Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States 0812249267, 9780812249262

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Building Militaries in Fragile States

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Building Militaries in Fragile States Challenges for the United States

Mara E. Karlin

U N I V E R S I T Y O F P E N N S Y LVA N I A P R E S S PHIL A DELPHI A

Copyright 䉷 2018 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112 www.upenn.edu/pennpress Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Karlin, Mara E., author. Title: Building militaries in fragile states : challenges for the United States / Mara E. Karlin. Description: 1st edition. 兩 Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, [2018] 兩 Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017026862 兩 ISBN 9780812249262 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Security Assistance Program. 兩 Military assistance, American—Evaluation. 兩 Military assistance, American—Greece—Evaluation. 兩 Military assistance, American—Vietnam (Republic)—Evaluation. 兩 Military assistance, American—Lebanon—Evaluation. 兩 United States—Foreign relations—20th century. Classification: LCC UA12 .K286 2018 兩 DDC 355/.0320973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017026862

To CDK, HRK, TBR, and RSJ

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However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results. —Winston Churchill

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Contents

Chapter 1. Understanding the Problem 1 Chapter 2. Greece: The “Will to Win” Was Fruitless Without U.S. Involvement 20 Chapter 3. South Vietnam: Building a Military “American Style” 65 Chapter 4. Lebanon I: “The United States Is Short of Breath” but Others Are Not 108 Chapter 5. Lebanon II: “The Side That Won Was Willing to Kill and Be Killed” 148 Chapter 6. Findings and Implications 193 Notes

205

Bibliography 255 Index 273 Acknowledgments 281

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Chapter 1

Understanding the Problem

In 2014, much of the Iraqi Army dissolved as the Islamic State overran key Iraqi cities like Tikrit and Mosul. After more than a decade of U.S. training and more than $20 billion in assistance to strengthen the force, training was for naught as Iraqi soldiers fled battles and holed up in their homes, military leadership disappeared, and nearly three divisions worth of equipment were abandoned to the Islamic State. Yet another example of U.S. efforts to build militaries in fragile states had failed. As a civilian policymaker in the U.S. Defense Department, I led a wide range of programs to build militaries in fragile states. Sandwiched between teams building Iraq and Afghanistan’s militaries while I sought to strengthen the Lebanese, Pakistani, Palestinian Authority, Sri Lankan, Nepalese, and Jordanian security sectors, I began to appreciate how difficult it is to execute these programs in fragile states. The relevant literature seemed detached and unhelpful, and policymakers—including me—longed for a better approach that was both effective and implementable. Above all, I wondered what circumstances would make it more likely for these programs to succeed. This book seeks to answer that question. When, why, and under what circumstances have U.S. programs to strengthen partner militaries for internal defense succeeded? Particularly since World War II, the United States has often responded to its allies’ faltering internal security situations by training and equipping their militaries. It will continue to do so given U.S. sensitivity toward casualties, a constrained fiscal environment, the nature of modern nationalism, increasing transnational security threats, and the proliferation of fragile states. And yet the U.S. track record for building militaries in fragile states is uneven at best.

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The United States generally conducts these programs with the expectation that the partner state will confront and contain a security challenge when U.S. national security is not immediately threatened. By strengthening a fragile state’s core function—its ability to secure its populace—it should be better able to govern its territory and to monopolize force. And if successful, the threat posed by such a weak state to U.S. national security interests and international security diminishes. An effective military institution is necessary for a state to function, according to Max Weber’s threshold. He argued that a state is an entity that “(successfully) claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”1 Although at some level there have always been states that could not meet this standard, Weber’s concept is increasingly challenged. Indeed, it may be irrelevant. Simply put, commanding a monopoly on violence is no longer a foundation of many existing states. There exist now an increasing number of fragile nation-states that have the trappings of statehood yet cannot create internal security. Such states must strengthen their sovereignty throughout their national territory, which can be accomplished by training and equipping their military so that it can hold a monopoly on violence. But how can the United States effectively help them do so?

Synopsis of Argument The commonly accepted narrative in Washington for fixing security assistance in fragile states can be summed up in one word: more. More equipment. More training. More help. More quickly. And, of course, more money. Too little emphasis, however, is put on the role of the partner military. And, too little emphasis is put on the role of unhelpful external actors; that is, other states that have a vested interest in undermining the success of programs to strengthen state militaries. Those that see benefit in fragility and seek to foment it—or at least maintain it—work contrary to U.S. interests. This book disputes that more is the answer; instead, it focuses on how. To effectively strengthen partner militaries in fragile states, the U.S. military must transform its engagement with them. Simply training and equipping these militaries will not enable them to effectively exert the government’s sovereignty throughout its territory. To be sure, it may have marginal effects by quantitatively influencing the military’s capabilities. But at a

Understanding the Problem 3

strategic level, meaningful change is only possible due to the interaction of two key variables: the nature of U.S. involvement and the role of unhelpful external actors. I hypothesize that if the United States gets deeply involved in the partner state’s sensitive military affairs, and if antagonistic external actors play a diminishing role, then the partner state military is more likely to establish internal defense. This outcome—establishing a capable security sector that can maintain internal defense—is therefore a function of the nature of the U.S. effort and the external threat environment. This historic U.S. dilemma has grown acute. Building partner militaries in fragile states “is in many ways the ideological and security challenge of our time,” argued former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.2 A wide range of events in recent years has further underscored that efforts to do so should not be dismissed as concerns of the last decade. Multiple crises around the globe, from the Islamic State’s manipulation of Iraqi and Syrian fragility to instability across North Africa to the continuing instability in Mexico, illustrate the salience of this challenge. As policymakers in the American, European, and Asian national security communities increasingly focus on challenges posed by sophisticated great power competitors such as China and Russia, they will have both less time and less funding to deal with fragile states. Building partner militaries will likely be increasingly seen as an easier and cheaper way to handle them, particularly as the U.S. Defense Department remains focused on conducting missions across the conflict spectrum amidst an increasingly complex security environment. Further illustrating its priority, in 2014 the Department of Defense’s policy shop stood up a new office focused solely on security cooperation.3 Short of a catastrophic event, the United States is unlikely to launch another invasion and large-scale military occupation like Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 in the near-term. Instead, it will “employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.”4 The U.S. Defense Department’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance reinforces these arguments: “Building partnership capacity . . . remains important. . . . Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, lowcost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives,” a concept echoed in other major national security strategy documents issued in recent years.5

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The United States faces a long-term decline in defense spending going forward. Given the 2013 experience with sequestration, and despite requests by the Obama administration for a larger defense budget, congressional wrangling and the lack of bipartisan consensus on the necessary level of national security funding make it unlikely that the overall defense budget will markedly increase over the coming years (short of a catastrophic event). At the same time, American leaders still wish to prevent failing states, terrorist safe havens, and civil wars. If U.S. direct military intervention to achieve those goals is unacceptable politically, then increasingly indirect options will invariably be considered. Today, a large and growing part of the national debate on defense is how to pursue American security interests at a lower cost. Building partner militaries in fragile states is one key way of doing so. But for the United States to effectively build these militaries, it must understand how it has done so in the past.

The Puzzle For decades, the U.S. military has spent substantial time and treasure trying to build partner militaries in fragile states. These programs pointedly focus on training and equipping, emphasizing hardware as the solution, and limiting the U.S. role. They take a hands-off approach to sensitive issues in these partner militaries, such as organizational structure and personnel appointments, and they largely discount the role played by other countries with vested interests, centering instead on the partner state and the United States. Yet this approach has rarely succeeded. It ignores the attendant qualities of a fragile state. Specifically, such state militaries may be structurally unsound and therefore require substantial and disruptive reforms. But they may lack the coherence and the will to undertake such necessary reforms. And discounting the role of antagonistic external actors is both misguided and harmful. Weak states are vulnerable. They lack capable institutions that enable the government to exert its sovereignty effectively. And there are external actors who will benefit from this fragility. They will, therefore, undermine U.S. efforts to establish a capable and willing partner military because they desire continued weakness in the partner state and view U.S. policy as inimical to their regional interests. Limiting the U.S. military’s role and focusing on just the role it plays, in addition to the partner state, simply hasn’t worked. And it is what the

Understanding the Problem 5

weak states, counterinsurgency, security sector reform, and security assistance literatures largely mandate, which calls into question the utility of this received wisdom. These literatures argue that a program to effectively strengthen a partner state military should be sustained and grounded in a shared agenda marked by local ownership in which the U.S. role is limited. They largely focus on tangible quantitative metrics such as the number of troops trained or the amount of equipment disbursed, and above all, they lack consensus on the most appropriate or useful ways to measure the progress and impact of a donor state’s security sector reform program. Moreover, they generally assume that the United States and the partner state are the primary actors influencing the program to strengthen the military.

The Problem: Weak States The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia launched the era of sovereign states, and centuries later Max Weber asserted that the defining feature of statehood was the ability to exert sovereignty throughout a territory. “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” he argued.6 Despite efforts such as the 1933 Montevideo Convention, which sought to preserve state legitimacy even if a state was unable to effectively command its territory, Weber’s terminology was maintained as a standard. “War makes the state and the state makes war,” echoed Charles Tilly in his discussion of a state’s core function.7 Yet the problem of weak states is their very inability to fulfill this core duty of securing their territory due to a lack of capability, will, or legitimacy.8 These elements align with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s definition of weak states: “States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations.”9 Weak states suffer from a “security gap” that violent non-state and antagonistic external actors can exploit.10 This first category includes insurgents and terrorists, who undermine fragile states, and the second category includes other external actors who assist them by providing sanctuary, materiel, training, political support, or simply rhetorical support, enabling these violent non-state actors to fight longer and with great lethality.11 Such

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assistance, although always relevant, has become even easier given the contemporary globalized and networked environment. Moreover, since World War II, conflicts within states have proliferated and “ ‘state death’ as a result of external invasion . . . has almost disappeared.”12 Therefore, weak states are less likely to be extinguished and instead will muddle through the international system as fragile entities ripe for manipulation. The impact of this manipulation has spurred U.S. interest in fragile states at varying periods. Given the British and French colonial experience, their interest in and analyses of insurgency largely predated the United States’, and save for a U.S. Marine Corps manual on small wars published during World War II, the U.S. military and U.S. scholars generally ignored insurgency.13 The American experience in Vietnam inspired an extensive exploration of insurgency-related assessments in the United States, including warnings about how difficult it is to counter, particularly given the U.S. bureaucratic system.14 Although the U.S. military strived to build partner militaries following the Vietnam War, including in El Salvador and Lebanon, the September 11, 2001 attacks represented a watershed moment that reinvigorated U.S. interest in failing states. Over the previous decade, the United States—along with much of the international community—had grown apprehensive about weak states’ inability to manage their internal challenges, given the potential spillover of this deficiency.15 In the wake of these attacks, a state’s failure to police its territory now had more serious security implications given the connected nature of the modern world; as the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy asserted, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”16 And U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan soon spurred a host of analyses about how this threat had changed, given the globalized security environment.17

External Actors Try to Fix the Problem External actors, including the United States, have sought to fix this problem wherein states are unable to secure their territory by “shor[ing] up or creat[ing] from whole cloth missing state capabilities and institutions.”18 Programs to strengthen partner militaries can promote domestic and regional stability, empower allies, broaden power, and provide deterrence.19 All of

Understanding the Problem 7

these dynamics were particularly relevant given America’s reliance on partners in the Cold War and post–September 11 environments. And foundational documents written soon after the Cold War began, such as the Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947, the first Mutual Security Act in 1951, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, illustrate that the U.S. government supported partner militaries because of perceptions that doing so was in its national security interest. The fragile states, counterinsurgency, security sector reform, and security assistance literatures offer advice for external actors on how to strengthen partner militaries for internal defense. The relevant recommendations primarily fall under two categories: (1) how the external actor should operate internally; and (2) what its relationship with the partner state should look like. Both suggest optimal ways for the external state’s behavior, and each case study’s assessment hinges on a close examination of these dynamics. However, as will grow clear in this exploration, they are also rather detached from the reality of policymaking. In the first category, the partner state should take a broad view of statebuilding needs and strive to establish a capable, legitimate security sector.20 With this support, the state’s provision of security should be both “effective and efficient . . . and in the framework of democratic civilian control.”21 To do so, the external actor should possess substantial local knowledge about the partner state and consider the context in which it operates, particularly the existing political and military circumstances; doing so can prevent it from assuming “an institutional blank slate” exists, or “the fallacy of terra nullius,” when embarking on an institution-building enterprise.22 The external actor also should pursue a clear, formal decision-making process in formulating, launching, and coordinating its program to strengthen a partner’s military; its approach should be unified and integrated based on objectives that are “specific, measurable, achievable, realistic (in terms of resources available), and time-bound.”23 But the reality is often tangled given the complex issues surrounding fragile states and particularly regarding a donor state like the U.S. government, which has multiple branches and possesses a decision-making system designed to restrain action.24 In this vein, although the catchphrase “whole of government” has become popular in the U.S. government for stability operations and institution-building efforts, its execution has been far more aspirational than realistic. Moreover, such processes require time, an element that rarely

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exists in abundance in the case of weak states, when rapid and flexible responses are critical. The external actor should make a long-term commitment to assist the partner state. Although the number of years depends on each situation, the external actor should be cautious of having “attention deficit disorder” and “promise not to abandon state rebuilding before the tough work is finished—before a failed state has functioned well for several years.”25 Yet this recommendation is unrealistic. It fails to consider the internal dynamics of the donor state, particularly in terms of its decision-making and funding processes, to say nothing of its accountability mechanisms, election cycles, and fluctuating interest in a specific partner state.26 Given the nature of the U.S. political system, maintaining a durable policy over a number of years can be difficult, particularly given the inevitable setbacks that occur when wrestling with a thorny issue, such as strengthening a fragile state’s military. Further, the longer that an external actor’s military is present to facilitate security, the less that the partner state’s population will welcome them, and the more likely that they will begin to resent the external actor; it is perhaps more helpful for the external actor to consider that strengthening a partner’s military “is a process rather than an end-point.”27 In the second category, the external actor’s relationship with the partner state should have certain characteristics, according to this literature. It should be grounded in shared values and shared interests; indeed, much of the contemporary literature assumes that the external actor and the partner state have aligned interests.28 Moreover, the external actor should play a limited role: the program to strengthen the state’s military should be wholly grounded in local ownership by the partner state. Though the comparison is imperfect because he sought to build an insurgency, T. E. Lawrence’s caution about the role of external actors in strengthening military forces reflects a commonly accepted contemporary understanding about the appropriate—and limited—role for the partner state. “Do not try and do too much with your own hands,” he urged, “better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them.”29 The U.S. Army urges its advisers to “be patient . . . subtle . . . [and] diplomatic” and, more broadly, the literature does not suggest that the external actor should delve into sensitive partner state military affairs such as personnel.30 Yet differing interests and values between the two states are unsurprising. They very well may disagree over whom to fight and how best to do

Understanding the Problem 9

so, and limited involvement by the external actor invariably has a limited impact on the partner military.31 Numerous historical and contemporary cases illustrate the former. And in the case of the latter, the nature of external actor involvement no doubt influences the extent of the reform effort.32 An asymmetrical power structure exists between the two states, particularly because the donor state is able to set the agenda. The donor state plays a very real, powerful, rarely articulated, and perhaps discomfiting role: it organizes and funds security sector reform efforts, and without its involvement, the partner state can find itself without a sponsor to facilitate these efforts. Yet this paradigm assumes the external actor will not—certainly, should not—set the agenda or become involved in sensitive internal military affairs in the partner state. For example, programs to strengthen a partner military—or any institution, for that matter—benefit from competent leadership, yet passivity and limited involvement on the part of the donor state would require it to avoid such a delicate topic. Even though capable counterinsurgent militaries possess “a high level of initiative . . . motivated soldiers . . . learning and creativity”—all of which are surely influenced by military leadership (as are other issues like resources, structural issues, and the use of force)—external actors do not delve into such a sensitive issue.33 Moreover, this paradigm emphasizes the partner state’s strength—because it can “get, but need not give in return”—and is a glaring reminder of how hesitant the external actor can be, particularly given fears that its partner will simply turn elsewhere for support.34 To be sure, the external actor should be humble about what is achievable, not simply desirable, when it seeks to strengthen a partner state military; simply put, building militaries—and by extension, building nations—is difficult.35 Foreign internal defense programs are particularly sensitive given that they involve a ruling regime’s inability to exert its sovereignty. And, U.S. programs are doubly challenging because the United States, as a democracy, seeks to empower its partner state to extend internal defense appropriately.36 Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that some scholars urge the United States to simply avoid internal conflicts or offer hyperbolic, unattainable thresholds for intervention.37 But the United States will surely continue attempting to strengthen partner militaries. The increasingly decentralized international environment and America’s weakening global economic position coupled with the proliferation of fragile states and transnational threats will further ensure its reliance on this approach. Although much of the advice about how the

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external actor should operate and what its relationship with the partner state should look like are unrealistic, the theory on strengthening partner militaries in weak states can best be described as an “undeveloped concept” whose history is less positive than its vision.38 Nevertheless, these literatures provided salient points of consideration that influenced this book’s research and assessment.

Research Design When, why, and under what circumstances have U.S. efforts to build partner militaries for internal defense succeeded? Taking a qualitative, comparative case study approach, I discovered a policy-relevant answer to this question that takes the literature to a different level and could be operationalized by the U.S. government, given both its paradigm for success and roadmap for achieving it. The Framework I conducted a structured, focused examination of all relevant aspects of each U.S. effort to strengthen a partner military in a fragile state. These included key decisions, program execution, and the nature of U.S. involvement with the partner state. Specifically, this assessment highlighted the details of each program, including the quantity, quality, and distribution of training and equipment; the U.S. decision to launch the program and subsequent notable decisions concerning it; and program-related interactions with the partner state. This latter aspect examined the extent to which the states agreed on and maintained terms for building and employing the partner state military. Looking at relevant aspects of these different programs and posing the same general questions during research and analysis helped to identify the sequencing of each effort.39 To facilitate exploration, several parameters of control limited the differences among the cases. All cases involved the same external actor—the United States—launching a program to strengthen a small, fragile state’s military as it faced an insurgency. Although a range of other external actors have led programs to build partner militaries, such as the United Kingdom and France, zeroing in on U.S. only–led programs enabled this study to explore key variables. All cases involved broader U.S. interest than just the

Understanding the Problem 11

partner state. For example, the United States became interested in these states due to their relevance vis-a`-vis broader issues in the post–World War II environment, such as the Cold War or the Arab-Israeli conflict. For each case, U.S. involvement was characterized by a concerted, high-level effort to build the state’s military for internal defense purposes. The nature of U.S. involvement was restricted in these programs to indirect or direct support of allies conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID).40 All cases had weak security sectors; however, the primary focus of U.S. assistance remained strengthening the military rather than paramilitary or police forces because the U.S. Defense Department is nearly always restricted to working with and assisting partner military forces.

The Desired Outcome: Partner State Extends the Monopoly on Violence This book measures the extent to which the U.S. program results in a more enforced and sustainable monopoly on violence extended by the partner state. Given the policy-relevant nature of this topic, this definition aims to incorporate key elements of successful internal defense while also providing a usable, coherent framework.41 Although it would be convenient to institute a set number of years for examining each program, I sought to avoid employing an arbitrary time horizon because the end of these programs is often hazier than the beginning. The first part of this measure, enforcement, assesses the extent to which antagonistic external actors are able to use violence to disrupt and manipulate the partner state. Enforcement includes declining levels of violence and the partner military’s willingness (or lack thereof) to actively confront its opponents. These markers are considered in tandem, to account for situations in which a fairly peaceful situation prevails where the state has ceded control of territory. Challenging opponents increases the level of violence in the short term, but it should not be mistaken for failure. Attempts to retake these areas aim to increase the partner state’s presence throughout its territory and to diminish the maneuverability of non-state actors. The second part of this measure, sustainability, accounts for the partner state’s long-term ability to monopolize violence within its borders, even without U.S. support. Sustainability includes increasing partner state military control of national territory. From a long-term perspective, the partner

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Nature of U.S. Involvement Monopoly on Violence is More Enforceable and Sustainable

External Threat Environment

Independent Variables

Dependent Variable

Figure 1. Variables framework.

state’s military—not an external actor—must be responsible for protecting its populace. The more it controls its national territory—not simply increases its presence—the more likely that the state can maintain its longterm viability in tempering opportunities for insurgents to adequately challenge it in the future.

Achieving the Desired Outcome There are two critical elements whose interaction makes it more likely that the partner state will exert a monopoly on violence: the nature of U.S. efforts to strengthen the partner state’s military and the role of antagonistic external actors (see Figure 1).42 If the United States gets deeply involved in the partner state’s sensitive military affairs and if antagonistic external actors play a diminishing role, then the partner state military is more likely to establish internal defense. This outcome—establishing a capable security sector that can maintain internal defense—is therefore a function of the nature of the U.S. effort and the external threat environment. The first element—the nature of U.S. involvement—discounts the notion that training and equipment will sufficiently build a military to take

Understanding the Problem 13

those actions desired by the United States. Instead, this element suggests that deep U.S. involvement in a partner state’s sensitive military affairs is critical for transforming a military. Not only do the military’s capabilities require enhancement—which is accomplished with training and equipment—so does its will. Influencing the military’s most sensitive affairs, including personnel and organization, can enhance its will. Therefore, deep U.S. involvement is characterized by selecting the personnel who constitute the institution’s senior leadership, organizing the military around countering an internal threat, and avoiding becoming a cocombatant. By their very nature, militaries “are especially resistant to change,” and a critical element for enabling them to change is “talented military personnel,” particularly in unstable circumstances.43 At least some partner state military personnel will be reluctant to adopt reforms that might limit their power. These disincentives to change are one reason why a deep U.S. role in sensitive partner state military issues, such as personnel affairs, is so critical. The role, shape, and mission of the organization, as influenced by its personnel, will therefore have an impact on the military’s actions. Organizations acquire “personalities of their own that are shaped by their experiences and that, in turn, shape their behavior.”44 Although efforts by the United States to expand its role into combat operations may have some utility in assisting a partner state, commencement of combat operations dramatically changes the nature of American involvement, heavily influencing the program to strengthen the state military. In that vein, I measure the nature of American involvement based on three components: 1. Structure: Does the United States organize the partner state military around combating an internal threat and establishing internal defense? How clear is its internal defense mission? 2. Personnel: Does the United States seek to—and effectively—influence the appointments process in the partner state military for key leadership positions? How effective and unified is the vision and initiative of the United States (in the field and in Washington)? 3. Limits: Does the United States restrict its role to training, equipping, and advising the partner state military? Does it avoid becoming a cocombatant alongside it? Taken together, this concept illustrates the extent to which the United States influences the partner state’s military in key areas.

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The second element—the external threat environment—suggests that when antagonistic external actors diminish their role in supporting insurgents, the partner state military is further enabled to establish internal defense. Antagonistic external actors influence the degree to which the partner state military’s monopoly on violence is more enforceable and sustainable for a wide range of reasons, including their own national interests, their position vis-a`-vis the United States, or their affinity for the group(s) destabilizing the partner state. Their support can influence the insurgency’s capacity and capability, decision making, and activities. Such external support is a critical component of an insurgency’s capabilities, longevity, and efficacy. The external threat environment is measured by a component focused on support. How do antagonistic external actors shift their support to the insurgents, including providing materiel and offering sanctuary, and more broadly undermine the state’s stability? A military appropriately built for internal defense purposes with capable leadership that is not reliant on the United States as a co-combatant has the ability to effectively take advantage of changes in external support to the insurgency.

Case Selection To effectively test this hypothesis and to facilitate a streamlined methodological structure, I selected four cases based on their variation along the previous outlined variables. These four U.S. programs involved efforts to strengthen militaries at historic junctures: Greece’s military following World War II, South Vietnam’s military throughout the 1950s, Lebanon’s military in the early 1980s, and Lebanon’s military again in the mid-2000s. Most important, the outcomes of the cases differ, which helped clarify under what circumstances U.S. programs to strengthen militaries were more likely to succeed.45 The Greece case was compelling to select because it was the United States’ first post–World War II effort to strengthen a fragile state’s military for internal defense. The two Lebanon cases signified a rare effort in which the United States twice organized a program to strengthen a partner state military. The longitudinal variation within the two Lebanon case studies supplemented the cross-section variation across the other cases, thereby overcoming some of the inexactitude present in cross-national comparisons and enabling a deep, focused examination. And

Understanding the Problem 15

Table 1. Case Studies in Relation to Key Variables Role of Antagonistic External Actors

Nature of American Involvement Ⳮ

ⳮ

Diminishing

Capable Security Sector Success (Greece)

Insufficient Progress Partial failure (Lebanon II)

Strengthening

Spoiler Partial failure (Lebanon I)

Overreaction Complete failure (South Vietnam)

the South Vietnam case not only offered temporal and geographic diversity, but for much of the previous century, it also represented the paramount example of a U.S. effort to strengthen a weak state’s military. Although two of the cases—Greece and South Vietnam, respectively—are characterized by a substantial program to strengthen each military by a different country before the United States becomes involved in doing so, this book focuses primarily on the U.S. program. Moreover, in the South Vietnam case, France’s involvement presents a dramatically different dynamic than that of the United States, given its role as a colonial power. Finally, each case is largely constrained to the same U.S. administration in Washington, DC in an effort to limit variation when possible. Examining each case for several years enabled me to hold many background parameters constant. Taken together, these cases enabled a structured, focused investigation and thick, bounded assessment of this question.46 Table 1 provides an overview of the categories illustrated by the four selected cases. They are based on two parameters: the nature of U.S. involvement in building the partner state’s military and the role of antagonistic external actors, which is a proxy for the external threat environment. The symbols “Ⳮ” and “ⳮ” refer to the extent to which the United States was deeply involved in the partner state’s sensitive military affairs. This includes organizing the partner state military around combating an internal threat and establishing internal defense based on a clear mission, seeking to influence appointments in the partner state military, having an effective and unified representative in the field, and avoiding becoming a cocombatant. “Diminishing” and “strengthening” refer to the extent to which

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antagonistic external actors shifted their support to the insurgents and undermined stability. In the “Capable Security Sector” category, the partner state military actively countered its opponents and could capably maintain internal security within two years of the U.S. program’s inauguration. The United States organized the military for internal defense, was deeply involved in its personnel affairs, and did not extend the monopoly on violence on behalf of the partner state. Antagonistic external actors receded or largely diminished their involvement. Broadly, there was less violence, the state controlled more territory, and the insurgents were much weaker than before the U.S. program began. This category is illustrated by the U.S. effort to strengthen Greece’s military following World War II. During this period, the United States organized an unprecedented effort to build Greece’s military as it fought guerrillas supported by various communist states. In the “Spoiler” category, the partner state took some steps to maintain internal security during the U.S. program to strengthen its military. The United States organized the military for internal defense and was somewhat involved in its personnel affairs; however, the internal defense mission was severely flawed. Antagonistic external actors increased their efforts to weaken the state and, to an extent, the United States extended the monopoly on violence on behalf of the state. Broadly, violence continued and the state’s control of its territory remained extremely limited after the U.S. program ended. This category is illustrated by the U.S. effort to build Lebanon’s military in the early 1980s as it countered numerous state and nonstate actors. In the “Insufficient Progress” category, the partner state took some steps to maintain internal security during the U.S. program to strengthen its military. The United States did not extend the monopoly on violence on behalf of the partner state; however, it also was not involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs, such as personnel assignments. Antagonistic external actors somewhat diminished their meddling and efforts to undermine the state. Broadly, the state had a greater presence throughout its territory, but its control remained limited throughout the U.S. program to strengthen its military. This category is illustrated by the U.S. effort to strengthen Lebanon’s military from 2005 to 2009, in an effort to extend Lebanese sovereignty over violent non-state actors that received external support from Iran and Syria.

Understanding the Problem 17

In the “Overreaction” category, the partner state was largely unable to maintain internal security during the U.S. program to strengthen its military. The United States organized the military for external—rather than internal—defense due to its nearly singular focus on the role of antagonistic external actors. Such actors substantially increased their efforts to undermine the partner state. The United States did not become involved in delicate military affairs, such as personnel, and it also extended the monopoly on violence on behalf of the state. Broadly, violence had worsened and the state’s control over its territory was increasingly tenuous five years into the U.S. program to strengthen its military. This category is illustrated by the U.S. effort to strengthen the South Vietnamese military throughout the 1950s, a relatively understudied period of this relationship. This program involved the United States attempting to build the nascent South Vietnamese military as it faced guerrillas supported by various communist states.

