Canada: A Middle-Aged Power 9780773595491

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Canada: A Middle-Aged Power John W. Holmes

T h e C arleton Library N o . 9 8

P u b lish e d b y M c C le lla n d a n d S te w a r t L im ite d in a sso c ia tio n w ith th e In s titu te o f C a n a d ia n S tu d ie s, C a rle to n U n iv e rsity

T H E C A R L E T O N LIBRARY

A series o f C anadian reprints, original w orks, and new collections o f source m aterial relating to C anada, issued under the editorial supervision of the Institute o f C anadian Studies of C arleton U niversity, O ttaw a.

D IR E C T O R O F T H E IN S T IT U T E

D avidson Dunton G E N E R A L E D IT O R

M ichael G narow ski E X E C U T IV E E D IT O R

Jam es M arsh E D IT O R IA L B O A R D

B. C arm an B ickerton ( H istory) D ennis Forcese ( Sociology) D avid B. K night ( G eography) J. G eorge N euspiel (L aw ) T hom as K. R ym es (E conom ics) Derek G . Sm ith (A n th ropology) M ichael S. W hittington (P olitical Science)

© 1976 M c C le lla n d a n d S te w a rt L im ite d A L L R IG H T S R E S E R V E D

0-7710-9798-0 The C anadian P ublishers M cC lelland and Stew art L im ited 25 Hoi linger R oad, T oronto P rinted a n d bo u n d in C anada

C ontents IN T R O D U C T IO N

v ii

P A RT I: FO REIG N POLICY R EV IEW ED

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2 3

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5 6

1

I

T he C anadian R ole as U surper T he N ew Perspectives of C anadian Foreign Policy C anada: T he R eluctant Pow er C anada and the C risis of M iddle Pow ers T he R ole of D iplom acy A fter 25 Y ears

2 8 20 33 44 54

P A R T II: IN TER N A TIO N A L IN STITU TIO N S

59

T he N ew A ge of Functionalism C anada and “ C ollective S e c u rity ” T he U nited N ations and the Frustration o f C onflict (i) M ediation or E nforcem ent? (ii) M ediation: A rt or Science — N otes on the T alloires C onference, 1969

60 73

102

P A RT III: CO U N TE R W EIG H TS

12 5

O dd M an O ut in the A tlantic C om m unity International Security: A W allflow er V iew Shadow and S ubstance: D iplom atic R elations betw een B ritain and C anada C anada and the Pacific T he Illusion of E urope

126 138 147 161 175

P A R T IV : N O RTH A M E R IC A

191

87

In Praise of N ational B oundaries Political and Security Issues C anada, Latin A m erica, and U nited States Foreign Policy Im pact of D om estic Political Factors T he V ietnam W ar and C anada Q uebec N ationalism and C anadian-A m erican R elations

192 204 231 247 272 279

P A R T V: IN C O N C L U SIO N

287

C onvocation address

288

Introduction

“ I am only a m edium m ed iu m ” w as a haunting plaint H erm ione G ingold used to sing into her crystal ball in a drab London suburb. So here w e are, alas, in C anada, m iddle-pow ered, m iddle-class, and now m iddle-aged. It’s a sad fate for young L ochinvar w ho cam e out o f the N orth such a short tim e ago to put the w orld right. T he m ood is m enopausal. T here are the fantasies about youth, a tim e o f golden accom plishm ent o r a tim e w hen the profligate gave aw ay his w ealth. T here is the feeling o f im potence m easured by illusions o f fantastic p otency. T he disposition is bitchy. A gonizing is preferred to delib era­ tion. E veryone is w rong-headed, including ourselves. W oe is us. A s is well know n, o f co u rse, this is a phase from w hich people and c ountries o f sound constitution recuperate. T here are m any hopeful sig n s, particularly the disposition of a younger generation, bored by the posturing and the abstractions. A governm ent w hich was determ ined to tear our foreign policy up by the roots has replanted it, having rediscovered that the earth is round and not easily rem ade to accom m odate the internal com pulsions of a large em pty country. It was a healthy exercise for both critics and defenders o f traditional policies. T here h as, in the process, been a reinterpretation of those principles of functionalism w hich have stim ulated C anadian foreign policy since the Second W orld W ar, but w hich got lost in the argum ents o f the 'six ties o v er roles and stan ces. T his, in no sense, m eans a reversion to policies w hich fitted the w orld and our circum stances as they w ere in the 'fo rtie s, the ’fifties, o r even the ’sixties. T he challenges o f the 'se v e n ties are different, and it is even harder now for us to duck them . O ur contem porary foreign policy is m ore closely concerned w ith the national interest, not because the collectivist policies o f the early p ostw ar period failed to serve the national interest in their tim e but b ecause the big issues of the 'se v e n ties— distribution of resources and p opulation in the w orld at large— cut closer to our bone. T he decisions we have to take about food for Bangladesh and the extent o f the continental shelf affect the basic preoccupations o f the electorate in w ays w hich the S uez crisis never did. E nlightened internationalism is going to cost m ore— in dollars and in votes. T he inclination to abandon “ the role of a m iddle p o w e r” as a guideline o f C anadian foreign policy w as tim ely. It is true that a governm ent w hich had talked a little disdainfully o f “ helpful fix in g ” found out soon enough that helpful fixing could hardly be avoided. It m ay have learned that the ‘ ‘role o f a m iddle p o w e r" w as not one w hich

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C A N A D A : A M ID D L E -A G E D P O W E R

C anada had in the first place sought but for which C anada w as invented by the U nited N ations to serve a com m on need. It w as perhaps not m iddlepow erism against w hich the new governm ent w as reacting but roleism . D oes a country need a role? T here is som ething to be said for it, but a preoccupation with posture is a w eakness o f m iddle age. T he concept o f having a role as m iddle pow er w as developed to a large extent after the fact. It had at least one good purpose and that w as to give C anadians a sense of proportion, to convince them that they need not be m ere ciphers in the international com m unity, and to w arn them also against assum ing that they could m odel their tactics on those of the g reat pow ers. T hat w as the real point of m iddlepow erism . It w as com plicated by a d ouble entendre. T he m iddle-sized pow ers found them selves w ith a m ediatory vocation w hich becam e part of the m ystique. T he idea of such a vocation reinforced C anadian self-confidence in diplom acy, and ju stifiable pride served a purpose— until it becam e over-stuffed. As m edium m ediation becam e som ething o f a cliche, sourness set in. Som e people saw a soft-spoken conciliator as one w ho failed to defend vigorously the national interest o r w ho could not distinguish right from w rong. O thers thought we w ere a little over-anxious to solicit m ediatory business for C anada. P eacekeeping had com e to be regarded as the quintessence o f the m iddle role, but our boys had been throw n out o f E gypt and scorned in Indochina. Surely this w as a fa ll-g u y 's role in w hich nice C anadians were bound to be tricked by foreign pow ers great and sm all. T o m ost p e o p le ’s surprise, how ever, w hen the calls cam e again for peacekeeping in the M iddle East and V ietnam C anadians did not feel any better able to say no than they had w hen they w ere young and starry-eyed. Perhaps after these ups and dow ns we shall com e to see the m edia­ tory function o f foreign policy not so m uch as the special vocation of one country or another but rather the norm al habit o f the international com m unity, standard practice for all m em bers o f the U nited N ations. T he required o b jectivity is a d hoc. So long as our foreign policy is not inform ed by the jealous defensiveness of som e of its critics, w e shall go on being an honest broker in hundreds of sm all and large w ays just by doing w hat com es naturally, seeing it as an aspect, not the w hole, o f a good foreign policy. W e can act our age, less self-conscious about role and identity, accepting all the facts o f life, including the inescapable fate o f being a m iddle pow er. A lthough the m iddle-pow er m ediator “ ro le ” w as not sought by C anadians after the w ar, it fitted our philosophy. A ccording to our w ell-defined version o f “ fu n c tio n alism ,” countries accepted special responsibilities and had special status in organizations and activities for w hich they w ere especially fitted o r in w hich they had special interests.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

v ii

T he generalization o f m iddle-pow er status w hich becam e com m on w as a m isinterpretation o f a theory, according to w hich any country could be a m ajor, m iddle, o r m inor pow er depending on the function. C anada w as a m in o r pow er in international shipping, a m iddle pow er in m ilitary and security affairs, and a m ajor pow er in relief and rehabilitation. W hen w e started to think there w as a standard role for a m iddle pow er, a concept w hich had been functional becam e dysfunctional. N ow the idea o f m iddlepow erm anship is being rejected because it is not seen functionally. O ur “ d e c lin in g '’ pow er, how ever, is not across the board. W e m ay no longer be a m ilitary pow er of consequence, but we have to be reckoned w ith w hen the subject is coastal w aters, fishing, nuclear reactors and o th er energy resources, o r even m oney. T he idea that C anada had been tem porarily a m ini-m ajor pow er in the im m ediate postw ar situation, and then had lapsed into a less a u ­ thoritative position as the U nited N ations expanded and o th er states becam e m iddle or m ajor pow ers, w as a healthy corrective to grandiose thinking but it, too, has becom e a deadhand legend. It is a handy excuse for inaction on the international scene, a nice them e for the m elancholics w ho enjoy our tragic situation as a lost cause. It ignores the fact, how ever, that we are a country o f increasing im portance in m ost econom ic issues (well behind the great pow ers but rarely below the top ten in the charts). N or is this a “ r o le " the responsibilities of w hich w e can escape by o u r favourite plea that we are ow ned by foreigners and have no control o v er our resources. Independence is a relative affair and it is doubtful if C an ad a’s “ d e p e n d e n c e " is greater than that o f Jap an , w hich h a sn 't even oil that foreigners own. Fortunately, there is evidence in our policies on the law o f the sea or o u ter space that there is a new breed o f functionalists in O ttaw a w ho understand how to apply our functional pow er in o u r ow n interest and in that o f the international com m unity. A lthough our bureaucrats are constantly criticized for clinging to old shibboleths, in m any o f these im portant international issues they are again, as they w ere in the late 'fo rtie s, bolder than the politicians and the press. T he conceptualizing o f roles is rem ote from the onerous activities of the players at interna­ tional conferences. Independence or alignm ent seem unreal as aim s of foreign policy. Q uiet and unquiet diplom acy are w ays o f life for all participants, not issues to be d ebated. R elations with the A m ericans are a m atter o f m anoeuvre, supporting them for our purposes, lining up allies to oppose them , or, m ost o f the tim e, trying to get them to alter a paragraph. It isn 't at all like sleeping with an elephant. W e are in an age w hich is not only post-C old W ar; it is also post-detente. Security issues cannot be ignored to concentrate on econom ic and social questions, but security is largely a problem of m aintenance in w hich the C anadian part is functionally m inor. B ecause

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C A N A D A : A M ID D L E -A G E D P O W E R

it is less im portant for us, how ever, it does not follow that it is unim portant in the schem e of things. It has to be seen in the new d im ensions of a U nited N ations w hich is now at last universal. O ur part will not be decisive; it never w as. A ny pow er in the system can provide leadership. W e can do that, and we can also act as a catalyst— as w e did in the sw ing tow ards relations with Peking. W e are not likely to do so, how ever, unless w e raise our sights and abandon the self-indulgent concern w ith our psyche. T hat is an appropriate preoccupation during puberty and the change of life. President N ixon invited us to have a m ature relationship with his country, and it m ust have been one o f the few bits of good advice he e v er gave. T his is a collection o f essays w ritten since the last such volum e w as published in 1970 as The B e tte r P art o f Valour. T he essays were w ritten for various audiences, foreign and dom estic. Som e are included as period pieces for historical reference. T he subjects are those w hich seem ed o f m ost interest to editors and to the courageous o rganizers of m eetings abroad on so unsexy a subject as C anadian foreign policy. For sound reasons I am not often asked to w rite about econom ics. T his volum e does not preten d , therefore, to cover the full range o f foreign policy issues for C anada. I am indebted to Peyton L yon o f C arleton U niversity, as is the whole foreign policy com m unity in C anada, for w ise counsel and encouragem ent in w riting and collecting these p ieces. M y thanks are due to all m y students at the U niversity o f T o ro n to and at G lendon C ollege for the w ay in w hich they have honed m y opinions and rescued m e from error, and to M arion M agee, w ho has probably saved m ore authors from m ore errors than any C anadian editor. G ayle Fraser, w ithout w hose constant help not a w ord w ould have been w ritten, let alone printed, served as research assistant, secretary, and editor-inchief. I have been very fortunate to have all the resources o f the C anadian Institute o f International A ffairs at m y d isposal, but that venerable institution has no responsibility for the opinion o f its e rst­ w hile D irector G eneral. T his volum e and a study in process of C an ad a’s postw ar foreign policy have been m ade possible by a grant from the Izaak W alton Killam M em orial Fund adm inistered by the C anada C ouncil to w hom I am m ost grateful.

Part One: Foreign Policy Reviewed

It m ight be said that C anadian foreign policy has been tw ice review ed since the process w as inaugurated w ith trum pets in 1968. T he T rudeau g o v e rn m e n t’s review , w hich culm inated in the “ w hite p a p e r,” F oreign P olicy f o r C anadians, set out to devise a policy for new c ircum stances, but it seem s from the perspective of the m id -'sev en ties, to have been preoccupied w ith them es of the past: independence, alignm ent, counterw eights, regionalism . In a few years after 1968, the w orld situation altered so d rastically that a review of the review has been forced on the governm ent and people of C anada. W hereas the first review served a purpose by re-exam ining foreign policy in the light o f a new calculation o f the national interest, the infinitely m ore difficult review into w hich w e have been plunged rem inds us o f the danger of assum ing that w e can shape a w orld to suit the interests o f C anada. We are the w o rld ’s oyster although an oyster can, o f course, express its ow n vitality and produce pearls. T he first essay, for purposes o f perspective, deals w ith the second stage review . T he p articular assignm ent w as to provide som ething like “ over-the-horizon ra d ar” for a discussion o f resources policy by a distinguished group o f C anadians assem bled in E dm onton in 1974 for the C IIA annual conference. T he other essays in Part 1 , w hich have m ore to do with the first review , w ere efforts to provide som e answ ers to questions raised by British and A m erican editors about the d irections of C anadian foreign policy in the T rudeau era.

1

The Canadian Role as Usurper

I should like to take m y text this m orning from Jean Jacques Rousseau: H ow can a m an o r a people seize an im m ense territory and keep it from the rest o f the w orld except by a punishable usurpation, since all others are being robbed, by such an act, o f the places of habitation and the m eans of subsistence w hich nature gave them in com m on?1 A lthough this statem ent sounds like the platitudes w e have heard from preachers and p oliticians for a long tim e, it is a revolutionary principle w hich threatens the basis of the C anadian state. Instead o f rem aining an abstraction of m oralists and philosophers, it is now being taken serious­ ly as a political principle by the aroused population of a good deal o f the w orld. If you d o n 't believe so , tune in on the recom m endations from the developing countries at the recent special session o f the U nited N ations G eneral A ssem bly called to deal w ith “ the problem s o f raw m aterials and d e v e lo p m e n t." You will find virtually nothing about it in the C anadian papers. T hey c o u ld n 't spare space from the scandals o f W ashington, the significance o f w hich for C a n a d a 's international relations is infinitely less than what the G eneral A ssem bly w as talking about. T he obsession w ith the U nited States and the total preoccupation w ith continental issues which has gripped C anadians, w hether they are pro- o r anti-A m ericans, has m ade us parochial. It has veiled from us the real challenges and m enaces for C anada— C anada w hich cannot help being a w orld pow er, both fortunate and vulnerable. T o get any attention in C anada the President of A lgeria had to put his speech in the C anadian papers as paid advertising. H e called “ the allocation o f w orld re so u rc e s" a central issue. “ A ny approach to a concrete, definitive solution to the p ro b le m ," he said, “ im plies as a prerequisite that an appropriate stand be taken regarding the recogni­ tion o f hum an priorities. T his should in the end lead to a profound reorganization o f econom ic relations betw een rich and p oor countries, tending tow ard a distribution o f the benefits o f grow th and prog­ ress . . . " H e added that “ the problem o f raw m aterials can no longer 2

F O R E IG N P O L IC Y R E V IE W E D

3

be form ulated in purely com m ercial te rm s.” M r. B oum ediene is one of the m oderates because he holds out the offer o f co-operation. T he espousal o f R o u sseau ’s revolutionary principle could totally upset present C anadian calculations about resources and population. It w ould m ean the application to the w hole w orld of a p rinciple o f sharing to w hich w e are still painfully trying to adjust w ithin the C anadian confederation. It presents problem s w hich m ake freight rates o r fuel prices across this bountiful land seem insignificant dilem m as. For the C anadian nationalist, furtherm ore, it presents a challenge which m akes the suggestions out o f W ashington for a continental resources policy sound utopian by contrast. It could m ake our finely calculated im m igra­ tion policy totally im possible to adm inister and C anada a pariah nation with about as m uch sex appeal at the U nited N ations as South Africa. I can be accused o f the kind of shock tactics w hich I deplore w hen the ecologists use them because they tend to induce people to despair rather than inspiring them to rem edial m easures. M y kind of argum ent carried too far m ight just persuade C anadians their best bet w as a tightly defensive continental resources policy with the U nited States to preserve F ortress A m erica’s high level o f beefsteak consum ption from the barbarian hordes. M y purpose is exactly the contrary. It is to m ake C anadians m ore aw are o f the im plications for us o f rapidly changing attitudes on other continents. As the events o f the past year have m ade c lear, the international clim ate in w hich w e try to carry on as one of the w o rld ’s leading trading nations is drastically altered. I am not suggesting that the national and continental issues on w hich we in C anada now concentrate are unim portant. T he argum ent for strengthening C anadian control o v er o u r own resources can be a petty nationalist argum ent. It can also be an internationalist argum ent for acquiring the capability to accept responsibilities thrust upon us by a global situation. In our agitated concern over oil o r beef, we ought not to lose sight o f the w ider international context. T he w orld com m unity is, o f course, a long w ay as yet from accepting the ultim ate im plication o f R ousseau’s m oral. T here w ere dozens of proposals put forw ard by the developing countries in the G eneral A ssem bly, but none of them at this point suggested the establishm ent of a w orld body to ration and distribute equitably the w o rld ’s resources on a one-m an, one-m outh basis. T hey sim ply pointed in that direction. T he so-called T hird W orld is far less m onolithic than w e tend to assum e. W e have w itnessed o f late, for exam ple, the differentiation of what is called the “ Fourth W o rld ,” those developing countries who d o n 't possess oil o r other resources w ith w hich they can bargain. T he developing countries, paradoxically perhaps, insist vehem ently on utter sovereignty o v er their ow n resources w hile they seem to be suggesting that the policies of the developed countries m ust be subject

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to som e higher law . T he debate w as confused because the subject is vastly confusing. W hat w e have to note, how ever, is that the thrust is tow ards a principle o f international sharing and it is directed against those countries w hich have the m ost resources and space per capita. T he heat m ay be turned o ff the superpow ers and on the rich, m iddleclass, m iddle-pow er, m iddle-aged countries like C anada. (W e are in fact so pre-em inently a target that it is hard to find another country w hich one could describe as “ like C a n a d a ." ) A s far as I can see w e are not at the m om ent o r in the im m ediate future likely to be confronted w ith anything very concrete in the w ay o f international “ leg isla tio n " com pelling us to ship off our oil and wheat as som e U N body determ ines o r pay U N taxes to feed the starving. W hat is being challenged, h ow ev­ e r, is our right to dispose o f our resources and to use our land sim ply in accordance w ith traditional principles o f a free international econom y o r in accordance w ith our ow n calculations o f the p articular interests of the few m illion people w ho happen to live here. W e at least have to talk the language o f sharing and that m eans that w e do have to think in that dim ension even w hile w e are figuring out w hat is best for C anadians and how best to hold this country together. It is clear from C anadian statem ents at the A ssem bly and elsew here that flat confrontation is recognized as u nw ise, that a disposition to be accom m odating, to go as far as possible in helping to alleviate the w orst situations, m ay help avoid dem ands and international controls in the future w hich would require m uch greater sacrifice. It is hard to say just how these w eak countries, even if they could m ake com m on cause, could force us to com ply. On the o th er hand their bitter hostility could m ake life for the rest o f us on their planet very uncom fortable. C learly it is politically im possible for the C anadian governm ent or the governm ent o f any other developed country, coping with inflation and shortages them selves, to undertake at present anything very drastic in the w ay o f resource sharing. W hen you get dow n to the w ays and m eans of it, the noble principle o f sharing resources for the benefit o f m ankind is som ew hat difficult to im plem ent and is full o f am biguities. It is inequitable that I should pay so little for hydro-electric pow er com pared with a B engali, but I d o n 't quite know how I share the O ntario H ydro-E lectric Pow er C om m ission w ith him . I could, of co u rse, give up driving m y c ar so that he could have m ore fuel and fertilizer, but I for one d o n 't know how that is w orked out. I could invite ten B engalis to com e and share m y sm all heated apartm ent. But if every household in C anada took ten B engalis, the population o f the A sian sub-continent w ould be little affected. T he easiest thing for the g o v ­ ernm ent to do is to q uadruple its foreign aid spending, but even quadruple am ounts rem ain m arginal to the problem .

F O R E IG N P O L IC Y R E V IE W E D

5

T he m ost serious issue is food. T he threatened w orld crisis o v er food shortages seem s m ore im m inent and catastrophic than the longer term crisis over m etallic resources. It seem s now w idely accepted gospel that the planet is going to be hard put to produce enough food to feed the expected population, even if birth control is successful beyond all expectations. C anadians are being urged at the m om ent to grow things like m ad because there is trem endous dem and. D em and, o f course, m akes prices go up. W hat do w e do if w e have the food and few people can pay for it— if C anadian dollars are beyond reach? W hen the U nited States met that situation in the obvious way in the p ostw ar years by giving it aw ay C anadians squaw ked like hell. I am far from being able to recom m end a specific agricultural policy to m eet this situation. I am m erely suggesting that in our calculations o f an agricultural po licy we will have to recognize that there will be strong international pressure, as well as strong m oral obligation, to cultivate every conceivably arable acre o f this craggy land o f ours to turn out m ore and m ore food, and our practices cannot be determ ined only by the traditional calculations of the m arket place. W e m ay even have to help feed the A m ericans. T here is another aspect of w hat R ousseau had to say w hich applies directly to the C anadian plight. T hat has to do w ith population. A lthough I recognize that the concept o f resource-sharing is hard to im plem ent, one notes increasingly the view , not only in the T hird W orld but even in E urope, that a sm all ration of population to resources in a country is not to be tolerated. If w e c a n ’t figure out w ays o f sending off the resources, it w ould be expected that w e allow m ore people to share them here. E verybody know s that the m ost generous possible C anadian im m igration policy could provide relief for no country larger than B arbados. W e are right to insist that the effort m ust be to increase drastically the resources in A sia, A frica, and Latin A m erica. T hat is w hat the developing countries say they w ant too. N evertheless, C anadian actions to keep people out o f our treasure house will be regarded as inhum ane if not crim inal. T he trend in C anada, how ever, for reasons of em ploym ent, ecology, and increasing concern for the m aintenance of o u r political c ultures, is in the direction of restriction. T his com es at a tim e w hen the pressure on the northern developed countries from restless people o f the south is presenting problem s o f increasing seriousness in E urope as w ell as in N orth A m erica. W e treat our im m igrant labourers far better than the G a starbeiter in E urope— as we dam n well should— but we w ant to inspect them first. Illegal im m igration has becom e one of the m ajor problem s o f governm ent. T he surge o f desperate people is not going to relax, and the gates are being shut in E urope and the U nited States as well. W e are going to do the ugly things we dislike, establishing firm er

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controls at the bo rd er, sending back planeloads of people, coping with a veritable slave trade, and deporting individuals w hose sad plights will be reported all over the w orld. It has been one o f the internationalist achievem ents of w hich we can be proud that C anada has rem oved racial discrim ination from its im ­ m igration regulations. W hat will be our attitude, how ever, if, as seem s quite likely, people from the U nited States and W estern E urope, facing m ore critical fuel shortages, w ant to com e to C anada in increasing num bers? W hen w e established racial equality w e thought we were establishing equality am ong those w e w ould a d m it. It is h arder to apply it as a principle o f exclusion. It seem s to m e that the pressures to let in A unt Elsie from B irm ingham o r B oston, not to m ention G ina L ollobrigida, are likely to be highly political. As an indication o f what the rest o f the w orld w ould think o f such a policy, one m ight consider the angry reaction am ong A m ericans to m oves o f C anadian provincial governm ents to restrict the sale o f land to foreigners. It isn ’t the sovereign right of C anada to do these things which will be a tta ck e d . It is the callous inhum anity of people w ith so m uch fresh air and w ater, fuel, an d , y e s, even houses. O ne o f o u r troubles in C anada is adjusting to pow er and w ealth. We have regarded ourselves as p oor relations for so long, and w e have taken a rather Presbyterian view o f adm itting affluence. Our philanthropic tradition is far behind that of the U nited States. W e are increasingly conscious o f the disparities w ithin our ow n population and we grow concerned w ith too large cities and too m uch garbage. (Have you e v er talked to a m an from O saka about our pollution problem s?) E vidence o f a national indisposition to face reality can be seen in that it is usually the sam e people w ho crusade against big cities and high rises and w ant all o f T o ro n to to live in A nne H athaw ay cottages, w ho think we should be m uch m ore liberal in our im m igration adm issions policy. W ell, the m ore im m igrants, the m ore garbage, and the m ore likelihood that they and their rose bushes will spread out over all the arable land in O ntario. E ven high-m inded people have to have a consistent policy on population. It is a tim e w hen in C anada the national interest is glorified. The internationalism w hich characterized C anadian foreign policy a few years ago is disparaged. T hat internationalism , one m ust recall, was based on a very hard-boiled calculation o f the C anadian national interest rather than on w oolly-m inded idealism . It w as a sim ple belief that C anadians could neither survive nor prosper in isolation in a fire-proof house because the rest o f the w orld just w a sn 't going to let them be so lucky.

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N o te s 'D avid Corbetl aptly drew this quotation to the attention o f Canadians in his

C anada's Im migration Policy (Toronto: U niversity o f Toronto Press, 1957), p. xi— and then went o f f and became an Australian.

2: The New Perspectives of Canadian Foreign Policy

O ne result o f C a n a d a 's decision to w ithdraw som e o f its fo rc e s fro m E urope was th e p a ssin g interest in m atters C anadian that it ro u sed in W estern E urope a n d even in B ritain. D uring fiv e m onths which I spent in G eneva in 1969 there m ust have been w ell ov er half-a-dozen stories about C anada in T he T im es a n d th e N eue Z iircher Z eitung w hile Le M onde, which g iv e s the best C anadian coverage o f any fo re ig n paper, h a d tw ice that num ber. E ven m ore extraordinary were invitations to talk a bout C anadian p o lic y in L ondon. This article is b a sed on talks to the F oreign A ffa ir s C lub, a cordial but scep tica l a ssem bly o f exd iplom ats a n d p ra c tisin g journalists; a t C hatham H ouse to an audience w hich was, needless to sa y, largely C anadian; a n d fo r the Foreign A ffa irs C om m ittee o f the C onservative p arty, w hich was d ep rive d o f m y stirrin g m essage because the d ivision b ells ra n g each tim e I g o t under way— a fte r having explained tw ice that M r. M ackenzie K in g was no longer with us (a t least, Id id n 7 think he was). T his is a som ew hat more on e-sid ed d efen ce o f C anadian p o lic y than I m ight have p ro d u c e d fo r a C anadian audience, induced b y increasing exasperation with the E uropean p ercep tio n o f C anada s ' 'fa ilu re '' to accept its obligation to d efend the E uropeans. The article originally appeared in th e O ctober 1969 issue o f T he W orld T oday, the m onthly jo u rn a l p u b lish e d by the R o ya l Institute o f International A ffa irs, L ondon.

O n 23 April 1969 the C anadian Prim e M inister m ade a statem ent in the H ouse o f C om m ons in O ttaw a on foreign and defence policy w hich changed C a n a d a 's international position very little but suggested an im portant shift in p e rsp ec tiv e .1 Instead o f being ignored abroad, as is custom ary w ith m ost C anadian declarations, this statem ent had the rare privilege o f being denounced by the N A T O foreign m inisters in c o n ­ clave. E ditors and political figures in E urope and the U nited States 8

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com plained or lam ented. It w as called isolationist, neutralist, and continentalist. In the w ords o f the distinguished D efence M inister of w hat one is tem pted of late to call C a n ad a ’s “ m other-in-law c o u n try ," it w as “ passing the buck to u s ." M r. T ru d e a u ’s stated purpose w as to repatriate the perspective on C anadian defence p olicy, w hich he thought had shifted its base from O ttaw a to B russels. He said that C anada w as acting in a responsible w ay w hen it observed that the E uropean m em bers o f N A T O now had a com bined gross national product o f $ 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 m illion and a com bined population o f 300 m illion, and that, apart from the U nited States, C anada w as at present the only m em ber o f N A T O carrying out a N A T O m ilitary role on tw o continents. H e thought the rem arkable recovery of the states o f W estern E urope since the Second W orld W ar had con­ siderably increased their capability o f defending “ their ow n re g io n .” T he w ord “ re g io n ” is the key to the perspective. W hereas in the e y es of its allies the N A T O region is obviously E urope, C anada is insisting that the C anadian region, m uch the largest o f any national region, m ust be regarded as a vital part o f the A tlantic com m unity. M r. H e ale y ’s clum sy statem ents certainly helped to rally the support o f C anadians to the new policy. M r. T ru d ea u ’s speech w as m ade on a m otion to support the g o v ­ ernm ent policy o f “ continued C anadian participation in the N orth A tlantictT reaty O rganization and the intention o f the governm ent, in consultation with C a n ad a ’s allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction o f the size o f C anadian forces in E urope. ” T he intention w as to put the defence policy in the context of a coherent policy announced a m onth earlier before the N A T O anniversary. A lthough C anadian governm ents had alw ays insisted that the defence o f C anadian territory w as their first priority, the view o f the new governm ent w as that previous g overnm ents had never shaken off the assum ption o f fifty years, that C a n ad a ’s first line o f defence w as bound to be in E urope. Its com m itm ent to a N A T O m ilitary policy, it w as b elieved, had com e to dictate its foreign policy. N ow the defence of C anada and co-operation w ith the U nited States in the defence o f the continent o f N orth A m erica w ere to take a larger share o f its resources and com e first in its calculations. It w ould still be prepared to undertake U N peacekeeping o perations, but an im pression w as given that this w ould have a som ew hat low er priority. W hether this is largely a reaction by the Prim e M inister to the som ew hat exaggerated rhetoric about the significance o f p eacekeeping by C anadian spokesm en in recent years is hard to say. It undoubtedly reflects the C anadian disposi­ tion, since the end o f U N E F , to be m ore tough-m inded about the term s of com m issions accepted. It is u nlikely that C anada w ould, in a m om ent of crisis, reject a call to serve.

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S ince A pril, the M inister o f N ational D efence, M r. C adieux, has discussed these intentions w ith his N A T O co lleagues, and he has had a rough tim e. O nly the French could not disagree, but they have preferred to act for som e tim e as if M r. T rudeau did not exist. Just w hen the reductions will take place is still uncertain; these are in a state of negotiation. T he governm ent has m ade various protestations of a desire to accom m odate the w ishes o f the allies but has reiterated that the decision to reduce is not negotiable. At present C anada has in Europe an arm oured brigade o f about 6 ,0 0 0 m en and an a ir division of about 4 ,0 0 0 m en. B oth o f these have nuclear capability, and, although the intention has not been m ade explicit, it seem s likely that they will becom e (if they rem ain) an entirely conventional force— to som e extent out of anti-proliferation principles but m ore so because of the im ­ practicability o f a sm aller p o w er being thus involved. M r. C a d ie u x ’s statem ents em phasized the transform ation of the brigade into a sm aller, m ore lightly arm ed, air-m obile fo rce, stationed in Europe for possible duty on N A T O ’ s flanks. T he air division w ould probably be reduced to fit this pattern. O ne objective is a force for E urope w hose training and equipm ent w ould be com patible w ith that o f o th er C anadian forces so that they w ould be m ore readily exchangeable. T his em phasis on m obility and availability for service in various parts of the w orld is not new ; it has been the them e o f statem ents on C anadian defence policy since the im portant w hite pap er o f 1964. It is an approach well designed to suit the internationalist direction o f C anadian foreign policy; how practical it is m ilitarily is a m atter o f dispute. T hese p ositions on N A T O and defence policy were taken after a review o f all aspects o f C anadian foreign policy w hich M r. T rudeau prom ised w hen he assum ed office and w hich is continuing. A lthough the review is directed to all foreign policy questions, public attention has been centred to a large extent on our N A T O m em bership. T here is in C anada som e opposition to the very existence o f N A T O , the argum ents being sim ilar to the opposition in o th er countries to m ilitary alliances in the b elief that detente and conciliation w ould be hastened by their dissolution. But the real issue in C anada is w hether o r not C anada should be in N A T O and about its contribution to forces stationed in E urope. T he principal argum ents used for our rem aining in N A T O are as follow s. First of all is the view that we joined the collective security club in our ow n interests and it is o u r duty to continue “ p ay ing our d u e s” in kind. M any C anadians take considerable pride in their fo rce s’ role in E urope and in their high quality. S econd, it is insisted, particu ­ larly by the professionals, that only in this w ay does C anada have any influence in E uropean questions. Som ew hat m ore im portant is the

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argum ent that m em bership m akes it an ‘ ‘insider’ ’ w ith the great pow ers in m ilitary questions, in the d evelopm ent o f technology, and in grand strategy. T his argum ent is m ore effective w hen it is stated negatively, by pointing out the extent to w hich C anada w ould suffer as a party in w orld politics if it w ere excluded from this kind o f confidential arrangem ent with the g reat pow ers, and w ith the U nited States in p articular. C anadians are strongly resistant to pressures from the U n ­ ited States, but there is a basic instinct that tells them life w ill be easier for them in m any w ays if the A m ericans consider them good chaps, friends, and allies rather than unreliable. A som ew hat more sophisticated argum ent is that C anada needs arm ed forces, as all c ountries need them , sim ply to protect and dem onstrate its sovereignty, and if one has arm ed forces they m ust have som ething to do. T hey are happier them selves w hen they are sent abroad, and they can be housed and looked after in G erm any just about as cheaply as at hom e. Finally, there are, C anadians have heretofore b elieved, political advantages in being a m em ber o f a m ultilateral alliance rather than being associated alone w ith a very great pow er in a bilateral alliance. A gainst these view s are those w ho do not recognize the collective security argum ent. T his represents to som e extent a difference in generations. T hose w ho lived through the last W orld W ar com prehend the conscious decision m ade by C anada after the w ar to entrust its defence to a collective security organization and they are therefore less concerned if the C anadian m ilitary contribution is hard to justify as a national defence program m e. A younger generation has not the sam e consciousness o f an investm ent in security and tends to think rather of N A T O as involving C anada in activities controlled by and for the benefit o f others. T here is also a good deal of scepticism about the real extent of the influence w hich C anada is able to gain in E urope or even the value o f having that influence. A s for being a m ilitary “ in sid er,” there are those w ho consider this sim ply a m eans o f being dragged along by the A m erican o r N A T O m ilitary m achine. T he argum ent expressed m ost vigorously against N A T O is that it involves C anada in a large and useless e xpenditure and that it m ight far b etter save the m oney and turn its attention to econom ic developm ent abroad and the living standards of C anadians. Som e c ritics o f present policy w ould like it to w ithdraw from all alliances in the b elief that it could be m ore effectual if it were nonaligned. O thers consider that C anada has no real place in Europe and it w ould be better to w ithdraw its forces in o rder to strengthen its contribution to N orth A m erican d efence. C an ad a’s econom ic and cultural ties w ith E urope are increasing considerably, but E u ro p e's political problem s interest the new generation o f C anadians far less than their parents. O th ers have no objection in principle to its being

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involved in a m ilitary alliance w ith E uropeans but believe for various reasons that its m ilitary contribution no longer m akes any sense and is in fact a w asted effort. T his view w as stated effectively in a recent article: by M r. D alton C am p, form er chairm an o f the Progressive C onservative p arty. Mr. C am p here touched upon an aspect o f the C anadian reconsideration of its role w hich has not been noted very m uch abroad. C anada has been faced with m ajor decisions on equipm ent in the near future w hich make im possible a policy o f sim ply carrying on as before. T o do so w ould soon involve decisions on the replacem ent o f aircraft, tanks, and destroyers w hich, inflation in the arm s business being what it is, w ould enorm ously increase its m ilitary budget for N A T O . T he new equipm ent w ould not be usable elsew here, and it w ould find itself com m itted in E urope for another decade or tw o by its m ilitary investm ent. T here has been a lively debate on this topic and conflicting opin io n s, particularly on the tim etable for re-equipm ent and its nature. T he general con v ic­ tion, how ever, that such decisions w ere loom ing inevitably provoked anxiety to have a hard look at the purposes o f being in E urope. At the sa m e tim e com es the prospect o f having to co-operate w ith the U nited States on the new A irborne W arning and C ontrol System ( a w A C S ), the A B M program m e, and other expensive operations. E scalating technology in arm s is posing questions about the role of all lesser pow ers in an alliance and th eir relationship to the “ le a d e r” in w ays for w hich the old form ulae o f partnership, joint policies, and shared decisions and obligations do not provide the answ ers. E uropeans have the sam e problem vis-a-vis the U nited S tates, but they hope to find a w ay out in a E uropean arm s establishm ent— a logical but unlikely solution. C anadians are not going to escape this dilem m a sim ply by w ithdraw ing from the E uropean aspect o f the problem to take, as M r. T rudeau advocates, their* ‘fair s h a r e " of the defence of the N orth A m erican continent. T o take such a “ fair s h a re " w ould involve us in astronom ical costs w hich one leading expert has estim ated at an additional $ 1 ,0 0 0 m illion o v er the next five years. D efence spending has been frozen for three y e ars, and it is doubtful if any governm ent w hich proposed a substantial increase, how ever im portunate its allies, w ould survive. T he principal significance o f the new policy m ay be in the a bandon­ ing o f a historic assum ption— the theory o f E urope as counterw eight. C anada prom oted and joined N A T O in 1949 for the com m on cause but also for reasons o f its ow n. It had been rent for years betw een continentalists and trans-A tlanticists. An alliance in w hich it w as joined w ith its large neighbour and its tw o m other countries suited it excellent­ ly, and it gave C anada a long period o f consensus in foreign policy. It

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also served the concept o f the alliance by c onverting w hat w ould oth erw ise have been a U nited States aid-to-E urope schem e into a defence com m unity o f tw elve o r fifteen countries. C anadians w ere the m ost dedicated b elievers in the A tlantic com m unity and w anted it to have econom ic and cultural im plications as w e ll. T hey w ere bringing in the O ld W orld to redress the im balance o f the N ew . In these hopes they have been disappointed. N A T O has becom e a cause o f conflict betw een B ritain, F rance, and the U nited States. It has turned out to be an aid-to-E urope schem e after all. T he Strategic Air C om m and, based in the U nited S tates, w as never regarded as part of N A T O . M ore im portant for C anada, n o r a d (N orth A m erican Air D efence), w hen it w as established in 1957, w as excluded from the N A T O m ilitary fram ew ork, in spite o f the strong w ishes o f m any C anadians. T his w as the fault not o f Europeans but of the U nited States m ilitary, and C anadians seem to be paying for it in the apparent inability o f E uropeans to grasp M r. T ru d eau ’s argum ent that the sh ift­ ing o f C anadian forces from the E uropean region to the C anadian region is not a w ithdraw al from N A T O . B eing part o f a m ultilateral d efence organization did not shield it from the im pact of direct defence relations with a superpow er. T he cultural and econom ic counterw eight it does need is not seriously affected by its relations to N A T O . If it is to g uard its sovereignty, the road does not lie through B russels. O n the o th er hand, in the w orld of international politics, C anada still gains from w orking in a forum w here it can form com binations against the great pow ers; this advantage w ould disappear if a E uropean bloc w ere form ed in N A T O . O ne reason for c hanging C anadian attitudes to N A T O and E urope has, o f co u rse, been the rise o f the doctrine of Europeanism . Som e years ago there w ere vociferous but not very w idely or deeply held objections in C anada to B ritain ’s jo ining the E E C . T hese have been m uted by the d eclining im portance for C anada o f the B ritish m arket. It is still im portant and there is no enthusiasm for losing existing favourable arrangem ents w ith Britain w ithout com pensation, but this attitude is counteracted by a w ide belief that the developm ent o f the E E C with Britain could increase the purchasing pow er o f the w hole m arket. T here is interest in C anada in ideas for an international free trade area, o r even the m ore lim ited idea of a N orth A tlantic free trade area, and this could be further stim ulated if there w ere m ore indications o f sponsorship in Britain and the U nited States. T hese changing attitudes to B ritain and E urope on the w hole reflect increasing C anadian self-confidence. T here w as a tim e in the past decade w hen it feared that the rest o f the w orld w ould be organized into continental or regional com m on m arkets and it w ould be left outside. H ow ever, the fact that C anadian exports

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have continued to rise on a scale com parable to those o f Japan has m odified an earlier anxiety that countries not involved in broad com ­ m on m arkets w ere lost. T he developm ent o f " G ra n d D e sig n " thinking both in the U nited States and E urope led C anadians to w onder if they had any place in the conventional pattern o f A tlantic thinking. T he so-called dum b-bell or tw in-pillar concept o f a united E urope and a united A m erica in partner­ ship w as neat and attractive although it ignored the fact that neither a united E urope nor a united N orth A m erica existed. E uropeans tended to posit a N orth A m erica in the singular as a m irror im age o f their own fantasy about E urope. M any E uropeans still do not seem to realize that there is no com m on m arket in N orth A m erica— except in autom obiles. T h ere is no single voice on w orld affairs and no interest in either W ashington o r O ttaw a in creating one. C anada-U nited States relations are based on a principle the reverse o f what E uropeans— o r at least what one m ight call E uropeanists— proclaim as their intentions. O urs is an e ffort to develop international co-operation o r rather to exploit each o th e r’s resources in the m ost m utually profitable w ay, and in d oing so to avoid integration, supranational institutions, and interference in the separate institutions, law s, and languages to w hich each o f us is devoted. A lthough the “ G rand D e sig n " is unattractive to C anadians, they realize that the pattern o f N orth A tlantic relations cannot be designed to their taste. If Britain is successful in creating a E uropean group within N A T O , C anada will naturally be less interested in n a t o as a political forum . T hat is not a decisive argum ent against a E uropean group if it has other m erits. It is ironical, how ever, that those W estern E uropean (including B ritish) m inisters w ho do so m uch huffing and puffing about som ething called “ E u ro p e ,” about “ its " rights and “ its” interests and “ its” voice, feel no sham e in reprim anding a non-E uropean country of m iddle size for not being w illing to go on defending E urope in­ definitely. I m ust not give the im pression that C anadian defence policy, unlike that o f others, is determ ined entirely by reason untouched by political passions. T he revulsion a gainst the m ilitary option and m ilitary e xpenditure is as strong in C anada as elsew here. T he dem and that m oney be diverted to eradicating poverty at hom e and to developm ent abroad is strong and cannot be ignored by any governm ent. It is no secret that som e m em bers o f the cabinet favoured getting out o f N A T O a ltogether and putting the m oney into saving their ow n country. T his is a tim e w hen the very continuation of C anada as a nation m ay depend on the provision o f m ore funds to the p rovinces, and on m aintaining, am ong other things, an educational standard in tw o languages w hich e nables C anadians to com pete w ith A m ericans. D ifferences of opinion

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on defence policy cut across ethnic divisions, but there is a firm er consensus against defence com m itm ents am ong French C anadians, and this fact cannot be ignored by a governm ent w hich is striving hard to prove that it is the legitim ate voice o f French- as well as E nglishspeaking C anadians. C anadians are m uch m ore concerned o v er a divided C anada than a divided G erm any. A nother political factor is the vigorous n ationalism , and a kind of restless “ in d ep e n d en tism ,” am ong C anadians, particularly am ong the m ore articulate if not necessarily the m ost representative. T his is m ore resistant to the U nited States than anti-A m erican, but opposition to m ilitary relations with the U nited States is at least strong enough to m ake political leaders sensitive. O pinion on V ietnam is divided, but even those m ore sym pathetic to W ash in g to n 's plight have been m ade aw are o f the advantages o f C anadian independence. T h ere has been som e vociferous opposition to continuing the association in N O R A D . T he view w hich prevailed, how ever, w as that nothing C anada could do w ould in fact rem ove it from involvem ent actively o r passively in U nited States defence o f the N orth A m erican continent. T his being the c ase, it is better to have som e form al m achinery w hich guarantees it a right to know and a right to be “ c o n su lte d ," even if all this can m ean is that we have som e pipeline through w hich w e can indicate w here C anadian interests m ight be affected. Policy will be m ade by those in control o f the technology, a fact w hich has to be faced. T he tentative U nited States decision to place S afeguard A B M m issiles near the C anadian border is a case in point. T he d anger of fall-out, if nothing else, concerns C anada. In the Senate Foreign R elations C om m ittee h earings, S enator Fulbright tried to find out w hether C anada had been involved in the decision. It w as m ade clear that it had been info rm ed of the decision, and M r. L aird said that there w ould never have been any question o f C an ad a’s having a veto. T here w as no dissent w hen Senator Fulbright concluded that if C anadians did not like it, “ they could lum p i t . " Som e C anadians w ere indignant; none w as surprised. T hey were less disposed than ever to be tied to a m issile program m e determ ined entirely in W ashington— if they could avoid it w ithout doing C anada m ore harm than good. T o turn now to som e o f the m ore specific criticism s o f the new C anadian policy. First o f all, is it neutralist? T he first point of M r. T ru d ea u ’s speech w as a reaffirm ation o f C an ad a’s belief in N A T O . Seen in the context of the C anadian debate, this was a m ajor decision. H e had been o bliged to resist the w ishes o f m any o f his closest supporters, and revealed that he h im self had been through a process o f convincem ent. He stressed the role N A T O should play in the cause o f detente w ith the W arsaw Pact and in prom oting arm s-control arrangem ents. In his view he w as not supporting a unilateral reduction of N A T O forces but propos­

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ing a regrouping in the course o f w hich every effort had been m ade to avoid rocking the boat. His statem ent that the unilateral decision to reduce w as not negotiable m ay sound unco-operative, but it m ust be asked w hich other N A T O governm ent can w ith an honest conscience p roclaim that it never took a unilateral decision and treated it as non-negotiable. T h e charge that the tim ing w as bad deserves consideration. It w as at least a better tim e than the autum n o f 1968, w hen the new policy m ight o therw ise have been announced. In the view s o f other m em bers it w ould never be a good tim e, and som e m om ent w ould have to be seized. T he argum ent that C anada could have bargained its reduction w ith the E astern E uropeans is too ingenuous to be taken seriously. R eciprocal w ithdraw als are at any rate m ore likely to take place without negotiation. T he best justification of the tim ing m ay be that the pressure in C anada for w ithdraw al could have built up to such a point that it w ould later have acted in a less responsible w ay. A considerable m ajority o f C anadians now favour staying in N A T O , but the budgetary im plications have not yet been faced. T o act after the A m ericans have done so is a kind o f hum iliation C anadians alw ays seek to avoid. C anadians know about the G erm an problem and the need to keep dow n the percentage o f G erm an troops, but they find it difficult to understand w hy they should pay to keep troops in that radiantly prosperous country. U nlike the U nited States o r the U nited K ingdom , C anada has never required financial com pensation from G erm any. If it is sym bolism that is required, that can be taken care o f by the efficient little force C anada will probably leave behind. T he argum ent that this is a dangerous precedent w as not disregarded; it w as not considered decisive. As for the E uropean countries, they cannot follow the precedent o f w ithdraw ing their forces across the A tlantic. T hey h av e, in fact, been bringing their ow n forces back to their continent at a rapid pace these past tw enty years, and E urope has becom e, it m ight be argued, the m ost isolationist o f all the continents. As for the precedent in W ashington, C an ad a’s reasons for w ithdraw al are its ow n. It is possible that its action will encourage U nited States politicians to press for reducing their ow n forces, but it is likely to be no m ore than a m inor debating point for them . T heir know ledge of C anadian foreign policy is norm ally so thin and conjectural that it does not m atter very m uch what C anada actually does. T he E uropean w ay of seeing C anadian troops as a proxy for the U nited States is the kind of E uropean thinking about C anada that is partly responsible for the alienation that has taken place. T here is, furtherm ore, a basic difference betw een the C anadian and A m erican m ilitary involvem ents in E urope. E urope is one o f m any areas in w hich A m erican forces are deployed as part o f a global strategy and the U nited States has alw ays

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felt very possessive about N A T O . C anada has had its fair share in the form ulation of N A T O policies, m ore than its public realizes, but m ilitary strategy is predom inantly decided o r predeterm ined by the U nited States. T he attitude o f C anadians and that o f A m ericans are therefore bound to be different. T hose C anadians w ho helped found N A T O and feel it is their creation have largely retired. T o say that the policy is isolationist is to accept the highly E uro­ centric connotation this term has acquired— as applied to the A m er­ icans w hen they are concerned about A sia, and to Britain w hen it devotes attention to M alaysia or N ew Z ealand instead of isolating itself in E urope. T here is little real isolationism in C anada. T hose w ho want to get out o f alliances w ant to put the m oney they think w ould be saved into a deep er involvem ent in A frica, Latin A m erica, and A sia. The im pulse is to becom e a m ore w orld-m inded country after snapping what is left o f the um bilical cord. T he T rudeau governm ent set out to establish relations w ith C hina and sent off large m inisterial m issions to Latin A m erica and to Japan; French C anadians, w ho have been tradi­ tionally isolationist, are interested in francophonie; the C om ­ m onw ealth as a field for econom ic aid and developm ent has an appeal to m any E nglish C anadians. T he C anadian aid program m e has m ulti­ plied in recent years, and it is the declared intention o f the governm ent to reach the m agic figure of one per cent o f g ross national product shortly. W hether it is strategically w ise for C anada to low er the priority in security m atters for E urope is debatable. It should not be called isolationism . It is true that the new policy looks like continentalism , because Mr. T rudeau em phasized that C a n ad a 's defence policy m ust give priority to its ow n continent. Is there any N A T O m em ber w hich does not do the sam e? W hat M r. T rudeau w anted to say w as not that C anada had abandoned a w orld view of security but that it is taking a new look at the w orld m ap. C anada, he has pointed o u t, is not just an A tlantic country; it is a Pacific and an A rctic country. In m any w ays the last is the m ost im portant because that is the w ay the m issiles com e, and it is these m issiles w hich are the m ain threat, not the Red A rm y. C a n ad a ’s prim ary contribution to preventing an exchange o f m issiles is on this front, in N orth A m erica, at the heart o f the system o f deterrence— the d eterrence w hich protects W estern E urope as w ell. E urope rem ains an im portant front, not " th e fro n t." M r. T rudeau also spoke of the necessity o f preserving C anadian sovereignty. P aradoxically C anada defends this against the A m ericans by collaborating with them . T he prospects o f A rctic oil and nuclear subm arines and ice-breakers have rem inded C anadians that their occupation o f the A rctic areas is less than overw helm ing. By proposing to assum e a larger responsibility for surveillance o f this vast region,

18

C A N A D A : A M ID D L E -A G E D P O W E R

M r. T rudeau acted in accordance w ith the traditional C anadian belief that it m ust bear its share o f continental defence lest the A m ericans insist on com ing in to do it for C anada. T h is m ay be a kind of continentalism , but it could hardly be described as a turning aw ay from the E uropeans to em brace the A m ericans. It is the C anadian w ay of coping with “ le d efi om ericain. ” N orth A m erica is itself less peaceful than it w as in 1949. Mr. T rudeau m ay have had in m ind— though it is not som ething nice C anadians talk about— that w e live beside a country in the throes of violent civil disturbance. C anada too has its ow n civil conflicts, m uch less violent as yet than in other countries. It is a first duty of m ilitary forces to assist the civil pow er. P lanning to restrain the kind of violence w hich can accom pany civil conflict ought not to be interpreted, how ev­ er, as planning to put dow n rebellion o r secession. All these intangibles of the future M r. T rudeau undoubtedly had in m ind— including the challenge o f the T hird W orld, the prom ise and threat o f technology, the questions raised about the survival o f g o v ­ ernm ent itself— w hen he said that C anada should have a role in the w orld “ w hich will acknow ledge that hum anity is increasingly subject to perils from sources in addition to an east-w est conflict centred in E u ro p e .” He also said: “ T h o se . . . w ho say that our defence policy represents a turn tow ard isolationism are proclaim ing only that, in their fixation on old w ars and on old problem s, they are isolated— isolated from the w orld o f now and the w orld of the fu tu re .” ’ T here is justification for a reorientation o f C anadian defence policy— and that o f all NATO m em bers— from a fixation on the cold w ars to concern o v er the greater threats to hum anity. So far the C anadian governm ent has done no m ore than m ake a gesture to clear the w ay. T he questions w hich arise are about how it is to be carried out in positive term s. W ithdraw ing forces from E urope can indicate an intention to re c u le rp o u r m ieux sauter— but w here and how to jum p and at w hat cost? T he significance o f w ithdraw ing a few thousand troops, one is inclined to think, has been exaggerated both by C anadians who call it a “ n e w ” policy and by their critics. O nly ten per cent of the C anadian forces have been assigned to Europe, and it can be argued that the priority for N orth A m erica is not at all new . It is easier to show how the previous “ E stab lish m en t” w as NATO-oriented than to prove that C anadian policy w as in practice m uch distorted in that direction. W hat is significant is the challenge to orthodoxy, the blunt scepticism about the priority o f E uropean security in our w orries about the 1970s. Perhaps it is the realization by W est E uropean governm ents that m any of their own citizens share this scepticism w hich has caused them to react so sensitively. T he one E uropean com plaint that deserves a hearing is the charge

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that C anada is sim ply planning to cut its financial contribution to “ w estern se c u rity ,” althought its percentage already ranks low am ong the allies. Part of the C anadian rebellion, o f co u rse, is against the assum ption that a N A T O m em ber m ust keep its defence spending at a certain level to prove its virtue, regardless o f the strategic value o f the contribution— not a w hole but at least a half truth about N A T O policy. It rem ains a substantial charge that C anada, under cover o f a plausible theory o f altered priorities, is reducing its burden. T he will to turn m oney for sw ords into m oney for A frican ploughshares has to be proved by the deed. It should be noted that M r. T rudeau him self has not given m uch com fort to those w ho argue that foreign aid is a sim ple alternative to defence spending. If m oney is to be saved by defence cuts o r spending stabilized, there m ay have to be an even m ore significant reconsideration o f the contribution to continental defence. T he laudable intention of doing a fairer share in N orth A m erica could be frustrated by the rising cost o f jo ining in m ilitary exercises w ith a superpow er. T he negotiations w ith the A m ericans, o f w hich M r. T rudeau spoke, have yet to take p lace. T hey are likely to go on for a long tim e. In the e n d , C anadians m ight have to consider the granting of U nited States bases on C anadian soil as the only feasible m eans of collaboration w hich w ould not tie C anada to the tail o f A m erican escalation. W hat we have had as yet is the adum bration o f a defence policy w hich should be judged in those term s. G overnm ent statem ents suggest that that is the w ay they look at it. T he hardest decisions are yet to com e. W e m ay find the challenge and the cost o f continental defence m uch greater than the sim pler and perhaps even less expensive p articipation in E urope. T his prospect, how ever, is an even stronger argum ent for the shift o f priorities.

N o tes 'Canada, House o f Commons, Debates, pp. 7866-70 •’“ Canadian-American Interdependence: how much?” , Canadian Forum, (February, 1969), pp. 242-4. C an ada, House o f Com m ons, Debates, p.7870.

X L V iu

3: Canada: The Reluctant Power

The A m e ric a n s se e m ed less co n cern ed than the B ritish o v er C a n a d a 's fo re ig n p o lic y revision, a n d the officials w ho d id view with ala rm were wise enough to realize that A m e rica n criticism w ould b e counter­ p ro d u ctive. W hen in th e sp rin g o f 1971 th e ed ito rs o f the d istinguished A m e ric a n q uarterly, O rb is,* p ro d u c e d th eir fifteen th anniversary issue, they ask e d a nu m b er o f fo re ig n e rs to com m ent on th eir c o u n tr y 's fo re ig n p o lic y in the light o f the "N ix o n D o c tr in e " p ro c la im ed in F ebruary 1970. This article was designed to respond to the questions being asked b y those A m e ric a n s who w ere largely concerned with international secu rity issues. L a ter, A m e ric a n s concerned with econom ic issues becam e a la rm e d b y reports fro m their sa n ita ry in­ sp ecto rs that a m alady c a lled nationalism was reaching epidem ic pro p o rtio n s north o f Buffalo.

Inquiry into the appropriate role o f sm all, m iddle, and great pow ers in the m aintenance o f w orld order has been overtaken by uncertainties about the categories them selves. W hich is now the m odel o f a m odern “ m iddle p o w e r,” G erm any o r C anada? It has been overtaken also by doubts about the art o f rolem anship and even the concept o f “ world o r d e r.” T here is still a strong argum ent for a state less than super to acquire a perspective on w hat it should and should not seek to achieve and see its pow er in relative term s. T ypecasting, how ever, has encouraged posturing. E fforts to categorize the uncategorizable have confused as m uch as they have clarified. And states are left, w hether aligned or nonaligned, to find their own balance betw een national and international dem ands, alone and unique. At least that seem s to be the ‘ Journal o f world affairs published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia. 20

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current m ood at a tim e w hen disintegration has affected the categories as well as the alliances, except for the superpow ers locked in their strange em brace. T hat C a n ad a ’s role in the w orld is unique and therefore not interest­ ing has been a persisting assum ption of E uropean and A m erican students o f international affairs. L ike all countries, C anada is unique but its case is illustrative. E uropeans, believing C anada no m ore than a frontier province o f A m erica, have disregarded a valuable laboratory for the study o f foreign investm ent. A m ericans, for their part, have never realized that the problem s that plague C anadians as allies, although co m plicated by the continental relationship, resem ble those that b other their allies in E urope and the Pacific. For the foreign policy establishm ent, plagued w ith troubles, C anada rem ains vaguely in the m ind as a tem peram ental but loyal and em inently forgettable tract. T he anti-establishm entarians, the revisionist historians, curiously ignore C anada also— perhaps because the long history o f the C anada-U nited States struggle for control of the territory of N orth A m erica had such a happy ending for the lesser pow er that it raises d oubts about the innate A m erican appetite for im perialism . T he point of these introductory rem arks is not pique. T he advantages o f being a lesser p o w er and forgettable are m ore evident today to C anadians than they w ere in the days o f their adolescence. It is sim ply to suggest that the throes in w hich C anada finds itself o v er foreign p olicy are both typical and illum inating. W hich is not to say , as C anadians have been w ont to say, that they are typical of the throes of a category we have been pleased to call “ m iddle p o w e rs.’’ W hat is typical and perhaps interesting is not the C anadian role but the C anadian dilem m a about that “ r o le ." A m ong internationalist A m ericans it is now custom ary to observe that C anada has a distinct m ediatory role in w orld affairs and that is a good thing. It is a w ay of defining the uniqueness and m aking further consideration unnecessary. C anadians should not com plain, because they have, for the past decade, been trying to convince their allies that they have indeed a special role as a m iddling and m oderating force in w orld politics. Basic concepts o f international relations, how ever, take a long tim e to be transm itted even to neighbours. A fter three-quarters of a century the Soviet U nion seem s to have com e around to the view s of A dm iral A lfred T . M ahan w hen A m ericans are grow ing w eary of them . A m ericans w ho, in the 1950s, regarded the independence o f C anadian foreign policy as not playing the gam e, are being converted to the C anadian thesis about diversity in unity and the role of the m iddle p ow er at a tim e w hen C anadians— especially those in high places— are turning aw ay from the idea of a role of any kind. T he recent governm ent

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C A N A D A : A M ID D L E -A G E D P O W E R

w hite pap er on foreign policy rejects the C anadian im age of the country as the “ helpful fix e r.” T he reference is less derogatory than it sounds. T he pap er w as not designed to question the interm ediary part C anada played in the U N (at the tim e o f the Suez crisis, for exam ple), over C om m onw ealth differences, and even occasionally in N A T O , or its general peacekeeping function. R ather it e xpressed revulsion against excessive rhetoric about m iddlepow erm anship, against a shift of em phasis from a C anadian d iplom acy w hich had tried to be useful because w orld order m attered to C anadians to an unhealthy em phasis on the C anadian role as an end in itself in a kind of diplom atic O lym pic gam es. R evulsions have set in in C anada as they have in other countries. T h ere is a w eariness not so m uch with the actual structure w hich Dean A cheson, w ith a little assistance from others, created after W orld W ar II as w ith the tw enty-year-old cliches about that structure and the C anadian part in it. T he C anadian response to a call to serve is likely to be as co-operative and as reluctant as it w as w hen C anada w as called upon previously to do dirty jobs, as for exam ple to m an the Internation­ al C ontrol C om m issions in Indochina. T hat the com pulsion to m edia­ tion is still stronger than the revulsion against it w as illustrated by the w idespread expectation that Prim e M inister T rudeau w ould take the lead in holding the C om m onw ealth together in Singapore. T h is sort of thing is less likely to be seen, how ever, as the central purpose of C anada in w orld affairs. C anadian com m entators on foreign policy are obsessed now w ith two ideas. C anadian influence in the w orld, they insist, has declined from an inflated position after the w ar b ecause o f the recovery o f the defeated pow ers and the expansion of m em bership in the U nited N ations. A m asochistic delight is taken in puncturing their ow n pride. T he other fashionable argum ent is that C anadian foreign policy has paid too little regard to the national interest and has given its priority to pretentious international diplom acy. T hese are different from but sim ilar to trends o f thinking in the U nited States and B ritain. In the grow ing d is­ illusionm ent about the C anadian role there has been som e flirtation w ith G aullist philosophy, the argum ent being that C an ad a’s quiet diplom acy failed to m ove the great pow ers, especially the U nited S tates, w hereas de G aulle by his bluntness m ade W ashington shake. T hat de G aulle got larger headlines in the A m erican press than did L ester Pearson is beyond dispute. T hat A m erican policy-m akers responded any m ore favourably to loud than to quiet diplom acy is not proved. C anadian nationalists are crying out for a posture o f defiance against W ashington, but this kind o f rhetoric is also dated. It is associated w ith the claustrophobic debate of the 1960s about in­

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d ependence and influence as ends in them selves and the advantages o f alignm ent and nonalignm ent w hich appear increasingly irrelevant in the 1970s. In any case C anada has for a prim e m inister the m ost noted non-G aullist in public life, as uninterested in that kind o f nationalism as he is in national role-playing. It is significant that in the past tw o years official com m ents from O ttaw a about the V ietnam w ar have virtually ceased, but one w ould be m istaken to assum e a greater sym pathy with any A m erican policy except w ith d raw al. T he silence is rather a reaction against a C anadian role as m oral ad v iser and a practical calculation that public calls from O ttaw a are not for the m om ent likely to help President N ixon get the boys hom e. T he charge that C anadian foreign policy and diplom acy have neglected the national interest reflects illusions about “ p rio ritie s” w hich afflict A m ericans, B ritish, and others. Problem s o f the cities, ethnic tensions, and econom ic paradoxes force them selves upon the attention o f governm ents. D om estic problem s are probably less serious in C anada than in alm ost any country in the w orld, although it w ould be hard to convince m any C anadians o f this. T he idea that they can or should drop foreign policy to turn to dom estic policy is a fallacy that persists in all countries. T he issues o f w orld peace, com m erce, and developm ent do not pause w hile political leaders deal w ith slum s. T he notion that governm ents and bureaucracies can turn their m inds to only one o r the other, the interests of the people at hom e o r those abroad, is particularly strong am ong C anadians, w ho have rarely regarded foreign policy and defence expenditure as a life-and-death m atter for them selves. T here is in public statem ents these days a rather forced note o f R ealpolitik, a determ ination to put the interests o f C anada first, that nicely catches the nationalist m ood but need not be taken seriously by allies w ho never shared the w idespread C anadian view that C anada has been the patsy o f international politics. C anada happens to be one country that can, o r w hose people think it can, leave w orld security to others w ithout getting into serious trouble. C anadian governm ents for sixty years have notably refused to adopt that position, but it is alw ays tem pting them . It is p articularly tem pting at the present tim e because C anadians have grow n sceptical o f the role they chose for them selves. Serious questions are raised about all the pillars on w hich their international com m itm ents w ere built. T hey find it hard to discern a role in the s a l t age. If there is a drift aw ay from traditional com m itm ents to international security, it m ay be attributed to several causes. First there is a m ore aggressive dem and for aid at hom e from those less benefited by the rich C anadian econom y. M ore shrill but less im portant is the C anadian variation on the them e of disengagem ent from “ A m erican im p e rialism ,” although this cry

24

CANADA: A MIDDLE-AGED POWER

cannot fairly be called isolationist because it dem ands C anadian in­ volvem ent and expenditure on behalf o f the unliberated in distant continents. M ost im portant m ay be an involuntary cause, failure to find an answ er to the question: w hat can a sm aller ally do in the 1970s that m akes sense? M ost C anadians w ould probably still like to go on trying, b ut changing circum stances cast doubt on old answ ers, and new ones that seem practical and consistent w ith the preservation o f identity are not forthcom ing. So the tem ptation is strong to turn to the internal revolution and justify the dow ngrading of a role in world security by a significant but not too painful rise in the contribution to aid and developm ent. A m ericans m ay find it difficult to understand w hy C anadians w ould not happily accept their good fortune as part o f a N orth A m erican e conom y burgeoning from the technological revolution, and as a partner in defence against com m on enem ies w hich is allow ed to pay only a sm all share o f the co st. A nglophone C anadians, incidentally, p ersist in asking alm ost the sam e q uestion, and w ith the sam e blind spots, about Q uebec. In the N ew W orld w e are intolerant o f all nationalism s except our ow n. In the U nited States nationalism was turned into a state religion. C anada, on the contrary, w as designed, as all states should b e , for com fort and convenience rather than for a moral purpose. C anadians, even at som e co st, are reluctant to get involved in a continentalism w hich at present looks uncom fortable. T h is is not a kind o f nationalism that looks w orthy to the heirs o f Jefferson, but it has som e o f the frontier optim ism the U nited States has m islaid. A nother problem o f tim ing is that although C anada m ay in recent years have been too big for its bo o ts, it is now trying to get into a sm aller pair that will not fit. In m ilitary term s C anada is not only a lesser pow er; it is w ithout am bition to b e anything else. T he am bition o f m ost C anadians is probably to be the sm allest possible m ilitary pow er. U nfortunately for a country getting over its adolescence and recogniz­ ing the happiness to be found in m odest m eans and seclusion, greatness is being thrust upon it. In those things that m atter increasingly— territory, resources, industry, and trade— C anada is rapidly becom ing a great pow er. T his fact is obscured by the inevitable com parisons with its neighbour. T he persistent problem o f the C anadian im age is chiaroscuro. B efore this decade is over, C anada, according to present tren d s, may have a larger gross national product than either o f the tw o E uropean countries w ith perm anent seats in the Security C ouncil. C anadians debate w hether theirs is an adult econom y, w hether their ability to play a m ajor role is inhibited by foreign control. A larger share o f C anadian ow nership o f industry and resources m ight well strengthen the C anadian hand, but descriptions o f the C anadian condition in drastic

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term s as pow erless or satellite are w ide of the m ark. C ontrol by C anada o f resources desperately needed by the U nited States and Japan gives the country its ow n kind o f pow er. T he grow ing im portance of C anada in international bodies concerned with m onetary or com m ercial issues, or in conferences on questions like the law o f the sea in w hich vast geog rap h y is a factor, suggest that, how ever dim inished its m ilitary strength, it will be a country o f increasing consequence in the kind of w orld affairs that are beginning to m atter m ost. O ne reason C anada has been conducting an extensive a n d , on the w hole, healthy review o f its foreign policy is that serious questions have been raised about the bases on w hich that policy rested: the U nited N ations, the C om m onw ealth, NATO and the continental partnership. T he universal w orry over the U nited N ations has a special dim ension in C anada because it has alw ays been the ideal place for a creative lesser p o w er to find a role com patible w ith national interests and national p ride. In the function o f p eacekeeping C anadians found an outlet for their idealism and a satisfying use for their m ilitary forces. T he rhetoric about peacekeeping, like the rhetoric about m iddlepow erm anship in g eneral, has been overdone in recent years and the disposition at present is to p lay dow n its significance. O n the o th er hand a tragic stance about the U nited N ations is avoided. C anadian governm ents had tended to view the U nited N ations as a valuable diplom atic instrum ent to be developed rather than as a w orld governm ent in w hich they could put their total trust. T hey are less disposed therefore to write it off now . C anadians are continuing to take UN causes seriously, especially those having to do w ith econom ics o r disarm am ent. All that is needed to revive interest in peacekeeping is probably another invitation. If such an invitation com es, there w ill be a m ore sceptical exam ination by O ttaw a o f the provisions for the o peration, but the governm ent is not g oing to find it m uch easier to say no than did its predecessors— although there m ay be m ore countries now than there w ere ten years ago w ith an interest in this kind em ploym ent for their troops, and the ban on g reat pow ers m ay be lifted. R ecent unilateral C anadian gestures to extend authority over larger areas o f ice and sea have been looked upon by A m ericans in particular and by m em bers o f the international law com m unity as a C anadian retreat from the role o f international good boy. T he C anadian argum ent is that it is nothing of the kind; it is sim ply a gesture by a reasonably pow erful country to defy the dom ination of international law by large pow ers w ith special m aritim e and naval interests, an insensitive dom ination w hich has encouraged international law lessness am ong the d eveloping countries. T here is room for argum ent here, but the C anadian position is not that o f the calculated outlaw . L ike m ost

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co u n tries, C anada will identify its national interest with the general interest, but it still recognizes that there is a general interest and that international law is im portant. O ne m ight sense a disposition to join forces w ith the developing countries, and C anada m ay play this part again w hen opportunities arise. U nless the O ttaw a governm ent becom es a great deal m ore revolutionary than it seem s, such o pportunities are not likely to arise often. B ecause C anada has an enorm ous coastline and few ships, its interests on m aritim e questions are contrary to those o f the U nited States and o th er m ajor p o w ers, but usually it will be pulled by its ow n interests into their cam p. A s for the C om m onw ealth, C anadians are proving tenacious because they consider them selves to som e extent creators o f the m odern C om ­ m onw ealth. It has been easier for C anada than B ritain to accept the looser C om m onw ealth because C anada had not regarded it as a m onolithic structure and its function as a consultative body has not ceased to be useful for C anada. A few years ago one m ight have thought interest in the C om m onw ealth w as m oribund in C anada, but few external issues have attracted as w idespread attention as the N igerian war and the controversy over arm s to South A frica. W ith a strong em phasis on the C anadian role in francophonie as w ell, it could be charged that these are areas o f a m odest kind o f C anadian im perialism . In both cases there has been som e contest w ith the m other country. The Secretaries-G eneral o f both the C om m onw ealth and L ’A gence de C ooperation culturelle et technique are C anadians. B ecause it is in a sense the C anadian as m uch as the British C om m onw ealth w hich is at stake, T rudeau w as forced by C anadian opinion and A frican expectations as well as conviction into opposing the B ritish o v er the sale o f arm s to South A frica. Few C anadians question the right o f the B ritish to say goodbye to their im perial past and to plunge into E urope, but a renunciation by the H eath governm ent o f one o f the great creations o f British political genius w ould deny the validity o f a long experim ent in international relations in w hich C anada played its ow n honourable part. At any rate, the C anadian response to this challenge to the C om m onw ealth show s that the m ood is not really as isolationist as it m ay seem to be— although o f course there is little cost involved. T here is the cost of econom ic aid and developm ent program m es both in the C om m onw ealth and in francophonie, still not adequate for an econom ic “ great p o w e r” but rising faster than those o f other developed countries. Any suggestions that C anada m ight take over leadership roles from Britain and France in these last phases o f their em pires get little encouragem ent in O ttaw a. C anadians are anti-im perialists not so m uch by conviction as by

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laziness— and a surfeit o f territory. T hey prefer to be a supplem entary rather than a leading pow er. For C anada the C om m onw ealth has been part o f a philosophy of counterw eight. N A T O w as another aspect. C anadians m ade no secret of the fact that although their prim ary purpose for going into N A T O w as its urgent necessity in 1949, it w as also an answ er to their ow n need for a m ultilateral rather than an unequal bilateral alliance. T he service of N A T O as a counterw eight is now questioned. T he U nited States insisted on divorcing N O R A D from N A T O , and there has been no practical w ay for the E uropeans to correct the im balance in continental defence. C ounterw eight is a neat political idea w ithout m uch relevance here. T here is scepticism also about the value o f acquiring “ influence” through alliances. N a t o m ay, as its advocates argue, have given C anada som e voice in E uropean affairs, but the critics are asking w hat national interest that serves. E urope as an econom ic and cultural counterw eight is m ore interesting, but these advantages are unrelated to the N A T O tie. T he reduction o f C anadian forces in E urope should be attributed not so m uch to C anadian isolationism as to the sheer irrationality in the 1970s o f C anada, w ith its ow n vast land to control or defend, m aintain­ ing troops in G erm any. It has m ade sense to those who lived through 1949; but it is difficult to convince present C anadian voters that an em ergency situation o f tw enty years ago, attributable to the w eakness o f France, G erm any, and Italy, is still an em ergency. T h is is not because the Soviet threat has dim inished but because the capacity of the E uropeans has increased. T he case o f the U nited States is different b ecause the U nited States is m ore than a W estern H em isphere pow er; it is a w orld superpow er, and its influence in N A T O councils is c o m ­ m ensurate with its pow er. So is C an ad a’s for that m atter, and that is why it is hardly w orth m aintaining. T he argum ent that C a n ad a ’s presence in E urope is that o f proxy for the A m erican presence is insulting. T he assum ption in E urope that C anada is w ithdraw ing in o rder to e n te r into a m ore com fortable defence relationship w ith the U nited States is the reverse o f the truth. T he philosophy expressed in the Prim e M inister’s defence statem ents is that w e should keep our forces at hom e so that w e can look after our surveillance ourselves rather than rely on our neighbour to do so. In that w ay w e preserve our independence from creeping continentalism and A m erican wrath. Serious questions about the basis o f continental defence have been raised w hich cannot be discussed adequately here. Suffice it to say that the logic of joint continental defence is still accepted but not taken for granted as readily

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as it w as fifteen years ago. Partly this is because there is not the sam e certainty of consensus in designating the enem y. Partly it is because the escalation o f technology and cost has m ade anything resem bling m ilitary partnership o r joint control of policy im possible. Som e C anadians think that by rejecting a defence relationship they can exorcise the U nited States. T he m ajority, w hile unhappy about the present situation and puzzled, are not clear about safe alternatives. At m ost, the established m achinery of joint d efence m ight m ove along unobtrusively. It is not a political clim ate that encourages new in­ itiatives, new roles, o r even the refurbishing o f old ones— or participa­ tion in expensive new joint projects. A preoccupation w ith the dilem m as o f the continental relationship has prevented C anadians from contem plating the im pact on them o f a w eakening o f the pax A m ericana. A problem for the allies is that the U nited States in the age of the A m erican em pire behaved, insofar as the allies w ere concerned, not so m uch like a governor as a governess. It did not im pose N A T O on any o f us. In a sense o f com m on danger we got together and created an alliance. B ecause the U nited States paid the piper it cam e to call the tune— not entirely, but to a considerable extent. It tried to get as m any contributions as possible from the poor relations, encouraged and praised them w hen they did w ell, and rem inded them of the aw ful d angers w hen they strayed into heresy. A n unhealthy reliance on the U nited States developed. It w as inevitable that people w ould com e to think, especially after the excessive C old W ar ideology o f the 1950s, that W ashington had created the alliance for its own purposes and that the Soviet threat w as the product of A m erican im agination— an assum ption encouraged in recent years by certain political and historical w ritings even in the U nited States. W e becam e dependent upon the U nited States even for intelligence, a disabling situation for any ally. A s the age o f the superpow ers d eveloped, the allies, o r at least their voters, becam e less and less preoccupied with the Soviet “ th re a t.” T hey thought it exaggerated o r they thought it was som ething for the U nited States to cope with. Sheltered from the Soviet U nion, governm ents becam e preoccupied w ith their relationship with W ashington. It w as not that the U nited States threatened them in the sam e dire w ay, but it raised m ore com plicated problem s. T h is is particularly the case in C anada. T he Soviet threat in the M editerranean m ay have stim ulated the E uropeans into anxiety, but it has less im pact on C anada. Increasingly, C anadians see them selves as A rctic neighbours o f the Soviet U nion rather than as separated from the Soviet land m ass by E urope, but this aw areness, this ultim ate abandonm ent o f M ercator’s view o f the w orld, leads their attention to a frontier w here they cannot see clearly. T he greatest physical threat to

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C anada is not a Soviet invasion o f E urope but a nuclear exchange betw een the Soviet U nion and the U nited States. T he form er m ight trigger the latter, but the form er is a problem for the E uropeans. T he exchange o f m issiles betw een the U nited States and the Soviet U nion is alm ost entirely a problem for the U nited S tates. C anada had a role in defence against the m anned bom ber on w hich doubt is now cast. For tw enty years C anada has accepted a supplem entary role in defence of the U nited States nuclear capacity, but this has grow n less im portant. C anadians once thought their partnership in continental defence w ould g ive them som e share in defence policy, but their bargaining pow er has been reduced. In the age of the superpow ers lesser allies can do little m ore than protect som e o f their ow n im m ediate interests. T h e U nited States alone m akes the decision to go into an A B M program m e, although it will listen to C anadian com plaints about how this m ight affect C anadian territory. C anadian influence in the S A L T talks is not likely to be im portant, and C anadians look for a m ore active outlet in the disarm am ent negotiations in G eneva. As in the argum ent o v er the placing o f arm s in coastal w aters, they som etim es find them selves in assocation with lesser pow ers against the U nited States and the Soviet U nion, but the philosophy is that w hile the superpow ers alone can m aintain the d eterren ts, other countries can best use their brains exploring arm s control agreem ents. C anadians do not see them selves as antagonists of the U nited States, but som etim es they are allies of certain forces w ithin the U nited States against others— a situation that m akes relations with the U nited States governm ent tricky indeed. T aking a fresh look at the fundam ental problem s o f defence, C anadians ask: W ho, if anybody, does threaten us? To judge by the decibels of the debate one w ould conclude that the answ er is the U nited States. T he d ilem m a is that w hile C anada considers the conventional problem s of its security in a d angerous w orld, it m ust also consider the defence of its independence, sovereignty, and identity. T he traditional associate in the form er struggle is the country that poses the largest threat in the latter. T he fact that the threat to C anadian independence is not a calculated policy o f the U nited States governm ent, but an am algam of econom ic and cultural forces o v er w hich the U nited States governm ent has little control, dim inishes the ill w ill but not the problem . R egionalist answ ers to w orld security problem s w hich seem sensible e lsew here w ould be suicidal for C anada. T he U nited States im pinges so m uch m ore than the Soviet U nion that defence against its far less m ortal threat preoccupies C anadian attention. Furtherm ore, it is a threat C anadians can and m ust cope with on their ow n. T he long-term challenges, how ever, are different from those p e r­

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ceived tw enty years ago. C anada is vulnerable because it is a country with a sm all population, enorm ous territory, and vast resources. It is exceedingly dependent upon a w orld safe for com m erce. Its relatively good im age in the T hird W orld is threatened by its international activities and its ow n “ neo -im p erialism .” It is one o f the few u n ­ derpopulated countries in the w orld and there is likely to be a great scram ble on the part o f the m ajor industrial pow ers for C anadian resources. T he challenge is not of flying m issiles, invading arm ies, and subm arines, but o f a general threat to those w ho are unfairly rich in a desperately p oor w orld. T he guerrilla arm has already struck at us viciously. T he threat o f international anarchy to the specific C anadian need fo r" w o rld o rd e r” w as never m ore clear, but this is not at all like the kind o f C old W ar threat against w hich o u r security arrangem ents w ere established in the postw ar years. Few developing countries now see em igration as an answ er to their pro b lem s, but they are nonetheless likely to resent the C anadian proportion of resources and investm ent to population. T he only country that could conceivably provide a threat o f m ass im m igration to C anada is the U nited States— an unlikely possibility but one w hich, in the light o f civil unrest and pollution, is at least im aginable. (C anada has civil unrest and pollution but m ore space for it.) T here is som e fear that the U nited States will w ithdraw into its ow n continent w here the pressures for resources o f energy and space w ill becom e such that A m ericans m ight put intolerable pressures on their underpopulated neighbour. In addition, uneasiness about the turbulence across the long thin border has m ade C anadians fearful of, rather than frightened by, the U nited States. It is to som e extent the m alaise o f the co m fortable suburb. It is keeping the attention of C anadians off distant continents and w orldly roles. B ecause their capacity to contribute m uch to w orld security in the conventional sense has dim inished, C anadians will find th eir role to be m uch m ore in the realm o f eco n o m ics, but as econom ic pressures grow m ore threatening, the issues o f w orld security m ay be largely econom ic. O ne w ould like to think that the C anadian capacity for interm ediation could be displayed in this area. T here is an obvious will in O ttaw a to be the enlightened w orld citizen in international econom ics, but here C anadian interest is m uch m ore basic and direct than in m ilitary questions, and the pressure o f dom estic forces is likely to m ake it m ore defensive. T he C anadian standard of living is involved as it never seem ed to be over Suez. For this purpose C anada is in a paradoxical position. Its favourable balance of trade and paym ents has been increasing spectacularly, and in international term s C anada is a rich and fortunate country. A t the sam e tim e unem ploym ent and

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regional disparity are increasing, and the difficulty w ill be for C anadian governm ents to behave abroad with the assurance and generosity other countries have a right to expect from a m ajor and confident pow er. T he N ixon D octrine for C anadians, as for other associates of the U nited States, has contradictory elem ents. T he m ajority o f C anadians proba­ bly feel that U nited States pow er w as overextended, especially in V ietnam , and that a w ithdraw al from the role o f w orld policem an is all to the good. T here m ay, how ever, be shocks accom panying that w ith­ draw al w hich will rem ind us all o f the extent to w hich we had com e to rely on the A m erican s’ capacity to intervene— w hen w e w anted them to as well as w hen w e thought they should not. T he notice from W ashington that o thers are expected to assum e a larger share in the m aintenance of w orld o rder and the com bating o f w orld catastrophes m ay have an effect in E urope. T h ere are signs it is doing so. H ow ever w illing sensible C anadians m ight be to accept such a c all, it is hard for them to know what they could do except perhaps m aintain their capaci­ ty for peacekeeping should the occasions arise again. T oken con­ tingents are m ore trouble than use. T he w hite paper advocates a C anadian orientation tow ard the “ Pacific rim ,’ ’ but in spite o f the w illingness to becom e m ore involved, no one has advanced any serious suggestions about a role C anada could play in Pacific security. A brigade o r tw o in V ietnam m ight once have been the suggestion from W ashington, but the N ixon D octrine indicates that is not likely in future to be the kind o f help required. T here is no prospect o f a N orth Pacific treaty organization and no apparent disposition in W ashington to share its Pacific suprem acy with allies w ho could be troublesom e. In looking for a role here there seem s little else than to fall back on rem edies which m ay sound old-fashioned but m ay still be valid: econom ic aid w here it is needed, m utually beneficial bilateral trade, and efforts at political and cultural understanding for w hich lesser people have som e advantages. C anadians w ould argue that their establishm ent o f relations with Peking is o f this order. Som e have apocalyptic illusions about what one m edium pow er can do to bridge that great gap. In m ore influential circles, how ever, the m ove is seen as a valid if sm all contribution that could help eventually to get A m ericans and C hinese talking to each other. It is ironic that n o w , w hen the tendency in the country is to m inim ize the international influence it can exert, C anada has dem onstrated again the pow erful effect even a lesser pow er can have as a catalyst. T he form ula for recognition that O ttaw a and Peking agreed to accept has been adopted by Italy and C hile and has led to a clim actic situation in the U nited N ations. W hether this w as a m ove in the right or

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the w rong direction is arguable, but that it has been influential is beyond dispute. W hen conventional w isdom is to m inim ize the impact of lesser pow ers on the superpow ers, w e tend to gloss over the im pact o f C am bodia o r Israel, not to m ention A lbania and C anada. W hat indeed is a m iddle pow er?

4: Canada and the Crisis of Middle Powers

The ed ito rs o f W orldview , p u b lish e d in N e w Y ork b y the C ouncil on R eligion a n d In ternational A ffa irs, w ondered w hat h a d been h a ppen­ ing to th e co ncept o f a ' *m iddle p o w e r ' ' a n d a sk e d fo r an a rticle "w ith p a rticu la r, b u t not exclusive, reference to C anada. ’ ’ A s is th eir wont, th ey stim ulate an a u th o r with pro v o c a tive questions, as f o r exam ple: " A t what p o in t is the role o f conscience c om prom ised o r confused by the fa c t that m iddle p o w e rs also have their ow n ga m e s to p l a y ? " This p ie c e was an effort to look a t m iddlepow erism a s an international phenom enon. It is reprinted, with perm issio n , fro m the June 1972 issue o f W orldview .

