturer - are in possession of the same basic material, the case, which is the focus of attention. Each has an opportunity to contribute to the analysis of the case. Emphasis is transferred from the lecturer-student

20 Introduction relation or one-way interaction channel to multiple student-student channels. In principle at least the class exhibits an 'each-to-all' net structure employing two-way communications. In a case discussion, therefore, 'It is not a question of dealing more or less en masse with an elder; it is a question of dealing with . . . equals and contemporaries whose criticisms must be faced and whose contributions need to be comprehended and used.'1 In this way the case method blurs the distinction between the lecturer on the one hand, and the students on the other. Everyone is more nearly on a par. The case method is thus essentially a more 'democratic', groupcentred or at least participative educational strategy than the lecture approach. These characteristics imply certain potentials for student development. Over a period of time, in which the student undergoes a series of case discussions, he is encouraged to build up a soundly based repertoire of diagnostic schemes for the analysis of organisational situations, and skill in their use. From the constant practice in discussion, development of his verbal and interactional skills takes place: he learns to draw and build upon the ideas of others. By confronting the student with open-ended, realistic organisational problems the method fosters his creative and innovative talents. With the younger man, especially, the use of cases results in the gradual accretion of confidence in his own ability to comprehend, analyse and resolve organisational problems. The ultimate justification for the method may be as Gragg put it in his classic article: The outstanding virtue of the case system is that it is suited to inspiring activity, under realistic conditions, on the part of the students; it takes them out of the role of passive absorbers and makes them partners in the joint processes of learning and of future learning.'2 The case method may appropriately be conceived of as a basis for providing intellectual skill training, as cognitive learning of a particular type. Cases may profitably be used to make knowledge usable, as a test bed to marry theory and concrete reality. They provide students with practice in exploring a range of managerial issues in a variety of organisational situations, in this way presenting a series of opportunities to practise responsible managerial analysis, diagnosis and action prescription. Cases also force the synthesis of a variety of concepts in the need they activate to understand individual concrete situations. The case method is at heart, therefore, fundamentally problem-centred and interdisciplinary, no respecter of the traditional boundaries between academic subjects. It provides a way of meeting the criticism voiced by Ackoff: 'We must stop acting as though nature were organised into disciplines in the same way 1 2

C. I. Gragg in McNair, op. cit., pp. 11-12. ibid., pp. 10-11.

Introduction 21 that universities are.'1 Cases also possess the minor but useful advantage, especially for inexperienced people, of providing a good deal of information about how a variety of organisations actually work. The wide range of vicarious experience available from cases cannot easily be duplicated by other means. But the case method is not, of course, a panacea for all the educational problems which abound in management education. It does not, for example, seem to be particularly appropriate for use with very young or immature students. Teachers habituated to the lecture method may not feel comfortable employing it - though this is hardly a weakness in the method. For the systematic exposition of difficult material there is probably no substitute for the directive approach of the lecture method. The case method is not the only educational strategy that can foster the symbiosis of knowledge and concrete organisational experience. Other methods can foster alternative, desirable forms of learning not readily or optimally available via the case system. Most importantly, the method does not bear centrally or in a controlled fashion on the development of the student's behavioural skills. In developing the student's ability to analyse and act on problems involving human behaviour in organisation there is also a need for training in actual behaviour, for 'here and now' skill. In such training the behaviour of the student - the action he takes, based upon his diagnosis of a problem - can be brought to the point of actual testing. Subsequently it can be analysed. Rather than the case method this is properly the field of experiential exercises of one type or another: role plays, games, simulations, and group dynamics exercises along the lines developed by the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in England, and the National Training Laboratories in the United States.2 Structure of this Book Whether he likes it or not the manager has to deal with organisational situations in which many forces and influences are simultaneously at work in complex interrelationships. As Lisl Klein remarked, 'Kicking and screaming one is dragged into accepting complexity as a fact of life . . .'3 1 R. L. Ackoff, quoted in Alfred Kuhn, The Study of Society: A Unified Approach (Homewood, Irwin-Dorsey, 1963), p. vii. 2 See, for example, H. R. Knudson, Management: An Experiential Approach (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1973); N. R. F. Maier et al, Supervisory and Executive Development: A Manual for Role Playing (New York, Wiley, 1964); D. A. Kolb et al., Organizational Psychology: An Experiential Approach (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1974); A. K. Rice, Learning for Leadership: Interpersonal and Inter group Relations (London, Tavistock, 1965); E. H. Schein and W. G. Bennis, Personal and Organizational Change through Group Methods (New York, Wiley, 1965). 3 'Some Implications of Rationalised Production', Occupational Psychology, vol. 36, nos. 1 and 2 (1962), p. 23.

22 Introduction It is accordingly essential that the manager possess a conceptual framework, a state of mind adaptive to analysing and acting on behaviour in organisations in terms of the complex relationships of many variables. Open or socio-technical systems theory provides such an analytical framework. Systems theory asserts that human behaviour in organisations can be most adequately conceived as occurring in a system of interdependent forces, each of which can be analysed and set in the perspective of other forces. A system exists in an environment, from which it extracts inputs, carries out internal processes involving human behaviour to transform the inputs, and exports the transformed inputs as outputs back into the environment. A system has a boundary definable in abstract terms, and characteristically exhibits feedback of knowledge of outputs to adjust inputs to maintain some internal balance of forces or equilibrium. Systems theory offers the advantage of an analytical framework applicable to the analysis of behaviour occurring in any kind of system, in any sector or at any level of an organisation. As such it contributes the most appropriate theoretical underpinning of managerial knowledge and skill in organisational behaviour, and hence of any systematic, integrated course in organisational behaviour. Practice in the use of systems theory is offered by the cases in this book. A systems-oriented course may with advantage open with an elementary review of systems theory, and conclude with a more advanced treatment of systems concepts.1 Systems theory also offers a way of segmenting the cases and references offered in this book.2 Each section of the book constitutes a broad system input category. The material in each section is intended to facilitate study of theory and concrete situations within the range of that input, and to trace its impact on other system inputs, system behaviour as a whole and vice versa. There are sections dealing with human, technical, leadership, structural and social inputs, as well as change of inputs. The first four inputs are conceived to arise largely from the extra-organisational and intra-organisational environments, social inputs to arise largely within the system from the interaction of the others. Change of inputs arises from action based on the feedback of information about outputs from the system in question. Each case has been allocated to a section according to the present author's interpretation of the major input area represented in it, and almost invariably reflects the classification adopted in testing it in the classroom. Lecturers will probably find most of the allocations unexceptionable. But 1 See Daniel Katz and R. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York, Wiley, 1966), ch. 2; F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, 'Socio-technical Systems', in C. W. Churchman and M. Verhulst (eds), Management, Science, Models and Techniques, vol. 2 (Pergamon, 1960); and J. A. Seiler, Systems Analysis in Organizational Behaviour (Homewood, Irwin-Dorsey, 1967), chs 1 and 2. 2 The present author is indebted to Seiler, op. cit., for this notion.

Introduction 23 the section classifications are fuzzy, at least at the edges. A handful of cases which centre on inputs straddling two or more sections could equally well have been placed elsewhere. Within each section the cases have been given a particular ordering to help the student build the kind of vicarious experience that case discussion can provide. In each section the cases are ordered in terms of two criteria. One criterion is that each section follows a developmental sequence in terms of grasp of theory and difficulty of case. Each successive case tends to involve the use of partially new and increasingly complex abilities in terms of theoretical understanding and skill in case analysis. Of course any of the cases can be made more difficult by means of encouraging and cajoling a class to explore it more deeply. Wherever possible the first case in the section introduces the broad issues and considerations of that section in more elementary form. The last few cases in each section are invariably the most difficult. The second criterion is heterogeneous ordering within the section, in terms of variety of issue, context, and industry. Each successive case differs from the one immediately preceding. Cases which are rather similar are kept apart. The criteria adopted in choosing the section references were selectivity and brevity. Even in post-graduate programmes of one or two years' duration it is impossible to study all there is to know about human behaviour in organisations. Selectivity in drawing upon the literature is therefore obligatory. Experience indicates that it is more useful to practise using selected concepts on the cases than to attempt to survey most of the literature. The references indicate either articles or specified chapters of books, not entire textbooks or monographs. The more popular items from the general literature are mentioned where they appear to be adequate. The items do, however, vary in the demands they make on the reader's background. As a whole the references are multi-disciplinary: they present different approaches from different disciplines and orientations to the behaviour under scrutiny in the section. Most of the references are well known. The lecturer may of course substitute other references he prefers in the light of the cases he intends to choose for a particular course. Assuming some pressure on student time, and acknowledging the poorly articulated and integrated present state of knowledge of organisational behaviour, the references are hardly definitive. They do, however, add up to a moderately systematic, modestly integrated treatment of the whole area of human behaviour in organisations. Using this Book Each case should normally be used as a discrete unit, to be discussed at the rate of one per class period. It is the author's experience in using the

24 Introduction cases that each provides sufficient material to fuel a discussion of fifty to eighty minutes' duration. Cases that provide a good deal more material than this are presented in two or more parts. A long sequel in a multi-part series should be discussed in the succeeding class meeting; a short sequel in the same meeting after the class has discussed the preceding part.1 The lecturer will find a number of opportunities for mounting various kinds of exercises based on the multi-part cases, some of which are referred to in the section introductions. The lecturer should ask his students not to read beyond the first part of a multi-part case until requested to do so. In preparing cases and theory for a particular course it is recommended that the lecturer work consciously from cases of interest in a particular section back to references of interest, and vice versa, in the light of his course objectives. In this way he can pull together a set of cases and concepts appropriate to his objectives. He then has the choice of either using lectures or seminars to expound and explore the theory, to be followed by the selected exercises, or intersperse lectures or seminars in between the cases as seems appropriate. Early in a course, lectures are to be preferred to seminars for most purposes with most classes: students usually need help in coming to grips with theory. The lecture-case sequence offers the advantage of tidiness over the interspersal method, and is easier to plan. In long courses there should be a number of lecture-case clusters. The lecturer should bear in mind that experience indicates that the ratio of lectures to cases should not exceed about 1:3. Students may usefully be assigned appropriate readings for study before the lectures are given. Where students carry out this reading faithfully, the lecturer can concentrate on evaluation of the conceptual schemes under study, rather than on a nuts-and-bolts exposition of it. As students gain familiarity in reading the literature, the lecturer may with advantage offer increasingly evaluative lectures, or switch to seminars. *

*

*

This book amounts to one man's attempt to pull together sizeable chunks of the empirical research literature bearing on human behaviour in a considerable number of British organisations. It implicitly demonstrates some rough behavioural uniformities to be found between these organisations. It is the author's hope that the book makes some contribution to the integration and development of organisational behaviour as a central area within the field of management education, and helps to close the serious communication gap between the researcher and the manager by providing a means for utilising research. 1 Two or more parts of a lengthy series may of course be combined and discussed together. In the author's view this practice, however, unduly burdens and complicates discussion without providing any clear advantages.

SECTION ONE

Human Inputs: Predispositions, Motivation and Development

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Introduction The first section of this book consists of cases and associated references primarily concerned with human predispositions, motivation and development: the personal characteristics men and women bring with them to work; how these characteristics arise and develop; the impact of organisations on predispositions and motivations; and how people change and develop different motivations over time. A central issue implicated in nearly all the cases is how particular individuals or groups in specific organisational situations may be motivated to behave in ways which will result in effective work performance. Finally, the section is concerned with how the behaviour and attitudes of people on the job affect their behaviour and attitudes off the job, and vice versa. The Bob Mansfield case which opens the section provides an account of the education, development and aspects of the early career of an engineering graduate who became a management trainee in a steel company. The case culminates in an incident in which Bob's cognitions and assumptions apparently acted as strong determinants of how he behaved. These assumptions may not be unique to Bob, but may perhaps arise from sources common to a large number of people who share something of his background. The case is probably most useful in discussion by a younger, graduate group. Case discussion may usefully attempt to get 'inside' Bob: to see how he views his environment and development over time, to focus on the process by which Bob developed his attitudes and assumptions, and the validity of his view of the incident. Peek Frean & Company Limited describes women at work in their characteristic organisational work roles, in status terms virtually in the basement of the manufacturing company. Peek Frean illustrates a clear environment-organisation interaction and adjustment over a period of time, and the implications of extensive part-time work in a particular factory. Analysis may reveal opportunities for management action within the environmental constraints. The Jim Moore (A) case is about the development of a skilled worker in the engineering industry, in the context of a career decision critical to his future. In order to understand the decision point the case provides certain information about Jim's background. The case affords the basis for a discussion of what decision Jim should make and, especially, why he should make that decision in terms of his development. Jim Moore (B) 27

28 Cases in Organisational Behaviour provides a sequel by disclosing the decision Jim actually made, and describes his further work history. In this as in other case series consisting of two or more parts, a full discussion of the (A) case should normally be completed before the (B) case is studied. The Bob Mansfield, Jim Moore and Octane Limited cases provide different opportunities to develop insight into how a particular organisational environment appears to the man (or men) who inhabits it, and how the two relate. The behaviour of a particular individual in his specific situation can make substantial sense only in so far as one can perceive how the individual involved himself perceives it. IDP Limited describes the problems experienced by an international computer manufacturer in attracting and retaining systems analysts and programmers on the payroll, and the attitudes of these specialists to their work. The company appears to have adapted successfully to the problem. Case discussion may fruitfully try to deal with what this adaptation amounts to, the basis of the individual-organisation nexus, and any problems appearing on the horizon. Octane Limited (A) and (B) to some extent continue with themes raised by the Bob Mansfield and Jim Moore cases. This series presents a study of the perceptions, preoccupations and attitudes of middle managers and technical specialists in a large British oil company. The paradoxes and contrasts provided by a careful analysis of this difficult case encourage insights into careers in a large organisation, and perhaps provide some perspective on one's own career. It should be possible to design a valuable, extended exercise based on the Octane series, drawing upon the last two papers mentioned in the references. References The references suggested here precis several theories and hypotheses about the mechanisms and processes involved in shaping behaviour, including individual development and motivation. All are brief; a number tend to be somewhat repetitive. Not all the references should of course necessarily be drawn upon, even in a course involving most of the cases in the section. Study of the cases may lead the lecturer to substitute alternative references he prefers. Leavitt (1) provides an elementary and Seiler (2) a more difficult general treatment of the area. Berelson and Steiner (3) survey the findings of research on behavioural development, Zalkind and Costello (4) review perception. Kluckhohn and Murray (5) and White (6) summarise useful concepts on personality formation and development. Hunt and Hill (7) present an up-to-date general treatment of motivation. Opsahl and Dun-

Introduction to Section One

29

nette (8) and Dubin (9) offer useful reviews of financial incentives. Festinger (10) provides a popular outline of dissonance theory. The nuts and bolts of the well-known Maslow (11) theory, more succinctly expressed by McGregor (12), has been assessed in terms of research by Clark (13). Herzberg's (14) motivation-hygiene theory is reported in his popular article, and evaluated by Vroom (15). McClelland (16) and Stringer (17) report the work on the need for achievement. The motivation-organisational climate nexus is explored by Litwin (18). Mansfield (19) presents research findings and concepts concerning graduate career development.

1. H. J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology, Third edn (Chicago U.P., 1972), chs 1 to 8. 2. J. A. Seiler, Systems Analysis in Organizational Behaviour (Irwin, 1967), ch. 3. 3. Bernard Berelson and G. A. Steiner, Human Behaviour: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), ch. 3. 4. S. S. Zalkind and T. W. Costello, 'Perception: Implications for Administration', Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 7 (1962-63). 5. Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture (Knopf, 1955), ch. 2. 6. Robert White, 'Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence', Psychological Review, vol. 66, no. 5 (1959). 7. J. G. Hunt and J. W. Hill, The New Look in Motivational Theory for Organizational Research', Human Organization, vol. 28, no. 2 (1969). 8. R. L. Opsahl and M. D. Dunnette, The Role of Financial Compensation in Industrial Motivation', Psychological Bulletin, vol. 66 (1966). 9. Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration, 3rd edn (Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 63-71. 10. Leon Festinger, 'Cognitive Dissonance', Scientific American, vol. 207, no. 4 (1962). 11. A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (Harper, 1954), ch. 5. 12. Douglas McGregor, The Need Hierarchy: A Theory of Motivation' in P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, Organizational Behaviour and Administration, rev. edn (Irwin-Dorsey, 1965), pp. 446-50. 13. J. V. Clark, 'Motivation in Work Groups: A Tentative View', Human Organization, vol. 19, no. 4 (1960-61). 14. Frederick Herzberg, 'One More Time: How do you Motivate Employees?' Harvard Business Review, vol. 46, no. 1 (1968). 15. V. H. Vroom, Work and Motivation (Wiley, 1964), ch. 5. 16. D. C. McClelland, 'Business Drive and National Achievement', Harvard Business Review, vol. 40, no. 4 (1962). 17. R. A. Stringer, 'Achievement Motivation and Management Control', in G. W. Dalton and P. R. Lawrence (eds), Motivation and Control in Organizations (Irwin-Dorsey, 1971); G. H. Litwin and R. A. Stringer, 'Motivation and Behaviour', in G. W. Dalton et al. (eds), Organizational Change and Development (Irwin-Dorsey, 1970). 18. G. H. Litwin, 'Climate and Motivation: An Experimental Study', in D. A.

30

Cases in Organisational Behaviour

Kolb et al., Organizational Psychology: A Book of Readings (Prentice-Hall, 1974). 19. Roger Mansfield, The Initiation of Graduates in Industry', Human Relations, vol. 25, no. 1 (1972); 'Career Development in the First Year at Work', Occupational Psychology, vol. 45, no. 2 (1971).

1.1 Bob Mansfield1

At lunch in the company cafeteria Bob Mansfield, a 24-year-old management trainee employed by the Northcote Steel Company, outlined his strong views on union-management relations to Vic Williams, who administered the company's management training centre. When over coffee Vic pressed Bob for chapter and verse to back his assertions, Bob quoted at length examples of 'gross mishandling' of employees by the management of a company he had frequently visited during training some months before. Bob concluded by exclaiming: 'I was so angry at management's actions that I had to control myself from trying to stimulate the company's employees into a strike!' As they left the cafeteria, Vic remarked in his quiet but firm way: 'It's no business of yours what state of industrial relations exist in the companies you visit on training trips.' Later in the day, Bob pondered Vic's remark. Was the quality of industrial relations indeed no concern of his? Or was it fundamental? *

*

*

Peter Robert Mansfield was born in 1938 in Liverpool. His father was a constable in the police force. Bob had one brother, John, who was seven years older. Like his father, John had served an apprenticeship before joining the police. Bob felt his parents working class, though the fact that his father was a policeman tended to de-class his parents to some extent. The Mansfield family lived in a predominantly lower middle-class area of Liverpool where the Mansfields, like most other people, owned their own house. Most people in the neighbourhood worked in whitecollar jobs. Bob began his formal education at the neighbourhood county primary school operated by the local education authority. On entering school he encountered educational 'streaming' on the basis of ability. At the school, classes were organised on a three-stream system consisting of Classes A, B and C. Bob was always in the A stream. Clear patterns of future educational attainment were established by the streaming system: pupils in the A stream almost always proceeded to grammar schools to pursue academic studies in preparation for professional careers; some pupils from the B stream went on to grammar schools, but most did not; the majority of B and C stream pupils went on to secondary modern and 1

Data for this case were provided by P. R. Mansfield.

31

32 Cases in Organisational Behaviour secondary technical schools, to study vocationally- and trade-oriented subjects. Having been successful in the eleven-plus examination, Bob proceeded to a Liverpool grammar school which had about a thousand pupils. The first year at the school was treated as a grading year, when pupils were classified into six streams on the basis of academic ability. There were three top forms and three bottom forms in each year. He told the case writer that he thought '. . . streaming was the very existence of the school: there was an elite within an elite within an elite. The top three streams were streamed again on the basis of ability in the various academic subjects we studied. I was in the top form for maths, but in the third for Latin.' 'I enjoyed being streamed. Unstreamed people, such as those who went to public schools, seem to me to lack drive and interest in education. Streaming undoubtedly makes one competitive. It provides an urge to learn. But I think it has a bad effect basically, because the lower grades get poorer treatment. In my own school the poorer teachers taught the lower forms.' At the school educational emphasis was almost entirely upon formal educational attainment: The only exercise one got in lower school was weekly gymnastics. I joined the gymnastics club, and went an extra two nights a week just to do that. During upper school I continued with gymnastics. I was keen rather than highly proficient.' Bob enjoyed English, history and arts subjects generally, but was clearly more successful at mathematics and scientific disciplines. After four years at the school Bob prepared to go to university: 'This was what one prepared for at "A" level. It never occurred to me that anything else would or could happen. My goals were defined for me by the educational system and the neighbourhood in the sense that people of my generation from my primary school went on to university. Ninety per cent of my contemporaries at eleven years of age went on to university.' 'I more or less marked time for the last couple of years at school, because of a lack of interest and ability at German, which I had to pass to satisfy the university entrance requirements.' In 1958 Bob went up to Ledfield University, an English provincial university, and enrolled for the degree course in mechanical engineering. He reached this decision by a process of elimination. He rated his ability at arts subjects low. Looking back on his decision a decade later, he realised that at the time he knew practically nothing about many of the courses open to students. He felt he was not sufficiently talented at

Bob Mansfield 33 mathematics to either take a degree in it, or to combine it with other scientific subjects, so decided to qualify in engineering where he thought he could use his moderate ability at mathematics to advantage. He decided on mechanical engineering rather than another branch of engineering because it seemed to him to be the most broad and general degree course available in that professional field. During the three years he spent at Ledfield, Bob did not work very hard at his formal studies. In the final year of the course students were split up into two streams, based on previous performance. Bob was in the Honours stream. The same year he stood unsuccessfully for a position on the student union executive, and became a member of the student engineering society's committee. He also edited a student journal, which took up a good deal of his time. He felt he had reached a stage where he was content to get a pass degree. Bob did not take much part in university sports activities. He dropped gymnastics early in his first year when he noticed the much higher standards attained by other student gymnasts. At Ledfield University certain subsidiary courses were required of students taking degrees in mechanical engineering. Bob was required to study applied economics, industrial psychology and industrial relations, which he found stimulating. Indeed, most social science and arts subjects strongly attracted him. He made a number of friends among students who were reading for degrees in these disciplines. 'I also made contact with Communists and fellow travellers, who I rejected in general. I came across the Socialist Labour League, who made Communists look like Tories. They are the end. You have to see these people to believe them. The Socialist Labour League are a subversive body - there's no doubt about it. They contact students and try to operate through them. They are the sort of people who invite you along to private houses for a chat or a seminar. I was invited as I had [student] friends who were Communists, or had Communist leanings. . . . Engineers don't make good Communists.' Bob adopted strong attitudes towards unionism : 'One of the influences on me in my final year was Fred Black, who lectured on industrial relations. Mr Black did not set out his own political views, but he challenged any political statements on a factual basis for a start. He was himself a left-winger. This came through in his attitudes and in his questions, and in his non-acceptance of values I held almost as traditional. It was certainly not indoctrination in any sense; it was a challenge to things I had not properly thought about.'

34 Cases in Organisational Behaviour 'The interpretation I placed on trade union history - in this country anyway - was of an attempt to do things by parliament, which was promptly set aside by the courts. There was progress and then setback. It influenced me to think about what a funny lot these Tories are. . . . I appreciated that both sides [in industry] were unskilled; one doesn't expect skills from unskilled people. But if you have people setting themselves up as rulers, you expect them to manipulate sensibly. The trouble was they weren't sensible in their manipulations.' 'I went up to Ledfield a weak Tory; I came down a rabid left-winger, with very strong attitudes to unionisation and what management ought to do - or not to do - with regard to the treatment of workers.' Bob failed to attain Honours, but graduated B.Sc. in mid-1961. In September of that year he joined Northcote and Company Limited, a large English steel firm, as a management trainee, and began a two-year training programme organised by the company's head office. Bob joined a steel firm because he found the steel industry fascinating and somehow romantic. He was not interested in 'making buns or detergent'. The first phase of the course consisted of three months at a company training centre, interspersed with visits to various company plants. From time to time the management trainees were addressed by leading company executives. Bob felt most of this was ' . . . very inflating to one's ego. Special attention was given to the intake of management trainees, as compared with other graduates and apprentices. There was a considerable edge, in being a management trainee. It makes me a little bit sick when I see the advantages a management trainee has in the company over people who have probably as good or better qualifications, but have not been through the management trainee system. Management trainees make all the right contacts at head office. They are deliberately surveyed as potential managers. You have to be about thirty before people stop thinking of you as an ex-management trainee.' At the training centre Bob met David Northcote, another management trainee. On more than one occasion, when David heard Bob expound his views on union-management relations and related issues, he had exclaimed, 'You're nothing but a bloody Communist!' Bob felt that David's opinion was not worth much. Unlike all the other management trainees, David was neither a graduate nor a member of a professional society. He had, however, been to one of the elite English public schools, and his family possessed powerful influence in the Northcote Company. Bob thought David 'a bit thick', and his evaluation 'a simple classification by a simple bloke'. During subsequent phases of the training course Bob spent time at a

Bob Mansfield 35 number of company plants at different locations. Whenever an opportunity occurred he put overalls on, and went on shifts with the men to try to see what the machines were doing: 'I felt I needed to know about machines what they do; what their limits are. I felt I had not obtained this essential experience from my university course - probably through my own fault.' He spent four weeks on shifts in a melting shop, which he thoroughly enjoyed. Later he was attached for a time to a steel plant manufacturer: 'I insisted that I go through the engineering apprenticeship school... I started with the fifteen-year-old Herberts, and learned to operate all the machines. I ended up doing all the trade tests that the apprentices do. This took me about eight to ten weeks [the normal course took about six months]. After that I went out and worked in the various shops.' Bob subsequently worked for short periods as a moulder in two steel foundries. Then, late in 1962, he was sent on a further routine training trip to Alexander Newsom and Company Limited, a small structural steelworks, to learn about that aspect of the steel industry: 'I went there in the summer, when it was a thoroughly happy firm, employing about 260 men. The work force was sloppy; this was why they were happy. The men got away with murder.' 'I thoroughly enjoyed my stay there, and made a lot of friends amongst the men . . . I had drinks with them . . . I stayed in a hotel and really enjoyed myself.' 'I noticed at the end of my stay that a large and interesting coke pusher was being erected, an operation which would be completed only some months later. Some time later I asked to be sent back to see what progress had been made in its erection. It led me right into the thick of a situation I found absolutely fascinating. . . . I came back the second time to find a bombshell had burst over the company.' 'I became so involved in the situation that I went back a third time. I engineered reasons. I couldn't get all the facts in the short period I was there on my second visit, so I volunteered to show another trainee around. I more or less disappeared when we arrived at Alexander's, and got in touch with all the people I knew, to get the facts on the situation. I obtained a lot of information from the shop stewards. Nobody in management volunteered or supplied me with any information. One or two supervisors were in fact suspicious of my interest in events at the plant. They would have run me off the site if they had guessed my point of view.' 'Alexander's, an inefficient firm which had for years existed on "cost plus" defence contracts, had in the later 1950s been taken over by Senior and Company, a major firm in the steel industry. The chief executive of

36 Cases in Organisational Behaviour Alexander's had been removed from office, and one or two executives from the parent company appointed in his place. A few of Senior's foremen had been brought in; there was a certain amount of jockeying between the established foremen and the new supervisors.' 'By 1962 there was considerable unemployment in the area around the Alexander Newsom plant - it was about six per cent for the whole region. The entire industry was depressed . . . a similar firm in the area had recently closed down, throwing many men on to the labour market who had skills comparable to those employed at Alexander's.' 'I found out from shop-floor workers and stewards that Senior and Company had compared the cost of structural steel between what Alexander Newsom produced, and what they could buy outside from other companies. They found these costs to be excessive - so high as to make it more economic for Seniors to subcontract their work elsewhere. Management therefore decided to try and improve the efficiency of the Alexander plant - by the crudest and most dishonest methods. They chose to attempt this goal via "redundancy".' 'The basic situation was that management decided to declare a massive "redundancy" of about eighty employees, including apprentices and two of the four shop stewards. Lists were posted on notice boards around the plant naming the "redundant" employees. One notable name in the list was that of a 64-year-old worker, with only eight months to go before becoming eligible for a retirement pension. By becoming redundant he would lose his rights to a pension and only receive repayment of his own contributions to the pension fund.' 'A feature of this decision was the method of determining the particular men to be given notice . . . : there was no attempt at joint consultation with the union representatives, and the usual trade union principle of last-in-first-out was not observed.' 'The eighty redundant workers left the firm. For three months after that negotiations between management and shop stewards continued in a state of deadlock. The stewards refused all of management's requests about revising wage structures and cutting out restrictive practices. Management's eventual way of resolving this deadlock was to issue notices that all remaining company employees were to be sacked, thus terminating existing employment contracts. Employees were informed that the personnel manager would be available for job applications, on the basis of new contracts, from the following w e e k . . . the majority of existing workers were taken back on these conditions.' 'Management called it a redundancy, but it wasn't one. It was a deliberate de-manning in an attempt to tighten up on work standards. They wanted the same work out of far fewer people.. . This idea of spurring men to

Bob Mansfield 37 greater effort, and using the higher productivity gained to sack other workmen, is exactly the behaviour at which trade unions have been protesting for many years.' This sort of managerial behaviour was enough to get anyone's back up. Management had disregarded just about every union agreement. Management's behaviour confirmed a lot of the attitudes I had developed in my industrial relations course. It is surely a responsibility of management to carry out any necessary reductions in the work force in a manner that does as little damage as possible to industrial relations within the firm.' The only way to describe my feelings about the situation was "outraged". I was so angry at management's actions that I had to control myself from trying to stimulate the company's employees into a strike!' This experience was valuable to me - a lesson in how not to do things, given by this abominable firm. I thought it was an event worth reporting, so wrote it up as a case example. I had no specific aim in view, except partly to clarify my own ideas on the situation. For these I was criticised by Vic Williams of Northcote's management training centre, and told it was no business of mine.'

1.2 Peek Frean & Company Limited1

Peek Frean Limited was a biscuit factory located at Bermondsey in the London area. Peek Freans had traditionally opposed the employment of married women. The commonest objection to their employment was that their home ties undermined the loyalty and efficiency which management had a right to expect. Before the Second World War factory management had been able to select women employees with considerable care, and to lay down rigid conditions for their employment. As in the case of many other employers in the south of England no married women were employed, and single girls had to leave on marriage. After 1937 some women who had left the firm to get married were allowed to return temporarily during peak periods, such as the Christmas rush. Many of these seasonal workers became full-time workers during the War, under the impact of an acute labour shortage. During the War some married women began to be engaged on a part-time basis. Peek Frean's management considered this to be a temporary measure, and in 1945 attempts were made to re-establish an entirely full-time labour force. The population of Bermondsey fell during the war, however, and did not regain its previous size. From the late 1940s management recruited parttime workers for a variety of shifts, which enabled the firm to offer a wide choice of hours to suit the domestic circumstances of the women who, though prepared to work, did not wish to work a full day. The full-time working day remained from 7.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. Management developed alongside it a set of short or 'split' shifts which complemented and in one case overlapped with another. These shifts were as scheduled in Table 1.2.1. The morning, afternoon and midday shifts were integrated into the normal working day and the production system. The evening shift was on a somewhat different basis. Originally it was introduced in order to give flexibility to deal with seasonal break periods. For several years evening shift workers had their employment terminated when the seasonal pressure was over. But the time came when, as expansion went on, the evening shift - though still officially temporary - was worked all round the year. The evening shift workers became as much a part of the regular labour force as the women employed at any other time. The consideration given to the married women and her needs had reached the point at which the 1 Data for this case were taken from the article by J. H. Smith in the British Journal of Sociology, vol. 12, no. 1 (1961).

38

Peek Frean & Company Limited 39 working arrangements of the factory had become reorganised around the system of part-time shifts. The part-time worker, who only a few years before had been on the point of being hustled back home again, had become vital to the factory's very existence. A research study of the women workers at Peek Freans was carried out by the Social Science Department of the London School of Economics, financed by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. At the time of the research the manufacture of the factory's biscuits was largely 'automated'. Packing of the biscuits was mainly performed by hand. Trade unions and a works committee were old established and flourishing Table 1.2.1 Schedule of Short Shifts Name of shift Duration Morning shift Afternoon shift Midday shift Evening shift

7.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. to 9.30 a.m. to 5.45 p.m. to

12.30 p.m. 5.30 p.m. 4 p.m. 9.30 p.m.

in the factory. There were various social and recreational clubs. Of approximately 4,000 workers in the factory at the time of the research study, some 2,000 were part-time women workers. Two out of three female employees were part-time.1 Some 80 per cent of the women employed in the factory were married. Of these more than two-thirds worked part-time. Because of the number of part-time workers the factory's administration had to deal with more people than they otherwise would. This burden fell principally on those departments concerned with factory records, such as personnel and wages. Each part-time worker required as much care and attention from the personnel and medical departments in interviewing and engaging her as if she had been working full-time. And the time and effort needed to train her was not noticeably reduced because she was part-time. However long she worked, the burden carried by the wages office was the same for every woman working in the firm. It appeared to the researchers that there was more paper work per worker for parttimers than for full-timers. Since the part-timer was not in the factory for the whole of the working day, enquiries involving her work often could not be dealt with as they arose. They had to be noted and dealt with when she came in next. As a result time was wasted and effort duplicated. Factory management wanted flexible production programmes to meet unexpected priority orders. High absentee rates complicated adminis1

At the time one in twelve female employees in British manufacturing industry were part-time.

40 Cases in Organisational Behaviour trative tasks, particularly production planning. The departmental situation demanded planning in considerable detail, so that the supervisors could maintain a balanced labour force in spite of considerable fluctuations in attendance. Uncertainties about the number of workers who would be available for work on the following day, and in particular about the chances of balancing the morning and afternoon labour force, were difficulties which required special consideration in planning. The situation presented many opportunities for mistakes and misunderstandings. It complicated the organisation of the flow of work and required exceptional concentration, control and patience on the part of the supervisors. The researchers concluded from their studies that the task of organising fulltime and part-time labour for the production system placed a considerable burden on supervisors. The researchers made a special study of one department where in the course of the day some 240 women were employed. Twenty-six of these women worked full-time. Two women supervisors were in charge of the department. At 7.30 a.m. each working day the supervisors dealt with an incomplete labour force, consisting of the full-time and part-time morning workers. The labour force was reinforced by a second shift at 9.30 a.m., with the arrival of the midday shift workers. The employment of the midday shift meant that factory space and machinery were idle for 3-5 hours a day, since they could not be used until the women arrived at 9.30 a.m. or after 4 o'clock when they left. The great majority of those who started work at 7.30 a.m. disappeared after the midday break. Their places were filled by the afternoon shift which came in at 1.30 p.m. The afternoon was interrupted by the disappearance of the midday shift at 4 o'clock. When the department stopped day-time working at 5.30 p.m. it had to be left in such a condition that the evening shift, managed by different supervisors, was able to take over at 5.45 p.m. The supervisors could not always be certain that the same number of workers would be available in the afternoon as in the morning. The absentee rate in the department reached up to 25 per cent on any one day. The researchers made a study in the department in which absence from work from all causes was examined over a period of three weeks. The 130 packers lost 198 working days in the course of the study. The full-time and part-time morning workers had a better record than the part-time afternoon and midday shift workers. The average absence per worker for the latter group was nearly double that for the former. Six out of every ten of the afternoon and midday shift workers were sometimes absent during the period, as against four out of ten of the part-time morning and full-time workers. The average absence for all workers in the department was 1-5 days out of 18 possible working days.

Peak Frean & Company Limited 41 The researchers kept a daily record of the work of the two supervisors, which they analysed in terms of the main supervisory activities and those held to be the basis of the supervisors' job, classified under the Ministry of Labour's Training Within Industry Scheme (TWI). It emerged from this analysis that by far the largest proportion of the supervisors' time was spent on administration, on planning and on controlling the factors affecting the flow of work through the department. In terms of time spent, human relations problems came a poor second. The training functions were scarcely touched at all, instruction being the special responsibility of trainers who reported to the supervisors. On the results of this analysis the two women supervisors were departmental managers in all but name, and might have enjoyed this status had they been men. In the various departments of Peek Freans the midday shift and the evening shift were composed mainly of younger mothers, and had the highest absence rates. Full-time workers, among whom were the small proportion of the female labour force who were single women, had the lowest absence rates. Married women in the factory had a less favourable record of attendance than men. The absence rate of women employees at the time of the research study was 40 per cent higher than that of men. Its fluctuations from month to month were sharper and less predictable. There were variations between shifts. Peek Frean's management attempted to meet the women workers' reasonable requests for time off work. At the same time management took action to minimise the disorganisation of production that high absence rates could cause. The more Peek Freans tolerated absenteeism the more temporary transfers management and the supervisors had to make in order to keep the work moving. A woman personnel officer screened requests for absence without pay in consultation with the supervisors concerned. Management recognised that it could not control absenteeism, but took steps to be able to predict what tomorrow's absence rates were likely to be. Particular problems were created at school holiday periods, and when husbands' holidays did not coincide with the factory shutdown. Management took steps to keep from key jobs women whose home circumstances were likely to lead to frequent absence. Management took steps to so arrange the work that the burden of carrying on when absence was high did not fall unduly heavily on particular workers. The high absence rates created problems for the workers themselves by breaking up effective work teams in which high group piece rates were earned. In those departments in which small work teams had to be organised, the midday shift found themselves isolated from the general life of the factory. A daily record was kept by the researchers of all transfers within, to and from the one department closely studied. Analysis of the

42 Cases in Organisational Behaviour record showed that although some transfers were due to sudden production needs, most resulted from the high rates of absence. In a few departments transfers were not made arbitrarily but on a roster based on a form agreed with the women themselves. Only a few departments had developed such arrangements. In most parts of the factory temporary transfers were governed by a works committee decision which management had vainly tried to get reversed. This decision laid down the rule that the worker with the shortest service had to be moved first. This rule was rigidly enforced in some departments of the factory. New recruits felt they were for ever being moved around. The researchers found from their general attitude survey of the women workers that the frequency with which newcomers were moved from one job to another was a source of considerable dissatisfaction among the women. There was a high labour turnover rate among married women workers, particularly the part-timers. In 1955 the highest turnover rate, 104 per cent, occurred in the midday shift. Next came the part-time afternoon workers with 62 per cent, then the morning workers with 50 per cent. The full-time workers had the lowest of all with 46 per cent. The personnel department asked employees who were leaving why they were leaving. Domestic responsibilities were the most frequently quoted reason. Management's findings was that domestic responsibilities were the most important cause of leaving. Many members of the factory's management believed that parttimers could only be regarded as temporary workers. The researchers made a special study of labour turnover in the late spring of 1955. A random sample of 100 women, who were all engaged by Peek Freans during a six-week period, were interviewed within eight days of starting and again at the end of six months. Those who had left were wherever possible interviewed at home. Of the 100 women engaged, 25 had never started work at the factory. Of the rest, 40 had left within three months, and a total of 57 within six months. This left 18 survivors of those who actually began work with the company. The follow-up interviews carried out by the researchers at the end of the six months showed that most of the women interviewed had immediately gone into other, better-paid forms of employment. The leavers included all the single women recruited, and all the married women with husbands but no children. More workers remained in each of the part-time groups. The most stable was the afternoon shift, where family responsibilities were often heavy. The researchers also made measures of 'labour stability' - a measure of the proportion of employees staying in their jobs over a given period. The researchers found that, leaving out the 9.30 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift, more than 80 per cent of the part-time workers had been with the firm for more than a year. Considering the labour stability and labour turnover figures to-

Peak Frean & Company Limited 43 gether, the researchers concluded that the least stable period of employment was during the first three months and, to a lesser extent, during the second three months. After six months the chance that a woman would stay with Peek Freans for a long time became very good. Those who stayed were likely to achieve a longer service than the full-timers. The midday shift had the worst record of labour stability, labour turnover and absenteeism. The researchers found it very difficult to make comparisons between full-time and part-time workers, and between part-time shifts in terms of output and general effectiveness. The part-time workers' average hourly earnings were 33d. The higher piece-rate workers were making 39J.1 The researchers were in no doubt that many part-timers were extremely effective workers. They found no evidence to suggest that the average hourly output of the part-timers was higher than that of the full-timers. Some members of management suggested that the short day led to faster learning. The researchers found too few exactly comparable work situations to make a satisfactory study of learning time. The researchers believed that their findings on efficiency and general performance were not conclusive. From their general attitude survey the researchers found that to the women a 'satisfactory' job was one in which the importance of domestic duties was recognised, and which also provided the opportunity to earn 'good money'. What most of the women wanted was an opportunity to earn money to raise the standards of living of their families. Provided the firm paid some attention to the claims of home life by adjusting its traditional rules and regulations, and afforded the opportunity to earn this money, they seemed to have very little to offer in criticism. Piece-work was on the whole preferred. A well-run department was appreciated as it was realised that this was essential for the steady flow of work on which high earnings depended. This impression was confirmed by the departmental study. Asked for suggestions for improving the running of their department, most of the women had no constructive comments to make. There was a high level of appreciation of the supervisors' efforts. This appreciation was frequently reinforced by such remarks as 'I shouldn't like to be a supervisor - no pleasing some of the girls', and also by sympathetic remarks about the kind of problems involved in absenteeism and labour turnover. The unfavourable comments made on supervision concentrated mainly on failure to maintain a steady flow of work, on disturbance of the regular job in a familiar working group or of petty discipline. What the women asked and expected from their jobs was a steady flow of work which would enable them to make the best use of their limited hours in the factory. They 1

At the time average earnings in the British biscuit industry were 31d., and for British manufacturing industry as a whole, 33d.

44 Cases in Organisational Behaviour wanted a really well-organised department. The researchers found that the women did not want opportunities for participation or a fuller life inside the factory. The trade unions, works committee, and social and recreational clubs in the factory gained little support from them. The combination of job and home responsibilities seemed to the researchers to have left them with little time, desire or need for these outlets. The women were not interested in the organisational problems of management. Factory life as a whole meant very little to them. But they did expect to be treated with the respect and consideration due to a woman combining the duties of job and home.

1.3 Jim Moore (A)1

In 1959 Jim Moore, a universal grinder employed at the tool works operated by Thompson and Company Limited in Sheffield, Yorkshire, was offered the post of foreman of the section he was working in, at a salary of £800 per year. Jim was thirty-two and married. He had been employed at the tool works of the Thompson Company for nearly sixteen years, and had spent a further three years under military direction. In recent years his pay packet had been about £25 per week. A trade union member, Jim thought that supervisors at the tool works had to be in complete agreement with their superiors. He wondered whether he should accept the offer. * * * Born in October 1926 in Sheffield, James Frederick Moore was his parents' only son, the eldest of three children. From the age of five Jim attended a state-owned primary school, where each class consisted of forty to fifty pupils. He was always in the top three in his class, and normally first. 'One of the things that was always with me in my school-days was the small amount of money available. When we went to the pictures, we always sat in the cheapest seats . . . We were always being scolded for playing football with our shoes on: one should be looking after them they were not easily come by . . . 'We had to make our own kind of amusement. We had to mix in. When we played games like cricket one boy would provide the bat, another the ball, and another the stumps. We usually had no pads at all.' 'At school I was never content to be merely a member of a cricket team stuck on a boundary. I wanted to bat a ball, to feel what it was like in the thick of things.' At the age of eleven Jim gained, by the regular examination, a state scholarship to attend a grammar school in East Derbyshire. But as Jim approached fourteen, the minimum school-leaving age, his parents came to the conclusion that they could not afford to allow him to continue at school. They thought he should make a contribution to the family income. Outlining his feelings to the case writer in 1968, Jim declared: 'Although 1

Data for this case were provided by J. F. Moore and Thompson and Company Limited.

45

46 Cases in Organisational Behaviour my father's wages were not terrifically high, it would not have involved many sacrifices on his part to have insisted that I continue at school even if he had had a couple less pints a week.' Jim thought his parents had not provided guidance on what was best for him. He felt he must have needed a 'bit of a push' to keep him at school, a push which should have come from his parents, but which was not forthcoming. At the time he did not have any particular ambitions. Jim decided to try to find a job at one of the plants operated by Thompson and Company Limited, the firm for which his father worked as a skilled employee. Mr Moore had worked for the Thompson Company since shortly after the turn of the century. 'I was probably influenced by the fact that while my father did not have a lot of money, at least he was always employed. He advised me to steer as far away from Thompson's as I possibly could - not because they had been difficult to work for, but because it was not right for his son to work in the same firm.' However, Jim insisted that his father find him a job at Thompson's. He began employment at the Thompson file factory, where his father worked, as a furnace boy. He stayed at this job for about a year. From what he had so far seen of the file factory, it did not seem to hold much of a future for him. He requested a transfer to the Company tool works, thinking that this particular plant would provide more opportunities in skilled work. Jim became an apprentice grinder in the tool works in December 1941, and continued to work at his apprenticeship until 1944, when he became liable for compulsory military service. At that time the British Government was concerned about a shortage of labour in coal mining, and had introduced a ballot scheme by which a certain proportion of all those called up for military service were allocated to the mines. Jim was so assigned and instructed to work at the coal-face of a mine near Sheffield. T o me mining consisted of using one's brawn instead of one's brain... My particular job involved me in regular night work. I didn't mind working shifts, which I had been accustomed to at Thompson's. But at 18, having done a hard day's work, I wanted some enjoyment out of life . . . [Mining] was all bed and work.' 'I decided I was not going to have this situation, so I refused to continue to go down the mine. I just absented myself from work. Being under National Service, I was under the direction of a government ministry. A representative of the ministry came to see me to ask why I was absent.. . He approached the mine manager to get me regular day work.' 'But by this time all my pals were in the forces. Having gone so far as to

Jim Moore (A) 47 take all this time off work, I took it up with the ministry; I was in the forces in ten days.' Jim said the miners he worked for were a 'grand bunch', who helped each other get on with the job, and to protect themselves against danger. They would all 'muck in', and were 'as good a bunch of men as one could wish to work with'. Jim spent the next six months on infantry training, and at a special training college for military policemen: 'The reason I was selected for the MPs was that I was foolish enough to pass the exam required very comfortably . . . I did not know that the examination was for finding potential MPs. At the college I was thought to be one of their best pupils, and was considered for the Special Investigation Branch.' But Jim did not stay in the MPs beyond the period of training: 'At this time I used to knock around with quite a few fellows about my own age. I think I allowed myself to be swayed by the opinions of others. Most of my friends at the time thought how awful it would be, when we all came on leave, to have a policeman among our ranks. I was finally persuaded to rebel against this and got a transfer to a Signal Unit.' When the war ended in 1945, Jim continued his military service in the Signal Unit. He felt that, unless he was willing to make a career of it, the scope available in the Army was very limited. 'My Unit was basically composed of Army regulars; the others were coming and going . . . I did not make many friends.' 'I was not too impressed with the Army. As I knew it the Army was a complete waste of time. It reminded me of the Americans invading an island inhabited by two or three hundred natives, which a couple of dozen men could probably take. But the Army would nevertheless storm the thing with five thousand troops . . . We were once sent to a tin-crushing plant, which was normally operated by two civilians. The Army's answer to the problem of operating the plant was to send in thirty soldiers.' Jim spent the whole period of his military service in England, and attained the rank of corporal. Demobilised in January 1948, he returned to the Thompson Company tool works as a universal grinder. He was the youngest qualified grinder in his section. At the time there was a certain resentment of young grinders by old grinders: The old grinders were more versatile and less specialised than the younger men. They were used to methods developed in Queen Victoria's day. In making a side and face cutter under heat treatment, for example, the old grinder would carry out every operation in its entirety, and probably turn out six cutters a day. By breaking the operation down and doing surface

48 Cases in Organisational Behaviour grinding, internal grinding and the sharpening operations separately, one would get productivity rates three to four times greater than what they were used to. I feel there was a certain resentment of people who were prepared to accept this new kind of thinking - the only kind of thinking in my opinion.' At this time nearly all the people employed in blue-collar capacities at the tool works were members of trade unions: 'We were never involved in any unofficial strikes. Only about 10 per cent of the men were very interested in union activities... I never attended branch meetings, except to pay my monthly subscriptions.' The grinders were probably the highest paid body of skilled men working in the tool plant, receiving total wages of about £25 per week by the late 1950s. *

*

*

In 1952 Jim married Margaret McLachlan, a Scots girl, in a Presbyterian Church in Sheffield. Trior to marriage my church association had been with the Church of England, but I was not a regular attender. Margaret has always been a Presbyterian. Since we married we have regularly attended Presbyterian services.' Margaret came from the west side of Glasgow. On leaving school she had taken a course at a secretarial college, and subsequently worked for four or five business organisations as a shorthand typist. After marriage she joined the Thompson Company as a shorthand typist. Almost a year later she became employment officer for Thompson's. In this post she was responsible for the engagement of production personnel for the entire company. She held this post until the birth of a son nine years later. During the first few years of marriage Jim and Margaret had a rather dull social life: 'I had bought a house a month before we married. We were striving to furnish it, and were worried stiff about having a twenty-year mortgage round our necks. We saved like mad to buy the things we wanted for cash, taking what discount we could get. . .' 'After this first few years, we were able to embark on a relatively free social life. We spent 360 days out of 365 enjoying ourselves. Very rarely did either of us go out without the other.' 'My wife took a real interest in my job, what I did in it, and the company we worked for . . . She reduced my dependence on the opinions of others, and made the greatest possible contribution towards orientating my thinking along the lines I later followed.' *

*

*

It was the established practice of tool works management, when it was

Jim Moore (A) 49 necessary to appoint a new foreman, to offer the post to one of the lowest paid skilled men. Such men were, apparently, the only appropriate candidates who received incomes even remotely near the level that management was willing to pay a first level supervisor; one of them would usually accept the offer. For this and other reasons a high proportion of men who attained management status in the tool works had once been on the shop floor. Jim became a candidate for such an offer. In the late 1950s he was an active member of a works production committee, which consisted of representatives of both management and employees. At committee meetings he frequently criticised management's decisions, and suggested alternative strategies which he felt might attain the desired objectives. When in early 1959 Jim was offered the post of foreman of the section he was working in, at a salary of £800 per year, he had an opportunity to put his ideas to the test. But he did not find it an easy decision: 'A salaried position meant pay for sickness, longer holidays, and a better pension scheme . . . I realised that if I didn't take this opportunity to join management, it might never come my way again. . . With a little luck I felt I might be able to achieve a leading post in the works in ten or fifteen years. I felt there was not much opposition standing in the way of further promotion.' 'But it seemed to me that there were too many changes in the senior management of the tool works, and this was a bad policy.' This was a very difficult job to consider undertaking: it would mean having to discipline men who I had had a pint with or gone to a football match with.' 'It was also a matter of great concern to me that management did not really welcome opinions which differed from their own.'

1.4

Jim Moore (B)

In early 1959 Jim Moore, an experienced universal grinder at the tool works operated by Thompson and Company Limited in Sheffield, Yorkshire, was offered the post of foreman of the section he was working in. A trade unionist and a critical member of a management-employee production committee, Jim believed that supervisors at the tool works had to be in complete agreement with their superiors. He also realised that he would suffer an immediate and severe drop in income if he accepted the offer. Nevertheless, he and his wife Margaret decided he should accept. Despite the initial disadvantages, they felt it was Jim's opportunity to take the first step in what they hoped would become a successful managerial career in the tool works. Jim felt there was 'not much opposition' standing in the way of further promotion in this plant of the Thompson Company. He hoped that by determination, hard work and a little luck he could capitalise on this opportunity. But he wondered how he should go about attaining further promotion. *

*

*

Jim was appointed foreman of the grinding section in May 1959. Almost immediately he was confronted with a problem. As a foreman he had to sign the wage cards of the men in his work group. About a fortnight after he had taken up his new job, Bert Crookes, one of the grinders, 'tried him for size': 'Bert booked a certain job both as piece-work and as daywork. I realised this was to be a test case: how I acted would have a great part to play in the control I could exercise over the men. I had no alternative but to dismiss Bert and get my superiors to agree with me. In this I was successful.' Bert was the same age as Jim. Until Jim's promotion they had worked together in the same work team, which was paid by means of a group bonus incentive system. As a foreman Jim reported to John Anderson, the works production manager, who was in turn responsible to the general manager, David Swanson. Figure 1.4.1 presents a partial organisation chart of the formal relationships affecting Jim at the time. John Anderson, in his mid-forties, was comparatively new to the type of production he was administering, and unfamiliar with the problems that cropped up. The tool works was eighty miles from his home. John customarily began the week's work about midday on Mondays, and left for his home at lunchtime on Fridays. Mr Anderson was too nice a man to disagree with. He was always very 50

Jim Moore (B) 51 friendly towards me. He used to accept all of what I said, I think because of my superior knowledge of the job.' From about the time Jim became a foreman, John had been looking for an opportunity to take a job nearer home. Late in 1959 Jim was appointed assistant to John by David Swanson, the general manager. Jim was to take over John's post if he was a success at his new job. A few months later, John joined the marketing side of the company's activities, which apparently enabled him to work nearer home. Jim was made production Figure 1.4.1 Partial Organisation Chart of the Thompson Tool Works in mid-1959a General manager David Swanson

Accountant

Production engineer

Production manager

Sales manager

Commercial manager

John Anderson

12 production foremen (including Jim Moore)

Production employees (about 160 'clock workers')

a

Constructed by the case writer on the basis of comments provided by Jim Moore.

manager, in charge of twelve production foremen, who in turn supervised about 160 'clock workers' (production employees). *

*

*

*

*

*

Beginning in the early 1960s the activities and relationships of the various plants owned by the Thompson Company were gradually reorganised. The board of directors of the company had decided that the activities of the tool works and the other company plants and departments should be reallocated into decentralised semi-independent divisions. By the mid'sixties the company's central office had reduced its role to providing only a few services to the various divisions, and exercising broad financial control over their activities. The tool works became part of a larger and more complete aspect of the business, the tool division. Sales, commercial and accounting activities within the division were gradually expanded.