Excluded Cases Although post-1945 history provided many examples in which the United States attempted to build a partner state’s military, certain types of cases were excluded as they were beyond the scope of this book. These include programs where the United States became involved in combat operations and launched costly occupations, such as Vietnam after 1961, Afghanistan after 2001, and Iraq after 2003. Not only are such engagements rare, but more important, the nature of U.S. programs to strengthen militaries during a massive occupation is harder to disentangle given the numerous other variables that exist. Although this could be an area for future research, it nevertheless presents circumstances that are both more rare and too different than the ones explored here. Programs focused on external defense, such as Turkey after World War II and Iran under the Shah, were ruled out because they are inherently different from those seeking to exert a central government’s sovereignty. In particular, external defense programs do not primarily involve sensitive affairs regarding a ruling regime’s domestic opponents. Those involving a non-state security sector, such as the Palestinian Authority in the 1990s and 2000s, were rejected given their uniqueness, as were those that emphasized paramilitary assistance, such as the Philippines post–World War II, because they are now generally conducted

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outside of Ministries/Departments of Defense. Those overwhelmingly characterized by the narcotics trade, such as Colombia over the last three decades or Mexico after 2008, were excluded given the markedly different set of issues raised by the considerable funds flowing to the non-state actors. Finally, other relevant programs that meet the criteria—including El Salvador in the 1980s, Pakistan after 2001, and Yemen since 2006—were not selected because their elements were already accounted for in Table 1, or because conducting research in them was too risky.

Sources Each case study benefits from the most appropriate sources available, including interviews, field research, primary and secondary sources, and archival materials. For example, given the historical nature of the Greece and South Vietnam case studies, U.S., Greek, and Vietnamese archival materials provided information and analysis of the greatest utility, including official—often declassified—documents like policy memos, meeting reports, intelligence analyses, and personal papers. Similar archival material was beneficial for the first Lebanon case study, but its limited existence necessitated fieldwork, interviews, and a heavy emphasis on news sources. There are virtually no declassified or official documents available for the contemporary Lebanon case study, so I also relied on fieldwork, interviews, and news sources. To effectively conduct these interviews, I employed the “snowballing” method in which interviewees suggest other potentially worthwhile individuals to consult.47 Snowballing was particularly helpful in enabling me to locate many relevant policymakers, given their elite status. In total, I interviewed nearly forty senior Lebanese and American political and military officials throughout Lebanon and Washington, DC. Many of the interviewees had not previously spoken about their involvement in these programs, bringing meaningful evidence to light for the first time. Each case study’s richness is due to the diversity of resources used in an effort to triangulate my research.

Conclusion The U.S. military has spent decades building partner militaries in fragile states; it will continue to do so given the nature of the security environment, state fragility, domestic fiscal constraints, and limits on U.S. public

Understanding the Problem 19

support for military interventions. Nevertheless, it is hard to do well. This issue has been understudied in both the academic and policy spheres. As a professor and as a policymaker, I have seen firsthand the ramifications. Therefore, this book seeks to contribute useful insights to the literature and to bridge this critical knowledge gap. Although most analyses of these programs converge around training and equipping, this book argues that is a misguided approach. Instead, given the nature of a fragile state, this book hones in on the outsized roles played by two key actors: the U.S. military and unhelpful external actors. For the former, the nature of U.S. involvement in sensitive military affairs, particularly efforts to reform organizational structure, influence key personnel appointments, and refrain from becoming a co-combatant is crucial. For the latter, diminished involvement by antagonistic external actors is essential to diminish instability. Taken together, these two elements facilitate a more enforced and sustainable monopoly on violence, with increased territorial control, declining levels of violence, and a partner military willing to confront its opponents. These key themes emerge from a rigorous examination of four case studies spanning Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In Greece after World War II, deep U.S. involvement in a range of sensitive Greek military affairs coupled with weakened antagonistic external actors enabled an increasingly capable security sector. Conversely, South Vietnam throughout the 1950s was characterized by a U.S. program with misguided involvement in military affairs—limited in delicate arenas and increasingly co-combatant in others—while the guerrillas received increased external support. And in Lebanon, two cases use longitudinal variation to pull apart elements of success and failure. During the first U.S. program in Lebanon, in the early 1980s, the U.S. military took some important steps to delve into sensitive military affairs; however, it also slipped into a co-combatant role, and a wide range of violent actors redoubled their efforts to weaken the Lebanese state. In the second iteration of this program, during the mid-to late 2000s, the U.S. role was overly constrained—limiting progress—and the threat environment evolved in both helpful and unhelpful ways. Taken together, this results-based exploration suggests new and meaningful findings for building partner militaries in fragile states.

Chapter 2

Greece: The “Will to Win” Was Fruitless Without U.S. Involvement

In 1947, the United States launched an unprecedented effort to assist Greece, including vigorously building its military as it faced guerrillas supported by various communist states. Its strategy in Greece was to strengthen Greek institutions in an effort to halt the creep of communism in the Eastern Mediterranean. Under the specter of the Cold War, U.S. involvement in Greece evolved considerably over a short span of time in an attempt to ensure Greek victory over the insurgency. Once the United States became deeply involved in delicate Greek military affairs, influencing its structure and personnel while refraining from becoming a co-combatant, the transformed Greek military was able to take advantage of changes in external support to the Greek insurgency, enabling it to secure a victory over the guerrillas in just over two years. By the end of 1949, it was clear that Greece’s military was capable of securing the state.

Greece’s Initial Capacity: Feeble and Fragile Greece had been a weak state throughout much of its contemporary history; indeed, “modern Greece had never really been unified.”1 After the destructive German occupation of Greece ended in 1944, the country was particularly fragile: its infrastructure destroyed, little economic opportunity, a ravaged landscape, and rampant starvation and disease. The German occupation caused nearly eighty million dollars in damage to the Greek state, which lost more than 300,000 people simply due to starvation.2 Through

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military occupation and substantial assistance, Great Britain struggled to rebuild Greece, particularly as it underwent continued iterations of its civil war exacerbated by years of foreign occupation, a tireless insurgency, a perpetually weak government, and venal politicians. Greece already suffered from low stability, and the failure of the 1945 Varkiza Agreement—an attempted ceasefire brokered between the Greek government and the main guerrilla group—only further worsened the fledgling state’s internal security as the communist guerrillas redoubled their efforts to undermine the Greek government by waging an insurgency. Like the rest of the country, the Greek military was similarly battered and weakened following the end of the German occupation, although Great Britain was struggling to reverse its abysmal state. The military numbered just over 100,000 personnel; however, this robust size discounted its limited capabilities. Plagued by low morale and overwhelmed with aged soldiers, the exhausted Greek Army—having fought since 1941—resigned itself to a static defense posture around major population centers.3 Treated poorly by their leadership and rewarded with miniscule salaries, Greek soldiers were particularly unenthusiastic about supporting an institution they viewed as politicized.4 Given this state of affairs, it is unsurprising that one scholar pointedly remarked, “Greek Army assets included little besides national pride and their army tradition.”5 To be sure, these qualities were not insignificant and were on display during the Greek Army’s efforts during World War II. The Greek Navy was also nearly nonexistent after its almost total destruction during World War II, and the air force struggled to maintain a tiny fleet of fewer than sixty aircraft.6 Yet the Greek military had one notable ally: Great Britain, which had begun a serious effort to rebuild the state after Germany’s occupation. The colonial power had been involved in Greek affairs for more than a century; the apex was its military intervention in 1944. During that period, Greece’s future—at least according to Winston Churchill—was decided between the Soviet and Allied leadership in an infamous October 9, 1944 meeting when all participants agreed that Greece should be 90 percent in the U.S.-UK sphere of influence.7 In practice, however, the United States was largely disinterested in Greece, so the British became immersed in Greek affairs on their own. In that vein, Great Britain inaugurated a program to rebuild the Greek military. The British Military Mission to Greece was established in 1942, and two years later, the British sent 16,000 troops to serve as a presence in

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Greece. They did not engage in combat; instead, they played a “symbolic” role to demonstrate British support for the weak Greek state.8 Furthermore, the British effort suffered from serious flaws. To be sure, Great Britain was beginning to strengthen the Greek military with some training and equipment, but its aspirations were colliding with reality as London ended World War II with severe economic problems; the U.S. government even began to indirectly support Greece by providing economic aid through Britain for its Greek expedition. Even more worrisome, the British military was “completely reorganiz[ing] [it] around [conventional] British lines,” which was unhelpful given the insurgent nature of the threat that Greece faced.9

Facing an Insurgency As the Greek state reeled from the debilitating German occupation and its aftermath, it faced multiple iterations of civil war, generally between the communists and the royalists. Coalescing many of the non-state groups, the communists formed the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), which had helped push Germany out of Greece. After Germany’s withdrawal, however, it fought other Greek resistance groups, particularly those supporting the fledgling Greek government. The Greek military’s opponent was well-equipped, received substantial external support, and practiced traditional insurgent tactics, deftly taking advantage of the mountainous terrain that enabled them to attack targets and slip away. The guerrillas obtained their materiel from a host of sources. These included Italian units stationed in Greece who redeployed to the mountains after Italy’s 1943 surrender, Greek Army personnel who had hidden arms and ammunition in villages during the German occupation, German forces who hoped this assistance would discourage the guerrillas from attacking during their redeployment, and—ironically—the Allied Forces, who had dropped them by air to enable Greeks to counter the German occupation.10 Yet now that the occupation was over and the Greek state was beginning to rebuild, additional sources of arms and robust support from external actors became highly problematic; such aid enabled the guerrillas to thrive. By the summer of 1946, a serious effort was underway—through the cooperation of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and the Greek communist guerrillas—to support the latter as they actively asserted themselves in

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Greece and took advantage of the state’s weakness. Tangible materiel assistance came primarily from the communist states of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and included “clothing, rations, arms . . . ammunition . . . training camps, transit areas, replacement centers, field hospitals, and supply depots.”11 Despite U.S. government assumptions to the contrary, it does not appear that the Soviet Union tangibly aided the Greek guerrillas; however, Moscow did not inhibit its satellite states from enthusiastically doing so and, at times, Moscow offered verbal support to the guerrillas.12 The guerrillas soon formalized their structure and announced the creation of the “Democratic Army,” in which approximately 13,000 guerrillas were actively operating against the Greek Armed Forces, a much more “effective fighting force” than the Greek military despite being one-tenth of its size. Operating “like a marshfire . . . creep[ing] underground, and then gush[ing] forth miles away,” the guerrillas were increasingly effective at undermining the efficacy of Greek government institutions, particularly the military. Greece’s military rarely confronted the guerrillas, and when it attempted to do so, it nearly always was overwhelmed; as former commander-in-chief of the Greek military General Alexander Papagos ruefully reflected, “at the end of 1946 the national forces were in danger of losing the war without fighting it.”13

Piqued American Interest as Britain Begins Wobbling: Fall 1946 Before fall 1946, when the United States first began heeding Greece’s importance as a strategically located country under assault from communist forces, the U.S. role in Greece had been minimal. American involvement was generally limited to sending election observation delegations and providing humanitarian and lend-lease assistance funneled through Great Britain.14 The American leadership was generally satisfied working through the British despite the worsening situation in Greece. As it became increasingly clear that Great Britain was unable to maintain all of its global commitments in the wake of World War II, rumors began to swirl about the future of British involvement in Greece, triggering a deepened interest by the U.S. government. American concern for the fate of Greece was based primarily on its strategic location. Greece was the sole non-communist state in the Balkans.

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As the United States began considering the contours of the emerging Cold War and how to respond to increasing Soviet posturing, Greece was a particularly appropriate place, given that it straddled Europe and the Middle East and was the only part of the Eastern Mediterranean over which the Soviet Union did not wield significant influence. As one senior American official described it, Greece was “integral” and “pivotal,” given its location.15 To be sure, President Truman himself recognized Greece’s importance. One telling example occurred during an August 1946 meeting. In response to Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower’s concerns about Soviet opposition to potential American involvement, Truman concisely outlined Greece’s significance while poring over a map.16 His personal support for robust U.S. involvement in supporting the fledgling Greek state was foundational to the priority the entire U.S. government placed on this effort. During this period, as worries spread throughout the U.S. government about Soviet meddling in the Eastern Mediterranean, various American officials began considering how to counter the Soviets. Throughout September 1946, War Department staff urged the United States to assist Greece with political and economic support, which was approved in late October, and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee considered how to extend Greek internal defense. But senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Byrnes—who stated that U.S. aid to Greece “is of the highest importance” and increasingly recognized Greece’s critical regional role— did not initially consider direct military assistance. The disbursal of such aid would be predicated solely on British capabilities, as both the secretary of state and President Truman agreed.17 Therefore, Secretary of State Byrnes refused a Greek government plea for military assistance in October, and U.S. officials discouraged the Greek leadership from making similar requests. They failed, however, and during Greek Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris’s December visit to Washington, he asked senior American officials for U.S. military aid. Although Byrnes and Under Secretary of State Acheson were particularly unimpressed by Tsaldaris—who inaccurately thought he had awed them with his arguments for aid—the U.S. leadership did commit to reexamining the prospects of military assistance with Great Britain.18 To be sure, the United States was responding positively to British requests for military aid during this period—including funneling eight C-47s for troop transport through them for the Greek Armed Forces—but this was intended to be a limited effort. Nevertheless, U.S. Ambassador to

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Greece Lincoln MacVeagh gleefully remarked about Washington’s increasing interest in Greek affairs, “I feel now as Cassandra might, had anyone suddenly agreed with her,” and he began gathering lists of Greek military needs, urging greater military aid, albeit still under British auspices.19 The British military supported such assistance, particularly as its senior leadership—cognizant of London’s diminishing capabilities—quietly began considering whether the U.S. government might be willing to fill the mission to strengthen the Greek military.20

Britain Crumbles and the United States Coalesces: Early 1947 In early 1947, rumors heightened that Great Britain—overstretched and overwhelmed—was no longer able to continue its nascent efforts in Greece. Picking up on these growing concerns, Ambassador MacVeagh feared, “unless Greece received immediate assurance of large-scale . . . aid, the last vestiges of the authority of the Greek government would disappear within a matter of weeks.”21 His warning was prescient. Within weeks, the British government delivered an aide-me´moire to the State Department that cited London’s “own situation”—alluding to its economic problems—and explained it could no longer continue to assist Greece, but hoped the United States would do so in its place. The document’s very first appendix outlined the Greek military’s desperate requirements for greater personnel and materiel, demonstrating the high priority Great Britain placed on strengthening Greece’s military to ensure the fragile state’s survival.22

A Weak State Desperate for American Support “There is really no state here in the Western concept,” lamented a senior U.S. official, and Greece’s domestic situation was fast declining as antagonistic external actors aided the guerrillas, according to U.S. intelligence assessments.23 In the throes of civil war, the CIA was emphatic that Greece required external assistance to facilitate internal stability, particularly given the guerrillas’ expanding strength. Many of the guerrillas, according to the CIA, were “trained, indoctrinated, armed, and equipped . . . beyond the Greek borders,” and their growing arsenal included “Sten guns, mortars,

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mines, machine guns, rifles, and grenades.”24 Conversely, while the guerrillas grew stronger, the Greek military remained weak. And British aid had been “insignificant compared with the problems and their needs,” highlighted one senior U.S. official.25 Furthermore, as one senior Greek military official deplored in early 1947, the military could not successfully counter the guerrillas due to its “low level of combat ability . . . ignorance of tactics . . . lassitude of spirit and defeatism of administrators.”26 From the American perspective, the urgency for helping Greece was clear: it was in precarious straits and American concern over the Soviet threat was on an upward trajectory. Dean Acheson described the Greek state of affairs: “Greece was in the position of a semiconscious patient on the critical list where relatives and physicians had been discussing whether his life could be saved.” And, other senior State Department officials were deeply concerned that the Greek state would fall if it did not receive immediate aid.27 Given this state of affairs—Greece’s fragile situation, strategic location, and the emerging Cold War—the U.S. government quickly agreed to assist Greece. In particular, concern over the Soviet threat propelled President Truman to take fast and robust action. Immediately after receiving the aideme´moire, the secretaries of state and war urged President Truman to begin an extensive effort to support Greece; he immediately concurred. And within days, senior War Department staff outlined a plan to assist the Greek military, preparing “to set up . . . the military training and advisory teams, to order supplies and weapons, and to procure weapons.”28 The extensive program they designed would not just focus on training and equipping the Greek military, but also on advising it. Just over a week after receiving the initial British aide-me´moire, the U.S. government affirmed that it would now fully take over responsibility for sustaining the fragile Greek state, including its military. Moreover, the United States inaugurated the assistance program marked by deep involvement in sensitive Greek affairs. Admitting their efforts in declassified documents, State Department staff wrote the Greek government’s initial request for aid, in an effort to ensure the formal request sounded sufficiently desperate and was appropriately worded to convince the U.S. Congress and the American people that American assistance was necessary to “restor[e] in the country the tranquility and feeling of security.”29 In an understatement, Dean Acheson later recounted the U.S. role in composing Greece’s request for aid: “with the support of kind friends and their guidance of a feeble hand, the Greek government wrote

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asking for help.”30 Such intense involvement in internal Greek affairs would continue throughout the U.S. program to build Greece’s military. To establish the assistance program, on March 12, 1947, President Truman gave one of the most famous speeches of his administration. He implored a joint session of Congress to allocate aid to Greece (and to Turkey, which had been subsequently brought in) nine days after receiving the formal Greek government request. In a dramatic plea for support, he warned, “The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists. . . . The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greece . . . [and] instruction and training.”31 The United States would get substantially involved, President Truman emphasized, noting the Greek government’s interest in having the United States do so.32 Greek government and opposition leaders praised President Truman’s speech, illustrating their willingness for deep American involvement in Greek affairs.33 Truman’s request was quickly considered and approved by both houses of Congress in April and May, respectively. Members had held a series of hastily organized hearings throughout spring 1947, which forced the administration to publicly outline its mission and the details for assisting Greece’s military. State Department officials estimated the effort would cost approximately 150 million dollars, which would include “arms, ammunition, clothing, rations, and equipment necessary to deal effectively with the guerrillas,” according to Under Secretary William Clayton.34 Early on, the program to build the Greek military was structured to focus wholly on internal defense; both the U.S. and Greek governments concurred with this reasoning when their leaderships met in Athens in May 1947 to begin outlining the terms of the program.35 Such a mission is particularly suited to fragile states because it involves strengthening the state military in an effort to exert the government’s sovereignty throughout its national territory. At no point during the entire two-year program to build Greece’s military did the U.S. government veer from this stated purpose, a critical reason for the program’s ultimate success. Limiting U.S. Aid Although the United States launched the program to strengthen Greece’s military by becoming involved in sensitive Greek affairs—for

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example, outlining the request for aid—many senior U.S. officials quickly restricted involvement once the program took shape. The legislation approved by President Truman permitted a robust U.S. program to advise, train, and equip the Greek military, but senior State Department and War Department officials decided the military mission in Athens would be small—ten to forty members, according to Secretary of War Robert Patterson—and “limit” American involvement to “technical” affairs, such as ascertaining military requirements and facilitating the delivery of equipment. “It is not a training mission,” Patterson stated—perhaps seeing no contradiction in his statement earlier that day that the most effective way to assist Greece’s military would include “permit[ting] reorganization of the Greek Army,” an effort that surely required intensive U.S. involvement and which Ambassador MacVeagh believed was necessary. Ambassador MacVeagh and some State Department officials pushed for deeper American involvement and took steps, such as drafting the Greek government’s thank you note to President Truman and editing other Greek communications, like the Greek prime minister’s statement commending American assistance. Nevertheless, the program’s initial emphasis was on facilitating equipment deliveries—perhaps partly in response to congressional concerns about “intervention in the internal affairs” of a state—and the War Department leadership restricted American military involvement.36

Lots of Aid but Limited American Involvement: Summer–Early Fall 1947 Throughout May and June 1947, the U.S. and Greek governments exchanged a series of notes to formalize the aid relationship; in them, both parties repeatedly emphasized that the effort to build the Greek military focused on internal defense.37 In less than a month—on June 20, 1947— Ambassador MacVeagh and Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tsaldaris signed the official aid agreement. At this time, the two governments generally concurred on the purpose, scope, and details of the program to build the Greek military, with one glaring exception. Foreshadowing debates to come, during spring 1947, the Greek government began suggesting their military required expansion; senior U.S. officials were generally unenthusiastic about doing so, given their belief that the

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Greek military was appropriately sized for its internal defense mission, and they maintained this reluctance for much of the next year and a half.38 Just weeks before the aid agreement was signed, the U.S. government established a new entity to coordinate the 150 million dollars allocated by Congress to build the Greek military: U.S. Army Group–Greece (USAGG), and one day before the agreement was signed, USAGG’s official director, Major General William Livesay, arrived in Greece. A naval component was also established, but it was weak and generally operated under USAGG’s leadership in practice. The initial USAGG cohort arrived at the end of May (it was temporarily led by Colonel Charles Lehner until Livesay’s appointment and subsequent arrival) and immediately began assessing the Greek military’s capabilities and requirements. USAGG was a small delegation, with 20 officers and three enlisted soldiers, although it grew a bit larger throughout the summer as 17 employees from the War Department were seconded to it.39

Focusing on Equipment with Limited Parameters and Hesitant U.S. Leadership Though limited in number, the USAGG personnel based in the Metochikon Tameion Stratou building in Athens immediately began collaborating with their Greek contacts and the rest of the American Mission in Greece.40 They quickly visited Greek military facilities and personnel, assessing Greek materiel stocks, and at the end of July, USAGG held a conference with the Greek military leadership to discuss its needs and requirements.41 Within two months, “USAGG had cut Greek general staff requirements from forty million dollars to sixteen million, established an integrated relationship with the British and Greeks, and made recommendations for supplies and operations.”42 Although USAGG was highly involved in equipping the Greek military, its leadership—namely, Livesay—was disengaged from sensitive Greek military affairs. After Livesay’s initial meetings with senior U.S. military officials at the War Department before departing for Athens, he recounted that the briefings emphasized “our interest is in training the Greeks in the use of American equipment and to see it is properly used. Overall training of Greek Army and reorganization is their problem (also British).” Being given such a limited mandate surely influenced his initial foray into Greece,

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and his diary gives the impression of a tactically focused and hesitant personality.43 Therefore, Livesay made a concerted effort to stick to his restricted mission. According to his personal papers, Livesay did not visit the field until late September 1947, more than three months after arriving in Greece.44 He was permitted to attend senior Greek defense meetings only to comment on equipment-related issues. When members of the Higher Military Council would ask his opinion of organizational affairs, he generally offered his own opinion with heavy caveats; there were a few exceptions, such as when Livesay asked to peruse the Greek Army’s order of battle, telling the Higher Military Council he would “inform them whether or not [it] is satisfactory.”45 Nevertheless, Livesay was generally passive during his first few months in Greece; he did not seek to influence sensitive Greek military affairs such as personnel appointments. After a few months, however, Livesay began playing a more outsize role and started to offer advice on Greek affairs beyond equipment needs; the impact of him doing so had a marked effect on the program to build the Greek military. When the Greek Army’s chief of staff privately sought his counsel on how to improve the military, Livesay gave his frank suggestions, urging the army to “adopt a more vigorous and aggressive attitude,” as he recounted in his diary. When Greece’s new prime minister, Themistoklis Sophoulis, approached him at the end of September to discuss leadership changes in the Greek military, Livesay offered his recommendation on the best selection. Moreover, Livesay then raised the issue with the minister of war, telling him “the offensive spirit could be gained if General Papageorgious was relieved and a more aggressive man, for instance General Philippidis, was placed in command.” Livesay characterized the C Corps commander as “weak” and passive. In the end, all of his recommendations —which he had hesitated to deliver for months—were followed.46 Ambassador MacVeagh supported this enhanced involvement in sensitive Greek military affairs; he told the Greek leadership that “no change in command should be made” without Livesay’s approval, and he was pleased when Livesay began quietly advising the Greek military about promotions and retirements.47 Even though the American role was still largely constrained, early on the guerrilla leadership criticized the United States and verbally attacked it as equivalent to the Greek military.48 Given the inaugural American effort to assist Greece’s military, the guerrillas perceived American involvement

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as problematic to their interests. Further, American efforts at the United Nations, including helping establish a Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents that examined external support to the Greek guerrillas, was unhelpful to their cause. Soon after its creation, the Commission issued a report validating the Greek government’s assertions that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania were aiding the guerrillas and impeding stability in Greece. Throughout July, thousands of well-armed and well-trained guerrillas crossed from their sanctuary in Albania into Greece, and other guerrilla cohorts received reinforcements and materiel from Yugoslavia; however, “a stalemate developed” because the Greek military was hesitant to respond by attacking the guerrillas’ external sources of support.49 U.S. Equipment Flows Rapidly . . . with Limited Effect Disbursing equipment remained the primary focus of the U.S. military mission; it flowed rapidly to Greece. And although American military personnel in Greece were cognizant of the Greek military’s deficiencies— particularly its static and defensive posture that was facilitated by political pressure—there was little they could do to change it, given the emphasis on tangible aid rather than American training or advice.50 The British military continued to train the Greek military, albeit in their image rather than based on Greek needs. For example, Livesay noted the Greek honor guard wore British military uniforms “and were hard to distinguish from British.”51 Although the United States fully subsidized all materiel from Great Britain once the program began, its limited parameters had initially restricted USAGG’s influence. Livesay’s attitude toward U.S. assistance demonstrated his interpretation of USAGG’s role: as he articulated, “after all in the final analysis the money provided the Greeks is in effect their money” to do with as they wished.52 On August 2, 1947, the first ship arrived in Piraeus with “a military general cargo, vehicles, and rations,” and ten more docked over the course of the month. They carried supplies, equipment, vehicles, rations, nearly 1,000 horses, and by early September, the United States had facilitated the delivery of 24,894 tons of aid for Greece’s military. In particular, the United States sought to enhance Greek mobility during the first phase of assistance to its military, and by September 1947, it had delivered more than 2,000 trucks, ambulances, and horses.53

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But problems arose with the delivery of supplies and even what supplies were required. For example, spare parts arrived months after vehicles, which were unhelpful because the Greek military was hesitant to employ the vehicles without them. Given Greece’s desperate needs, such aid was critical: the Greek military had been unsuccessful in its spring campaign to clear the central and northern parts of the country of guerrillas for a host of reasons, including its lack of mobility. This failure, coupled with its previously discussed sorry state of affairs and a salary of less than two dollars per month for new recruits, led to further hemorrhaging of the military.54 Moreover, the senior Greek military leadership could not agree on the military’s needs. Finally, after much frustration from spending nearly two months fielding disparate supply requests from various components of the Greek military, Livesay told the Greek military’s chiefs of staff that the U.S. government would reconsider materiel requests only upon receiving a statement on which all service chiefs had concurred.55 U.S. assistance was clearly necessary for the fledgling Greek military, and its deep dependence on the United States—even for rations to feed its personnel—further illustrated its limited capabilities. Debates over Size Demonstrate Need for Deeper U.S. Involvement Although the U.S. military leadership in Washington and in Athens was initially reluctant to become deeply involved in Greek military affairs, early debates over the size of Greece’s military helped sway them. When Greek political and military officials raised their desire to expand the army and to establish a civil defense force with USAGG personnel, General Livesay’s initial response was to wait for an assessment before making a decision, particularly because before his arrival the State and War Departments had already supported a short-term request to temporarily add 20,000 personnel to the Greek military.56 Livesay soon grew comfortable with the notion of a village defense force after facing heavy Greek pressure, especially because such an entity would enable the Greek Army to operate more offensively rather than continuing its static posture of defending rural areas.57 Generally, U.S. officials in Greece did not believe that the Greek military required expansion because they believed it was appropriately sized at 140,000 personnel, given its internal defense mission, and they thought that

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better use of its resources would suffice; increasingly, U.S. officials realized that deeper American involvement—such as expanding training—would be the best option for strengthening the military.58 Similarly, the Greek political leadership started encouraging deeper U.S. military involvement in Greek affairs. Although frustrated that the United States did not support a larger military force, Tsaldaris urged Secretary of State Marshall to deepen U.S. military efforts in Greece during his summer visit to Washington and, at the same time, American arguments about the Greek military’s size began resonating with the Greek general staff.59 Of course, not all Greek leaders concurred with the de facto American veto on expanding Greece’s military, and some continued pressing for it. In this vein, one of Livesay’s most difficult moments occurred in late August when the Supreme National Defense Council accosted him and—as he recounted—the prime minister effectively said he should “tell them what was wrong with the Army and [all of] the answers to their request for an increase in strength.”60 As the conflict in Greece worsened toward the end of the summer, U.S. officials grew increasingly cognizant that the limited American role— overwhelmingly focused on equipment deliveries—was inhibiting its efforts to transform the Greek military. Further, the British were rapidly decreasing their military presence in Greece—having left only one brigade there— which likely reinforced American impressions that London’s role would remain constrained.61 Finally, the creation of AMAG (the American Mission for Aid to Greece) in an attempt to unify all American aid to Greece under the leadership of Dwight Griswold was causing its own disarray. Griswold—a former Nebraska governor appointed because Truman thought his Republican credentials would be helpful with Congress—possessed a strong personality and broadly interpreted his mandate; he and MacVeagh clashed, disrupting internal American efforts in Greece.62 Therefore, Ambassador MacVeagh suggested to the secretary of state that an altogether different U.S. entity in Greece might be more appropriate for enabling deeper involvement in transforming the Greek military. As he put it, “Dept and War Dept may soon, if not immediately, have to consider whether AMAG . . . can be expected to provide all necessary answers to present and future problems involving Greek national security and Greek sector of security of Near and military East [sic].” He further suggested that the U.S. military mission in Greece would benefit from “perhaps larger staff military observers” imbued with greater authority than a military attache´, and he was deeply concerned that the U.S. government must begin