If the superpow ers are, as is com m only suggested, passing through a tim e o f crisis, so inevitably are the “ m iddle p o w e rs,” for the states that for tw enty-five years have been collectively but erratically referred to as m iddle pow ers are groping for their place in a system determ ined by the g iants. At San F rancisco in 1945 the m iddle pow ers seem ed to have found a m ission in frustrating the g reat-pow er determ ination to brook as little interference as possible in their ordering o f w orld politics. W hen the great pow ers fell apart, the m iddle-pow er front w as also broken. Its m em bers found their niches in alliance with the great pow ers or in a status they called nonalignm ent. A lignm ent and nonalignm ent m ake sen se, how ever, only in relation to the great p o w e rs’ division. W e m iddle m en chafed at our dependence, but, for the m ost part, flourished and survived nicely w ithin the fram ew ork o f m utual d eterren ce, of pax A m ericana o r pax Sovietica-A m ericana. N ow that fram ew ork is in transition. If the superpow ers lose th eir grip o r if, for that m atter, they act together to tighten their grip on the system , do we resum e our San F rancisco stance? T he prospects force us out o f our 33

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habitual rhetoric to honest self-exam ination. H ow m uch do w e really want to float free? Do we w ant to revive the discredited illusion of universal collective security? If not, w hat can w e do for the cause of peace that m akes sense? A ssum ing w e are ready to play a real part in m aintaining international security, w hat can w e do when technology has largely restricted the arm s race to the top tw o or m aybe three? There w as a tim e w hen the concepts o f alliance and collective security gave us rational purpose, but they no longer seem so rational. If we resum e our com pulsive and autom atic resistance to the superpow ers, is that in their interest? or ours? o r the w o rld 's? Finally, as the unfrozen issues of international relations becom e m ore econom ic than m ilitary, m aybe w e have to re-think what w e m ean by “ su p erp o w er” and “ m iddle p o w e r.” T he concept of m iddle pow er cam e out o f a peculiar history. It is a term o f convenience w ith no standing in international agreem ents or organizations. It is subject to a confusing am biguity, its significance is in a play on w ords. It m ay o r m ay not have a future. A lthough the concept w as recognized in the structure o f the L eague o f N ations m ore clearly than in the U nited N ations, the term m iddle pow er becam e current at the end o f the Second W orld W ar. It w as an unofficial w ay o f describing countries w hich did not have the veto rights of great pow ers in the U nited N ations but could still contribute m ore than sm all p o w ers. Sw eden, Brazil, and C anada w ere clearly m iddle pow ers, but the term w as frequently extended to include a country like India w hich, although enorm ous in population, w as neith­ er econom ically nor m ilitarily a great pow er. C anadians em braced the term m ore enthusiastically than others, arguing in 1945 that there m ust be no perm anent right o f the great pow ers to privilege and veto in all aspects o f international relations. T he strong m ilitary pow ers should be accorded rights in line w ith their function in the Security C ouncil o nly. C ountries w ith special colonial responsibilities w ould have their place in the T rusteeship C ouncil, and it w as hoped that countries with econom ic pow er w ould have special status in the E conom ic and Social C ouncil (ECOSOC) and the functional o rganizations. T he rule w ould be, “ T o each according to his c a p a c itie s." G eographical and regional p ressures, ho w ev er, soon succeeded in overw helm ing the rule. Pow ers o f m iddling m ilitary strength w ere not even recognized as having a greater right to election to the Security C ouncil, as C anada had insisted. N evertheless, the persisting value o f the concept, at least for those w ho professed it, was that it defined for them selves a sensible attitude to responsibility. T hey did not presum e to be great m ilitary pow ers, but they knew they had du ties beyond those o f the sm all and w eak. T hey w ould dem and a

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larger voice than the great w ere disposed to accord them , and they w ould earn it through services in the cause. E nter the am biguity. M any issues— K ashm ir, Indonesia, Palestine, for exam ples— arising out of the break-up o f em pires required states or individuals w ith less vested interests to play the role o f interm ediaries. T he m iddle-sized pow ers filled the bill because, w hile they did not have interests or pow er enough to be threatening, they did have sufficient diplom atic and m ilitary resources to m ediate conflicts. T he term “ m id­ d le ” originally denoted size, but now took on the connotation of interm ediary. C ountries w hich proved useful as interm ediaries, how ever, soon included N orw ay, Ireland, and T u n isia, states w hich are hardly m edium in resources o r population. T he term m iddle p o w er is no doubt am bivalent; som e think it am bivalent to the point o f being m eaningless. T he 1970s prom ise only to intensify the am bivalence. N ow that the B ritish and G erm ans— but never, o f course, the French— are inform ­ ally referring to them selves as m iddle p o w ers, it is tim e to take a new look at the hierarchy. Instead o f the great pow ers designated by the Security C ouncil in the 1940s, we now seem to have this line up: tw o superpow ers; C hina, w hich is su i generis; Britain and France, still recognized as great pow ers in the S ecurity C ouncil but far from super; Japan, an econom ic if not a m ilitary pow er; India, a great pow er in political influence; and Brazil m oving up fast. In econom ics w e have, for exam ple on m onetary questions, the G roup o f T en , w hich includes am ong the financial great pow ers som e o f the classical m iddle pow ers of the postw ar period. If the term m iddle pow er m eans anything useful now , it is probably w ith reference to countries like Y ugoslavia o r Sw eden w hich have by nature or situation interm ediary capacities. Interm ediation, how ever, has becom e m uch m ore ad hoc. A s the concept o f w orld-em bracing alignm ents declines, nonalignm ent becom es m ore regional and specific. O ne hopes o f course, that as m any nations as possible will cherish their capacities and responsibilities. O n the o th er hand, the idea that certain countries are suited by nature for this role in m ost if not all w orld conflicts m ay be of dim inishing value. E ven C anada, w hich has clung to this m ission as its best definition of foreign policy, is turning aw ay from the idea o f m ediation. A new generation is bored with the role and the reputation that goes w ith it. A lso, since C anada is now a m ajor econom ic pow er, it is less likely to play the part o f disinterested m ediator in the great com m ercial and m onetary conflicts of this decade. It is not easy, how ever, to escape the habits o f a generation or the expectations of the international system . Prim e M inister T rudeau,

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shortly after expressing scepticism about the role o f “ helpful fix e r," w as draw n into m ediating betw een Britain and the A frican states over arm s to South A frica and the status o f R hodesia. Being view ed as a professional m ediator has it draw b ack s, but it is finally m ediation that keeps the planet from blow ing up. B efore w e discard the concept o f m iddle p o w er w e should consider its past contributions to w orld politics as well as its failures. It should be em phasized that, although the m iddle pow ers did struggle at San Francisco to establish their second-class voice in the hierarchy, the m ediatory role w as m ore thrust upon them than sought. T he role was largely defined e x p o s t fa c to . T he issues that arose in the U nited N ations required an interm ediary force. T he great pow ers persuaded the m iddle m en to act, and the victim s o f conflict w elcom ed their interventions. G reece, Indonesia, L ebanon, and Indochina are am ong the better know n interventions, but the functions of the m iddle pow ers (in the late ’fifties T h e E conom ist called them the “ Sanitavian B lo c " ) w ere dem onstrated persistently if less visibly in the regular w ork of the U N and other international bodies: getting together sponsors for com ­ prom ise resolutions, lobbying to avoid dangerous confrontation, co l­ laborating w ith the efforts of the Secretary-G eneral, and in a thousand w ays seeking to reduce tension. It can be argued that, insofar as it can be w orked, the m iddle pow ers m ade the U N w ork. T hey m ade possible the “ p e ac ek e ep in g " w hich em erged in the ’fifties as one w ay the U N could act to prevent the spread o f conflict. T o be sure, these were chapter vi functions o f conciliation rather than ch ap ter vn functions of enforcem ent, but they w ere the best that could be done. O r w ere they? Perhaps peacekeeping, w hile it dam pened im m ediate conflicts, prevented settlem ents. It could be argued that peacekeeping has prevented for o v er tw enty y ears a settlem ent in K ashm ir, w hereas the sharp m ilitary surgery o f the Indian governm ent in 1971 m ade a settlem ent possible in East B engal. B ut such logic is perilous. T he wars that did not take place are never as vivid as the conflicts that continue; a strong case rem ains for the policy o f dam ping brush fires during an inflam m atory period in the w o rld ’s history. In any case, the m iddle pow ers were doing w hat the great pow ers and a strong m ajority o f UN m em bers w anted them to do. T he instinct o f the U nited N ations to interpose a m ediatory force in any conflict is deeply rooted. W hile less often practised in recent years, another conflict could revive the process instantaneously— particularly a conflict that pow ers w hich have in principle disliked peacekeeping w ant to have extinguished. T he m iddle-pow er function w as not confined to the m ajor councils of the U N . T he sam e practices have been prevalent in N A T O , the O rganiza­ tion o f A m erican S tates, and the C om m onw ealth. T he m iddle-pow er

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function is also evident in the d isarm am ent negotiations in G eneva. It is som etim es hard to preserve a distinction betw een m iddle pow ers and nonaligned pow ers, since m iddle p ow ers, w hether aligned or not, have som e responsibility to restrain superpow er assum ptions which threaten the legitim ate interests o f the w eak. Italy and C an ad a, fo r exam ple, neither o f w hich could be called nonaligned, have frequently joined w ith T hird W orld forces to press the nuclear pow ers at G eneva. T hey ganged up to pressure and defeat their betters in securing the adm ission o f new m em bers to the U N in 1955, and perhaps they deserve som e credit for getting Peking seated in 1971 w hen both superpow ers had reason to be less than enthusiastic. (T here have, o f co u rse, been other o ccasions w hen the so-called A frican-A sian bloc has enforced its w ill, but that is som ething different from m iddlepow erism .) If in the age o f S A L T there is a resurgence o f superpow er authority, a coalescence o f all lesser pow ers m ay becom e a m ore frequent phenom enon; the coalition m ight also include E uropean pow ers with veto rights, nervous o r jealous o f the presum ptions o f W ashington and M oscow . But such schem atizations should not be pushed too far. Just how the antagonism to superpow er dom ination felt by B ritain, France, o r G erm any m ight be harm onized w ith the not very sim ilar feelings of, say, T anzania, U ruguay, or R um ania is hard to envision. O f course, W estern E urope itself m ight becom e a superpow er. T he greater danger, how ever, is that the m em bers o f the E uropean E conom ic C om m unity, incapable o f the d iscipline o f a single voice, w ill use the “ voice of E u ro p e ” them e for blackm ail w hile refusing to accept the respon­ sibilities o f a unified superpow er. O ne unhappy consequence o f this pretense is that the authentic voices o f som e very useful E uropean m iddle pow ers will be silenced. T he international com m unity w ould be the loser, for it needs conscientious m iddle pow ers m ore than it needs a new superpow er— especially an unreliable superpow er. At least one of the superpow ers is going through a devastating e x am in a­ tion o f conscience. T he citizens o f the m iddle pow ers should follow suit. A certain m oral arrogance has crept into the concept o f m iddle pow er. T hat m ight is not right all w ould agree— but neither is w eakness. M iddle pow ers are m iddle pow ers because they are w eaker, not b ecause they are m ore virtuous. M any of them (and I think esp ecial­ ly o f m y ow n countrym en) boast that they have no im perial aim s, they threaten no one, and therefore they are w idely loved. But they forget that they threaten no one because they are incapable of doing so. Stated so bluntly, this is too harsh a judgm ent, for m iddle pow ers have indeed show n judgm ent, o bjectivity, and dedication. N onetheless, the basic difference betw een us and the great pow ers is functional rather than m oral.

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CANADA: A MIDDLE-AGED POWER

A m ong the less pleasant psychological m anifestations o f m id­ dlepow erism , all too evident in C anada at presen t, is the “ D avid versus G oliath c o m p le x .’’ T h e facile assum ption is that D avid is justified in using any m eans to beat G oliath sim ply because G oliath is a giant and D avid is self-evidently on the side of the angels. T his attitude is g enerally encouraged by UN A ssem bly rhetoric, and it is at least more understandable w hen proclaim ed by very sm all and w eak pow ers, although it is o f doubtful validity even then. It is thoroughly un­ w arranted and undignified in the case o f m iddle pow ers w hich are, in relation to the w orld at large, rich and greedy. T he C anadian reputation for good sense and proportion has been threatened by an obsessive chauvinism w hich has taken hold even am ong socialist and liberal circles w here one custom arily expects expansive internationalism . R esistance to A m ericanism m asquerading as internationalism is entire­ ly justified. H ow ever, an obsession w ith the need to protect o u r in­ terests in com petition with a very pow erful neighbour seem s, to an articulate m inority o f C anadians, to justify a policy of national selfinterest in w hich w e lose sight o f our responsibilities in the wider w orld. W e have m ore land and resources and coastline per capita than any o th er country in the w orld, but w hen it com es to the protection and extension of o u r coastal w aters, o u r fish, our seabed, and our protective tariffs w e tend to behave in an aggressive m anner m ore appropriate to a developing nation in A frica. Fortunately, C anadians are not aggressive enough by disposition to sustain this posture, and the governm ent has for the m ost part resisted these pressures. W hatever the future of m iddlepow erism , m ost C anadians still realize that a reputation for fair-m indedness rem ains their m ost valuable asset. A n additional tem ptation for m iddle pow ers is to cling to the Cold W ar w hich m ade us. It is a greater tem ptation for the nonaligned, b ecause changing alignm ents underm ine the very concept of nonalignm ent by w hich they defined them selves. D ependent countries m ay be even m ore attached to the C old W ar because of their notable success in getting support by playing one side off against the other. It is easy to exaggerate this tem ptation, but it calls for vigilance. A good w orld citizen should, for ex am p le, w atch the P eking-W ashington rapprochem ent w ith relief and enthusiasm . Som e countries m ight be excused a few unw orthy arrieres-pensees. Scandinavian and Eastern E uropean countries w hich have been im portant as m essengers and interpreters m ay find them selves unem ployed. W hile C anada did not enter into diplom atic relations with Peking in 1970 in order to m ediate betw een Peking and W ashington, there is no doubt that O ttaw a had som e w orthy hopes o f helping to heal that breach. M r. N ixon, how ev­ er, got to Peking even before M r. T rudeau.

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C anada has long had som ething of a “ linchpin” fixation. It once saw itself as the interpreter betw een Britain and the U nited S tates, but M essrs. C hurchill and R oosevelt put that idea to rest m any years ago. T here is m uch to be said for renouncing bridge-building as a national profession. But som ething w orse could replace it. T he need of lesser states for a m ission m ay be deplored but it c a n 't be ignored. T he healthier aspect o f the new C anadian nationalism is a d eterm ina­ tion to be ourselves, not to be judged as extensions of Britain, France, or the U nited States. T he m ood is caught in a po p u lar Q uebec song, ' 'M on p a y s, ce n 'esi p a s un p a y s; c ‘est I 'h iv e r' ’— sung not regretfully but exultantly. Such a m ood hardly prom otes international brokerage as a national m ission, how ever. B urgeoning nationalism is a volatile force that can turn sw iftly in various directions. W ith the C anadian GNP approaching $100 billion, w e are tem pted to a hard self-assertion that could spaw n its own brand o f m iddle-pow er im perialism . F oreigners, A m ericans in particular, can help turn C anadian nationalism sour by deploring it. A m ericans have a habit o f disparaging any nationalism except their ow n as em otionalism , o f assum ing that nation-states, except their o w n , are anachronism s— an assum ption that has in the past decade becom e one o f the m ore anachronistic cliches of our tim e. W hat C anadians— and other m iddle pow ers— need from abroad is e n ­ couragem ent of their better instincts, o f self-confidence, and a m od­ erate, m edium but inspiring sense o f m ission. Such a m ission m ust be unique, appropriate, d iscrete. It can be com plem entary o r even su p ­ plem entary, but it m ust not be just a m atter o f pitching in and sharing the w ork that a great pow er has d efined for itself. T hat is w hat the A ustralians did in V ietnam , and it is not a precedent they or others will w ant to follow . Fortunately for C anada, as for m ost other m iddle p o w ers, our first national interest is in a w orld o rder that secures the greatest co m b in a­ tion o f peace and prosperity for all. O ur secondary interests are com ­ petitive. O ur interests are in freedom o f the seas and o f com m erce and in the stability that com es not from conserving the status qu o but from controlled change and developm ent. W e need not see foreign policy as a zero-sum gam e. T here is no basic incom patibility of interest betw een us and the large o r sm all, developed or underdeveloped countries, although this assum ption is m uch less clear to those for w hom the present is m uch less satisfactory. N arrow er conceptions of national interest, how ever, are bound to assert them selves, and the very high percentage o f land and resources per capita in C anada com pared with other countries in a crow ded world will put o u r large-m indedness to a severe test. E conom ics increasingly

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dom inates w orld p olitics, and our responsibilities for constructive leadership are e norm ous and increasing. A s for m atters o f security, our responsibilities are probably decreasing. T he technology and exorbitant costs o f fleets, p lanes, and m issiles reduce the m ilitary options o f m iddle pow ers to little beyond peacekeeping, relief, and patrolling our frontiers. In a m issile age even our real estate is less essential for bases. O ur m ilitary contribution through m ultilateral alliances once seem ed sensible, but the utility o f such alliances is u nclear beyond the im m ediate future. N A T O for exam ple, m ay becom e p rim arily an instrum ent for m aintaining equilibrium in E urope in order to counterbalance the W arsaw P act. O ur role in international security will be m ore and m ore econom ic o r diplo m atic, and thus o u r pow er depends less on arm ed m ight than on o u r G N P and our w isdom in international policies. M eanw hile, we should try not to be inconsistent in our tensions with the g reat pow ers. It is true that m ost o f us recognized early the disastrous A m erican m iscalculation in V ietnam , but few of us recognized the general responsibility for a situation into w hich the U nited States so w rongheadedly p lunged. W e foreign friends seem unable to m ake up our m inds w hether the U nited States is a bogeym an or a fairy godfather, w hether w e w ant A m ericans to pack up, go hom e, and stop bothering us, o r w hether w e w ant them to intervene all over the w orld in favour of the good guys— o r at the very least to accept our volatile conceptions of w hich guys are at the m om ent good and bad. W e need som e rigorously honest thinking about pax A m ericana, or w hatever one chooses to call an international system m arked by a c onsiderable, although lim ited, U nited States hegem ony. T he sensible response is obvious. Pax A m ericana m ay have provided som e stability in the postw ar years, but it is inequitable, untenable, and, at any rate, its raison d ’etre has been destroyed in V ietnam . It m ust be replaced by a w orld o rder in w hich pow er and authority are shared by the strong and the w eak in fair proportion. A m ericans and non-A m ericans can all agree about that. But how do w e get there? W e are w here w e are because the U nited States acted as trustee for w orld authority w hile other pow ers were gathering their resources. T h at is the creation at w hich D ean A cheson thought he was present. W e have learned som e hard lessons since 1945. W e have learned, of course, that even the m ost benevolent superpow er cannot for long distinguish betw een its ow n and the international interest. T he rest of us have also learned how com fortable and inexpensive it can be to leave the basic structure of w orld order to the superpow ers. T his is not the custom ary statem ent o f gratitude to the U nited States for generously

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d efending us, for one cannot be sure w hether it has been defending us against our ow n o r its ow n enem ies. W e are protected not by one superpow er but by the system of m utual deterrence. T he point is that we lesser pow ers have discovered distinct advantages in a system w herein w e had to m aintain only a m inim um police force and had to accept no responsibility except that o f w atchdog in the critical decisions about m issiles and fleets and in the d ilem m as o f intervention. W e have made tw o efforts to im plem ent the principle o f universal co llective security. W e have been disp o sed to blam e the great pow ers for their failure, but w e know in o u r hearts that the principle w as unsound. In the new constellation w e sh all, for better o r w orse, be m ore on our ow n and w ithout the easy concept of alliance that gave us a definition of our role and som e share in policy-m aking. So long as w e have superpow ers, m ost C anadians want the U nited States to be a superpow er. O f course we m ight want to get rid o f the superpow ers, but not one at a tim e. A little isolationism in the U nited States w ould be a good thing. T he U nited States ought to rationalize its com m itm ents, to give up trying to do the im possible in A sia, to stop trying to m anage E urope and Latin A m erica and the w orld at large. But the U nited States has little need now of our advice to do just that. We should be very careful to avoid driving the U nited States into isolationism . W e m ust appeal to the b enevolent, internationalist spirit w hich is the persistent greatness o f the U nited States. T o play that large-spirited ro le, the U nited States m ust rem ain strong and respected, and w e m ust respect its need to rem ain strong, even m ilitarily. W e m ay not like the pretensions o f the U nited States N avy, but if there are going to be superpow er patrols o f the Seven Seas— and there are— w e w ould m uch rather there be m ore than one w orld-girdling fleet and that one of them be A m erican. T he U nited States m ust keep its place in the arm s equilibrium in order to play a forceful role in the constant effort to scale dow n arm s all around. T o say that the m iddle pow ers should be the conscience o f m ankind is presum ptuous only if we presum e to be its exclusive custodians. B ecause our specific national interests are rarely engaged directly in international conflicts, w e are less subject to internal pressures than are the great pow ers, and w e ought to, even if we d o n 't, m aintain more balanced perspectives. It is alw ays hard for S am aritans to avoid being Pharisees. W e in C anada and Sw eden and other m iddle pow ers are encouraged by a n xious citizens o f the U nited States to act as the conscience o f m ankind because we h a v e n 't their p o w er and their tem ptations. W e have our ow n. P ettiness is a sin like overw eening pride. S till, virtue m ay be less co stly for us It is hard to take seriously the idea of urbanized tw entieth-century C anada as the new W alden

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Pond, but w e do have a duty to give sanctuary, for exam ple. T hat includes sanctuary to som e refugees w ho m ay be im posters. C ontrary to A m erican opinion, w hich sees this as an unfriendly act, it is not as a judgm ent on U nited States policy in V ietnam that C anada adm its deserters and draft-dodgers. It is in sim ple accordance with the historic and honourable p rinciple of sanctuary w hich the U nited States and other liberal pow ers have alw ays them selves respected in the case of other n atio n s’ straying recruits. It is one o f m any precious principles w hich have m itigated the severity o f the international system ; like the conventions of the Red C ross, o r w hite flags, o r hot lines, it m ust not be sacrificed for tem porary expediency. W e have a right and a duty to offer opinions, privately and publicly, to the g reat pow ers and, if necessary, w e can com bine to put stronger pressure on them . A dvice is not effective, how ever, if it is autom atic, cantankerous, and hypocritical. A bove all, it m ust be based on our own considered schem e for w orld security, a calculated consideration of the proper part for the great pow ers in that structure and a due appreciation o f the actions they m ust take and the resources they m ust m aintain to do w hat w e expect of them . In short, w e have to be credible. In sum , w e have reason to fear the superpow ers in concert but less reason than we have to fear the hegem ony o f one or a w orld w ithout leadership. T he superpow ers in concert m ay sacrifice the rights and positions o f lesser pow ers. S om e c ountries— T aiw an, C uba, Y ugoslavia, Israel, o r E gypt— have grounds for concern. W est E uropeans and C anadians, lying as they do betw een the Soviet U nion and the U nited S tates, should be vigilant, but the advantages for both of superpow er accord so far outw eigh the dangers that obstruction on our part w ould be unforgivable. O f course we should seek to have som e voice in negotiations, both to protect our national interests and to discourage backsliding, and, if the U nited States does not want to rouse the grudging spirit in us all, it will m ake sure that our appropriate participation is respected. T he U nited States has set itself a good precedent in its consultations w ith its N A T O partners on the S A L T talks; these consultations helped to dim inish the antagonism building in W estern E urope against superpow er bilateralism . O ur relative w eaknesses as m iddle pow ers also m ake us perilously dependent on the strengthening o f the U nited N ations system . T hat system is deeper and broader than the U N as an organization; it is a m aze o f international law s, rules, and prescriptions, of international habits and expectations. It is everything im plied by the C harter, how ever im perfectly observed. Its gaps and w eaknesses are well know n, but its tenacity m ay be best dem onstrated by the fact th a t, after all these years, the regim e of M ao w anted to take its place in that system . T he U N is

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threatened by a revived spirit o f national assertion, a contem pt for w orld opinion and for international restraints w hich are “ o n ly " m oral. By defying the system , the g reat pow ers can do m ore d am ag e, but m iddle and lesser pow ers have also contributed to to d ay ’s perilous cynicism about w orld order.

5: The Role of Diplomacy

To the m iddle-pow er concept o f C anada, diplom acy was intrinsic. The m edium was a g o o d p a r t o f the m essage. M uch attention was p a id by th e advocates a n d antagonists to the p ro c e ss b y which C anada would pe rsu a d e , m anipulate, or ju s t co m m a n d the G abonese o r the A m e ric a n s or the w hole U nited N a tio n s to see things the C anadian way. The role o f C anadian diplom ats was a su b je ct o f contention durin g the fo reig n p o lic y review . In the p re ju d ic e d opinion o f an ex-diplom at, the a rg u m en t was largely inconsequent. M inisters, professors, a n d editors so u n d e d off, fre q u en tly with a dubious gra sp o f the fu n ctio n s o f diplom acy, not to m ention C anadian constitutional p ra ctice. The diplom ats, silen c ed b y that so u n d constitutional p ra c tic e, co u ld not retort— sa ve f o r the sp le n d id statem ent o f one y o u n g officer to a gentlem an o f the p r e s s d uring th e B iafra crisis: ' 'A n d i f y o u te ll m e I d o n ’t ca re w hether A fric a n babies starve, I 'll p u n c h y o u in th e god-d am n fa c e . ' ' U nhappily, stereotypes on both sides g e t in the way o f the constructi ve exchange betw een academ ics a n d civil servants which the country badly needs in the dilem m as we face. It is a situation which has been im proving rapidly, p a rtly a s a result o f the effort p u t into it by the D epartm ent o f E xtern a l A ffa irs through its A c a d e m ic R ela tio n s D ivision a n d p a rtly b y the g o o d work o f bodies like the C entre fo r F oreign Policy S tu d ie s o f D alhousie U niversity, which a rra n g ed in 1973 a conference on ' 'the changing role o f the d iplom atic fu n ctio n in the m aking o f fo reig n p o lic y . ' ' S o m e thirty academ ics a n d ci vil servants were c loseted f o r a lengthy w eekend on the rocky coast o f N o v a Sco tia w here p o in t-sco rin g g a v e way to w hat the p o li. sci. chaps call consensus-building. This essa y was a serm on d elivered to the conference by a schizophrenic with a fo o t a n d heart in both cam ps. It w as p rin te d a n d d istributed as an occa sio n a l p aper, a long with the m ore scholarly p re se n ta tio n s, b y the C entre in June 1973.

T his p ap er is a sim ple plea for the application o f com m on sense and AA

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responsibility to the study o f diplom acy and foreign policy, together w ith som e suggestions for areas o f exploration. It is an appeal to diplom ats and professors to abandon the futile effort to score points against each oth er, to recognize that the function o f diplom acy cannot be exorcized, that its satisfactory perform ance is a life-and-death m at­ ter for all of us, that the functions, habits, and priorities o f diplom acy are m utable, that kinds and breeds o f diplom ats or interlocutors are likely to m ultiply and the role o f the am bassador does need serious rather than captious re-exam ination. It is not a scholarly paper but a serm on, personal and prejudiced, reflecting the schizophrenia of one w ith a foot in each cam p. T he basic assum ption o f this paper is that diplom acy is inevitable (if not necessarily diplom ats as we have know n them ). Let us speak of interlocutors if the w ord diplom at is regarded as p ejorative or expendable. T he assum ption that diplom acy has been abolished by the invention of T elex and participatory dem ocracy and o th er m odern im provem ents is w idely and glibly held and provides considerable satisfaction to those w ho cling to rom antic notions o f the diplom at as a villain— and perversely prefer a m achine. D iplom acy, it is here assum ed, is a prim itive instinct. T he question for consideration is the alw ays changing role o f the people w ho act as interlocutors, w hether they are professional d iplom ats, private citizens o f good (or ill) w ill, or the m em bers o f prim e m inisters’ and presid en ts’ personal staffs and entourages, w ho, contrary to fashionable assum ptions, have been a prom inent feature o f international relations since long before the reigns of M essrs. T rudeau and N ixon. A nother glib assum ption is that diplom acy is m oribund w ith the nation state. T o begin w ith, it seem s clear the state is far from dead, how ever m uch its sovereignty is inhibited by international agreem ents, econom ic or m ilitary dependence, o r by pow erful neighbours. D iplom ­ acy, in any case, struck its roots in the city state and w ould presum ably survive the so-called nation state. A s far as C anada is concerned, it is not and never w as a “ nation s ta te .’’ T he m ultiplication of transnational links is undoubtedly a challenge to the authority o f the state and the efficacy o f its d iplom ats. It is a challenge, how ever, w hich has re ­ em phasized the im portance o f the state as the defen d er o f its p e o p le ’s interests. In the other direction, the diplom acy o f the state, particularly a federal state like C anada, is challenged by the loosening o f its internal structure. T he result is not the death o f diplom acy but rather its m ultiplication and its com plication. T he relations am ong the provinces and of provinces w ith foreign bodies increasingly look like diplom acy on other levels. T he consequences o f this diversity can be the spread of anarchy by the abandonm ent of rational m eans o f com m unication or the adaptation o f diplom atic rules and practices to serve the purposes o f a

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universe in the process at the sam e tim e of integration and disintegra­ tion. W e m ust concern ourselves with all these changes in w hat is regarded as classical diplom acy, although it w ould be w ise to bear in m ind that adaptation has been proceeding pretty rapidly in the last quarter-century and w hat exists today is replete w ith u n '‘c la ssic al” features. D efenders and critics both distort the discussion by dealing in stereotypes. T he effect o f technological changes in com m unications on the conduct o f diplom acy for e x am p le, is im portant. T he frequent assum ption that the part played by the am bassador in policy form ation has been dow ngraded if not elim inated is one exam ple of the superficial treatm ent o f a subject scholars have too often disdained to take serious­ ly. C om m unications w ork in both d irections, and the part the am ­ b assador can now play in the devising o f his ow n instructions has been greatly increased. T he question to be considered is how technological change can be best ex ploited to im prove the policy ­ m aking process o r, if one prefers the chaster role for political science, to analyse the consequences to date on the policy-m aking process. L ikew ise, there is needed a m ore pragm atic look at the changing function o f the em bassy or consulate in the light o f the increasing com plexity and specialization o f negotiation. T he easy assum ption that as neither the am bassador nor his staff can com prehend the issues of nuclear pow er o r salm on fishing they are expendable is another o f the fashionable conclusions too ingenuous to be taken seriously if they were not repeated by scholars and politicians w ho ought to know better. T he increase in the q u antity and the intricacy o f negotiations has already had a profound effect on the role of professional foreign service officers. It can be argued, how ever, that it only em phasizes the need for greater com petence in their ow n professional stock-in-trade: d iplom a­ cy and international know -how . T h e com plem entary functions o f the specialist assigned ad hoc and o f the perm anent establishm ent in a foreign capital ought not to be difficult to define. A t any rate, w hat we should be looking at closely is change and adaptation. Investigation m ust not stop short w ith irresponsible conclusions about the death of diplom acy. W e m ust concern ourselves w ith good and bad diplom acy, c o m ­ petent and incom petent d iplom ats, as well as anachronistic diplom ats and diplom acy. C ritics o f diplom acy are particularly given to extrem e conclusions about the value o f a diplom atic service based on their direct experience o f one or tw o incom petent m em bers of this profession. Like all professions, diplom acy has its duds— perhaps m ore than m ost because the profession as now practised is a peculiarly corrupting experience. T oo often, how ever, criticism is based on a hazy idea of what duties and services our representatives abroad are expected to

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perform and the scope and lim itations of their advisory function o f the governm ent. T he assum ption by m any citizens that em bassies abroad are intended to provide free travel, legal and m edical services is one w hich diplom ats have grow n used to living w ith. M ore serious, from o u r point o f view , are the m isapprehensions of those who should know better: as, for exam ple, that the prim ary function o f m issions abroad is to send back political reports in com petition w ith the N e w Y ork Times. T he prim ary function o f any diplom atic m ission abroad is negotia­ tion, and that includes the constant preparation o f the ground for possible negotiation. R eporting is valuable in that context. T he kind of inform ation O ttaw a needs to have about p ersonalities and policies in B ogota before em barking on a trade treaty w ith C olom bia o r a joint initiative in the U nited N ations is unlikely to be carried in any one o f the public m edia. In any ca se , all com petent diplom ats read the N e w Y ork Tim es and even better papers like L e M o n d e to supplem ent the specialized reports from their m issions. T hat the m em bers o f the C anadian o r any o th er foreign service m ight be occupying them selves m ore usefully than they now d o , that their training and experience m ight be of a different kind, goes w ithout saying now and forever m ore. T hat there are paradoxes, co ntradictions, and priorities to be considered ought also to be taken for granted. T he question o f w hether a foreign service should be com posed o f generalists o r area specialists is a case in point. A c ontinuous re-exam ination o f the advantages and disadvantages o f either practice is required. All bureaucracies need outside stim ulation to consider c hanging traditional custom s, but the retention o f custom s w hich are still valid is not to be w ritten off as inertia. N ot all good practices are new ; som e go back to the G arden of E den. T he disrepute into w hich diplom acy has fallen is a m atter for serious concern on the part of lovers o f peace in all countries. Stupid diplom ats and blundering diplom acy can properly but only partially be blam ed for this ill reputation. D iplom ats, like journalists, rally too often to defend their profession as indiscrim inately as critics attack it. A ttitudes of glow ering suspicion and intolerance have built up. W hat seem s un­ due conservatism on the part o f diplom ats is often an outraged d e ­ fensiveness provoked by the irrelevance and m isinform ation o f m uch o f the criticism . T h ere is also to be considered the helpless frustration of diplom ats them selves w ith diplom acy as it is w idely practised. Few experienced diplom ats w ould w ant to abandon in principle the concept o f protocol. E stablished rules o f precedence have averted w ars and ruptures o f friendly relations am ong states. Few diplom ats doubt, how ever, that the social custom s o f diplom ats, w hich earn them envy and contum ely, require sober re-appraisal. Such a re-appraisal, if sober, w ould acknow ledge the inestim able

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value o f happy social relations am ong diplom ats along with the needless escalation o f eatin g , drinking, and the bending o f callingcards occasioned by the escalation o f the num ber o f diplom ats. The U nited N ations has initiated useful progress in im proving o r estab lish ­ ing rules and custom s o f international intercourse, and it m ight som e day tackle the anachronism o f protocol. T he abolition, for ex am p le, of the term “ E x cellency” for an am bassador w ould be a first step in the right direction, as it w ould rem ove one of those factors which tend after years o f chancery life to corrupt even the nicest o f guys from M edicine H at and their w ives. It should be acknow ledged, how ever, that it is hard for a country to m ake progress unilaterally, and that the stoutest defenders of antique rituals and indefensible privileges are the new com ers on the international scene rather than the bored old relics of the C ongress o f V ienna. It is easy e n ough to en courage our ow n foreign service officers to break aw ay from the herd and act hum bly and austerely on their o w n , but such an injunction does not alw ays accord w ith the equally ad m irable advice to adapt to local custom s rather than offensively to im pose abroad the preferred habits o f M edicine Hat o r R ockcliffe. It is unlikely to be consistent either with the popular injunction o f the m om ent, w hich is to put first the C anadian co m m erci­ al interest. It is the C anadian businessm an who m ost frequently lam ents th e cocktail partying of the “ striped-pants b o y s” and most ex travagantly practises this form o f salesm anship in his ow n trade. Som e sensible cost-benefit analysis o f this kind o f nonsense, w hich m ost diplom ats w ould happily e scap e, should be possible if the aforem entioned desire to score points could be abandoned. It w ould be helpful if “ d ip lo m a c y ,” like “ ap p ea se m e n t,” could lose its pejorative overtones— w hich is not to say that there are never occasions w hich require loud challenges rather than diplom acy and stubborn confrontation rather than appeasem ent. In popular fantasy, diplom ats are charged w ith being by profession both w arm ongers and appeasers. T he latter charge is a great deal m ore apt. T heir duty has alw ays been to prevent conflict, and this instinct is m uch stronger now than it ever w as before because an increasing proportion o f their tim e is involved in the creation o f international structures and their w ay o f life encourages broad perspectives. A continual problem w ith diplom ats today is that they tend to put the international above the national interest, to be carried aw ay by the spirit o f G eneva or B russels or Peking. T here are som e particular problem s of C anadian diplom acy w hich require disentangling. T hese m ay be partly attributable to the confusion in C anadian m inds betw een d iplom acy and foreign policy and the consecration o f diplom acy as foreign policy. T he so-called m iddlepo w er diplom acy o f C anada in the postw ar period w as a response to

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international needs and can be defended as a service to the international com m unity. For a country w hich can survive o n ly in a w orld w here there is constant brokerage am ong states, it rem ains a service to be perform ed on call in the national and international interest. It is not a role chosen; it is doing w hat com es naturally. T he glorification of diplom acy into a basis o f foreign policy w as a response partly to the C anadian need for definition. T echnique w as exalted, ends and m eans w ere confused. M iddle-pow er diplom acy can still be a facet o f our foreign policy. Its relationship to a “ foreign p o lic y ” is in fact a subject w hich w ould profit from the kind o f co-operative analysis by political scientists and practitioners w hich this essay recom m ends. T he present tendency to reject the interm ediary function in principle rather than just the fantasies o f m iddlepow erism threatens to underm ine w hat is, after all, m erely a disposition to help avoid conflict and confrontation. E specially in the present w ave o f assertive nationalism in C anada, the governm ent and its instrum ent, the D epartm ent of External A ffairs, are being urged to renounce diplom acy in favour o f the strident dem and: instructions to other states to stop their w ars, the unilateral assertion o f rights o v er w aters and fish and o th er resources. D iplom a­ c y , it is too easily forgotten, is a gam e o f skill in w hich countries w ithout adequate w eight to be decisive in w orld politics and econom ics play w hatever hands they can m uster. T o do so they need m ore friends than enem ies. C anadian short-sightedness on this point is attributable partly to the fact that w e have n ev er been threatened o r pilloried to the extent that we desperately needed the help o f friends. W e are too little aw are that even in our internationalist activities w e have needed friends. T he C anadian initiative in the Suez crisis w ould not have been successful if C anada had not been able to put together m ajority support in the U nited N ations A ssem bly. T hat support did not com e instantan­ eously. It w as built up laboriously over the past years by fraternizing w ith and show ing understanding o f the interests of Indians and A rabs, Latin A m ericans and Y ugoslavs, and even o f the defendants in the case, the B ritish, French, and Israelis. You d o n 't get that kind of support if you run around international conferences w ith y our fists up and your chips in place on the shoulder. He w hom you denounce will w elcom e the chance to denounce you. Increasingly in a w orld dom inated by the pressure o f population on resources w e are g oing to need friends, not just to stop som eone e lse ’s w ars but to help us establish international rules to protect o u r ow n vital interests. B ut even this argum ent for sw eet relations in the national interest is not a sim ple one. C ountries w hich sacrifice consistency and principle and never stand for their convictions lose credibility and respect. T he C anadian initiatives w hich gained us a reputation for good international citizen­

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ship have lost us friends but so long as this reputation persists (and it endures longer abroad than at hom e) it does strengthen our position in international councils. C anadian com m entators on diplom acy have been too reluctant to accept paradox. T he confusion o v er the functions o f C anadian diplom acy has been now here m ore foolishly illustrated than in the controversy over “ quiet d ip lo m a c y ," a controversy, incidentally, w hich is not to be found in those term s in o th er countries. T h ere has, o f course, been a legitim ate debate since at least the days of W oodrow W ilson about open covenants openly arrived at. T he persistent problem for opponents o f secret diplom acy is that every one, from L eft to R ight, who assum es pow er realizes that Secret diplom acy is both dangerous and indispensable. A H oare-L aval pact secretly arrived at to dism em ber E thiopia is easily recognized as evil, but there are few people w ho w ould not co ncede the right to confidentiality o f H enry K issinger and Le D ue T ho if they can thereby bring peace to V ietnam . It w as the C hinese w ho particularly requested secrecy about the talks w ith C anada in Stockholm . Few C anadian critics o f “ quiet d ip lo m a c y " com plained, because m ost of them wanted C anada to be successful in establishing relations with Peking and recognized that regular reports on the state o f play, as on the chess m atches in R eykjavik, w ould not contribute to that end. W hat has confused the issue badly is that the argum ent in C anada o v er ‘ 'q u ie t d ip lo m a c y '' is a genuine argum ent ov er foreign policy and the diplom atic instrum ent but it is not an argum ent about “ quiet d ip lo m a cy .” It is an argum ent about how to deal with the U nited States. T he criticism is based on a belief that C anada did not stand up firm ly enough to A m erican pressures and w as ineffective in persuading W ashington to the C anadian point o f view on w orld problem s. T his is one o f the m ost im portant subjects for discussion and analysis in C anadian foreign policy, but useful analysis has not been prom oted by this kind o f over-sim plification. C onfidential diplom acy is practised by every governm ent on earth , as well as by every private organization and institution, including the fam ily. If C anada w ere to abandon such a practice, it w ould becom e a pariah nation, utterly im potent. T he apparently absolutist argum ent against “ quiet d iplom acy” has un­ dercut the essential discussion about the abuses o f privacy and the frustration o f public discussion. T he childish assum ption that because C anada w as unable, in private discussion, to persuade the A m ericans to clear out o f V ietnam , public denunciation w ould have done the trick has diverted us from a sensible calculation o f the m ost appropriate instrum ents to use. W hich m ethods have proved m ost effective: an am bassadorial plea before U nited States policy has congealed, a public request in a speech in P hiladelphia, a threat to w ithhold resources, o r an

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o ffer o f collaboration under certain term s? T here is a case for each tactic. At the heart o f the problem is the calculation as to the extent to w hich C anada can go it alone and the extent to w hich w e need, w ithout being unduly subm issive, to retain the good will o f W ashington— and of B russels— and how m uch, if anything, w e should be prepared to sacrifice to m aintain it. T h is fundam ental issue is not being treated seriously enough in the current caricaturings o f both “ c o n tin en talists” and “ anti-continentalists” (w hatever those caricature term s m ean) because they avoid the realities o f diplom acy. B lam ing the diplom ats is also a handy m eans of avoiding hard decision. D iplom ats involved in the tough international g am e, far from St. G eorge Street, or Point Grey, or St. Jam es S treet, know that one rarely gets concessions w ithout m aking at som e tim es concessions. T h ere is legitim ate argum ent about w hether C anada has m ade too m any o r the w rong concessions and about the stew ardship o f the D epartm ent o f External A ffairs. It w ould be a better argum ent if it w ere based on m ore im partial research. Paradoxically, it w ould also be better if the successes and failures of “ quiet d ip lo m a c y " did not rem ain, by definition, quiet for som e years at least. (H ow long is in itself a subject for arg u m en t.) A n exam ination should also be m ade as to w hether the argum ent for loud diplom acy is reciprocal. C anadians w ho anguish over our quiet diplom acy w ere the first to protest w hen the State D epartm ent in 1962 issued a press release questioning som e conclusions o f the C anadian governm ent. President K ennedy w as also rebuked for saying in O ttaw a that C anada w ould be w elcom e in the O rganization o f A m erican States. T h is is not, how ever, essen tially an argum ent about quiet or loud diplom acy. It is the m uch bigger, the endem ic C anadian problem of how to use o u r w its to live as a nation on a continent in w hich w e have alw ays been vastly out-num bered. It should be noted, incidentally, that our diplom ats on the w hole take a m uch less defeatist attitude on our capacity for survival than do the doom sters in the academ ies. D iplom a­ cy is to a large extent the science o f living by o n e ’s wits. T he question of public opinion and foreign policy is, o f course, m uch in need o f investigation. T he com plexity and intricacy o f international relations, and perhaps the increasing need by governm ents to integrate their resources and play strong hands in international negotiation, do not m ake the problem easier. O bviously the exigencies o f the situation encourage elitism am ong the p ractitioners and bureaucratic contem pt for the p u b lic ’s fum bling approaches. On the o th er hand, the assum p­ tion o f other elite gro u p s, in the academ ies, cham bers of com m erce, or other professional organizations, that they are the true voice o f the people is not acceptable. Can we at the sam e tim e talk about opening up

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the policy process and dem and that the governm ent form ulate in­ tegrated policies— on resources, for exam ple— and play successful p o k er? W e probably do have to do both, but w e had b etter not pretend that the conflicts involved can sim ply be blam ed upon the stupidities or arrogance o f our governors o r a bunch o f professors. W e are going to have to resist increasingly the m anagerial presum ptions of the go v ern ­ ing classes b ecause o f the increasing com plexity of issues but it is dangerous to do so by reviving ingenuous notions about the p e o p le ’s w isdom . R elated to this question is the position in governm ent and society of our foreign service. W hat should be their role in the policy-m aking process? If the bureaucrats them selves are confused about their role, so too are the critics, and the gam e of point-scoring gets in the w ay o f clear thinking. T he classic concept o f the civil servant in the C anadian/ B ritish tradition m ay not be good enough, but it had values w hich should not be m islaid in the process o f revision. It should com m and m ore respect than it does from critics w ho fear the excessive influence on policy o f the bureaucracy. It affirm s the suprem acy o f the elected m inisters and assigns to diplom ats the role o f advisers. T h e c o n ­ tradictions are apparent in discussion o f the relationship o f the D epartm ent o f E xternal A ffairs to the public. Is it the function o f these professional advisers to incorporate in their advice the vagaries of public o pinion, o r is it their duty to set out for the governm ent the consequences of their action on the international com m unity and on the long-range interests o f C anada regardless of internal p o litics? A good civil servant surely has the responsibility o f w arning the governm ent, how ever unpopular his w arnings m ay be. It cannot be assu m ed , of course, that his view s are unbiased, but the conflicting view s o f the professionals w ithin a service w hich has been kept healthy and un­ cow ed is som e guarantee of hard advice. T he fashionable caricatures o f foreign services as m onolithic preserves o f reactionaries or nests of disloyal pinkos have not only been w rong in fact; they have obscured the issues for consideration about the function and com position of foreign offices. So rem edies and definitions proposed tend to lack sense. N either the idea of the foreign office as a politically virginal elite nor o f the elim ination o f the professionals in som e pure exercise o f the p e o p le ’s will in foreign policy is acceptable. D iplom ats far rem oved from the political realities o f their country o r contem ptuous o f their fellow -citizens are incapable o f giving advice w hich a governm ent can accept. Should the citizen, how ever, seek to affect policy by influenc­ ing the bureaucracy o r his elected representatives? A cadem ic critics in C anada too often encourage the heretical idea that foreign policy is m ade by the D epartm ent o f E xternal A ffairs by talking and acting as if this w ere so. T he purist argum ent, how ever, that

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no effort should be m ade to persuade the bureaucrats begs too m any questions. T he D epartm ent o f External A ffairs c an n o t, unless it un­ healthily isolates itself, avoid being som ething of an agency o f tran s­ m ission o f ideas and opinions b etw een the governm ent and the people or at least the foreign affairs elite. It is not, strictly speaking, their function to act in this w ay and they ought not to b e assigned it. T he first principle in this m atter is perhaps to avoid strictly speaking altogether. H ow do these p rocesses actually w o rk , and how m ight they work b etter? T hese are the questions w hich the practitioners and political scientists, historians, and journalists should be w orking at together. We are, in C anada, far from having done adequate descriptive w ork. B ehaviouralist techniques o f analysis have lagged, not only b ecause of the persistent scepticism o f their value on the part o f C anadian academ ics and bureaucrats, but also because the raw m aterial for quantification is lacking. W hatever the m ethodology, w hat is needed most of all is objective research. T he age o f the clam seem s to be passing in O ttaw a. T here is a m uch greater disposition in the relevant departm ents to m ake m aterial available. C loser association, as w e well know , betw een o fficials and scholars is producing a new attitude of confidence. O fficials and politicans are m ore likely to offer inform a­ tion if they believe that it is not going to be m isused in their disfavour. For the sch o lar, as for the journalist, o f co u rse, there is the constant fear that he will be used in this w ay. H e cannot com prom ise his integrity by prom ising to conclude w hat the official w ants him to conclude. Here lies and will continue to lie the heart o f this problem . T here is no solution for it. As in all issues o f foreign policy there is only the need to recognize that there are and will rem ain inescapable conflicts of in­ terest.

6: After 25 Years

In 1970 the International Journal o f the C anadian Institute o f Interna­ tio n a l A ffa irs celebrated its tw enty-fifth anniversary a s the unique E nglish-language quarterly on international a ffa irs in C anada with a w orld-w ide reputation a cq u ired b y its editors fo r the p a s t fifte e n years, R o b e r t S p e n c e r a n d Jam es E ayrs. This introductory contribution to a volum e d evoted to C anadian fo re ig n p o lic y was an effort to see in historical p e rsp e ctive recent changes as w ell as the loom ing challenges w hich w ould require a m ore d ra stic review o f o u r p la c e in th e world. It a ppears in volum e x x v i , w inter 1970-1.

In co n tem plating the C anadian position in w orld affairs over the quarter-century since this Journal w as established, it is hard to decide w hether w e have m oved into a new age or just com pleted another o f our fam iliar m anic cycles. B oth conclusions are no doubt valid. The dim ensions have changed enorm ously, but the persistent them es are reappearing. W e are back w ith the three hundred and fifty year old dilem m as o v er dividing a continent across the m iddle. W e struggle again with the paradoxes of independence and collectivism — the unsolvable but acceptable paradoxes o f trying to control our ow n destiny and share, as well as pay for, the advantages o f the pax B ritannica or the pax A m ericana o r the U nited N ations system or the new era o f s a l t . The debates over R eciprocity o r the N aval Bill or sanctions against Italy are relevant. In fact, w hat seem s m ore strange from 1970 is the euphoric m ood o f the late ’forties. W hether w e have passed through golden decades or silv er o r base m etal (the sell-out theory) is a m atter o f perspective, loyalty, o r even m ood. T he m iddle pow er has becom e m iddle-aged, m ore sceptical of its capacities and its accom plishm ents. T he m ood is introspective. In international affairs, one is tem pted to call it unadventurous, but it is also, and not o n ly in C anada, utopian and apocalyptic and perhaps unadventurous only in the intergovernm ental relationship. T here is m uch confusion and perplexity over w hat the state can do in this

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bravura new w orld— especially w hat our particular kind of state can do. C anadians exalt and ignore their ow n foreign policy. A perverse com ­ pulsion to identification w ith A m erican political and social processes is accom panied by an insistence on utter independence. T he right and left seem to have m isplaced the C anadian identity in their thrilling co n te m ­ plation o f other p e o p le 's revolutions, but the chilling contem plation of our ow n recent e v e n em en tsm ay repatriate their concern. T he pragm atic m ajority is properly puzzled about the best w ay to be good C anadians and good w orld citizens. W e have been through this kind o f debate before w ith G oldw in Sm ith and Sir G eorge Parkin and Sir Robert B orden and M ackenzie K ing— but w ithout television. It is easy to be depressed, even h um iliated, by m uch o f the current debate over foreign policy, especially if one looks at it from abroad. Foreigners seem often to hold us in contem pt both for the extravagance o f o u r nationalism and for our lethargy in the face o f threats to it. T hey find it hard to tune in on our shrill debate. N evertheless, our re­ exam ination o f ourselves is not unhealthy. W e w ere getting out o f step w ith our ow n philosophies and needed a new look at our place in the w orld. W e are, it is to be hoped, going through a stag e. W e w ould be w iser to acknow ledge a m enopause than to go on at age 103 claim ing exem ption for adolescence. S om e corrective w as required to the illu­ sion o f m iddle-sized superpow er, and recognition that foreign policy is m ore than a diplom atic high-w ire act— a view , incidentally, w hich is dearer to the heart o f the public w ho found it cheap and com fortable, than to the diplom ats, w ho found it exhausting. W e shall pass through this aw kw ard stag e, no doubt, but not until we rediscover the w orld around us. O ur tem per seem s clo ser to the late 'th irties than the late 'forties. T he latter is the period, how ever, w hen, it is now charged, we w ere selling ourselves to the Y ankees. But it w as an age o f m uch greater selfconfidence than the present o r than the 'th irties. W e w ere not disposed to doubt our ability to keep com pany with larger pow ers and stand up to them if required. In this respect St. L aurent and Pearson were m ore like Borden and M eighen than like M ackenzie K ing or the present articulate, if less highly placed , “ n a tio n a lists" w ho give the ingenuous but high-m inded C anuck no m ore chance to stand up to IB M o r the C IA than the colonially-m inded nationalists of a generation ago gave him w ith a B ritish lord. T heir innocence rem inds one o f the political m ileage M ackenzie K ing got out o f the “ p lo t" o f Lord H alifax in 1944 to ensnare us in a closed em pire— and the obsession about im perial threats is just as peripheral to the hard w orld issues o f now as then. T here is everything to be said for beginning a calculation o f our national interest and our consequent foreign policy from bang in the m iddle of the northern h alf of N orth A m erica, with our very ow n polar

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view o f the im portance of E urope and the A rctic and the G ulf o f A qaba. W e have been too m uch disposed to ge t our strategic concepts seco n d ­ hand from m other countries, large neighbours, and dom inant allies. L ooking at the w orld from B eaver Lodge, how ever, need not lim it our vision to the continent around us. N or ought it to fix us in perm anent fascination w ith le d efi am ericain. So preoccupied have we becom e w ith standing up for our little rights to the A m ericans that w e are in d a n g er of ignoring the real scope of our international plight. T he essential issue for C anadians in the next few d ecades is how to live w ith our riches in a w orld m ore and m ore preoccupied with the gap betw een population and resources. The q uestion of C anadian ow nership is relevant and im portant but incident­ al. O ur relationship to the U nited States m arket for energy and other resources is o n ly one aspect, and by far the easiest to resolve, o f the resources issues w hich will com e to w orry us. W e m ust at last give up the illusions o f being p oor and undeveloped and recognize the responsibilities and the vulnerabilities of extrem e affluence. It is w e, not the A m ericans, w ho m ay be regarded as the arch-im peralist pow er o f the 'e ig h ties, even though there will still not be m any o f us. W e are feeling first the pressures o f the A m ericans and the Japanese, but they already have, in the eyes o f the rest of the w orld, m uch too large a share o f w hat the earth provides. T he argum ent against a sharing o f resources on a continental basis is m uch deeper and w ider than our nationalists seem to realize. O ne o f the truths to w hich w e cling is that o u r status at the end o f the last w ar w as inflated but that, since the restoration o r rise o f G erm any, Jap an , France, and o th er countries, w e have had to give up illusions of m iddle pow er and behave like the dependent and dependable but ornery youth we have som e natural disposition to want to be anyw ay. It has been w ise of us to accept this dem otion, but as an argum ent for caution rather than self-indulgence. T he decline in our stature is relative, not absolute; and the trend is deceptive. W hile w e have been adjusting ourselves to a low er standing in the w orld league, our G N P has been rising so rapidly that by the m id -'sev en ties it is approaching that of B ritain. W hat kind of pow er do we call ourselves then? It isn’t a q uestion o f vain boasting but o f accepting responsibility. M ost C anadians w ould p robably prefer not to have to be a great pow er; we have for centuries know n the com forts of being sheltered, the luxury of a supplem entary foreign and defence policy. But the country which sits o n vast sources o f en erg y , land, and resources will have to get used to thinking and acting for itself. Standing up for o u r rights a gainst the big guy, assuring o u r claim to m ore fish and m ore undersea resources per square m ile o f coast and head of population than any oth er peoples, stretching our sovereignty to

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keep out intruders, is not an adequate end for C anadian foreign policy. It m ay be an essential m eans to a higher end. Fortifying C anadian nationalism and assuring C anadian sovereignty are reactionary if their purpose is to allow us to sit on our hoard and drive off poachers. T hey are necessary steps, how ever, to en ab le us to behave as enlightened w orld citizens. T he dilem m a for the C anadian internationalist is that his w ell-intentioned serm ons against nationalism and sovereignty m ay save the w orld in the long run but m ay lead C anada into com m itting suicide in the short ru n , to no good internationalist purpose at all. M aintaining foreign policies at various levels is, how ever, the key to survival for pow ers o f all shapes and sizes.

Part Two: International Institutions

T he idea o f the m iddle-pow er “ ro le ” grew out o f C anadian participa­ tion in international organizations, especially the fam ily of the U nited N ations. T he fashionable thesis o f C a n ad a ’s decline in the w orld is popularly associated w ith the belief that both C anada and the U nited N ations have g row n decrepit. Both those assum ptions are strongly contended in the first article. T he o th er articles in this section consider the tw o m ajor functions o f the U nited N ations as C anada saw them in 1945, collective security and m ediation. T he extensive attention given to the m ediatory function is justified on the grounds that it has been and is likely to rem ain our C anadian habit if not o u r role in m iddle age.

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1: The New Age of Functionalism

A s one w ho ca rrie d a briefcase in th e C anadian delegation to the First G eneral A sse m b ly o f the U nited N a tio n s in L o n d o n in 1946, a n d was on h a n d f o r the crises o v er B erlin, K orea, Suez, H ungary, and L ebanon, I ought to have been d isillusioned early a bout the U nited N ations. I w as not, because I was tra in ed b y a rem arkable gro u p o f m en in a p ra c tic a l, fu n ctio n a list concept o f a U nited N a tio n s respond­ ing to a n d building its e lf on challenges. S o in the 'seventies I sa w it not so m uch as an institution a s a n o w ineradicable habit. M y m entor, H um e W rong, p u t it thus to the last session o f the L eague o f N a tio n s in 1946: " T h e troubles o f th e w orld are not, a n d n ever have been, a t bottom a question o f th e nature o f the existing international m achinery, o f the p ro c e sse s w hereby issues a re brought fo rw a rd fo r d iscussion and settlem ent, o f the C ovenant o r th e C h a rter o f th e rule o f u nanim ity o r th e veto p o w e r . . . The L e a g u e o f its e lf c o u ld accom plish nothing. The U nited N ations o f its e lf can accom plish nothing. B oth a re instrum ents fo r collective action o f their states m em bers. W e m u st se e k to avo id that m ischievous fa lla c y which a t tim es in the p a s t le d m any p e o p le to m ake excu ses fo r the inaction o f th e ir ow n g overnm ents on the g ro u n d that the question a t issue was one fo r the L e a g u e to settle. M o re cannot com e o u t o f a n y internationl organization than its m em bers a re ready to p u t into it. ” * This article w as p ro v o k e d b y the dangerous attacks on the U nited N a tio n s in 1974 b y w ell-intentioned p e o p le w ithout historical perspectives, a n d also by the fa ilu re o f the C anadian p re ss a n d p u b lic to p a y adequate attention to the extraordinary i f undram atic con­ tributions O ttaw a b ureaucrats a re m aking to the m ost im portant con­ tem porary activities o f the U nited N a tio n s fa m ily o f institutions. This is an e xten d ed version o f an article e n titled “ T h e W o r ld " which a p p e a re d in S aturday N ight, J u ly /A u g u st, 1975. *Canada, Department o f External A ffa irs, Conference Series, 1946, N o . 2,

R eport o f the Canadian D elegates to the Twenty-First A ssem bly o f the League o f Nations, G eneva, A p ril 8th-18th, 1946, pp. 24-5.

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In its thirtieth year the U nited N ations is not expiring. It is, in fact, in one o f its m ost creative phases. W hat is m ore, the C anadian con trib u ­ tion is as effective and constructive as it has e v er been. T hat, adm itted­ ly, is not conventional w isd o m . T he U N is said to be in a precarious state and C a n a d a 's part in it that o f an ineffectual observer relegated to third-class status. T he “ golden d e ca d e ’’ after the w ar, w hen the U N really w orked and C anada w as heeded, is regarded either with nostalgia as a busted dream o r as an overrated tour de force rem ote from the real interests o f the country. People who talk that w ay are usually looking in the w rong direction. T hey m ay be obsessed by particular issues, the fate of Israel or the price o f o il. O r they are m ired in traditional values of the age of the Cold W ar, preoccupied, as far as C anada is concerned, w ith archaic questions of alignm ent o r independence. Paradoxically, those w ho cling m ost doggedly to the C old W ar perspectives are those w ho think they have opposed them m ost vigorously. T he C old W ar provided the m indless Left as well as the m indless Right w ith their point of reference, their one sure indication o f goodness and badness. A U N no longer dom inated by the C old W ar or even by detente— in w h ic h , for exam ple, the deadliest rivalry is betw een M oscow and Peking— is hard for them to cope w ith. N o w onder; it is hard for anyone to cope w ith, and the tem ptation is strong to throw up our hands. T he posture o f the cynic is alw ays tem pting. Its uncom prom ising stance so easily disguises its essential naivete. It is easier to holler “ D oom ’ ’ than to think through the com plex w ays o f avoiding it. A rticulate C anadians are incurable denouncers. T he basic problem is, as alw ays, that people never seem to get through their heads w hat the U nited N ations is. It is neither an avenging G od nor a dispenser o f divine justice. N or is it the devil incarnate. It is m ore they than it. T he U N is a loosely linked netw ork of institutions and agencies w ithin w hich m em ber states can do o r not do w hat they can find a consensus o r a m ajority o r enough g reat-pow er agreem ent to carry out. It is also , o f course, a C harter, a com m on bond to good behaviour am ong sovereign states and in that sense som ething greater than the sum o f its parts. B ut as the U N it cannot act, and the system is not responsible for the actions taken w ithin its com ponent parts. T he U N did not recognize the Palestine L iberation O rganization. A large m a­ jority o f m em bers invited A rafat to state his case and, abetted by the tem porary President of the T w enty-N inth G eneral A ssem bly, gave him preferential treatm ent. T he w isdom o f doing so is debatable. It m ay be regarded as an unholy blessing on terrorism o r a bid to offer the P L O an alternative to terrorist action. It w as one o f m any w ise or unw ise decisions that have been m ade since 1945 by m ajorities of various kinds in the hundreds o f assem blies and com m ittees that m ake up the U N

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system . T he G eneral A ssem bly is one of the principal organs o f the U N , but it is not “ the UN, ’’ and it cannot on its ow n adm it or expel m em bers. T he recourse is not to abandon the institution but to seek w ays of altering the m ajority o r the m ajority view . T o talk as if the U N were d ispensable is to m isunderstand w hat has been happening in this century. T he habit of m ultilateral collaboration is so deeply in­ grained— not just because it is desirable but because it is unavoidable— that in a vacuum new institutions w ould re-form like a sp id e r’s w eb or flesh o v er scar tissue. T he problem for the W est is that they m ight not again be universal and w e w ould be on the outside. A M iddle East settlem ent m ight be juggled for a tim e by the great pow ers on their own but not the control of epidem ics, nuclear p roliferation, civil aviation, or m eteorology. T hese latter are the critical issues of international surviv­ al, so successfully m anaged w ithin the U N system that we take them for granted. T hey are not to be dism issed as its secondary purposes. T he w orst enem ies o f the U N have alw ays been both the Utopians and the cynics. T h e form er insist on seeing it as a w orld governm ent asserting its will over sovereign states. T he trouble with that perspective is not just that it bears no relationship to w orld politics in the foreseeable future. By positing an “ all or noth in g ” approach it stunts the grow th o f the U N as an organism of enorm ous vitality constantly finding w ays and m eans o f dealing w ith diverse problem s, building up the infrastructure by experim entation rather than seeking to im pose a p h ilo sp h er’s dream w hich w ould sh atter at the first unsuccess­ ful challenge. T he cynics, on the o th er hand, like to pretend that the U N is a w orld governm ent in o rder to score points against it by p roving that it does not act like one. If the U N is to be blam ed as an “ it” for not stopping the w ars in V ietnam o r B angladesh o r, by a wave o f its hand, closing the gap betw een rich and p oor countries, it m ight be given credit for seeing to it that m ore o f us failed to die o f cholera than were e v er killed in these w ars. W e rarely think either o f the m illions w ho did not die in the w ars frustrated by preventive action in U N bodies. W ithout any alteration o f the C harter, the Security Council and other organs could be used for practically all the purposes their critics have in m ind. W e have to w ork fo r con sen su s because the U N is a voluntary system , and no change of the rules on paper can alter that fact o f life. N one o f us can be forced by a m ajority, although w e can be subjected to strong moral pressure. T he U N w as invented not to abolish international politics but to provide a setting in w hich they m ight be conducted more harm oniously. O ne m ay well ask w hether the present cacophony does m ore harm than good. It is surely preferable, how ever, to the terrifying reverberations in the void w hich could follow the dism antling o f a system w hich forces the pow ers to split their differences and be called to account. It is this enforced association w hich m atters m ost and its

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best results are rarely expressed in form al resolutions. It is too often forgotten that the U N C harter does not insist that all peacem aking take place in its form al sessions. By article 33 parties to a dispute are enjoined “ first o f a ll” to seek a solution by “ peaceful m eans o f their ow n c h o ic e .” T here is nothing essentially contrary to the C harter in H enry K issin g e r's efforts to find solutions in Jerusalem and C airo o r in the efforts to do the sam e in G eneva. It is the results that m atter. T o pretend, o f course, that present problem s in the U N are routine w ould be as dangerous as giving up the struggle. W e do need perspective, how ever. T he U N is going through another and perhaps m ore critical period o f agonizing adjustm ent, as m em bers try to com e to term s w ith a changed political configuration. M ajorities form and re-form , and the U N has adjusted quite w ell. T he danger has alw ays been that those in control o f a m ajority will exploit their tem porary advantage to alter the universalist structure. In the late 'fo rties there w ere heedless politicians in the W est w ho w anted to force the Soviet U nion and its friends out of the system because they w ere frustrating the will o f a m ajority w hich w anted to do things in its w ay. T he C anadian governm ent w as am ong those w hich stoutly resisted this pressure, arguing that the U N m ust be preserved as the one forum w here deadly antagonists w ould have to talk to each other so that, if the tem porary rivalry could be contained, the U N could carry on its essential purposes. T hey regarded N A T O not as an abandonm ent of the U N but as a m eans by w hich countries w hich felt them selves threatened could provide for their own collective d efence, thereby frustrating those who w ould turn the U N into a non-com m unist m ilitary instrum ent in the nam e of collective security. W ithout saying so, the R ussians did the sam e in the W arsaw Pact, and in the U N m em bers w ere thereby enabled to devote their attention to keeping the w orld as peaceful and prosperous as possible. Feeling m ore secure and confident, they w isely abandoned the effort to turn the U N into an agency o f enforced co llective security. T here w ere successes, failures, and stalem ates, but undoubtedly m uch less fighting than there w ould otherw ise have been. T hat the long-range gam ble on universali­ ty is p aying off m ight be proved by the fact that the U nited States and the U S S R are not only still sitting together in U N bodies; they are actually collaborating in efforts to control nuclear proliferation as well as brush-fire w ars. T h eir progress cannot be regarded as entirely satisfactory, but their accepting such a program m e is som ething we w ould hardly have dared hope for tw enty years ago. It is a curious kind o f p a rtn e '/a n tag o n ist relationship and it certainly d o e sn 't solve all the issues in the U N , but the essence of international collaboration in the U N is the recognition that w e are all natural antagonists and com petitors w ho have to restrain our com petition so that w e d o n 't tear each other

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apart. It is a higher level o f civilization than is envisaged in concepts based on the fantasy that m en and tribes are by nature loving and co m plem entary, frustrated in their longing for peace by self-seeking leaders. T he universalism of the U N is, o f course, part o f its present problem . T he balance has again sw ung too far. T he g ro ssly under-represented “ T h ird W o rld " has acquired a n unhealthily sw ollen m ajority in the A ssem bly. Pow er and responsibility— especially the responsibility for paying the bills— are out o f joint. A m ajority has been using its pow er som ew hat recklessly and threatened the principle o f universality, the basic conviction that w e are all sinners at tim es, that m em bership in the U N is a discipline, not just a privilege. C ountries like Israel and South A frica cannot hope for fair-m indedness, w hile states o f the m ajority could practise genocide w ithout censure. T he U nited States can expect o n ly its sins to be noted by A ssem bly orators. It is tim e for the A m ericans and friends to resist, to set lim its to what is tolerable, and rem ind the exasperated of the essential role they have played. In doing so it is w ise, how ever, to realize that the current abuse o f the m ajority m ust be com pared w ith the exclusion o f the real governm ent of C hina for tw o long decades. Present m isbehaviour ought not to be justified by bad precedents, but recollection o f the latter should keep us hum ble. O ver thirty years the U N has developed a rem arkable set o f checks and balances. T he T hird W orld is using its A ssem bly m ajority to correct w hat they regard as im balances in the international structure, and specifically to com pensate for the barrage o f vetoes by w hich the First and Second W orlds control the Security C ouncil. Yet the veto itself is one o f the useful ch ecks in the system , a m eans o f breaking the circuit w hen the system is o v e r-h e a te d .1 W hen the U nited States, B ritain, and France vetoed in the Security C ouncil the effort in 1974 of the A ssem bly m ajority to expel South A frica, they were not supporting apartheid. T hey w ere rem inding a tem porary m ajority that this way m adness lay. U nless tem porary m ajorities resist the tem ptation to fling into outlaw ry states they dislike, the U N could be eroded. L earning to live with the U N system is the justification o f the system . F ortunately the reality of U N politics is never the caricature it is made out to be. C urrent assum ptions to the contrary notw ithstanding, the U N w as never at any tim e the plaything o f the U nited States. N or is it now the tool o f a united and vengeful T hird W orld. T he latter, w hich must already be distinguished as T hird and Fourth W orlds, unite only on certain issues. M any o f its leaders are as aw are as any W estern statesm an o f the need for restraint to preserve the U N . T hey resist W estern dom ination, but they know perfectly well that the R ussians and the C hinese can offer them little m ore than verbal support, that their w ish to use the U N for their econom ic developm ent will not be abetted if

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the industrialized countries are driven into sullen resentm ent. So m a­ jorities form and disso lv e, but the structure survives if the m ajorities have show n it sufficient respect. It is, o f course, the lash of the T hird W orld and the energy dilem m as of the First that have propelled the U N into w hat I have called its m ost creative phase. It is alw ays m ost creative w hen it is m ost dangerously challenged. T he planetary issues— food, population, pollution, the seas, and outer-space— cannot now be avoided. G overnm ents are just beginning to grope with them in the established U N organs and agencies and by special conferences on resources, population, food, and “ the law o f the s e a .” If the U N did not exist som ething like it w ould have been invented under pressure in 1974. T hat our governm ents have barely com e to grips with the life and death issues is obvious from the rudim entary— though m ostly p ositive— steps taken last year in G eneva, B ucharest, R om e, and C aracas. B ut the U N is ready and available, w ith its infinitely flexible m achinery and its chastening but encouraging experience, to support just as m uch change and progress as national g overnm ents, or m ore particularily their frightened electo rates, are prepared to sanction. It has been said of peace that it is no longer a “ w h e th e r" question; it is a “ h o w ” question. T he sam e is true o f the equalization o f econom ic advantage. W e have to get out of o u r p ulpits and into com m ittees o f the w hole. O ne value of the U N forum is that in the end it induces pragm atism and reveals the irrelevance of the closeted d octrinaires, capitalist o r M arxist. N obody foresaw the w orld we are in. Flogging our guilt com plexes, avoiding thought and sacrifice by blam ing O P E C or the C IA or Kurt W aldheim m ay be fun, but they are distractions w e cannot afford. In C anada we shall not think straight until w e can lift o u r sights beyond our stultifying obsession with the U nited States and contem plate a world in far worse shape than a continent— in w hich w e are an independent and re­ sponsible m ajor pow er. In such bew ildering circum stances one favourite scapegoat is the bureaucracy, paralyzed, it is said , by inertia and its effortless preference for the status q uo. Such a generalization w ould be a gross m isjudgm ent in C anada at the p resen t tim e. T he agenda of the U N , m ore than ever before, occupies the attention not just o f the D epartm ent of External A ffairs but o f a dozen m inistries. It w ould be easy to cite exam ples o f lethargy and unim aginative responses no doubt, although it should be borne in m ind that the need to defend the interests of C anadian farm ers and fisherm en q uite properly com plicates bold in­ ternational initiatives. T he best kept secret in C anada, how ever, is the extraordinary degree o f successful initiative C anadians have taken in recent years in the m ost fruitful area o f U N activity: extending the infrastructure o f international law and regulation.

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T he subjects m ay seem m ore m undane than those dealt w ith by the great pow ers in the Security C ouncil, o r the S uez crisis over w hich C anada gained respect in 1956. But are they less im portant to people? T here w as, for e x am p le, the C anadian-S w edish initiative to get U N consideration o f the effects of d irect satellite broadcasting, o r the C anadian initiatives to get international action on the sensing o f earth resources by satellites as well as fixing responsibility for dam age from fallen space objects. Such things are essential for an international com m unity in a new age and for the defence o f C anadian culture, econom y, and sovereignty. C an ad a, concerned over the role of m ultinational corporations but realizing that this w as w orld-w ide and not just a C anada-U nited States issue, w as responsible for getting a discussion o f the legal aspects under w ay in the U nited N ations C o m ­ m ittee on International T rade L aw . It has co-sponsored proposals to cope w ith hijacking in various U N organs. Its proposals on the control of pollution were the basis o f international action at Stockholm . T hese are only a very few o f the activities in w hich C anadians have been actively engaged. N one m ay seem decisive on its ow n. C om pounded, they are a calculated and w ell-reasoned cam paign. It is c losely related to the national interests of C anadians, but it reaffirm s the traditional C anadian conviction that the interests o f C anada, an inescapably international c o u n try , are best protected by the developm ent o f w orld o rder and the extension o f international rules. The m ain C anadian thrust in the U N has shifted from the highly visible issues o f the Political C om m ittee of the G eneral A ssem bly or the Security C ouncil o f w hich we have not been a m em ber for som e years. It is m aster-m inded by a rem arkably ab le team o f international law yers, abetted by the collaboration and criticism o f their academ ic colleagues across C anada. T he m ost notable o f these has been J. A lan Beesley, form er Legal A dviser and at present A m bassador in V ienna w here he is m ore readily available for the kinds o f m eetings at w hich he is required. M ore and m ore it is G eneva and V ienna rather than N ew Y ork w here the fabric of the U nited N ations is being w oven. W hen G eoffrey S tevens o f the G lobe a n d M a il ventured to the L aw of the Sea C o n ­ ference in C aracas last sum m er, the central focus o f C an ad a’s new U N diplom acy, he said o f B eesley, “ B rilliant w ould not be too extravagant a w ord to describe his p e rfo rm a n ce ,’’ and “ By any yardstick, he was am ong the half-dozen m ost effective delegation leaders in C a ra c a s .” 3 H e had been m ade chairm an o f the conference drafting com m ittee in recognition o f the fact that he and his able colleagues had for ov er four years been probably the m ost creative thinkers in the Seabed C o m ­ m ittee. T here they laboured patiently to bring off a conference the significance o f w hich is hard to exaggerate. It w as a first effort to establish an international regim e by the consent o f the w hole w orld,

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w hich w ould replace the “ international law ” o f the sea established by the custom o f m ajor pow ers. T he project is so bold it m ay w ell be an incom plete success at the present series o f conferences. T he C anadian planners w ould be disappointed but not dism ayed. T hey have been w orking nearly tw enty years on the sea law . T h eir approach is to build on w hatever agreem ent they can get, to w iden areas o f regulation, bilaterally, m ultilaterally, o r regionally as proves possible, w orking tow ards universality but not sacrificing all p rogress to perfectionism . A lthough this philosophy is concerned largely w ith an aspect o f the UN to w hich C anadians in the earlier stages paid less attention, it is in the traditions o f “ fu n ctio n alism ” w ith w hich C anadians approached the w orld structure at the end o f the w ar. A s B eesley states it, interna­ tional society w ill not develop into an international com m unity by settling first the p roblem s o f the use o f force. “ T he process, in m y view , w ill, on the contrary, be that o f regulating so m any fields of conduct so effectively that there will be less and less reason to resort to force, and thus less resistance to the gradual acceptance o f real con­ straints upon its u s e .” T his is no ingenuous utopian speaking. “ States abide by the law because it is in their national self-interest to do so. ’ ’ He insists defiantly: “ It is a fact o f international life that states do not take their treaty o bligations lig h tly .” 3 T h at can be proved even by the conduct o f the superpow ers. Such optim ism is also in the C anadian tradition. W ithout ignoring the problem s ahead o r the failu res, try to build on w hat has been accom plished. T hat w as the essence o f the Pearsonian approach, and also that o f D ag H am m arskjold. Som e spokesm en of the new approach like, in the fashionable preoccupation w ith the national interest iiber alles, to see in the new cam paign a departure from the “ tim id ity ” of earlier C anadian policy. O thers, like B eesley, p refer to cite L ester P e a rso n ’s statem ent in his m em oirs: “ E verything I learned during the w ar confirm ed and strengthened m y view as a C anadian that our foreign policy m ust not be tim id o r fearful o f com m itm ents but activist in accepting international responsibilities. T o m e, nationalism and in­ ternationalism w ere tw o sides o f the sam e coin. International co­ operation for p eace is the m ost im portant aspect o f national p o lic y .” 4 F o r the nationalist, suspicious of the D epartm ent of E xternal A ffa irs’ susceptibility to foreign (i.e. A m erican) and internationalist (i.e . the big bad great pow ers) blandishm ents, the history o f C a n ad a ’s sem inal contribution to the L aw o f the S ea conferences should be illum inating. T he w orking paper w ith draft articles on basic issues w hich C anada presented at C aracas w as co-sponsored by N orw ay, N ew Z ealand, M exico, M auritius, Indonesia, India, Iceland, and C hile. So m uch for C a n ad a ’s inhibiting “ alignm ents. ” T he w hole conference, m uch of the im petus for w hich has com e from C anada, w as an assault on the law of

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the sea as established and vehem ently defended by the g reat seafaring pow ers, including th e U nited S tates, Britain, and even the Soviet U nion. So m uch for C an ad a’s “ sa tellitism .” T he agenda involves so m any aspects o f the sea that generalization is too hazardous. A t the heart o f the m atter w as the insistence of the great pow ers on a narrow territorial sea and unlim ited “ freedom o f the s e a s ,’’ positions w hich the m ajor coastal states, like C anada, and the developing countries firm ly opposed. T echnology has raised new issues vital to coastal states— the prevention of oil pollution and the protection o f fisheries far beyond a three- o r even tw elve-m ile lim it, as well as the e xploration of oil and m ineral resources on the sea-floor. T he concept alm ost certain to prevail if agreem ent is reached is that of the “ e c o n o m ic " o r “ patrim onial z o n e ,” som e tw o-hundred m iles beyond the 12 m ile territorial sea in w hich the coastal state would acquire not sovereignty but the right and duty to police or regulate pollution, fishing, and m ining, w ith som e special claim s on the products of the area. C entral to this form ula is the concept of “ c u sto d ia n sh ip ,” as distinct from sovereignty, w hich C anadians developed out of the controversy over the A rctic voyage o f the M a n ­ hattan and the A rctic W aters P ollution Prevention Act o f 1970. W hen the M an h a tta n , ow ned by Jersey S tandard, set out on an experim ental voyage w ith C anadian approval and supervision it was w idely regarded in the C anadian press and parliam ent as w as the pocket battleship, G ra f Sp ee. T here w ere chauvinistic outbursts in the H ouse and External A ffairs C om m ittee from Right and Left. T he governm ent w as com m anded to declare sovereignty unequivocally and plant m aple leaves up to the Pole. T he lily-livered bureaucrats w ere accused of capitulating, as usual, to the Y ankees. T he bureaucrats w ere, in fact, avoiding the grand show dow n, the polar G rey C up the fans w anted, because they w e ren ’t sure w e w ould w in it. T he frontal challenge m ight serve o n ly to provoke opposition far w ider than that o f the U nited States. T he bureaucrats w ere painstakingly preparing an approach with w hich, in the e n d , C anada w ould achieve m uch m ore than a score against the A m ericans. It w ould convert them . Persuading A m er­ icans— or any o th er people— to see things our w ay is rarely if ever achieved by putting them on the public spot. T he new approach w as the hundred-m ile zone tow ards w hich we took a “ fu n c tio n alist" approach. Sovereignty w e did not need out that far. W hat we needed to do for ourselves and for the international com ­ m unity w as to accept a responsibility to prevent disastrous oil spills. It w as an approach w e applied also to the protection o f coastal fish from extinction. It is the concept o f custodianship w hich becam e a m ajor com ponent o f the various proposals for an “ econom ic z o n e " at

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C aracas. T he U nited States did not like our A rctic W aters A ct at all. T hey com pared it w ith the 200-m ile territorial seas the benighted P eruvians had established. U ntil a few m onths before C aracas it looked as if C anada and the U nited States w ere locked in confrontation. O ttaw a did not blink. C anada had m any allies— including som e in the U nited States. E ventu­ ally the A m ericans realized that the “ econom ic z o n e ” w as the only feasible alternative to an anarchical extension o f the territorial sea by one state after another. T he great pow ers had to recognize their vital interest in international rule. It w as the second tim e C anada had persuaded the A m ericans to give g round for that reason. A t the G eneva L aw o f the Sea C onference o f 1960 there w as a C anada-U nited States proposal for a six-m ile territorial sea plus a six-m ile fishing zone. This is the kind o f event w hich casual scholars list as one m ore exam ple of C anada supporting the U nited States. W hat they fail to note is that in this, as in m any cases, C anada votes w ith the U nited States only because alone, o r m ore often in com pany, it has persuaded the U nited States to m ove to m ore acceptable ground. T o get the A m ericans to abandon their fanatical insistence on a three-m ile territorial sea w as no m ean feat. A lthough there rem ain considerable differences betw een C anada and the U nited States o v er the law o f the sea, a n d , o f course, the w hole proposal could still break up in disorder, the history so far is instructive about C anadian diplom acy. T o confront a great pow er in the UN we need allies, w e need to use o u r w its and im agination, and above all we have to build up a sound case. T he U nited States cannot be ordered or threatened to change its p olicy, but it can be persuaded to see its interests in a different light— p articularly, o f course, if som e interests in the U nited States are arguing our case. Som e com prom ise on our part w ill be necessary, but instead o f starting w ith the assum ption that it is a zero-sum c o n test, it is better to look for an alternative proposal which could satisfy the legitim ate interests o f both parties. Steady nerves are required, for the A m ericans can be intim idating even w hen they are b luffing. T he C anadian hankering for a braw l is best confined to hockey. O ur shrill dem ands often m ake it harder for a U nited States adm inistration to give ground. In these various C anadian efforts to build a w orld order from the foundations up, the creation o f a revolutionary regim e for about three quarters o f the e a rth ’s surface, the seas, is only the m ost significant. T aken altogether, it is as im portant as any C anadian contribution to international o rganization in the ’forties or 'fiftie s. It is a new ap p lica­ tion o f the peculiarly C anadian interpretation o f functionalism . In m atters o f sea and space C anada is not a m in o r but a m ajor pow er; we

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have so m uch of both. Pow er in international diplom acy m ust be regarded functionally. T hat is w hat w e alw ays argued. Instead of p rattling on about how C anada lost its status as a sem i-great pow er, we should relate pow er to functional capacity. W hen it com es to Strategic A rm s L im itation T alks ( S A L T ) , ours but to keep a vigilant eye. In questio n s o f trade, resources, food, o r even m oney, we are a m uch m ore significant pow er than w e have been since the brief em ergency period o f 1945-6. M ilitary capacity has very little to do w ith the m ajor issues o f U N concern at the m om ent. T he boldest idea for a new law of the sea, that of the oceans as the “ com m on heritage of m a n k in d ,” w as put forth by M alta. For C anadians it is the cum ulative im portance o f m any cam paigns w hich needs to be understood. U nless the particular subject m atter grabs the interest, it is all rather boring, but it m ight be said that the U N is at its m ost effective w hen it is m ost boring. A s A lan B eesley has described C anadian policy: “ T h ere is an em phasis on concrete problem -solving and a lesser concern w ith doctrinal attitudes, particularly those stem m ing from traditional concepts. On a num ber of continuing problem areas, there is evidence of consistency and perseverance over a lengthy period . . . T h ere is a deliberate attem pt on virtually every issue to develop the basis for accom m odation betw een conflicting interests, in particular betw een the interests o f C anada and those o f the o th er m em bers o f the international com m unity. A com m on ch aracteris­ tic throughout is a conscious tendency tow ards pragm atism , func­ tionalism , and flexibility, m ost notably in responding to the need for c h a n g e .” 5 In m any w ays this is harder slugging than it w as in the 'fiftie s, when U N policy w as to a considerable— and probably too g reat— extent designed by the S ecretary o f State for External A ffairs and his staff. T he big issues now vitally concern m inisters and officials dealing with fish, com m unications, w heat, o r defence ad hoc. W hat is m o re, the provinces have to be involved in policy form ulation in a w ay regarded as inconceivable even a decade ago. So also do non-governm ental organizations like trade unions, farm ers, and fisherm en. B efore the big con feren ces in 1974 such as that on population at B ucharest, exercises in cross-country consultation w ere carried out. A t the W orld Food C onference in R om e, there w as a large attendance of representatives of private C anadian organizations. T he delegation at C aracas included various m inisters and deputy m inisters, provincial representatives and p oliticians on rotation, representatives o f trades unions and business. It goes w ithout saying that the efforts at consultation w ere roundly criticised and the governm ent accused o f disregarding good advice. C anada, like all countries, has dom estic interests w hich are irreconcilable. It m ay be that these elaborate and expensive efforts to secure consensus will prove too confusing, and tim e-consum ing, but

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they are still in the stage o f experim entation. It is certainly good for the b ureaucrats to rub shoulders w ith the special interests. It is also good for the latter to learn by experience at an international conference the reasons w hy o u r diplom ats cannot alw ays have it o u r way. B ecause C anadian diplom ats have played so constructive a part in thinking out international devices, they have to act in these conferences on tw o levels— just as L ester Pearson or Paul M artin did w hen they sponsored and m anaged plans for a K orean arm istice, the universality o f U N m em bership, o r a U N E m ergency Force. G eoffrey S tevens noted o f A lan B eesley at C aracas that, “ He found h im self playing tw o, not entirely reconcilable, roles. H e w as expected to prom ote C a n ad a ’s view s vigorously. At the sam e tim e, he becam e a sort of honest broker trying to reconcile divergent view s am ong the 137, particularly be­ tw een the developed countries and the developing n a tio n s.” 6 T his is presum ably the w ay m ost equable C anadians w ould like our m en to act. T heir hand is inhibited, how ever, by that parochial form of nationalism w hich feeds on the self-indulgent m yth of victim ization (by A m ericans and m ultinational c apitalists or by O ttaw a do-gooders and A fro-A sian sw indlers) and unable to see C anada as others see u s, a very rich and m ajor pow er. T he apologists for C an ad a’s 4‘current a p p ro ach ” argue, how ever, that there is no fundam ental distinction betw een the pursuit o f national goals and international objectives, o r betw een self­ developm ent and w orld order. A ccording to A llan G otlieb and C harles D alfen, both o f w hom have been involved in these efforts to extend “ international la w ,” self-interest requires the betterm ent o f C anada and it im plies a w orld order w hich is favourable to o r com patible with such betterm ent. T he prom otion o f national self-interest fuses the planes on w hich governm ent objectives are pursued. It not only fuses the goals; it fuses the activities that are undertaken in pursuit o f these g o a ls.7 N eedless to say, C anadian policies in these fields are open to criticism . W hat is needed, how ever, is critical consideration o f what our diplom ats are actually up to. A good approach can be carried ad absurdum — as happened perhaps to m iddlepow erism . W e have had som e failures and frustrations, not all of them unw orthy. O nce at a conference in B russels w here w e advocated stringent m easures of international responsibility for oil pollution we found ourselves in a m inority o f one. U nless w e are prepared to take a m ore generous position about the produce o f our ow n enorm ous continental shelf and the needs o f countries hungrier for fish than we are, not to m ention the T hird W o rld ’s interest in the seabed as “ the com m on heritage of m a n k in d ,” we m ay jeopardize the w hole effort to get a law of the sea. G enerosity with dom estic interests is a m atter for the politicians and the citizenry, not the diplom ats, to decide. T hat is w hy it is essential to have a w ider understanding o f w hat is at stake. It is no less than the

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survival o f the attem pt to m aintain and extend international regulation o v er the increasingly perilous activities of m ankind through the flexible instrum entalities provided by the U nited N ations system . The alternative is to lapse into anarchy. T he struggle to discipline ourselves w ith international law has been g oing on, not just since the UN w as founded, but over at least three centuries. International law is changeable but not expendable. B ecause it is based on voluntary acceptance rather than im position by force, as is the case in dom estic law , it is alw ays vulnerable. A people so utterly dependent as C anadians on the international exchange in tranquillity o f goods and services dare not lose sight o f our vital interest in a structured interna­ tional com m unity. A s a country w ith a future w e should recognize also that w hat w e are dealing w ith is not just the prevention of calam ity but the exploitation o f boundless opportunity— the tw o faces o f nuclear pow er, the revolutionary technology o f space and the oceans.