52 Cases in Organisational Behaviour For some years Jim held the position of production manager of the tool division. He was one of five executives directly responsible to the division's general manager, David Swanson. 'During this period I thought - and indeed made a case for - the possibility that there should be a works manager in between the general manager and the other five heads . . . I believe that during 1963 and 1964 I was in fact doing the job of a works manager . . . I regarded myself as the senior partner of the five of us, and acted accordingly. When the general manager was absent, his authority was effectively delegated to me. The other executives were quite happy about this. After all, I had much more experience of tool division activities than any of them, and they knew it.' 'I was always prepared to make decisions. I believe that any manager who doesn't make decisions is not doing his job properly . . . The other executives in the division were not amenable to change; I was.' David Swanson, the general manager, was working away from home. He normally took up the reins of office about lunchtime on Monday, and relinquished them for the weekend about midday on Friday. Late in 1965 David decided to leave the company, in order to take a job nearer home. The board of directors of the Thompson Company decided not to replace David as general manager, and instead appointed Jim as works manager of the tool diivsion, in charge of production and related services. Barry Hastings, a 35-year-old executive, was appointed from outside the company to the position of sales and commercial manager. Figure 1.4.2 diagrams the revised organisation of the Tool Division. Figure 1.4.2 Partial Organisation Chart of the Thompson Tool Division in January 1966a Board of directors, Thompson and Company Limited

Sales and commercial manager Barry Hastings

Works manager Jim Moore

Accountant

Production engineering

a

Production department

Work study

Development

Sales department

Commercial department

Constructed by the case writer on the basis of comments provided by Jim Moore.

Jim Moore (B) 53 In the following months Jim made most decisions in the grey areas on the borderline between his authority and Barry's. He felt this was appropriate, as he had extensive experience in the tool division. During Barry's frequent absences on sales missions, Jim made nearly all decisions of significance. This state of affairs continued until November 1966, when Jim was appointed general manager of the tool division by the board of directors of the Thompson Company. Jim was made solely responsible to the board for the overall administration of the division. Barry was to continue in Figure 1.4.3 Partial Organisation Chart of the Thompson Tool Division in November 1966a Board of directors, Thompson and Company Limited

General manager Jim Moore

Accountant

a

Production engineer

Production manager

Sales manager Barry Hastings

Commercial manager

Constructed by the case writer on the basis of comments provided by Jim Moore.

the role of sales manager. The revised formal organisation of the division is presented in Figure 1.4.3. Jim had reached the top post in the division. Asked by the case writer what he felt about his future prospects, Jim replied: The only way 1 could achieve further promotion would be if I were given the opportunity to join the board of directors. I am at the moment directly responsible to the managing director.' *

*

*

As general manager, Jim changed the personnel policies of the tool division: 'I had noticed during the years before I became general manager that, apart from the production department, we had had too many changes of personnel, particularly ones in high positions. We never seemed to get a stable team. In about seven years there were three or four commercial managers, and three or four production engineers. I realised my first task was to achieve continuity of employment, particularly at senior levels.

54 Cases in Organisational Behaviour This I feel I have achieved. Since I became general manager there has not been one personnel change in any of the five departments directly responsible to me, other than for personal reasons.' 'All foremen now get at least as much pay as the highest paid men in their work sections.' During the five years from 1960, upwards of a dozen senior divisional executives had resigned from their posts. From 1965 to early 1968 only one senior executive resigned. In March 1968 Barry Hastings was still sales manager of the division. *

*

*

In early 1968 the tool division employed approximately 470 people, consisting of around 350 clock workers, and about 120 people engaged in managerial, marketing and staff service activities. Turnover for 1960 had been at the level of £400,000 per year; seven years later it had risen to nearly £1.5 million. In 1962 profits had been 5 per cent of turnover; five years later they had risen to 10 per cent. During the intervening years much of the older plant in the division had been replaced, and new and existing markets developed.

1.5 IDP Limited1 International Data Processing Limited (IDP) manufactured and marketed computers. The company had achieved a high level of technical and marketing expertise. The development of electronic data processing (EDP) technology was a major company interest; IDP Limited was in the forefront of computer technology. IDP emphasised product development, and relied on customer recognition of this technical competence. The company defined its marketing role as selling machines through up-to-date marketing practices, and an efficient customer service. The company operated in an extremely competitive market. There were considerable pressures on IDP to reduce costs, provide a better customer service, and thus secure a larger share of the market. IDP experienced an excellent and growing demand for its products. IDP needed computer specialists - programming and systems analysis staff-who could meet high standards and work to firm time targets. Both programming and systems analysis required a high level of technical skill. At the time there was a rising demand for computer specialists. These specialists worked in a loose labour market, and tended to be mobile between firms. Companies requiring computer specialists were concerned to know whether they were providing the kind of work environment which met the needs of these specialists, encouraged them to stay with the company, and to work efficiently and productively. Many of IDP's computer staff worked out in the field. There were strong pressures on staff to gain new customers and not to lose existing customers. Programmers had little or no personal contact with customers; systems analysts had extensive customer contact. The image of itself which IDP projected to prospective job applicants was of a dynamic, technically advanced company which provided excellent training, and was not slipshod in its methods. One systems analyst suggested that he joined the company because 'standards of work here are better than elsewhere and one is dealing with wide sections of industry.' The company provided training courses for their programmers and systems analysts. Most of these courses were related to programming. IDP recruited computer staff with varied backgrounds. Around 40 per cent had university degrees. Sixteen per cent had been in EDP jobs all 1 Data for this case were taken from the article by Enid Mumford in the Sociological Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (1970).

55

56 Cases in Organisational Behaviour their working lives. Twenty-three per cent had Arts 'A' levels. High standards were maintained by the company partly by means of attracting staff who were interested in operating at an advanced technical level, and who were strongly motivated to achieve efficient solutions to EDP problems. Within TDP a programmer could be promoted to senior programmer; a systems analyst to senior analyst, to EDP manager. Promotion from programmer to senior programmer, and from analyst to senior analyst, was not difficult to achieve. Most of the men holding EDP management jobs in the company were young. Researchers from the Manchester Business School studied IDP's programmers and systems analysts by means of interviews. The researchers asked the staff questions to ascertain on which of the following job attributes programmers and systems analysts placed the most importance: security of employment work which did not interfere with social and family life recognition of competence and ability opportunities for self-development opportunities for advancement opportunities for high salary opportunities for pleasant work relationships working for a firm with a good company image status work interest The programmers rated opportunities for self-development, recognition of competence and ability, and work interest as of the greatest interest to them. The systems analysts agreed with this priority too, but also ranked highly company image and pleasant work relationships. Status, advancement and high salaries came very low down on everyone's list. The desire for recognition correlated with age. The younger age groups stressed their need for this. Those giving self-development a high ranking were themselves doing something about it. They indicated that they were proposing to take further courses. The systems analysts referred especially to management courses. No employee regretted making EDP his career. All spoke about their work with enthusiasm. The work they were called upon to do provided them with opportunities for using their skills, and was thought to be challenging and interesting. The programmers talked about getting a programme running as providing them with the greatest satisfaction. The researchers felt that both the programmers and systems analysts clearly received a great deal of satisfaction from the achievement of high standards in their work. A programmer said: T enjoy completing a job satisfactorily and well, making an improvement on a system.' For a

IDP Limited 57 systems analyst, 'It's when you finish a job and the new system is well received by the customer.' Answers to other interview questions showed that the programmers and systems analysts nearly all hoped to get promotion at some point in their careers. Most of them had clear ideas of what positions they would like to be in in five years' time, and of what they could ultimately hope to become. Fifty-three per cent of the programmers and 42 per cent of the systems analysts desired to change to a job of higher status; the others did not. Eighty-one per cent of the computer staff taken as a whole sought promotion within EDP. Seventy per cent of the total staff rated their chances of promotion as good, 10 per cent as average, and 20 per cent as poor. It was the younger men in each group who tended to say that their prospects were good. The researchers asked the staff if they would prefer to be doing some other kind of work of equivalent status to their present jobs. Ninety-one per cent of the systems analysts said they did not want a change to another job of equivalent status. All the programmers said that they did not desire to change to another job of equivalent status. One programmer put it in the following way: 'Programming has always interested me. Telling a machine to do something and it does it. It is a battle of wits getting the thing to work and finding mistakes. It is all interesting.' Programming appeared to attract an individual who derived great satisfaction from mental jugglery, and who had no wish for work which involved other kinds of skill. All the programmers and systems analysts interviewed during the researchers' survey were asked to describe their jobs in terms of their technical, administrative and human relations content. The programmers saw the principle skill element of their work as lying in the technical area, although some referred to human relations responsibilities when they were working with customers: 'We have to be tactful and diplomatic with customers.' 'With customers one must be polite and dress well as a representative of the company.' Systems analysts were much more likely to see their principle skill area as being human relations, both in regard to their own staff and to the customer: 'I have to ensure that my staff do not feel neglected, particularly when they are on remote sites.' 'With staff it's keeping them happy, providing motivation; customers are a bit trickier. One has to keep them happy with the company and its products.' IDP's systems analysts saw their jobs as having a large human relations content, and believed that they could not carry out their functions satisfactorily unless they were able to win the confidence of their clients. The staff recognised that there could be difficulties as a result of the nature of the IDP-client company relationship. The staff had problems

58 Cases in Organisational Behaviour because of a lack of understanding of EDP on the part of the customer. A systems analyst said: 'Customers have no real comprehension of what a machine will do because they don't know its real usefulness or limitations. We get frustrated because we can see where they are heading. We try to guide them but we can only advise. We can't demand or control unless the practice the customer is proposing to use will damage the equipment.' Staff who were in contact with customers were likely to experience conflict between a desire to look after the interests of IDP Limited while at the same time looking after those of the computer purchaser. They tended to side with the customer, although they recognised that on occasion they had to choose between the interests of IDP and those of the client: 'If software is not working - it may be outside our company's interests to put in time putting it right. I try and arbitrate for both sides.' Any divided loyalty through siding with a customer rather than with IDP was resolved by many of the staff through the adoption of an attitude of 'What is good for the customer is good for the company too. If customers are happy, this is good for the firm's reputation.' Many staff thought that there was a point when they could not side with the customers against their own firm, and that this could cause problems: 'Our company promised to meet a delivery date for equipment and then broke this promise. I felt that I should tell the customer but I didn't - it wasn't the right moment in terms of the company's interests.' 'We are a profit-making organisation. Customer service is the prime object but it must have a return, I wouldn't give anything to a customer unless the company gained from it. You must know where to draw the line.' Because many staff worked out in the field it was difficult for IDP to exercise much control over them. Staff thought that IDP's controls were not tight, and that pressure was exerted only if jobs fell behind schedule. It was the customer rather than the company who was seen as attempting to exercise tight control. One programmer put it: 'While customers don't complain there is no control.'

1.6 Octane Limited (A)1

Octane Limited was a large international oil company, which had wholly or partly owned subsidiaries in many countries in the western world. The firm was in many respects one of the United Kingdom's leading companies. It was among the largest in Britain, and was highly successful in the oil industry. The company controlled a whole series of integrated activities in the industry, ranging from research, development and manufacturing, through to wholesale and retail marketing. The company showed considerable public spirit in its operations and donations. There was a highly developed division of labour in the company. Octane Limited maintained a headquarters office which was divided into a number of functional departments, broken down into smaller divisions or branches. The headquarters departments were, broadly speaking, of two types. First, there were operational departments that were responsible for the direction of the operating companies. Secondly, there were service departments that had the primary function of providing technical aid to companies. The large scale, complexity and interdependence of Octane Limited's activities made it difficult for the company's staff to identify with a common task or to see whole tasks to a conclusion. It was difficult to identify the contribution of individuals to the company's objectives. Octane Limited's personnel and welfare practices were well abreast of most that were at the time considered desirable and ethical in large industrial organisations. In recent years the company's staff department had become highly conscious of costs, and had made strenuous efforts to maintain and increase opportunities for individual employees to contribute to the company's productivity. The company had one of the best known and most 'advanced' management development schemes in Britain. A company-wide personnel performance appraisal scheme was operated. Through it it was hoped that latent and potential talent among the staff could be identified and developed. There was a company-contributed pension scheme. In 1964-65 a research team carried out an exploratory study of middle level managers and technical specialists employed by Octane Limited. The researchers were interested in studying the preoccupations of the company's staff so far as their work was concerned - what they thought of Octane 1 Data for this case were taken from Men in Mid-Career, by Cyril Sofer (Cambridge University Press, 1970).

59

60 Cases in Organisational Behaviour Limited as a place to work, what they liked and disliked about it, how it compared with other companies, and so on. The project was intended to pose questions concerning the place of work in the personal identity of the executives and specialists, and the relation of their work in Octane Limited to other aspects of their lives. The researchers were also interested in the personal 'philosophies' and group 'ideologies' developed by the staff to explain their organisational fates. Finally, they were interested in the interplay between the new graduate entrant into Octane Limited and those with whom he interacted, and the significance of this for his subsequent commitment to his career and to the company. To obtain pertinent data bearing on these issues the researchers studied heterogeneous samples of middle managers and specialists employed in five of the company's departments: stores, central staff, supply and development, product sales, and engineering. The composition of the samples was roughly representative of all members of these departments earning between £1,800 and £3,000 per annum. The staff members in the samples ranged in age from men in their late twenties to men in their late forties. The researchers held group discussions with the selected sample staff who worked in each of the five departments, carried out individual interviews, and administered a questionnaire. One of the researchers subsequently made a precis of the major findings of the investigation, based on a combination of the group discussion data, and of that obtained from the interviews and the questionnaires.1 Detailed accounts of the group discussions, the interviews and the questionnaire responses were not shown to any member of the company. Most of the staff members studied said they were reasonably satisfied with life in Octane Limited, and spoke positively of the company as an employer. A reasonable salary was among the most frequently mentioned benefits of employment by the firm. The company was seen as providing security. Considerable satisfaction was expressed with the welfare arrangements, provision for recreation, fringe benefits and consideration for staff. They regarded senior management as decent and benevolent. The reputation of Octane Limited and its products was said to be high. Working conditions were described as pleasant. Outspoken criticism of the firm occurred in the sphere of organisation structure and climate. The men said that there were endless layers of management in the company. In their opinion there was minimal contact between those who made policy and those who carried it out. Even their superiors, they said, lacked influence as sources of upward communication. They felt that Octane's hierarchical structure produced slow decision1 All the following data presented in this case were drawn from the researcher's precis.

Octane Limited (A) 61 making. They thought that there was a company-wide inability to delegate. The men said that there seemed to be more concern in the company with not making mistakes and with making things palatable to colleagues than with innovation: ideas and initiative were less welcome than conformity and acceptance. It was hard, they said, to try to change things without being labelled a trouble-maker. The men felt that the company was less aggressive than its competitors: there was little risk-taking, which was unsuitable for marketing. A majority said that they could not see the results of their work, there were no major decisions that were theirs alone, and there were no complete tasks they could point to as their own achievement. One of the main concerns of the men was that their work was lacking in challenge. They did not feel stretched in their work. They said that senior managers, as well as people at their own level, were apt to be engaged in routine duties. They felt that the work was beneath them, and that much of it was clerical and could easily be delegated to persons with less experience. They felt frustrated by the fact or theory that they had unnecessarily high qualifications for the duties they were in fact allocated. Nearly half the men felt that they had talents and abilities they were not called on to exercise. They felt that their full potentialities were not being drawn upon. A prominent theme in the series of group discussions was the alleged unwillingness or incapacity of Octane's senior management to identify talent and promote the right people. This centred on three main assertions. First, it was asserted that the firm recruited people who were too talented for the work made available to them. That was one reason why the staff were under-used. Secondly, it was asserted that the company's appraisal and placement scheme was ineffective and unsystematic. This meant that talented people could be overlooked. Thirdly, it was asserted that Octane's senior management was sluggish and lacked commercial edge. If this were not the case senior management would seek out and promote the most talented. Whichever part of this set of ideas was put by the men, it was the organisation that was held responsible for any differences between what the man had and got or wanted and would get. The personnel institutions determining the men's organisational fates were believed to be defective. The men told the researchers that young men were attracted to Octane Limited in the hope of receiving rapid promotion. In fact the majority of those recruited would in their opinion have to stay in fairly routine work: the company needed only a proportion of effective people. The men thought that the company recruited people with unnecessarily high qualifications for the jobs available. This led to frustration. The researcher

62 Cases in Organisational Behaviour felt that what they were saying was, in effect, that unrealistic expectations had been aroused in the new recruits by the company, almost as if they had been victims of a confidence trick. The men did not feel that Octane's performance appraisal system identified and developed the most able among them. They said that they were not appraised regularly and, when they were appraised, the results were not communicated to them. A high proportion of the men complained about lack of feedback on performance for those people in the company (among whom they seemed to include themselves) whose performance was neither outstandingly good nor disastrous. Most said they would especially like to know what aspects of their performance they should try to improve. Career development was not considered to be satisfactory, especially for graduates, who did not appear to go through a series of carefully planned stages. The men were also nervous that their own abilities might be adversely judged on the basis of the quality of the appraisals they made of their own subordinates. The men implied that problems existed between peers in their efforts to differentiate themselves from each other, and have their differential contributions recognised. The men made incidental references to the toleration by the organisation of 'dead wood', i.e. of persons who were really 'casualties' whom the senior management was carrying only out of a sense of moral obligation. There were complaints that 'gentlemanliness' led to insufficient stringency in dealing with non-productive members of staff. There seemed to be some fear that such a policy might mean that one was being retained in one's place only out of charity. There was something repugnant to the men in the possibility that in the company they had their places not because they were useful and their contributions important, but because they were tolerated or kept more or less out of pity. The influence of the appraisal system on promotions was thought by the men to be peripheral; appraisal and promotion were not seen as integrated into one system. About three-quarters of those interviewed said that they had no idea of what their promotion prospects might be. There was not a great emphasis on higher salaries as a result of promotion. The sorts of promotion the men desired were not of an order that could have made radical changes in their present standards of living. In the questionnaire the men were asked what qualities they felt were needed for promotion in Octane Limited. The qualities mentioned and the relative frequency of mention are shown in Table 1.6.1. Of the 18 per cent of the men who said in their interviews that they saw some pattern to their future prospects, all were satisfied with the company generally. Of the 25 per cent who said in their interviews that they were fairly contented with their prospects, 86 per cent of them were satisfied. Of the 29 per cent of the

Octane Limited (A) 63 men who said that they had a clear post in view which they expected to occupy in ten years'time, 88 per cent of them were satisfied. Staff who said that they had not been promoted as fast as they had hoped and were doing less interesting work than they wished said that they stayed in Octane Limited because of the reasonable rates of pay, fringe benefits, pleasant working relations and atmosphere, security, and the difficulty of moving to a competitive company. There was a good deal of discussion of the conflict between the desire to stay and the expressed interest in trying to improve one's position elsewhere. The obvious Table 1.6.1 Qualities Stated to be Necessary for Promotiona Quality

Number of mentionsb

Ambition, determination, ruthlessness Diplomacy, tact, patience, acceptability Ability Intelligence, understanding, knowledge Experience Luck, opportunity Total number of mentions

13 12 12 8 6 6 57

a b

There were 25 respondents. Several respondents mentioned more than one type of quality.

alternative employers in the oil industry tended not to consider a person from outside unless he had first terminated his current employment. Not everybody's skills were easily transferable to the service of another organisation. The men said that alternative employers might make better initial offers, but might well prove less reliable in the long run. At some points respondents appeared to be intimating that they were reluctant to try their luck elsewhere in case Octane Limited had made a correct estimate of their capacities. The men felt that, despite their doubts, they were now reaping the benefit of years of investment. By leaving Octane they would lose the company's contribution to their pensions. If they left, they would give up what they had but could not be sure they could really do better elsewhere, and might in fact do worse. Some of the men described the impact of the company's security and amenities as 'capture by the shilling lunch'. They made statements to the effect that they would recommend Octane to young potential recruits only if they had technical skills that were transferable, and would enable them to maintain their independence of Octane Limited and the oil industry if they wished.

64 Cases in Organisational Behaviour The men interviewed were divided by the researchers into the age categories of 29-34 ('young'), 35-44 ('middle'), and 45 and over ('older'). The young expressed themselves as happy to belong to Octane Limited. They felt that they had done well to join it. They were the most ambitious of the staff studied, and they believed their prospects to be good. Nearly half the members of the middle category felt that they had not done as well as they had expected. About the same proportion said that they had done worse than their contemporaries at school. Men in the older category were not optimistic about their prospects, but they were the most appreciative of the three groups about the pay, and the most contented with the welfare arrangements. Those who lacked academic qualifications and those who had come into Octane after an earlier spell of work elsewhere felt that they could probably not have done so well in another company. Significant variations existed between the responses of the men who worked in the different departments of Octane Limited. Those in the stores department were the least happy. They found their work boring and repetitive. They said that their department was contracting, and that their promotion prospects were poor. They felt unwanted and partly redundant. The members of the central staff department were the most satisfied of those studied. They were more satisfied than those elsewhere with the organisation of the firm, the opportunities they had to try out new ideas, the pay they received, and the welfare arrangements. They considered that their promotion prospects were poor, and that the influence of their department was somewhat low. Many of the staff in the supply and development department saw themselves as an elite doing important and exciting work, and thought their department of central importance in the company. They were critical of the management structure, which they regarded as frozen and overelaborate. They felt that their promotion prospects were worse than for people of equal ability in other departments. The men who worked in the product sales department felt themselves to be a favoured department doing interesting work, but felt frustrated by the organisational structure. They were discontented with their pay and critical of senior management. The staff in the engineering department enjoyed their work. They showed an involvement with technical tasks that clearly held intrinsic interest for them. The engineers reported that they sometimes worked on projects for sustained periods, and this gave them the satisfaction of completing connected sequences of tasks, tasks that they knew would often lead to substantial results in physical structures. On these occasions they had defined jobs to do, with terminal points. At the same time they felt that their professional expertise was not

Octane Limited (A) 65 sufficiently recognised. The company was felt to undervalue its engineers. They were less than satisfied with the hours they had to work, the extent to which they could use their skills, the amount of responsibility they were given, and their working conditions. The physical conditions in which they had to work were said to be inadequate for the jobs to be done. The engineers said that it was annoying not to have a room, door and nameplate of one's own, and to have to receive visitors - especially professional colleagues - under conditions more appropriate to a clerk or a draughtsman. The men felt a need for outside contact: for technical liaison visits to external establishments, to outside contractors and sites which they had helped design. Members of the engineering department felt at a distinct disadvantage in promotion. They believed that their promotion prospects were worse than for those not technically qualified. They asserted that engineers were simply not considered for promotion on the same footing as other colleagues. The implication was that technical competence was a handicap in a managerial career, instead of being regarded as an advantage. It was seen as better to have no training. At the same time they suggested that promoting a man to a managerial position as a reward for his technical skill was not necessarily wise. He might be a poor manager as distinct from his skill as an engineer. Such a man stopped contributing his technical skills and, to justify his 'managerial' position, meddled with the work of subordinates who were perfectly capable of acting on their own. Their suggested solution to this problem was a dual hierarchy of the sort they had seen publicised by British Chemicals,1 one that gave the outstanding scientist or engineer a status and salary commensurate with that of a manager, but without giving him managerial responsibilities. 1

A pseudonym.

1.7

Octane Limited (B)

In examining the results of the study of the middle managers and technical specialists at Octane Limited, the possibility occurred to senior management and the researcher that at the stage of initial recruitment Octane Limited might have tended to overemphasise opportunities within the company. Members of the personnel department confirmed in discussion that, in the stress of competing with other employers for the cream of the crop of new graduates and school leavers, it was possible that those responsible for recruiting were unduly optimistic in discussions with prospective recruits. The researcher believed that, in general, recruiting advertisements for management trainees and the like emphasised glowing prospects, 'selling' careers which only a few would probably experience. The researcher's own experience of several years as an adviser in industrial selection schemes led him to conclude that the potential recruit wanted to believe in these possibilities, and often had quite unrealistic notions of what his abilities were and where these might take him. The researcher believed that the potential recruit was likely to collude with the persons recruiting him in an over-favourable estimate of his probable long-term organisational fate, and possibly to put an over-optimistic construction on what had been conveyed to him, or on what he felt had been conveyed. In justifying his career choice to himself and others the new recruit would possibly be prone, at acceptance of his initial appointment, to emphasise the bright side of his prospects. In this way the recruiting process in itself began to generate and support high aspirations in the new recruit. It was a surprise to Octane's senior management and the researcher to find that such a high proportion of the men studied felt that they were under-utilised, even that their personal resources were rejected. One strong impression left in the researcher's mind was that even the most outspoken critics of the appraisal and promotion system had some feeling that Octane Limited might be right about them - that if they went elsewhere they might have to confront the fact that they had already found their appropriate job level. One possible interpretation of the men's set of attitudes and desires that occurred to him was that by early middle age the managers and specialists had inevitably suffered some disappointments and setbacks in all the main areas of their lives, including work, marriage, parenthood, friendships, recreations, and so on. It created fewer subsequent problems 66

Octane Limited (B) 67 for them to represent the source of all their disappointments as residing in their employing organisation. *

*

*

The chief engineer pointed out that it was uneconomical for the company always to put engineers on whole projects. If a man had highly specialised talents, it paid better to use his services on several projects. If he worked on a multiple joint basis with one project team, his expertise might well be wasted for 90 per cent of the time. *

*

*

From the data obtained from the group discussions held with the managers and specialists, the researcher subsequently built up a picture of the 'ideal' work environment and set of tasks as pictured or implied by the men in the sample. This emerged as follows: 'One's employing organisation should be part of a stable industry. It should be a socially worthwhile business with a worthwhile/significant product. It should have scope for growth and be able to give its employees a feeling that it is getting somewhere. It should constitute/provide an aggressively profit-oriented atmosphere, display entrepreneurship, be enterprising in its business methods and have punch in its operations. It should have a steady, consistent and clear policy.' 'One's department should be successful, it should have a clear objective known to its members, it should be close to the centre of operations rather than merely providing a service. Its function should be appreciated within the rest of the organisation. Members of the department should work as a team.' 'In its internal administrative arrangements the organisation should provide staff with opportunities to identify with it, should constitute a democratic non-authoritarian environment, and should allow a degree of informality alongside its prescribed procedures. But the management should not worship a god of impersonal efficiency or intrude into one's private life.' 'One's senior colleagues should guide one in relation to aims and methods, recognise one's abilities and be in free communication with one. One wanted to be taken into the confidence of seniors, to have the opportunity to explain oneself to them. One wanted seniors to care about one's opinions and to carry weight with them. As far as colleagues at the same level were concerned, one wanted pleasantness, friendliness, dependability, candour and congeniality. One wanted to count with colleagues. One wanted to work with colleagues in such a way that one could act without unnecessary checking and without having to inform or consult everyone;

68 Cases in Organisational Behaviour at the same time one wanted to be consulted where one had expertise and to have direct contact with those concerned with the same job. Colleagues should not pirate one's ideas. One wanted to be able to differentiate oneself from colleagues and to have that differential contribution recognised. One disliked losing colleagues as this cast doubt on the worthwhileness of the job and of the employing organisation. As for juniors, one wanted younger people around, but these should be people who thought about the job and did not work only for the money.' 'In its personnel practices, the employing organisation should provide an initial placement that was appropriate to one's intellectual/technical training and was not an anticlimax. It should use one's resources fully, challenge one, stretch one mentally. One should have an opportunity to take responsibility for work that contributed significantly to the purposes of the organisation; this would help one to feel wanted and useful. One should be able to feel that by one's own individual efforts one was reinvesting in one's own and the company's future.' 'One should be given the opportunity to influence the way things were done by the organisation and to make a mark. One wanted to be placed close to the hub of operations and know what was going on in the organisation. The firm should consider one systematically for promotion and transfer, give one a chance to change one's job, watch over one's career and prevent one from being stuck. One should be consulted about one's own work and career and be allowed to state one's aspirations for record and consideration: one should on entry and subsequently be given an accurate and not over-rosy picture of one's likely prospects and promises should be honoured. Procedures should exist to help one learn one's image and systematically to review one's salary. The firm should provide security of tenure, a settled life and give appropriate rewards. It should not involve one in a rat race or promote on the basis of considerations apart from capacity to contribute to the work.' 'In the actual work one did, one should be doing a whole job, be in charge of a project, be able to see the end product of one's work, exercise one's skills in a field in which one felt and was recognised to be an expert. One's work should be effective in some way within or for the company. One should have enough time to do a job to a level that met one's standards. One should be able to have one's contribution identified. One should have changes of work that open up new realms of thought and experience. The job should keep one busy within one's capacity, challenge one's ingenuity, be involving. One should be able to work out solutions with colleagues and then be able to negotiate those solutions with the other colleagues concerned. One disliked anything that prevented one from doing a properly professional job, interruptions, blocks in communica-

Octane Limited (B) 69 tions, administrative delays, being prevented from doing what one felt to be necessary for 'political' reasons or because it impinged on someone else's sphere of interest.' The researcher was struck by the amount of reward, satisfaction and concern for themselves the men seemed to want from their employer and their jobs. They seemed to him to be placing higher expectations on Octane Limited and the company's senior managers than these could reasonably be expected to bear. The men's picture of the ideal employing organisation struck the researcher as being so idealistic as to be quite unrealistic: perhaps only a child in arms received the amount of care, attention and personal solicitude described.

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SECTION TWO

Social Inputs: Group and Intergroup Behaviour

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Introduction This section concentrates on the behaviour and functions of groups in organisations. The kinds of groups which appear in the cases include small, face-to-face, work or primary groups, as well as reference and formal groups to some extent. The cases illustrate a variety of ways in which groups behave. The processes of interest here include group formation, the socialisation of the individual to the group, deviance, leadership and control, group maintenance through time, the influence exerted by groups on their members and on their organisational environments and vice versa, the relations between groups, and the influence of groups on organisational objectives. The Apprentice Marine Engineer case recounts the experiences of a young man beginning work and life in a factory. In a minimum of words the case provides the basis for a useful introductory discussion of many of the major aspects of small group behaviour. The Lanx Factory concerns machine workers in an engineering factory, working under a timestudied, payment-by-results scheme. Discussion of it may be centred on the effect of group behaviour and financial incentives upon one another. In this and other early cases in the section there are examples of 'restriction of output' and group norms and values which raise important questions about group processes, structure, and environment. The Municipal Airport {A) case describes a 'greenfield' situation concerning the selection and organisation of ground staff to handle- baggage and freight at a new airport. The (B) case provides an account of the emergent behaviour of ground staff over a period of time. The data which constitute the two cases are presented in such a way as to make it possible for lecturers to ask students to make predictions about likely behaviour subsequent to the information supplied in the (A) case. The lecturer should formulate his own prediction questions about group formation, leadership, norms and other behaviour that may be predicted from a careful analysis of the (A) case. Such analysis and prediction must, in the interests of learning, precede study of the information supplied in the (B) case. An exercise of this kind provides students with a specific means of testing their ability to comprehend the dynamics of group behaviour. The last four cases in the section are intended to progress the study of 73

74 Cases in Organisational Behaviour groups in concrete organisational situations beyond analysis of more or less unitary groups, towards the consideration of intergroup behaviour, here represented by two groups. In these cases the spotlight is mostly on the internal characteristics and dynamics of groups which affect the relationships between them, and how intergroup behaviour affects organisational purposes and objectives. The Immigrant Steelworkers concerns the tasks and working arrangements in a plant employing British workers, before and during an influx of Italian workers. The case raises ethnic and cultural as well as group issues, and may encourage consideration of mechanisms for the socialisation of different streams of people into the organisation. It also poses difficult problems of management action. Hull Trawlermen provides an account of conflict and co-operation between two differentiated occupational groups, fishermen and engineers, in a somewhat unusual organisational environment and industry. It presents an opportunity to analyse intergroup relations in group, organisational and industrial terms. The McKinley Company describes the behaviour of sales clerks employed in a large manufacturing company. The clerks behave in ways which do not accord with company policy. The case recounts management's attempt to find a solution to the problem, and encourages discussion of problem diagnosis and action prescription. The passenger and freight transport organisation's control room, described in The Transport Control Room, raises issues about the handling of information by groups. Discussion may usefully lead beyond diagnosis to consideration of possible management action. References Schein (1) offers a most useful general treatment of groups. Van Zelst (2) and Seiler (3) provide concise treatments of interpersonal behaviour, mediating between the individual and the group. Where time permits, students may with advantage read a detailed research report in which the behaviour of a particular group or two is analysed in greater detail than is possible in a case. Lupton's (4) study is admirable for this purpose; Roy (5) provides an excellent American alternative. Asch (6) offers an elementary treatment of independence and conformity in groups. Seiler (7) and Dubin's (8) systematic treatments plus the precis of Rice's work (9) provide concepts concerning group behaviour in concentrated form. Lupton (10) reviews group behaviour from the point of view of financial incentives. French (11) offers a research report on reference groups. Seller's (12) general treatment of intergroup behaviour is informative and not too difficult, while Gouldner (13) and Sherif (14) provide the indispensable concepts of reciprocity and superordinate goals. Strauss (15)

Introduction to Section Two

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and Landsberger (16) treat problems of the relations between departments and groups in their well-known contributions. 1. E. H. Schein, Organizational Psychology, 2nd edn (Prentice-Hall, 1970), ch. 5. 2. R. H. Van Zelst, 'Sociometrically Selected Work Teams Increase Productivity', Personnel Psychology, vol. 5, no. 3 (1952). 3. J. A. Seiler, System Analysis in Organizational Behaviour (Irwin-Dorsey, 1967), ch. 4. 4. Tom Lupton, On the Shop Floor (Pergamon, 1963), chs 7-12. 5. Donald Roy, 'Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 57, no. 5 (1952); Orvis Collins, Melville Dalton and Donald Roy, 'Restriction of Output and Social Cleavage in Industry', Applied Anthropology, vol. 5, no 3 (1946). 6. S. E. Asch, 'Opinions and Social Pressure', Scientific American, November 1955. 7. Seiler, op. cit., ch. 5. 8. Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration, 3rd edn, Prentice-Hall, 1968), ch. 5. 9. Daniel Katz and R. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (Wiley, 1966), pp. 433-5, 443-6: P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, Organizational Behaviour and Administration, rev. edn (Irwin-Dorsey, 1965), pp. 196-8. 10. Tom Lupton, Money for Effort, Problems of Progress in Industry, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (HMSO, 1960). 11. C. J. French, 'Correlates of Success in Retail Selling', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 66, no. 2 (1960). 12. J. A. Seiler, 'Diagnosing Interdepartmental Conflict', Harvard Business Review, vol. 41, no. 5(1963). 13. Alvin Gouldner, 'The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement', American Sociological Review, vol. 25, no. 2 (1960). 14. Muzafer Sherif, 'Experiments in Group Conflict', Scientific American, November 1956; 'Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 43, no. 4 (1958). 15. George Strauss, 'Tactics of Lateral Relationships', Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (1962). 16. H. A. Landsberger, 'The Horizontal Dimension in a Bureaucracy', Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 1 (1961).

2.1 The Apprentice Marine Engineer1 In the 1930s, during my apprenticeship as a marine engineer, I spent some years in an engineering workshop. This experience brought home clearly to me the influence of customary workshop standards of conduct upon individual behaviour, and the subtlety of the sanctions employed to enforce conformity. It was the custom of the workshop in which I served my apprenticeship for the workers to cease work some fifteen minutes before the official finishing time. During the second day in the shop I was given a job by the foreman which completely absorbed my interest. I became oblivious to my surroundings and to the passage of time. I was disturbed by the sounding of the 'buzzer' which announced the official finishing time, and when I looked up I found myself surrounded by a group of men who had obviously been watching me for some time. They were all ready to go home. Nothing was said, but their looks made it clear that I would soon become unpopular if I persisted in observing official times. The lesson was quickly learned, and not unwillingly. In time I learned other lessons about the customs and usages of the shop. To work too quickly was to be labelled a 'teararse' and to be at least partly shut out from the friendly give and take of the shop and from the spontaneously formed 'scrounging groups' which, in defiance of management rulings, assembled in secluded corners of the shop for unofficial tea breaks and discussions. Here, the latest sporting and political news was argued about and highly coloured accounts of sexual adventures were retailed. If to be a 'teararse' was to court exclusion from the social life of the workshop, it was also regarded as a breach of workshop custom to be too much of a 'scrounger'. The man who persistently dodged work and whose output fell below what was generally considered 'decent' became an object of ridicule. Equally, in this workshop of skilled craftsmen, the man who produced shoddy work lost status in the shop and was pointed out to apprentices as a bad example. As it so often turned out, the 'teararses' and the 'scroungers' produced the shoddy work. So workshop custom was reinforced by the value placed on a high standard of workmanship, a value held by management and workmen alike, and by the apprentices even before they entered the shop. Many of the customs of the workshop effectively regulated the output of the shop in respect both to quality and quantity, and it was known to be 1

This case was taken from On the Shop Floor, by T. Lupton (Pergamon, 1963).

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The Apprentice Marine Engineer 77 management's opinion that the output of the shop could easily be increased. From time to time a determined effort was made by management to enforce official starting and finishing times, to break up the scrounging groups, to end unofficial tea breaks, and generally to tighten management control. The threat to use the sanction of dismissal, or suspension of apprenticeship, might for a time be effective, but gradually shop custom would reassert itself. The running battle between management and the workers in this shop was sometimes brought out into the open, but for the most part it was guerrilla warfare. Woe betide the worker who betrayed the strategic aims and the tactics of the workshop to the other side. He would be labelled a bosses' man; and to be a bosses' man was the greatest of workshop misdemeanours. I spent the greater part of my youth amongst industrial workers. My father was a skilled craftsman, his kin and his friends were skilled craftsmen. I became one myself. Listening to their conversations led me to believe that my own experiences were not unique and that workshops everywhere were much the same. It was no surprise, therefore, later to learn that industrial psychologists and sociologists had observed the same kind of behaviour in workshops. I was enthusiastic to discover how they interpreted behaviour of a kind which I personally had observed and experienced. As an adolescent I had accepted such behaviour as being in the nature of things, although I remember being troubled at times that what I was doing offended against the virtues of hard work and conscientiousness which I had been taught at school and in the home, and which was at the core of the religious teaching I had received. I quickly learned to overcome what scruples I had.

2.2 The Lanx Factory1 A researcher from the University of Manchester carried out an eighteenmonth research study of the behaviour of the men employed in a particular workshop within the Lanx factory. The Lanx factory was a mass production engineering plant in the north country area of England. The factory formed part of a medium-sized manufacturing organisation, and was one of a large group of companies operating in a buoyant market. The researcher's initial contact with the factory was as an unpaid hand, working on the casting of molten metal by the hand process. His participation in this work lasted for six weeks. As a result of this preparatory observation the researcher decided to concentrate his attention on the men operating casting machines, who were located over a gangway from the hand-working operatives. The researcher spent three weeks in continuous observation of the casting machine (CM) workers. He wanted to work as a CM operative. But there were no spare machines available, and the job required greater skill than casting by hand. His participation in the work therefore had to be in terms of assisting with ancillary tasks - other than keeping watch and making adjustments while a workmate went out for an officially permitted smoke - not actual machine operation. After this first phase of observation the researcher continued to observe the CM workers for frequent periods of a few days at a time during the succeeding months of the research project. For more than a year he also made daily visits to the workshop to stand around and chat with all and sundry. In addition, he obtained permission to attend various managerial and joint meetings, and made constant fact-finding calls in management and staff offices. He obtained various data by analysing all kinds of Lanx factory records: length of service; individual output; current earnings; and memoranda linking up the tortuous history of the application of the factory's payment system. He carried out a small attitude study, by non-directive interview methods, of those line managers and supervisors with formal responsibility for the CM workers, the works convenor and the union steward of the shop, the CM workers and some of the nearby hand workers. In all the researcher conducted thirty-six interviews. 1 Data for this case were taken from the article by D. J. Hickson in Occupational Psychology, vol. 35, no. 3 (1961).

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The Lanx Factory 79 Casting Machine Production Ultimate production of the staple lines produced by the Lanx factory depended in the first instance on the components coming off the battery of casting machines. The researcher found that the factory management wanted greater production of these components to meet expanding sales. The CM workers were conscious that theirs was the job on which all else hung. There were eighteen of them in all. They were split into three shift sub-groups of six men, each of which successively operated the same equipment on eight-hour turns around the clock. The casting machines were a recent innovation at the Lanx factory. They were not designed with any set maximum speed. The men who worked them were able to control the quantity and quality of the machines' output. The researcher's experience as an observer who also took part in the work gave him no indication of any physical limit on man or mechanism. CM workers were semi-skilled. They were a minority in a shop where the majority were employed turning out the same product by means of the older hand process. They took pride in their skill. Not everyone who had tried machine casting had been able to adjust to its demands. The CM workers enjoyed relatively high earnings, and modifications of the pay system in their favour. The attitude of managers and other workers towards those who were on mechanised casting production showed that the CM workers were accorded a comparatively high status - in the estimation of groups both above and below them - in unofficial status ranking. This rank position, and the earnings that were permitted the men in accordance with it, were out of line with the official or formal ranking explicit in the Lanx factory's grading system. Their informal status was higher than the job grade implied. The Payment System The factory's official system of financial reward was one of individual payment-by-results. The job of the CM workers, like most others in the factory, was on an individual incentive payment system associated with time study. A standard time was arrived at and issued by the work study office, formulated in terms of a number of Standard Minutes allowed for a prescribed quantity of components. Since the cash rate collectively negotiated between the trade union and the employer was in a direct ratio to the number of Standard Minutes, the more Standard Minutes allowed for the job, the higher and quicker the potential earnings; the fewer the Standard Minutes the lower the potential wage packet. Following the customary practice in the engineering industry, Standard

80 Cases in Organisational Behaviour Times could normally be altered at the Lanx factory only by mutual agreement, if a Time was obviously mistaken, or when a change in the method of work took place. These conditions did not apply, however, if the Time were 'Temporary'. The label of 'Temporary' enabled factory management to postpone final commitment to a Time if, for example, a new machine had not yet overcome teething troubles and attained the anticipated level of production. The CM workers at the Lanx factory had a Time for their work operations which was designated as Temporary. It was officially subject to alteration at the discretion of management. This had been the position affecting the CM workers for some time. The description of their work in terms of a Temporary Time had ceased to have much meaning for them. Then management had changed the method of work to be followed by the CM workers. The Time for the job was left as it had been before. To the men the word 'Temporary' assumed a fresh significance. It forewarned them that some day the Time for the job would be revised, perhaps unfavourably, so that the earnings potential of the job was no longer secure. The researcher's notes of conversations with the men on the shop floor, and the records of subsequent interviews, did not suggest to him that the CM workers generally distrusted management or feared deliberate rate-cutting. But the outcome of a time study and of any negotiations over it was bound to be uncertain, due to the subjective factor in speed-andeffort rating, and to the effects of the 'guessing game' between rater and worker. The men felt that their present and future earnings had been placed in jeopardy by the change in the method of work. They pointed out to the researcher that a few Standard Minutes either way could mean pounds a week to them. They did not refer to the earnings differential between them and other workers ostensibly in the same official pay grade. Restriction of Output The response of the CM workers to the change in the method of work was to determine and adhere to informal output ceilings. The machine workers decided to restrict output, in an attempt to guard their position against an anticipated renewal of union-management bargaining. It was clear to the researcher, early on in his research, that a feature of the behaviour of the machine workers was group restriction of output. The workers, acting in concert, set and maintained standards of output below the expectations of management, below the standard that they themselves believed they could maintain. The researcher noted many comments by the machine workers to the effect that 'we fixed this ceiling between ourselves'. The relationship between managers and workers in regard to output was

The Lanx Factory 81 summarized by one worker as: 'If they give a Temporary Time they must expect a temporary score [output total].' The researcher's investigation of this aspect of CM worker behaviour was prompted by an examination of output records. It was quickly apparent to him that an informal ceiling existed of 6,000 components per man per shift. This figure was never exceeded by any member of the group. The researcher examined 835 shifts on various machines, charted for more than a year, and found that the ceiling was exceeded only twice. Both these instances occurred in unusual circumstances, and were not true exceptions to the rule. Some of the machine workers operated machines which were of a different design to the rest, and had a different 'time' or 'price' for the job under the payment-by-results system. The ceiling was not 6,000 components per man per shift but 3,600. This output figure was equivalent to exactly the same earnings. Individual CM workers did not all begin a day's work on an equal pay footing. On long-term performance they assessed some machines as 'good' and others as 'bad'. The researcher tried to check this distinction by an analysis of output records, which showed that 'good' machines averaged up to 21 per cent more production than 'bad' machines. The latter often fell short of the ceiling quantity. The researcher could not find any measure to determine to what degree, if any, individual variations in ability contributed to this difference. His observations indicated that men on 'bad' machines endeavoured to reach the ceiling whenever mechanical vicissitudes allowed, and generally bore out the workers' opinions. As men were permanently allocated to either 'good' or 'bad' machines, some had an advantage which was not of their own making or within the group's control. The CM workers shared the egalitarian belief that men on similar work should get similar pay. The output ceiling, being a constraint on individual earnings, restrained disparities in wage packets within a range that was compatible with the group's egalitarian ethic. Some of the men told the researcher that if they all worked flat out there would be trouble between themselves, and also with management: the inequity of men who had the same 'price' for the job being given outwardly similar but actually varying equipment would no longer have been tolerated. So the output/earnings ceiling functioned to reconcile the circumstances of the work situation and the social code. They enabled the work people to acquiesce in the imperfect results of time-study techniques, and to contribute to the continuing functioning of the formal organisation of the factory. The CM workers found that the practice of restriction of output afforded them certain satisfactions. In so far as output restriction set a limit to individual competition, it increased the opportunities for mutual co-

82 Cases in Organisational Behaviour operation. A worker who was having a troublefree run on 'good' machines could comfortably attain ceiling output, and had time to spend a few minutes helping a neighbouring worker, who had encountered mechanical faults. Men were able to attend to the machines of a colleague who had gone outside for a smoke, and had time enough at the end of the work spell to leave everything straight for the workers on the next shift. The ceiling figure had become something of a target which everyone tried to reach. A man who had it in sight would willingly go to the aid of another who was not so well placed. The researcher found an instance of the force of this target aspect in the action of a man on a 'bad' machine who, after some weeks of mechanical trouble, suddenly had a better shift and announced his success in achieving ceiling production by hoisting a rag on a stick over his machine. The researcher concluded that by inhibiting the competitive drive and facilitating informal co-operation and social interaction on the job, the restrictive group norm increased the satisfaction that the men gained from companionship at work. Some of them said that they had no wish to return to former days of 'cut-throat competition' when 'no one spared a thought for his fellows'; nowadays they 'all worked together'. The Re-Timing The machine workers continued to observe their ceiling of 6,000 or 3,600 components per man per shift, depending on the machine used, until the long-awaited re-timing of the job eventually took place. To the men this came as the expected justification for the restrictive nature of their output norm. It was to them inevitable proof that their assessment of the situation had been correct. A sequence of negotiations began which ultimately brought not only a revision of the time allowed, but also a modification of the payment system as it applied to them. The total effect of these changes was that, on the one hand, the men would have to produce more to attain the same ceiling earning as before. On the other hand a high time rate had been incorporated into the method by which they were paid. They had reached a bargain which called for greater output from those who were able to achieve it, not for more money but for greater security. They accepted this bargain with enthusiasm. After the new bargain was struck production rose, and the old ceilings disappeared. It looked to the researcher as if individual competition was asserting itself. Then a straight line began to reappear on the researcher's output charts. A ceiling was re-established at 7,000 components per man per shift. This ceiling was still in force when the research project ended. The new maximum was as rigid as the old one: no one went beyond it.

The Lanx Factory 83 During the interviews subsequently conducted by the researcher, most of the men said that the new 'price' for components did not make it worth while turning out any more than 7,000 components, and that at that figure they were anyway earning what they used to: 47,000 earns nearly what 6,000 did before'. No interview threw up any hint of insecurity about pay: the revised time was regarded as settled for good and all. The men preferred to go on working together: 'a score of 7,500 or 8,000 would show up other men who can't get it.' The men preferred to have time to give one another a helping hand and swop banter, rather than go flat out with every man for himself.

2.3 The Municipal Airport (A)1

The old airport which had served part of the United Kingdom needed replacing. Accordingly, a new airport had been planned and developed. It opened at the beginning of the summer. The new airport was municipally owned and operated by the Norfield City Corporation. Various methods of municipal airport staffing had been studied by the airport director responsible for the planning and implementation of a staffing structure. Ground operations at the airport were expected to vary considerably according to the season of the year, and daily on an hour-tohour basis. The summer holiday season was the predicted time of peak airport usage, when the airport would be busy with charter flights. There were three broad work functions which had to be carried out by manual employees at the airport: portering, baggage sorting and baggage loading. It was necessary to carry outgoing passengers' baggage from the airport entrance to the check-in desk, and carry incoming passengers' baggage from their point of arrival in the airport buildings to the airport entrance. It was necessary to sort and separate passengers' baggage into different flight categories. This could be best performed near to the passengers' check-in desk. This baggage was then required to be taken out on trolleys to the various planes. It was necessary for employees to load and and unload the baggage into the holds of the appropriate outgoing and incoming planes. A further task was, in addition, the loading and unloading of freight, which was occasionally likely to be extremely heavy. The movement of freight and unloading of baggage involved reversing a lorry to within inches of a plane. Under the system adopted by the airport's management it was intended that ground staff manual employees would be organised on the basis that there would be no specific categories of workers. Everyone would be utilised in all job categories. This system was consciously chosen on the grounds that for operational convenience considerable flexibility was believed to be essential. Accordingly, all manual workers were called 'general hands', and could be required to perform any task. In terms of manual workers whose tasks were to sort, load and carry baggage, the old airport had been manned by employees of the different airlines using the airport. The new airport, being municipal, had to provide 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by S. R. Timperley in the Sociological Review, vol. 18, no. 2 (1970).

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The Municipal Airport (A) 85 its own manual workers. The terms and conditions of employment for general hands had been negotiated by the Corporation with an appropriate trade union before the airport's opening. It had been made a condition of employment that all the general hands joined the union. The Corporation and the union had agreed that the rate of pay for general hands would be30½new pence per hour. The need for at least some general hands to be able to drive lorries was crucial. Ground operations depended on at least one member of every work team loading or unloading a plane being able to drive a lorry. It was the Corporation's intention that all general hands recruited should be able to drive. One aspect of the terms negotiated with the union by the Corporation was an additional1½new pence per hour agreed for all hands who were able to drive, in view of the extra responsibility involved. The Corporation came upon a problem when they attempted to recruit general hands who could drive. The labour market position was such that, though there were sufficient individuals available who could perform the duties of general hands, many of them could not drive. In view of the imminence of the airport's opening, the Corporation found it necessary to lower their recruitment standards, and to take on employees who could not drive. These employees were told that they would be taught to drive on airport property. Recruiting was carried out from the local labour market by means of press advertisements, by contacting the labour exchange, and by recruiting employees from other Corporation departments. Some of the manual workers from the old airport transferred to the new airport, but they were a relatively small proportion of the total manual work force initially employed. The general hands recruited came from widely differing occupational backgrounds. Many of them were unknown to each other. The general hands were brought together at the new airport prior to its opening for training purposes. This training lasted two or three days. Under the staffing system set up at the airport, day-to-day ground operations came under the overall management of a ground controller. He controlled four shifts of men: shifts, A, B, C and D. Each shift had its own duty officer and baggage master. The duty officer was in charge of the shift; the baggage master was second-in-command or administrator. The organization of work arrangements was the overall responsibility of the duty officer. This was in practice done by the baggage master, as was the allocation of work. Each shift consisted of 36 men, comprising 2 charge hands, 6 leading hands and 28 general hands. There were two major working periods: from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., and from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. In addition there was a night work period from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., but generally this was manned by only twelve men. Each shift

86 Cases in Organisational Behaviour worked for seven consecutive days, then had two days off. In addition, every three weeks each shift had four days off. Each shift was together as a whole for most of the time, but at three-weekly intervals the shift was split, with half the men working the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. session, the other half working from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. It was necessary for people to work on the night shift from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. at three-monthly intervals. For each of the two major working sessions there was one complete shift working with half of another shift. There were usually 8 general hands working as porters, 11 as baggage sorters and 21 as loading crew members. The same groups of men were allocated to the jobs of porter, baggage sorter and baggage loader on each shift. These were occasional changes, but these were of a temporary nature, and usually due to exceptional operational circumstances. The porters and sorters had one charge hand to control them overall, with one leading hand to directly supervise the porters, and one to supervise the baggage sorters. The loading crews, each of three men, had a separate charge hand to exercise overall control. Each loading crew rarely had the same members for more than a few days at a time. There was one leading hand to control two crews, and there were generally about ten crews. The leading hands, charge hands and general hands from the 'half shift' were usually distributed between the crews and the baggage sorters, never as porters. All the general hands were provided with lockers in a 'bothy', a type of locker-room, rest-room and mess-room. It had originally been intended that the bothy be sited in the main baggage hall. For economic reasons the airlines were allowed to have their offices on this site. The bothy was instead located at a distance of some 200 yards from the baggage hall. There was a clear view from the bothy of anyone approaching from the central control area. There was a telephone line to the bothy from the central control area. Direct instructions were brought over to the bothy by the charge hand. The porters and baggage sorters were located in the main building. The sorters operated under assembly line conditions, and were tied to the motorised baggage conveyor. Each loading crew member was given a 'flight sheet' at the beginning of every work session, which carried full instructions about which flights he was to deal with during the work session. The work load of the loading crews varied considerably from hour to hour; they spent about half of their time in the bothy away from the direct work situation. The general hands were paid a basic wage which varied from week to week, but which averaged out at £16 per week. During the first two months of the new airport's operation, with charter flights at their peak and summer schedules in operation, there was a considerable amount of overtime available.