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seriously considering these issues “if we are not to risk falling into British error of ‘too little and too late.’ ” His warning was a sobering reminder to Washington of the precariousness of this program.63 MacVeagh’s suggestions to reassess the nature and degree of U.S. involvement in Greece were timely, and they were in line with General Livesay’s evolved thinking. By September, the situation in Greece was worsening as the guerrillas received greater tangible assistance from their external supporters: Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. The military was suffering from a “shortage of troops, physical fatigue . . . [a] lack of offensive spirit,” and generally poor morale, particularly among officers who “feel they receive no clear guidance from the top,” as General Livesay described to General Omar Bradley. For example, nearly 15 percent of the army was composed of elderly men. The Greek military required an empowered leadership, an offensive posture, and better training; effecting these three critical changes required deep American involvement. Like MacVeagh, Livesay was now clearly outlining a different, more active U.S. military role in Greece: “the Commanders need firm guidance in the planning and conduct of operations if they are going to compete successfully,” he implored. Given all of this, it was growing increasingly clear that to most effectively build the Greek military, the nature of the U.S. military’s role in Greece needed to change.64

Reassessing and Deepening U.S. Involvement: Fall 1947–Early 1948 In response to growing calls for deeper American involvement in Greek military affairs, Major General S. J. Chamberlin from the U.S. Army’s Intelligence Division was appointed to assess the security situation in Greece and consider the nature of American efforts. From September 26 to October 11, Chamberlin toured the country; as the Joint Chiefs of Staff history reports, he “visited numerous points in the area of operations, talked with commanders and staffs of Greek army units, and conferred with all the principal U.S. and UK representatives and key members of the Greek cabinet.”65 By October 20, Chamberlin submitted his report to General Eisenhower, chief of staff of the army. Chamberlin’s findings were predictable. In an interagency meeting held even before Chamberlin departed for Greece, participants agreed the War

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Department should begin finding qualified advisers under the assumption that he would request them. Critical of U.S. policy in Greece, Chamberlin argued that U.S. objectives were insufficiently defined, and he recommended substantial changes to the nature and degree of U.S. policy toward the Greek military. Simply put, Chamberlin advocated for U.S. involvement in sensitive Greek military affairs. He specifically recommended that the United States reorganize its military mission in Greece and increase its size if it were to have any influence on the complacent and static Greek military. Rather than USAGG, which Chamberlin found inadequate particularly because it operated under AMAG’s control, he recommended establishing a separate entity—a “U.S. Advisory and Planning Group”—which “report[ed] directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and was empowered to deliver “high level military advice” to the Greeks when requested. Chamberlin also wanted to strengthen the mandate of U.S. advisers so that they could offer operational advice to the Greek military. Instead of simply disbursing equipment, these advisers would focus on “energizing operational action, restoring the offensive spirit and advising on planning and operations.” Together, the new military mission and the broadly empowered advisers could influence Greece’s military by becoming involved in sensitive issues at all levels. Chamberlin also recommended disbursing additional equipment (particularly machine guns and mountain artillery) and advocated for greater U.S. involvement in training. And finally, he recommended establishing a “Home Guard,” which would maintain security in areas the Greek military had cleared of guerrillas, therefore enabling the military to more actively counter guerrillas elsewhere.66 Within one week of the report’s submission, the National Security Council approved Chamberlin’s recommendations for redefining the U.S. role in Greek military affairs. American representatives outside and inside of Greece were enthusiastic about Chamberlin’s recommendations, particularly in the hopes that their successful implementation would limit the Soviet impact in the Eastern Mediterranean, although Griswold was hesitant about being bypassed by the new military mission. In this vein, senior American officials debated the new military mission’s reporting chain— specifically, whether it should report to AMAG in an effort to keep the local American leadership involved or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Chamberlin recommended. Given all of these dynamics, the agreed-upon solution was for the new (as yet unnamed) entity to nominally “be a part of AMAG, but with direct communication to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on

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matters concerning military operations,” enabling the involvement of both the U.S. political leadership in Greece and military officials in Washington.67 Importantly, the Greek leadership similarly and enthusiastically supported expanding American involvement into all Greek military affairs. The Greek prime minister had even requested that “General Livesay be given broader authority so as to be able to advise the Prime Minister and the Greek government on all phases of military matters. . . . the Prime Minister has been impressed by the impartiality and sound judgment of General Livesay in matters of supply and logistics to which his advice is now limited by his present instructions.”68 And beyond the effort to build the Greek military, the Greek government sought to wholly cooperate with the Americans. For example, the government’s coordination minister sent a memorandum to every ministry requesting that they work with the United States before taking any steps that might influence how Greek resources were utilized.69 Also during this period, Dwight Griswold requested and received a transfer of nine million dollars from the economic assistance program to the military program. Doing so allowed for the slightly larger Greek Army and temporary military extension to be funded. Rather than evenly splitting aid as previously planned, by the end of the year the military program received nearly 60 percent of the initial congressionally allocated funds.70 Codifying Deeper American Involvement, but Within Limits On November 3, President Truman approved expanding the U.S. military role in Greece, and within days, Secretary of Defense Forrestal began forming the new entity and Secretary of the Army Royall began to plan the congressional notification.71 On November 19, the Greek public was formally notified—by Dwight Griswold rather than by General Livesay— about the expanded U.S. role. “The Americans will not take command,” emphasized Griswold, yet it will be a “joint Greek-American operation” to plan for countering the guerrillas.72 The number of U.S. military personnel in Greece would substantially increase; however, the United States would not send combat troops.73 The British were preparing to redeploy the last brigade they maintained in Greece. Because their presence was seen as stabilizing—even given their extremely limited rules of engagement— senior U.S. officials began debating whether U.S. military personnel should

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replace them, a suggestion that Chamberlin had offered in his report.74 Serious discussion on this issue was saved until later in the year; until then, the newly approved deep American military involvement in Greece would have to suffice. The worsening security situation in Greece almost surely influenced U.S. decision making. Guerrillas now controlled “four-fifths” of the country, according to one British journalist. A CIA assessment during this period outlined the guerrillas’ capabilities and size (nearly 20,000) and dramatically asserted, “the survival of Greece as an independent country will depend on how much and what kind of aid is forthcoming from the US.” Further, the guerrillas announced they were establishing a new government, thereby putting more pressure on the fledgling Greek government. Taken together, these reports underscored the increasingly capable and larger guerilla force facing the Greek military and the high stakes for U.S. policymakers seeking to meaningfully shape Greece’s future.75 Relationships Fray Among the Americans As the situation in Greece grew increasingly problematic, so did the relationship between the key American decision makers in Greece: Ambassador MacVeagh and Dwight Griswold. Although Livesay had attempted to play a more active role, he was particularly diminished by Griswold’s pushy personality. Poor relations between Griswold and MacVeagh were nearly inevitable; as one senior U.S. official explained simply, “there could be only one American running the show in Greece, and the position of the aid administrator was more important than that of the Ambassador.”76 However, their personalities and operating styles exacerbated the tension, particularly as the nature of U.S. involvement shifted. A childhood friend of Dean Acheson, MacVeagh was a well-respected career diplomat based in Athens since 1933. His “cautious” style meant that he deeply believed “careful non-interference in Greek internal affairs” was critical for effective U.S. policymaking in Greece.77 Griswold, a Republican politician, became involved in U.S.-Greek affairs as the aid program was beginning and held a very different perspective of the U.S. role: in his view, the United States must influence sensitive Greek affairs. Even before arriving in Athens, he brusquely told senior U.S. officials that his first project was “to change or reorganize the Greek government,” a comment that immediately concerned State Department staff, including the secretary of state.78 Unfortunately, he

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operated clumsily, as illustrated in fall 1947 when he asserted that the potential new Greek government would be “inadmissible,” a comment interpreted by the Greeks as “declar[ing] war” until MacVeagh clarified that Griswold intended to say “inadvisable.” The uproar quickly reached Washington, and in response, Marshall encouraged Griswold to be more “discreet”; however, Griswold was unmoved, given his deep political connections, particularly his support on Capitol Hill, where members of Congress threatened to investigate if Griswold was not sufficiently empowered.79 After months of bickering and unsuccessful attempts to bridge differences between the two, President Truman removed MacVeagh from Greece at the end of November. He kept a weak charge´ d’affaires at the helm of the U.S. embassy in Athens, permitting Griswold to operate as he wished. The political leadership in Washington therefore sanctioned Griswold’s vision that the United States should become involved in sensitive Greek affairs. A New—and Empowered—Entity: JUSMAPG As 1947 came to an end, the notable November decisions to expand the degree and nature of American involvement came to fruition with the establishment of a new and empowered entity to lead American efforts to strengthen Greece’s military. The Greek leadership supported these changes; they were frustrated that the United States had not moved more quickly to provide operational advice to the Greek military.80 The new military mission was finally established on the last day of the year: the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG). This new entity was substantially more powerful than USAGG. Its functions—focused on enhancing Greek internal defense—were to “maintain a continuing study and appraisal of the developing situation in Greece from a military point of view. . . . Formulate plans for the employment and coordination of the armed forces of Greece. . . . Furnish advice concerning the military situation in regard to security and maintaining internal security in Greece. . . . Furnish operational advice . . . upon request of the Greek government, and render military decisions which do not affect overall AMAG policies or other AMAG activities [among others].”81 The directive also stated that JUSMAPG’s leadership would report to AMAG, but on “military operations” it could maintain “direct communication to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” This delineation was meaningful because

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it enabled the U.S. military leadership to be intensely involved with JUSMAPG, but it also ensured that Griswold was cognizant of any affairs that might have political implications, such as the military’s size. With their new role codified, U.S. military personnel in Greece formally deepened their involvement as they rapidly began training and advising all levels of the Greek military.82 Soon after JUSMAPG’s establishment, Livesay emphasized that JUSMAPG staff should become heavily involved in all Greek military affairs. But under their mandate, JUSMAPG’s personnel had to restrain themselves from becoming co-combatants with the Greek military; Livesay therefore also exhorted they could “observe combat but don’t get involved in it.”83 With this guidance, and as JUSMAPG’s size jumped from 14 personnel (excluding USAGG) to 170—90 of whom were officers—it wasn’t long before U.S. personnel were accompanying the Greek military in the field and advising the general staff.84 The nature of American involvement in Greek military affairs had deepened considerably in recent months, and it was already having a notable impact. Livesay found that the presence of foreign military officers inspired the Greek military. And this directly influenced their willingness to counter the guerrillas; the Greek military’s December 1947 success at Konitsa— where the guerrillas sought to establish their new government—was one example of this enhanced collaboration.85 Despite the inevitable constraints on Greek sovereignty, the senior Greek leadership supported U.S. involvement. Reflecting on this period, the Greek prime minister explained, “it was not intervention; it was interest in common.”86 The U.S. effort was beginning to have an impact on Greece’s military, but much still had to be accomplished.

Intensifying U.S. Involvement, but Not as a Co-Combatant: Winter–Summer 1948 As it grew increasingly clear that the effort to extend the Greek government’s sovereignty centered on the military’s capabilities, two critical events occurred during the first half of 1948 that influenced American efforts to do so effectively. First, the senior American leadership agreed that the United States should not become involved in combat. Second, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, a charismatic former corps commander in Europe, was selected to lead JUSMAPG in an effort to place a visionary

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individual at the helm of this important program. Although the executive branch decided to transfer fifteen million dollars in economic aid to military assistance for Greece—making the total 174 million dollars for the first year of aid—it was clear that other issues beyond the size of the assistance package would influence the Greek military’s success.87 Early in the new year, as the guerrillas grew more numerous and more capable, the National Security Council staff began seriously wrestling with the appropriate role for U.S. military personnel in Greece, a debate that lasted nearly half the year. Six months earlier, the secretary of state had warned the secretary of war that the British leadership thought substantial external military force might be necessary to help the Greek military establish internal security; such an effort would be dramatically different from the defensive rules of engagement maintained by the British brigade that remained in Greece.88 And at the end of 1947, a senior-level meeting deferred serious discussion and decisions about whether the United States should send combat troops to Greece.89 Finally, in mid-January, the National Security Council debated NSC 5, an attempt to outline U.S. policy on Greece. Reiterating the internal defense mission for Greece’s military, NSC 5 outlined the Greek military’s challenges—namely, its static defensive posture, inadequate leadership, and the Greek government’s unhelpful meddling—and again raised the issue of U.S. combat operations in Greece. Over the subsequent months, most debate on Greece inside the senior levels of the U.S. government focused on this question. President Truman approved various iterations of NSC 5, which concurred on the importance of increasing military aid and training, and gradually developed U.S. policy defining what circumstances would necessitate sending American combat forces to Greece.90 Perturbed by the notion of an American combat role, the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were generally unhelpful to the national security team’s efforts to consider this issue, as a number of examples show.91 Secretary of Defense Forrestal warned that even discussing action by U.S. combat troops in Greece might not be in the executive branch’s authority and, should Congress inquire about the department’s role in these discussions, he wanted to reply, “it participated only when asked for the military viewpoint.” Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found in their study on this issue that before deploying troops, strict—arguably impossible—conditions were necessary, including a decision that “the United States has decided not to take military action elsewhere.” The Joint

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Chiefs of Staff even argued that the U.S. military must be partially mobilized should a decision be made to send combat forces to Greece, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal agreed with them. The State Department staff was comparatively more divided.92 The regional office supported robust military involvement—believing it would demonstrate U.S. resolve, particularly important given the Cold War context—but the policy planning office remained frustrated by a lack of details on such an effort, including future redeployment plans, the responsibilities and mission of the combat forces, and whether such involvement might then translate into similar regional efforts. At the highest levels, the secretary of state and the U.S. Embassy leadership emphasized that internal security was critical, but they were otherwise uncertain about the most appropriate way forward. Finally, the CIA assessed that U.S. combat troops would probably not be “decisive” in Greece because they would almost surely be “limited in strength and mission,” which would be evident to the Soviet Union.93 This lack of consensus—coupled with a host of events over the next few months—enabled the senior national security leadership to agree that the status quo of deep American involvement in Greek military affairs without combat support was sufficient for the time being. Congress extended military aid and allocated another 150 million dollars to Greece, demonstrating continued American support, and positive changes had begun on the ground as “the Greek Army has exhibited greater offensive spirit and the operational advice extended by US military representatives has improved the operational efficiency” of Greece’s military, according to a U.S. government review.94 Given these circumstances, in June 1948 the National Security Council—including President Truman—agreed to “reconsider” the issue of combat support when and if the security situation worsened. Otherwise, it would continue strengthening the Greek military, employing “all feasible means short of the application of United States military power.”95 Van Fleet: A Charismatic Leader Arrives in Athens As military assistance increased and JUSMAPG advisers became increasingly involved in sensitive Greek military affairs such as personnel appointments, organizational structure, and missions, one critical deficiency remained in the U.S. effort: a strong, visionary personality at JUSMAPG’s helm. Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marshall, had been

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increasingly concerned about Livesay’s quiescent style. They thought “a strong military leader” and “more impressive personality” was important for JUSMAPG.96 Queen Frederika of Greece may have further influenced Marshall in this regard when she commented that Livesay was simply “a supply officer”; soon after, Marshall arranged to interview then-Major General James Van Fleet.97 Van Fleet was heavily experienced in strengthening weak fighting forces, particularly through training and reorganization. He spent much of World War II leading the 8th Infantry Regiment in preparation for D-Day and then the XXIII Corps as it brought together all U.S. Army personnel in England to ensure they were appropriately trained, equipped, and advised on “lessons learned.”98 Although corps commanders were generally threestar generals, Van Fleet’s promotion had been stalled when General George Marshall confused his name with another officer who had a poor reputation.99 And although Van Fleet was attuned to guerrilla warfare’s unique aspects, he had no actual experience with it—although State Department officials inaccurately believed that he did.100 Van Fleet immediately impressed Marshall. After hearing his exhortation, “if the Greeks had this WILL TO WIN [sic], and with our aid, Greece could be saved without the need of a single American rifleman” Marshall quickly sought the approval of both President Truman and Chief of Staff of the Army General Eisenhower for Van Fleet to lead JUSMAPG—even before informing Griswold of the decision.101 Within weeks, Van Fleet was nominated, confirmed, and promoted by the U.S. Senate and on his way to Greece to lead the robust and unprecedented U.S. military effort.102 Rather than being effectively demoted now that Van Fleet would lead JUSMAPG, Livesay chose to depart Greece and take on a new assignment.103 Van Fleet raced to Athens, arriving on February 24, 1948, after a brief stop in London to learn about British efforts in Greece to date, and he quickly began forming relationships with key Greek leaders. In his first interview upon arriving in Greece, Van Fleet emphasized he was not a Greek military commander and would not be; his role was to provide advice and, as he described it, his “mission . . . to end the war,” which he would facilitate by spending substantial time in the field.104 He immediately met with the Greek leadership and formed a close relationship with the prime minister, who called Van Fleet a “savior”; King Paul and Queen Frederika, who pledged their cooperation; and, Greek Army Commander

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Table 2. Examples of Van Fleet’s Influence on Greek Military Personnel Name

Position

Van Fleet’s Role

Lieutenant General Yiatzis

Commander of the Greek Army

Ensured Yiatzis only lieutenant general to remain in position

Major General Kitrilakis

Deputy to the Chief of Staff for Operations

Promoted & reassigned

Major General Vimblis

Deputy to the Chief of Staff for Administration and Supply

Promoted & reassigned

Major General Tsakalotos

“A” Corps Commander

Promoted & reassigned

Major General Kalogeropoulos

“B” Corps Commander

Promoted & reassigned

Major General Grigolopoulos

“C” Corps Commander

Promoted & reassigned

Major General Tsigounis

Peloponneseus Commander

Reassigned

Source: James A. Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, AMAG Memo, March 31, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, VA.

General Dimitris Yiatzis, with whom Van Fleet visited the front soon after arriving in Greece.105 Van Fleet quickly began attending meetings with the senior Greek military and political leadership, and his influence was palpable, even though he spent most of his time outside of Athens. He immediately pushed for General Yiatzis to be more deeply involved in planning, coordinating, and controlling operations and all military matters, which the Supreme National Defence Council unanimously approved despite Greek politicians’ previously “habitual” interference, as the CIA described it.106 As one Greek source recounted, Van Fleet was not empowered to vote in these meetings, so instead council members tried to “observe his expressions so that they would agree on each and every issue with the ‘yes’ or the ‘no’ that he would pronounce deliberately and without a smile.”107 Early on Van Fleet sought to influence military personnel appointments, and he was wildly successful in doing so, as Table 2 illustrates. Van Fleet urged specific retirements of the senior military leadership, a tougher sell that took a month to achieve. He privately convinced King Paul to keep General Yiatzis rather than replace him, as the king had desired; Van Fleet’s

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immediate concerns centered on the poor quality of the Greek military leadership, and he saw Yiatzis as a rare competent exception.108 Within weeks of his arrival, Van Fleet facilitated the retirement of every single lieutenant general in the Greek military (except for Yiatzis) and ensured both the promotion and placement of eight major generals in the Greek military. Van Fleet continued the precedent he set early on to push for the removal of division and corps commanders when they were reluctant to or incapable of following the plans that he and Yiatzis put together; notably, Yiatzis promptly followed Van Fleet’s recommendations.109 Van Fleet expected to be deeply involved in all issues related to the Greek military. “I do not anticipate any [Greek] interference and, should it crop up, I will make an issue of it,” he reported back to Washington early on, in an effort to highlight his willingness to counter Greek attempts to disregard his advice.110 Van Fleet broadly interpreted his instructions as JUSMAPG director. As he later described it, the directive gave him “real authority and grave responsibility,” enabling him to become involved in sensitive Greek military affairs.111 Although Van Fleet maintained positive relations with the British Military Mission in Greece, he quickly grew frustrated by their efforts. The British—used to being the Greek military’s sole supporter—attempted to maintain their previous level of involvement even though British aid was soon dramatically overshadowed by U.S. military assistance. They attempted to “merge” the two Allied Military Missions, which Van Fleet did not support; however, both he and his bosses in Washington repeatedly strove to avoid an acrimonious relationship with the British, particularly to ensure the Greeks perceived a “unified front.”112

Making Progress with Van Fleet’s Leadership and Deep U.S. Involvement in Personnel Affairs The Greek military had desperately needed assistance, given that it was “inactive, ill trained and ill led”; however, American involvement quickly improved its status.113 Substantial progress on training, equipping, and advising the Greek military was made within months of JUSMAPG’s intense involvement and Van Fleet’s arrival. Now, members of JUSMAPG and the Greek general staff began collaborating to assess the security situation and to develop an operational plan for countering the guerrillas. This

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collaboration at the strategic and tactical levels was increasingly effective; the Greek military improved substantially, as clearly evidenced by the improved Greek fighting in Operation DAWN that spring, by which time the Greek military had already undergone meaningful personnel changes and received “more than 2,800 vehicles, 7,000 tons of ammunition, and 75,000 weapons, including machine guns, mortars and rifles” from the United States.114 Both JUSMAPG and Greek Army staff were spending more time visiting the field, which was beneficial for understanding the situation on the ground and for deciding which leaders—such as the 72nd Brigade commander—needed to be replaced, which Van Fleet then quickly ensured.115 The number of U.S. advisers varied, averaging sixteen per corps and seven per division, as they worked with all levels of the Greek military, providing suggestions on weapons, tactics, equipment, and operations.116 Notably, the divisions between the American and Greek military personnel were limited, to the extent possible; all U.S. officers had interpreters and JUSMAPG staff generally lived and traveled with the Greek military unit to which they were assigned. The advisers were often frank with the Greek military and influential with Van Fleet. One senior JUSMAPG adviser who worked with A Corps noted, for example, that he did not hesitate to offer operational advice or to suggest plans.117 Before JUSMAPG’s establishment, Greek Army training was poor, which worried Van Fleet. Training focused primarily on individual soldier tactics instead of unit-wide or combined operations. After one brigade-level adviser, Colonel George L. Eckert, witnessed the Greek military’s problematic infantry tactics and Van Fleet himself also saw them, JUSMAPG deepened its focus on infantry training.118 Moreover, Van Fleet complained to the Greek military leadership about the lack of sufficient training for new recruits; he prioritized enhanced training and an offensive posture.119 Therefore, JUSMAPG staff made a serious effort to correct these deficiencies by setting up a rotation of increasingly sophisticated training courses that included small unit, platoon, and company maneuvers. Van Fleet quickly established military training schools, and he broadened and extended training from six to seventeen weeks, though not without some challenges: according to one Greek general’s explanation, initially “trainees had not show[n] up . . . [because] he had not been able to persuade his division commanders that their men needed further training.” Further, JUSMAPG established a new section entirely focused on training; however,

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given that the Greek military was preoccupied with large-scale operations, it was invariably difficult to wholly focus on the training program. Overall, JUSMAPG’s emphasis on training was having an important impact across the entire force—not least because of how limited the training effort had been before the program commenced.120 Van Fleet himself—and the American effort more broadly—positively influenced the Greek military’s effort to counter the guerrillas. One journalist found that the Greeks generally supported Van Fleet, and he used a moving anecdote to demonstrate this dynamic. “Near Van Fleet’s headquarters, an old woman in black . . . asked the general’s aide if that was ‘Van Flit’ coming down the steps. When the surprised officer nodded, the woman crossed herself [and] murmured ‘God bless him.’ ”121 Other indications of Van Fleet’s high profile include the guerrillas trying to kill him within weeks of his arrival in Athens and concerted steps to counter his personal efforts, such as destroying the village of Naousa and killing its mayor right after Van Fleet’s visit.122 Van Fleet predicted that, given the progress to date, the Greeks would succeed in substantially reducing the guerrilla threat by the end of 1948, and he advertised his thinking throughout the U.S. government.123 Van Fleet’s optimism, which the U.S. leadership in Greece shared, even influenced members of Congress, who reduced military aid to Greece for the next fiscal year under the assumption that the fighting would end in 1948. Congress had allocated 150 million dollars for the Greek military in Public Law 793, which would disburse funding from June 1948 to June 1949; Van Fleet had requested a much larger sum. However, by summer, the United States had delivered more than one hundred million dollars in materiel, including thousands of vehicles, thousands of tons of ammunition, and tens of thousands of weapons. Overall, U.S. funding to support Greece’s military remained substantial throughout this period.124 Given the progress made to date, Van Fleet and the JUSMAPG staff found it timely to work with the Greek military to coordinate a summer offensive in the Peloponnesus and the northern mountain areas. These campaigns were so crucial that the U.S. Army leadership rejected Van Fleet’s request to visit Washington because they deemed his personal involvement in the current Greek operations to be critical.125 American personnel changes may have also contributed to Washington’s interest in having Van Fleet stay in Greece. Over the summer, Griswold decided to leave Greece and a new ambassador was appointed: Henry Grady, a close friend

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of President Truman. His relations with Van Fleet were strained, from Van Fleet’s perspective.126 JUSMAPG continued its involvement in sensitive Greek military affairs. In addition to training, equipping, offering tactical and strategic advice, assisting with planning and operations, and dealing with personnel affairs, JUSMAPG staff made organizational changes to the Greek military. They amended the order of battle, suggested changes to its “laws and decrees,” and Greek commanders regularly requested and followed JUSMAPG advice during the summer offensive—including collaboration on after-action reports examining “GNA troop performance, officer performance, and [offered] recommendations for improvement.”127 More broadly, it is difficult to find any arena dealing with the Greek military that JUSMAPG staff did not influence. With this support, the Greek military grew increasingly effective throughout summer 1948, and it began taking on more difficult engagements with the guerrillas. Although violence increased, it was largely due to Greek military efforts to counter its opponents. More limited efforts to counter the guerrillas near Krusia and Roumeli in northern Greece—where the Greek military killed more than 400 guerrillas and took custody of more than 1,000 others—inspired the Greek military to launch the Grammos battle, a long and difficult engagement that resulted in nearly 800 guerrilla casualties.128 The combination of U.S. materiel and advice was having an “excellent” effect on the Greek military, according to AMAG’s assessment, and was motivating it to offensively target the guerrillas.129 More Changes Necessary for Transforming Greece’s Military Yet more had to be done if the United States was going to transform the Greek military. To be sure, Greece’s military had not conducted significant operations before JUSMAPG’s creation, so its offensive engagement in large-scale operations—such as Operation CROWN in Grammos— inevitably required some learning. Some Greek Army elements were not operating as actively as the U.S. advisers hoped: they focused on holding positions rather than on aggressively clearing additional territory, often due to their commander’s inhibitions.130 Such events demonstrated the need for additional personnel changes in the Greek military. In an August visit to the front with senior U.S. military leaders visiting from Washington, for example, Van Fleet was disheartened

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by the limits imposed by the Greek commander of the operation, Lieutenant General Panos Kalogeropoulos. In response, Van Fleet urged—and was granted—Kalogeropoulos’s swift removal.131 Generally, the Greek leadership was amenable to considering such changes, although at times they were frustrated by Van Fleet’s constant suggestions to replace personnel. Though chastised by some Greeks for being “naı¨ve, bossy, publicity-conscious,” Van Fleet was not deterred.132 At the end of July, for example, the Greek political leadership decided to ignore his suggestions to replace certain senior military personnel. As Ambassador Grady recounted, “today’s meeting was played so smoothly that I was left with distinct impression that it had been planned in advance in order to prevent adoption of Van Fleet’s recommendations.” Yet in less than a week, Van Fleet’s suggested changes were made.133 At least some Greek military and political leaders were also frustrated by what they perceived as shortcomings in U.S. equipment deliveries; however, their understanding of the military’s requirements was often skewed. For example, the Greek general staff asked Livesay for anti-aircraft guns when they first met; he pointed out that this capability would not be helpful because the guerrillas lacked airplanes.134 Van Fleet encountered similar misperceptions. For example, during mid-summer 1948, the Greek government requested a host of materiel, including special incendiary bombs, flame throwers, and poison gas. Van Fleet explained these would not be helpful in countering the guerrillas; similarly, he found the Greek request for additional artillery to be misguided because nearly all of the Britishprovided six-pound artillery pieces were sitting in storage.135 On the political level, the minister of public order publicly denounced the United States in a 1948 parliamentary debate, exclaiming that it purposely kept the military weak and had not even given it mountain artillery. Though the prime minister quickly countered this sentiment, it nevertheless existed among some Greeks who found U.S. assistance insufficient or inappropriate.136

Stymied by External Actors, the United States Redoubles Its Involvement with a New Greek Partner: Fall–Winter 1948 As it grew increasingly clear that the Greek military made progress but did not successfully defeat the guerrillas over the summer of 1948, both the Greeks and the Americans reassessed how to best counter them. They made

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important changes that would positively influence the program to build the Greek military. The guerrillas also made some key modifications in both their leadership and their operations, which made it easier for the Greek military to counter its enemy.