N o tes 'See Inis Claude, Sw ords into Plowshares: the Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (N e w York: Random House, 1971), p. 136. 2G lobe and M ail, 3 1 August 1974. JJ. A lan B eesley, “ W ar, Peace and L a w in T o d a y ’ s D ivided W o r ld ,” Leonard Beaton M em orial Lecture, U niversity o f Toronto, 26 February 1973. 4M ike, the M em oirs o f the Right Honourable Lester B . Pearson, V o l. i (Toronto: U niversity o f Toronto Press, 1972), p. 283. ’ “ The Sixties to the Seventies: the Perspective o f the Legal A d v is e r ," in R. St. J. Macdonald, Gerald L. M orris, and D ou g la s M . Johnston,eds., Canadian Perspectives on International L a w and Organization (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1974) pp. 935-6. '•Globe and M ail, 31 August 1974. ’ “ National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility: N e w Canadian Approaches to Internationl L a w ,’ ’ unpublished paper, portions o f which were presented by A . E. G otlieb at the First Annual Conference o f the Canadian C ouncil on International Law , 13 October 1972, p .6.

2: Canada and “ Collective Security”

/4 s it will be c lea r to anyone reading the su b seq u e n t essay that, in my view, the idea o f collective secu rity is one w hich, as a sp ecific theory, the U nited N a tio n s w isely abandoned, a question arises as to w hy it is w orth a w hole lecture. The topic was assig n ed by th e N a tio n a l D efence C ollege in K ingston, a n d as a fo r m e r m em b er o f its D irecting S ta ff, I do w hat I am told. The p u rp o se o f th e essay is to exam ine w hy th e theory w ouldn ’t a n d didn 7 w ork a n d to grapple with the collectivist approach to d efen ce a n d secu rity which C anada adop ted during a n d a fte r the S e c o n d W o rld W ar— a n d which is what m o st C anadians m ean when th ey ta lk loosely a bout “collective security. " The lecture was d elivered on 19 A p r il 1973.

F irst of all w e m ust decide w hat w e are talking about. C ollective security is one o f the m ost m isused term s in the political science vocabulary. It has a precise m eaning, but in popular as well as academ ic and political parlance it has been used to m ean m any things. I suspect you w ant m e to talk not only about C a n a d a 's relationship to the classic concept of universal co llective security but also about the idea as m ost C anadians seem to think about it— that is, the idea of not going it alone, o f joining forces with others to assure our p rotection, perhaps of paying du es to a protective agency (or getting a free ride?). I expect you also w ant m e to say som ething about our alliance relationship, o f N A T O , and o f continental defence but th ese, as I shall explain later, are not collective security institutions; they are som ething else. I shall begin w ith a definition by one o f the best w riters on the subject, Inis C laude. “ T he concept o f collective security m ay be stated in deceptively sim ple term s: it is the principle that, in the relations of states, everyone is his b ro th e r's keeper; it is an international translation o f the slogan, ‘one for all and all for o n e ’; it is the proposition that aggressive and unlaw ful use o f force by any nation against any nation will be m et by the com bined force o f all other n a tio n s.” 1 It is a noble, logical, and beautiful concept w hich w e have dis73

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covered after several tries is too rigid and even dangerous for a w orld w hich is so far from being a com m unity. Few people take it seriously as a concept applicable to our present situation, but m any people persist in the belief that it is w hat w e are w orking tow ards. A lthough it is discredited, a b elief that it isn’t applicable but ought to be confuses the thinking o f too m any people and the m ost serious result is the use of this argum ent to discredit the U nited N ations. E ven people w ho do not believe in collective security belabour the U nited N ations because it does not act as if it w as an agency o f universal collective security. C anadians are probably m ore confused than m ost on this subject. As th e sam e political scientist put it: “ C ollective security has go n e the way of m ost other ideal concepts; respectable people insist upon believing in it, but they also insist upon retaining beliefs w hich are incom patible w ith it and rejecting beliefs w hich are fundam ental to it. In these circum stances, the problem o f evaluating the principle o f collective security as an approach to peace requires especial c a r e .’" C anada suffers from schizophrenia of various kinds. O ne variety has to do w ith collective security. W e gyrate w ildly betw een isolationism and internationalism , to som e extent cyclically, depending upon events and the national m ood, but also even in the course o f a single political speech. O n the w hole w e have tended to favour collective security for others. For a century o r so w e survived on the delicate balance o f pow er betw een the B ritish and A m ericans. T hen the B ritish and A m ericans decided, w ith o u r encouragem ent, that they w e ren 't going to fight each o th er any m ore and w e subsided into the security provided by the A nglo-A m erican pax o r em pire. Secure as w e felt then, it is hard to understand w hy w e rushed to fight in 1914 and 1939. In spite o f our isolationism w e en jo y ed then o u r ow n form o f internationalism , the E m pire. In 1914 w e did believe that the fram ew ork w hich protected us w as underm ined by the G erm an challenge. It w as the sam e thing in 1939. By 1945, ho w ev er, w e w ere beginning to see collective security in broader term s— the U nited N ations, w ith A nglo-A m erica as its core. T he first effort at co llective security in w hich we w ere involved was the League of N ations. It gave us a recognized position in the w orld, but w e had grave doubts about an organization w hich in our view was designed to protect a E uropean status quo o f dubious justice. Both C onservative and Liberal C anadian governm ents show ed the gut C anadian view w hen they struggled persistently against article 10 which put teeth, or presum ed to, in the provision for collective security. T he L eague w as too E urope-centred and not sufficiently universal to be effective. W e w ere reluctant even to get involved in sanctions against Italy o r Japan. M ackenzie K ing is blam ed for C a n a d a 's “ failing the L e a g u e ," but it is pretty clear that he reflected uncannily the political

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w isdom of a people w hom he never consulted on foreign policy. He passionately supported C h a m b e rlain ’s appeasem ent policy and went to see H itler out o f his conviction that face-to-face talks w ould settle all disputes. In doing so he struck a note w hich persists in C a n ad a ’s international policies to this day. C anadians are not pacifists, but they do believe in the settlem ent o f conflict by alm ost any m eans o r on alm ost any term s. L ike the theory o f collective security this is an approach w hich has a great deal to be said for it— especially now that we live in a nuclear w orld. H ow ever, like collective security it m ust be applied w ith discrim in atio n .3 T he Second W ord W ar, o f course, had a lasting effect on C anadian thinking. T he conclusions d raw n w ere these: if w e were alw ays going to be draw n into w ars w e ought to have a part in trying to prevent them by offerin g forces in advance and having a hand in policy; and secondly if the aggressors had know n in advance that there w ould be a coalition o f free peoples against them there w ould have been no w ar. By the end o f the w ar w e w ere thinking o f the great allied effort as a collective security operation, and the U nited N ations, it should be recalled, was set up during the w ar to perpetuate this w artim e united nations alliance on behalf o f peace. In 1945 the talk w as about a universal collective security system “ w ith te e th .’’ Fortunately, although there w as m uch rhetoric about universal collective security, those responsible for designing the U nited N ations w ere w ise enough not to establish such a body. T he U nited N ations w as conceived as the continuing alliance of the great pow ers w ho together could resist threats to w orld security like those w e had suffered from the N azis and the Japanese. C anadians did resist the spread of the veto to non-m ilitary subjects, but they clearly accepted this principle of g reat-pow er suprem acy in the Security C ouncil. W hat w e approved w as not a universal collective security system . T here w as no provision for a great U nited N ations arm y but only for m ilitary contributions negotiated w ith the U nited N ations and v oluntarily m ade available w hen required. T he U nited N ations, it is im portant to rem em ber, had a m ixed program m e for security. It w as a system to prevent conflict in the first instance. T hat w as to be its m ain purpose. In the background there was to be the threat of econom ic or, as a last re so rt, m ilitary force against the m isbehavers. It w as a concept of deterrence. C anadians indicated their w illingness to play th eir sm all part in the latter function but they saw their role as m ainly in the first. T hat is the role w hich rem ains to the U nited N ations. T he C anadian schizophrenia on collective security w as particularly apparent in the first decade after the Second W orld W ar. T he strongest possible rhetorical support of collective security w as com bined with the strongest possible effort to reduce m ilitary forces to a bare m inim um . It

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w as not deliberate hypocrisy. It seem ed as if leaders believed that pledges alone w ould d eter aggression. T he question o f “ cred ib ility ” had not yet been expressed on such term s. In the late ’forties C anadians developed their reputation as the strongest supporter o f the U nited N ations, but in June 1950 w hen the call cam e for the U N force in K orea, the cupboard w as bare. T he sam e illusion w as notable w ith regard to N A T O , the belief that entry into a collective defence agreem ent w ould reduce the C anadian m ilitary establishm ent and budget— if that w as p ossible. You could scare hell out o f an aggressor just by threatening to m obilize several o f those terrifying C anadian divisions if he m is­ behaved. O ne has th e im pression som etim es that the politicians and the officials, as well as the m ilitary, w ere leading quite separate lives. V ery shortly after the U nited N ations Security C ouncil w as set up, it w as realized that collective security w as not going to w ork as in­ tended— if not necessarily as expected. I need not go over the reasons it failed. T he Security C ouncil, for one thing, w as designed before all but a few international statesm en knew about nuclear w eapons, and the configuration o f pow er in the w orld w as p articularly unsuitable for a universal schem e. T he lack o f a w orld com m unity w as reflected in an inability to get a consensus on aggression. T he idea of universal collective security, it has been argued, turns out to be an arrangem ent by w hich all conflicts are universalized. T he U nited N ations job w as in fact to localize them . C anadian officials were am ong the first to realize that things w ere not going to w ork out as they had hoped and to argue for a self-defence agreem ent o f those countries w illing to do som ething about it. Far from w anting to abandon the U nited N ations, how ever, they w anted to save it. T hey w anted to out-m anoeuvre those w ho w ould turn the U nited N ations into a “ free w o rld ” organization. If the U nited N ations c o u ld n ’t act in accordance w ith chapter v n , w hich deals with enforcem ent o f peace, they w ould retreat to the second position, ch ap ter vi, w hich deals with peaceful settlem ent. In its first term in the Security C ouncil under a distinguished soldier, G eneral M cN aughton, C anada established an enviable record for progress in conflict resolu­ tion. It w as very im portant in our eyes to keep the U nited N ations alive for these purposes and for the prom ise o f som e future day w hen great po w ers had had their heads knocked together. C anadians w ere am ong the strongest, therefore, to insist that N A T O m ust be designated as a self-defence organization in accordance w ith article 51 o f the C harter rather than as a rival to the U nited N ations. T hat really m arked the end of C anadian dedication to the principle of universal collective security— except confusingly in speeches. We reverted to our faith in alliance, essentially to a concept of the A tlantic w orld w hich w as an expansion o f our old A nglo-A m erican shield.

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N a t o is not a collective security organization because it is not prim arily d esigned to keep peace in its ow n area. It is an alliance against an outsider in a co llective defence schem e. It w as a w ay round the Soviet veto, an effort to m ake it possible for those U nited N ations m em bers w ho w ould defend w hat seem ed to them im portant to be ab le to do so. T he U nited N ations effort in K orea is som etim es seen as its one effort to enforce collective security, but in fact it w as m ore an effo rt on the part o f one o f the great pow ers, strongly supported by tw o oth er o f the great p o w ers, to organize broad support w ithin the U nited N ations for a crusade operated by the A tlantic alliance. At any rate, even those w ho hoped that it w ould launch the U nited N ations on a career of collective security recognized, a fter the m ilitary stalem ate and w ith a perceived threat o f Soviet aggression in other parts o f the w orld, that how ever desirable collective security m ight be it w as, as a U nited N ations o p eration, a strategic im possibility. W hat should be said, how ever, is that C anadians responded to the call in K orea in a belief that they m ust do so in order to fulfil the co llective security prom ises o f the U nited N ations. T h ere w as still in 1950 a strong conviction that if any aggressor w ere allow ed to get aw ay w ith it in any part of the w orld the hopes o f peace w ould collapse. T h at concept belongs to the theory of universal collective security. A s a conviction it survives, having out­ lived any confidence in the m eans of enforcem ent. It w as the conviction which took the A m ericans unilaterally into V ietnam . O ur dilem m a is that the conviction m ay still be justified even though it seem s un­ enforceable. O ne point m ight be cleared up here about C a n ad a ’s attitude to N A T O at this tim e. It is frequently said that C anada insisted on article 2 because it w as asham ed of belonging to a purely m ilitary a llian c e.4T his w as a part o f the truth for internal political reasons but in fact the point o f article 2 w as that countries w hich w ere to have a m ilitary and political alliance m ust accept a decent regard for each o th e r's econom ic interests as an essential part o f that bargain if they w ere to stick together. T he idea w as never m ore relevant than in 1973. T he real, if unacknow ledged, rem oval from the U nited N ations of responsibilities for w hat w e called ‘‘collective secu rity ” after 1950 perhaps helped the U nited N ations because it had a lively and useful decade in conflict resolution and in d eveloping the concept of peacekeeping. T he U nited N ations w as helpful in reaching a peace settlem ent in K orea. A great m any conflicts w ere not only solved but prevented by U nited N ations diplom acy in the cham ber and in the corridors and in all this C anada developed its considerable reputation as a m ediatory pow er. T he inability o f the U nited N ations to do anything effective about H ungary in 1956 did not m ark the failure o f collective security. It sim ply revealed starkly w hat could and w hat could not be

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done under this banner in any organization. D enunciation of the United N ations as such for failure to stop aggression in H ungary w as just silly— o r deliberately m ischievous. T he U nited N ations could not order force to be used because the countries with arm ies w ere not prepared to fight a hopeless battle. T he sending of a U nited N ations peacekeeping force to the M iddle E ast at the sam e tim e w as not a collective security effort but a part o f conflict resolution. A ssociated w ith this surge o f U nited N ations activity w as the developm ent o f w hat the books call "p re v en tiv e d ip lo m a cy .” By preventive diplom acy I m ean w hat w e usually lum p together as “ p eac ek e ep in g ,” ranging from observer m issions in L ebanon, In­ d o china, o r K ashm ir to em ergency forces as we have know n them in the M iddle East and C yprus. T heirs is a function o f peaceful settlem ent rather than co llective security and it is particularly im portant for C anadians to understand this fact and also to persuade other peoples to understand it. M isunderstandings about w hat such a force is expected to do have been all too obvious in V ietnam , for exam ple. I need not discourse here on the C anadian aptitude for, C anadian affection for, and perhaps now the C anadian d istaste for peacekeeping. T hose with responsibility for C anadian policy in peacekeeping alw ays understood, I think, that w hat w as being developed was not a collective security role o f the U nited N ations. It w as som ething the U nited N ations m ight u sefully do w hen it w as quite obvious that it could not take on a collective security role. In O ttaw a there w as alw ays, o f course, enthusiasm for developing the strength o f the U nited N ations and at tim es perhaps the idea that this nucleus of an international force, if it could becom e perm anently established and accepted by all the great p ow ers, m ight lead to the revival of ideas about co llective security em bodied in article 43 o f the C harter. T he C anadian m ilitary w ho w ere engaged in peacekeeping w anted for obvious reasons a perm anent establishm ent in N ew York w hich w ould save them from the perils and problem s of im provisation. E xternal A ffairs officials sym pathized w ith this w ish and w ould p rob­ ably have favoured som e kind o f standing U nited N ations force for this kind o f service if they had thought it w as politically possible. T he objections o f the com m unist pow ers and m any o f the nonaligned to such a m ove m ade it seem unw ise even to try. T he C anadian view tended to be that in tim es o f em ergency the U nited N ations would accept steps w hich it w ould not accept in theory and success w ould lead to further success. O r o f course failure could lead to further failure. C anadians tended to favour also a clear distinction betw een p eacekeep­ ing and m ediation although they insisted that the m ediatory process should be undertaken firm ly at the sam e tim e so that peacekeeping w ould not go on forever.

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I think it can be said that C anadians, both officials and the public, w arm ed to the peacekeeping role b ecause it seem ed to fill a particular need. C anadians by and large did not w ant a free ride and they w anted to m ake som e kind o f contribution to w hat they thought o f as “ c o l­ lective security. ” Insofar as possible also, they w ere feeling a need for doing som ething helpful w hich w as their ow n thing. T hey had been finding that, w ithout particularly seeking it, a role for them as a m ediatory m iddle pow er w as being created by the U nited N ations diplom acy o f the tim e. T hey had no desire to be “ n e u tra l,” but objectivity in the p articular issue w as what w as required here rather than neutrality. T he idea that they m ight play their allotted part in a U nited N ations collective security force had vanished. T hey were engaged in a contribution to N A T O , with troops now in E urope, but already by the m id -’fifties there w as talk o f w ithdraw ing forces w hich had been sent for a transitional period until the E uropeans could get on their feet. T he idea o f joint continental defence w ith the U nited States was pretty well accepted on the eve o f N O R A D (in 1957) but this seem ed prim arily a function o f radar ch ain s, of the air force and the navy. Up to 1954 C anadian contributions to U nited N ations peacekeeping forces in K ashm ir and the M iddle E ast had been pretty easy. A few officers, som e out o f retirem ent, w ere sent off to New Y ork w here they w orked under U nited N ations direction. W hen the first m ajor call on the C anadian forces cam e for Indochina in 1954 the arm y w as busy trying to get a force together for E urope. T here w as little enthusiasm for this new role, w hich seem ed unconventional. T o the great credit o f the arm y a first class effort w as m ade— and o f course they suffered the rew ard o f a first class effort— further dem ands. By the tim e the U nited N ations E m ergency Force ( u n e f ) w as established in 1956 the C anadian forces w ere beginning to see this as a regular function, an interesting one, an overseas assignm ent, a m eans o f prom otion, and a form of activity they w ere beginning to take pride in. A ltogether this w as a laudatory response to particular requests in particular places. W hen at a later stage— and there w as less peacekeeping to do— it becam e glorified into a kind o f national m ission, scepticism developed. A w ord m ight be said about the idea o f a special force w hich evolved in C anadian thinking about 1950. W hether it w as a good m ilitary idea is not for m e to say. It has been a good foreign policy idea. W hen it becam e clear in the sum m er o f 1950 that C anada had no forces to send to K orea, it had to raise them fast. M r. Pearson w as anxious to dem onstrate C anadian fidelity to the U nited N ations and also to strengthen the idea o f the U nited N ations as a body which could call on forces for its ow n purposes. It w as thought C anadians, French- and E nglish-speaking, w ould rally w ith few er co m plexes to a U nited N ations call. B ecause w e also needed to raise forces at that tim e for the

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new N A T O dem ands this special force w as raised for service at the call of international organizations— the U nited N ations or N A T O — although of course there never w as any intention that the sacred C anadian principle o f having parliam ent decide on our com m itm ents w ould be abandoned. T h is idea has gone through various changes, becom ing eventually the idea o f holding certain troops inoculated and ready for service and specially trained in the w ays o f keeping the peace. W hether it m akes good m ilitary sense or not, it is a persistent idea b ecause it is a response to the C anadian feeling of a vague responsibility to do things in various parts o f the w orld to help the forces of law and order, good guys in trouble, w ithout know ing w here the next call m ight com e from . H ow ever difficult m obility m ay be to achieve in practice, those who design C anadian foreign policy, as long as it rem ains internationalist, will be attracted by the idea. I have em phasized that in the m inds o f those w ho established the U nited N ations— and the L eague as w ell— there w ere various w ays of keeping the peace and co llective enforcem ent w as o n ly one. W ith peaceful settlem ent I have dealt. In the days o f the L eague o f N ations the idea o f econom ic sanctions had been ever present as the m ost p ainless m eans o f collective security. T he general consensus of scholars has been, I think, that except in tim e o f w ar w hen there is an econom ic block ad e, sanctions sim ply do not w ork. T he idea of sanctions p ersists, how ever. T here is an instinctive reaction to strike out against and to punish w rongdoers. But there is rarely a consensus about w rongdoing. O ttaw a has alw ays been pretty sceptical about the efficacy o f sanctions rather than about their desirability o r their m orali­ ty. C ritics argue that it is the C anadian anxiety to m ake fast bucks that keeps them from joining these w orthy cam paigns— w hether it is against C uba on the Left o r South A frica on the R ight. In the various sanctions issues w hich have arisen o v er the past fifty years o r so, how ever, it is hard to find a case w here C anadian trade w as sufficient to m atter very m uch. South A frica m ay be an exception, but the pragm atists in O ttaw a are quick to point out that C anadian trade w ith South A frica is so heavily in C anadian favour that the result o f a boycott w ould be to punish C anada rather than South A frica. R hodesia, being a sm all land-locked c ountry, seem ed the one case w here a universal boycott m ight w ork— especially as nobody loved R hodesia. G iven the C anadian position in the C om m onw ealth and in the U nited N ations it w ould have been im possible for C anada, even if it had w anted to do so, to stand out alone against these sanctions. T he effort has generally not been considered a great success although the judgm ent o f history in long range m ay be different. At any rate the results to date are not such as to encourage a belief that sanctions against South A frica w ould

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achieve their end. T he C anadian decision to give special help to Z am bia as the victim of R hodesian sanctions seem ed a m ore practical approach. N ow w hat is the present C anadian position on w hatever m ight roughly be called “ collective se c u rity ? ’’ A fter the Second W orld W ar I think there can be no doubt that the C anadian governm ent, supported by a consensus o f the C anadian electorate, m ade a solem n decision for collective security d efence in principle rather than going it alone. Ideas about collective security, as I have tried to point out, w ere confused (not only in C anada but generally in the W estern w orld) but the belief w as clear that the only sensible w ay for C anada to defend itself w as in c ollaboration w ith o th ers, m aking its ow n contribution to general schem es w hether in the U nited N ations o r N A T O . O ne attraction for O ttaw a w as that this w as also believed to be by far the cheapest w ay. T he oth er strong attraction w as the belief that by participation w e would earn a voice in policy. It is necessary to em phasize this point because it is m issed too often by younger critics not only in C anada but in the U nited States and elsew here. T he idea that the w hole “ collective se c u rity ” netw ork, and particularly N A T O , w as a single-m inded crea­ tion o f the U nited States into w hich C anada w as forced o r sucked, is a ltogether too prevalent. A t the tim e N A T O w as conceived C anada thought very m uch in broad A tlantic term s and not at all about docilely follow ing A m erican leads. At that tim e the principal aim w as to m ake sure the A m ericans rem ained com m itted to “ co llective se c u rity .” C anada is still free to decide w hether o r not it w ants to continue this com m itm ent after calculating the profits and losses. It w as healthy that a new look w as taken at the N A T O com m itm ent in 1969 so that w hen it w as m ade again it w as clear that it w as done so for C anadian reasons and for reasons that still seem valid. It is unfortunate that the decisions on N O R A D have alw ays been hasty and unaccom panied by appropriate debate. Such a discussion w ould m ake clear that this w as an entirely voluntary com m itm ent on C a n ad a ’s part and we can continue to d eterm ine w hether or not we regard it in our interest. T he lack of debate o v er the renew al of n o r a d probably reflects not a governm ent disposi­ tion to secrecy but rather a lack of interest and controversy at the present tim e o v er continental defence w hen all brains are absorbed in c o n ­ tinental econom ics. In connection w ith the debate o v er the w ithdraw al o f forces from E urope there is one historic point I should like to m ake here. W hether it m akes m ilitary sense to em phasize defence and surveillance o f our great land m ass as a first priority I leave to the m ilitary. It should be n oted, how ever, that this priority is by no m eans as original as both the cham pions and the critics seem to assum e. T o anyone going through the record it is perfectly clear that C anada m ade the point very strongly that

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w as a reciprocal pledge o f E uropeans and o f N orth A m ericans and that N orth A m erica w as an area to be d efended. It is perfectly clear also that in the beginning it w as not expected that C anadian troops w ould serve in E urope and that w hen they w ere sent a fter the Korean w ar it w as taken for granted that their stay w ould be tem porary. If one looks furtherm ore at statem ents on C anadian defence going back to 1945 one will find that the hom e base has alw ays been given priority. W hat w as also q uite clear w as that N A T O applied to the A tlantic region only. Security in the rest o f the w orld w as left to the pax A m ericana w ith som e inform al help from a dw indling pax B ritannica. W hether or not this w as an arrogant assertion o f A m erican im perialist tendencies rather than a benevolent security effort is a m atter of w ide­ spread debate (in the U nited States as elsew here). I think it is fair to say, how ever, that although in C anada there have been increasing m is­ givings about A m erican policies and m any efforts to influence A m erican activities, there w as a basic feeling that any pax w as better than no pax in the kind o f w orld w e w ere living in. It w as beyond our control and there w as little w e could do to help, but w e should be careful about k nocking it. T he V ietnam w ar h as, o f co u rse, stim ulated doubts about this c o n cep t, m ost particularly in the U nited States. T he relationship o f the N A T O allies to U nited States w orldw ide c om m itm ents has alw ays been a m atter o f am biguity. A lthough there has been continuous consultation and exchange o f view s am ong the m ajor N A T O partners on w orldw ide issues, it certainly cannot be said that A m erican policy in the Far East in particular w as m ultilateral. D ivisions o f policy am ong the m ajor allies w ere a m atter of particular concern to C anada w hich, especially during the 'fiftie s, strongly em phasized the desirability o f consultation and co-ordination. T h is just w a sn 't possible. T he paradox w as that for constitutional reasons alone the U nited States had to act unilaterally. C anada and o th er countries w ere inevitably affected by w hat the U nited States did but they could not adm it the principle o f being com m itted w ithout any share in the decision. T h is seem s to be a paradox to be accepted rather than a grievance to be aggravated. In the case of V ietnam , N A T O allies had to decide their moral responsibilities to their pow erful friend. T hey w ere under absolutely no form al com m itm ent to join the A m ericans, even though A m ericans did regard this as a crusade to teach aggressors a lesson in accordance with the classic principle o f collective security. It w as the A m ericans them selves w ho m ade their unilateral position clear at the beginning. T hey specifically and categorically refused to be m ade in any way responsible to N A T O for consultation o r decision on their policies outside the N A T O area. H ere is the endless circle about “ collective d e fen c e ’ ’ w hich has alw ays been a problem for C anadians. If you

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h a v en ’t a voice in policy you c a n ’t b e ex p ected to co n trib u te , but if you d o n ’t contribute, you h a v e n 't a right to a say in policy. A fter years of staring at that paradox I think it best to leave it unresolved in theory. C anada has had security agreem ents w hich apply to three o f its four frontiers. T he A rctic, A tlantic, and A m erican are covered in one w ay or another through N A T O and arrangem ents for continental defence. It is perhaps w orth noting here that the basic texts on continental defence date back to 1938. In spite of a continuing debate on the im plications of N O R A D and our defence arrangem ents w ith the U nited States, I think that the reciprocal pledges given by President R oosevelt and M r. K ing before the last w ar rem ain unchallenged. President R oosevelt’s pledge w as that if C anada w as threatened from abroad the U nited States w ould not stand idly by. M r. K in g ’s pledge w as that although C anada o b v i­ ously w a sn 't g oing to attack the U nited States it w ould consider that it had a responsibility to see that C anada w as not used as a base from w hich any other po w er could attack the U nited S tates. O ur agreem ents on continental defence are w ithin the N A T O fram ew ork and are not co llective security agreem ents either. T hey are practical arrangem ents to meet a com m on enem y. T hey do not, as alleged, tie C anada to the tail of A m erican policy. It is for us to decide the extent to w hich w e think U nited S tates interests coincide w ith our own. A dilem m a o f joint defence is that if it is to be convincing there has to be som e reasonable agreem ent on the direction from w hich the threat com es. It w as quite clear in the first cou p le o f d ecades after the w ar that w e w ere jointly defending ourselves against a perceived threat from the Soviet U nion. W hen it com es to C hina o r N orth V ietnam o r C uba, how ever, agreem ent is not q uite so clear— and at any rate there w as a C an adian fear that the U nited States w as picking its ow n enem ies who w e ren ’t necessarily ours. T he o fficial view that there is a Soviet m ilitary threat against w hich w e need to be defended has certainly not been abandoned. O n the other hand, at a tim e w hen the U nited States and the Soviet U nion are discussing defence policies betw een them selves in the S trategic A rm s L im itation T alk s (S A L T ), the earlier assum ptions get fuzzier. T hese developm ents, along w ith the technolo­ g y w hich has m ade collaboration m ore difficult and a general sense of detente— w hether well based o r not— certainly dim inish the sense of solidarity. T he econom ic conflicts w hich C anada had hoped to control under article 2 o f N A T O d o n 't help. O n the Pacific front C anada has had no agreem ent w hich could be called even incorrectly a collective security pact— other than the U nited N ations. D uring and after the w ar C anadians w ere q uite happy to let the A m ericans regard the N orth Pacific as their lake. T hey recognized the U nited States-Japan treaty as fundam ental but there was no point in our horning in on it. C anada has in a sense been nonaligned in its trans-

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Pacific activities and this has been useful in that it has done som e helpful m ediating and peacekeeping. T here has never been m uch doubt w here our interests w ere believed to lie, but the fact is that w e had no com m itm ents in s e a t o or any other security organization applying in that area. T he C om m onw ealth w as a moral com m itm ent w hich led to som e support o f the M alaysians during the period o f confrontation with Indonesia. In the different political circum stances there could not have been a N orth Pacific treaty organization w h ich , like N A T O , contained the m ajor pow ers. W ithout such an organization, ho w ev er, it is difficult for a sm all o r m iddle pow er to find any m eaningful role in “ co llective d e fe n c e .” If the new kinds o f relationships developing betw een the U nited States and C hina, the Soviet U nion and Japan, continue there is very little likelihood that anyone will talk about new m ultilateral security agreem ents. (T he vulnerability o f o u r best friend in N orth A sia, Jap an , is basically econom ic. As that is w here our strength lies, there is a good argum ent that the best C anadian con trib u ­ tion to stability and security in that part o f the w orld lies in the realm of econom ics— if w e can figure out how to interpret that truism in practic­ al policies.) For a lesser pow er a basic principle is that even though w e recognize that w e live in a w orld in w hich trouble anyw here can affect us and in w hich the security o f E urope o r o f A sia o r o f Latin A m erica m ight affect o u r ow n security, nevertheless, it does not follow that w e should assum e obligations everyw here. T here m ay be a m oral argum ent for doing so , but the strategic argum ents are all against it. In fact, this may be the lesson w hich even a superpow er, the U nited States, is learning. In conclusion I should like to go back to Inis C laude and collective security. T he pure theory has to be discredited, but there is som ething in the idea w hich one is reluctant to disparage: “ Y et, the point rem ains that the theory o f collective security has inspired the grow ing recogni­ tion that w ar anyw here is a threat to order everyw here . . . As a doctrinaire form ula for a global panacea, collective security is a snare as well as a d elusion; as a form ulation o f the reality o f global in­ volvem ents and the ideal o f global responsibilities, it m ay be a vital contribution to the evolutionary developm ent of the conditions of peace through international o rg a n iz atio n .” * N ow let m e suggest that our current issues o f “ collective se c u rity ” are m ore issues o f tactics than principle, and the form er ought not to be taken as the latter. W hether our N A T O forces are in N orth A m erica rather than E urope, for exam ple, is a question as to w here they are most effectiv e— for political as well as purely strategic reasons— and ought not to be regarded sim ply as a test o f our loyalty to the collective principle. T he problem s are how to m ake an effective and appropriate contribution to the defence organizations w e b elong to at a tim e w hen there have been technological shifts and political developm ents (like

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the enlarged E E C ) and w hen the old rationale is open to question. T hings w ere sim plest w hen w e just kept up our defence spending to the respectable level expected at the N A T O A nnual R eview and used the soldiers w here they obviously seem ed to be needed. Q uestions about the conventional roles w e had in N A T O , N O R A D , or peacekeeping do not necessarily reflect detentiste illusions or a careless desire to get a free ride. E xpectations of detente, w hether realistic or unrealistic, do account, I suppose, for the lesser urgency of the defence discussion at the present tim e. On the other hand, the m oves to s a l t . M utual and Balanced Force R eduction ( m b f r ) , and the C onference on Security and C o-operation in E urope (C S C E ) have produced a wider understanding o f the requirem ent to m aintain d efence forces as an elem ent o f deterrence and in a negotiating situation. W hat does a m edium pow er like C anada, an econom ic m ajor pow er and a m ilitary m inor pow er, do to pay its w ay in prom oting world secu rity ? I have no answ er. I suggest that people w ho argue that we m ight just as well give up being a m ilitary pow er altogether and throw o u r w eight behind econom ic m easures w hich are o f increasing im ­ portance in deterring revolution and aggression are not necessarily being irresponsible. W hat they fail to recognize probably is not so m uch the essentiality o f our m ilitary strength in “ collective secu rity ” as o u r need as a nation— o r tw in nation— for arm ed forces w hich are perm anent, self-confident, and m ulticom petent. M y purely subjective im pression is that the country at large is reasonably content w ith the present disposition o f forces and the defence budget. T hey feel rather than think the need for collective action with friendly countries. T hey are confused by the technical argum ents about equipm ent and disposition and they w ould be happy to continue as we are, provided costs d o n 't escalate. If they have to face issues o f defence policy again soon it will be because there have to be tactical decisions about equipm ent in E urope and N orth A m erica. T hese d ecisions involve questions as to the am ount C anadians are w illing to pay for collective defence rather than their belief in the principle. T hat is as it alw ays has been. It w ould be better if we all recognized that problem s o f C anadian defence policy are com plex. It d o e sn 't help to dram atize them as issues betw een w arm ongers and peacem ongers. It certainly d o e sn 't get us very far to say again that we m ust stand shoulder to shoulder against a threat w hich is constant, pay for our ride, and gird our loins. It is even less helpful to say that the Cold W ar is o v er and w e can m ake love rather than w ar— for w hich w e presum ably ungird our loins. If w e are going to attend appropriately to o u r loins w e have to cover them with a m aple rather than a fig leaf— and th e re 's a problem . T he m ost logical courses m ight be to tell the A m ericans w e w ould just pay a certain percentage o f their defence budget and let them g et on w ith

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it— o r to do aw ay w ith our forces altogether and go in for econom ic aid, as suggested. N either course is viable for a state w ith a national consciousness an d , w hat is m ore im portant, a national responsibility. T h e reason w e have to m ake our ow n kind of contribution, do o u r thing in a collective effort, is not just to satisfy em otional nationalism . It is because w e have to m aintain reasonable control over its size, shape, and cost. W e cannot allow it to be escalated by the technological and p urchasing d ecisions o r the grand strategy o f a governm ent elected by a nother set o f taxpayers. H ow to reconcile that set of facts w ith the other set of facts, our need for the security o f collective action and our relative inability to determ ine grand strategy, is the inescapable dilem m a— and it is not solved by pretending that it d o esn ’t exist.

N otes 'In is L . C la u d e , J r . , Sw ords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International O rganization, 3rd e d . (N ew Y ork: R an d o m H o u se , 1964), p. 224.

'Ibid.,

p. 227.

'S e e “ M ed iatio n o r E n f o rc e m e n t? '', p. 88 for M ack en zie K in g 's v iew o f the L eague of N a tio n s a s a b ody the p u rp o se o f w h ich w as c o n ciliatio n , a n attitude reviled du rin g and after the w ar but w h ich so u n d s re m a rk a b ly like a c o n v e n ­ tional speech now a b o u t the U n ited N ations. ‘A rtic le 2 re q u ire d m em b ers t o ' ‘see k to elim in a te co n flict in th eir in ternation­ al eco n o m ic p o lic ie s ” a n d “ e n co u rag e eco n o m ic co lla b o ra tio n b etw een any or all o f th e m .” T h e p o p u lar a ssu m p tio n has b e en that it w as the C anadian in ten tio n to g iv e n a t o eco n o m ic fu n c tio n s, b u t the e sse n ce o f it w as that allies w ho m ig h t h a v e to fig h t to g e th e r o u g h t n o t to b e w eak en in g the a llia n ce by c o n d u ctin g trad e a n d m o n e ta ry w ars w ith each o th e r. ’C la u d e , Sw ords into Plowshares, p . 259.

3: The United Nations and the Frustration of Conflict

D u rin g the su m m er o f 1969 I h a d the g o o d fo rtu n e to be a V isiting R esea rch Fellow a t the E uropean O ffice o f the C arnegie E ndow m ent f o r International Peace in G eneva. W hile there I se rv e d as rapporteur a t the C onference on M ediation, Talloires, F rance. It was sponsored b y th e E ndow m ent a n d the p a rticip a n ts were m en with wide experience in m ediation. The fo llo w in g tw o a rticles on the role o f m ediation in international organization were the re su lt o f a su m m e r ’s contem plation f o r w hich I am d eep ly gra tefu l to th e C arnegie E ndow m ent. The fir st a rticle originally a p p e a re d in International Journal, volum e XXV. spring 1970. It is intended f o r the gen era l reader. The p u rp o se o f including the se c o n d " report ” is that it m akes available fo r anyone interested in the art, science, o r craft o f m ediation, international, industrial, o r fa m ilia l, the view s o f so m e very d istinguished practitioners. It is not p o ssib le to id entify them , how ever, (a n d the report m ust b e ab stra ct) because it was recognized that a g o o d m ediator, i f he is to be trusted by the p a rties, m ust sw e a r not only to be d iscreet a t the tim e but also n ever to reveal the offers a n d responses m ade to him in confidence.

i) Mediation or Enforcement? “ T h ere is undoubtedly m uch that is attractive and persuasive in the conception of a w orld united to prevent by force a breach o f the peace by an aggressor. ’ ’ T h is m uch w as acknow ledged by M ackenzie K ing in 1936, but he added, of course, that it w as only a hypothetical argum ent and bore no relation to the actualities o f the day. “ It m ay be that eventually som e such rule o f law will be established in the international as has been established in the national field, or at least in those countries w here law and the free expression of the p e o p le 's will still prevail. But 87

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clearly that tim e has not yet co m e, and to pretend that it has is only to m ake for disillusionm ent and m isdirected e ffo rt.” F o r such sentim ents M r. K ing and his generation of thinkers have been reviled ever since it w as apparently m ade clear in 1939 that w ithout a system o f tight collective security w ar w ould com e at least once a generation. But over thirty years later these view s are com ing back into fashion. M r. K in g 's long speech in the H ouse of C om m ons on 18 June 1936 bears re-reading. It is m uch m ore intellectually respectable than has been assum ed— the product probably o f his tw o brilliant advisers, O. D. S kelton and L oring C hristie. He did not dism iss the effort at international organization but defended it in w ords striking­ ly like those used by defenders of the U nited N ations in 1970: “ If it [the L eague] cannot becom e the international w ar office, neither need it becom e a m ere d ebating society. It can em phasize the constructive side o f its task. It is o f great value to have a t G eneva a w orld-w ide org an iza­ tion w here the m achinery for conference and conciliation is alw ays availab le, not having to be im provised in the m idst o f a crisis; w here representatives o f fifty countries m eet periodically and com e to have som e appreciation o f the d ifficulties and the m entality o f o th er lands, and slow ly develop the habit o f w orking together on sm all tasks leading to greater; w here, in spite o f all the criticism s w e often hear as to vaguely w orded resolutions and hotel bedroom conversations, the statesm en o f great countries are forced to com e into the open and defend in public, before a w orld forum , the policies o f their g o v ­ ernm ents. It can press on to its task o f disarm am ent, or at least to the halting o f arm am ents. It can develop and apply the instrum ents of conciliation and o f arbitration in settling specific disputes before they lead to open challenges and entrenched positions. It can provide a forum for the discussion o f eco n o m ic g rie v a n c e s.” W e seem to have com e full cycle. W e dare not forget that these were the view s o f a m an w ho, along with the like-m inded, has been accused of having “ killed the L e a g u e .” T here m ay be a horrible parallel betw een the trium ph o f such convictions in the last days of the League and the scepticism w hich is affecting the U nited N ations in 1970. Are w e repeating the sam e m istake or are we finding the sam e truth a second tim e? M ust w e g rapple again w ith the stark reality that the only w ay for an international organization to serve our needs is by conciliation rather than by force? T he answ er is by no m eans clear-cut, but there is m uch to be said for asking questions about our assum ptions and seeing where the case for a U nited N ations devoted to conciliation leads us. Is it possible that our various efforts o f the past half-century to create a better w orld order have failed because they were too preoccupied with w ar? H ave w e been too m uch concerned with disease? H as our atten­ tion been directed unhealthily to solving disputes and to settling con­

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flicts, dedicated to the trium ph o f right over w rong, to defence against aggression? H as this preoccupation led us to see w orld governm ent in term s o f institutions rather than o f process, bent on the creation of supranational en forcem ent rather than providing for people and tribes to govern them selves by infinite negotiations, accepting a continuous state of brokerage as the basis o f international relations? T here is not a w hole truth here certainly, but perhaps a w ay of looking at things. T h ese are questions provoked by m editation about m ediation and its place in the experim ents in international institutions in w hich w e have been engaged during this century. T here has been a slow process o f disillusionm ent w ith the form ulae: collective security, the pacific settlem ent o f disp u tes, all those devices enum erated in article 33 o f the C harter— “ negotiation, e nquiry, m ediation, co n cilia­ tio n, arbitration, judicial settlem ent, resort to regional a g e n c ie s.” D isillusionm ent produces the kind o f cynicism about international institutions w hich threatens us now with anarchy. B ut the shedding of illusions leads us to the beginning of w isdom , and one likes to hope that w hat seem ed like disillusion has been rather an unravelling. W e m ay be reaching the heart o f the m atter, the identification o f m ediation not as a device but as a w ay o f life, a habit of m ind, not as an institution in itself but institutionalized in the process o f w orld governm ent, w orld g o v ­ ernm ent w hich is not a constitutional entity but a kind of self-discipline. G enerations exposed to the horrors o f the tw o w orld w ars have naturally thought o f the prom otion o f good relations am ong peoples in term s o f the prevention of w ar, but w ar m ay no longer be the m ajor issue because it m ay be destroying itself. T hat is not to say that it has done so o r is certain to disappear from the earth. If it is banished, how ever, it will be as a result of its ow n technological exaggeration not because w e have outlaw ed it by international institutions. If w ar becom es an irrelevant concept in the endeavour to m ake life on earth endurable and even enjoyable, then is peace a n irrelevant aim ? Do w e take peace for gran ted , thereby exorcising it, and get on with the serious problem s o f hum anity? Do w e cease to think in term s of settling disputes and concentrate on regulating and harm onizing interests? “ T he lesson o f the tw entieth c e n tu ry ,” according to Inis C laude, “ is not so m uch that the w orld needs b etter arrangem ents and devices for pacific settlem ent, but that p acific settlem ent— how ever well in­ stitutionalized— is not a sufficient rem edy for w hat ails the m odern w o rld .” 1 All this is, as suggested above, only a w ay o f looking at things, not the definition o f a new orthodoxy. A s a corrective to cynicism , it m ay serve a purpose. Is it because w e have linked the idea of m ediation with the prevention o f w ar o r the settlem ent of disputes that we have found it w anting? T hat m ay be a partial explanation. W ars and d isputes c o n ­

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tinue. Bui m ost o f the m ediation w hich goes on in the w orld today has nothing to do w ith the prevention o f w ar or the righting of w rongs; it is part o f an infinitely com plex process o f adjustm ent. T he struggle for peace has been negative. It w as a struggle against w ar, not for a better society. As the prospect of w ar recedes, the instrum ents for peaceful settlem ent w eaken. But antagonism s rem ain m alevolent and interests are at cross purposes even if they are unlikely to lead to large w ars. T he need for m ediation is greater than e v er, but the need is not basically the prevention o f w ar. T h at is still one requirem ent, o f course. T he „ prospect o f w ar m ay be receding, but it has not disappeared. E ven in a transitional stage w e have bloody fighting in South A sia, the M iddle E ast, and w est A frica. T hese w ars have been subjects o f intensive m ediation and w ithout successful m ediation they are unlikely to end. T o end w ars and to forestall them w e still need m ediation. T here rem ain m any concrete disputes over territory o r resources w hich require arbitration, m ediation, o r conciliation. Perhaps w e are shedding, how ever, that concept o f a w orld in w hich peace and brotherhood w ould daw n as soon as w e knew how to settle disputes and right w rongs. T he fixation on w ar created first the illusion o f collective security as the goal o f international organization. T rue b elievers in the L eague struggled to enshrine the dogm a against the sceptics, the opponents of the G eneva P rotocol, those w ho have been considered the enem ies of international organization. But objections to an autom atic com m itm ent against an “ a g g resso r” look w iser since w e have com e through the learning experiences o f K orea, the debate o v er article 19, and the failure o f a long effort to define aggression. W hatever m ight have been said for co llective security in the days o f M unich, the developm ent of nuclear w arfare has m ade a conceivable theory inconceivable. C onven­ tional w isdom on that subject is now that of H ans M orgenthau: “ By the very logic o f its assum ptions, the diplom acy of collective security must aim at transform ing all local conflicts into w orld conflicts . . . T hus a device intent upon m aking w ar im possible ends by m aking w ar u niver­ sal. Instead o f preserving peace betw een tw o nations, collective secu ri­ ty, as it m ust actually operate in the contem porary w orld, is bound to destroy peace am ong all n a tio n s ." 2 As dogm a, collective security w as as w rongheaded as are all dogm as about international relations. As an ideal, how ever, it m ust be re c ­ ognized as having had its im pact on the consciousness o f the w orld in a w ider assum ption o f responsibility for the protection o f others. If we are beginning to think o f guidelines for a postw ars era, an era that could be as sanguinary and unjust as the era o f w ars, w e m ust recognize the contribution to international solidarity of the struggle to o utlaw w ars. W e shall need that sense of responsibility in w hat m ight be a long era of

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transition with few er w ars and m ore m urders. C ollective security principles m ay still be applied by m oral o r econom ic sanctions, although doubts about the efficacy o f such sanctions have been reinforced recently. T he idea o f collective security is likely to be tried for som e tim e on a regional basis. Such application of the principle can be helpful although it m ay not alw ays be for the best, as illustrated by the 1968 invasion o f C zechoslovakia, w hich, from the point o f view of the regional alliance, w as a collective security operation. T he dogm a of “ collective secu rity ” w as based on an assum ption that m oral issues w ere black and w hite and aggression identifiable. It w as, how ever, a principle o f last resort. O ut in front w as the provision for “ pacific settlem ent o f d isp u te s.’’ It w as an age w hen international relations w ere dom inated by law yers rather than social scientists. T he rigidity o f the L eague w as tem pered by the concept o f “ peaceful c h a n g e ,” a m ore radical idea than that of the “ pacific settlem ent of d isp u te s .” T he L eague w as dom inated by those who w anted to preserve the status q u o and w ho b elieved, therefore, in the settlem ent of disputes according to the law s and treaties they had m ade. T he principle of “ peaceful c h a n g e ,” unlike “ collective se c u rity ,” recognized the a m biguous nature o f dispute and conflict. T he L eague m ade little progress in its endeavours to change, if not to legislate, intolerable situations into situations better adapted to new conditions— although the conditions in D anzig, M em el, and the S aar m ight have been considerably w orse w ithout L eague m anagem ent. A good deal of progress w as m ade, particularly in the first decade, in designing and using instrum ents for the peaceful settlem ent o f disputes. T he C ouncil explored m ethods o f m ediation and developed program m es for in ­ tervening in disputes and interposing third-party assistance, even send­ ing peacekeeping fo rces, long before these m ethods were rediscovered by the U nited N ations. U nderstandably the statesm en o f the L eague counted heavily on an international court to settle the disputes w hich caused w ars. M uch was done to develop and im prove concepts of international law . T he belief in judicial settlem ent as a m eans o f preventing w ars persisted into the San Francisco C onference and the new International Court o f Justice, m ore broadly based than its predecessor. W hether its decisions have prevented w ars is open to question, but they have played their part in easing tensions. International legal procedures m ust be an im portant feature o f an international order w hich seeks governm ent through m ediation and conciliation, but they are unlikely to be central. It is not surprising that the C ourt has alm ost ground to a halt at a tim e w hen there is strong pressure everyw here for changing the structures w hich con­ fine us— w hether this be pressure against w hat is perceived as a structure im posed by the strong against the w eak or sim ply the pressure

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o f countries like those o f W estern E urope to create a new structure for them selves. International law is essentially conservative and has its place— but only if the institutions it helps conserve are at the sam e tim e subject to peaceful change. T he U nited N ations C harter w as in one sense reactionary. C onceived in the shadow o f a w ar w hich by 1945 looked very m uch like a collective security operation against aggression black and identifiable, the fram ers w ere dom inated, as w ere their p ublics, by the determ in a­ tion “ to put tee th ” into the organization and establish a police force against aggression. T h ey seem ed to have turned their backs on the progress m ade in the m ediatory processes under the L eague, although they did try to provide in the C harter for everything in the L eague which seem ed to have w orked. T he public w as in a vengeful and tough m ood about w arm ongers and there w as heavy concentration in U nited N ations rhetoric on the collective security function. T he founders of the U nited N ations w ere in fact m ore sensible than the rhetoricians have im plied. T hey did not try to set up a w orld governm ent w ith a police force. T hose w ho insist on positing the U nited N ations as an institution designed to im pose universal collective security have been to a c o n ­ siderable degree responsible for the disrepute into which it has fallen. It should not be accused o f failing to do what w e never intended it to do. A s an agency for peaceful change its record is b etter— far from perfect but good enough to justify its existence. T he U nited N ations did not legislate the transform ation o f em pires after 1945 w hich has been the m ost phenom enal exam ple o f peaceful change in history, but it did help keep it peaceful. T he U nited N ations, abetted by the establishm ent of the C om m onw ealth idea, provided a fram ew ork o f assum ptions based on the C harter and an infinite variety o f forum s and conciliatory procedures to ease the transition for the im perial pow ers as well as the dependencies. O f course it w as and still is a bloody business, but nothing com pared with w hat it m ight have been. W e know about V ietnam , but w e d o n ’t know how bad the situation m ight have been in Indonesia w ithout U nited N ations assistance. In the perspective o f a hundred years, the U nited N ations record in this transition m ay well look better than it does now w hen we are all too conscious of w hat w e cannot do through it. It is hard to see a body so resonant with unconciliatory voices as a force for conciliation, but that is w hat it has been in rude em bryo. T he debate is probably m ore violent precisely because the d anger o f w ar is less. T he violence of the argum ent m ay also be attributable to the preoccupation of the founders w ith w ar. It is to som e extent true to say that there can be no peaceful change unless the victim of injustice scream s and threatens the peace to get a hearing not only under ch ap ter v i i , w hich deals with breaches of

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the p e ace, but even under ch ap ter vi, w hich deals with the pacific settlem ent o f disp u tes. H as this em phasis discouraged preventive m ediation? C ollective security as a universal principle has been abandoned, although it is still used to signify a sense o f international responsibility for peace and order. Efforts at the pacific settlem ent o f disputes c o n ­ tinue and m uch is accom plished in the am biance o f the U nited N ations by quiet bilateral and m ultilateral diplom acy, but this is divorced from the function o f keeping the peace. T he U nited N ations is m uch m ore disposed to “ peaceful c h an g e ” although the term is considered oldfashioned. T he U nited N ations is not, as was the L eague, dom inated by those w ho have their m ajor vested interests in the status q uo. T he trouble, o f co u rse, is that peaceful change can be just as unlikely when there is a m ajority in favour o f change at alm ost any price. In e ith e r case m ediation, c onciliation, even-handed justice are sacrificed to political pressure. And so , in the tw enty-fifth year o f the U nited N ations, the struggle for w orld o rder seem s in a discouraging phase. H opes founded on universal collective security, w orld federation, the com pulsory ju ris­ diction o f an international co u rt, the pacific settlem ent o f disputes as the key to peace have been found w anting. E fforts to “ leg islate” peaceful change produced a dubious and uncertain arrangem ent for the form er Italian colonies but have failed to provide even that for southw est A frica o r to control the evolution o f a m inor country like R hodesia. T he catastrophic w orld w ar has been averted, but there have been savage if lim ited w ars, riots, and carnage. E ven the progress m ade in the very lim ited contribution to security know n as “ p e ac ek e ep in g ” seem s to be in abeyance. W e have reached either the end o f the age of idealism o r the end o f the age o f illusion. U nless we resign ourselves to chaos, w e have to decide that it is the latter. W e are, after a ll, entering the S A LT age, and anyone w ho foresaw that possibility a decade ago m ight have been considered a foolish optim ist. T he S trategic A rm s L im itation T alks betw een the A m ericans and the R ussians are likely at best to m ake slow progress but they could change the international clim ate because they are based on an acknow ledgm ent of the validity o f a basic tenet o f the C harter, the fundam ental com m on interest of great pow ers in international security. T here is serious talk of g etting back to article 43 and w hat w as really the basis o f security in the C harter, not universal and autom atic collective security but a grand e ffort at the m ediation and conciliation o f international tensions led by the g reat pow ers. T he four-pow er talks on the M iddle East have revived the classic concept o f the U nited N ations function as seen at San F rancisco, and it is a concept o f pressure used not against the aggressor

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but against both parties to a dispute. It is an effort to find not a “ se ttle m e n t” o f a dispute but a possible m eans for countries to live w ith each other. Perhaps the shift in the centre o f U nited N ations gravity from New Y ork to G eneva and to V ienna is part o f the pattern for the optim ist to discern. T here is conflict enough in G eneva, but it is not the dram atic and posturing clash w hich accom plishes nothing; it is the conflict of real interest in hundreds o f subcom m ittees w here the rough texture o f a new w orld o rder is being fabricated. T he horrid facts o f life have show n us not only that collective security and w orld federation are im possible. T h ey have taught us that life on the planet is m ade possible not just by the banishm ent o f w ar but by the bargaining, arranging, calculating, n egotiating, m ediating, c onciliating, arbitrating o f interests w hich by the nature of things conflict and go on conflicting. Pacific settlem ent of disputes m ust be a continuing process, and there is rarely settlem ent. E ven in New Y ork things are changing. T he Security C ouncil operates less and less by vote and veto and m ore and m ore by consensus achieved quietly by the president. It is to be hoped that the C ouncil is p reparing itself for the situation w hen neither the threat o f w ar nor the prom ise of instant peace is a cred ib le inducem ent to peaceful change. O ptim ism m ust, o f co u rse, be based not on illusion but on the end of illusion. N uclear w ar has not been banished, and violent rather than peaceful change m ay be expected in A frica, Latin A m erica, and A sia, not to m ention in the body politic o f the great pow ers. A nother superpow er m ay well challenge the equilibrium in a w orld from w hich it has been excluded. T he new w orld revolutionaries oppose the very idea o f w orld o rder as it has evolved. Pow erful econom ic consortia arc challenging the authority o f governm ents. International political and security institutions seem unable to co p e, and it is quite possible that a failure o f the g reat-pow er effort to drive the M iddle E astern countries into a lasting truce will discredit finally the U nited N ations system . O ut o f this appalling com plexity o f an overpopulated w orld com es, nevertheless, a realization that there are no sim ple answ ers— no answ ers at all. T he threat o f w ar m ay no longer be the m ajor problem and peace m ay no longer seem an end in itself. C oexistence is what we are after, not the pacific settlem ent o f disputes but the pacific living w ith them . W e are forced by a society red in tooth and claw to seek not punishm ent but m ediation and reconciliation. T his does not seem like an age w hich encourages sw eet reasonableness, but the disposition to m ediation m ay be m ore soundly based on despair than on w ishful thinking, on a recognition o f our com m on greed and above all the need for com m on action to curb o u r instinct to corrupt the life process and destroy the planet. So w here do w e go from here? H ow best can the m ediatory function

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be strengthened to reduce and forestall conflict and to m ake for a m ore productive and co-operative international society? W ays and m eans must be found because, as w e have realized ag ain , m ediation, broadly conceived, is the U nited N atio n s' basic m ethod of dealing with conflict and forestalling conflict. First o f all there is the question o f what can be done by scholars, practitioners, and politicians to understand the practice and purposes of m ediation. W e are still groping out o f sim pler concepts into a m aze. C learly the approach m ust be m ore interdisciplinary, involving law yers, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, and the help of all sorts o f people from fam ily court judges to experts in linguistics. M ost difficult o f a ll, the academ ics and the practising international politicians and diplom ats m ust learn to talk to each other. T he scholars should be attached to form al m ediatory exercises and im m ersed in the m ediatory politics o f the U nited N ations D elegates’ L ounge. D ip­ lom ats should go to the academ ies to inject m ore realism into the sc ien tists’ quantifications. U nited N ations diplom ats should be encouraged to talk to each o th er a n d , w hen they can, to the general public about their experiences, about their failures as w ell as their successes. T hey should spend as m uch tim e as possible with m ediators in o th er fields, p articularly labour. T hey should be w illing to look at the results o f scholarly research in the spirit o f the injunction: K now th yself. M ediation is a hard subject to talk about because it is a cham eleon. It changes colour and disappears. Som etim es one finds oneself grappling w ith sophisticated ideas and m ore often m erely stating the obvious. M ediation suffers from too precise definition b ecause it is essentially a hum an approach, not an institution. It is easy to reach the conclusion that m ediation and conciliation m ust increasingly becom e the basis o f o u r institutions if life is to survive on the planet. B ut w hat kind o f institutions are required to m ake this possible? T he m ost obvious solution, the creation o f a suprem e body w hich supersedes national sovereignties, is the w orst o f all because of its rigidity and its totalitarian inclinations. A ny system , how ever, w hich provides for m ediation only am ong sovereign states seem s inadequate w hen conflicts o f interest increasingly cut across national boundaries. T hose conflicts w hich seem m ost likely to disturb the peace, furtherm ore, are often internal issues w ith international c o m ­ plications: B iafra, T y ro l, Q uebec, V ietnam . T o regard national sovereignty, ho w ev er, as the villain and assum e that life w ould be beautiful if it could be abolished has for too long distracted m en of good w ill. A s the B iafra issue has dem onstrated, it is not im possible for outside pow ers to reach in to an internal dispute and even to urge m ediation upon the parties. W e are not likely, how ever, to get far by pressing for institutions of m ediation w hich violate the basic principle

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o f national sovereignty. M any C anadians, for exam ple, im agine they are in favour of such institutions w hen they think about B iafra, but not w hen they think about Q uebec. T he w hole B iafra affair show ed how frustrating it is for good people to accept the inability of the internation­ al com m unity to force countries to act as the com m unity w ishes because w e can rarely count on a consensus o f the com m unity, although it m ay have dem onstrated that the m oral pressures o f the com m unity are not w ithout influence. T he illusion of collective secu ri­ ty dies hard, even w hen it is applied to pacific settlem ent and peaceful change rather than to the punishm ent o f aggression. It is hard to reconcile ourselves to persuasion, know ing that persuasion m ay not be enough. F ighting against sovereignty m ay be the sam e kind o f distraction, essentially negative in approach, as fighting against w ar. Sovereignty m ay seem to divide m ankind, but its m ore im m ediate function in international society is to protect the w eak against the strong. The liberal internationalist fails to realize that his crusade against sovereign­ ty can serve the en d s of im perialism . A bout the only w ay m ost o f us can in fact divest ourselves o f our sovereignty w ithout perishing in lim bo is to becom e frontier provinces o f the A m erican or Soviet em pires, subject to the centrifugal forces o f W ashington and M oscow . H ow ever defective a system o f international m ediation based on the assum ption that only sovereign states can be p arties, it w orks better if there are one hundred and tw enty-five parties rather than four o r five. T he world could presum ably be re-planned so that cen tres o f population were m ore rationally tied to resources, but so long as com m unities are based on historical circum stances, not only past circum stances but un­ predictable present and future circum stances, there are going to be pockets o f people o f various tribes w hose defiant intention to go on living can be protected only by sovereign governm ents. T h e po w er of these governm ents to stand u p to the pressure of stronger governm ents, as w ell as stronger non-governm ental forces like international corporations, is o f course lim ited, but their right to participate in the m ediation o f their ow n interests is a defence w ith w hich they dare not d ispense. T he present state o f international relations is not entirely unfavourable to them because o f the m utual deterrence of nuclear force and the play o f international politics. A w orld o f sovereign states is not an ultim ate condition o f m an, but it grew up in response to real needs and should not be abolished until there is som ething better to take its place. T here is nothing essentially reactionary, therefore, about c o n ­ centrating for the tim e being on the prom otion of m ediatory institutions am ong sovereign states. T his m eans essentially bolstering and if necessary adapting the U nited N ations system . T he need is not for new institutions but for the

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will and the disposition to use w hat are provided. O ne thing that is needed is for m em bers to settle dow n in recognition of the fact that they can no m ore achieve their ends by the im posing of m ajority decisions in the A ssem bly than by the organization of collective security in the Security C ouncil. T hey can only press for conciliation and m ediation in the search for peaceful change. Since the establishm ent of the L eague there has been a continuous w eakening o f the decision-m aking role of the third party, from the im position o f peace to the laborious unravel­ ling o f interests. If conflicts are to be prevented rather than solved p erhaps w e should direct renew ed attention to articles 10 and 11 w hich perm it discussion by the G eneral A ssem bly o f any m atter w ithin the scope o f the present C harter. T he heavy em phasis in the early days of the U nited N ations on resisting aggression and keeping the peace, and co nsequently on chapters vi and v n o f the C harter, tended to rule out consideration o f issues w hich w ere not a threat to the peace. T here is still e verything to be said for the insistence that parties try to solve their d isputes by less dram atic m eans before they bring them to the Security C ouncil, but the test o f an im portant issue should no longer be w hether o r not it threatens w orld peace. T o encourage the inscribing on the A ssem b ly ’s agenda o f every cause o f conflict in a very conflictful w orld w ould be to open a P andora’s box and w reck the A ssem bly in a flood o f passionate language. T here m ust be priorities, but these could be accorded to issues w hich are subject to conciliation rather than those about to trigger fighting. T he shift o f attention to the forestalling o f conflict by rem oving the causes before birth is notable in the attention to outer space, the seabed, and the non-proliferation o f nuclear w eapons. In provisions for these purposes processes o f m ediation will be o f great im portance. T o m ake clear that m ediation is the intended basis o f the operation there is an argum ent for enshrining it in prescribed institutions but here the case of U N C T A D is illustrative. It w as solem nly launched by the A ssem bly w ith elaborate provisions for m ediation w hich have never been used. N evertheless m ediation, inform al and continuous, has been the basis of its operation. T h ere seem s little to be gained by establishing new institutions of m ediation for the U nited N ations. T he U nited N ations Panel o f C o n ­ ciliation still stands although m ediators have only on rare occasions been chosen from it. In 1950 the A ssem bly provided also for a Peace O bservation C om m ission w hich could be sent with the consent o f the territory to ‘‘observe and report on the situation in any area w here there exists international tension the continuation o f w hich is likely to endanger the m aintenance o f international peace and se c u rity .” In ­ ternational politics have not favoured its use, but it could presum ably be em ployed in situations which need straightening out even if they do

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not directly threaten the peace. It isn 't the lack o f consensus to back them . Such a consensus m ay be m ore likely in the s a l t age, even though it is a kind o f consensus w hich w ould have to be regarded with constant vigilance by all but the superpow ers. If the U nited N ations is to m ake the great leap forw ard to conflict prevention then its agenda will have to be enorm ously m ultiplied. U nless it is to be strangled by even m ore talk, it will have to develop w ays and m eans to cope: subcom m ittees, supervisory bodies, ad hoc investigations, and endless m issions o f m ediation. In a sense this is w hat is happening by the enorm ous proliferation o f activity in G eneva. M uch of it seem s and is futile— just as futile as m ost of the debates in national parliam ents o r in the interm inable sessions o f academ ic c o m ­ m ittees. G ood governm ent is essentially boring. T he less dram atic and the m ore norm al it is, the better. H aving said that, one realizes with dism ay how alien the present intellectual clim ate is to the proliferation o f m ediation. T he opposition to w ar has never been stronger, but so also is the hostility to peaceful change. R adicals and reform ers seem to oppose w ar and glorify c o n ­ flict, partly it m ust be noted, in despair over the possibility o f peaceful change by m ediation w hen conservative forces seem too deeply entrenched. T he concept o f neutrality and objectivity at the basis of m ediation is rejected. Force and violence are com ing back into favour, with new illusions about collective strength deployed in the cause of justice— this tim e by the alignm ent o f pressure groups not g o v ­ ernm ents. It is hard to see w hat argum ents could divert this great moral fervour behind the cause o f m ediation— except perhaps experience of the am bivalence o f force and a greater disposition on the part o f those w ith pow er to dem onstrate concretely that the w eak have m ore to gain b y m ediation than by violence. C ynicism about m ediation is too often justified. W hen advocating the im portance of a m ediatory approach to the problem s o f international society it is essential to recognize the dangers o f the m ediatory m entali­ ty. It can lead to the assum ption that So lo m o n ’s judgm ent is alw ays the m ost satisfactory. But the w ay o f m ediation is the hard and com plex w ay, not the easy and sim ple solution. T ruth and justice are not to be found dow n the m iddle. E ven if one accepts the principle o f seeking alw ays to upgrade the com m on interest, one has to recognize that the sacrifices to be m ade are not just fifty-fifty. A m ajor problem o f a m ediator is to deal with a situation in w hich one party has staked out preposterous claim s in expectation o f a solution based on splitting the difference. He m ay also find h im self tem pted to apportion blam e equally to establish his position in the m iddle. W hen one reads, for exam ple, that on 16 M ay G eneral O dd Bull attributed the initiative for firing on the Suez C anal to the forces o f the u a r and on 17 M ay to the

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Israeli forces, one recognizes that this m ay w ell be in accordance with the facts but it m ight just be a U nited N ations “ m ed iato r” coping with very difficult facts in the m anner m ost conducive to an eventual settlem ent. It is difficult to posit principles o f justice to be follow ed w hen the issues are relative and subjective, but it is w rong to drift into the assum ption that m ediation is a sim ple m atter o f cutting the cake in tw o. If w e have an hegem ony o f great pow ers in the next phase o f our planetary experience, we m ay find that their anxiety to avoid trouble pushes them in this direction. T he concept of m ediation as the prom otion o f a bargain, the division o f a cake, or, in the professional patois, “ a zero-sum g a m e " is under attack and rightly so. T he approach to m ediation as an effort to upgrade the com m on interest, to prom ote o r arrange a situation w hich, partly because conflict could be replaced by c o-operation, w ould be a gain for both parties is being advocated as a revolutionary perspective on m ed iatio n .5 It is sound and tim ely, particularly as m ediation m oves aw ay from form al structures and as it is m ore influenced by sociologists and psychologists and less by law yers. T he only question is w hether it is really as revolutionary as suggested. B ernadotte and B unche and the long line o f m ediators in the M iddle East have believed that they w ere w orking tow ards a situation in w hich both Israelis and A rabs could find greater prosperity. For P alestinians there has been, on the o th er hand, the stubborn question o f territory w hich is theirs o r som eone e ls e ’s. T erritorial disputes am ong countries seem to be d eclining in frequency and im portance as the aspirations o f nations m ove in other directions. N evertheless the value of resource-bearing land has becom e even greater and there are m any econom ic resources w hich do have to be divided in som e w ay am ong disputants even though form ulae can be sought w hich w ould provide for joint profit. T he principle o f alw ays seeking to upgrade the com m on interest can be prom oted w ithout necessarily claim ing that it is universally applicable. It can be insisted that m isperceptions are often at the bottom of disputes w ithout insisting that therapy directed tow ards the altering of perceptions will clear aw ay all conflict. T he advocates o f the therapeutic approach m ay dam age their case by overstating it, but it cannot be d isregarded, especially as we are in an age w hen the authority o f governm ents is m ore and m ore questioned. T he problem o f conflict-solving through therapy is w hom to apply it to and how to get at the right parties: governm ents or peoples and w hich peo p les? It is too easy to slide into the convenient assum ption that conflict is the invention o f self-seeking politicians and cynical d ip ­ lom ats rather than the suffering people. It can be, but m ore often it is the people rather than the diplom ats w ho have to have their perceptions changed, and it is not easy for third parties to intervene in public

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opinion. D iplom ats are by the nature o f their profession m ore likely to see the com m on interest in a solution and they have a vested interest in pacific international relations. T hey are, o f co u rse, the servants of their political m asters, not creatures in a political vacuum . Som e are untrue to their calling and see their jobs as that o f prom oting the narrow ly conceived interests o f their ow n countries and parties, but these are m ore often the am ateurs than the professionals or those w hose lives have been spent in antique rituals in antique chanceries rather than in the new er d iplom acy o f international organizations. G ood diplom acy is absolutely basic to the cause o f m ediation. The increasing tendency to discredit the profession o f diplom acy and its practitioners has becom e a serious m enace to pacific international relations. Insisting that diplom ats live up to the highest standards of their calling is som ething q uite different. T here can be no progress tow ards an international society based on the conciliation o f conflict, preventive and therapeutic, w ithout a large body of interlocutors w hose loyalty to their ow n governm ent is tem pered by internationalist perspectives and a better grasp than m ost citizens of the inescapable com pulsion to reconciliation in a nuclear w orld. “ T he function of pacific settlem ent agencies is not so m uch to let the people get at the diplom ats as to protect the diplom ats from the people. O ne o f the few hopeful signs for w orld society is that international organizations have in fact produced a new breed of diplom at and international civil servant w hose way o f life is the p ractice o f m ediation. T here m ay well be, as has been said, a decline in the U nited N ations secretariat from the standards of internationalism m aintained w ith conviction by the pioneers o f the p ostw ar period. It m ust be recognized, how ever, that the earlier secretariat w as to a considerable extent unicultural and the institution itself dom inated by the W est. A s it becom es m ulticultural it is less easily m anageable. T he concept o f a civil service o f in­ ternationalists has given w ay to that o f a civil service w hich is in­ ternationalist because it is com posed o f representatives o f various countries. T he change w as inevitable and there is the hope that a revived sense o f com m on purpose in the U nited N ations w ill lead to a revival of the internationalist calling. As stated at the beginning, the purpose o f this essay has been to suggest questions and to speculate. T o m ake clear that nothing is certain, it ends w ith a question w hich contradicts m uch o f the trend of the argum ent. Is it possible that our traditional insistence that m ediation is, by definition, voluntary m ight have to be revised o r at least qual­ ified? A t the present stage there is little evidence in the international organizations that sovereign parties can be forced into m ediation. It is recognized that one o f the advantages o f institutional m ediation as in G A T T o r E E C is that a skilful and perceptive d irector can m anoeuvre a

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situation w hich gets w hat is virtually a process o f m ediation started w ithout the consent o f the parties. W ithin regional organizations such as the W arsaw Pact o r the OAS very strong pressure can be put on m em bers by the m ost pow erful m em ber o r by a m ajority of all m em bers to patch up their differences. A R um anian-H ungarian dispute over territory is unlikely to be allow ed to threaten the peace, and when d ifferences betw een H onduras and N icaragua burst into violence a settlem ent is prom ptly forced on them . N ATO pressure on T urkey and G reece to accept m ediation w as probably decisive. It happens in the U nited N ations only on those o ccasions w hen the superpow ers w ant a settlem ent o r at least control o f conflict, as they did in 1956 and apparently want again in 1969. W hether the parties to the M iddle East conflict will accept this pressure, or will be forced to, is the outstanding question. W e m ay have to look again at a prediction w hich w hen m ade in 1961 by Jean M eynaud looked unrealistic: “ B ut the developm ent of the international organizations w ill gradually deprive the ‘classical m ed iato ry ’ procedures o f part o f their discretionary elem ents: the peaceful settlem ent o f differences, resort to m ediation and conciliation, are am ong the o b ligations im posed on signatories o f treaties and c o n ­ ventions and, notably, on m em bers o f the L eague o f N ations and the U nited N ations, expressions such as ‘im perative m ed iatio n ’ and ‘o bligatory c o n ciliatio n ' cea se bein g sim ple self-contradicting te rm s.” 5

N o tes 'Inis L . Claude. Jr., S w ords into Plowshares, 3rd ed. (N e w Y ork: Random House, 1964), p. 221. 'Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics am ong N ations (4th e d .) (N e w Y ork: Knopf, 1967), p. 402. ’E g ., John Burton, Conflict and Comm unication (London: Macm illan, 1969). ‘ Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 220. Mean Meynaud et B rigitte Schroeder, La M ediation: tendances de la recherche et bibliographie (1945-1959) (Am sterdam : North Holland Publish­ ing, 1961), pp. 31-2.

ii)

Mediation: Art or Science—

Notes on the Talloires Conference, 1969

T he basic recognition o f the essentiality o f the m ediatory process brought together in June 1969 at T alloires on Lake A nnecy a group of m ediators, experienced in both international and dom estic m ediation, to consider w hat had been learned over the years about this very basic vocation and w hat role it could o r should serve in future. A long with the practising m ediators w ere a few scholars interested in the subject. At a private session at w hich all participants w ere either m ediators or m ediationologists, there w as no need to prove to anyone the virtue of the profession. A fter a searching and sceptical exam ination over five days o f past and present practices and institutions, there em erged a sober consensus on the inescapability of the principle and the need to im prove the practice if w e w ere to escape dam nation. T he increasing com plexity o f international relations, it w as recognized, m ade the study of m ediation, the exploration of better m ethods, and the probing o f an increased role for m ediation in international society m ore difficult but also m ore essential. T he U nited N ations had turned from the principle o f enforcem ent to that o f conciliation and from elaborate and form al structures o f m ediation to highly inform al m ethods, often difficult to distinguish from ritual negotiation and other form s of international politics. It w as pointed out that it w as not so m uch the classical m ediations like that o f the T hai-C am bodian border or the Indo-Pakistan m eeting at T ashkent w hich should concern us now but rather the am orphous conflicts like Biafra. It w as not just the form al interventions in high policy but the everyday and highly inform al ajudications and adjustm ents on w hich all international institutions justified their existence. In the course o f reaching w hat w ere on the w hole soberly hopeful conclusions about m ediation, a good deal of evidence and opinion on m any aspects of m ediation were forthcom ing, and it is on the evidence o f this unique assem bly that this essay will to a large extent rely in its discussion o f m ediation. Scepticism about m ediation extends even to the value o f talking about it. Is it just hum an nature, instinct, the application to international differences o f approaches learned from childhood? A t T alloires there

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were about fifteen practitioners, those w ith experience o f individual m ediation and those associated w ith institutional m ediation, from the U nited N ations and o th er functional and regional organizations and agen cies, and they for the m ost part thought m ediation w as an art. T he sch o lars, outnum bered four to one, w ere inclined to think, o r cau tio u s­ ly to hope, that the analysis and classification o f techniques could lead to the tentative d efinition o f principles o r guidelines. T here were experienced labour m ediators w ho, although generally on the side of art rather than science, did point out that labour m ediation had in m any c ountries becom e in the past quartdr-century a profession with established institutions. It is not long since the sam e scepticism was applied to the idea that there could be a scientific approach to business, but business m anagem ent is now universally accepted. T he problem here is, as usual, the overstatem ent o f the two positions. M ediation is no m ore likely to becom e a com puterized science th an , say, business. G enius, sensibility, perception, tim ing, are intuitive and essential. If good m ediators are not born, they are at least form ed in childhood. T hey can n o t be m ade. O n the other hand they have a good deal to learn from each o th e r’s experience. T he system ic approach o f the political scientist o ffends the practitioner by the academ icism o f its categorizations and he cries out for flexibility. The w ise political scientist insists that he is only g roping after system s and rules and that the p ractitioner w ould understand his art b etter if he joined in the gro p in g , for it is the groping rather than the body of dubious doctrine produced w hich is revelatory. It is perhaps significant that the p ractitioner w ho proclaim s that m ediation is indefinable genius is quick to generalize him self and to explain the principles he has deduced from his ow n experience. M ediation is by definition a lonely job, and the m ediator, fortified by som e study o f w hat o th er lonely souls have tried in situations w hich, if never sim ilar, are usually in som e respects analogous, is m ore likely to retain the confidence he needs. W hether it is m erely a question of sw apping experiences or classifying situations and practices, there is considerable value, as the T alloires experience p roved, in talking about m ediation. If the scholasticism o f the social scientist is to be avoided, so too is the scholasticism o f the legalist w hich has dom inated this subject too long. D ifferentiation betw een arbitration, conciliation, or m ediation can becom e an end in itself o f little profit. O ne good m an seeking to prom ote agreem ent is likely to m ix a bit o f all these ingredients into his recipe, and it is the results not the definition w hich m atter. For the purposes o f discussion, therefore, it is better to use the w ord " m e d ia ­ tio n " in its encom passing rather than its m ore lim ited and technical m eaning. In the form er sense it has been well defined by Jean M eynaud as " a considered and m anifest effort taken by a third party with a view

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to resolving a c o n flic t.” M eynaud has provided tw o other useful d efinitions: ‘‘T h e introduction of a third party distinguishes m ediation from direct negotiations betw een parties and m ore diffuse m ethods of reconciliation su ch as the elim ination o f prejudice by education, e tc . A second essential criterion is the voluntary character of the process, d istinct, at least in principle, from judicial m ethods. A ccording to general o pinion, the m ethods o f m ediation and conciliation are characterised by an absence o f precise, form al procedure, and by an opportunism in the elaboration o f re co m m e n d a tio n s.” ' T hese form a loose and flexible definition for the purposes o f this essay. It m ay be questionable also w hether one w ants to leave out of consideration those “ m ore diffuse m ethods o f reconciliation such as the elim ination o f prejudice by e d u c a tio n " as the w eight o f em phasis on the subject sw ings aw ay from the law yer to the sociologist. T he interesting efforts at m ediation by the C entre for the A nalysis of C onflict at the U niversity o f L ondon, for exam ple, are m ore like therapy than negotiation. T he intention here is to concentrate on w hat is generally thought o f as m ediation as distinct from arbitration or negotiation, b u t, as sem antic distinctions are not im portant, one has to look at a conciliatory concept that looks interesting. T he subject m atter is all the activities advocated in article 33 o f the U nited N ations C harter: “ negotiation, e nquiry, m ediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlem ent, resort to regional a g e n c ie s ." In the discussion one w ants at tim es to distinguish for specific purposes betw een certain classical procedures and for this reason M e y n a u d 's definitions are useful. In the case of “ good o ffic e s" the third party does not intervene on the basic grounds o f the dispute. In m ediation, propositions designed to furnish the basis o f a solution o f the conflict are subm itted, and the m ediator en ters directly into the negotiation. T he object of inquiry is the establishm ent o f the facts by a d isinterested party w ithout the form ulation of the recom m endations. C onciliation unites the task of the investigator and the privileges o f the m ed ia to r.2 T here are obviously som e types o f conflict w hich are m ore am enable to m ediation, to the intervention o f a third party, than others. The international balance of forces m ay be such o r the character o f the d isputants and their independence such that the proferring o f thirdparty assistance w ould be a w aste o f breath: the Soviet-C hina border disp u te, for exam ple. T he tim e m ay com e, how ever, e v en on the U ssuri. For years there w as deadlock in the attem pts at m ediation over T rieste, but eventually the political situations in Y ugoslavia and Italy changed and a settlem ent becam e possible. D ag H am m arskjold was encouraged by his success in prom oting a m ediated solution o f the border dispute o f 1958-9 betw een T hailand and C am bodia to try to m ove into the dispute betw een L aos and N orth V ietnam , but the latter

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w as no sim ple territorial dispute. It w as a great-pow er contest in m icrocosm and there w as nothing doing until there w as a new president in W ashington prepared for a different basis o f agreem ent. Som e few c ases in w hich there is a legal dispute and the parties are disposed to honour international law are best left to arbitration: the disputes b e­ tw een Britain and Iceland or Britain and N orw ay, for exam ple. Som e­ tim es the m ediator is less a m ediator than a kind of balancer w ho tips the balance in the direction o f com prom ise. T hat m ay have been the case w ith E llsw orth B unker o v er W est Irian w hen he obviously carried the authority of a superpow er in the com prom ise he “ re co m m e n d e d .” It has been said that the W orld Bank “ bou g h t” a settlem ent o f the Indus W aters dispute betw een India and Pakistan because the econom ic support and good will o f the Bank m ade an acceptance of a com prom ise attractive. T here are som e cases in w hich U nited N ations m ediation is unw ise because it takes the pressure o ff the parties to seek a com prom ise. W hen S ir O w en D ixon presented his report on K ashm ir he recom m ended handing responsibility for the settlem ent back to the p arties. A s is the case w ith peacekeeping, m ediation som etim es is an avoidance o f responsibility. O n the other hand, som e d isputes have to be lived w ith until they have lost their sting or becom e irrelevant. New g enerations grow up w hich care less about old quarrels and an arrangem ent can be m ade quietly. If a chronically unsuccessful m ediatory m ission, as in K ashm ir, can help the parties through a non-violent transition it has probably been w orth w hile. A p eacek eep ­ ing m ission can serve the sam e purpose, but it is so expensive it is unlikely to last a generation as required. Som e disputes are sm othered by friends and neighbours w ho will not let any really non-partisan m ediators at them . A lan Jam es suggests that there w as no attem pt at m ediation over the R w anda m assacre b ecause the o th er A frican states did not w ant to attract attention to an A frican m assacre and the S ec­ retary-G eneral did not w ant to get involved in another C o n g o .3 The U nited States, acting alone o r through the OAS, frustrates outside m ediation in Latin A m erica, and border issues in E astern E urope are unlikely to be m ediatable. In answ er to the question w hether som e types o f conflict w ere m ore am enable to m ediation than others, there w as a disposition at the T alloires m eeting to consider rather the levels o f conflict at w hich m ediation m ight be effective and the different types o f m ediation required at different levels. T here is a case for a m ediatory approach to e very conflict not subject to arbitration o r judicial decision— o r force beyond the present capacity of the international com m unity to resist. C ases w ere cited, nevertheless, w here the intervention o f a m ediator could be tactically unw ise or on the w rong level o f m agnitude or

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authority. A problem is that som etim es the parties prefer to nourish their grievances for internal reasons and do not really want a settlem ent. O ne experienced m ediator said that m ediation should be attem pted only w here there w as a reasonable chance o f success; there w as a case in som e disputes for doing nothing, although even doing nothing should be a calculated tactic. M ediation could be successful in both negative and positive w ays. It w as not necessarily to be regarded a failure if it produced no solution but prevented things from getting w orse, saved the faces o f the p a rties, and allow ed them to live w ith their conflict until it eventually m ight be resolved. E ven w hen there seem ed little chance o f success, it w as adm itted, the pressures w ere often such that it had to be tried. M ediation w as easier and m ore routine, it w as suggested, w here values and interests w ere shared, as w ith the E uropean C om m unity. T he m ore passionate issues of politics and security raised in the U nited N ations— the “ to be o r not to b e " issues on w hich a natio n ’s life d epended— w ere less am enable than the econom ic issues in G A T T , for exam ple, w here interests w ere easier to define and bargains to negotiate. T he argum ent that econom ic issues roused lesser passions than political issues w as not, how ever, left unchallenged. T he in­ volvem ent of the great pow ers and the polarization of the p ositions of the parties, as in the M iddle East, certainly m ade m ediation m uch more difficult. An “ in stitu tio n a l" m ediator said that the only types o f con­ flict am enable to m ediation w ere those w here there w as p erceptible a com m on interest concealed by political passion; that w as w hat m edia­ tion w as about. He illustrated how a com m on interest could be found even w here passions w ere strongest. T he task of m ediation, it w as said, w as to de-ideologize conflict; but another participant pointed out that political activists today, including students, are opposed to m ediation for this reason. T here is an increasing trend tow ards view ing m ediation in interna­ tional relations as a continuing function, part o f the w ay o f life o f a m ultitude of international organizations, designed m ore for preventing than solving conflicts, rather than as a p rocedure o f last resort established ad hoc by som e recognized international authority to prevent a war o r to stop one. N evertheless, there is still need of the latter and m ore traditional procedure, and at any rate there is value in studying the course o f such m ediations for w hat they teach us of m ethod. W hat is being prom oted now is in a sense just the m ultiplica­ tion to infinity o f the process of m ediation, and a code o f p ractice based on m ore lim ited experience should be w orth exploring. T hat is the argum ent for spending a good deal o f tim e in this essay, as did the participants at T allo ires, on kinds o f classical m ediation w hich we agree are less and less relevant.