2.4 The Municipal Airport (B)

During the early stages of the new airport's operations the general hands went through a period of gaining familiarity with the technical aspects of the job, and there emerged a pattern of social relationships. There were several promotions of general hands to leading hands in this early period. Many of these promotions went to hands who were often seen near the baggage master's office. The general hands accepted that the loading crew driver's job involved extra responsibility. This extra responsibility was clearly illustrated shortly after the airport opened when one driver was dismissed for reversing a lorry into a plane. The bothy was the scene of most of the communal social interaction, and the centre of shift activity. All the general hands went straight to the bothy at the start and finish of the shift period. It was here that the loading crew members ate their 'piece' (sandwiches), brewed up, played cards, read the paper, and so on. The porters and baggage sorters spent short breaks in the baggage hall, but tended to walk across to the bothy for most of their longer breaks. There was a considerable amount of social ease amongst crew members at a relatively early stage. The flight sheet enabled the crew members to remain well away from central control throughout the shift. The crew members in the bothy answered the telephone inconsistently. The group organisation amongst loading crew members consisted of a dominant social set which centred on card-playing activities. The cardplaying social set had a 'hard core' of seven or eight members. There were as many again who were on the fringes. The latter mostly watched the card games, but joined in if some of the hard core were working at a particular time. When one of the absent hard-core members returned the place was quickly given up to him. There were other small groups with two or three members who were not card players, and some peripheral card players. The card-playing activities were generally peaceful, with relatively small amounts of money involved in the form of 5p and lOp stakes. Occasionally excitement would be generated when two particular individuals, both single men, were allowed to raise the stakes considerably. On such occasions there would be, for half an hour or so, four or five men playing for very high stakes. When this occurred a large crowd would gather around the card table. Often the general hands would delay going back to work to see 87

88 Cases in Organisational Behaviour the end of such games. Money for cards, horses, football pools and drink was discussed by the general hands in quite different terms from the basic wage. They regarded the basic wage as untouchable in that it represented their family responsibilities. Overtime money was regarded in more personal terms, and was seen as being extra money for their own pockets. The men quickly settled into specific work roles and regarded themselves as loading crew members or baggage sorters or porters. Any attempt to move an individual from one work role to another was generally resisted. Even within a shift there tended to be not just a shift 'culture' brought about by the fact that they were all general hands, but also different aspects of the shift culture. The baggage sorters and porters had some group or occupational identity themselves. But they essentially regarded themselves, and in turn were regarded, as members of the shift - as general hands. The shifts remained fairly separate socially. Those in charge of the formal planning of, for example, the compilation of crews, acceded to the obvious distinction, and work teams were arranged according to shift membership. If the whole of B shift was working from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. together with half of, say, C shift, it was regarded as B shift's work session. It was accepted by most of the loading crew members that the lorry driver should not perform what they regarded as the worst part of the crew's work - working inside the holds of the planes - but should work on the lorry, stacking and unstacking baggage and freight. One driver attempted to avoid all loading and unloading work on the grounds that he was a 'driver' only. He resisted the attempts of the crew members to make him take part in this work initially, but he relented after being forcibly deposited into the holds of a number of planes, and made to perform this work as well as driving. The drivers generally were satisfied with their work. They had more freedom in their task area, more responsibility, and in the task situation had a higher status than the ordinary loading crew member. Being mid-summer, with charter flights at their peak, there was plenty of overtime available, and hence opportunity for extra payment for all the general hands. The overtime system consisted of one of the leading hands being instructed to obtain a number of men for overtime work. The 'first come, first served' principle operated. The tendency was for 'men with initiative' and friends and acquaintances of the leading hand or baggage master concerned to be given first choice of any overtime. If there was sufficient overtime for everybody, then the favourite overtime period was the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. session. This was usually allocated to general hands in or around the baggage master's office at that time. Owing to the summer charter flight peak the porters were earning anything up to £30 per week in addition to their wages in the form of tips or 'bung' money. It was not long before the facts concerning the porters'

The Municipal Airport (B) 89 bung money earnings were communicated to the rest of the general hands. The topic of bung money was often raised by men who were losing money at cards. The discussions about bung money were centred on the prospect of using it as more money for cards and other activities. On B shift bung money became a burning issue. From the card-playing group emanated the suggestion that there should be a formal meeting of all shift members to to discuss the question of bung money, and the fact that the porters were earning so much more than the other general hands on the shift. A meeting was held five weeks after the airport had opened. The meeting was chaired by Tom, a leading hand and one of the card players. Before coming to work at the airport Tom had been a charge hand at a nearby steel works. The meeting was initially fairly stormy, with some resistance from the porters to the idea that bung money should be shared. But the porters found it difficult to justify their resistance on rational grounds. The major part of the meeting was then devoted to the development of a system which would enable all the general hands to participate in the bung money. It was decided to elect a bung money representative whose job it would be to collect from every porter at the end of every work session the money taken in tips during that particular session. The election of Tom to this position was unanimous. This scheme had already been discussed informally by most of the loading crew members. At the meeting two other representatives were elected in connection with the bung money. The object of this was to enable the banking and distribution of this money to take place. Given that each porter collected some three pounds per work session, the necessity for some form of safe-keeping was obvious. A system was developed whereby any two of the three elected individuals could pay in or draw out the money from the bank. The system worked quite well in practice. The bung money representative sat in the bothy at the end of each session. The porters reported to the bothy, stated their name and handed him the amount they had collected. This was noted in the bung money book. There were initial attempts at 'cheating'. But since the handing-over process took place before an interested audience of crew members, and after one or two porters had been turned upside down and relieved of the tips they had not declared, the cheating problem was at least partially solved. There was an unwritten rule that the porters could buy their meals and a 'packet of fags' from the tips they collected. A 'packet of fags' really meant up to 50 pence or so for themselves. The distribution of the bung money to the general hands worked quite well. After withdrawing the money from the bank the representatives divided it up into equal portions. Each portion was wrapped in a piece of newspaper, and one portion given to each shift member at two-weekly intervals. The system was accepted by the porters on the

90 Cases in Organisational Behaviour grounds of fairness. Similar systems were developed on the other three shifts. With the autumn came a decline in the number of charter flights, and the amount of overtime available to the general hands lessened. Overtime became a key issue amongst the general hands. At an informal meeting of many of B shift's general hands it was agreed that Tom should put an official complaint to the duty officer. The duty officer told Tom that if the shift wished to run their own overtime rota they could do so, as long as there were enough men to perform the required duties. Tom reported back to the general hands, and suggested to them that they might implement the overtime rota idea. A volunteer was called for to operate such a system. Phil, who had been outspoken over the unfairness of the old system of allocating overtime, agreed to keep the overtime rota. The system agreed upon was simple: everyone who worked overtime went to the bottom of the list, and up through the list again. The card-playing group was instrumental in discussions about the need for a shift representative or shop steward to represent them on economic and work-related matters. It was decided to draw up a list of names of candidates for the position of shift delegate. Tom drew up a list of names at an informal meeting of loading crew members. This meeting occurred on a Sunday, when operations were at a low level. Some off-duty porters and baggage sorters were present. There were three names on the list, of which Tom's name was one. Tom had been persuaded to submit his own name by members of his immediate group. The list was put up on the noticeboard for a week. Each shift member was to sign his name below the candidate of his choice. Tom gained the most votes in a fairly close election. The other serious candidate was an older man who was well liked by everyone, and was extremely knowledgeable about trade union matters. A formal meeting took place after a period of ten days. Tom took control. He read out the result, commented that it appeared that he was the shift delegate, and that if anyone had any complaints they were to come to him first. One of the general hands raised the question of the relationship with the union. Tom agreed to investigate this, and to open formal communications with the other shifts. Within two weeks the other shifts had adopted a similar procedure, and there were thus representatives from each of the four shifts. These delegates met informally and agreed that Tom of B shift would act as overall general hands delegate. Tom agreed to this, and as a result announced his intention to resign as a leading hand. He further agreed to approach the union for recognition as the general shop steward, and to contact the ground controller to inform him of the new workshop arrangement. The union and the ground controller readily agreed to this recognition.

The Municipal Airport (B) 91 Six months after the opening of the airport a number of developments had taken place. There was regular, procedural contact between shift delegates. General hands were represented on the Airport Joint Consultative Committee and on the Airport Social Committee. Children's Christmas parties had been arranged by the four shifts for the children of general hands; a dance committee had been formed and had organised a dance for general hands and their wives; and an organised football pool was in existence on each of the four shifts. Each of the shift delegates had, after discussion, produced an agenda for the Regional Trade Group Committee. The regional office of the trade union was in direct contact with Tom, the shop steward, and had recommended procedures to him for conducting negotiations at airport level.

2.5 The Immigrant Steelworkers1 A university researcher undertook a research project in a steel plant. He made observations on at least one day every week and daily for some periods over a duration of eighteen months. The plant's function was to transform steel bars and rolling steel by hand-working methods into sheet form for subsequent surface coating with tin. The work organisation involved in rolling the steel bars into sheet was by means of teams of six men. There were around thirty teams of six men each in the plant. Performance of the complete work cycle of rolling operations by a work Figure 2.5.1

Mill-Working Operations3 21 feet

roll train

23 feet rest cabin

shearing table

furnaces

a

The arrows indicate the direction of passing movements. 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by J. K. Chadwick-Jones in the Sociological Review, vol. 12, no. 2 (1964).

92

The Immigrant Steelworkers 93 team was carried out by a sequence of interdependent operations in which each man participated. Status was unevenly distributed among the six work roles, a differential wage-grading system reflecting in large measure the skill and seniority hierarchy. The senior operative was the rollerman. He carried responsibility for the team's overall output. He frequently earned about twice as much as the weekly rate of the most junior team member. Figure 2.5.1 shows the mill-working operations of a six-man work team. All the operatives in the work team except the junior member (A) carried out the task sequence between the furnace and the rolls, passing the metal piece from one to another. These operatives took their rest periods in rotation. The job of the incumbent of the junior position in the work team required receiving the steel sheets after rolling, and stacking them outside the work area. Junior team members were by the sheer fact of layout cut off by the rolling mills from the remainder of the mill crew during most of the working shift. Figure 2.5.2 presents the frequency of work contacts between members Figure 2.5.2 Hourly Interaction Frequency within Work Groupsa A B

rolls

a

A and B represent the positions of the two junior grade team members. Each one of the unbroken arrowed lines represents the passing of the metal pieces from one operative directly to another for a period of ten to twelve minutes during the hour. The broken lines each represent the sum of contacts across the rolls. There were six such hourly contacts.

94 Cases in Organisational Behaviour of a team during the one-hour work cycle. During this period the 40pound iron bars were rolled, folded, and refolded until they formed eight-layer sheets. The sequence was then repeated for every hour of the shift. The physical obstacle of the rolling apparatus meant a considerable limitation of interaction opportunities between the two junior grade team members (A and B) and the rest of the team. The arrangement of rest pauses for the team members was such that during the five or ten minute break for the junior grade the remaining five men continued working. As well as the requirements of individual skill and task performance from each team member, each role in the work team carried with it responsibilities to other members of the team. There were a number of interpersonal norms which were equally important in their consequence: regularity and punctuality of attendance; helping other workers through interchange of jobs; and affording occasional relief for anyone suffering from fatigue by taking over their jobs. These norms were revealed in the data collected by the researcher by means of interviews and his observations of work behaviour. There were also clearly laid down standards of workmanship. Care was exercised by team members in carrying out the physically exacting operations of the mill so that the plate was not damaged, or its quality affected by inept performance of the various manual and muscular skills. Even a junior grade team member could make such errors as 'shaking' the sheet as he guided it through the rolls, thus damaging the surface quality. Or he could produce faulty alignment in the sheets when they were piled outside the mill after the rolling operations. It was a matter of pride in the mill teams that this alignment should be as near perfect as possible. A junior grade worker might neglect to carry out such work tasks adequately, or his performance might be variable and thereby increase the work load on other members of his team. Rewards for conformity to the norms of the work team came in the form of positive gestures of help and approval from other members of the crew. Punishment was as readily dealt to those who did not satisfy the expectations of desired behaviour. Verbal expressions of disapproval, ridicule, aggressive humour or withdrawal were the sanctions revealed by the researcher by his interviews and observations of the teams at work. Sanctions did not end at the work group level. There was a formalised medium for both reward and punishment in the union branch organised at the workplace, the British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades Association. The branch's action in this respect was mainly positive: allocating rewards and benefits and protecting its members' perceived interests at every point where company policy might require a change in working arrangements. Promotion was one of the major rewards available from the union

The Immigrant Steelworkers 95 branch to the 'good' member. The union branch had gained control of appointments to the better paid positions in the firm, and was able to administer promotions by a seniority rule. Seniority was accumulated not in terms of the firm's employment, but by membership of the branch. Transfers from one team to another, at the request of members, were administered through the branch. The branch also administered the allocation of financial benefits to sick members, presentations to retiring members, and grants to members' widows. The branch also acted as internal regulator and controller of its members' behaviour. It was more often the case that formal intervention on the part of the branch was not needed, since the more subtle forms of social pressure and behaviour control were fully adequate. The union branch nevertheless constituted an ultimate enforcement agency for the application of sanctions. Over a period of time the junior and low-paid positions in the work teams had become increasingly difficult to fill as it became known that the type of process operated in the plant was obsolescent, and long-term job security in the work dwindled. Alternative employment opportunities were available in the region, including those in a continuous-rolling steel plant which had superseded the hand-operated industry. Some of the old-type plants in the steel industry including the present one continued working, operated mainly by older employees whose personal resettlement in new or alternative industries was difficult. During this period the employers undertook recruitment in Italy to fill the low-paid jobs which did not any longer offer any attraction to young local men, who would formerly have taken these jobs as a starting point for the slow progress through the rolling mill hierarchy to the better paid operative grades. Italians were first introduced to the steel plant in 1951. Twenty were engaged then, and the number was doubled in the subsequent two years. At the time of the research study they formed just under a quarter of the total number of about 200 process workers. When they arrived at the plant the Italian workers were not offered any formal training of any kind or tuition in the English language. They were new to this type of industrial situation. At the time of the research study almost all of the work teams had been allocated one or two Italian team members in the junior grades. The Italian worker was usually placed in position A in a work team, behind the roll train (see Figure 2,5.1). The researcher observed the Italians spending their rest pauses either alone or else with other Italians occupying the equivalent positions in adjacent teams. The Italians also changed their clothing and washed in a room rarely used by the local men. Outside the work situation their activities were generally shared with other Italians. Most of them lived in a hostel in the town where they had their meals and spent much of their

96 Cases in Organisational Behaviour free time. They met regularly outside the two or three Italian-owned restaurants in the town. The researcher interviewed a random one-in-five sample of thirty-seven members of the work teams, nine of whom were Italians. With the aid of an interpreter the researcher tried to elicit information on the attitudes of the Italians. The average age of the Italians interviewed was twenty-seven. Their actual lengths of service ranged from a month to four and a half years, and averaged just over a year. Five members of the sample had been employed for less than six months. Two had advanced to mill grades above that of the most junior and lowest paid position in the team. The researcher concluded from the interviews that the Italians' attitudes reflected a minimal level of commitment and job satisfaction. The positive attractions of the job for them did not extend beyond relative security and regular wages, which they contrasted to their experience of irregular employment and lower wage rates in Italy. Eight of the nine interviewed referred either to the better working conditions in terms of security, wages, or shorter working hours as reasons for liking the job. There was an absence of any comment on specific aspects of the job and its immediate work environment which might have revealed a positive incentive value in the actual job content. The Italians shared a common expectation determined by the contractual obligation to take up mill work. For most of them it was seen as a temporary expedient, to be followed after the expiry of their contracts by employment in other industries. Two members of the sample mentioned re-emigration to Canada. In many instances the Italian workers failed to conform to the standards of behaviour expected of steel mill workers. Sanctions were brought to bear on them by the teams on the shop floor. The researcher observed instances of refusal by teams to continue working until an Italian member had been induced to conform to an interpersonal or work norm. In some instances the senior operative requested the mediation of a member of the supervisory staff. In other instances both supervisors and trade union officials intervened. The senior operative in a team could insist on the removal of an Italian worker 'if he didn't do his work properly'. Several incidents where physical violence had occurred between Italians and local men were mentioned in the researcher's interviews. On one occasion an Italian worker neglected to carry out his duties in greasing the rolls, with resulting damage to them. As a result of this incident the senior operative, who was considered responsible for all operations in the team, was sent for by the manager and reprimanded. When he returned to the workshop a general fracas ensued. The failure of the Italians to conform to many of the standards of behaviour expected of steel mill workers resulted eventually in attempts to

The Immigrant Steelworkers 97 control their behaviour through the operation of the formal machinery of the union branch. Resolutions formally passed at open meetings were used to enforce conformity or to implement sanctions. The extracts taken from union branch proceedings given below are examples of the enforcement of 'displacement' from a team. This meant that the individual concerned lost his fixed place in the team, and was used instead for temporary relief duties among different teams at a lower wage rate. 'Brother Lewis was placed in No. 7 Mill in place of Tanganello who was out of compliance.' 'Complaints that three Italians - Bros D., P. and A. were causing dislocation by their repeated absences from work. Resolved that they be displaced with the following - Bros etc' The extract below illustrates the application of the ultimate sanction of dismissal: 'It was unanimously decided that arising out of a certain incident on Friday night when an Italian worker threatened the foreman that we ask the management to dismiss forthwith the two Italians concerned.' During the first year of the Italians' employment a run of lateness and absences on the part of the Italian workers had created something of a crisis for the work groups, which found themselves short of members repeatedly and without warning. Union action had been taken in which all the Italian workers were involved. The union branch entry for this period records: 'It was resolved that the management be asked to call a meeting of all Italians together with branch officials in order to discuss their future conduct in relation to work.' Socialisation or social learning of the behavioural standards required of the work teams was achieved by a small number of Italians over a period of time. Several Italians during three to five years' employment achieved acceptance on the part of the local workers, and gained promotion to the more skilled, arduous, and higher paid positions. Those Italians who did not achieve acceptance - and therefore could not participate in the mutually supportive activities of the work teams - were left out of the group in all but the sheer locational sense. They were thus left unprotected from the worst aspects of strain and fatigue in the physically arduous routine of hand-rolling. There was an overall replacement rate of Italian workers of 75 per cent per annum. The researcher observed that at union meetings the majority of the Italians sat on benches around the side of the hall, separate from the local workers who sat in rows of chairs in the centre. Several Italians, however, sat in the body of the hall with other members of their own team. These were the small number of Italians whose attainment of the behavioural expectations of work and interpersonal relationships had brought them higher rank and full group membership.

2.6 Hull Trawlermen1

The typical distant-water trawler which sailed from the port of Hull had a crew of twenty men. The crew consisted of the skipper, mate, bosun, third hand, six to eight deckhands, one or two deckhand-learners, the chief engineer, second engineer, two fireman-trimmers, the cook, cook's assistant, and radio operator. All the crew members were 'trawlermen'. In order to study the behaviour of Hull trawlermen, a researcher from the University of Hull made a voyage in a trawler. He also spent a period of unpaid employment in the Hull fish docks, and a great deal of time with trawlermen ashore. The fieldwork material presented in this case was collected by the researcher over a period of two years. Hull trawlermen shared a hard, difficult and often dangerous life. The main distant-water fishing grounds were Iceland, Bear Island, White Sea, Norwegian coast and Greenland. The trawlerman's work-place was a confined space many hundreds of miles from the home port. The average duration of trawler trips to the distant-water fishing grounds was three weeks. For trawlermen in continuous employment these trips were punctuated by short leisure periods in Hull of about sixty hours. The engine-room personnel (chief engineer, second engineer and firemen), cooks, and radio operators were not regarded as 'fishermen' by the trawlermen, since they did not participate in the manhandling of trawls and fish, and the other activities directly associated with the actual catching process. The amount of fish caught by a trawler was up to the fishermen in the crew, under the direction of the skipper. The skipper supervised trawling operations from the bridge of the trawler. The function of the engineers in the crew was to see that the trawler's engines and associated equipment would do what the skipper demanded of them. The work of the engineers did not vary as a function of the amount of fish caught. Their duties were more or less the same whether the trip was successful or unsuccessful. The engineers' work was to a large extent maintenance work. It was in everyone's interests that the engines and associated equipment continued to function without a hitch throughout the trip. In this respect the less manipulatory work the engineers did the better. Both engineers and fishermen were skilled in different ways. The continuous manual work of the fishermen on the deck led to a view of 1 Data for this case were taken from the article by P. Duncan in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 1, no. 3 (1963).

98

Hull Trawlermen 99 work as hard physical labour: 'We do all the grafting.' The routinised maintenance work and episodic repair work of the engineers led to the view that 'we get paid for what we know rather than what we do'. As far as the fishermen were concerned the felt contrast between the routinisation of engine-room work as compared to their own arduous labours on the open deck was a basis for invidious comparisons: 'If you look down the engine room you'll see them sitting reading . . . if that's hard work . . .' The fishermen said of the engineers: 'They're the ones who do the worrying for us. When fishing is good they're happy, but when it's slack they won't speak to you.' Among trawlermen the opinions of engineers on matters of actual fishing generally received scant attention, as did the opinions of fishermen on the workings of the engine room. During a Ministry of Transport enquiry into the loss of a Hull trawler, the second engineer said that the weather had been too bad for the trawler to be fishing on the day she was lost: The wreck commissioner: 'Did you ever tell the skipper?' The second engineer: 'I said it was a bit bad for fishing but of course they take no notice of us.' (Laughter)1 There was a kind of 'joking' relationship between fishermen and engineers. The jokes were permitted rather than prescribed. Joking appeared to the researcher to take place only between fishermen and engineers who had similar status, particularly deckhands and firemen. The content of the joking remarks almost invariably drew attention to some aspect of the work: 'When are you going to get some work done?' 'What, drinking tea again?' 'What's he got to be tired about?' Remarks of this kind, delivered in a blend of insult and wisecrack, sometimes prefaced a straightforward argumentative comparison of the work of fishermen and engineers. One of the researcher's informants, a skipper, described the relations between fishermen and engineers as 'an armed truce'. Many verbalisations of this cleavage in trawler crews added up to the general maxim that 'oil and water don't mix'. This notion was not peculiar to the crews of trawlers. In varying degrees of intensity it was a characteristic feature of the relations between all 'seamen proper' and engineers. The maxim embodied a traditional attitude which went back to the development of the steamship in the nineteenth century, and the introduction of engineers into ships. Overt conflict between engineers and fishermen was most clearly manifested in the sphere of trade union activity in the home port. Union organisation was based on occupational specialty within trawling. The wage structure 1

Newspaper report in the Hull Daily Mail.

100 Cases in Organisational Behaviour of Hull trawlermen, as in other fishing ports, was partly the result of trade union action. On board a trawler the skipper's word was law. The position of skipper was theoretically open to all fishermen. One could not become a skipper without having started on the deck. Sometimes the mobility of fishermen was quite rapid. It was possible for a chief engineer to find himself under the supreme authority of a man who had previously earned less and had had less authority than himself. Avoidance seemed to be a characteristic element of the relations between skippers and chief engineers. During his trip to sea the researcher never saw the skipper go down to the engine room. The chief engineer made very rare visits to the bridge. In an account of a trip in a Hull trawler Hugh Popham wrote: '. . . the Chief Engineer came up on the bridge . . . . He and the Skipper exchanged good mornings. That was usually the extent of their conversation, for among the Skipper's idiosyncrasies is one which maintains that Engineers have no place on the bridge. "How would they like it", he would demand rhetorically, "if I was always down their engine-room, poking my nose into their drip-feeds and gauges, eh? They wouldn't like it; and I don't like them on my bridge."' 1 British distant-water trawling was vigorously competitive. Payment of each Hull trawler crew was partly based on the price realised by the sale of the catch in the dockside auctions. Skippers struggled to outfish each other and to catch the market at the most favourable time. The competitive relations between the crews of different trawlers could increase or decrease the significance of the differences between engineers and fishermen within a crew, depending upon the success or failure of the trip. Identification with a successful trawler tended to draw all the crew together in relation to other crews, while failure tended to lead to mutual recriminations. There seemed to be less turnover in the crews of successful trawlers. The researcher found it impossible to work out precise quantitative relationships between success in catching fish and crew turnover, as figures were not available. But his fieldwork material strongly suggested to him that there was an inverse relationship between success and turnover. There was much competition among trawlermen for berths in the trawlers that were successful, and skippers tried to keep together a crew that was working well. Earnings were dependent on results. There was an accumulation of advantages at the 'top', as the best ships, the top skippers and stable crews entailed each other. There was a corresponding accumulation of disadvantages at the 'bottom'. There were no contractual obligations which tied 1

Hugh Popham, Cape of Storms (Rupert Hart-Davis, 1957), p. 53.

Hull Trawlermen 101 particular men to particular ships for longer than a single voyage. Trawling was essentially a 'casual' occupation. Skippers and mates received 10 per cent and 7-5 per cent respectively of the net proceeds of the sale of fish from a trip (i.e. the gross proceeds minus the expenses of the trip). Skippers and mates had a guaranteed minimum which they could claim if their share for a particular trip fell below it. They also shared in 'oil money', the value of the oil extracted at sea from the livers of certain fish. There were considerable differences in material rewards between skippers and chief engineers. The pay of fishermen and engineers was based on the value of the catch. Earnings were made up from three sources: (1) a minimum weekly wage, usually drawn by a dependent in Hull; (2) 'poundage', which was a share in the gross Table 2.6.1 Rates of Pay of Trawlermen Position Basic weekly wage (£)

Poundage per £100 gross (£)

Bosun Third hand Deckhands Chief engineer Second engineer Firemen

1.24 .69 .64 1.09 .74 .64

8.92½ 8.22½ 8.22½ 10.67½ 9.27½ 8.22½

value of the catch; and (3) a share in oil money. The rates of pay of various kinds of trawlermen at the time of the research study are summarised in Table 2.6.1. Poundage and oil money were paid as a lump sum at the end of each trip. This payment was the most important part of the reward of fishing as far as the trawlermen were concerned. Payment of a lump sum at the end of each trip was an integral part of the way of life of the trawlerman. In Hull trawling had a traditional community basis. Fishing was very much a matter of family and neighbourhood tradition. Recruitment from outside was rather rare. A degree of community feeling united trawlermen in relation to the outside world. An earlier researcher had calculated the number and percentage of trawlermen, divided according to position in the crew, living within a mile of the Hull fish dock. These figures showed a roughly similar degree of concentration of engineers and fishermen (excepting skippers) in the area, 65.8 per cent of third hands, deckhands and sparehands, and 62-2 per cent of firemen lived in the area.1 The local 1

G. W. Horobin, 'Community and Occupation in the Hull Fishing Industry', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 8, no. 4 (1957).

102 Cases in Organisational Behaviour community was the locus of the trawlerman's traditional leisure institutions, the pub and social club. For the trawlermen there was no divorce between work and leisure. Work spilled over into leisure in the sense that the trawlermen sought the company of other trawlermen during leisure time. The main topic of conversation was work. The unofficial grapevine provided information concerning the movements of men and ships.

2.7 The McKinley Company1 The McKinley company was a large British manufacturing company. Under the company's board of directors there were five general works managers in charge of production, and three general sales managers in charge of sales. The general managers of production and sales were of equal status in the McKinley company's hierarchy. There were eighteen different works in the company, regionally grouped under the general works managers. The company had six sales departments, grouped under the general sales managers. Every department possessed its own departmental manager. Each department was organised into sections, managed by a section head who was directly responsible to the departmental manager. Each sales department had a staff of thirty to forty clerks, some of whom were ranked as senior clerks. Figure 2.7.1 sets out the schematic production and sales organisation of the company; Figure 2.7.2 sets out the formal organisation of the company's sales departments. Figure 2.7.1 Partial Organisation Chart Board of directors (production director, sales director etc.)

General works managers (5)

General sales managers (3)

Works (18)

Sales departments (6)

Each sales department specialised in selling certain of the company's products, and had a list of mostly long-established customers, who had dealt with the McKinley company over many years. The staff in each section specialised in the sales of a sub-type of the department's product range. Within the sections each clerk had his own list of customers, based on an alphabetical breakdown. Staff turnover in the sales departments was very low, and transfers between departments were rare. Many of the sales clerks had had experience of clerical work in the company's works. Most 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by A. J. M. Sykes and James Bates in the Sociological Review, vol. 10, no. 3 (1962).

103

104 Cases in Organisational Behaviour of the clerks had spent many years dealing with the same customers, and had built up close relations with them and their representatives. McKinley's general works and sales managers had been mainly recruited from those with public school or university education, who had entered the company as trainee managers. The rank of departmental manager was the normal limit of promotion within the company for a man who had joined the company as a clerk. The departmental managers and clerks had a similar social background, and similar social attitudes and behaviour patterns. The general managers differed from the departmental managers in accent, social attitudes and behaviour patterns. The departmental managers were very conscious of these differences. As they put it, the Figure 2.7.2 Partial Formal Organisation of the Sales Departments General sales managers (3)

Sales dept mgr

Sales dept mgr

Sales dept mgr

Sales dept mgr

Sales dept mgr

Sales dept mgr

Section mgrs

Section mgrs

Section mgrs

Section mgrs

Section mgrs

Section mgrs

Clerks

Clerks (senior and others) (30 to 40)

(senior and others) (30 to 40)

Clerks

Clerks (senior and others) (30 to 40)

(senior and others) (30 to 40)

Clerks

Clerks

(senior and others) (30 to 40)

(senior and others) (30 to 40)

general managers were 'the officers', the departmental managers 'the NCOs'. The departmental managers and clerks referred to the general managers' lunchroon as 'the officers' mess', and to the departmental managers' lunchroom as 'the sergeants' mess'. Informal communications between the departmental managers and their clerks were excellent. They discussed their work quite freely with each other. In discussing McKinley company matters the clerks and departmental managers always spoke of the general managers and directors as 'them - the management', and of themselves as 'us - the staff'. The clerks spoke of the McKinley company as being divided into two groups with conflicting interests, conflicting not only on questions of pay and promotion, but also on matters concerning the work. 'They' were spoken of as being out of touch with the work. The general managers had little direct

The McKinley Company 105 contact with the departments and the lower levels of the staff. They had little idea of what the departments were in fact doing. Company Policy and Behaviour In fhe interests of efficient production by the company's works the official policy of the McKinley company set certain limits on service to the customer by the sales departments. It was the company's policy that customers should be limited to certain standardised products. In this way the company aimed to achieve economies from long runs and to reduce unit costs. Senior company management had laid down a system of priorities for the handling of sales orders. These priorities were intended to give preference to certain types of order, such as export orders, and to certain large and important customers. As many as four of the company's works were capable of manufacturing certain relatively standardised ranges of products. The company's policy was passed down from the board of directors to the general managers of production and sales. The general managers conveyed only the bare details of company objectives and policies, and changes in them to their departmental heads and section heads. They limited their communications with their middle managers to the formal minimum, and did not discuss or explain informally company policy or matters concerning departmental work. The clerical staff as well as the departmental managers did not clearly understand company policy and the reasons for it. A typical sales enquiry or order placed with a sales department was officially supposed to proceed as follows: the sales clerk first asked for quotations and delivery dates from all the company's works capable of manufacturing the product named in the order. On the basis of the responses he placed the order with one of the works. The actual handling of orders placed with the sales departments was quite different from the officially proclaimed system. On receipt of an order from a customer the individual sales clerk got in touch with a clerk in a works. His choice of the clerk was determined not by company policy on works loading, but on his own personal contacts. A clerk did not telephone a works; he telephoned someone he knew, exchanged social pleasantries with him, and then got down to business. The order went to a personal contact for a number of reasons. The sales clerk wished to help his works contact by giving him an order. His personal contact enabled him to obtain priority on delivery or other privileges for his customer. A sales clerk gave an order to a works clerk who could provide special privileges, in return for which the sales clerk had to place further orders. A works clerk gave privileges

106 Cases in Organisational Behaviour and priorities, and in return established a right to further orders when he needed them. Both sales and production clerks wished to keep these good social relationships, and knew that refusal to do their contacts a favour would disrupt them. The clerks in the sales departments, especially the section heads and senior clerks, had over the years come to look on the company's customers as 'their' customers. They took a pride in doing their best for the customer, and felt an obligation to assist him by using all their personal influence within the company to obtain special privileges for him. The clerks in each department genuinely believed that their own customers were more important than any others, and deserved production priority. They fought ruthlessly with the other sales departments' staffs to ensure that their customers received priority. There was keen rivalry between the sales departments: each was forced to compete, otherwise it could get nothing done. Personal relations between the sales departments were bad. Disputes between individual clerks, each trying to get priority, were frequent. In such disputes the individual clerk had the full backing of his department. Clerks in the sales departments received every encouragement from their departmental manager and the senior staff of their department. In each department the general managers were criticised for their failure to understand the importance of the department's work, and to give the department status and work priorities over the 'less important' departments. The clerical staff and departmental managers excused their failure to carry out company policy by saying that the policy was unrealistic because it was created by a group - the directors and general managers who were out of touch with the work. The clerks and departmental managers held that the official company policy was unworkable, and that they therefore had to create their own policy for practical work purposes. The departmental managers themselves saw the main duty of their departments as being to please the customer. They made little attempt to enforce company policy when it prevented them pleasing the customer. The sales clerks in each department rationalised their behaviour by claiming the especial importance of their work. The export department emphasised the importance of the export trade. In another department the overall value of orders received was held by department members to entitle them to priority. In a third department the complexity of the orders was claimed as a justification. Each department had a scale of values by which the work of the various sales departments was rated. Each department's scale was biased in its own favour. The clerks usually saw only the good side of the relationship. The clerks with contacts - and every department had clerks with contacts - believed that the system worked in their favour. None realised the extent of the other departments' contacts. Each

The McKinley Company 107 department believed that it had an interest in the continuance of this system of placing orders. In this way sales dominated production, and insisted that customers be supplied by the works with products made to their own specifications, and delivered as required. This did not matter to the company when the works were operating at much less than full capacity. But when capacity was fully utilised planned production became impossible. There was constant conflict between production management, which wanted to limit the range of products in order to increase the volume of output and reduce unit costs, and the sales departments which tried to force production to comply with the customer's exact specifications, regardless of the need to standardise. Conflict also arose between the different sales departments, since each department tried to secure the earliest possible delivery date for customers without regard to the system of priorities which the McKinley company officially laid down. The network of unofficial communications between sales clerks and works clerks had developed initially through the McKinley company's practice of recruiting sales staff from the clerks at the various works. Some technical knowledge of the company's products was necessary for the sales staff, and the works staff had acquired such knowledge. Some clerks were recruited direct to sales without works experience, but it was felt to be necessary to have a hard core of sales clerks who had been through the works. Pay and prospects were better in the sales departments than in the works, and there was no shortage of recruits. Clerks transferred in this way naturally retained the contacts they had made in the works offices, and in many instances they continued to live near the works and to share in its social functions. In every sales department there were men who had personal contacts in one or more works. These contacts formed the basis of the network of unofficial communications. The Creation of SOLD The sales-production situation caused difficulties in production which the company's senior management put down to a conflict of interests between sales and production. At the time company management was not aware of the system of informal relations which existed between the sales and works clerks. In order to resolve the evident conflict between sales and production, McKinley's senior management created a new department, the Sales Order Liaison Department (SOLD), to act as the formal liaison between sales and production. The intended function of SOLD was to hold the balance between the conflicting interests, and to see that the inter-

108 Cases in Organisational Behaviour ests of the company as a whole prevailed, not those of any one function. SOLD's main functions were defined by senior management as: (1) to obtain all relevant information from the works to enable accurate picture of production capacity to be drawn up; (2) to obtain information on sales policy and requirements, and to coordinate these in terms of delivery schedules for customers; (3) to act as a liaison between sales and production by keeping each informed of the other's requirements; (4) to formulate a comprehensive pricing policy; (5) to maintain a statistical department and produce reports for the company's chairman and board. Detailed instructions for the activities of SOLD were drawn up in an attempt to regularise the placing of orders. SOLD was required: (1) to receive orders and enquiries from sales departments, and to check technical data; (2) to allocate orders to works possessing the capacity to deal with them, and which were convenient for delivery to the customer; (3) to give delivery dates to sales departments in accordance with the company's system of priorities; (4) to progress orders and to keep a list of orders unavoidably delayed. SOLD consisted of a department with a staff of thirty-five men, excluding typists. The head of SOLD was a general manager whose sole responsibility was for the new department. He was of the same formal status as the general managers of home sales, export sales, and the general managers in charge of each regional group of works. The general manager of SOLD was directly responsible to the director of production. Under the general manager was a manager equal in formal status to the departmental sales managers and works managers. The general manager's main duty, and that of his departmental manager, was to see that company policy was carried out. The SOLD clerks were made responsible for seeing that company policy on sales and production matters was maintained. Policy was transmitted to them by their general manager. The official function of SOLD was to control formal relations between sales and production. From the foundation of the new department all direct contact between the sales departments and the works was officially forbidden by senior management. All communications between the two had to go through the medium of SOLD, whose intended function was to preserve a proper balance between the needs of sales and production. SOLD alone had the responsibility for placing orders with the works. In practice SOLD's most important function was to control the informal communications which had been developed between sales and production. Unofficial communications were still possible: clerks could telephone

The McKinley Company 109 each other and meet each other outside working hours. But the sales clerks no longer had the power to allocate orders, nor the works clerks the power to give production priorities or to do special work for a customer. Informal communications were not stopped, but they could no longer be used for purposes contrary to official company policy. The clerks in the sales departments and works could not continue to make effective use of the system of informal communications and favours which had formerly thwarted company policy. The existence of SOLD was bitterly resented by the staff in the sales departments and, to a lesser degree, by the clerks in the works. The clerks in each sales department believed the importance of their departments to be such that it entitled them to a privileged position. They were aggrieved because the clerks in SOLD refused to recognise the special importance of their customers. As they put it SOLD favoured other, less important customers. No sales clerk mentioned company policy. All spoke as though SOLD had complete freedom to alter priorities or permit non-standard work, and blamed it for allowing these to the wrong customers and departments. The fact that customers' interests had often conflicted with those of the company as a whole was not comprehended. The main complaint of the clerks was that SOLD was unnecessary, and that its existence had completely ruined relations between sales and production by preventing effective personal contacts. It was claimed that the works were perfectly willing to work to customers' requirements, and that it was only because of the obstructive attitude of SOLD that this could not be done. The hostility to SOLD by clerks in the sales departments and works soon welded SOLD into a group in which the duty to preserve company policy in face of pressure from other departments became a group value, the value which distinguished SOLD from other departments. In view of the complaints made by the sales departments, the company's senior management investigated the position, and seriously considered restoring some degree of personal contact between the sales departments and the various works. It was suggested that for the progressing of orders sales departments should be allowed to deal directly with the works. It had become realised by senior management that communications between the general managers and the departmental managers were poor. The effect of this on the sales/production problem was not realised.

2.8 The Transport Control Room1

A researcher from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research studied a passenger and freight transport organisation's central control room. He tried to obtain data on the functions of the control room, and the tasks and behaviour of the staff who worked in it by means of observations, interviews and a questionnaire. The work of the control room was concerned with the loads of the organisation's transport units, their routes and timetables. The control room consisted of a row of seats and desks, and a display board, which ran the whole length of the room, parallel to the row of desks. The control room staff sat behind the desks facing the display board. Figure 2.8.1 shows the layout of the control room. Figure 2.8.1

Plan of the Control Room display board

desks

seats

The display board carried information about current transport services for all the room's transport control staff to refer to. This information consisted principally of the arrival and departure times of transport units. Information about the payloads of transport units, and advance estimates of their arrival and departure times, were fed into the control room by telephone or printed messages. There were two switchboards in the control room. Messages were passed to the staff maintaining the display board, who posted the information on the board. If the message contains other information it was routed to the appropriate senior employee in the control room. Due to the growth of the control room's work, the display board had become too small for its job. Part of the function of the control room's staff was to move information 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by R. A. M. Gregson in Occupational Psychology, vol. 31, no. 2 (1957).

110

The Transport Control Room 111 between different sorts of specialists within the transport organisation, and up and down the lines of authority within the organisation. The room's staff could also give information to people outside the organisation, or take it from them. The other part of the control staff's function was to make decisions affecting loads, routes and timetables. Once a decision was made by one person in the control room, it constituted information for another person. In this way decision-making was an operation performed on information in motion. From his observations and questioning the researcher concluded that arrival and departure times of transport units were considered by control room personnel to be the most important items of information dealt with by them, and those on which most decisions hung. The control room served a liaison point, where decisions which involved two lines of authority within the transport organisation could be reached by face-to-face consultation between representatives of the two lines. Control room staff fell into two sub-groups, and totalled seventy persons. These groups had different but rather similar jobs. The first group were services controllers. They were part of a major section of the transport organisation whose job it was to plan and maintain advertised services by co-ordinating the activities of the engineers, crews, public relations departments, and so on. The control room was 'legally' theirs: it was part of the facilities of the part of the formal organisation structure of which they were members. The facilities within the control room used by all the staff permanently there were largely their responsibility. Telephones, loudspeaker intercommunication and the services of clerical messengers who posted messages on the display board were under their control. The switchboard operated by the services controllers had twenty-seven channels, not all of which were normally equally loaded. It was necessary to maintain a twenty-four-hour watch in the control room, and a shift system was operated for this purpose. There were always a duty services controller and two deputies present. During the day there were also four clerks or assistants taking and transmitting mesages. The service controllers had decision-making authority. The clerks did not possess decision-taking authority. At night three clerks were present. Two of the clerks operated the switchboard communicating with other departments. The second group in the control room were the technical controllers. They regarded themselves more as engineers by tradition than the services controllers were. Their work consisted mainly in planning the allocation of transport units to services, compensating for breakdowns, and ensuring that maintenance schedules were followed to get the most out of each transport unit. Their engineering knowledge was used mainly in inter-

112 Cases in Organisational Behaviour preting reports of breakdowns of transport units to estimate the extent of future delays in meeting schedules. They possessed a switchboard of their own, which had four channels. The switchboard connected them with the engineers in the nearest repair workshops. Most of their information came in through the communication network established and operated by the services controllers. The technical group was made up of four men on duty: a duty technical controller, assisted by one deputy and two clerks. General types of information, such as arrival or departure times or payloads, which were fed into the control room by telephone or printed messages, were mostly the concern of the services controllers, who saw or heard these messages first. Most of the information shown on the display board was dealt with by means of a routine procedure, which was supplemented by spoken instructions if the duty services controller so wished. What the duty services controller instructed his clerks and messengers to display was immediately available to his colleagues in the control room. Other controllers could not use the board in the same way. Information passed only from the duty services controller and not to him by this link. In this way the board provided an information link between the services and technical controllers. The display board carried information about current services for all the controllers, technical and services, to refer to. If a message contained information other than an estimate of an arrival time, it was brought to the senior controller of one of the two sub-groups. Arrival times could also get to an individual controller by other routes. Instead of waiting for one to appear on the board he could ask a colleague who sat nearer to the clerk first getting the arrival times. Alternatively he could pass slips of paper bearing information or requesting information. Or he could get up and walk about to ask other people if they knew. There were some messages which were the prime concern of the technical controllers because they consisted mainly of engineering information. Such messages, if from engineers working close to the control room, came directly to the technical controllers. Other engineering information, from engineers geographically more remote, came in as part of messages sent to the services controllers, and then proceeded to the technical controllers by some other route within the control room. The classification of messages on arrival was officially the subject of joint agreement by the two groups in the control room. In practice classification was delegated to the clerks subordinate to the services controllers. This arrangement was the cause of some disagreement, centring on the classification of messages according to the priority of destinations within the room, and on the actual method of distribution. Officially the

The Transport Control Room 113 services controllers had the last word. In the formal authority structure they were senior. In practice compromise solutions were commonly reached with the technical controllers. If a transport unit broke down, for example, the decision to run the service with another unit, while partly determined by the passengers' requirements and general organisation policy, depended also on whether the technical controllers had available another unit with the same or similar capacity. There was considerable variation in the extent to which various individuals working in the control room relied on the display board as a source of information. Some preferred to get their information by other, apparently more indirect, ways. These other information sources consisted of face-to-face conversation, telephoning, passing slips of paper, and walking over to a colleague. These other ways of getting information had become the most preferred methods of the technical controllers. At one time the technical controllers had used the display board to the same extent as did the services controllers. They had moved away from that position to the one held when the research investigation was made. Each of these methods of communication was regarded by the technical controllers as about equally useful, and preferred to the official primary source, the display board. In the main the services controllers used the display board in preference to anything else. The attitude of the technical controllers to the display board was a subject of criticism by the services controllers, who considered that their colleagues rejected a useful instrument. The staff were asked, in the researcher's questionnaire, to estimate the amount of walking about they had to do in their work. These estimates were compared by the researcher with his observations of the men's mobility in terms of the distances walked, and contacts initiated and received. The two sets of measures showed what the researcher regarded as reasonable agreement. The researcher carefully estimated the proportion of the display board's area clearly visible from each workplace. In his questionnaire each employee was asked to estimate what parts of the display board he could see clearly from his desk. Because of the shift system there were a number of men for each control room job. The researcher took the average of their estimates, and divided them by his own. This provided a ratio of the mean area of board claimed visible by controllers, and the area estimated visible by the researcher. By this measure if the men had completely agreed with the researcher the ratio would have been one (unity). If they disagreed and partially or wholly rejected the board as a source of information the value would have been less than one. A value of zero would have implied a complete rejection of the board as a source of information. The values obtained for some of the control room staff are given in Table 2.8.1. These

114 Cases in Organisational Behaviour figures corresponded closely with the opinions of the staff as expressed in the researcher's interviews. The services controllers used more of the information on the display board than others in the control room, and kept it as their primary source of information. They used other information sources as secondary aids. Table 2.8.1 Estimation of the Proportion of the Display Board Visible Formal function/posit ion Mean area of board claimed visible Researcher's estimate of area of board visible Services controllers Deputy services controllers Technical controllers Assistant technical controllers

0•82 0•50 0•27 0•32

But in the event of a major traffic dislocation the system broke down; the primary source became a secondary source. Slips of paper appeared as a new but rather 'rocky' primary source. Under stress, as when there was fog or floods, the work of the controllers became more intensive and difficult. In these circumstances the services controllers were forced by the logic of the situation to change their procedure to something approaching that used by the technical controllers.

SECTION THREE

Technical Inputs: Technology and Behaviour

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Introduction This section introduces technology as an input affecting human behaviour in organisations. For case discussion purposes technology is here defined largely in the narrow sense of knowledge and techniques relevant to the production of physical goods - in the cases bread, cars and coal - and its influence on people operating and working with the technology. The focus here is on technology in the sense of its effect as an immediate determinant of individual and group job designs, as a significant influence on the behaviour of people in organisations at the 'micro' rather than the wider 'macro' level. Cases which implicate the effect of technology on organisation structures are deferred until Section Five. Study of the cases and references in this section is intended to foster comprehension of the impact of technology on people, the fit between technological and human inputs, and the action choices facing management in this area. The Northwestern Bakeries case vividly describes the work roles of production operatives and delivery salesmen in a bakery, including changes in the production task over time, and the behaviour and attitudes of employees. Discussion may usefully centre on the role of the technologies employed by the company in differentiating people. The attitudes of vehicle assembly workers at the Luton plant are the subject of Vauxhall Motors Limited. The case encourages discussion of the backgrounds and motives of the assemblers. Northwestern Bakeries and Vauxhall Motors constitute a useful pair of cases for successive case discussions. Conclusions reached in the analysis of each seem to lead in different directions: the pair provide the prospect of an extended discussion of certain themes. This discussion, may be further developed, following case discussions, by a seminar on the debate in the literature (see references). The British Coal Industries series describes the successive modifications in the technology employed in certain English coal mines over a period of years, and of the work organisation used with each. The value of the series can be maximised by carrying out a full analysis of each case before proceeding to the next one in the series. References In courses intended to include treatment of technology and organisation structure it seems appropriate to introduce technology's general impact 117

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on organisations at this point, despite the concentration of the cases in the section on restricted aspects. Kast and Rosenzweig (1) provide a useful elementary introduction to the whole area, Seiler (2) a more operational and Woodward (3) the early classic treatment. Thompson and Bates (4) and Miller (5) present more advanced treatments. Turner (6) and Walker and Guest (7) wrote the standard popular treatments of the assembly line, which have been very briefly summarized by Lupton (8). Jasinski (9) provides many insights. To foster a first-rate debate subsequent to the discussion of the Northwestern and Vauxhall cases, Daniel's critique (10) and the ensuing comments should prove good value. 1. F. E. Kast and J. E. Rosenzweig, Organization and Management: A Systems Approach (McGraw-Hill, 1970), ch. 6. 2. J. A. Seiler, Systems Analysis in Organizational Behaviour (Irwin-Dorsey, 1967), ch. 6. 3. Joan Woodward, Management and Technology, Problems of Progress in Industry-, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (HMSO, 1958). 4. J. D. Thompson and F. L. Bates, 'Technology, Organization, and Administration', Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 2 (1957-58). 5. E. J. Miller, 'Technology, Territory, and Time', Human Relations, vol. 12, no. 3 (1959). 6. A. N. Turner, 'Management and the Assembly Line', Harvard Business Review, vol. 33, no. 5 (1955). 7. C. R. Walker and R. H. Guest, 'The Man on the Assembly Line', Harvard Business Review, vol. 30, no. 3 (1952). 8. Tom Lupton, Management and the Social Sciences (Hutchinson, 1966), pp. 30-5. 9. F. J. Jasinski, 'Adapting Organization to New Technology', Harvard Business Review, vol. 37, no. 1 (1959); 'Technological Delimitation of Reciprocal Relationships: A Study of Interaction Patterns in Industry', Human Organization, vol. 15, no. 2 (1956). 10. W. W. Daniel, 'Industrial Behaviour' and Orientation to Work - A Critique', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (1969); J. H. Goldthorpe, 'The Social Action Approach to Industrial Sociology: A Reply to Daniel', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (1970); W. W. Daniel, 'Productivity Bargaining and Orientation to Work - a Rejoinder to Goldthorpe', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 8, no. 3 (1971); J. H. Goldthorpe, 'Daniel on Orientation to Work - a Final Comment', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 9, no. 3 (1972).

3.1 Northwestern Bakeries Limited1

Northwestern Bakeries Limited was an independent family bakery which, in the course of two generations, had grown from a north-country backkitchen baking shop into a flourishing business with 1,000 employees. The present generation of family directors held managerial positions in the firm. They had been educated at English universities and American business schools, and were eager to make technical and managerial innovations in the business. They were also keen to maintain the traditions of a benevolent family firm, and were concerned about the impact of growth on employees. At the main bread bakery the firm's employees were divided into two main groups: the production operatives (the bakers), and the delivery salesmen (the vanmen). Both the bakers and the vanmen agreed that Northwestern Bakeries was a good firm to work for. This feeling seemed to be something of a universally shared attitude. The men's approval of the firm was invariably expressed in terms of the personalities of the family directors, their good intentions, and their pleasing attitudes. The men were convinced of the family's good will. Both the bakers and the vanmen came from the same population. A large number of them had been drawn from the ranks of redundant cotton workers. The majority of them had had no experience of the baking industry. Whether they had been recruited as bakers or vanmen had been largely a matter of chance. They were on the same terms of employment and drew very similar wages. On average the bakers earned slightly more. The Bakers The bakers in the firm's factory were spread out spatially along the length of motorised production lines. There were four separate tasks of varying qualities and demands in the baking of bread in the factory. These distinctive tasks were undertaken by four different types of operative. Each baking operative, however, carried out a single, simple task or a few tasks of brief duration, such as transferring lumps of bread dough from one conveyor belt into tins on another conveyor. The men were separated from each other by the layout of the work processes. They affected the 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by W. W. Daniel in the Sociological Review, vol. 14, no. 1 (1966).