Inhibited by Antagonistic External Actors Even though progress had been made in securing Greece by strengthening its military, the guerrillas remained formidable, particularly due to the substantial support they continued receiving from antagonistic external actors, including sanctuary and materiel assistance. By the end of the summer, State Department officials were increasingly confident that there was now “no immediate danger that Greece will fall” and the conflict would end soon, although the secretary of the army was less optimistic.137 American aid to the Greek military continued—focused solely on internal security. Unfortunately, it soon became clear that Van Fleet’s prediction—that Greece’s military would defeat the guerrillas in 1948—was wrong because external support enabled the guerrillas to thrive.138 His erroneous prediction was particularly based on the level of external aid the guerrillas received. As Van Fleet implored his boss in Washington, “keep those Soviets or their satellites from crossing the border and we will mop up everything in Greece right up to the border this year.”139 Van Fleet was deeply concerned about the substantial support these communist states provided the Greek guerrillas. By one estimate alone, Yugoslavia sent “35,000 rifles, 3,500 machine guns, 2,000 German bazookas, 7,000 anti-tank guns, 10,000 field mines, clothing for 12,000 men, and 30 wagons of food to Greece” in addition to providing sanctuary and medical care for the guerrillas.140 That summer, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans found that Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were emphatically supporting the guerrillas. And it continued unearthing evidence that these three states “aided the rebels with sanctuary, supplies, and training.”141 Although Yugoslav assistance to the guerrillas briefly diminished when the country was kicked out of COMINFORM that summer due to disagreements between Moscow and Belgrade about the nature of their relationship, it soon resumed; further, Albania and Bulgaria continued to enthusiastically aid the guerrillas.142 It would be another year before Yugoslavia would seriously limit its support

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to the guerrillas—notably, once it was increasingly clear that the Greek military was willing and capable of effectively countering them.143 By early fall, the guerrillas managed to regroup. Their ability to quickly do so demonstrated that the Greek military had failed to strategically defeat them. Although the Grammos campaign had harmed the guerrillas, it “did not fundamentally change the situation in Greece,” according to the U.S. intelligence community.144 Instead, the guerrillas had been pushed into Albania, retreated to Yugoslavia, rearmed, and infiltrated back into Greece. More specifically, personnel from the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans saw approximately 1,000 guerrillas enter Albania following the Grammos mountains campaign. Such materiel support and sanctuary enabled them to increase in size and to obtain increasingly sophisticated equipment.145 Meddling by antagonistic external actors was making this effort to weaken the guerrillas and strengthen the Greek military “longer . . . and [of] greater complexity” than expected, as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Omar Bradley warned Van Fleet.146 Both he and Ambassador Grady were concerned about the role played by “external factors.”147 In Greece, the leadership, including the prime minister, expressed its frustration to U.S. officials over Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav support to the guerrillas. Uncertain about Greece’s viability—and his governing coalition’s future—the prime minister was rumored to have warned that “no government can continue to shoulder the responsibility for bleeding Greece white while the frontiers remain open.”148

Secretary of State Marshall’s October 1948 Visit The picture in Greece was complicated, and given the priority President Truman placed on its success, Secretary of State Marshall visited Athens in an attempt to understand events there. Although external aid to the guerrillas continued—even Yugoslavia, which had stemmed its support, still provided sanctuary—and though the Greek military was making improvements, it still had a long way to go. “US funds and tactical advice have corrected many deficiencies in the army, but the army appears still unable to eliminate the guerrillas,” noted a CIA assessment, which particularly highlighted the Greek military’s low morale and weak leadership.149 To be sure, progress had been made, including reorganizing the Greek military

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for internal defense, disbursing substantial American aid, making key personnel changes, seconding advisers, and establishing an increasingly active military posture now that the Home Guard was maintaining village security.150 Yet as the Greek military improved, so had the guerrillas, and they continued receiving help from Greece’s neighbors.151 Given this state of affairs, Greek leaders encouraged Marshall’s personal involvement in the American aid program. Earlier in the summer, Queen Frederika urged Marshall to visit Greece; he responded that the fall UN General Assembly meeting in Paris might be a convenient time to do so.152 At the same time, the Greek political leadership sought Marshall’s personal involvement in stemming the upcoming scheduled reduction of the Greek Army’s size and hoped he could increase American aid.153 To their delight, in mid-October, Marshall—the most senior American government official to date—arrived in Athens for a host of meetings with the Greek leadership. It was a disheartening visit. Marshall left Greece deeply concerned about the state of affairs there. “Something definite and immediate must be done to permit the improvement and refreshment of the Greek Army,” he reported to his under secretary immediately after his visit—confiding that his recommendations were not appropriate for a secretary of state to offer given their military focus—but “I am only human.” In Marshall’s assessment, the JUSMAPG staff and the Greek political and military leaders suffered from low morale after the unsuccessful summer effort to rout the guerrillas, and they were frustrated by external support to the guerrillas, although they generally agreed on the strictures of the program to strengthen Greece’s military. Van Fleet, and Ambassador Grady and the Greek political leadership, respectively, told Marshall the Greek military required additional training and the Greek Army required additional personnel. His visit to Greece coupled with their compelling arguments swayed Marshall and within a week, Secretary of Defense Forrestal similarly concurred, quickly approving a proposal to expand the Greek Army by 15,000 soldiers.154 Yet during this period, Ambassador Grady was concerned about Greek overreliance on the United States. He worried that additional American assistance and a larger Greek military “added proof to Greeks that this, in first instance, is America’s war rather than Greece’s.”155 But the depth and nature of American involvement made it rather difficult for the Greek leadership to function in any other way. For example, after the U.S. leadership agreed to a larger Greek military, the letter sent to the Greek prime minister

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stated, “My government approves . . . ,” which demonstrated how clearly this decision was in American—not Greek—hands.156 Given that the United States was deeply involved in all Greek military affairs, and considering the continued “stalemate” throughout 1948, it should not have been surprising that the Greeks were increasingly blaming “insufficient U.S. aid” for the poor state of affairs.157 New Greek Leadership Enables Military Transformation Although American military personnel repeatedly facilitated new leadership in many senior Greek military positions, to date they had refrained from urging a new commander for the Greek military in the hopes that General Yiatzis could lead it effectively. His weakness, however, was increasingly evident, and many American officials involved in the program began suggesting that the Greek military required new leadership at the very top. In particular, they believed a “competent military officer with sufficient prestige and force of personality” would minimize unhelpful Greek political meddling in military affairs.158 Queen Frederika concurred and criticized General Yiatzkis. As she starkly told Marshall, “either our army must be taken over completely by the Americans, who then would have to share freedom of command with full responsibility, or our staff is given a leader who knows how to command and carry responsibility.”159 Marshall was convinced and began urging Greek politicians to refresh the military leadership. When Coordination Minister Stefanopoulos requested additional materiel, Marshall responded that “military leadership” was much more critical, urging Stefanopoulos to “proceed with the same decisiveness to appoint suitable leadership, which then you must leave alone to direct the struggle responsibly” and subtly criticizing political interference.160 Just a few days later, he told Minister of Foreign Affairs Tsaldaris in their Paris meeting that the Greek general staff must be empowered and the army required new leadership. But Tsadaris begged off, exclaiming, “that the Chief of our Staff never did or does anything without the opinion of Van Fleet,” as he later recounted to his ministry.161 Finally, in late October, the prime minister—after securing American approval—decided to appoint General Alexander Papagos as the new commander-in-chief of Greece’s military in the hopes that his respected, apolitical background would secure victory against the guerrillas.162 Both

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Marshall and Van Fleet had previously expressed their support for Papagos as long as he had sufficient decision-making authority.163 They may have underestimated, however, that an empowered Greek military leader could make it harder for JUSMAPG to maintain its deep involvement in all Greek military affairs. Described as “Greece’s most esteemed soldier” given his World War II role as commander-in-chief of the Greek military—for which he was sent to the Dachau concentration camp—Papagos made his conditions for taking over Greece’s military clear: he would not tolerate Greek political interference and wanted assurances that his decisions would supersede JUSMAPG.164 American military personnel in Greece had obtained an unauthorized copy of the frank letter General Papagos sent Greece’s political leadership after they suggested he should be appointed commander-inchief. It demonstrates his serious concerns about being a figurehead responding to American—or Greek politicians’—orders. To ensure his predominant role should he take over the Greek military, Papagos requested a larger military force and that the Supreme Council of National Defence be disestablished; it was neutered not long after approving the following statement, also one of Papagos’s conditions: “The Allied Military Missions will not intervene in administration, organization of the army and in general in the conduct of operations. They will be competent on matters concerning training and questions related to the fulfillment of the Armed Forces requirements in supplies.”165 Papagos, the Greek political leadership, and the Americans in Greece negotiated these demands for months, and by January 1949—to Ambassador Grady’s surprise—Papagos was granted almost every single request save for a larger Greek military. Even though Ambassador Grady declared, “two of the General’s conditions, namely limiting the authority of the Allied Military Missions and increasing the Greek Army to at least 250,000 men, were not acceptable,” the prime minister appointed him anyway.166 Further, the initial rejection of Papagos’s demand to expand the Greek military was not problematic because he simply continued the quiet Greek effort that was in process since December to mobilize conscripts—without JUSMAPG’s concurrence.167 Amid these negotiations, the U.S. leadership in Washington again reaffirmed, internally and to its Greek partners, that its effort to build Greece’s military was solely focused on extending internal defense and would not include American combat troops.168

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A Difficult Period, but U.S.-Greek Relations Quickly Recover The first few weeks of Papagos’s appointment represented the most difficult period in U.S.-Greek military relations to date. Although it formally centered on that perennial issue of dispute—the size of the Greek military—it was acutely influenced by Papagos’s discomfort with deep American involvement in sensitive Greek military affairs. Since early November, the U.S. leadership in Athens had told the Greeks that the army could not increase beyond 147,000 men; soon after his appointment, however, Papagos nearly threatened to resign unless this condition was now met.169 In an awkward early February meeting, General Papagos boldly confronted the Americans. He argued that the Greek Army was too small and asserted—inaccurately—that the United States had not responded to Greek requests that it be increased. “In the vernacular, he [Papagos] was telling us off,” recounted Ambassador Grady.170 Perturbed by Papagos’s behavior, U.S. officials in Greece wanted to confront him. They advised Secretary of State Marshall: The time has come for a final show-down with the Greek government in which the issues will be so clearly stated that there can be no future misunderstanding. The Greek government and the Greek leaders must decide once and for all whether they are willing to accept U.S. assistance on the scale which it is possible for us to offer and whether they are prepared to make sincere attempts to use it effectively without any future diffusion of energy in fruitless attempts to blackmail the United States with reiterated and greatly exaggerated requests.171 Marshall agreed with their concerns. Therefore, Ambassador Grady warned the Greeks that continuing to enlarge the Greek military without American support would “violat[e]” the Greek-American aid agreement and might then require the United States to “reconsider the entire basis of military aid.”172 Marshall himself told the Greek leadership how “greatly disturbed” he was over the matter. 173 The threat had its intended effect. The Greek military stayed within its authorized limits and the topic was finally pushed to the side.174 Once this issue was sorted out, Van Fleet and Papagos worked to establish a close relationship, and his superb military leadership soon reminded

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the Americans why they had urged his appointment in the first place. Both the Greek and American archives illustrate the close partnership between Van Fleet and Papagos, and Van Fleet himself emphasized how much the two agreed, particularly about the most critical near-term issue: how to best counter the guerrillas.175 The guerrillas may have realized the criticality of this relationship. They attempted yet again to assassinate Van Fleet during this period.176 Beyond Van Fleet’s support for Papagos, Ambassador Grady also assessed that Papagos’s appointment was critical. In his memoir, Grady reflects that Papagos’s appointment was “the turning point . . . that really saved the day for Greece,” and Papagos himself also underscored the power of his position.177 Tangentially, it is worth adding that some members of the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration did, at one point during this period, try to convince King Paul to appoint Papagos as prime minister. This effort did not succeed for a host of reasons, including the dearth of support it commanded among senior American officials dealing with Greek affairs.178 An enthusiastic, inspiring, and active commander, Papagos was a tough military leader, particularly toward those personnel who maintained a static posture. Insisting he “will spare no strong measure against those who are inactive, afraid of responsibilities, against those who are fainthearted or those who do not show the faith to fight,” Papagos did not tolerate “inefficient commanders” or “officers who failed to act aggressively.”179 He even appointed an inspector general whose job was to bring reluctant or overly aggressive soldiers in line.180 And not only did Papagos agree with Van Fleet and JUSMAPG staff about the importance of capable personnel leading the Greek military, he also gave commands similar to American military advice and he “listened” to U.S. military suggestions, despite his initial discomfort with the nature of U.S. involvement in Greek military affairs.181 The official JUSMAPG history finds deep congruence between the efforts of JUSMAPG staff and Papagos. It underscores that he “accomplish[ed] . . . many of the aims which JUSMAPG had long advocated”; in the words of one JUSMAPG adviser, after Papagos was appointed, “what the U.S. advisors said was the word.”182 Early in Papagos’s tenure, Van Fleet complimented his efforts. Van Fleet assessed that he utilized Greek military resources well and was taking “far-reaching and drastic steps” that benefited the military.183 His strong support for U.S. training especially encouraged JUSMAPG staff. During this period, JUSMAPG managed to train 45,000 soldiers while also

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providing a host of equipment to the Greek military, including vehicles, artillery, and communications devices.184 It was soon clear that Papagos’s tour as commander-in-chief would deeply benefit the Greek military effort against the guerrillas.

The Guerrillas Also Change, but Continued External Support Precludes Defeat The Greek military was now finally in the throes of transformation, given the deep American involvement in its affairs—including its structure and personnel—which enabled it to take advantage of mistakes made by the guerrillas, who were beginning to lose control of their organization. Although the guerrillas still received substantial support from external actors, the guerrillas’ unity fractured amid leadership infighting and their operational focus on conventional tactics, which were less effective given both the force’s size and the mountainous terrain it encountered in Greece, thereby easing the Greek military’s efforts to secure its territory.185 Taken together, the increasingly capable Greek military was now able to more actively assert itself over its opponent.

Time for Defeat: Spring–Summer 1949 The Greek military was gradually establishing a more enforced and sustainable monopoly on violence. Deep American involvement in Greek military affairs had enabled a better led, trained, equipped, and overall more capable Greek military to progressively counter the guerrillas—who faced their own difficulties—and to increase governmental control of Greek territory. Van Fleet and JUSMAPG personnel continued transforming the Greek military while the U.S. political leadership reaffirmed that the United States would not become Greece’s co-combatant. Antagonistic external actors—namely, Albania and Bulgaria—maintained their assistance to the guerrillas. However, Yugoslavia’s leadership began to seriously curb their country’s support, representing a meaningful downward shift in the guerrillas’ materiel stocks and sanctuary. Taken together, these factors enabled the Greek military to finally rout the communist guerrillas in 1949.

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Positive U.S. Progress Assessments as Washington Revalidates Its Strategy American personnel in and outside of Greece recognized the progress being made in Greece. “We are now getting good returns for money invested,” assessed Ambassador Grady, and “we have solid basis. . . . the guerrilla warfare can be reduced to police proportions within the foreseeable future.”186 This judgment was based on the military’s increasingly active and aggressive posture, as evidenced by its focus on and subsequent success in the Peloponnesus, and on the guerrillas’ highest casualty rates to date: 4,700 in March 1949 alone.187 Concurring, the CIA praised Papagos’s leadership of the Greek military. They found that its “gloomy estimates of the past few months may need tentative revision,” and JUSMAPG staff even began assessing what kind of military aid the Greek military would require once the conflict ended.188 Van Fleet suggested that the Greek military had made progress in its “leadership, training, and offensive spirit” and could be substantially reduced in size, but the U.S. needed to maintain its current aid levels to ensure success, which Grady found convincing.189 Given this progress, the U.S. national security leadership in Washington reassessed the nature of American involvement in Greece, which had not been done since the end of 1948. Again, they maintained the singular focus on the U.S. mission in Greece—to develop a military focused on internal defense—and reaffirmed that American combat involvement was not necessary. Further, the deep American involvement in Greek military affairs— facilitated by having more than 400 American military personnel based in Greece to advise, train, and equip the Greek military—was transforming the increasingly effective force. But in this assessment, the national security leadership found that U.S. aid “has prevented communist domination and control of Greece . . . on the other hand, the Greek forces have been unable to establish a satisfactory security situation in the Greek interior.”190 The real test was imminent: a massive assault against the guerrillas.

Confronting the Guerrillas Throughout spring, JUSMAPG was intensely involved in creating an operations plan for the Greek military to finally rout the guerrillas. In preparing the plan, which involved offensively attacking the guerillas from numerous vantage points, they were likely influenced by a British military

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assessment analyzing why the 1948 summer campaign failed, which focused on a lack of leadership and morale and insufficient training; deep American involvement had dramatically improved all of these deficiencies over the last year.191 JUSMAPG’s training program, which took approximately four to five months, was finally coming together because almost the entire Greek military would be retrained and strengthened by early summer 1949.192 And American efforts over the last year to facilitate personnel changes throughout the Greek military—particularly at the senior leadership levels—had almost fully remedied other flaws. Yet even in spring 1949, some Greek field commanders hesitated to operate as aggressively as Van Fleet urged while they fought in battles throughout central Greece. As he had done in the past, Van Fleet expressed his frustration to Papagos—specifically blaming “command failure”—and urged further personnel changes among the field commanders.193 Throughout late spring and summer, the Greek military implemented the JUSMAPG operations plan, moving through central and northern Greece to attack the guerrillas and take territorial control from them. After countering the guerrillas in the Peloponnesus-based Operation PIGEON— which was particularly successfully because Greek military intelligence detained thousands of suspected collaborators before commencing the operation—the Greek military pivoted toward the northern mountains again.194 As the Grammos and Vitsi mountains were the guerrillas’ stronghold and the link to their external supporters, cutting off their ability to function in the mountains was critical. Operations ROCKET and TORCH commenced in May and August, respectively. Van Fleet was delighted by this progress. “I feel victory is on the way,” he declared, noting that he expected most of Greece to be peaceful by the end of the year. 195 This time, his prediction would prove correct. Some External Support Diminishes as Yugoslavia Seals Its Border External support to the guerrillas also shifted during this period. The specter of Soviet involvement had initially encouraged American involvement in Greece; although the Soviet Union did not directly aid the guerrillas with materiel or sanctuary, its allies did. Moscow did not pressure Albania or Bulgaria to halt their support, and both countries maintained their aid to the guerrillas, although at times they sought to conceal their

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assistance. For example, “serial numbers on small arms and artillery markings on shells have been removed in many instances,” according to American investigations of captured guerrilla weapons.196 The Soviet Union’s deteriorating relationship with Yugoslavia ultimately influenced Belgrade’s support to the guerrillas. Yugoslavia’s aid— which slightly subsided during the COMINFORM incident the previous summer—had rebounded over the spring, although it was “probably more closely supervised,” according to the CIA.197 But its tense relationship with the Soviet Union continued, and the impact of Moscow halting economic aid forced Yugoslav President Tito to reconsider his patron’s utility. Given this dynamic, and in an effort to improve its relationship with the United States, Yugoslavia finally sealed the border with Greece in July 1949, as the United Nations Special Commission validated.198 Although Albania and Bulgaria did not halt their support to the guerrillas—to be sure, any guerrillas that survived the fighting fled to these two countries—Yugoslavia’s diminished role naturally helped the Greek military extend its government’s sovereignty because guerrillas no longer received sanctuary there. The Guerrillas’ Final Defeat Yet the downward shift in external support was insufficient for the Greek military to extend internal defense. To do so also required a capable and aggressive Greek military that could ultimately defeat the insurgency it faced. The guerrilla leadership itself was concerned about the Greek military’s advancement, particularly as it coincided with diminishing external support.199 Sustained and deep American involvement in Greek military affairs enabled the Greek military to finally trounce the communist guerrillas in 1949. With Van Fleet’s diligence, the United States committed extra resources to Greece’s military during this final phase of fighting. In early summer, he visited Washington to expedite the delivery of certain materiel that he and the Greek military deemed necessary, including forty SB2C dive-bomber aircraft. He begged the military leadership in Washington, pleading “we want them now.”200 Although the aircraft took a few weeks longer to arrive than Van Fleet had hoped, fifty-one of these “Hell Divers” were delivered to Greece for the final phase of the summer campaigns, as was much of the ammunition and weapons he had requested.201 The senior leadership in Washington was particularly interested in Van Fleet’s efforts; even President

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Truman had hoped to meet with Van Fleet during his visit to Washington, but his staff had not realized his interest in doing so and failed to arrange it.202 To further support the Greek military at this critical juncture, General Papagos and Van Fleet—who had recently been featured in Time magazine as “Man of the Week”—made a concerted effort to visit the troops and ensure they were receiving adequate support.203 The U.S. role remained substantial during the final—and most critical—phase of fighting in Operation TORCH in August 1949. During much of the operation, which had been planned jointly by the Greek military and JUSMAPG staff, Van Fleet remained on the front lines.204 As the Greek military effectively used its firepower and maneuvers to counter the guerrillas and seize massive weapons caches, Van Fleet’s involvement grew even deeper. At some points in the fighting, his biographer alleges, Van Fleet gave orders to Greek military troops, effectively running the war.205 Yet Van Fleet’s efforts were in line with U.S. involvement in assisting the Greek military, which had been deep since JUSMAPG’s creation in late 1948. As one journalist so bluntly described it, “it is the Americans who make it possible to fight . . . neither the Greek army nor government could survive without aid—concrete military aid—from the United States.”206 The American investment, however, consisted almost entirely of treasure, not blood. U.S. military personnel in Greece suffered a total of only four casualties during the effort to build the Greek military, which ultimately cost 353.6 million dollars.207 Table 3 illustrates many of the items that this assistance purchased. With this support, the Greek military commanded increasingly large swaths of territory and the guerrillas suffered substantial casualties throughout the summer. By the end of August, the guerrillas had been nearly destroyed. Fewer than 4,000 remained in Greece; the rest had been killed or had fled to Albania, which had continued supporting them (bodies of Albanian soldiers were found among deceased guerrillas during the summer 1949 battles).208 To sustain these gains, the Greek military then shifted its focus as the conflict wrapped up. It conducted operations to prevent infiltration or the reestablishment of guerrilla areas; although some sporadic activity would inevitably continue, the insurgency that had ravaged Greece for years “virtually ended in August 1949.”209 In mid-September, the United Nations assessed that Greece’s military now controlled the country’s northern borders; in mid-October, Secretary of State Acheson announced that the war

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Table 3. Aid Delivered to Greece by USAGG (as of December 1949) Item Vehicles Mules Small arms weapons Small arms ammo Mortar & artillery weapons Mortar & artillery ammo Bombs & rockets Uniforms (incl. components) Hospitals: Personnel Hospitals: Animals

Approximate Quantity 20,000 23,400 309,000 881,921,400 8,000 14,146,900 131,700 55,799,200 12 10

Sources: Amen, American Foreign Policy in Greece, 171; Manolas, American Arms, Greek Blood, 368.

in Greece was “substantially over,” and weeks later, the guerrillas made a public announcement effectively concurring with him.210

The Program Concludes . . . and a New One Is Born? End of 1949–1950 In slightly less than three years, the Greek military—with substantial American assistance—prevailed over the communist guerrillas that had taken advantage of the fledgling Greek state with the support of external actors. By September 1949, the United States had trained nearly the entire Greek military and given Greece approximately 50 aircraft, almost 11,000 vehicles, hundreds of thousands of small arms and rifle ammunition, thousands of artillery pieces and mortars, and more than 150,000 small arms, in addition to substantial aid for the individual Greek soldiers, including clothing and food.211 It had been deeply involved in every single aspect of Greek military affairs, including promotions, retirements, operations, plans, strategy, and tactics. Limiting American Involvement Now, the U.S. government began debating how to limit its assistance to Greece’s military, which no longer needed vast resources or extensive American involvement to establish internal defense. Ambassador Grady

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emphasized that these decisions were in line with American thinking from the start of the effort to build Greece’s military. Van Fleet, however, began to envision a different role for Greece’s military. He urged U.S. assistance to shift its focus to prepare Greece against external threats, and he also began suggesting that Greek military personnel might be helpful to American military efforts elsewhere. But, as the U.S. government explored the contours of a more limited role in Greece, Van Fleet’s vision attracted no enthusiasm from the State Department and was initially ignored.212 The following months were, therefore, spent reducing both JUSMAPG and the Greek military. JUSMAPG, the formal institution established in 1947 to help build Greece’s military, was deactivated and replaced with a lower-profile and more modest entity.213 The Greek government reacted to the changed threat environment by enacting major reforms, downsizing its security apparatus, and instituting a fresh training program to help prepare the military for its new responsibilities.214 Greece needed a military it could afford to sustain, as its military leadership understood; moreover, a smaller, more agile military was more effective for securing the state, emphasized Ambassador Grady.215 The number of guerillas inside Greece dwindled to fewer than 1,000 and the country was slowly returning to normalcy.216 Global Changes Alter American Efforts in Greece Yet by the next year, the global situation began shifting, which invariably influenced American involvement in Greece. The United States pivoted its focus toward external security. In particular, it began considering how the Greek military might be helpful in a broader sense in the Cold War, given increasing tensions in Korea. This marked change involved supporting a larger Greek military and additional funding. By early summer 1950, the internal U.S. government discussion on shifting its stance in Greece became policy “as a result of the Korean aggression and consequent Balkan uncertainties.”217 Before departing Athens to command the Second United States Army, Van Fleet offered suggestions to the U.S. Army leadership and to his successor about how the Greek military might assist in Korea. He suggested the Greeks could contribute “transport aircraft or . . . ground forces.”218 But Van Fleet wasn’t just advising the United States. He also sent a personal letter to a Greek colonel—requesting that his son discreetly deliver it by hand—outlining the exact military assistance that Greece should offer for

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the Korea effort and urging the Greek colonel to deliver this information to the King, Queen, and General Papagos.219 His ideas bore fruit. Greece did join the Korea coalition, providing one infantry and one air force battalion, and it suffered nearly 1,000 casualties in the conflict.220 Van Fleet also began advocating for General Papagos to serve as prime minister; his hopes were realized after Papagos resigned from the military and entered politics—but not before halting proponents of a military coup.221 Throughout the coming years, U.S. military assistance to Greece was markedly different from the previous program. Instead of focusing on internal defense, its purpose was to support a Greek military “capable of causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite forces,” as one U.S. national security document illustrates.222 Greece’s membership into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) further symbolized this shift.

Conclusion The U.S. program to strengthen the Greek military succeeded as Greece established a more enforced and sustainable monopoly on violence. The program was marked by deep U.S. involvement in sensitive Greek military affairs, including the military’s structure and its personnel, while limiting the U.S. military from becoming a co-combatant. Its coupling with the decrease in external support to the guerrillas, including equipment and sanctuary, enabled the Greek state to effectively confront the guerillas and increasingly control its territory. The nature of U.S. involvement in sensitive Greek military affairs was deep and subsequently transformational. It structured the program around establishing a capable military organized and focused on an internal threat. Relatively early on, its leadership sought to influence key military personnel appointments and effectively did so. Under the powerful guidance of Van Fleet, the United States facilitated new, capable Greek leadership at multiple levels. And the United States limited its role in Greece; it trained, equipped, and advised the Greek military but refrained from becoming a cocombatant. It did not seek to extend the monopoly on violence on behalf of the Greek state. Antagonistic external actors limited their support to the Greek guerrillas, a meaningful shift that allowed the newly strengthened Greek military to succeed. Yugoslavia, in particular, repositioned itself globally. It therefore

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diminished its materiel assistance and sanctuary to the guerrillas. Albania and Bulgaria continued providing sanctuary, but they were less effective given the substantial loss of Yugoslav support and the Greek military’s increasingly aggressive response. As the Greek military effectively confronted its opponents and increased the state’s territorial control, the monopoly on violence grew more enforced and more sustainable. Under Papagos’s leadership, the Greek military achieved its final, critical gains against the guerrillas. The guerillas grew weaker, particularly without Yugoslavia’s support, and violence eventually subsided. Greece’s military had prevailed over the communist guerrillas seeking to upend the state. With deep U.S. involvement in delicate Greek military affairs, it was able to take advantage of the diminished support that the guerrillas received from antagonistic external actors, resulting in a capable security sector. And the first postwar example of the United States building a partner military for internal defense purposes was a triumph.