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A prim ary question w hich arises is by w hom should the initiative in starting a process o f m ediation be taken. By one party , both p arties, a third party, an international organization, a regional o r o th er org an iza­ tion, o r by the m ediator him self? T he answ er at T alloires seem ed to be that it could be taken by anyone with the authority to get the process under w ay. T here is alw ays a danger, o f course, o f the strong forcing the w eak into a m ediation w hich is really only an im posed solution— a description w hich som e people m ight think fitted the W est Irian “ m ed iatio n ” — and that is the best argum ent for the authority resting in the hands o f an international organization and preferably the U nited N ations. T h at the U nited N ations is capable o f im posing a solution of dubious justice at the insistence o f the great pow ers in unison who p refer p eace to justice o r because o f the partiality o f the A ssem bly m ajority on colonial m atters is o b vious, but the general international organizations contain m ore checks and balances than th e m ore lim ited, and particularly the regional, organizations. T he right and obligation of the S ecretary-G eneral o f the U nited N ations and of the directors of other international bodies to undertake m ediation is clear. T he Secretary-G eneral’s authority to do so is clearly stated in article 99 o f the C harter although it is not often used. H ow ever, the im possibility o r the disadvantage of placing certain critical subjects on the agenda o f the Security C ouncil o r the G eneral A ssem bly— the B iafra dispute, for exam ple— m akes private initiative essential. It is perhaps the principal value o f the U nited N ations that it provides an am biance for the m ediation o f disputes in its back room s w here parties m eet on com m on ground to seek com prom ises on issues which are not on the agenda of any U nited N ations b o d y .4 O nly by private initiative is there likely to be hope of m ediation which w ould treat the causes o f conflict before a crisis erupts. A suggestion w as m ade at T alloires that w hat w as needed was an official like the m an w ho used to sit in the tow er o f a C hinese tow n to detect the “ to n e ” o f the com m unity. T his, it w as thought, w as to som e extent the function o f the S ecretary-G eneral of the U nited N ations and there was evidence that increasingly the directors o f the functional agencies were developing their sensitivity to c onflicts w hich m ight arise. It w as recognized, o f co u rse, that conflict could be functional as well as dysfunctional and that the role of institutional m ediators w as not only to forestall dysfunctional conflict but to control or even at tim e force functional conflict to a head to prom ote progress. T he question of the authority o f the m ediator, the source from w hich he derives his m andate, is o f central im portance. T h o se w ho have been m ediators are virtually unanim ous in their insistence on the backing they m ust receive from the institution w hich com m issioned them . Ralph B unche has said that he could not have done w hat he did in the

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M iddle E ast in 1948 w ithout the m oral authority o f the U nited N ations. O ther m ediators have pointed out that their m issions m ight have been successful had they received the continuing backing o f the U nited N ations or, in particular, of the great pow ers w ho had pressed them into taking up the m ission. On the other hand, there is the argum ent that the U nited N ations is m ore im portant than any m ediator and it is better that the latter suffer as a scapegoat than that the w orld organization dim inish its authority. It is a n honourable position but o f dubious value, as the gesture o f a m ediator in a ccepting blam e is unlikely to prevent the public from seeing w here the cause o f failure lay. T here seem s to have been a decline in the authority o f the U nited N ations and its w illingness to use its authority to prom ote m ediation. The L eague C ouncil approached m ediation with the full panoply o f its authority and had its special procedure for the purpose, w ith a “ ra p p o rte u r" to find a solution w hich he could report back to the C ouncil. In the early days of the U nited N ations m ediators like Count B ernadotte and R alph B unche w ere the sym bols o f U nited N ations authority. But as the politics o f the U nited N ations have becom e more contradictory there has been m ore reliance on m ediation established by the authority o f the Secretary-G eneral, even if not undertaken by the S ecretary-G eneral him self. G unnar Jarring, on the other hand, has been very m uch on his ow n. A t T alloires there w as general agreem ent on the necessity o f the m ed iato r’s com m anding authority o f som e kind, but the very concept o f authority rem ained am biguous and contradictory. It w as considered as based, in W eb e r’s term s, on charism a, tradition, o r the law , w ith the addition of pow er as another elem ent. Law is an insufficient elem ent; m ediation is involved only w here there is no law o r the law is inap­ plicable, although treaties and general international law can play a role in the m ediation. A ttention w as fixed on tw o ideas of authority. F irst is the authority derived from c h arism a, the q uality, particularly the im­ partiality, o f the m ediator and his acceptance by the parties. Second is the authority derived from the m eans o f suasion at his disp o sitio n , a com bination o f tradition and pow er. T he view w as also expressed that although the com petence of the m ediator m attered, what m attered most w as not the authority behind him but the w illingness o f the parties to agree. A nother opinion w as that the classical definition o f authority w as alien to m ediation; w hat the m ediator needed w as sim ply personal credentials, a “ p a ssp o rt" o f acceptability to the parties. W hatever his auspices there is no doubt o f the need for quality in a m ediator. T here w as such a strong preference at T alloires for the single m ediator that the discussion o f m ediatory com m issions w as confined largely to the re-exam ination o f historical cases. If there w ere to be c om m issions, how ever, they should be com posed o f individuals, not

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governm ents, the latter experim ent both in the L eague and in the U nited N ations having been discouraging. T he individual m ediator, furtherm ore, m ust be independent o f his ow n governm ent and in ­ vulnerable to political p ressures. W hether charism a is w hat the m ediator requires m ost rem ains a question. W hat counts is integrity, sensitivity to cultural variations, and a capacity to develop his authority by the respect he gains as he proceeds. A uthority, it w as said, is the w eight a m ediator is able to bring to bear on his w ork; it is som ething he has to build him self. H e and his sponsors ought not, if possible, to be prejudiced in favour o f a particular kind o f w orld order, even the preservation of the present state system . It w as o b jected , for exam ple, that all those w ho had attem pted m ediation in N igeria, w hether from the o a u or the C om m onw ealth, had brought w ith them a bias against the division o f existing states. T h ere is doubt w hether the kind of charism a that attracts publicity helps a m ediatory process, although w hen the dispute has reached crisis stage it is probably necessary to bring in a distinguished figure as a dram atic gesture to divert attention or cool the crisis. Som etim es the parties will accept m ediation only by a distinguished personality. In m ost cases it seem s desirable that the good m ediator should strengthen his authority from outside as w ell. “ T rad itio n a l” authority he derives largely from the institutions w hich sponsor him . The experience o f labour m ediation suggests a m ixture o f authority driving from the institution and from the m ed iato r’s successful career in the job. In the international field there are no professionally trained m ediators as yet although a few m e n , chiefly m em bers of the secretariat of international organizations, have acquired the authority of reputation and experience. S till, m en outside the organization with a record of success can bring w ith them the reputation w hich builds up their authority. C oncern w as expressed at T alloires over the d eclining authority of the U nited N ations, attributed, am ong other things, to a changing view of the Secretariat as no longer international but a collection o f national persons. It w as suggested also that the U nited N ations had been too available and ought not to be over-burdened w ith m ediatory responsibilities, and that the Secretary-G eneral w as and should rem ain at the head o f the U nited N ations m ediators rather than becom e in­ volved him self. W hether he could pass on his “ c h arism a ” to those delegated by him w as disputed. T hose w ho had had experience of m ediation w ithin the U nited N ations system felt strongly the need for the m ediator to be assured o f the support of the organization and o f the m ajor pow ers interested in the success of the operation. Such authority must not be just nom inal, it m ust be involved, even though the m ediator should be left as free a hand as possible. It w as noted also that the very

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term , m ediator, w as becom ing unattractive in the U nited N ations context. T h o se , for exam ple, w ho w ere perform ing ostensibly m ediatory roles in C yprus and the M iddle E ast were not form ally “ m ed ia to rs.” C ountries did not like the idea of having their interests “ m ed ia te d ,” and this w as a sound reason for taking the d ram a out of the exercise and institutionalizing it into norm ality. W hen it com es to special agencies o f the U nited N ations fam ily, the situation is m ore encouraging. A uthority in such bodies as G A T T , U N C T A D , or the O ffice o f the H igh C om m issioner for R efugees derives from the institution and ultim ately from the com m on interest o f the m em bers to m ake it w ork. T he m ediatory function, inform al and a m ixture o f negotiation, m ediation, good offices, and the knocking together of heads, is increasingly the role o f the directors and other m em bers o f the secretariat. S trong personality is obviously a m ajor factor in this kind o f m ediation. T he case o f the E C C om m ission is special but interesting as it illustrates how a com m on interest in p ro ­ m oting integration reinforces the insitutional authority. The C om m onw ealth S ecretariat’s effort to resolve conflicts has been strengthened by the will o f the m em bers to hold the institution together. T he situation o f the International C om m ittee o f the R ed C ross is different again. Its authority is in its w eakness, in the fact that there is no coercive pow er attached to the G eneva C onventions but nations w ant in their ow n interest to keep this bridge open. T he G eneva C onventions, it m ay be argued, do, how ever, provide an elem ent of “ law ” in Red C ross authority w hich can be an asset but can, in certain cases, constitute an im pedim ent to the m ediatory function. T he North V ietnam ese, for exam ple, will not deal w ith the International C om ­ m ittee o f the R ed C ross because they do not w ant to accept the G eneva C onventio ns, although they will deal with national R ed C ross societies. A uthority by coercion is incom patible w ith m ediation. T h e consent o f the parties is essen tial, although it need not be explicit or verbal. M ediation has been described as “ an instrum ent o f constructive p re ssu re .” T he force o f w orld opinion and an appeal to hum anitarian instincts is part o f the authority o f the U nited N ations and other international bod ies, and, although it has to rem ain im plicit, a prospect o f sanctions. In labour disputes m ediation is often invoked to forestall the application o f penalties. T h ere is the carrot also in the im plied w illingness o f an organization like the W orld Bank to m ake it worth w hile for the parties to get together. On the M iddle East the four great pow ers are m eeting, w ith the threat o f pressure o r even sanctions on the parties, an exercise kept entirely distinct from the quasi-m ediatory function o f M r. Jarring. T he legitim acy o f the m ediator is established by his personal ability to acquire it in the eyes o f the parties, and by the prestige o f the

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institution or other force backing him . T he office w ould be strengthened by reinforcing both elem ents, and there are various w ays o f doing this. T he m ed ia to r's com petence m ight be im proved by som e training in the art an d /o r science o f m ediation. He could be helped in the process of m ediation by a ctions and declarations of the Security C ou n cil, the G eneral A ssem bly, o r other bodies. He m ight be assisted by the establishm ent o f a peacekeeping m ission to assure tranquillity. H e him self, how ever, should have no other obligation. H e should be divorced from any p eacekeeping responsibility, because the need for firm action w ould com prom ise his reputation for im partiality. W hat m ight in som e circum stances reinforce his authority could in other circum stances be a hindrance to m ediation. Public discussions, in or out o f a U nited N ations organization, could put pressure on the parties tow ards agreem ent, a kind o f public m ediatory operation accom pany­ ing the private effort. O ften, how ever, it is best to take the glare o ff the m ediator and w hat he is doing. P eacekeeping, although often essential to prevent bloodshed and escalatio n , m ay rem ove the pressure on the parties to m ove from rigid positions. S o even could the establishm ent of a form al process o f m ediation. T h e m ediatory process, how ever, is usually long, and som etim es the function of a m ediation operation is to sit it out until tim e and events change the conflict situation. From any external p ressures, how ever, the m ediator should be divorced, ostensibly at least. F urtherm ore, he should be given as loose a rein as possible, a blank cheque to negotiate and m ake proposals as he sees fit and as the attitudes o f the parties perm it, w ithout having to report back to his principals for instructions. E xam ples w ere cited at T alloires of a situation in w hich a m ediator w as given a m andate by his principals but denied their m oral support, and one in w hich the m ediator had got from his principals a pledge to back w hatever propos­ al he cam e up w ith. T he form er did not succeed and the latter did. The evidence that the latter w as a m ore prom ising situation w as strong, but it had to be acknow ledged that the form er w as an inherently less tractable dispute. C learly a prescription for a solution laid dow n by the Security C ouncil o r another international institution w ould be an inhibiting factor. T he advantage of the system o f the rapporteur under the League w as that he w as a m em ber of the C ouncil from a d isinterested state who went off and w orked out with the parties a com prom ise w hich w as then presented to the C ouncil with the expectation that it w ould be accepted. T he authority of the international institution to support the m ed iato r’s proposals m ust be distinguished from the insistence of the institution on prescribing in advance the lines o f a settlem ent or keeping the m ediator on a very short rein. O n the other hand, it m ay be that the insistence of the Security C ouncil that a settlem ent betw een Israel and the A rab

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states should be based on Security C ouncil resolution 242 o f 22 N ovem ber 1967, w hich recom m ends the restoration o f the 1967 frontiers and the end o f the state of w ar, provides the elem ent of com pulsion necessary to induce realism on the part o f intransigent disputants. T he question of the m ed ia to r's authority raises also the com plex issue as to w hether he should be g uided by his conscience if he is faced w ith proposals w hich are unjust o r not in the interest of the international com m unity. T his is a question w hich arises in labour disputes as well. T here w ere practitioners at T alloires w ho insisted that it w as not the role o f the m ediator to stop an agreem ent if the parties w ere going to accept it. H is not to reason w hy, his m erely to act as a transm itter. Perhaps this is a principle useful to lay dow n as an antidote to officious and presum ptuous m ediation, but it w ould be im possible to carry out as an absolute principle. P articularly w here the m ediation has been set up by an international body, a solution w hich set a bad precedent o r w as at the expense of third parties o r just out o f tune w ith contem porary ideas of international m orality w ould seem to be unacceptable. A t least one w ould like to think so, but, as the case o f W est Irian m ight illustrate, there are som e disputes w hich the international com m unity w ould like to get rid o f at any cost. It is a danger w hich m ay becom e greater if, as seem s possible, we return in the s a l t age to an international regim e, briefly adum brated in 1945, w hich is dom inated by the will of the great pow ers for peace above all. It is a turn of international politics not likely to be left unchallenged by lesser pow ers w ho, as the behaviour o f the G eneral A ssem bly now suggests, m ay again com bine forces as at San Francisco to try to frustrate great-pow er hegem ony. On the other hand m any of them too w ant peace at any price not their ow n. It is the prospect of these new alignm ents w hich m akes the proposed “ m ediation” o f the four great pow ers in the M iddle E ast o f such decisive im portance. If they agree and are able to im pose their will on the parties by using sticks and carrots, the U nited N ations m ay turn aw ay from its trend tow ards voluntary m ediation, and co llective security w ithout arm s m ay be revived as an ideal. A nd w e shall have to look to our sem antics, for w hat the great pow ers are trying to do looks like m ediation but cannot be called that if it is im posed. O n the other hand, G unnar Jarring, w ho is carefully not called a m ediator but is just a representative o f the S ecretary-G eneral acting in accordance with a Security Council resolu­ tion, is trying to do w hat is m ore classically know n as m ediation. That the tw o exercises can be com plem entary is obvious, but is it m ediation— or does it m atter w hat w e call it if it w orks? T here w as p erhaps som e paradox in the view s at T alloires that the m ediator should be protected by his sponsors (from the noise of interna­

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tional politics, from the press, and from the requirem ents o f security) and the general opinion that he should consider him self expendable. T he principle o f m ediation and its institutions w ere m ore im portant than the m ediator, it w as insisted. He should suffer calum ny o r offer a personal resignation if necessary rather than interrupt a process of m ediation o r low er the reputation o f international institutions as m ediatory bodies. S om etim es he should see his function as that o f a scapegoat. He should not give up easily, how ever. T he im portance of tenacity, o f trying again, w as stressed, in particular by those with labour experience. D ifferent kinds o f authority are required at different levels of the dispute. T he earlier the m ediation process could begin, the better, and there w as m uch stress at T alloires, w ith exam ples from labour, on the great value of conflict prevention. T his is happening increasingly am ong the functional agencies w here conflicts can be spotted in advance and forestalled by the m ediatory efforts o f officials. It is a principal preoccupation o f the EC. It is m uch harder in the political and security field o f the U nited N ations, because m ost serious conflicts are internal-international and few m em ber states are w illing to accept any kind o f intervention in internal affairs. H ope w as expressed that the e xploration of conflicts at an early stage m ight be attem pted increasing­ ly by private organizations but that the healing function o f the U nited N ations should be developed nevertheless w henever possible. In spite o f efforts in this directio n , how ever, there are bound to be conflicts that erupt into crises w hich have to be dealt w ith by the classical procedures, the appointm ent o f a m ediator w ith personal and institutional authority. T he im provem ent o f these “ cla ssic al” procedures as well as the developm ent o f m ore rational and progressive m ethods o f dissolving conflict will have to rem ain a subject o f study. C losely related to the question o f initiating m ediation and the au­ thority o f the m ediator is the m atter o f the tim ing of third-party in­ tervention. O bviously the aim should be conflict prevention and this is the argum ent for institutionalization. Even here, how ever, it is rec­ ognized that conflict m ust often be forced to a boil so that progress can be m ade to a m ore satisfactory set o f relationships. For disputes o f the m ore classical type there seem to be tw o periods w hen intervention is likely to be m ost successful. O ne com es before passions have been roused to such a pitch that it is very difficult for governm ents to m ake concessions. T he o th er com es later after publics have becom e bored w ith the issue. If a m ediation has to be initiated during the passionate period because of the disturbance o f international tranquillity it should probably be regarded as a holding operation only. T hat is not to say , of course, that the m ediator can avow this aim . H e m ust start hearing both sides and g oing through the rituals o f m ediation but, unless he is

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convinced that a sudden solution is absolutely essential to prevent bloodshed— and he should not be easily intim idated by hot language— he should bide his tim e before producing his proposals. A practical problem is, o f course, that parties to disputes, especially the parties for w hom the status quo is preferable, cannot be persuaded to accept m ediation unless they are frightened o f w ar o r retaliation or the dis­ pleasure o f the great pow ers o r their closest associates. C onsequently the m ediation is usually set up during the passionate period when success is least likely. T here is an apparent conflict betw een the increasing em phasis on the institutionalization of m ediation and the trend aw ay from form alization o f the procedure, but these tw o trends are in fact com plem entary. A good exam ple is the case o f the U nited N ations C onference on T rade and D evelopm ent ( U N C T A D ) . W hen the structure of U N C T A D w as established in 1964 great trouble had been taken by the U nited N ations G eneral A ssem bly itself to provide for conciliation procedures. T hese p rocedures, how ever, have never been used. N evertheless, m ediation and conciliation have been practised constantly w ithin U N C T A D ; it is the w ay the institution w orks. M ediation w as constant but inform al. The form al procedures w ere never invoked b ecause m em bers knew in advance they w ould not w ork in the particular case. In the international a gencies m ediation should be considered as an instrum ent o f con­ structive international pressure, but it m ust not be construed as law , the im posing o f legislation. Institutionalization is the provision o f a fram ew ork w here individual cases can be dealt w ith by a perm anent staff of m ediators in a continuing m anner— on their m erits and w ithout undue attention to precedents. Form alization is the laying dow n o f a p ro c e d u re of m ediation inside an institution. T his procedure would provide rules w hich include those of interpretation, ie, the follow ing of precedents. T hus one can have institutionalization w ithout form aliza­ tion, as is in fact the case in U N C T A D w here procedure has been spelled out but never used. O n the subject o f procedure and tactics for m ediation a book could and perhaps should be w ritten, but if it is to be at all scientific it will have to aw ait a good deal o f research. Perhaps a m anual o f case histories w ould be m ost useful at present o r even a listing of alternative procedures found useful and not useful in the past. T here is no getting aw ay from the argum ent o f " I t all d e p e n d s,” although its constant use infuriates the political scientist. A serious problem is that the kinds of m ediations usually com pared and about w hich there are records are too few in num ber and disparate in character to produce results w ith m uch validity. W hat is perhaps necessary is to turn aw ay from the classical cases and look at a fair sam ple o f the thousands o f m ediations and subm ediations w hich are carried on every day w ithin the U nited

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N ations fam ily and all o th er international organizations. It is significant that in the field o f labour m ediation we are clo ser to patterns and guidelines because there are hundreds o f com parable cases w hich can be analysed. A lm ost any diplom at w ith U nited N ations experience could produce a dozen cases in w hich he has been involved, ranging from efforts to produce a com prom ise resolution to efforts to settle out o f form al sessions a passionate dispute w ith a form ula w hich can be subm itted for ratification by a contrived group o f sponsors. P rocedures are less form al in this kind o f routine m ediation but the tactics o f the third p arties, their assessm ent o f the facts, the attitudes o f the dis­ putants, and the tim ing o f proposals involve psychological and other considerations relevant to the m ajor issues and even m ore relevant to the institutional m ediation w hich m ay be the w ave of the future. T he practitioners at T alloires w ere reluctant to com m it them selves to anything that looked like rules, but they w ere interested in the accum ulation o f experience. A bout the only “ ru le s” they agreed on w ere that m ediation should be private and flexible. It w as just as significant, how ever, that they d id n 't flatly disagree about m uch, if anything, although there w ere differences o f stress. T heir ex periences had varied greatly and they w anted to insist that procedures and tactics should be chosen to suit the particular conditions, but nevertheless their e x periences seem ed to have taught them sim ilar lessons. T he need for privacy is basic, o f course, although it runs counter to certain attitudes o f contem porary thinking and is rarely accepted in practice by the p re ss.5 In spite o f the insistence o f the press, in the nam e o f the p u b lic ’s right to know , to reveal anything they can get their hands on, it is hard to find anyone positively arguing that there can be hope of successful m ediation if the m ediator cannot talk to the parties in confidence. T he parties them selves usually cannot be persuaded to keep quiet, although a m ediator is o ff to a good start if he can get their agreem ent to let him be the sole spokesm an to the public. O ne m ediator suggested that in norm al circum stances the parties w ere so busy giving their ow n versions to the press that it w as better for the m ediator not to c om pete. It has to be recognized that com m ents and leaks to the press are aspects o f the vying for position and the organization o f support by the parties w hich has to be expected as part of the m ediatory exercise. T h ey can also serve the purpose o f preparing the public for c o n ­ cessions. (M ediation is rarely concluded because light has daw ned on one o r both parties. It com es w hen the balance o f pressure is such that the parties are ready to give in o r strike a d e al.) T he m ediator m ay even find that although he m ust keep all d etails o f the negotiation private he needs som e public discussion to keep the heat on the parties. B odies like the G eneral A ssem bly and the Security C ouncil are not designed as forum s for m ediation, but there are tim es when public discussion of the

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issues lets off steam or creates pressure for settlem ent. It can, o f course, have exactly the opposite effect by m aking the parties m ore intrans­ igent. O ne m ust reluctantly say that it all depends. H ow ever, one can also review the situations in w hich publicity helped and those in which it d id n 't to see if there are a few useful pointers. T h e practitioners are likew ise agreed on the need for flexibility and reject not only predeterm ined procedures but also any fixed rules about how to m ove from the first stage, that o f inform ation gathering, to the final stage, the release o f an agreem ent, the preparation o f a report, or the resignation of the m ission. N evertheless they have acquired som e advice to give on all these subjects. T he m ediator m ust have a plan of attack in m ind before he starts, even though he will have to adjust it as he proceeds. He should not, how ever, offer to the parties a fixed p rogram m e for he m ight then be stuck w ith it. He m ust keep in the d riv e r’s seat. O ne practitioner suggested the need to keep the disputants off balance, for m ediation is som ething of a cat and m ouse gam e. First o f a ll, it is agreed, the m ediator m ust set out to discover the facts, not only the facts as they are but as they seem to be to the parties. W hether he should be chosen for his fam iliarity w ith the area is a m atter of difference, w ith a slight preference for the virgin m ind not only un­ biased but seem ing to be so. He m ust interrogate the representatives of the disputants and supplem ent this direct m ethod w ith his ow n in­ vestigations. In the latter endeavour he m ust be very careful to get at popular o r m inority opinions, even the view s o f the extrem ists who apply the pressure, not just the fixed positions o f official rep­ resentatives, but it is a delicate and often im possible task to make contact with non-official, and particularly opposition, sources. At T alloires scholars proposed various devious m ethods for acquiring essential inform ation w hich the practitioners rejected as unbecom ing or risky. T he fact to be recognized, o f course, is that there are m any ways o f acquiring im pressions about the background to a dispute which cannot and should not be acknow ledged before o r after a m ediation by those involved and the scholars m ight leave well enough alone. In interrogating the representatives o f the parties, the m ediator probably has to act with each privately although there are advantages in trying to get an agreed set o f facts around a table w henever the parties are sufficiently civil to each other to m ake this possible. He m ay try to m ove as a first step to a version o f the facts on w hich both sides will ag ree, but this can be a useless effort w hich serves only to aggravate the conflict. Parties can agree on a com prom ise w ithout surrendering any o f their convictions about the righteousness o f their cause. C larity about the term s o f the agreem ent will forestall m isunderstanding, but am biguity about the nature o f the conflict is probably desirable in any

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statem ents issued. It has been suggested that the result of a successful m ediation is a m isunderstanding acceptable to both sides. At T alloires the vital im portance o f inform ation to the m ediator w as stressed. A m ediator has to know the dispute, and even m ore so the parties them selves. Pre-m ediation briefing is im portant, but m uch inform ation has to be obtained du rin g the m ediation. How to ob tain this inform ation w as the subject o f varying opinions. It w as generally considered unw ise to attem pt a form al statem ent o f the “ fa c ts,” as this w ould initiate controversy and lead both parties to question the m ed iato r’s im partiality. M oreover, parties often create m yths w hich becom e for them realities that no “ in p u ts” of m essages or inform ation can shake. Som e thought the m ediator o ught not to question the representatives o f the parties on the facts; o thers considered this un­ avoidable and a good w ay to get the feel of the d isp u te . O ther classes of inform ation considered im portant included the basic go als o f the parties, the extent to w hich their ideological protestations w ere rhetorical, the decision-m aking p rocesses in the relevant governm ents, and the p ersonalities of the negotiators. B efore putting forw ard p ro p o sals, soundings should be taken to m ake sure they w ould be acceptable. It is im portant to show the parties that their grievances are not unique. T here w as considerable discussion as to w hether the m ediator should put forw ard proposals at all or w hether he should be a m ere transm itter o f m essages. It w as agreed that it w as best for the parties to be induced to ask for proposals. S om etim es they entered into m ediation to get proposals they could use to obtain dom estic acceptance o f a settlem ent. T he “ p ra ctitio n ers" w ere disposed to think that in international, as in labour, disputes the m ediator could rarely avoid m aking proposals in som e w ay, and even that he should use the tacit threat to m ake public his proposals. As for transm itting m essages, he ought not to be a “ sh u ttle c o c k " and there is grave risk o f each side assum ing that he favours the m essages he brings, but on the other hand if he is no longer trusted sufficiently to act as a go-betw een in this w ay, it is tim e to give up. W ith w hom should the m ediator seek to d e al? O bviously he should refuse to treat w ith anyone lacking in authority, but he cannot usually dictate w hom the disputants will nom inate to represent them . T o insist on seeing the top m an is not necessarily w ise, as the latter is usually required by political factors to be m ore intransigent than anyone else. T he popular but erroneous theory that am bassadors are m erely useless m outhpieces does not hold. A good am bassador, m uch of w hose skill is in the negotiation o f com prom ises and w ho usually has a m ore interna­ tional perspective than his hom ebound principals, is often the best m an to draft a form ula and persuade his governm ent to accept it. Som etim es

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the m ore ju n io r diplom ats are freer to engage in speculative e x ­ plorations than are their seniors. T here are tim es, o f course, w hen a m ediator, particularly if he is a m an of the status o f the SecretaryG eneral o r his personal representative, m ust insist on talking to the head o f governm ent if for no oth er reason than to involve him m orally in the exercise. A m ediator usually has a staff provided by the institu­ tion w hich authorized him and he will w ant to pursue his explorations at various levels. A lw ays he m ust bear in m ind that he w ill succeed only if he com es up w ith a form ula that the governm ents concerned can accept w ithout losing th eir ow n authority. It profits little to get an agreem ent w hich is prom ptly upset by a coup d ’etat. M ediation is norm ally a lengthy procedure involving hundreds of conversations w ith the parties on various levels. O bviously som e record should be kept o f these discussions and in particular o f any agreem ents reached o r prom ises m ade. T he practitioners recom m end against any effort to keep an official and agreed record. It is like the effort to get an agreed set o f facts, the source o f infinite delay and exacerbation. T he m ediator should keep his ow n private record. O ne very successful m ediator kept a detailed diary w hich he found adequate for his purposes. In the end the m ediator m ay well have to issue a report. He will alm ost certainly have to do so if he has failed o r if he is suggesting an interm ission. W hat goes into the report w ill, of co u rse, depend on w h eth er the m ediator hopes for a resum ption o f negotiations later or w hether he feels that the parties o r their sponsors need shock treatm ent. W ith due hum ility, the m ediators them selves insist that the last thing to be considered is their ow n personal reputations, although it should be noted that the stock o f m en w ith the kind of international reputation and ch arism a to m ove into dangerous disputes it too lim ited for them to be co nsidered lightly expendable. T hey are likely to be judged, in any case, not by w hat they say o f them selves and their endeavours but by w hat the press has been reporting of their activities. N either version is necessarily accurate. T he strongest case is usually to be m ade for a report w hich is not inflam m able, but although there is a case to be m ade in theory for a report w hich places the blam e squarely on one o f the parties o r both o r on their backers there are few exam ples o f this having been done, possibly because it w ould be an act contrary to the instinct the m ediator has been training him self to observe. Of co u rse, the breaking o ff of a m ediation is in itself som ething o f a shock treatm ent. T he threat of resignation is one o f the m ed ia to r's m ost valuable tactics, but it cannot be used very often and m ust never seem the expression of m ere petulance. M uch m ore useful is the adjournm ent o f active negotiations for cooling-off periods o r to let the parties live a little longer w ith their troubles o r cope w ith intransigent opinions at hom e.

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T he necessary pressure m ight be provided by the m ed iato r’s having his ow n deadline to m eet, the e xpiration, for e x am p le, o f his leave of a bsence from his regular occupation. R ecesses and c o oling-off periods are obviously useful tactics, but there are tim es for heating-up periods as well. T he practitioners are doubtful about im posing forced m arathon sessions but if they happen they can certainly be exploited to induce a m ood o f com prom ise by e xhaustion. T he im position o f deadlines is considered risky also. D eadlines are, o f co u rse, often im posed by outside factors o r even by the requirem ent o f a report by a stipulated date on the part o f the authorizing institution. D eadlines, how ever, can lose their force q u ick ­ ly if they are too often im posed and too seldom observed. It is often w ise, how ever, w hen m ediation has been stalem ated on one point to m ove on to another and seek a m ore favourable situation to return to the form er. S om e tactical options w hich attracted the scholars seem ed to the practitioners too difficult o r risky in practice to be considered. T h is is especially true w ith regard to such activities as m obilizing pressure by outside pow ers or affecting a d isp u tan t’s decision-m aking processes by contacts w ith dissident m em bers of the governm ent o r opposition elem ents. In certain circum stances, w hen the m ediator is on the gro u n d , it is hard to avoid som e involvem ent in local politics. One participant at T alloires spoke o f the necessity o f dealing with extrem ist o pinion, not just the m oderates. T he charge w as m ade that m ediators did m uch m ore of this than they adm itted, but in response a difference w as m aintained betw een a recognized and acknow ledged process of fact-finding in the com m unity and clandestine contacts. T here seem ed a consensus, how ever, that it w as b etter if pressures could be exerted by other pow ers o r institutions, not involving the m ediator. O ne m ediator said that m ediators should be careful not to becom e intriguers, but som e o f the scholars had a fancy for intrigue, w ithout w hich, they thought, m ediation w ould get now here. It w as recognized, how ever, that the exertion o f political pressure w as difficult w hen the m ediator w as an ad hoc third party w ithout continuing contacts with the countries and persons involved. It w as m ore practical for the m ediator w hen his organization w as o f im portance to the parties because o f the tangible benefits it provided and w hen its activities involved m ediation on a day-to-day basis over the years. O fficials of such an organization d eliberately created contacts in various countries w hich could be brought to bear w hen needed. T h ey even m ade discreet speeches intended to influence o p inion, a tactic w hich w as alm ost inconceivable for an ad hoc m ediator. A difficult tactic under any circum stances is an effort to affect o r use the press, by press conferences or leaks o r the planting o f editorials— although there are exam ples o f effective use of

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all these. T he risk o f m isinterpretation and the abuse o f confidence m akes this too risky. A n association w ith journalists is better exploited to keep things out o f the press than to get them in. T h ese are a few o f the general principles o f procedure and tactics on w hich som ething m ight at this stage be said. T here are m any other questio n s w hich m ight be treated in handbooks o r investigated by scholars able to quantify the answ ers. H ow should a m ediator start out, for exam ple? Should he go straight to the central issue o r try to get agreem ent first on som ething easier? A re there advantages in initial success w hich creates confidence and induces tolerance? If so, should this be sought on a procedural issue as seem s to be the regular procedure of the superpow ers w hen they sit dow n in co n ference? W ould it be b etter, on the o th er hand, to postpone w hat looks like an easy question for a tim e w hen the exercise is threatening to break up? If the m ediator is going to m ake a proposal him self should he w ork to develop a p ack ag e? Should he for tactical reasons e v er m ake a proposal the parties are unlikely to accept? Should he lim it him self to ruling out unacceptable solutions and putting forw ard general principles o f a co m p ro m ise? Should he put forw ard proposals one at a tim e or are there advantages in issuing a stream o f proposals as R alph B unche is said to have do n e in 1948, in order to draw out the parties? Should the m ediator start off w ith his ow n conception o f w hat a general settlem ent could be o r let h im self be led to a plan on hearing the a rgum ents? How can a m ediator help clear aw ay any advance com m itm ents by the parties w hich stand in the w ay o f m ediation? T h ere are at present no available answ ers to these questions beyond the injunction to use com m on sense, but one detects on the part o f practitioners a bias in favour o f the m ediator as one w ho draw s out o f the parties the fram ew ork o f a settlem ent rather than one w ho is forw ard in putting up solutions for consideration. O ne o f the principal reasons for this disin­ clination to suggest a solution is the fear that highly prejudiced parties w ill regard any proposal w hich is short o f their dem ands as favouring the o th er side. T h is w ould be particularly true if the proposals, as is very likely, got into the press. T he need for the m ediator to preserve the c onfidence o f both sides in his ow n im partiality is absolutely essential— pro v id ed , o f course, that the parties are negotiating in good faith and not sim ply engaging in a ritual of m ediation to prove to their ow n o r the general public that there is no com prom ise possible with an opponent. If the m ediator loses the confidence o f one side, there is a general assum ption that he m ight as well give up, but if this loss of confidence can be kept private he should do everything p ossible to regain that c onfidence before e xcusing h im self from the assignm ent. He should have som e leverage in that a party w hich is involved in

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m ediation in good faith will be reluctant to accept responsibility for breaking it off. M ediation m ay o f course often serve purposes other than that of m utual agreem ent on som e com prom ise. T he value o f stalling until passions have cooled o r the cause has lost its significance has been m entioned. If the purpose is m erely to prove that the other side is unreasonable the m ediator should probably break it off w hen he becom es aw are of this m otive. H e m ight com e to the sam e conclusion if he began to realize that one o r both parties w ould rather live with an exploitable grievance than receive satisfaction. O r he m ay conclude that for both parties it is easier to live with the conflict than to m ake the sacrifice or to face the loss of prestige involved in any settlem ent. Such a situation is unlikely to be critical enough to cause a w ar and m ight safely be abandoned to the parties. If it is the ostensible cause of a war, then it is only an excuse the solution of w hich w ould not prevent fighting. S om etim es the principal purpose o f a m ediation is sim ply to clarify the real facts about a m ilitary situation or internal developm ents in opposing cou n tries to quiet fears. T his w as the function o f Pier Pasquale Spinelli w hen he w as sent by the S ecretary-G eneral to A m m an after the L ebanese crisis o f 1958 and he m anaged successfully to dissolve suspicions am ong the A rab states that had created a d anger­ ous situation. W hen D ag H am m arskjold brought the foreign m inisters o f E gypt, France, and B ritain together in the autum n of 1956 he insisted that he w as m erely trying to help the parties see their som ew hat obscured agreem ent. H e got agreem ent in three m eetings and m ight well have succeeded had other forces not been intent on bringing about a nother kind o f settlem ent by force. Som etim es also the parties, or at least their representatives, are in agreem ent o r close to it and sim ply w ant a third party to “ fo rce ” them to accept a solution so that they m ight get m oral approbation to cover a retreat or acquire a scapegoat for the benefit of their voters. T he present and the prospective institutionalization of m ediation was a recurring them e o f the T alloires conference. It w as pointed out that the state m ediatory institutions in the U nited States, available for m ediation but not prescribed, in w hich the conference show ed a good deal o f interest, w ere only about tw enty-five years old. T he precedent o f the International C ourt, set up w hen the U nited N ations w as devoted to the belief that d isputes w ere subject to judicial treatm ent, w as cited; now that m ediation w as recognized as the w ise approach, w hy could not a procedure for it be institutionalized? T he principal advantage o f institutionalized m ediation, even w hen p ractised w ithout form ality, w as seen to be its constant availability. It avoids the often em otionally charged issue o f selecting an acceptable

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m ediator in tim e o f crisis. (T he need for the special m an for the special case w as, how ever, insisted u p on.) M ore im portant, the institution has a m uch better chance o f preventive m ediation; it can even initiate a m ediation w ithout the consent o f the parties. A m ultilateral institution can be m ore im partial. In institutions like the C om m ission o f the EC, w here com m on interest is strong, this w as perhaps its m ajor function. O ne “ institutional” m ediator said the charter o f his organization was drafted with the intention o f m ediation in m ind and he described the p lay of fo rc e s w ithin the body to prevent conflict, stressed the need for “ esprit de c o rp s" in the Secretariat for this purpose, and estim ated that o f about one thousand substantive decisions taken in ten years only one had had to be put to a vote. A nother “ institutional” m ediator claim ed he had never been a m ediator although he had spent tw enty years m ediating. He asked w hether m ediation w as a process that w as c o n ­ tinuous, built into a system perm anently, or a “ one sh o t” operation turned to in an eleventh-hour c risis w hen other processes had already failed. T he opinion o f the conference seem ed to be that it had to be both. A d anger from the m ultiplication of institutions is that they may becom e involved in conflicting w ays in the sam e dispute. T h e case of B iafra w as exam ined w here there had been m ultiple involvem ent and perhaps som e advantage from different approaches. In this case one organization refrained w hile the other w as trying and they kept in touch. P assing on inform ation by one m ediating institution to another w as difficult, ho w ev er, as it had been given in confidence. T here is a strong argum ent for co-ordination but not for lim iting m ediation in principle to certain institutions. T here was no disposition, for exam ple, to try to keep functional and regional agencies out of political disputes. Interest w as show n particularly in w hat the ILO w as doing in political conflicts and the hope w as expressed that in som e intractable political disputes a w ay in to m ediation m ight be found by (he econom ic and social agencies concerned w ith non-political aspects. A new look w as taken at institutions tried in the past w hen the acceptance o f m ediation w as less clear— particularly procedures o f the L eague w hose progress in this field had been too often ignored. The advantage of the L eague, it w as said, w as that m ediation had been m ade a norm al ex officio part of the process o f dealing with conflicts. T he one L eague institution given extensive consideration w as that o f the R apporteur, the m em ber of the L eague C ouncil designated to prepare a report on the dispute before it. T here w as som e support for reconstitut­ ing such an appointm ent in the Security C ouncil, at least on an ad hoc or trial basis, as a m eans o f reducing tension w ithin the C ouncil. It was suggested, how ever, that the rapporteur had been a consequence of the rule o f unanim ity in the L eague Council and that perhaps the increasing

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practice o f the President o f the U nited N ations Security C ouncil of expressing a consensus obtained by discussion w ith m em bers out of session served a sim ilar purpose. A nother view w as that the rapporteur had been invented at the L eague to shield the Secretariat from political involvem ent, but the U nited N ations Secretariat had developed a m ore active function and a rapporteur w as less necessary for this purpose. T he m ost prom ising prospect seem ed to be in the special institutions with built-in m ediation, in the possibility, for exam ple, that a High C om m issioner for H um an R ights m ight be fully “ in stitu tio n a liz e d " to take early initiatives in m ediation. C onsideration w as given also to the possibility o f inform al third party interventions by private institutions, w hich could bring together officials or un-official people to seek agreem ent under circum stances in w hich they w ere not “ p laying for k e e p s .” T hey could also , by patient probing o f special conflict situations, seek to “ upgrade the com m on in te rest.” In spite o f m any w orries expressed about trends in U nited N ations m ediation there w as a recognition that w ays and m eans w ould have to be found because m ediation, broadly conceived, w as the U nited N ations principal m ethod o f dealing w ith conflict.

N o tes 'Jean Meynaud et Brigitte Schroeder, La Mediation: tendances de la recherche et bibliographie (1945-1959) (Am sterdam : North Holland Publish­ ing, 1961), p. 30. 2Ibid,, pp. 31-2. 5A lan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping (London: Chatto and Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 71. 4A hom ely but typical exam ple o f this function o f the United Nations o f which the author had experience concerned the disposition o f the state treasures from Krakow stored in Canada during the war and held there for many years at the insistence o f trustees w ho remained faithful to the “ o ld '' Polish regim e. Dis­ cussions in Warsaw and Ottawa between officials made little headway because o f the need for governments to stick to established positions, but at the United Nations they could hypothesize. Formal discussion in the General Assem bly would only have hardened positions. T h e Canadian governm ent, from being a party to the dispute, became the initiator o f a m ediatory process between the “ o ld ” and " n e w ” Poles, the impetus provided by its anxiety to rid itself of embarrassment. Another mediator was the pianist, W itold Malcuczynski, whose charisma as a patriot with contacts in both camps enabled him to help in the devising o f and pressing for a formula for solution. 5T h e reasons the exam ples cited in this article are less concrete than might have been wished is that the mediators at the conference insisted, with admirable integrity, that a mediator ought not only to respect confidentiality during the process o f mediation but forever after. A politician w illin g to risk his career in the treacherous waters o f concession must feel confident that his tentative position w ill not be laid bare shortly in the mediator’ s memoirs.

Part Three: Counterweights

C anada grew up in traction. It w as the product of a balancing act, and it is no w onder that the idea o f counterw eights pops up so frequently in calcu latio n s of our foreign policy. A lthough w e cling to the legend o f victim ization by our g reat-pow er associates, Britain and the U nited States, in fact w e skilfully used our leverage with one against the other. W e developed the concept o f m utual deterrence before a nam e w as found for it, prospering on the uncertainty each of the pow ers felt about w hat the other party w ould do if w e w ere raped. T hat fear of violation, w hen younger, encouraged us to em brace NATO in accordance w ith the theory espoused publicly at the tim e, that there w as less danger of rape if one w ent to bed w ith eleven partners. It is a proposition w hich ought to have been subjected to quantitative analysis by som e doctoral student— a challenging interdisciplinary project for the C arleton School o f International A ffairs in association w ith M asters and Johnson. At any rate, the validity o f the counterw eight as a defensive m echanism w as severely tested in our youth. In m iddle age, how ever, divested o f our ch astity in one w ay o r another,* w e are offered the counterw eight again in F oreign P olicy fo r C anadians, this tim e with the M ysterious E ast as an added dim ension. It is a recurrent note in the effort to establish an independent relationship w ith the E uropean C om ­ m unity.

*In a lecture several years ago to the National D efence C o lleg e I planned to explain how we had lost our early virginal aura when w e got into the thick o f U N politics, inevitably stepping on the toes o f other countries w ho therefore con­ tested our shiny im age. M y hastily scrawled and cryptic note for the lecture was transcribed with the fo llow in g entry: “ Loss o f chastity by stepping on toes.” The typist had added an oversize question mark.

1 Odd Man out in the Atlantic Community

The fo llo w in g a re excerpts fr o m a p a p e r com m issioned b y the B ro o kin g s Institution fo r a stu d y o f the fu tu re o f the A tla n tic relation­ ship, w hich h a d been inau g u ra ted b y the C om m ittee o f N in e o f the N o rth A tla n tic A ssem b ly. A report o f the stu d y was p u b lish e d in 1974, but the p a p e rs have not ap peared in print. M y co -author o f this p aper, w ho d id the so lid work but sh o u ld not be held responsible f o r the m ore churlish opinions, was R o b ert W illm ot, now on the s ta ff o f the P arliam entary C entre f o r F oreign A ffa irs a n d Foreign T rade and ed ito r o f International C anada.

It is necessary to look briefly at the A tlantic w orld as C anadians saw it during the period o f “ the C re atio n ” from 1945 to 1950. C anadians w ere exploring the concept o f a N orth A tlantic com m unity even before the strategic im peratives as perceived in 1947-8 m ade an alliance necessary. For som e years they had talked about the “ N orth A tlantic tria n g le ,” and this w as an expansion o f the so-called “ A ngloA m erican id ea” that had been central to C anadian ideas of international security. C a n ad a ’s continuing existence had becom e dependent in the late nineteenth century on harm ony betw een Britain and the U nited States. C anadians, particularly after the First W orld W ar, w ere inclined to see the B ritish E m pire and the U nited States in tandem as the essential basis for peace, the core area of the kind of w orld w hich w ould be good for C anada. T he w artim e experience o f collaboration am ong the allies and gro w ­ ing concern over the dom ination o f the triangle by the tw o m ajor pow ers encouraged C anadians into the m ore international concept o f a W estern E uropean-N orth A m erican basis both for prosperity and for the deterrence o f aggression. T his som ew hat regional concept w as not seen as co ntrary to the interests o f the U nited N ations, for while 126

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C anadians had reluctantly accepted the necessity o f N A T O as a co l­ lective defence arrangem ent, they w ere at great pains to reconcile it w ith the term s of the C harter. Indeed, one o f the reasons they espoused the N orth A tlantic m ovem ent and took an active part in preaching the doctrine w as that they considered this far better than the transform ation of the U nited N ations into a W estern organization by the expulsion of the com m unists— a proposal being advanced in som e influential quarters to cope w ith Soviet abuse o f the veto. A lthough C anadians recognized the m ilitary necessities o f 1948, they assum ed that their ow n m ilitary contribution w ould be lim ited. They had no reason then to think they w ould be expected to send troops back to E urope. G iven their disposition tow ards the A tlantic c om m uni­ ty, how ever, they naturally w ere strong advocates o f the idea that countries w hich w ere pledged if necessary to fight and die together m ust do everything possible to harm onize their foreign policies. M ost m em bers o f NATO agreed on this in principle but C anadians had particu ­ lar concerns w hich led them to press especially for inclusion of article 2 in the T re a ty .1 T hat article and C a n ad a ’s effo rts on its behalf have subsequently been m isinterpreted as unnecessary attem pts to m ake N ATO an agency for econom ic organization. It is true that som e C anadians, including som e high officials, did entertain hopes that N ATO w ould develop into a close-knit, relatively co-ordinated international com m unity. W hatever their m erits, how ever, such hopes w ere not the operative concerns behind C an ad a’s efforts. C an ad a’s real w orries arose from the sim ple calculation that adequate co-operation on security m atters w ould be im possible if the allies w ere constantly confronting each other over econom ic issues. It w as based also on the belief that N ATO m ust offer som ething besides sim ple m ilitary deterrence to counteract the im pact of com m unist expansion on the m orale o f W estern E uropean publics. T hat C anadians w ere not alone in these w orries is suggested by articles I , 2 and 3 o f the B russels Treaty.-’ Since the closing days of W orld W ar II , senior officials in O ttaw a had been haunted by the fear that once the bond of w artim e alliance w as dissolved, the devastated E uropean countries and the N orth A m erican countries, w hose econom ies had been stim ulated by the w ar, w ould find their interests so different that they w ould inevitably engage in econom ic policies w hich w ould degenerate into som ethign like econom ic w arfare. As C anadians saw it, article 2 w as designed to infuse into the spirit of NATO an acceptance o f the view that the econom ic policies of the m em ber nations should be guided by the sam e principles o f m utual interest and respect as were considered essential in o th er aspects o f their foreign policies. C anadians also saw N ATO as a counterw eight. A long w ith the C o m ­ m onw ealth and the U nited N ations, it w ould give C anada a m ultilateral

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forum in w hich, by com bining w ith other lesser pow ers, it could make its w eight felt and so be relieved, at least psychically, of the inhibitions o f life on a continent w ith one gigantic neighbour. B eing grouped with B ritain, France, and the U nited States in a com m on organization, it w as hoped, w ould bridge the prevailing rift in C anadian opinion am ong im perialists, internationalists, and continentalists. T o a very con­ siderable extent it did achieve that. A quarter of a century later, the one C anadian purpose in sponsoring and joining the N orth A tlantic T reaty w hich w ould not be w idely questioned in C anada is that w hich inspired article 2. T here is no question of a C anadian w ish to turn N A T O into a W estern econom ic institution, for although N A T O is itself now dealing with such m atters as p ollution, the functional divisions betw een N A T O , O E C D , and other bodies are entirely accepted. H ow ever, the reasons for concern over the p ossible isolation o f the A tlantic countries into w arring econom ic blocs are greater now than at any tim e since 1949. C anada has m ost to lose in such a situation because its identity as well as its trade is threatened. O ther reasons for being in N A T O have either evaporated or c o n ­ siderably lost their force. In the greatly changed circum stances o f the E uropean m em bers, m ilitary argum ents for the stationing o f C anadian forces in E urope are hard to support. T hey w ere sent there as a tem porary gesture w hen E urope w as w eak. T hey are trapped there now not because they are needed but because of the sym bolism w hich would be attached to their w ithdraw al. T he argum ent that they give C anada a seat at the table and a voice in E uropean affairs, em phasized by one school o f thought, grow s less convincing to C anadians w ho ask w heth­ e r a peripheral influence on a continent m ore than ever determ ined to go its ow n w ay is relevant to the C anadian national interest. T he m ilitary role is taken m ore seriously by C anadian diplom ats, but in their case they probably see it largely as one w ay to keep a foot in the d oor of E uropean m inistries if they are not to be shut right out o f the W est E uropean econom y. T hey have good reason also to value the exchange o f intelligence and the discussion of policy with m ajor pow ers in N A T O , about w hich the public is largely unaw are and sceptical. In the m ilitary field the counterw eight did not work out as hoped. C anadians on the w hole w ould have liked N orth A m erican defence and, in particular, the N orth A m erican A ir D efence agreem ent ( N O R A D ) , to be part o f the N A T O fram ew ork, but the A m erican m ilitary insisted on its separation lest they have interference from Paris o r any sem blance o f m ultilateral control over the Strategic A ir C om m and ( S A C ) . At the sam e tim e E uropeans, w ho rarely seem able to com ­ prehend that N orth A m erica is an integral p art o f the area o f the North A tlantic T reaty , preferred to concentrate on their ow n continent. T herefore, N A T O did not act as a counterw eight to the im balance o f the

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C anada-U nited States m ilitary relationship in continental defence. A t a tim e w hen C anadians are obsessively concerned w ith the N orth A m erican im balance, this m ight be a m ore serious problem w ere it not that the grow th o f technology, and particularly the developm ent o f intercontinental m issiles, has greatly reduced the im portance o f C anada in A m erican m ilitary calculations for the defence o f the U nited States. H aving no longer a very serious role to play in E uropean o r N orth A m erican d efen ce, C anada finds itself increasingly in a position of w hat m ight be called functional neutralism . B elief in detente h as, of co u rse, affected C anadian thinking as it has the thinking of the peoples o f all N orth A tlantic countries. It is the lack o f a clear m ilitary role rather than excessive optim ism , how ever, w hich inclines m any C anadians tow ards a position best described perhaps as non­ involvem ent. T h is is not, o f course, governm ent p olicy. Fundam ental strategic realities, as well as a variety o f econom ic and political c o n ­ siderations, ensure C a n a d a 's co ntinuing m em bership in the N A T O and N O R A D alliances. But as long as the w idespread confidence in detente lasts, and as long as C anadians feel that they have little to contribute besides their bare presence— w hich is likely to be for the life o f the alliances— this feeling o f non-involvem ent and a certain longing to be free o f essentially encum bering obligations m ay well grow . Its expres­ sion in policy will not be in the form of w ithdraw al but rather in the discovery o f even greater elasticity in the obligations of alignm ent. The basic security considerations w ith w hich C anadians are concerned are, at any rate, m uch m ore econom ic than m ilitary, and it is econom ic issues that are likely to determ ine the degree o f elasticity discovered. W ith a heightened aw areness o f the ubiquitous A m erican presence, and less faith in the efficacy o f international role-playing, the old instinct for counterw eights has reappeared. T he recognition of Peking, the Prim e M in ister’s visit to the Soviet U nion, and M r. K o sygin’s return visit encouraged som e C anadian neutralists and foreign critics into false assum ptions about C a n a d a 's “ re alig n m e n t.” T here is a g re a t deal o f interest in Japan and the F ar E ast, and an interest perhaps m ore rhetorical than actual in Latin A m erica and A frica. Som e co u n ­ terw eight m ay be found in a revived U nited N ations, m ore p articular­ ly in the econom ic and m onetary institutions w ith broad international m em berships. Y et it w ould be m ore realistic to think o f C a n ad a 's a ctions in such agencies not in term s o f counterw eights, but m ore sim ply as the fulfilm ent o f international responsibilities in areas of special interest and com petence. At any rate, this w ould seem to be the g o v ern m en t’s view . For exam ple, the strong C anadian initiatives at the Stockholm conference, though clearly directed to the extension and strengthening o f international law in the field o f environm ental protec­ tio n , w ere nevertheless visibly linked to C an ad a’s vital national interest

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in challenging the w hole concept o f an unchecked freedom o f the high seas. T he question arises, then, as to w here C anada is to find the desired counterw eights. B esides the obvious strategic value of pursuing as norm al and healthy relations as possible w ith the Soviet U nion, there are a num ber o f areas for possible collaboration, particularly on com ­ m on problem s o f northern developm ent. But the potential for increased trade, though significant, is lim ited. C hina, it is hoped, will rem ain an im portant m arket for C anadian w heat, and C anada is seeking a foot in the C hinese m arket, in tobacco and airline com m unication, for ex am ­ ple, before W ashington and Peking becom e too cordial. A lthough C anada and C hina are exchanging enorm ous trade fairs this year it is doubtful if m uch can be expected as long as the C hinese show no signs o f dropping their preference for econom ic self-dependence. M ore m ight be expected from trade w ith the non-com m unist, in­ dustrialized countries o f the Pacific but, aside from Jap an , d e­ velopm ents so far are not on a scale to prom ise im portant diversion from the U nited States m arket. T he norm al difficulties of finding counterw eights are com pounded in C anada by the lack of energy being expended for the purpose. O ne m ight alm ost say that the problem has not really been identified, for the focus o f political debate is on the adm ittedly alarm ing extent o f A m erican investm ent in C anada, instead o f on the extrem e dependence on the U nited States m arket that c o n ­ stitutes our real vulnerability. T he C anadian business com m unity below the level of the large corporation is m ainly unaw are o f the potential m arkets in the Pacific, including Jap an , and seem s unw illing to m ake the special efforts required for their exploitation. C anada and Japan now rank as each o th e r’s third largest trading partner, but on our side this is too m uch a result of the actions of international corporations and o f Ja p a n ’s need for the natural resources and sem i-processed goods w hich w e have in seem ing ab u n d an c e.' In any talk o f counterw eights, C anadian thoughts ought logically to turn to the other side of the A tlantic, but the view tow ards E urope is still am bivalent: in political and security questions there is increasing detachm ent, as already noted, w hile in the fields o f trade, culture, and e specially tourism , the interest am ong C anadians is grow ing. Except during the period of B ritain ’s first unsuccessful bid for entry, C anadian g overnm ents have taken a passive and deliberately correct view tow ards the E E C . Few C anadians have shared the m essianic view s of influential A m ericans about E uropean union. T hey have been less inclined to see it as a giant step tow ards w orld o rder and m ore as a m anifestation of econom ic and political regionalism or blocism . T hat le d e fi E uropeen has to be accepted is clear, but C anada has been paralysed by uncertainty. T rade with the U nited K ingdom last year was

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still larger than trade with the six C om m on M arket countries com bined. Part o f the problem has been a general apathy in the business c om m uni­ ty, sim ilar to that noted above regarding trade w ith Japan. Such an attitude w as relatively easy to sustain during the ’sixties, the period of m ost rapid econom ic developm ent in the EEC, because C an ad a’s trade with the U nited States and Japan w as expanding explosively. T he present signs o f change are to a considerable extent due to the im m inent loss o f traditional advantages offered under the C om m onw ealth preference system coupled w ith the fears that attended the m easures announced by P ressident N ixon in A ugust 1971. B etter intentions tow ards E urope m ay be w elcom ed, but they will not solve all problem s. T he grow th and enlargem ent o f the E uropean E conom ic C om m unity is variously regarded as a good o r a bad thing in g e n e ra l, and w hether in the end it will be helpful or harm ful to C anadian trade and investm ent is m uch d ebated. But there is general recognition that it tends further to isolate C anada w ithin the A tlantic com m unity, and this m ay be m ore im portant in the long run than the loss of advantages in the U nited K ingdom o r the structural difficulties of form al Canada-EEC relations. C an ad a’s historic role in N A T O w as, as pointed out at the tim e, to convert w hat w ould otherw ise have been an A m erican aid-to-E urope schem e into a com m unity o f fifteen nations. If the W estern E uropeans now seek to speak with one voice, C anada is shut out from com m on causes w ith its m ost natural associates, the sm aller E uropean m em bers. If the EEC is to be one of the “ tw in pillars’’ o f the A tlantic w orld, then the U nited States m ust be the other. It cannot be “ N orth A m e ric a.’’ T here is no B russels on this side o f the Atlantic. N ot only is there no com m on N orth A m erican front— there is no basis for o n e, because the differences in pow er and econom ic interests are such that a com m on position on political, econom ic, or security m atters can rarely be guaranteed. T he U nited States and C anada will often be in agreem ent, but the agreem ent is coincidental and C anadians could not perm it it to be regularized. T he fact o f being both N orth A m erican is responsible for as m uch conflict as com m on interest. E ven the onagain-off-again acceptance o f the principle o f a com m on policy by the m any nations o f the EEC is no m odel for a continent consisting o f one superpow er and one m iddle p o w e r.4 C anada thus becom es the odd man out, the unsym m etrical elem ent in the pattern. T h is creates a problem for C anadians o f being disregarded. It presents a real problem for A m ericans and E uropeans also o f seeing how (or even rem em bering) to fit this stubborn piece into the fram ew ork. In m atters o f security the notion of a triangular A tlantic com m unity is n earing the end o f a long death , and w hile C anadians have found it a painful process they are now adjusting. T he sam e concept of triangularity m ay seem equally distorted when applied to non-security

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m atters. R elations with the U nited States are, o f co u rse, o f far greater im portance to the E uropean countries than their relations with C anada. A s a trading partner, C anada is at present m ore im portant to the U nited States than is the E E C , but in broad international affairs the E uropeans still carry m ore w eig h t, and C anada tends too often to be left to fit into patterns w orked out betw een the U nited States and the E E C as happened in the K ennedy R ound of negotiations. T he situation w hich C anadians have com e to accept in N A T O is intolerable in the econom ic and m onetary discussions w ithin the A tlan ­ tic com m unity. B ecause C anada is now an econom ic pow er co m ­ parable with the m ajor pow ers o f E urope this exclusion, how ever understandable, inspires a frustration w hich is partly responsible for the current w ave o f nationalism and em phasis on the national interest in C anada. In the issues w hich preoccupy C anadians now— exploitation o f resources, fishing, coastal w aters, m onetary stability, trade restrictions— the antagonists tend to be the U nited States, B ritain, and even our close political friends o f postw ar years, N orw ay and D enm ark, not to m ention the w hole o f the E E C . O lder assum ptions o f a basic com m unity with the other A tlantic countries are thus no longer accepted so autom atically. Yet this itself raises problem s for C anadians. T he inescapable fact is that w e need our friends, both politically and because it is essential that w e establish good relations w ith the E E C . T he question arises nevertheless, w hether the A tlantic c om m unity is now too narrow to be recreated as such. From a C anadian point of view the inclusion of Japan and A ustralia in the O E C D and other organizations is very m uch w elcom ed, p articularly if w e are to be faced in these bodies with a com m on E uropean front. (T he supplem entary question w hether the E E C can continue to claim tw elve o r fourteen votes in international bodies if it is going to speak as a unit is one w hich C anadians will increasingly ask. A lthough their interests are by no m eans coincidental w ith those of the U nited States in m onetary m atters, they are not anxious to replace A m erican dom inance with E uropean.) B ecause o f their continuing conviction that a basic solidarity betw een W estern E urope and N orth A m erica is necessary, C anadians do not w ant a split either in the A tlantic alliance o r in the A tlantic com m unity. T he decision to rem ain in N A T O w as an earnest o f this conviction. The sublim ation o f the A tlantic com m unity into som ething broader is a different m atter, how ever, and it raises another set of questions. The inclusion of Japan and A ustralia and in due co u rse, no d o u b t, other co u n tries, suggests the evolution o f a bloc not o f A tlantic but of industrialized countries. C ertainly this w idening is in the particular interest of C anada, caught as it is betw een the tw in pillars of the strictly A tlantic com m unity. W e m ust w onder, how ever, w hether it is in the

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general w orld interest to have a bloc o f industrial countries em erge. Such a group could bring disaster if its m em bers placed the em phasis on the preservation o f their privileges, but it could forestall dangerous conflicts and prom ote the evolution o f a m ore equitable w orld, if they continued to recognize that, as rich and pow erful countries, they have an obligation to assist developing nations. A question very m uch for consideration is w hether this larger g ro u p ­ ing should continue the old A tlantic idea of form ing a com m on front against the com m unist pow ers o r o th er hostile blocs. T he answ er is probably that it w ould be futile to attem pt to do so across the bo ard , but the m em bers m ight feel obliged to coalesce for resistance in ad hoc situations. T here are no longer m onolithic first and second w orlds, and the effort of the T h ird W orld to form a com m on front in UNCTAD is having trouble. It is not a good tim e to encourage the first, o r A tlantic, w orld into a coherence m ost p eople w ould consider anachronistic, and yet it has to be rem em bered that the original argum ent for that coherence w as not a defence o f privilege but a recognition o f certain obdurate facts o f international life, including the regrettable but un­ deniable existence o f m alevolent pow er. A m ajor problem is the tendency to think in term s o f shapes and sym m etrical desig n s, for one o f the threats to the evolution o f a m ore orderly w orld com es, paradoxically, from the com pulsive constitution m ongers and o th er tidy-m inded people in universities and chanceries. T he concept o f a triangular A tlantic com m unity, to take an exam ple dear to C anadian hearts, is not so m uch distorted as out o f date. T he econom ic com m unity w hich really m atters has at least four m ajor poles, and any attem pt to encom pass that system w ithin a single grand design w ould have to resort to pre-C opernican epicycles to “ save the a p p ea ran c es.” It follow s that the concept of the tw in pillars should also go the w ay of all good m etaphors, and the sooner the better. It has been cherished by the A m ericans because it offers them the illusion of escape from lonely pow er. T he problem with such easy im ages is that they d istort the perception o f reality and tend to fulfil them selves until they founder on their ow n inherent contradictions. If they do not prevent, they at least inhibit, frequently rather severely, the developm ent of w hat w ould otherw ise be m ore norm al and desirable processes and relationships. A healthier attitude now w ould probably be to w elcom e a prolifera­ tion o f agencies and o f coalitions on a functionalist basis. In som e agencies, as in the case o f the G roup o f T en , m em bership m ight be lim ited in fact, though not in principle, to the A tlantic o r the highly industrialized states. O ther bodies w ould include m em bers from w hat­ ever part o f the w orld o r state o f developm ent w as appropriate. T o a considerable ex ten t, this is a d escription of w hat is in fact happening.

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W hat is necessary is to recognize it as on the w hole a desirable rather than an anarchical principle. W hat C anadians had particularly in mind by prom oting the functionalist principle w hen the U nited N ations w as being established in 1945 w as that although the m ajor m ilitary pow ers w ould have a special status for security purposes in the Security C ouncil, they w ould not presum e to be an executive body adm in ister­ ing the w orld. It w as recognized, as jt still should be, that m ajor pow ers will participate in m ost o f these functional international agencies. But this flexible system , o r non-system , w ould be a better guarantee of responsibility than the im practical and unacceptable establishm ent of a hierarchy with special authority in all fields given to tw o o r five superpow ers. Such a philosophy leaves open the possibility o f collaboration am ong w hat have been know n as the A tlantic pow ers w hen this is desirable, w ithout m aintaining their existence as the kind of bloc w hich will increasingly exasperate less favoured areas o f the globe. It leaves room for countries like C anada and Japan to play roles and exercise influence in accordance w ith their real pow er, in a w ay that they cannot do in a tw o-pillared com m unity. O ne o f its key advantages— the one that m ay lead to its eventual adoption— is that it should m ake life easier for the W estern E uropeans. In the not-too-unlikely event that unity of policy becom es even m ore difficult to achieve in an enlarged E E C , with three m ajor pow ers instead o f tw o, the debilitating effects of com ­ pulsive concern w ith m atching o r forestalling A m erican econom ic m ight will m ultiply. In any c ase, like everyone else, the E E C will have to diversify its m arkets and find new areas for investm ent. Som etim e soon it will be forced to confront soberly the W e s t's rapidly disappear­ ing supplies o f raw m aterials and energy resources. T hese and other problem s, notably the accom m odating of Jap an , will be m ore easily m anaged w hen the E E C has freed its thinking and its policies from the obsessions w hich are both cause and effect of the tw in-pillar m entality. T hese are factors to be considered also w hen w e rem em ber that the continuation of deten te, though it should be prayed for, cannot m erely be assum ed. T he strength o f N A T O , and the deterrence im plied by the continuing w illingness of its subscribers to coalesce if necessary, rem ains a factor in detente. So too, the concept of N A T O and the W arsaw Pact as com plem entary bases o f E uropean security, w hile it m ay o r m ay not produce the desired results, is certainly not one to be dropped at this point. W hereas it is clearly not desirable to strain the bonds of the A tlantic com m unity too far by expecting even the unity of policy achieved tw enty years a g o , it is essential to m aintain enough com m unity spirit to sustain the credibility of the pledges of 1949. If the m ilitary threat to the alliance seem s less real, one has to bear in m ind that in a w orld w here security issues will increasingly be econom ic

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issues, there m ay be tim es w hen the A tlantic countries should seek to stand together against what seem to be calculated and co-ordinated threats to their legitim ate interests based on a policy o f p laying one W estern country o ff against another. W e should o f course be ex ceed ­ ingly reluctant to use this tactic against legitim ate claim s o f the developing countries, but we cannot rule out the possibility that it will be necessary in confronting som e o f the m align forces now battling for po w er over the m ore indigenous revolutionaries in Latin A m erica, A frica, and Asia. If there is to rem ain enough com m unity spirit am ong the A tlantic countries for these various purposes, the c om m unity will have to becom e less E urocentric. T here w as som e justification in the beginning for thinking o f this as an aid-to-E urope schem e because there w as reason to think that the m ajor threat to A tlantic security w as in E urope, and the N orth A m erican m em bers w ere in m uch better shape to c o n ­ tribute than w ere the E uropean countries. Even though both these situations have changed greatly, there persists the assum ption that N A T O is designed for the protection o f E urope. T his w as seen clearly w hen E uropean m em bers protested the rem oval o f C anadian forces from E urope to C anada, w hich they insisted on calling “ w ithdraw al from N A T O . " T he C anadian governm ent insisted, in a w ay in w hich it had unfortunately not done before, that this w as a transfer from one area o f N A T O concern to another. As suggested above, C anada has rejected M ercator and in a m issile age refuses to regard E urope as “ the f ro n t." T he assum ption that C anada w ould and should participate in the C onference on Security and C o-operation in E urope ( C S C E ) , how ever, w as not questioned. T he C anadian governm ent, by insisting on a seat, indicated that it has not shaken loose from old concepts— in spite of the attem pt to put E urope in perspective in the foreign policy w hite paper. T he U nited States as a superpow er is intercontinental in its responsibilities and the argum ents for its attending a E uropean security conference are obvious. C anada, on the other hand, seem s to have got itself included for the w rong reason— that is, to prove to the R ussians that N orth A m erican countries c o u ld n ’t be excluded. So long as Canada is a m em ber and has som e troops in N A T O , there is certainly an argum ent for attendance. But as the C S C E is presum ably designed to establish som e co ntinuing security arrangem ents for the continent of Europe and its im m ediate environm ent, the question m ust first be explored w hether C anada is to accept the idea o f a perm anent c o m ­ m itm ent to that continent, any m ore than to A sia, sim ply because of habits o f m ind developed in 1941 and 1939. T he U nited S tates, o f co u rse, by its unilateralism , its denial o f N A T O authority in N orth A m erica, and its ow n espousal of the tw in-pillar and sim ilar concepts, has strengthened the E urocentricity o f the c o m m u n i­

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ty. T he attem pt at cohesion o f the expanded E E C , and the bloc tactics that w ill, to a greater o r less extent, be its consequences, will m ake it m ore difficult to m aintain, let alone d evelop, a pan-A tlantic perspective. F o r C anada the pan-A tlantic position has alw ays been the m ost attractive. It w ill continue to resist the forces o f continentalism , w ith o r w ithout the aid and com fort o f its A tlantic partners. T he defection o f C anada w ould certainly not be fatal to N A T O , but its continuing alienation m ight be regretted as a sym ptom of the decline of the A tlantic spirit w hich, although it is too narrow in itself to save the w orld, nevertheless rem ains one o f the essential com ponents o f a peaceful and m ore o r less prosperous international society. C anadians, for their part, have to shift back from negative to positive thinking, exploring new form s and practices for the com plex relationship with their pervasive neighbour, adjusting im aginatively to the altered pattern o f relations w ith E urope and reconciling that w ith the w ider c om m unity o f the O E C D m em bership. Finding for them selves the d efinable place, com parable to no one e ls e ’s, will be difficult. T hey w ould profit from a little m ore serious— and preferably critical— attention from fellow m em bers, preoccupied though they are also with identifying them selves.

N o tes 'T h e North Atlantic Treaty, 4 A p ril 1949. A rticle 2: The Parties w ill con­ tribute toward the further development o f peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding o f the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by prom oting conditions o f stability and w ell-being. T h ey w ill seek to eliminate conflict in their international econom ic policies and w ill encourage economic collaboration between any or all o f them. ■The Brussels Treaty, 17 March 1949. A rticle I: Convinced o f the close community o f their interests and o f the necessity o f uniting in order to promote the econom ic recovery o f Europe, the High Contracting Parties w ill so organize and co-ordinate their econom ic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination o f conflict in their econom ic policies, the co-ordination of production and the developm ent o f commercial exchanges . . . A rticle 2: T he H igh Contracting Parties w ill make every effort in comm on, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to prom ote the attainment o f a higher standard o f livin g by their peoples and to d evelop on corresponding lines the social and other related services o f their countries . . . A rticle 3: The High Contracting parties w ill make every effort in com m on to lead their peoples towards a better understanding o f the principles which form the basis o f their com m on civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means . . . ’For a fuller discussion o f the problems o f Canadian-Japanese trade see Lom e

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K a vic , “ Canada-Japan relations,” International Journal, x x v i (summer 1971), pp. 567-81. 'M e x ic o is a m ajor middle power in what is geographically called North A m erica, but its affiliations are with Latin A m erica rather than “ North A m erica ” as conceived in the North Atlantic context.

2: International Security: A W allflower View

A s th e U nited S ta te s sought deten te with both Peking a n d M o sc o w and a dim inution o f its own responsibilities in the w orld a t large, th ere was ta lk out o f W ashington o f a w orld balancing on fiv e po in ts, the U nited S ta te s, the USSR, C hina, Japan, a n d W estern E urope. T h e p e n ta rch ica l structure h a d its attractions a fte r bipolarism , but it ra ised som e questions, in g e n era l a n d f o r a C anadian in particular, w hich I sought to exam ine in a talk p re p a re d f o r the C ouncil on Foreign R ela tio n s in N e w Y ork in J u n e 1972, a t the conclusion o f th e 1972 A n n u a l C on­ fe re n c e o f the C om m ittees on F oreign R elations. The them e o f the c onference was ” T h e C hanging B alance o f International R elations. ”

I see m y assignm ent as that o f asking irresponsible questions from the northern flank. M ore im portant than the direction is the fact that the q uestions com e from a country w hich is to an increasing extent outside the fram ew ork— a w allflow er state, so to speak. T h o se countries which have been called m iddle pow ers are becom ing the forgotten peoples of the international security system . W e are outcasts. I suspect, how ever, that far from being the w retched o f the earth we are the truly blessed. It is necessary to begin w ith som e W eltanschauung e ve n if I do not plan to be original. M ay I assum e a certain consensus of contem porary opinion about w here w e are at the m om ent. T h ere is to begin w ith an assum ption that the A chesonian “ C re atio n ” o f the postw ar years— the U N , N A T O experim ent in collectivism — is breaking up or at least being shaken to the roots. W hat is taking its place? A tw o- o r a five-pole system ? T he escalation of m ilitary technology and the s a l t talks seem to som e people to confirm a shift from m ultilateralism to a b ipolar hegem ony of the tw o unquestioned superpow ers. H ow ever, the capaci­ ty o f these pow ers to im pose order by the use o r threat of m ilitary force w as never m ore in doubt than now . T he econom ic factor o f pow er is loom ing larger, and that raises all sorts o f questions about the con­ figuration. So there is m uch talk about a shift from a bipolar to a three138

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o r five-pow er w orld— a “ P entarchy” as C oral Bell has called it: the U nited States, the U S S R , C hina, W estern E urope, and Japan. Incidentally, w hat has been called the T hird W orld seem s to have disappeared from this five-pow er structure. It m ay be that the term T hird W orld now m eans little b ecause the first and second w orlds are recognizing com m on interests and the old concept o f non-alignm ent, w hich held the T hird W orld together, is dissolving. If the P entarchy, as defin ed , m eans that the T hird W orld is no longer regarded as a paw n in the pow er gam e, that is all to the good. If it m eans w e w ant to forget about the T hird W orld just because w e d o n ’t w ant its bases any m ore, or its votes in the U N , that is not so good. For one thing the first and second w orlds are technologically fragile and the particular pow er o f the Third W orld elem ents to attack us at our w eakest point— with bom bs and g uerrillas and faith-healing ideologies— suggests that it is im prudent to d isregard them as a factor in international security. O ur estim ates of p o w er and conflict are still pretty conventional. T hey are slow , I think, to adjust to the loom ing struggle for food and air w hich are the new im peratives o f a security system . As for the postw ar C reation w hich is said to be breaking up, I think it is fair to say that its broad U nited N ations aspects w ere intended to be perm anent, though evolutionary. T he N A T O elem ent, how ever, w as h opefully regarded as tem porary o r transitional. T he break-up o f the broad international structure w ould be disastrous, but the replacem ent o f N A T O in due course by som ething broader and deeper m ight be w elcom ed. T his is som ething, how ever, w hich all the N A T O allies must think hard about and not just let things drift. I say “ all the a llies” deliberately because I am aw are o f a popular view o f the m om ent— propagated especially by young A m ericans— that this w hole postw ar international system , and especially N A T O , w as im posed by A m erican dogm atists pursuing the narrow interests o f A m erican im perialism . People o f m y generation know full well that D ean A cheson had m any w illing and foreign collaborators, m uch as he disliked the lot of us. The C reation did becom e far m ore o f a pax A m ericana than w e had in­ tended, m ore than the A m erican co-founders intended, but there has persisted a joint sense o f responsibility for the pattern, how ever un­ equal our contributions to the structure. T he inequality of contribution w as basically due to the inequality o f pow er. A llied governm ents still carry with them , as part o f their fram ew ork, assum ptions about an A tlantic security com m unity as an entity, how ever fissiparous. T he attitude o f allies o f the U nited States to the trend tow ards bipolarity has been am biguous. Increasingly w e have thought o f the poles as the two superpow ers, but on the one side it has alw ays been m ore o r less “ the U nited S tates and friends. ” In the new Pentarchy, how ever, our pole is split in tw o, W estern E urope and the U nited States. (Iceland and

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C anada are out. In an age w hen everyone is m adly seeking his identity, do you w onder w hy C anadians are enjoying a kind of m ass nervous b reakdow n?) It is one thing to have the A tlantic alliance sublim ated into som ething broader. It is less attractive to hazard in a split all the work done over the years to bridge the A tlantic. T he other current assum ption I w ould like to note is that universal co llective security is dead— w ith a dom ino serving as a tom bstone. T his view is shared both by those w ho consider the U nited States was w rong in Indochina and by those w ho think it w as let dow n by its friends and by the UN. T he favourite idea o f 1946, that o f policing the w orld, is discredited alm ost everyw here. T he only people who believe in the dom ino theory now , it w ould seem , are the R ussians in their attitude tow ards the countries o f E astern E urope. N ow how m uch any foreign policy planners in the W estern w orld really believed in u niver­ sal co llective security after the K orean W ar is hard to say. U nfortunate­ ly politicians kept it as a stock in trade of their rhetoric for such a long tim e that the public has been m isled into thinking it is som ething that has been lost, betrayed by a cow ardly U nited N ations o r by the self­ ishness o f the g reat pow ers, o r by the petty nationalism o f the lesser. It is fashionable now to look again at the concept o f regional organization for defence as a m ore practical alternative to universal collective security. T he m ore one looks at that assum ption, how ever, the less practical it seem s. T he Lord did not oblige by laying out the w orld in regions, and m ilitary pow er is not distributed according to any rational plan. (A C anadian, o f course, m ight be expected to have a som ew hat jaundiced view o f the concept o f N orth A m erica as a cosy region, its security determ ined dem ocratically by a m ajority in a club of tw o .) T here are som e viable regions, but that does not add up to a universal pattern. T he U nited N ations w as not, o f course, based on the d o ctrine of universal collective security. It w as based on a m ore sensible concept of g reat-pow er hegem ony in security m atters. U nfortunately, during the period w hen we needed that great-pow er hegem ony it failed us. Now w hen, after painful experience, the greatest pow ers are beginning to grope tow ards consensus, their incapacity to im pose their will on other states is becom ing all too clear although they m ay do by econom ic pressure w hat they could not do by m ilitary deterrence. So w e seem to be shifting back to the idea of equilibrium m aintained by a concert of five centres o f pow er— except that the cast o f perform ers has shifted— and som e o f them have only econom ic m uscle. W hat of this new pentarchy, this new trend tow ards the m aintenance o f som e kind o f w orld order by the linking in a strange dance of five disparate partners? W hat are the view s o f those o f us who are left out of the dance? W e ought to disapprove, to dem and a return to the dem o cra­

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tic principles o f the U nited N ations w ith a greater voice for the forgotten. T o a certain extent I w ould com plain on those grounds. T his effort to m aintain equilibrium by antique diplom acy is a poor w ay to run a w orld. It is precarious because it depends upon an intelligence w hich cannot be depended upon. It leaves a large part o f the w orld voiceless and vulnerable. H ow ever, if one regards it as a holding operation it m akes sense. A t any rate one has to ask: W hat better? For the rest o f us it looks b etter than a bipolar w orld because our interests are m ore likely to be balanced am ong five than am ong tw o. (A t least I think that is true, but it m ay be just a congenial abstraction.) It is fashionable and it is politically obligatory for spokesm en o f the w allflow er states to com plain that their interests w ill be sacrificed in superpow er negotiations. N o country has a greater reason to be nervous than C anada because it is the one country w hich lies betw een the U nited S tates and the Soviet U nion. T he greatest m ilitary threat to C anada is not an attack on us by either o f the superpow ers; it is a w ar fought by the superpow ers over our heads. (O r in the new w orld o f desperate c o m ­ petition for natural resources, perhaps the greatest threat could be a S oviet-A m erican econom ic deal w hich undercuts the C anadian in­ te re st.') No country has a stronger vested interest in the success o f the SALT negotiations than C anada. T he E uropeans do m ore com plaining about superpow er negotiations, but m ost of them recognize the sam e basic interest. In principle, yes, w e m ust be vigilant against the sa c ­ rifice o f ourselves in the achievem ent of superpow er com prom ise, but I am prepared to be pragm atic and look an issue o f this kind in the eye w hen it com es. N ostalgia for universal collective security as an alternative can m uddle our m iddle-pow er thinking. E ven if it w ere possib le, it had a built-in rigidity w hich m ade it not only im practical but undesirable. It m ight have looked like the only w ay of preventing w ars, by the threat of unity in advance, but it w as also a form ula for guaranteeing that even a m inor incident w ould becom e a w orld w ar. (C anadians conceived a particular dislike o f this theory during the days o f the League of Nations w hen it w as in our eyes designed as a m eans of d ragging the rest of us in to preserve a questionable status quo in E urope.) T he pentarchical schem e could act as a deterrent to aggression w ithout running the risks o f collective security. A nd yet there is alw ays the paradox. In spite of the im practicality of a system o f universal collective security, it has never been possible to duck the logic of the argum ent that aggressors should be dissuaded in advance. W e are still hung up, o f course, on o u r utter inability to agree on the nature of a g g ressio n .1 Im agine the Security C ouncil trying to agree on w ho the aggressors are in C am bodia. Frankly, I w ould have great difficulty m yself. Surely we have learned the painful lesson that it

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takes tw o sides to m ake a w ar and w ars are set off by actions and reactions. T here is, I believe, a force loose in the w orld w hich m ay prove m ore persuasive of good behaviour than an unreal provision for an international arm y. It is the sense o f prudence w hich links the pentarchs in a nuclear w orld and still gives m eaning to the U N C harter. T he bom b is a terribly blunt instrum ent and it certainly h a sn ’t stopped w ars. It h a sn ’t prevented aggression and injustice but it has prevented unlim ited w ars. It has provided one com m on interest on w hich we m ight begin painfully to build. I adm it that there is nothing new in that idea, but it has to be confirm ed from tim e to tim e against cynics and Utopians alike. Ideas d o n ’t have to be new to be sound. M y ch ief concern about the concept of the pentarchy is that it m ay be accepted too neatly. It is too evanescent to survive schem atization. The U nited States and the Soviet U nion m ay be like a w hale and an e lep h an t, but they are com parable. C hina is a country o f enorm ous people-pow er and considerable ideological clout w hich m ay o r m ay not d evelop com parable m ilitary and econom ic strength. Japan is becom ­ ing an econom ic giant, but its will and its capacity to becom e a pow erful m ilitary force is view ed sceptically by the specialists. W hat is called E urope is largely a m ythological beast. T he W estern E uropean cou n tries in collaboration can becom e som ething o f a united— though not necessarily benign— force in w orld econom ics. T o think of E urope, how ever, as if it w ere an entity in international security m atters is a m iscalculation o f w hich w e should bew are. Som e instrum ent m ay be c reated for fo rm ulating a com bined E uropean grievance, for stating w hat E uropeans are against. A people having aspirations to superpow er status o f a diplom atic and m ilitary kind m ust have the capacity to accept and fulfil responsibilities. M y w orry is that a schizophrenic attitude to E uropean and national interests and an inability to agree except on the low est com m on denom inator will serve only to reduce the strong and useful voices in international discourse o f B ritain, F rance, and G erm any, not to m ention the w ise lesser pow ers o f W estern E urope. T he idea o f E urope as one o f the pillars o f a five-pow er w orld, as I suggested earlier, particularly confuses those o f us w ho have regarded the N orth A tlantic alliance as som ething of a pillar. C ontinentalist nationalism as threatened in the enlarged E E C is not going to strengthen the A tlantic partnership. T he position o f a country like C anada is particularly painful because w e are clearly excluded from an A tlantic structure w hich is now norm ally defined as the relationship betw een som ething called E urope and som ething called A m erica. S om etim es in the presence o f a troublesom e C anadian the term A m erica is enlarged to “ N orth A m e ric a.’’ T here is, how ever, no political entity w hich is N orth A m erica and that too is a m iscalculation. T here is in N orth A m erica one superpow er— super in all fields— and one country which

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is a m inor m ilitary but m ajor econom ic pow er. T he tw o states recognize com m on interests in w orld security but they are forced by the disparity of their pow er and by som e diverse interests to find their ow n w ays in a pentarchical w orld. 1 m ust show a due sense o f proportion, how ever. T he special em barrassm ent to C anada is not a priority reason for w orrying about trends tow ards continentalism in E urope and in N orth A m erica. W hat m atters m ost is the m aintenance o f a spirit of partnership betw een the countries o f W estern E urope and the U nited States. C an ad a’s m em ber­ ship has alw ays been useful because it m ade the w hole thing less like a U nited States aid-to-E urope schem e and m ore like a m ultilateral com ­ m unity of nations on both sides o f the A tlantic. As things change, how ever, C anada m ight be m ore useful in a free float. T he question arises w hether the lesser pow ers ought to serve the general schem e by attaching them selves in firm alignm ent to one or other o f the pentarchs. Is the alternative that old and disgraceful condition called neutralism ? W hat in fact does neutralism m ean any m ore? If the W estern E uropeans seek to set up an independent basis of pow er from the U nited States, are they being n eutralists? Is the U nited States itself not going neutralist? W ho, incidentally, w ere the neutralists back in 1954 w hen the U nited States broke w ith its N A T O allies o v er Indochina and set off on its ow n co u rse? The problem about neutralism is that it has to be neutral o f alignm ents, and if alignm ents are not very clear, neither is neutralism . T he term m ight better be abolished from o u r international vocabulary. I do not think C anada can detach itself from its basic interest in the security and prosperity o f the U nited States, although a lot of articulate C anadians seem disposed to try. On the other hand C anada has im ­ portant com m on interests w ith the E uropeans and the Japanese. In a pragm atic w ay it is also forging o v er the pole a kind o f com m unity of frozen people with the Soviet U nion. A s the w orld o f m ilitary pow er becom es, for technological am ong o th er reasons, m ore and m ore a region for superpow ers only, a country like C anada finds itself by no choice of its ow n in a kind o f functional neutralism . Its troops are needed in E urope only as a vestigal token. It h a sn 't m uch o f a role in continental defence and although it has a vital interest in Pacific security there is really nothing m ilitary that it can do about this. W hat still rem ain valid are the basic C anadian and A m erican pledges m ade to each o th er in the 1930s: that the U nited States w ould not stand idly by if C anada w ere threatened from ov erseas, and on C a n ad a ’s part that it w ould never allow itself to be a base from w hich the U nited States could be threatened by another pow er. If w e rem ain aw are of and loyal to this fundam ental com m itm ent, then w e m ust e ac h .see k our national in­ terests and m ake our individual contributions to a better w orld order on

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a broad international scene. It stands to reason that the kinds o f things a sm aller pow er can do will be qualitatively as well as quantitatively d ifferent from those things w hich a superpow er does. U nited N ations peacekeeping w as the kind of useful, if m inor, thing that suited us well, and it rem ains about the only useful contribution of a m ilitary kind we can m ake to international security. T he problem is that w e a ren 't g etttin g m uch to do. But international security is less and less a p urely m ilitary m atter. N ow I w ould like to offer a schizophrenic perspective from the vantage o f a country w hich is a negligible m ilitary pow er but a m ajor econom ic pow er. T his is im portant because it is the lot of m any of the w allflow er states and at least one of the pentarchs, Japan. 1 suggest also that this schizophrenia about m ilitary and econom ic aspects o f security afflicts A m ericans and other superpow er people as w ell. In som e contexts, we look at a w orld dom inated by m ilitary considerations and at other tim es w e look at a w orld dom inated by econom ic considerations. T hey seem to be quite different w orlds. T he concept o f the pentarchy reflects the confusion. It seem s basically a calculation o f m ilitary factors, includ­ ing m ilitary pow er potential based on a large population o r industrial strength. It is the w orld, shall I say, o f M r. L aird. It certainly does not seem to be the w orld of the form er S ecretary o f the T reasu ry , Mr. C onnally. M y adm ittedly jaundiced view o f M r. C o n n a lly ’s view is that in it neither the Soviet U nion nor C hina is o f great consequence; the enem ies are E urope and Japan and there are no allies. A t least it is not q uite clear w hether C anada is an ally o r an enem y. C anada, it seem s to be assum ed, has cast itself in the role o f an enem y, as w ould a w ayw ard child unaw are o f w here its advantage lies. W hatever is said publicly, the m essage that com es through to C anadians is that if they w ere not consum ed by som e childish fantasy called petty nationalism they would realize that N orth A m ericans are all in this together and m ust join in d efending the continental fortress against the unscrupulous Japanese and E uropeans. (In this vocabulary note that nationalism is alw ays “ p etty nationalism ' ’; great-pow er nationalism , w hich nobly disregards the anachronistic idea of the nation-state in pursuing its terrestrial interests, turns up as “ intern atio n alism .” W ell, you c a n ’t accuse it of being “ petty intern atio n alism .” ) B esides, it is suggested som etim es m ore heavy handedly: W here else d o you think you can go? It is not only A m ericans w ho look out at tw o w orlds w hich seem irreconcilable. E uropeans, Japanese, C anadians, are equally confused. For m any o f us there is n o significant part to play in the w orld of security. O ur national survival depends on the w ay w e play our hand in the w orld o f econom ics. T his is a fact that m ay be as true of Japan as it is o f C anada— and of the E uropean Econom ic C om m unity as a com m uni­

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ty. In the case o f C anada there is a distinction to be m ade betw een the survival o f our persons and the survival of o u r country. C anada could cease to be a political fact and C anadians could carry on hew ing w ood and draw ing w ater at a bare living w age for the rich folk in C hicago and H ouston. It is by playing the econom ic gam e that we m aintain the ex istence o f ou r country with a reasonable standard o f living. O ur first priority, o f course, is that C anadians as people should not be blow n off the face o f the earth , but their protection d epends on the international security gam e w hich w e are not pow erful enough to play. T he econom ic w orld rather than the security w orld is the tangible w orld for us, but it does not necessarily follow that w e have lost sight o f the fact that global w ar is ever possible and we could be extinguished at any tim e. T here is a tem ptation to believe in detente because that allow s us to concentrate on econom ics. It is a different thing, ho w ev er, to recognize that overriding m ilitary threats exist but find no m eaningful role in coping w ith them . W e can m ake our m inor contributions as in U N peacekeeping and constructive co ntributions to international organization. O ur one alliance, N A T O , is now an instrum ent for the prom otion of detente. W e have a little part in it, but it is m ainly a m atter for the E uropeans. T here are no alliances in the Pacific o r elsew here for us to fit in to. If we are to play our constructive parts in m aintaining a w orld safe for peaceful change then w e have to do so largely in a non-m ilitary w ay. W hat we have to rem em ber, o f course, is that the m ilitary considerations are real, that the strength o f the A m erican m ilitary bargaining hand is im portant to us. T h ere are still areas for collaboration in g uarding this continent. W e are w isely recognizing that the old concept of an alliance in w hich policies as well as contributions w ere shared w as an illusion because a superpow er is bound to act unilaterally. B ut the alternative to the sense o f alliance w e had in the past m ust not be alienation. If we are cast in the role o f observers, w e can be sym pathetic and constructive. N ot being a superpow er is a luxury w hich can corrupt o r induce illusions o f superior virtue.