119

120 Cases in Organisational Behaviour product for only a small part of its production. Each day was almost the same, and involved working at the same task all the time. Each man was dependent on other men to carry out their respective job tasks. Any man who modified the speed of the production process affected the 'comfort' of the work for everyone else on the conveyor line. The bakers worked a 'fortnight about' shift system, which consisted of two weeks working by day, followed by two weeks working by night. The men averaged over fifty hours work per week on the day shift, and over sixty hours on the night shift. They were paid on a flat time rate, and over twelve months averaged £18.19 per week. At the beginning of the week they worked an eight-hour shift. This became twelve hours towards the weekend. In discussing the characteristics of the work and their reaction to it one baker said: 'Well the work is more or less controlled by the machinery and the men can't really increase their quality. All they can do is keep their eyes open and make sure there's no mistakes. The trouble is keeping your eyes open on this job!' The bakers constantly commented that: 'There's nothing really hard about this job. It's just the tediousness of it. It does get tedious and monotonous when you've done six or seven hours of it. You're fixed to your job. You can't move away. You're fixed so you can't move away - so what happens ? They all think it's a doddle. They think it's nothing, but it is. It's that keeping at it all the time.' One baker explained: 'Well I think that a bakery that gets mechanised like this has, well you don't get that atmosphere that you had when everybody was more or less together like, round a table: table hands and like that. You don't get the same atmosphere. I mean it's not that feeling like when everybody's mucking in sort of thing, getting everything done together. I mean you're isolated now, you're like an individual doing a certain job, like not all together. When you've got a group of men doing a job there's more fun and it's more sociable than a man working on his own. There's always something happening, some cracks or something. There's always some fun going on. Well you miss that now.' Baking has formerly been considered to be a semi-skilled craft carried out in demanding conditions. Before the introduction of automatic plant at Northwestern Bakeries the bakers had been responsible for the bread at each stage of its production: 'You mixed it y'self. You made it y'self. You looked after it y'self, put it in the oven and took it out y'self. That was interesting. You were going

Northwestern Bakeries Limited

121

right through the process and you could see what you were producing. With a bit of care you could improve the bread and you could see the results of your work. Now you have nothing to do with it.' A baker described the men's general reaction to the work in the following terms: 'When you're on that oven you're thinking all the time. You get browned off and you're thinking to y'self. You're thinking all sorts of things, dibs and dabs, until you get bad-tempered and start biting each other's heads off. You might think nothing of it but then again you might just do some thing . . . you're on the same job and it goes on and on. So you're biting him, the nearest bloke, because the job's getting on your nerves.' On the production lines there would suddenly be, for no apparent reason, an explosion of undirected and evidently unprovoked shouting and yelling. One man would cry out and the cry would be taken up, incoherent and indiscriminate. Sometimes the practice would be provoked by the appearance of a cleaner or mechanic. The men universally thought that they should be changed around on the various jobs and given more variety: 'You do get fed up with being stuck on one job all the time. I've been here for twelve years and I've been stuck at the front of that oven for twelve years. You never get a change or a swop round. Sunday night week in and week out, year in, year out. Then eventually you tell them that you want a change and you get put on the other oven.' Few men were permitted to 'float'. One who did explained: 'I do every job going. I'm more or less freelance. If anybody's off I take their place. I do get a bit of variety. That's what the blokes need; variety. Move 'em round. Don't keep one bloke on one job. It's always better to have them floating. The time passes quicker and it's more interesting.' Respite from work activities was afforded by 'breaks' or rest pauses. These breaks were lengthy. In ideal circumstances, when a shift was fully manned, the men worked an hour and then had a half-hour off. The bakers welcomed the system of breaks: 'The breaks here they're terrific. They look after you. You get terrific breaks and they make sure you get them. Other places the breaks you're supposed to get are terrible and even then you never know if you're going to get them or no.' Over 80 per cent of the operatives in the baking department spontaneously commented on the breaks in this way. At the same time they frequently added: 'The

122 Cases in Organisational Behaviour breaks are good, but they have to be. Nobody would stop here in this kind of work without them. You couldn't stick it.' The breaks permitted the operatives in the shift on duty to function as an informal group. In this way some of the tensions, conflicts and resentments built up on the job were resolved through informal interaction. The men engaged in group activities during breaks. The men explained how: 'You have a row with a bloke and you go for a smoke with him and somehow it doesn't seem so bad.' Often when bakers came to the researcher's interviews they would perceive them as an opportunity to release themselves of their pent-up resentments and frustrations, and would indulge in lengthy, irrational and often incoherent diatribes against every section of the firm. Their resentment was directed particularly against those organisation levels and departments in Northwestern Bakeries which were the result of expansion and change: the supervisors and professional managers who blocked the men's former direct access to 'the tops', and the various departments and technicians: engineers, chemists, health officers, and PROs. In fact all 'the people who stand around doing nothing while we're sweating our guts out on those bloody ovens.' The bakers were concerned about their growing isolation from the family who owned Northwestern Bakeries, whose authority and position they accepted as part of the 'proper order of things', and their increasing contact with 'jumped-up tits with degrees from outside'. The bakers held the firm in high regard. Nearly 90 per cent of the men said it was the 'finest firm I've ever worked for'. The firm's employment records were excellent. Despite a long series of complaints about and condemnations of every aspect of the actual job, the men continued to to insist that it was a 'grand firm to work for'. The bakers' production manager was a jealous defender of the virtues and rights of his men in the face of any external criticism or attack. The bakers looked upon the union as an indispensable piece of collective security. All the bakers were union members. Eighty per cent of them had no hesitation in claiming that they were 'working class'. A large percentage of the bakers said that they voted Labour. Ten per cent of them ran their own cars. The Vanmen The vanmen shared to a large extent the same favourable attitude towards the firm as did the bakers. The vanmen were lauded by their departmental manager as 'the finest body of van salesmen in the country'. He was determined that they should be treated with the respect that this distinc-

Northwestern Bakeries Limited 123 tion required. The vanmen spent the greater part of their working day outside the factory, and out of contact with the firm's personnel. Each vanman had about fifty rounds. All the bread drivers on the road were on friendly terms with one another. They would meet each day, stop and chat if they were serving the same shop at the same time. They would exchange bread with one another if they were short of any particular line, and help each other generally if they were in difficulties, such as a breakdown. The bakery's customers were the people with whom they had the greatest contact. It was of the customer that they talked more than of anyone else. Many of the vanmen had had the same round for ten years or more, and had been visiting the same shop-keepers for all that time: 'It's like going home.' 'It's home from home for me now.' 'It's just like home from home.' Such was the permanence of some of the rounds that the driver was more firmly established and knew more about the business than the shopkeepers : 'Oh, I get on very well with my shop-keepers. Half of 'em don't even give me an order. They leave it to me. They say 'you know best, put in what you think'. And I do. If I think they'll sell more then I just leave more on me own. Or sometimes it'll be a bit slack and I'll knock 'em back a bit. But they don't order, they leave it to me.' It was the customer-driver contact which seemed to be the key to job satisfaction: 'It just depends on how the vanman gets on with his customers. That's half the battle i'n't it? I get on with mine famous. But you'll always get that awkward one with them. I've only one on my round that I don't really care for. I never have any trouble with her like b u t . . . . Well I just walks in, gives her what she wants and walks out.' Another vanman commented on the work : 'Oh, there's a lot of interest in it. You get to know people. There's always something happening. If you go down that street 365 days a year there's always something different. There'll be somebody stood at the door, or there'll be a wedding or a funeral, or somebody's up on the coupon. And that's how it is on the rounds; it's interesting. It's not boring. I don't thing there's another job where the time passes so quickly.' One driver said: 'You're fighting the clock y'see, you're fighting against it all the time. It comes ten o'clock, you've been working three hours and it only seems like five minutes. Inside [the bakery] you're watching the clock and it seems like five hours.' The universal cry of the vanmen was:

124 Cases in Organisational Behaviour 'I'm me own boss. I do my job. Everything runs smoothly. Nobody bothers me and I bother nobody. And that's the way I like it.' 'You're your own boss outside. You've nobody over you all the time. It's a different world from working inside. I've worked inside y'see and the point is there's always somebody there watching.' The vanmen were contented with their conditions of employment and the Northwestern firm. They saw the union as restrictive and superfluous. Despite repeated attempts by local union officials to get them to join, encouraged by the firm, nothing persuaded them to do so. The vanmen were not very willing to answer questions on social class, and tended to claim that they did not really believe in class. Politically they were equally divided between Labour and Conservative. Seventy per cent of the vanmen ran their own cars. Three times as many vanmen as bakers lived in privately owned modern semi-detached houses, as opposed to the traditional rented back-to-back terraced housing.

3.2 Vauxhall Motors Limited1 A Cambridge University research team studied assembly workers who worked in the Luton plant of Vauxhall Motors Limited.2 The findings of their research were derived chiefly from interviews with workers employed in six assembly departments of the Vauxhall plant. The assemblers worked on a number of motorised assembly lines or 'tracks'. The overall task of assembling vehicles was minutely subdivided into a large number of individual job tasks. Each individual assembly job contained few operations in a brief work cycle, and was highly repetitive. The jobs had low skill requirements on the part of the assemblers. The tools and techniques used in assembly-line production were predetermined. The rhythm and speed of the work was mechanically controlled by the pace of the assembly line, which was set by company management. Control was exercised in the first instance by the technology: 'the track is the boss'. By means of the assembly-line methods large numbers of workers were brought together in the Vauxhall plant who differed little in skill-level, rates of pay, status, or prospects of advancement. During work the assemblers were strung out along the length of the track. Their mobility during work was generally restricted to within a few yards of their 'station' on the line. Only rarely was it technically necessary for the men to collaborate directly with each other. Each assembler worked in fairly close proximity to a few other assemblers. Most workers were close enough to others to be able to exchange words fairly easily, but the noise level often made sustained conversation difficult. The researchers took a random sample of the men working in the assembly departments who were Grade 1 assemblers, between the ages of 21 and 46, were married and resident in Luton. There were 127 workers in the original sample. Of these 100 agreed to be interviewed at work. The researchers asked the assemblers in the interview: 'Do you find your present job monotonous?' Sixty-nine answered in the affirmative. In response to further questions, forty-eight assemblers said that they found their present jobs to be physically tiring. Thirty found the pace of the job too fast. The researchers asked: 'In your job, how much do you talk to your workmates? Would you say a good deal, just now and then, or 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by John H. Goldthorpe in the British Journal of Sociology, vol. 17, no. 3 (1966). 2 The data reported in this case were collected as part of a more general study of highincome manual workers.

125

126 Cases in Organisational Behaviour hardly at all ?' Fifty-nine assemblers said that they talked to their workmates 'a good deal', and twenty-nine 'now and then', as against eleven who said 'hardly at all'. One man felt unable to answer in terms of these categories. The assemblers frequently made remarks to the effect that 'If you didn't talk, you'd go stark raving mad'. The researchers asked the assemblers: 'Are there any other shop-floor jobs in Vauxhall which you would rather do than your own ?' Sixty-three answered in the affirmative. Those who answered in this way were then asked: 'What are they?' In response fifty-five assemblers referred to jobs off the track, such as in inspection, maintenance, rectification and testing. 'Why would you prefer those?' asked the researchers. Among the reasons given for favouring such a move, those relating to the content of work were paramount. Jobs off the track were seen as offering more opportunity to exercise skill and responsibility, greater variety and challenge, and more freedom and autonomy. The researchers asked: 'How would you feel if you were moved to another job in the factory more or less like the one you do now but away from the men who work near you? Would you feel very upset, fairly upset, not much bothered, not bothered at all?' Four answered 'very upset', twenty-five answered 'fairly upset', thirty-four said they would be 'not much bothered', and thirty-six 'not bothered at all'. There was one 'don't know'. Those men who talked to their workmates 'a good deal' fell into the latter two categories as much as the other categories. Representative comments from the assemblers were: 'How would I feel about being moved? It wouldn't bother me much. You're here to earn your living.' Another was 'I wouldn't be bothered at all. The job comes first. Work's what I come here to do.' 'How do you get on with your foreman?' asked the researchers. 'Would you say you got on very well, pretty well, not so well, or very badly?' Forty stated that they got on with their foremen 'very well', and fiftyfour 'pretty well'. Five said 'not so well' or 'very badly'. One man gave an indeterminate answer. Very few negative comments in regard to supervision were made throughout the interviews. Of the sixty-six assemblers who said that they got on with their foreman 'very well' or 'pretty well', and who advanced a reason for this, forty-three gave an explanation for this in terms of infrequent contact with their supervisor. Typically, the kind of reason given was that 'the foreman leaves me alone to get on with things', or 'I do my job and he doesn't bother me'. A few men put down their good relationship with their foreman simply to the fact that they hardly ever saw him. Seventeen of these assemblers gave reasons for getting on well with their foreman which referred chiefly to more positive forms of supervisory behaviour. The other reasons given were miscellaneous.

Vauxhall Motors Limited 127 The researchers asked the assemblers, 'How many of the men who work near to you would you call close friends ?' The responses concerning the number of workmates regarded as close friends, and the type of association outside the Vauxhall plant, are tabled in Table 3.2.1. The researchers found little evidence, from their questionnaire responses, to indicate that shopfloor relations between assemblers amounted to anything more than a generally superficial camaraderie. They found no evidence of a high degree of group formation within the assembly departments, or that the majority Table 3.2.1 Number of Workmates Regarded as Close Friends and Type of Association Outside the Plant Number of close friends claimed among Type or 'level' of associationa workmates None One only Two or more 37

42

}

Visiting at home Arranged outings Semi-casual meetingsb Purely casual meetingsc No contact at all Total number of assemblers

21

37

12 6 20 13 12 63

a

Only the highest type or 'level' of association with any close friend is reported and counted in this table. The highest level was assessed in terms of the categories listed in this column. b Defined as meetings at public houses, clubs, sports grounds and other places which both men frequented. c Chance meetings in the street, shops, etc. of assemblers were concerned with group belongingness at work or felt deprived of it. Informal relations on the shop floor tended to be of a largely unorganised and superficial kind. Their main function seemed to the researchers to be that of providing occasional relief from the tedium and tensions of the work in the form of intermittent talking, joking and horseplay. Few men on the line appeared to have a sense of belonging to any recognisable team or other social unit within their departments. The researchers held interviews with eighty-six assemblers from the original sample in their homes, together with their wives. Of the persons with whom the eighty-six assemblers reported that they most often spent their spare time (excluding members of their immediate family), a fifth were workmates or ex-workmates. Nearly a half were friends (other than

128 Cases in Organisational Behaviour kin) made in non-work milieux. Forty-seven of the assemblers stated that they 'had couples round in the evening' on average at least once a month. Of the couples they usually entertained in this way less than one in twelve were reported as including a workmate or ex-workmate of either the assembler or his wife. Nearly a third were other friends apart from kin. In discussing their contact with workmates outside of work, the assemblers Table 3.2.2 Previous Work Experience of Assemblers Majority of previous Occupational category occupations Professional, managerial white collar Self-employed Supervisory, inspectional, minor official and serviceb Skilled manual (apprenticeship or equivalent) Skilled manual (other)c Semi-skilled manual Unskilled manual Unclassifiabled Total number of assemblers

Highest occupational level attained

3 1

1 1

3

27

14 17 39 4 19 100

14 24

}21 100

a b c

Jobs lasting less than one year were not counted. Includes NCOs and shop assistants. For example, unapprenticed mechanics, fitters and maintenance workers; lorry and p.s.v. drivers; skilled miners; painters and decorators. d Because of extreme variety of previous work. often used the phrase 'mates are not friends', even in instances where earlier a workmate friend or friends had been claimed. Whether or not close friends lived near to the respondent was not associated in a statistically significant way with these friends being seen in an arranged manner. Residential proximity did increase the likelihood of semi-casual or casual meetings. Table 3.2.2 tables the previous work experience of the assemblers. After collecting this data the researchers asked the 100 assemblers: 'Did you like any of your other jobs more than the one you have now?' Sixtyone stated that they had, and gave reasons for such preferences which related overwhelmingly to immediate work satisfactions rather than to economic returns. 'How would you say Vauxhall compares with other firms you know of as a firm to work for?' asked the researchers. 'Would you say it was better than most, about average, or worse than most?'

Vauxhall Motors Limited 129 Seventy-four assemblers rated Vauxhall as 'better than most' as a firm to work for. Twenty said it was 'about average'; two that it was 'worse than most'. There were four indeterminate answers. The researchers asked: 'Have you ever thought of leaving your present job at Vauxhall?' Sixty-one had never thought of leaving Vauxhall. Those thirty-nine who had were asked: 'Have you done anything about it-such as looking for a job in the paper?' Eight of them had never thought of this sufficiently seriously to investigate other employment possibilities. Then the researchers asked all the assemblers: 'What is it then that keeps you here [at Vauxhall]?' Seventy-four gave pay as either the sole reason for remaining in their present work, or one reason along with others. Thirtyone stated that the level of pay was the only reason why they remained in their present work. 'Security' was mentioned by twenty-five assemblers as their reason for staying with Vauxhall. Six assemblers said that they stayed with their present employer because they liked the actual work they performed. 'Do you think there are many firms which would give you these advantages?' enquired the researchers. Of the ninety-five who replied, sixtythree of them gave a generally negative answer. Twenty gave a generally affirmative answer. Twelve were uncertain. Of the sixty-three men giving negative answers, twenty-three of them gave pay as their only reason for staying at Vauxhall. Twenty-seven mentioned pay along with other things. Thirteen did not mention pay. For the twenty men giving affirmative answers, the corresponding figures were five, nine and six. Twelve assemblers thought that their present jobs were 'dead safe' in the sense of economic security. Seventy-seven thought that their present jobs were 'fairly safe'. Eleven thought that their jobs were to some extent insecure, or were uncertain. Eighty-two of the assemblers had never been unemployed. Six had been unemployed for a period longer than three months. The researchers put the following question to the assemblers: 'Here are two opposing views about industry generally. I'd like you to tell me which you agree with more. Some people say that a firm is like a football side - because good teamwork means success and is to everyone's advantage. Others say that team work in industry is impossible - because employers and men are really on opposite sides. Which view do you agree with more?' Seventy-seven of the assemblers took the 'teamwork' view. Nineteen took the 'opposite sides' view. Four were undecided. Typical comments made on this were: 'Teamwork means success—success means plenty of work and work is what we want.' 'Management and workers can't work without each other. If you get a man out of line, it's like a broken link in the chain . . . . It does no good in the end.' The comments

130 Cases in Organisational Behaviour typically made by assemblers on this question indicated fairly clearly that, in the eyes of the majority, a co-operative attitude towards management was important to the effective operation of the plant. It would also, in most cases or 'in the long run', turn out to be in their own best interests. The researchers asked: 'Do you think work-study men are more concerned to make things go smoothly for everyone or chiefly to make the worker keep up a fast pace all the time?' Fifty-one of the eighty-four assemblers who expressed an opinion on this question saw work-study engineers as being more concerned with forcing the men to keep up a fast pace of work than with the general smoothness of production operations. These officials were regarded chiefly as agents of management with specifically management interests in mind. 'Do you think the firm could pay you more than it does without damaging its prospects for the future ?' asked the researchers. Eighty assemblers said 'yes'. Fifty-eight gave their reasons for an affirmative answer and referred to the level of profits, and the 'right' of workers to a larger share of these. The arguments advanced for believing that the firm could afford to pay more were often, in the researcher's view, of a reasoned and relatively sophisticated kind. It was clear to the researchers from statistical evidence that the car industry was among the most strike-prone of all British and American industries, and suffered in particular from a high rate of unofficial disputes. At the time of the research study Vauxhall was conspicuous among major car manufacturing firms in Britain for its success in maintaining an almost strike-free record. The researchers found no evidence of any widespread sense of conflict among the assemblers over such issues as deployment, job rights, work rules and discipline. In the researchers' view, Vauxhall management followed a relatively 'tough' policy on a number of these questions. Personnel statistics revealed that absence rates among hourly paid employees in the Vauxhall plant averaged between 4-0 per cent and 4-25 per cent of total hours worked excluding overtime. These rates referred to all hourly paid employees, not just assemblers. In the assembly departments absence allowances ranged from 3 per cent to 5 per cent. The researchers believed this was low for a large-scale manufacturing concern. Foremen generally regarded these figures as adequate, except during exceptional circumstances such as during flu epidemics. Over the period from 1958 to 1962 the quit rate per year ranged from 5-4 per cent to 17-5 per cent, the median figure being 9-7 per cent. Vauxhall had a consistently good accident record compared with the other major car firms.

3.3

British Coal Industries (A)1

Introduction of mechanised equipment into British coal mines in recent decades has brought about substantial changes in the methods of coalgetting. The traditional hand-got methods have been largely replaced by the newer 'longwall' techniques. Recently, however, there has been a search for some modifications to the longwall method which might help to alleviate the problems of low productivity and dissatisfaction among the face-workers. As a part of this search, serious re-examination is being made of not only the current longwall method of coal-getting but also the former 'hand-got' methods. Hand-Got Methods of Coal-Getting Prior to the changes which accompanied mechanisation, it was common practice for two colliers - a hewer and his mate - to make their own contract with the colliery management and to work their own small face with the assistance of a boy 'trammer'. Sometimes this working unit extended its number to seven or eight, when three or four colliers with their attendant trammers would work together. These small groups tended to become isolated from each other even when working in the same series of stalls - the isolation of the group being intensified by the darkness. There was no possibility of continuous supervision from any individual external to this small work group. This type of work organisation placed the responsibility for the complete coal-getting task squarely on the shoulders of a single small face-toface group which experienced the entire cycle of operations. Each collier was an allround workman usually able to substitute for his mate. He had craft-pride and artisan independence. Choices of workmates were made by the men. Workmate teams frequently endured over many years. In circumstances where a man was injured or killed, it was not uncommon for his mate to care for his family. Being able to work their own short faces continuously, these groups could stop at whatever point may have been reached at the end of a shift. The work pace was flexible; when bad conditions were encountered, the 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by E. L. Trist and K. Bamforth in Human Relations, vol. 4, no. 1 (1951) and Doc. no. 506 by E. L. Trist and H. Murray, Tavistock Institute. The case was prepared at the Harvard Business School by Gene W. Dalton under the direction of Paul R. Lawrence.

131

132 Cases in Organisational Behaviour extraction process could proceed unevenly in correspondence with the uneven distribution of these bad conditions. Under good conditions, groups of this kind were able to set their own targets which could be adjusted to the age and stamina of the individuals concerned. To earn a living under hand-got conditions often entailed physical effort of a formidable order and possession of exceptional skill to extract a bare existence from a hard seam with a bad roof. Trammers were commonly identified by scales, called 'buttons', on the bone joints of their backs caused by catching the roof while pushing and holding tubs on and off the 'gates'. Yet anyone who has listened to the talk of older miners who have experienced in their own work-lives the changeover to the longwall cannot fail to be impressed by the mourning for the past together with a feeling of indignation and dismay regarding the present. The Longwall Method With the advent of coal-cutters and mechanical conveyors, the degree of technological complexity of the coal-getting task was raised to a different level. Mechanisation made possible the working of a single long face in place of a series of short faces. In thin seams, short faces increase costs since a large number of gates (see Figure 3.3.1) have to be 'ripped' up several feet above the height of a seam to create haulage and travelling facilities. In coal beds where seams less than 4 feet thick are common, there has been a tendency to make full use of the possibility of working optimally long rather than optimally short faces. The longwall method of coal-getting was developed to meet these conditions. It enabled a pit which contains three or four seams of different thickness, to work its entire coal economically and to develop its layout and organise its production in terms of a single self-consistent plan. In the longwall method, a direct advance is made into the coal on a continuous front, faces of 180-200 yards being typical, though longer faces are not uncommon. The coal-getting is broken down into a standard series of component operations which constitute a coal-getting cycle. An undercut is made along the bottom of the face of the coal-seam. Holes are drilled along the top of the seam. Explosives are placed in the holes and 'shot', loosening the coal. A conveyor is moved in place parallel to the coal face. In the meantime, the gates are advanced to correspond with the advance of the longwall. The loosened coal then is removed (filled) and placed on the conveyor which carries it out to the gates. A medium-size pit with three seams would have twelve to fifteen longwall faces in operation simultaneously. These faces are laid out in districts as

British Coal Industries (A) 133 shown in Figure 3.3.1. Since the longwall method is specially applicable to thin seams, Figure 3.3.1 has been set up in terms of a 3-foot working. The face extends 90 yards on either side of the main gate. The height of the face area - that of the 3-foot seam itself- may be contrasted with the 9 feet and 7 feet to which the main and side gates have been ripped and (A) horizontal section coal longwall face 190 yards

90 yards

air

air gob' (roof collapsed on extracted area) bottom: gate

main gate

'gob' (roof collapsed on extracted area)

top gate

trunk road - main haulage to pit bottom

another district belonging to the same seam

(B) vertical section (at point x in (A) above) •cambers 7 feet

props

side packs

ripping 9 feet •3 feet: 3 feet

floor

roof:

7 feet 90 yards

Figure 3.3.1 Layout of a District, Longwall Method built up as permanent structures with cambers and side-packs. By regulation, props must be placed every 3 feet, and the line of props shown in Figure 3.3.1 (B) is that placed immediately against a coal-face waiting to be filled off. The area marked 'Gob' (to use a term common in mining vernacular) indicates the expanse from which the coal has already been extracted. On this area the roof is left to collapse. Only the tunnels made by the main and side gates, which are used for ventilation and for haulage and travelling, are kept open. These tunnels may sometimes extend for distances of two miles from the pit bottom. In each coal-getting cycle the advance made into the coal is equal to the

134 Cases in Organisational Behaviour depth of the undercut. A cut of 6 feet represents typical practice in a thin seam with a good roof. All equipment has to be moved forward as each cycle contributes to the advance. The detail in the face area is represented in Figure 3.3.2 where the coal is shown cut and waiting for the shot-firer, whose task is the last to be performed before the fillers come on. The combined width of the lanes marked 'new creeping track' and 'new props'drawn o f f i.e. knocked outroof left to sag or collapse

(A) horizontal section

props

3 feet 3 feet

6 feet undercut

(B) vertical section - side elevation bore hole for shot

face

new conveyor track

new creeping track

old conveyor track

old creeping track

'gob'

roof

6 feet undercut 6 inches

3 feet noggings to props keep the weight from bringing undercut to floor

3 feet floor

Figure 3.3.2 Coal Face as Set for Filling Shift conveyor track' equal the depth of 6 feet, from which the coal had been removed by the fillers on the last shift of the previous cycle. As part of the preparation work of the current cycle (before the fillers can come on again), the conveyor has to be moved from its previous position in the 'old conveyor track' to its present position, shown in Figure 3.3.2, in the new conveyor track, against the face. At the same time the two lines of props on either side of the old creeping track are withdrawn (allowing the roof to sag or collapse) and thrown over beside the conveyor for the

British Coal Industries (A) 135 fillers to use in propping up their roof as they get into the next 6 feet of coal. The term 'creeping track' refers to the single, propped, 3-foot lane, adjacent to that occupied by the conveyor but on the side away from the coal. It allows free passage up and down the face, and is called a creeping track since in thin seams the low roof makes it necessary for all locomotion to take the form of creeping, i.e. crawling on the hands and knees. Organisation of the Cycle Group The work is so organised that the component operations follow each other in rigid succession over three shifts of seven and a half hours each, so that a total coal-getting cycle may be completed in each twenty-four hours of the working week. The men are organised into a cycle group of approximately forty men: ten each to the first ('cutting') and second ('ripping') shifts; twenty to the third ('filling') shift. The shot-firer and the shift deputies are responsible to the pit management as a whole. The artisan type of pair, composed of a skilled man and his mate, assisted by one or more labourers, was out of keeping as a model for the type of work group required. Each of the workers belongs to one of seven different job categories: borer, cutter, gummer, belt-breaker, belt-builder, ripper or filler (see Figure 3.3.3 for the functions and relationships of these seven categories). Face workers have usually been trained for only one of the seven job-categories and expect to spend all or most of their underground life in this one occupation. The over-all tasks which must be performed in a cycle fall into four groups, concerned with (a) the preparation of the coal-face for shot-firing, (b) shifting the conveyor, (c) ripping and building up the main and side gates, and (d) moving the shot coal on to the conveyor. The face preparation tasks are all performed on the first shift. They include boring holes for the shot-firer, with pneumatic or electrically operated drills, near the roof of the seam through to the depth of the undercut, at short distances (within each filler's 'lengths') along the entire expanse of face; driving the coal-cutter so that the blade or 'job' makes an even undercut into the coal some 6 inches from the floor to whatever depth has been assigned, again along the entire expanse of face, taking out the 6 inches of coal (called the 'gummings') left in the undercut, so that the main weight of coal can drop and break freely when the shots are fired; placing supporting 'noggings' underneath it so that this weight does not cause it to sag down to the floor while the 'cut' is standing during the next shift. These tasks are performed in order given. Three of the seven work roles are associated with their execution, two men being fully occupied

Shift sequence First (usually called 'cutting' shift). Either night, 8 p.m.-3.30 a.m., or afternoon, 12 noon-7.30 p.m. (borers start an hour earlier). Though alternating between night and afternoon, personnel on the cutting shift are never on days.

Job categories

No. 1 of men

Methods of payment

Occupational Structure in the Longwall System Group organisation

Tasks

Skills

Borer

2

Per hole

Interdependent pair on same note.

Boring holes for shot-firer in each stint to depth of undercut.

Management of electric or pneumatic drills, placing of holes, judgement of roof, hardness of coal, etc.

Cutter

2

Per yard

Interdependent pair on same note, front man and back man.

Operating coal-cutter to achieve even cut at assigned depth the entire length of the face; knocking out (front man), resetting (back man) props as cutter passes. Back man inserts noggings.

Requires rather more 'engineering' skill than other coal-face tasks. Mining skills in keeping cut even under changing conditions, watching roof control.

Gummer

4

Day wage

Loose group attached to cutters, though front man without supervisory authority.

Cleaning out undercut, so that clear space for coal to drop and level floor for filler. The coal between undercut and floor is called 'the gummings'.

Unskilled, heavy manual task, which unless conscientiously done creates difficulties for filler, for when gummings left in, the shot simply blows out and coal is left solid.

Beltbreaker

2

Per yard

Interdependent pair on same note.

Shifting belt-engine and tension-end into face clear of rippers; breaking up conveyor in old track, placing plates, etc., ready in new track, drawing off props in old creeping track; some packing as required.

Belt-breaking is a relatively simple engineering task; engine shifting is awkward and heavy; drawing off and packing involve responsibility for roof control and require solid underground experience.

136 Cases in Organisational Behaviour

Figure 3.3.3

Beltbuilder

2

Per yard

Interdependent pair on same note.

Reassembling conveyor in new track; positioning belt-engine and tension-end in line with this; testing running of reassembled conveyor; placing chocks; packing as required.

As with breaking, the level of engineering skill is relatively simple; inconvenience caused to fillers if belt out of position. The roof control responsibilities demand solid underground experience.

Ripper

8

Cubic measure

Cohesive functionally interrelated group on same note.

To 'rip' 'dirt' out of main and side gates to assigned heights; place cambers and build up roof into a solid, safe and durable structure; pack-up the sides. The ripping team carries out all operations necessary to their task, doing their own boring. The task is a complete job in itself, seen through by the group within the compass of one shift.

This work requires the highest degree of building skill among coal-face tasks. Some very heavy labour is entailed. Since the work is relatively permanent there is much pride of craft. On the ripper depends the safety of all gates and main ways.

Third (usually called 'filling' shift). Either day, 6 a.m.-1.30 p.m., or afternoon, 2 p.m.-9.30 p.m. Never night.

Filler

20

Weight-tonnage on conveyors

Aggregate of individuals with equal 'stints' all on same note; fractionated relationships and much isolation.

The length of the 'stint' is determined by the depth of the cut and the thickness of the seam. Using hand or air pick and shovel, the filler 'throws' the 'shot' coal on to the conveyor until he has cleared his length, i.e. 'filled off'. He props up every 2 ft 6 ins as he works in.

The filler remains in one work place while conditions change. Considerable underground experience is required to cope with bad conditions. Each man is responsible for his own section of roof. Bad work on other shifts makes the task harder. It is heavy in any case and varies in different parts of the wall.

3 shifts

7 job categories

40 men

5 methods

4 types

The common background of 'underground' skill is more important than the task differences.

British Coal Industries (A) 137

Second (usually called the 'ripping' shift). Either night or afternoon alternating with cutting shift. Rippers may start rather later than builders. None of these personnel are on day shift proper.

138 Cases in Organisational Behaviour boring the holes, a further two in managing the coal-cutter, and four in clearing out the undercut. The success of the shots fired at the end of the second shift to make the coal finally ready for the filler depends on the efficiency with which each of these interdependent preparation tasks has been carried out. Bad execution of any one of them diminishes, and may even cancel out, the effect of the shots, with consequent havoc in the lengths of the particular fillers where such breakdowns have occurred. Holes bored too low leave a quantity of coal, difficult to extract, clinging to the roof after the shots have been fired. If the roof is sticky, this gives rise to 'sticky tops'. Holes not bored through to the full depth of the undercut create the condition of 'hard backs', the shots having no effect on this part of the coal. The coal-cutter only too frequently has a tendency to leave the floor and 'get up into the coal', producing an uneven cut. This means less working height for the filler, and also less wages, since his tonnage is reduced. When the gummings are left in, the shot is wasted; the coal has nowhere to drop and the powder blows out of the hole (usually up the 'cutting break' in the roof) so that the mass to be extracted is left solid. Failure to insert noggings, which leads to the cut sagging down, also renders useless the services of the shot-firer. The group of operations concerned with the conveyor involves - since forward movement is blocked by props which must be left standingbreaking up the sections of belt in the old conveyor track and building them up in the new. Each of these tasks requires two men: the belt-breakers and belt-builders. The dismantling part is done on the first shift in the wake of the cutting operation. The reasons for this include the necessity of shifting belt-engines and tension-ends out of the gate areas (where they are positioned when the conveyor is working) in order to allow the ripping operation to proceed. The reassembly of the conveyor is the only task performed in the face area during the second shift. Unless the conveyor is properly jointed, set close to the new face, and accurately sighted in a straight line, a further crop of difficulties arise, and frequent stoppages may interfere with filling. The most modern types of belt, e.g. floor belts, avoid the labour of breaking up and reassembling plates. Belt-engines and tension-ends are cumbersome equipment, but they must nevertheless be shifted every day. Similarly, the last two lines of props have to be taken down and thrown forward. The third group of tasks comprises those that entail ripping up the roof of the main and side gates to the depth of the undercut, and building them with a stable roof and firmly packed sides so that haulage and air-ways can advance with the face. Unless this work is expertly done, the danger of roof falls is acute, with the likelihood of both men and equipment being

British Coal Industries (A) 139 blocked in the face. This work is carried out by a team of seven or eight rippers. Only when all these operations have been completed can the shots be fired and the fillers come on. (The culminating activity of moving the coal on to the conveyor is known as 'filling-off'.) For the filling operation, the entire face is divided up into equal lengths - except that the corner positions are somewhat shorter in view of difficulties created by the proximity of belt-engines and tension-ends. In a 3-foot seam, lengths would be 8-10 yards; and some twenty fillers would be required, ten in each half-face of 90-100 yards. Each filler is required to extract the entire coal from his length, going back to the depth of the 6-foot undercut. When he has thrown his last load on to the conveyor he has 'filled off', i.e. finished his 'length' or 'stint'. As he progresses into his coal, he has the additional task of propping up his roof every 3 feet. As well as a hand-pick and shovel, his tool kit includes an air pick, used for dealing with some of the difficulties created by bad preparation, or in any case when his coal is hard. Isolation and Interdependence of Those Performing the Various Tasks So close is the task interdependence that the system becomes vulnerable from its need for 100 per cent performance. Yet the segmentation of the work cycle makes it difficult for workers to feel responsible for the completion of the total task or even responsible to the workers in the other shifts. As will be seen from the shift timetables (Figure 3.3.3) the three shifts never meet on the job. Moreover, the two preparation groups alternate on the so-called 'back-shifts' while the fillers alternate on 'days' and 'afternoons' so that the fillers never meet the preparation groups even in the outside community. It is upon the work of the cutting team - containing the front and the back man on the cutter and the four gummers - that the filling shift is most dependent. But the cutting team does not exist officially as a group since the cutters are on their own note, responsible for, and paid for, their cutting alone. The gummers are not under their authority, and no one except the deputy can take responsibility for any tendency they may have to leave some or all of the gummings in, as they traverse the face. As they are on day wage, they have nothing to lose unless they go too far - so, at least, the fillers feel on this score. Performing the least skilled task, the gummers are the lowest paid and the lowest prestige group on the face. Their work is arduous, dangerous, dusty and awkward. Hostility in them towards 'the system' or towards other face workers is most easily expressed by leaving in some of the gummings. This is particularly likely under conditions of fatigue and difficulty.

140 Cases in Organisational Behaviour There are, of course, instances where effective leadership is exercised over the gummers by the front man. But it was stressed at the same time that management could hold the cutters responsible only for the cut, and that to exercise detailed supervision was an impossible task for a deputy, especially on 'back shifts' where his territory of responsibility is apt to be more extensive than on day shift. In shift groups where a good spirit of co-operation obtains, the belt-breakers are often willing to help out the gummers. It was suggested that fewer lapses occurred when these interchanges took place. But the pattern of the cutting shift works against such co-operation, consisting, as it does, of four different categories of workers successively traversing the face at their own separately institutionalised component tasks, with no overall goal to bind them together and no functionally defined responsibilities to each other. The borers are off by themselves; and as regards the belt-workers, since breakers and builders are on different shifts, neither can feel the satisfaction of accepting responsibility for the conveyor system as a whole. By contrast, the ripping team is a well-organised primary work group of seven or eight with an intelligible total task for which it carries complete responsibility. Rippers are frequently referred to by others as a 'good crowd' who seldom 'go absent on each other'. Pride of craft is considerable. A main ripper and, usually, individuals of very varying experience compose the group, but it appears to manage its internal relationships without status difficulties. Here, responsible autonomy persists. Unfortunately, like the other face-work groups, the ripping team is a group by itself and there is as a result no transfer of its more stable morale to other groups in the system. Working, as it does, in the main and side gates, it is felt to be a closed group very much apart from the main interaction between the preparation and filling operations carried out in the face itself. In all essential respects the ripping team represents a survival of the hand-got past in the mechanical present. For the gates in which ripping parties of varying sizes operate are, as it were, their own 'stalls', continuously and autonomously worked. All relevant operations are carried out within the group which completes them within the compass of one shift. Rippers have retained intact their total task, their multiple skills, their artisan independence, and their small group organisation. The filler is the modern version of the second collier of the older handgot systems, whose hewer has departed to the cutting shift. While his former mate has acquired a new partner in the back man on the coalcutter, and is serviced by a new group of labourers (gummers), the filler is alone in his stint, the dimensions of which are those of the short face formerly worked in common. The advent of mechanisation has changed

British Coal Industries (A) 141 but little the character of filling, except that the filler has, in his air pick, the assistance of one power-driven tool and, instead of a hand-pushed tub, a mechanically driven conveyor on to which to load his coal. The effect of the introduction of mechanised methods of face preparation and conveying, along with the retention of manual filling, has been not only to isolate the filler from those with whom he formerly shared the coalgetting task as a whole, but to make him one of a large aggregate serviced by the same small group of preparation workers. In place of an actually Succession of shifts

Region of gates

Region of face (180 yards)

borers (2) cutters (2) first gummers (4) breakers (2)

second

third

rippers (8)

builders (2)

fillers (20) each in own length ( 9 yards)

Figure 3.3.4 Position and Locomotion of Successive Groups of Face Workers on the Longwall present partner, who belonged to him solely as the second member of an interdependent pair, he has acquired an 'absent group', whom he must share with nineteen others. The filler is unusually dependent upon the quality of the work done in previous shifts. If a borer fails to drill to the proper depth, the shot-firer's task is no more difficult, but the filler must contend with sticky tops. If gummings are left in, the work of the cutter is not affected, but the mass is left solid for the filler. If the belt-builders do not sight the conveyor in a straight line, the work of the belt-breakers is not changed, but the fillers must contend with frequent stoppages. Difficulties are increased still further by the fact that the concern of this succession of pairs is with the entire 180-200 yards of the face. For them the face is a single continuous region, whereas for the fillers it is differentiated into a series of short adjacent sections. For the individual filler it is the 8-10 yards of his own length. In the corner of this length he usually chalks up his name, but

142 Cases in Organisational Behaviour these chalk marks mean little more than just the name to traversing pairs, to whom individual fillers are personally little known. The pattern of these relationships is shown in Figure 3.3.4. Most of the troubles seem to accumulate on the filling shift. It may be noted that the face is not 'filled off' until each and every length has been cleared, and that until this has been done, the new cycle cannot begin. Disorganisation on the filling shift disorganises the subsequent shifts, and its own disorganisation is often produced by the bad preparation left by these teams. Every time the cycle is stopped, some 200 tons of coal are lost. The closeness of the interdependence of the tasks tends to rebound upon itself. Mistakes and difficulties made or encountered at one stage are carried forward, producing yet other difficulties in the next. The inflexible character of the succession gives no scope for proceeding with later tasks when hold-ups have occurred earlier. The main burden of keeping down the number of cycle stoppages falls on the deputy, who is the only person in the face area with cycle as distinct from task responsibility. In view of the darkness and spread-out character of the work there is no possibility of close supervision. Responsibility for seeing to it that bad work is not done, however bad the working conditions, rests with the face-workers themselves. Management complains of lack of support from their men, accusing them of being concerned only with their fractional tasks and being unwilling to take broader cycle responsibility. Workers complain of being tricked by management who are resented as outsiders. On occasions, the deputy is reduced to bargaining with the men as to whether they will agree to carry out essential bye-work. The Physical Conditions The environment in which the face-workers perform their tasks makes the work even more difficult and uncertain. Some of the most dreaded conditions, such as wet, heat, or dust, are permanent features of the working environment of certain faces. But others, less known outside the industry, may also make the production tasks of the face-worker both difficult and dangerous, even when the seam in which he is working is well ventilated, cool, and dry without being dusty. Rolls or faults may appear in the seam. Control may be lost over the roof for considerable periods. Especially in the middle of a long face, certain types of roof are apt to sag down. Changes may occur in the floor, the condition known as 'rising floor' being not uncommon. Since some of these conditions, described in Figures 3.3.5 and 3.3.6, reduce working heights, their appearance is particularly troublesome in thin seams. If the difference between working in 5 feet 6 inches and 5 feet may be of small account, that between working

British Coal Industries (A) 143 in 3 feet and 2 feet 6 inches may often produce intolerable conditions. Loss of roof-control is serious whatever the working height. In general, bad conditions mean not only additional danger but additional labour. The need to insert packs to support a loose roof is a common example. Special tasks of any kind, over and above the specific production operation for which a given category of face-worker receives his basic pay, are known as 'bye-work'. A large amount of bye-work is usually necessary when unfavourable physical conditions are encountered. Though many bye-work tasks have gained the status of specially remunerated activities, the rates are such that the over-all wage received at the end of a week, during which a good deal of bye-work has been necessary, is less than that which would have been received had the whole of the five shifts been available for production work. From the face-worker's point of view, bad conditions mean not only more danger and harder work but less pay, and they may also compel overtime. To stay behind an hour or sometimes three hours longer under bad conditions may involve a degree of hardship beyond the capacity of many face-workers to endure, especially if they are older, and if overtime demands are repeated in close succession. 'Bad conditions' tend to instigate 'bad work'. When they occur, the smooth sequence of tasks in the production cycle is more likely to be disturbed by faulty performance. Bad work can, and does, arise when conditions are good, from personal shortcomings and social tensions, in themselves independent of bad conditions; but difficulties arising from human failings are more readily - and conveniently - expressed when the additional difficulty, and excuse, of bad conditions is also present. The result is a tendency for circular causal processes of a disruptive character to be touched off. Unless rapidly checked by special measures, often of an emergency character, these, once started, threaten to culminate in the fillers not filling off, and the cycle being stopped. The system is therefore always to some extent working against the threat of its own breakdown, so that tension and anxiety are created. The men who face these unequal conditions are themselves unequal; but the lengths of face they clear are the same. The detailed implications of this situation are set out in Figure 3.3.5 where the differential incidence of some of the most common types of bad conditions and of bad work, in the different lengths of a typical face, is shown in relation to the variations in skill, conscientiousness, and stamina in a typical group of fillers, fractionated into informal sub-groups interspersed with isolates. The local arrival of certain types of bad conditions, such as rolls that move across the face, can be anticipated, so that anxiety piles up. The passage across the face, of a roll that continues for different periods of time in various lengths is shown in Figure 3.3.6. As regards bad work

Figure 3.3.5 Cumulative and Differential Incidence of Bad Conditions and Bad Work in the Filling Shift (This table has been built up as a 'model' of the situation from the experience of a group of face-workers who acted as informants. It relates the effect of bad conditions and bad work, traversing the face unevenly, to the unequal personal and group qualities of the fillers.) x indicates local distribution of difficulty in typical examples of different kinds of bad conditions and bad work. Positions across the face of twenty fillers Types of adverse factor

1

2

Loose roof- roof broken up by weight or natural 'slips' (cracks) making it difficult to support; extra time required for timbering reduces that for filling Faults - sudden changes in slope of seam either up or down, producing bad conditions capable of anticipation, possibly lasting over a considerable period.

X

Rolls - temporary unevenness in floor or roof reducing working height and producing severely cramped conditions in thin seams. As above for anticipation and duration.

X

3

4

5

6

X

X

X

Bad boring - holes bored short so that coal at the back of the undercut is unaffected by shot (hard backs); heavy extraction task with air pick at end of shift, when tired; or holes too low, so that shot leaves coal clinging to roof (sticky tops). Both these conditions tend to occur through naturally hard coal and certain types of roof.

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Roof weight - roof sagging down - especially in middle positions along the face where weight is greatest; not dissimilar to above in effect. Rising floor - from natural bad stone floor, or from the cut having been made into the coal so that the gas in the coal lifts up the floor, or from naturally inferior coal which is left down but which lifts (gas).

7 18

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

x

X

X

X

X

Uneven cut - from the coal cutter having gone up into the coal. This reduces the filler's working height, cf. rolls, and the tonnage on which his wages depend. Also, as with rolls, faults, etc., it means that 3-foot props have to be inserted in 2-foot 6-inches height, which means sinking them in floor (dirting props) as an additional unremunerated task.

X

X

Gummings left in - failure on the part of the gummers to clear coal from undercut so that coal cannot drop and shot is wasted. The result is a solid mass of hard coal, requiring constant use of air pick and back-breaking effort. The amount left in varies.

X

Belt trouble - the belt may not have been set in a straight line, or bad joints may have been made, or it may not have been made tight enough. On top-delivery belts coal going back on the bottom belt very soon stops it. Belt stoppages may produce exceedingly awkward delays, especially if conditions are otherwise bad. Total*

3

Skill**

+

1

-

3

X

X

X

X

X

X

7

5

2

1

-

X

X

X

X

3

2

X

X

1

+

3

-

+

4

2

2

-

2

X

-

-

3 +

a

a

a

1

b

b

I

c

c

c

d

d

I

e

e

e

e

I

f

f

* These numbers simply indicate the fact that several different kinds of things often go wrong in the same length. Severity varies. At one extreme there may be a series of minor nuisances, at the other one major interference. When conditions seriously deteriorate the interaction of factors and effects is such that some degree of disturbance is apt to be felt from most quarters at one or other point along the face. ** Plus or minus ratings have been given for supra- or infra-norm group status on the three attributes of skill, stamina and conscientiousness on the job, which represent the type of judgements of each other that men need to make, and do in fact make. *** Members of the same informal subgroup are indicated by the same letter; I = Isolate.

British Coal Industries (A)

+ +

Conscientiousness* * Subgroup membership***

X

—

+

Stamina**

-

X

145

146 Cases in Organisational Behaviour left by the other shifts, the filler is in the situation of never knowing what he may find, so that anxiety of a second kind arises that tends to produce chronic uncertainty and irritation. There is little doubt that these two circumstances contribute to the widespread incidence of psychosomatic and kindred neurotic disorders among those concerned. A roll is a rapid development in either the roof or the floor temporarily reducing the degree of thickness of the seam.

roof roll

roof

3'

2'6" floor

coal 2 ' 6 " floor roll

A fault is a sudden change in the slope of the seam, up or down.

fault

slope

fault

Shift numbers

Men

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

12

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 2930 3132 33 34 35 36 37 38 3940

9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The shaded portions show the number of shifts during which the roll or fault stays in the length of a particular man.

Figure 3.3.6 The Course of a Roll or Fault Across a Longwall Face Reactions of the Men That the fillers experience a great deal of stress is indicated by widespread instances of neurotic episodes occurring on shift - of men sitting in their lengths in stony silence, attacking their coal in towering rage, or leaving the face in panic. To protect themselves against their dependent isolation, some of the men had formed protective defences. These might be categorised into four types: 1. Some informal small groups had formed in which private arrangements to help each other out are made among neighbours in twos, threes, or fours. However, these arrangements are often undependable and open to manipulation for antisocial and competitive ends. A number of isolates are left over. There is no loyalty felt beyond this small informal group and even these groups are highly susceptible to break-up through internal 'rows'.

British Coal Industries (A) 147 Where the groups do become stable and work well together for long periods of time, they were envied but also criticised for being too close. Isolates, it appears, are either individualists - who 'won't even share timber' - or men with bad reputations, with whom others refuse to work. Amongst these are the unconscientious - who 'won't help out at the end of a shift' and who are frequently absent - and the helpless - who 'cannot learn to look after themselves under bad conditions'. Others, whose stamina is deficient (whether through age, illness, or neurosis) and whose lengths are often uncleared in consequence are dropped from the informal groups. 2. To protect themselves, the fillers have developed a strong individualism involving a great deal of personal secrecy. Among his own shift mates there is competitive intrigue for the better places - middle positions are avoided; from these 'it is a long way to creep' - and for jobs in workings where conditions are good. On some faces, fear of victimisation is rife, particularly in the form of being sent to work in a 'bad place'. Against the deputy, advantage is taken of the scope afforded in the underground situation for petty deception over such matters as time of leaving the pit, or the 'measure that is sent up' (amount of coal filled on to the conveyor). With the deputy, however, men are also prepared to enter into alliance against each other, often for very good reasons - to stop mates from going absent and by so doing throwing more work on to the others. As regards outside groups, practices of bribing members of the other shifts in the hope of getting a 'good deal' in one's own length were mentioned by several informants. Tobacco is taken to the cutter; gummers are stood a pint on Sunday. Nowhere is the mistrust that shift mates have of each other more in evidence than in controversies over bye-work 'slipping off the note'. On what is referred to as the 'big note' is entered all the contract and bye-work done during the week by the shift aggregate. This note is issued to one man called 'the number man' since he is identified by his check-number. In no sense is this individual a representative appointed by his mates. Only rarely is he an informal leader. Customarily he is a 'corner man', whose length adjoins the main gate, i.e. the man most conveniently within reach of the deputy. When asked about bye-work he does not always know what has been done at the far ends of the face and he is under no obligation to stop his own work to find out. But though a number of men will grouse about their pay being short, mentioning this or that item as having 'slipped off the note', very few ever bother to check up. There are men who have worked on a face for three or four years and never once seen their own big note. Yet these are among the more ready to accuse the corner man or the

148 Cases in Organisational Behaviour deputy. The corner man is suspected at least of never forgetting to make the most of his own assignments. To the deputy is ascribed the intention of keeping the costs of his district down. Conspiracy between the two is often alleged. Only when a major rumpus occurs are such suspicions put to the test, but showdowns of this kind are avoided as apt to peter out in spuabbles proving nothing. 3. The third protective device might be called mutual scapegoating. Fillers almost never see those who work on the 'back shifts', and this absence of contact gives full scope for mutual and irresponsible scapegoating. When there is a crisis, and the filling shift is unable to fill off, the 'buck' is passed to the other shifts - or vice versa if disorganisation has occurred elsewhere, It is frequently also passed to the deputy, who is blamed for not finding substitutes, and to repair men, brought in, but too old to stand the pace. For these to pass the buck back to the fillers is fruitless. The individual filler can always exempt himself. Since bad conditions and bad work interact so closely, it is usually difficult to pin blame specifically. Mutual scapegoating is a self-perpetuating system, in which nothing is resolved and no one feels guilty. 4. Absenteeism is the fourth form of defence. For example, one filler, returning from his week's holiday with pay, complained that the first two shifts had 'knocked it all out of him'. The gummings had been left in. His coal was solid. He had had the air-pick on all day. 'I've tried cursing 'em but it's no use, and pleading with 'em but it's no use. I'll take a day off for this.' When conditions on a face deteriorate, especially in ways that are predictable, absenteeism among fillers sometimes piles up to a point where the remainder have to stay down an extra two or three hours in order to clear the face. Should this situation repeat itself for more than a day or two, those coming on shift often meet at the pit-head baths before presenting themselves for work. If less than a certain number arrive, all go home. Since the introduction of the longwall techniques into the pits, production has not met expectations. Despite improved equipment, productivity has remained low. Evidence suggests that a norm of low productivity has developed well below the potential of the men. It has been suggested by some that this norm is an adaptive method of handling the contingencies of the underground situation and the demands of a complicated and rigid work programme. Those in authority have been likewise disturbed by the drift of the face-workers from the pits, despite higher wages and better amenities.

3.4 British Coal Industries (B)

Because of a general concern over certain conditions in the British coal industry (see British Coal Industries (A)) a variety of attempts have been made to find ways to improve these conditions. One such attempt was a research study, sponsored by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, to examine the relation between the form of work organisation and the undesirable conditions. Particular focus was to be given to the interaction between the physical, the technological and the social factors in the mining system. The underground situation at the coal face is characterised by constantly changing physical conditions, and by the impossibility of close supervision. In an effort to find an organisational system which might be more appropriate to the underground situation, the researchers carefully examined the organisation of work-groups under the traditional hand-got system. They found that the traditional system embodied several characteristics which made it particularly appropriate to the underground situation. 1. Acceptance by a single crew of responsibility for the entire cycle of operation. 2. Self-regulation by the whole team and its constituent groups. 3. Adaptability of the work crew to meet a variety of conditions. The longwall system, although it had many advantages over the handgot methods, did not have these characteristics. The researchers were interested in finding some system of organising the work which would embody these characteristics while still making use of the improved equipment currently in use. The Discovery of Composite Patterns of Work Organisation In several mines, the researchers found certain forms of organisation which made use of conveyors but which derived from rather than running counter to the principles of hand-got mining. The patterns of organisation in the mines were called composite systems. In one form of composite system which the researchers encountered in the East Midland Division, the cycle operations were carried out simultaneously, or in close succession, within the compass of a single shift. Three coal-getting shifts were run, therefore, in the twenty-four hours. Faces were single units averaging 100 yards in length. Face-workers were multi-skilled, 149

150 Cases in Organisational Behaviour the total one-shift cycle group consisting of twenty-five or thirty men on a common note. Three such groups shared a face. At two pits visited in north-west Durham it was found that there were certain short conveyor faces, approximately 30-60 yards long, using coal cutters, being worked by a small group of men who shared a common note and carried out all the cycle operations. A group of six to eight men worked the face for one shift, not necessarily completing the whole cycle in this time. Each shift group took up the work at the point at which it had been left by the previous shift, and the men, being multi-skilled, displayed themselves as necessary to the main tasks of cutting, filling, boring, belt-moving or ripping. At yet a third pit, a number of composite shortwalls were seen in which a group of fifteen men sharing a common paynote worked each face over three shifts - five men working on each shift. All operations of the cycle were generally completed well within the limits of one shift and the next cycle was continued by the same men. The men who worked on these composite shortwalls were experienced workers who, by a process of self-selection, 'marrowed' themselves into sets of fifteen. Each group had developed its own method for allocating itself into three sets of five and for rotating shift times every week in accordance with their expressed preferences. Technically, these shortwalls seemed to operate successfully, and several of the social disadvantages of the conventional longwall seemed to be eliminated. However, like the Midlands and two Durham pits, they had certain economic disadvantages. The increased cost of labour needed for winding (transporting) coal on all three shifts and the amount of unproductive gate ripping associated with shortwall working began to get the pit into economic difficulties and a return to conventional longwall working was proposed by management. Among the men in the seam, however, there was a longstanding belief, arising from earlier experiences of difficulty in controlling the roof, that the seam could not be worked with a longwall technology, and moreover, they did not want to return to a system which had tied them to particular shifts and narrow jobs. Out of this background an attempt was made to apply a composite approach to an orthodox three-shift longwall cycle worked by a team of forty-one men. The idea of trying to combine a three-shift cycle with a form of composite organisation was untested as far as the management knew, but while they anticipated certain problems, they felt that these problems could be overcome. In common with other agreements of the same type, the pit's formal agreement for composite longwall conveyor working prescribed on the one hand the technical conditions for the completion of the cycle of operations, and on the other hand the basis .