Chapter 3

South Vietnam: Building a Military “American Style”

In 1955, the United States took responsibility from France for building the newly created South Vietnamese military.1 Its strategy in South Vietnam was to strengthen the South Vietnamese state as a bulwark against communism in Asia. The military assistance program—inaugurated to help the nascent South Vietnamese government exert its sovereignty throughout its territory—was a spectacular failure because the United States played a limited role in South Vietnamese military affairs and overreacted to the threat posed by external actors. Instead of its intended focus on building a South Vietnamese military capable of maintaining internal defense, the U.S. program was structured over the next five years around a conventionally oriented military. U.S. personnel in South Vietnam did not get involved in sensitive South Vietnamese military affairs, such as influencing appointments; their vision was disjointed; and overall, they hesitated to transform the partner military. Further, the insurgency benefited from substantial and increasing external assistance, which arrived directly from North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, and indirectly from Cambodia and Laos. By 1960, it was clear that South Vietnam’s military was incapable of countering the insurgency.

South Vietnam’s Initial Capacity: Feeble and Fragile South Vietnam was a fragile, weak state in 1954 when the United States decided to begin directly building its military. It had just split from North

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Vietnam along the 17th parallel, as decreed by the Geneva Accords, although the demarcation simply formalized a history of division. The two countries were profoundly different. “In the 500 years before . . . there had only been about three decades during which a single government controlled the whole of present-day Vietnamese territory, and only 100 years of unity out of the past 4,000,” as one scholar starkly outlined.2 Further undermining it—and facilitating the existence of and support for armed non-state actors—this territory was ravaged by years of French and Japanese occupations. The new government, led by Ngo Dinh Diem (initially under the emperor Bao Dai), faced the intimidating prospect of bringing together a populace battered by occupation, war, and division—a challenge only exacerbated by the young state’s disjointed geography. South Vietnam’s military, like the state, was similarly feeble. It had just been established, including the Ministry of Defense and Army in 1949, and the Joint General Staff, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were set up over the next five years. The military force itself was pieced together from disparate Vietnamese elements of the various French colonial forces. And it was “still organized into small units,” although it did benefit from a substantial trove of French equipment, which had been purchased with U.S. funding.3 The South Vietnamese military also suffered from a lack of capable leadership. Although the French had made some changes in the early 1950s that—on paper—empowered the South Vietnamese, the reality was that the military remained under French control. In 1953, it had “2,600 native officers, of whom only a handful held rank above major compared to 7,000 French officers in a force of 150,000 Vietnamese troops.”4 Further, one American official in Saigon explained that the South Vietnamese officers had limited command experience. The French did not even “allow . . . the Vietnamese to direct technical or staff services,” as he described it.5 With poor leadership and inadequate French training, the South Vietnamese military was suffering from low morale as it worked to coalesce and strengthen the young South Vietnamese state.6 Facing an Insurgency The weak South Vietnamese state faced a host of opposition forces, including the Viet Minh—which was bolstered by external support—and various militias. By 1950, the Viet Minh was a coherently organized entity commanding conventional and irregular capabilities led by General Vo

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Nguyen Giap.7 Once the Geneva Accords were signed, nearly one million refugees fled North Vietnam and had to be settled in the south. Estimates are that 10,000 or so of these new citizens and native South Vietnamese formed another element of the Viet Minh, the so-called stay-behinds who would later work to undermine the South Vietnamese state, capitalizing on Saigon’s repressive policies.8 The Viet Minh heavily benefited from external support. Over the years, it received substantial materiel from a wide range of sources, including China, Japan, and the Soviet Union—and some aid inadvertently diverted from French forces and quietly delivered by the U.S. intelligence community at the end of World War II.9 Chinese assistance was a particular area of focus for the Viet Minh leadership. Since the 1949 Chinese revolution, China’s leadership overtly and overwhelmingly provided “sanctuary, improved training, and most of all military supplies,” all of which the Viet Minh found to be helpful.10 One spectacular example of this assistance is highlighted by the tranche China sent the Viet Minh just after the Geneva Accords were signed: “150 artillery pieces, over 500 mortars, 9,000 automatic weapons, 500 recoilless rifles, 400 military vehicles, and large quantities of ammunition,” which worried the United States immensely.11 Although the South Vietnamese military and the Viet Minh were similar in size by 1954, glaring differences existed between the two forces, particularly around leadership and organizational structure.12 The Viet Minh was more organized and benefited from experienced internal leadership; conversely, the South Vietnamese military had been effectively under French tutelage, which inhibited promoting and developing Vietnamese leadership. The Viet Minh was structured around a combination of regular and irregular units, whereas the South Vietnamese military was primarily conventionally focused and coping with the disarray caused by its new organization into 125 battalions. And once the Geneva Accords were signed, the South Vietnamese military began to suffer from a high desertion rate, further exacerbating the young military’s challenges.13 South Vietnam faced another threat besides the Viet Minh: purely domestic militias, notably the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao—which were politicalreligious groups—and Binh Xuyen, a criminal force. They varied substantially in size and capability but managed to control some areas— particularly benefiting from French assistance—and only worsening the official relationship between the South Vietnamese government and France.14 These forces illustrate the complexity of challenges that the new

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South Vietnamese state faced as it worked to consolidate its control over a disjointed territory brewing with discontent.

The American Effort Begins . . . and Broadens as France Wobbles (1950–early 1954) U.S. involvement in building South Vietnam’s military first began in early 1950, when France warned that without American assistance, it would be forced to abandon Indochina. Such threats continued for the next four years as the French led, organized, trained, and equipped the South Vietnamese military—with U.S. funding and U.S. materiel—but not U.S. input. Given American concerns about France’s ability to uphold its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–related commitments, the United States was satisfied helping its ally through limited involvement in Southeast Asia.15 Establishing MAAG with Very Limited Parameters President Truman responded positively to the initial French request for support, particularly given the upheaval in Korea, but the U.S. commitment was solely financial; it did not become deeply involved in South Vietnamese military affairs. The United States quickly disbursed ten million dollars for the French military effort and, soon after, established Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)–Indochina.16 This new entity—initially led by Brigadier General Francis G. Brink—was directed to coordinate U.S. military assistance to the Associated States (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam). U.S. military assistance skyrocketed throughout the early 1950s. By 1954, the United States was paying for nearly 80 percent of the French military effort, including aid to the South Vietnamese military.17 The scale of American aid was so extensive that one U.S. Defense Department official exclaimed after his 1954 visit to Saigon, “It seemed to me that every last French officer and enlisted man was driving around town in his own American jeep.”18 Table 4 provides further details of this support. And yet, MAAG’s role was extremely limited. The French did not permit MAAG staff to do anything but facilitate materiel deliveries. The French commander in South Vietnam “viewed any function . . . beyond bookkeeping to be an intrusion upon internal French affairs.”19 Given these

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Table 4. Examples of U.S. Assistance to the French in Vietnam, 1950–53 Equipment

Number

Vehicles Pieces of artillery Automatic weapons Small arms Radios Airplanes

16,000 2,500 24,000 75,000 9,000 200

Source: Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 167–68.

limitations—which the United States did not seek to challenge, particularly considering its other regional commitments—MAAG operated under the radar. “Most Vietnamese tactical commanders in the field were even unaware of its [MAAG’s] existence until 1953 when they received the first visits by MAAG officers,” according to former senior South Vietnamese military officials.20 But such limited American involvement was hardly sustainable as France’s commitment to Indochina grew dire. The battle of Dien Bien Phu in early 1954 marked a critical turning point for France. The Viet Minh was a more formidable opponent than the French expected—in part due to Chinese aid—and the United States was unwilling to accede to French requests for air support; with rapidly diminishing domestic support in France, the French leadership began plotting its path out of Vietnam.21

Codifying a Deeper U.S. Role Despite a Disjointed Vision of the South Vietnamese Military’s Mission: 1954 Given evolving regional circumstances, particularly in light of the Geneva Accords and the expected French redeployment, senior U.S. officials spent much of 1954 debating the appropriate U.S. role in South Vietnam. Out of these discussions, a critical flaw of the program to build South Vietnam’s military emerged: the emphasis on external—rather than internal—defense. The South Vietnamese leadership had begun urging greater American involvement in strengthening its military, particularly in terms of training, and President Eisenhower also supported commencing such a program; however, doing so would require defining its parameters.22

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New MAAG Leadership In April 1954, Lieutenant General John Wilson “Iron Mike” O’Daniel was designated the new chief of MAAG-Indochina. Described by one colleague as “a soldier’s soldier, combat wise, [with] a bulldog look to him,” O’Daniel had visited South Vietnam the year before to assess the situation; his intrigue was so deep that he requested a demotion to serve as the MAAG chief.23 During one such trip, O’Daniel despaired of French negativity and the feelings were mutual. “I think the word difficult was used 50 or 100 times in their [French] initial briefings,” he lamented; unsurprisingly, the French military mission did not support O’Daniel’s relocation to Saigon and would not accede until his rank was reduced and he had concurred with their vision of a limited MAAG role.24 This relationship remained uneasy throughout 1954. O’Daniel was particularly frustrated by how the French organized the Vietnamese military and their unwillingness to empower MAAG; he even sought—unsuccessfully—to withhold American materiel until they changed their position.25 O’Daniel was an imaginative leader who took initiative in defining the program to build South Vietnam’s military. As he began urging senior U.S. officials to directly assist the military, he realized the ramifications of broader issues such as MAAG’s size and the depth of American involvement.26 For example, the impending Geneva Accords would minimize MAAG’s size because neither North nor South Vietnam could have any additional foreign military personnel after the Accords’ implementation that summer.27 O’Daniel highlighted this problem to senior American military officials, and even outlined “a comprehensive plan for advisory assistance at all levels of the military establishment,” but they failed to respond in time.28 Therefore, he “took advantage of the passage through Saigon of one hundred Air Force mechanics en route to Manila to expand his roster of authorized personnel.”29 MAAG’s size would serve as a perennial challenge for the American effort to build the South Vietnamese military; O’Daniel was among the few who managed to influence it for most of the decade.

Rifts About the Nature of American Involvement Have Lasting Impact Given the dynamic regional situation and the arrival of a new, visionary leader for MAAG, U.S. officials began reconsidering the nature of American

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involvement in South Vietnam; their disjointed vision would enable a critical flaw to exist in the effort, given disagreements about the fundamental reason for building the South Vietnamese military. O’Daniel took the initiative to formulate a study on how MAAG could assist the South Vietnamese military by becoming deeply involved in all military affairs. Doing so would include providing training, facilitating a thorough reorganization, developing budgeting and logistics capabilities, and establishing intense American involvement in sensitive military decisions, including personnel policies.30 Although U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Donald Heath and O’Daniel did not agree on much—their relationship was uncomfortable because Heath disagreed with O’Daniel’s relocation to Saigon and operating style, out of concern that he would be upstaged—both did advocate for a program to strengthen South Vietnam’s military.31 Separately, the United States would direct aid to the weak South Vietnamese paramilitary and police forces through a program organized by Michigan State University during this period; this was generally a limited effort in the 1950s.32 O’Daniel’s proposal—coupled with the South Vietnamese government’s request for increased assistance—spurred serious debate in Washington, yet for President Eisenhower, there was little question of the appropriate American role. As he suggested, “What we want is a Vietnamese force which will support Diem . . . the obvious thing to do is simply to authorize O’Daniel to use up to X millions of dollars to produce the maximum number of Vietnamese units which . . . Diem can depend on to sustain himself in power.”33 This comment demonstrates that Eisenhower supported a program to strengthen South Vietnam’s military that was strictly focused on an internal defense mission, enabling the South Vietnamese government to exert its sovereignty. South Vietnam was a country replete with weak institutions. Nevertheless, the South Vietnamese military “despite its failing, is the only organized, cohesive indigenous force in [the] country,” as one former senior American official explained.34 But the State Department leadership and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were more hesitant, and the latter’s lack of enthusiasm had serious ramifications. Senior State Department officials—particularly Secretary of State Dulles— were concerned about the weakness of South Vietnam’s government. However, Dulles viewed this dynamic as a “hen-and-egg” problem, as he described it, and nevertheless suggested that the United States should robustly build the South Vietnamese military for an internal defense mission.35

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More worryingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a skewed vision of the South Vietnamese military’s mission. Concerned about political instability, the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially outlined nearly impossible “preconditions” before establishing a program to strengthen South Vietnam’s military. Had these “preconditions” existed—such as a “reasonably strong, stable civil government”—they would have no doubt largely precluded the need for strengthening South Vietnam’s military in the first place. The Joint Chiefs of Staff propagated a broader vision of the military’s mission, which included internal defense and “deter[ring] Viet Minh aggression by a limited defense of the Geneva Armistice demarcation line.” In this vein, they suggested organizing an outlandishly large force for internal defense: 234,000 army personnel alone. This recommendation was offered despite the National Security Council’s request for a military appropriately sized to “accomplish the military objective merely of the maintenance of internal security.” Although border security was a real challenge, these impractical “preconditions” marginalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff.36 Eisenhower made his decision. In mid-October, he directed his staff “to undertake an urgent program to improve the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces” and sent a letter to Diem pledging American assistance to help build “a strong, viable state.”37 To implement the new policy, the State and Defense Departments jointly asked Ambassador Heath and MAAG Chief O’Daniel to “collaborate in setting in motion a crash program” for strengthening the Vietnamese military.38 The initial cable outlining this program specifically stated—based on the National Security Council’s decisions encapsulated in NSC 5429/2, which emphasized U.S. support for internal security missions—that the South Vietnamese military’s mission was “internal security . . . [to] establish and maintain control by that Government throughout the territory of Free Vietnam; and effectively . . . counteract Viet Minh infiltration and paramilitary activities south of the 17th Parallel.” Moreover, the cable highlighted the need to reorganize and train the South Vietnamese military.39 The Joint Chiefs of Staff reluctantly acquiesced to the program. This was in line with their pledge to do so “if political considerations are overriding,” and cognizant of the Joint Chiefs’ reluctance, the secretaries of state and defense reiterated that this program to build South Vietnam’s military was to fulfill an “internal security” mission.40 But the broader mission still resonated among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and became reflective of how MAAG built South Vietnam’s military.

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Initial Program Illustrates Diem’s Hesitancy About Deep American Involvement President Eisenhower dispatched Brigadier General James Lawton Collins to South Vietnam with a broad mandate: to lead negotiations with the South Vietnamese and the French on inaugurating a program to build South Vietnam’s military for internal defense.41 Described as a “soldierstatesman” who commanded presidential-level support, Collins focused on garnering concurrence from both parties on the military’s “size, composition, and mission” based on extending internal security throughout South Vietnam. His vision included a heavily reduced South Vietnamese Army, which he hoped to narrow from 170,000 personnel to 77,000 personnel within six months, even though the North Vietnamese Army was rapidly expanding to more than 300,000 personnel. In particular, Collins hoped to empower the South Vietnamese leadership; he wanted it solely under Vietnamese command and control by that time. Organizationally, Collins planned for a six-division army—including three divisions to serve as “field elements” capable of waging irregular warfare, given North Vietnam’s capabilities—and a “small” navy and air force, all of which would cost approximately 200 million dollars.42 By December, the American and South Vietnamese military leaderships in Saigon had generally agreed on the broad parameters of the U.S. program to train and equip South Vietnam’s military.43 Although South Vietnam’s minister of defense supported Collins’s proposal to develop a “relatively small and well-trained” military, his concerns about the immediate economic and social effects of decreasing the military’s size resonated, given that it lacked a pension or retirement system. Therefore, the parties agreed that the military should be sized to 100,000 personnel.44 Beyond numbers, the South Vietnamese military leadership was enthusiastic about a substantial American advisory role. They requested American advisers for various parts of the military, which MAAG supported, and by the end of the year, these advisers were placed in the Ministry of Defense and at various regional headquarters.45 However, the South Vietnamese political leadership—namely, President Diem—was less enthusiastic about Collins’s desire for deep American involvement in sensitive military affairs. Diem’s palpable concerns about loyalty made him fearful of empowering the military. For example, when Collins suggested a candidate for consideration as the minister of defense,

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Diem immediately rejected that individual out of fear that his considerable nationalist credentials would pose a challenge to Diem. Further, Diem appointed a new army chief of staff and inspector general without consulting with the United States, precluding U.S. influence over two key personnel appointments. “I protested [the] fact we were not consulted on these moves which we feel sure Diem knew would be contrary to [the] recommendations of O’Daniel,” Collins complained to State Department staff. With these examples, among others, Diem managed to “fairly effectively seize control of [the] army” reported one U.S. official in Saigon.46 To be sure, Diem’s worries were somewhat justified. For example, during late summer and early fall, one senior Vietnamese military official broached the idea of a coup with Americans in Saigon. And yet, Diem effectively ignored American suggestions that he work with specific Vietnamese military leaders to explain what had transpired in order to dissuade them from siding with the coup-planners. The coup plotter was temporarily stalled when Ambassador Heath and General O’Daniel threatened to cease the burgeoning American program to build the Vietnamese military if the army were to become involved in politics, a short-term success.47 Nevertheless, Diem’s heavy involvement remained problematic—within a few weeks of arriving in Saigon, Collins articulated his frustration with Diem’s “meddling hand” in the nascent program.48 Amid internal American confusion and disagreements with its new ally, U.S. involvement in South Vietnam was moving to a new level.

The Effort Takes Shape, but Structured Around External Defense Despite Presidential Direction: 1955 With the start of 1955, the United States formally inaugurated its program to directly assist South Vietnam’s military. During this decisive year, South Vietnam’s leadership worked to consolidate power and counter opposition while American involvement deepened and French efforts diminished. By the end of 1955, American efforts to strengthen South Vietnam’s military were in full swing. However, American military personnel in Saigon were building the military there as they wished—in a conventional manner to counter antagonistic external actors—and not organizing it for internal defense as they had been directed.

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250

Number of People

200 150 French Americans

100 50 0 Mar-55

Jul-55

Jan-56

Mar-56

Figure 2. Overview of Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM). Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 239–40, 252, 290–91.

A New Training Entity Extends External Defense Mission In early 1955, the French political leadership finally agreed to “grant full autonomy” to South Vietnam’s military by summer, enabling the United States to begin its training program.49 To facilitate this effort, the Americans and French in Saigon jointly established a new entity—the Training Relations and Instructions Mission (TRIM)—based on a compromise arrangement designed to make France more comfortable with deep American involvement in South Vietnam, even though their role was narrowing, as Figure 2 illustrates. The chief of France’s military mission technically oversaw TRIM, but in practice, it was under O’Daniel’s leadership, which senior South Vietnamese military leaders also realized. TRIM was “essentially an American concept but for the purpose of political convenience, its staff also included French officers who performed mostly in a consultant’s role,” they explained.50 On a technical basis, TRIM made little progress, given that the military was still composed of disparate entities spread throughout South Vietnamese territory; however, it was useful in “beginning training programs and identifying problem areas,” as one former senior American military official

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acknowledged.51 TRIM staff tried to train the South Vietnamese army as quickly as possible, given the impending French redeployment from South Vietnam. Focusing on training, planning, and logistics, TRIM advisers were stationed at various levels of the South Vietnamese military, including the Ministry of Defense, the Joint General Staff, and various training institutions.52 More strategically, however, TRIM staff strengthened South Vietnam’s military based on two missions: establishing internal security and countering external opponents. This effort was demonstrably broader than the original mandate approved by President Eisenhower and his senior national security advisers. Even though O’Daniel asserted that the South Vietnamese army “will be above all . . . a police force capable of spotting communist guerrillas and communist efforts at infiltration,” TRIM’s mission had already expanded.53

South Vietnamese Hesitancy About the Role of American Advisers Although the South Vietnamese military leadership welcomed U.S. military assistance and advisers, it was hesitant about the depth of their involvement. Perhaps out of discomfort with the previous French role, the South Vietnamese military quickly limited U.S. efforts. Soon after MAAG took over and TRIM was established, the chief of the Joint General Staff sent a memo to all of its personnel that clearly outlined how these entities should operate. They “have no command or supervisory authority over the Vietnamese Armed Forces organizations or activities,” the memo highlighted, in an effort to constrain U.S. involvement.54 Although the South Vietnamese military leadership was largely unsupportive of deep American involvement in South Vietnamese military affairs, they welcomed tactical and operational advice. The chief of the Joint General Staff’s memo underscored that U.S. military personnel would “assist and advise, on strictly technical aspects, the Vietnamese military authorities to whom they are assigned, to rapidly and effectively rebuild the Vietnamese Armed Forces on a new basis.” And, he urged South Vietnamese officers to work with TRIM, “particularly in the areas of new and misunderstood techniques, instruction, training, logistics and organization,” and emphasized they should take U.S. suggestions under consideration.55 For its part,

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MAAG would facilitate this dynamic by generally maintaining a weak posture and largely refraining from involvement in sensitive South Vietnamese military affairs.

Facing the Militias: A First Step for Internal Defense As the American program to strengthen South Vietnam’s military took hold throughout 1955, President Diem struggled to consolidate the new state. He wrestled with various members of the three major militias: the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. The South Vietnamese government lured some militia members with money while the South Vietnamese military alternatively countered these forces in violent engagements and worked to integrate them into the state’s force. Although the active fighting against the militias inhibited much of the planned American efforts to train South Vietnam’s army, it was an essential step for establishing internal defense and the United States supported Diem’s efforts to diminish this threat.56 In particular, U.S. personnel in Saigon facilitated the South Vietnamese military’s program to integrate the militias. O’Daniel even briefed some of the sect militia leaders about American plans to strengthen South Vietnam’s military. He emphasized that the United States was working to build an army of 100,000 personnel that is “compact, hard hitting, well-trained, well-equipped.”57 Similarly, Secretary of State Dulles met with Diem while visiting the region and “assured [him] of logistic support from US . . . and of equipment,” according to the meeting report.58 Further, President Eisenhower viewed these engagements as a worthwhile test. “It would be too bad [if it wasn’t successful] but it would be better to find out now rather than later whether the National Army on which we were spending so much money was loyal,” he underscored.59 And at this time, as South Vietnam’s military worked to counter armed nonstate actors to strengthen the government’s sovereignty, it appeared to be a worthy investment. Divisions over the militias issue sprung forth, however. This success had solidified U.S. support in the near term; the U.S. intelligence community positively assessed the South Vietnamese military’s efforts so far and in late spring, the National Security Council agreed to “continue its support of South Vietnam.” But, illustrative of heated debates among the American leadership, it also “recogniz[ed] that the composition of the government

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might have to be changed,” alluding to U.S. worries about Diem’s leadership.60 This decision coincided with the end of Collins’s brief tour in South Vietnam. Collins left in May 1955 after months of arguing—unsuccessfully —that Diem was not a worthwhile ally.61 Military Organization Inhibited Progress These engagements illustrated some of the South Vietnamese military’s continued weaknesses which, given its newness and history of French tutelage, were unsurprising. South Vietnam’s military needed to be restructured and resized for internal defense, but that was not occurring. Its “loyalties and capabilities” remained uncertain, warned the U.S. intelligence community, morale was low, and the South Vietnamese leadership virtually ignored O’Daniel’s pleas to redeploy troops for periodic training.62 Perhaps most challenging, the South Vietnamese military suffered from a flawed command and control structure, and it was severely politicized.63 Described diplomatically by one former senior U.S. official as a “less than satisfactory” structure, the military was fraught with “conflicting, duplicating channels” that ensured Diem’s ultimate power. For example, division commanders often received orders from both corps and regional commanders, and field units received orders from branch and field commanders, severely impeding the military’s efficacy.64 These dynamics further weakened the military leadership. Moreover, Diem himself frequently became personally involved in lowlevel military affairs. As one former senior American military official colorfully recounted, “using his radio net from a van in the garden of the presidential palace, [Diem] sometimes sent out operational orders directly to combat regiments, bypassing the Department of National Defense, the General Staff, and the field commands.”65 Similarly, Diem often “ordered . . . forces without consulting his minister of defense or his chief of staff,” observed a senior U.S. intelligence official.66 Exacerbating these command and control challenges, various senior military elements were physically separated in Saigon, including the Joint General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense. To be sure, MAAG staff urged Diem to locate them together; however, he was recalcitrant—likely due to concerns that they might collaborate against him. This disjointed structure further “hamper[ed] coordination, rapid staff action, and decision making,” according to one former senior U.S. official.67

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Such dynamics invariably politicized the South Vietnamese military, inhibiting the development and emergence of positive, capable leadership. Diem himself was personally involved in all major military appointments and promotions, and given his obsession with ensuring the senior military leadership’s loyalty, appointments were consistently based on fidelity rather than on competence or merit.68 As one former senior South Vietnamese military official reflected, “the true mission of the armed forces . . . was repeatedly neglected in favor of the unspoken concern to prevent an overthrow of the government.”69

A Larger Military Further Enables an External Defense Mission To strengthen the South Vietnamese military, MAAG staff agreed in summer 1955 to increase its size to 150,000—which the South Vietnamese leadership urged—but more important, they used this larger size to further enable the expanded external defense mission. In O’Daniel’s vision, a bigger military should be able to “delay external aggression” and allow for “all areas of Free Vietnam [to be] covered by military forces . . . to establish and maintain internal security in the true sense of the words.”70 By confusing these two missions, this set up allowed O’Daniel to further expand the reason the United States was building the South Vietnamese military. Even though the national security leadership in Washington repeatedly emphasized that internal security should be the primary mission, O’Daniel quickly moved forward with his hybrid plan—reinforced by TRIM’s work—and he confidently predicted South Vietnam’s military would be able to fulfill this larger mission by the end of the year.71 Given this focus, it is unsurprising that MAAG supported a larger South Vietnamese military; the North Vietnamese military was increasingly capable and the French were preparing to redeploy.72 By 1955, North Vietnam’s military was formally organized and—unlike the fledgling South Vietnamese military—it had “trained, grown and tested its forces and military commanders . . . in the battles of the war of 1946–1954.”73 And, it continued receiving substantial external assistance. Although Soviet aid centered around goods such as petroleum, Chinese materiel was so extensive “that by mid-1955 some foreign observers were guessing . . . [North Vietnam] had come under China’s domination.”74

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4 Regular Divisions 159 Combat Battalions 6 Light Divisions

Figure 3. Reorganization of the South Vietnamese military, 1955. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, 506–10, 522; Central Intelligence Agency, “Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956,” National Intelligence Estimate, October 11, 1955, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.