N o tes 'A ccording to a N ew Y ork Times despatch from M oscow reprinted in The Globe and M a il on 30 M ay 1972 “ a high Soviet econom ic planner,” Mikhail M isnik, suggested it was about time the United States and the u s s r moved beyond the stone age o f bartering a sheep for a camel “ into large-scale arrangements in which the United States w ould provide plant and equipment and w e would pay with raw materials and the end-products o f such plan ts." -The u n General Assem bly did finally in 1 9 7 4 after years o f effort reach agreement on a definition o f aggression, bui there remain doubts about agree­ ment when it com es to identifying the guilty.

3: Shadow and Substance: Diplomatic Relations between Britain and Canada

In S e p te m b e r 19 7 1 th e In stitute o f C om m onw ealth S tu d ies in London a n d the C anadian Institute o f In ternational A ffa irs, with essential help fro m the N u ffie ld F oundation, h e ld a conference a t C um berland L o d g e o f W indsor G reat Park a t which a group o f B ritish a n d C anadian parliam entarians, professors, journ a lists, civil servants, a n d one exP rim e M inister, L e ste r P earson, sou g h t to explore the vastly altered relationship betw een tw o A tla n tic countries o f m iddle class. The B ritish were pre o c cu p ied with their fo rth co m in g m arriage to Europe. The C anadians tu rn ed up in la rg er fo rc e , m ore in the m o o d fo r counterw eights. T his p aper, which was p re p a re d f o r the occasion, is due to be p u b lish e d in Britain and C anada: A S urvey o f a C hanging R elationship. It is rep ro d u ced h ere by p erm issio n o f the publisher, F rank C ass a n d C om pany, L ondon. (A ll rights reserved.)

W hen the historic relationship betw een countries shifts, the substance is often obscured by shadow s and foreshadow s. T his is the present case of B ritain and C anada. Several reasons m ight be suggested for this obscurity. B ritain and C anada are out o f phase historically. A lthough they are clearly bound together in the preservation o r evolution o f a com m on civ ilization, they seem to be m oving in opposite directions. T hey are d ivided by a paradox in the present phase o f w orld politics. A pow erful m ovem ent tow ards transnational integration has been w idely c o n ­ sidered, in the past tw o decades, to be the w ave o f the future and the hope o f m ankind. N ow , how ever, there is a reassertion o f nationalism and particularism w hich is not m erely reactionary but part o f the 147

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revulsion against the inhum anity o f technology, o f central authority and great-pow er dom ination. It is im possible to regard one m ovem ent as good and the o th er evil. W e m ust accom m odate ourselves to this planetary am bivalence. Britain and C anada are being driven by both com pulsions, but w hereas the B ritish have elected to m ove in the direction o f continental integration, C anadians are resisting it. Here w e m ay be dealing m ore w ith national attitudes than w ith the basic facts of integration on the tw o continents. P erceptions, how ever, m atter w hen one is concerned w ith a relationship betw een tw o countries w hich have really very few substantial grounds for estrangem ent. W hile B ritons are in a state o f enchantm ent and C anadians in a state o f disenchantm ent with continental regionalism as the econom ic and political answ er, their perspectives o f each o th er lack sym pathetic understanding. T he B ritish, having abandoned ex ­ pectations o f C anada based on C om m onw ealth loyalties, seem im ­ patient and bored w ith the p roblem s o f C anadian nationalism . C anadians are largely indifferent rather than hostile to the developm ent o f the E uropean E conom ic C om m unity. B eing anxious, how ever, to preserve as m uch independent action as possible in a w orld of superstates and blocs, they are uncom fortable about the em ergence of a W est E uropean superstate w hich m ight sw allow up not only an old friend and trading partner like B ritain but also lesser pow ers on the continent w hich have been o f late even closer diplom atic associates than B ritain. B ritain can, of course, hope to m aintain m uch m ore o f its sovereignty and identity in a E uropean com m unity o f states than C anada could hope for in a very unequal integration with a superpow er. T he challenges w hich face the tw o peoples are analogous but dissim i­ lar. For the m om ent, how ev er, there are differences in perspective w hich put their short and long range thinking out o f phase. A n historian m ight note that the old im perial relationship betw een B ritain and C anada had alw ays kept them out o f phase, m oving in different d irections, one tow ards im perial solidarity and one tow ards independence. H ow ever, that struggle, if one could call it that, was m ore a civil debate in both countries than a confrontation of states and there w as a com plem entarity in the process w hich held them locked in step. Paradoxically, the fact that these contem porary debates over intregration are being w aged in different spheres prevents the friction of contact. It m ight, if the tw o peoples could change spectacles and see it that w ay, give them som ething to think about in com m on. A nother factor w hich w orks against sym pathy is that the tw o countries seem to be m oving in opposite directions in the hierarchy of pow er. T he B ritish have accepted w ith reasonable equanim ity their relegation to a low er bracket. C anadians are confused about their ow n m ovem ent. T hey are inclined now to see in their recent past an

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exaggerated position of international influence in the w ake o f W orld W ar ii, follow ed by a decline. W hat they cannot escape, how ever, is the consequence o f being a country rising rapidly in econom ic pow er in a w orld m ore and m ore preoccupied w ith econom ics. R egardless of the term s o f the B alfour D eclaration, it is difficult for B ritons and C anadians to regard each other as anything like equal pow ers on the w orld scene. T heir international influence is still disproportionate even though their g n p ’ s are draw ing level. In the w orld o f diplom acy B ritain, for reasons of tradition and experience, has a m uch m ore effective voice than C anada. B ritain is engaged in a ploy to regain w orld status through the E uropean C om m unity. C anada know s it cannot have m uch influence unless it acts in collaboration w ith others. It seeks, as the recent C anadian w hite pap er on foreign policy indicates, to strengthen its ties w ith o th er continents. C anada is likely to be m ore energetic and m ore unilateral than B ritain in cu ltivating its relations w ith the developing countries and w ith C hina, the Soviet U nion, and E astern E urope. T he present intention is not to see this as a m ove aw ay from W estern E urope, but if C anada feels shut out from the E E C , it will take on that character. T he consequences o f pow er are predictable, and B ritons m ay gloat a little w hen C anadians suffer them . T he richer C anada becom es in trade and resources, the m ore difficult it will be to m aintain its reputation as an international “ good g u y .” T he protection o f national econom ic interests is for the C anadian electorate a m ore serious business than diplom atic m ediation, and C anadian diplom acy m ay be less highm inded— thereby perhaps rem oving one o f the B ritish com plaints against C anada. B eing neo-im perialist pow ers to gether could be a new bond. A third factor w hich obscures the substance o f the relationship is the tendency to concentrate on relative statistics. T he fact that C anada and B ritain are relatively less im portant to each other than they once w ere is incontestable. No one is allow ed to forget that w hereas in 1939 Britain took 34 per cent o f C a n ad a ’s exports it now takes nine per cent. W hat is rarely noted is that C anadian ex p o rts to the U nited K ingdom in 1939 am ounted to $328 m illion w hereas in 1970 they am ount to one and a half billion dollars. C a n ad a ’s population has dou b led in that p erio d , but its exports to B ritain have increased five tim es. C anadian im ports from B ritain declined from fifteen per cent o f the C anadian total in 1939 to five per cent in 1970, but the value m ultiplied over six tim es from $114 to nearly $800 m illion. T he percentage shifts are obviously worth noting but not to the point that they hide the substance o f the present trading relationship. T h e U nited States is obviously m uch m ore im ­ portant to C anada econom ically and in all other w ays than is B ritain, and E urope is sim ilarly m ore im portant to Britain than is C anada. No

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country survives, how ever, by lim iting its associations to the one pow er w ith w hich it does the m ost business. B ritons and C anadians seem hypnotized by the percentage figures into a b elief that the rela­ tionship is dw indling and there is no future in it. T he B ritish-C anadian diplom atic relationship over the past gen era­ tion is hard to disentangle from the m ultilateral associations to w hich both belong. T here is no tim e here to exam ine the w hole scene, but a few selected observations m ight be in order because to d ay ’s d isaffec­ tion seem s m ore rooted in the past than in any clash of present interests. Up to 1939 there w as, in spite o f the C anadian insistence on a foreign policy m ade in C anada, a sufficient acceptance o f diplom atic unity so that C anadians recognized a com m on interest in going to w ar together. T h is unity, incidentally, has been obscured by the nationalist m ytholo­ gy to the effect that C anada had to go to w ar although it had had nothing to do w ith the E uropean diplom acy that led to it. T his com fortable assum ption should have been shattered by the publication in recent years o f com m unications from M ackenzie K ing to N eville C ham berlain giving fervent support to B ritish diplom acy in the im ­ m ediate prew ar years. M r. K in g ’s prejudice against a united C om ­ m onw ealth foreign policy w as not so strong as his b elief in appeasem ent, and it w as he w ho bullied the Im perial C onference of 1937 tow ards a united front on this subject. T he w ar revived the spirit of com radeship, but it never led to the recreation o f C om m onw ealth institutions such as the Im perial W ar C abinet o f 1917. E fforts by the A ustralians and som e at least o f the B ritish C onservatives to revive the concept of a single voice w ere frustrated by C anadian and South A frican opposition. T his left a lingering resentm ent in B ritain because there w as hope that a united C om m onw ealth w ould bolster the United K ingdom ’s status as a great pow er. T he C anadian view w as that such a unified C om m onw ealth w ould be dangerously brittle, that Britain w ould have been the pow er to suffer m ost from the restraint. Further justification o f the C anadian view seem ed to com e later w hen India and Pakistan brought new im portance to the association. T he historic issue o f a voice for the dom inions, in any case, lost its m eaning w ith the em ergence o f the U nited States and the Soviet U nion on the w orld scene and th e im position o f great-pow er hegem ony on the p ostw ar arrangem ents and on the U nited N ations. C anada had m uch less voice in the peace provisions o f 1945-6 than it had had in 1919. It did, how ever, develop a new appetite for influence in w orld councils and found this in the U nited N ations, in the enlarged C om m onw ealth, and later in N A T O . T he old them es recurred in C anadian foreign policy— unity and independence, the relation betw een consultation and contribution— but in the new context of the W estern alliance, the great pow ers in general, and m ore specifically the U nited S tates, w ere now

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the offenders. B ritain had learned a lot from the C om m onw ealth experience and w as m ore conscious o f the rights o f lesser pow ers— or of their capacity to be tiresom e, a favoured w ord in the Foreign O ffice. T he old im perial relation, it w ould seem , had ceased to be a source of friction betw een B ritain and C anada. It is an association w hich has held the tw o countries in closer diplom atic association than w ould otherw ise have been the case. A ssociation, how ever, can breed friction as well as collaboration. T he C om m onw ealth has ceased to be a decisive factor in the d i­ plom acy o f B ritain as w ell as C anada, and the fact that it is of secondary im portance has obscured the fact that it is nevertheless valuable. A gain the shadow o f relativity obscures the substance. B ecause they are out of phase, B ritons and C anadians tend to see the m erits and the dem erits of the C om m onw ealth differently. T he transform ation o f the em pire into the C om m onw ealth w as a g reat achievem ent w hich gave Britain prestige and influence during a period w hen its m ilitary po w er w as declining. T his respect for B ritain, how ever, w as largely tacit on the part o f the T hird W orld, and it is not surprising that for the British people the critical reactions o f the new m em ber states w ere m ore apparent. T h e C om m onw ealth offered a form ula w hich enabled Britain to disengage from its im perial com m itm ents less painfully than other im perial pow ers. B loodshed w hich has been prevented, how ever, is never as vivid as present trouble. It w as a difficult and trying period and British em bitterm ent w ith the C om m onw ealth is understandable if regrettable. For C anada, on the other hand, there were advantages in the asso cia­ tion and few disadvantages. Its econom ic assistance to new m em bers was voluntary, w hereas Britain w as saddled w ith what w as regarded as a post-im perial obligation. Successive C anadian governm ents did try to be helpful in intra-C om m onw ealth disputes. T he C anadian reputation as a m ediator enhanced C a n ad a ’s position am ong the new nations o f the C om m onw ealth, but the C anadian stance o f im partiality som etim es looked to the B ritish like betrayal o r the calculated currying o f favour for C anadian nationalist reasons. C anadians at the U nited N ations and in C om m onw ealth m eetings felt that they w ere doing their best to m itigate attacks on the form er im perial pow er and to create a C om ­ m onw ealth w hich w ould be a helpful institution not only for the new m em bers but for B ritain as w ell. C anadians them selves had ex ­ perienced the disadvantages as well as the advantages o f colonialism . T heir attitude w as pragm atic and their “ anti-colonialism ” m uted. T hey saw them selves as historically aligned not against Britain but with the liberal forces in B ritain w ho had alw ays been their allies against the E m pire chaps. T he view that C anada has been less than helpful to Britain in its relations w ith the E m pire is stronger on the

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R ight than on the Left o f the B ritish political spectrum . T he fact that C anada has had no g reat sacrifices to o ffer and has been on the sidelines o f intra-C om m onw ealth disputes is the result o f geographical and historical facts o f life. T his incapacity for sacrifice m ade the C anadian position seem pious to m any B ritons but it w as not a respectable argum ent for C anada to sit back and watch the fighting. T he strength of the C anadian position on R hodesia, for exam ple, w as underm ined by the fact that w hereas B ritain suffered real dam age from sanctions, the C anadian stake w as m inor and the C anadian tobacco industry profited. M em bership in the C om m onw ealth and the U nited N ations, how ever, o bliged C anada to take a position. W here C anada could m ake “ sac­ rific es” w as in econom ic aid and assistance. B ecause o f the C om ­ m onw ealth, it gave m uch m ore aid to the C olom bo Plan, to C om ­ m onw ealth A frica and the C aribbean than it otherw ise w ould have done. It w as less than m ight have been expected from a rich country and adm ittedly not on a scale w ith w hat Britain lost in R hodesia. Incom ­ patibilities o f this kind require an effort at m utual understanding and good will w hich needs fostering. D uring the ’fifties B ritain and C anada w orked closely together in w orld diplom acy. T he episode o f Suez distorted this picture, but Suez w as an aberration. O n the A sian questions w hich w ere o f m ajor im ­ portance in the decad e o r so after the w ar C anadian and B ritish view s and policies w ere in harm ony. C a n a d a 's policies in Indochina, in which it w as involved by m em bership in the control com m issions, w ere much clo ser to those o f B ritain than the U nited States. Both countries took a m ore relaxed view o f A sian com m unism than did the A m ericans. In the M iddle E ast, how ever, B ritish attitudes seem ed as possessive as the A m ericans about C hina. W hereas to C anadians A m erican attitudes to A sia seem ed ex cessively rigid, B ritish positions in the M iddle East seem ed unrealistic. In the eyes o f those C anadians who w ere charged w ith governm ent responsibility at that tim e, and in the eyes o f m any articulate B ritish editors and political leaders, C anada contributed to saving B ritain from a disaster. T he episode is best forgotten, but as it has been regarded as the high point o f C anadian diplom acy, this is not easily accom plished. S uez m ay have m arked the turning-point in an easy and close association in international diplom acy w hich had roots in a com m on foreign policy and a com m on foreign service. W hat is required after fifteen years is a fresh recognition o f com m on interest based on factors m ore relevant than m aternity. For both countries during this period N A T O w as m ore im portant than the C om m onw ealth although the causes o f discord in the ’sixties were m ore often o f C om m onw ealth origin. C a n ad a ’s part in N A T O was relatively less and differences w ith B ritain, w hen they occurred, were rarely bilateral. In the early days o f N A T O there were few serious

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divisions betw een B ritish and C anadian policies, although C anada found a natural alliance w ith the other sm aller m em bers. O ne thing the tw o countries had in com m on w as that they w ere the closest allies of the U nited States. T h is w as a relationship w hich at the end o f the w ar looked as if it m ight develop triangularly. T he C anadian experience of the triangle in atom ic policy at the end o f the w ar w as so troublesom e that it is just as well for all three parties that the triangle w as absorbed into N A T O . C anada has consorted ad hoc w ith one o r the o th er on o ccasions to put joint pressure on the third in the norm al gam e of d iplom acy. T he idea of C anada as a linchpin survives only as rhetoric. T he C anadian instinct to keep the A tlantic narrow will no doubt be revived if the U nited States and the EEC drift dangerously apart, but it will be the E u ropean-A m erican, rather than the A nglo-A m erican, alliance w hich w ill be at stake. D ifferences w hich developed in the ’sixties betw een L ondon and O ttaw a in the n a t o context ought not to be exaggerated. T here were som e deviations in approach. S om etim es these w ere seasonal, ad hoc d ifferences on tactics, dependent to som e extent on the com patibility o f the respective governm ents. T he m ost noticeable dispute cam e w hen B ritain, in the fury o f its anti-G aulIism , took a hard line against France in N A T O at the tim e o f F ran ce’s dissociation from the m ilitary aspect. C anada, in the year before de G aulle cam e to M ontreal, tried de sp e ra te ­ ly to heal a breach w hich, it w as feared, could have unhappy dom estic consequences— and got no thanks in Paris o r L ondon. A sharp argum ent em erged in 1969 w hen C anada decided to reduce its forces in E urope. T he C anadian action w as so insensitively criticized by the B ritish M inister o f D efence that he strengthened the consensus in C anada for w ithdraw al. W hen the C onservatives returned to po w er at W estm inster there seem ed to be som e variation in interpretations by W estm inster and O ttaw a o f the strategic threat. C anadians have usually been less haw kish than their m ajor allies. B ritons and other E uropeans tend to attribute this “ irresponsibility” to rem oteness from the threat. C anadians increasingly question this persistent Eurocentrism and argue that in present strategic term s C anada is as close and as vulnerable a neighbour o f the Soviet U nion as is the U nited K ingdom . A ssum ptions in L ondon o r B russels— or W ashington— that C anadians are naive about com m unism are p articularly exasperating. T he persistence o f the tw o-pillar concept o f N A T O , w hich posits a E uropean entity and a N orth A m erican entity, has been distasteful to C anadians. T he disposition of Britain to favour a “ E uropean v o ice ” to defend the E uropean interest in N A T O , w hatever that m ight be, serves to isolate C anada. E uropeans cannot be dissuaded from creating a E uropean caucus because it m akes the C anadians unhappy; it w ould help if they just show ed better understanding o f the consequences for C anada— and the C anadian

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d istaste o f being subsum ed in a po litical unit called N orth A m erica. T o a considerable extent the existence o f N A T O has dissolved the bilateral relationship betw een B ritain and C anada insofar as it w as not already dissolved in the m ultilateral C om m onw ealth association. T here is no argum ent for a special B ritish-C anadian association in N A T O except for the argum ent that all m ultilateral relationships have to be reinforced by bilateral un derstanding. T his is an obvious truth w hich both B ritons and C anadians seem perversely disposed to apply to countries w ith which they have not had an intim ate historic association, not because a historic association is deem ed to be sufficient but because it is ipso fa c to som ething to be cast off. T he m ost likely effects of B ritish entry into the E E C on the diplom atic relationship are difficult to predict. D uring the period w hen the British have been forcing them selves to look East rather than W est C anada has not interested them m uch. N ow that a decision has been taken, the B ritish m ay take a m ore secure look at the rest o f the w orld. A C anadian fear is that W est E uropeans w ill be so preoccupied w ith the nuts and bolts of an exceedingly difficult and delicate operation that none of them will have m uch tim e to look abroad. N either C anadians nor A m ericans could object to such a developm ent because the preoccupa­ tion o f A m ericans w ith serious internal questions and of C anadians w ith internal and continental issues has turned their m inds inw ards a ls o .1 A com m on assum ption in B ritain that C anada is w ithdraw ing from E urope into its N orth A m erican destiny is m isleading. The C anadian half-w ithdraw al from E urope is intended to strengthen its continental posture vis-a-vis its pow erful neighbour. T he idea of C anada and the U nited States as partners in defending th eir continent still holds, but it is m ore w idely challenged than at any tim e since the last war. T he official C anadian attitude on B ritish entry into the C om m on M arket has, in recent years at least, been determ inedly correct. Som e influential C anadians share the view that this trium ph o v er old fashioned nationalism in E urope is a good thing in itself, but am ong those w ith an eye to C a n a d a 's ow n interests, there is no great enthusiasm . T h ere is little reason why there should be. C anadian calculations are that there m ight be econom ic gains and econom ic losses, but their chief w orry is the creation o f another large pow er centre. T his failure to share the m essianic view o f E uropean unity as a great contribution to internationalism m ay pain B ritons, particularly those determ ined that the new E urope will be “ o u tw a rd " rather than “ in w ard ” looking. T he problem , as those w ho have been involved in federations know , is that w hether the participants intend it or not, unifications oblige those being unified to look inw ard a good deal of the tim e. W hat is m ore, unification in the nature o f things has to be against

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non-m em bers. U nions look different to those included and those excluded. C anada d o e sn ’t feel excluded in the sense that it w ants to be a m em ber, but m any o f its best friends are banding together and erecting barriers. E m phasis on the sharing o f a com m on E uropean civilization and the need to protect the unique interests o f E urope sound highm inded and internationalist to E uropeans. T hey d o n ’t sound q uite the sam e to the barbarians. A m ovem ent which in the eyes of its E uropean exponents and A m erican prophets is a trium ph o v er bad old nationalism looks at tim es to o utsiders m ore like the assertion o f an even m ore fearful continental nationalism . W hen this assertion o f the uniqueness o f E urope is com bined w ith a co ntinuing assum ption o f the C anadian and A m erican obligation to defend E urope, there is ground for aliena­ tion. Fear and suspicion and lack o f im agination on both sides are the problem s, not an inevitable conflict o f m ajor interests. W hat are the issues m ost likely to cause conflict betw een B ritain and C anada— apart from the econom ic questions w hich are not the specific subject of this essay? T hese seem likely to be C om m onw ealth issues. A British “ settlem ent” w ith R hodesia w hich is rejected by the non-w hite m em bers o f the C om m onw ealth places C anada in a difficult position. T he B ritish governm ent, it can be assum ed, although not necessarily the w hole B ritish population, w ould bitterly resent C an ad a’s lining up w ith the A fricans o r even w ithholding full support for the B ritish proposal. C anadians m ight well w ithhold support in the hope that this w as the only w ay to save the C om m onw ealth o r m itigate international tensions, although no serious illusions are harboured in O ttaw a about the capacity o f the C om m o nw ealth to survive B ritish d efection or rejection. T he question o f arm s to South A frica could produce a sim ilar crisis again. M any B ritish regard C anada as a high-m inded m eddler in these m atters w ith no interest at stake. C anada do es have a stake o f its ow n, though it m ay be less substantial, and B ritons m ight try to understand it. C anadians believe they have as big a stake as anyone in the m aintenance o f com m unications and peace am ong the races and continents. Just b ecause there is no specifically C anadian security interest in the Indian O cean o r a crucial econom ic interest in southern A frica, it does not follow that this aspect o f C anadian diplom acy should have a low priority. C anada, as m uch as older countries, has a national interest in m aintaining as strong an international position as it can acquire. Its reputation as a fair-m inded w hite country is w orth preserv ­ ing not only b ecause C anada is no loner in w orld politics and needs friends but also b ecause it has, in fact, been ab le to play som e part in relieving international tensions. It is true that som e C anadians have displayed such a m ediatory m egalom ania in recent years that the n a tio n ’s credibility has been affected, but these C anadian pretensions are tem pered by a scepticism at hom e about the role of “ helpful fix e r,”

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expressed even in the recent official w hite paper on foreign p olicy. T he im age of C anada as m iddlem an rem ains so strong abroad that the C anadian Prim e M inister could not avoid trying to play this part before and during the recent Singapore conference. It w ould be a real sacrifice for C anadians to give up this im age, and it is im portant for L ondon to realize that it is dealing here w ith som ething m ore substantial than a C anadian w him . O n the other hand it should be said that C anadian view s on such qu estions, along w ith the view s o f other W estern countries, have becom e m ore pragm atic. Sym pathy for A fricans rem ains strong, but the w ay seem s m ore com plex. In C anada, as in the U nited States and E urope, there is a turning aw ay from other p e o p le ’s problem s, partly selfish but partly a feeling that there is a lim it to the extent to w hich o utsiders can help countries to develop them selves. In such a clim ate the view s o f L ondon and O ttaw a m ight differ less than in the past. O ne is tem pted to conclude that if the C om m onw ealth w ere to go out of e x istence an im portant obstacle to good relations betw een B ritain and C anada w ould be rem oved. If the C om m onw ealth did not exist at the m om ent, it w ould clearly not be invented. T here is, how ever, a difference betw een the gradual m erging o f the C om m onw ealth into a broader international system , thereby phasing out an honourable c h ap ­ ter o f history and the break-up in w rath that is m ore likely over the A frican issues. T he latter w ould leave som e bitterness everyw here and an intensification of the shadow w hich clouds B ritish-C anadian relations. It m ay be doubted w hether the B ritish and C anadian peoples think m uch about the question w hen they think o f each other. G ov­ ernm ents do, how ever, and so do the m edia. E uropean issues co u ld , but need not, be a cause o f dispute. M uch depends on w hether Britain w ill, as prom ised, be a m oderating in­ fluence o r be transform ed into an over-zealous convert to E uropean nationalism . M uch depends also on the extent to w hich C anada will interest itself in E u ro p e, w hether its preoccupation with its national and continental d ilem m as turns C anadian attention inw ard o r revives the interest in E urope as a counterforce. T he question of C anadian troops in E urope has been settled for the tim e being. T here is no present d isp o si­ tion in C anada to w ithdraw from N A T O . T he transfer o f the rest o f the C anadian troops in a few years to w hat O ttaw a insists is the C anadian theatre o f N A T O should suprise no one. C anada agreed, som ew hat heedlessly, to take part in the proposed E uropean security conference but if this should lead to continuing arrangem ents for E uropean security C anada is likely to avoid further com m itm ents. T he C anadian view has alw ays been that N A T O itself, and particularly the stationing of C anadian troops in E urope, is an interim m easure. If C anadian forces w ere w ithdraw n from the E uropean theatre regardless o f possible

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negotiations on m utual and balanced force reductions, there w ould undoubtedly be a renew al o f irritation in Britain but no m ore so than in other N A T O countries. T he gradual phasing out o f the C anadian m ilitary presence in E urope, how ever, seem s unlikely to disturb very seriously the relations betw een the tw o countries. It is noticed only in chanceries. A s far as C anadian relations w ith B ritain and w ith E urope in general are concerned, com m erce and cu ltu re are o f greater interest. T he C anadian governm ent is berated at hom e for neglecting to cultivate the E E C o r for taking a fatalistic view o f its consequences. G iven the strong C anadian desire to strengthen its extracontinental econom ic and cu ltu r­ al associations to relieve the pressures of N orth A m erica, Britain w ithin the E uropean context m ay becom e the object o f C anadian diplom atic and econom ic offensives. T he U nited States econom ic offensive of A ugust 1971 revealed d ram atically to C anadians how dependent they had becom e on one country. It quickened a new zeal to strengthen trans-A tlantic ties, m oderated by a sober realization that E urope and Japan could not replace the g iant neighbour. R elations w ith France are not likely in present circum stances to be a serious cause of trouble betw een L ondon and O ttaw a. T hey m atter less now to C anadians than they did a few years ago. T hat is not because Q uebec separatism is d eclining but because the present breed of separatists is strongly quebecois and takes a cynical view o f France. M ost im portant o f all, how ever, has been the shift o f French g o v ­ ernm ent policy tow ards b etter relations w ith O ttaw a. T he fact that B ritain and France are now joined in their ow n political-econom ic association m ay not have m uch effect on the relations am ong anglophone and francophone C anadians, but it is at least a better situation than one in w hich B ritain and France w ere in a state o f hostility. It is w orth noting in this connection the agreem ent recently signed betw een Britain and C anada for British forces training in C anada. W hat is interesting about the agreem ent is that it attracted so little notice. A new agreem ent for A m erican troops to train in C anada w ould be a m atter for excited debate. At one tim e C anadian nationalists w ould have taken a dim view o f such provisions for the B ritish. O nly a few survivors o f prew ar C anadian nationalism still fear the red co ats. The fact that the lively C anadian nationalism o f the day is directed to resistance against the U nited States has affected the view o f B ritain. T here has been considerable discussion recently— m ore discussion than action— about the surfeit o f A m erican academ ics in C anadian universities. T here w as a tim e w hen this criticism w as directed against B ritish professors w ho had com e out to elevate the colonials. Now B ritish professors are regarded as a w elcom e leaven. (In this m ore favourable C anadian im age o f the B ritish im m igrant the decline of

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so uthern E nglish has certainly h e lp e d .) T here is not m uch satisfaction in noting that one neurosis m ay have killed another, but the m ore rational view o f B ritain m ight as well be exploited for its ow n sake. If the B ritish and C anadians have so m uch in com m on and if their d ifferences are not o f great substance, is there a need for new m echanism s o f c o nsultation ? T he issue of c onsultation, w hich pre­ occupied C anadian thinking about foreign policy for such a long tim e, has suffered a change. T he old dilem m a as to w hether C anada should be com m itted to B ritish w ars o r other foreign policies w ithout adequate consultation has o f late been applied to the N orth A m erican ‘‘partnership. ’ ’ N ow that only a paranoiac C anadian could im agine that B ritain w ould ‘ ‘c o m m it’ ’ C an ad a, an old shadow has vanished from the q uestion o f A nglo-C anadian consultation. C ertain illusions about c o n ­ sultation in general have in the m eantim e been rem oved by S uez, the C uban m issile crisis, and the m any decisions taken unilaterally in W ashington about defence and foreign policy w hich inevitably affect C anada. In a n uclear w orld, the leaders o f m ajor pow ers m ay not even consult their ow n foreign offices. T hus it is unw ise to expect them to consult their friends o r allies. T his is a fact lesser pow ers m ust live w ith. T he need is all the g re ater, how ever, for regular sharing of intelligence and opinion am ong partners w ho are likely to w ant to act together in a crisis. A m ong the professionals this has alw ays been a habit. T he C anadian D epartm ent o f E xternal A ffairs grew up in close association w ith the C om m onw ealth R elations O ffice and the Foreign O ffice. Patterns o f sharing involved constant com m union not m erely in O ttaw a and L ondon but also in o th er capitals w here the tw o were represented. In the past decade the intim acy of the earlier days has been diluted, but the cause is to be found in personalities and attitudes rather than in the absence o f opportunities for consultation. T he m erging of the tw o services in Britain m eans there will now be w ithin the foreign service m ore senior officers conscious o f and interested in C anada. (W hether they like the country o r not is less im portant. A m ericans m ay desire to be loved. C anadians d o n ’t particularly care w hether they are loved o r not; they w ant to be noted. It is the tendency o f B ritish as well as A m erican officials to forget about C anada that is the m ajor cause of irritatio n .) It w ould be fatuous to suggest the setting up o f special com m ittees o r practices to increase consultation. W hat is needed is just for the tw o cou n tries to take each o th er m ore seriously. T he reasons for taking Britain seriously as a m ajor pow er o f second class are fairly obvious. B ritons m ay and do ask w hy, in present circum stances, they should take C anada seriously. T he answ er could be blunt: at least as seriously as you take any other country w ith a G N P o f 9 5 billion dollars. B lood and tears are better not m entioned. O n the political level, how ever, the need for candid consultation is

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greater. D iplom atic issues are, o f course, less im portant than econom ic, but questions like R hodesia do require frank and bilateral discussion. It is interesting to note that C anada has joint m inisterial com m ittees with the U nited States, Japan, and M exico w hich continue to m eet and are regarded as useful. A joint m inisterial com m ittee with the U nited K ingdom w as set up in 1967, m et once, and has not been revived. W hether this failure represents a lack o f interest on both sides o r the inappropriateness o f the body is a question to exam ine. It m ay be that there is so m uch traffic o f m inisters and officials betw een the two countries, so m any functional m eetings, professional and o th er kinds of personal exchanges, that such a body is unnecessary. O n the other hand, the sam e could be said o f the relations betw een C anada and the U nited States. A reason the jo in t m inisterial com m ittee is needed with the U nited States m ay be the difference betw een the C anadian and A m erican structures o f governm ent and the extrem e difficulty for any foreigner o f penetrating the U nited States policy process. B ecause the B ritish and C anadian system s are sim ilar, and perhaps because there has been a long tradition o f not regarding each other as foreign, penetration is easier. T he traffic in m inisters and officials is o n e -sid ed .: W hereas C anadians still tend to think o f L ondon as the first base for a E uropean operation, B ritish m inisters, prim e and secondary, m aintain the irritating habit o f touching dow n in O ttaw a e n route to and from W ashington. T hey m ight, like M r. K osygin, som etim es consider C anada an end in itself— or com bine the trip, as he did, with a visit to C uba. It is B ritish and C anadian perspectives on international diplom acy w hich seem to have drifted apart in the past decade. B ecause their relationship has for m ost o f this century been encased in m ultilateral relationships like the C om m onw ealth and N A T O , a s well as the League and the U nited N ations, it is difficult for the tw o countries to see them selves as partners. T he shadow o f the past m akes it difficult for them to accept each o th er as com parable players on the w orld scene. B ritish resentm ent o f an upstart is no m ore serious a factor than a persistent C anadian preference for the postures and the m aladies of adolescence: an infatuation w ith innocence and a preference for leaving serious decisions to others. Som e voices to the contrary notw ithstand­ ing, C anada is really a very reluctant pow er. N either side seem s disposed to bother m uch about a relationship betw een tw o adjacent N orth A tlantic pow ers w hich m ight have seem ed m ore obviously com plem entary if it had never been fam ilial. C anadians find the British disinterested. A com plaint from B ritain is that C anada has not looked at the w ider perspective o f its relations w ith Britain o r considered what im portance should be attached to the relationship as a w hole w hen the integration o f E urope m ay lock C anada m ore tightly into a N orth

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A m erican system and its need for friends inside the E uropean system w ill becom e m ore urgent. C anadians, it is com plained, have c o n ­ centrated on specific issues w ithout any guiding principle about B rita in 's role in their international system . Som e philosophy on both sides w ould help. T he range of co m m o n interests is perhaps too obvious to be apparent. It includes everything basic like the preservation of our kind of c iv iliz a ­ tion, the m aintenance o f an international society free for com m erce and ideas, and the struggle against international anarchy. T hings seem ed sim pler w hen one spoke also o f a com m on interest in the “ struggle against c o m m u n ism ,’’ but it is no less im portant now that one speaks of “ negotiation w ith the com m unist sta te s.” N either B ritain nor C anada could conceivably threaten the other, and each has a strong interest in the o th e r’s freedom . T here are, o f course, clashes o f econom ic interest but not the endem ic contradictions w hich C anada faces w ith the U nited States o r Japan. B etw een an enlarged E E C and C anada there will be econom ic friction and com petition, but C anada m ay find Britain a m eans o f com m erce and com m unication into the new organization. As for diplom atic and security cleavages, these w ould prove to be m ore shadow than substance if there w ere less generalized talk about the interests o f E urope and the interests o f N orth A m erica. B ritons and C anadians m ight, as a pilot project in consultation, sit dow n to determ ine w hat is a E uropean interest and w hat is a N orth A m erican interest and h o w , if at all, they diverge as continents. It is not to argue against the continuation o f the B ritish-C anadian co m m unity w ithin the C om m onw ealth and NATO to suggest that the two governm ents exam ine m ore o ften how they m ight w ork together. T o start w ith they need to throw out the sepia prints and take new p hoto­ g raphs o f each other.

Notes ■Whether the rest of the world will allow any of us the luxury of withdrawal is a question. :During the twelve months preceding this colloquium there were twelve visits to London by Canadian federal cabinet ministers, sixteen by provincial premiers and cabinet ministers, fifty-six by m p s and senators, and nearly two hundred by senior federal officials for bilateral purposes.

4: Canada and the Pacific

W e have a habit o f conducting en d less fo re ig n p o lic y debates a bout g e ographical abstractions w hich confuse the issue. This is p a rticu la rly notable in o u r ta lk a b o u t that o th er ' ‘counterw eight, ’ ’ L a tin A m erica . T hat C anada sh o u ld have a p o lic y applicable to B ra zil, C uba, a n d M e xico a cross th e boa rd seem s a den ia l o f o u r w holesom e p rin c ip le o f functionalism . T hat C anada h a s so m e sp e c ia l lin k with B olivia because o f the w ay o ld g e ographers laid out the hem ispheres is a notion that has p ro v o k e d m uch sterile arguing o v e r o u r p o sitio n vis-a-vis the O rganization o f A m e ric a n States. A sim ilarly confusing term o f m ore recen t vintage is th e P acific R im . ” C anada, it is said, m ust have a strong p o lic y fo r th e countries o f this rim, fo r reasons o f com m erce and counterw eight. T hat o u r agonizingly co nceived p o lic y tow a rd s C hina m ight have been a p p lied to that oth er P acific p o w e r, C hile, is p e rh a p s a reductio ad absurdum . W hat is really m eant b y a ll this talk abo ut a P acific counterw eight is, o f course, n o t the ocean b u t the co n tin en t o f A sia . A u stra lia a n d N e w Z e a la n d a re som etim es brought in to show that we do not a c know ledge racial differentiation, b u t th ey a re certain­ ly sui generis. W hen the ed ito r o f Pacific A ffairs a sk e d fo r an article with this title, I knew w hat h e m eant. H ow ever, a b o u t th e sa m e tim e the ed ito r o f a Japanese quarterly a sk e d fo r an a rticle on “C anada a n d P acific Security. ’ ’ W hat, he asked, was C anada p re p a re d to do fo r P acific security, a s it h a d d one fo r A tla n tic se c u rity ? W e were, he rem inded m e, a P acific a s w ell a s an A tla n tic pow er. The question was log ica l in th at p re c ise Japanese way. Trying to explain w hy there is p ra c tic a lly noth in g we co u ld do a b o u t ' 'P acific security ’ ’ was a valua­ ble exercise, nevertheless. The fo llo w in g article is the m ore general su rve y w hich a p peared in Pacific A ffairs, volum e x l i v , spring 1971. T he o th er a p peared in Pacific C om m unity, Tokyo, volum e ill, July 1972.

C anada w as discovered by m istake. French and B ritish explorers w ho ventured up the S t. L aw rence or across the top o f C anada were looking 161

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for A sia; the sym bol o f their disappointm ent is the M ontreal suburb still called, after three hundred years, L achine. A lthough the venturers from E urope to C anada had to settle for the considerable resources available on this vast land obstacle on the w ay to C athay, the rom antic vision w estw ard to the East persisted. C anada, like the U nited States, thrusts to the Pacific and w hen dom inion w as achieved from sea to sea by com pletion o f the C anadian Pacific R ailw ay in the 1880s, there w as a revival in com m ercial and political quarters o f the “ gatew ay to A sia’’ m ystique. W hen the second transcontinental railw ay w as com pleted several decades later, the term inus w as in the outpost tow n o f Prince R upert because this w as 4 0 0 m iles closer than V ancouver to Japan. In the early years o f this century the C anadian governm ent w as seized w ith “ the m yth o f the Japanese m a rk e t" based on a conviction that once the Japanese experienced the high quality of C anadian w heat, they w ould forsake rice. S ir W ilfrid L aurier, the Prim e M inister, declared to a cheering throng in T oronto: “ Up to the present m om ent we have m arkets, chiefly in E urope, but th e tim e has com e w hen we m ust seek m arkets in the O rient, in Japan and C hina . . . W e are in a position to profit m ore from this m arket than any other portion o f the civilized g lo b e .” 1 T he Japanese did not give up rice, but the vision o f A sia as a vast m arket for C anadian w heat and other produce w as never q uite lost. It w as never realized in very exciting term s either, but in recent years both Japan and C hina have been buying C anadian grain in am ounts sufficient to revive the vision. T here are close parallels betw een Sir W ilfrid ’s prospectus and that inspired by M r. T rudeau in the recently issued w hite pap er on foreign p o lic y .2 The em phasis now being placed in O ttaw a on cultivation o f Pacific relations w as dram atized by the Prim e M in ister’s gesture in m aking his first extended official voyage not on a E uropean tour but in an arc from N ew Z ealand through M alaysia to Japan, signalling thereby both governm ent intentions and his ow n predilections. T o see in these g u id e lin e s , com ing at the sam e tim e as the establishm ent o f C a n ad a ’s d iplom atic relations w ith Peking, a radical shift in C anadian foreign policy o r a new approach to A sia w ould be at least prem ature. It is, as suggested above, not the first tim e C anadians have turned in that direction. H ow ever, C anada is now a m uch stronger econom ic pow er, and the facts o f A sia have changed so greatly in fifty years that the consequences this tim e m ay be considerably m ore con­ crete, even if the rhetoric is fam iliar. T he Pacific thrust is partly a gesture and partly a calculation o f interest. As a gesture it is an assertion of national interest but also a recognition of internal politics, a response to the w estern pro v in ces’ claim that their Pacific frontier is ignored in favour o f the rutted A tlantic preoccupation. W hat m akes it som ew hat

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unreal is an apparent assum ption that the “ Pacific rim ” is a region, a political o r g eographical entity o f any kind tow ards w hich C anada could have a uniform policy. T here is nevertheless m uch to be said for it as a w ay o f broadening the p u b lic ’s vision. L ooking w est and north instead of steadily gazing south and east is healthy for C anadians if they w ant to get them selves ready for the next century. T he new Pacific d irection, as described in the w hite paper, m ay seem lim ited. It has been criticized as largely com m ercial in content and inspiration, but the professed determ ination to expand cultural exchanges and increase understanding ought not to be regarded cynically. W hat the w hite pap er is not apparently concerned w ith is security. T he question is raised w hether the governm ent sim ply does not see any place for itself in a Pacific security schem e o r w hether it does not see any Pacific security issue as such. It is not a question, o f course, w hich can be very realistically discussed in an official paper because it requires blunt speech about o th er countries. T he apparent assum ption, therefore, that all m em bers o f the Pacific rim , including the Soviet U nion, C hina, o r A ustralia, m ay be looked upon alike as friends to be cultivated does not m ean that the C anadian governm ent is lacking a private concern about the forces loose in A sia. It is p robably the realization that C anada is unlikely to be a decisive factor in these questions that has encouraged the C anadian authorities to ignore wider problem s o f security on their Pacific coast. O r they m ay have rec­ ognized, w ithout specifically saying so, that “ Pacific secu rity ” o r even “ A sian secu rity ” can no longer be contem plated in the tradition of A dm iral M ahan. T he w hite pap er does display an aw areness, in appropriately general term s, o f the “ inevitable tension betw een the forces o f change and the forces o f tradition” and that the “ shifting pow er balance is thus only one aspect of the pattern of unresolved tensions in the P a c ific ” 3 and d iscreetly asks questions rather than offering prescription. W hat does provide a solid basis for the new direction is the tran s­ form ation o f the com m ercial dream from rom antic fantasy to a sound basis for trade. T he principal factor here is, o f course, the em ergence of Japan as a great econom ic pow er. It has already assum ed third place to the U nited States and B ritain in C anadian trade and m ay well rise to second place soon. In the past ten years exports to Japan have risen from 150 to 615 m illion and im ports from 100 to 4 6 0 m illion dollars. T he econom ic relationship is becom ing m ore sophisticated and m ore firm ly based because of increasing Japanese investm ents in C anada. As the A m ericans have done in the past the Japanese are now seeking to assure them selves o f supplies of C anadian coal, oil, and other m aterials by m oving into the developm ent and ow nership phase. T hese m oves are exceedingly w elcom e to the governm ents of the w estern provinces,

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hungry for capital to develop their resources. In the rest of the country w ise old ow ls m ay be w orrying over the kind o f dependence this could eventually involve but this fear is counteracted by satisfaction that foreign investm ents in C anada are being diversified. T he w orry about m ortgaging C anadian resources is lively, but it is directed alm ost entirely to the increasing pressures from the U nited S tates, now desperately short o f w ater and sources o f energy. If Japan, how ever, should becom e in another generation the giant industrial state predicted the com petition for C anadian raw m aterials could turn ugly. A nother factor in the new look is, of co u rse, the large sales of C anadian w heat to C hina in the past decade. T he canny C anadian instinct is to look upon these as strokes of luck and to acknow ledge the uncertainties o f the C hinese m arket. N evertheless there is still the vision of C athay. T he m assive populations o f A sia will have to be fed and C anada is am ong the countries w hich can m assively overproduce food. T o allow the w estern e conom y to becom e dependent, how ever, on so politically uncertain an area could be foolhardly. C anada is more dependent upon its export trade than all but a very few countries and it m ust bew are o f relying too heavily on any single m arket. C anada ranks about seventh in trade with C hina. In 1969 sales w ere $122 m illion, m ostly w heat, but im ports from C hina am ounted to only $ 2 7 m illion, m ostly textiles and peanuts. Federal trade officials are e n couraging a m ore hopeful but essentially restrained vision o f the C hina m arket in the new era of diplom atic relations, seeing prospects beyond w heat for raw and sem i-finished m aterials, industrial m achinery and transport equipm ent, but not consum er p ro d u c ts.4 A t best C hina could be only one o f a num ber of countries that could help C anada ease its excessive need for the A m erican m arket. T rad e and investm ents are also grow ing w ith other countries o f the Pacific rim — a term w hich curiously om its C h jle, P eru, and even the U nited States. A lthough C anadians are not disposed to think o f the Soviet U nion in the Pacific c o n tex t, nevertheless it is fifteen years since the tw o countries recognized w ith their first w heat agreem ent that it m ade better econom ic sense to im port C anadian w heat from V ancouver to the Soviet far eastern region than to transport it there from the U kraine. In fishing and w haling C anada recognizes the Pacific exten­ sion o f R ussia, but in com m ercial as well as political questions it is hard to break the habit o f looking at the Soviet U nion across E urope. Trade relations w ith South K orea, H ong K ong, M alaysia, A ustralia, and New Z ealand have been increasing notably and raising m any o f the sam e questions first posed by Japanese exports. T extiles from A sian c ountries are forcing C anadians to face even m ore acutely the internal cost o f free trade principles. T he dream o f Far E astern trade included the im portation o f gorgeous silks but not K orean shirts at half the price

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o f those m ade in Q uebec. T here are profits to be acquired undoubtedly, but also a great deal o f trouble. A s for A ustralia and N ew Z ealand, the trade issues are q uite different. T he turning aw ay by Britain from its erstw hile partners m ay bring the old “ d o m in io n s” closer together. C ertainly C anadians are taking A ustralia m uch m ore seriously now as a place not only for exports but for investm ents. T he inclusion o f A ustralia and N ew Z ealand, ho w ev er, in the c o n ­ cept o f the Pacific rim and in the Pacific section o f the C anadian foreign policy w hite pap er is sheer gesture. T he concept o f regions defined by hem ispheres and o ceans persists in spite of the doubt cast o n their validity by m odern com m unications and m ilitary technology. A com ­ m on “ Pacific p o lic y ” tow ards N ew Z ealand and K orea w ould m ake no m ore sense than a com m on policy linking New Z ealand and Poland. C a n ad a ’s econom ic, and indeed its p olitical, relations w ith A sian countries are all su i generis. T here are som e com m on elem en ts, with reference to the textile industry for exam ple, but these apply also to Latin A m erican, A frican, o r even E ast E uropean countries and bear no relation to the w aters o f the Pacific. T hey m ight apply in C anadian relations with M exico but certainly not because M exico is a Pacific country. If the E ast A sian countries w ere them selves united in som e­ thing equivalent to the E uropean E conom ic C om m unity o r the E uropean Free T rade A rea, there w ould then be som e basis for a Pacific econom ic policy for C anada, but such a developm ent seem s highly unlikely— unless o f course som e day A sian countries w ould feel a com m on interest in com bined pressure on the N orth A m erican countries. T hat the interests o f A ustralia and N ew Z ealand in such a situation w ould be w ith the A sians rather than w ith the N orth A m ericans can hardly be taken for granted. Sim ilarly there is nothing in the Pacific area com parable to N A T O , of w hich C anada w as a founder m em ber. W ithout som e Pacific treaty organization it w ould be hard to find a role for C anada in Pacific security. C anada has never been m uch interested in the skeletal security organizations w hich have been form ed on the other side o f the Pacific O cean. Som e o f them seem ed to O ttaw a m ore provocative than useful. A s for S E A T O , C anada w as not w anted b ecause it w as not a southeast A sian pow er in any sense of the w ord, and at the tim e o f its form ation in 1954 C anada had just assum ed responsibilities in the International C ontrol C om m issions in Indochina w hich required it to avoid such com m itm ents. If the U nited S tates, South K orea, and Japan, for exam ­ ple, w ere at any tim e to propose a N orth Pacific treaty organization, then C anada w ould undoubtedly have to think w hether its interests required it to join and contribute. In the past C anada w ould have used alm ost any excuse to keep out o f such an entangling alliance. In spite of the interest in shifting attention from E urope to A sia, it is highly

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unlikely that a C anadian governm ent w ould be disposed or w ould have sufficient popular support to involve it in a new Pacific com m itm ent. Insofar as E urope is concerned, C anadians have on the w hole been eager d etentistes and they em phasize N A T O ’ s function in m utual agreem ents on E uropean security w ith the W arsaw Pact. As far as C hina is concerned the C anadian disposition seem s to be tow ards understanding rather than p rovocation. It is not beyond the bounds of calculation that w ithin a decade w e m ight see the Soviet U nion propos­ ing a N orth Pacific treaty organization, but w hat any country w ould think o f such a proposal d epends upon so m any other developm ents in C hina, in Japan, and in the U nited States that speculation from a C anadian perspective is unprofitable. If a m iddle pow er surrounded, as C anada is in the Pacific m ore so than in the A tlantic, by giants, leaves security initiatives to those giants and concentrates on econom ic issues in w hich it is a m uch m ore considerable factor, it is not necessarily blind to the possibilities o f conflict and collision in that area; it m ay just be avoiding pretensions. P erhaps the perspective of a lesser Pacific p o w er serves to reveal the unreality o f the concept o f “ Pacific se c u rity .” S ecurity is for people, not for w ater. T here are ad hoc argum ents for— and against— bilateral o r even m ultilateral U nited S tates security agreem ents with Japan or South K orea o r the Philippines. T hese are m atters, how ever, o f A sian security, not Pacific security. It is the A m erican s’ belief, o f co u rse, that the security o f the U nited States and o f N orth A m erica is involved as well and no doubt they are right. In an age o f intercontinental ballistic m issiles, how ever, one questions w hether this danger has m uch to do w ith the Pacific O cean. T he heavy A m erican involvem ent in V ietnam is attributable to convictions about the m aintenance of w orld-w ide, not P acific, security. T o get to their assignm ents in the C ontrol C o m ­ m issions in Indochina C anadians have found that it d o e sn ’t m atter m uch w hether they set out across the A tlantic or the Pacific. T he old A m erican— and to som e extent C anadian— fear of invasion from the A sian hordes dies hard, but surely security concerns about A sia have to do w ith the w orld balance of forces, not the control o f the Pacific. U nless o f course w e are thinking about the protection o f trade routes, and a m ajor C anadian concern about “ international se c u rity " is the m aintenance o f free com m erce. W ith the increasing volum e o f trade across the Pacific, the freedom o f those seas becom es m ore im portant. T he queston arises, how ever, w hether one could have a situation at sea in w hich escorts and convoys w ere required to protect shipping w ithout full-scale w ar. It seem s unlikely, but o f course so m any variations of lim ited wqr have been discovered that one could rule out nothing. C anadians, at any rate, do not now , o r are not likely in the future, to carry m uch of their trade in their ow n ships, and w ould be disposed to

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think that the R ussians and the Japanese w hose ships they do use could be expected to protect th eir ow n bottom s. E ven here, w here C a n ad a ’s interests are m ore obviously touched, it is hard for C anadians to see w hat they could do except w histle— and try m odestly in their traditional w ay to ease tension and avert conflict. F or a country like C anada it is particularly hard to think in term s of “ Pacific se c u rity .’’ For the U nited States a vast ocean is and has been for three-quarters o f a century w ithin its calculation. T here is in C anada no traditional m ilitary involvem ent in the Pacific, and its entire w illingness to leave it to the A m ericans w as dem onstrated w hen C anada in the ’tw enties played an effective part in opposing the renew al o f the A nglo-Japanese T reaty lest the U nited States be offended. W hen the Pacific w ar began in 1942, C anadian forces w ere already deployed in E urope, and it m ade better logistic sense for them to stay there and leave the Pacific to the U nited States. T he decim ation in H ong K ong (in 1941) of the only C anadian force in A sia discouraged any interest in further token participation in Pacific security. A s C anada did not have the chance to get involved on any scale in the fight against Japan betw een V -E D ay and V -J D ay, it w as quite content again to leave that ocean to the A m ericans, w ho, in any case, show ed no interest in sharing their responsibility. C anada contributed tardily but on a relatively large scale to the K orean operation, but this w as regarded as an o b ligatory fulfilm ent o f responsibility to the U nited N ations rather than as a joint Pacific operation w ith the U nited States. C anadians were disposed to recognize the Japan-U nited States relationship as a bulw ark o f their ow n security, but there never seem ed any good reason w hy they should try to have a say in it. T he A m ericans w ould do w hat they w anted to do in the Pacific anyw ay, and by being form ally involved C anada w ould only lose its freedom from com m itm ents. T he principle o f joint continental d efence, accepted by C anadians as w ell as A m ericans long before it w as form alized in n o r a d in 1958, included, o f co u rse, collaboration in defending the Pacific coast. T he fact that the continent can be threatened b ecause o f U nited States policy in A sia o v er w hich C anada has no control is a paradox w hich C anadians have preferred not to look at too carefully. T hat its sm aller partner m ight have its ow n view s as to w ho its enem y are is not an idea w hich has com e naturally to A m ericans. An enem y o f theirs— at least until recently— w as assum ed to be an enem y of the “ free w o rld .” M ost, but by no m eans a ll, C anadians w ould have agreed w ith them — before V ietnam at least— and they accepted therefore the illogic as well as the logic o f continental defence. N orth Pacific security is hardly distinguishable from A rctic security, and that is a subject on w hich C anadians feel m ore directly involved. C a n ad ian s’ attention is increasingly being d iverted to their A rctic

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frontiers, partly because o f certain real issues o f sovereignty, urgent and fashionable issues about oil transport and pollution, and partly because o f a greater feeling o f possessiveness in a period o f nationalist assertion. In the A rctic C anadians are increasingly conscious of a kind o f com m unity o f northern peoples w ith the R ussians and w ith the A laskans and G reenlanders. H ere they are m uch m ore independent and assertive than in the Pacific area, m ore conscious that it is th eir own territory and their ow n resources w hich are to be protected for their own C anadian reasons and less inclined to think o f them selves as a c o n ­ tinental hostage bound to a w orld pow er w ith a habit o f getting into trouble all over the w orld. B ut it is hard to draw a line w here A rctic security ends and Pacific security could be considered to begin. A laska fortunately saves C anadians a lot o f problem s. A lthough S ew ard, the M anifest D estiny b raggart, has been a villain of C anadian history, he ought to be a hero. T he pressures w hich w ould have been exerted on C anada if A laska w ere R ussian or C anadian, since R oosevelt in the late ’thirties began to grasp the significance o f C anadian territory for the Pacific defence o f the U nited S tates, w ould have been intolerable. If C anada becom es m ore and m ore involved in exchanges across the P acific, w hether o f trade or o f p eople, the m utual stakes rise and it is bound to be m ore concerned w ith m atters called “ se c u rity .” It will have an increasingly im portant stake in the survival o f Japan as an econom ic partner and m ay increasingly develop special interests in its relations w ith Pacific countries w hich are not necessarily shared with the U nited S tates. Japan, for its part, m ay have a dependence on the availability of C anadian resources w hich will give it an interest in C anadian security— and C anadian independence. In spite of the present disposition to leave E urope to the E uropeans, C anadians have not rejected the conventional w isdom that a stable and affluent E urope is essential to their ow n security and prosperity. For the next generation, how ever, A sia, o r at least parts of it, are certain to becom e as im portant to C anada as Europe. T he “ g e s tu re " tow ards the Pacific could turn into an essential com m itm ent. H aving been a sheltered and a supplem entary p ow er. C anadians have had a voluntarist5 approach to their particip a­ tion in w orld affairs. A s they becom e an econom ic m ajor pow er in a shrinking w orld, they begin to feel m ore exposed. T h e C anadian tie w ith E urope has been a blood tie w hich is part of its strength. T his too is changing, although not decisively. N othing is m ore significant o f the changed relations w ith A sia than the drastic alterations o f C anadian im m igration regulations in the past decade. A lthough C anadians w ere clever enough never to talk o f a “ W hite C a n ad a ” policy, for m ost of their history they have discrim inated against non-C aucasians. A fter the last w ar the prohibition against Japanese w as absolute, and ten years ago it w as alm ost im possible for a

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Japanese student o r businessm an to enter C anada even for a trip. N ow C anada m aintains an im m igration office in T o k y o to encourage and assist Japanese im m igrants. B ecause the Japanese have good reasons to stay at hom e, there is no large m ovem ent o f population to C anada, but im m igration from H ong K ong, In d ia, Pakistan, and the Philippines has increased significantly and is already having a visible im pact on C anadian c ities.6 D uring the past decade discrim ination on grounds of race has been elim inated from C anadian im m igration policy, but selec­ tion is on the basis o f education and skill so that the flood gates tow ards A sia are unlikely to be opened. T he A sians w ho have com e to C anada are those best able to adapt them selves productively in C anadian society— a situation q uite different from that in B ritain. W hile the C anadian econom y is expanding and there is still a need for skilled personnel, there is little evidence that the rise in the A sian population is provoking the kind o f racial prejudices w hich disgraced the country before the Second W orld W ar. T here is a predom inating disposition to regard A sian-C anadians as a further enrichm ent o f the C anadian m osaic— and w ith very good reason. T he flow o f w ell-educated H ong K ong residents, for exam ple, could be a great help in the developm ent in C anada of a better understanding o f C hinese language and civiliza­ tion. C anada has a b etter chance than m ost countries to develop a m ultiracial and m ulti-ethnic society, but racial relations are volatile and it is hard to isolate the C anadian e xperim ent, w ith its m ore favourable conditions, from infection. C anadians are by no m eans free o f racial prejudices; they just have few er excuses for them . B ecause it has had a long and special history, som e com m ent is required on the C anadian-C hinese agreem ent on diplom atic relations. It w ould be a m istake to assum e that this necessarily m arked a reassessm ent by C anada of the C hinese role in the w orld or the w ay to deal w ith the C hinese fact and w ith real and p seudo-M aoism . W hat is significant is not the C anadian decision but the C hinese decision to let the exchange take place w ithout dem anding C anadian su rren d er on a m atter o f principle. T he C anadian action should be regarded as the correction o f an acknow ledged erro r o f tw enty years ago. In spite of som e lapses from tim e to tim e C anadian governm ents had alw ays intended to recognize the regim e in Peking, but they w ere prevented from d oing so by m any factors, including the outbreak o f the K orean w ar just as they had decided to act, a lack o f interest in Peking in m aking it easy for them to do so then and thereafter, and a H am letian indecision7 w hich settled upon O ttaw a over the C hina question. D irect pressure from W ashington w as not so m uch a factor as C anadian uneasiness about provoking the w rath of the U nited States C ongress. T he new elem ent in 1970 w as a new prim e m inister com e to pow er with a previous com m itm ent to do som ething about Peking and a disposition

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to get on with it. T he tim ing proved right, as far as Peking w as concerned. Som e lengthy negotiation w as p resum ably necessary for both sides. T he C anadians w ere prepared to m ake all the com prom ises they could. C anadians have never by and large had a feeling o f c o m ­ m itm ent to the N ationalist governm ent in T aiw an as the governm ent of C hina. T heir com m itm ent w as to the principle o f self-determ ination. Faced w ith P e k in g ’s dem and for a declaration about T aiw an they were not prepared to abandon that principle. T hey realized also that there w as som ething preposterous about C anada solem nly disposing o f the fate o f that distant island. T he C anadian governm ent had had its ow n political reasons for starting negotiations with Peking. T here w as little opposition in C anada to the m ove, and the Prim e M inister w ould have been ridiculed if he failed to go ahead w ith his prom ise. It was not necessary for him to m ake a deliberate gesture o f defiance of the U nited S tates, but he w ould have had to m ake clear that he w as not, in office, subm itting to A m erican pressure. N egotiations having been started, how ever, and stalled by w hat in the eyes o f C anadians generally w ere unreasonable dem ands from Peking, the governm ent seem ed quite prepared to sit it out. T he experience o f other countries, including G erm any and France as w ell as C anada, had not indicated any close connection betw een diplom atic relations and expanding trade, and the particular C anadian national interest in establishing relations with Peking w as not sufficiently dem onstrable to goad the governm ent to further com ­ prom ise. T he decision therefore to conclude the negotiations success­ fully w as presum ably P ek in g ’s. W hat is im portant, therefore, is how this reflects a revived C hinese interest in establishing better relations w ith W estern c ountries and taking the C hinese seat in the U nited N atio n s.8 For C anadians w ho are endlessly debating as to w hether and how they can influence the w orld at large and the U nited States in particular, it is an interesting exam ple o f the role o f m iddle pow er as cataly st, for the C anadian action m ay well have started a m ovem ent w hich could lead to the transform ation for good or ill of the U nited N ations. N ot that it had to be C anada. Italy w ould have done the trick. D uring the G eneva C onference o f 1954 L ester Pearson and P aul-H enri Spaak reached a tacit understanding that the m ost constructive step C anada and B elgium could take w ould be to recognize P eking at a tim e w hen such an action w ould be best calculated to ease the U nited States through an em barrassm ent w hich could affect W estern security. It has taken a longer tim e than foreseen and it m ight better have happened sooner, but it m ay be that the vision of these tw o distinguished statesm en will be fulfilled. It has com e at a tim e w hen the reaction from A m ericans has been m uch less hostile than w as calculated in 1954.

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T he criticism has been m ade that the governm ent acted heedlessly and w ithout any clear disposition to spend its resources on exploiting the new opportunity o f diplom atic, com m ercial, and cultural relations w ith C hina, o r convictions about coping w ith the C hinese political phenom enon. T here are undoubtedly illusions in the popular C anadian argum ents for establishing contact w ith “ one-quarter o f the population o f the w o rld ” w hen the latter are effectively forbidden contact. T h ere is too little recognition o f the disruption threatened by P ek in g ’s entry on the UN scene. T he challenge to internal security w hich people claim ing allegiance to the d octrines o f the C hinese C hairm an can pose even for C anada w as vividly illustrated by events in Q uebec at the exact tim e w hen the negotiations for recognition w ere com pleted. C anadians, both official and unofficial, how ever, have grow n sceptical o f the prim itive idea o f a m onolithic com m unist enem y. T hey have long subscribed to the traditional view that one has diplom atic relations w ith regim es o f w hich one does not approve— the case o f C hina having been the exception to the rule. T he case of C uba has probably confirm ed C anadians in this belief. In spite o f a strong suspicion that terrorists in C anada w ere trained o r sheltered in C uba, it w as an advantage to the C anadian governm ent during the FLQ crisis to have regular relations w ith the C uban governm ent w hich, having reason not to disrupt these relatio n s, proved very co -operative in arrangem ents for releasing the kidnapped m en. T he connection, if any, betw een Peking and its idolaters abroad, is a m ystery, but the argum ent from C anadian terrorism against adm itting C hinese com m unist diplom ats seem s to have been used largely by people w ho had already been opposing the step. Spokesm en in C hina seem to have ignored the FLQ entirely, perhaps in o rder not to disturb relations w ith C anada at this tim e. T here is no evidence that C anadian officials expect any great tran s­ form ation after the establishm ent o f relations. T his act is m erely a clearing o f the ground for w hatever m ight prove possible in the future. C anadians are painfully aw are that they lack resources in Sinology and are ill-equipped to take a lead. T he exchange of relations should give a considerable im petus to C hina studies in C anada and is w elcom ed for this purpose. An em barrassm ent C anadians face is pressure from A m erican scholars to take advantage o f a C anadian base to establish th eir ow n personal cultural relations with C hina. C anadians will presum ably have to be careful to avoid the im pression in Peking that they are acting for larger clients, but bridge-building is not a function to be shirked. As for a policy o f reconciliation in broader political and strategic term s, the disposition is to do w hatever seem s possible, but the current O ttaw a m ood is to underestim ate the previously o v er­ estim ated role o f a m iddle pow er. A lthough its present action m ay prove catalytic, C anada is bound to be a m inor player in the dram a of

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C hina. W hether C hina m oves tow ards a m ore international role or retreats further into isolation is a riddle to those w ho do and do not recognize the Peking regim e, but the C anadian assum ption is that w hatever C h in a ’s intentions m ay be, it is b etter to be in com m unica­ tion. T h is is the foreign policy o f a m iddle pow er, not a superpow er. T he considerations w hich affect U nited States policy are on an entirely d ifferent scale because action by the U nited States w ould be decisive rather than supplem entary and because the U nited States, unlike C anada, has specific com m itm ents to the C hinese N ationalists. C a n ad a ’s involvem ent in A sia has o f course extended beyond the Pacific rim . T hrough the C om m onw ealth association its relations with India, Pakistan, C ey lo n , and M alaysia have been closer than w ith the Pacific countries oth er than Jap an . Its one security involvem ent in A sia has been the arduous and frustrating responsibility for the past sixteen years in the International C ontrol C om m issions in V ietnam , L aos, and C am bodia. H ow ever futile the w ork on the C om m issions m ay seem to have been, it has had an im portant effect on m em bers o f the C anadian arm ed forces and foreign service officers, a considerable num ber of w hom have served there o v er the years and acquired insights and perspectives as well as interest in A sia which have influenced them and toughened C anadian foreign policy. T he C anadian governm ent is not seeking an extended role o f this kind in Indochina but, as the white paper m akes clear, it w ould be prepared to do its duty by responding to a c all, provided the provisions for the C om m ission w ere som ew hat m ore responsibly laid dow n in the next “ G en ev a a g re e m e n t.’’ L argely because the first C anadian aid program m es w ere w ithin the context o f the C olom bo Plan, the bulk o f C anadian overseas aid has gone to the A sian m em bers o f the C om m onw ealth. T he fact that the largest proportion of C anadian aid go es to the C om m onw ealth, not only in A sia but in A frica and the C aribbean as w ell, is attributable both to an interest in m aintaining this unique association and to the fact that the population o f the C om m onw ealth form s a considerable m ajority o f the total population o f the non-com m unist developing w orld. A lthough C anadian enthusiasm for the C om m onw ealth seem ed to be flagging in the new adm inistration, the c hallenge presented to its future by B ritish policy on arm s to South A frica seem s to have stim ulated C anadians in general to a defensive posture and the Prim e M inister to take the C om m onw ealth seriously. W hereas the C om m onw ealth at one tim e w as the cause o f som e division am ong anglophone and francophone C anadians, the new policy o f supporting francophonie and the C om ­ m onw ealth as com plem entary expressions o f C anadian biculturalism has given it a new validity in C anadian external policy. A lthough the attention to francophonie is directed largely to A frica, there is anxiety in O ttaw a to pay special attention to V ietnam , L aos, and C am bodia

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w hen circum stances perm it. If the C om m onw ealth survives the B ritish C onservatives, and Indochina does not em erge as three A m ericanophone nations, C anadian interest in south and southeast A sia should carry on. E ven though C anadians see these countries as part of the A sian scene, the political and econom ic ties that bind them have b een conditioned by a special historic relationship. O ne o f the reasons C anadian and U nited States policies in the Far E ast differed over the past tw enty years is that w hen C anadians talked o f the “ free countries o f A sia ” they m eant India, P akistan, C eylon, and M alaysia w ith their p articular approach to C hina, w hereas A m ericans w hen they used this term norm ally m eant the Philippines, T aiw an , South K orea, South V ietnam , and T hailand. For A m ericans south A sia w as perhaps part of the Pacific scene, but the C anadian approach w as from the opposite direction. C anada through the three hundred years o f its existence has been involved in a perm anent struggle against continentalism . B ecause it is so unequal in pow er to the neighbour with w hich it shares N orth A m erica, the C anadian instinct has been to call in the O ld W orld to redress the im balance o f the N ew . T he tie w ith B ritain, m em bership in the C om m onw ealth, and N A T O w ere p art of this intuitive response— as has been its rejection o f the O rganization of A m erican States. In recent years C anadians have believed them selves threatened by a new ex clusiveness on the part o f the E uropeans and the increasing econom ic and cultural thrust o f the U nited States. T he fear o f being shut out of all trading blocs and m arkets has been acute for a decad e, in spite o f the fact that C a n a d a 's exports have been grow ing at such a rem arkable pace that they have dislocated its m onetary position. R egardless o f the facts, w hatever they are, C anadians have been looking hopefully at the wide w orld for co unter-balance. T he gesture tow ards the Pacific should be seen in this context. T he countries on the far side o f the Pacific are a fascinating area and their vast population and rapid developm ent give prom ise o f counter-balance o f proportions adequate to relax C anadian dependence on its one g reat m arket and source o f investm ent, the U nited States. M r. T rudeau has been rem inding C anadians that they have Pacific and A rctic frontiers as well as A tlantic. H e is only draw ing their attention to the obvious because K orea, Indochina, Japan, and C hina have in fact preoccupied and involved C anadians in the past two decades at least as m uch as E urope. W hat is involved is not a Pacific policy but a Pacific direction. The so-called Pacific countries have little in com m on w ith each o th er and C an ad a’s relations w ith them are largely ad hoc. N o one expects C anadian attitudes to the A llende regim e in C hile, for exam ple, to be determ ined in a Pacific context. T he section o f the w hite paper dealing w ith the Pacific om its the Soviet U nion entirely. “ T he P acific” is no

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m ore than a chapter heading under w hich can be listed a num ber of disparate countries w ith w hich C anada w ould like to cultivate the best possible relations. T he fact that C anada has a Pacific coast is not particularly relevant except in the stim ulus it provides to the im agina­ tion. It w ould be difficult to argue that the Pacific O cean is, as the North A tlantic has been described, a bond which holds together a com m unity. W hat the C anadian w hite paper is try in g to say m ay, how ever, be more to the point: that the Pacific O cean need not be a barrier. W e should seek to revive the philosophy o f the form er Institute o f Pacific R elations, the purpose o f w hich w as not to establish a Pacific region for com m erce o r security or for any other reason, but to m aintain and prom ote com m unications and understanding across this vast expanse of w ater.

N o tes 'F or this and further quotations and a v iv id account o f this episode see Robert Joseph G ow en, “ Canada and the M yth o f the Japan Market, 1896-1911 ," Pacific H istorical R eview , x x x ix (February 1970).

:Foreign Policy fo r Canadians (six pamphlets o f which one is entitled “ P a cific” ), Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970. 3Ib id ., p .8. 4Foreign Trade, fortnightly journal o f the Department o f Industry, Trade and C om m erce, Ottawa, 10 N ovem ber 1970. T h is term is w ell explained in the study by Professor Thomas Hockin o f York University, Toronto, in Hockin, L ew is Hertzman and John Warnock, A lliances an d Illusions (Edm onton: M .G . Hurtig, 1969), part 3. ‘ Immigration from A sia has increased from about 2,000 to 20,000 a year between 1963 and 1969, o f which the largest groups are ethnically Chinese, Indian-Pakistan, and Filipino, with less than a thousand from Japan. 7A very apt phrase for which I am indebted to M ichael Tucker o f Mount A llison University. ®The “ Canadian Formula” was to “ take n o te " o f the Chinese statement about Taiw an, explained by the Canadian government as a position o f neither "en d orsin g nor ch allenging." It was subsequently adopted by Italy and Chile.

5: The Illusion of Europe

O ne o f the m a jo r p ro b lem s o f th e counterw eight p o lic y on its m ain sa lien t is that th e E uropean C om m unity is n e ith e r fish , fle sh , n o r fo w l a n d therefore very h a rd to w altz with. Its am orphousness p re se n ts se rio u s p ro b lem s f o r C anada. The note o f exasperation in this article (reprinted, with perm issio n , fro m the O cto b er 1973 issue o f W orldview ,) is exp la in ed p a rtly b y the long lectures su ffered o v er the p a s t decade fro m B ritish, D utch, o r A m e ric a n frie n d s on th e m oral superiority o f E uropean internationalism a t a tim e when C anadians (those once nice p e o p le ) were turning n a tionalistic a n d resisting the p u rifyin g rite o f integration. M y p reju d ices on the subject h a d p e rh a p s been too m uch conditioned b y th e writings o f D a vid M itra n y, the theoretician o f fu n ctio n a lism w hose classic w ork w as very influential in th e D epartm ent o f E xternal A ffa ir s during the p e rio d when the U nited N a tio n s was being form ulated. H e wrote in 1943, " T h e r e is little pro m ise o f p e a ce in th e m ere change fro m th e rivalry o f P ow ers a n d alliances to the rivalry o f w hole continents, tightly organized a n d capable o f achieving a high degree of, i f not actual, self-sufficiency. C ontinental union w ould have a m ore real chance than individual sta tes to p ra c tic e the autarky that m akes fo r division. ” * P erhap s the m istake was to assum e that such a union co u ld e ve r be strong.

D uring the excitem ent o f e x pansion, m em bers o f the E uropean E conom ic C om m unity m ay be forgiven if their com m ents on C o m ­ m unity policy are often m ore rhetorical than rational. In sober m om ents E uropean leaders display an aw areness o f the d ilem m as they face in achieving that am biguous state o f grace know n as unity. W hat is less fully recognized is the dilem m a the C om m unity presents to outsiders, particularly those w ho are and w ish to rem ain its friends.

* A W orking Peace System : A n A rgum ent fo r the Functional D evelopm ent o f International Organization (London: r i i a . 1 9 4 3 ), p . 12. 175

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H ow are we to deal w ith, how are w e to accom m odate, how are w e to m ake provisions for this creation w hich, because it is in the process of shaping itself, does not know w hat it is going to be? D o w e accept it for w hat it seem s to be at this m om ent, a loose association o f sovereign p ow ers w hich already can exercise som e authority in internal m atters but is not acting in external m atters like the unit it seem s to want to be? O r do w e m ake our calculations on the basis o f the rhetoric? E e c spokesm en at tim es stress the freedom o f its sovereign parts. But they usually go on to talk about E urope speaking w ith one voice to d efend its rights and its interests. T hey like to regard E urope as one of five g reat or superpow ers, and they add up populations, resources, and trade, not to m ention arm ed forces, to show that they count in a superclass. W hat distinguishes a superpow er, how ever, is not its am algam ated resources. If one adds up the com bined populations, resources, and arm ed forces o f the continent o f A sia, he gets som ething pretty stupendous. W hat m akes a super po w er super is the capacity to accept re­ sponsibility. Internal discipline enables governm ent to behave e f­ fectively, w hether it does so in its ow n or in the international interest. Internal d ifferences indeed lim it the effectiveness o f both W ashington and M oscow , and probably Peking. B ut none o f them can evade the responsibility of pow er for the very reasons w hich, for the foreseeable future, will excuse the leaders o f the E uropean C om m unity from fulfilling any but the blandest international com m itm ents. O nce the celebrations are o v e r, it is tim e for m ore candid talk about all this. W est E uropeans have been spoiled in the honeym oon period by their conviction (encouraged by A m ericans) that, since they were engaged in creating utopia in the obvious interests of hum anity at large, they w ere entitled to indulgence. W ho could be against unity? W hether the E E C is a step forw ard in the long path to the brotherhood o f m an o r just another effort to build an exclusive econom ic and political bloc is a m atter on w hich opinion w ill continue to differ. T here are m any outside the bloc w ho m ay w ish the T reaty o f Rom e had never been concocted. T h is is not to say, how ever, that the w iser am ong them w ould now w ish the E uropean C om m unity to collapse. F o rg o o d o r ill, it has been launched. H aving in m ind the paralyzing schizophrenia w hich gripped Britain for the past decade, one is w arned against the paranoia w hich could afflict the W est E uropean peoples if they were denied the chance to m ake som ething of their experim ent. W hat they m ake o f it, how ever, affects the rest o f us in vital w ays. R alf D ahrendorf has expressed surprise that relations betw een the U nited States and the E uropean C om m unity are shaped, not by the W hite H ouse, o r by the State D epartm ent, o r by leading foreign policy specialists in C ongress, but by the C alifornia and A rizona C itrus

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A sso c ia tio n .1W hat does he ex p ect? T h e E E C is designed to protect and further the econom ic interests o f certain countries in w est-central E urope, and that is legitim ate. O ther countries will legitim ately bargain w ith, m ake deals w ith, or form alliances against, the E E C in line with their understanding o f their ow n interests. T h ey can be expected to m ake concessions for the unity o f “ E u ro p e” to the sam e extent that W estern E uropeans w ould sacrifice their farm ers for the benefit of such political ideas as the R epublican p arty, the survival o f the C om ­ m onw ealth, or the independence o f C anada. It is the E E C , after all, w hich is incapable o f political decisions and asks others to deal w ith a bureaucracy. U nless relations w ith “ E u ro p e” are to be regarded as a zero-sum gam e, there m ust be a m utual disposition to act in the broader interna­ tional, rather than the purely national, interest. E uropeans, how ever, m ust be w arned against the assum ption that because the E E C claim s to be international, it is acting m ore nobly w hen it furthers the special interests o f its dem icontinent than A ustrailia, Jap an , or the U nited States w hen they act in the nam e o f national interest. C ontinentalism is not inherently m ore m oral than nationalism and m ay indeed be m ore dangerous. It is not the w illingness o f the E E C to act generously and farsightedly that is w orrying, it is their inability to do so. T h e puzzle for outsiders— friends o r otherw ise— is to know w hich w ay they w ould like the C om m unity to m ove. T here are m any good reasons for w orrying about the em ergence o f a united E uropean superpow er. W e have quite enough overkill loose in the w orld at the m om ent. W e certainly d o n ’t w ant to be draw n any m ore into E uropean civil w ars. B ut the argum ent that the creation o f a E uropean C om m unity w ould put an end to the danger o f w ar in E urope has lost credibility. T he rebirth of G erm any and the creation o f N A T O settled that question long before the T reaty o f Rom e. W e m ight rather fear that differences will be exacerbated by efforts at am algam ation. C ontinentalist econom ics provoke econom ic conflicts, internally and externally. It w ould be unfair to blam e the E E C alone for the m ore ruthless nationalism evident in A m erican econom ic policy over the past cou p le o f years, but there is an interaction betw een A m erican nationalism and the threatening continental nationalism of the E E C — together w ith, it m ust be adm itted, the nervous econom ic nationalism o f lesser pow ers. W hen continentalist econom ics are accom panied by continentalist cultural assertion and the m ythification o f E uropean history, the overseas barbarians have reason to sh u d d e r.2 O ne m ight w ish the E urop eans w ould just sensibly go on about co-ordinating their transport and rationalizing their neighbourly relations and forget about their m ission as E urope. On the other hand, if

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they are going to take com m on actions w ithout being able to accept com m on responsibilities, w o u ld n ’t it be better if they did indeed becom e som ething m ore like a sovereign pow er? A s H err D ahrendorf h im self acknow ledges: “ T he six E uropean States have created a poli­ tical reality w hich need not be defined as som ething different from them , but w hich, in accordance w ith the will of its architects, cannot be controlled by any one o f them alone. T his reality has an effect on the outside w orld, w hether decisions are taken or not. T he Six are therefore jointly responsible for seeing that what they have created does not adversely affect them individually or jointly, and above all for ensuring that it does not do dam age in the w orld w hich they w ould find it difficult to re p a ir.” 3 B elief in som e general W est E uropean interest or in the defence of an E E C institution o r practice will presum ably, on occasion at least, prom pt E E C m em bers to close ranks and dem and o r force international organizations to accept certain policies or com m itm ents. B ut the record o f established governm ents in living up to their com m itm ents is hardly im peccable. A nd the C om m unity can be a special problem because, w hen conducting negotiations, it can alw ays plead that it has no sovereign control over its m em bers and to enforce discipline w ould be politically difficult. P hilippe Sim m onot, w riting in the L ondon Tim es (20 Ju n e 1973), sees the m ain negotiating advantage o f the U nited States to be “ the indiscipline o f the countries o f the E uropean C om m unity” because “ the people in B russels are obliged to stop short at the point at w hich agreem ent betw een the N ine w ould bring dow n the E uropean edifice in ru in s.” He fails to see the disadvantage to others w ho w ant to make m utually satisfactory agreem ents w ith E uropean countries in the con­ text o f a com plex relationship involving w ider political considerations. H ow often have w e all com plained w hen the A m ericans used the excuse o f attitudes in C ongress to avoid com m itm ents. T he response of W estern E uropeans to H enry K issinger’s recent (23 A pril 1973), statesm an-like call for a re-exam ination o f the A tlantic relationship has not been reassuring. W hat w as clearly set out as an invitation to revise A tlantic relations on a m ore equitable basis w as too w idely regarded as not m ore than a crude effort to force econom ic concessions in paym ent for defence protection. E ven the L ondon Tim es (25 April 1973), w hich w elcom ed the initiative to lift discussion from “ a largely technical level w here conflicts o f interest are u n avoidable” to “ the broad political level w here the long-term com m on interests of the partners are m ore clearly v isib le ,” nevertheless pointed out that “ E uropeans have rightly resented attem pts to link the m ilitary com ­ m itm ent w ith trade p o lic ie s .”