British Coal Industries (B) 151 and method of payment. No reference was made in this agreement to the methods of organising work, but the inclusion of the word 'composite' in the agreement clearly embodied the established customs in the pit. The continuance of these was not only implicitly assumed, but was in fact induced both by the basis and method of payment and by the experience and attitudes of the men concerned. The way in which the facework groups would organise themselves was partly in line with the traditions of the coalfield and in part subject to an understanding arrived at between management and Lodge during the negotiations, but this understanding was not embodied in the formal agreement. The researchers became interested in this development and as it proceeded they isolated what seemed to them to be the four key aspects of this composite system: The Work Method In accordance with the tradition of composite working which originated in the single place system, the oncoming men on a shift were to take up the work of the cycle from the point at which it had been left by the previous shift group and continue with whatever tasks had next to be done. When the main task of a shift was completed the men were to redeploy to carry on with the next tasks whether they formed a part of the current cycle or commenced a new one. The Workmen In order for this task continuity to be practised, it was necessary for the cycle group to include men who were at least competent under supervision, if not always formally qualified, to undertake the necessary tasks as they arose. It was not essential that all the members of the composite team be completely multi-skilled, but only that as a team they should have sufficient skill resources available on each shift to man the roles likely to arise. The Work Groups The team manning the composite longwall was to be a self-selected group. The cycle group was to accept responsibility for allocating its members to the various jobs that management specified to be filled. In order to regulate the deployment, the team was to develop and operate some system for the rotation of tasks and shifts among team members. Method of Payment As in single place systems, there was to be a common paynote in which all members of the team were to share equally, since all members were regarded as making an equivalent contribution to the completion of the cycle. The paynote was based upon an inclusive basic shift rate covering all work done at the face. The byework items paid for

152 Cases in Organisational Behaviour separately on conventional faces and which had always given rise to so much bargaining and argument with management over amounts due, were to be consolidated into a basic amount which was higher than the minimum shift rate. An incentive bonus was to be added to this as a piece-rate component based upon the amount of coal produced. In the various cycle groups which were formed there was some variation in the way the above-mentioned items were handled. For example, it did not follow that because the total earnings of the group were pooled, equal rates were always paid. This depended on whether the contributions of all were regarded as equal by the men. Nor did it follow that all members of a composite team spent an equal amount of time on each of the shift tasks; so long as each group was capable of a range of deployment so that the roles required by the cycle could always be occupied. In spite of the variations, however, it was held that all the groups were to be essentially similar in that (1) the members of the groups themselves were to have the responsibility for distributing the tasks and shifts among themselves in some way so as to ensure that the cycle would be completed, and (2) control of the interaction between men working on different parts of the cycle, which had been one of the functions of the district and seam officials, was now largely in the hands of the cycle group. There were some who raised some question about the system. It was pointed out that in the conventional longwall system it is in the large group of fillers where the most trouble occurs and also that in the smaller marrow groups of single place systems, men of similar capability sought each other out and consequently the performance of these groups varied widely. It was suggested that if they were merged together the pace might be that of the slowest. However, the majority of the management were optimistic about the anticipated results of the new system.

3.5 British Coal Industries (C)

Early in 1955, a research team sponsored by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to study systems of work organisation in British coal mines, became interested in a new form of organisation developed in a mine in north-west Durham. In order to discover whether contrasting types of face group organisation have any relationship to the level at which production is maintained, it was decided that a comparative study should be made between two longwalls. One of these longwalls was organised along conventional longwall lines, with clearly specified responsibilities for each shift, specialised task roles for face workers, separate payment for the performance of various tasks, and management being primarily responsible for co-ordination and control of cycle group (see British Coal Industries (A)). The other longwall was organised along composite lines, with each shift responsible for task continuity rather than a specific set of tasks, multi-skilled face workers, a common paynote for the entire cycle group, and with responsibility for co-ordination and control being primarily in the hands of the cycle group (see British Coal Industries (B)). Although at different pits, both of these longwalls were situated in the same neighbourhood and both faces were in the same seam, the geological conditions being very much alike. The same cutting technology was used and the haulage systems were similar. The primary task was the same in both cases - the daily production of a production cycle. This primary task was broken up into the familiar sequence of main tasks - cutting, gumming, boring, belt-breaking, belt-building, filling, and ripping. Haulage and pit winding arrangements fixed the relationship of tasks to shifts and the coal had to be filled off at specified times alternating between day and afternoon shifts. No task could be undertaken until the previous task had been finished, and the work done on any main task could be affected to a considerable extent by the way work had been done on previous main tasks. The first comparison was made on the basis of the percentage of worker time spent on non-cycle activity. Ideally, all work done by the face teams is on either main tasks or on subtasks which comprise work essential to the performance of main tasks. In addition, however, there are certain non-productive ancillary tasks to be carried out which arise from stoppages or disorganisation in the progress of the cycle, e.g. unnecessary work 153

154 Cases in Organisational Behaviour created by one group for another by the manner in which they do their own work, or waiting-on because of some technical breakdown. Such non-cycle activities can never be completely eliminated, but the time spent by face-workers on such activities is an index of the extent to which the smooth running of the cycle is disturbed. Table 3.5.1. sets out the proportion of face-time spent on ancillary tasks by the groups on the two longwalls. One quarter of the activity on the conventional longwall was spent on ancillary tasks primarily created by the manner in which previous shifts had carried out their work. For the fillers such ancillary tasks arose from interruptions to their main task Table 3.5.1 Time Spent on Non-cycle Activitiesa Conventional longwall Composite longwall 25 0-5 a Both figures are percentages.

Table 3.5.2 Variety of Work Experience* Aspect of work experience

Conventional longwall

Composite longwall

Main tasks worked at Different shifts worked on Groups worked with

10 20 10

3-6 2-9 5-5

a

Averages for whole team.

caused mainly by conveyor belt breakages and tub shortages. Ancillary work for the gummers very largely resulted from the call made on them to clear off coal left on the face. Work spent on main and sub-tasks accounted for nearly all the time of the composite group and the amount of ancillary work was negligible - half of 1 per cent. Table 3.5.2 summarises the main factors affecting the day-to-day experience of face-work in the two teams. In the composite group there was a good deal of movement between tasks, nearly all the men had a share of all three shifts, and there was much interchange of men between different work groups. Face-work places a good many stresses and strains on the worker, particularly when things are not going well. It has been suggested by some that one way of easing these stresses and strains is to have a change of task shift or work place on the face. It is seldom that all

British Coal Industries (C)

155

groups share the burden of bad conditions equally. When bad conditions were encountered on the conventional longwall, the workers whose work was primarily affected had no relief, but on the composite longwall, there were systematic changes of task in an attempt to share the stress. The researchers felt there was reason to believe that the absence rate was an indication of felt stress and that if the composite form of organisation actually provided less stressful working conditions, this would be reflected in lower absence rates. When they compared the absence rates of the two longwalls they found the absence rates for the composite longwall to be considerably lower (see Table 3.5.3). Table 3.5.3 Absence Rates* Reason for absence

Conventional longwall

Composite longwall

No reason given Sickness and other Accident Total

4-3 8-9 6-8 200

0-4 4-6 3-2 8-2

a

Per cent of possible shifts.

The researchers were also interested in the different effects of the two types of face group organisation on the face and seam management. Initially, both pits had similar management structures. There was a deputy who was responsible for each face district during a shift, an overman who was responsible for all the activities of the several faces in a seam during a shift, and an undermanager who had unified control over the whole cycle of operations. The overman had the role of 'gate-keeper' through whom all communication and interaction having to do with the running of the various faces had to pass. The deputy acted as the overman's agent in the face district. The researchers found that on the conventional longwall a great deal effort on the part of officials at all levels was required to ensure the completion of operations. For example, the deputy spent so much time cajoling and bargaining with the men in all groups on his shift to get the work done satisfactorily that other aspects of his job, especially those having to do with face service and seam liaison, received relatively little attention. Since the deputies and overmen had responsibility for operations only on their shift, unified control over the shift as a whole was not affected below the level of the undermanager. On the composite longwall, on the other hand, the researchers found a

156 Cases in Organisational Behaviour considerable amount of self-regulation and control of the cycle by the team. There was evidence that the men saw it as being to their advantage to see that all the main tasks progressed smoothly and if possible to get ahead of schedule as an insurance that the cycle would be completed. The deputy, with little demand on his time to see that the work was done properly, was able to give more time to anticipating his district's requirements and keeping in touch with other seam officials to ensure that the haulage and other face service needs of his district were optimally satisfied. The effects of this self-regulation by the cycle group on the management of the seam of which the composite longwall was a part - and in which all faces were similarly organised - was that the seam management structure was eventually simplified. One overman was withdrawn; it was found that there was no job for him. Table 3.5.4 State of Cycle Progress at End of Filling Shifta State of cycle progress Conventional longwall

Composite longwall

In advance Normal Lagging All cycles

22 73 5 100

a

0 31 69 100

Per cent of cycles.

The researchers also attempted to measure the effectiveness of the two different longwalls in terms of the maintenance of production. As a way of making this measurement, they made three comparisons. The first was in terms of the progress of cycle operation, the second in terms of the regularity of production, and the third in terms of output per manshift. Table 3.5.4 presents a comparison of the two longwalls in terms of cycle progress. The progress of cycle operations on the conventional longwall tended to be erratic - partly because of the amount of time spent on non-productive ancillary work. While this work was being carried out, the cycle of operations effectively stood still. Also, the best that could be hoped for in the conventional longwall was that main tasks would be up to schedule, that is, completed at the end of the shift. It was impossible for the cycle to be in advance, i.e. for the work of the next shift to be started ahead of schedule, because if a group finished its task before the end of the shift, it could not go on to the next task. That was the preserve of another group. In general, main tasks, especially filling, were not finished at the end of the shift and management had then to take counteractive measures. For example, when filling was not finished the pullers would have to be paid to complete it

British Coal Industries (C) 157 and if necessary reinforcements would have to be sent on to the face. Cycle lag was so usual on the conventional longwall that it required on average about 6 per cent per week of extra labour as reinforcement to the face team. To supply this labour, work on maintenance and development in the seam had to be neglected. On the composite longwall, on the other hand, the cycle usually ran to schedule; it could and often did get ahead of itself. Each shift group went on to the next tasks of the cycle when they finished their own work. Even when there was lag, the face team regulated its pace of work so as to catch Table 3.5.5 Productivity as Per Cent of Estimated Face Potential Conventional longwall Composite longwall 78

95

up, or gain control over the lag by the end of the cycle. In this way the composite longwall maintained itself without any extra labour as reinforcement. As for the regularity of production on the two faces, during the period of observation the conventional longwall, with conditions quite normal, ran for only twelve weeks before it lost a cut, and during these weeks it needed reinforcement to enable it to complete its cycles. The composite longwall, on the other hand, ran for sixty-five weeks before it lost a cut, and never needed any reinforcement. The productivity of the conventional longwall, in terms of output per manshift at the face, was 3-5 tons, and that of the composite longwall was 5-3 tons. As the o.m.s.1 for Durham Division was 2-8 tons and the national average was 3-3 tons, the conventional face was perceived by those concerned as at the norm and the composite face as above it. Because the seam sections were different (the conventional face had 21 inches of coal and 1½ inches of band, the composite 26 inches of coal and 6 inches of band), comparison of face o.m.s. is not possible without adjustment of the figures. Each face was, therefore, assessed against its own estimated potential, i.e. against what it would produce were it completely efficient. On this basis, the conventional longwall, as can be seen in Table 3.5.5, was working at 78 per cent of its potential. The composite longwall, by comparison, was working at 95 per cent of its potential and was clearly functioning at a much higher level that the conventional face. At 100 per cent efficiency 5-6 tons might have been expected from the composite face and 4-5 tons from the conventional. 1

Output per man shift.

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SECTION FOUR

Leadership Inputs: Leadership Style and Managerial Behaviour

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Introduction The central thrust of this section is on the leadership of groups, departments and plants within organisations. Leadership is here defined in the formal (as opposed to the informal) sense. The concerns at issue include the leader's relationship to subordinates, superiors and peers within the context of an organisational structure and organisational behaviour as a whole, and his influence on obtaining at least satisfactory work performance from the people in his unit. In some important senses this section builds upon the knowledge and skills implicated by Section One, Two and Three: motivation, group behaviour and technology offer opportunities as well as constraints within which the formal leader must develop a leadership style which will help produce behaviour functional for organisational objectives. The point of view underlying this section is that the leader is not placed in an organisational situation in which he is virtually perfectly constrained by the many pressures in his immediate working environment. On the contrary, he may take action to influence the forces acting upon him and his people: he can diagnose problems and take steps to remedy them. A number of cases in this section facilitate analysis beyond the diagnostic stage to the prescriptive phase of propounding action proposals. The early cases provide descriptions of leaders at work in a range of organisational settings, attempting to influence different kinds of people in various ways to perform their distinctive tasks effectively. These leaders are not jnly responding to pressures and constraints placed upon them: they are also actively seeking to re-channel pressures and lift or lessen constraints. Their situations, methods, and the results they achieve are open to analysis of the interdependent forces, and prescription of supplementary or alternative leadership action. The Chamberlain Steel Company case presents a study of a small OR project team charged with the preparation of a computer programme. Case data are presented in the form of four instalments or parts, each of which provides information on behaviour during the succeeding time phases of the project. The parts are intended to facilitate prediction of consequent behaviour, in this way to present a test of the student's analytic grasp of likely behaviour in general and leadership behaviour in particular. A rather exhaustive set of prediction questions are provided for this purpose, some or all of which the lecturer may find useful. Each part should be 161

162 Cases in Organisational Behaviour analysed in discussion, and predictions made about likely behavioural outcomes, before the reader proceeds to the next part. The case will lose much of its learning potential if the feedback information offered in a subsequent part is read before the previous part has been analysed, and the associated predictions made. Ernest, Drawn from the Life offers a portrait of a chargehand formally responsible for the performance of assembly sections consisting of women workers. The case poses in embryo form most of the issues fundamental to leadership, and provides the opportunity of a diagnostic-prescriptive tour of the issues in a particular concrete situation. The British Steelworks is a fairly full, paradoxical study of the behaviour of a plant manager in the steel industry. It offers the prospect of discussion of the organisational opportunities and constraints for leadership in the situation, and consideration of supplementary or alternative leadership behaviours which might conceivably be utilised. The last case in the section presents a detailed comparative description of what managers actually do. Information on the tasks and activities of supervisors in a mass production firm are the stuff of Electronics Limited, providing data for comparative discussion in a number of ways. References Bavelas (1) offers an introductory perspective on the traditional and newer ways of viewing leadership. Dubin (2) provides a most useful summary of leadership and productivity, while Katz and Kahn (3) and Lawrence and Seiler (4) furnish alternative statements about the whole area. Tannenbaum and Schmidt (5) present an elementary, well-known discussion of authority and freedom in leadership, Day and Hamblin (6) a more advanced investigation of close supervision. Brayfield and Crockett (7) review the connection between satisfaction and performance. British research by Argyle (8) questions some American findings about worker autonomy. Many disparate findings of research on leadership may be resolved in terms of the contingency model advanced by Fiedler (9). The supervisor's role in the organisation is taken up by Roethlisberger (10), and elaborated by Mann and Dent (11). Dubin (12) admirably summarises research on managerial behaviour in the organisational context. Home and Lupton (13), Dubin and Spray (14) and Thomason (15) report research on the work roles and activities of managers. 1. Alex Bavelas, 'Leadership: Man and Function', Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 4 (1960).

Introduction to Section Four

163

2. Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration, 3rd end (Prentice-Hall, 1968), ch. 19. 3. Daniel Katz and R. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (Wiley, 1966), ch. 11. 4. P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, Organizational Behaviour and Administration, rev. edn (Irwin-Dorsey, 1965), pp. 423-68. 5. Robert Tannenbaum and W. H. Schmidt, 'How to Choose a Leadership Pattern', Harvard Business Review, vol. 36, no. 2 (1958). 6. R. D. Day and R. L. Hamblin, 'Some Effects of Close and Punitive Styles of Supervision', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 69, no. 5 (1964). 7. A. H. Brayfield and W. H. Crockett, 'Employee Attitudes and Employee Performance', Psychological Bulletin, vol. 52, no. 5 (1955). 8. Michael Argyle, Godfrey Gardner and Frank Ciofi, 'The Measurement of Supervisory Methods', Human Relations, vol. 10, no. 4 (1957); 'Supervisory Methods related to Productivity, Absenteeism, and Labour Turnover', Human Relations, vol. 11, no. 1 (1958). 9. F. E. Fiedler, 'Leadership - a New Model', Discovery (April 1965); 'Engineer the Job to Fit the Manager', Harvard Business Review, vol. 43, no. 5 (1965). 10. F. J. Roethlisberger, 'The Foreman: Master and Victim of Double Talk', Harvard Business Review, vol. 43, no. 5 (1965). 11. F. C. Mann and J. K. Dent, 'The Supervisor: Member of Two Organizational Families', Harvard Business Review, vol. 32, no. 6 (1954). 12. Dubin, op. cit., pp. 178-85; 325-7. 13. J. H. Home and Tom Lupton, 'The Work Activities of "Middle" Managers - an Exploratory Study', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 2, no. 1. (1965). 14. Robert Dubin and S. Spray, 'Executive Behaviour and Interaction', Industrial Relations (Berkeley), vol. 3, no. 2 (1964). 15. G. F. Thomason, 'Managerial Work Roles and Relationships - Part F, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 3, no. 3 (1966); 'Managerial Work Roles and Relationships - Part II', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (1967).

4.1 Chamberlain Steel Company1 Part 1 Management of the Delta plant, part of a division of the Chamberlain Steel Company, intended to install a number of furnaces in a melting shop. The furnaces were to be complemented by the appropriate number of cranes needed to service them. Plant management were faced with the problem of predicting how many cranes would be optimal for the servicing task. It was decided to request the company's Department of Operational Research, which was located in a separate departmental building some miles away, to carry out a full-scale simulation of the number of cranes needed. In January John Whyte, a 40-year-old project manager in the OR department, was assigned the responsibility of managing the project. John had worked on OR problems in the British steel industry for some years. At any one time he was usually in charge of four or five projects in varying stages of completion. It was decided that the simulation should be carried out in the computer located in the departmental building, via a new programming language called SOVOL. This language had not been used in the department before; management had a higher than average interest in how the project fared. As assistants for the simulation study, John was assigned the services of three young company employees, Karen Edwards, Dave Styles and Ted Phillips. Karen, Dave and Ted had not met before. All three had been to English grammar schools, and held degrees from redbrick universities. Karen was twenty-three and married. She had worked in the OR department for a few months, and was interested in computer simulation. Before joining the Chamberlain Company she had worked for another large steel firm on statistical activities. Dave Styles was twenty-two and single. He had graduated from university the year before and joined Chamberlain's. He had been in the OR department for a few weeks, and had only a little experience with computers. About the time the project began he decided to return to university the following September to carry out research for a Ph.D. Dave did not, however, announce his intention until he was accepted as a doctoral candidate. 1

Data for this case were provided by two members of the Chamberlain Steel Company.

164

Chamberlain Steel Company 165 Ted Phillips was twenty-five and married. He had worked for Chamberlain's for more than two years. Ted had at one time unsuccessfully requested to be sent for a period to the OR department. He was released from his regular work-study duties at the Delta plant for the duration of the project, in order to provide basic data and expertise on melting shop operations. He had taken part in an earlier, inconclusive plant study of the number of cranes required at the melting shop. Ted had no experience with computers. On appointment to the project he was instructed to keep Delta plant management well informed about its progress. He continued to receive his salary from the plant. Ted's salary was £100 higher than Dave's, and £200 more than Karen's. The normal OR department procedure, when inexperienced assistants began work on a project, was for the project manager to give a strong lead in constructing a rough model of the process to be investigated. He would then largely hand it over to his assistants for refinements and detailed expression in computer language. But John decided that assistants working on the Delta project should learn model building in a computer language much more on their own - by trial and error and 'sitting next to Nellie' than was usual. As the assistants reported for duty to John, he gave each of them a SOVOL manual, and asked them to work through it to build a working understanding of the language. Karen started learning SOVOL about a fortnight before Ted arrived at the OR department. Dave joined Karen and Ted a couple of weeks later. After reporting for duty to John, Dave's first action was to take a SOVOL manual, and disappear back to the room from which he had come. He returned when John went to see him some days later. After an initial briefing lasting a day or two, John spent a few minutes each day with the assistants, and usually twice a week called them to his room for discussion. After this initial contact during the first weeks of the project, John left the assistants largely to their own devices to build a simulation model of the melting shop, expressed in SOVOL. The assistants worked together, mostly in the same project room, until the middle of the year. The room was simply furnished, and contained about half a dozen desks and chairs. Karen, Ted and Dave made periodic visits to another part of the building, to test their programme in the department's computer. They shared the project room with three or four other members of the department, including two girl programmers, who were preparing the compiler for SOVOL. The programmers worked in the room until June. Hours of work in the department were nominally nine tofive.There were few work rules; the atmosphere was free and easy. Project assistants were relatively free to set their own work pace. Departmental management

166 Cases in Organisational Behaviour normally rewarded competent job performance, on an individual basis, by giving an annual increase in salary. Poor performance was penalised by withholding salary increments. There was a lot of coming and going in the department. Project managers regularly went out to company plants to discuss projects; the computer was often operated late into the night, early in the morning, and sometimes round the clock. People who had worked together the previous night might not begin work until 10 a.m. or 11 a.m. the following morning. In the department coffee and tea breaks were taken wherever personnel were working. At lunchtime all the project assistants, programmers and typists ate together in pleasant surroundings in one small lunch-room inside the building. The lunch-room catered for about two dozen people. Project managers had a small dining-room of their own. Predictions - Part 1 From what I know about the simulation project I predict that: 1. Relationships between the three project assistants will be (close-knit) (neutral) (hostile). Explain the reasons for your prediction. 2. The work output of the project assistants will usually (exceed management's expectations) (meet management's expectations) (fall below management's expectations). Explain why. 3. The quality of the work carried out by the project assistants will usually be of (high) (medium) (sometimes high, sometimes low) (low quality). Explain why. 4. The level of individual (work) (social) satisfaction of the project assistants will be (high) (medium) (low). Explain why. 5. Ted Phillips will keep Delta plant management (well) (poorly) informed about the status of the project. Explain why. 6. Relationships between the project assistants and programmers and computer operators will be (close-knit) (mixed - some friendly, some not) (neutral) (hostile). Explain why. Part 2 For the first few days Karen drew on her limited knowledge to help Ted develop an understanding of computer simulation. Together they played about with various simulations, in an attempt to build some familiarity with simulation models, and the use of SOVOL. Then they started trying to design rough models of the melting shop system, preliminary to writing a programme for the computer. By the time Dave joined them in the project room during the third week, they had solved many of the initial problems.

Chamberlain Steel Company 167 Karen and Ted were at first annoyed with Dave for not joining them at the first opportunity. They felt overloaded by the many problems they were finding in the project; any assistance was welcome. But their resentment did not last long. As time went by Dave became interested in the project, and the three assistants worked closely together in tackling the many problems it posed for them. They spent about four months unsuccessfully trying to perfect a programme, which the computer monotonously rejected. When this happened the project team would return to their room to find the faults in it. As well as the errors which resulted from their lack of skill, an additional source of problems arose from the general lack of expertise among the department's personnel in the use of SOVOL. During the project many problems cropped up which were unlikely to occur again. The group felt that their progress was slower than it should have been, because they were to a great extent self-instructed. Within the project team, no one was accorded deference because of greater seniority or assumed superior technical skills. Each assistant was obliged to justify his or her assertions about the best way to solve each problem as it occurred, by detailed and systematic argument and persuasion of the other two. As the weeks and months went by the group became absorbed in trying to perfect a simulation they would find satisfying - not necessarily one that represented a workable solution to the problem they had been appointed to solve. They came to regard the project as their own personal property, in which they had a vested interest. They became techniqueoriented, rather than problem-oriented. Becoming successively more and more deeply involved in the simulation project, Ted maintained steadily poorer contact with Delta plant management. Karen, Ted and - after an apathetic beginning - Dave enjoyed working on the project, which they found intrinsically interesting and challenging. Karen and Ted believed the project was likely to be useful for career reasons as well. The three assistants enjoyed working together. Because the computer demanded a logically perfect, error-free programme, it was a constant source of challenge and tension to the group. From time to time Dave acted the clown and 'larked about a bit', relieving the tension and strain when the group were experiencing difficulties. The team felt that Karen was their most adept and elegant programmer, while Dave excelled in solving the logical problems which arose. Ted provided a measure of determined leadership of the group, especially in the latter months of the project. In the early phase the project group's work pace was leisurely. In the project room a few hours were usually spent each day in chatting about

168 Cases in Organisational Behaviour matters not directly connected with the job at hand. Discussion in the room was often general, including all the people present. The two programmers were often as interested in the problems that Karen, Dave and Ted were trying to solve, as were the project assistants themselves. In the room conversations about matters not directly related to the project diminished as it continued, and the group became more and more absorbed in the technical problems involved in it. During the many periods when they awaited their turn to run their programme on the department's computer, the three would often drink coffee with the programmers and operators, and exchange comments and jokes about all sorts of topics. In the lunch-room everyone talked freely to everyone else. The three assistants often sat together, but by no means invariably. Post-Prediction Analysis Refer to your predictions at the end of Part 1. How closely to they match the information given above? Do inaccuracies in your predictions reflect inadequate analysis? If so, explain the analytical failure. If not, what additional information would you have needed in Part 1 to improve your predictive accuracy, and how would you have used that information ? Part 3 By May John Whyte was becoming increasingly concerned that the simulation programme still showed no sign of running successfully in the computer. In an effort to bring about a successful conclusion to the project, John began to check with the project group much more frequently about the problems holding them up, and to make suggestions about how they might get over them. John found that the team's model was in his view too big, unwieldy, uneconomical and inelegant as a programme. It took nearly three-quarters of an hour of computer time to simulate one week's melting shop operations. Drawing on his programming experience and fluency in computer languages John made a number of suggestions about how the group could preserve the essential accuracy of their simulation, while doing away with much of the detail of the existing programme. Taken together, these suggestions would cut the computer time required to run the programme by about two-thirds. Predictions - Part 3 1. John Whyte's suggestions will be (favourably) (neutrally) (unfavourably)

Chamberlain Steel Company 169 regarded by the project assistants. Explain the reasons for your predictions. 2. The assistants will react in a (uniform) (differentiated) way to John's suggestions. Explain why. Part 4 The project group felt that John had provided almost no assistance in training them or helping them to develop the simulation model. They resented what they regarded as his interference in their project. They developed the habit of stopping what they were doing when John came into the project room. They would listen, apparently attentively, to what he had to say. After he left they would carry on working on their programme as though nothing had happened. The assistants were proud that they had successfully and jointly overcome many intractable problems to develop a programme which they believed to be at the point where it would provide the results required. They claimed that, although the abbreviated model John kept suggesting would be much faster, this did not really matter much - provided they could have abundant computer time. During this period, time on the department's computer was not at a premium; it was possible to run programmes for four or five hours at night. Ted and Dave in particular became determined not to abandon the model their project group had formulated. After a while Karen felt obliged to try to develop John's amended model when John was around the project room; she helped Ted and Dave to work on the group's original model when he was not. The group's decision to persist with the model involved them in a lot of night and evening work during late May and early June, as they worked furiously to make their programme run successfully in the computer. For nearly a fortnight they worked weekdays from 10 a.m. to 1 a.m. and during weekends. Post-Prediction Analysis Refer to your predictions at the end of Part 3. How closely do they match the information given above? Do inaccuracies in your predictions reflect inadequate analysis? If so, explain the analytical failure. If not, what additional information would you have needed in Part 3 to improve your predictive accuracy, and how would you have used that information ?

4.2 Ernest, Drawn from the Life1 Ernest is a little man with glasses and a long face and a busy manner. You would take him for a bookie or a barber if you met him in the street. You would never think that he was a cog in a great industrial machine, but he is, and a very smooth running one. Ernest is a chargehand in a big firm. He works in a cluttered noisy shop, looking after a couple of sections on one of the assembly floors. They are sub-assemblies, a bit messy, with little machines, and not very accurate piece-work values. The operation times aren't balanced, so that it's batch production mainly, not a flow line. There are boxes of components in various stages of asembly stacked around the benches. The girls on the line are mainly part-timers, local housewives doing a morning or afternoon job to boost the housekeeping money or pay for the new living-room carpet. The one or two full-timers are younger, only just married with no kids yet. They've all been there some time because Ernest keeps his girls! He hasn't lost one, apart from pregnancy or the old man moving jobs, in all the four years he's had the section. Ask Frank, his foreman, about Ernest and he will tell you: 'Ernest is a good lad. He gets his production out regularly each week. [In fact he hasn't dropped below target in a single week in the last fifteen months.] He handles his girls well and tells them what to do.' Ask Elsie, or Freda, or Madge on his section and they laugh and say, 'He's all right. He gets the whip out every now and then, but we know he doesn't mean it. We can handle him.' It's all said jokingly, in a very friendly way. Watch the section at the end of tea-break. All the girls are sitting chatting, smoking or reading their stars. The bell goes for the end of the break and there is a desultory movement back to work. Ernest appears round the corner from his other section, throws up his hands in mock horror and roars 'Back to work you lazy lot! Let's have you!' To cries of 'Slave driver!', 'Where's your whip?', groans and much mirth, the section settles down for the rest of the morning's work. The girls are always willing to help Ernest out. When one of the morning girls is away on holiday, Nora, who normally comes to work only in the afternoons, volunteers to do mornings too, 'To help Ernie out' as she says. 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by A. R. H. in 'Bulletin', Spring 1971, London, National Institute of Industrial Psychology.

170

Ernest, Drawn from the Life

171

That's quite a common phrase on this section; they cover jobs when people are away sick; they go and fetch their own stock of material instead of waiting for Ernest to get it; they make an effort to keep up with the production targets: 'If we have a bad day Ernie knows we will make it up the next.' Ask Ernest how he gets such a happy, close-knit group, and he just says 'Oh, they're a good bunch of girls. I just have to tell them to stop chatting now and then and get on with it, but they don't mind. I suppose I'm lucky. I've always been able to get on with people. If you have a bit of a laugh and a joke now and then they're much easier to work with.' This attitude is present all through the section. It is a real group. They help each other a lot: Ann tells Nora, who's on a different job this morning from her usual afternoon job, that she is putting the clips on back to front and shows her how to do it properly; Elsie nips off to collect some components and brings back some for Madge too. They all chat together, and they all say how much they enjoy their work: 'I really like my job.' 'It's the first job I have really enjoyed doing.' So how is it that Ernest has such co-operation from his section, such high morale, and such good production figures too? You can get some idea if you watch him train a girl on a new job. He sits down and does a few components slowly, explaining step by step and pointing out the important things to look for. Then he lets the girl have a go, talking her through a few before strolling off to another part of the section to deal with something else. But watch him closely and you will see that he is keeping an eye on the girl and as soon as she really gets stuck he wanders back over and puts her right. He stays around unobtrusively working on something else until she has done a few off correctly before going about his business. This is typical of his whole approach. As Kathy says, 'I like the way Ernie trains you. He doesn't stand over you all the time.' That is true of all parts of their work. He doesn't fuss over them or pester them; he gives them responsibility. Take the allocation of jobs. There is one operation which is only done for a few hours a day to keep up the supply of components. Ernest leaves it to the girls to decide who is going to do it and when. In the afternoon, when the section runs with half its complement, and the girls have to do several jobs, they decide how to divide their time between them and who is going to help out who, to keep the section going. It's not only the responsibility of deciding who does what job that they enjoy; it is also the variety: 'It helps to relieve the monotony of one job.' 'It makes such a nice change.' Ernest encourages this swapping of jobs: 'I take them off their jobs every now and then and give them a couple of days on a new one to learn it. You can tell after a day if they're going

172 Cases in Organisational Behaviour to be any good, and it helps the flexibility of the section, and anyway it gives them a nice change.' Another thing about Ernest, he is very fair over their money. If they have helped him out by doing a new job or filling in for someone who's away, he makes sure they don't lose out on the piece work. 'There's one thing about women, they are happy as long as they get their wages. You can't let them fluctuate too much - five or ten bob a week is O.K. but no more. So if I see they've worked their hardest on a job but haven't been able to make their normal piece work, I let them book the odd few components extra, because I think they should get their money. Anyway it all gets evened out in the production.' He smooths out the section's daily production too: 'If we have a good day I keep the odd box back in the corner to tide us over a bad patch. It saves them [the foremen] coming down on me like a ton of bricks, and it keeps them happy.' Ernest was away the other week . . . The section achieved their production target just the same. They told Ernest when he got back that they didn't really need him, except that he was such a nice fellow.

4.3 The British Steelworks1

A university researcher decided to carry out a research study in a British steelworks, paying particular attention to the organisation and behaviour of the men working in the melting shop, one of the major departments in the steelworks. The researcher first interviewed a one-in-five sample of the labour force in all four major departments of the steelworks: melting shop, rolling mills, finishing department and barmill. He began the interview with an explanation of the confidential nature of the research project, its university auspices and long-term research aims. After this explanation Table 4.3.1 Job Satisfaction of Employees in Four Main Departmentsa Per cent satisfied Number of employees with their jobs Department interviewed Melting shop Rolling mills Finishing department Barmili a

90 71 68 53

30 28 19 17

This data was derived from the interviews with the one-in-five sample of the labour force in the four departments, selected by the random stratified sampling method.

the researcher asked the interviewee to mention any factors which contributed to his liking or disliking his job. Finally, the researcher made use of a uniform schedule of questions on specific aspects of the steelworks' social and technical environment. The researcher expected that in this open-ended way he would spontaneously obtain information on what the employee considered to be important in his work environment. There were three questions especially on job satisfaction in the schedule of questions used by the researcher during the interview. One was intended to elicit from the employee a self-assessment of overall job satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The second required the interviewee to talk about favourable or unfavourable characteristics of the job itself. The third asked for more general opinions on the company which owned the steelworks, as well as on the working environment. 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by J. K. Chadwick-Jones in the Journal of Management Studies, vol. 2, no. 3 (1965).

173

174 Cases in Organisational Behaviour After holding the interviews the researcher summated the interview comments to make possible the calculation of percentages of favourable to unfavourable comments, which he used to produce an index of job satisfaction. Table 4.3.1 summarises interview data concerning the job satisfaction of the employees who worked in the four main departments of Table 4.3.2 Job Satisfaction Indices for Four Departmentsa Number of Number of Department dislikes likes

Likes as a percentage of likes and dislikes

Melting shop Rolling mills Finishing department Barmill

66 63 51 42

a

33 29 27 28

64 49 28 20

This data was derived from the interviews with the one-in-five sample of the labour force in the four departments, selected by the random stratified sampling method.

Table 4.3.3 Influences Contributing to Job Satisfaction as Perceived by Melting Shop Employeesa Percentage of employees referring to it Job satisfaction factor Management Work group Intrinsic job characteristics Freedom in working methods a

43 36 33 23

This data was derived from the interviews with the one-in-five sample of the labour force in the melting shop, selected by the random stratified sampling method.

the steel plant covered by the interviews. Table 4.3.2 shows job satisfaction indices of favourable and unfavourable opinions for each of the four departments. The major influences contributing to the job satisfaction of the sample melting shop employees, as spontaneously perceived by them, are shown in Table 4.3.3. Thirty per cent of the melting shop interview sample made references to the works manager, Mr R. F. Burnham, when asked to talk about the job itself. One employee commented that he felt that he worked for 'a good company . . . a good team . . . and a good manager. He explains to you and you try and follow his ideas and you find out he is quite in

The British Steelworks 175 order though. Mr Burnham has organised the place and undoubtedly been a big lift-up to this firm and increased our pay-packets.' Later in the interview the men were asked to express their opinion on whatever aspect of melting shop management they felt to be important. The responses were uniformly favourable. Over half the men made comments referring to the quality of the relationship between the works manager and his subordinates. Most of these comments concerned Mr Burnham's approachability, friendliness, and willingness to help and explain: 'He will always listen to what you want to say . . . [gives an example]. I had quite a satisfactory answer for Mr Burnham and everything was put right for me.' Another said 'He is very, very fair. If, on the other hand, Mr Burnham finds a man is not pulling his weight, well, he's got no room for him. I often think of a remark Mr Burnham made about two years after he had been here"Whatever steelworks you go to, anything can happen in a steelworks" - a good manager will believe that but when you get a manager who says "It shouldn't have happened", that's no good.' A third of the respondents described the technical efficiency and production achievements of the steelworks under Mr Burnham's leadership. The steelworks output figures showed an average annual increase of 44 per cent over the eight years after the arrival of Mr Burnham, in relation to the average figure for the eight years immediately preceding. Some mentioned the increase in output since Mr Burnham's appointment to the steelworks: 'I don't see eye to eye with him on everything but to me he is a good organiser. It is practically the same here now as before and all it wanted was to be organised. Indubitably by his being energetic and a good organiser we have increased the shop tonnage and our pay-packets.' Mr Burnham's behaviour, as perceived by his subordinates, involved being friendly, making himself accessible, and giving prompt attention to complaints. He was willing to listen, to take an interest in the men, was willing to give an explanation and 'appreciates what you do'. Perceptions of his technical efficiency were closely related to the improvements which were achieved because he was 'a good organiser'. After gathering data by means of the interviews, the researcher began to study the social context of the steelworks by continuing with a period of observation. About 470 men worked in the steel plant, of whom 150 were employed in the melting shop. Two-thirds of the melting shop workers were concerned with the preparation of furnaces and moulds and the operation of melting processes. The remainder were employed in maintenance, general labouring or machine-loading and charging the furnaces. The furnace is the boss' was a comment of one senior operative which

176 Cases in Organisational Behaviour expressed the view that in the steelworks production limits were set by the technical environment. The Teemer and I have absolute control of the ladle. If you are sitting down no foreman dreams of asking you why. The boss of our job is the demands of the furnace.' By collecting further information on the frequency and quality of the interaction between Mr Burnham and his subordinates, the researcher thought that he could learn something of the conditions for the build-up of the positive attitudes expressed by the employees towards the steelworks leadership, and whether any consistent pattern could be discovered. For a year the researcher made observations of Mr Burnham's leadership behaviour. During the first three months he made daily visits to the plant. For the remainder of the period he visited the department at least once each week. He also conducted a series of interviews with Mr Burnham. His survey of the memoranda from Mr Burnham to the directorate of the company revealed that the works manager undertook a great deal of prediction of stock requirements and rates of production, sometimes several months in advance for furnace repairs and rebuilds. Mr Burnham nevertheless felt that he did not do '. . . as much planning as I'd like to because of the foot-slogging - I've got to do a tremendous amount of contacting.' There were few routine activities in Mr Burnham's working day. But he did perform a routine check of two report books: the furnace tapping diary, which largely contained technical data, and the general report book for each shift. He carried out these checks, he said, 'because the keeping of statistics in itself keeps men on their toes'. He also made a routine weekly visit to the company managing director's office to provide a summary on stocks and furnace yields for the week. The relationship between Mr Burnham and his superior was an easy one: the works manager might call over at the managing director's office 'if there's anything unusual, otherwise he leaves the running of the plant to me. But I'm in constant contact with him.' The researcher attempted to discover patterns in Mr Burnham's behaviour in relation to his subordinates. It soon became clear that Mr Burnham spent most of his time out of his office around the plant. It was not possible to predict in what part of the plant he was likely to be at any given time. The researcher found it sometimes necessary to visit several sections of the plant before he could find Mr Burnham. It often happened that a search over the four furnace stages in the steelworks might reveal that Mr Burnham had been present, and had spoken to operatives at each one at some time during the morning or afternoon. The researcher gained the initial impression of a very high level of activity and of a great deal of interaction on the part of Mr Burnham with his subordinates.

The British Steelworks 111 The researcher examined Mr Burnham's own view of what he did. In several interviews with the researcher Mr Burnham talked about his avoidance of routine patterns in his steelworks visits, which he deliberately varied. He felt that his written work was 'negligible', and that 'the major part of the time' was spent 'prowling'. The researcher made a closer examination to determine what 'prowling' signified. In further interviewing Mr Burnham talked at length about his reasons for continually visiting and talking to his subordinates. It was clear that the men were not allowed by Mr Burnham to do their jobs in their own way. Having established this definition of his policy, Mr Burnham made the attempt, through frequent contacts, to influence the opinions and work performance of steel works employees. This was a conscious effort on his part. To the question: 'What is the most important part of your job?' Mr Burnham replied: 'You must have a very good idea of what you want and the men must be "propaganda'd", particularly in this works - there have been traditions and old standards set in the shop which haven't been good enough . . . chatting to key men on the job, repeating things to them ad nauseam, hoping to get them to come along with me, in their thoughts.' From the evidence of stability and homogeneity of the steelworks employees the researcher inferred that group behaviour was well developed, with firmly established behavioural norms or standards regulating the behaviour of its members. The framework from which the group behaviour had developed was the shared-activity pattern provided by the technology of the steel works. The interpersonal norms in the steelworks, discovered by the researcher partly by conversation with employees and partly by observation of behaviour, were mutual help and supportiveness in work teams. The steelworkers also valued individual craftsmanship. The researcher had conducted previous studies in steelworks. In Mr Burnham's steelworks he found that 'rational' discipline was absent. In the researcher's opinion this was characteristic of the traditional steel industry. This was expressed, for example, in the custom of 'finishing the shift before time', or 'leaving early for a pint'. It was accepted that there should be 'time to talk during the work shift'. An occasional day's absence was tolerated as customary behaviour. Over a long period a tolerance of untidy and 'dirty' furnaces and of inefficient work practice had developed. The supervisory staff had been expected 'not to interfere too much'. One supervisor commented: 'You've got to turn your back on a lot, otherwise you'd always be in trouble.' Autonomy as a value of the steelworkers emerged in the researcher's interviews with employees, and in Mr Burnham's comments on steelworkers in the company as '. . . individualistic - each one wants to be his own little general manager.'

178 Cases in Organisational Behaviour In evaluating his subordinates Mr Burnham differentiated between individuals quite easily. He provided the researcher with ratings for each of the thirty melting shop men in the interview sample. In rating them on a simple three-point scale of their work capacity, Mr Burnham rated ten of them as 'very satisfactory', sixteen as 'satisfactory' and four as 'not satisfactory'. When he rated them on their general behaviour six of the 'satisfactory' subordinates emerged as 'capable but unreliable', or 'most disappointing'. One of the 'very satisfactory' group he rated similarly as 'can be disappointing - has to be directed on to essential jobs.' When the ratings of each individual were being discussed by Mr Burnham with the researcher, Mr Burnham began describing some as 'old school' employees, some as 'new school'. Mr Burnham applied the latter distinction to those employees who were 'following his ideas'. He used the former expression to refer to those who still held to ideas or behaviour established before his arrival at the plant, and which he was attempting to change. In this way it became clear to the researcher that a factor of importance in the leadership pattern in the steel plant was the deliberate attempt to change work methods and prevailing ideas of subordinates. In refusing to accept some of the established behavioural norms of the steelworkers Mr Burnham was, as works manager, attempting with partial success to change them. Many of the norms of the steelworkers had been attacked in turn by Mr Burnham, who described employees' expectations of non-interference from supervisors and senior operatives in the following terms: 'Another thing I noticed was the shocking diffidence of the first hands. They should have been small ships' captains and instead they were labourers - afraid to make straightforward demands from the people working the furnaces, and this hasn't been entirely eradicated, although they're fairly well indoctrinated. It's been a war of propaganda more than anything else, daily talking with them - men of all levels.' Mr Burnham's 'propaganda' aimed at 'bolstering' the senior hands, telling them 'how important they are' and 'imparting the desire to push on for outputs'. Mr Burnham also endeavoured to change work methods as, for example, in raising standards of cleanliness in the preparation of furnaces and moulds. Mr Burnham described a particular incident as follows: 'Knowing that the men had no experience of this sort of practice and knowing that they knew very little about the various safety precautions that would be necessary, I had a meeting of all the first hands and one or two senior hands. I told them how dangerous the situation was and that we would do everything in our power to avoid shutdowns. But I told them

The British Steelworks 179 J had an idea and that this time in particular I wanted blind following from them and didn't want any of their viewpoints and I was very blunt about it. They could see from that how critical things werq because in the past I'd always asked them what they thought about this move, that move, or the other.' 'We talked about the new technique and they went away quite satisfied and prepared to put it into operation.' Mr Burnham encountered resistance to the introduction of efficiency values from the directorate of the company. At the time of the research study efficiency values had by no means been accepted, even in steelworks management ranks. Mr Burnham was not involved in kinship or community ties which influenced other sections of steelworks management. The researcher believed that the 'extended family' might have had an influence on several major management appointments, as well as on senior supervisory and clerical posts. Mr Burnham recalled to the researcher how he had told 'three men they were "out" for leaving early', only to have them reinstated through the intercession of their wives with the wives of other members of management. Mr Burnham's action was evidently considered to be not so much a measure taken against individuals, but as a contravention of the group code. It had been customary practice in the steelworks to make promotions to the positions of sample passer or supervisor on the basis of seniority alone. Mr Burnham broke away from this with his most recent appointment, against the opposition of union representatives. There was evidence of much greater resistance to Mr Burnham's leadership on the part of his subordinates some time before the present research study. This had come to a head in the confrontation of Mr Burnham and the 'natural' leader of the subordinate group. Mr Burnham commented: 'I had to "take him down" in front of the men, the only time I've had to do that, I had to be quite ruthless.' Mr Burnham won respect from the men partly on the grounds of ascribed qualifications, partly because he had proved the soundness of his knowledge and of his methods in improved techniques and output. One of the employees interviewed by the researcher described how 'At the beginning Mr Burnham found the men "tapping" [a furnace] a certain way and he said: "There's a much easier way than that." They turned round as if to say "If you can think of a better way, do it yourself". He took off his coat and got down to it and in a very few seconds it was done. They were amazed.' The works manager's subordinates did not perceive his leadership as restrictive. Employees interviewed by the researcher said that 'If you're put to do a job here no one stands over you', and 'You are not bothered, like being stood over'. Mr Burnham claimed that he did 'stand over' the

180 Cases in Organisational Behaviour men, although he pointed out at the same time that it was necessary to 'stand over them, and be pally'. The researcher inferred that Mr Burnham's presence was seen as 'taking an interest' or being supportive. Mr Burnham commented: 'I try not to worry them - a worried man is not a bit of good, they're very easily demoralised but very easily strengthened as well and I can do a lot when I go amongst them when things are going badly.' Mr Burnham did not interfere with norms governing the interpersonal relations of the steelworkers or the expectation that there should be 'freedom' in carrying out the job. Mr Burnham exercised a form of persuasive leadership that had assumed subtle forms. He maintained a close and easy relationship with his subordinates. One interviewee commented: 'If any man couldn't be friendly with him, there was something wrong with that man.' Mr Burnham said that he 'can put words into their [subordinates] mouths': 'I will make the decision but I'll make them feel they are involved in the making of the decision.' Acceptance of Mr Burnham's prescriptions for behaviour was limited by the existence of the behavioural norms established among the steelworkers before his appointment - the 'old school' norms. 'Although I like working with men very much, however shockingly disappointed one can get sometimes with men's reactions in the mass, there can be controversy, a clear-cut case where nothing but good could follow and the antagonism, the reaction to it, is sometimes extremely stupid. You can be very disappointed and I often get exasperated with that and even the best of men occasionally give you the impression that they haven't a deep enough interest in the job. It's terrible to have to tell them things like that - about inclusions in the moulds - that's where I say supervision is all important - if clear supervision is there. I've had a very good response from the men and can trust nine out of ten of them. I'm very proud of them now but I have to jockey them a bit. . .' The researcher concluded that the continual interaction of the works manager with his subordinates was influencing the attitudes of the steelworkers. The attitudes of the steelworkers had formerly developed from interaction among the employees themselves. The researcher believed that he had found indications that Mr Burnham's leadership influence needed to be sustained if performance standards were not to decline in the steel plant. Mr Burnham himself thought that a majority of the men were 'pretty well indoctrinated'. But he also referred to a slide in standards if he was away from the plant. It could be, he said, 'very discouraging.'

4.4 Electronics Limited1

Electronics Limited was a mass production firm in the electronics industry, located in the north-west of England. The company produced three complex products or lines. Researchers from the London School of Economics visited Electronics Limited as part of a research project on systems of supervision. The researchers studied two departments in the company, departments X and Y, in which the supervisory organisation was similar. Departments X and Y were at different stages of the production process. The departments' 370 male employees were organised on a shift basis. There were three rotating daily shifts. The researchers studied a total of fifty-one supervisors, including twenty-four first-level supervisors. There were two or three levels of supervision in each department. The span of control of the first-level supervisors ranged from fifteen to seventeen. Together with the company's personnel department, the supervisors in departments X and Y were nominally responsible for the selection and training of operatives. These duties took up very little of their time. Newly engaged operatives were instructed in the appropriate job tasks away from the production areas in the training department. Where the jobs were simpler the training was carried out by 'sitting next to Nellie'. The distribution and transfer of work in the two departments was handled in a routine fashion. Operatives went on with their jobs, and organised rota schemes for changing jobs around at regular intervals, without instructions from their supervisors. The supervisors arranged the utilisation of labour when absenteeism was high. Absenteeism, including all the causes of shortage of labour, such as holidays, lateness, refusal to work overtime, etc., could cause serious setbacks to production and increase the supervisors' work load. The only pre-production preparatory job of the departments' supervisors was to ensure the arrival of components. This did not usually present serious problems. The amount to be produced each day in the two departments did not vary. The amount of day-to-day production planning required of the supervisors was therefore minimal, and was carried out by higher management on the basis of past experience. Variations or breakdowns in the machinery or plant caused problems for the supervisors, especially in department X. Electronics Limited's 1 Data for this case were taken from The Supervisor and his Job by K. E. Thurley and A. C. Hamblin, Problems of Progress in Industry, No. 13 (HMSO, 1963).