Furthermore, efforts to comply with the 100,000-personnel ceiling initially imposed by the United States on South Vietnam’s military had been painful as the South Vietnamese forced discharges of thousands of soldiers. Not only were many of these soldiers “well-trained and battle-experienced,” according to former senior South Vietnamese military officials, but many were also disabled and wounded veterans whose discharge was particularly searing given that there was no pension available.75 Therefore, after MAAG and the South Vietnamese military leadership debated the larger military’s organizational structure, O’Daniel finally approved Diem’s plan for a ten-division force composed of four field divisions and six light divisions, in addition to thirteen territorial regiments and 4,000 air force and navy personnel. Figure 3 illustrates this dramatic reorganization of the South Vietnamese military. Although Diem had initially conceived of this plan, according to a former Vietnamese military official, it changed from his initial vision. MAAG rejected Diem’s request for an airborne division, and the territorial regiments signified a compromise because the South Vietnamese were uncomfortable with relying heavily on reserve forces, which had been MAAG’s preference.76 Although this proposal was expensive—“averag[ing] $1843 per uniformed person”—senior officials in Washington quickly approved

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it.77 Their approval of this reorganization no doubt empowered O’Daniel to continue with his flawed effort. New Institutions Established By fall 1955, two important institutions were formally established. First, Diem officially announced the creation of the Republic of Vietnam based on a suspicious referendum whose outcome was prejudiced before it was conducted; nevertheless, he now had a clear mandate as the new state’s leader.78 The state’s military institutions were given similarly updated names—the military was now the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the army was known as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Secondly, MAAG-Indochina now established an entity singularly focused on Vietnam: MAAG-Vietnam. This mission recognized that American involvement in South Vietnam had dramatically evolved since the MAAG effort in Southeast Asia was established in 1950 and therefore required an appropriately focused and sized entity to coordinate military assistance. But, MAAG-Vietnam’s size remained the same—342 personnel—based on the ceiling imposed by the Geneva Accords, which senior U.S. political officials hesitated to violate despite repeated requests by O’Daniel, the commander in chief of U.S. Far East Command, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more personnel.79 New MAAG Leadership Further Stymies the Internal Defense Mission These new entities coincided with the arrival of new American military and political leaders in Saigon; the new MAAG chief, in particular, was a disaster given his abrasive personality, lack of respect for civilians, and most problematic, his emphasis on an external defense mission. On the military front, the secretaries of state and defense agreed O’Daniel’s successor should have experience in Asia and proven leadership skills; based on Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor’s recommendation, they settled on Lieutenant General Samuel T. “Hanging Sam” Williams, a veteran of both World Wars who had spent a number of years in Korea.80 On the political front, Ambassador Frederick Reinhardt had been assigned to Saigon a few months earlier; he had no experience in Asia, but he was familiar with Soviet issues and was generally uninvolved in MAAG affairs.81

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Williams’s leadership skills were far from stellar. One official U.S. Army study described him as a “disciplinarian, outspokenly intolerant of slackness, incompetence or boodling” and his biographer noted, “he caused ulcers, mid-career burnout, heart attacks, divorces, and the resignations of commissioned officers of the regular army.”82 Williams was relieved of command in 1944 for these traits, among other reasons, and demoted from Brigadier General to Colonel, although he was later promoted to Lieutenant General.83 From the very outset, Williams ignored the internal defense mission mandated by senior U.S. leaders for South Vietnam’s military. Williams reflected that his mandate was “first of all, to organize the armed forces to repel any invasion coming down from the communist North.”84 As one MAAG staff member described it, Williams was wholly focused on building a conventional military rather than one that could maintain internal security because he “was certain that that was the way [it] was going to go.”85 Williams’s pointed focus—which went against declared U.S. policy— was at least partly attributed to how the U.S. military prepared him for his new position. Despite being heavily briefed by State Department officials—who emphasized the internal defense mission—the U.S. military briefings that Williams received before arriving in South Vietnam outlined a different mission.86 Williams explained, “the Chief of Staff of the Army, or his staff,” told him that if elections were not held in summer 1956, then North Vietnam would attack. Therefore, “the thing uppermost in my mind . . . was that I had until next July to get something up on the [17th] Parallel to withstand an attack in July of 1956,” he stated.87 The disjointed vision in Washington had bled into his preparations for this assignment. Williams’s MAAG deputy further asserted that the U.S. Army leadership told Williams he should strengthen South Vietnam’s military to counter a conventional attack.88 Given the U.S. military’s initial hesitancy to expand American involvement in South Vietnam, it is not inconceivable that at least some of Williams’s briefings emphasized the external mission. His tour of South Vietnam’s borders immediately upon arriving may have further heightened his fears of external aggression.89 Even as the American intelligence community highlighted potential guerrilla challenges to South Vietnam—and assessed that North Vietnam was unwilling to conventionally counter South Vietnam at this time— Williams remained focused on countering external aggression. And Diem agreed with him, which made it easier to discount the internal defense

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mission.90 On one rare occasion, Williams did give Diem an academic paper on guerrilla warfare, but Diem was unenthusiastic about it and Williams did not follow up on this topic.91 Similarly, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff raised the internal defense mission with Diem during his visit to Saigon at the end of 1955, but he assessed in his meeting report, “I do not believe that President Diem changed any of the preconceived ideas he had.”92 Having an ally also pointedly focused on the external defense mission no doubt influenced Williams’s program to build South Vietnam’s military, and Williams was extremely sympathetic to Diem’s challenges. As he reflected, Williams “believed him [Diem] when he told me he was ‘just trying to build a country.’ ”93 Their close relationship further discouraged Williams from urging uncomfortable personnel or structural changes in the military. By the end of the year, Williams had settled into Saigon as MAAG chief and realized the enormous challenge he had accepted. MAAG was a fledgling operation and Williams felt unsupported as he took it over. He described MAAG under O’Daniel as “one man driving hard to get things done and with little help,” and he referred to his new posting as “the most difficult one of any to date.”94 Williams likewise sought to expand MAAG—he hoped for 2,000 personnel instead of the 342 he was initially given—but was unsuccessful as the political leadership in Washington maintained its reluctance to violate the Geneva Accords.95 Moreover, Williams was frustrated by the French. Although they were increasingly irrelevant and would soon be effectively redeployed, he blamed the French for the RVNAF’s lack of leadership due to their failure to empower South Vietnam’s military. Disdainful of their low expectations, Williams once remarked to a French military official, “Hell, they just got through whipping your ass and driving you out of this country. What do you mean they won’t fight?” When the French official responded, “that’s the Vietnamese up north,” Williams retorted, “well, they’re bound to be cousins to these down here. I think they’ll fight if they’re given proper training and have any leadership.”96 Yet Williams failed on both of these fronts during his tenure. Rather than training the South Vietnamese military for an internal defense mission, he built a conventional military focused on countering external aggression. And, engendering South Vietnamese military leadership required deep involvement in transforming the military, which Williams was

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unwilling to do. Establishing a warm, trusting relationship with the South Vietnamese was his immediate priority. Williams obsessed over this concern and although under his leadership MAAG offered some organizational suggestions, training, and equipment-related advice and similarly technical efforts—in fact, the military budget was regularly put together with heavy American involvement—MAAG generally refrained from becoming deeply involved in sensitive military affairs such as command and control operations, politicization, and personnel assignments.97 By the end of 1955, the path of Williams’s tenure was clear: MAAG was staying on its path of building a conventionally oriented military and hesitating to transform it.

The Mission Formally Expands as U.S. Efforts Focus on Equipment: 1956 During the second full year of the American effort to build South Vietnam’s military, the program’s emphasis shifted in tangible and philosophical ways. Now that the training and advisory effort had begun, MAAG focused on disbursing equipment. Moreover, the reason the United States was building the RVNAF shifted: it grew increasingly in line with the U.S. military’s desire to focus on conventional warfare and to counter external aggression. By the end of 1956, the sect militias had been generally eliminated as a threat and the security situation was relatively quiet, which further encouraged U.S. military personnel in Saigon to maintain their focus on external defense. A New U.S. Entity Equips South Vietnam’s Military—While Secretly Training It South Vietnam’s military faced an equipment nightmare, according to an early 1956 U.S. survey mission. Massive amounts of American materiel—which had been flowing to South Vietnam via the French since 1950—were in disarray throughout the country, which resulted in two problematic efforts. First, the French mission’s disorganization had almost surely led the United States to send equipment that was already in South Vietnam, duplicating its efforts. Because the French had not permitted either the RVNAF or MAAG to deal with logistics, this challenge was particularly acute. Second—and even more problematic—the French were selling

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some of these items to the South Vietnamese. Therefore, because the United States was heavily contributing to South Vietnam’s budget, “the U.S. may be paying for some items a second time,” exclaimed American representatives in Saigon as they began to appreciate the extent of equipment problems.98 If the United States quickly responded to this situation, Secretary of Defense Wilson estimated that perhaps one hundred million dollars’ worth of equipment “can be saved.”99 To effectively deal with this challenge, the U.S. government established a new entity in spring 1956: the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). Separate from MAAG, TERM’s ostensible focus according to its directive was “supervising the recovery and outshipment of excess . . . equipment” and strengthening the South Vietnamese military’s “logistical capabilities.” Consisting of up to 350 personnel, TERM’s work would enable the United States to both equip the RVNAF and to utilize excess materiel that remained in South Vietnam over the next four years.100 Although TERM made substantial progress throughout 1956 in providing logistics training to South Vietnam’s military, its job became harder as the French redeployed. In addition to taking out the materiel they wanted to keep for use in Africa—approximately 200 million dollars’ worth of materiel—the French failed to coherently organize the materiel they left; as Williams lamented, they were “taking out equipment they have no authority to take out, and I have no means to stop them.”101 They “literally dumped mountains of equipment upon the Vietnamese . . . most . . . was improperly packed, indiscriminately piled, often placed in outside storage, and controlled by inadequate or meaningless inventory records,” according to one former senior U.S. military official in Saigon.102 Former senior South Vietnamese officials noted that the military “did not even know exactly how much equipment there was in the inventory,” and General Williams despaired that its units lacked standardized equipment.103 Yet TERM had another—classified—purpose: it allowed the United States to rapidly expand the number of American military personnel in South Vietnam without increasing MAAG. Rather than acceding to pleas by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense, and the CIA leadership for the United States to enlarge MAAG, senior State Department officials found establishing TERM was easier than the substantial political maneuvering required to amend the Geneva Accords. Coupling the two entities together, TERM and MAAG increased the U.S. military presence in South

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Vietnam to nearly 700 personnel. Thanks to its classified purpose, the TERM personnel therefore grew the number of American military personnel in South Vietnam, enabled MAAG advisers to focus on training rather than dealing with the mess of materiel and, during the next year or so, the vast majority of TERM personnel themselves helped with training.104 Although the French closed their high command in South Vietnam in 1956—resulting in TRIM’s dismantlement in April, the cessation of French training of South Vietnam’s army, and the remaining trainers being incorporated into MAAG—they continued to train the South Vietnamese air force and navy for another year until MAAG took over that role, also.105 Formally Shifting the Mission to External Defense— as MAAG Hoped Senior U.S. military officials in Saigon and in Washington maintained an expansive mission for the South Vietnamese military during 1956, which encouraged President Eisenhower to formally shift the mission that summer—as many had hoped. During Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson’s visit to South Vietnam, he found Williams encouraging the South Vietnamese leadership to focus on an external defense mission; in this vein, Diem ordered the Joint General Staff to prepare plans for defending the northern border and remarked that the military should be “relieve[d] . . . of its internal security assignments.” 106 In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to argue that the RVNAF’s mission should be broader than internal security; it should also include “resist[ing] external aggression . . . [and] assist[ing] in regional defense with other noncommunist countries.”107 Positive assessments from a variety of key individuals further colored U.S. perceptions of the South Vietnamese military’s capabilities. After visiting South Vietnam in 1956, Secretary of State Dulles recounted to President Eisenhower how “greatly impressed” he was by the progress that had been made since his meeting with Diem the previous year, and as of mid-1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff praised South Vietnam’s military, stating it was “capable of establishing and maintaining internal security” as long as threats weren’t “organized” by North Vietnam.108 The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s assessment no doubt ignored the dynamics of external support to non-state actors and gave a false impression of the RVNAF’s real capabilities because

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a serious internal defense challenge would almost surely involve substantial assistance from North Vietnam. And later in the year, former MAAG Chief O’Daniel—now heading the American Friends of Vietnam lobby—told American officials that the South Vietnamese military was prepared “to do a first-class fighting job.”109 These evaluations almost surely influenced President Eisenhower’s decision in summer 1956 to expand the RVNAF’s mission. He now wanted MAAG to “encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon approved U.S. policy,” according to the National Security Council meeting summary.110 The final part of this decision is particularly meaningful: Eisenhower focused on the role that the RVNAF might be able to play in stemming an attack by a communist power on South Vietnam in tandem with the United States, which markedly broadened MAAG’s mission. Later that summer, the president even approved a plan by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that included the use of nuclear weapons to halt such aggression.111 The French redeployment may have also influenced President Eisenhower’s shift; when the French high command was shuttered earlier that year, any hopes that they could help deal with an external security threat—which were tenuous at best—disappeared. MAAG’s mandate was still, first and foremost, to build a South Vietnamese military capable of enforcing the government’s sovereignty throughout its territory; however, its breadth had now formally expanded. Yet little changed in practice because its work was already focused on countering external aggression; instead, the internal defense mission remained secondary. At least some U.S. military officials were cognizant that MAAG needed to shift its prioritization; during a 1956 visit to Saigon, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “cautioned the senior officers of MAAG to remember that our requirements are really met when Vietnam is able to take care of its own internal security.”112 It does not appear that his comments resonated with the MAAG leadership or many others in the Pentagon. To be sure, the South Vietnamese military did face a threat from the larger, more capable North Vietnamese military, but it was not as immediate as the requirement to extend internal security. Even though the anticipated elections were not held in 1956, North Vietnam did not launch a conventional attack—as Williams had expected.113 Moreover, the U.S. intelligence community assessed it would remain quiet for at least another year,

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particularly because North Vietnam’s leadership was focused on consolidating its power.114 Some Progress Training and Equipping, but None Influencing Appointments Not only did MAAG build South Vietnam’s military based on the wrong mission, but it also hesitated to become involved in its sensitive affairs. To be sure, MAAG delivered substantial training and equipment, and South Vietnamese military morale improved amid this progress. But, salaries were high—“averag[ing] 21/2 times that of each member of the Thai armed forces”—and the United States was paying “90 per cent of the costs” in South Vietnam, so the approximately 170 million dollars’ worth of support delivered in 1956 alone did not stretch far.115 And even though the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam had doubled to nearly 700 with TERM’s establishment, the training program faced meaningful challenges. Advisers were not distributed among all regiments, and although 300 RVNAF personnel had trained in the United States or at U.S.-affiliated schools throughout 1956, many lacked sufficient language skills or did not receive training in accordance with their expertise.116 Beyond tangible aid, however, MAAG personnel limited their involvement in South Vietnamese military affairs due to both their qualifications and General Williams’s urging. Advisers received little in the way of background preparation before arriving in South Vietnam. For example, officers received four hours of briefings “on some dozen subjects, none directly touching on the government, politics, or recent history of South Vietnam,” and fewer than ten MAAG personnel spoke any Vietnamese.117 The former South Vietnamese Chief of the Joint General Staff reflected that he was unaware of a “single instance in which a U.S. adviser effectively discussed professional matters with his counterpart in Vietnamese,” which was problematic given the extremely limited English proficiency of RVNAF personnel.118 Such circumstances all but guaranteed limited U.S. involvement in sensitive military affairs. Most MAAG personnel were ill suited for the mission in other ways, too. Their background in regional affairs and internal defense was superficial; given that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had generally emphasized the external defense mission, they did not hesitate to send MAAG personnel with that experience.119 As General Maxwell Taylor, then chief of staff of the U.S.

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Army, reflected when asked about this issue, “you teach what your experience has taught you . . . the American influence certainly followed the path, generally, of the experience of the officers who happened to be the instructors on the spot.”120 Further, Williams pushed MAAG members to maintain narrow parameters in their involvement in South Vietnamese military affairs. Above all, he focused on positive, warm relationships with the RVNAF and urged advisers to do so, too.121 Americans in Saigon pointedly focused on “establishing ‘rapport’ ” with their counterparts, underscored one former senior American official, a view validated by former senior South Vietnamese officials, who reflected that most military personal would describe the Americans as “tactful.”122 To maintain these positive relations, Williams was disinclined to become involved in sensitive South Vietnamese military affairs. Simply put, Williams did not want to hear about problems his staff had with the South Vietnamese military. Early on in the regular senior advisers conferences he held, Williams himself facilitated an environment that “discourage[d] adverse adviser reports on Vietnamese units that might reflect unfavorably on MAAG leadership and work to the detriment of the allies’ morale.”123 And yet, Williams had real concerns about the weak senior RVNAF leaders. For example, one of his documents notes his opinions of the chief of the general staff (who “shows no real interest in training . . . has no force, and is tied to his desk”), the army chief of staff (who lacks authority), and the Joint General Staff personnel (who are “inexperienced” and “hesitant”); nevertheless, he did not highlight such problems to Diem nor did he suggest specific potential replacements.124 Given the precedent Williams set, MAAG staff rarely became involved in RVNAF personnel affairs. According to a former senior American military official, they were unwilling to urge demotions or firings “for fear that such recommendations would reflect badly on their own capabilities,” and their short tours further exacerbated this dynamic; moreover, advisers did not want to sully their records by attempting to do so—even when faced with “a clearly ineffective . . . commander.”125 One former senior American political official reflected that during this period, “perhaps most grievous was our [the United States’] failure to insist on replacement at all levels of political leaders and military commanders whom we knew to be incompetent.”126 And on the rare occasions when MAAG personnel did suggest changes in sensitive RVNAF affairs, the South Vietnamese generally “ignored”

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them.127 Confirming this response, former senior South Vietnamese military personnel admitted that the rare suggestions by American advisers for RVNAF personnel changes were not dealt with in a timely and satisfactory manner.128 According to Ambassador Reinhardt, MAAG’s attempt on one occasion “to point out [to Diem] the necessity of proper delegation of responsibilities” similarly failed.129 Yet South Vietnamese officials seemed pleased with this limited U.S. involvement. A number of former senior South Vietnamese military officials viewed the best advisers as those who would “never interfere with command responsibilities”—almost surely a reference to sensitive military affairs—but the South Vietnamese military generally acquiesced to American ideas on tangible, less controversial needs.130 For example, the South Vietnamese military adopted American-style uniforms—even though they were not necessarily practical for their climate or terrain—and they adopted U.S. military doctrine and rank.131 Further, during the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s visit to Saigon, Diem requested that MAAG expand its training to include the South Vietnamese navy and air force; given MAAG’s size, however, Admiral Radford suggested that training in the United States was more feasible, although even that took another year to commence.132 Therefore, the South Vietnamese military’s leadership remained weak and wholly under Diem’s control. He continued to micromanage military affairs and exploit the RVNAF’s “conflicting, duplicating chains of command” while obsessing over his staff’s trustworthiness, and he and his family members placed members of their secretive political party in senior military positions.133 The chief of the Joint General Staff was largely irrelevant in influencing personnel affairs—even among his senior staff—and instead, military officers regularly commented that personnel assignments were based on the “Three D’s” system, meaning, in Vietnamese, “Dang, Dao and Du,” which disparagingly referenced party affiliation, religion, and birthplace.134 For example, Diem appointed one division commander under the age of thirty who was roundly seen as incompetent and inexperienced but came from an important family.135 Although Williams denied accusations that Diem would select less capable—albeit loyal—officers for senior military positions, there is substantial evidence to the contrary from both MAAG reports and South Vietnamese leaders.136 Yet in Saigon, U.S. military personnel made little effort to challenge the system that had been established, inhibiting meaningful progress to transform the South Vietnamese military.

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Disjointed U.S. Vision in Saigon as MAAG’s Role Remains Limited and Security Worsens: 1957–1958 A change in personnel on the American side coupled with a worsening security situation in South Vietnam made the American effort to build South Vietnam’s military increasingly critical in 1957–1958. Yet MAAG personnel—led by the example set by General Williams—continued their focus on external defense and maintained their limited parameters for building the RVNAF. Poor Relations Between U.S. Officials in Saigon Exacerbated by Different Visions In early 1957, Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow arrived in Saigon; he and Williams had famously disastrous relations as their personalities and work clashed, resulting in a civil-military split.137 Williams alluded to Durbrow by stating his predecessor “never . . . [would] get up, for instance, in front of a mixed crowd and strip down to his shorts and put on a belly dance.”138 He blamed Durbrow and his staff’s “jealousy . . . [and] stupidity” for problems they had with him; for example, he asserted that embassy staff easily approved MAAG’s annual budget as long as he didn’t present it.139 Conversely, Durbrow said Williams “had no respect for civilians.”140 These differences were exacerbated by both the multiplicity of Americans involved in South Vietnamese affairs and their differing views of the appropriate American role there.141 Each complained that the other did not keep him updated on his work. Durbrow was upset that Williams sent the U.S. military leadership reports without showing him. Williams was frustrated when he was not able to comment on a cable from Embassy Saigon dealing with military affairs, and he felt particularly disempowered when, in his words, Durbrow said MAAG could “send no communication of any importance . . . without it being proofread and approved by this headquarters.”142 Moreover, Durbrow was outspoken that he viewed Diem as a problematic ally, whereas Williams thought more positively of the South Vietnamese leader. Williams took Durbrow’s criticism of Diem personally. “I resent a friend of mine being referred to as a SOB,” he complained, and he argued that Durbrow’s negative views were widely known among South Vietnamese—inhibiting cooperation—as did actions by Durbrow and his staff “scathingly attack[ing]” South Vietnamese proposals.143

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Despite their poor relationship, Durbrow twice agreed to extend Williams’s tour in Saigon—totaling five full years—because of Williams’s close relationship with Diem. “Diem just begged and plead[ed] and screamed” for Williams to stay, recalled Durbrow.144 He remained in South Vietnam until 1960. However, their tensions worsened considerably once Durbrow realized that the MAAG chief was building South Vietnam’s military solely to face a conventional external foe. Their visions of the nature of U.S. involvement differed more than Durbrow had realized.

Serious Flaws in Training as MAAG Focuses on External Defense Mission MAAG made real progress setting up a training program, but it suffered from serious flaws, including its emphasis on external defense. By the end of this period, nearly twenty different training centers were inaugurated throughout South Vietnam, and tens of thousands of military personnel received training each year at these centers—and at other Americanaffiliated institutions around the world. MAAG helped develop a serious training apparatus and instituted a three-phase program that included basic training and then regimental and field-level exercises based in South Vietnam. Given all of this training, by the end of 1958, “every unit in the VietNamese Army, with the exception of two territorial regiments . . . had completed, to a reasonable degree of satisfaction, the entire year’s training cycle,” reported one former senior MAAG leader.145 Yet in many ways the training program was problematic. Above all, the training materials were not focused on the South Vietnamese context. Instead, training courses were “almost exact copies of corresponding U.S. Army training courses,” and no unique Vietnamese needs were taken into account, according to one former senior RVNAF official.146 Validating his argument, one MAAG officer explained, “we had the TO&ES [Tables of Organization and Equipment] of the U.S. translated into Vietnamese and issued through the Vietnamese army, and I don’t recall any major variations.”147 Williams continued to prioritize training against external aggression, which senior U.S. military officials supported even though the National Security Council yet again reaffirmed that the United States was building South Vietnam’s military primarily for internal security.148 Describing his

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1957 visit to Saigon as army chief of staff, General Maxwell Taylor highlighted, “The JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] viewed Vietnam always within the context of the defense of Southeast Asia . . . and what they were thinking about was, ‘what should we do in case of a massive attack from the Chinese, perhaps combined with the North Vietnamese?’ ”149 Because the introductory training materials for U.S. trainers failed to even mention the South Vietnamese military’s mission, they depended on Williams’s comments at the regular advisory conferences to understand their purpose. Unsurprisingly, his remarks almost wholly emphasized North Vietnam and the external threat to South Vietnam, and, even at an operational level, Williams focused on conventional tactics by requiring trainers to conduct scores of “speed marches.”150 Moreover, the training program lacked capable South Vietnamese trainers—usually the least talented officers served in this role.151 Given that much of the officer corps had come directly from school or working as teachers, there was invariably a serious requirement for improving military leadership.152 Even those with military expertise were not necessarily qualified. For example, one MAAG member described one RVNAF trainer he worked with as “pompous, fat, stupid . . . will do anything to increase his personal fortune”; such reports no doubt dispel Williams’s arguments that he “never found any corruption” in the South Vietnamese military.153 Many trainers lacked sufficient English language capabilities or could not obtain a U.S. security clearance, inhibiting them from fully benefiting from specialized U.S. training.154 Upon returning from U.S. training programs, many of the trainees were not deployed to the field or assigned to positions commensurate with the training they had received; indeed, the more qualified military personnel were rarely assigned to the field.155 As military officials were increasingly used in civilian administrative positions, such as running provinces, the military’s leadership capability was further undermined. By the end of this period, South Vietnamese military officials led approximately one-third of South Vietnamese provinces, a number that would substantially increase in the coming years.156 Furthermore, relations between the military’s officers and enlisted personnel were problematic. This dynamic was illustrated by challenges such as senior RVNAF officers who did not speak Vietnamese and who regularly hit enlisted personnel, and it further demonstrated the leadership challenges that abounded.157

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Positive Reports Continue Despite the South Vietnamese Military’s Weakness Despite these acute flaws, positive reporting roundly characterized American assessments of the training program from Saigon throughout this period.158 General Williams argued that the South Vietnamese military “was making good progress,” and Ambassador Durbrow delivered a similar report to Washington, highlighting the South Vietnamese military’s enhanced capabilities.159 Although Durbrow was concerned about the difficulty of required reforms given its personnel’s “lack of command and planning experience, paucity of technical know-how and long acceptance of low standards,” he generally painted a positive picture, which was in line with the information Williams had given him to date.160 Even though Durbrow arrived in South Vietnam worried about the potential for subversion against the South Vietnamese government and the military, he believed—incorrectly—that MAAG was taking serious steps to deal with internal defense in 1957–58.161 And after visiting South Vietnam while leading the American Friends of Vietnam lobby, former MAAG Chief O’Daniel extolled the program to build the RVNAF, describing it as “on the right track, and moving well.”162 These reports were likely due to two dynamics: concern by the South Vietnamese military and MAAG members about giving Diem and Williams negative reports, respectively. As one scholar asserted, South Vietnamese military officials feared Diem and therefore “deliberately manufactured” reports of the military’s capabilities, going so far as to make up operations by battalions that “did not exist.”163 MAAG advisers were distributed throughout the South Vietnamese military, averaging six for a light division, eleven for a regular division, and twelve per corps headquarters. But they not only “lack[ed] . . . reliable and precise method[s] . . . to assess the effectiveness of their units,” they were also often criticized by Williams when they conveyed negative reports about South Vietnamese military capabilities.164 Chastising advisers for delivering such reports during the August senior advisers conference, the MAAG leadership told them that any complaints must be “substantiate[d] . . . with detailed factual data.”165 Unsurprisingly, these dynamics discouraged advisers from delivering accurate reports, and every single report from the March and August 1958 conferences describes relations between MAAG and the South Vietnamese military as “excellent,” according to advisers to the Capitol Military Region;

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135th and 136th Territorial Regiments; 1st and 2nd Armored Brigades; 2nd and 4th Field Divisions; 12th, 13th, and 14th Light Divisions; navy; and air force.166 But in reality, relations were not so rosy. A 1958 directive issued to all South Vietnamese officers by the chief of the Joint General Staff—urging them to treat MAAG respectfully and as “truthful friends”—demonstrated that problems existed in the relationship.167 And Diem’s 1957 visit to the United States also underscored turbulence. He was feted—met on arrival by President Eisenhower and addressed a joint session of Congress— nevertheless, he also voiced deep concerns about U.S. support for South Vietnam’s military.168 American Aid Decreases, Worrying Diem In 1957 and 1958, American aid to South Vietnam decreased as Congress urged global cuts in foreign assistance. Military assistance to South Vietnam was cut to 110.5 million dollars in 1957 and 53.2 million dollars in 1958. However, its proportional decrease was smaller than most countries because it was a high-priority U.S. effort for Washington.169 Even with the decrease in funds, the United States managed to continue providing substantial assistance to South Vietnam’s military. From 1950 to 1954, the United States had delivered approximately 1.1 billion dollars in equipment to South Vietnam’s military, and from 1955 to 1958, this had grown to nearly 2 billion dollars.170 In 1957–1958, for example, the United States paid nearly 90 percent of South Vietnam’s defense budget.171 Both TERM and MAAG had made considerable progress. By summer 1957, TERM had improved the South Vietnamese military’s logistical and supply capabilities, having “shipped out more than 36,000,000 dollars’ worth of . . . equipment,” and MAAG had disbursed spare parts and ammunition, among other materiel, and made plans to provide additional vehicles and communications equipment to South Vietnam’s military.172 The South Vietnamese leadership was perturbed by the change in funding. Diem, in particular, repeatedly raised it with senior American officials and was “really angry,” according to one meeting report, worrying that a decrease “paralyzes progress,” threatening to obtain funds from another source (though he did not suggest one), and warning that he might divert economic aid to fill security needs.173 In one glaring illustration, Diem told Williams that military aid from the United States must continue to be a

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priority, warning, “do you think the Americans want to see American G.I.s on the 17th Parallel?”174

Internal Security Worsens, yet Americans Officials Are Unconcerned Senior U.S. officials continued issuing positive reports about the security situation in South Vietnam. At the end of 1957, MAAG assessed that the South Vietnamese military was “capable of maintaining internal security” and could delay North Vietnam’s military for nearly two weeks.175 During Diem’s visit to Washington, he and Eisenhower proclaimed in a joint statement, “internal security had been effectively established” in South Vietnam.176 Even when MAAG personnel were injured in two different explosions, Williams continued exhorting the progress being made in South Vietnam, and a U.S. intelligence assessment in mid-1958 argued that the situation in South Vietnam was actually much better than it had been when the American effort commenced just after the Geneva Accords.177 Although accurate, such a perspective invariably ignored that a period of quiet was disrupted. These assessments betrayed a misunderstanding of the situation in South Vietnam and they ignored the increase in attacks throughout 1957– 1958. As one scholar argued, “the Diem regime owed its continued survival more to inaction by its enemies than to its own successes.”178 The earlier quiet had been due to decisions made by North Vietnam and its allies—the stay-behinds—to refrain from internally destabilizing South Vietnam at that time. These actors decided to restart hostilities in early 1957, and the security situation quickly worsened as attacks, particularly assassinations, rippled throughout South Vietnam.179 Even Diem himself realized that the situation had markedly changed in South Vietnam. At the end of 1957— contradicting the declaration he had recently issued with Eisenhower— Diem warned Williams, “If we don’t accomplish something strong and vigorous in 1958, I fear the future,” and when Williams cautioned him against making such a negative statement, Diem replied, “I say that only to you.”180 By 1958, the campaign of attacks was severely undermining internal security. “Terror, sabotage, kidnapping and assassination severely threaten[ed] the GVN [Government of Vietnam] control,” according to former senior South Vietnamese military officials.181

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Unhelpful External Actors Support Increased Violence Violence flourished, given the substantial support the stay-behinds received from external actors. China and the Soviet Union provided some aid to the effort; most, however, came from North Vietnam, which pretended to be uninvolved in the surge of violence, but in reality covertly helped “organize . . . and direct” it.182 Although North Vietnam had initially urged the stay-behinds to “lay low, reorganize . . . infiltrate . . . and strengthen,” according to an intelligence report that MAAG received, during this period, it increasingly supported their efforts.183 North Vietnam and South Vietnam’s other neighbors were also being used to “smuggle through orders, propaganda material, funds, arms, ammunition, and supplies”; for example, the North Vietnamese spread propaganda that the South Vietnamese military disliked MAAG because the advisers mistreated, insulted, and rudely criticized military personnel.184 As one scholar has discussed, the increasing violence during this period was not only attributable to the substantial North Vietnamese support but to Diem’s repressive domestic policies, which provided a base of discontent with his government. Both dynamics were critical for fomenting the insurgency in South Vietnam.185 Diem was particularly concerned about the surge in attacks, which came to be known as tru gian. He responded by arresting tens of thousands—and killing thousands—of South Vietnamese, problematic actions that further demonstrated the United States “consistently underestimated the strengths of the enemy and overestimated those of our GVN [Government of Vietnam] allies,” as one former senior American official rued.186

MAAG Redoubles Its Focus on External Defense by Reorganizing South Vietnam’s Military: 1959–Summer 1960 While MAAG again reorganized South Vietnam’s military—this time into seven heavy divisions—this effort only furthered Williams’s emphasis on external defense. As the security situation markedly worsened during this period due to shifts in external support to destabilizing actors, MAAG’s skewed focus on countering antagonistic external actors rendered South Vietnam’s military incapable of arresting the decaying internal security situation. By summer 1960, an entire decade of American military assistance had failed to extend internal defense throughout South Vietnam.