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But w ho is d oing the linking? C anadians have been led to believe that they m ust leave forces in E urope if they are to have any hope o f a fair deal on trade from the EEC. A nd there can surely be little doubt that a w ithdraw al o f A m erican forces w ould prom ptly be used in B russels as an argum ent to abandon generous consideration of A m erican econom ic d ifficulties. D efence and econom ics are irrevocably linked in the A tlantic alliance, article 2 o f w hich w as intended to m ake clear that the spirit o f co-operation and m utual respect w hich w as essential to securi­ ty w as essential also in econom ic relations if the alliance w as to hold together. K issenger w as sim ply rem inding E uropeans o f a fact they too readily forget. In an alliance based on give and take, N orth A m ericans tend to feel they have done all the giving. Both the U nited States and C anada sent troops to a E uropean w ar, poured relief funds into the reconstruction of the continent, then sent m ore troops to hold the line until the Europeans could recover. W hen the E uropeans did recover, they insisted the troops stay on, and their recovery took the form o f an econom ic bloc w hich looks m ore hostile than friendly. Even an internationally m inded E uropean like T h eo Som m er o f D ie Z e it w rites in F oreign A ffa irs that the preparedness o f the N ine in principle “ to conduct a good n eighbor policy tow ard everyone w ill be subject to only one qualification . . . w hen in d oubt act in the interests of the C o m m u n ity .” Such a p rinciple m ay be unavoidable, but it is doubtful if it is going to be reconcilable for m any years with his further statem ent: “ In the security field, there is no substitute for A m erica’s contribution to E uropean d e fe n se .” 4 C om m ents in E urope on the K issinger speech w ere not all parochial. T he shrew dest m ay have com e from the F ra n kfu rter A llg e m ein e Z e itu n g , w hich asked w hich E urope w ould give the answ er: “ Pom pi­ d o u ’s fading neo-G aullism ? B randt, suspended betw een A tlantic loyal­ ly and necessity and the tem ptation o f the opening to the E ast? Italy, shaken by internal c ris e s ? ” R aym ond A ron rem inded E uropeans that they are vulnerable not only in defence but also in econom ics if they disavow the A tlantic tie, and he pointed to the need for the w hole W estern com m unity to act together in face o f the dire threat to their security posed by oil shortages. “ It fo llo w s,” he w rote in L e F ig a r o (2 June 1973), “ that broad policy ought to be defined not only by defense against the com m ercial ‘ag g ressio n ’ o f the U nited States but by the search fo r com m on objectives. In the hypothetical situations o f an econom ic w ar o r o f a Soviet-A m erican condom inium , w ho has the m ost to fear and to lose if not the E uropeans, divided am ong them selves, w ho ow e their w ealth to the transform ation o f prim ary m aterials com ing from the w hole w o rld ? ”

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U nfortunately, this is not the language of the new breed of European chauvinist. A ndrew Shonfield has noted the tendency in the E E C to live in a charm ed circle, to think they can carry on their private world w ithout affecting anyone else. Friends o f E urope m ust ask them selves, o f co u rse, w hether it is prem ature to push questions about the long-range intentions o f a single E uropean voice. It m ay be that E uropeans have in m ind a long-term process by w hich the habit o f w orking together w ould e ventuate in a continental/national consciousness able to secure a consensus strong en ough to perm it a new E urope to act som e day as a responsible unit in international politics. Even from this perspective, how ever, w e m ust ask E uropeans to clarify w hat they hope to achieve. U nity is not a sufficient end in itself. W hen Jean M onnet set out on his crusade, few people doubted that the integration o f larger units w as the w ave of the future. Now this is a more d ubious proposition. N ationalism and sovereignty, w hich seem ed bad things, have reappeared as the last defence o f peoples against m ultina­ tional econom ic forces and the aggrandizem ent o f governm ent. We m ay charitably regard the E E C as a supereffort to create a superstructure that can defend the interests o f a “ co n tin en t” against superpow ers, specifically against the Soviet threat and the A m erican challenge. And that m ay well be the only w ay E uropeans think they can protect their standards and w ays o f life, the presum ption being that they have com m on interests w hich are sufficiently distinctive to separate them from other countries struggling for sim ilar protection. A t the sam e tim e, how ever, they are creating another threat of superproportions. As far as lesser pow ers are concerned, the E E C , because o f its am orphousness, m ay be harder to do business with than are the U nited States o r Japan, C hina o r the Soviet U nion. O ne o f the spectres confronting us is the possibility that nationalism , having becom e continentalism , will becom e hem ispherism . T he fear of the consequences o f the E E C ’ s special agreem ents in A frica m ay be exaggerated, but even a careful and sym pathetic observer o f the E E C like M iriam C am ps is pessim istic. She doubts “ w hether the grow ing E uropean-A frican and E uropean-M editerranean special relationships could be broken except as a part of a large restructuring of relationships w hich included the w ithdraw al o f the U nited States from the O A S sy s te m .” A lthough she h erself favours “ a drastic shift to a truly m ultilateral s y s te m ," she finds it hard to see it happening: “ T he m ore likely developm ent is a co ntinuation o f special arrangem ents betw een the E uropean C om m unity and the less developed countries to its south, continuing A m erican protests against this developm ent, constant fric­ tion, and a general drift tow ards a w orld in w hich the m ain developed

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countries have in fact, fairly w ell defined spheres o f influence— or spheres o f responsibility if one w ishes to be euphem istic— in the less d eveloped c o u n trie s.” 5 T he w ord im perialism has been flung about so casually o f late that one is hesitant to use it in this case. N evertheless, the proprietary attitude tow ard A frica adopted by som e E uropean leaders, and not only in France raises dou b ts as to w hether, in the process o f E uropean co ntinent-building, they m ay be carried aw ay from their m ore laudable policies o f relatively generous responsibility for assisting the T hird W orld. T he political factor to be faced is the spirit o f rivalry and even hostility inherent in the process o f setting up any new com m unity. T he view is that there is nothing incom patible betw een a united E urope and a co-operative A tlantic w orld; in fact, a co-operative w orld is proclaim ed, no doubt sincerely, by E uropean leaders. But how else can one build a com m unity except by em phasizing its exclusiveness? T he argum ent as to w hether the C om m unity w ould be inw ard look­ ing o r outw ard looking has been called “ un fa u x p ro b le m e ." T ru e, but the reason it is false is that unless the C om m unity is inw ard looking, it is nothing. T he leaders can be inspired by a m ore or less liberal attitude on w orld trade and developm ent, but the w hole enterprise is m eaningless except as an attem pt to put a wall of som e height around a com m unity. M em bers o f the C om m unity, having been for centuries w orld traders, travellers, and em ig ran ts, have varied associations overseas. T hey c a n ’t, and say they d o n ’t w ant to, cut them selves off from old associates, but they are bound now to em phasize w hatever interests they can find in com m on w ith their E uropean neighbours. T he idea that the B ritish w ould b ring international perspectives into the C om m unity m ay be an illusion . It is the G erm ans o f the B randt regim e w ho seem m ost aw are of the extent to w hich the E uropean countries are em bedded in a w ider com m unity— perhaps b ecause they have no extra-E uropean ties to renounce. T he F rench, from the beginning, have insisted on the prim acy o f the E uropean loyalty. T he B ritish, until recently at least, have been busily denigrating their relationships w ith the U nited States, C anada, and A ustralia to prove their virtue as E uropeans. C om m unity builders do need a few good m enaces. T he Soviet threat is less om inous at present. In any case, the Soviet threat is an argum ent for the strengthening, not o f the E uropean C om m unity, but of the A tlantic alliance. T o accept the Soviet m enace as a reason for the C o m m u n ity ’s cohesion w ould be to accept responsibility for constructing a truly E uropean defence system . It is both easier and cheaper to m aintain the A tlantic system . A nd so the C o m m u n ity 's apologists reach for the threat to E urope

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posed by the collusion o f the superpow ers, but they are not very clear about how they w ill be collectively harm ed by the S trategic A rm s L im itation T alks o r by Soviet-A m erican trade negotiations. If there is no obvious e n em y , one m ust be created. E uropean zealots in Britain even m anaged to transform the C om m onw ealth into a threat, thereby doing perm anent dam age to a w orthy and harm less institution and unnecessarily em bittering relations betw een the B ritish and those who had in the past perceived com m on interests w hen the threats to Britain w ere far from im aginary. T hese questions o f im agination and em otion m ay not seem im ­ portant, but E uropeans do not seem to grasp that their “ econom ic co m m u n ity ” is a m atter not only o f opening doors but o f slam m ing doors as w ell. T he consequences w ill be less dangerous if the m em bers of the E E C recognize that they are engaged in an operation that is not necessarily com plem entary to A tlantic o r w ider international com ­ m unity building. , T he need to em phasize barriers is what disturbs those w ho recognize the E E C as a fact but hope it will not accentuate the drift in the w orld at large tow ard national or regional self-interest. T he creators o f the E uropean unity m ovem ent have certainly seen the m ovem ent as part of an overarching international system . M uch o f that spirit still inspires E uropean leaders. T he question is w hether it can survive the transition period w hen the E uropean interests o f the m em bers of the C om m unity have to be em p h asized o r invented. E uropeans can in return call for understanding from others o f what they are trying to do. In fact, they have had little cause to com plain on this score. T he U nited S tates, propelled by the illusion that it w as creating a partner in the m aintenance o f w orld order, w as m ore than generous in the form ative stages. W ith the C om m unity now established, the U nited States need not apologize for recognizing the E E C as a com petitor, to be dealt w ith com petitively. T he C om ­ m onw ealth, not being an entity, took no stand against B ritish entry. B ritish opponents of the M arket holding antiquated view s o f the Em pire used the C om m onw ealth as a w eapon w ith w hich to beat the E E C . But the behaviour o f the m ajor C om m onw ealth countries affected was correct. T hey did not, by and large, share the illusions o f A m ericans about the blessings o f E uropean unity, but they recognized B ritain's right to self-governm ent. T h eir approach on the w hole has been pragm atic. T he institutions on w hich E uropeans are now co ncentrating constitute only a part o f the continent o f E urope. T h ey are cutting off the eastern, northern, and southw estern peoples o f the sam e continent. Eastern E urope has, o f course, isolated itself, but there is a question as to

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w hether its present straining for pan-E uropean institutions is getting the right response in the closing o ff o f the E E C . A m ore im m ediately relevant q uestion is w hether it is desirable to strengthen E E C institutions or those o f the O rganization for Econom ic C o-operation and D evelopm ent. T h ere is an advantage in the o e c d concept w hich is perceived m ore clearly perhaps by those w ho are neither E uropeans nor A m ericans. An unhappy consequence for C anadians, A ustralians, N orw egians, o r Sw edes o f the E u ro p ea n s’ em phasis on co ntinentalism is that they fasten this pattern on others. C anada and the U nited States do not claim to speak w ith one vo ice, for exam ple, although their econom ies are closely interm eshed. N evertheless, C anadians are continually finding them selves, to their ow n disadvantage, included in a n e n tity called N orth A m erica, w hich has no existence as a political or econom ic institution. For countries like C anada, A ustralia, S w eden, Sw itzerland, and m any others the fashionable new tw o-pow er concept o f E urope and the U nited States (or the three-pow er concept o f E urope, the U nited States, and Japan) is unattractive and inaccurate. T h is co ncept seem s particularly attractive to those E uropeans w ho, especially in B ritain, see the E E C as a w ay to m aintain g reat-pow er status. T he O E C D , on the o th er hand, not only gives m ajor and lesser pow ers appropriate voices but also reflects m ore accurately the realities of the w orld econom y, w here resources count for more than guns. It m ay also be a less polarized and m ore flexible international system . A lthough it is itself too restricted in m em bership, it has alw ays expressed the broad international responsibilities of its m em bers. T h e E E C answ er to all this is, o f course, that the E E C has no intention of renouncing these broader associations— from N A T O and the O E C D to the U nited N ations— but seeks only to co-ordinate the E uropean voice w ithin these institutions. T hat is all very w ell in theory, but w hat does the co-ordination o f the E uropean voice m ean? T his is som ething m uch m ore than just a Central A m erican caucus or an A rab lobby. W ould the hardening o f a European bloc w ithin N A T O do anything to strengthen the o rganization? Som e E uropeans have w isely recognized that an arbitrary insistence on all E uropean m em bers speaking w ith a com m on voice in N A T O co u ld lead to assum ptions about E uropean defence w hich they w ish to avoid. Yet m uch is m ade o f defence interests w hich E uropean countries are supposed to have in com m on— even though N A T O w as based on the firm assum ption that the defence interests o f N orth A m erica and W est­ ern E urope w ere com m on. In o th er international bodies, w hether the O E C D , G A T T , or the Interna­ tional C ivil A viation O rganization, the form ation o f a disciplined E uropean bloc cannot be accepted w ithout unpleasant consequences.

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Q uestions w ill eventually be asked about w hether a group w hich acts in this w ay can go on calling itself a group o r w hether, if it w ishes to speak w ith one voice, it should not, in accordance w ith prevailing rules o f the gam e, have only one vote. In the U nited N ations, L ondon and Paris m ight continue to claim special seats on the m odel o f M insk and Kiev. V oting blocs beget voting blocs. T hey d o n ’t necessarily strengthen the hands o f those w ho participate. T he position o f the A tlantic countries w as strengthened rather than w eakened by their refusal to vote as a team in the U nited N ations. Im m ovable states, like those o f E astern E urope, have had little influence. T he contrast with independent Y ugoslavia has m ade that clear. T h is brings us to the question o f a com m on foreign policy for the E E C , one o f the frequently proclaim ed aim s o f founders and m em bers. And in som e w ays the easiest to achieve because it requires no m ore than an agreem ent am ong governm ents that they will either defin e a com m on policy on m ajor w orld issues and stick to it or caucus on each issue and, in the absence o f consensus, accept a m ajority vote. Yet one has only to define w hat is necessary to realize how unlikely this is. Foreign p olicy, as its practitioners know , is not just a m atter o f great principles but o f deciding how to vote, speak, or act on thousands of d aily issues. It isn ’t d ifferences on principle that m atter m ost; it is the variations of attitudes on tactics. No one has specified, and probably no one can specify, those natural interests w hich should keep E uropeans aligned. So m any w orld issues are ideological, and the present gov­ ernm ent o f the Federal R epublic o f G erm any m ight conceivably find harm onization o f policies easier at one m om ent with the A ustralians than w ith the B ritish. C om m onw ealth citizens recognize this question o f a com m on foreign policy as an old and sad story. T he idea o f “ one v o ice ” C om m onw ealth foreign policy w as a favourite o f British C onservatives and A ustralian L abourites at the end of the Second W orld W ar. British T ories thought it m eant the dom inions w ould, like sensible chaps, accept policies defined by the w iser and m ore experienced people in W hitehall. A ustralians thought it m eant they w ould have a g reat deal m ore say in the determ ination o f B ritish foreign policy. T he E uropean m em ber states m ight be w arned that m any B ritish T ories are now talk in g the sam e w ay about the E E C — having been let dow n by the E m pire. In fact, the C om m onw ealth survived for m any useful years because this concept o f a single voice w as rejected as not only im possible of achievem ent but also exceedingly divisive. Of co u rse, no tw o situations are analogous. T he E E C is creating a m uch m ore integrated structure than the C om m onw ealth w as o r w anted to becom e in 1945.

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N evertheless, m any of the sam e d ifficulties in co-ordinating a com m on voice obtain. N A T O in the 'fiftie s w as a fairly tightly knit structure with vow s o f co-ordination, but it survived because a flexible attitude w as taken tow ard foreign policy. Judging by the so-called “ D avignon p rin cip les” form ulated by the six foreign m inisters in 1970, one m ight assum e that a fairly sensible a ttitude is being taken on this subject. M ention w as m ade of ‘‘exchanges o f inform ation and regular co n su ltatio n s” and the harm onizing o f points of view “ w hen it appears possible and advisable, by trying to adopt com m on p o lic ie s.” N evertheless, in B russels the beavers are busy w ith com m ittees, secretariats, and draft agreem ents on m ajor item s o f policy. A gain we recognize the illusion that afflicted the C om m onw ealth in 1945, the illusion that the problem is one o f structure. It persisted too in N A T O — the idea that if there could be m inisterial instead o f am bassadorial representatives on the perm anent N A T O C ouncil we w ould have a com m on foreign policy. C om m ittees and secretariats, how ever, can do no m ore than draft com prom ise form ulae. T he real problem is a m eeting o f m inds and a consensus on aim s and tactics w hich is not forced. On m ost w orld issues it has been easier to get agreem ent betw een C openhagen and O ttaw a than betw een C openhagen and Paris, and a C anadian m ay be forgiven for w ondering about the advantages of a situation in w hich not only the D anes but the B ritish and the B elgians w ould be o bliged to support French policy tow ard C an ad a, w hatever it m ight be. Perhaps countries like C anada, w hich have norm ally found am ong the sm aller E uropean pow ers their habitual collaborators in international policy, are m ost inclined to regard the creation of a rigid E uropean caucus as purposeless. Just w hat the basic principles o f an E E C foreign policy w ould be is a p roblem . It is not difficult to define com m on interests o f a security and political nature. It is m ore difficult to define interests w hich are unique to them and not shared by other m em bers o f the W estern com m unity and, indeed, by countries in o th er parts of the w orld. T he possibility o f the C om m unity having unique econom ic interests to protect and negotiate is clearer. T hese are not so m uch inherent E uropean interests as created E E C interests. A lthough for the tim e being im portant m onetary issues are debated in organizations broader than E urope, the question o f w hether the E E C will act as a unit in m onetary questions is yet to be decided. B ut the need to stand to gether on m oney does not necessarily im ply standing together on Portuguese colonies or on the continental shelf. T he creation o f any kind o f com m u n ity , w hether it be N A T O o r the C om m onw ealth o r th e O rganization of A frican U nity, sets up expectations o f loyalty. N ot to vote with o n e ’s associates seem s a

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particular form o f unpleasantness w hich m erits retribution. M ost of the so-called disunity in n a t o is attributable to expectations o f unity which ought never to have been proclaim ed in the first p lace. T hat m em bers of the E E C should pay due respect to the w ishes and interests o f their partners in the C om m unity is som ething w hich the rest o f us can live w ith and understand. T hat they should be required to shut their ears to other friends and vote like sheep, how ever, is a dem and that is likely to invite retaliation. W hen one attem pts in this w ay to probe the elem ents of a “ com m on foreign p o lic y ,” E uropeans have a habit of reacting im patiently against w hat they consider caricature. T h is, w e are told, is obviously not what they have in m ind. W ell, if not, then w hat do they m ean by having a com m on foreign policy and speaking with one voice to defend the interests o f E u ro p e? T hese are the illusions w hich breed disillusion. It is advisable to m atch lim ited expectations w ith lim ited rhetoric. T he rest o f us m ay not have a su re interest in the transform ation o f the E E C into a fifth pow er in the w orld, but we do not w ant a w eak W estern E urope. T he effo rt to push too far the idea o f a com m on foreign policy can result in a foreign policy o f the blandest variety based on the low est com m on denom inator. If we do not see the E E C as in itself a third or fifth pow er, w e do nevertheless look to the g reat countries o f W estern E urope, and the sm aller but w iser ones as w ell, as counterw eights, as alternatives, and as constructive forces in the creation o f international com m unity. In the w orld w e are facing it is not necessary to have m ilitary pow er to have w isdom and influence, although som e superpow ers will continue to be superstrong. W hen the B ritish pull them selves together, w e trust they will realize they do not need to have a fleet east o f Suez to be the great constructive force they have been in international affairs. T he voice of G erm an y , strengthened by its successes in E uropean detente, should bring new hope to the U nited N ations. France show s som e signs of em erging from its isolation into a new internationalism . W hat w e do not w ant is to have these E uropeans so intent upon the problem s of their internal bureaucracy and so m uch preoccupied w ith producing an indigestible m ash called a com m on E uropean foreign policy that they vacate the field en tirely to the real great pow ers. I am tem pted to end w ith a sim ple plea to E uropeans to cool their enthusiasm for pow er and a role, to get on w ith the business of harm onizing their interests, an d , out of their regional confidence, to behave in the w orld like the m agnanim ous and constructive countries their w ealth and experience q ualify them to be. If they can, a d hoc, act together in good c au ses, so m uch the better. It is the im posed obligation

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to unity and uniqueness w hich is m ischievous. If they really have interests— econom ic, p olitical, o r m ilitary— w hich they do not share w ith others, obviously they m ust protect them in com m on. B ut if they d o not resist the tem ptation to seek out or invent such interests, they will only isolate them selves and fall behind in the search for international com m unity. A nd yet I am w orried by D ahrendorf’s w arning. If the E E C does not set about doing the im possible, forging a unitary instrum ent o f g o v ­ ernm ent, will it not rem ain a m indless creature, capable o f doing grave m ischief but lacking the internal d iscipline to deal w ith the conse­ quences? C an it m ove further in a com m on foreign policy than agreem ent on its basic grievances and resentm ents? In m eeting the com plex international issues w e all face, how m uch could w e expect from a peevish E urope? T he hope expressed by m any E uropeans is that the E E C will be an econom ic and social pow er, that in the new w orld equilibrium m ilitary pow er is unnecessary. It is the Japanese approach, as well as that of C anada and other lesser pow ers w ho are econom ically potent but w hose m ilitary potential, even in alliance, is increasingly seen as negligible. T h e argum ent against this is w hat the A m ericans call burdensharing. T his can no longer be understood in crude m ilitary term s, m eaning that Japan and the E E C should take over U nited States security responsibilities in their respective regions. It is doubtful if, given the present state o f the w orld, Japanese o r W est E uropean public opinion w ould perm it the increase in defence spending necessary for such a purpose-r-even if the U nited States disarm s substantially. A nd the paradox of the A m erican dem and for security burden-sharing is, of course, that the U nited States does not w ant the E E C or Japan to control their ow n nuclear w eapons. N evertheless, these g reat econom ic pow ers will be decisively affecting international relations in an age when resources and com m erce are the vital issues o f national survival. On these subjects divergence betw een the U nited States, Japan, and a hungry, but headless E urope can be sw ift and drastic. If the m ilitary burden cannot be shared, the burden o f m aintaining the essential structures of a m utually beneficial w orld econom y m ust be shared. It is not good enough, as is com m on in both E urope and the U nited States of late, to disguise a reluctance to share burdens and international responsibilities as a renunciation o f im perialism . T hat the m em bers o f the C om m unity will serve their ow n and the general interest best by acting as a bloc is an assum ption that should be reconsidered. O ne thing is certain. If they use their po w e r, in w hat can only be described as an old E uropean tradition, to bully and blackm ail w eak governm ents in A frica o r elsew here, they will propel the w orld

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further into anarchy. U nited States policy tow ard L atin A m erica could be cited as a precedent. B ut it is a bad precedent and one w hich now seem s as m oribund as the O A S . W e need to bury the m ischievous tw o-pillar theory w hich John K ennedy and his B oston gam esm en and their E uropean friends did so m uch to propagate. T he A m erican idea, w hich goes back to D ean A cheson and John Foster D ulles, w as that a united E urope w ould share w ith the U nited States a benevolent hegem ony in the w orld. Insofar as it m eant accepting responsibility and sacrifice to prom ote a peaceful and prosperous w orld com m unity, it w as a noble idea. B ut it had tw o great flaw s: it gave the E uropeans the w rong idea o f how they could act in the A m erican m odel; and as has been revealed in the V ietnam disaster it dem onstrated the gross erro r into w hich even a noble concept of hegem ony can lead a great and united pow er. T he danger, o f course, is the sw ing to the other extrem e: renuncia­ tion by the U nited States and o th er W estern countries of concepts larger than their ow n national or continental interests. T he reasons w hy the U nited States m ight turn isolationist at this stage o f its history are o bvious. It is a tim e w hen non-interference in other parts o f the w orld can look like a sound m oral principle. T hat W estern E urope is also in an isolationist m ood is less frankly acknow ledged, because E uropeanism is portrayed as internationalism . T he rest o f us are not in a position to preach serm ons, but we nonetheless view with anxiety W est E urope setting itself apart. C anada, in the throes o f a reaction against its active internationalism , is n o exam ple to any country. W e need E uropean energies on a w ider stage. Frankly, our historical m em ories do not perm it total confidence in the political w isdom of E urope united and ram pant; w e w ould rather see the E uropeans concentrating on som ething m ore useful and relevant than trying to transform them selves into a sem i-superpow er. T he prom ise o f a E urope w ise, united, and responsible by the tw enty-first century isn ’t m uch to count on for the issues crow ding in upon us in the rest o f the tw entieth: m ultinational corporations, com puter trans­ nationalization, global television, global p ollution, preprogram m ed nuclear w arfare, and the survival o f governm ent by the people.

N otes 'R alf Dahrendorf, “ Possibilities and Lim its o f a European Communities Foreign P o lic y ,” The World Today, xxvn (A p ril 1971). :See, for exam ple, M ax B e lo ff, “ The European Course o f British History,

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The R o u n d Table (O ctober 1971) or A lain Clem ent, “ L e temps des recrim inations,” L e M onde (25 , 26, 27 A p ril 1973). 3Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 152 4" T h e Community is W o rk in g ,” Foreign A ffairs, l i (July 1973), p .759. ’ “ Sources o f Strain in Transatlantic R e lation s," International A ffairs, xlviii (O ctober 1972). pp. 570-1.

Part Four: North America

T he question m ay be raised why this section is called “ N orth A m erica” w hen I argue in the essays against the excessive use o f the term . T he argum ent, how ever, is against using it as if it w ere a political or econom ic entity. It is an undeniable geographical phenom enon, and the relationship betw een the U nited States and C anada m ust be regarded as distinct in m ost, but not in all, w ays from our relationship w ith other countries— but then all bilateral relationships are unique and therefore “ sp e c ia l.” C ulturally and socially the problem is to identify and strengthen the peculiar features o f the C anadian scene— o r scenes— w hile sensibly recognizing that w e are a native and not a conquered part o f a branch of civilization one could identify as N orth A m erican. The problem is partly term inological, the failure of the U nited States to get a proper nam e for itself. A B elgian can be a B elgian and see h im self as E uropean also. If the U nited States had called itself W ashingtonia we could share the w ord A m erican m ore com fortably— provided, of course, the southern part of the W estern H em isphere had not called itself also after that sam e troublesom e Italian, A m erigo V espucci. N om enclature has plagued the C anadian nationalist. T here w as once the problem o f being both C anadian and B ritish, com plicated by the fact that the citizens o f the U nited K ingdom could never find a handy nam e for their island and a quarter.

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1: In Praise of National Boundaries: The case against creeping continentalism

T his is a revised version, w hich a p peared in S aturday N ight in July 1974, o f a lecture d elivered on 8 A p r il 1974 a t St. L a w ren ce U niversi­ ty, C anton, N e w Y ork, which fo r the p a st fo r ty y e a rs o r m o re has ea rn ed the g ra titu d e o f C anadians fo r the opportunities it h a s con­ sisten tly p ro v id e d to d iscuss "th e relationship. ” It is an audience to tre a t with respect, not to be bullied the way C anadian speakers usually m anhandle A m e ric a n audiences on w hose a lm o st total ignorance o f C anada they can rely. R esid en ts o f C anton are captives o f C anadian television, with no CRTC o f th eir own to p ro te c t them fro m foreign cu ltu ra l penetration.

W hat do we w ant to m ake o f N orth A m erica? It is not a question to w hich resisters o f “ c o n tin en talism ” in C anada have directed enough attention. It requires positive as w ell as negative thinking, because we cannot exorcize o r reject the U nited States. O n m any levels o f policy and practice w e have to think in continental term s. W e have to identify w here continentalism is appropriate and w here it is not. T he danger isn ’t w ell defined as “ c o n tin en talism ” ; it is “ co n tin en talizatio n ” — and m any w ho fight the form er are backing into the latter. W e are less likely to be continentalized by A m erican investm ent than by assum ptions on both sides o f the border that N orth A m erica is an entity rather than a co m m unity of tw o. T he best w ay to avoid continentaliza­ tion is to find w ays o f m aking the com m unity w ork. It is m ore im ­ portant to be non-A m erican than to be anti-A m erican, and m indless anti-A m ericanism could destroy a structure erected out o f long experience. T he threat to o u r identity com es not from the U nited States as m uch as from the idea o f N orth A m erica. O ne problem o f course is that the idea o f continental unification has been w idely regarded as the w ave o f the future. T here is the false 192

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analogy with W estern E urope. E uropeans and A m ericans have rarely g rasped the fundam ental difference betw een the E uropean E conom ic C om m unity and w hat the political scientists call the C anada-U nited S tates dyad. T he W est E uropeans deliberately seek political union through forced econom ic integration. In N orth A m erica w e are trying to preserve our political identities a gainst the strong forces o f econom ic integration w hich need no governm ental encouragem ent. W e have been intim idated by the alm ost universal belief in unity as an end in itself, by the insistence that internationalism requires the ex tinction of nationalism . T he m ost over-estim ated political value o f o u r tim es is unity. M otherhood having becom e a questionable virtue in the light of the population explosion, there rem ains unity as the universal blessing. W ho could hold unity in disfavour? W ell, I can, for one. W e have, for exam ple, the spectacle o f the W est E uropeans aggravating their natural differences into dangerous frictions in the nam e of unification, losing sight o f their ow n genius in the vain hope o f asserting pow er and authority in a wistful dream of the H oly R om an E m pire. C anadians are thrashing them selves into un­ n ecessary frustrations in pursuit o f w hat our leaders insistently call “ national u n ity ” — w hereas the great advantage o f being a C anadian is that we have never been unified. W hy does C anada exist anyw ay— and is it a defiance o f the c o n ­ tinental im perative, not to m ention love and brotherhood, destined to be am algam ated o r sublim ated into a larger hunk o f the planet as m an m oves to a higher level o f civilization? Surely it is tim e for us to reject those w orld federalist concepts w hich have dom inated too m uch idealist thinking— not because w orld governm ent is unattainable but because it is highly undesirable. It is hard to im agine a m ore m onstrous tyranny. G od bless the nation state an d , even m ore so , the tw o-nation state, and G od bless nationalism , the em otional ingredient necessary to keep a sense o f civic responsibility healthy. T h at has been an un­ fashionable view , but one could argue that the prejudice against nationalism , the idea that it is the cause of w ar, w as propagated by great pow ers w ho resented lesser pow ers standing in their w ay. T hat is a very cynical view , and like all cynical view s on international politics, it is half w rong— but half right also. O f course nationalism can be vicious. So can religion and w ine and a lot o f other good things. If I am sceptical about unity as a universal good I am not arguing that disunity is a virtue. W hat I am arguing against is a universal prescrip ­ tion. W e have a U nited N ations o f very disparate sizes, som e apparent­ ly viable, som e apparently not. T he patterns will ch an g e, but a n orderly system cannot be im posed upon it. T he d ism antling o f existing structures m ay or m ay not be advisable. T he creation o f som e new unities m ay be a good thing. On the other hand, if the peoples o f East

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Pakistan or east C anada com e to regard their existing structure as intolerable, it is doubtful w hether a pre-existing unity can be m aintained or im posed. T here is a good deal to be said for the attitudes o f new A frican states: that although they are the artificial concoctions o f im perial pow ers, their stability and chances o f developm ent depend on starting from the status quo. T he w orld is not, and presum ably never will be, laid out logically. All states— and not just C anada— are artificial products o f the politics and econom ics of past generations. E conom ic and ethnic pressures may be expected to shift the present pattern of states from tim e to tim e. We are led astray, how ever, by an unthinking devotion to the idea that the m ore countries w hich can be w rapped up in bundles the better. The B ritish tried that in the W est Indies, C entral A frica, and M alaysia when they w ere trying to launch successful nations out o f colonial dependencies, but it d id n 't w ork very w ell. It had been successful one hundred years earlier in uniting the B ritish N orth A m erican colonies into C anada, but that w as possible only because the U nited States scared the hell out o f those colonies. Internationalism too often has been a negative belief that barriers should be torn d ow n, that national boundaries are unnatural and offensive to hum an dignity. It is particularly hard for people on this continent to realize that the custom s and im m igration controls w hich irritate us w hen they interfere w ith our sw ift passage across our fam ous unguarded frontier are in fact essential guarantees of o u r respective w ays o f life, including our jobs. It is a level o f understanding w e had better acquire q uickly because the pressure o f grow ing populations seeking dim inishing supplies o f goo d s has begun already to challenge o u r national legislation and regulation, and these frontier barriers are going to be harder rather than easier to penetrate. T o this prospect the unreasoning instinct o f nice friendly peo p le is to tear the nasty barriers dow n. T h at is the path to unity. It is also the path to the hom ogenization o f m ankind, the dom ination o f g reat pow ­ ers, and the crushing o f sm aller ones. It is the w ay also to the m etropolitanization o f society, the abandoning of resistance to the m agnetic attraction not only o f the big countries but of the big cities. Sm aller countries do not exist only out of perversity. T hey exist so that governm ent, even in a cybernetic age, can rem ain closer to the people. T heir existence furtherm ore saves the great pow ers from intolerable responsibilities. C an you im agine the A m erican president having to lunch regularly with the prem iers o f A lberta and N ew foundland and deal w ith Q uebec over breakfast in French? T he threat o f continentalization com es not from governm ents but from forces beyond the control o f governm ents. T he m en in W ash­

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ington insist that C anadian nationalists are flogging a straw m an, that the U nited States has no intention o f annexing C anada or interfer­ ing w ith the C a n ad ian s' perverse w ill to m aintain a national existence, not to m ention their questionable national identity and their habit of plastering m aple leaves on their jeans. M any of them are fed up with the w hining o f C anadians about being pushed around by Big B rother and are inclined to tell them to run off and behave in unm entionable w ays. M uch o f that w hining should be offensive also to C anadians who respect their country. I not only agree that there is no evidence w hat­ soever of a U nited States intention to annex C anada, I disagree strongly w ith the sim ple-m inded assertion that the U nited States is planning to take o v er C anada econom ically. T he U nited S tates, thank G od, has no plans for C anada at all. It never had and I trust never will have a C anadian policy. T here are real problem s for C anada in the pow er and allure o f the A m erican econom y and culture, but it is m ore a problem of sellout than takeover. Insofar as there is an A m erican disposition to take over, it is m ore benign than m align. It is certainly not a conspiracy centralized in W ashington. It is m ore likely to rest on a m isplaced belief that C anadians as well as A m ericans w ould benefit from continental sharing— and that they d o n ’t like being regarded as foreigners. It isn ’t annexation by the U nited States w e have to resist now ; it is creeping continentalism , the incorporation o f C anada by suction into an entity called N orth A m erica. If C anada ceases to exist it is m ore likely to be death by hypnosis than by foreign investm ent. T he vitality of the A m erican m edia, from NBC to P enthouse, is such that C anadians are losing consciousness of them selves. T hey tend, for e x am p le, to be so absorbed in W atergate that they neglect those urgent issues o f confederation w hich are less like a daytim e serial but o u r ow n. Paradoxically, the branch-plant m entality in C anada is m ost notable am ong m any w ho regard them selves as anti-A m erican. T hey have aped and envied the big-tim e radicalism of the A m erican N ew L eft, ignoring the po o r o f N ew foundland o r east M ontreal to picket and chant on behalf o f such un-C anadian phenom ena as black ghettoes, the draft, o r C alifornia grape-pickers. W e are in danger o f becom ing a zom bie nation, our physical structure intact but our souls and m inds gone abroad. H aving gloriously resisted w ith o u r loyal m uskets the Y ankee invader on the slopes of Q uebec and Q ueen sto n , C anada m ay well be conquered by A m erican television. T h a t’s a hell o f a w ay to die. W e are obliged to protect our m edia and our e conom y w ith form al restrictions on outsiders. T he preservation of national distinctions, the m aintenance o f frontiers, is no m ore hostile than the sensible erection

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o f fences to clarify jurisdiction betw een neighbours. T his has all been said so often that I hesitate to say it again, but we do have to rem ind o urselves in 1974 o f this central principle o f N orth A m erican c o ­ e xistence because we are entering a new era w hen our relations m ay be fundam entally changed from those to w hich w e are historically accustom ed. Present trends indicate that the balance o f advantag e m ay now be shifting to the sm aller country even though that country is bound to rem ain the w eaker in aggregate pow er. C anadians ought not be over-confident o f this trend, for the w orld is in an unpredictable state. So long as the w eaker w as the p oor relation, w e m aintained a civilized relationship w hich w as the adm iration o f the w orld. A m ericans are a benevolent people and kind to the poor. But if the C anadian w ay o f living— as distinct from the standard o f living m easured in dollars per capita— seem s to be higher than that o f the U nited States in energy resources, space, fresh w ater, and urban tranquillity, w hat happens to the rules and assum ptions w e have lived by? A s a product o f m y generation I have an unreasoning faith in the civilization o f this continent to m eet the challenge, but I do think we should look hard at our basic philosophies and recognize new trends. A lready there has been a dram atic shift in the flow o f im m igrants, altering a century-old pattern of a preponderant flow o f C anadians to the U nited States. T he num bers in both ways are not great and that is for the significant reason that it is harder now to m ove residence. A long w ith this are the m easures now being taken by the C anadian provinces to restrict the sale o f land to foreigners w ho have been buying it up— particularly lake and sea fronts— to a n alarm ing extent. W e must consider the possibility that a shift of econom ic advantage w ould invite a shift o f population w hich could bring w ith it som e baffling and disturbing dilem m as. In the past the U nited States on the w hole played the gam e with C anada (a few foul b alls to the contrary notw ithstanding). It does the A m ericans all the m ore credit because it w as the historic view of A m erican statesm en that C a n ad a ’s existence w as an affront to G o d ’s clear design for H is ow n continent. C ontrary to current assum ptions in the U nited States and ab ro ad , I do not believe that the U nited States is by nature an im perialist pow er— although a lot o f A m ericans certainly have w ildly im perialist notions. T here is a dangerous A m erican im ­ pulse to im pose on other peoples w hat is regarded as good for them . A m ericans d o n ’t frighten m e w hen they play Y a n kee D oodle D a n d y or even D ixie, but the tim e to throw up the barriers is w hen they sing The B a ttle H ym n o f the R epublic. C anada survived because in spite of M anifest D estiny and the F enians and “ 54-40 o r F ight” there were enough A m ericans w ho believed that the founders o f the R epublic had

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intended their country to follow m ore enlightened principles o f interna­ tional relations. T hese quiet A m ericans seem ed to prevail in the end over the rabid senators and editors and generals w ho hollered at the C anadians to get in step or else. In any case, there w as the ripe apple theory in w hich to take com fort. T here w as no need, it w as said by a distinguished A m erican, to push, because w hen the C anadians w ere ready C anada w ould fall like a ripe apple into the arm s of the R epublic. T he natural assum ption w as that w hen C anadians were free o f the shackles of em pire they w ould choose liberty on its hom e ground, A m erica. T hey d id n ’t realize that the B ritish w e ren ’t using C anada; the C anadians were using Britain as a deterrent and counterw eight to protect C anadian independence. T he B ritish for m ost o f the tim e w ould have been quite content to see C anada go as q uickly and quietly and inexpensively as possible into the N orth A m erican federation w here they w ere sure it w ould eventually land. T he B ritish m iscalculated, like the A m ericans, because they regarded C anada as an aberration, an assertion o f bad politics against good econom ics w hich had no future. It is still C a n ad a ’s problem to convince foreigners— and to som e extent its ow n people— that it is for real. T here m ay have been som ething to be said for continental union at one tim e, although it w ould alw ays have been an annexation rather than a m erger. In any c ase, it is too late now — unless the w orld m oves into really desperate tim es. C anada has created o v er several centuries its ow n raison d 'e tr e a n d , w hat is m o re, C anadians now know w e have a good thing going for us. W e are suspicious o f continental projects. T he oil o f T ex as or the coal of Pennsylvania were not regarded as co n tin en t­ al resources w hen C anada w as in short supply. So w e are chary of U nited States proposals for a continental resources policy w hich we fear as an effort to apply to northern gas and w ater the principle o f sharing C anadian surpluses and A m erican shortages. O ur fear m ay well have m ade us too dogm atic, how ever, for there is an argum ent, w hich is at least w orth looking at, to draw up bilateral principles for disposing o f resources in the tw o countries based on the idea o f orderly a d ­ justm ents rather than the sharing o f resources and shortages on the present basis o f population and industry. W e have to rid ourselves of the notion that we alw ays com e out the loser if w e negotiate w ith the A m ericans or the B ritish. It is historically unsound, and it is dem eaning. T he recognition o f separate rather than com m on interests is in the h istoric tradition. N orth A m erica (north o f the R io G rande, that is) n ever w as a political entity. N either w as E urope, for that m atter. C ulturally and socially and, of course, geographically, N orth A m erica

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is a valid concept. C onstitutionally and politically, how ever, there is no such entity as N orth A m erica. O ur history is that of tw o separate strains o f colonization pressin g from the A tlantic to the Pacific in com petition w ith each other for land and com m erce. It w as not, as rom antic C anadians like to think, an heroic struggle o f C anadian yeom en against ruthless A m erican expansionists. It w as m ore like a contest o f rival territorial im perialism s in w hich the C anadian im peralists outfoxed the m ore populous A m erican im perialists and gained m ore than half the continent. T his is the g reat epic story o f C anadian h istory, the national dream . B ut although it w as a struggle w hich helped shape the U nited States also, it has alm ost no part in A m erican history books. Look at the index o f any book on the history o f A m erican foreign p olicy. U nder M exico the entries are lengthy. U nder C anada, one finds: “ see E ngland, w ar of 1812,” o r “ p .715 under N A T O . ” E ven in those new pseudo-histories w hich seek to prove that “ im perialism is as A m erican as apple p ie ,” C anada is ignored— and for a very good reason. H ow can you account for an honest-to-G od im perialist pow er losing h alf a continent to a handful o f scattered settlers w ho d id n ’t even have a road o r a language to hold them together? It is in the C anadian national interest to seek accom m odation rather than confrontation w ith the U nited States. T he legitim ate argum ent is over the gains and losses, short and long term . W e m ust recognize the difference betw een interests w hich are coincidental and interests which are com m on, because the argum ent for “ N orth A m erica” is based on a dubious assum ption o f m utuality based on geography. T here is no doubt of our fundam ental com m on interest, but it does not follow that w e have a com m on N orth A m erican interest over fisheries or relations w ith C hina. C om petition, the struggle for advantage, m ust be rec­ ognized as part o f our living tradition. It is not the result o f perverse and selfish interests interfering w ith a continental G arden o f E den. C anadians and A m ericans have had in com m on a high regard for the virtues o f com petition. R easonably restrained, it is healthy for nations as w ell as peoples and industries. A dvantages shift, and I think that C anadians are learning that this is not a zero-sum gam e. O ne co u n try ’s health depends on that o f the other. B argaining and negotiation are our perm anent w ay o f life. T here is nothing either unneighbourly o r con­ trary to the spirit o f alliance in opposing each other o r pressing our own interests. C anadians have a neurotic habit o f scream ing foul w henever W ashington puts it ow n interests ahead of ours— as if G oliath is alw ays in the w rong. A m ericans have som etim es thought C anadians should be docile in gratitude for protection. N either attitude is self-respecting. A question now is how A m ericans, suffering shortages, w ould regard C anadians enjoying not endless supplies but a m ore com fortable

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level o f austerity. W ill the idea that shortages should be shared gain strength? A nd to w hat extent are w e both obliged to share the shortages o f our E uropean allies? Since the Second W orld W ar the U nited States in an era o f alliance has in m any w ays recognized that a healthy and prosperous C anada is in its interests and has behaved accordingly. T h ere is too little recognition in C anada o f this fact. It is not so m uch a question o f w hat the U nited States has done to help us as w hat it has refrained from doing in order not to crush us. I do not share the view that C anadians should be grateful to A m ericans for pouring all that nice m oney into developing o u r resources and m odernizing our industry. At the sam e tim e, I c a n ’t feel any sense o f grievance against A m ericans w ho did just that. T he profit w as seen as m utual. M any C anadians fear that w e w ent too far in losing control o f our econom y in the nam e o f grow th, but surely fair-m inded C anadians w ould blam e C anadians rather than the U nited States governm ent for letting this happen. O n the other hand, I believe that there w as m ore foresight in O ttaw a after the w ar than is recognized. T he C anadian econom y w as precarious, having lost its m arkets in E urope and its hope o f finance from that source. T he risk of too great dependence on U nited States capital and m arkets w as fully realized, but the gam ble w as that in this w ay— and there seem ed no other w ay— the C anadian econom y could grow strong enough to hold its ow n eventually. T he alternative w as an E ast G erm an pattern. T h ere is no doubt the degree o f c ontrol surrendered has been cause for concern. On the o th er hand, the fact is that now w hen w estern countries are facing grim econom ic prospects C anada is recognized as being in perhaps the m ost favourable situation o f any. W hat is m ore, during the crisis o v er oil the C anadian governm ent has show n that although it m ay not, any m ore than o th er countries, control the interna­ tional traffic in oil, it can exert control on the export and im port o f its ow n energy resources, regardless o f the nationality o f the shareholders w ho seem to ow n them . O ur lack o f independence is a fact to recognize, but those w ho overstate it sap o u r will. T he fact that the position o f C anada vis-a-vis the U nited States has been fundam entally altered in the past decade m ay be better realized in W ashington than it is am ong C anadians— w ho tend to be reluctant and em barrassed m illionaires. W e shy aw ay from the responsibilities of w ealth and prefer the right of the poor to com plain. President N ixon laid it on the line w hen he cam e to O ttaw a in 1972. He said that C anadians and A m ericans m ust regard each other as m ature and in­ dependent nations. He and his advisers were well aw are that C anadians had been grow ling about their threatened independence w hile at the sam e tim e using the old argum ent about a special continental dependence w hen they w anted concessions in U nited States legislation.

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H e borrow ed C anadian language aboui m aturity and independence. C anadians tended to regard this statem ent o f the P resid en t’s as an acknow ledgem ent o f o u r right to be ourselves, but I presum e that he was issuing an A m erican d eclaration o f independence as w ell— independence of the o bligations o f a special relationship. It seem s to me that C anadians have m atured further since that w as said. It should be noted, nevertheless, that in spite of his acceptance of the continental divide, M r. N ixon could still talk about the desirability o f a continental resources policy. T here is a dangerous clash o f C anadian and A m erican p erceptions ov er those w ords. C anadians are in no m ood to be denied the opportunity to exploit our new -found advantage in order to raise our industrial base, social infrastructure, incom e, and population. T hat includes the right to surpass the A m erican level of consum ption. E verything m ust be done w ithin reason, o f course. L uxuriating in too m uch oil and heat if the U nited States w ere short m ight o r m ight not be a C hristian thing to do; it w ould be untactful and provocative. A lthough during the oil c risis C anadians insisted on their right to be self-sufficient before exporting, nevertheless they did not brutally turn off the tap when A m ericans w ere in difficulties last w inter. U nder stress they saw what they had alw ays recognized in the past, that it is not in the interest o f the w eaker country any m ore than it was in the interest of the stronger to disregard the o th e r’s d istress. T o have cut o ff all exports w ould have upset the equilibrium o f civilized b ehaviour on w hich the future o f the continent— and particularly the lesser pow er— inevitably depends. W hich is not the sam e as accepting the principle that C anadians m ust settle for the sam e level o f per capita oil supplies as A m ericans. T he g reat epic o f N orth A m erica is not the sharing of a co ntinent; we share only a border. It is that after having divided the continent by traditional rough and tum ble m ethods w e settled dow n to live w ith it like civilized peo p le— inventing procedures like the International Joint C om m ission and thousands o f ad hoc agencies to seek out equitable solutions for the issues we shall never cease to have betw een us. W e have been w ise enough to avoid supranational bodies w hich would im pose their d ecisions. T he U C proposes, but W ashington and O ttaw a dispose. Supranational institutions m ay be conceivable for six o r m ore states o f E urope w hich can balance each other. T hey w ould never be acceptable betw een tw o co u n tries, one o f w hich is ten tim es as p o pulous as the other. It is not A m erican arrogance but the sy ste m ’s bias w hich C anadians w ould have to fear. A w orld superpow er like the U nited States could not possibly allow C anada an equal say— that is, a veto— in form ulating its political and

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econom ic policies. A nd C anada in its ow n w ay has w orld-w ide in­ terests w hich by no m eans alw ays coincide w ith those o f the U nited States. W e share a basic interest in the m aintenance o f econom ic stability and a w orld w hich lives by rule and regulation, but w e have different view s o f w hat those rules should be. C anadians m ust and do recognize a responsibility to defer at tim es to the U nited States because a m ajority o f C anadians regard the health and strength o f our neighbour and the leading W estern pow er as a C anadian national interest. B ut, in spite o f ou r propinquity and our econom ic links, our econom ies are far from identical. T he w ide d ifferences in our populations, in the nature of p ro d u ce, the proportion of resources to p eople, the burden o f com ­ m unications, m eans that our needs in the w orld are very m uch o u r ow n. Perhaps the greatest difference betw een A m erican and C anadian policies is that the U nited S tates, unlike C anada, does not have an A m erican problem . T he existence o f a bordering superpow er is an overw helm ing factor for policym akers in C anada and introduces a defensive elem ent w hich is not at all a consideration in W ashington. H aving a tiresom e nag as a neighbour presents it ow n problem s for the U nited States but they are different ones. An exam ple o f the w ay in w hich our interests lead us not only to differ but to oppose each other in international conclaves is presented by the negotiations o v er the law o f the sea. A t the forthcom ing c o n ­ ference at C aracas as at other m eetings, C anada, along with A ustralia, w ill be opposing the U nited States and the o th er great shipping pow ers. W e m ay all be N orth A m ericans, but one country has the interests o f a great naval and m aritim e pow er and the other has the interests o f a country w ith little shipping but an enorm ous length o f vulnerable coast line. So that is w hy C anadians m ust struggle against this habit of c onjur­ ing up an entity in w orld politics called “ N orth A m e ric a.” T here is no N orth A m erica as there is an EEC, no B russels on this contin en t, and C anadians m ust firm ly resist the forces w hich press us into this form ula. C anadians and A m ericans do have som e positions to argue in com m on in w orld conclaves— including, for exam ple, a m utual in­ terest in opposing the protectionism o f E urope and Japan. T hese in­ terests should be regarded, how ever, as coincidental, not as perm anent interests in com m on, just as we have coincidental interests w ith A us­ tralia ov er the law o f the sea. W e cannot allow others to assum e that the U nited States is speaking for us. W e C anadians are, on the eve o f revolutionary changes in the balancing of p o w er and w ealth, in a highly unfam iliar position, and alone. W hat other countries m ight have the sam e interests as w e, w ith surplus resources to be defended o r shared? A ustralia o r N igeria p erhaps? In som e cases the Soviet U nion m ore than the U nited States.

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W e have one thing in com m on w ith the OPEC countries— oil to export. T he relatively good relations we have had w ith the T hird W orld, as a pow er too w eak to threaten them , are at stake. Perhaps w e m ay take o v er from the U nited States the role of im perialist enem y num ber one. W e cannot avoid being closer than ever to the centre of international controversy. T he historic triangle on w hich we balanced has changed its shape. T he search for counterw eights is still instinctive for C anadians, but the priority has declined— partly because the c ount­ erw eights have not lived up to our expectations and partly because we feel firm er on o u r ow n feet. W e are m uch m ore closely entw ined in the A m erican econom y than w e w ere w hen we conceived o u r place in a triangulated w orld after the last w ar. T o say that w e are m ore dependent on the U nited S tates, how ever, begs m any questions. It is on the relationship that w e are m ore d ependent, not the U nited States. W ithin it our relative strength has greatly increased and the dependence o f the U nited States on the relationship has also increased. W e are a very long w ay from being equal. Still, the new balance could be a healthier one and, as M r. N ixon p erceived, m ore m ature. T he adjustm ent to a new status can be difficult, how ever. It m ay be difficult for A m ericans to accept the new C anada in place o f the hunting and fishing preserve for w hich they had a condescending affection. W hat w orries m e m ore, how ever, is the capacity o f C anadians to grow into a new status as an econom ic pow er w ith increased responsibilities in the w orld at large, shedding the shin-kicking postures o f the adolescent past and the illusion o f poverty. O ur obsession w ith the giant beside us has obscured our changing position in the w orld at large. W e are being isolated by our unique good fortune. O ur sm all population, traditionally regarded as an inadequate m arket and a source of w eakness, has becom e, in an age o f shortages and pollution, an advantage. It is an enviable position, but a country rich in resources and space and short on people is increasingly vulnerable. C an w e live fatly w hile the T hird and Fourth W orlds collapse o f hunger and cold, w hile W estern E urope and Japan, w hich are not only our friends but o u r m arkets, face industrial and social breakdow n from inflation and lack o f fuel? Preoccupation with the A m erican problem has m ade us parochial. T he negotiations betw een E dm onton and O ttaw a and betw een O ttaw a and W ashington on resource issues are im portant, but they have to be seen in the context of the infinitely g raver and m ore threatening situation in the w ider w orld. O ur fuel and food are needed for m ore crucial purposes than the health and strength o f the C anadian state. W hen it com es to resources we m ay be better off than the A m ericans but together w e form the uniquely fortunate continent. A peculiarly seductive form of continentalism w e m ay have to resist is the tem pta­

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tion to w ithdraw into F ortress A m erican to protect o u r hoard from the barbarians. T hat m entality, bred o f fear, w ould lead us inexorably to the philosophy o f the efficient continent— a philosophy w hich has alw ays posed the greatest threat to the C anadian dream .

2: Political and Security Issues

In 1 9 6 9 1 was in vited to a p p e a r before the H ouse o f C om m ons S tanding C om m ittee on E xtern a l A ffa irs a n d N a tio n a l D efence to d iscu ss “the non-econom ic a s p e c ts ' ’ o f o u r relations with the U nited S ta te s which the C om m ittee was setting out to study. M y assignm ent was to pose questio n s ra th er than to a n sw er them a n d su g g e st where the issues lie. In m y introductory com m ents I sa id I would try to define the dilem m as a n d sta te the p a ra d o x e s ra th er than offe r solutions. This m ay w ell have been a rationalization, but I d e fe n d ed it by asking w hether we sh o u ld be th inking in term s o f solutions a t all. P roblem s betw een the U nited S ta te s a n d C anada sh o u ld b e regarded a s perm a n en t. T hey w ould not g o a w a y when we h a d “s o lv e d ” them o r fo u n d a form u la . It was a question o f “p r o c e s s ” ra th er than “solution. ” W hat we n e ed e d were the rig h t p e rsp ectives on the p ro c e ss so th a t we could live with the pro b lem s. W hether th e d istinguished legislators bought this I don t know . T hey g a v e m e som e g o o d lessons in the p o litic a l a n d security issues as they h a d to see them . F eeling w iser a fte r the event, and c ontem plating the things I w ished I h a d sa id o r h a d sa id differently, I p ro d u c e d a refurbished version o f m y testim ony which was p u b lis h e d in B ehind the H eadlines, volum e XXIX, M arch 1970.

T he present debate o v er C a n ad a ’s relations w ith the U nited States is distorted by tw o schools o f thought: anti-A m ericanism and anti-antiA m ericanism . T he sim ple desire to score points against the U nited States stands in the w ay o f reason. S o does the blind assum ption that any relationship other than total com m itm ent is unm entionable. A lthough I share neither o f these attitudes I shall try in m y analysis to take the ex istence o f both into consideration. Som e confession of faith, how ever, is necessary in advance. 1 reject the view that the U nited States is a m alevolent force, an attitude found not only in C anada but in the rest o f the w orld and in the U nited States itself. It seem s to m e as intellectually w rong-headed as M cC arthyism , w hich attributed all the evils o f the w orld to the con204

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spiracies o f M oscow . B elief that the U nited States is w rong in som e or m any o f its policies, for exam ple V ietnam , is different, o f co u rse, from the fixed attitude that U nited States policies and A m erican influence should be opposed and rejected on principle. If one holds the view that the U nited States m ust be purged of its sins, then certain conclusions on policy follow w hich have their ow n logic. It is not a view held by m any C anadians, although a som ew hat larger num ber, with less logic, borrow argum ents from those w ho do. I have left it out of consideration because I d o n 't believe it is likely to be a dom inant opinion in C anada and b ecause I cannot see any practical line o f policy w e co u ld follow from this conviction. O u rs is a long border on w hich to erect a B erlin W all. I do not believe that the U nited States as a state o r as a society is a counter-revolutionary force. It is still the m ost revolutionary society of o u r century. W ithin it there takes place the conflict betw een revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. It certainly has its sicknesses, but these are not unique. M ost o f them are shared by other W estern cou n tries including C anada, but U nited States sicknesses are, like ev erything else A m erican, extravagant. E ven its sicknesses, how ever, are a vant-garde, because the U nited States is engaged in a further expansion o f dem ocracy to include groups w hich did not p rev i­ ously share its advantages. T he adjustm ent is exceedingly painful, but it is a process in w hich other dem ocracies are o r w ill be engaged. O ur sicknesses in C anada, social and co n stitu tio n al, resem ble but are not the sam e as those of the U nited States. W e should profit by the exploratory errors o f the U nited States and also b e careful not to im port their problem s, racial problem s in particular, from a com pulsion to identify ourselves w ith them — a characteristic o f the Right and the Left in C anada. T o handle our problem s in our ow n w ay w e need to preserve our institutions and to change and reform them in our w ay. T o do this, the preservation o f national sovereignty is essential. W e m ust bew are of the bigoted defenders o f sovereignty, but w e m ust bew are also o f the w oollym indedness o f liberal internationalists w ho denounce so v ­ ereignty and nationalism in the abstract as evil. L ike m ost other things in life, sovereignty and nationalism can be good o r evil depending on w hether they are exploited to prom ote civic virtue at hom e and a sense o f national responsibility abroad o r un­ iform ity at hom e and aggression abroad. T here is no good argum ent in C anada for an archaic attachm ent to sovereignty o f a kind w hich w ould inhibit international collab o ratio n , but w e do not prom ote the cause of internationalism by allow ing the sovereignty o f a lesser pow er to be drained into the national sovereignty o f one larger pow er. O ne fact o f life that m ust be recognized is that C anada, if it continues to ex ist, will do so by sufferance o f the U nited States. W e shall continue

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as alw ays to depend upon U nited States forbearance. If the A m ericans turned ruthless, they could extinguish us. T h ey are unlikely to do so by old-fashioned m ilitary m ethods o r positive econom ic sanctions, but by ceasing to take o u r econom ic interests into consideration they could m ake life for us as C anadians on our p art o f the continent unacceptable. In considering our policy tow ards the U nited S tates, w e cannot forget the need to m aintain the basic good will o f the A m ericans and their governm ent. From this principle one deduces a policy of good sense rather than o f subm ission. H istory has show n us that we do not need to accept an attitude o f hopeless dependence. W e have, as alw ays, certain cards to play. T he m anifest destiny o f the U nited States has for nearly tw o centuries been curbed by internal politics and regional stresses w ithin that country. T he respect o f A m ericans for them selves and their ow n good reputation inhibits the U nited States governm ent, if not necessarily all its citizens. Increasing U nited States vested interest in the C anadian econom y involves m any A m ericans in the continuing existence o f C anada as an entity. O ne reason w e need to m aintain our sovereignty and the strength o f o u r governm ent is that through that governm ent we can negotiate w ith the U nited States governm ent to protect us against A m ericans w ho, for econom ic o r other reasons, do not care about C anadian sovereignty. T he good will w hich we need from the U nited States need not be entire. W e can live w ith a U nited States that is irritated, unfriendly, or even hostile on specific issues. T h e question w e have to bear in m ind, how ever, is w hether w e could exist if A m ericans regarded C anada as they regarded C uba in the early 1960s, a country w hich poses a serious threat not only to their w ay o f life but to their se c u rity .1 Here concludes m y credo. From now on I shall be endeavouring to analyse the political and m ilitary issues and speculate— with a few opinions but no convictions. W e cannot divorce the political and strategic from the econom ic aspects o f our realtionship with the U nited S tates, but, in the spirit o f contradiction, this is w hat I propose to d o . I shall speak of econom ic factors only as they affect defence and foreign policy. O f course they affect it e n o rm ously, probably decisively. T he answ ers to the questio n s w hether w e can or w hether we w ant to pursue foreign policies separate from o r in close association w ith the U nited States are to be found largely in our econom ic interests and our econom ic conditions. T he deductions from the econom ic factors are not, how ever, autom atic o r obvious. In this sense w e have freedom of choice in our foreign and defence policies and it is not true to say that our “ dep en d en ce” on the U nited States, w hatever that m eans, m akes us a “ sa te llite ,” w hatever that m eans. T here are factors other than the econom ic w hich play a part in the determ ination o f our foreign policy, in questions o f security and in the protection o f our national in­

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stitutions. It is w ith the paradoxes involved in the political and security association with the U nited States that I shall be principally concerned, w ith the alliance and its significance, and w ith the contradictions betw een the need w e have felt to join with the A m ericans in defence of shared interests and the need w e have to protect the interests and the identity which we do not share w ith them and w hich are jeopardized by the partnership.

Identification o f th e R elationship T o begin w ith we have a problem o f definition. W hat are we vis-a-vis the U nited States in the international context? A re we a p artner? an ally? A tributary province? A co lo n y ? O r a natural enem y? A threat to satisfactory relations is that the relationship is changing in fact but our definitions are not catching up. B etw een the idea and the reality falls the shadow o f m isunderstanding. T he change is largely in circu m ­ stances and should not be defined as if it w ere a sim ple change of attitudes and dispositions. T he definitions to w hich w e c lin g , at least in rhetorical statem ents, are “ a llies” and “ p a rtn e rs,” but these term s w ere conceived in the circum stances o f tw enty years ago. D uring that period there have been the follow ing changes, am ong others: 1 An explosion o f technology has increasingly differentiated the superpow ers from all others in m ilitary function and capability. 2 T o a considerable extent as a result of these technological developm ents, the requirem ents for “ continental d e fen c e ” have been changing. T he trend has been to lessen the im portance o f C anada in A m erican plans to d efend the U nited States, the continent, and the deterrent. T his trend, how ever, cannot be assum ed to be constant because technology can alter the situation. A requirem ent for C anadian participation in the A irborne W arning and C ontrol System ( A W A C S ) , for exam ple, illustrates the im portance the U nited States governm ent is likely to attach to C anada so long as there rem ains a threat o f bom bers from the U S S R . 3 T he changing relationship betw een the U nited States and the U S S R inevitably affects the position of their allies. H ow ever one regards the reality of deten te, there is the present fact of the Strategic A rm s L im itation T alks ( S A L T ) , begun by the U nited States and the U S S R in H elsinki in 1969 and due to be carried on in V ienna. It m ay be years before these talks produce results, but the fact that the tw o superpow ers are consulting together about their arm am ents em phasizes the differentiation in function betw een the super- and the lesser pow ers. W hether o r not s a l t will eventually end the confrontation o f the tw o

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blocs, they m ay restore in the m eantim e the tendency, notable at the e n d of W orld W ar u , for lesser pow ers to draw together, as w as already notable in the 1969 session o f the U nited N ations G eneral A ssem bly. 4 T he V ietnam w ar has shaken the basic C anadian conviction of tw enty y ears ago that w hen the U nited States is at w ar, C anada, w hether it likes it o r not, will also be at w ar. A lthough C anadians have been divided in their attitudes tow ards the U nited States role in V ietnam , the exp erien ce has accentuated a disinclination to be too closely allied w ith U nited States foreign and defence policies— either because these policies are regarded as w rong o r because V ietnam is the kind o f m ess we w ould like to keep clear of. 5 T he grow th o f a continental consciousness am ong W estern E uropeans, although it has not been institutionalized to the extent its devotees w ould like, tends to isolate C anada from its E uropean allies and force it into a “ N orth A m erican” role w hether it likes this o r not.

The Im p lica tio n s o f A llia n c e T he question is therefore: are w e still an ally o f the U nited States in the classical sense o f the term ? A nd, the supplem entary question: should w e still be an ally and does the U nited States w ant o r need us as an ally? T o answ er these questions w e should look first at the historical basis of the alliance. T he m ilitary alliance betw een the U nited States and C anada is a relatively new phenom enon and one that w as quite un­ thinkable in the first century and a half o f our tw o centuries of coexistence. T he principles of the new relationship can be traced to M r. R o o sev elt’s statem ent in 1938 that the U nited States “ w ould not stand idly b y ” if C anada w ere threatened and M r. K in g ’s reciprocal pledge that C anada w ould see that the U nited States w as not attacked through or across C anadian soil. T hese are still the basic features o f the N orth A m erican com pact. If they are now being questioned, it is largely because their relevance in an age o f intercontinental m issiles is less obvious than it w as in 1940 and 1941 w hen the O gdensburg and H yde Park agreem ents com m itted us to the concept o f partnership in defence and in defence production. In retrospect it m ight be argued that partner­ ship leads inevitably to integration, but integration w as not w hat was being talked about in the early 1940s, except of course in term s o f the desperate need to w in the w ar. C ircum stances change in a generation, and it is im portant for C anadians to recall that at the tim e o f these two agreem ents it w as C anada, not the U nited States, w hich w as pressing for the defence tie because in 1941 we w anted to involve the U nited States in our w ar. A fter the w ar, w e w ere as keen as the A m ericans that the defence p artnership should not lapse, partly because w e w anted to

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have the cheapest possible m ilitary establishm ent ourselves. T he defence partnership w as never forced on an unw illing C anada, and in the field o f defence production it w as w e w ho alw ays took the initiative because it has alw ays been to o u r econom ic advantage to do so. T hat is not a decisive argum ent that the defence partnership as it stood is still in our interest. It is intended m erely to provide som e perspective on C anadian interests w hen our vision has been clouded by the V ietnam W ar. In looking at C a n ad a ’s role as a m ilitary ally, it is essential to recognize that this is based on a com pact. In the late 1940s, the C anadian governm ent, backed by an unusual consensus o f the C anadian p eople, consciously and voluntarily rejected the option of an independent defence policy in favour o f a lim ited co llective security agreem ent in the N orth A tlantic T reaty. W ithin this broader fram ew ork w e set our m ilitary alliance w ith the U nited S tates, including the separate instrum ent for n o r a d . T he basis o f the com pact w as the sim p le belief that defence w ould be m ore effective and also less costly if resources w ere pooled and that an aggressor w ould be m ore effective­ ly deterred if he had to take into consideration an alliance w ith a disposition on the part of its m em bers to go to the defence of each other. C a n ad a ’s position w as neither selfish nor altruistic. It w as based on a cool estim ate o f C anadian national interests. It is proper that this com pact should be re-exam ined because o f the considerable change of circum stances, but it is im portant in regarding C anadian policy tow ards the alliance w ith the U nited States in p articular and w ith N A T O in general to recognize that a com m itm ent w as m ade and that our partners look upon us as fellow investors rather than as benefactors. O ur policies in the past tw enty years tow ards our allies m ust be regarded as having been based on this concept o f m utual interest against a com m on threat. T here is notable a considerable generation gap on this subject. T hose of us w ho w ere conscious during the w ar and postw ar periods accept the fact of the com pact even if som e m ay question its w isdom . T he younger generation is less conscious of it and som e of the confusion o f the present debate rises from this m isunderstanding. W e have to decide w hether o r not w e consider it in the C anadian interest, broadly conceived, to continue the com pact. If w e ac­ know ledge benefits w e should pay dues— although the question is asked w hether one incurs obligations through benefits inadvertently conferred. T he nature o f the benefits requires re-exam ination. So also does the nature o f the threat against w hich the alliance is directed. T here is no reason, fu rtherm ore, w hy the nature of the du es cannot change. T hey have changed in the past tw enty years: we had, for exam ple, no expectation o f sending troops to E urope w hen w e joined N A T O in 1948. W hat w e do have to bear in m in d , ho w ev er, is that so

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long as w e subscribe to the idea of a com pact and a poo lin g of resources, our defence policy is justified as a contribution to a broader schem e rather than as a strategy m eaningful in purely national term s. T he presence o f troops in G erm any o r C anadian assistance in defence o f the U nited States Strategic A ir C om m and are not isolated operations but parts of a com bined strategy, the sum total o f w hich is assum ed to be in the long-range interest o f C anadians. It can be argued, o f course, that C anadian interests have not been adequately catered for in the alliance program m e or even that it w as a m istake in the first place for C anada to take the pledge. W hat is essential, how ever, is to recognize that this w as a w ay o f defending C anada calculated as such quite freely by C anadians. It is also necessary to ask w hether C anada has already renounced the com pact. C ertainly its desirability is no longer unquestioned. Statem ents even by som e governm ent spokesm en seem to ignore it, but the recent renew al o f com m itm ents to both N A T O and N O R A D , although lim ited, suggests that the com pact has not been renounced. Like all o th er m em bers o f the alliance C anada has continually altered its views o n w hat its contribution should be, though we obviously m ust make som e contribution unless w e inform our allies that we have for good reasons renounced the com m itm ent to collective defence. A fair question for us to ask is w hether our allies, and p articularly the U nited States, have renounced the com pact o r acted in such a w ay that o u r renunciation w ould be justified o r desirable. T h e com pact, it m ust be rem em bered, involved participating in policy-m aking as well as in the offering of guarantees and the sharing o f burdens. W e have a right to ask w hether w e have had o r continue to have our share in alliance p olicy-m aking. H ere w e w allow in the uncertainties of w hat w ould be the fair share for a country w hich carries only a sm all part o f the burden— either of N A T O in general or o f N O R A D in particular. (T here is a controversial issue also o f w hether and to w hat extent w e should participate in the foreign policy-m aking not o f the alliance but o f our allies.) As far as N A T O in general is concerned, C anada has had as good a share as could be expected in the m ilitary decisions and political recom m endations. A s for N orth A m erica we probably have a grievance in principle. T he U nited States has not consulted w ith C anada as prescribed in the term s of the N O R A D exchange. Basic to this agreem ent w as the concept that if A m ericans and C anadians w ere going to fight together they should consult together about questions which w ere likely to cause the fight to b re ak o u t: “ T he tw o governm ents consider that the e stab lish m en t-o f integrated air defence arrangem ents o f the nature described increases the im portance o f the fullest possible consultation betw een the tw o governm ents on all m atters affecting the joint defence of N orth A m erica, and that defence co-operation betw een them can be

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w orked out on a m utually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently u n d e rta k e n .” 2 It w ould be hard to m aintain that this pledge w as observed by the U nited States at the tim e of the C uban m issiles crisis. E vidence is hard to com e by w hich w ould prove that C anada has really been consulted on the m ajor U nited States decisions concerning continental d efen ce, in spite o f the close and useful daily association o f C anadian and A m erican m ilitary personnel in W ashington and in C olorado. Recently M r. L aird m ade it clear that w hen he spoke o f C a n a d a 's being “ c o n ­ su lted ” over the decision on A B M s he m eant “ in fo rm e d ." T he basic question w hich this poses for C anadians, how ever, is not w hether we have been w ronged but w hether the N O R A D provision is realistic. G iven th e changing circum stances m entioned above, and especially th e cu ri­ ous isolation and com bination of the superpow ers, can C anada expect any real sharing in the m ilitary policy o f a superpow er, how ever well intentioned the latter m ight b e ? A nd if there can be no real policy sharing, is it in o u r interest to m ake our contribution to the continental defence schem e— a question by no m eans sim ply rhetorical? T he “ com m on th re a t” against w hich an alliance is directed requires consideration. C an w e speak o f a com m on threat w hen there is no single instrum ent but rather separate governm ents to perceive and define that th reat? U nited States strategists, w hen talking about n o r a d , seem to assum e that this threat is a perm anent fact o f life. T he question is inherent in the alliance structure, but it w as o f less im portance w hen there w as a general consensus in “ the W est” that the Soviet U nion and its allies w ere in one form o r another “ the th re a t.” O ttaw a never p erceived that threat in exactly the term s that W ashington did and frequently differed strongly w ith W ashington over the tactics to be used. T he m atter is even m ore controversial now w hen there are considerable d ifferences of opinion about the Soviet “ th re a t.” A s the superpow er, the U nited States, draw s aw ay from its allies in its responsibility, how free do we rem ain to determ ine the threat as w e see it? A re w e obliged to play our parts in an alliance the posture of w hich is inevitably determ ined by W ashington? A re not W ashington’s view s of the Soviet U nion and C hina, little affected by o u r interpretations, the determ ining factor in the international confrontation? As we increas­ ingly accept the philosophy o f deterrence and the logic w hich has led to s a l t , are we not m oving aw ay from the sim ple conception o f a threat initiated by the Soviet U nion and responded to by the rest o f us to a concept of Soviet-U nited States provocation and Soviet-U nited States response? E ven if w e are basically on the side o f the U nited States, we m ust recognize that its actions, over w hich w e have little or no control, could provoke the threat. But such logic leads to the sobering question: if w e insist, as w e have a right to do, that o u r ow n governm ent will

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m ake its ow n assessm ent of the threat, w here does that line of argum ent lead us? T o splendid isolation, m oral superiority, o blivion, o r a better stance from w hich to use our b argaining p o w e r? E ach conclusion can be argued. T he question w hether N A T O is the best fram ew ork w ithin w hich to conduct our alliance relationship w ith the U nited States requires exam ination. C anadians m ade no secret o f the fact that one o f the advantages for them o f N A T O in 1948 w as that it seem ed safer to join a m ultilateral alliance than a highly unequal bilateral alliance. T he ques­ tion arises w hether this w as a valid calculation or just an instinctive response to the old adage that w e m ust call on the O ld W orld to redress the im balance o f the N ew . W e have not been able to bring n o r a d into the n a t o structure. W e are left unaccom panied to deal w ith a superpow er in the difficult problem s of continental defence. T his naked confrontation is likely to becom e m ore acute as w e sw itch o u r em phasis from E urope to o u r ow n land m ass. So it seem s, but there m ay be an argum ent w hich could be put forw ard by our m ilitary advisers to show that the ability to com bine w ith other pow ers in N A T O institutions strengthens our hand in dealing w ith the U nited States. M ultilateralism is im portant in the diplom acy o f N A T O , w here th e com bination with lesser pow ers has been m ore effective in affecting U nited States policy than has C anadian influence alone. In general our ties w ith E urope fortify our culture and o u r econom y to resist U nited States dom ination. It m ust be asked, how ever, w hether m em bership in N A T O is at all relevant to m atters o f culture and trade. A cause o f confusion is that C a n ad a ’s relationship is not only to a continental neighbour but to a superpow er, a perm anent m em ber o f the U nited N ations Security C ouncil, an im perial system . It is hard to d isentangle contin en tal, N A T O , and U nited N ations o r other in­ volvem ents o f the U nited S tates and therefore to calculate our obligations as an ally to the w hole of U nited States foreign policy. W hat are the im plications of the N A T O /N O R A D com pact outside the N orth A tlantic? T here is no doubt that the area in w hich N A T O applies is a lim ited one and m em bers hav e, for exam ple, never considered them selves obliged to support m ilitarily their allies in their im perial problem s in A frica o r A sia. A lthough C anada allow ed the A m ericans to keep N O R A D outside the N A T O structure, recent C anadian policy seem s to have established the valid argum ent that the transfer of troops from E urope to N orth A m erica is not by itself to be considered w ithdraw ing them from N A T O . T he im perial pow ers w ithin N A T O , that is those involved in other continents, including the U nited S tates, m ay never have expected m ilitary support from their allies, but they have expected m oral support o r at least the absence o f active opposition. B ut no N A T O ally has given m ilitary support to the U nited States in V ietnam , and one

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of the causes o f U nited States disenchantm ent w ith N ATO has been the lack o f even m oral support from m any o f its allies. It has never been suggested that there w as a legal obligation on a NATO m em ber, not even C anada as a NORAD m em ber as w ell, to put troops into V ietnam . T he problem posed for the allies o f the U nited States, how ever, is not w hether they have a legal obligation to the U nited States in southeast A sia, L atin A m erica, o r elsew here; it is w hether their ow n national interests w ould lead them to save the U nited States from defeat or hum iliation on the grounds that the w eakening o f the U nited States in A sia w ould w eaken it also in the N orth A tlantic w here w e recognize its role in our security. T he dilem m a has not been acute because a superpow er like the U nited States is not dependent upon the m ilitary support of others to avoid defeat. A few divisions o f E uropean or C anadian troops in V ietnam w ould probably have o n ly com plicated the com m and structure, although they w ould have been im portant in the d iplom atic struggle. For C anada and other allies there rem ains how ever the consideration w hether they should use w hatever political and d ip ­ lom atic influence they have to prevent the w eakening o f a pow er w hich, in other spheres including the U nited N ations Security C ouncil, is regarded as an essential force. W hether U nited States strength can best be preserved by sim ple support of U nited States policy o r by o pposing it totally or partially w hen it is w rong is a legitim ate question for those who consider the preservation of U nited States stren g th in the C anadian national interest. A question w hich bothers C anadians is that of paying th eir fair share. C anadian social tradition frow ns on those w ho get a “ free r id e ." G etting a ride at half-price is perhaps m ore our w ay of doing things. H aving accepted the com pact, how ever, w e tried to m ake a respectable contribution. A s the question o f nuclear d eterrence seem s to get farther and farther from the things the alliance deals w ith, the problem of a free ride begins to look different. T he general assum ption is that C anada is protected by the U nited States nuclear um brella, and it is only right therefore that it should pay for protection o r do w hatever is required of it to keep the um brella aloft. In the s a l t age, how ever, it m ay seem increasingly as if w e w ere p rotected not by the U nited States deterrent but by the system of deterrence itself, a system w hich enables not only C anada but all lesser pow ers to pursue their contribution to w orld politics relatively free of the threat o f oblivion. S een this w ay, there is an argum ent for saying that our paym ent for peace is to m ake our ow n best contribution to develop the kind o f w orld w hich is in the interest not only of C anada but of the U nited States. T his m ight be done m uch m ore effectively if we did not get involved in further m ilitary expenditure. T here is alw ays, on the other hand, the argum ent to be considered that the system o f nuclear deterrence depends upon the

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effective perform ance o f the U nited States and Soviet system s and that C anada is an essential part o f the U nited States system . T h is may alw ays be a m atter o f opinion, but it again em phasizes the necessity of finding out w hat the U nited States w ants m ost from us.

A lte rn a tiv e Policies H aving in m ind the questions raised concerning the com pact or alliance relationship w ith the U nited States, let us look at various policies which m ight be considered. 1 W e could try to con tinue, as before, a policy of close m ilitary co-operation, sharing contributions and expenses at about the present proportion. T he advantage of such a policy is that w e w ould not rock the boat and there w ould be less danger o f the kind o f ill will in C ongress and elsew here in the U nited States w hich w ould induce unfavourable treatm ent o f C anadian interests. W e w ould also be able to m aintain the present special association w ith the A m erican m ilitary and civil bureaucracy and the special consideration given to an ally in p olicy-m aking. E ven if this special consideration is regarded as a w asting asset or less than ju st, it m ight be better than nothing. E ven if its positive w orth does not seem g reat, w e should consider the negative results o f being cut o ff the secret and confidential list altogether. T he principal question m ark about such a policy is w hether it is in fact possible to carry on as before a policy o f sharing. W e have never paid w hat could honestly be called o u r “ fair sh a re ,” even o f NORAD expenses. If, as is possible, the U nited States takes off in a new escalation o f m ilitary expenditures over w hich w e have little o r no control, can we carry on at about the sam e proportion w ithout being caught up in a sim ilar escalatio n ? W h en these m ounting expenses are the result o f m ajor technological decisions by the superpow ers, w ould C anadians be prepared to m ultiply their defence expeditures? It seem s clearly up to us w hether we w ant to take part in an ABM system o r an AW AC S sy ste m .3 If w e do, o u r defence expenditures are bound to m ultiply unless, o f co u rse, w e let the A m ericans pay even for the C anadian participation. If w e do not, is there not inevitably som e change in the nature o f our defence relationship? A n assum ption is m ade here that although we m ay w ell be given a chance to state objections o r put forw ard national interests w hich m ight be affected, decisions on these m ajor strategic policies are bound to be m ade in W ashington (or H elsinki o r V ienna)— not because the A m ericans are inconsiderate but b ecause these are A m erican, not alliance, policies and cannot be sh a red .4 In spite o f this assum ption, how ever, som e calculation o f advantages and disadvantages in going along is required.

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It is advisable, furtherm ore, not to describe the policy-m aking process in too absolute term s. T he opportunity for “ c o n su lta tio n ” on Mr. L aird ’s term s w ould never give us a veto but it m ay not be entirely useless. 2 W e m ight continue as an ally, declaring ourselves to be still on the U nited States side but w ith a m ore clearly differentiated m ilitary and diplom atic function. W e w ould accept an even m ore unequal partnership than w e have at present— both in burden-sharing and in policy-m aking. F irst o f all w e should find out w hat the U nited States does need o f us now for defence— defence o f the continent, defence of the deterrent. W e should not sim ply accept their prescription, but we are obliged as neighbours to take it into consideration. T o have a differentiated m ilitary function is an attractive political idea, attractive in the w ay the unique role in international peacekeeping and m ediation has satisfied our po litical needs. W e w ork better and m ore effectively if w e can do our ow n thing. T here is a great deal to be said for this political prescription, but w e have to find out w hether the m ilitary facts allow us to fill it. C an we find a form ula according to w hich we co-operate in continental defence on a shared basis w ithout getting involved in the stratospherically expensive operations o f the U nited States in the gam e o f d eterrence? C an w e retreat to M r. K ing’s form ula that w e w ill look after our ow n defences and see that the U nited States is not threatened from our soil? W e m ight quickly find ourselves faced with the question w hether a people w ith the largest num ber of square m iles per person to defend could in fact do so w ithout going broke. Can w e afford even to patrol our ow n cou n try ? If the A rctic is opened up and becom es as exposed a frontier as the A tlantic and P acific,5 can we afford to defend o r even just to m aintain all this lan d ? A re w e then driven back to an acceptance o f the view that although w e rem ain vulnerable no one is likely to violate us and the d anger o f their doing so is too sm all to w arrant ruining ou rselv es in m ilitary expenditure? O r do we com e back to the sim ple theory that w e are protected by the gam e o f m utual d eterren ce? If so, w hat interest in o r responsibilities for the deterrents should w e accept? T h ere is a q uestion w h eth er C anadian defence collaboration is a nuisance to the Pentagon. A fter the C uban m issiles affair, w hen C anadian collaboration w as not q uickly forthcom ing, there w as som e disposition am ong the A m erican m ilitary to p refer reliance on a u nila­ teral defence even if this m eant leaving C anada out o f their calculations. T hat w as in the period w hen the im portance of C anadian real estate seem ed to be declining. It w ould be desirable to find out w hether this attitude exists and w hether it is justified and w hether it has b een altered by the appearance o f such new devices as a w ACS. O ne alternative w hich C anadians w ould certainly find hard but m ight

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eventually com e to see as the lesser o f evils w ould be the gran tin g of b ases to the U nited States on C anadian soil. If we do not w ant to be w hisked off in the escalation of A m erican technology but are fearful of the consequences o f the A m ericans resenting us as unco-operative or neutral, w e could presum ably let them establish bases w here they need them — preferably in o u r w ilderness— and let them use them as exp en siv ely as they please. T hey w ould becom e prim e targets for an enem y o f the U nited States but presum ably no m ore so than if they were jo intly run. Such a concession m ight tie C anada less closely to U nited States policy than it is tied by NORAD. It could hardly be said that the presence o f G uantanam o inhibits the foreign policy of C uba— a parallel w hich has som e relevance but should not be pressed too far. It could be argued that the C anadian prejudice against having U nited States troops on C anadian soil is a nineteenth-century prejudice related to nineteenth-century fears. A greater tw entieth-century threat is the loss o f identity w hich com es from m ilitary integration in a collaborative effort. T here is the precedent o f A m erican troops stationed in a num ber o f E uropean c ountries for tw enty years, although countries separated by an ocean from the tro o p s’ source do not have the sam e acute concern for th eir sovereignty as w e have because their identities are m ore secure. Such a p ro p o sa l, it m ust be reco g n ized , goes so strongly against C anadian inclinations, both o f those w ho w ant to m aintain and of those w ho w ant to break the A m erican alliance, that it m ay not be w orth considering. T he pursuance o f this logic, how ever, does help us un­ derstand som ething o f our condition even if w e end by rejecting it. F inally, one o f the advantages o f this second course is an argum ent w hich adm ittedly goes counter to one o f those advanced for the first co u rse. T here m ight be less danger of incurring A m erican ill w ill if we clearly differentiated our function than if we pretended we w ere sharing and fell further and further behind in paying o u r dues. 3 T here is the course o f neutrality o r non-belligerency. N on­ belligerency is the position w e have adopted vis-a-vis V ietnam and w hich w e could adopt in other w ars, declared or undeclared, w hen the U nited States w as engaged in areas w hich do not directly threaten N orth A m erica.6 N eutrality is a nam e usually given to a policy o f w ithdraw ing from N ATO and follow ing the Sw edish m odel. It is a term w hich becom es less and less m eaningful as the w orld becom es less polarized. In C anada the argum ent for this position has to a large extent been based on the diplom atic advantages w hich w ould be achieved. T his is no place to go into the contradictory argum ents as to w hether non­ m em bership in NATO w ould or w ould not give us m ore ballast in dealing w ith the T hird W orld. It m ay well be true that our m ilitary association w ith the U nited States m akes us less attractive to A fricans, and it can be argued that it m akes A fricans take us m ore seriously. T he key c o n ­

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sideration in this context, how ever, is w hether C anadians are likely to decide the fundam ental question o f our m ilitary relations w ith the U nited States on the basis o f an uncertain calculation of our influence in the T h ird W orld, how ever m uch w e are told that the future of the planet depends on correcting the balance betw een rich and poor nations. It is not only our relations w ith the T hird W orld w hich m atter in this con n ectio n , of co u rse. Sim ilar inconclusive argum ents are raised as to w hether our independence from o r close association w ith the U nited States enhances o u r influence in the international com m unity at large. O ur W estern E uropean allies seem to like us best in the role o f loyal ally, although this position also causes them to ignore our special position in the alliance and lum p us against our w ill in “ N orth A m erica” on the assum ption that that is a single, constitutional entity. It m ay have been b ecause G eneral d e G aulle (as a result of our selling uranium to the U nited States w ithout the restrictions required of France) regarded us as irrevocably com m itted to the A m ericans, that he sw itched from a benevolent to a m alevolent attitude to C anada. It m ight be assum ed that the E astern E uropeans w ould respect us m ore if we w ere neutral, but there is also evidence that they w ould rather have us as a m em ber o f the NATO team , involved thereby in a E uropean security conference and NATO-Warsaw Pact bargaining, because o f our rep u ta­ tion for flexibility. A s for L atin A m erica, there is a strong argum ent that our relations w ould be com prom ised by too close an association w ith the U nited States in security questions. B efore com m itting ourselves to the O rganization o f A m erican States and full participation in inter-A m erican security and econom ic agreem ents it w ould be advisable to exam ine w hether our n o ra d and NATO obligations w ould in any w ay p rejudice our freedom o f action in considering interA m erican security questions. W hat w ould be the A m erican e x ­ p ectations o f o u r behaviour as a special kind o f ally in this system ? A s in so m any o f o u r dilem m as, the answ ers to all these questions are to be found not in blanket assertions but by carefully totting up the balance o f advantages and disadvantages, all o f w hich are still hypothetical. T he question o f neutrality m ust be looked at in term s o f direct C anadian national interest. It is for this reason w e have rejected it for the past thirty years. It should be looked at again in the light of changing technology and international politics even if it is only to discover again in a new situation that m ilitary disengagem ent from the U nited States w ould not serve o u r interests in the 1970s any m ore than w e thought it w ould in the 1940s. It has usually been dism issed w ith the argum ent that C anadians could not escape the holocaust if there w ere a w ar betw een the Soviet U nion and the U nited States. It can be argued, how ever, that it is b etter to be a side-effect than a direct hit. If C anadian participation in continental defence is no longer crucial (and that is by

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no m eans a certainty), have w e a right to look again at the possible advantages for us o f contracting out from an expensive g am e? T he g am e in any case is com ing to be m ore and m ore a question of shadow -boxing betw een tw o players. O ne w onders w hether, if s a l t con tin u es, we m ay not find o urselves in a position resem bling neutrali­ ty not by deliberate choice but by a train of events w hich shunts us onto the sidelines. T here m ay be nothing very useful for us to do and it m ay be m ore efficient for the U nited States and the USSR to play this gam e alone. U nited States strategic policy w ould then be determ ined in negotiation w ith the USSR rather than in consultation with its allies. T he threat to C an ad a, it can be argued, is not a nuclear attack upon us from the Soviet U nion or from C hina, as w e are unlikely to p rovoke an attack. T he danger to us is nuclear w ar itself, particularly if this is a war betw een one o r o th er E urasian p o w er and the U nited States o v er our c ountry. O ur principal defence interest, therefore, is not in protecting o urselves from the Soviet U nion or C hina but in preventing a w ar breaking out. Should w e consider the possibility that in due co u rse, if s a l t continues, w e m ight serve our ow n interests as well as those of the U nited States and the w orld b etter by being not a m ilitary ally o f the U nited States but the neutral area betw een the superpow ers on w hich m ight b e installed the devices of inspection or detection pointed in both d irections7 on w hich a strategic arm s lim itation agreem ent w ould be based. T his again is one o f those ideas w hich has political attraction for C anadians and w hich is w orth exploring. H ow ever, there is no c ertain ­ ty that it w ould be m ilitarily feasible o r even helpful. T hat w ould depend on the technology o f the superpow ers and the trend o f their d iscu ssio n s, and o f course on their political perceptions. Som e in­ vestigation o f the m ilitary aspects o f it could, how ever, be undertaken at this stage. O n the other hand, o n e cannot take for granted that the SALT trend is necessarily an argum ent for neutrality. E ven if the U nited States and the Soviet U nion are the single negotiators, they do in a sense represent their respective alliances. N egotiation progresses m ore surely w hen the negotiators play from strength. O ne cannot disregard the argum ent that agreem ent m ight be reached so o n er if w e stood behind the U nited States as an alliance just as the Soviet alliance is bound to stand behind its cham pion. T here is som e question w hether w e m ight, like other and m ore neutral p o w ers, exploit the cold w ar by p laying off the Soviet U nion against the U nited States. T h ere are presum ably som e questions on w hich w e m ight get Soviet support against the U nited States. If we should enter into a contest with the U nited States over A rctic sovereign­ ty the Soviet U nion w ould be likely to support our thesis. C alling in Soviet forces to prevent an A m erican invasion is not a policy w hich is

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likely to becom e real under foreseeable circum stances. In a sense, ho w ev er, w e do profit from the cold-w ar contest. A m erican good b ehaviour tow ards its neighbour is basically a product of their ow n best traditions; it is also stim ulated by a cold-w ar desire not to behave like R ussians. A suspicious C anadian m ight on the other hand see som e sinister prospects in the w ay in w hich the U nited States deplored but accepted Soviet intervention in C zechoslovakia on the grounds that each superpow er has rights in its ow n sphere. T he difference betw een A m erican policy and the B rezhnev doctrine m ay be sim ply that the A m ericans are m ore sophisticated and allow their neighbours a great deal m ore latitude in political form s. Interven­ tion in a n eighbouring state w here a form o f governm ent considered inim ical has been established is not beyond the reach o f the A m erican m ind. O n the o th er hand there is an air of unreality about this specula­ tion b ecau se the com m unity o f social and political attitudes in the U nited States and C anada, in recent years at least, is such that the likelihood of C anadians, anglophone o r francophone, w anting to install a governm ent totally alien in philosophy from that o f the U nited States is rem ote. S ocial, p olitical, and econom ic philosophies on this con­ tinent m ay , how ever, be in for drastic change and the com petition for resources m ay be renew ed m ore ruthlessly. C anada, w ith no concern o v er the grow th of its population, and the U nited S tates, turning like Japan to controlling its n um bers, could conceivably diverge in their social p ractices, and C anada could becom e m uch m ore defensive. It is still hard to see us turning for protection to the Soviet U nion, but the instinct to turn som ew here for m oral support w ould return if the endem ic contest betw een C anada and the U nited States for the resources of the continent becam e too raw.