181

182 Cases in Organisational Behaviour machinery was specialised. Machine faults could, to some extent, be anticipated and prevented. When faults did arise they usually had serious long-term effects. The rectification of machine faults was normally beyond the supervisor's power. He had, however, to make the decision when to stop and empty out a machine and to obtain help from the maintenance departments. Dealing with contingencies or unforeseen deviations from the planned schedule after it had been put into operation was a major part of the supervisor's job in both departments. The type, frequency and importance of the contingencies and the counter-measures taken by the supervisor varied greatly. Variations in product or raw material occurred frequently in the two departments, especially department X. The main responsibility for isolating and eliminating unplanned variations in the raw material or product belonged to the second-level supervisors, who conducted special tests and kept in touch with the previous department where variations were thought to arise. In department X the first-level supervisor or foreman's most important job was to inspect for contingencies, and to deal with them when they arose. First-level supervisors in department X spent an average of 16 per cent of their time inspecting one of the semi-automatic machines at the start of the production line. The second-level supervisors spent 17 per cent, and the departmental head 7 per cent of his time inspecting this machine. No element of operative performance checking was involved in these inspections. The supervisors claimed that the settings on the machine were subject to fine tolerances and yet could not be exactly measured. Constant inspection was therefore believed necessary. The researchers found that individual supervisors varied greatly in the amount of time spent watching this machine, without any observable effect on the production or efficiency figures per shift unit during the period of the research study. In department Y production contingencies were not especially frequent. For much of the time foremen were 'waiting for something to go wrong'. Inspectors formed a large part of the departmental labour force. In department Y the main purpose of inspection by the supervisors was to check on the performance of the inspectors, and to ensure that the right standards of acceptance and rejection of the finished product were being maintained. The supervisors performed special electrical tests on the product after processing. In the two departments the supervisor's communication activities included three basic types. One consisted of acting as a link between higher management and the operatives. Another consisted of communicating as a means of carrying out other functions such as discussing, instructing and receiving requests from other supervisors or subordinates on activities

Electronics Limited 183 going on within the section. The third consisted of personal conversation. For most supervisors the second type of communication occupied the most time. All the supervisors were expected to report regularly to higher management on the production situation, either orally or on paper. In department X reporting back to management was possibly the most important function fulfilled by first-level supervisors. Department X supervisors had very few cross-contacts, except with maintenance. Department Y foremen had frequent contacts with each other, with the preceding Table 4.4.1 Activities of First-Level Supervisors* Nature of activity Proportion of working hours occupied by the activity Department X Department Y Communication Paperwork Close supervising of operatives' work Inspection Performing operatives' manual work Responsible (non-operative) manual work Walking Personal and no apparent activity Breaks (lunch, tea and unofficial breaks) Outside production area a

18 12

36 12

2 26 3

1 14 2

5 17 6

3 14 5

6 5

6 7

Thesefiguresrelate to twelvefirst-linesupervisors studied in department X and twelvefirst-linesupervisors in department Y. Allfigurespresented refer to percentage of total working hours which are averagefiguresfor each departmental group.

and following production departments, and with technical personnel on various production problems. In both departments the first-level supervisors were usually as badly informed as were the operatives themselves on the reasons for changes made by higher management. The operatives knew their jobs and needed very few instructions. Most of the supervisors in departments X and Y regarded the operatives' personal problems and general welfare as one of their main concerns. The researchers found that the amount of time spent on these matters decreased as the pressure of other jobs increased. Disputes and disciplinary matters did not take up a large amount of the supervisors' time. Unions were not very strong in Electronics Limited. The union steward dealt directly with

184 Cases in Organisational Behaviour higher management. There were occasional examples of supervisors who felt that discipline was a problem, and of operatives who resented individual supervisors. The activities of first-level supervisors in departments X and Y were studied by the researchers. Their findings are summarised in Table 4.4.1. The Rotating Shift Study After their study of the activities of the supervisors in departments X and Y the researchers studied the supervisors of three rotating shifts in department Y. Each shift had a shift head and four foremen under the management of a departmental head. The technology and the formal organisation Department head (days) (Roger Hamilton)

Shift head A (Alan Roberts)

Shift head B (Mark Stevenson)

Shift head C (Arthur Catlin)

Foreman (4)

Foremen (4)

Foremen (4)

Workforce

Workforce

Workforce

Figure 4.4.1 Partial Organisation Chart of Department Y were the same on all three shifts. Figure 4.4.1 shows the formal organization of the shifts. A majority of foremen with technical qualifications had been brought in from outside on both B and C shifts. The department head on 'days', Roger Hamilton, allowed his three shift heads, Alan Roberts, Mark Stevenson and Arthur Catlin, to run their own shifts in different ways. Each shift head had considerable unofficial power over the selection of subordinate supervisors for his own shift. The head of shift A, Alan Roberts, chose his foremen from the shop floor. He 'trained them up' to behave in particular ways as, for example, to spend much of their time 'patrolling the unit'. Roberts imposed strict standards of discipline. Shift head B, Mark Stevenson, was a qualified engineer. He spent more time than the other shift heads in the actual production area, and worked in

Electronics Limited 185 closer co-operation with the foremen. Shift head C, Arthur Catlin, believed in and practised maximum delegation to his foremen, and let them 'learn by their own mistakes'. Table 4.4.2 shows the activity patterns of the 'average' foremen on each of the three shifts. Much of the supervisors' work in department Y was inspection. They Table 4.4.2 Activities of First-Level Supervisors in Department Ya Nature of activity First-level supervisors Shift A Shift B Shift C Communication Paperwork Close supervision of operatives' work Inspection Performing operatives' manual work Responsible (non-operative) manual work Walking Personal and no apparent activity Breaks (lunch, tea and unofficial breaks) Outside production area a

31 11

31 14

43 13

2 16 4

1 16 2

1 11 2

4 20 3

3 14 7

2 9 4

5 4

7 5

5 10

All figures presented refer to percentages of total working hours for averagefirst-levelsupervisors in each shift.

inspected the product, and frequently made their own decisions on acceptance or rejection of it. When performing inspection themselves the supervisors checked the inspectors' work rather than that of the process operatives. Rejection rates were worked out daily per shift-unit (i.e. per foreman's section). In Figure 4.4.2 the average rejection rates per shift unit are compared with the proportion of time spent by individual foremen on inspection. The researchers found that the rejection rate on shift B tended to be highest when the foremen did most of the inspection. This was not true on shifts A and C. The researchers believed that the most plausible explanation that they could find for these differences was that the different points of view of the three shift heads on appropriate supervisory behaviour were passed down to their respective foremen. Mark Stevenson, the head of shift B, apparently believed in the rigid application of quality standards. The purpose of inspection of the product by supervisors in his shift was therefore to reject borderline cases which had been passed b)

186 Cases in Organisational Behaviour

Below average rejection rate Above average rejection rate

the inspectors. This was confirmed to the researchers' satisfaction by interviews with shift B foremen. On shift A the purpose of inspection by supervisors was to raise the efficiency rate by preventing inspectors from rejecting too many items. On shift C, each foreman followed his own inclinations on inspection standards. shift A

shift C

shift B

+3.0 +2.5 +2.0 +1.5 +1.0 +0.5 Average -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.5 -3.0

0

5

10 15 20

(Each block

0

5

10

15

20

0

5

10

15

20

represents percentage of total time spent on inspection by one supervisor)

Figure 4.4.2 Time Spent on Inspection by Department Y Supervisors Compared with Percentage of Products Rejected in Supervisors' Sections

SECTION FIVE

Structural Inputs: Organisation Structure and Behaviour in the Organisation as a Whole

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Introduction This section is intended to centre on three related foci: organisation structure (i.e. management's official attempt to provide an appropriate formal blueprint to shape the organisation's behaviour), the actual behaviour of the organisation as a whole, and the relation between the two. To a significant extent the section is intended to consolidate the knowledge and skills achieved from exercises based on the earlier sections of this book, each of which was largely concerned with partial analyses of organisational behaviour, mostly from the standpoint of a particular cluster of variables. The cases and references may, however, usefully be studied independently of the other sections. Certain themes appear in these cases. The most general one concerns the mutual fit - or lack of fit - between the organisation's structure, its behaviour and its environment. The section affords insights into the interdependence of the components of an organisational system, the forces that hold the system together, and the forces that tend to disrupt it. A related theme concerns processes for the transmission of information between the sub-parts of the organisation for purposes of problemsolving and decision-making. The focus on the organisation as a whole, considered as a somewhat distinct entity, and its need for some kind of structure, facilitates some perspectives on the role of senior management. A further theme concerns the conscious or unconscious assumptions managers make about the nature of man and authority, and the consequences of these assumptions for organisation structure, climate and behaviour as a whole. The cases present descriptions of whole organisations or considerable organisational units within large organisations. The Debenham Weaving Mill case provides a fairly complete description of the structure and behaviour of a textile plant operated by a company which owns a number of other mills. Attention can be usefully directed towards analysis of the devices and processes which integrate organisational effort within the environmental opportunities and constraints, and the factors which cause dissipation of effort. British Merchant Ships outlines the structure and behaviour of merchant crews, contrasting in some respects with the more usual kinds of work organisation. In these first two cases the focus of discussion is probably most appropriately a diagnostic one, i.e. how do these organisations work? How do environment, structure and behaviour 189

190 Cases in Organisational Behaviour interact to produce organisational viability? By what mechanisms are decisions made and problems solved in these organisations? In Multiproducts Limited, a firm producing light engineering products in small batches, important issues apparently reside in the area of organisational climate, its impact on employees, and their response to it. HSC Limited portrays an electrical engineering company which lacks the structural devices commonly found in industrial companies. The firm's unusual features raise important questions about the necessary characteristics of structure in relation to organisational behaviour and performance. Redfield & White concerns one of the largest department stores in London. The case describes the behaviour of staff in the sales departments, which apparently ensures cohesion of effort by the organisation as a whole. Certain norms seem to hold throughout the organisation, and have particular consequences. Discussion may ultimately lead to consideration of the long-term utility of the behaviour patterns, and the scope and prospect for management action. Mr S. L. Blake consists of the report of a research interview with a manager who describes the organisational problems he faces, and his ideas on possible solutions. The knotty problems Blake and his company confront clearly call for remedial action. The case provides a test of comprehension of structural-behavioural issues, and a challenge to ingenuity in designing solutions. Critical Books, an unprofitable, privately owned London publishing firm, poses problems of values and objectives, and related effects on behaviour and organisational performance. This difficult case poses many buried problems. Multiproducts Limited, Mr S. L. Blake and Critical Books all provide in part opportunities to identify particular sets of management assumptions in different organisational settings, to trace the consequences that flow from them, and to explore possible managerial action. Mr S. L. Blake and Critical Books describe organisations which are in some sense struggling. They implicate careful diagnosis of the causes of the struggles, and call for action prescriptions. References Lorsch (1), Seiler (2) and Leavitt & Pondy (3) provide useful general introductions to the area; Gouldner (4) surveys one of the most fundamental issues. March and Simon (5) review classical organisation theory. Burns and Stalker's research (6), summarised when in progress by Croome (7), and Joan Woodward's work (8) provide conceptual schemes linking organisation structure, technology and environment. Leavitt (9), Cohen (10) and Hall (11) contribute useful accounts of the characteristics of

Introduction to Section Five

191

various types of communication net, which may be linked to types of structure and environment. Lorsch and Lawrence's (12) research offers one perspective on integration of organisational effort. McGregor (13) provides the classic exposition of assumptions about human nature and the effect on structure and organisation. Berelson and Steiner (14) comment on the nature of man. Miller (15) offers an historical, anthropological view and Graves (16) a contemporary view of authority and related issues, Bradney (17) a handful of anthropological concepts, derived from the study of primitive societies, which may fit modern organisations. 1. J. W. Lorsch, 'Introduction to the Structural Design of Organizations' in G. W. Dalton et al. (eds), Organizational Structure and Design (Irwin-Dorsey, 1970). 2. J. A. Seiler, Systems Analysis in Organizational Behaviour (Irwin-Dorsey, 1967), ch. 7. 3. H. J. Leavitt and L. R. Pondy, Readings in Managerial Psychology (Chicago U.P., 1973), ch. 11-14. 4. A. W. Gouldner, 'Organizational Analysis', in R. K. Merton et al. (eds), Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects (Basic Books, 1959). 5. J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations (Wiley, 1958), ch. 2. 6. Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (Tavistock, 1961), Introduction, ch. 6. 7. Honor Croome, Human Problems of Innovation, Problems of Progress in Industry 5, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (HMSO, 1960). 8. J. J. Rackham's paper in G. W. Dalton et al. (eds), op. cit.; Joan Woodward (ed), Industrial Organization: Behaviour and Control (Oxford, 1970), chs 1 and 11. 9. H. J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology, 3rd. edn (Chicago U.P., 1972), ch. 18; 'Some Effects of Certain Communication Patterns on Group Performance', in E. E. Maccoby et al, Readings in Social Psychology, 3rd edn (Holt, 1958). 10. A. M. Cohen, 'Changing Small Group Communication Networks', Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4 (1962). 11. D. J. Hall in P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, Organizational Behaviour and Administration, rev. edn (Irwin-Dorsey, 1965), pp. 790-1. 12. J. W. Lorsch and P. R. Lawrence, 'Organizing for Product Innovation', Harvard Business Review, vol. 43, no. 1 (1965). 13. Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (McGraw-Hill, 1960), Part One, especially chs 3 and 4. 14. Bernard Berelson and G. A. Steiner, Human Behaviour: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 662-7. 15. W. B. Miller, 'Two Concepts of Authority', The American Anthropologist, vol. 57, no. 2 (1955). 16. Desmond Graves, 'The Impact of Culture upon Managerial Attitudes, Beliefs and Behaviour in England and France', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (1972). 17. Pamela Bradney, 'The Joking Relationship in Industry', Human Relations, vol. 10, no. 2 (1957); 'Quasi-familial Relationships in Industry', Human Relations, vol. 10, no. 3 (1957).

5.1 The Debenham Weaving Mill1 The Debenham Weaving Mill was located in the small English town of Debenham. Weaving had long been practised at Debenham, and the company which owned the mill had a long tradition of activity in the area. The company operated a number of other textile plants in the locality. The mill was located, with some other factories of different kinds, near the centre of Debenham. The large majority of the people who worked in the mill were drawn from the local area. Many of them cycled to and from work each day. The management of the mill was entirely recruited from local men. Most of them had spent all their working lives in the company, in the same part of the country. The building which the mill occupied was located on a site which also contained a multi-storied building belonging to the company. The latter was concerned with the preliminary processing of yarn before it was sent to the company's weaving mills. This building housed the main services for the weaving mill and other mills, and also the maintenance engineering personnel. The activities carried out in the multi-storied building and in the weaving mill were under the control of separate managers, both being subordinate to the company's central executive, which was located in offices a few miles away. The weaving mill was formally controlled by a manager with full administrative powers for its organisation and functioning in order to secure the final goal of production, the manufacture of woven cloth of commercially saleable quality. Other functions in the production and marketing of cloth were handled elsewhere: sales, yarn supply, cloth finishing, cloth storage, and so on. Nearly all the units and departments of the company's head office were housed near Debenham, within a few miles of the weaving mill. The only exception was the sales department, which was located elsewhere in a large city. There was very little direct contact of any sort between the sales department and the mill. The mill manager maintained contact with a number of specialist advisers at the company headquarters. These specialists had no formal executive power over the mill, and were supposed to exercise authority only through the senior management of the company. A central company programming office handled the main aspects of 1

Data for this case were taken from The Dynamics of a Changing Technology, by Peter J. Fensham and Douglas Hooper (Tavistock, 1964).

192

The Debenham Weaving Mill

193

production control for all the mills, including the delivery of yarns to the mills, and the supply of woven goods to the customer when they were required. Within each weaving mill there was a system of programming and control, operated in conjunction with the central programming office, on the one hand, and the mill's production staff on the other. There was Manager, Harding

Weaving shed senior foreman, Morris

Cloth examiner, Deacon

Weaving shift foreman, No.1 shift, Carter

Weaving shift foreman, No.2 shift, Drew

No.1 shift operatives

No.2 shift operatives

Secretariat and programming, Royle

Preparatory foreman, Hunt

Operatives (graders, pickers, shearers)

Operatives (warpers, sizers, enterers, etc.)

Preparatory foreman, Anderson

Operatives (pirn winders, etc.)

Work study engineer, Jones

Clerks (orders, supplies and wages clerks)

Work study clerks

Figure 5.1.1 Partial Organisation Chart considerable consultation between the mill and the company headquarters. The placement of orders with the mill was in the last resort a company responsibility. There was little formal contact between the managements of the various mills operated by the company. Mill managers met from time to time at managers' meetings, and also occasionally visited other company mills. Supervisors from the various mills in the district rarely met, except perhaps at functions arranged by the local Textile Society. Figure 5.1.1 shows the formal organisation of the Debenham Weaving Mill at the time of the research study. A total of 143 personnel worked in

194 Cases in Organisational Behaviour the mill, including the manager, 8 supervisors and 134 operatives. The secretariat and programming section, headed by Royle, dealt with orders, supplies and wages. There were five clerks in this section. The preparatory department was led by two foremen, Hunt and Anderson. They were concerned with various operations on the yarn in preparation for weaving. Fifty-four day operatives and four shift operatives were employed on these activities. Morris was senior foreman of the weaving department, assisted by two shift foremen, Carter and Drew. Carter and Drew each supervised one of the two shifts. Each had thirty operatives under his formal control. These operatives consisted of weavers, overlookers, and supporting operatives. Each weaver was responsible for looking after a set of several looms. Maintaining the looms in good working order, changing them over from one type of cloth to another, and correcting loom faults of any magnitude, were the tasks of the overlooker or loom mechanic. Each overlooker typically maintained the looms of two or more weavers. The Debenham mill weavers averaged 31 years in age, and ranged in age from 21 to 45. The average age of overlookers was 40, and their ages ranged from 24 to 50. Overlookers, followed by weavers, were the most highly paid employees in the mill. Some of the weavers were women. Morris's main task was that of watching quality. He was regarded by the other supervisors as being one of themselves. He did not intervene in the running of the shifts, so that the shift supervisors were largely autonomous. Both shift supervisors consulted Morris for his advice and assistance in difficult matters. Morris, Harding and the other mill executives used the terms 'supervisor' and 'foreman' interchangeably. In the company mills, weaving supervisors were recruited from the ranks of overlookers. Preparatory supervisors were recruited from outside the ranks of weavers or overlookers. The cloth inspection department was led by Deacon, assisted by eight day operatives. The work study department headed by Jones, aided by two work study clerks, provided work study services to the production departments. The two main unions active in the plant were the National Association of Power Loom Overlookers, which catered for the loom mechanics, and the Transport and General Workers Union, which catered both for weavers and for many other workpeople in the mill. The specialised maintenance personnel, based on the multi-storey building on the same site, belonged to such unions as the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the Electrical Trades Union. Unions were accepted by the company, and all negotiations concerning conditions of work and rates of pay were carried out between management

The Debenham Weaving Mill 195 and union representatives. Official union-management relations were cordial, and such disputes as occurred were generally solved by local negotiations at the mill. A works council was active in the mill. Shortly after the end of World War II, works councils had been formed at each unit of the company as part of deliberate company policy. The stated aims of the councils were to provide direct management-worker contact; to consider jointly matters affecting company units; and to co-operate together to promote the wellbeing and efficiency of all. The works councils were composed of elected members who held their seats by proposal and secret ballot held in the sections which they represented, and other members proposed by unit managers from among their managers and supervisors. The overlookers, as a union body, refused to recognise the councils and did not send representatives to them. The councils did two rather different jobs. They acted as forums for the expression of ideas and information from both management and workers, and they also had some executive power in the arrangement of 'socials' and entertainment activities of one sort and another. They were excluded from discussing anything bearing on wages or conditions of employment, which were felt to be the prerogative of the unions in negotiation with management. The councils met regularly at monthly intervals. As far as the operatives were concerned, information about the councils' activities reached them either through their representatives, some other person, or through written information about their proceedings. The Debenham works council consisted of representatives of the yarn processing unit as well as of the weaving mill. The chairman was the yarn processing manager, who was the senior manager of the two. At the weaving mill the council minutes were passed around so that most employees were in a position to see them. The researchers found that the large majority of employees at the mill believed that the council was worth while and felt it should be continued. Both managers and operatives viewed the activities of the council as an expression of enlightened policy. Very few were antagonistic to it on the basis of what it was. However, it was found that the functions of the council were not properly understood by most of the operatives. Figure 5.1.2 shows the layout of the weaving mill. The mill was single storied, though certain offices had been built in specially constructed half stories. Its total size was 58,300 square feet. Top lighting was used throughout the building, which was constructed of bricks. It possessed a light, clean and airy working environment. The main physical barrier in the mill was a wall between the weaving and preparatory sections.

196 Cases in Organisational Behaviour Some ten years before, 264 automatic looms had been installed in the mill. Much of the equipment in the preparatory and inspection sections was modern in design and function. The mill operated a 'double-day' pattern of shift working, two shifts working each day of the five-day week. During the past few years production had remained fairly stable at a consistent level of efficiency. 'Efficiency' was one of the main overall criteria by which the productivity of weaving looms was gauged. The level of efficiency was calculated from the quantity of production actually achieved by the looms, compared with General office

Manager's office

Stores Cloth inspection and grading

Weaving shed

Work study Foremen's office

Preparation:

S t o

spooling

r

warping

e

sizing

s (yarn)

Figure 5.1.2 Layout of the Debenham Mill the maximum possible work achievable at the given loom speed. The figure took into account factors beyond the control of the factory, such as yarn shortages or power failures. At the Debenham mill the overall efficiency figure had for a few years been maintained at between 90 and 94 per cent, and had in the last year or so averaged 93-5 per cent. This was considered to be highly satisfactory compared with other mills in the industry. The automatic looms had been comparatively expensive to buy, and manufactured cloth at considerable speed. The high cost associated with an automatic loom installation increased the pressure for operating them continuously. In terms of operations the requirements of the technology employed led to a need for detailed and accurate planning to ensure that no loss of production was caused by materials and men not being at the right place at the right time. Swift communications were required to ensure that delays due to errors or breakdowns would be corrected with the least possible delay. Precise methods of preparing and handling the yarn were required, since the looms were intolerant of faulty material. The allocation of cloth orders to particular weaving mills and the ordering of yarn was done by company headquarters. Both the allocation of orders and a properly timed supply of yarn could make a great deal of difference in designing a production programme. During the research

The Debenham Weaving Mill

197

study Debenham suffered sometimes from inadequacies in the supply of yarn. On occasion the supply of yarn to the looms ran extremely short. The Debenham Weaving Mill did not have to deal with a large number of different types or sorts of cloth, differing in yarn, weaving pattern, and so on. Within the constraints set by economic circumstances, the aim of the company headquarters was to give fairly large orders to Debenham. Most of the looms, at any one time, were weaving the same sort of cloth. During the period of the research study the mill handled about fifteen different types of cloth. Another, larger, mill owned by the company, which had less than three times the number of employees as the Debenham weaving mill, handled seventy to eighty different types of cloth during the same period. The supervisor's task was to ensure the smooth running of his department, and to make sure that information and working materials were provided and readily available. Under automatic weaving conditions the weaving supervisor had an important function as a link between his operatives and the other departments which served them. The researchers concluded that the weaving supervisor's prime task was to act as the focal point for communication and action in relation to the continuous demands of automatic production. Purely supervisory activity was of less importance, since in many respects the automatic looms themselves determined the rate and continuity of work. The members of each shift carried on the operation of the machines from the point where their opposite numbers on the previous shift had finished. This meant that the state of the machines, or the position of the work or total production, was always unknown to the operatives on the incoming shift. Operative-to-operative communication about loom performance and current difficulties was necessary between the weaving department employees working on shifts. There was no officially allowed time for the exchange of information between operatives doing the same job in successive shifts. This exchange could only occur by the employees themselves overlapping for a short time on the change of shift. Despite the lack of a formal channel between shift operatives, such communication was explicitly and implicitly assumed by all. The very high noise level in the weaving section made conversation arduous. By the nature of their jobs the weavers were much more tied to their geographical locations than were the overlookers. But the researchers believed that the operatives were adept in overcoming barriers to conversation. Most information from management to the operatives, and vice versa, was passed along by face-to-face rather than written means. One operative said: 'We make it our business to find out [about work matters]

198 Cases in Organisational Behaviour from the foreman.' Another commented: 'When we finish the job, we just go and ask Jack [Carter] for the next.' In the weaving department, most of the operatives received information about matters affecting their work from a book which was always located on the shift supervisor's desk. This book indicated what sort of cloth was to be woven on which loom. It also gave details of the type of yarn which it was proposed to use, and whether this differed for warp and weft yarns, or whether they were identical. One operative said: 'We get quite enough information. In fact, you know, this is generally a much better shed than most.' During working hours there was hardly any contact between the weavers and preparatory workers. But a third body of workers effected some sort of link between the two main departments. These people were responsible for conveying materials from one place to the other, and doing ancillary work on the looms. In general, the communication of information of one sort or another in the mill was characteristically by sporadic, face-to-face means. It was company policy that all the supervisors in each mill should meet regularly to discuss matters of interest and importance to themselves and the company. Some years before, the Debenham mill meeting had been a formal monthly one, as at the other mills in the company. It was held in the canteen, away from the production departments. Then it was decided to hold the meeting at monthly intervals in the manager's office. Mr Harding was not keen on this idea. He finally decided to hold an informal production meeting in his office each day. At the time of the research study this meeting had continued to be held each day for four or five years. At the daily production meeting the agenda was informal, determined by day-to-day problems. No minutes were taken. The individual members of the mill's management felt free to comment and question each other directly. Decisions made by one supervisor were liable to correction or alteration by management as a whole, if they did not tie in with overall production targets. The ease with which criticisms and feelings were expressed at these meetings was recognised by the supervisors. One commented: 'If you have anything to say about another department you can say it there without any worry about them thinking you went behind their backs.' Another said: 'It helps reduce the differences which arise between preparation and weaving departments.' The researchers recorded the number and type of contributions which members of management made during daily production meetings. Their findings are presented in Table 5.1.1. On two different occasions during the research study the researchers also surveyed the contacts taking place between members of the mill's management during a working week. On

The Debenham Weaving Mill 199 both occasions each person contacted every other person during the course of the week. The rate of interaction between any two individuals naturally varied a good deal. The researchers observed many instances illustrating the easy, informal relationships that existed between members of management. During the period of the research study there were few interruptions in the mill's highly efficient production of cloth. Difficulties did arise, but they were difficulties stemming largely from external circumstances, and Table 5.1.1 Interactions at Daily Management Meetingsa Type of interaction

Per cent of total contributions

Manager to a specific supervisor Specific supervisor to manager Manager's general comments Supervisor to supervisor

34 33 11 21

a

The data which this table summarises was collected by the researchers at nine meetings.

not from internal ones. The major internal difficulty was a reallocation of looms stemming from changes in the nature of the cloth to be woven. But, after a short period of uncertainty among operatives and supervisors, the reallocation was completed successfully. On the evidence of company executives and other individuals in the Debenham Weaving Mill, the pattern of working in the mill was harmonious and highly satisfactory. The manager said, 'I like to think of the people in the mill as a family.' An operative, who also held an official trade union position, said: 'Relations are as good at Debenham as you could expect them to be anywhere.'

5.2 British Merchant Ships1

A merchant ship's purpose was to transport cargo and passengers. This demanded three main focuses of work for the crew: (1) aiding and facilitating the loading and discharging of cargo and passengers; (2) bringing the ship and her contents safely to her appointed destination; and (3) throughout the life of the ship maintaining and repairing her so that she would give efficient service. A ship and her contents were a large capital investment. She was frequently exposed to such hazards as storms, collision, fire and shipwreck. The safety of the ship depended in large measure upon the quick judgement and action of experienced and skilful seamen. The social organisation of the crew therefore had to have a clearly designated hierarchy of responsibility, and had to make provision for rapid communication and execution of orders. Because potential hazards to the ship existed at all times, the organisation was obliged to function continuously. A ship's movements imposed limitations as to when a member of the crew might form and sever connection with the ship. A seaman joined a ship when it was in his country and reasonably close to his home. With few exceptions, he was obliged to remain with the ship until it returned to his home country. This period might last from a month to two years. During the voyage the crew therefore had a smaller turnover than any comparable organisation ashore. Members of the crew spent their working hours and leisure time at sea, isolated from other people. In foreign ports the friendships they could form ashore were limited by the brief duration of the ship's stay, and by the limited channels that were available to establish social contacts. Life at sea has in most cases been found unsuitable for families. Members of the crew were therefore obliged to be separated from their families for the duration of the voyage. To fulfil the purpose of the ship and to adapt the seaman to the environment, a clearly defined social system had been evolved through centuries 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by Stephen A. Richardson in the Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 2 (1956). Dr Richardson had first-hand experience on British and American merchant ships between 1937 and 1946. He had sailed in all the deck departments of cargo ships, in posts ranging in rank from ablebodied seaman's apprentice to chief officer. He held a British master mariner's certificate. In 1947 he returned to sea to carry out research for a university thesis. The data reported in this case draw on his experience and research.

200

British Merchant Ships 201 of experience. This system had to be sufficiently clear so that a new crew made up of men who had never met before could immediately co-ordinate the complex task of running a ship. The crew was divided into four departments which worked in close co-operation: deck, engineering, stewards, and radio. Figure 5.2.1 shows the manning and basic working organisation which, with little variation, was in the 1940s typical of British cargo ships of about 7,000 gross tons carrying forty men as, for example, World War II Liberty ships. Captain

Deck department: chief officer, 2nd officer, 3rd officer

Carpenter

Dayman: 1 AB

Engineering department: chief engineer, 4 officers

Steward department: chief steward

11 men

7 stewards etc.

Bosun

1 2 - 4 watch: 2 ABs; 1 OS

AB = able-bodied seaman

4 - 8 watch: 2ABs; 10S

Radio officer

8 - 1 2 watch:' 2 ABs; 1 OS

OS = ordinary seaman

Figure 5.2.1 Typical Partial Organisation Chart of a British Merchant Ship of 7,000 tons gross There were two main categories of work for the crew while the ship was at sea. These were: Navigating and propelling the ship While at sea, a ship was continuously under way, and most members of the crew were divided into three shifts, or watches. Each watch alternated four hours on duty with eight hours off duty. A watch on deck was made up of one officer, two able-bodied seamen, and an ordinary seaman.1 Although the deck watch-keeping officer was in full charge, the captain was at all times responsible for the safety of the ship, and was on call if an unusual situation was suspected or special 1

Able-bodied seaman was a rank obtained after a man had spent three years in the deck department and had passed the required examination. The rank of ordinary seaman was given to men in the deck department when they first went to sea.

202 Cases in Organisational Behaviour vigilance was required. The chief engineer was at all times responsible to the captain for the ship's machinery. The radio officer received and transmitted messages at internationally agreed times. The competence of all officers was tested by a governmental examination system. The watchkeeping routine at sea was broken only in extraordinary circumstances. The entire crew was trained in the procedures to be adopted in case of emergency. Ship's maintenance During the day, the carpenter worked on his own, and the bosun1 worked with any able-bodied seamen who were on day work and did not keep watch, and with the two watch members not steering the ship. Since this gave the bosun only three or four men, if any large job had to be done extra men were called out during their time off watch and paid overtime. On occasion, the bosun might supervise ten to twelve men. Planning and supervising the deck department work was done by the chief officer (often called the mate) during his time off watch. The captain rarely participated in this supervision but could do so if he wished. The chief officer sometimes gave a man more overtime than he had earned, a procedure sometimes used by chief officers to reward better workers. The officers and men on British merchant ships were represented by unions, and collective bargaining between the shipping companies and unions was well accepted. While at sea, the crew had to determine the administration and interpretation of company-union agreements without assistance of shore officials. This task was left to traditional informal practices, and the unions did not require any organised activity while the crew were aboard ship. The officers' union had no organised activity aboard the ship while at sea. For the effective maintenance and survival of the social system on a ship there were two important requirements: (1) a continuous supply of trained men; and (2) ways to control deviance from normative or ideal patterns of behaviour if the degree of deviance became a threat to the functioning of the system. On British cargo ships the four-year apprenticeship or cadetship period for youths intending to become officers was generally spent with one company. This training began at age sixteen or seventeen, and the company took the responsibility of teaching the apprentice the work of a seaman, and the duties of a navigating officer. The apprentice 'binds and obliges 1

The position of bosun was analogous to that of foreman. It required an able-bodied seaman's rating and sufficient sea experience and supervisory ability (as judged by competent seamen) to be responsible to the chief officer for the work of the able-bodied and ordinary seamen.

British Merchant Ships 203 himself... to faithfully serve [the company] and any shipmaster . . . and obey their and his lawful commands [perform various duties]. . . nor absent himself from their service without leave nor frequent taverns or alehouses, nor play at unlawful games.'1 About three-quarters of British Merchant Service officers received their training as apprentices or cadets, and the remainder put in the required sea time as ordinary seamen and able-bodied seamen. The primary loyalty among officers was to the shipping companies, and to be a 'company man' was considered advantageous. When the British boy went to sea as an apprentice, he was separated from his family and his friends, and placed in a social structure composed almost entirely of adult men. Here the peer group was limited to one or two somewhat older apprentices, since he was not allowed to associate with able-bodied seamen or ordinary seamen. The captain, as shipping company representative, had certain responsibilities to the youth and played a role closely analogous to that of a father. Because the youth was in need of stability, a sense of belonging and friendship to replace what he had lost, he was highly motivated to use the captain - who represented the company - as a substitute for his father. The company was interested in training its apprentices in its ways, and followed the youth's training and development with interest, because it was likely that if he showed promise he would remain with the company throughout his career. Although the apprentice was given a great deal of work that was normally done by seamen, he was trained to identify himself with the officers, even though he did not hold officer status. An intricate set of checks and counterchecks was continuously in play between the mate, bosun and deck crowd. The captain and officers' interest and responsibility was to initiate the work and see that it was done. The deck crowd's interest was to control authority which was not customarily acceptable or was illegitimate. When the able-bodied seamen or ordinary seamen thought that the mate had infringed on an official regulation (as, for example, if he had not kept an accurate check on the number of hours overtime), the offended person would generally enlist the sympathy of the deck crowd, since there was a close identity of interest and a tendency to stand together for mutual protection. The first formal move generally was to take the complaint to the bosun, although this was often little more than a gesture to prevent any comeback from him that might occur if he were ignored. The deck crowd often felt that the bosun was on the chief officer's side. A direct approach to the department head would have probably met with refusal and an order to see the bosun. This was well described in two interviews. An able1

Indentures to Anchor Line Ltd, Glasgow.

204 Cases in Organisational Behaviour bodied seaman said: 'The bosun is rather suspect, because he works so close with the mate. The men are afraid he can be too easily called [talked around by the mate]. He is more used to acting for the mate than the men, so he may not be a good spokesman.' A second officer commented: 'Often the men try the bosun to get him to clear up the trouble and he has failed.' If the complaint was not settled by the bosun himself or by his referring the matter to the mate, the second step was for the aggrieved individual, a spokesman, or a delegation to go to the mate. There was no formal way of selecting a spokesman, but one appeared in almost every deck crowd. The ability to talk well and think fast seemed to be the prerequisite. In the researcher's interviews, an able-bodied seaman said that a delegation was sent to accompany the spokesman 'for moral support', and the second officer explained that the delegation was sent 'to give him moral courage and to see he says his piece'. If the complaint could not be settled with the chief officer, the delegation might then go to the captain. The use of delegations for giving moral courage was evidenced by the more common usage of a delegation for the captain than for the chief officer. Omitting some of these steps was sometimes done intentionally as a sign of hostility to or disparagement of a disliked bosun or mate. It was possible for behaviour to deviate widely from expected or ideal forms of behaviour without technically infringing upon any written agreement. To counteract such deviations by officers, a number of informal controls were commonly used by crews of British merchant ships. Close supervision of most of the work on deck was difficult, especially if the bosun was party to the slowdowns. Slowdowns had to be very marked before the captain or chief officer could find grounds for action great ingenuity could be exercised in doing nothing, and doing it industriously. A slowdown was most commonly used to counteract too close supervision by the mate, or too rigid application of working rules without allowing for any flexibility or give and take. It was also used to prevent the chief officer from deviating far from the role expected of him in his relations with the men. Reduction in the quality of the work on deck served the same purpose as work slowdowns, and these two forms of control were generally used together. Within certain limits, it was difficult for the chief officer to obtain sufficient evidence of poor workmanship, especially where the work was of such a nature or in such a position as to be difficult to check by periodic inspection. Misuse of the ship's equipment might take the form of either misusing equipment, or the dumping overboard of small articles not easily checked.

British Merchant Ships 205 The degree to which this was done depended largely on how well equipment was watched by the chief officer. Misuse of equipment was a more destructive reaction than work slowdowns and was likely to lead to further deterioration of relations, whereas slowdowns and poor work could vary in seriousness, and any sign of improved relations instigated by the chief officer could be encouraged by increased output and quality of work. If the work relationship between the deck officers and the men had been poor, and if the men's complaints had met with little or no satisfaction from the captain, a great deal of hostility accumulated. This was often harmlessly dissipated at the end of the voyage, but the men might all leave the ship or make a formal complaint to the union if there were grounds for action against the captain or chief officer. A complete turnover of the crew at the end of a voyage, especially if this happened on several consecutive voyages, might indicate to the shipping company's officials that the cause might have been a captain or officer. The men leaving the ship spread the information of the cause for leaving, and it might in extreme cases reach the stage where the shipping company had trouble in getting a new crew as long as the officer causing the difficulty remained on the ship. A formal complaint achieved the same purpose directly. There were a number of indicators of social stratification and social distance which were recognised implicitly or explicitly by members of British crews. These included wages, qualifications formally required for holding an office (such as examinations and length of sea service), number of persons supervised, food and living conditions, and such behaviour as the use of titles in addressing people. Union membership had little effect on status. Together these indicators influenced the behaviour of every member of the crew with respect to every other member, and provided pressures towards maintaining approved patterns of behaviour. The bosun and carpenter ate with the engine-room supervisory men. This group was often called the petty officers. The researcher's interviews showed a close positive relationship between status and the quality of food on British ships. The able-bodied seamen and ordinary seamen collected their meals from the cook, carried food to their messroom, and after eating did their own cleaning up. The officers were served at meals. Only officers had tablecloths at meals. Social distance was accepted as a matter of course, and it was stressed among the men that one of the reasons that officers and men for the most part kept separate was that the men had no wish to mix with the officers and preferred companions from their own or similar status.

5.3 Multiproducts Limited1

Multiproducts Limited was a large engineering firm, located on the outskirts of London. The firm was one of a large group of companies. It manufactured light engineering products, making fairly small batches of a large variety of components. The firm employed about 4,000 people altogether. Multiproducts' reputation was partly founded upon quick customer service. It was regarded as legitimate by company management to interrupt production programmes for urgent orders. Under the economic conditions prevailing at the time, a credit squeeze constrained company management to keep stocks of materials, tools, and work-in-progress as low as possible. Only minimum-sized batches were produced. The shorter the batch the more frequent was the need to reset machines, and the greater the call on planning ability, tools and services. The problem of deciding optimum batch sizes preoccupied many people in the company. There appeared to be frequent crises. Multiproducts' production facilities consisted of two factories, one of them making about 4,000 components, and the other about 14,000. Each factory was divided into a machine shop and an assembly department. Each had a number of service departments which at senior level were common to both factories. The company's production organisation was complex. Sales orders were analysed into the various components necessary for the products required. The different operations needed to produce these components were scheduled on to particular machines in the factories' machine shops. Production scheduling was complex due to the large variety of products, each consisting of a number of components and operations. One supervisor grumbled: There are 3,700 jobs in the capstan shop alone.' Rush and pressure were the keynote, particularly for supervisors. Production planning was based on an estimate of the capacity of each machine, compiled from time study figures of how long operations should take, past bonus earnings (i.e. actual output) and records of machine stoppages. The whole weight of running the production system and organising new product and process innovation was carried by the company's line management and specialist staff. There was a time study department which measured the time needed for the different operations in the workshops, and used the information as a basis for incentive payment schemes, and 1

Data for this case were taken from Multiproducts Ltd, by Lisl Klein (HMSO, 1964).

206

Multiproducts Limited 207 also for estimating costs and planning production. Method engineers were responsible for modifying and improving existing products and processes. These activities were affected by a shortage of trained engineers. Time study and methods engineering were very well integrated parts of a very comprehensive system of production rationalisation, under which the work content necessary to make a product was subdivided, work was arranged in logical sequence, production was planned and controlled, and costs estimated and controlled. A considerable amount of technical change was going on in the firm. Innovation was continuous, rather than sporadic and dramatic. There was a large process planning department which was concerned with the planning, development and introduction of new products and processes. The department was short of trained people. A great deal of technical skill and know-how was required of production supervisors. On paper this should have been supplied by the specialist time study, methods and process planning departments. There was a problem of the relationship between those directly responsible for production and the specialists. In Multiproducts there was some truth in the comment that: The only person who isn't worried or driven nowadays is the operator on the machine.' The operators' work role in the machine shops was implicitly defined by Multiproducts' work organisation and piece-work system. The operator was expected to perform short-cycle production operations as quickly as possible, to look after his own interests in the piece-work situation, and not concern himself about anything else. The company did not try to stimulate participation on the part of the operators. Multiproducts' personnel policies were aimed at providing a good general background of job security, pensions and good wages. In the machine shops machines were grouped into machine sections, usually according to the type of machine. In the sections there were a number of machine setters, each of whom was responsible for about five or six machines and operators. The operators worked the machines directly. About 500 operators worked in the machine shops. The management hierarchy in the machine shops consisted of supervisors and production managers. Ancillary staff and functional specialists impinged on the employees in the machine shops directly or indirectly. There were time study engineers, methods engineers, inspectors, checkers, bonus clerks, process planners, machine planners, production control staff and progress chasers. The preoccupations of the operators in their interviews with the researchers centred to a very large extent around time study and the incentive system. Even when they did not have expressed attitudes to it, it was clear to the researchers that the mere fact of being on piece work was a dominant factor in their working lives. One important topic to the opera-

208 Cases in Organisational Behaviour tors was the question of how to achieve a good piece-work rate or 'price'. This included the relationship with the time study engineer, where the difference between role relationships and personal relationships showed clearly. A man could say in the same breath, 'He's all right - mind you, I'm not sticking up for him, nobody likes a ratefixer.' It also included much discussion of the time study techniques and of ways in which to make sure of a reasonable price - either in the way one behaved during a time study, or in the way one did the job afterwards. The more daring or amusing devices for doing this were 'fiddles'. Others were so much a part of everyday life that people were hardly conscious of them any more. The operators discussed disputes over prices, and the different interests which had a bearing on them. Prices were challenged frequently, but the operators' grievances about prices and other matters were quite often not pursued beyond the first stage. Pursuing grievances to a conclusion possibly required a greater degree of involvement with the firm than most of the operators wanted. The researchers looked at the question of what happened to prices if jobs were timed on people who did not possess the personality characteristics apparently required by the work-people who were new and inexperienced, or nervous, or had some other, stronger motivation. One young girl in particular was said to get flustered during a time study. When asked whether it worried her she said: 'No, it doesn't bother me at all. But you have to be careful how you put them in the jig - you might do it wrong.' The researchers concluded that any anxiety she felt was caused by the fact that someone of relatively high status was watching her, not by the fact that he was timing her with a stop watch. The second important topic to the machine shop operators was the level of earnings. It was in some ways more important because the occasions on which they were timed were relatively rare, while piece-work earnings were a constant preoccupation. There was much talk about a ceiling to earnings, and why output had to be kept within certain limits. There was talk about how to record one's output in such a way as to counteract the effects of tight and loose prices and hold-ups in the flow of work, as well as to give oneself some freedom and elbow-room. Manipulations in the booking of work were a major category of fiddle whose main function seems to have been to give the operator some control over his working situation. There was concern on the part of the operators over the conditions of production and about whether one got 'good' jobs. Short production runs, favouritism in the way work was allocated, hold-ups, flaws in the coordination of tools and services, all limited the operator's ability to make bonus. These constituted a big part of the operator's conversation. People talked about 'good' and 'bad' jobs. A good job was one where the price

Multiproducts Limited 209 was good, one which was not subject to a great deal of tool trouble, one with a long production run. One woman said, 'I'm on a good job at the moment. When I say it's a good job I mean they're clean, they've been well inspected, there aren't a lot of burrs to catch your hands.' On piece work there was an obvious conflict between quantity and quality. The more the operator wanted to make the more he had to let quality go by the board and rely on the firm's inspectors to reject faulty pieces. In practice inspection standards were quite often not absolute. If a batch of material was proving difficult, or if a machine was not turning the pieces out exactly to specification, the inspector would go to the assembly department and quite often find that they could still be used. There was a difference between what was expected of the operator when the work system was working perfectly, and what was expected of him when it was not. The operators who responded in the intended way to the incentive situation, who said flatly that they wanted to make as much money as possible, were also the people who wanted absolute standards of inspection, imposed from outside. They were very annoyed if an inspector was not sure whether something would pass or not, or if an argument developed about whether it would pass. There were very few signs of any resistance to change on the part of the operators, and very few comments from them about it. When the company introduced a new product there might be substantial problems in translating the original idea into practice, getting drawings out, getting quality standards right, co-ordinating tools and materials, not letting current production suffer while the new product was being integrated with it, and getting the foreman's acceptance for all the upheaval. None of this touched the operator. By the time it reached him a new product had been broken down into discrete operations like any other product. There may have been a hole of different dimensions to drill in a different grade of metal, but essentially he was still drilling holes. The operator's perspective of his job was limited to his immediate job cycle. If the method department devised a new way of doing something, combining or changing the sequence of operations, using different tools or different jigs, this reached the operator as a new job - not as a changed method. The fact that it required a new time-studied price also helped to bring it within this definition. There was much talk amongst the operators about new jobs, but hardly any about changed methods. It was not possible for the operator to tell which of the 'new'jobs were ones which a methods engineer or a foreman would have regarded as 'old' jobs being done in a different way. The machine shop work system in Multiproducts Limited was not entirely self-selecting. There were operators working in the machine shops

210 Cases in Organisational Behaviour who did not fit in. A minority wished for more personal contact with management. There were people who would rather not have been on financial incentives. Some would like to have been involved with the firm. In particular some would like to have paid more attention to quality or to the upkeep of tools than the pressure of being on piece work permitted. The firm as such made very little impact on the operators. They were not interested in it. An assessment of their attitudes to Multiproducts Limited, made by the researchers on a five point scale, showed that 92 per cent were either mildly favourable or neutral. A typical comment was: They're fair enough. The money's good. As long as I can earn my living I'm not bothered. I come to work, then I go home and I forget all about it.' One employee commented about the factory superintendent: 'He doesn't get in my way and I don't get in his. That's how it should be.' The operator's most frequent comment about the firm and his main reason for liking it was that it gave him a feeling of independence. Management left him alone to get on with the job; they were not breathing down the back of his neck the whole time. Checkers were men who counted or weighed what the operators produced, and recorded the quantities of work passed through the workshops. They were not selected on any Very different basis from the operators. They had low status and were paid on an hourly basis. There was no reason to think that they were more intelligent than the operators. Quite often a newcomer who was not thought to be capable of working a machine was put on checking. The range of what the checkers talked about to the researchers, and their interest and understanding of production problems in Multiproducts, were very much greater than those of the operators. The researchers concluded that the technical and organisational set-up in Multiproducts produced or selected the kind of person for the operative role who fitted in most easily and with least stress to himself. The appropriate characteristics of such a person were that he was independent, did not like people in authority to take too close an interest in him, was confident in relation to those in authority (either as a strong individual or deriving strength from his union), not too much interested in the quality of the product, or too conscientious about tools. These were the characteristics he needed in order to like being on piece work. They were also the characteristics he needed in order to behave appropriately during a time study, to challenge prices where necessary, to regulate the level of his performance, and to optimise the way he booked his work. There was an assumption on the part of Multiproducts' top management that the workshops were entirely peopled by this kind of person. By limiting the operators' perceptions of their jobs and selecting particular characteristics in operators, the work system apparently produced

Multiproducts Limited 211 two separate 'societies', the operators and the rest, with entirely different values, different codes of behaviour, different interests and different preoccupations. The gulf between them was substantial. It was also increasing: the skills required for operating and setting the machines were growing less, and those required for running a shop were growing greater and becoming different in kind. The skills required for managing a shop were becoming more intellectual and less technical. The company was beginning to employ graduates as foremen. The chances of promotion for the operators were becoming substantially smaller.

5.4 HSC Limited1

HSC Limited was a concern in the electrical engineering industry. The company produced two major types of switchgear. Both product types were manufactured and sold according to contract. The design and production of switchgear were carried out by HSC on fairly standard lines. Every contract, however, required some special units. There was a constant flow of design improvements. Design and production on standard lines was a principal endeavour of HSC's management, and were main factors in the commercial success of the company. HSC was commercially successful and expanding fairly quickly on the basis of improvements in well-established switchgear design, and the low costs achieved by extremely proficient production engineering and factory management. Due to the nature of the market for switchgear and developments in switchgear design the expectations of HSC's management were constantly subject to alteration. The framework of management's decisions was continually being reset. There were frequent episodes in which changes in the scale or kind of operations being performed by one manager repercussed through the company's organisation structure. The researchers' interviews with the head of HSC began with the chief executive sketching out an organisation chart as a convenient summary of HSC's structure. The sketch drawn for the interview petered out in unresolved dilemmas. The company had a broad management hierarchy, most members of which performed specialist tasks. All members of senior management possessed common background training, qualifications and language in engineering. There was in HSC, however, a deliberate avoidance by top management of clearly defined functions and of lines of responsibility at the senior management level. To a lesser extent this carried on down through the rest of the management structure. It was claimed that nobody on the company's staff had a title except the managing director. Nobody had a definite function to which he could keep. This was said somewhat ruefully to one of the researchers by a senior staff member in the presence of other members and the managing director, who all agreed. HSC's own practice was not discussed, but was defended by implication in derisive accounts of other firms which made great play with titles throughout senior and middle management ranks. It was an 1

Data for this case were taken from The Management of Innovation, by Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker (Tavistock Publications, 1961).

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HSC Limited 213 explicit rule at HSC that any member of the top management group could be consulted or asked for a decision by any junior manager. Freedom of consultation between juniors and seniors was encouraged, irrespective of their departmental functions and formal authority. There were two separate plants in the company, which were located a few miles apart. Each plant was concerned with the final production of one of the two major types of switchgear. Each factory performed certain processes for both. All turning, drilling, etc., was, for example, done in one; all sheet metal work was done in the other. Work was, wherever possible, distributed between the two factories and between shops in the factories in a non-routine fashion so as to avoid the growth of any feeling that certain parts only of the manufacture of products were 'our responsibility', and everything else 'somebody else's worry'. The stages in the manufacture of each main product were interleaved into the programme of work of each of the two factories. Buying was centralised in one section. The managers in both factories were young, efficient, well-qualified and ambitious. The same works manager supervised production in both factories. Each factory had its own production controller. The express policy of the company was for each foreman to regard the work of his shop as a contribution to the whole task of the firm. The foremen were often not skilled craftsmen. In order to ensure a coherent and comprehensive framework for their own individual decisions, and consistency between their several decisions, the company's top management interacted continually. In addition, a company management committee met every week. At these meetings senior managers 'found out what was happening and decided what to do about it'. The function of the meetings was to enable each member of senior management to arrive at decisions respecting his own part of the firm's task, in the light of information derived from the others, and in the light of the implications of his decisions for the rest of the firm's activities. Certain decisions, however, like the purchase of machines, were for the committee as a whole to make. In the committee the hierarchy of management and the specification of each person's authority, information, and technical standing were, to some extent, put aside for the duration of each meeting. Only rarely were votes taken formally by the committee. Normally the committee consisted of the two principal executives in the two main factories of the concern, the works manager, the production controllers, and occasionally one or other of the specialist executives who might be particularly concerned. The dimensions of the committee were not permanently set. The committee was regarded by HSC's senior management as a cadre which was capable of expansion, at need, into a large meeting consisting of almost

214 Cases in Organisational Behaviour the whole of management and representatives of the different shops in the factories. This happened when, the researchers were told, 'the firm seemed to be getting into the dolrums a bit': when overtime seemed to be called for fairly often; when production targets had not been approached closely enough; whenever there appeared symptoms of dislocation between the programme and actual production, between earlier and later process departments, or between one level and another of HSC's personnel, and so forth. At such meetings senior management would usually find that, after the preliminaries, a good number of complaints and criticisms would start getting voiced. The first large meeting would be taken up with getting these ventilated. By the time the second meeting occurred many of the difficulties behind the complaints would have been settled in the interval by the people directly involved in them. The residue of difficulties would be discussed, and possible solutions put forward. After a few meetings the volume of new problems which lent themselves to discussion by a large group of members of the firm would have dwindled. The management committee would shrink to its ordinary size. It was said on more than one occasion by the company's top managers that if, because of the absence of more than one of them a week went by without a meeting, they all felt the lack of it fairly strongly. They were relieved when the next meeting came round. Senior managers regarded the weekly committee as important during the periods which most approximated to stability. Every week the works manager held a foremen's meeting with the foremen under him. These were affairs of a few minutes only, and consisted almost entirely of instructions about the week's production programme. Questions were asked and answered, and there might be discussion and even decisions by agreement about some matters, such as synchronising jobs affecting two departments. The organisational conditions of these foremen's meetings were essentially those of briefing sessions in the armed services. The foremen's meeting was a convenient way for the works manager to see that routine instructions were disseminated to his subordinates quickly and uniformly, and that they all understood what they had to do. Each foreman knew the extent of the other's dependence on his shop during the week, and saw that the others knew what he was expecting from them. The situations with which the meeting was concerned were clear, familiar, and stable. They were the routines of production, and related to normal production factors. Anything abnormal, so far as the forecast week's production went, had been dealt with already by other people, and had been translated into the normal and routine. Some time before the research study began HSC's management had

HSC Limited 215 decided to start a small research department. Soon after a new committee was set up to discuss policy and general problems relating to design and development. The research and development (R and D) committee was convened by the chairman and managing director at intervals of five or six weeks. It was attended by a research consultant. The committee abrogated, for the length of each meeting, the distribution of authority and technical competence pictured in the hierarchic structure of the firm. Only rarely were votes taken by the committee. The R and D committee began as a large, comprehensive, even 'omnibus' affair. It was set up during a period when a major design change was developed for one of HSC's two main products. The biggest single reduction of cost eventually effected by the new design proved to be in the direction of simplifying and cheapening the switchgear's metal chassis and container. The biggest contribution of ideas about this came from the shop floor. Later the R and D committee shrunk to its normal membership of about a dozen. The researchers were told that the reason for the reduction in size was the substantial difference in levels of technical knowledge between members of the higher and lower levels in the HSC's hierarchy. It had apparently quickly become uprofitable to conduct the meetings in a language understandable by foremen, say, and to take up time with the kind of problems which presented themselves to these members of the company.

5.5 Redfield & White Limited1

Redfield & White Limited was one of the largest department stores of its type in London. The store sold a wide variety of merchandise, from haberdashery to all types of household equipment. Each sales department sold a particular type of commodity and occupied a certain floor area within the store's building. Every department had its own internal structure, based primarily on order of seniority in the service of Redfield & White, and on age and sex. With the exception of men's wear, sports equipment and furniture, the various departments of the store were staffed mainly by women. Few departments had mixed male and female assistants. The labour force in the store was stable. The biggest labour turnover in the organisation occurred during the first few weeks of employment. At the head of each sales department was a 'buyer', who ran the department and was ultimately responsible for the efficiency of its members and the successful sale of its goods. An 'underbuyer' assisted the buyer, and was responsible for the day-to-day running of the department and the direct control of the sales staff. The number of sales assistants varied according to the size of the department, averaging about seven or eight. There were usually one or two 'juniors' attached to each department, who were being trained to become sales assistants. The underbuyer was responsible for training the juniors and for organising their work. The juniors acted as messengers and light porters for the buyer and underbuyer. As a result of the general practice at Redfield & White and of the particular departmental training given, sales assistants understood just how far to go on their own initiative in making sales, and when to pass on a problem or a pending decision to a higher authority. The stabilisation of a sales assistant's position in a particular department, and the possibility of any advancement, depended on the assistant being able to convince the buyer and underbuyer of her selling ability, or of some other desirable quality, such as politeness to customers or generally careful work. In addition to a basic weekly wage, a commission of 0-5 per cent was paid by Redfield & White on all the sales made by each sales assistant. Prizes were awarded by management for certain types of employee behaviour. A prize was awarded, for example, for courtesy to customers. Redfield & White's management published a 1 Data for this case were taken from two articles by Pamela Bradney in Human Relations, vol. 10, nos. 2 and 3 (1957).