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4 Regular Divisions

7 Standard Divisions 6 Light Divisions

Figure 4. Reorganization of the South Vietnamese Military, 1959. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 28.

Reorganizing the South Vietnamese Military for External Defense In 1959, MAAG Chief Williams urged South Vietnam’s leadership to reorganize the RVNAF, which his military superiors thought would facilitate the delivery of American materiel. MAAG’s earlier study on reorganizing the RVNAF failed to outline its mission, and the latest effort was plagued by similar problems. After considering “more than two hundred” different structures, they designed what Williams referred to as “a Vietnamese division,” which he hoped could operate in varied environments—but it was not coherently organized to internally secure South Vietnam.187 The seven divisions—each just under 11,000 personnel— were overwhelmingly geared toward conventional war and countering massive, external aggression, in accordance with Williams’s focus, and Diem supported this effort to eliminate the light divisions (see Figure 4).188 These standard divisions resembled “those of the U.S. Army in World War II,” and although Williams emphatically denied that allegation, asserting that outsiders misinterpreted how the South Vietnamese military was built because journalists based in other parts of Asia focused on Saigon parades featuring heavy materiel, the similarities were clear and served as further evidence that Williams was dismissing the internal defense mission.189 Despite arguing that he was no longer concerned about “a North Korean–type invasion from North Vietnam,” Williams

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nevertheless reorganized South Vietnam’s military to counter that very threat.190 And once it was reorganized, Williams continued opposing any serious effort to strengthen the South Vietnamese military’s ability to extend internal defense. Williams believed that conventionally trained units were similarly capable of countering an insurgency. He stated outright, “MAAG does not train the Vietnamese Army in anti-guerrilla operations”; he told South Vietnam’s assistant secretary of state for national defense that MAAG training was for “all types of operations . . .[because] well trained soldiers, with good leadership and sound plans can successfully fight any kind of enemy on any kind of terrain”; and he stymied U.S. Special Forces training.191 Neither Williams nor other senior MAAG leaders thought Ranger units would be helpful, as Diem preferred. Indeed, Diem “formed [these units] without MAAG approval” because he was uncomfortable with MAAG’s focus on external defense at this time.192 At multiple levels, Williams spent this period pointedly focused on the external defense mission. He ensured that MAAG gave South Vietnam’s military numerous 155 mm howitzers—despite the difficulty of transporting them given South Vietnam’s poor roads—and he had his staff rebuff requests from senior RVNAF officials for counter–guerrilla training. By 1960, for example, MAAG had conducted only one course in antiguerrilla training, although it had translated U.S. military manuals on this topic. Williams himself discounted the utility of these materials, explaining that they “mean little to [anyone] other than an [American] Army Officer.”193 Even the foundational training that MAAG had given to date was minimal, given how long it had been in existence. By 1960, less than half of the South Vietnamese army had received “sound fundamental advanced individual training and . . . basic unit training.”194 Although decades later Williams argued “people misunderstood” MAAG’s work, the conventional direction of most materiel and the training given to South Vietnam’s military during this period—which one former senior South Vietnamese official criticized as irrelevant to the terrain and the threat—illustrates his flawed argument.195 Limited U.S. Role Continues to Limit Influence In addition to focusing on the wrong mission, MAAG failed to become involved in sensitive South Vietnamese military affairs during and after the

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reorganization. For example, it did not attempt to tackle the military’s serious personnel problems. Instead, Diem’s loyalists continued occupying key positions, which inhibited the development of the RVNAF’s leadership capabilities, and Diem repeatedly undermined the newly established—on paper—streamlined chain of command.196 Given that a lack of sufficient leadership was one of the South Vietnamese military’s major challenges, keeping inadequate personnel in influential positions failed to remedy this deficiency.197 Further, Diem’s “arbitrar[y]” decisions about when and where units were deployed inhibited progress, according to U.S. officials, who made little effort to counter these moves.198 Yet Williams continued praising the South Vietnamese military and military-related decisions by Diem, including on personnel. He repeatedly offered positive reports to members of Congress and to a senior U.S. delegation that visited Saigon.199 Williams consistently focused on the number of advisers he had— deeming the amount insufficient—rather than focusing on what they were doing. MAAG’s size had evolved over the years. It began with just over 100 U.S. military personnel in 1950, expanded to more than 700 in 1956 following TRIM’s establishment, and indirectly increased, given that 98 percent of TERM personnel were helping MAAG rather than out-processing materiel—and by 1960, all of its members had officially joined MAAG. Nevertheless, Williams was unsatisfied by this growth and pushed for more.200 Yet even at the tactical level, however, their influence was narrow. MAAG advisers began working with South Vietnamese military units in the field after Williams persuaded Diem to allow them to do so. But the advisers’ impact was quickly restricted once Diem required that he “be consulted in each individual case” of advice delivered on daily operations; as one adviser explained, he could not even convince the troops he was advising not to carry items on their rifles.201 However, MAAG personnel remained reluctant to tell Williams about their limited impact, and they were particularly disinclined to deliver bad news to him. Numerous MAAG members corroborated this problem and, as one member described reports to Williams during this period, “a man from Mars listening to it would have believed that everything was going quite well.”202 According to Williams, MAAG members were the only Americans who had a positive relationship with the South Vietnamese leadership. Although this likely was an exaggeration, his perception almost surely influenced his response to negative reports.203 When one adviser—

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Colonel Russell Miner, who was assigned to the 2nd Military Region— dared to deliver a frank report that his unit “couldn’t really punch its way out of a paper bag,” Williams was “absolutely incensed,” according to one participant.204 Given this reaction, few advisers were willing to share honest reports; according to one MAAG member, they “were scared to death of General Williams.”205 The lack of commonly accepted metrics for advisers to rate the units they worked with exacerbated this dynamic. As one scholar assessed, “few were willing to report forthrightly that they had been unable to bring about needed reforms and improvements in the units to which they were assigned,” and reports from the April 1960 senior advisers conference corroborate this assessment, as do earlier MAAG evaluations.206 MAAG’s constrained role was also illustrated by how it administered U.S. military assistance. MAAG did little to assess this aid, which was cut now to less than fifty million dollars in 1959. They played a narrow role in overseeing it: MAAG staff emphasized that they do not “audit . . . military expenditures” and simply offered comments on the South Vietnamese military budget once per year.207 Diem’s brother repeatedly implored staff from the U.S. Embassy and MAAG to grant economic aid as it was disbursing military aid. As Durbrow described, Diem’s brother was effectively saying, “Give us the money for economic aid and we will know how to spend it.” And validating this point, Diem said “he wants [a] major proportion of US aid contributed to military budget . . . [because] there are less controls on GVN use of military funds,” according to Durbrow. Diem’s positive assessments of MAAG’s support to South Vietnam’s military were no doubt related to this dynamic, and neither Durbrow nor Williams suggested deepening MAAG’s role in strengthening South Vietnam’s military.208 Internal Security Worsens as Antagonistic External Actors Increase Support As the security situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, the implications of MAAG’s sustained effort to build South Vietnam’s military for an external defense mission were glaring. The last two years of sporadic attacks evolved into a stream of regular and lethal efforts by the stay-behinds and North Vietnam to undermine South Vietnam’s government—which they termed “the U.S.-Diem regime.”209 The security situation had meaningfully shifted. Assassinations increased five-fold from 1958 to the first half of 1960, the first MAAG advisers were

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targeted and killed in summer 1959, and assassinations and kidnappings spiked during this period when “about 20 percent of the village chiefs” were killed.210 “The guerrilla threat was . . . the only active threat to the nation’s security,” lamented one former senior South Vietnamese military official as the U.S. intelligence community detailed the worsening situation.211 As one scholar termed it, this was the period in which “things fall apart.”212 North Vietnam’s military increased its support to the insurgents in South Vietnam, sending thousands of infiltrators and tons of materiel to help with this effort, particularly through Laos.213 And the stay-behinds and North Vietnam developed “Group 559,” which reinforced a fledgling system for transporting aid and personnel into South Vietnam; it would soon be known by the nickname “Ho Chi Minh Trail.” As Diem’s repressive policies escalated, they provided additional fodder for the stay-behinds to garner support against the South Vietnamese government.214 South Vietnam’s military was unable to deal with this worsening security situation. Its institutions were repeatedly overrun, its posture remained static, desertions escalated, and even more worrisome, its personnel were losing weapons in record amounts. In one month, “South Vietnamese troops lost enough weapons to arm a battalion,” estimated one South Vietnamese Ministry of Defense staff member, as shown by a spectacular early 1960 attack in which insurgents killed hundreds of South Vietnamese troops and captured more than one thousand weapons—a larger, better organized, and more effective attack than had been occurring before.215 After this attack at Tay Ninh, MAAG Chief Williams and a few South Vietnamese military leaders made a rare suggestion to Diem that the military leadership should be empowered to influence personnel assignments, but they were quickly rebuffed and did not push the issue.216 MAAG’s Mistakes Focusing on External Defense and Limiting Its Role Grow Clear, but Not to Williams In spite of the unquestionably worse security situation and the repeated examples of the South Vietnamese military’s inability to maintain internal defense, MAAG’s leadership was upbeat. Reflecting on this period, Williams said he fully believed “the situation [in South Vietnam] was under control and that it could be kept under control.”217 Williams repeatedly praised South Vietnam’s military—even suggesting to a member of Congress that

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MAAG could substantially decrease its presence within two years—and his comments, along with those of other current and former MAAG officials, positively influenced a host of reports and studies on how the American effort to build South Vietnam’s military was proceeding.218 But by spring 1960, it was clear to at least some Americans and South Vietnamese that South Vietnam’s military was incapable of dealing with the growing insurgency in South Vietnam because it had not been built for internal defense, as the United States originally set out to do. Both the National Security Council and the Washington-based Operations Coordinating Board yet again affirmed that the United States was building South Vietnam’s military “to assure Viet-Nam’s internal security and to provide limited initial resistance to North Vietnamese attack,” yet the first part of this mission was still dismissed by MAAG’s leadership.219 President Eisenhower was deeply worried. As he told the National Security Council that summer, “we rescued this country from a fate worse than death and it would be bad to lose it at this stage.”220 Not long after, the secretary of state asked the secretary of defense how MAAG could better assist South Vietnam’s military, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began developing the counterinsurgency plan (CIP), a draft program based on “reforming and enlarging” the military, which did not receive presidential approval for an entire year.221 Within months, the U.S. intelligence community highlighted that the South Vietnamese military’s “deployment . . . and training activities” focused on that mission rather than internal defense.222 And in Saigon, Durbrow finally began realizing that Williams had wholly focused on external defense. He spent the last few months of Williams’s tenure in Saigon furiously questioning these efforts.223 Upset that MAAG’s work was under dispute—particularly by Durbrow, whom Williams described as “better suited to be the senior salesman in a good ladies shoe store”—Williams waited two months before even responding to his formal request for more information on this issue. Williams’s response validated suspicions that the internal defense mission was not MAAG’s priority: he reiterated to Durbrow his belief that a well-trained soldier could fight either a guerrilla or conventional enemy.224 Williams remained sensitive to this issue until his departure from Saigon. For example, he handwrote “1956–1957” on a summer 1960 meeting report in which Diem remarked MAAG “originally made the same mistake as had the French in concentrating their training in conventional warfare.”225 Williams wholeheartedly

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believed he had built South Vietnam’s military appropriately, and he ignored naysayers—Americans or South Vietnamese—who sought to convince him otherwise. Further, Williams had refrained from becoming involved in sensitive South Vietnamese military affairs. Even his final report to Diem in late August 1960—a massive list of eighty-nine areas in which the military required improvement—illustrated the limited nature of his involvement. Williams’s commentary on critical problems—including the continued challenge posed by an incoherent chain of command, weak subordinates, and the low-priority training received—were almost always vague and lacked specific examples where Diem should make changes. In that vein, he urged Diem to establish a formal system for promotions and for “demotions and elimination of unqualified personnel,” but he failed to offer specific recommendations unless they were in the most innocuous areas, such as moving training centers.226 Therefore, the South Vietnamese military leadership remained weak as personnel decisions and command and control continued entirely in the hands of Diem and his cohort.227 Williams left South Vietnam in late summer 1960, after five years of training, equipping, and organizing South Vietnam’s military for the wrong conflict. His major accomplishment had been organizing the South Vietnamese military—albeit for a different war—and his opposition to becoming involved in sensitive South Vietnamese military affairs facilitated the military’s deep flaws.228 Although it had managed to defeat the militias early in the program’s tenure, the restructured, strengthened South Vietnamese military could not secure the weak state’s territory. Departing South Vietnam, Williams rejoiced, “In 1954 the communist army of North Vietnam could have crossed the seventeenth parallel and walked into Saigon standing up. Today if they tried it, they would have one nasty fight on their hands.”229 Unfortunately, that had not been the primary threat to South Vietnam, nor had it been the mission mandated by senior U.S. leaders in Washington.

The United States Becomes a Co-Combatant as Insurgency Grows: Late 1960–Early 1961 The United States had spent nearly a decade—including five years of direct involvement—strengthening South Vietnam’s military in what was one of

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Table 5. U.S. Assistance to South Vietnam’s Military, 1956–60 (Millions of U.S. dollars) Fiscal Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

U.S. Military Aid $176.5 $119.8 $79.3 $52.4 $72.7

Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Situation in Vietnam: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, 331; Douglas C. Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development: South Vietnam, 1955–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 200.

the largest military assistance programs to date. The program did, however, decline throughout much of this period from its apex in 1956, as Table 5 highlights. Nevertheless, “South Vietnam was the fifth ranking recipient overall” of U.S. aid, nearly 80 percent of all American assistance had focused on assisting its military (including indirect support, such as building a highway that Williams requested “for specifically military purposes”), and MAAG-Vietnam “was the only [American] military aid mission anywhere in the world commanded by a lieutenant general.”230 Yet the South Vietnamese military was unable to maintain internal security, and over the next year, as a new U.S. administration came into office, the United States began exerting the monopoly on violence on its behalf while the insurgency grew. By this period, the military assistance and advisory effort in South Vietnam was no longer similar to any other security assistance program.231 The new MAAG chief, Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr, retained Williams’s focus on external defense and limited involvement in sensitive military affairs. However, the new U.S. president sent a senior-level mission to Saigon to investigate whether all American aid was focused on “the internal threat to South Vietnam,” and soon after, President Kennedy expanded the U.S. role to include “combat support activities,” deploying U.S. military aircraft and helicopter companies to South Vietnam and substantially increasing the American military presence.232 The U.S. military’s role shifted; it became co-combatants with the South Vietnamese military, not simply its advisers. And at the same time, the insurgency increasingly coalesced and strengthened. North Vietnam deepened its support by working with its

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allies in South Vietnam to create the National Liberation Front. This formal entity focused on coordinating efforts to overthrow the government in Saigon; it represented a serious effort by the stay-behinds to overthrow the fragile South Vietnamese government.233

Conclusion The U.S. effort to strengthen the South Vietnamese military failed as it overreacted to concerns over antagonistic external actors. U.S. strategy to coalesce the nascent South Vietnamese state was muddled, particularly given the prickly South Vietnamese political leadership. The program to build South Vietnam’s military suffered from overreaction as the United States overwhelmingly focused on the role of antagonistic external actors— structuring the military around and focusing on external defense—and refused to become involved in delicate South Vietnamese affairs. The nature of U.S. involvement in sensitive South Vietnamese military affairs was extremely limited. Reorganization of the South Vietnamese military focused heavily on countering an external threat, as did the heavy U.S. emphasis on disbursing equipment. This aspect was particularly problematic because it ignored critical issues of host population dynamics and the need for a military wrestling with FID challenges to maintain popular support. The United States did not influence South Vietnamese personnel affairs, enabling weak leadership to persist. Profound divisions among U.S. policymakers facilitated this flawed program, as did the obstinate personality of Williams. Put simply, South Vietnam’s military was trained and equipped to face the wrong threat. Moreover, the United States gradually became a co-combatant in South Vietnam. It increasingly sought to extend the monopoly on violence on behalf of the partner state, an effort that would increase by an order of magnitude over the coming decade. And as U.S. military involvement deepened, the South Vietnamese military grew dependent on its outsized military power. Antagonistic external actors substantially increased their efforts to undermine the South Vietnamese state throughout this period. The guerrillas—benefiting from sanctuary and/or materiel support from North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and China—grew more capable. Their attacks were brazen and sophisticated and fomented additional violence.

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There was now neither a more enforced nor sustainable monopoly on violence by the South Vietnamese government. It had not effectively increased its military presence throughout South Vietnamese territory. And internal security worsened considerably. It became clear that the U.S. effort to build the South Vietnamese military had not succeeded, and the United States would go on to fight a lengthy war in South Vietnam. It would commit millions of troops, suffer tens of thousands of casualties, and spend billions of dollars. Had its effort in South Vietnam to strengthen this partner military been organized differently—had it not been a spectacular failure—much of that may have been avoidable.

Chapter 4

Lebanon I: “The United States Is Short of Breath” but Others Are Not

In 1982, the United States began building Lebanon’s fledgling military, and more than two decades later, it launched another program to do so, as this chapter and the next explore. The nature of U.S. involvement and the role of unhelpful external actors differed meaningfully between these two programs. They therefore present an ideal opportunity for cross-case variation to illuminate my hypothesis that a capable security sector is more likely when the United States gets deeply involved in the partner state’s sensitive military affairs and antagonistic external actors play a diminishing role. In the first case, U.S. strategy in Lebanon was to strengthen the Lebanese government as it countered a host of unhelpful actors amid civil war. The military assistance program—inaugurated to help the new Lebanese government exert sovereignty throughout its territory—partially failed as spoilers undermined it. External actors, including Syria and Iran, increased their aid to the opposition, and Israel undermined the Lebanese military’s efforts. The nature of U.S. involvement was mixed. Structurally, the Lebanese military was organized for internal defense and that was the mission area of focus; however, the United States propagated a confused interpretation of it. Save for one critical exception, the United States largely did not become deeply involved in personnel assignments. And over time, it increasingly focused on the expanding mandate of the deployed Marines, and on becoming a co-combatant, rather than on strengthening Lebanon’s military. By 1984, it was clear that Lebanon’s military was incapable of securing the state’s territory.

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Lebanon’s Initial Capacity: Feeble and Fragile Lebanon was a fragile state when the United States began building its military in 1982. Composed of eighteen officially recognized “confessions,” or ethnic-religious communities, Lebanon was ruled by various minority power-sharing agreements from time immemorial. Given its internal diversity, the state was deeply vulnerable to external actors supporting their favored confessions and to regional disputes. Since 1975, it had been enmeshed in a brutal and chaotic civil war triggered by the relocation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to Lebanon after its Black September expulsion from Jordan. And, by 1982, “the central government had no presence in Lebanon except around the presidential palace,” explained a senior Lebanese government official.1 Like the state, the Lebanese military was weak. Created in 1945, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) initially coalesced approximately 3,000 personnel who had served under the French colonial force. Until 1975, Lebanon’s government purposefully kept the military small because it feared coups, did not perceive a substantial external threat, and preferred to direct investment toward other areas.2 From its inception—even when it was a local force under French control—the military focused on internal defense, and it always played a limited role for fear of exacerbating confessional tensions.3 As one scholar highlighted, “the state of the army . . . largely mirrored Lebanon’s stability, sovereignty, and independence.” It was a paradox. Lebanon’s military was a weak institution whose very weakness aided Lebanese stability, and it historically received support from the Lebanese populace because of its inaction, rather than because of specific actions it took.4

Facing Many Opponents as the Civil War Further Weakens the Military In 1982, the Lebanese state faced numerous opponents of varying strengths as antagonistic state and non-state actors sought to undermine it. Syria’s military had occupied Lebanon since 1976 (under the guise of an Arab peacekeeping force), Israel’s military had just launched its second invasion in four years, and Iran was increasingly supporting a nascent nonstate actor that would soon emerge as Hizballah. A host of militias representing the various confessional groups proliferated throughout the state.

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Although the PLO had helped trigger the civil war—and the Israeli invasions—by this time it had taken on a momentum and complexity of its own. “There wasn’t just one war going on . . . we were tracking 80odd groups,” outlined a U.S. military official based in Lebanon, and a former senior Lebanese government official wryly noted, “Some days, we had no idea who was fighting who.”5 Perhaps Ambassador Philip Habib provided the most colorful description when he detailed his initial visit to Beirut after being appointed to serve as the president’s special envoy on the Middle East: “As this cable is being drafted, heavy artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire are providing noisy interruptions. It may be typical of the complex Lebanese problem that as many as five factions may be involved in this gunfire: the Lebanese army, the Syrian army, the Murabitun, the Palestinian Liberation army, along with a Shi’a faction and an Iraqi-supported group.”6 The Lebanese military was severely weakened—seven years into civil war, six years into Syrian occupation, and in the throes of a massive Israeli invasion—when the U.S. program began in 1982. It had approximately 23,000 troops who were poorly equipped—nearly half of its troops lacked appropriate uniforms and usable small arms—and most received little formal training. At an extreme, it could be seen as “a ragtag excuse for a national guard” or, as both a U.S. military official based in Lebanon at the time and a former senior Lebanese political official asserted, “there was no army.”7 The Lebanese military’s capabilities were so minimal that it could not prevent the Israeli military from parking its tanks outside the homes of senior Lebanese political officials.8 By this time, Lebanon’s military suffered from a severe lack of leadership, particularly at the top but also throughout the force. Minister of Defense Issam Khoury was overwhelmed by holding multiple ministerial portfolios during much of his tenure, and LAF Commander Victor Khoury was weak, unable to exert control over much of the military, and intrigued by a potential appointment to the presidency.9 At different periods during the civil war, the military “ceased to behave as a single entity” and was an “empty shell,” as some elements fought, deserted, joined the militias, or refused to leave their barracks based on the fluctuating political state of affairs in Lebanon. “I fought against part of the army helped by part of the army,” explained one former militia leader as he described the crumbling military during this period; it resembled “Swiss cheese,” asserted one U.S. military official based in Beirut.10 Such

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events no doubt damaged the LAF’s leadership, particularly at the midlevel, although deserters continued receiving their salaries in the hopes that it would induce their return. Furthermore, the Lebanese military promoted a substantial number of officers—1,100 military personnel, many at senior levels—just before the U.S. program began; given how poorly the military had performed in the first part of the civil war, these promotions were inexplicable.11 However, the Lebanese military was relatively balanced among the major confessions, although much less so at the brigade level. Because the initial forces had been under French control—and the French historically were closer with the Lebanese Christians—the officer corps was more heavily Christian. But by 1982, Muslims slightly predominated among enlisted personnel whereas Christians slightly predominated among officers; the only severe disparity was at the colonel level.12 And most important, the Lebanese military persevered. “That Army was the only institution in Lebanon . . . surviving,” reflected U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Robert Dillon. To be sure, it had gone through countless upheavals by the time the U.S. effort began; however, it survived as a multiconfessional—albeit disjointed—entity. Simply put, it was the sole Lebanese institution commanding broad support among the Lebanese populace. Even though it had been unable to secure the state through seven years of civil war and external intervention, the LAF remained a forum for all Lebanese, “one of the few place where there was still cooperation between Maronites, Shiites, Sunnis, Druze, Greek Catholics and others,” as Ambassador Dillon affirmed.13 Given the weak state, poor reputation, and lack of confessional diversity in Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces, extending internal defense naturally fell to the LAF when the United States became involved in Lebanon.