P aradoxes o f Partnership T here is a paradox at the basis of partnership and alliance betw een unequal countries. W ithdraw al from the partnership could leave us out in the cold. W e can have little influence on U nited States policy if w e do not know w hat that policy is o r if w e do not know what is going on in d iscussions am ong the great pow ers. It is w orth, therefore, p aying a price for influence, especially if that influence includes not only a voice in w orld politics but the protection o f our ow n interests. H ow ever, if the influence we gain is m inim al, is it w orth paying the price? Do w e lose o u r freedom o f m ovem ent for an illusion? T h ere are even certain advantages in not being consulted by the U nited States. B eing involved in a process o f consultation m ay m ean being m orally involved in supporting the conclusion. If w e had shared in the decision to m ove to

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w ould we not feel m oral responsibility to participate in carrying out this agreed policy— even if there had never been any real chance of our changing the A m erican m ind. W e should be exceedingly w ary of schem es, usually w ell-intentioned, w hich em anate from A m erican political leaders o fferin g to give us a voice in som e body supposedly d eterm ining joint foreign or d efence policy— o r even a right to be heard in the Senate. T h o se w ho propose such things are rarely unscrupulous enough to realize that they are proposing a trap, but it is not one we should fall into. N evertheless, in considering this question o f policysharing and burden-sharing, it is advisable not to pursue the subject to logical conclusions. G ood sense and long experience suggest caution and resistance to the principle of integration, along w ith a disposition to pragm atism . In deciding w hether an alliance is the m ost satisfactory m utual relationship betw een our countries, one could also com pare and con­ trast our relations w ith the U nited S tates in the N orth A tlantic and in N orth A m erica w here w e are bound by an alliance and in Latin A m erica and the Far East w here we are not. It m ight be argued that there has been less conflict and irritation o v er Latin A m erica and the Far E ast because the A m ericans did not expect us to behave as m ilitary allies. F rom the tim e o f the K orean w a r there have been very considerable differences betw een C anadian and U nited States attitudes on A sian questions and in Indochin a w e have had separate responsibilities. T hese differences w ould have been rubbed raw if w e had been m em bers o f SEATO.8 F urtherm ore, it w ould not have been possible for C anada to p lay the useful m ediatory roles it essayed in trying to get and to establish arm istices in K orea and Indochina if it had been an ally o f the U nited S tates in those areas. T hese are sim ilar to a reason used for our not jo ining the O rganization of A m erican States; the d anger in friction caused by different perspectives if it is enclosed w ithin an institution. T here have been m ore direct clashes in NATO and on continental qu estions. H ow ever, one m ust recognize that there have also been a great m any m ore causes for conflict because the interests are m uch greater and closer. T he suggested contrasts in the various system s are w orth looking at, but it is necessary to bear in m ind that the N orth A tlantic and N orth A m erica are o r have been areas o f prim ary concern to C anada, and Latin A m erica and the Far E ast secondary. W hereas C anada is to a considerable degree a finite, a discrete state, the U nited States is a n im perial system . T his is to som e extent a reverse o f the prew ar situation w hen C anada w as involved in a w orld-w ide em pire and the U nited S tates, seeking isolation, did not w ant to be dragged into a w orld w ar by C anada. W hether we like it o r not, the U nited States has assum ed obligations abroad to m aintain “ w orld o rd e r.” T o som e extent it has created a pax A m ericana. T h is is not an ideal w ay of A B M s,

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m aintaining w orld o rd e r, but it is a pax of som e kind and it m ay be argued that it is better to m ove from a tentative pax to a m ore soundly and justly based pax than to relapse into international anarchy. O ne does not have to agree fully with U nited States foreign policy to recognize that its reserve o f force m ight be needed. E ven U nited N ations peacekeeping has been dependent upon U nited States m ilitary transport and logistic assistance. U nited States intervention in V ietnam and in the D om inican R epublic m ay have been m istaken, but there could be other situations in w hich the A m ericans alone o r through an international organization w ere asked to intervene by a w ider c o n ­ sensus. U nited States pretensions to intervention arise to som e extent out o f its responsibilities as a great pow er in the U nited N ations Security C ouncil. C anadians m ust ask them selves therefore w hether they have som e interest o f their ow n in m aintaining this pax A m ericana even as a transitional form . If so, then they m ust act in this recognition and consider how C anada m ight assist the transition to a m ore w idely based security system rather than sim ply d enigrate the present in­ strum ent. T h ere is an am biguity at the heart of C anadian defence. T h is has been well stated recently by a young A m erican, R oger S w anson, in the follow ing term s: “ N ational security m ust, if it is to have any c o n ­ tem porary relevance, include . . . survival of national identity and values . . . Indeed, in a strategic sen se, C anada is caught in a dilem m a o f K afkaesque proportions. A m ong possible threats to its national security are the U nited States and the USSR. T he one force (U nited States) that guarantees C a n ad a ’s security and thereby elim inates a second possible security threat (U SSR) itself then constitutes a national security threat o f a different nature and m agnitude, but o f no less relevance to C a n ad a ’s existence and id en tity .” 9 C anada conducts a defence on tw o fronts. W e are of course reluctant to equate the tw o threats and in fact we d o n ’t. T he threat from an extra-continental aggressor m ay be greater to our personal liv e s, but the threat from the U nited States is greater to o u r national existence. T he form er m ay be m ore fatal, but the latter preoccupies us m ore. T he acceptance o f this paradox is surely the beginning o f w isdom .

The R eleva n ce o f Independence T he question w hich obsesses C anadians is how independent w e can be in our foreign policy. T he first question o f course is w hether in­ d ependence should be considered an end in itself. M ost people w ould deny that it should b e , but they often seem to act as if this w ere in fact

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the case. O thers seem to think independence a frivolous aim . In itself it is em pty, but a considerable elem ent o f independence and the im age of independence are im portant instrum ents if C anada is to carry out a foreign policy w hich protects its ow n interests and contributes to the general good. A n answ er to this question is that w e can be as independent as we d are to be. T he U nited States is not likely to specify the bounds beyond w hich w e can m ove. O ur freedom o f m ovem ent is circum scribed not by orders from W ashington but by our ow n caution. W e could lose a good deal by being reckless. W e alw ays have to calculate carefully our various interests in determ ining the extent to w hich w e w ant to differ from the U nited S tates. In m aking this calculation we have to ask o urselves tw o m ajor questions. 1 A re w e likely to provoke ill w ill in W ashington and elsew here w hich w ill jeopardize our interests? 2 Is it in o u r interest to w eaken the U nited States or the credibility o f the coalition to w hich w e belong? T h is is not to deny that there are other considerations w hich should guide the C anadian governm ent to do w hat it thinks is right. A decision is particularly painful if O ttaw a considers that W ashington is m orally w rong and such a decision requires particularly strong public support. G iven the sim ilar nature o f C anadian and A m erican societies and the transnational cultural influences, w e are not likely often to face a situation in w hich our g overnm ents differ starkly o v er a m ajor m atter of foreign policy. In such a situ atio n , w e w ould probably be free to contract out o f any association w ith U nited States policy. In the cases of V ietnam and the D om inican R epublic, both in areas to w hich the alliance com m itm ent does not extend, C anadian governm ents have rem ained aloof but have refrained from condem nation. In neither case w as C anadian help seriously needed and in V ietnam C anada had the valid excuse o f its obligation to the International C ontrol C om m ission. T he consequences for C anada have not been notable. O fficial denunciation by C anada o r interference w ith defence production shar­ ing w ould undoubtedly have provoked a dangerous reaction. It should be noted that a sim ilar policy on V ietnam has been follow ed by m ost other W estern countries, a fact w hich raises certain questions a bout the uniqueness of the C anadian position vis'-a-vis the U nited States. In all cases, the reasons w ere p robably the sam e: uneasiness about the A m erican reaction to criticism , concern for the prestige o f the “ lead­ e r , ” a belief that U nited States policy w as m istaken rather than w icked and co u ld be influenced m ore effectively by persuasion than by con­ dem nation, and divided opinion in the country about the V ietnam w ar. W hether this cautious attitude by C anada and o th er countries w as wise o r not, one cannot rule out the possibility that there will be occasions w hen C anada will feel obligated to dissociate itself flatly from U nited

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States policy. E ven in such a situation, ho w ev er, the consequences should be calculated so that they can be coped w ith as well as pos­ sible. M y ow n conviction is that C anadian policy, as practised by gov­ ernm ents and their diplom ats, is a good deal m ore independent of that o f the U nited States than is w idely assum ed. T h o se, for exam ple, who talk about C anadian support o f o r “ co m p licity ” in U nited States policy in V ietnam concentrate their attention on the secondary (though not necessarily unim portant) factor o f defence production and ignore the m ajor factors, w hich are that C anada has not joined and has never considered joining the U nited States as an ally in this w ar— and has been free to do so— and that C anada acted contrary to A m erican policy w hen it agreed to serve the G eneva agreem ents o f 1954 from which the U nited States abstained. An exam ination o f the positions adopted by allies o f the U nited States on various international issues m ight be w orth pursuing. I have no doubt that it w ould show C anada as having acted a good deal m ore independently than m ost o f the oth ers, Britain and A ustralia in particular. T hose w ho w ant C anada to break free of the U nited States and follow w hat they consider an independent policy usually have o f course som ething m ore drastic in m ind than opposing U nited States tactics in particular situations. T h ey differentiate be­ tw een independence of m anoeuvre w ithin an accepted alliance relation­ ship and a policy o f “ n eu trality ” in w hich the com m on interest and affinity with the U nited States w ould not be recognized. A basic question here is not only w hether this w ould be in C a n a d a 's interest but w hether it w ould accurately reflect the attitudes o f the C anadian public w hich w ould have to support it— probably w ith a prospect o f som e personal sacrifice. A n assum ption frequently m ade is that C anada cannot have an independent foreign policy because o f U nited States “ c o n tro l” of C anadian industry. I will not touch here on the consequences o f this “ c o n tro l” on our econom ic policy, w hich are obviously considerable, but rather on its effects on our general foreign and defence policy. Here w e need a good deal m ore investigation. It is often stated as an obvious fact that U nited States control of C anadian industry m ust inhibit our general foreign policy, but this charge has been neither pro v ed nor entirely disproved. It is necessary to be specific. W hat does U nited States control o f our industry m ean? T here is no centralized control of A m erican industry from W ashington, and the control over C anadian industry com es from H ouston o r P ittsburgh o r D enver on the part of people w ho are by no m eans in collusion w ith each other. T hese people in H ouston and P ittsburgh m ay w ell have ideological objections to C a n ad a ’s recognizing the Peking governm ent or trading with C uba, but the question is how effectively they can and do translate this personal bias into a real im pact on O ttaw a. M uch has been m ade of the extension

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o f U nited States trading restrictions to their C anadian subsidiaries. The U nited States governm ent, as distinct from private U nited States in­ dustry, has been m ore co-operative and understanding in this m atter than C anadians usually acknow ledge, but it rem ains a genuine source o f irritation. A source o f irritation m ust be distinguished from a serious threat to the freedom of C anadian foreign policy. T he export o f a few D odge engines to C hina is less im portant than the right to sell w heat to C hina or to recognize Peking, neither o f which w e have been prevented from doing. T h ere are undoubtedly, as suggested above, inhibitions on our foreign policy arising out o f our econom ic interests in the U nited States. Is it U nited States control o f C anadian industries, how ever, w hich is the im portant factor o r the pow er o f C ongress to ignore our interests? C ertain A m erican attitudes on w orld affairs are probably carried to the C anadian business com m unity by its professional associations, but this is true o f a variety o f professions, including professional students. T he extent to w hich w e are tied to the U nited States by defence production sharing agreem ents is a special m atter. T hese agreem ents w hich, as suggested above, w ere sought by C anada and have been to our econom ic advantage, raised few questions until the V ietnam war, w hen the indirect supply o f A m erican m ateriel seem ed contrary to the o bligations o f a m em ber o f the International C ontrol C om m ission in V ietnam . U nless the w hole broad series o f agreem ents is renounced, it w ould b e difficult for C anada to avoid the sam e kind o f ‘‘co m p licity ” in any other A m erican w ar. T here seem s no practical w ay in w hich they can be suspended to cover o n ly the particular situation in V ietnam . T h ey w ould have to be rem oved entirely, and it w ould have to be seen w hether this w as possible, given the integration o f C anadian and U nited States industry. F o r those w ho believe that this “ co m p licity ” is im m oral, the econom ic con sequences will not be the d ecisive factor. T hat these m ight be on such a scale as to w eaken the national fabric and provoke U nited States ill w ill to a dangerous degree cannot be ignored. W e m ay be saved this dilem m a by a phasing out of the A m erican w ar effort, but the question rem ains w hether the likelihood o f a sim ilar situation arising in the future m akes it desirable for us to becom e less dependent on defence production sharing. It m ay be, o f course, that further differentiation o f o u r m ilitary function, suggested above as a p ossibility, m ight dim inish our claim for orders in any case.

In fluencing U nited S ta te s P olicy T he question o f how to influence U nited States foreign policy has becom e a m ajor preoccupation o f students o f C anadian foreign policy.

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O ne has the im pression som etim es that this is, in m any m inds, the sole aim o f C anadian foreign policy— to find out w hat the A m ericans are doing and tell them not to. B ecause o f the pow er o f the U nited S tates, it is o bviously im portant for C anada to consider its leverage in W ashington as a significant elem ent in its policy. V ery often this is best exerted m ultilaterally rather than bilaterally. An exam ination o f the C anadian record in the U nited N atio n s, from the ending o f the K orean w ar to the present C anadian opposition in the G eneva disarm am ent com m ission to the U nited States-S oviet proposals on dem ilitarization o f the seabed, suggests that co m bination w ith o th er countries is the effective w ay o f resisting A m erican policies. O ccasionally, as in the question o f sovereignty in the A rctic passages, the governm ent is not confident o f support from a m ajority o f countries, and it m ust play its hand w arily. T here are m any situ atio n s, both econom ic and m ilitary, in w hich C anada claim s a special position vis-a-vis the U nited States and does not w ant to be lum ped w ith the w orld at large. In m ost questions of w orld politics and strategy, in questions o f econom ic developm ent or international trade, w orking on the U nited States through international organizations seem s the obvious path. O n the o th er hand, on issues of continental defence o r m any financial and other econom ic issues there is not m uch help to be had from outsid e, and the best w ay seem s to be to request special status in W ashington. T he danger is, o f course, that this special status can be turned against C anada in the form o f special o bligations and expectations. (“ W e expected better o f the C anadians w hom we d o n ’t consider as fo re ig n e rs.” ) T here are various m ethods o f trying to have an im pact on U nited States policy, one o f w hich is through norm al diplom atic channels, a m ethod w hich has been m isunderstood by critics o f “ quiet d ip lo m a cy ” in principle. D iplom acy is by definition quiet. E very country in the w orld, like every individual and every private organization, rightly insists on the w isdom o f discussion and o f negotiation in c o n fid e n ce .10 C anada w ould becom e a pariah in international society if its foreign service officers w ere not allow ed to engage in confidential discussions with o th er diplom ats. G overnm ents can o f course be too secretive; that is another issue. T he possibility how ever that all diplom acy should from now on be through loudspeakers is a terrifying thought for peace-loving peoples. T he U nited States norm ally seeks to influence C anada by “ quiet d ip lo m a c y ,” but w hen it once used blunter m ethods, the issuance o f the fam ous State D epartm ent “ c la rific atio n ” concern­ ing C anadian policy on nuclear arm s on 30 January 1963, it w as denounced by C anadians o f all parties fo r not o bserving the accepted rules o f international behaviour. S om etim es quiet diplom acy is the w rong course because it has been tried and proved ineffectual, because public criticism o f one country by another is m ore likely to have an

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effect in this p articular circu m stan ce, o r because there is a m oral issue at stake w hich requires a public pronouncem ent. Even w hen quiet diplom acy is being pursued and statem ents by governm ent leaders are m uted, this is not a policy w hich can or should in a dem ocratic country be extended to the citizenry. B ut the role o f C anadian citizens, either singly o r in gro u p s, in influencing the U nited States governm ent and its citizens is o f gro w in g im portance as the m eans o f doing so m ultiply. A m ore effective use o f extra-diplom atic channels to affect the U nited States C ongress and a d m inistration, such as the C anadian-A m erican parliam entary m eetings, m ight well be explored. A problem for the citizen about “ q uiet d ip lo m a c y " is that if it is to be effective it has to rem ain quiet and he m ay not be aw are o f w hat has been done until the archives are released thirty y ears later. T h is is frustrating and un­ satisfactory in a dem ocracy. O n the other hand instant disclosure might w ell w eaken o u r position. T his is another paradox o f any diplom atic relationship w ith w hich we have to live. A particular reason for quiet diplom acy in dealing w ith the U nited States on w orld issues is that the tim e w hen we are m ost likely to im pinge on A m erican policy form ation is before the policy has been announced publicly. T he form ation o f policy in W ashington is alm ost like an international operation because o f the m any pow erful agencies involved. An advantage o f close association w ith the U nited States, based either on an alliance o r on the continental status argum ent, is that w e can often, though not alw ays, fully o r partially learn w hat the U nited States governm ent is thinking before it has reached its c o n ­ clusions. T his is often the best tim e to strike. W e w ould receive no secrets if w e could not be relied upon to keep them to ourselves. S triking at this tim e is no guarantee of success, but influencing U nited S tates policy on a w orld issue is not easy by any m eans. O nce policy has been form ulated by agreem ent am ong the agencies in W ashington and publicly announced, it is alm ost im possible to get it undone o r revised. N o c o untry, certainly not C anada, likes to change its policy under public pressure from another. O n the other hand, in certain cir­ cum stances public pressure from a num ber o f countries, particularly friendly countries, can have an effect on C ongress. Som etim es there is an argum ent for O ttaw a to put on the record in the final stage its disapproval ev en if it no longer has m uch hope o f changing the U nited States position. It could be useful in future— o r it could just cause unnecessary irritation. D iplom acy cannot be successful if it ignores the obvious rules of psychology. It involves not faceless forces but hum an beings. O ne pitfall o f w hich w e m ust be w ary is too close identification w ith the U nited States opposition; another is the danger o f being a nag. No country likes to think that the governm ent o f another country is in

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league with it opponents. T he response o f the C anadian governm ent to G eneral de G aulle m akes the C anadian attitude clear. T he U nited States, like any other country, is run by political creatures. If C anadian spokesm en take public positions w hich give the im pression that they are allying them selves with a party or individuals looked upon as antagonistic by the U nited S tates adm inistration, then o u r public protests m ay be c o u n terp ro d u ctiv e." It is not a question o f w hether A m erican leaders ought to feel this w ay; it is a question of w hether they as hum an beings do. On issues like relations w ith C hina o r the w ar in V ietnam , C anadians are constantly being beseeched by A m erican opponents o f their ow n g o v e rn m e n t's policies to speak up. T h is is not a request w hich can alw ays be turned do w n , and som etim es it is w ise to b e associated w ith a certain w orld m ovem ent o f op inion. On the other hand, from the view point o f tactical effectiveness, it m ay be the best w ay to gain the point. T h e o th er factor to rem em ber is that the president of the U nited States and the secretary o f state are exceedingly busy m en and there are approxim ately one hundred and tw enty-five am bassadors in W ashington anxious to see them . C anada has a special claim on som e issues but not m any. If w e claim th e special right o f the C anadian am bassador to be at the head o f the queue, then o f course w e are accepting a special relationship w ith the U nited States w hich can be turned against us w hen w e w ant to be independent. A nyone w ho is subm itted constantly to dem ands and com plaints from another in­ dividual is likely to resent the o th er individual and be less disposed to agree w ith him o r m ake concessions. B ecause o f the breadth o f the agenda o f C anada-U nited States relations we are likely at any one tim e to have a large num ber o f issues to take up. It will often be necessary, ho w ev er, to establish priorities. If we w ant the C anadian am bassador or the secretary o f state for external affairs o r even the prim e m inister to m ake a personal appeal to the p resid en t, we have to save these appeals for the m ost im portant issues lest they lose their force.

The S tru c tu re o f the R ela tio n sh ip T h is analysis has been largely concerned w ith the questions o f alliance w hich have preoccupied us in the past tw o decades. T hey will not go aw ay just because w e declare them old-fashioned, but one m ust w onder w h eth er they are the m ajor issues o f the 1970s. Priorities will alm ost certainly shift to the dilem m as o f the continental relationship. T hese are to a large extent questions o f econom ics, but they pose intractable dilem m as about the structures w ithin w hich the tw o countries exist and seek to flourish. T he relevance o f governm ents them selves is in qu es­

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tion w hen the private connections are m ultiplying at such a rate as to threaten the authority o f federal governm ents. T he necessity of C anadian sovereignty becom es m ore apparent w hen it seem s less significant. O ur problem as C anadians is that w e cannot pursue logical c o n ­ clusions too far. L ogic often seem s to point in the direction of integra­ tion, but integration is w hat w e w ant to avoid. O ur position is the reverse o f that o f the E uropean countries under the T reaty o f R om e. In their case they look to econom ic integration as a phenom enon w hich will encourage political integration. A m ericans and C anadians on the other hand are seeking w ays of rationalizing the continental econom y w ithout m aking political integra­ tion necessary. T here seem s little, if any, interest in the U nited States in political incorporation o f C an ad a, and in C anada the advantages o f a m ore tranquil state and a h igher standard o f living (as distinct from a h igher level o f incom e) have strengthened the will to political in­ dependence. A t the sam e tim e, w e are driven by the logic o f proposals for N orth A m erican solutions. T he concept of a continental econom y, for ex am p le, bears w atching for political reasons. T he continent developed unevenly in the past tw o centuries and w hen A m ericans have in m ind a continental resources policy they no doubt think in term s of preserving the present balance. C anadians, on the other hand, have a strong interest in adjusting the balance in their favour. For this reason, therefore, A m erican proposals based on the idea that w ater is a c o n ­ tinental resource are quickly rejected in C anada. T he C anadian aim has to be to develop its ow n industry not sim ply to feed the further expansion o f A m erican industry. T he language o f the continentalist is beguiling. C anada a n d the U nited States obviously have a com m on interest in developing peacefully and w isely the resources of the con­ tinent, but the fact should not be disguised that we are in com petition as w e alw ays have been for a share o f continental resources. T his is not to say, o f course, that in econom ics as in defence, there are not things w hich have to be tackled on a continental basis, but we m ust be cautious as w ell as sensible. W e have to be careful also that other countries and international organizations do not, out of convenience, m ake us part of a unit called N orth A m erica, because N orth A m erica is not a political or adm inistrative unit and if it is expected to speak in w orld affairs with one voice, the voice will not be ours. T he problem of integration as a principle for our structural relatio n ­ ship, either econom ically o r politically, is that C anada becom es a m in o r shareholder in the policy-m aking instrum ent w hich is bound to be controlled largely by the m ajor shareholder. B ecause o f the im ­ p lications o f integration, how ever, the m inor shareholder is bound by the decision. M ore appropriate to our needs has been the form ula o f the

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International Joint C om m ission in w hich there is full recognition of joint interests through investigation by a com m on board o f solutions w hich w ould be in the general interest. T he decisions, how ever, are left to the tw o independent legislatures. T he sam e principle and the sam e advantage w as to be found in the P erm anent Joint B oard on D efence in its m ore active days. A question to be investigated is w hether devices o f this kind can cope w ith the enorm ously increasing volum e o f business. Should w e look to a m ultiplication o f such bodies? Should w e try to co-ordinate the C anadian-A m erican bodies and rationalize them into a single instrum ent o f w hich they w ould be subcom m ittees, o r is that the inevitable road to an experim ent in supranational governm ent w hich is bound for C anadians to prove an illusion? T hese questions are beyond the scope of the present exam ination, but the answ ers w e find w ill deeply affect o u r foreign and defence policies. If w e decide that on balancing the advantages and disadvantages, the integrated continental e conom y is best for us o r that w e have gone too far to resist, then m any o f the argum ents outlined in this paper becom e irrelevant. It m ight then be best to seek a special status in the m aking of foreign and defence policy a s, it has been said, “ a kind o f extra­ territorial T e x a s .” T he pro b ab ility , o f course, is that w e shall do nothing so clear cut but will pursue o u r national genius for im provising conditions w orkable but undefinable. For the tim e being at any rate, the option o f a reasonably independent foreign policy reasonably pursued, w ithin reaso n , m ay retain o u r C anadian identity in international affairs.

N o tes ■The important points to note in this analogy may be that in spite o f its hostility the United States never used the m ilitary force at its command to conquer Cuba or drive out its governm ent. It resorted to sanctions, which could be resisted by a country which had a totalitarian government and was an island. Its w ill to overthrow Castro was obvious, but for reasons which are worthy o f study it never deployed its full m ilitary power to accomplish that end. 2From the exchange o f notes o f 12 M ay 1958 establishing the North American A ir D efence Command. 3On 2 February 1970 Prim e M inister Trudeau, in reply to an enquiry in the House o f Commons concerning President N ixon 's statement that his administra­ tion proposed to proceed with the second stage o f the Safeguard a b m system, said that there was as yet no evidence that the earlier announcement by the United States had in fact created an escalation o f the arms race, as the Canadian government had feared. Nevertheless, he stated that the governm ent was not happy “ that a friend and ally o f such importance should be seeing its w ay to peace in this d ire ctio n ." The dissociation from the United States A B M prog­ ramme was futher emphasized when M r. Sharp, in reply to a subsequent

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question, gave the assurance that this decision by the United States “ was made quite independently o f any consultation with u s ." 'T h e nuclear com m ittee recently set up in N A T O is cited as an exam ple of im proved means o f sharing policy-m aking. This is undoubtedly true, but there is a question whether it can have much effect on American decisions to commit themselves to this or that form o f technological developm ent in continental defence. There is always, o f course, the opportunity fo r Canadians to participate in the intellectual process by which doctrines are developed if they have adequate information. 5It can o f course be argued that it has been ever since the last war but w e have been slow to recognize it. 6It is presumably easier for us to be non-belligerent in a war which the United States wages without declaring war; a form al state o f war by the United States would involve a change in the status o f all their defence activities out o f which it would be harder for their continental partner to opt. This is an uncertain area which requires investigation. T h e rationale might be similar to that o f General de G aulle's famous policy o f

tous azimuts. “There has been in Canada officia l and even more vigorous public ill w ill over United States policies in various parts o f the Far East and in Latin A m erica, but the point is that the absence o f an alliance has reduced the amount o f in­ tergovernmental friction. '’" T h e United States as a National Security Threat to C an ad a," B ehind the

Headlines, x x ix (July 1970) 9, 10. I0lt is the Peking government rather than the Canadians who have insisted on the confidential nature o f the discussions over recognition in Stockholm. 1'There is reason to believe that President Johnson's coolness towards Canada was attributable to the fact that he thought Canadians w ere playing Senator Fulbright's game.

3: Canada, Latin America, and United States Foreign Policy

The n e ed fo r A m e ric a n s to p u t C anada into so m e c ategory is adm itted ­ ly a p ro b le m . N o u s ne som m es p a s com m e les autres. T h e tendency to gro u p us with oth er nations o f the sa c re d hem isphere was understand­ able i f w rong-headed. T h ere is a considerable fu n ctio n a l distinction betw een th e issues that arise with C anada a n d those with the L a tin countries, although there are a lw a ys interesting p arallels. T hat C anada is a burden they have to re g a rd as unique is increasingly understood in W ashington, as revea led in the special institutions they are no w settin g up to cope with it. It is disconcerting f o r C anadians to fin d them selves in sessions with a ll the oth er sp ecies o f A m ericans. C anada, they are aw are, has been in vited a s an afterthought a n d the p a ttern s u n d er discussion d o n 't fit very well. H ow ever, u n d er the inspiration o f an ex-O ttaw an, B a rry Farrell, th ere is a t N orthw estern U niversity a course on U nited S ta te s relations with L a tin A m e rica a n d C anada in which C anada is very m uch a centre o f attention. A visiting lecturer m ust cope with severa l hu n d red students in a class who are unexpectedly a n d uncannily aw are not only o f C anadian p o lic ie s but also o f C anadian p lo ys. S o when in 1972 there was a conference a t N orth w estern on “C anada, L atin A m e rica , a n d U nited S ta te s F oreign P o lic y ” it was n o t based on fa ls e assum ptions. The p u rp o se w as to listen to L a tin A m e ric a n s a n d C anadians p ro v id e th eir p e rsp e ctive s on U nited S ta te s fo reig n po licy. S o , o f course, the A m e ric a n s listened w hile th e ir g u ests a rg u e d am ong them selves— the L a tin s with the L a tin s a n d th e C anadians with the C anadians. It p ro v id ed an exceed­ ingly useful p e rsp e ctive f o r a C anadian to look a t th e su b je ct b eyo n d the conventional a ttitudes o f the deb a te w ithin C anada, a n d the p a p e r p re se n te d to the conference was considerably revised afterw ards. It has been p u b lish ed only in Spanish in R . B a rry F arrell, e d ., Latin A m erica, C anada and U nited States Foreign Policy (M exico: F o n d o d e C ultura E conom ica, 1974).

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S hortly after the last w ar the M a n c h este r G uardian, com m enting on B ritish foreign policy, suggested that it seem ed sim ply a m atter of finding out w hat the R ussians w ere d oing and telling them not to. A m ericans m ust som etim es w onder w hether their assum ed friends w ork on a sim ilar principle applied to the U nited States. T h is assum p­ tion that w hatever the U nited S tates does is bound to be w rong seem s, how ever, to be shared by m any articulate A m ericans. A stubborn persistence in the past decade in courses w hich have proved w rong has offered som e ju stification. U nless one accepts, how ever, ad eterm in ist interpretation by w hich all action o f an im perial pow er is m alevolent, such sim plistic assum ptions about the foreign policy o f any country are unprofitable. N ever having accepted the view prevalent in W ashington tw enty years ago that all the ill in the w orld could be traced to a sw itchboard in the K rem lin, I find the fashionable contem porary view that the c i a is the source o f all evil even less convincing. I do not think a significant num ber o f people in C anada, o r in Latin A m erica accept this perverse theory about the U nited S tates. T hey too often talk as if they did, and therefore their criticism , lacking consisten­ cy, is counter-productive in W ashington. I am not suggesting that logic and consistency necessarily prevail on the banks of the Potom ac; o r that U nited States po licy is itself consistent. It seem s at the m om ent particu­ larly contradictory because som e o f it is so good. W hat I em phasize is the obligation on non-A m ericans to resolve o u r inconsistencies. The m istakes W ashington m akes are m ore consequential than ours. N evertheless, w e are under the sam e obligation to conduct our policies w ith due regard to the w orld com m unity. W e m ust co-operate with larger pow ers rather than contract out to enjoy the luxury o f criticism . W e suggest often enough w hat w e do not w ant the U nited States to be and d o . W e give too little thought to the difficult question: w hat role do w e w ant the U nited States to play? W e give the im pression that we w ould like the U nited S tates just to go aw ay, end the Cold W ar by abandoning one side o f it, shut dow n its arm s factories, dem obilize its arm ed forces, and get all its troops o ff other p e o p le ’s soil. O ne principle that seem s agreed upon is non-intervention. H ow ever, no sooner have w e banished the A m ericans to im potence than w e insist they intervene prom ptly in B engal, R hodesia, o r C zechoslovakia. W e cannot m ake up our m inds w h eth er to cast the U nited States as bogym an o r fairy godm other. It m ust on no account intervene in other countries, but som ehow it m ust support p e o p le s’ m ovem ents. T hese contradictions are n o t, o f co u rse, alw ays m outhed by the sam e critics; I am thinking of the im pression given by a chorus. If, as is likely, w e assign to the U nited States a large and active role in m aintaining w orld security and prom oting p rosperity, we should accept the fact that the U nited States m ust m aintain arm ed forces and cultivate its ow n econom ic capacity

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and that it is likely to favour countries it regards as partners and expect som e sacrifices to be shared. In a w orld as com plex as ours it is bound, furtherm ore, to d eterm ine its policies w ithout taking into full con­ sideration the conflicting w ishes o f one hundred o r m ore clam orous countries. It should listen to others m ore than it does but the exigencies of superpow erdom are facts w e have to live w ith. First o f all we m ust ask ourselves how we regard the possibility o f a U nited States retreat from its over-extended responsibilities. T he balance o f argum ent in favour of m ilitary w ithdraw al from the A sian continent has grow n stronger the m ore w e have realized the disastrous results o f co ntinuing involvem ent. T he argum ent for w ithdraw al from E urope is less obvious because it rem ains the w ill o f dem ocratically elected W est E uropean governm ents to have A m erican forces rem ain. A m erican bases are being dism antled in A frica, and as far as Latin A m erica and C anada are concerned there are few A m erican forces or b ases to w ithdraw . It is the possible intervention o f A m erican troops rather than their presence w hich has been a grievance in the A m ericas. T he case for w ithdraw al o f the A m erican navy to hom e w aters has been less strong. W e m ay not like its landing m arines here and there or threatening B angladesh, but so long as other superpow ers are active at sea the policing should be international. A t the very least we should be grateful for U nited States strength abroad in the a ir and at sea w hen there is a natural o r a hum an disaster. If the U nited States is to pull in its horns, it is essential to build w ithin the U nited N ations an infrastructure for international action to cope w ith floods and earthquakes. If there is to be further UN peacekeeping, som e substitute will have to be found for the transport largely provided in the past by the U nited States. A w orld so interconnected as o u r global village requires patrolling. It is easier and cheaper to leave these things to o n e, o r preferably m ore than one, great pow er because if w e w ant a truly international pax rather than a pax A m ericana or pax A m ericana-S ovietica w e have to pay for it— and w e know from experience how d ifficult it w ould be to m ake it w ork. T here is a case, nevertheless, for a little A m erican isolationism . T he W est E uropeans, if they accept the NATO strategy, m ust do m ore them selves. T he U nited States, as the organizer o f the W estern alliance and the idea of a coalitio n of the righteous to m aintain w orld order, w as too bossy. In the early days o th er countries w ere w eak and the U nited States had to bear the brunt. By cajoling o th er countries to m ake c o n tributions, the U nited States provoked the idea that contributions to N ATO w ere not to a com m on effo rt but to the U nited States. E ven in southeast A sia the U nited States w as begged to intervene by local authorities. B ut this historic truth can becom e irrelevant w hen a country so pow erful and so m echanistic has taken charge o f its intervention. W e cannot return to attitudes w hich prevailed about the benevolence o f

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A m erican protection before the V ietnam w ar, but there is good reason for w ithdraw al at least until it becom es clear that in places and in circum stances o f another kind A m erican help will be w anted and justified. T his retreat tow ards fortress A m erica w ould seem to please R ightists at hom e and Leftists everyw here. T he latter have been crying, ‘4Y ankee go h o m e , ’ ’ for y e a rs, and a lot of old Y ankees are w elcom ing the m essage. T he trouble is that w hen we com e up against the harsh, rough voice o f A m erican isolationism w e are frightened by its im plications. Isolationism has not only m ilitary but also econom ic aspects. C onsider the shocked response to the N ixon econom ic policies of A ugust 1971. It was not so m uch the m easures them selves w hich frightened us as the voices crying for protection and a reversion to the ruthless attitudes on A m erican interests characteristic o f U nited States governm ents before their view o f their role w as transform ed in the M arshall Plan and Point IV. H ow m uch w e need and w ant A m erican investm ent m ay be a m atter o f debate. A m erican trade, how ever, is som ething none o f us can get along w ithout. H ow ever m uch w e p refer a variety o f m arkets, the unique absorptive capacity o f the U nited S tates is in the foreseeable future irreplaceable. If one believes that the confrontation w ith the com m unist pow ers w as the result o f U nited States provocation and that the w ars in A sia, A frica, and elsew here are the deliberate gestures o f neo-im perialism , then there is a logical case for w elcom ing total U nited States dis­ arm am ent and w ithdraw al o f all its forces and investm ents from abroad. T hat prem ise is too sim ple for m e to accept, but for those who do, nothing I say w ill be relevant. It takes, o f course, strong conviction to face the consequences. W hether o r not Soviet arm s w ere only a response to provocation, they are now of terrifying proportions, and the Soviet m ilitary m achine is show ing the sam e disposition as the A m erican to strengthen itself. T here are other aw esom e m ilitary m achines in existence. These are not Cold W ar fantasies; they are Cold W ar facts. T he problem o f how to paralyse this w eaponry is far from academ ic. N o governm ent in the w orld, not even the revolutionaries in Peking, seem s disposed to pack up its arm s and take a chance. Sm aller countries m ay do so because m odern technology renders dubious their chance to d efend them selves anyw ay. T he balance o f pow er is not a policy one advocates; it is a situation one deals w ith. T hose w ho say we can abolish w ar only by c hanging people are right, but there has to be som e w orld-w ide balance o f the pow er o f changed people. T he Cold W ar now is a m atter o f reverberations w hich will set off explosions if they are not tranquillized. Finding out w ho w as to blam e for starting the vibrations is a useful exercise, but it d o esn ’t elim inate the conse­ quences.

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W e are dependent for day-to-day survival on an equilibrium arrived at by accident and by design. T he paradox w hich brings the constant danger o f w ar is that the confrontation m ay in itself becom e a fram ew ork to guarantee p e a c e .1T he s a l t talks point in this direction. In the discussion about a E uropean security conference, m utual and balanced force reductions, not unilateral disarm am ent, are the aim . H ow long the s a l t g am e can continue in the face of C h in a ’s em ergence is uncertain. In principle, at least, one can see b etter prospects of equilibrium if it becom es m ultipolar. A n advantage o f this present tug-of-w ar situation ov er earlier concepts of universal collective secu ri­ ty is that it is less conservative. It allow s for shifts in the status quo w ithout im posing universal w ar. W hatever w e as individuals think o f it as a w ay to run the w orld, w e have to face up to the certainty that those now firm ly in charge o f governm ents, com m unist, non-com m unist, or neutralist, are going to play the gam e of balance for the foreseeable future— how ever beautiful and sincere their protestations that they are doing nothing o f the kind. W e have to ask ourselves, therefore, w hether the m ilitary im potence of the U nited States is in anybody’s interest. It is not necessary to believe in the virtue o f W estern capitalism o r the w ickedness o f co m ­ m unism to consider that it is healthier to have am ong the three o r four pillars o f the system one w hich is representative o f w hat is called W estern civilization. A deplorable aspect o f the V ietnam aberration is that it has discredited A m erican po w er and we cannot see it in proper perspective. It is hard to argue for the m aintenance o f A m erican m ilitary strength w hen it is being used for abhorrent purposes. In predicting A m erican foreign policy, how ever, w e m ight better regard V ietnam not as a precedent but as a traum atic experience. T he w ar has eventually proved that in the U nited States there is a system o f checks and balances. W e have been acutely conscious o f how slow ly it has w orked, but it w orks in w ays hard to discern in the m ore obscure superpow ers. W e ought to oppose by all m eans at o u r disposal the crim inal lunacy o f over-kill by both superpow ers and the continuation o f d angerous testing by four pow ers, but should w e expect the U nited States to abandon its position in w eapons technology? O ne kind o f lim ited isolationism som etim es suggested for the U nited States is a retreat into regionalism . A superpow er cannot easily extract itself from the w orld-w ide system o f deterrence o r renounce its econom ic as well as its security investm ent in other continents. The m ost one could expect w ould be a shift o f em phasis, the according of a priority, in rhetoric at least, to the affairs o f the W estern H em isphere. A s C anadians and L atin A m ericans com plain that the U nited States does not accord them the attention they deserve, w e should be gratified. Or should w e? T o w hat extent do w e really want the U nited States to

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concentrate its attention upon u s? Som e Latin A m erican countries w ould still like an increased share of the dim inishing U nited States public and private budgets for econom ic developm ent, although others seem prepared to live by their conviction that U nited States econom ic aid does m ore harm than good. C anada has never received go vernm en­ tal aid from the U nited States. W hether it w ants m ore private A m erican investm ent is a question on w hich C anadians have not m ade up their ow n m inds. W hat we all w ant are better term s o f trade w ith the U nited S tates, but w hether w e should seek a special arrangem ent for the W estern H em isphere is doubtful. If the EEC, with A frica linked to it, eventually becom es a c losed econom ic bloc and som ething sim ilar develops under Japanese aegis in East A sia, then we m ight have to c onsider w hether w e w ant to defend our interests in a pan-A m erican econom ic com m unity. For the tim e being, how ever, the fight against econom ic blocism seem s w orth carrying on in universal forum s. If continentalism seem s to be w inning out elsew here, w e are m ore likely to be driven into continental than hem ispheric solutions in the A m ericas. Latin A m erican econom ic co llaboration is a m ore concrete objective than an unnatural econom ic union o f the tw o continents. T hose in W ashington who take a backs-to-the-w all attitude now about the enlarged EEC, the threat o f Japan and other protectionist pow ers, seem m ore interested in a N orth A m erican continental fortress. T hey em phasize to C anadians the com m on interest w e are believed to have in protecting o u r joint econom y a gainst Europeans and A sians. C anadians think o f a N orth A m erican com m on m arket o r sim ilar schem es as a last resort, som ething to be avoided because o f their political im plications. For political reasons they m ight be m ore a ttracted by a pan-A m erican econom ic agglom eration, as they have preferred m ultilateral to bilater­ al associations w ith the U nited States. W hatever the political attrac­ tions, how ever, the econom ic argum ent is unconvincing. A lthough C anadians are am bivalent about “ c o ntinentalism ” they w ould rather have their ow n relationship w ith the U nited States than be assim ilated in a regional fram ew ork w ith countries w hose anxieties and re ­ quirem ents are not parallel w ith their own. In international politics and security our attitude tow ards regionalism is also paradoxical. M any people in Latin A m erica and in C anada still look to the U nited States as our defender against both conventional and unconventional aggression from com m unist pow ers. H ow ever, fear of a m ilitary threat from overseas has dim inished. If it cam e in a m issile attack the question is w hether the rest o f us w ould be targets only if we are associated w ith the defence o f the U nited States. L atin A m ericans w ho regard the U nited S tates as their protector presum ably think o f it m ore as a pillar o f the “ free w o rld ” in a terrestrial context than as a country w hich will rush to their defence against an attack from the

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Soviet U nion or som e unforeseeable overseas threat. T h e concept of the U nited States as protector has d im inished in C anada, but a m ajority still believe they have a stake in the U nited States deterrent and should contribute to its d efence. T he problem for C anadians is w hat m eaning­ ful contribution they can m ake in an alliance w here the strategic decisions are inevitably taken by the larger partner. In such circum stances it is hard to see a case for a hem ispheric security organization. E ven the case for a united front against guerrillas has w eakened as the L eft disunites. T here is no urgent need to d ism an ­ tle existing bilateral and m ultilateral security arrangem ents w hich associate us w ith the U nited States in the various w ays in w hich we w ant to be associated. T o w hat extent the O rganization of A m erican States should be strengthened o r m aintained seem s largely a m atter for Latin A m ericans to decide. T he m eeting at Vina del M ar in w hich Latin A m ericans caucused to present a unified position to the U nited States m ay give the organization a new raison d ’etre. It is not one, how ever, w hich encourages C anadian e n try . C anadians w ould not w ant to be part o f a N orth A m erican bloc in the OAS. T he suggested role for C anada of m ediator betw een the U nited States and the Latin A m ericans should be regarded as an occasional rather than a professional occupation. If W ashington w ants to strengthen the hem ispheric association it w ould be w ell advised in the present clim ate to listen but avoid leadership. The present untidy netw ork o f associations w orks reasonably w ell and is adaptable to such desirable m oves as closer unity of L atin A m ericans. W e should discourage com pulsive organizers attracted to grand designs for a new W estern H em isphere. T he trouble w ith a new W estern H em isphere regionalism is the sam e trouble there has alw ays been. All parts o f it have their ow n deep involvem ents in other continents. A s a pole-to-pole area it is strategically and econom ically incom ­ prehensible. In the age of intercontinental m issiles, intercontinental guerrillas, and intercontinental corporations, it is hard to find a function even for the M onroe D octrine. For C anadians an A m erican interest in co ntinentalism is a m ore urgent concern. Fear has been expressed that the U nited States, rebuffed m ilitarily in A sia and faced w ith pow erful econom ic blocs abroad, will pursue a new m anifest destin y , som e signs of w hich are detectable. W hat w orries C anadians is that the U nited States, short of p ow er to m aintain its fantastic industry and standard of living, w ill take a m ore ruthless attitude tow ards resources existing on this continent. T he President has him self suggested that he w ould like talks with C anada about a continental resources policy, and C anadians have shuddered for reasons w hich are perhaps hard for A m ericans to un­ d erstand. T hey have feared that the N ixon econom ic m easures of A ugust 1971 indicated an intention to force them into acquiescence. If

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w e are to avoid serious clashes, A m ericans outside as well as inside W ashington should understand this C anadian fear o f “ contin e n talism .” A m ericans m ay well be confused because a debate rages in C anada on the subject. T here are C anadians happy to exploit the A m erican need for oil, g as, o r w ater pow er to m ake a quick buck. T hey assure their A m erican friends that econom ic nationalism in C anada is just the yacking o f a bunch o f feckless p rofessors— but they are only partly right. T he federal governm ent is increasingly responsive to those w ho argue that C anada, if it is not to rem ain a subsidiary p roducer of raw m aterial for a w ealthy, populous A m erican industrial state, m ust conserve these resources to develop further its ow n industry and population. A m ericans m ay find it difficult to understand w hy C anadians w ould not be interested in continental planning based on fair shares. The C anadian argum ent is that if the A m ericans have used up prodigally their share o f resources they ought not to consider C anadian resources, and in p articular C anadian w ater pow er, as continental. If fair shares im plies an acceptance o f the status quo, that does not appeal to C anadians as they believe they have the w herew ithal to increase their ratio o f industry and population. C anadians have learned, furtherm ore, that it is unw ise to have A m erican industry and settlem ent becom e dependent on C anadian sources o f energy. T h ey know , for exam ple, that if a large industry and new cities grow up in the A m erican northw est on po w er and irrigation from C anada, to cut off the flow w hen it is needed at hom e w ould be a casus belli. It m ay take a good deal o f understanding on the part o f A m ericans if heating and lighting and air c o nditioning, as well as industry, in the U nited States should run d ow n w hile C anadians enjoy the advantages o f a larger ratio of resources to population. T he U nited States has been a good neighbour o f C anada w hen A m ericans had no obvious reason to envy the C anadian standard o f living. H ow w ould they adjust if the C anadian quality o f life is apparently h igher? T here will be opportunities for A m ericans to play rough. T h ere is a d ifference o f view betw een C anadian provincial governm ents, includ­ ing that o f Q uebec, and the federal governm ent on selling resources to the U nited States and im porting U nited States investm ent. T he o pportunities for A m erican private as well as public interests to exploit this difference are obvious. A C anadian can only plead that A m ericans bear in m ind their long-range interest in a healthy and reasonably united C anada on their border. A m ericans m ight bear in m ind also that C anada w as created and confederated by threats from the south. A C anadian considering what he w ould like the U nited States to do or not do is confronted with the am orphousness and intangibility o f “ the

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U nited S tates” o r “ the A m e ric a n s.” H ow can one persuade or force or even bargain w ith this “ it” o r “ th e m ? ” O n questions o f foreign and defence policy the governm ent in W ashington takes d ecisions, but the w ay to the decision-m aking process is difficult. T he State D epartm ent, through w hich C anadian diplom ats d eal, is not d ecisive, and to secure attention a foreign governm ent has to cam paign on m any fronts. It has to get involved in the political side o f governm ent but avoid the kind o f involvem ent w ith opposition elem ents w hich w ould turn sour the pow ers-that-be. W e cannot ask the U nited States to alter its form o f governm ent. W e can plead for deeper understanding o f C anada o r w e can m ake A m erican legislators conscious o f the strength o f our bargaining hand. W ellm eaning A m ericans from tim e to tim e suggest that C anada m ight have observer status in the Senate o r som e form al right to a part in the U nited States decision-m aking process. T h is is for C anadians the w rong kind o f solution. It w ould sim ply com m it C anada in advance— m orally if not constitutionally— to share responsibility for policies in the m aking of w hich it had a m ore assured position but on w hich its influence could rarely be decisive. M ore interesting m ight be a special right to point out, before im portant A m erican foreign and defence policy decisions are m ade, in w hat respects they could harm C anada. In the case of a b m s , for exam ple, a C anadian opportunity to explain the co n se ­ quences on C anadian territory w as reasonable to expect. It w ould be a right o f com plaint only, not intended to im ply that policy m ade in W ashington should be considered joint policy. H ow ever, w e w ould have to reckon w ith political assum ptions rather than legal obligations. Favoured treatm ent based on a continental association w ould dim inish C anadian independence because it w ould encourage an assum ption of partnership w hich m akes a C anadian g overnm ent’s decision to go its ow n w ay look like disloyalty. C anadians talk too often as if it w as their sovereignty w hich is at issue rather than their freedom of m ovem ent. C a n ad a ’s sovereignty, its legal right to do w hat it likes, is lim ited only by international agreem ents to w hich it has freely subscribed. W hat w e are concerned about is what a country can get aw ay with in a w orld in w hich its spraw ling interests drive it in contrary directions. R ivers across borders flow in both directions. Som etim es it is in our interest to m aintain dow nstream benefits and som etim es it is in the interests of the U nited States to do so. T hat is w hat foreign relations across a long continental dividing line are largely about. T h ere is nothing the U nited States need do to assure us o f our sovereignty in general, although there are som e specific questions o f encroachm ent on our sovereignty in the north and by the extraterritorial application o f U nited States econom ic legisla-

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tion. T hese are, how ever, aspects o f the m anoeuvering for advantage w hich is endem ic in a divided continent. T he U nited States governm ent has the absolute pow er to get aw ay w ith w hat it w ants. C anadians can appeal to its b etter instincts, take it to court, o r retaliate. T he threat of retaliation varies in effectiveness depending on the issue but, as the recent controversy over the surcharge revealed, there is a healthy realization on both sides that it involves an escalation w hich is in no o n e ’s best interest. D ealing w ith the U nited States governm ent is relatively sim ple. Our m ajor problem s result from the exuberant operations o f A m erican private enterprises o f all k in d s, industrial and cultural, over w hich W ashington has lim ited control. T he U nited States governm ent can be an ally in seeking to restrain o perations by A m erican enterprises which do harm abroad. N ot only in the State D epartm ent but also in other policy-m aking establishm ents in W ashington there are peo p le c o n ­ cerned w ith the global relationship w ith C anada and disturbed at A m ericans w ho upset this. A ppeals by C anada have alleviated the im pact o f A m erican legislation governing, in accordance with A m erican not C anadian foreign policy, the A m erican subsidiaries in C anada— notably in connection w ith sales to C hina. Som e C anadians com plain that their diplom ats w ho deal with A m ericans turn soft. T hey forget the im portance for C anada o f the softening up process o f their opposite num bers. D iplom ats and other bureaucrats recognize m ore clearly than m ost citizens that w e m ust not play a zero-sum gam e in N orth A m erica. M ost C anadians are aw are that the A m erican econom ic threat is a hydra-headed creature. N evertheless, too m uch political rhetoric im ­ plies that w e are faced w ith a m onolith, rather like M r. D u lles’s vision o f the K rem lin, in a vast conspiracy against our independence and prosperity. T he trouble w ith that assum ption is not so m uch that it is u n fair as that it is a w rong d iagnosis. E ven efforts to apply it system ically get aw fully far-fetched b ecause C anada is very aw kw ardly type-cast as the victim o f im perialism . L e defi am ericain is the product o f the enorm ous vitality o f the A m erican econom y and the A m erican culture. It is based not in W ashington but in N ew Y ork and H ouston and H ollyw ood and C am bridge, M ass., and is anything but m onolithic. T he U nited States governm ent could not bottle it even if it w anted to. T h is “ th rea t” is regarded by m ost C anadians as a m ixed blessing. B efore w e know w hat, if anything, w e w ant the U nited States gov­ ernm ent to do about it, w e have to decide w hat restrictions 22 m illion C anadians can agree on. A nd in m ost cases it is up to the C anadian rather than the U nited States governm ent to do som ething. C anadians too often think their problem s are unique, but le defi a m ericain 'is universal. W e resent the w ay progress and m odernization

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are regarded as synonym s for A m ericanization, but w e m ake the sam e m istake in reverse by identifying the evils o f industrialization and pollution w ith one country. A m erican corruption is an advance case of a universal disease. W e w ant to profit from A m erican m istakes but we do not escape the disease by quarantining the U nited States. C onsider, for exam ple, the problem s posed by the prevalence in C anada of foreign, especially A m erican, corporations. T he question o f m ultina­ tional corporations is a com plex issue for the w orld at large. T here is a grow ing opinion that these corporations m ust be brought under som e control and that it is in the interests o f the U nited States as well as other governm ents that this be done. H ow ever, the im position o f controls raises alm ost as m any problem s as it solves. B ecause o f the ram ifications, w e are not likely to get at the m ain issues by a bilateral approach. T here are plenty o f A m ericans concerned w ith the problem in and out of W ashington, and w e are m ore likely to m ake p rogress if w e regard this as a co-operative international enterprise rather than an anti-A m erican cam paign. In the m eantim e there are advantages in that the A m erican “ th re a t" is undisciplined. N one of the g reat corporations is guided solely by the national interests o f the U nited S tates. T he pressures and interests that determ ine their policies have becom e m ultinational even if special. Far be it from m e to argue, like som e rom antic apologists, that m ultination­ al corporations ought to be left unchecked because in the process of the m arket they reflect the interests of the peoples o f the w orld, but they are caught up in the paradoxes. T here are advantages fo r host countries in these corporations com peting against each other. F urtherm ore, their co m petitiv e stake in a country such as C anada obliges them to lobby in W ashington for the C anadian claim s in w hich they have an interest. T h ere w ould be m ore cause to fear industrial m anifest destiny if W ashington had totalitarian control. A M arxist argues that the socialist ethic w ould take the sting out o f the A m erican threat. Perhaps it w ould if a state could be produced able or prepared in a naughty w orld to abide by classical principles o f socialism . E xam ples w e have had have not been encouraging. A m ericans have had m essianic visions o f their service to the w orld through free enterprise. M essianism can have capitalist o r socialist labels to justify national advantage. S o , aside from the fact that a socialist U nited States seem s quite a w ay o ff, it is doubtful w hether this slogan offers a precise solution. W hat w e need is m ore pragm atism on the R ight and on the Left. For a healthy national life C anadians have to im pose som e re­ strictions on the entry o f A m erican industry, capital, and culture. It is better to act positively by developing o u r ow n resources, but such is the pow er o f A m erican industry and the A m erican m edia that tender plants are strangled o r brought out before they acquire roots. O ur governm ent

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has the pow er to do w hat seem s necessary, subject to international agreem ents like g a t t , provisions o f international law , and its concern to avoid retaliation. A s far as the U nited States governm ent and people are concerned, all w e can do is ask them to be understanding and not be cow ed by excessive dem ands from their ow n special pleaders. W e m ust ask A m ericans to recognize that we are not tw o equal states but one overdeveloped and one underdeveloped c ountry, and it is not fair to expect in all things reciprocity. T he anxiety to control our resources is not to be dism issed as “ e m o tio n alism ” o r “ an ti-A m eric an ism .” It is an assertion o f the sam e civic ethic o f self-reliance as that in w hich A m ericans are indoctrinated. H istory m ight have m ade us a single continental com m unity, but it did not. T h is is not an error to be corrected but a blessing to be c o unted, for N orth A m erica in the tw entieth century is too vast to be governed from a single centre. A m ericans have an infuriating tendency to call C anadian resistance “ n a tio n a lism ,” the assum ption being that the cause of the A m erican bank o r publication w hich w ants entry into C anada is “ in­ tern atio n alism .” G enuine anti-A m ericans are a sm all but shrill m inori­ ty in C anada. T hey have the sam e view s on A m erican policy as radical A m ericans, but the latter com e out as anti-nationalists and the form er are called nationalist anti-A m ericans. If A m ericans do not w ant to sw ell their ranks they m ust distinguish betw een the predom inant form s o f nationalism in C anada and m alevolent anti-A m ericanism . If there are to be C anadian airlines and railw ays and a C anadian broadcasting and television serv ice, w e have to use the resources of the state because o u r private interests cannot com pete against A m erican g iants. W e can adm ire the good w ork done by CBS or NBC, but w e could not expect that C anadian television in their hands w ould pay the attention to our ow n problem s and policies essential for the nourishm ent o f a healthy state. T here is no question o f banning A m erican television. T he m ajority o f C anadians live close enough to the border to receive it directly. W e have to prevent take-over o f our new spapers. A larm has been sounded about the publishing industry, control o f w hich is being bought by w ealthy A m erican and French com panies. It w as a conservative, not a radical, governm ent in O ntario w hich recently prevented the sale to A m ericans o f an established C anadian publishing firm . It is w rong-headed to identify these d efensive m echanism s w ith book burning. C anada is probably the most liberal country in the w orld in accepting foreigners, foreign culture, and investm ent. W e have w elcom ed them so liberally into o u r uni­ versities that w e are now concerned about the C anadian content in our education. If w e do not w ant o u r young citizens to apply the standards o f the A m erican political system to our ow n, it is not because those

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standards are bad but because they are inapplicable. You can n o t run a m achine w ith parts from a d ifferent m otor. In all fairness I should add that A m ericans ought not to let C anadians get aw ay w ith the “ po o r young co u n try ” stance, w hich is often disreputable b lackm ail. W e are as old as the U nited S tates, and although w e look po o r in the continental shadow w e are one o f the w o rld ’s great econom ic pow ers. T he m odesty w e display is at tim es a front for o u r reluctance to accept the responsibility o f a m ajor pow er in w orld econom ics. T he special consideration w e request as an unequal partner at the b argaining table w ith the U nited States need not be extended by the w orld at large. M any C anadians, if asked w hat they w ould like the U nited States to do, w ould put it negatively. T he U nited States should stop pushing us about; it should allow us m ore freedom in o u r international relations. A sked to be m ore specific about the constraints placed on C anadian independence, the C anadian w ould be hard pressed to docum ent his com plaint. T here is little available evidence o f U nited States dictation. T he extent o f U nited States “ c o n tro l” o f C anadian industry is often produced as ev id en ce, but that foreign controlled enterprises determ ine our foreign policy is unproven. T h e im plications o f this foreign “ con­ tro l” for the freedom o f C anada to m anage its ow n econom y is another m atter. T he U nited States consistently presses its view s about policies it w ould like C anada to follow , but this is norm al diplom atic in­ tercourse am ong allies. It m ight be easier to list aw ards m eted out to C anada by an A m erican adm inistration grateful for C anadian co­ operation in international e n te rp rises.2 O ne w ould search hard for concrete exam ples o f retaliations o r sanctions handed out as punishm ent to C anada for m isb eh av in g .3 It m ight be arg u ed , of course, that C anada has never sufficiently “ m isb eh av ed ” to bring dow n upon itself such a reactio n . T he C anadian recognition o f Peking w as delayed until the A m erican attitude had grow n soft. T he continuation of C anadian econom ic and diplom atic relations w ith C uba w as passive. Even so, it soured the attitude o f som e C ongressm en on issues w hich w ould have benefited C anada. But this kind o f argum ent is unreal. T he restraints upon C anadian diplom acy by the U nited States operate like the system o f deterrence. It is doubtful if the U nited States has ever calculated a conscious C anadian policy o f any kind. T he strength o f deterrence, how ever, is in the m ind o f the beholder. It is the restraints C anadians place upon them selves out of consideration for A m erican attitudes o r possible A m erican attitudes w hich are the determ ining factor. T hese restraints, it should be understood, are not inspired only by fear o r by the hope of favour. For the m ost part they are a consequence of the alliance

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diplom acy in w hich C anada has freely participated and an abiding conviction that m aintenance o f the strength and prestige o f the U nited States is in the interest o f the W estern alliance in general and of C anada in particular. T his conviction is not as universally accepted as it w as tw enty years ago but the assum ption o f basic com m on interest still guides official and m ajority opinion. W hat I am concerned w ith here, how ever, are the restraints im posed by w orry over the consequences to the vulnerable C anadian econom y o f action displeasing to A m ericans. W e have to judge on a basis o f speculation, because the U nited States has never show n w hat it w ould do, and undoubtedly A m ericans do not know them selves w hat they w ould do if C anada provoked them seri­ ously. N ow if C anada w ere to join the W arsaw Pact o r offer the P e o p le ’s R epublic o f C hina bases on V ancouver Island, drastic m ilitary action by the U nited States m ight be contem plated. B ut the m ost any substantial body o f C anadians advocates is disengagem ent from a specific m ilitary association w ith the U nited States like n o r a d . The chances o f C anada actually w anting to join a coalition hostile to the U nited States are sim ply not w orth thinking about unless one w ants to be m ischievous. In the present international atm osphere, and w ith the dim inished im portance o f C anadian real estate to the defence o f the U nited S tates, the w orst C anadians could expect from such a m ove w ould be an erosion o f the consideration accorded to an ally. M ore serious w ould be a conviction in W ashington that a ruthless defence of A m erican interests w as now justified in all relations w ith its northern neighbour. Som e C anadians w ould argue that that is the w ay A m ericans act anyw ay, but they should think hard over what the United States could do if its actions w ere restrained by no good will at all. S o C anadian policy tow ards the U nited States has been cautious. Its “ independence” has never been put to the test because o f a basic com m unity of thinking. T o see this as evidence o f system ic bondage is a reasonable enough analysis, but the policy im plications are beyond the grasp o r the w ill o f contented bondsm en. If C anada w ants to disregard entirely the interests o f the U nited S tates, it m ust reduce its present dependence on the U nited States econom y. In fact C anada is already stronger than C anadians have assum ed and its foreign policies have often been too tim id. W e cure this, how ever, by acting less tim idly, not by telling A m ericans to stop doing w hat they are not in fact doing. Som e C anadians now argue that we ought to m ake greater use of the cards we hold— in particular the grow ing dependence o f the U nited States on C anadian resources and the stake o f A m ericans in C anadian industry. C anadians, how ever, m ust ponder w hether it is in the in­ terests of the w eaker party to start playing poker. W ashington m ight be tem pted to pull all its cards to gether and com e up w ith a C anadian policy.

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M y point is that this kind o f constraint is not som ething w hich can be ended by unilateral A m erican action. It is a product of the sheer existence o f enorm ous pow er, w hich is by nature intim idating. A dilem m a for C anadians is to d eterm ine w hether A m ericans will be less intim idating if one deals toughly w ith them o r if one m akes certain sacrifices to m aintain their good w ill. T here are sound reasons for com bining firm defence o f national rights w ith reassurance that no threat to the security and prosperity o f the U nited States can com e through C anada. T he strongest argum ent for rem aining in som e form of m ilitary alliance w ith the U nited States is that a rupture w ould provide an excuse for A m ericans to refuse consideration o f C anadian interests. It is foolish to talk about ‘ ‘so lv in g ” the problem s of the C anada-U nited States relationship. A border o f this extent goes on generating p ro b ­ lem s. If C anadians w ant to gain as m any points as possible they have to keep their w its about them . T h ey should avoid provoking the U nited States into having a C anadian policy. C anadian survival has depended on recognizing that C anadian-A m erican relations com prise an en o r­ m ous num ber o f strands, that w e negotiate som etim es from strength and som etim es from w eakness, but o u r total w eakness w ould be c o n ­ siderable if the U nited States w as a phenom enon in the singular. N orth A m erica is not only tw o sovereign states; it is a system ic agglom eration, and its relations are a cobw eb over w hich no g o v ­ ernm ent can have full control. O ne w ay A m ericans can help is to join C anadians in trying to understand the nature o f this system and help im prove it. If A m erican political econom ists could take their eyes off the W estern E uropean system or the politics o f even rem oter continents to look m ore intensely at their o w n , C anadians w ould not have to consider C anadian-A m erican relations in such a suffocatingly unilater­ al w ay. I have em phasized the im portance o f A m erican understanding o f C anadian pro b lem s, not only so that U nited States policies will be ju st and aw are, but also so that A m ericans in and out o f office will exercise forbearance w hen C anadians have to do things that look hostile. I realize that the U nited States involvem ent is w orld w ide and A m ericans have to concentrate th eir attention on those countries which cause them the m ost trouble. H ow ever, w hen I read the new s in A m erican papers o r look at the curricula o f A m erican universities I w onder if A m ericans ever look at a m ap. W hat on earth do they m ake of that g reat pink blob w hich is all over them and larger? W hen I find books on A m erican foreign policy, even a recent book on A m erican ‘4im perialism , ” in w hich C anada does not ap p ear in the index except in som e historic references m arked “ See G reat B rita in ,” I w onder how A m ericans can begin to understand the history o f their ow n c o untry. It is cu rio u s and perverse that these histories talk m uch about M exico w here the A m erican record is infam ous and ignore C anada, the very

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existence o f w hich inspires grave doubts about the proposition that im perialism is as A m erican as apple pie. W hat w e need is a m ore adult relationship on both sides. W e have to recognize that w e are friends and foreigners and that foreigner is not a p ejorative w ord. O ur relations cannot be solved by good will alone. O ur com m on interest in a peaceful and prosperous w orld m ust be assum ed, but we are also natural com petitors. A m ericans who believe in the com petitive system m ust— and for the m ost part do— accept com petition as a norm al aspect o f relations betw een friendly pow ers. T he relations are com plex and w e have to w ork at them . T hey can go sm oothly or roughly, but they will never go aw ay. Perhaps N orth A m ericans are m isled by the sam e rom antic notions about alliance that w e are said to have about m arriage.

N o tes 'For an effective argument to this effect see Gerard Bergeron, La guerre froide inachevee (M ontreal: Les presses de 1'universite de Montreal, 1971). -President Johnson's support fo r the auto pact Canada wanted in 1964 was partly attributable to the good w ill inspired by Canada's initiative in getting a UN force into Cyprus, although there was no bargain struck in advance. 3I am not suggesting that our close link with and dependence on the United States econom y is o f no consequence in our foreign p o licy , but it ought not to be thought o f in these concrete terms. The spillover in attitudes from the American and Canadian business community m ay be more important. Intellectual sub­ servience in Canada is to be found most often among the Old Right and the N ew Left.

4: Impact of Domestic Political Factors

A n encouraging d evelopm ent in recent y ea rs h a s been the attention no w being d evo ted b y A m e rica n scholars to the nature o f the rela tio n ­ sh ip with C anada. T h a t C anada is a boring p h en o m en o n m a y rem ain a w idespread conviction. The d isco very is that the relationship is a fa sc in a tin g international a n d transnational p h en o m en o n — a n d the com puters are beginning to click. It w ill b e o f great adva n ta g e to C anadian p o litic a l scientists to have, a t last, a dialogue on the subject, a lthough th e n e w A m e ric a n research w ill m ake it h a rd er f o r C anadians to g e t aw ay with those instant best-sellers on th e su b je ct fo r which fa c ts a re se le c te d to su it the native appetite fo r victim ization. A notable contribution h a s been m ade b y the editors o f the adm irable quarterly, International O rganization, in its autum n 1974 issue (© 1974 b y the R e g e n ts o f the U niversity o f W isconsin System ). T his issue, which was p ro d u c e d by the indefatigable A lfr e d O. H ero o f the W o rld P eace F oundation with the assistance o f A n n e tte B a k e r F ox o f C olum bia a n d Joseph S . N ye, Jr. o f H arvard, scholars w hose distinction has do n e a g o o d d e a l fo r th e cause, appeared a fte r the ed ito rs a n d contributors h a d exp erienced conferences a t H a rva rd a n d a t C arleton w here their d ra fts were refined in crossfire. The fo llo w in g is the approxim ately fifth dra ft o f an essay in which m y assignm ent w as to p ro v id e an im pression o f the p o litic a l fa c to rs on the C anadian side a s an introduction to the sch o la rly exam inations to follow . The hope o f p o litic a l science is, o f course, th a t i f the data on the relationship can be subjected to m uch m ore objective a n d ' 'tra n sn a tio n a l' ' scrutiny a n d quantification, there will be less, i f any, need fo r this k in d o f su b jective writing.

T he m ajor difference betw een C anadians and A m ericans on the subject of their relationship is in the intensity of their perceptions. T here is bound to be conflict betw een a people w ho regard the relationship as critical and those w ho have scarcely noticed the o th er country. Firm ly fixed in the C anadian view is the idea that a special rela­ 247

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tio n sh ip has com e to an end. W hen the B ritish contem plated the end of their special relationship w ith the U nited States, they w ere interested in an alternative— association with the E uropean Econom ic C om m uni­ ty (EE C ). T he problem for C anadians is that no alternative association seem s clear, attractive, or prom ising. In light o f their relative com fort in the energy crisis o f 1973, how ever, the need for any special relation­ ship has seem ed less urgent.

The S p e cia l R elationship T h ere has been a notable C anadian am bivalence about the special rela tio n sh ip , and it is not surprising that som e outspoken A m ericans are telling C anadians that they can no longer have their cake and eat it too. T hat m eans sp ecifically that they cannot ask for special treatm ent on the basis o f a continental relationship and then reject that relationship when the U nited States w ants to talk about, for exam ple, a continental resources p o lic y .' W h en President N ixon spoke in O ttaw a in April 1972, he picked up the fashionable C anadian form ula w ith disturbing alacrity. He said it w as tim e for both peoples “ to m ove beyond the sentim ental rhetoric o f the p a st” and recognize “ that w e have very separate identities; that w e have significant d iffe re n c e s,” that A m erican policy tow ard C anada “ reflects the new approach w e are taking in all o u r foreign relatio n s” and “ that doctrine rests on the prem ise that m ature partners m ust have autonom ous independent p o lic ie s.” 2 S hrew der o bservers in O ttaw a realized that he w as not so m uch recognizing the C anadian right to independence as proclaim ing an A m erican independence o f special obligations. W hat C anadians fo rg et too readily in the present debate is the term s o f their ow n existen ce. C anada is an adventure of various com m unities that did not w ant to join the U nited S tates, a collective experim ent in A m erican living under different auspices and w ith different rules. From the beginning this w as recognized as a risky experim ent based on “ u n n a tu ra l” econom ics. It w as and rem ains a defiance o f the U nited S tates. A m ericans have com e to take a reasonably civilized view o f this perverse determ ination o f C anadians to live unto them selves, but C anadians too often give the im pression that there is som e historic A m erican obligation to support the project. Political annexation seem s a dead enough issue, but, given the A m erican b elief in the rem oval of barriers to free enterprise, especially governm ental, the boundary m ust seem to m ost of them a regrettable an achronism .3C anadians can expect A m ericans to play the international gam e m ore or less according to the U nited N ations C harter w hich they so strongly recom m end for others. W ithin those rules, how ever, the U nited States w ill pursue its own interests and C anada m ay pursue its interests as it sees them . C om peti-

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tion and conflict are natural and perpetual. T he basic facts have been concealed, especially in the years o f alliance, by the stress on com m on interest. T he sense of alliance partnership, the belief that the com peti­ tion m ust be m oderated by fair dealing and good neighbourliness, is a product o f the last h alf century. B efore the B oundary W aters T reaty of 1909 and the establishm ent o f the International Joint C om m ission, the gam e w as exceedingly rough. T he N ixon adm inistration m ay well lack m agnanim ity tow ard C anada, but C anadians m ight well com pare M r. N ix o n ’s pledge to M r. T rudeau in 1971— that the U nited States did not insist on a surplus trade balance— w ith the rem arks about C an ad a’s lack of a future m ade not only by M r. S ew ard in the 1860s but by M r. T aft in 1911. C anadians w ho m ake a villain o f John C onnally and S enator H artke have forgotten those nasties of the 'th irties, Sm oot and H aw ley. O n the other sid e , statem ents o f C anadian politicians about Y ankee greed and im m orality w ere in the not too distant past a good deal m ore devastating than the som ew hat restrained regret expressed by the C anadian parliam entarians over the bom bing of N orth V ietnam in 1973. Plus ?a c h an g e, plus il n 'e s t pas exactem ent la m em e chose. E ven if one regards the present situation as a cyclical phenom enon, it is necessary to look for new factors. B ecause the tw o countries are less isolated from each other and the w orld at large, the proportions o f the problem s are enorm ously greater, and quantitative factors m ay have becom e qualitative. A m ong the differences the follow ing m ight be noted.

E n d o f the A tla n tic Triangle C anada is now a m ore independent country than it w as during previous periods o f confrontation. A feeling of aloneness, of being the o u ter one, has been an im portant aspect o f the C anadian political perception in recent years. F o r a century o r m ore C anadians have had an am biguous attitude tow ard the U nited States— seeing it as protector and as threat. T h ey regarded them selves as an integral part o f an A nglo-A m erican w orld, w hich guaranteed them security and som e prosperity. W ithin that w orld their pow erful protectors checked each other. B ritish pow er w as a counterw eight that deterred the U nited S tates, even if the British on occasion sacrificed pieces o f C anadian territory in the broader interest o f preserving this special relationship betw een R epublic and E m pire. T he m ovem ent of B ritain into the EEC m ay or m ay not have im portant econom ic im plications for C anada. It has had psychic effects. T he B ritish percentage o f C anadian trade declined to such an extent in the last decade or so that the actual m ove into the C om m unity w as less w orrying than had earlier been expected, but it w as the fact of

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that decline that increased the C anadian feeling o f alienation. T he idea o f the A tlantic com m unity w as for C anadians an extension of the concept o f shelter in the A nglo-A m erican w orld. A nd W estern E urope w as seen also as the counterw eight that B ritain and the E m pire once provided. O ttaw a officialdom still clings to the idea of E urope as a c ounterw eight in econom ics and in international diplom acy. M ost C anadians w ould w elcom e such a factor if they could believe in its strength. Japan and other Pacific countries are looked at w istfully. T rade w ith all these areas does increase, but not in percentages c o m ­ p ared with N orth A m erican continental trade. T he sense o f being left dependent on a giant, especially a giant w hich m ay be altering its fam iliar personality, tends to polarize C anadian opinion. In a m inority it induces a determ ination for drastic steps tow ard autarky, and in a nother m inority it induces a disposition to give up resistance. M ost C anadians are still looking for broader internationalist arrangem ents, aw are, how ever, that the old triangular pattern is inadequate and they are m ore than ever obliged to fight for them selves in a chaotic w orld.

In crea sin g S tre n g th a n d V ulnerability A nother change o f im portance is the sheer econom ic strength of C anada at a tim e w hen this is a m ore salient factor than m ilitary pow er. T his strength is seldom grasped by C anadians o r others because it is alw ays jux taposed against that o f a superpow er rather than estim ated w ith its peer group. Its G N P , projected at over $130 billion in 1974, and a total international trade one-third that of the U nited States m ake it one o f the m ajor com m ercial pow ers in the w orld, w ith a considerable voice in international m onetary questions as w ell. B eing a responsible m em ­ b er o f the sm all com m unity o f states that can influence decision m aking, realizing m ore and m ore that C anadian interests in the w orld are unique, coincidental often with those o f the U nited States but not sufficiently so to justify absorption into a bloc, has e n couraged, at least in official circles, a new and tougher internationalism .4 T he shift of international p riority from security to econom ics increases C a n ad a ’s influence and its solitude. On m any issues of the 'se v e n ties, the seabed, m aritim e pollution, foreign investm ent, and the control of m ultination­ al corporations, C a n ad a ’s m ajor antagonists are m ore likely to be its m ilitary allies than its assum ed m ilitary antagonists w ith w hich its econom ic relations are relatively uncom plicated. T he need to find allies all over the w orld on an ad hoc basis to strengthen the C anadian hand in such m atters has encouraged a new boldness in C anadian diplom acy vis-a-vis the U nited S ta te s.5 A s this is undertaken in defence of identifiable national interests about w hich C anadian politicians are

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concerned, this boldness is likely to have a stronger political base than past challenges to U nited States policies on broad international issues su ch as C hina o r nuclear w eapons. T he paradox for C anada is that its strength increases its vulnerability. M aintaining its greater industrial pow er m akes C anada all the m ore dependent on factors beyond its control. T h is vulnerability, how ever, is m ore vividly perceived in econom ic than in m ilitary calculations, w here a sense o f dependence is probably d ecreasing. T he C anadian contribution to co llective defence has been m aintained in prin cip le, but in p ractice it co nsists of token con­ tributions abroad and increasing em phasis on defence of th e vast hom e base as a part o f the w hole alliance area. T he feeling of dependence on the U nited States for protection, how ever, has been counteracted by a declining aw areness o f a m ilitary threat. T he view that C anada is indebted to the U nited States for its defence is less persuasive than it w as, partly because o f an increasing alienation from U nited States m ilitary operations and partly because o f the shift o f a new generation to the view that nuclear deterrence is a gam e, played by superpow ers w ith each other, w hich allow s pow ers that cannot defend them selves anyw ay to stop spending m oney uselessly trying to do so. T he alm ost unchallenged assum ption of tw enty years ago— that if the U nited States were at w ar, C anada w ould b e at w ar— has lost credibility, largely as a result o f U nited States unilateral activities in Indochina. B ecause o f the decline in the value of C anadian soil for the defence o f the U nited States in a m issile age, d efence pressures fro m the Pentagon are less than they once w ere. It is a situation, how ever, that is not necessarily perm anent. T echnological changes m ay well alter the P en tag o n ’s concept o f the part C anada could and should play in N orth A m erican d efence. A challenge over the new A irborne W arning and C ontrol System could com e shortly in fact. C urrent assum ptions about detente could also be shattered by shifts or accidents in the configuration o f po w ers, and in a tim e o f fear there seem s little doubt that C anadians w ould return to the instinct to find shelter w ith friends. In tim es o f crisis, they w ould as usual w ant to p lay honourably their ow n part, and as usual they w ould probably have to start again from close to scratch, th eir m ilitary capacity having again been reduced to the barest m inim um . It is even h arder politically for a country like the U nited States w ith the capacity for decisive m ilitary pow er. H ow ever, although the assault on alliance m indedness has been loud and righteous in recent years, it do es not seem to have shaken the convictions o r instincts of political leaders or a m ajority o f their electors. C o-operation w ith conventional w eapons continues. N either w ithdraw al from NATO o r .of m ore troops from E urope nor disbandm ent o f the N orth A m erican A ir D efence C om m and ( n o r a d ) are under serious consideration in O ttaw a.

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T he C anadian vulnerability is, like the Jap an ese, largely econom ic. T he m ore prosperous it becom es, the m ore it depends on foreign trade and therefore the m ore vulnerable is the high standard o f living. T he increasing dependence on the U nited States m arket, and in p articular on the auto p act, is a constant concern that conditions a g reat deal of C anadian foreign policy. It is probably a m ore im portant inhibition than the foreign investm ent on w hich the nationalists concentrate. It w ould be w rong to suggest that C anadian policy on, for exam ple, service in the International C om m ission o f C ontrol and Supervision in V ietnam w as decided by this concern o v er the vulnerability of the C anadian econom y to A m erican action. H ow ever, it w as a factor m uch discussed at the tim e, and it is a factor for consideration in w eighing the advantages and disadvantages o f m any issues. T here are alw ays voices in Parliam ent saying out loud o r m ore often so tio voce that C anada should put its ow n direct interests in W ashington ahead of international obligations. H erein lies a dilem m a for any C anadian governm ent. It m ust bear in m ind the danger that can be done to C anadian interests by a hostile C ongress o r adm inistration in W ashington, but it m ust m aintain the posture o f a governm ent p u rsuing a strong and independent C anadian policy. Its critics can be counted on to denounce it for one sin o r the other. It is not only vis-a-vis the U nited States that the g o v ­ ernm ent o f a m ajo r com m ercial pow er has to exercise discretion. A rab oil producers and C hinese w heat buyers require m ore consideration than in the days w hen C anada could be the free m iddle spirit in the UN.

C ontinentalist P ressures O n econom ic questions O ttaw a’s position is still aggressively in­ ternationalist. T he spirit o f article 2 o f NATO is strong— the conviction that the W estern alliance will founder if its m em bers do not restrain their com petition— and H enry K issinger is regarded as an im portant convert to the traditional C anadian position. In practice, how ever, this alm ost doctrinaire approach is underm ined by suspicion that the E uropeans and the U nited States C ongress will not play that w ay. The idea o f C anada as m artyr to its high principles is a vision seen m ore c learly in O ttaw a than in W ashington, B russels, or C anberra. A s a fallback from internationalism there is som e sense o f defensive con­ tinentalism in the country at large. T he C anadian business com m unity is susceptible to prevailing w inds o f opinion in the A m erican business com m unity. T he hostility that this U nited States com m unity and its political spokesm en feel tow ard the Japanese, the E uropeans, and other people w ho, by m eans of cheap labour and o th er un-A m erican activities, are threatening the good folk on the N orth A m erican c o n ­

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tinent has its appeal. Japanese trade w ith C anada is now second only to that w ith the U nited S tates, but it is open to even stronger criticism in that Japan rejects C anadian m anufactures and so ak s up C anadian resources. T he idea o f a com m on front in F ortress A m erica has its attractions in C anada. T h e O ttaw a establishm ent resists it in favour of w ider internationalism , and there seem s little doubt that the c o n ­ tinentalist im plications run contrary to what articulate C anadians w ould like. H ow ever, if the going gets rougher, m ore C anadians m ay decide, although reluctantly, that this is the option to back. A nd so, as the sense o f standing together against a m ilitary threat from the com m unist pow ers has dim inished, a new concept o f continental defence in the realm o f eco n o m ics, a realm , incidentally, w here C anada could have a m ore influential role than it could e v er have in defence, m ay take its place. In such an atm osphere the pressures for continental m an­ agem ent, particularly in the resources sp h ere, could becom e less resistible. T he extent to w hich transnational integration has gone in practice w ithout any governm ent direction m akes C anadians nervous. A fear that the situation is out o f control tends to discourage g o v e rn m e n ts’ efforts to try, but the feeling that the C anadian c om m unity is being burrow ed aw ay forces them to see w hat could be done. T he idea that C anadian citizens are being locked into a com puter w eb, w hich puts their personal lives on file for instantaneous transm ission to P ittsburgh o r C hicago or San C lem ente did prom pt efforts in O ttaw a to preserve som e national p rivacy in the c om puter industry. T he O ntario g o v ­ ernm ent is investigating the transm ission o f inform ation from private security com panies to their U nited States head offices, and it has show n som e interest in seeing that school children are reared on C anadian textbooks. A fter m uch agonizing consideration the T rudeau g o v ­ ernm ent cam e up w ith a proposal for an agency to review foreign take-overs of C anadian com panies. H ow ever, as the M inister of Finance assured a N ew Y ork audience, “ It’s not a dam , it’s a filter. A s the tim e for action has com e, both federal and provincial g o v ­ ernm ents are facing the bew ildering com plexities o f unravelling the cobw eb. O ne form of continentalist pressure that has traditionally conditioned C anadian calculations is dim inishing som ew hat. T h is is the fear that the C anadian standard o f living can never be allow ed to fall far below that o f the U nited States lest C anadians pack up and m ove south. N ew factors are affecting the balance. E ven in periods o f depression and considerable inequality, C anadians w ere sustained in their long experim ent by loyalty to their ow n political tradition and the desire to m aintain w hat seem ed to them , if not to others, a reality— their ow n w ay and quality o f life. T he flow o f im m igration has in fact altered. In

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recent years m ore A m ericans have m oved to C anada than C anadians to the U nited S ta te s.6 T he brain drain flow s in both directions. W hether this reversal is attributable to factors associated with the V ietnam w ar rem ains to be se e n .7 T he U nited S tates, even in turm oil, retains its fascination for m any C anadians who find even its sin and conflict big-tim e com pared w ith their ow n pale im itations. N evertheless, the advantages o f living in a less turbulent country at slightly less pay are now m ore obvious. T h ere is also a rejection of A m erican values w hich, ironically, is largely inspired by A m ericans criticizing their own country. T he fact that C anadians, although to a lesser extent than E uropeans, tend to lum p together as A m erican the features o f m odern society that they do not like is grossly unfair but politically significant. T he m ore bucolic im age o f C anada, both am ong A m ericans and C anadians, is partly m yth, but it has its effect. R acial strife and other factors in the U nited States have increased the differentiation betw een C anadian and A m erican cities in fact as w ell as in fancy. L iving in T oronto and living in C leveland are not as m uch alike as they once w ere. W indsor is less a suburb o f D etroit because W indsorites are afraid to cross the river.