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Redfield & White Limited 217 store magazine. There was a store club, with many facilities for employees to get to know each other. There was a staff canteen and restroom. There were two types of department in the store: 'open' departments, where goods were openly displayed, and 'counter' departments, where goods were displayed in front of and behind counters. Each assistant had her own section of floor space or counter on which to sell. These areas were allocated by the department's underbuyer. At Redfield & Whites' there was a problem of leaving enough room in the store to display goods to potential customers, to allow potential customers sufficient space to move about freely, and to find enough space to store goods yet keep them readily accessible. In striking the necessary balance between the various spatial factors involved in an open department, the necessity for putting the stock room, packing room and pay desk well out of the way of the display space usually entailed a very long walk for a sales assistant in the course of each transaction she made. Assistants working in open departments often could not easily find other members of the department when contact with them became necessary. In achieving a balance between the various spatial considerations involved in a counter department the sales staff were often left only just enough room to move behind the counter. In these departments 'blockades' were frequently and unavoidably made by other members of the department when they opened a drawer in a narrow gangway, or stood talking in the only opening leading to the other side of the department. In making a transaction with a customer an assistant had to know where to go in her particular department for the variety of goods she needed, and the necessary wrapping materials, etc. Sales assistants often did not know the departmental and store layout well enough to be able to answer quickly and easily enquiries from customers and other staff concerning particular merchandise. It was on the wishes and requirements of the customer that the type of bill to be made out depended. The assistant had to sell the goods in accordance with the correct method of sale appropriate to the customer's wishes. She had to perform this operation while continually open to orders from the buyer and underbuyer managing her department, and interruptions from her co-workers. Redfield & White's sales procedure was highly complicated. The store had four main types of sales bill: 'cash-take', 'cash-send', 'enter-take', and 'enter-send'. Differently coloured bills were used for 'cash' and 'enter'. Each of these bills was completed in a different way. There were further complications in the case of cheques, export cards (which enabled the purchaser to obtain purchasing-tax reductions), purchase assembly cards (when the customer bought a number of goods from different departments and paid for them all together), COD transactions, and hire-purchase

218 Cases in Organisational Behaviour transactions. Another procedure had to be followed in the case of refunds. Many labels and stickers, all in frequent use, were available at each cashier's desk. There were forty-three different items of stationery kept by each cashier for use by the assistants in selling. Each method of sale had to be followed precisely, often while continuing a conversation with the customer. Many of the bills required an authorising signature from either the buyer or underbuyer, or sanction by means of a telephone call to the sanction office. Most transactions necessitated a walk to the cashier's desk. The buyer might at any time ask to see an assistant or get her to do a special job. The underbuyer, in carrying out her daily organisation of staff, arranging meal breaks, dealing with queries from staff and customers as they arose, frequently had to interrupt an assistant to tell her, for example, that a special order had arrived and might be despatched, or to ask her how a particular line was selling. More frequent interruptions came from co-workers. There was much for assistants to learn and know about where things were situated in the department and the store as a whole, and much to know about the sales procedure. Working side by side as the assistants did, they referred to each other from time to time about these matters, often interrupting a sale in doing so. Interruptions also came from members of other departments. It was usually when the department became busy and all the assistants were serving that demands and questions became most frequent. To relieve the build-up of pressure and tension in such circumstances the store's employees resorted to 'joking'. Employees addressed each other other in jovial, hail-fellow-well-met and often teasing ways. In the store jokes were made by any employee about an occurrence or situation generally recognised as likely to create considerable difficulties for those involved in it. The joking consisted of one or a combination of the following: a jovial manner of passing the time of day or commenting on the weather or some other matter of topical interest; mutual teasing about personal habits, appearance, love experience, morality and in particular work and method of work; or telling funny stories in some way relevant to the subject of the conversation. All these subjects were used in carrying out the day-today work of the store. In the store joking occurred between individual employees, between one person and a group, and sometimes between two groups. It occurred both in contacts necessitated by the work system and in personal contacts. The different types of joking extended from the lower to the higher ranks of the organisation. There was a tendency for staff of lower rank to adopt a jovial or teasing manner in their contacts, and for higher ranks to tell funny stories. The joking of assistants was mainly related to their own particular work

Redfield & White Limited 219 problems. The joking of buyers and others was concerned with their problems and covered a much wider field, taking in the whole store. Buyers and underbuyers were continually telling anecdotes in the course of their work. One story that frequently cropped up, particularly at underbuyer level, concerned the piano department. The piano department had the reputation in the store of being moved around more frequently than any other department. The story was that when a customer asked where she could find the piano department the assistant replied: 'If you'd be good enough to wait here, madam, it's sure to be passing by.' Joking was in general established more quickly and easily between members of the same status in the same or different departments when they happened to come into contact. Joking also occurred between members of different status. The joke might be made by a member of higher status in an attempt to disarm a subordinate member of any antagonism and maintain a good relationship. One of the buyers, on seeing a junior carrying out her duties in a slow and lazy manner, said to her: 'Miss . . . [the junior] looks as if her heart's in her boots today! Don't you like work today, dear?' Joking might also be used by a superior in order to give a subordinate a reprimand without offending. In the course of an underbuyer training juniors and organising their work the juniors usually teased and joked with the underbuyer endlessly. The underbuyer found that a better relationship was maintained if she took the joking in a good-humoured way and was ready to have a joke back at them. Employees often said how much they liked other members because the latter were 'always ready for a joke' and 'full of fun'. Those who joked readily were much more popular than those who did not. They were approached more often by other members. They elicited a more favourable reaction than others when they made an approach themselves. They never sat alone during their meal breaks in the store's canteen. Employees often said that the reason they liked working in the store was that they had such fun in carrying out their routine jobs. Joking was usually learned by a newcomer after she had been in the store about three weeks. It took about the same length of time for her to be accepted as a 'joker' by the rest of the department. It was a very uncomfortable period for her. Once a newcomer had acquired the knack of joking in the right sort of way she found that all the approaches necessitated by the work system could be made much more smoothly. Because a contact made with the approved type of joking attitude achieved the purpose of the contact more quickly and easily, a member tended to repeat this type of joking in further contacts. If her attitude in making the approach was not 'correct', the fact that it elicited a rather less satisfactory reaction discouraged her from using it again. One of the assistants said that

220 Cases in Organisational Behaviour whenever someone was sent to help or to work in her department who was rather snobbish and would not talk to them, they all made a point of joking at her continuously in a good-humoured way, and she soon 'came off it'. When a new girl appeared to be working overhard and taking her work too seriously, one of the old hands to whom the newcomer had put another query to help her with a sale said: 'You want to sell up the shop today, don't you?', in a friendly joking manner. Those who had joined Redfield & White when the store had been founded were called the 'A' stock by employees generally. They were regarded with particular affection. They were felt to be a 'living link with the past'. They often taught newcomers something of Redfield & White's history and of the tradition that had held them to their jobs for many years. There was a genuine admiration on the part of young members and new members for the work skill which the more experienced members had acquired. The new members often tried to copy their techniques and methods of work, and the more experienced members usually helped the less experienced to do this. The more experienced members often showed a great interest in training others, and watching them make progress. Members of the same department and store employees from various departments who happened to meet in the course of their routine work or during breaks usually spent a certain length of time in friendly and sympathetic conversation. They showed an interest in each other's affairs inside and outside the store. They discussed and expressed mutual sympathy over matters of general interest in the store. They showed the utmost readiness to help each other whenever an opportunity arose. Each member to some extent identified her interests with those of other members of Redfield & White's. There was a noticeable sense of unity between members of different departments who, usually as a result of formal contact, had got to know each other personally, i.e. had become interested in each other as individuals, even though they might never meet outside working hours. The importance of this knowledge of others was recognised to some extent by Redfield & White's management, and encouraged by articles on individuals in the store magazine, by the existence and nature of the store club, and by the facilities for contact provided in the staff canteen and rest room. In the store friendships or 'pairings' were very common. They usually consisted of friendships between employees of the same sex, though they often differed widely in age. The partners in the pair relationship usually had a similar length of experience in the store, and had about the same degree of skill in selling. These partners might be assistants who worked next to each other on a counter, or members who purposely contacted each other in their free time, who worked in different departments. Some

Redfield & White Limited 221 pairings existed between members who did not work together, but had developed a habit of comparing notes in their chance meetings. These pairings were clearly recognised informally. Each partner in speaking to the other referred to her as 'my friend'. The term had a connotation that distinguished the person in question quite clearly from any other friends the member might have had either in the store or outside it. The term 'friend' was also used when other members of the store wished to refer to a particular assistant's partner. They spoke of 'your friend' or 'her friend'. An assistant speaking of a particular newcomer who was not 'fitting in' as well as she might said: 'We understand each other in this department and we help each other out whenever we can, but that one she likes to be different; she won't pal on with anybody.' The relation involved in the pairings varied considerably. Sometimes it was one of open competition with the partner. Sometimes by having a knowledge of her partner's ability, and by keeping a close watch on the amount she was selling, an assistant was able to keep a constant check on how she herself was doing. The relation was also often of a social type. The partners confided in each other over any out-of-the-ordinary sale they had made, or an unusual customer they had served. They discussed new merchandise and any particularly interesting aspect of existing merchandise. They told each other when they had had orders from or had to go to the buyer or some authority in the store's hierarchy. They told each other if they were not feeling well. In this way they were often able to help each other over difficulties. They relieved the boredom of the slack periods for each other. In exceptionally busy periods, when they were on the verge of losing their temper over a customer or another member of the department, a joke or a nod of sympathy from a partner often averted an outbreak, and relieved the tension. There was some variation in the extent to which unity existed between the different departments and offices of Redfield & White. The inexpensive coat department was on the best of terms with the model coat department. Each was always helping the other by sending customers along. There was a good relationship between each selling department and the receiving room that was at its service. Relations were never quite as good between selling departments and the adjustment department, which was always troubling them with queries, or the sanction office, which might sometimes refuse or delay the sanction of an important bill. The relation between departments also depended on the personal knowledge members had of each other, and the past experience of the members involved. Even where the formal structure, past experience and present circumstances were of such a kind as to create the possibility of great disunity and distrust between departments and their members, a sense of unity was still main-

222 Cases in Organisational Behaviour tained. Any enmity tended to be focused on a particular member within a department who was held to be the true cause of any trouble that had occurred. In the instance of the adjustment office bad feelings over queries tended to be focused not on the adjustment clerks who brought the queries to the selling departments, but on the office's manager. The manager might, in fact, have had nothing to do with the queries in question. The sales assistants willingly submitted to Redfield & White's practices concerning which types of problem they should tackle on their own initiative, and which problems should be passed on to staff members in positions of higher authority in the organisation. The assistants showed signs of relief that they did not have to take the responsibility themselves. The assistants were often very glad to be able to go to the underbuyer and buyer for their help and advice when faced with problems that they were themselves unable to solve. If the department's buyer was busy with other matters when an assistant approached her about a problem, she might speak in an abrupt way to the assistant. The buyer might at times give orders that appeared callous and ruthless. Yet the buyer's fundamental attitude to her staff was one of affection: 'I've got such a wonderful set of girls in this department. They're an excellent team and I'd do anything to help any one of them.' The buyer often showed considerable knowledge of the individual idiosyncrasies of her staff. An ability to show this understanding, even if only occasionally, was often an important factor in making for the buyer's popularity with her staff. They expected her to be strict, but she had to be human. In such instances as in passing on the buyer's orders, the underbuyer was often the go-between. Sometimes she was able to solve the assistant's problem without having to go to the buyer. Sometimes she found the assistant a suitable time to make an approach to the buyer. She was always the softening influence that made it easier for both parties. The assistants often objected to the orders given to them by their superiors. They sympathised with each other over the jobs given to them, and said that they could not understand the buyer's reasons for asking them to do a particular thing when they had had it in mind to do such-andsuch a job, which would have been so much better for all concerned. The assistants sometimes felt that a buyer's request was unreasonable. This was a conclusion they always reached jointly if it was to become articulated. They then got a spokesman to express their feelings to the underbuyer, in the hope that she might be able to intercede on their behalf with the buyer. Sometimes the underbuyer agreed to do this. Sometimes she tried to persuade the assistants that they should have done as the buyer had asked, and explained to them the buyer's reasons. In this way the matter was gradually settled.

Redfield & White Limited 223 If a member of a certain department won one of the store prizes no jealousy appeared to be felt or shown by her co-workers in the department. They seemed to show a genuine pride that one of the members of their department should have earned such a reward. Any praise from the buyer or underbuyer meant a lot to the assistants. If the slightest favouritism was shown towards one of them, they quickly showed their disapproval by a coldness of manner towards the assistant in question, and by a 'go-slow' reaction to any instructions given by the authority showing the favouritism. No open quarrel with another assistant or open expression of disapproval by departmental members occurred, no matter how much jealousy or anger might be experienced, until some recognised regulation was obviously broken by the offending parties. Those at management level and those of high rank in each of the various departments of Redfield & White's were regarded by the staff as something like parents. Because they were in their jobs they were trusted implicitly to do them well. The staff accepted without question top level decisions made by management. Although Redfield & White's management were to some extent feared by the assistants, they were also spoken of at times with sincere affection. Redfield & White's was often described as a 'big happy family' by its employees. One of the assistants said of the store in general: 'What's so nice about this place is that we're like one big family.' There was considerable informal sanctioning of 'familial' behaviour of both a positive and negative kind. Assistants who adopted the customary familial behaviour made contacts more smoothly both inside and outside their departments, established their place in the departments more easily, and got their work done more quickly and satisfactorily. By adopting a familiar mode of behaviour towards other members they were able to allay at once any suspicion or fear of them as 'strangers' that might have existed, and to resolve other tensions likely to arise from the store's formal structure. There was also a sanction resulting from the psychological satisfaction of belonging to and being accepted by a 'family'. The familial behaviour required was learned in about three weeks by newcomers. Once the individual had learnt the behaviour she was expected to adopt towards other members, and that they were ready to adopt towards her, and once she had learnt the attitude of mind that was adopted towards other departments and management, she was able to feel completely 'at home' in a true sense. The other members of the organisation were no longer 'strangers'; they were 'brothers', 'sisters' and 'parents'. She could approach them easily without formality, and could trust them. This made for smooth running and time saving generally. It also meant that keen competition was natural as between members of

224 Cases in Organisational Behaviour a family. Above all the individual had a sense of 'belonging' and being taken care of. In engaging new employees the personnel officer always wanted to know whether a newcomer would 'fit in' with the rest of the department. Personnel staff were unaware of what 'fitting in' meant in the store. The joking which occurred between the store's employees was unknown to Redfield & White's management. On reading the researcher's report on the store the company's managing director said that he had previously had no idea that a joking relationship existed, but that he was not surprised that it did. The researcher concluded that store management did not understand why the staff in the various departments of the store accepted top level decisions, or how the mechanisms which operated to attain unity between the various parts of the store's organisation worked. In attempting to encourage unity of effort in the store Redfield & White's management worked largely in the dark.

5.6 Mr. S. L. Blake1

McQuaide and Company was an old-established Scottish engineering firm. The company carried on a large business in heavy fabrications. In order to provide for the design, production and sale of technically advanced and fairly intricate products, a new department had been set up in the company. The products made by the department were utterly different from those to which McQuaide's was accustomed. Most of the components required for the new department's products were made in other departments of McQuaide's factory. The new department had to produce the designs for the products, to control progress through the factory, to buy in stock and parts, and run a separate assembly shop. In the recent past the department had been meeting fairly serious difficulties in sales and production. Mr S. L. Blake had recently been made responsible for technical sales. He had previously been a design engineer. The quotation which follows is a verbatim transcript from the record of a research interview with Mr Blake. Mr Blake: 'Well, as it is to my mind, and I may be quite wrong in this, the most important thing in any industrial undertaking is delegation of authority and delegation of responsibility to the different levels from whoever is resident at the top. In our case it would be the managing director. Now the authority must be in line with the responsibility that you expect the individual to take. Unless you have that and you have one man holding all the strings and under him a sound team of people who are specialists in the various fields and the various management functions which they are to exercise, then you get what is happening here - it means you get a virtual break. I can only speak for the technical side, I can't say anything on the accounting side or the works side, purely on the design and development and the production functions that we have. Now, unless you've got this top management level with the delegated responsibility and authority, I don't think you'll be able to get a healthy industrial community. You cannot effectively skip that level and come down to the next lower level and make that directly responsible to the top or have odd little offshoots who bypass the normal scheme and see themselves as responsible to the 1 Data for this case were taken from The Management of Innovation, by Tom Burns a nd G. M. Stalker (Tavistock, 1961).

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226 Cases in Organisational Behaviour top, or alternatively, have somebody on the intermediate level who is not prepared to take the responsibility he should . . . . What happens in our case, the way I see it, is that this top management level is missing, and you're jumping virtually from managing director to a number of senior technicians in charge of sections either on design, development, research, or production, who haven't got anybody co-ordinating their efforts except the managing director, by his occasional appearances and periodic meetings. That, I think, is the main trouble our particular company is suffering from. Now, to take one instance, we do have meetings: they are fashionable now. Something goes wrong and then it's decided that a weekly meeting should take place.' Interviewer: 'What kind of things went wrong?' Mr Blake: 'Well, supposing that a delivery goes wrong, or a design is put into production and is functionally not quite what it ought to be, then there is the usual post-mortem and it usually boils down to that everybody realises there hasn't been enough contact. People have gone too far their own way and got rather wrapped up in their own particular small aspect of the overall project. It's then realised that there hasn't been any one body drawing together all the threads of the particular project and keeping an overall eye on things, and then the usual scheme is to inaugurate a weekly meeting at which various points can be raised and jobs can be discussed. Now, in theory, that's a very desirable thing as long as it discusses matters which are relative to its function. Also that the plan of attack for the following week's work is clearly laid down and it is stated who will do what and they report back at the following meeting. It shouldn't just amount to a weekly gathering of bodies who, halfway through the business, drink a cup of tea and then break up and that's that. I'm afraid that is what has happened in our case very often: it hasn't helped us much.' Interviewer: 'What kind of things go wrong that are not put right at such meetings ?' Mr Blake: 'Well, when you start a new design or even a new series of an established model there are certain steps you must go through to get a new production batch on the go. These steps involve the drawing office, purchasing, and, to a great extent, planning and progress. That in turn will require examination of the capacity available within the plant, machine loading and the rest, and a great deal of ground work . . . . To get the whole thing going needs one instruction to one man who, in turn, will see that the wheels are set in motion. Well, that does not normally happen here.' Interviewer: 'There is no one man?' Mr Blake: There is no one man. What it amounts to is that it's announced,

Mr S.L.Blake 227 "Wouldn't it be a good idea if we produced another ten of such and such a type?"and everybody says, "Yes, sir, it's a jolly good idea. Let's do that." The meeting breaks up and a few days later, for instance, I'm in the drawing office and happen to say, "What have you done about these ten units? Have you got the drawings printed? Is somebody getting the schedules out?" and they'll say, "Haven't had any instructions." I say, "Well, you go ahead and get the drawings printed and the schedules out." The chap in charge in the drawing office will take my word for it - not because at some time he had been instructed that I will give him instructions about what he had to do but because I've always done so off my own bat and I know that unless somebody tells him he'll stay put. That may be the first movement. The lot will go forward to purchasing. Stock control first will run through the schedules, tick off what is in stock and so forth.' Interviewer: This is all routine passing of paper?' Mr Blake: There is an automatic passage of the schedule through the various departments. Ultimately somebody, usually it's the stores, will say, "Well, there's a hell of a lot of stuff in for this job. When are you going to start it?" Then everybody will think "When are we going to start it?" Because, at the time I said to Charlie in the drawing office, "It's time you got your schedules out, boy", nobody said to the planning office, "How are we going to fit this job in?" . . . People here are not pushing their jobs through but trying to drag them out at the other end, like a surgeon with a pair of forceps trying to drag the baby out. There should be no need to drag it out. It should come through.' 'Now it's true that in an organisation of our size, with a variety of products and frequent change of machining requirements, you cannot plan as efficiently as for a company which turns out, say, electric motors or razors and nothing else. At the same time, each batch could be routed so as to ensure a steady flow. Secondly, there is the lack of co-operation due not to the individuals but due to the absence of functional contact. Production is based mainly on demand - on contracts, not forecast sales which means that when an article is wanted it's wanted yesterday. Then priorities are introduced or revised and any existing programme upset. . ..' 'And our own departmental production manager has no direct control over machining facilities. Whatever he gets done in the shops in the factory he has to try to ease in and bolster his way around to try to get them in because there is nothing laid down. I mean, he would go and see the works manager and he could see the planning people, but the situation changes so fast; he wouldn't be in the picture all the time. They wouldn't keep him informed; they'd say "All right, we can put so-and-so in the machine shop on; you can have them." And twenty minutes later maybe something else comes up. They take his job off and put the new thing on, and nobody

228 Cases in Organisational Behaviour would tell him. So two days later he'd come back and ask how the job was getting on. They might be sorry, they might not be, but it wasn't their affair really.' Thirdly, lack of forecasting and market survey has also resulted at certain periods in our holding very large stocks and not processing them; in other words, capital being tied up in virtually useless material or partfinished products, or else in finished products lying on the shop floor in inadequate storage and of course deteriorating, which meant duplication of some of the work done on them - re-testing, repainting - before they actually went out.' Mr Blake's account squared with those of other members of the company's management. One junior manager confessed himself reluctant to seek promotion into a position in which he would be more dangerously exposed. Others at his level in the company felt the same way. He pointed for justification to the very high turnover that had been occurring among the senior managers of the McQuaide company.

5.7 Critical Books1

Critical Books was an English publishing firm located in London. In terms of output Critical Books was a medium-sized firm in the British publishing industry. Unlike many publishers of its size and type, the firm had remained completely independent during a period when the publishing trade as a whole had experienced a great many mergers and takeovers. Critical Books was a literary publishing house. It had a fifty-year-old tradition of literary and literary-critical publishing. In that time it had been in the forefront of most of the important movements in that field. A large proportion of the British novelists and poets who had emerged in the inter-war years, and several since, had originally appeared under Critical Books' imprint. Many major figures continued to do so. Out of the annual total of approximately 150 new titles published by Critical Books, some six to ten on average were volumes of poetry, and a further ten to fifteen were first novels. In addition, the firm published a further ten to fifteen new novels a year. Outside these areas the firm's emphasis was on 'highbrow' critical works, with a leavening of books on history and current affairs which were primarily written for or by academics. Both poetry and first novels were considered by publishers to be, on the available evidence, sure losers of money. New novels had, at the very best, an extremely slender chance of being profitable. All-in-all Critical Books' publishing list was, by common belief among publishers, at best only marginally profitable. Precise figures on profitability were not available to the researcher. The evidence suggested to him that the firm achieved a return on capital of less than 5 per cent per year.2 Profits were assured to Critical Books only by the existence of a backlist of titles in steady demand, which showed high margins because the major costs of production had been covered several printings before. Critical Books had six directors, all save one of whom were full-time working members of the firm. The exception worked half-time with the company, and devoted the remainder of his time to another publishing company of which he was also a director. All the directors had alternative sources of income. Critical Books provided the major source of income 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by Michael Lane in Sociology, vol. 4, no. 3 (1970). 2 At the time of the research study the return on capital achieved by the nationalised industries averaged 12 per cent per year {The Times, 11 September 1967).

229

230 Cases in Organisational Behaviour of three of them. All voting shares in the firm were held by the active directors. Some non-voting shares were held by members of the board who had retired. Efficient publishing depended on effective interdepartmental co-operation. Production departments had to be sure of obtaining manuscripts and corrections from the editorial departments in time to fit in with printing schedules. Sales departments had to have information on the content of a book from the editors, and its likely date of publication from the production department, in sufficient time to arrange distribution, reviews, and Table 5.7.1 Salaries of Managersa Salary paid and number of managers Years Up to £800: £801-950: £951-1,100: £1,101-1,250: No. of No. of No. of No. of of managers managers managers Service managers

£1,251-1,500: No. of managers

0-1 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-10 10-15

— — — 1 1

a

2 1 — — — —

1 2 1 — — —

2 3 1 — —

— — 1 — —

The data in the table concerns the salary levels of sixteen managers during late Spring 1967.

publicity. All aspects of Critical Books' production, publishing, marketing and distributing operations were concentrated in a single building. The company did not use any of the warehousing and distributive facilities set up to service the whole book trade. Some sixty employees worked in the company's building. None of them had been with Critical Books as long as the directors. Forty of them were semi-skilled manual workers employed in the packing room and warehouse, or on routine non-manual work concerned with accounts, filing, and other low-grade clerical tasks. Twenty members of the firm's staff held management status. Five of them were members of the editorial staff. Two were general list editors, two educational books editors and one a children's books editor. There werefivemembers of the sales and marketing department, consisting of the sales manager, the publicity manager, and three sales/publicity assistants. There were five members of the production department, consisting of the production manager, an assistant production manager, the designer and assistant designer, and the head of the rights department. There were

Critical Books 231 five persons designated by the researcher as 'administrators'. They consisted of four directors' secretaries, and an editorial secretary who was a member of the editorial department. The researcher concluded that the tasks these secretaries performed were essentially managerial. Nearly two-fifths of Critical Books' managers were graduates. Fewer than one in five had terminated their education in secondary school. Amongst the editorial staff the proportion of graduates was 94 per cent. Critical Books paid low salaries. The editorial staff earned, on average, 25 per cent less than they would have done if, with their qualifications, they had been school teachers on the Burnham salary scale. Seventy-five per cent of the managerial staff had been with Critical Books for less than three years. The average length of service of the firm's managers was 3-25 years. Table 5.7.1 provides information on the salaries and length of service of the firm's managers. Goals The researcher concluded that the roles of Critical Books' managers were defined by the directors' understanding of the cultural tradition of the firm. The directors' definition of the content of the firm's cultural goal had been shaped and fixed at an earlier period in the past. The directors expected the managers to work on texts which represented or contributed to this definition of the firm's cultural goal. In their roles as employees the managers were subject to the expectation that they implement the policy that the directors had decided upon. Over half of the managers gave as their reason for having gone to work at Critical Books the fact that they admired or respected a publisher with the authors on its list that Critical Books had. The managers themselves inferred from the backlist and reputation of the firm expectations that they would work towards a cultural goal whose content was in constant flux. The managers defined the firm as having, by its past record, established a relationship to the literary world and its public which imposed obligations on Critical Books. Editors especially saw their role as being expert representatives of this literary and public world, a position which they felt they had achieved through academic success and job experience. As such, they felt themselves subject to expectations that they support and implement the cultural values of their group. What they wanted to do was to publish books that they perceived as the present-day equivalents of the works on Critical Books' backlist they admired. The managers saw their responsibility as being primarily to and sanctioned by the ideas of this elite, and only secondarily to the firm with whom they were working. They saw themselves subject to the expectations of the firm's distinguished

232 Cases in Organisational Behaviour authors and the imprint's loyal public that they would continue to sustain high cultural and literary standards. All of them had become disillusioned since starting work at Critical Books. What they saw was the directors of the firm intent upon publishing books whose style and content were in their opinion unchanged pastiches or historic relics of a culture that had passed. The managers perceived themselves as compelled to work upon what were to them old-fashioned, pale imitations of the books they admired. They felt that the directors evaluated these in terms which put the new and the old on equal levels. At the same time they felt unable to be as critical as they would wish because Critical Books had in the past done what they wanted it to do now. The researcher carried out extended periods of observation of the firm's managers, and interviewed sixteen of them. He asked the managers to say what they believed the primary aim of Critical Books was. Ten said that they believed the primary aim was cultural, three that it was economic, and three were doubtful. Of the three doubtful managers, one was a newcomer. The other two felt that the definition of culture to which the directors subscribed was so alien to them that they were unable to see any goal-oriented action on the part of the firm. Twelve managers said that they did not believe that Critical Books would publish a book for purely economic reasons. They were insistent that the directors would reject a manuscript which did not in some way stand for, support, or represent the values to which they subscribed, even if they could be sure in advance that it would make a great deal of money. One manager felt that the firm would publish a book for purely economic reasons; three said that they did not know. Eight managers perceived their primary orientation or responsibility as being towards authors. Five perceived their primary orientation as being towards the public. Two perceived their primary orientation as being towards author and public equally. One did not know. The interviews suggested to the researcher that orientation was an issue that had been considerably thought about. Opinions were firmly held with, on occasion, a positive moral fervour. Where the orientation was towards authors, editors perceived an obligation not to publish work which they valued much below that of the idealised author, for fear the latter be contaminated or devalued by propinquity. Where the orientation was towards the reading public, editors felt an obligation not to publish work of a low standard - as they defined it - which the public would be deceived into buying and reading by a halo effect from the firm's established reputation. According to a production staff member the argument for the salary levels of the firm's managers was: 'You're not in it for money . . . you get

Critical Books 233 so little, you couldn't be. . . there must be something else.' Managers who asked for higher pay, especially on the basis of work achievement, were forced to define themselves as persons for whom economic criteria were more important than cultural. Their situation was such that a request for more money was defined as a betrayal of the values for which they were supposed to be working. The researcher was told that requests for higher salaries on the ground of personal need met a more sympathetic response from the directors. Behaviour The directors of Critical Books maintained constant day-to-day contact with the staff. The directors involved themselves intimately in all aspects of the work and at all levels. Formal organisation structure was eliminated by the directors as far as possible. There was a minimum of formal methods of communication between individuals and departments. Information about newly accepted manuscripts was, for example, required by both the editorial and sales departments. This information was not circularised, but was 'acquired' by those who needed it by asking the directors, or any other person likely to know. This was recognised as highly inefficient, and had led in the past to considerable difficulties. The directors declined to change it on the grounds that by this means 'people keep in touch with each other over things'. Within Critical Books information passed from person A to person B because they were friendly with one another. Staff members without a network of relations of this sort were condemned to constant frustration. From time to time conflicts arose between the interests of one department and those of another. The editors, say, would press the production department for the galley or page proofs of a book because they wanted to complete their work on it. Or the production department would press the editors for a manuscript for which they had printing capacity available. In the early stages of his career the Critical Books manager was frustrated in his work by the absence of an interpersonal network that he could use for information and co-operation. As he built up this network so his job satisfaction increased. But in the researcher's opinion friendship norms made it impossible for him to level off interpersonal involvement at the point where he obtained the required help, and was still in a position to apply the pressure that would get done what he wanted done. His involvement reached the point where he might no longer apply pressure on behalf of his work. The directors minimised status differences between the different levels of management in the firm. This was achieved by dispensing with the

234 Cases in Organisational Behaviour ascription and use of titles, and by insisting as far as possible that low status work be done by all staff. Editors were required to do their own filing and correspondence. All correspondence was kept in large, chronologically ordered letter-books, and staff were not permitted to have their own filing systems. All staff were addressed by their first names. Any member of staff who was on hand, no matter how senior he was, was expected to do menial tasks for a director if required. In all areas where status distinctions could have been made they were scrupulously avoided or suppressed. The most senior editor was, for example, expected to arrive at the same time in the morning as the most junior clerk. The clerks left at 5.30, while four-fifths of the managers interviewed reported spending a minimum of four hours a week on work outside office hours. Decision-making In conversation with their managers directors expected discursive discussions. Attempts by managers to get decisions from directors without lengthy preambles and postambles were regarded by the directors as in very bad taste. If a manager pressed for an answer to a question it was common for a director to say that he was too busy to give it. This expression of disapproval at the way in which the employee was handling the interaction confirmed that 'businesslike' procedures were not expected of managers. Directors used arguments of the order of: 'When you've been here a little longer you'll understand why . . .' Many of the managers reported to the researcher that this type of statement had frequently been made to them, though decreasingly as their length of service grew. The manager in Critical Books was apparently not permitted to make decisions within a known area. He was also not in a position to predict the likely outcome of his actions. In theory, all decision-making power rested with the directors. They were insistent on these rights being recognised. In practice, the volume of decisions that had to be made was such that subordinates had to make them all the time if the work was to be got through. By a process of trial and error employees had established the range of types of decisions that they could make. At the centre of this range lay an area covering operating procedures broadly defined, within which decisions were effectively the responsibility of the subordinate. Outside this area there lay a less well-defined region in which decisions were taken at risk. The greater part of the time the subordinates assumed the responsibility for making decisions in this area, and assumed the power required to do so. From time to time these decisions were questioned and overruled by the directors.

Critical Books 235 The decision whether to accept or reject a manuscript was, for example, in theory exclusively the directors'. In practice the volume of manuscripts received by Critical Books made it impossible for the directors to read them all. Editors therefore took it upon themselves to reject clearly impossible manuscripts, putting forward for the directors' consideration only those that they felt were possibly publishable. Editors and readers assumed complete responsibility for the form which rejecting a manuscript took. They might choose between a rejection slip, a brief letter of rejection, or a lengthier letter in which the manuscript was criticised and the author advised how to remedy defects in it. There was usually no interference from directors over these matters. From time to time, however, the directors insisted on their formal right to decide on what would and what would not be rejected. When they did so the whole work pace slowed down because the directors' time was occupied by reading manuscripts. Decisions that they alone could make were necessarily postponed. Job satisfaction in all the departments of the firm dropped steeply because much work simply could not be done without those decisions. The editorial staff became disturbed and resentful because they felt that their professional competence was being questioned, and they became fearful lest a work that they had rejected be approved. This had never in fact occurred. The firm's publicity manager was in practice responsible for deciding the form, content and placing of advertising. From time to time, however, one or other of the directors would decide to take over this work, if necessary cancelling bookings for space made in journals and ignoring blocks that had been specially prepared. On these occasions the publicity manager had to cope not only with the internal difficulties raised, but also with journal advertising managers on whose good will he was dependent for co-operation in various ways, and who had been inconvenienced by cancellations. Extra costs incurred as a result of directorial intervention had to be met out of the advertising budget. This created difficulties in that insufficient money was left for publicising later publications. The researcher could find no recognisable or recurrent pattern in the directors' excursions into the sphere of the managers' activities. They did not occur in such a way that they might be viewed as routine checks on performance. Their erratic occurrence and unpredictable consequences were perceived by subordinate managers as permanent threats to their achieved status as responsible and experienced professionals. They reduced autonomy and damaged self-esteem. The researcher's observations confirmed that the atmosphere at Critical Books was relatively free in most respects. The firm had no rule book for employees. Minor breaches of the expected order were either

236 Cases in Organisational Behaviour ignored by the directors or dealt with by 'scolding'. Failures in work, even lapses that were expensive for the firm, were generally ignored or simply drawn to the attention of the culprit with advice on how to avoid them in future. Twelve of the managers interviewed by the researcher said that discipline was lenient in Critical Books. Three said it was not lenient, and one did not know. Ten managers felt that discipline was not applied consistently. Five felt it was applied consistently; one did not know. The five managers who reported discipline as consistent felt that though discipline was on the whole lenient, it was very difficult to predict what the outcome for any given breach would be. The researcher believed that the way in which infringements of discipline were handled illustrated the essential 'rulelessness' of Critical Books. During the researcher's period of observation the privilege of leaving half an hour early on the Friday afternoon before a bank holiday was, at the last minute, withdrawn without notice by the directors as a punishment for lateness in the mornings. The lateness was a crime of the few; the punishment was applied to all. At Critical Books the same act by an employee might at one time be defined as acceptable, at another as deviant. An act defined as deviant might be severely sanctioned or quite ignored. Different directors ranked offences in quite different orders of seriousness. There was considerable disagreement amongst colleagues as to what constituted deviant behaviour, much of it related to the conflict between friendship norms and work norms. There was a division between those who regarded business effectiveness which offended against cultural canons as more reprehensible, and those who regarded what they saw as excessive emphasis on good taste at the expense of effective publishing as the more reprehensible. The researcher believed that he found some evidence which suggested that the directors would have probably chosen to do their work alone, if such had been feasible. The firm's longest serving manager stated that the directors were 'happiest of all during the war when there were practically no staff and they had to do everything themselves. What's more the paper shortage meant that they could publish very few books and just ones they were absolutely happy with and be sure of selling anything they printed.'

SECTION SIX

Change of Inputs: Organisational Change and Development

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Introduction The final section of this book concentrates on change and development in the organisation at both the partial and total levels, spotlighting strategies intended to maintain or improve the organisation's viability in its environment. Change and development can occur in many different forms or guises. Change can be externally initiated, touched off by alterations in the organisation's environment such as shifts in market patterns and the elaboration of new technologies. Development may be conceived as organisational change internally initiated by management, in the form of deliberate attempts to improve the organisation's utilisation of its human potentialities. Management's attempts to develop the organisation may be made with or without the collaboration of external consultants. Change and development strategies may be based on altering the organisation's human, social, technical, leadership, or structural inputs in some or other combination, by some or other method. For this reason study of cases and concepts centred on change and development should most appropriately be preceded by study of the various system inputs. Most of the cases in this section consist of two-part series, the first of which describes an organisation and the impending change or development. The second part provides information concerning the impact of the change, on development in the organisational system, and consequent emergent problems which may require further management,action. The Radbourne Mill case offers a profile of a textile plant at the beginning of a technical-financial change intended to maintain the plant's competitiveness. The case presents an opportunity to diagnose the likely human impact of the changes propounded at the end of the case. Vulcan Tyre Company (A) describes the adoption of a merit-rating scheme by a manufacturer, intended to ensure reliable workmanship and improve management-worker relations generally. The case encourages prediction of the outcome of the development strategy. Vulcan Tyre Company (B) outlines the impact of the scheme from the vantage point of three years later, and provides data confirming or denying the predictions made on the basis of the (A) case. Carters Cattlefoods (A) offers a detailed picture of the arrival of electronic data processing in a company, facilitating an exercise in which students may diagnose the likely impact of the computer on certain of the company's staff. Carters Cattlefoods (B) provides information on the 239

240 Cases in Organisational Behaviour reception of the change by the staff, and the progress of the change over time. In The Supervisory Training Course (A) a management consultant is called in, by the management of a contracting firm, with the brief to increase the organisation's efficiency. Training was conceived as the appropriate medium of development, which led to changes in the attitudes of supervisors. The lecturer may usefully append prediction questions to the case. The Supervisory Training Course (B) takes up the implementation of the change, and describes further events in the company. This case, like the Carters Cattlefoods series, illustrates the use of external experts called in by managements to bring about change and development. References Four very brief items present notions about change and development in elementary form: Lupton (1) provides a systems perspective of the change process; Morison (2) elegantly describes an historical innovation in a systemic context; Dalton (3) introduces the notion of change related to the individual, group and organization; Greiner and Barnes (4) some concepts about change at the level of the organisation as a whole. Leavitt (5) and Spencer and Sofer (6) discuss change in somewhat more advanced fashion. Beckhard (7) reviews strategies and models for organisation development. Lewin's celebrated research and that of Bennet and Morse and Reimer is succinctly precised by Lawrence and Seiler (8). Coch and French's (9) study of work groups and Lawrence's (10) on resistance to change are usually regarded as essential reading. Benne (11) outlines a way of analysing change and concepts for doing so. Greiner (12) reviews recent change strategies at the total organisational level, Dalton (13) the role of influence in change. 1. Tom Lupton, 'The Practical Analysis of Change in Organizations', Journal of Management Studies, vol 2, no. 2 (1965). 2. E. E. Morison, 'A Case Study of Innovation', Engineering and Science Magazine, April 1950. 3. G. W. Dalton, 'Criteria for Planning Organizational Change', in P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, Organizational Behaviour and Administration, rev. edn (Irwin-Dorsey, 1965). 4. L. E. Greiner and L. B. Barnes, 'Organization Change and Development', in G. W. Dalton et al. (eds), Organizational Change and Development (IrwinDorsey, 1970). 5. H. J. Leavitt, 'Applied Organization Change in Industry: Structural, Technical, and Human Approaches', in W. W. Cooper et al. (eds), New Perspectives in Organization Research (Wiley, 1964). 6. Paul Spencer and Cyril Sofer, 'Organizational Change and its Management',

Introduction to Section Six

241

Journal of Management Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (1964); Cyril Sofer, The Assessment of Organizational Change', Journal of Management Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (1964). 7. Richard Beckhard, Organization Development: Strategies and Models (Addison-Wesley, 1969). chs 1, 3 and 10. 8. P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, op. cit., pp. 933-8. 9. Lester Coch and J. R. P. French, 'Overcoming Resistance to Change', Human Relations, vol. 1, no. 4 (1948). 10. P. R. Lawrence, 'How to Deal with Resistance to Change', Harvard Business Review, vol. 32, no. 3 (1954). 11. K. D. Benne, 'Changes in Institutions and the Role of the Change Agent', in P. R. Lawrence and J. A. Seiler, op. cit. 12. L. E. Greiner, 'Patterns of Organization Change', Harvard Business Review, vol. 45, no. 3 (1967). 13. G. W. Dalton, 'Influence and Organizational Change', in G. W. Dalton et ah (eds), op. cit.

6.1 The Radbourne Mill1 The Radbourne Weaving Mill was located in the small English town of Radbourne. Weaving had long been practised at Radbourne, and the company which owned the mill had a long tradition of activity in the area. The company operated other textile plants in the locality. Radbourne was only a small town, and alternative employment was nonexistent, especially for trained personnel. The mobility of families in the area was not great. Throughout its history the company had been progressive as far as the welfare of employees was concerned. As early as 1846 organised welfare and educational opportunities had been offered to company employees. In the 1850s a nursery school was started for the children of working mothers. A small reminder of the old nineteenth-century working atmosphere still existed in the Radbourne mill at the time of the research study. This took the form of several moral directives painted on the factory's iron beams, such as 'Weave truth with trust'. These maxims had been refurbished every time the mill was painted. During the 1930s employees at the Radbourne mill had worked a great deal of short time. But there had been no dismissals, and employment by the company had provided a security which was lacking in many other parts of England. The company was regarded as a good employer by the older people working in the mill. The Mill's Technology There were two component sets of processes involved in turning yarn into cloth. First in sequence came preparatory processes, during which the yarn was assembled and arranged for weaving. Then came the weaving process itself, which was performed on a loom. The essential function of the loom was to intertwine lengthwise and crosswise threads of yarn, in a systematic fashion, in order to produce cloth. Since the invention of manmade fibres at the beginning of the twentieth century, the company had been in the vanguard of this development. At the time of the present study manmade fibres of all types were almost exclusively used in weaving at the Radbourne mill. 1

Data for this case were taken from The Dynamics of a Changing Technology, by Peter J. Fensham and Douglas Hooper (Tavistock, 1964).

242

The Radbourne Mill 243 During the previous ten years there had been a constant stream of changes occurring in equipment, organisation and personnel at the mill. Some weaving looms had been replaced by other looms, and new machinery had been installed in the preparatory departments. New yarns had been developed, which led to changes in the type of cloth woven. Many new operatives had joined the company as others left. Most of the existing members of management had reached managerial positions in the organisation during this period. Ninety-four automatic weaving looms of an early American design had been installed in the mill some sixteen years before. At that time less than 48 automatic looms (current model)

94 automatic looms (early model)

Maintenance shop

Offices (all aspects of administration)

Preparatory departments (yarn store, spooling, warping, sizing, entering, etc.)

Main weaving shed

212 non-automatic looms engaged on specialised weaving

354 non-automatic looms engaged on non-specialised weaving (simple mass production)

Figure 6.1.1 Layout of Building 3 per cent of the power looms in Britain were automatic, and the proportion weaving manmade fibres was even smaller. These looms were introduced in order to meet the growing competition of overseas manufacturers. Another group of forty-eight automatic looms of current design had been installed two years previously. The comparatively high cost associated with the purchase of automatic looms and their speed of production had led the company to inaugurate a two-shift system of operating the looms. This took the form of a double-day working shift, on a five-day week, excluding weekends. Shift working had slowly spread, over a period of years, to several sections of the mill in both the weaving and non-weaving departments. The layout of the mill is set out in Figure 6.1.1. The area of the building was 226,000 square feet. The total personnel working in the mill numbered

244 Cases in Organisational Behaviour 409, of whom 391 were operatives and clerical personnel. There were 17 persons in managerial positions. The Work Force At the mill there was a traditional separation between the weaving and non-weaving departments. Each department and even section was traditionally distinct and separate, having its own particular location and skills. The operatives felt and talked in terms of this distinctiveness, and cherished the skills of the best workers as contributing to this. There were a few operatives whose task it was to move materials from department to department. But for the most part operative-to-operative communication between departments was virtually non-existent during working hours. The great majority of the weaving personnel in the mill worked in the non-automatic weaving sections. Employees in the preparatory departments spent most of their time preparing material for the non-automatic looms. The area of the building which contained the non-automatic looms was referred to by all the mill's personnel as the 'main shed' or the 'big shed'. Seventy per cent of the cloth produced by the mill came from this shed. About 250 of the Radbourne mill's personnel worked on preparatory and non-weaving activities. The ante- and post-weaving processes, which included the preparation and processing of the yarn, inspection of the cloth, and so on, were all perceived as more or less ancillary operations that served the weaving activities. There were in all between 130 and 140 operatives employed in the weaving sections. About half of these operatives were engaged in specialised weaving on non-automatic looms. More than a third of the total weaving personnel were engaged on simple mass-production weaving. The remainder worked on the automatic looms. Many of the weavers were women. Each weaver had charge of a number or set of looms. The set of looms allocated by management was the weaver's domain of responsibility, and set the boundary of his or her task. During working hours the weaver was anchored within the physical bounds of his set of looms. Each weaver working on non-automatic looms was in comparatively close proximity to several other weavers. They were able to communicate with each other without leaving their looms. Weavers operating automatic weaving machines had charge of a much larger set of looms. Each weaver occupied a working domain some ten to twenty yards from other weavers, and was comparatively isolated from them. This was intensified by higher noise levels. Conditions varied considerably within the different sections of the

The Radbourne Mill 245 weaving department. There was no standard form of training or apprenticeship for weavers. They were not infrequently moved from one section of the weaving department to another, or even transferred to other jobs altogether. Weavers were the second most highly paid group of employees at the mill. The other major kind of operative directly involved in weaving operations was the 'overlooker'. Overlookers were essentially maintenance mechanics or maintenance engineers to the looms. Their tasks covered the preparation of the weaving machines for production, and their adjustment and maintenance during production. Like the weaver, the overlooker was responsible for a set of looms. The number of looms in the overlooker's set was larger than that of the weaver. Each overlooker's responsibility for looms thus overlapped that of a number of weavers. In this way each overlooker came into a working relationship with between two and a dozen weavers, depending on the type of loom involved. All the overlookers were men. Among all the operative roles overlooking was agreed by the mill management to be the most skilled. The loom mechanic was recognised by management to be the key technician in the weaving process. Overlookers had the highest status of all operatives, and were paid at a considerably higher rate than any other operatives in the mill. They were a highly cohesive group with norms and attitudes which were shared by all overlookers in the various weaving sections. Organisation and Management The formal organisation of the Radbourne mill is shown in Figure 6.1.2. The mill was formally controlled by a manager, who possessed full administrative powers for its productive operation. Other company functions, such as sales, yarn supply, cloth finishing and cloth storage, were handled centrally. There was considerable consultation between the mill and the company headquarters about the placement of orders for cloth production. But the placement of orders was, in the last resort, a company responsibility. A central company programming office handled the main aspects of production control, including the delivery of yarn to the mill, and the supply of woven goods to the customer. Within the mill there was a system of programming and control operated in conjunction with the central programming office, and the mill's management. Six members of the mill's management, including the manager, came from the north of England. Five of them had come to the Radbourne area during the previous twenty years. Most members of management had spent a considerable proportion of their working lives employed by the

246 Cases in Organisational Behaviour company. The upper levels of the Radbourne hierarchy were composed solely of weaving specialists who had in the past been overlookers. Supervisors for weaving sections and the weaving department were always recruited from the ranks of the overlookers. Preparatory supervisors were recruited from outside the ranks of either weavers or overlookers. Nearly all the supervisors in the mill met at a foremen's meeting, held at monthly intervals, to discuss matters of interest and importance to themselves and the company. The holding of such meetings was company Manager Oakroyd

Accounts department (supervisor)

Non-auto weaving department

Automatic weaving department

Foreman Bowyer

Foreman Gardiner

Maintenance department (supervisor)

Preparatory departments

Foreman Ashby

Spooling foreman, Lawson

Warping foreman, Black

Sizing foreman, Watson

Entering foreman, Harris

Foreman Yates

Cloth examining foreman, Boyd

Yarn store foreman, West

Work study engineer, Moore

Programme foreman, Jackson Two 'junior' foremen (on shifts)

Figure 6.1.2 Partial Organisation Chart policy. These meetings were presided over by the manager. There was a formal agenda, and an elected secretary to record the minutes and to deal with business. Jackson (the programming supervisor) and West (the yarn store supervisor) did not attend these meetings, as they were not considered to be full status supervisors. The implementation of work study techniques throughout the mill was official company policy. Nearly all the operatives' tasks, and incentives for performance of them, were largely determined by work study methods. In setting output targets the work study engineer dealt directly with the operatives. More often than not the immediate supervisor was bypassed. The overlookers had refused to operate under the work study scheme. Unions were accepted by the company, and all negotiations concerning

The Radbourne Mill 247 conditions of work and rates of pay were carried out between management and union representatives. Official union-management relations were cordial, and such disputes as occurred were generally solved by local negotiations at the mill. The two main unions active in the plant were the National Association of Power Loom Overlookers (NAPLO), which catered for the loom mechanics; and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), which catered both for the weavers and many other employees in the mill. By agreement with the management all loom mechanics were obliged to belong to NAPLO. NAPLO also had agreements with the company about the selection and training of overlookers in the mill. The number of apprentice loom mechanics was a matter for negotiation between union and management. About 70 per cent of the weavers and other operatives eligible to be members of the TGWU held current membership. A works council had been formed at the Radbourne mill some years before. The stated aims of the council were to provide direct managementworker contact; to consider jointly matters affecting the mill; and to co-operate together to promote the well-being and efficiency of all. The council was composed of elected members who held their seats by proposal and secret ballot held in the sections which they represented; and other members proposed by Oakroyd, the manager, from among his managers and supervisors. The overlookers had refused to recognise the council, and did not fill the seat allotted to them on it. The council acted as a forum for the expression of ideas and information from both management and workers. It was excluded from discussing anything bearing on wages or conditions of employment. The council met at monthly intervals. Information about the council's activities reached the mill operatives either through their section representative, some other person, or through written statements about the proceedings. Information about the council's current activities was made available in the form of summaries of the meetings, which were posted on general notice-boards scattered throughout the factory. *

*

*

Senior company management believed that in order for the firm to stay competitive it was important to lower labour costs per loom, and labour costs in the overall production of cloth. The executive assumed a continuing scarcity of skilled labour. Cost reduction could, it was felt, be achieved by the company adopting the most technologically advanced forms of production. This would serve to keep the company's products viable in the face of British and international competition. The company executive felt that automatic production would best complement the assumed continuing scarcity of skilled labour. Extensive

248 Cases in Organisational Behaviour experiments were carried out by the company with various types of automatic loom, particularly the British automatic type. From these tests the company concluded that there was no British loom to compare, on quality and cost bases, with those produced in Switzerland or in the United States, for the weaving of manmade fibres. Senior management decided to install a number of new American automatic looms in the Radbourne mill. The directors of the company perceived this step as a major departure from the existing pattern of the mill's activities, which they described to the researchers as stable and unaccustomed to change. It was decided that 112 new automatic looms should be purchased and installed in the centre of the main shed of the Radbourne mill. Some non-automatic looms would be removed to make room for them. The activities of the preparatory departments would in future need to become much more geared to the requirements of automatic looms. Oakroyd, the mill manager, made the first general announcement of the projected installation of the automatic looms in the main shed. He made this announcement to the works council and to the foremen's meeting. A few days later, Manning, the company personnel manager, suggested that more information about the impending changes should be given to the personnel who would be directly involved. He believed that this would help to evoke co-operation from the operatives during the changeover period. Oakroyd agreed to this suggestion, and called two further meetings - a foremen's meeting, and a meeting of all the operatives in the non-specialised, non-automatic weaving section from which looms were to be replaced. Manning addressed these meetings, and emphasised the economic need for the change to automatic production. Only in this way, he stressed, could the company hope to remain competitive in the industry. He instanced the town of Lavenham, dependent, like Radbourne, for its prosperity on a single industry. Lavenham had in the past failed to keep pace with industrial development, and had lost all its wealth and most of its people. He said that changes would be necessary for some of the mill's employees, but that the company was seeking ways to make these most easily. After his address, Manning answered a few questions about the details of the impending changes. Shortly afterwards Oakroyd drew up a list of twenty-eight weavers and overlookers who were to be the prospective operatives for the new automatic looms.

6.2 Vulcan Tyre Company (A)1

The Merc factory was situated in a small industrial town in the south of England. The parent firm, the Vulcan Tyre Company, was a neighbouring and much larger organisation under separate management. The factory was concerned with the manufacture of rubber tyres. It employed some 500 employees, two-thirds of whom were men and one-third women. The factory used shift-working and shared a joint consultative committee between management and the shop floor with the parent company. Before the Second World War the factory had had a bad name for pay and other reasons. By advertisements and other publicity the Merc factory was now attempting to build its reputation on the high quality of its goods. The factory's managing director, Mr G. W. Lane, had a clear idea of the goal he wished the organisation to attain, and apparently inexhaustible energy in driving towards it. The processes carried out in the factory were many and varied. Most of the jobs were semi-skilled. Many jobs required some manual skill, continuous observation and intermittent judgements and decisions. Some jobs were almost entirely determined by the requirements of the process. Few workers in such jobs complained of boredom. There was a tendency to relax after each article had been finished, a natural break that on some jobs occurred about seven or eight times a day. The workers were paid on hourly rates. Many of the jobs had in common a necessity for attention to the quality of workmanship. In any one of many different hand processes a flaw might easily be undetected or hidden, and affect the quality of the finished tyre. A tyre could only be tested by destroying it or by wear. Ensuring reliable workmanship at every stage of manufacture was of great importance. Mr Lane, the managing director, held that four conditions determined the success of a factory: materials, equipment, technical knowledge, and management-worker co-operation. He had reorganised the factory until he considered that the first three conditions were satisfactory or improving. He then turned his attention to strengthening what he called the 'fourth leg', which he thought was usually the main weakness in British industry. He considered that autocratic management was outdated and inefficient, 1

Data for this case were taken from the article by Norah M. Davis in Occupational Psychology, vol. 27, no. 2 (1953).

249

250 Cases in Organisational Behaviour and that workers could not be expected to do their best 'unless they feel the factory belongs to them'. In order to achieve this integration he thought that management should keep the workers fully informed on all matters affecting the factory and its trading position. In his view decisions affecting the workers should, whenever possible, be made jointly by them and management. At the same time he felt that each member of the firm should have personal responsibility for his own job, and that individual merit be recognised and rewarded. This policy was supported by Merc factory management, so that the management as a whole had a common outlook and aim. The factory's works manager shared with his managing director an unpremeditated friendliness and lack of self-importance. The two men were friends. In the hope that it might ensure reliable workmanship at every stage of manufacture, apart from other possible advantages, a merit-rating scheme was conceived and introduced by Mr Lane. Before the scheme was submitted for discussion with the factory's employees, management discussed their draft scheme in detail with the factory's foremen. Management regarded the approval and support of the foremen as essential. Long discussions on the proposed scheme were held between management and foremen. Merc factory management believed that the representatives on the joint consultative committee were too few in number to be adequate links between the shop floor and management. They therefore proposed that every group of ten workers in the Merc factory should elect a representative, and that this body of representatives should discuss the proposed merit-rating scheme with management, and later report to them the views of their own electors. These proposals were put into action. At all the many meetings subsequently held to discuss the merit-rating schemeincluding those held at midnight for shift-workers - both the managing director and the works manager were always present. A scheme was eventually agreed upon by management, foremen and the workers' representatives. A written description of it was then issued to each worker in the factory. A universal ballot followed, in which 95 per cent of the workers approved of giving the scheme a trial. -Management made a statement to the workers that the scheme was an experiment, and that they realised that mistakes might be made. Under the scheme each rating of each employee was to be made on the basis of five qualities selected as being the most appropriate and desirable characteristics for the type of work done in the Merc factory. These characteristics were: (1) quality and quantity of work; (2) application; (3) effort and initiative; (4) co-operation; and (5) attention to safety and care of tools and materials. Twenty marks were allotted to each of these five qualities, the final possible total of marks being 100.