The N e w C anadian N ationalism C ontributing to this differentiation is a w ave o f C anadian nationalism different from anything previous. For one thin g , it is for anglophone C anadians unilateral C anadianism untem pered by m ultilateral im perial loyalties. For Q uebeckers it is often not tem pered even by-C anadian loyalties. It is fiercest am ong the young. It ranges from a heightened aw areness am ong the m oderates of the values o f the C anadian tradition and a desire to strengthen it against unattractive pressures not only from abroad but also from w ithin to an irrational A m ericanophobia w hich is less in the C anadian tradition. In fact, the m ore neurotic C anadian nationalism has a distinctly A m erican accent. M uch o f its dogm a is, in the m ost colonial tradition, m indlessly transplanted from the A m erican Left. D enunciations o f the U nited States in the glottal tones and arid verbiage o f lesser A m erican graduate schools becom e, sim ply by hopping the border, nationalist rather than antinationalist. E ven less neurotic C anadian nationalists have alw ays been affected by the cu ltu r­ al im pact o f A m erican-style n ationalism , transferring the sam e credos, p ledges, and convictions about governm ent to a C anadian flag and an unw ritten C anadian constitution for which they are peculiarly unsuited. T he new m anifestations are m ore intense and intolerant and directed tow ard rousing ill will rather than good. O ut of this confused nationalist debate, how ever, are em erging som e

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g enuine C anadian values. Som e o f these are ex cessively historicalrom antical and som e needlessly reject an A m erican cultural heritage that has been shared rather than im posed. N evertheless, there is a better understanding o f the C anadian w ay o f life, based perhaps on a recogni­ tion that the political identity o f C anada is clear even if the cultural identity is perhaps subsystem ic. T he C anadian confederation w as not an im itation of the A m erican but a response to the A m erican C ivil W ar. It has developed m ore directly from its B ritish roots and has its ow n strengths and w eaknesses w hich m ake even good A m erican exam ples inapplicable. T he loose nature o f the C anadian federation is its w eakness, but it is also being perceived as its strength in an age w hen governm ent is becom ing colossal. It is the urban challenge and the challenge o f regional governm ents, not only Q uebec but the w estern p rovinces as w ell, to the federal structure that have forced C anadians into an argum ent about their ow n w ay of governm ent, thus producing a c uriously unifying effect. T he debate does em phasize the frontiers betw een the provinces and betw een the provinces and the federal governm ent, but because it is a dem icontinental rather than a co n tin en t­ al preoccupation, it draw s an even heavier line along the 49th parallel. T he greatest danger to the C anadian identity is a preoccupation with A m erican issues to such an extent that C anadians lose sight o f their individuality. T he problem s o f C anadian federation force C anadians to concentrate on issues for w hich the U nited States experience is largely irrelev an t.8

T he F ederal-P rovincial F actor D ivision of responsibility betw een federal and provincial governm ents, p articularly in such im portant areas as resources and investm ent, and the relative decline o f federal pow er are w idely believed to have w eakened C anada considerably in its effort to m anage a national policy that could guarantee independence. T h ere is justification for this view . T he federal governm ent is constantly being told that it m ust have a resources policy, an industrial policy, and a population policy if it is to play its cards intelligently vis-a-vis the U nited States and in the w orld at large. T he governm ent is apparently w eakened by tw o factors. In the first place there are the divisive interests of the provinces. In the second place the regionalization o f C anadian issues in politics has resulted in an alm ost chronic situation o f m inority governm ent. T he incapacity of a m inority governm ent to take bold risks in the long-range interest is ob vious. In the present nationalist m ood o f the electorate, at least as diagnosed by the rhetoricians of all parties, a posture o f resistance to the U nited States m ust be m ain tain ed .9 A problem , how ever, is that the

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need to m aintain such a posture m akes difficult the constructive com ­ p rom ise, conceding m inim um disadvantage for a greater advantage, regarding continental relations not as a zero-sum gam e but as a process o f bargaining and m anipulating for m utual p ro fit.10 Y et C anadians are a djusting, as m any W estern E uropeans have, to m inority governm ent, w hich has been for som e years and is likely to be for m any m ore the norm al w ay of holding together a spraw ling people. T he crisis over oil e xports in the autum n o f 1973 revealed inevitable conflicts o f interest betw een the oil-producing and oil-consum ing provinces and d if­ ferences o f attitude tow ard sales to the U nited States. H ow ever, the need for the governm ent to put together an acceptable national policy w as all the m ore clear b ecause it had to be conciliatory to stay in office. It has becom e conventional to say that C anadian nationalism is largely confined to O ntario, that it is the expression o f a confident and sophisticated industrial area w hich feels capable o f standing on its own feet, and that it is resisted by less favoured provinces that w ant foreign investm ent, gro w th , jobs, industrial developm ent, and all those things they think can com e from w elcom ing U nited States capital. T h ere is truth in this assum ption, but there is a danger now o f its being repeated as an absolute truth. A m ong intellectuals, nationalism is as strong in E dm onton as T oronto. A part from O ntario there are various regional or provincial assertions o f nationalism , directed partly against O ntario but not basically continentalist in thrust. A lberta and B ritish C olum bia have been regarded as the provinces w ith the strongest A m erican orientation. B ut they are under new m anagem ent. S o , in fact, are all the p rovinces. T he old set o f dem agogic provincial prem iers ( “ provochia l , ” they have been called) has in the last few years been replaced by a set o f pragm atic, m anagerial types, m ore disposed to pay due regard to the national interest than w ere their predecessors. T hree o f the four w estern prem iers, w here co ntinentalism is believed to be most ram p an t, are from the N ew D em ocratic party , w hich is the m ost anticontinentalist o f all the parties. Prem ier B arrett ( n d p ) o f British C olum bia, it is true, w ent direct to W ashington to talk w ith the au ­ thorities there, but w ith the intention o f defying them on the A laska pipeline rather than snuggling closer. H e has taken a tough line about the export of B ritish C olum bian w ater to W ashington state. Prem ier L ougheed of A lb erta, a C onservative, challenged not only O ntario but to a greater extent the U nited States w ith his insistence on m ore returns for A lb e rta ’s energy resources. H e has struck a nationalist note w ith an A lberta accent and show ed a w illingness to accept a national priority. T he Social C rediters, w ho have been throw n out o f pow er in A lberta an d BC, w ere far m ore A m erican and continentalist in their philosophy. T he north-south industrial ties seem to be grow ing stronger, but there is a countervailing force. It w as once the St. L aw rence system ,

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extended to the Pacific by the railw ays, that created a C anadian econom y. T he east-w est ties o f trade and people are deeply rooted. T he phenom enon that now holds to gether C anadians (to som e extent against their w ill) m ay be less the St. L aw rence route than the extraordinary phenom enon o f T oronto, one of the fastest grow ing m etropolitan areas in the w orld, w hose econom ic vitality retains its m agnetic effect on businessm en and industry, on the professional and nonprofessional labour force from V ancouver to H alifax. T o a lesser extent this is true in the arts as well— for A nglo-C anadians. W hether T o ro n to is the capital o f an independent system o r a subsystem attached to N ew Y ork and C hicago, it is o f som e consequence that it is still to a considerable extent a transcontinental system o f its o w n ." T he relative decline of M ontreal, how ever, exacerbates internal tension. T he greatest threat to C anadian independence is that its divisions should increasingly associate them selves w ith regions in the U nited States so that for all practical purposes the continent is divided not into tw o countries but into subdivisions o f an essentially continental society and e c o n o m y .12

F ea r o f A m e ric a n N ationalism T he p rovinces, and particularly the poorer provinces, have as m uch as O ttaw a to fear from the rough attitude taken by m em bers of C ongress and by W ashington officials tow ard C anadian federal and provincial policies to w iden the geographical base of industrial developm ent w ithin C anada. W hen special tax concessions w ere given to the M ichelin T ire C om pany to build a plant in N ova Scotia rather than in central C anada, the U nited States T reasury D epartm ent im posed countervailing duties on its export o f tires to the U nited States. T he rules o f the gam e seem ed unclear, o r unfairly applied, since the U nited States C ongress had already passed legislation in 1971 authorizing D om estic International Sales C orporations (DISC). U nder this law com ­ parable tax incentives w ere m ade available to A m erican com panies to increase exports if they m et certain conditions. A m erican officials have m ade it very plain to C anadians that they are not prepared to take a benevolent view of w hat they call C a n a d a 's ‘4industrial strateg y ” if it is contrary to their perception of the A m erican national interest. As the ‘‘industrial strateg y ” that the C anadian electorate increasingly d em ands includes regional developm ent as w ell as corporate taxation and foreign take-over legislation, there could well be a basic confronta­ tion and a trial o f strength. C anadians have been able w ith som e success, p articularly in the postw ar years, to argue w ith A m erican officials that they should restrain their pow er so that a m ore prosperous good neighbour could

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establish itself as a trading partner. T hat plea is less likely to be heeded w hen those o fficials regard C anadians as prosperous enough to look after their ow n interests. W hen A m ericans talk about a m ore m ature relationship, the m essage reaches O ttaw a loud and clear. O ne aspect of this m ature relationship seem s to be a greater disposition on both sides to shift the argum ent into m ultilateral forum s w here no special relation­ ship applies and w here allies from other continents can be en listed by both sid e s.13 T h is is notably the case o v er the sea and seabed c o n ­ troversies. T he shift tow ard nationalist positions on alm ost all fronts in C anada in the early 1970s has been to a large extent a response to what C anadians w idely regarded as an assertion o f nationalism 14 in the U nited States. M em bers o f the C anadian business com m unity w ho, in T o ro n to and elsew here, have on the w hole deplored econom ic nationalism as a left-w ing aberration have been shedding som e o f their hopes and expectations about partnership. It is less easy to a rgue now that the best w ay for C anada is the way o f econom ic integration, because the U nited States looks less prosperous and m uch less disposed to share anything but its shortages with a partner. T here is h ardly a consensus in C anada on this m uch debated subject, but consensus m ay be a little closer. T he fortunes o f the extrem e nationalists o f the “ W a ffle " Left have declined considerably, but the bourgeoisie are being radicalized, in a m oderate C anadian w ay of course. T hey are not disposed to find socialism and nationalization the key to C anadian independence. T h ey are im pressed, how ever, and alarm ed by the roughness o f the N ixon adm inistration. T he special relationship they have favoured seem s to have been ruled out by the current leadership in W ashington. M any business leaders are pressing the governm ent to­ w ard toughening its bargaining position, even though this is seen w ithin the fram ew ork o f a civil continental association rath er than the noisy confrontation encouraged by the m ore leftish nationalists.

T h e C oncept o f N o rth A m e rica T he C anadian problem is partly sem antic. F o r instance, a D utchm an can call him self a D utchm an and a E uropean w ithout confusion. A C anadian is unable to use the term A m erican to describe the cultural com m unity o f w hich he is a historic part rather than a subjugated victim . T oo m uch identification w ith N orth A m erica, on the other hand, subm erges the C anadian individuality. C ontinentalism is a p e ­ jorative term in C anada w hereas elsew here there is a w ide, if not very well based, b e lie f that it is the blessed w ave o f the future. E ven those in C anada who w ould like som e joint m anagem ent of resources, perhaps a

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N orth A m erican free trade o r com m on m arket area, are w ary about being called continentalists. Statem ents by M r. N ixon and o thers that they w ould like to d iscuss w ith C anada a continental resources policy are regarded as sinister. A m ericans think of such proposals as equitable because they have in m ind a fair division o f resources. T hey do not realize the sy stem ’s bias inherent in any schem e o f sharing w hen one elem ent is ten tim es larger than the other. C anadians realize this with their historic instincts. A m ericans have been vague about w hat they m ean by a continental resources policy, and C anadians are so frightened by the co ncept that they do not w ant to be seen considering w hat m ay be under any other rubric sensible proposals. T he strong C anadian preference rem ains for bodies like the Interna­ tional Joint C om m ission, w hich has equal representation and is relatively apolitical. Its function is to find form ulae for m utual advantage and recom m end these to the tw o sovereign governm ents rather than to im pose them . T he com plexity o f border issues, pollution in the G reat L akes for exam ple, is raising the frequent q uestion of w hether the tim e has com e for international authorities that can im pose their w ill. M any o f these subjects com e under provincial o r state jurisdiction and w ould seem to provide opportunities for ad hoc, b ilateral, transborder agreem ents that do not c hallenge the C anadian resistance on the federal level to continental institutions. T here are usually ram ifications, how ever, that affect federal control over national resources. C anadian resistance to extending the institutional fram ew ork is reinforced by the w orry that federal pow er is itself disintegrating. T his fear m ay have m ade C anadians rigid w hen there is a requirem ent for im aginative im provisation and experim entation with national and even continental institutions. C anadian unity has been one o f the false gods o f C anadian politics of late. T h e flexibility achieved in C anada by the grow ing responsibility and com petence of the provincial g overnm ents should be seen as an assertion o f the C anadian w ay o f life. It provides grass roots interest in C anadian independence and a stronger d isposition to preserve the sacred C anadian constitutional principle of looseness against the centripetal forces in the continent. It is in the C anadian tradition for citizens to want to preserve the C anadian fram ew ork in order to live m ore securely as Q uebeckers o r N ova S cotians o r B ritish C olum bians. A problem for C anadians on the w orld scene, how ever, is presented by an increasing tendency in E urope and elsew here to regard N orth A m erica as an entity. T he EEC presum ptuously considers itself an entity called E urope. B eing prim arily interested in the U nited States but vaguely conscious o f C anada, the EEC posits an entity called N orth A m erica that it assum es, for convenience and in the interest of sym m etry, speaks w ith a single voice because it has a com m on interest.

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C anada has m any interests coincidental w ith those of the U nited S tates— free en try to the Japanese and EEC m arkets being am ong them . B ut on a large num ber o f im portant issues, from m aritim e regulations to foreign aid or relations with India or V ietnam , its position varies from contradictory to divergent. In m any trade and o th er questions its rela­ tionship w ith the U nited States is com petitive. In official o r unofficial discussions involving, as is so often the case at present, E urope, N orth A m erica, and Ja p a n , C anada m ust resist being lum ped as N orth A m erica not from a petty desire to show the flag but because it w ould be a sacrifice of C anadian interests to allow the W ashington governm ent or any group o f private A m ericans to speak for N orth A m erica. T here is not and cannot be a B russels in N orth A m erica. A s far as culture and society are concerned, there are sound reasons for talking about E urope. T here is an unfortunate tendency, how ever, to ignore the differences betw een com m on issues and values and coincidental issues and values. W hat m atters m ost in this context is not the sim ilarities of accent and dress but the difference in national interests of tw o countries and the fact o f tw o separate governm ents w ith no com m on institution. It cannot be taken for granted, for exam ple, that C anadian interests w ould be served by a N orth A m erican position on M iddle E astern oil, although on this o r o th er subjects there is alw ays the possibility of w orking out a com m on front on an ad hoc basis w ith the U nited States as w ith Japan o r A ustralia. So w hile international pressures and the m ood o f the tim es drive C anadians tow ard a continental identity, they also stim ulate resistance. T he rise o f nationalism in the ’sixties has been partly a felt need to reject the conventional w isdom o f the rest of the W estern w orld and of M anifest D estiny in the guise o f F rankenstein. A problem o f the 'sev en ties is that an odd m an out risks being regarded as a tiresom e bore. H e is alienated from his friends because his problem s are so often very different from theirs.

Q uebec M ost o f w hat has been said here about popular attitudes describes E nglish-speaking C anada in p articular. It w ould probably apply to m ost o f the m illion o r so francophone Q uebeckers. T h is is not a tim e w hen there are w ide divisions on foreign policy am ong those C anadians, liberal o r conservative, eastern o r w estern, anglophone or francophone, who think in term s o f a federal C anada. T he w ide divi­ sion is betw een those w ho think o f Q uebec and C anada as destined to have separate existence in the com m unity o f states and those w ho do not. E ven am ong separatists, how ever, there are those w ho think of

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hostile separation and those, probably a m ajority, w ho assum e som e kind o f special relationship with C anada— and presum ably also som e sharing in special relationships w ith the U nited States. In the m eantim e Q uebec has its ow n form o f nationalism that is not identified with C anadian nationalism , although a n indeterm inate proportion o f voting Q uebeckers w ould not consider their own nationalism and that of C anada incom patible and w ould prefer, w ith varying degrees of scepticism , to share also in a C anadian nationalism that was reasonably bilingual and bicultural. T he attitude of the Q uebec nationalist to E nglish C anadians on the grounds o f their “ econom ic d o m in a tio n ,” “ a rro g a n c e,” and “ neglect o f F rench C an ad a” is rem arkably sim ilar to the attitude o f E nglish-C anadian nationalists tow ard the U nited States. T he Q uebec nationalist tends to be contem ptuous o f the E nglish C an ad ian ’s nationalism and m inim izes his identity, and the E nglishC anadian nationalist is frustrated because the Q uebec nationalist will not m ake com m on cause. Paradoxically, how ever, one m ay argue that there is in 1974 less confrontation and m ore separation, and perhaps that is cause and effect. E conom ic rather than constitutional issues are now dom inant; and there is, for the tim e being at least, less sense of crisis, although the relation­ sh ip betw een econom ic and constitutional issues is by no m eans dis­ regarded. Issues such as the energy crisis tend to em phasize the im ­ portance to Q uebeckers o f a healthy national eco n o m y , a fact reflected in the support given the B ourassa governm ent in the provincial election of 1973. E m phasis is now on the cultural identity of Q uebec, the flow ering of w hich raises few questions affecting C anadian-A m erican relations. T he intelligentsia of Q uebec live just about as separate and independent an existence as they w ould in their ow n state. O ther C anadians are adjusting to this fact o f life and, inspired to som e extent by the Q uebec exam ple, have been m aking rapid strides in the creation o f a m ore indigenous culture o f their ow n. An unprecedented surge of d ram a, cinem a, and literature, based on the experience of N ew found­ land or T oronto o r the Y ukon rather than a m ythical C anada o r a revam ped Surrey o r Illinois, has in the past year o r so given the A nglo-C anadians m ore self-confidence; the w orks are less preoccupied with the them e o f survival from the Y ankees and therefore less boring. Q uebec nationalism is becom ing less F rench, m ore native, and therefore m ore self-confident, less petty, and m ore serene. It has rediscovered its rich sense o f hum our and has ceased to reject its ow n language, A m erican French or jo u a l. T his is healthy except that jo u a l is so little com prehensible even to A nglo-C anadians, let alone F renchm en or A m ericans, that it does in som e w ays isolate Q uebec from all its neighbours. It is a private joke, like S w itzerdietsch. T he n e ighbours, how ever, have som e reason to hope that C anadian culture,

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o f both com m unities, will grow m ore rew arding and less obnoxious. A ttitudes in Q uebec tow ard the U nited S tates vary considerably. Q uebeckers accept their N orth A m erican destiny. A lthough dedication to the preservation o f a F rench-language culture is basic, France is of d eclining im portance. R esentm ent of Parisian snobbery is an em otional elem ent in Q uebec nationalism . T he E nglish C anadians and the French rather than the A m ericans and the B ritish are the butts of the M ontreal chansonniers. T he standard o f living and m uch o f the w ay o f life of the Q uebeckers are N orth A m erican, and they are m ore w illing than E nglish C anadians to acknow ledge this fact because they have less fear o f their identity. M em bers o f the large m iddle class of Q uebec who drive their big cars off to M iam i as do other N orth A m ericans have a pretty relaxed view o f the U nited States. On the left w ing o f the separatist m ovem ent, the antipathy to the U nited States is e xpressed in the conventional language o f G uevarists, but it is directed w ith even m ore bitterness against A nglo-C anadian capitalists. O n the con­ servative w ing are less revolutionary leaders, som e o f w hom see in the U nited States a counterw eight to E nglish C anada. Proposals for an econom ic union o r free trade agreem ent with the U nited States have been put fo rw a rd .13 For som e it m ay be a flirtation intended to p rod and irritate an arrogant and neglectful spouse. T he provincial L iberal g o v ­ ernm ent has frequently stated its opposition to the C anadian nationalists who w ould deny A m erican investm ent, although in its anxiety to protect the Q uebec econom y it is nervous about A m erican as w ell as O ntario dom ination. T his Q uebec view is identifiable w ith the view of other less favoured provinces, but suspicion of O ntario do es not m ake them all avid continentalists. T hey are less confident than the O ntario industrialists of their ability to com pete internationally. T here is probably less anti-A m ericanism in Q uebec than elsew here in C anada, but there is less identification w ith the U nited States. E xcept from a radical m inority, Q uebec nationalists have not felt m uch w arm th o r encouragem ent from A m ericans. T he tendency in the U nited States to identify Q uebec nationalism w ith the Front de L ibera­ tion du Q uebec (FLQ) and C uban m ischief is a gross over-sim plification that discourages the m oderate Q uebec independentists from a dialogue w ith the southern neighbours w ith w hom they have to live w hether federated o r not. From the point o f view of other C anadians, it is less m ischievous than w ould be the rousing o f A m erican sentim entalism about an oppressed m inority. A lthough anti-A m erican C anadian nationalists dearly love to see CIA plots in Q uebec, there has been no convincing evidence of any official or unofficial A m erican dispositions to play w ith separatists. F ranco-A m ericans o f N ew England seem even less disposed than Franco-O ntarians o r A cadians to favour the Parti Q uebecois. Fear in W ashington o f a Q uebec C uba w ould presum ably,

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if a crisis arose, lead any A m erican adm inistration to support a C anadian federal position. T he Q uebec situation, how ever, is so volatile that one does not know in w hat form confrontation m ight present itself. It m ay w ell not present itself at all. C anada m ay just go on in its w ell-know n preference for evolution rather than revolution but evolve itself into som ething that does not look m uch like the C anada of today. T he relationship o f C anada and Q uebec to the U nited States is bound to be a factor in the calculations o r negotiations about Q u e b ec ’s po sition vis-a-vis the rest o f C anada, a unifying o r a divisive issue am ong C anadians and C anadiens. T he evolution is not likely to be placid, and given the very large A m erican interests in Q uebec and in C anada as a w hole, the U nited States governm ent and A m ericans in general m ay find it harder to m aintain a totally neutral position. If their relations w ith O ttaw a becom e n asty, as they m ay, tem ptations could be less resistible. E ven not very well founded suspicions am ong E nglish C anadians that A m erican official o r private interests were playing the separatist gam e could increase tension. (T here is m ore suspicion at present o f their p laying w ith A lb erta.) A factor o f im portance to the continental relationship is that the strong Q uebec stand on its social, e conom ic, and cultural pow ers is being m atched o r supported by other provinces. T here is a historic O ntario-Q uebec axis vis-a-vis O ttaw a o r the w estern provinces. These forces cut across the idea o f an A nglo-F rench confrontation, and they provide the possibility o f accom m odating Q uebec quasi independence in a quasi-federal structure. A s suggested above, the conventional view that the federal-provincial division o f pow ers w eakens C anadian resistance to the forces o f continentalism depends on how one looks at it. T he finding o f a form ula fo ra relatively independent and reasonably contented Q uebec in a loose federation w ould strengthen the C anadian position. C anadian resistance to continental suction has been w eakened by a lack o f confidence in the future o f the country as an entity. Part of this has been the association C anadian nationalists have tended to make betw een a strong C anada, national unity, and the affirm ation o f the federal pow er. T his position is no longer tenable. A m ong other things, the Q uebec nationalist has forced the C anadian nationalist to an agoniz­ ing reappraisal o f the nature of C an ad a’s political virtue. Som e o f the latter’s m ore dogm atic assum ptions about the m anagem ent of the C anadian-U nited States relationship m ay be shaken up in the process.

T h e N e w F actor: R eso u rces a n d P opulation W e seem to be on the verge o f conceptual changes, both in the facts governing the relationship and in attitudes, requiring rapid adjustm ents

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o f policy. T hey are related to altered attitudes in the w orld at large to g row th and to the new M althusianism . T ypical o f the im pact is the shift w ithin one year, 1973, o f the nationalist C anadian co m plaint that the U nited States im poses unfair restrictions on im ports o f energy resources and agricultural produce from C anada to the dem and that A m ericans be prevented from draining C anada o f the m aterials that its citizens need to m aintain the standard of living to w hich they have an independent right. A t the sam e tim e, the A m erican grievances have shifted from C anadian advantage in the balance o f trade to C anadian reluctance to sell en erg y resources. P olicym akers find it difficult to see the long-term interest clearly as their attitudes to buying and selling fluctuate. O nly dim ly foreseen at present are the im plications for traditional attitudes to population as well as re so u rc e s.16T he extrem ely unequal distribution o f population on the continent has alw ays been a w orry to C anada, but it has not been a serious source of friction betw een the tw o countries w hile there w as relatively free m ovem ent acro ss the b order. U nited States doubts about an increase o f its ow n population have been apparent for som e tim e and for understandable reasons. T he new factor is that C anada, o f all countries, is having second thoughts about a n increasing population because o f com pulsive urbanization, endem ic unem ploym ent, and the ecology factor. T o citizens o f a crow ded w orld, including A m ericans, such an attitude m ust seem inexcusable. T he C anadian attitude is getting to be som ething like that o f the Sw iss, a nervous desire to protect a w ay o f life and standard of living against too m any people w ho w ant to share in it. C anadians had nourished for so long the m yth o f victim ization that they w ere slow to realize th at a m ere 22 m illion people have a very good thing going for them . W hat could p rovide, th erefo re, an im portant dom estic political factor is the em ergence o f the U nited States in the past few years as the largest source o f im m igration to C a n a d a .17 T he irritation about draft d odgers is, it is to be hoped, over. Ill feeling has been roused am ong som e C anadians by the fact that it is easier for an A m erican to im ­ m igrate to C anada than for a C anadian to get into the U nited States and take em ploym ent. C anadian nationalists, how ever, are not unhappy w ith the latter provision. O ne m ay foresee a surge o f A m ericans from their crow ded and polluted cities tow ard the C anadian “ w ild ern e ss.” T he idea that C anada is a land o f w ide open spaces for settlem ent is contradicted by the fact that C anadians them selves are leaving the land to crow d the cities, and that is w here the im m igrants go as w ell. T his rom antic m otivation for m oving north m ay be less im portant than a p ractical reason for m oving to a country w here fuel is m ore plentiful. T he irritation o v er the C anadian perm issiveness in adm itting A m erican

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“ d e lin q u e n ts” m ay be replaced by anger o v er the solid A m ericans C anada will begin to keep out. A m ericans have m any advantages as im m igrants, along w ith one disadvantage. T h ey are the im m igrants least disposed to realize that C anada is a country unlike the one they have left. T hey are often benevolent m issionaries w ho w ant to bring C anada up to date in their im age. A lready their w ell-intentioned desire to “ m odernize” C ana­ dian universities has inspired resentm ent o f som e political conse­ quence. Som e o f them w ant to turn C anada into their ow n idea of anti-A m erica. E ither w ay old C anada w ould be engulfed. E nglish C anada w as, o f co u rse, a creation o f A m erican refugees, but 300 years of separate history has created a state dedicated to som ething m ore positive than sim ple opposition to A m erican institutions. W aves of im m igrants, including A m erican im m igrants, have been absorbed over tw o centuries. T h e A m ericans continue to supply a special kind of zeal that the m ore relaxed native C anadians appreciate and tolerate— up to a point. T he present 22 m illion, by no m eans all of w hom are native born, could be sw am ped. Persistent unem ploym ent and new attitudes to population grow th indicate a trend in C anada to m ore restricted im ­ m igration. Pressures o f illegal im m igration and the painful read­ justm ent it is forcing in attitudes to population are creating one o f the m ajor political issues o f the day. Im m igration to C anada from the U nited States has to be considered alongside the pow erful thrust all ov er the w orld of peoples m oving from regions o f lesser to higher developm ent, from the M editerranean to northern E urope, from Latin A m erica to the U nited States, from A sia and the C aribbean into C anada. B ecause o f its relative security and ratio o f people to resources, C anada is p robably the w o rld 's m ost vulnerable country. U ntil very recently it has been one o f the easiest to enter. O ver the past decade racial d istinctions have been elim inated from C anadian im m igration law s. T here are grounds for selection based on skill, e ducation, o r fam ily ties, but no country or region is given preference over another. W hen C anadians rem oved all racial discrim ination from im m igration regulations, they thought in term s of adding new categories to the flow . T hey thought of equitable adm ission rather than equitable exclusion. If, as seem s likely, they m ove increas­ ingly to control the total flow , B ritons, Frenchm en, o r A m ericans have to be kept out o r deported on the sam e basis as m ore exotic p eoples. T he only w hite country from w hich im m igration is increasing is the U nited States. (B lack A m ericans have show n less disposition than white A m ericans to cross the border.) N either A m ericans nor C anadians are used to harsh frontier controls. A spokesm an fro m the U nited States D epartm ent o f State recently

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suggested that C anadians be exem pted from the W estern H em isphere restrictions. B arbara W atson, adm inistrator o f the Bureau o f Security and C onsular A ffairs, said adverse reaction had been “ particularly m arked in C anada w hich, because o f our traditionally open bo rd er, has long felt itself to have a special relationship w ith the U nited S ta te s .” 18 R eciprocal p references w ould presum ably be expected. T hat sounds reasonable enough, but C anadians w ould have to exam ine the im ­ plications. W ould they be m oving tow ard the m ost continentalist o f all conceptions— a free flow o f p eople, a continental labour m ark et? Not necessarily, but trends of that kind are increm ental. W hen it com es to keeping our A m ericans, C anadian popular attitudes are likely to be am bivalent. H ardship cases will m ake the headlines, and m em bers of Parliam ent and congressm en will cry out. A t this point one can only note the storm w arnings. T he tendency of A m erican corporations to run their C anadian branches as regional plants is com plicated by the barriers to the transfer o f personnel. O pposition in C anada to the im portation o f A m erican professors and plant m anagers suggests that m any C anadians w ould not be unhappy in theory to frustrate in this w ay the continentalization of their econom y. O n both sides, ho w ev er, there have been assum ptions about personal m obility that w ould be challenged by the im position o f stiffer border c ontrols of all kinds and the erection o f the kinds o f barriers that all N orth A m ericans associate w ith the m ore restrictive society o f the E urope they rejected— and at a tim e w hen, in W estern E urope, border restrictions are being eased. N either federal nor provincial gov­ e rnm ents in C anada have been persuaded as yet to enact special legisla­ tion on the em ploym ent o f A m ericans, but a clim ate o f opinion has been created that has m odified the personnel policies of universities and corporations. T he tide, for the m om ent at least, is against con­ tinentalism in people. It is also against continentalism in land. S trong pressures are build­ ing up on provincial governm ents to prevent o r restrict the purchase of C anadian land by foreigners, w ith a special eye on A m ericans buying up farm s in S askatchew an, resort country in B ritish C olum bia and N ova S cotia, as well as the already w ell-populated lake country in O ntario. T his em erged as a m ajor subject o f concern w hen the pro v in ­ cial prem iers m et in C harlottetow n in A ugust 1973. A s in the provincial talks about the control o f resources and outside investm ent, there is also in the land question an am bivalence about w hether foreigners are people in another country or another province. T he forces o f continentalism are like pow erful forces o f nature. T he pressure o f A m erican capital and A m erican hunger for resources are phenom ena o f w hich C anadian politicians are well aw are. In the earlier years C anadian lands were filled up with A m erican settlers pushing

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w est and north w ith little regard for ill-defined frontiers, and C anada had a hard tim e establishing its sovereignty in som e areas. For the past half century A m ericans have been enjoying their ow n prosperity, and C anada has been m aking itself viable w ith m ore assim ilable, o r docile, im m igrants from overseas. A m erican im m igrants are likely to com pete directly with C anadians for jobs, w hereas the W est Indians and Portuguese and the Pakistanis and G reeks will do the support jobs native C anadians are spurning. T he population o f the continent, how ever, is still very unequally distributed, and A m ericans have a historic tendency to press tow ard frontiers. C anadians have traditional­ ly thought they w ould like to have a larger share o f the c o n tin e n t's population, but they have to cope w ith an increase in the w ork force from their ow n c itizen ry , w hich is larger in absolute term s than that of Britain o r G e rm a n y .19

A llia n c e a n d P artnership S hifting attitudes tow ard the U nited States role in the w orld have, in recent years, inevitably altered C anadian attitudes tow ard the relation­ ship. P artnership is a w ord less used now . T he C anadian disposition seem s to be tow ard m ore independence in foreign policy, and the shift o f em phasis from strategic to econom ic issues fixes attention on areas w here there is m ore conflict. T he concept o f partnership flourished during the w ar and p ostw ar d ecades w hen the need to stand shoulder to shoulder against a clearly perceived threat from abroad w as regarded as the basic national interest. T hat threat has grow n m ore am biguous. Som e of this change, how ever, is m ore apparent than real. It is of significance that C anadians and A m ericans both seem to think that the foreign policies o f the T rudeau governm ent are m ore nationalist and independentist than those o f its predecessors, although a strong case can be m ade that the U nited States w as in fact defied m ore stubbornly by the St. L aurent-P earson policies o f the 'fiftie s. On the continental front, for exam ple, the U nited States w as pressed into collaboration on the St. L aw rence Seaw ay because the C anadian governm ent decided to g o it alone. In w orld affairs the St. L aurent governm ent took advantage o f its considerable leverage to oblige W ashington to accept article 2 of the N orth A tlantic T reaty and to oppose the U nited States o v er K orea w ith m ore courage than w as required to recognize Peking in 1970 w hen the U nited States no longer cared. A difference m ay be that there is now less confidence in O ttaw a, and p robably in W ashington also , that the benevolence o f an ally o r a priority accorded to the com m on interest will prevail over a perceived national interest. E ven those C anadians w ho concede that quiet diplom acy paid off am ong people who

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respected each o th er in the heyday o f the NATO spirit speculate now as to w hether the goodw ill o f allies is a com m odity to be counted on. H as that gone w ith the C old W ar? T hat priority once accorded to the alliance spirit w as less in a continental than a n A tlantic context. T he broader trans-A tlantic spirit has soured even m ore certainly than the N orth A m erican partnership. A s a result, a bilateral partnership o f so rts, w anted or unw anted, m ay be thrust upon N orth A m ericans by the ex clusiveness o f the W est E uropeans. It w ould be w rong, furtherm ore, to take for g ranted that C anadians as a w hole and in the m iddle o f the night have abandoned their reliance on N orth A m erica as their bastion in a volatile w orld. A ttitudes o f the 'fiftie s have been abandoned. C anadians have learned that A m erican m ilitary p o w er can be em ployed in disastrous w ays and is beyond their control, that there are alm ost insuperable strategic and logistic obstacles to the sim ple m ilitary c ollaboration they thought they once agreed to, but nevertheless m ost o f them w ould rather have the U nited States stay as strong as the devils they do not know . N o r a d w as renew ed in 1973, although for only a few years, w ithout very m uch discussion. U nless and until overseas challenges look m ore m enacing, o r the cost escalates d ram atically, n o r a d is likely to look m ore like one o f m any sensible structures for handling transborder problem s than the political com m itm ent to com m on causes here and abroad that it appeared to be a decade o r m ore ago. It m ay be all the m ore soundly based fo r being regarded as a practical m echanism and enduring con­ venience rather than as a gesture o f solidarity dependent on shifting calcu latio n s o f a threat. It should be noted also that the new C anadian nationalism is a bourgeois as m uch as a left-w ing phenom enon. T he greater em phasis on the national interest paradoxically provides as strong an argum ent for being nice to the A m ericans as for standing up to them . That C a n ad a ’s essential interests are econom ic and depend on U nited States policies is a proposition w idely taken for granted. M any tough C anadian nationalists, therefore, advocate C anadian foreign policies designed not n ecessarily to please W ashington but to avoid irritating it and thereby risking som ething they regard as im portant, like the auto p act. T hey put the C anadian interest ahead not o n ly o f internationalism but also o f m ere anti-A m ericanism . T heir nationalism is based on a vested interest in the C anadian econom y and polity rather than concern for the im age o f C anada in w orld councils o r support o f the U nited States as bastion o f the “ free w o rld .” T he divergences o f the past few years have sharpened conflict, but they have also been a learning, and a sobering, experience. T he crunch revealed how m uch each country had becom e dependent on the other. C anadians learned by standing firm against M r. C onnally that the

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A m erican governm ent w ould not o r could not be as ruthless as they had feared. H aving a better appreciation o f their ow n stren g th and the areas o f A m erican dependence, they are m ore likely to seek agreem ents on the basis o f m utual and balancing interest than by the enervating p lea of special vulnerability. T he energy crisis has been stark enough to cut through a lot o f bluster and illusion. A m ong the things C anadians have learned is that they are not pow erless to control their ow n resources even if these are ow ned by A m ericans. W hile C anada m ay at the sam e tim e be involved in an international netw ork o f corporations, g o v ­ e rnm ents, and institutions that restricts its range o f choice it is less so than m ost other m iddle pow ers. Just as M r. C onnally and his associates retreated as it becam e clear that drastic m easures for C anadians w ere d o uble-edged, so too those C anadians w ho w anted to hold the A m ericans ransom for C a n a d a 's resources realized w hen the chips w ere being counted that there w ere tw o sides in that gam e. U sing O n ta rio ’s plentiful hydro-electric pow er as a co u n ter, for exam ple, w as rejected by the authorities of the O ntario H ydro-E lectric Pow er C om m ission w ho pointed to their d ependence on supplies o f cheap coal from P ennsylvania. D iverting w estern oil entire­ ly to eastern C anada w as risky as the pipeline goes through the northern U nited States. M ost im portant o f all perhaps w as a realization, w hen a show dow n could be co ntem plated, that although C anadian energy resources w ere not the solution to A m erica’s problem , cutting them off w ith no regard for a neig h b o u r’s distress w as not an act to be undertaken glibly. A side from the danger o f retaliation, there w as a rediscovery under stress o f the truth that the w eaker pow er in the d yad is better o ff in the long run w hen the doctrine o f m utual consideration is m aintained. A t the sam e tim e, how ever, the C anadian governm ent w as driven in the course o f a few m onths to take drastic m easures in the direction of self-sufficiency that w ere heretofore politically im possible. P reserving and strengthening the C anadian advantage in resources is likely to be the endeavour o f any C anadian governm ent. A straw in the w ind is O ntario P rem ier D av is’s prediction at the end o f 1973 that the greater availability of energy in O ntario w ill give a great advantage to the heartland of C anadian industry in the continental context. T he con­ tinental spirit o f give-and-take m ay be preserved in an era o f hard barg ain in g , but the trend is against continental solutions. It m ay w ell be tow ard a m ore expedient approach to policym aking. In an interview of 1 January 1974, D onald M acdonald, m inister o f en erg y , m ines and resources, said , w hen asked w hether the M ackenzie pipeline w as not “ the spearhead tow ard c o n tin e n ta lism ,” that: “ T his is very m uch argued betw een tw o p o les, the continental energy policy on the one hand and no truck nor trade w ith the Y ankees on the other. O f course the reality does not exist at either pole. T he best C anadian position

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exists in the m iddle, that is to be able to assess at any one tim e w hat is in our best interest in term s o f sales and energy to the U nited S ta te s .” 20 T he U nited S tates, considering its enorm ous strength, has been a rem arkably good neighbour ov er tw o centuries. A question C anadians seriously ask them selves is w hether this w ill continue to be the the case if for the first tim e the C anadian standard o f living becom es a reason for envy. T hat m ay depend on w hether o r not C anadians can keep their heads in such circum stances.

N o tes 'Canadians generally regard the proposed Burke-Hartke bill as a menace, but when the Canadian section o f the United Steel Workers o f Am erica discussed the subject, what they demanded were exemptions fo r Canada, ie, protection on a continental basis. Globe and M ail, 1 June 1973. 3Canada, House o f Commons, Debates, 28th Parliament, 4th sess., vol. 2, 1972, p. 1328. ’us Assistant Secretary o f State fo r Econom ic A ffa irs Thorp and Under Secretary o f State Lovett, 8 M arch 1948, on a proposal under secret discussion to eliminate trade barriers between the United States and Canada: “ T h e present may o ffer a unique opportunity o f prom oting the most efficient utilization o f the resources o f the North American Continent and knitting the tw o countries together— an objective o f United States foreign p o licy since the founding o f the Republic” (us Department of State, Foreign R elations o f the U nited States 1948, vo l. ix The W estern Hemisphere [W ashington, D .C .: United States Governm ent Printing O ffic e , 1972], p. 406). 'S ee, fo r exam ple, A llan G otlieb and Charles D alfen, “ National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility: N e w Canadian Approaches to International L a w ,” A m erican Journal o f International L aw , l x v i i (July 1973), 229-58. In the currently fashionable anxiety to emphasize, as in the United States, that Canadian foreign policy is being dictated now by tough-minded national in­ terests rather than by soft-minded internationalism as in the past, the extent to which the national interest was in fact subordinated to do-goodism by previous governments has been considerably exaggerated. T h e same argument m ay w ell apply in the United States, but the tw o m ythologies are political forces nevertheless. ’For a contradictory aspect o f this situation, how ever, see p. 252. ‘ For statistics, see footnote 17. ’ Certainly the popular assumption that most recent Am erican immigrants to Canada w ere draft dodgers has been w idely exaggerated. 'F or exam ple, the m ove to integrated schools has been a great goal o f liberals in the United States. In Quebec, Ontario, or N e w Brunswick, any threat to the right o f the English and French to their ow n schools would be regarded as reactionary. Paradoxically also, it is the factor o f the United States as an outside challenge that makes the problems o f the Canadian confederation so different from those o f the United States, which has no such challenge. T h e argument for governmental control o f communications, for exam ple, has no counterpart in the United States.

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’ N ot to be confused with genuine anti-Americanism. Resistance to the United States is a sine qua non o f the existence o f Canada. It does not require a b elief that the United States is sinful or intentionally hostile. It emphasizes differentia­ tion rather than superiority. Anti-Am ericanism is more ideological, a conviction o f the far L eft or far Right or far liberal that the United States is based on false premises or has grown degenerate. "Th ere is evidence, for exam ple, that the government could im prove the Canadian-u.s. relationship on trade questions by conceding certain safeguards o f the auto pact that have ceased to be meaningful but it does not dare risk accusation from the opposition parties o f g ivin g in to U.S. pressure. "W h en the United States went on year-long daylight saving time in January 1974, the other provinces waited for Ontario’ s decision, and when Ontario decided not to fo llo w the U.S. exam ple, British Columbia reversed its decision to do so. I2A straw in the wind could be the agreement between premiers and governors o f the Atlantic provinces and the N e w England states, meeting in August 1973, to press their respective governments to allow a free flo w o f power, generated in Canada, between the two regions. Globe and M ail, 17 August 1973. l3See particularly a report on United States tactics in the Globe and M ail, 17 June 1973. “ It is a w ord Americans tend to use on ly about other countries, but Canadians do not see much difference between the increasing emphasis on u.s. interests and what Americans pejoratively call nationalism in Canada. l5See Rodrigue Trem blay, Independance et marche commun, Quebec-Etats-

Unis (M ontreal: Editions du jour, 1970). “ T h e Canadian percentage o f the total population o f North Am erica (north o f the R io Grande) is rising rapidly. A t the beginning o f the century it was 6.6 per cent. In the decade o f the 'sixties it rose from 9.2 per cent to 9.6 per cent. "Im m igrants in 1972 from four largest sources: United States— 22,618; United Kin gdom — 18,161; Portugal— 8,737; Hong K on g— 6,297. A ccording to the 1973 annual report o f the visa o ffic e o f the U.S. Department o f State, Canadian immigration to the United States has declined steadily from 40,013 in 1965 to 7,278 in 1973.

18Globe and M ail, 29 March 1973. "“See UN Sratistical Yearbook, 1972 (N e w York: Statistical O ffic e o f the UN, 1973), pp .95-6.

20G lobe and M ail, 1 January 1974.

5: The Vietnam War and Canada

W hen the C anadian A sso c ia tio n fo r A m e rica n S tu d ie s m et in M o n tre a l in N o v e m b e r 1970, I was a sk e d to d iscuss th e bro a d question o f the V ietnam w ar in C anada. The lecture, in w hich I tried to su m m a rize o u r ow n supervisory role a n d th e consequences o f th e w ar on o u r fo reig n a n d defen ce p o lic ies, was p u b lish e d in W ar and Society in N orth A m erica, e d ite d b y J . L . G ra n a ts te in a n d R . D. C u ff (T oronto: N elson, 1971). W hat app ea rs belo w is th e fin a l section o f th a t essay in which / tried to calculate w hat the w ar se e m ed to have do n e to o u r relationship in o th er ways. The m o o d in M o n tre a l was sober. O u r gra tifica tio n at avoid in g o u r n e ig h b o u r’s gh a stly experience h a d been checked by the violent events o f that autum n.

M uch of the im pact on C anada o f the V ietnam w ar is a spill-over or a m irror im age of its im pact on the U nited States. O ne m ust be careful in o n e ’s deductions because the V ietnam w ar is only o n e, although perhaps the m ajor, elem ent in the transform ation o f A m erican society and attitudes in the past decade, and it is part of a w orld-w ide m ovem ent, not just a N orth A m erican phenom enon. T he effect on C anadian-A m erican relations has been curiously am bivalent; V ietnam has stim ulated in C anada both alienation and identification. It w ould be hard to say how m uch o f the increasing anti-A m ericanism — o r at least strong criticism of the U nited States— in C anada is attributable to the V ietnam w ar and how m uch to the racial issue, U nited S tates policy in L atin A m erica, o r its heavy investm ent in C anada. C ritics usually draw these aspects together in a gross charge o f “ im p erialism .” It is the ex ercise o f great m ilitary force in another continent, how ever, w hich especially seem s to confirm the diagnosis o f “ im p e rialism .” It is the aspect w hich seem s inexcusable to those w ho w ould concede to the U nited States, as to any c o u ntry, its dom estic failings and its assertion of regional predom inance. In spite o f the articulateness and the passion o f the critics, how ever, probably just as m any C anadians regard the U nited States en d eav o u r to “ resist ag g ressio n ” in other parts o f the 272

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w orld as justified and w orthy o f m oral support— even though they m ay increasingly consider it a losing c a u s e .1 T h e V ietnam w ar has raised the level of anti-A m erican feeling in C anada and it has also tended to polarize attitudes tow ards the U nited S tates. For the m ajority, how ever, it has probably just stim ulated C anadianism , o f both the affirm ative and perverse varieties. It could once be assum ed that all C anadians, w ith the exception o f a few last-ditch L oyalists, regarded the U nited States as a frequently arrogant, not p articularly lovable, but basically harm less and essen tial­ ly benevolent pow er and, provided they were not expected to say so too loudly, a good friend to have on our side. Few doubted that the U nited States w as a good deed in a naughty w orld. F o r a large num ber o f less articulate C anadians there w as also a strong urge to share the higher standard o f living in the U nited States o r to m ake it in the big tim e .2 N ow that the higher standard o f living includes the possibility of com pulsory m ilitary service in the Indochinese jungles and a m uch h igher liability to m unicipal violence, calculations have shifted. Few er C anadians are m oving to the U nited States and m ore A m ericans are m oving to C a n ad a .3 It is hard to say w hether this trend will outlast the V ietnam W ar, b ecause the m otivation is ecological and rom antic as w ell as political. It is hard also to say w hether calculations will be altered by the threat o f civil com m otion in C anada. In C anada anti-A m ericanism w as traditionally a phenom enon o f the R ight. N ow the R ight, disillusioned in its dream o f E m pire and tied closely to the industrial and financial com m unity o f the U nited S tates, has reconciled itself to continentalism and is sym pathetic to the A m erican cause in V ietnam . O n the w hole it is suspicious o f the econom ic aspects o f nationalism . T he sw ing o f the L eft to attitudes varying from virulent anti-A m ericanism to a m ore-in-sorrow -than-inanger disapproval o f U nited States foreign policy is part o f the w orld­ w ide phenom enon o f the Left. T h e U nited States and, to an increasing exten t, its fellow superpow er, the Soviet U nion, are the villains of left-w ing thought in the w orld at large and V ietnam has played the m ost im portant part in creating this im age. It has given anti-A m ericanism a w ider respectability than it previously had in C anada. C anadian liberal intellectuals are affected by the m ood o f A m eri­ can liberals, an apparent state o f despair about A m erican civilization. The C anadians do not know w hether to respond by rejecting the U nited States and finding their ow n w ay o r by w allow ing in sin w ith A m ericans. T h is dilem m a is attributable to one virtue, fairm indedness— the realization that w e share the horrid bourgeois civilization and the C old W ar and it is not decent to attribute the w ickedness to the U nited States and the virtue to C anada. It is attributable also to the hair-shirt hangup w hich m akes it im possible for

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som e C anadians to accept their m ore fortunate circum stances. Renata A dler, film critic for the N e w Y o rk Tim es, has p ointed to the determ ination o f people to claim guilt for violent political events. “ C laim ing responsibility for the acts m ost rem ote from one seem s a w ay o f trying to assert control over things, of denying that events can be random , pointless and chaotically h o rrib le .’’4 O ut o f a laudable effort to avoid hypocrisy, C anadian critics of U nited States policy in V ietnam have been a nxious to blam e their ow n governm ent for com plicity. In doing so they have got things out o f proportion. T hey ignore the rem arkable deg ree o f detachm ent from the w ar in Indochina w hich the C anadian governm ent has m aintained and the p art it has tried to play in keeping peace in that area and centre their attention on the less im ­ portant fact that C anada has not denounced the U nited States or broken off its defence production sharing agreem ents. T he latter are perfectly valid (if debatable) criticism s, but they divert attention from the more significant event, that C anada, contrary to earlier assum ptions, did not have to participate in fighting an A m erican war. Identification w ith the U nited States and its conflicts is to be found m ost notably on the extrem e Left and the extrem e R ight, although it is probably the L um pen M id d le, brain-w ashed by television, that is least aw are o f the fact that C anada is not itself at w ar in V ietnam . O r faced w ith problem s o f conscription and racial violence. If C anadian radicals join anti-V ietnam parades in the streets of W ashington, other C anadians will assum e an identity o f interest w ith the U nited States governm ent by calling for the exclusion o f draft dodgers and deserters. T o describe these inconsistencies is not to suggest there could be perfect consistency. It is sim ply to suggest that w e are here in the thick o f paradoxes o f w hich w e have to be aw are. T he extrem e R ight and the extrem e Left do not w orry about consistency. T hey both regard the U nited States and C anadian governm ents as linked inseparably in defence o f the capitalist system and they m ust be destroyed together or p reserved together in accordance w ith values m ore im portant than the p reservation o f national sovereignty. T he dilem m a is for the m ore p ragm atic C anadian nationalist. T he V ietnam w ar, w hich has given a strong stim ulus to C anadian nationalism , could in the end contribute to the erosion o f C anadian sovereignty o r at least the idea of C anada, not by A m erican intervention but by the refusal of C anadians to accept their condition as non-A m ericans. F inally, w hat im pact has the V ietnam w ar had on C an ad a’s view of itself, of its place in the w orld, and on the view oth er people, including the A m ericans, have o f C anada? So m any elem ents have gone into the changes since 1954 that one has to be w ary o f ascribing them all to V ietnam . H ow m uch, for instance, o f the increase in nationalism and self-confidence in C anada in the past sixteen years is attributable to the

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expansion o f our econom ic g row th to near g reat-pow er figures, and how m uch to our neig h b o u r’s m isfortunes? C anadians have suffered in the past from not so m uch an inferiority com plex vis-a-vis the U nited States as a consciousness of sm allness o r perhaps o f sm all-tow nness. L ike sm all-tow ners they felt po o rer and less sophisticated but had no doubt o f their m oral superiority. T he V ietnam w ar m ay have encouraged sm ugness, but I am not sure that it has, in fact, aggravated our sense o f m oral superiority. A s I have suggested, those C anadians m ost convinced o f the im m orality o f A m erican policy are those m ost determ ined to associate C anada w ith the crim e. O ther C anadians think w e are letting the A m ericans fight o u r crusade and they, therefore, feel m orally inferior. O ne can find parallels in the argum ent fifty y ears ago betw een those w ho believed it w as the obligation of Britain to m aintain the pax B ritannica for our benefit but w ithout our help and those who believed w e should contribute to the great im perial cause. W hat has shifted is the C anadian view as to w ho has the luck. M any C anadians grow sceptical of the N orth A m erican assum ption that bigness, w hether o f population o r o f industry, is an unquestionably good thing. T he com forts of a qu ieter life and in particular the freedom from the terrible o b ligations to keep the peace in all parts of the w orld becom e d aily m ore obvious. O th ers, paradoxically, see our luck in the bigness o f our resources. W e have certainly not shaken off the im petus to econom ic grow th, but w e covet less the status o f g reat pow er because w e have becom e m ore aw are o f its dreadful responsibilities and its vulnerability. W e seem to be in a p eriod of retreat from the am bitions for w orld influence w hich ch aracterized us at the tim e o f the G ene­ va conference o f 1954. W hether this is a renunciation o f world responsibility o r a seeking after a different o r a m ore appropriate re­ sponsibility for a co u n try econom ically rather than m ilitarily strong rem ains an unansw ered question. S trengthening o f the desire for in­ dependence o r neutrality, for a non-m ilitary role, has certainly been encouraged by the V ietnam w ar, partly by the desire to keep out of som ething so m essy and partly because of the apparent dem onstration o f the futility o f m ilitary force. T he V ietnam w ar still rages and the final results are uncertain. If it ended in a new G eneva agreem ent w ith a responsible part for C anada, an adjustm ent to reasonably independent regim es in Indochina, and an A m erican w ithdraw al w ithout too great loss o f face, w e m ight all resum e o u r active and constructive role in th e building o f a strong U nited N ations by experience. O n the other hand an A m erican w ith­ draw al in disarray accom panied, o r perhaps preceded, by upheavals in the U nited States w ould drive us into a frantic effo rt to isolate ourselves from contagion or, im pelled by the death w ish w hich plagues m any C anadians, to jum p into the flam es in o rder not to be unlike the

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A m ericans. W hatever the shape o f events, w e are likely to feel a cold chill from a collapse o f the pax A m ericana. W hether w e have liked it or not, and it is far from the ideal w ay to keep the peace, we have regarded it as a bulw ark. C anadians w ho considered that A m erican p o w er was unw isely or w ickedly used in V ietnam have, at least subconsciously, thought o f diverting it to better causes. S u b sp e c ie a ete rn ita tis we may regard the disintegration of the A m erican em pire as a good thing, but at the m om ent it w ould leave C anada m ore exposed and vulnerable than it has e v er been part o f our philosophy to regard ourselves. T he shock w aves alone could be devastating. T h is is not an argum ent to join the A m ericans in the w ay they are going; it is sim ply to underline our vital interest in their fate. C anadian calculations about o u r ow n situation in the w orld, w hether they are neutralist o r alliance-m inded, for the most part assum e a strong and internationally active U nited States— as well as a strong S oviet U nion in counterpoise. A shift in the capacity, stability, or disposition of either superpow er w ould bring us hard up against the brute facts o f survival as an over-resourced and un­ derpopulated entity. O ur present obsession w ith independence as the principal them e o f foreign and defence policy m ay then seem to ourselves as heedless as it now does to m ost foreigners. Preoccupation w ith C anada has never been an A m erican obsession, but there is evidence o f a changing attitude to us in the age o f V ietnam . Persistent in A m erican m ythology, although never very high in profile, has been the vision o f C anada as the tranquil frontier. It is a view which m ay be destroyed by recent events in Q uebec, but C anada is a vast country and this elem ent is now unpredictable. It is disconcerting to find A m ericans view ing C anada as an over-sized W alden Pond or a w om b-like area w here they m ight find the bliss o f childhood. It is a bucolic vision o f C anada w hich C anadians have been anxious to cast o ff, but it is not unattractive these days to be a haven where brilliant and attractive A m ericans com e to find rest and help fight our expressw ays. T he idea o f C anada as A m erica w ith a second chance has been suggested by no less a person than form er U nited States Secretary of the Interior, Stew art U dall. He told the M ontreal C anadian C lub C anada ought not to try to w in the race o f bigness w ith the U nited States but should provide a lead in avoiding the galloping, unplanned grow th in that country. “ C anada has a built-in head start if you should elect to g ive priority to the creation o f an over-all environm ent o f balance and order and beauty. M ost sober C anadians realize that we face m any of the issues o f A m erican society and w ould like to avoid A m erican m istakes. M any o f the A m erican im m igrants, especially the in­ tellectuals, see their m ission in helping us do exactly this. But w e are not just the U nited States in the days o f its innocence and w e need different cures for different illnesses. D esegregation is no panacea for

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our ethnic differences, an d , as for V ietnam , o u r national sin is underrather than over-involvem ent in the affairs o f other states. W e m ust som e tim e shake that paralyzing conviction that C an ad a’s national purpose is catching up w ith the U nited States. V ietnam m ay have helped. O ne is tem pted to conclude, trying to avoid sm ugness, that the V ietnam w ar and all it has done to the U nited States, its soul and its im age, has given C anadians m ore confidence in the quality of their ow n country o r at least m ade them value m ore their habitat. But has it? O ur liberation will not com e through any form o f obsession with the U nited States, even if it is hostile. O ur artists and w riters rem ain infatuated by the excitem ent and d ram a o f V ietnam and the race riots— all o f w hich they m ost vividly deplore. T he m ost successful C anadian p lay o f the year is about the C hicago trials, a phenom enon w hich one critic described as “ the ultim ate U.S. cultural invasion o f o u r c o u n try .” T he expatriate acto r, D onald S utherland, w hose view s, if he w ere in C anada, w ould be called anti-A m erican, say s, “ A m erica is the m ost exciting country in the w orld b ecause it is so volatile. ” E uropeans m ay have been attracted to the U nited States by its republican virtues. C anadians have been m ore attracted by its excitem ent. T he U nited States has alw ays been better theatre. T he V ietnam w ar and the A m erican tragedies it has p ro voked have fascinated C anadians and draw n their attention aw ay from the incipient tragedy in th eir own c o untry. And so the C anadian reform ers— the A nglophones at least— have only foreign rem edies for dom estic m aladies w hich are unique. T h at seem s to m e a sell-out by E nglish-C anadian intellectuals w ith consequences as threatening to th e C anadian survival as the sell-out of our physical resources w ith w hich less purely intellectual C anadians are charged.

N o te s 'A s late as 1966, according to polls o f the Canadian Institute o f Public Opinion (G allup), only 31% o f Canadians thought the United States should withdraw its troops from Vietnam whereas 18% favoured carrying on at the present level and 27% w ere fo r increasing the attacks. By 1967 these figures had shifted to 41% , 16%, and 23% . In 1968, 35% o f Canadians said they w ere grateful to the Am ericans fo r their efforts in Vietnam and 37% disassociated themselves from what the Am ericans w ere doing there. In M a y 1970, 36% said their opinion o f the United States w ould g o up if they withdrew all their troops from Vietnam and the same per cent said it would have no effect on their vie w o f the great neighbour. In spite o f the assurance o f an articulate m ajority on both sides o f the issue, it is hard to detect firm convictions on Vietnam by the Canadian public. Shifts o f opinion in the last fe w years probably reflected shifts in opinion in the United States. There has certainly not been mass disapproval o f

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United States policy but a desire to remain uninvolved can probably be deduced from the fact that assistance to the United States war effort has been championed by no political party and rarely even by those w ho speak up in strong defence of Am erican action. :It is interesting to note a similar compulsion among virulently anti-American radicals in Canada w ho are contemptuous o f the pettiness o f Canadian grievances and are infatuated with Am erican causes and campuses. 3Since 1964 the annual immigration o f Americans to Canada has doubled from 11,000 to 22,000, whereas the number o f Canadians believed to have m oved to the United States has declined from 50,000 to 30,000. 4N ew York Times, D 15, 23 June 1968. 5Globe and M ail, p .b l, 24 October 1967.

6: Quebec Nationalism and Canadian-American Relations

It is tem ptingly e a sy to fo rg e t a b o u t Q uebec when discussing C anadianA m e ric a n relations. The reason is n o t ju s t an a rro g a n t rejection o f the Q uebec fa ct. It is h a rd to know how to d e a l with it. S o long a s Q u eb ec is p a r t o f C anada, then the cultural variations w ithin C anada are n o t a crucial fa cto r, a t lea st in defence, econom ics, a n d fo re ig n policy. I f Q u eb ec becom es a state, then, a s C anadians like to sa y in th eir quaint A m e ric a n way, we a re co n fronted with a whole n e w ball gam e. W hen the C entre quebecois de relations internationales a n d th e W o rld P eace F oundation o f B o sto n m e t a t S a in t-M a rc-su r-R ic h elieu in J u n e 1974 to continue their exploration o f "Q u eb ec-E ta ts-U n is, ” I was a sk e d to stare a t this very difficult subject, “ The S ig n ifica n ce o f Q uebec N a tio n a lism fo r C a n adian-A m erican R elations, " a n d s a y som ething. T hese a re the rem arks p re p a re d fo r that occasion.

It is im possible to talk o f Q uebec o r o f C anadian nationalism w ithout recognizing that the m ere existence o f the U nited States— either as a challenge o r a threat— is o f central im portance. T he m ost significant aspect o f Q uebec nationalism on C anadian-A m erican relations m ay be the im pact it has had on the nationalism of E nglish C anadians. It is shaking up our certain ties, sending us back to discover the nature and p urpose o f the C anadian state. W e are, I hope, passing through the stage w here fear and the instinct o f resistance drove us sim ply to reaffirm the certainties o f the past generation. I hope we are com ing to recognize that the sacred principle of evolution we have regarded as our special virtue m eans that w e continue to be an experim ental p henom enon, that our genius lies in adaptation to new circum stances and that the circum stances are new . N ot only C anada but the w hole of N orth A m erica has been an evolving experim ent in governm ent, and 279

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w e have to see o u r ow n evolution, now as alw ays, in the context o f a continent. In the present situation, under the im pact not only of internal pressures on the C anadian concept o f governm ent but also o f rapidly c hanging facts o f international life, we should be open to alm ost any suggestion. T he o n ly sure thing is that the status quo is no place on w hich to stand. T o o m any shibboleths stand in the w ay of fresh thought— national unity is a good thing; nationalism is a bad thing— and our dialogue is inhibited by too m any unm entionables: separatism , special status, o r continentalism . W e need to unplug our ears to each o th er— Q uebecois, A m ericans, o r those conglom erate C anadians who grew up speaking not really E nglish but w hat one m ight call “ h a rse ,” roughly translated as “ jo u a l.” It is m y intention, therefore, to be extrem ely tentative, to express no certain ties, to ask questions and raise p ossibilities about w hich I have no fixed convictions. B ecause m y subject is nationalism , w hich is generally recognized to have an uncertain relationship with econom ics, I am disposed to accentuate the political and ask w hether econom ic realities can conform to the political will— as it is generally believed they have do n e in the past in the C anadian-A m erican relationship. I think it is fair to say that the reaction to Q uebec nationalism of what for w ant o f a b etter term I shall have to call E nglish C anadians— o r of m ost of them — has been to fall back on the assum ption that if C anada is going to survive and prosper on a continent w here it is unequally paired w ith a superpow er, it can do so only by strengthening the po w er of the federal governm ent to control and m anipulate the econom y. T here is justification for the assum ption because such a philosophy in O ttaw a did lay the basis o f C a n a d a 's evolution as an independent country and its p ostw ar em ergence as a m ajor econom ic p o w er in the w orld. Even those w ho argue that w e built up not an independent but a satellite e conom y blam e the central governm ent for not being stronger. N ation­ al unity is accepted in rhetoric as the unquestioned goal. H ypnotized by the U nited States, E nglish C anadians have been losing sight o f the other assum ptions o f the C anadian system . T hey are victim s o f the A m ericanization of C anadian n ationalism , w hich im poses A m erican philosophy on w hat w as a very different experim ent in governm ent. T h ey have accepted even the blackm ail o f the tranquil revolutionists, that C anada w ithout Q uebec w ould have no identity. T hey have got them selves out on a long lim b— and lost contact with their roots. F o r w hat is C an ad a? It nev er w as an effort to create the new m an or even a readily indentifiable C anadian. T he purpose o f the founders was to put a protective ro o f over th eir heads so that they could live their N orth A m erican-style lives under different rules from those o f the G reat R epublic w hich for varying reasons they disliked. E ventually

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they cam e together to erect a joint and presum ably stronger fram ew ork for the sam e purpose. T he purpose o f this structure w as peace, order, and good governm ent, based on com m on sense, com prom ise, and collusion rather than the m iasm a o f national unity. U nhappily A m erican im perialism provoked C anadian im perialism in the late nineteenth century, and the healthy pragm atism o f the founders w as lost sight o f ; I suppose w e needed that all-C anadian fanaticism to build the C anadian Pacific R ailw ay, and I d o n 't regret o u r m aking it from sea to sea, but I do regret som e o f the consequences. W e have lost sight of the fact that the purpose o f the C anadian state w as less to create C anadians than to provide a fram ew ork w ithin w hich N ova Scotians, Q uebeckers, or V ancouver Islanders could flourish as securely and prosperously as international circum stances w ould allow . If N ew ­ foundlanders joined later to get O ttaw a ’s fam ily allow ances, that w as not cynical; it w as a recognition o f the purposes of the C anadian state— a progressive and civilized concept o f the purposes of a state: to serve its people. It is a purpose w hich requires a high degree o f flexibility, a sensitive distribution o f po w er in accordance w ith changing functions and circum stances. It is destroyed by dogm atism , in particular the dogm atic belief in central authority. O bviously decentralization carried to extrem es m eans the end o f the experim ent, but this does not require fanatical resistance to decentralization in principle. T im idity ought not to close the m ind to a restructuring o f the experim ent. C anadians have never adequately recognized their ow n genius for constitutional ad ap ta­ tion. In addition to our considerable contribution to the theory and practice o f federal and o f m ulticultural states, w e virtually invented the C om m onw ealth w hich, w hatever its future, played a notable historic function as a fram ew ork for constructive disintegration. H ere a t hom e we have not seen the end o f the experim ent w hich began with New France, w as at one tim e the D om inion of C anada, and is reshaping itself into w ho know s w hat. It is hard for E nglish C anadians to accept this m atter o f fact in­ terpretation of the m eaning of their existence w hen they are hot after a C anadian cultural identity. I think they are som ew hat confused be­ tw een the need to construct a C anadian culture and the need to protect and nourish culture in C anada. W e cannot allow the m etropolitanization of cu ltu re, w hich is a w orld-w ide p henom enon, to suck aw ay our talent, and w e m ust keep ou r artists focused on our ow n life so that we do not see ourselves falsely through foreign prism s. If our artists discover certain com m on features o f C anadian life, the product o f a shared political experience, so m uch the better, provided they realize that such uniform ity is not essential. It is know ing ourselves in all our particularities that m akes us healthy. H ere E nglish C anadians, as in so

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m any things, have learned from Q uebec. A w areness of, envy of, the b urgeoning Q uebec literature and cinem a based on the native experience has been the m ajor stim ulus for a sim ilar revolution in T o ro n to , W innipeg, V ancouver, and even L ondon, O ntario. T he selfconscious C anadianism o f the recent past, w hich had m eaning only as defiance o f H ollyw ood, C hicago, o r L ondon, is giving w ay to a critical and even am used exam ination o f real people in N ew foundland, a sm all tow n in S askatchew an, or o f N ova S cotians in T oronto. It is not so m uch nationalism as nativism . W hat w e have in com m on is the search­ ing for ourselves. T he m ost popular contem porary playw right in T o ro n to is M ichel T rem blay. So E nglish C anadians have m oved, I thin k , to the p o in t'w h ere it w ould not be difficult for them to accept the com fortable concept of cultural autonom y for Q uebec w ithin a federation or union of som e sort based on econom ics. It has been m ade very clear to them that the artists and intellectuals o f Q uebec, by and large, w ant to live unto them selves. T he cultural autonom y o f these Q uebeckers is such an obvious fact, the q uestion m ay b e asked w hether constitutional autonom y is required. E nglish C anadians begin to w onder also if bilingualism is w orth w hile, and they relax. Life m ight be easier all round if Q uebeckers could do w hat they like and the rest o f us did not have to feel guilty about doing w hat w e like. If som eone could com e up w ith a form ula w hich w ould o rganize that w ay o f life, it m ight be very successful politically. C ultural autonom y with econom ic union are obviously attractive also to m any Q uebeckers, but one cannot ignore those w ho say they are not com patible, that culture and econom ics cannot be separated, especially by a people w ho have been econom ically disadvantaged. I certainly do not reject that argum ent, but I w ish w e could do a little m ore exploring o f the contradictions involved. T h e trouble is that neither federalists nor independentists can, for good enough political reasons, adm it that any com prom ise is possible. T h is is particularly the case for the independentist w ho m ust encourage his follow ers to take a bold risk. T hey m ust not be beguiled w ith the possibility o f an easier w ay out. T he anglais m ust rem ain m audits. For the independentist the dialogue can be perm itted only after independence is an accom plished fact. W ith the logic o f that position I sym pathize. T he trouble is that the econom ic and political factors on this continent are so m uch e ntw ined that no new state could be im ­ m aculately conceived. T here has to be prelim inary negotiating or prelim inary fighting am ong all three parties. T he latter certainly ought to be regarded as a last re so rt. By that I do not m ean that O ttaw a o r even W ashington should regard arm ed force as the ultim ate w eapon to prevent the independence of Q uebec. W hat I m ean is that w e ought to

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look b efore it is too late at im aginative and p acific arrangem ents for relationships w hich w ould give us all optim al satisfaction. W hat sort of relationships m ight they be? M ust they for exam ple, be based on the present bilateral division o f the con tin en t? T he principal argum ent in the 1970s for an arrangem ent w hich preserves a basic division along the 49th parallel is the shifting balance o f advantage to the north in the loom ing w orld crisis over resources and population. T hat crisis has already affected d rastically the w orking habits of the C anadian constitution. T he balance o f pow er and advantage on w hich the federation rests has been strengthened by the dissidence o f A lberta and by the Q uebec interest in a national energy policy. T he conferences of first m inisters have becom e a m ajor elem ent of the constitution. O ne can regard these m eetings as evidence o f disunity across the country or of a persistent w ill to com prom ise w hen a national policy is clearly required. W hatever it is, it is the denial o f the old thesis that a national policy can be achieved only by the assertion o f the authority o f O ttaw a. T he reserve pow er of the federal governm ent is certainly a factor but it is used to obtain an inter-provincial consensus. In the econom ic sphere A lberta is asserting rights to discrim inate against other C anadians w hich go beyond anything Q uebec has d em anded. Q uebec assertions in the fields o f education o r even international relations m ust henceforth be seen in that light. In other w ords, the changing clim ate o f federalprovincial relations suggests that there are b etter chances than there w ere in a m ore doctrinaire period for the accom m odation o f Q uebec and C anadian nationalism s in a structure, federal o r quasi-federal, w hich m aintains the com m on resistance to continentalism . W hat o f the school of thought w hich regards a period o f co nstitution­ al separation as essential w hile both parts of C anada com e to term s with them selves and understand better their ow n interests in each other— to be follow ed by negotiation for reunion o r partnership on a m ore equitable basis? It is an idea that is attractive b ecause it is based on good psychology. A dan g er, how ever, is that the haggling over the d isposi­ tion o f effects associated w ith the divorce and rem arriage could poison the relationship indefinitely. W hat is perhaps m ore relevant to our subject today is the fact that the centripetal forces o f continentalism are such that Q uebec and C anada could hardly hope to m aintain during a prolonged interim sufficient control over their ow n polities to com e together again. So w ithout any desire to be unhelpful, the A m ericans, by their m ere existen ce, lim it the freedom o f choice w e have to experim ent. W hat about options in a broader continental context? A state of Q uebec w hich had cut the econom ic and political ties w ith C anada w ould be relatively stronger than m ost independent states, but the

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m aintenance o f its high standard o f living and the fact that it has been em bedded in a N orth A m erican econom y w ould create special prob­ lem s. A ssum ing that a close association w ith the EEC is unobtainable or undesirable, a special econom ic relationship w ith the U nited States could be attractive— Q uebeckers because o f their greater cultural assurance being less nervous than other C anadians about becom ing econom ically integrated. A lthough W ashington seem s not at all dis­ posed to encourage Q uebec nationalism , it is not inclined to be very sentim ental about C anada because C anada is fat and rich. Faced with a fait accom pli, W ashington w ould have to live w ith a state o f Q uebec and pursue its ow n special interests. T he com m on assum ption that a truncated C anada w ould have no alternative than to be sw allow ed up in one o r tw o parts in the great R epublic cannot be dism issed but should not be taken for granted. C anadians w ould suffer from a w ounded im age, but they w ould retain m any of the natural advantages of rem ain­ ing on their o w n , e .g . m ore oil and less hom icide. T h ere could be a feeling of relief. T he idealists w ould feel deeply the failure o f the bicultural endeavour but others m ight see a new w orld o f opportunity opening up— rather like the D utch and the B elgians w hen they looked back on lost colonies as a burden rather than an advantage. T h is new national enthusiasm , how ever, w ould, by reason o f the exigencies of a curious g eography, be tem pered w ith pragm atism . A nything like an EEC m odel has been deem ed inappropriate for N orth A m erica because o f the unsym m etrical nature o f the political division. T he im balance o f econom ic pow er w ould perhaps be aggravated rather than narrow ed by a division o f C anada, but the idea of three rather than tw o c ountries form ing an econom ic com m unity is m ore attractive in principle. Suggestions that M exico m ight be draw n into a tripartite partnership w ith the U nited States and C anada have never been m ore than figm ents o f the post-prandial im agination because the M exicans have needed, even m ore than C anada, to protect their econom ic life. H ow ever, there is no need to close our m inds indefinitely to speculation in that direction. W e are presum ably talking about an evolution o f governm ental structures, but in tim es w hen change can be rapid and drastic. A loosening o f the federal structure in C anada could, as federalists have alw ays m aintained, lead to a gradual regionalization o f the con­ tinent, not by governm ent action but by business and societal forces. O ur affiliations w ould be determ ined not by o u r elected governm ents but by the disposition of A m erican corporations, o f K iw anis Interna­ tional o r the W orld Football L eague to lay us out in sales regions which defy the border. Q uebec is better protected here by its linquistic identity. It has even given som ething approaching a special identity to an A m erican baseball team . F o r the rest o f C anada, this kind of

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regionalization is h ighly subversive, but the answ er could be in the affirm ation o f o u r ow n provincial orders as well as resistance on a national level. I need not add that m y speculations beg m ore questions than they answ er, and I do not propose here and now to defend them on constitu­ tional o r econom ic grounds. T hey are just part o f an argum ent that in considering w here the forces o f Q uebec, C anadian, and A m erican nationalism are leading us w e should look forw ard constructively rather than backw ards defensively. G overnm ent for the people is a N orth A m erican principle w e all have in com m on. It is a principle w hich requires constant adaptation because the p e o p le 's will keeps changing. W hat is required m ost o f all is constructive dialogue. Q uebeckers and A m ericans have nev er talked enough to each other, have tended to let E nglish C anadians handle relations w ith the U nited States. A m ericans, terrorized by C anadian nationalists into keeping their hands off C anada, are afraid even to be helpful. E nglish C anadians and French C anadians m aintain their contacts in the political zo n e, but the dialogue am ong academ ics and intellectuals has alm ost ceased. T oo m any su b ­ jects are taboo. T here is also a central paradox for m any E nglish C anadians. T hey find them selves often sym pathetic w ith the political concepts of the Q uebec independentists, recognize that they resem ble their ow n view s vis-a-vis the U nited S tates, and have a sneaking suspicion that they w ould be in that cam p if they w ere Q uebeckers. N evertheless, they are at cross purposes because they d o n ’t w ant the independentists to be successful in am putating a part o f the flesh and blood o f the C anada to w hich they are deep ly attached. T hat E nglish C anadians have an econom ic interest in the m aintenance o f the federation is undeniable. T hat their attachm ent to Q uebec is also one o f em otion and affection is too little recognized. B ut the em o tio n s, like the eco n o m ics, are ine­ quitable. Q uebec is a part of the C anadian legend w hereas the E nglish provinces are dispensable fo r Q uebeckers seeking their roots. In such circu m stances it is not easy to d iscuss the term s o f divorce, new rules for c o habitation, o r a m enage a trois.

Part Five: In Conclusion

T ributes to youth are so ritual and perfunctory it is hard to sound honest. N evertheless, I w ish to say that w hatever there is o f w isdom in the contents of this book derives in large m easure from the opportunities I have had to engage in sem inars during the past eight years w ith a quite rem arkable crop of students. T hey consistently oblige m e to dism antle and rebuild m y structures. T hey are respectful and sceptical and m ore inclined than their elder brothers to treat m e as an equal. C onstant association w ith them sharpens the m ind and is good for the soul. I suspect it w ould induce even the editors o f the G lobe a n d M a il to cheer up. I find them reassuring because they have the capacity to com e to grips w ith the future far better than I have. T he follow ing rem arks were delivered to a 1973 C onvocation o f L akehead U niversity in T hunder Bay on 26 M ay— w ith som e variations taken from an address the follow ing m onth on a sim ilar occasion at the U niversity o f W estern O ntario.

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I am greatly honoured to be present at this particular occasion in this p articular place. H ere at the L akehead one know s he is in the heart of this c o untry, N orth and S outh, E ast and W est. T he perm anent C anadian condition is here vividly reflected— w ith the solem n land to the north and the unsolem n land to the south. Each is in its ow n way intim idating, and our national problem is how to live w ith both. C onvocation is a solem n occasion. I w ish you all the success 1 know you deserve and if I say sim ply that I have great confidence in w hat you will do for yourselves and this country I hope you will accept that as som ething m ore than the solem n pronouncem ent w hich an occasion such as this requires. M y confidence is based on m ore than faith. Perhaps I should adm it that I am by nature an optim ist. L ike C .S .L e w is, “ I am an optim ist because I believe in the fall o f m a n .” People like M r. L ew is and me d o n ’t believe the w orld w as beautiful just before w e w ere b o rn , and we are m ore inclined to notice progress than regression. F urtherm ore, m y w ork o f late has led m e to clo ser study o f the history o f C a n ad a ’s relations with the w orld outside and it is hard to avoid the one obvious conclusion. A ny people w ho have not m erely survived but have trium phed o v er challenges to their personal and national existence m uch m ore forbidding than those they now face ought not to be cringing defensively but should be leading the m arch tow ards a better international com m unity. T he other reason for optim ism is that at an age w hen I should be taking up basket-w eaving I have taken up teaching— if one can use that w ord for the experience o f one who conducts sem inars in a m odern university. Six years direct exposure to college youth gives one an entirely different im pression from the portrait on w hich the glossier periodicals thrive. It is o f som e slight com fort to m e to realize that those o f m y generation could spell better and w e knew how to put a verb in a sentence. Intellectually, how ever, w e w ere m uch less sophisticated— appallingly so. I should hate to have one o f m y students see one o f m y college essays on how to save the w orld for peace— even though he could learn a little gram m ar from it. Incidentally, I trust that in the great concern you are all going to show for ecology you will aw aken to the serious consequences of verbal pollution. If not, w e are going to have a generation of C anadians which isn ’t even unilingual. N ow I d o n ’t w ant to fall into the fashionable habit o f so-called “ concerned a d u lts” w ho take the tem perature o f youth at intervals and 288

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devise forecasts o f hope o r despondency for the w orld on the basis of w hat students are doing or being o r consum ing this season. I rather suspect that w hat students are doing m ost o f the tim e is pulling our leg. H ow ever, as you probably know , it is being said at the m om ent that in the ’seventies you are grow ing apathetic, conservative, exhausted with causes except the prom otion o f your ow n w elfare. A m ong professors I detect even a nostalgia for the obstreperous days w hen yo u r elder brothers and sisters w ere locking them up for day s in their ow n filing cabinets. All I can say is that unaw areness and acquiescence are not the qualities I note am ong the students to w hom I am at present exposed— and I doubt if the intellectual clim ate on the old O ntario strand differs m uch from that on L ake Superior. I have never know n such a co m b in a­ tion o f healthy scepticism , honest enquiry, and intellectual integrity. M y optim ism in the country is based on solid evidence that in spite of reduced subsidies, the perm issive society, foreign professors, and m ixed bathing, the universities o f this province are turning out people w ith the qualities w e badly need to run this fractious country. I som e­ tim es w onder frankly w hether the g ra d u ate ’s good sense isn’t a product o f his survival— survival from professors, professors o f a previous generation w hose absolute convictions about absolute c au ses have fortunately contradicted each other. It is perhaps by grow ing up absurd that you see the light, the light being th e realization that truth is not so easily established as those professors thought. T he trouble w ith all those crusaders, confident o f the truth divinely revealed to them , is that they w ould blow up the country o r the w orld for a principle. N ow I should like to m ake a sm all plea for pragm atism , not as the one absolute philosophy but just as a corrective. If this country and this w orld o f ours are going to survive they need a lot of m anagem ent— m anagem ent by intelligent, educated hum an beings w ith blood in their veins and a sense of p roportion, m asters o f the c om puter but not its slaves. T he beginning o f w isdom is the recognition o f com plexity, the need to live w ith paradox. T hat seem s to m e the C anadian w ay and the o n ly w ay for a country as happily diversified and elongated as ours. T here are ad m ittedly less attractive strains in our national tradition w hich w e can identify— a certain niggardliness o f spirit for exam ple. W e are being told now that ours is a tradition of beautiful losers. But our m yths and traditions are w hat w e m ake them and there is a lot to be said for identifying and perhaps even for exaggerating certain national virtues in order to propagate them . O ur national disposition to c o m ­ prom ise m ay have been overstated, but it is w orth cultivating. W e shall expire if w e w ork aw ay self-destructively at negative m yths, finding our virtues only in being not as o th er m en are— especially our nasty neighbours.

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As on old-fashioned nationalist w ith deep roots in the clay and rock and, m ore particularly, the m arvellously unhom ogenous peoples of this province and this country I am disturbed o v er som e aspects o f c o n ­ tem porary C anadian nationalism . I am disturbed not because, like m any o f m y generation, I think nationalism is evil. I think it is essential to good citizenship. By profession 1 am an internationalist and I have seen w hat m orbid nationalism can do to the p eace o f nations. T he a nsw er, how ever, is not to ban national em otion but to keep our nationalism from being m orbid. W orld peace is not to be found in the hom ogenization of peoples but in the protection o f peoples in all their healthy diversification. T his pro tectio n can in the foreseeable future com e only from the m aintenance o f sovereign states, another institu­ tion, like nationalism , w hich has got a bad reputation o f late from dogm atic internationalists. T he purpose o f a good state is the peace, order, and good governm ent o f the people it shelters. A s such it is an essential and constructive elem ent in an international com m unity of states. T he nationalism w e need to pum p blood into our C anadian state need threaten no one— unless it turns sick . If it is to accom m odate the kind of free and easy country w hich it is our good fortune to be, it should be relaxed, self-confident, generous, and tolerant, equipped above all w ith a sense o f proportion w hich m eans a sense o f hum our. Its aim should not be, as w e too often say, national unity. It should be national harm ony, equilibrium . T hose w ho are preoccupied w ith the C anadian identity should realize that this kind of nationalism is about as C anadian and as un-A m erican as you w ould want. T he U nited S tates, by its D eclaration of Independence, is dedicated to a w orld m ission and to unity. T h a t's fine for them . N o C anadian should disparage the enor­ m ous contribution to the w orld m ade by the ideals proclaim ed in that D eclaration, how ever im perfectly they have at tim es been applied. But w e have our ow n thing to d o . O u rs is a very different political experim ent— to set our kind o f exam ple. W e have to prove that a state can have good governm ent w ithout national unity, that flexibility and looseness are political virtues in the com plex w orld w e face. T oo m uch C anadian nationalism is just hand-m e-dow n A m erican nationalism , even w hen it sounds anti-A m erican. Som e o f our more sim ple-m inded nationalists w ant to create a C anadian identity w hich is just a m irror im age of A m erican nationalism adorned with a m aple leaf. A fig leaf w ould be m ore appropriate. W hat are w e anyw ay if our bosom s sw ell with pride only w hen an ill-advised group o f drum m ajorettes from S askatchew an, dressed like W est Point cadets, w ins a prize in Pasadena o r a bunch o f A m erican baseball players do their stunts in a M ontreal park instead o f in M ilw aukee? W hether sew ing

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m aple leaf flags on the backside o f o n e ’s jeans sw ells the b osom is a problem I leave to the physiologists. M ore w orrying, how ever, than this kind of adolescent nationalism is the effort o f som e o f o u r m ore fanatical nationalists to divorce us entirely from the N orth A m erican society o f w hich C anadians are just as native as the A m ericans, to im agine that w e are o r could ever be a nation undefiled by the contagion o f contem porary society. W e m ust profit from the m istakes o f the A m ericans and not m eekly assum e that o u r national goal is just to catch up to them . But identifying all our troubles as A m erican in origin is not only bad diagnosis; it leads us to the w rong kind o f cures. W e cannot shut out infection by closing the 49th parallel. Infection w ould in any case reach us by air o r sea from E urope o r Japan, w hich, like C anada, are struggling w ith problem s o f industrialization, m odernization, pollution, capitalism , o r w hatever you w ant to call it. T he U nited S tates has alw ays been a pioneer society— even in sin. It seem s to m e that too m any of o u r contem porary nationalists start w ith the w rong prem ise. O ur problem is not how to divorce the U nited S tates but how to live w ith it. T he continental relationship w as not fastened on us by gutless politicians and bureaucrats w ho sold us out for a fast buck— according to current m yth. It w as established by the g laciers. And it w as our ow n C anadian forefathers w ho decided to co-habit this continent and to carve out a separate constitutional existence. W e cannot hold the B ritish or A m ericans responsible for our success o r failure; w e are no m ore their victim s than w e are their foster children. O ur forefathers knew perfectly w ell that if w e w ere g oing to be C anadians w e had to find w ays o f living w ith that giant force to the south. T hey knew that w e had no right to expect the A m ericans to be o u r patro n s or o u r benefactors. W e chose the term s on w hich w e w ould try to live. W e shall exist and prosper now and forever m ore by a c om bination o f m anipulation, confrontation, and, m ore often, m utual a ccom m odation. T here is no solution to, no fixed form ula for, the C anadian-A m erican relationship. T h ere is a fashionable current assum ption that this is a zero-sum g am e, that any A m erican ad vantage is bound to be o u r disadvantage, that the w ay to deal w ith the A m ericans is to tell them to run aw ay, to cease and desist— to join M exico. B ut this is the fantasy o f those w ho have not faced up to the reality o f relations am ong states. T he w eaker country has to survive by its w its, its brain pow er— and that is w here you com e in w ith y our w ell-furbished brains. O ur problem , as ever, is to d evise the kinds o f treaties, agreem ents, bargains, joint c o m ­ m issions, o r even trade unions w hich will provide the greatest possible satisfaction to both countries. T he assum ption that any agreem ent

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reached w ith the A m ericans about resources o r defence is bound to be to our disadvantage is not only craven; it is unhistorical. B ut if the A m ericans see no satisfaction o f their ow n interests, they w o n ’t accept it. In these days even the East and W est G erm ans are seeking w ays of living w ith each o th er for m utual benefit. T he peoples of this continent will not tolerate a w all. W e are too restless and inquisitive. A good, sound border, how ever, is not an im penetrable w all. W e need a border to keep us politically separate and live in our ow n way. T h ere is no need to feel apologetic about insisting on o u r separate institutions. T his spraw ling continent is far b etter governed in tw o parts and w e C anadians have m any reasons o f co m fo rt, convenience, and em otion to w ant to preserve our kind of governm ent. O ur distinctive contribution to the U nited N ations is a good enough justification in itself. D o n ’t be beguiled by the sentim ental anti-nationalism o f those w ho think the w orld w ould be m ore peaceful if w e abandoned our nation states and am algam ated. It is a statistical fact that m ore people are m urdered by m em bers o f the fam ily than by strangers. A nd d o n ’t be beguiled either by A m ericans or by subsidiary C anadians w ho think it w ould be so m uch m ore efficient if C anada w ere run as a branch plant and the continent put on a cost benefit basis. T hose w ho deplore econom ic nationalism as if it w ere a virus are not alw ays, as they claim , internationalists. M any of them honestly confuse industrial progress w ith hum an progress and are im patient of all obstacles put in their way by hum an beings. Som etim es they m istake U nited States o r continental nationalism for internationalism . (A generation o f C anadians horrified at the kind o f nationalism w hich caused the W orld W ars has been understandably som ew hat susceptible to this anti-nationalist plea.) T hese critics o f nationalism w ould not m ake headw ay, how ever, if so m uch o f w hat passes for C anadian nationalism at the m om ent did not have ugly spots on it. It is too often a sick chauvinism w ithout the m agnanim ity befitting a country that, w hatever its problem s w ith a larger neighbour, m ust regard itself as a responsible and constructive force in the international com m unity. W e need allies if w e are going to stand up to the g reat pow ers. T he good reputation and the friendships w e have acquired in the w orld are essential to the prom otion o f our national interests. T hey are dissipated all too q uickly w hen w e strike the posture o f the neurotic poor relation for w hose m iseries som eone else is alw ays responsible. It is indeed fortunate that you are in a position to com prehend the dilem m as o f international life m ore intelligently than m y generation w as because in forty years C anadians have m oved out of shelter into the m ainstream of international com plication. W e are m ore alone than we once w ere, w ith the lives and the fate o f our country dependent upon the w ay in w hich w e chart our ow n course. W e are not a m ilitary po w er of

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consequence, but we are one o f the m ajor econom ic pow ers o f the w orld— a fact too often obscured for us by the shadow o f a unique superpow er. T hat is a fact to induce not vain boasting but a sense of responsibility. T he loom ing issues o f the future have econom ic roots. T he central dilem m a o f C an ad a’s existence in the last quarter o f this century w ill be how to live as the people who in all the w orld have more land and resources per capita than any other. A nd this in an age when the pressure o f population on resources is m ore likely than the sim ple lust for em pire to determ ine w hether the universe will continue in som ething resem bling tranquillity. In C anada our m yopic obsession w ith the control of our econom y in a purely N orth A m erican context has shaded our eyes from the universal problem . T he question we now deb ate, for exam ple, about the share o f our energy fuels the A m ericans can have is not irrelevant but it is only one aspect o f a global issue in w hich o th er continents m ay p lay the decisive role. O ur obsession w ith the U nited States giv es us a perm anent squint. T he anti-A m ericans are just as obsessed as the so-called continentalists. W e shall never be liberated until w e cast off this obsession and look out at the broad w orld. In that w orld our problem is n 't that we are w eak and dependent but that w e are filthy rich. O ur proper concern for the distribution o f incom e w ithin our country does not affect the status o f fat cat w hich C anada occu p ies in the com m unity o f nations. B ecause we have had to struggle vigilantly to m aintain our national existence in the rough em brace o f a pachyderm , w e have developed an inferiority com plex w hich looks self-indulgent from the perspective of R angoon o r P ort-of-S pain. O ur nationalism of late has turned too easily into jingoism w hen w e stridently w arn off from our sacred shores and som ew hat less sacred continental sh elf hungry peoples w ho just m ight need our fish and oil a lot m ore than w e do. In their eyes w e are in no sense a victim ized people. Isolationism is no longer either a personal o r a national alternative for C anadians. W e are in the thick o f things, not because larger pow ers have dragged us in to them but because our g reatest national interest is a w orld in w hich w e can peacefully trade. W hat w e need are C anadian nationalists w ho recognize that if we pursue the national interest too narrow ly w e lose the w ay, for the w orld is w ide— w ho recognize that the w ay is hard to find and there are no sim ple m aps. A bove all they m ust realize that it is only by accom m odating our interests to those of others that any o f us can survive. A nd it is largely because that is the prevailing attitude am ong students as I know them in 1973 that my c onfidence in you and the country is an em pirical conclusion rather than just w hat seem ed the right thing to say on this very happy occasion.