Vulcan Tyre Company (A) 251 Two assessment forms were to be filled in for each worker, the raters being his foreman and his assistant foreman. The raters were to mark independently without consultation. The five qualities were described fully on the forms. The rater was required to put a sign at any appropriate point on a 'line of progress' for each quality. At five points on these lines descriptive phrases indicated the type of behaviour expected. The final assessment was to be made by a panel consisting of the two foremen concerned, the personnel manager and the works manager. This panel was to consider the two assessments and all the other information available, such as time-keeping records and details of any contributions to the 'suggestion box'. The panel was to continue to discuss each case until the members reached unanimous agreement. The presence of permanent members on the panel was regarded as a safeguard against individual differences in rating and against favouritism. Each worker's assessment was regarded as confidential; he was to be given his assessment privately. Workers were to be encouraged to question and discuss their assessments. Employees with over three month's service who obtained at least 30 marks were to be paid an award graded according to the number of marks obtained and reckoned as a percentage of their hourly rate. Every two marks was equivalent to an additional payment of 0-87 per cent of the base rate, the maximum possible award being 43-5 per cent of the base rate.1 A gain or loss of one mark would not make any financial difference. Employees who gained less than 30 marks were to be dismissed. Under the system changes in a worker's earnings could occur twice a year. For the first assessments the panel sat for twelve hours a day seven days of the week for three weeks. On the introduction of merit-rating management adopted the policy of delegating more responsibility to the foremen. Management attempted to raise their self-esteem and status by delegating more authority to them. Foremen were compelled to spend more time in organising, and less in acting as inspectors or helpers of their subordinates, As a symbol of this management changed the term 'foreman' to 'supervisor'. 1 An example illustrates how the system was intended to work. A merit rating of 72 would be equivalent to an increase in pay of (72/2 x 0-87), i.e. 31-3 per cent of the base rate.

6.3 Vulcan Tyre Company (B)

When the merit-rating scheme had been in operation for three and a half years, the Merc factory was studied by researchers from the Medical Research Council's Group for Research in Industrial Psychology. The research study of the Merc factory was carried out in the course of a wider survey. The researchers gathered information from the factory's records, and from individual interviews with managers, supervisors and workers. They felt that they received friendly and interested co-operation from all levels of the factory's employees. The researchers found that output per man hour had risen steadily, and had increased by 85 per cent since the merit-rating scheme had been instituted. During this time much new and highly efficient machinery had been introduced, and there had been increases in hourly wage rates. Labour costs and the amount of scrap had decreased. Over the period voluntary labour turnover was negligible. The first merit award had brought an average increase of about a third in the hourly wage rates paid. After that time wages showed a slight upward trend, due partly to increases in hourly rates which were common to the whole industry, and partly to a general tendency for merit awards to rise slightly at each assessment. In the three months preceding the first assessment the percentage of hours lost through absence without permission and lateness had been 0-76 and 0-32 respectively. In the following quarter these percentages had dropped by more than half. They then continued to decrease slowly for about a year until they reached a stable average level of 0-05 and 0-12 respectively. Despite occasional setbacks the Merc factory was expanding and progressing. The introduction of new machines and new methods brought a sense of life and development to the shop floor. Owing to trading conditions and shortage of raw materials at one period, some workers had been dismissed as redundant. They had been later re-engaged. No employee had been dismissed for achieving a merit rating of less than 30 marks. The factory's management director and works manager each insisted that the other was entitled to the main share of praise for any success achieved by the changes made three years before. Management thought that the merit-rating scheme was largely responsible for the rise in output per man hour, the reduction in labour costs, the decrease in absence and lateness, and the general improvement in morale. The new role for the supervisors was welcomed by most of the super252

Vulcan Tyre Company (B) 253 visors. The supervisors said that most of their workers had a high standard of work and general working behaviour. The supervisors agreed that their departments were 'a happy family'. Contact between supervisors and their workers were on the whole easy and informal. They made some criticisms of the merit-rating scheme. On the whole they thought that it had contributed to efficiency and good relationships. One supervisor said that he thought it much preferable to piece-work systems, since it encouraged interest in quality as well as quantity, and stimulated interest in and suggestions about working techniques and safety. The supervisors said that it was customary for men who had to arrive early at work, because of infrequent bus services, to go to their machines and start cleaning up or doing odd jobs. One supervisor commented that the emphasis laid on individual responsibility lightened the task of supervision, and decreased the influence of the unofficial leader on a social group of workers each doing an individual task but linked by social ties. As an example he described a group of men who, before merit-rating, had tended to imitate the behaviour of the dominant personality, a man who was usually a good and quick worker, but was erratic. 'When he had his off days, everyone [had] followed him.' The Interviews The researchers took a 25 per cent statistically random sample of the main group of the factory's production workers. The sample consisted of 52 men and 28 women. In the consequent interviews the researchers followed a planned framework. Each person was encouraged to talk freely. 81-3 per cent of the workers interviewed in this way approved of the merit-rating scheme. They assessed their general attitude in one of the two highest categories of a five-point rating scale. The workers gave three main reasons for their approval: that the scheme increased their earnings, that it made work more interesting, and that it was just. Comments about increased earnings were made by 63-8 per cent of the workers, and reflected the general high level of satisfaction with the wages paid by the Merc factory. The workers compared their wages favourably with those paid by other factories in the locality, and with those paid before the Second World War. It was clear to the researchers that most workers regarded their merit award as an integral part of their weekly wage. Some of them implied that the award was almost equivalent to a rise in hourly rates. A few said that the award was 'money for nothing', since they would work as well in any case. 32-5 per cent of the workers commented that the scheme increased their interest in their work. 35 per cent of the workers commented that the

254 Cases in Organisational Behaviour scheme was 'fair'. 'Fair' referred most often to the just administration of the scheme, the absence of favouritism, and the opportunity to ask for explanations for the marks given. They reflected the workers' belief in the integrity and capability of their supervisors and managers. In the early days many workers had questioned or discussed their assessments. At the earlier assessments requests for information had been frequent. Another, somewhat different, conception of justice was implied in remarks such as, 'It is fair because it's not given on what you do but on how you do it, so that the person who sweeps the floor is as liable to get full marks as the tyre worker.' Half of the workers made specific criticisms of the merit-rating scheme. The most frequent type of criticism, made by 20 per cent of the workers interviewed, was that points were 'wrongly allocated'. Many of these criticisms revealed misunderstandings of the qualities assessed, among which were said to be 'quantity not quality of work' and, conversely, 'quality not quantity', length of service, type of job, and various other characteristics. A number of workers failed to realise that the actual output of an individual was not the only or the all-important factor in determining his assessment. 13-8 per cent of the workers said that the scheme had led to jealousy or bad feeling among the workers. In some instances this bad feeling arose from misunderstandings about the qualities for which marks were given. Several workers said that it was unfair that all members of a working team should not get the same assessments. Allegations of incompetence or favouritism on the part of the assessors were made by 8-8 per cent of the workers. In reply to a direct question posed by the researchers, 33-8 per cent of the workers said that they did not understand the merit-rating scheme. A further 20 per cent said that they had only 'a rough idea'. The proportions who admitted to lack of understanding were greater among women than among men, and greater in the less skilled than in the more skilled grades. Some workers said that they had understood the scheme when it was first explained to them, but had since then forgotten some of the details. Merc factory management was extremely surprised and disconcerted when told of this finding by the researchers. The researchers asked the workers interviewed for permission to see their assessment records. Almost all of them gave their permission. The researchers made an analysis of the records of the 49 workers who had been employed continuously for the preceding three years, and who had had six successive assessments. The variation in the marks of individuals in this category were within a range of zero to 9 marks. About two-thirds of the workers had not gained or lost more than three marks. During the three years 9 of the 49 workers earned the same money award throughout.

Vulcan Tyre Company (B) 255 Eighteen earned one increase, 16 earned two increases, 4 earned three and 2 earned four. The lowest marks earned by any member of this group were 72, and the highest 96. On the first six assessments the average mark for men was 83-4 and for women 79-9. On the last assessment the averages were 86-7 and 82-1 respectively. In the four grades of men workers in ascending order of skill, the average marks were 74, 82, 86 and 91. *

*

*

Most workers gave apathetic approval to the method of communicating with factory management through their elected representatives. Many of them said that this method was a 'good idea'. But they said that in practice their representatives failed to pass on effectively the information and opinions they had learned at the meetings. The meetings seemed to be regarded by many workers as a means of receiving rather than of giving or exchanging information. The workers usually judged, occasionally unfavourably, the behaviour of other managers and supervisors in the Merc factory by the standard of the managing director and works manager. The workers praised the two highest members of management for their courteous and approachable manner and lack of snobbery, and for their energy and hard work, which set a fast tempo to life in the factory. One of the workers' representatives said: 'If we are in danger of running short of materials, our managing director goes chasing round the country like a madman till he gets them.' In their interviews with the researchers many workers made remarks about factory management such as, They're straight and will admit they're human, so you can respect them.' Most of the workers said that they enjoyed their work. Several workers said that they found that the habit of continuous activity on the job had decreased boredom. They said that the merit-rating scheme had increased output 'not because we work any harder but because we don't waste so much time'. Another worker said: 'Everyone's expected to work hard here and not waste time, and that's as it should be.' Both the workers and management often spoke of the merit-rating scheme as an incentive. One worker said, 'It's an incentive because you get an idea of what they think of you and of your work.' Very few workers engaged in the jobs which were almost entirely determined by the requirements of the process complained of boredom. In very many instances they said they liked their jobs because 'no one worried you' and 'you can do the programme they give you in your own way'. Some of the workers were bored, and said they were engaged on monotonous tasks that had lost their novelty and made too few demands on them. On some jobs on which a number of workers were engaged on similar

256 Cases in Organisational Behaviour tasks the general intention to do 'a good day's work' seemed to lead the workers to form a specific intention to complete a certain number of articles in a day, and to regard this number as a standard below which an individual's production should not fall. This target did not seem to be regarded as an upper limit. In several instances workers praised those who exceeded it. These self-imposed targets had come to be the supervisors' standards of acceptable minimum output. One man said: 'You're watching the clock all the time, just to mark how you're getting on, although it's not till towards the end of the day that you really start aiming. But you're working with time and not against it.' Other comments on changed attitudes to work showed a tendency to conform to certain customs now regarded as 'right' - such as to aim at high quality of workmanship, not to waste time, etc. - were reinforced by the discovery that such customs increased satisfactions arising from the performance of the job. The workers constantly inspected their own work. They made this a habit which many found to be pleasurable for its own sake. Many workers said that the stress laid by management on quality increased their interest in the work. One man said: 'You seem to be part of the firm in helping to get the stuff out'. Both management and workers often spoke about co-operation. The researchers noticed that the merit-rating scheme had created none of the sense of continuous pressure and strain associated with many forms of incentive payment.

6.4 Carters Cattlefoods (A)1

Carters Cattlefoods was an old-established, medium-sized manufacturing firm in the cattle-food industry, which employed a clerical labour force of 147. The firm did not have a personnel manager. Carters' managers had a great deal of knowledge of traditional office procedures and staff and customer reactions. The chairman of Carters became interested in electronic data processing after reading an article which described the application of linear programming by computer to the mixing processes used by the firm in the manufacture of its products. The article had been brought to the chairman's attention by Mr G. M. Fathers, the company's accounts manager. Further investigation established that a computer could perform the necessary linear programming operations, and also process customer accounts, forecast sales and take over some management control functions. Mr Fathers stressed that a computer would reduce staff numbers. A decision to get a computer followed, unanimously made by Carters' board of directors. The board made the decision partly in the hope of reducing labour costs. Once Carters had decided to get a computer, it next had to find a make and model suitable for its purposes. Because the firm was looking for a relatively small machine, it did not approach a large number of manufacturers, and asked only three for detailed feasibility studies. The final choice was made in terms of price and suitability for the firm's work. Carters decided to rent the machine rather than to buy it outright. The process of negotiating with the manufacturers took about a year, including six months' discussion and planning with the manufacturer of the chosen machine. Carters believed, largely as a result of the information supplied by the computer manufacturer, that introducing the computer to the firm was a simple technical procedure, similar to introducing any other kind of machine, best handled by accountants. Carters were also given optimistic estimates by the computer manufacturer of the time it would take to transfer data processing operations from the existing methods to the computer. Senior management had little information about whether or how the computer might affect office organisation, staff numbers or job skill and content. Little clerical redundancy was anticipated by senior management. The 1 Data for this case were taken from two works by Enid Mumford, Living with a Computer (Institute of Personnel Management, 1964), and the article in the Journal of Management Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (1965).

257

258 Cases in Organisational Behaviour possible consequences of the computer's introduction on human relations within the firm were largely ignored. At this stage the board's only worry was that staff would leave if they knew that a computer had been ordered. Senior management decided that it would be best not to give the firm's section heads or the clerical staff in the accounts department any information about the proposed computer installation. It was decided at board level to implement a policy of secrecy. A director explained to the researchers that this policy was necessary 'because human nature is what it is. We shall get more co-operation if staff are left in ignorance of what is to happen.' This secrecy was justified by Mr Fathers on the ground that 'if we are too frank we may create difficulties for ourselves'. These difficulties, he believed, could arise not only or even mainly amongst routine staff, but also among section heads, 'who might worry if they knew that they will lose work and so have their empires reduced'. Apart from the board of directors and the company secretary and accountant, no one except the computer staff subsequently appointed was informed about the computer or its intended purpose. Very little information about the change to the computer was given to the staff and the process was carried out in an atmosphere of secrecy. There was no official statement about the computer to section heads or to accounts department clerks until a few months before the computer was due to arrive. By this time systems analysis and programming activities had been going on for nearly a year. The information supplied was confined to the fact that a computer was coming. Only a broad outline was given, without any indication as to the computer's functions, its effects on people's jobs or the possibility of redundancy. Several months after the arrival of the computer, Carters' sales manager had not been give full information on the consequences of the change. Senior management decided that the accounts department was to be the first to have its work transferred on to the computer. This department was staffed by thirty-four clerks, thirty-one of whom were young girls. The clerks were not unionised. The department was divided into three sections, each supervised by a section manager. One section dealt with sales invoicing and ledger posting, the clerks checking invoices and statements produced by the four typists. This work was processed on the Hollerith punch card installation by thirteen staff members. Carters had a complicated pricing system. The second section, cash, handled cash and cheques sent in by customers and agents in payment for commodities received. The third section, account collection, looked after unpaid accounts. Demand notes of increasing urgency were sent to customers who delayed paying their bills. The total number of girls employed full-time on machines, excluding typists and comptometer operators, was eight.

Carters Cattlefoods (A) 259 Simultaneously with planning for the arrival and installation of a computer, it was necessary to recruit and train staff necessary for the operation. This staff normally consisted of systems analysts, responsible for making a detailed analysis and rationalisation of the work to be transferred on to the computer; programmers, responsible for writing, in the symbolic language required by the computer, the procedures associated with the electronic processing of this work; computer operators, the individuals who run the computer; auxiliary staff such as punch girls who produce paper tape or punch cards for the computer input; and engineers to look after the computer's maintenance and repair. Programming was normally started eighteen months before a computer arrived in a firm, as it was important that programmes should be tested and snags ironed out before the computer was installed. The non-programming staff of a computer centre largely consisted of punch operators responsible for producing input in the form of cards or paper tape, computer operators and engineers. Three stages were involved in input procedures. Firstly, new documents had to be prepared to replace documents used with the existing manual system. Secondly, new data origination procedures such as punched tape had to be introduced. Thirdly, the computer had to be programmed to receive the data input. Comprehensive checking was essential if the input was to be accurate. Input problems could be due to technical deficiencies in equipment, or errors due to inaccuracy on the part of the staff employed in coding and punching. Operators had to be carefully selected, and be instructed in the necessary manual skills. The job of selection and training of staff to carry out systems analysis, programming, punching and computer operating became the responsibility of the accountant, Mr Fathers. He was faced with the task of building up a team of assistants who had the ability necessary to carry out the vital phases of preparation from the systems analysis of existing operations, to the transposition of these operations into a form suitable for the computer installation. These procedures involved the preparation offlowcharts, block diagrams and finally the machine code. A great deal of work had also to be done in planning and preparing for the way in which the conversion from one system to the other was to be carried out. This involved the design of new documents and changes in the work process in a number of the firm's departments. The only major change in managerial jobs made in preparation for the computer was in the punch-card section manager's job. Arthur Collier, the punch-card section manager, was made computer manager. An attitude survey covering all the clerks in the accounts department was carried out by the researchers from the Social Science Department of Liverpool University in December 1960, three months before the computer arrived. The aim was to ascertain attitudes to the existing system of work,

260 Cases in Organisational Behaviour and opinions on the effect the computer was likely to have on job security and work content and organisation. The secrecy policy imposed by Carters' management meant that the researchers could not ask any questions which might suggest that the firm was getting a computer. The researchers, therefore, had to keep their questions very general. Twenty-one members of the department's staff were general clerks, including all three men. There were thirteen punch-card staff. Two-thirds of the women clerks were under twenty-one. The majority had a secondary modern education. A quarter of them said that they had taken up clerical work because they were not trained for anything else, or did not want factory work. Six of them said they were interested in clerical work. Another six had been influenced in their choice of job by their parents or teachers. Six had fathers in white-collar jobs. All the thirty-four clerks interviewed were asked if they would like to change their present jobs. Ten of the women clerks answered 'Yes' to this question. Seven of them preferred either a job on the punch-card equipment or typing. Four said that they would like to work on either punch-card or computer equipment. Machine jobs associated with the punch-card installation were considered by the women to be of superior status. Twenty-six clerks had no plans for their future careers. Half of the department's clerks believed that promotion opportunities within the Carter company were poor or non-existent. Five thought that they had good chances of promotion. In answer to the researchers' question 'What do you like most about your job?', a third of the female clerks said 'don't know' or 'nothing in particular'. Within the work situation their goals seemed to the researchers to be those of an easy life and a convivial social atmosphere. Their principle objectives were presumably matrimony and domesticity. The clerks were asked by the researchers if they thought automation was likely to affect clerical workers. Fourteen said 'Yes', seven referring to redundancy, the remainder to possible advantages. Twelve said they did not know, and eight 'No'. Nearly two-thirds of the punch-card staff were prepared to express an opinion on the effect of automation on the job of the clerk. Five thought that it would lead to improvement in the job of the clerk. Fifteen of the general clerks in the department felt that they did not know what the effects of automation would be, or thought that it would have no effect. Two believed it would improve the job of the clerk. Senior management believed that the fifteen staff required for routine clerical duties were most likely to be affected by the new computer system. The firm hoped that the expected problems of surplus staff would rectify themselves of their own accord. Carters made no plans to let their labour run down, or to recruit temporary clerks for the parallel running period

Carters Cattlefoods (A) 261 when the changeover from the existing data processing system to the new computerised system would be made. With its small installation Carters felt it did not require a large supporting staff, and did not need to recruit additional girls for punching or for operating the computer. Mr Collier, the computer manager, did not envisage any major reduction in staff when the new computer took over. He suggested that card pulling would become unnecessary but that other jobs were unlikely to be affected. Because the firm already possessed a punch-card system and a number of girls experienced in running it, Mr Collier believed that special training for the computer was unnecessary. He thought that the skills required were similar to those that the girls already possessed. A computer engineer was loaned to Carters by the computer manufacturer. The manufacturer recommended choosing computer staff from within the Carter company, arguing that it took much longer to learn the system of a firm than to learn how to programme. Carters were reluctant to do this. The fact that the firm was interested in using the computer for linear programming meant that initially mathematical ability seemed particularly important. Efforts were made in the first instance to recruit a mathematician. These were unsuccessful. Two male programmers were eventually appointed, both of whom had been working in Carters' accounts department for a year. One of them was in his middle twenties, and the other almost thirty. Both men had grammar school educations, and possessed good 'O' Level or School Certificate results and considerable clerical experience. They had no previous experience of working with computers. They were studying for professional examinations, such as the Diploma of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries. Their fathers had pursued some managerial occupation in an office or bank. They took up the opportunity to become programmers because they had been asked to, because they were interested in the semi-scientific nature of the work, and in the opportunity of participating in a new development. The two clerks were sent on the computer manufacturer's five-week training course in programming. They were subsequently made responsible by Carters for programming and systems analysis, and were helped on the job by one of the manufacturer's own programming staff. The programmers were located in the firm's new computer centre. In the centre they were isolated from senior management and most of the firm's staff. Mr G. M. Fathers was appointed to take charge of the computer installation. At first Carters paid the programmers less than £1,000 a year. The programmers Were told by Carters' senior management to be tactful in their dealings with the firm's staff, not to reveal what they were doing, and simply to collect information on the details of the current systems for processing data.

6.5 Carters Cattlefoods (B)

Most of the staff working in the accounts department heard at an early stage, by means of rumour, that a computer was coming. They seem to have assumed that its function would be to take over the work of one section of the department only. It was not generally realised that it would eventually take over part of the work of all three sections. Once the programmers began to study the work of these other sections fear and suspicion were aroused. The programmers' brief from management to be tactful, not to reveal what they were doing, and simply collect information on the details of the current data processing systems created considerable difficulties. The programmers met with suspicion and hostility as they tried to carry out their work, particularly from those managers whose work was likely to be affected by the computer. Two section heads in the accounts department, in particular, wanted to know what they were doing, and why they were asking questions. The section managers believed that they should have been consulted about the introduction of the computer. They felt threatened by the computer, and were anxious to maintain their status in the company. The programmers themselves disapproved of the policy of secrecy: 'It made it much more difficult for us to get the co-operation we needed. People were far more anxious than would have been the case if the firm had been frank with them, because they didn't know what was going to happen.' A hostile attitude towards the two programmers and towards their superiors in the firm developed in some clerks. Carters took more than a year to transfer the data processing work of one section of the accounts department from the old system to the computer. This delay was, in the researchers' opinion, caused by a long series of technical difficulties that caused the computer to break down. In practice the computer proved to be technically unreliable. It broke down so frequently that Carters' plans for computerisation fell a long way behind schedule. Machine breakdowns became a more or less permanent problem. A backlog of work accumulated, which added to the computer staff's day-to-day problems of getting the computer to work effectively. Two years after the arrival of the computer only two-thirds of the invoices scheduled for transfer were on the computer, leaving one-third to be processed by the punch-card installation. The accounts department's work load was increased by the simultaneous operation of the punch-card and computer systems. Running the two systems side by side in this way 262

Carters Cattlefoods (B) 263 imposed a great strain on the department as staff had difficulty in coping with the amount of work involved. As a result of the firm's failure to recruit temporary clerks for the parallel running period when the computer came into operation, existing staff had to work considerable overtime, and this increased their resentment against the computer. Carters' complicated pricing system made the training of coders difficult. The programmers' responses to the researchers' question on what they liked most about their jobs were almost identical. Initially, the programmers were enthusiastic about computer technology. They believed that their new skills opened the door to interesting careers, and were proud that they were involved in something as up-to-date as EDP Both programmers stressed the challenging and varied nature of the work, and the fact that it was completely new. The programmers wanted to stay in the EDP field. They thought that their promotion opportunities were fairly good, although they were not sure which direction these would take. When technical problems and breakdowns began to hinder the achievement of expected schedules, a great deal of conflict developed between the computer centre staff and top management. Senior management became very disturbed at the slowness of the changeover to EDP. They were unwilling to accept that they had been misled by the computer manufacturer's sales talk, tended to blame their own computer staff for the hold-ups, and to put increasing pressure on them. As one of the programmers said at the time, The directors are now breathing down the accountant's neck, wanting to know when the computer will be ready. They do not like to see all that rent being paid out for something that is lying idle.' Mr Fathers began putting pressure on the computer manager and the programmers to work harder and achieve faster results. The morale of the programmers, who were already working exceedingly hard, deteriorated. They began to work very long hours during the week and at the weekends. They were subjected to a great deal of stress, and their work deteriorated. Their health also deteriorated, and they became depressed and discontented. The programmers felt strongly that they were being blamed for a situation that was not their fault. They felt frustrated because they believed that they could not communicate the real situation to top management. They were indignant because they suspected that the computer manufacturer's representative was suggesting to senior management that they were incompetent, in order to conceal the technical defects of the computer. They felt that they had a number of justifiable grievances. One of these was the refusal of Mr Fathers to engage more staff to assist them in the routine work associated with getting the basic input programme into the computer. The programmers believed that they were refused this assis-

264 Cases in Organisational Behaviour tance because Mr Fathers had sold the idea of getting a computer to the directors on the basis of reducing staff. He was therefore unwilling to negate his earlier arguments by taking on any additional staff, even of a temporary nature. A second grievance was associated with financial rewards. The programmers had been promised a bonus for Easter 1962. They believed that the considerable work they had been compelled to undertake, because of the breakdowns and consequent backlog of accounts for processing, warranted a small bonus at Christmas as a token of appreciation for their hard work and overtime. Instead of rewards, they said, 'We received only abuse and exhortations to work even harder.' The programmers believed that Mr Fathers would not recognise their difficulties as this might have been interpreted as an indication of uncertainty concerning the correctness of the decision to get a computer. 'He knows in his heart the problems we are facing but cannot or will not admit they exist.' Two years after the introduction of the computer, the accounts department was staffed by thirty-three clerks. As the firm's accounts system had been already partially mechanised before the computer arrived, the computer had made little difference to the organisation of work. The jobs of the clerks had changed to some extent. New jobs had been introduced, and staff numbers reduced in some jobs. The girls now checked invoices and statements produced by the computer, where previously they had checked work produced by the typists. One ledger control clerk was now responsible for preparation of work for the computer on the punch-card tabulator and multiplier, and another for operating a machine which posted details from the computer on to ledger cards. One typist now typed statements from the computer, another typed applications for money and corrections for the computer. The tabulator operators now prepared work for the computer on the tabulator. In addition there were the new jobs of coder - translating data from sales notes into code for punching purposes - computer operator, and punch and verifier operators for the computer's ancillary equipment. Staff working on the punch-card installation had been reduced to nine. There were now six girls operating, punching and verifying, two cardpulling and one checking work as it came off the machine. The computer had a work group of eight: one operator, one puncher, one verifier, two coders and three invoice checkers. Data processing was divided between the punch-card equipment and the computer. The total number of girls employed full-time on machines, excluding typists or comptometer operators, was nine. The number of typists had been reduced to two, a result of the automatic production of invoices and statements by the computer. There were now twelve staff required for routine clerical duties.

Carters Cattlefoods (B) 265 Three years after the researchers' first attitude survey of all the clerks in the accounts department, a second survey was carried out in the same department. The researchers' aim was to discover the degree to which staff believed their jobs and work situation had been affected by the computer. All thirty-three clerks in the department were interviewed. Owing to labour turnover only seventeen of the clerks had worked in the department before the computer arrived. Twelve of these clerks said that their work had been altered by the computer. Ten of them preferred their new duties to their old ones, for a variety of reasons. Two girls, previously on punch-card equipment but later operating and punching for the computer, found their jobs easier and more straightforward. Three girls still on punch-card equipment said that the introduction of the computer into the system had made their work more interesting and varied. Three invoice checkers said that it was easier to check work produced by the computer than to check the work of typists. A card puller said that she was now able to do a little punching. A typist found that she had less work to do. Two girls did not entirely approve of their new jobs. One was being trained as a tabulator operator and had been learning the job for eight days. The other was responsible for preparing work for the computer, using the punch-card tabulator and multiplier. She found that her work now had to be much more accurate as the new procedures made it less easy to correct errors. All the clerks interviewed during the survey were asked if they would like to change their present job. Fifteen of the clerks said 'Yes'. Seven said they would like to work on punch-card or computer equipment. Four of these were girls already associated with the installation as coders, checkers or pulling clerks. It seemed that machine jobs were now more highly favoured by women staff in the department than previously. Four girls who wished to change their jobs specified something else. It was of little consequence whether these jobs were attached to the computer or to the punch-card installation, as the prestige aspect of the work as far as the girls were concerned was apparently the responsibility for operating a machine. None of the nine girls on machines or punching wished to transfer to non-machine jobs, although some were anxious to move up the machine hierarchy. A tabulator operator wished to become a computer operator. Two punch girls wished to become tabulator operators. One punch girl expressed the opinion that punching was the best job the firm had. Clerks who had been with Carters before the computer arrived were asked by the researchers how the computer had affected various aspects of their jobs. Their replies are set out in Table 6.5.1. Five girls said in response to question 4 that the increased mechanisation of the department

266

Clerks' Responses to Questions on the Computer's Effect on their Joba Question number

Aspect of job

More now

Less now

No change

Don't know/ Not applicable

This aspect of job not affected by computer

1 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Amount of variety in work Amount of work Degree of accuracy required Control over pace of work Importance of work for the firm Amount of supervision received Amount of skill work requires Amount of responsibility Amount of planning work requires Amount of judgement The interest of the work Security of employment Promotion chances Pay

1 4 3 1 3 — 2 2 4 3 2 2 1 1

4 9 1 5 1 — — 1 — — 3 6 1 —

1 — 8 4 7 12 9 8 6 8 7 8 12 15

— — — 2 1 — 1 1 2 1 — 1 2 —

9 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 4 5 5

a

These responses were made by clerks who had been working with Carters Cattlefoods in December 1960. The table includes four girls who were with the firm in 1960, but were not interviewed then as they did not transfer to the accounts department until a later date.

Cases in Organisational Behaviour

Table 6.5.1

Carters Cattlefoods (B) 267 had decreased their ability to control the pace at which they worked. A typical comment on question 12 was 'most of us will become redundant when the work is all taken over'. Two girls, both members of the computer team, felt that their security had been increased as their new skills made them indispensable to the firm. Table 6.5.2 Clerk's Responses to a Question on Computer's Effects on Clerical Careersa Other For the For the Made no Don't Total answer Sex of clerks worse better difference know Girls Boys

9 1

4 4

4 5

2 11

2b —

21 21

a

These responses were made by clerks who had been working with Carters Cattlefoods in December 1960. The table includes four girls who were with the firm in 1960, but were not interviewed then as they did not transfer to the accounts department until a later date. b These two respondents gave factual descriptions of how the work had changed. The clerks were also asked a general question on how they thought the introduction of computers into offices had affected clerical work as a career for boys and girls. Their responses are table in Table 6.5.2. The nine girl clerks who believed that computers had adversely affected clerical work as a career all referred to redundancy. The four suggesting that computers had improved opportunities mentioned the interesting new jobs associated with running machines. The clerks were more prepared to comment on the effect of computers on girls. Many of them replying 'don't know' when the question was applied to boys, pointed out that they were unable to express an opinion as there were so few boys working in Carters' offices. In the interviews a number pointed out that computers did cut down on the amount of work available for clerks, and that this had already happened to some extent in their own department, particularly with typists and checkers. The researchers concluded that the girls seemed to be nervous about the future. * * * The researchers found that two departmental managers were antagonistic to the new computer system. These managers maintained that they had been led to believe that they would get statistics earlier from the EDP system, but it had proved no quicker than the old system. The senior programmer eventually left Carters, apparently because of his low salary. The other considered resigning, but Mr Fathers, realising that the com-

268 Cases in Organisational Behaviour puter could not function without programmers, offered him an increase of £400 providing he agreed to stay for another eighteen months. Three years after the computer's introduction, two-thirds of the firm's invoices were being dealt with by the new system, leaving one-third still to be processed on the punch-card installation. The computer still broke down, and Carters had for a year seriously considered replacing it with a more up-to-date model. Carters' senior management blamed part of its breakdown trouble on inadequate and inefficient maintenance procedures on the part of the computer manufacturer's engineer. Relations between Carters and the computer manufacturer gradually deteriorated until there was mutual dislike and hostility. Arthur Collier, Carters' computer manager, said, The manufacturer's reps are contemptuous if we ask questions or make a mistake. We've come to dislike asking for help.' Carters' operating problems led senior management to the decision to replace the computer with a more modern one of a different make.

6.6 The Supervisory Training 1 Course (A) The McCabe company was a medium-sized contracting firm employing 1,500 people. Owing to the nature of the contracting work performed by the company, many of the approximately 100 supervisors in the company worked on isolated sites visited very infrequently by members of the company's management. The more junior supervisors rarely if ever met members of senior management. The administrative and technical supervisors in the company's office, on the other hand, had regular personal contact with senior management in the course of their work. The senior foremen on the outside sites reported directly to members of the senior company management. These supervisors also had frequent contact with each other. At the time of the research study supervisors in the McCabe company were suffering from an erosion of their real incomes, caused by the failure of their salaries to keep pace with rises in the cost of living. The supervisors had for many years been working a regular working week of5½days, which amounted to working regular overtime without additional pay. Rates of pay for the supervisors were not standardised, and varied widely. There was no company system of annual assessments of staff to serve as a basis for promotion and regarding. Vacancies at supervisory and managerial levels within the McCabe company were advertised outside the company in the Press. Little formal training of supervisors or managers took place either inside or outside the company. Of the approximately 100 supervisors in the McCabe company at the time of the research study, half of them had worked for the company for more than ten years. All but a handful had worked for the firm for more than two years. Eight supervisors claimed to have applied for other jobs outside the company in the past. One supervisor had left the company in each of the two previous years. Exact figures for earlier years were not available, but the heads of the various departments in the company told the researcher that turnover among supervisors had been very low. With the objective of increasing the general efficiency of the company, McCabe company management called in a firm of management consultants. The consultant, C. F. Renwick, recommended that a supervisory training course should be set up, that all the supervisors in the company should 1 Data for this case were taken from the article by A. J. M. Sykes in Human Relations, vol. 15, no. 3(1962).

269

270 Cases in Organisational Behaviour attend the course, and that a similar course should be given separately to members of McCabe's management. To ensure the permanence of such training, Renwick also recommended that a personnel and training department should be instituted in the company. These recommendations were accepted by company management. Renwick was authorised to set up a supervisory training course, and to advertise for a personnel manager. The classes organised for the supervisory training course were made up of groups of eight to ten supervisors. Those classified as 'supervisors' for the purposes of the course were divided into three categories: (1) those company employees ranging in status from senior foremen to chargehands who were engaged in supervising work on the various contracts; (2) those employees who had experience as foremen on contracts, but were at the time engaged on technical work within the company's head office, mostly as estimators on the design and estimating of jobs; and (3) senior members of the administrative staff in the company's head office who held nontechnical positions of responsibility in their departments as, for example, the assistant purchasing officer, the chief storeman, and senior members of the accounts department. Each class group on the course was to include individuals chosen from each of these categories, the intention being to ensure that each group contained as wide a range of experience as possible. In order to lessen the strain on the organisation, only one man was taken from each department or site for each training group. The Supervisory Course The consultant, C. F. Renwick, led each training course, which was of a week's duration. At the beginning of each course he gave all the members of the class a verbal and non-verbal intelligence test, on the basis of which he gave each man an intelligence rating. The results of this testing are tabled in Table 6.6.1. The work of each course was made up as follows: every day four lectures were given. After each lecture there was a period devoted to questions and discussion on the subject of the lecture. In addition, there were two separate discussion periods. Some of the lectures on general subjects as, for example, on Methods Improvement, Planning and Controlling Work, Broader Business Sense, and Human Relations, were taken by the consultant. Other lectures on the work of the various departments in the McCabe company as, for example, on Accounts, Invoicing, Estimating, and Purchasing, were taken by the heads of the appropriate departments. The first of the separate discussion periods during each course was led by Renwick as a demonstration of how to lead a discussion group. The subsequent ones were led by each member of the group in turn. The

The Supervisory Training Course (A) 271 subjects for discussion were chosen by the members of the training group from a list drawn up by the consultant. The list included such topics as: 'Improving Relations Within the Firm', 'Keeping Workers Content', 'Improving Communications', 'Building Morale Within the Company', 'Leadership Qualities', and 'Employee Pay Problems'. Renwick laid great stress on his 'discussion or conference method' during the course, stating that 'A leader guides the formulation of corporate ideas concerning a given problem. Supervisors grow in their capacity to interpret personal experience, apply new ideas to their own job, and modify their attitudes of Table 6.6.1 Intelligence Grading of Supervisorsa Number of supervisors Intelligence grade in the grade Excellent (E) Above average (AA) Average (A) Below average (BA) Well below average (WBA) Total a

21 40 26 10 0 97

These intelligence gradings were based on the scores to be expected among the general population.

mind through group participation in discussion of common problems.' Renwick said that the objective of the training course was 'to raise the standard of the supervisors and improve their morale by means of the conference method.' The technique for leading a discussion taught by Renwick consisted of four stages: defining the problem; finding its causes; putting forward possible solutions; and finding the best solution. The group leader was expected to get the full co-operation of the group at each stage, making no decision himself but asking the group for their ideas, writing these on the blackboard, and allowing group discussion until general agreement was reached. The consultant played no active part in these discussions. It was made clear at the beginning of each course in the series that the supervisors should, in the discussion periods, discuss the various topics in the light of their own practical experience. During the course the discussions invariably centred on the problems that affected the McCabe company. According to the researcher, this was favoured by the consultant, since it enabled him to discover the grievances of the supervisors and their attitudes towards the firm. In each class group the discussion periods became in effect discussions on what was wrong with the firm and what

272 Cases in Organisational Behaviour ought to be done about it. The consultant avoided any direct criticism of the company, and did not suggest to the supervisors any ways in which the company might be improved. The supervisors started on the basis of the assumption that something was wrong in the company, or the consultants would not have been called in. They discussed their own grievances on wages and conditions, promotion, and so on. They also discussed the shortcomings they believed McCabe company management had as regards the general efficiency of the firm, and compared management's behaviour with the ideal standards laid down by the consultant in his lectures. The researcher observed the various supervisory training groups closely during the training period, and found that they all followed a basically similar pattern. At the beginning of each training period the group would be 'stiff', reluctant to talk freely about the company, and to give their criticisms of it in discussion. As the course progressed, this stiffness disappeared, and the members discussed company matters freely. As the successive courses continued, the later training groups proved more and more ready to discuss company matters from the beginning of the week. The researcher noted that the courses apparently increased the supervisors' interest in the company. At the beginning of the early courses it was clear that the supervisors did not have much interest in company matters generally, although some members had private grievances which had obviously been considered at some length. During the early courses interest in company matters increased, and the focus moved from private to general complaints. It was clear to the researcher that the members of later courses had previously thought about and discussed company matters. In each class group it was noticeable to the researcher that the supervisors from within the office, and the senior foremen from outside contracts, took the lead in discussion. The junior foremen and chargehands from outside the office participated the least, and had little to say in group discussion. This was particularly noticeable when company matters were discussed. The junior foremen and chargehands had few complaints or suggestions to make, and these were usually of a personal nature concerning, for example, pay and promotion. They rarely criticised the general conduct of the McCabe company's management. The consultant put this down to the fact that the junior foremen and chargehands were, according to his ratings, of lower intelligence than the senior foremen and administrative supervisors. The senior foremen and administrative supervisors were extremely free in their criticisms of the company, once the original stiffness had worn off.

The Supervisory Training Course (A) 273 In their discussion on what was wrong with the company, considerable indignation was whipped up in the class groups. The supervisors became very excited, and group decisions were made in an atmosphere of considerable excitement, with the men shouting and denouncing the senior management of the company. In each group apparently unanimous decisions were made concerning the faults of the company, and what should be done to remedy them. There was general agreement among the various groups about both the faults and the solutions. The researcher believed that this was possibly because there was much discussion, between members of the different groups and between supervisors who had not yet been on the course, both at work and in pubs after working hours. The consensus of opinion in all the supervisory groups was that the faults in the McCabe company were caused by senior management. At the beginning of the training courses it was clear to the researcher that the senior management of the McCabe company were not popular, but at the same time they did not seem to be unpopular. The attitude of the supervisors was that, as one foreman put it, 'all bosses are bastards'. The McCabe company senior management were regarded by the supervisors as being neither better nor worse than those of other companies, both in regard to their general efficiency and in their relations with staff. During the course, however, each training group began to question this assumption. In each class group the consultant was constantly asked, during his talks on improving efficiency and creating good relations: 'The management don't do these things, are you telling them this ? They need it more than we do.' The supervisors told Renwick that it was a waste of time teaching them unless he also changed the attitudes of management. In the final group discussion at the end of each course, when the consultant summed up what had been done, and listed the improvements that he hoped would stem from the course, every group made the same point: that the main faults in the company were due to the senior management, and that there would be no improvements unless the consultant could change the attitudes of senior management. It was agreed by the supervisors in each training group that the advent of the consultants marked a turning-point in the history of the McCabe company. Either the senior management would 'turn over a new leaf, improve conditions, and develop a new approach to their staff, or they would continue in the old way 'without hope of redemption'. The question of an immediate change was looked on as crucial, for, so the supervisors said, if the senior management did not change now when under the stimulus of the consultants, they would never change. The consultant made notes of the points raised by each class, and

274 Cases in Organisational Behaviour checked the points raised by each training group against those raised by the other groups. By the end of the eighth class Renwick considered that he had enough evidence of this kind. He reported the complaints raised by the supervisors to J. B. Smith, the managing director of the McCabe company, and recommended that action should be taken to remedy certain of these conditions. The Management Course Before taking any action on the complaints voiced by the supervisors, it was decided that the training course for managers in the company should be held as originally scheduled, and that the complaints raised by the supervisors should be discussed during it. Renwick believed that the training course for management would cause changes in their attitudes and behaviour that would bring them into conformity with the supervisors' expectations. The management courses consisted of all members of the management, both junior and senior. They differed from the supervisory courses in that the lectures on the work of the various departments were omitted, the time saved being spent on human relations problems, and on discussing the grievances of the supervisors. All the managers on the management course showed some degree of resentment of the consultant, complaining that he had no understanding of the practical difficulties of management within the McCabe company. The junior managers accepted that many of the supervisors' complaints were justified. They accepted some blame themselves, but laid most of it on senior managers. At various times during the class discussions junior managers made bitter attacks on senior managers for their alleged bad relations with staff in the past. The senior managers were similarly willing to accept some of the supervisors' complaints as true, but blamed the junior managers and would not agree that any blame attached to themselves. No conclusions were reached in the management training group discussions. There was much argument about the validity of the various complaints, about who was to blame, and about what ought to be done about the complants. No consensus was reached on any of these points. Renwick was able to persuade Smith, the managing director of the McCabe company, of the validity of the complaints, and of the need for remedial action. Smith accepted Renwick's recommendations. The researcher noted that Smith was apparently left with the belief that no responsibility for the complaints attached to himself, although he did believe that other members of the company's management were at fault for their behaviour in the past. Smith informed the company's management of the changes that he and

The Supervisory Training Course (A) 275 Renwick had decided on. The managers criticised many of the proposed changes, but allowed the managing director to override their objections. None of the managers was enthusiastic about the changes. The senior managers in particular regarded the changes as being a temporary fad of the chief executive which would soon pass away, and permit a return to the old methods of working. They made it quite clear that they did not expect, or wish, the changes to be permanent. The Managing Director's Statement At the end of October a meeting was held of all supervisors who had been through the training course. At this meeting Smith described the action management would take to investigate and remedy the grievances of the supervisors. Questions were allowed on his statement. In order to meet criticisms regarding pay and conditions of work Smith announced the following decisions: Beginning in January, cost-of-living increases would be paid to staff in any year in which there was an increase in the cost of living. Payment of staff overtime was to come into effect from 1 December. The working week was to be cut from 5½ to 5 days. Rates of pay for supervisors would be standardised. To meet complaints that there was a lack of opportunity for promotion, it was announced that all vacancies would be advertised within the company before being advertised outside. A system of annual assessments of staff was to be set up to serve as a basis for increases in pay, promotion and upgrading. Supervisory training courses within the company would continue, and supervisors would be given every opportunity for training at courses run by local technical and commercial colleges. One of the major complaints of supervisors was that communications in the company were bad, and that senior management were 'out of touch' with the staff. In order to remedy this, Smith proposed to take the following action: To establish regular monthly discussion meetings at all levels within sections and departments and among management - to allow information and ideas to pass freely from supervisor to managing director level, and vice versa. Smith stated: These meetings are for two-way communications. It is important to top management that they should be aware of the feelings and opinions of the men on the tools.' A company magazine was to be instituted. Company information would also be circulated through a system of notice-boards. A suggestions scheme was to be set up. Smith ended his statement by assuring the supervisors that the company would do all it could to maintain and improve their conditions and opportunities for promotion.

6.7 The Supervisory Training Course (B) The management consultants brought in by the management of the McCabe company believed that they could improve the efficiency and morale of the company's supervisors by means of a series of one-week training courses, which included group discussions on company matters, and by persuading the senior company management to remedy any justified grievances which emerged from these discussions. It was foreseen by the consultant, C. F. Renwick, that the supervisory training courses might change the supervisors' expectations of company management. But Renwick also anticipated that another series of training courses, for managers in the McCabe company, would change the managers' own perceptions of their roles so that they would change their behaviour and conform to the expectations of the supervisors. The supervisory training course had awakened the supervisors to certain grievances and to faults in the McCabe company which they attributed to senior management. The supervisors had specified their grievances during the discussion periods, and group decisions were made by all the training groups to the effect that the attitudes of management to the supervisors were bad, that unless these attitudes were changed the training course would be a failure, and that if the McCabe company senior management did not change when the consultants were in the company they would never change. It had been decided by all the supervisory training groups that the question of change in the attitudes of senior management was of vital importance. Renwick, the consultant who had led the training course, had conveyed the grievances of the supervisors to J. B. Smith, the company's managing director, who met with the supervisors in October, and made a detailed statement promising them that their grievances would be remedied. The Supervisors' Reaction Smith's statement had something of a mixed reception at the October meeting, the attitudes of the supervisors ranging from enthusiasm to open cynicism. The attitude of the majority - as far as it could be judged by the researcher in terms of behaviour at the meeting and in unofficial discussions afterwards - was the very non-committal one of 'We'll wait and see.' 276

The Supervisory Training Course (B) 277 After the October meeting two more supervisory groups went through the training course. There were no further courses, since all the supervisors in the company had by then attended the course. The consultants completed their work and left the company by the end of December. The promises made by Smith at the meeting were all fulfilled. The annual merit increases for the supervisors came in January. The five-day week was granted three months after the date by which a decision had been promised. The cost-of-living increases began to be paid from June. The suggestion scheme was delayed for two months. The payment of staff overtime was delayed for two months beyond the date promised. For almost four months after the October meeting the researcher detected no serious change in the attitudes of the supervisors, although the department heads did report that the supervisors expressed impatience at the new monthly meetings about the time it was taking senior management to implement the promised changes. Although the annual merit increases disappointed many of the supervisors, there was no serious signs of discontent. Disaffection became apparent at the end of February, however, when supervisors started to leave the company, and it became known that several were applying for jobs in other companies. The researcher found that the supervisors had arrived at the conclusion that the delays in the implementation of Smith's decisions were due to the opposition of certain members of senior management - the same members of whom they had complained during the training course discussion periods. They appear to have reached this conclusion from their own contacts with senior management, from observations of their attitudes, and also from information leaked to some of the supervisors by members of management - information which indicated that the delays were due to resistance from senior management. Whatever their reasons for reaching these conclusions, it was soon generally accepted by the supervisors that members of the senior management had learned nothing from the consultants, and were actively trying to prevent the promised improvements from being carried out. The Research Interviews The researcher interviewed the ninety-seven supervisors who worked in the McCabe company in June, six months after the last group had completed the training course, and after all the promises on pay and conditions had been implemented. Those who left before June were interviewed when they put in their notice. These interviews lasted from half an hour to an hour. They were mainly non-directive, but certain standard questions were asked. The standard questions and the answers given to them are tabled in Table 6.7.1.

278 Cases in Organisational Behaviour Of the eighty-three supervisors who said that the course had been a failure, every one gave as his reason the opinion that it had failed to make any lasting improvement in the attitudes of senior management. The fourteen supervisors who had no opinion whether the course was a success or a failure were all foremen and chargehands permanently working on outside contracts. These fourteen expressed no opinion on the question of improvement in relations between senior management and supervisors: twelve of them expressed no opinion on the question of improvement in relations between supervisors, and the other two said there was no improvement in relations between supervisors. Table 6.7.1 Opinions of Supervisors on the Effects of the Training Course Supervisors' responses Interview question Yes No No opinion Did the course improve material conditions in the company ? Did the course improve relationships between supervisors? Did the course improve relationships between supervisors and management? Was the course as a whole a success ?

92

4

1

81

4

12

0 0

83 83

14 14

The supervisors said that the course had led to certain improvements in material conditions and to an improvement in relations between the supervisors, but it was held that these were comparatively unimportant. The supervisors claimed that the vital factor was whether the senior management changed their attitudes to the staff. It was held that there were no signs of a permanent change. There had been signs of change during the course, but relations had soon returned to the level normal before the course. It was held, too, that if the consultants and the course had failed to make any permanent change in the senior management, there was no hope of such a change ever occurring. Hence, the supervisors claimed, there could be no lasting improvement in the company and the material advantages gained would be gradually whittled away. The supervisors expressed their opinions in different ways, but the researcher felt there was unanimity on these basic points. The researcher found it impossible to obtain any accurate statistics of the effect of the course upon individuals. While some said that the course had been a 'revelation' and had 'opened their eyes' to the conditions in the company, most of those interviewed claimed that, though the course

The Supervisory Training Course (B) 279 must undoubtedly have been a 'revelation' to the other supervisors, they themselves had sized up the situation long before the course. The Supervisors' Level of Satisfaction The researcher analysed certain factors concerning the supervisors over one complete year, commencing on 1 January immediately after the training course had ended. Information was available about four factors which might have had an effect on the supervisors' level of satisfaction with the company: the intelligence of the supervisors as rated by C. F. Table 6.7.2 Intelligence and Satisfaction of Supervisors with the Company Number of Number who Number who Number who left supervisors stayed with applied for company during the company other jobs Intelligence grade* in grade the year Excellent (E) Above average (AA) Average (A) Below average (BA) Well below average (WBA) Total a

21 40 26 10

6 22 18 7

1 12 5 1

8 6 3 2

0 97

0 53

0 25

0 19

These intelligence gradings were based on the scores to be expected among the general population.

Renwick, the consultant; their length of service; their company status and function; and the presence or absence of regular contact between supervisors and members of the senior management. Data concerning the relationship between the level of the supervisors' satisfaction with the company and their intelligence is tabled in Table 6.7.2. This exhibit shows the consultant's rating of the supervisors' intelligence, and whether they had stayed on with the McCabe company, attempted to leave it, or left the company in the twelve months after the supervisory training course had ended. The researcher found that the foremen and administrative supervisors had a larger proportion of men in the higher intelligence grades than had the chargehands. Of those rated by the consultant's test as grade E and who had subsequently left the company, four had Higher National Certificates (HNCs), two had Ordinary National Certificates (ONCs), and two had certificates in accountancy and administration. Of those graded AA who left the com-

280 Cases in Organisational Behaviour pany, one had an HNC and two had ONCs. One man in grade A had an ONC. Of those supervisors who stayed with the company there was no one with an HNC and two with ONCs. One of those with an ONC was graded E, the other A. Table 6.7.3 Length of Service and Satisfaction of Supervisors with the Company Number who left the company Number who Number who during the Length of stayed with applied for Number of year service the company other jobs supervisors Under 5 years 5 to 10 years Over 10 years Total a

20a 27 50 97

1 15 31 53

8 6 11 25

5 6 8 19

Of this number 8 had been in the McCabe company for less than two years. Table 6.7.4

Company Status, Function and Satisfaction of Supervisors with the Company Number who Number who Number who left during Company status Number of stayed with applied for the year and function supervisors the company other jobs Chargehand Foreman Administration Total

36 46 15 97

30 19 4 53

3 13 9 25

3 14 2 19

Table 6.7.3 shows data concerning the relationship between the supervisors' level of satisfaction with the company and their lengths of service with the company. Of the nineteen supervisors who had left the company, twelve stated that the training course had brought things to a head, and precipitated their decision to leave. The other seven denied that the course had had any effect at all on them, and stated that they had made up their minds long before that there was no future in the company and that they must leave. Two of these seven had applied for other jobs before the course. Of the twenty-five who had applied for other jobs but did not leave, fifteen stated that the course had brought things to a head. The other ten said that they had made up their minds to leave before the course.

The Supervisory Training Course (B) 281 Of the ten one had applied for another job before the course took place. Table 6.7.4 shows data concerning the relationship between the level of the supervisors' satisfaction with the company and their formal statuses and functions in the company. Owing to the nature of the contracting work done by the McCabe company, many junior foremen and chargehands, and a smaller number of senior foremen worked on isolated sites visited very infrequently by company management. These sites were visited usually less than once a month by members of management. These supervisors rarely - in some cases never - met members of senior management. The junior supervisors on the sites not only had no direct contact with senior management but also, because of their isolated position, heard little of the gossip and Table 6.7.5 Contact with Management and Satisfaction of Supervisors with the Company Presence or Number who absence of left company Number who Number who contact with during the Number of stayed with applied for management supervisors the company year other jobs Contact No contact Total

45 52 97

9 44 53

20 5 25

16 3 19

speculation that was rife in the head office on the question of whether the senior management had or had not absorbed the Sessions' of the supervisory training course and 'turned over a new leaf. In Figure 6.7.5 these supervisors form the category described as having no contact with senior management. Those categorised in Table 6.7.5 as having contact with senior management were the administration and technical supervisors in the office, who had regular personal contact with senior management in the course of their work, and the senior foremen on the outside sites who reported directly to members of the senior management. No one was placed in this category by the researcher unless he had regular contact with senior management. The supervisors in this category also had frequent contact with each other, and were known to pass on to each other information about their relations with senior management. Table 6.7.6 tables data concerned with the relationships between the supervisors' contact with management, their intelligence and their degree of satisfaction with the McCabe company.

Excellent (E) 16 Above average (AA) 17 Average (A) 10 Below average (BA) 2 Well below average (WBA) 0 Total 45

with contact 5 23 16 8 0 52

without contact 1 5 3 0 0 9

with contact 5 18 14 7 0 44

without contact

Supervisors' Contact with Management, Intelligence and Satisfaction Number of Number who stayed Intelligence grade supervisors in grade with the company

Table 6.7.6

without contact 0 3 1 1 0 5

with contact 1 8 5 0 0 20

Number who applied for other jobs

8 4 2 2 0 16

0 2 1 0 0 3

Number who left company during the year with without contact contact

282 Cases in Organisational Behaviour