The American Effort Begins as the Implications of Israel’s Invasion Expand: Summer–Early Fall 1982 The United States became interested in building Lebanon’s military out of a desire to strengthen Lebanon so that its fragility no longer enabled violent non-state actors to undermine regional security and foment Arab-Israeli conflict. Some U.S. officials pushed to inaugurate a program in 1981 and even garnered substantial Lebanese political support for doing so. However,

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Syrian opposition to the idea and apathy among most senior U.S. government officials precluded its establishment at that time.14

Israel’s Invasion Catalyzes U.S. Interest in Lebanon Israel’s invasion in summer 1982 shifted the dynamic, triggering immense interest in strengthening Lebanon at senior levels of the U.S. government and ineluctably escalating American involvement in the Levant. President Reagan removed Secretary of State Al Haig from his post, in part because Haig was less concerned about the invasion, and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger identified this event as the catalyst for U.S. efforts to “secure . . . Lebanon.”15 Given that the Israelis partly justified the invasion by highlighting the Lebanese military’s weakness and unwillingness to confront nefarious Palestinian activity, a strengthened force would delegitimize—and hopefully limit—Israeli military involvement. Therefore, George Shultz, the new secretary of state, quickly urged President Reagan to “provide major U.S. assistance to the Lebanese armed forces,” which Lebanese political leaders enthusiastically supported. The nascent program would build on incoming Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel’s plan to double the Lebanese military’s size and, in Shultz’s estimation, could cost up to 200 million dollars and require stationing approximately 100 U.S. military personnel in Lebanon by inaugurating a formal Military Assistance and Advisory Group. Under his proposal, the strengthened Lebanese military would increasingly deploy throughout the state’s territory, fulfilling an internal defense mission.16 Yet the program was not launched. Instead, the United States focused on the immediate opportunity: evacuating the PLO from Lebanon, which its leadership had agreed to do after undergoing two months of heavy Israeli military attacks. Working with European allies to form the MultiNational Forces (MNF), the United States deployed approximately 800 military personnel to Lebanon in late summer 1982—assuming they would be in Beirut for “a month” to “provide appropriate assistance” so that Lebanon’s military could actually evacuate the PLO. The withdrawal proceeded smoothly, even though the Lebanese military managed to play only a limited role given its weakness. Less than three weeks later, the U.S. contingent of the MNF redeployed. Notably, it had not fulfilled the other portion of

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its mandate: “further[ing] the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.”17

Worsening Security Results in Deeper U.S. Involvement The PLO leadership’s evacuation from Lebanon in September 1982 offered a meaningful opportunity to strengthen the fragile Lebanese state because its presence had severely contributed to Lebanon’s instability. A flurry of events quickly worsened the situation in Lebanon, however, resulting in the United States abruptly deepening its involvement. Before the U.S. contingent of the MNF had even arrived in European ports, incoming Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated—he had not even been inaugurated. His brother Amin, a political novice, took over the presidency. And in response to Gemayel’s assassination, his militia massacred hundreds of Palestinians in two Beirut refugee camps: Sabra and Shatila. Out of guilt over these massacres and frustrated by the Israeli invasion, the United States redoubled its efforts in Lebanon, which manifested in two critical ways. First, it sent U.S. military personnel back to Beirut to join a reincarnated MNF. The mandate of this force—which included nearly 2,000 U.S. military personnel at its largest—was to “provide an interposition force at agreed locations . . . and assist . . . the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Beirut area.”18 Its fuzzy mission, characterized by vague rules of engagement, ultimately distracted from and undermined the U.S. program to build Lebanon’s military. Within weeks, President Gemayel became the first Lebanese president to visit Washington, and he met with President Reagan to discuss how the United States would support Lebanon, including inaugurating a vigorous program to rebuild its military, the second key aspect of U.S. efforts. Less than two weeks later, Reagan approved a new U.S. policy in Lebanon focused on facilitating the redeployment of foreign forces and strengthening the Lebanese government’s ability to “control, administer, and defend its sovereign territory” in the wake of their withdrawal. To make the withdrawal of the Israeli and Syrian militaries possible, and to enable Lebanon to secure its fragile state, the United States planned to “undertake, on a priority basis, a systematic program to rebuild the Lebanese security forces to maintain security within the country and improve the Lebanese government’s ability to assume its responsibility as quickly as possible.”19

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Program Structured Around the Right Mission, but with Erroneous Parameters The United States envisioned an internal defense mission for Lebanon’s military; however, its understanding of internal defense was flawed. According to the U.S. government’s rationale, the Lebanese military would serve as a “presence” in Lebanon, particularly through deployments alongside the MNF and the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). If the PLO’s withdrawal presaged additional redeployments by the Israelis, the Syrians, and the MNF, then the Lebanese military could fill the security gap plaguing Lebanon. In this vein, one former senior U.S. government official explained what he termed the “theme” of U.S. policy: “If ever there were to be a stable Lebanon again, as had existed in the early 1940s–mid 1970s, it would have to rely upon some measure of [political] reconciliation . . . and separately, the departure of foreign forces . . . and finally, a security force that could truly represent the country in all of its diversity with the ability to maintain the frontier, border security, and internal calm.”20 Yet this vision of internal defense was problematic, as the gap between National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 64’s goal illustrated. The United States was not building Lebanon’s military to fight the Syrian or Israeli militaries, according to senior U.S. officials. Nor was it building the LAF to counter the many militias and other non-state actors that ran rampant throughout Lebanon. Instead, its plan assumed the Lebanese military would “take over passive environmental control” of Lebanon.21 In other words, the United States was building it so that once the foreign militaries withdrew and the various insurgent forces reconciled, it would be able to exert the government’s sovereignty throughout its peaceful territory. Highlighting the conundrums inherent in this strategy, one former senior U.S. national security official explained, “The policy didn’t go beyond the conceptual stage; that is, the concept was if ultimate sovereign control of the territory was to be viable, you had to have a military. How you got from the condition of late 1982 to sovereign control was to be developed later.”22 A close—albeit imperfect parallel—for understanding how the United States viewed the Lebanese military’s future role in Lebanon was illustrated by the Marines’ mission. The U.S. military personnel were supposed to serve as a “presence” in Lebanon, which is exactly what the United States hoped a more capable LAF could epitomize.23 Both sought to fill a

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vacuum—however, the Marines were not expected to move into areas other forces had departed, which was expected of the Lebanese military—and both had distorted missions. Much of the Lebanese leadership supported this confused mission for the military. “We were not building an army to go into war with other groups . . . not to push the Syrians out or the Israelis out,” explained a former senior Lebanese political official. According to him, “there was no disagreement” with the United States that the objectives of building the Lebanese military were to “protect the republic . . . and to replace the militias and to ensure civil peace.” His emphasis on “replace” is meaningful and was purposeful; he expected that “through political negotiations with these internal forces, they would . . . withdraw . . . and then the army would come in to protect, for civil security . . . there was no disagreement on that with the U.S.” The Lebanese military’s mission could be understood “only in the context of consensus for issues that are not controversial,” articulated a former senior Lebanese political official, further buttressing this argument that the Lebanese military would counter neither militias nor foreign militaries.24 And another former senior Lebanese figure affirmed that both countries had a similar vision of how the military would “monopolize the question of sovereignty.” Few senior Lebanese officials—political or military—disagreed with this vision, although some did assert the opposite, arguing, “We were building an army to get involved in domestic issues” and an army that “fights”; notably, they did not outline whom this military would target.25 The U.S. government had now outlined the vision behind its program to build Lebanon’s military: it was predicated on a confused internal defense mission. Some very real problems quickly emerged as the U.S. program took shape because it had not resolved how the major impediments to a peaceful security situation in Lebanon would be resolved. And, the Marines’ presence invariably influenced both the perceptions and manifestation of U.S. efforts to strengthen Lebanon’s military.

A Robust Training and Equipping Program Takes Shape and the United States Influences a Key Personnel Decision: Fall 1982–Winter 1983 In fall 1982, the U.S. government established the Lebanese Army Modernization Program (LAMP), an organized effort to build Lebanon’s military.

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It was based on a quick assessment conducted by Brigadier General Gerald Bartlett, who served as the assistant division commander of the 2nd Armored Division and previously assisted Saudi Arabia’s National Guard. General Bartlett’s team of around fifteen personnel spent several weeks in Beirut immediately following Bashir Gemayel’s assassination, assessing how the United States might best support the Lebanese military and then preparing a report—nicknamed the “Bartlett Plan”—that recommended steps for strengthening it.26 It was an ambitious plan to reorganize and build Lebanon’s military. Designed to quickly train and equip the Lebanese military, Bartlett planned to “form the foundation for long-term development of a professionally competent army.” The United States would build seven wholly integrated Lebanese Army brigades over four discrete phases, and the mission would solely focus on internal defense. The force would dramatically expand— from 23,000 military personnel at the end of 1982 to 40,000 by summer 1984.27 The four phases were as follows: Phase 1: Provide the LAF with sufficient equipment to build four brigades to a 70 percent capability level (based on training and equipment) by February 1983. Although these brigades would not initially have sufficient personnel, equipment, or training, the Bartlett Plan advocated for their organization even at limited levels. A range of equipment would be sent to Lebanon, from M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other vehicles to 155 mm howitzers and uniforms. This phase was initially estimated to cost eighty-five million dollars, of which thirty-five million dollars would come from U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, and the Lebanese would pay fifty million dollars from national funds. Some of these FMS credits were unused credits from earlier phases of the civil war when the U.S. government had provided a minimal amount of aid to the LAF. Phase 2: Increase the four brigades to 100 percent capability level. This phase would also begin building two other brigades, aiming for a 65 percent to 70 percent capability level. Its cost was projected to be fifty-five million dollars. Phase 3: Complete the building of six brigades to 100 percent capability level. Develop LAF infrastructure and explore the possibility

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Table 6. Proposed U.S. Program to Strengthen Lebanon’s Military, Fall 1982

Phase

Expected Timeline

Military Strength (Personnel, Training, and Equipment)

Projected Cost

1

Fall 1982– February 1983

4 original brigades at 70 percent

$85 million

2

February 1983– to be determined

4 original brigades at 100 percent; 2 new brigades at 65–70 percent

$55 million

3

To be determined

All 6 brigades at 100 percent strength; consider additional brigades

$105 million

4

To be determined

Consider robust Navy, Air Force, and infrastructure support

To be determined

Source: Michael Collins Dunne, “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army,” Defense and Foreign Affairs (June 1983): 19; NSC, “Memorandum to William Clark from Robert Lilac.”

of building two more brigades. This phase would cost approximately 105 million dollars. Phases 2 and 3 would be covered partially by Lebanese national funds and partially in U.S. supplemental funding for Lebanon, which included one hundred million dollars in FMS loans and one million dollars for military training in the United States. Phase 4: In this phase, additional LAF infrastructure needs would be fulfilled and options to build the other Lebanese military services (the Lebanese Navy and the Lebanese Air Force) would be explored (see Table 6).28 In early November 1982, Defense Department officials led an interagency visit to Beirut to seek Lebanese political support for inaugurating the LAMP based on Bartlett’s report; Gemayel quickly accepted the proposal, welcoming robust American involvement. Less than one week later, as a first step for building the Lebanese military, the United States established an Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in Beirut, which was composed of eight U.S. military personnel led by Colonel Arthur “Tom” Fintel,

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who had spent time in Vietnam as an adviser.29 Previously, security cooperation with the Lebanese military had been handled through the U.S. Embassy’s defense attache´ office; now, there was a single U.S. office—notably, based in the Lebanese Ministry of Defense headquarters at Yarze. Moreover, U.S. officials hoped to soon establish a U.S. Military Advisory Group in Lebanon and a joint planning group with the military. The former never came to fruition, however, because tight congressional restrictions implemented after U.S. involvement in Vietnam prohibited increasing the OMC’s permanent staff beyond eight people, although limited term deployments did enable it to grow slightly.30 Bartlett’s report—and subsequently the LAMP—suffered from a critical shortcoming. It focused solely on assessing the Lebanese military’s equipment needs, and any training it recommended was simply oriented toward operating that equipment. Criticizing the Bartlett report, one senior U.S. military official involved in its execution remarked that it failed to outline the “depth” of the military’s problems. The report laid the groundwork for and encouraged a limited U.S. role in strengthening Lebanon’s military, one focused on training and equipment. Although at least one senior U.S. military official in Beirut became involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs over the next two years by influencing a key military personnel appointment, generally the limited parameters defined by the Bartlett report characterized the program’s execution.31 Between this vision and the Marines’ presence—which soon made the United States appear to be a cocombatant with Lebanon’s military—the program faced serious challenges from the beginning. Lebanese Leaders Support LAF and U.S. Involvement in Sensitive LAF Affairs From the outset, senior Lebanese political leaders supported U.S. efforts to strengthen their country’s military; they sought out U.S. involvement in sensitive military affairs. President Gemayel focused on “restoring trust in the LAF, reuniting it, reinstating the military spirit and discipline among its members, and equipping it with new armaments,” according to a former senior Lebanese official. His close advisors agreed, believing it was a critical time to “rebuild the country,” and buttressing the military was critical for strengthening the state.32 In two notable moves, Gemayel appointed a capable leader for the military—after garnering U.S. support for the new

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commander—and he ensured that Lebanon contributed financially to the LAMP. In early December 1982—only weeks after the Lebanese and American leadership formally agreed to strengthen the military—Gemayel officially named General Ibrahim Tannous to serve as the force’s new commander. His appointment process was telling. It demonstrated one of the few instances when the United States became involved in a sensitive Lebanese military issue and was the only example in which it sought to shape a LAF personnel appointment. As a former senior Lebanese military official explained, Gemayel gave a senior U.S. official in Lebanon the files of a few potential candidates for the position of LAF commander, including Tannous, a battle-hardened, war-scarred veteran. While holding the comparatively low rank of colonel, Tannous was asked by a senior Lebanese political official to meet with this senior U.S. military official. After inquiring about Tannous’s striking injuries to his eye and one of his arms, and learning that these wounds were from battles, the senior U.S. military official exclaimed, “You must head the Lebanese Army because you know how to fight.” The very next day, Tannous’s appointment as commander was announced on the radio—before Gemayel informed him of his promotion.33 Tannous went on to play a critical role in the U.S. program to build Lebanon’s military. Immediately upon taking over leadership of the LAF, he focused on its dire personnel problems. Tannous quickly replaced 140 officers due to concerns about their competence, transparency, or perceived affiliations. Removing senior officials and commanders was difficult and took some creativity; some, such as the head of military intelligence, were given appointments abroad. Further, he worked to integrate all confessions in the Lebanese military by inducing retirements to reduce the number of Christian officers and increase the number of Muslim soldiers. He also purposely designed officer cadet classes so that they were evenly split between Muslims and Christians, in an attempt to bring the confessions together under the military’s multiconfessional umbrella. With these steps, Tannous sought to standardize and professionalize the military’s promotion system, at one point going so far as to hang a list of required qualifications for good officers on his door at the Ministry of Defense.34 Illustrating U.S. enthusiasm about Tannous, Habib urged continued support for General Tannous’s “efforts to assign officers in southern Lebanon who are equipped by temperament, attitude, and experience to best carry out the agreements agreed upon.”35

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Yet given Tannous’s tense relationship with Gemayel, he might never have been appointed to lead Lebanon’s military without U.S. involvement. Multiple senior political and military officials close to both Tannous and Gemayel highlighted the poor relationship between the two leaders; in particular, Gemayel trusted Simon Kassis, the director of military intelligence, more than Tannous.36 Yet Tannous was well qualified and widely respected among senior Lebanese political figures and among U.S. political and military officials. As one former senior American official observed, Tannous was “respected by people in all of the sects.” Concurring, a senior Lebanese official highlighted that the LAF “needed someone of this caliber and with a charisma that can reunite” it.37 Gemayel also ensured that Lebanon contributed financially to the LAMP. Unlike most U.S. programs to strengthen partner militaries, the Lebanese government purchased the majority of U.S. training and equipment. Of the first eighty-five million dollars required for the inaugural phase, Gemayel quickly contributed fifty million dollars in Lebanese national funds. As the LAMP developed, the United States and Lebanon divided the sum of the program’s first three phases—which grew to approximately 500 million dollars—almost in half, with the United States agreeing to pay 235 million dollars. The U.S. government paid for its share with a combination of previously unused FMS credits, reprogrammed foreign military financing, and supplemental funds, while Lebanon used national funds; it was the rare country that managed to have substantial reserves in spite of its nationwide civil war.38 And even with the aid gifted by the United States, senior Lebanese military officers were creative in stretching the funds. For example, rather than permitting training participants in the United States to use the per diem they received at their discretion—as most countries’ participants did—the Lebanese military pooled per diem funds so that they could be used to purchase additional training slots.39 “Everything It Takes” as the Training and Equipment Flow to the LAF The task that the United States and Lebanon faced in building Lebanon’s military when the LAMP began toward the end of 1982 was formidable. They “started from zero,” as one senior Lebanese political official described, and the United States supplied “everything it takes to get an

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army going,” highlighted the director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency.40 U.S. assistance to Lebanon’s military began modestly, with an initial tranche of twenty-five APCs, twenty-five 155 mm howitzers, and some communications equipment. Over the subsequent months, the United States rushed 1,000 vehicles to Beirut, including 102 M-48 tanks and 500 APCs, among other items such as 70 artillery pieces and 30,000 M-16 rifles. It also sent basic assistance such as uniforms and tents—vital to a military in which “40% of its soldiers . . . [lacked] regulation footwear.”41 There was a heavy psychological element to the type of U.S. aid provided. Although the United States took into account Lebanese operational needs based on the Bartlett report, it particularly sought to provide the military with materiel that advertised its presence. Given the numerous armed actors in Lebanon, U.S. officials believed Lebanon’s populace needed to see an increasing LAF presence in order to believe it could extend the Lebanese government’s sovereignty. For example, the Lebanese military did not require as many APCs and tanks as the United States disbursed, but U.S. officials thought the psychological impact of such large armored vehicles was “valuable,” as one former senior U.S. military official described.42 Concurring, a former senior Lebanese political figure explained that such materiel demonstrated “that there is a national militia that could be seen as more equal and, in time, used against” the other armed forces in Lebanon.43 U.S. officials expected the symbolism of such equipment would have a corresponding effect on the Lebanese military’s domestic support and willingness to operate aggressively. The LAMP’s training portion formally began in early January 1983, although the marines who were in Lebanon as part of the MNF had been training the military since early in their deployment. Although U.S. military personnel provided training in both countries—for example, almost sixty lieutenants participated in basic training at Fort Benning—the vast majority of training was in Lebanon, for reasons of cost and convenience. Training exercises organized by the Marines included three weeks of general military, helicopter, and naval training; however, the vast majority of training came from approximately eighty to one hundred U.S. military advisors participating in Mobile Training Teams, or groups of U.S. military personnel sent to Lebanon on a temporary basis restricted to a few weeks. The Mobile Training Teams provided a variety of training to Lebanese soldiers, including basic infantry skills, artillery skills, combat skills, logistics, and maintenance.44 As

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OMC Chief Fintel described, U.S. military personnel in Lebanon provided the gamut of training to Lebanon’s military, “teach[ing] everything from combat tactics to how to dig latrines.”45 From the outset, the training program exceeded the U.S. military’s expectations. Lebanese military officers generally had high education levels, which made training easier, and many had attended U.S. Army schools, giving them an insight into how the U.S. military operates.46 In a particularly thoughtful move, U.S. and Lebanese military personnel arranged for each unit to receive new individual soldier equipment, including uniforms and boots, after undergoing an entire month of training, in the hopes that it would raise morale throughout the Lebanese military.47 Substantial equipment and targeted training flowed to Lebanon’s military, yet U.S. military personnel did not expand their role to advise the LAF in the field as the program developed. Nor did they seriously seek to influence personnel affairs beyond Tannous’s appointment. The Marines’ presence implied a more intense level of American involvement than was actually the case.

The Program Progresses, but the Politics Worsen: Spring–Summer 1983 Throughout spring and summer 1983, the LAMP made substantial progress, and by the end of this period, Lebanon’s military had seven functioning brigades of varying capabilities.48 Yet the internal decision-making process among senior U.S. officials was in disarray. In Beirut and in Washington, a multitude of U.S. officials were involved in U.S.-Lebanon affairs, and their disagreements erupted in heated tensions and uncertainty. The program to strengthen Lebanon’s military was making progress, but it had much to accomplish before it was transformed. Rifts in Debate About U.S. Vision of Its Involvement Have Lasting Implications From LAMP’s inception and throughout its entirety, senior U.S. officials remained deeply divided about the appropriate American role in Lebanon; these divisions resulted in a nightmarish and heavily flawed decision-making process.49 Although senior political and military officials— including President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense

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Weinberger, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—were personally involved in facilitating U.S. support to the Lebanese military, they held wildly different views of the nature of U.S. efforts in Lebanon. In particular, they disagreed over how to push antagonistic external actors out of Lebanon, according to one senior U.S. official involved in these discussions, because the Lebanese military was not yet capable and the MNF was unwilling to do so. This tension was exacerbated by Reagan’s unwillingness to personally break the bureaucratic impasses plaguing decision making on Lebanon.50 His decision-making style of seeking consensus among his team was especially problematic in this case, given the tremendous level of disagreement at senior levels of the U.S. government, which was further muddled by his inaction. The confusion was palpable and problematic; as one former senior U.S. official lamented, “Everybody’s entitled to their own opinions, but we couldn’t even get together on the facts.”51 Unsurprisingly, the Lebanese political leadership was aware of these fractures; for example, one former senior Lebanese official remarked that internal U.S. disagreements were much more substantial than U.S.-Lebanese conflicts.52 Secretary of State Shultz and Robert “Bud” McFarlane (who replaced Habib as the Middle East envoy and later served as a senior official to President Reagan) maintained an expansive view of U.S. involvement in Lebanon. As Shultz recounted, “The Lebanese government particularly relied on us to save them from outside predators and to help them restore Lebanese central authority.” He and McFarlane advocated for a deep U.S. role in working with the Lebanese military; as one former senior U.S. official explained, they “urged . . . [the U.S.] military [to] develop a genuine military mission in the traditional sense . . . to make clear that at least the capability [existed], if not the actual movement to require Syrian and Israel forces to leave the country.”53 Conversely, Defense Department officials, such as Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey, Jr., urged limited U.S. involvement. Weinberger generally supported a formal defense partnership with Lebanon, but he viewed its utility within a regional context: he argued that the United States benefited from positive relations with Middle East countries, and he deeply feared American involvement in war against Muslims. Skeptical of U.S. efforts to help Lebanon’s military establish internal security until the Israeli and Syrian militaries redeployed from Lebanon, Weinberger did not want the U.S. contingent of the MNF to be too closely identified with Lebanon’s military and

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opposed joint patrols.54 Although Vessey was involved in the LAMP’s execution, he limited his role to closely monitoring the Office of Military Cooperation’s work and facilitating equipment deliveries to Lebanon; he did not become involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs. He did, however, maintain a direct satellite communication with the Office of Military Cooperation in Beirut, receive a report from it each day at 1700 hours, and personally chose Colonel Fintel’s successor later that year: Colonel Al Baker. Moreover, Vessey redirected equipment from U.S. Army stockpiles to Lebanon’s military when General Tannous requested assistance that was not immediately available.55 In addition to substantial disagreements among senior U.S. officials in Washington about the appropriate U.S. role in Lebanon, President Reagan’s envoys further contributed to the disarray. Because the envoys were personally appointed by Reagan and had overlapping responsibilities with the Embassy teams, their mere existence inevitably led to tension. Although relations were better during Habib’s tenure, particularly between him and Ambassador Dillon, he had a tense relationship with the Embassy’s military staff; as one of its members despaired, Habib “read me the riot act because I had not built the LAF yet.” Habib bypassed the interagency decisionmaking structure; as one former senior Defense Department official asserted, “It was not an interagency process. It was basically Habib reporting back to the White House and to Shultz, and the interagency process trotting along behind.”56 When McFarlane replaced Habib in summer 1983, relations plummeted because the Embassy staff disliked his analysis and operational style. It was “a shameful situation,” according to Dillon, dismayed after hearing a member of McFarlane’s staff say, “I hate to lie to an American Ambassador,” following a conversation with him. Dillon took pains to emphasize— decades later—that not a single member of McFarlane’s staff had regional expertise or spoke Arabic. Like Habib, McFarlane’s staff also bypassed formal communication channels. For example, Brigadier General Carl Stiner, the Defense Department’s representative to McFarlane’s team, reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ignored both his military chain of command and the intelligence community.57 Given this tangled decision-making process, the multiplicity and personalities of actors involved in Lebanon and in Washington, and the deep disagreements among key U.S. officials, the nature of U.S. involvement in

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Lebanon remained muddled throughout the first half of 1983. Such incoherence enabled unhelpful external actors to further exacerbate tensions in Lebanon and weaken the fragile Lebanese state.

Stymied by Antagonistic External Actors Antagonistic external actors, notably Israel, Iran, and Syria, impeded the U.S. effort to strengthen Lebanon’s military during this period. The deployment of the Israeli and Syrian militaries, and their support of various non-state entities, made it particularly difficult to empower Lebanon’s military. Throughout spring 1983, the U.S. national security team—known as the National Security Planning Group (NSPG)—explored how to encourage an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, in the hopes that removing one antagonistic external actor would make it easier to facilitate the departure of others. Senior White House officials urged President Reagan to focus on this issue; one described a meeting to discuss it as “one of the most important foreign policy meetings we will have.” Emphasizing that “we are at a watershed” in Lebanon and “the credibility of U.S. power and U.S. leadership is at stake,” President Reagan believed the United States must work to alleviate Israeli security concerns in Lebanon; at one point he even considered making a commitment to Israel that the United States would guarantee its northern border security. Instead, the United States offered security proposals to empower the Lebanese military, which the Israelis distrusted, and to expand the MNF’s deployment to southern Lebanon in tandem with the LAF, which MNF members opposed.58 Yet the other effort aimed at enabling an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon—the May 17, 1983 peace agreement brokered by the United States— not only failed, but it also encouraged Damascus to redouble its efforts to undermine the Lebanese state. President Reagan signed NSDD-92, “Accelerating the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Lebanon,” immediately before the Lebanese government approved this agreement; while it remains classified, its declassified title and timing offer clues that senior U.S. officials believed an Israeli withdrawal would, in turn, lead to a Syrian redeployment.59 But Syria viewed the formal signing of this agreement as violating a red line because it was conditioned on the redeployment of Syrian troops. Syrian leaders quickly pressured the Lebanese political leadership to nullify

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it. Moreover, they fomented protests throughout the state and targeted Lebanese state institutions, further destabilizing Lebanon. As one former senior militia leader argued, the agreement exacerbated the ongoing civil war.60 Syria also targeted the U.S. presence: Damascus declared Habib persona non grata for brokering the agreement, so he resigned as special envoy and was replaced by McFarlane in summer 1983. In addition to the challenges posed by Israel and Syria—neither rapprochement nor redeployment had taken hold in either case—Iran played an increasingly unhelpful role in Lebanon. A coalescence of events, including the civil war, nascent activism among the Lebanese Shi’a, the disappearance of a major Shi’a figure from the Shi’a leadership landscape (Imam Musa Sadr), the Israeli invasions, and Iran’s revolution enabled Iran to deepen its involvement in Lebanon, namely by helping establish Hizballah.61 Throughout 1983, hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps members flooded Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, offering military training and financial assistance to this violent non-state actor and further undermining Lebanon. Not only did the Iranian military personnel assist Hizballah, but they also fought alongside it against the Lebanese military.62 Moreover, Iran also supported efforts to undermine the United States in Lebanon, the first being the April 18, 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Among the sixty-three people killed in the attack were four U.S. military personnel leading an equipment maintenance training program for the Lebanese military.63 Although the United States was aware of unhelpful efforts by Syria and Iran, it underestimated them, according to one former senior U.S. official who explained, “We didn’t have sufficiently thorough intelligence regarding Iran’s role and enthusiasm with Syria for supporting the Shia minority . . . what became Hizballah.” As he pointed out, “Syria and Iran were focusing on what could be done to neutralize this effort to stand up a Lebanese armed force that could some day protect the country.”64 Taken together, these three antagonistic external actors continued undermining efforts to strengthen the Lebanese state. By supporting the government’s opponents, or by simply failing to work with the fledgling government, the involvement of Israel, Syria, and Iran was often at odds with efforts to extend internal defense in Lebanon. And U.S. reluctance to become deeply involved in transforming Lebanon’s military further exacerbated these challenges.

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Equipment and Training Flow to Lebanon’s Military Throughout much of 1983, the LAMP made substantial progress in strengthening the Lebanese military. OMC Chief Fintel rejoiced to journalists that he was already “two years ahead of schedule” as equipment, training, and personnel flowed to the LAF.65 In spring, Congress voted to give Lebanon one hundred million dollars in supplemental security assistance, as requested earlier by the administration; notably, both the House of Representatives and the Senate voted within two days of the U.S. Embassy bombing.66 This aid package constituted the bulk of large-scale U.S. assistance to the LAF; the administration planned to reduce aid the next year because all heavy equipment deliveries and training would be nearly complete, assuming absorption capacity on the LAF’s part did not pose a challenge. Notably, it was timed to coincide with the U.S.-anticipated Israeli and Syrian withdrawals during summer 1983, another demonstration of the high expectations that the United States had for the May 17, 1983 agreement. On the training front, the U.S. military had approximately eighty personnel in Lebanon by summer 1983. They organized programs composed of four weeks of basic training and then “specialized exercises in urban and anti-terrorist operations.” With this training, the Lebanese military grew increasingly capable; after one year, it could mobilize an entire unit of 160 soldiers in three minutes.67 The military’s performance particularly improved in “maintenance capabilities . . . tank gunnery, [and] infantry maneuver,” according to a former U.S. military official involved in this effort.68 Both parties remained enthusiastic about the training and sought to increase it to the extent possible; it involved the “best methods,” praised one former senior Lebanese military official, and was described as “very good” and “very professional,” according to others.69 To Colonel Tim Geraghty, commander of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, the U.S. contingent of the MNF, “all indications appeared that the training program was progressing well.”70 And in Washington, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East received monthly briefings on the training program’s status.71 Training did move at a slower pace than the United States had initially envisioned; however, this was due to a lack of training areas, not due to a dearth of support on either side. But the parties were creative in finding places; the newly created Ranger battalion

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even held urban warfare exercises in the center of Beirut because much of the downtown was shuttered due to the ongoing conflict.72 U.S. equipment moved quickly to Lebanon, particularly as senior U.S. officials became personally involved in facilitating it. As one former senior U.S. military official involved in this program boasted, “When I needed something, someone moved it. . . . I got anything I asked for . . . if they [the LAF] could convince me, I could get it done.”73 President Reagan personally agreed to send more ammunition and tanks to the Lebanese military when Gemayel requested an influx of aid during his July 1983 visit to Washington, according to a senior Lebanese official who participated in the trip.74 Incidentally, ground vehicles represented a substantial portion of U.S. support to Lebanon’s military during this period; by August 1983, the United States had sent nearly 500 vehicles to Lebanon, including M48A5 tanks, M113 APCs, trucks, and jeeps.75 General Vessey was another example of senior-level involvement. During his summer 1983 visit to Lebanon—characterized as “very productive” by both a U.S. participant and a senior Lebanese political leader—he told senior Lebanese military leaders, “We can now give you something good.” Based on his trip, he pushed to send sixty-eight M48A5 tanks to Lebanon, in addition to howitzers and anti-tank missiles. Notably, these were M198 howitzers, the most sophisticated 155 mm howitzers available at the time.76 Such personal senior involvement helped explain how the U.S. supported the Lebanese military “without a lot of bureaucratic hurdles,” as one senior Lebanese politician noted.77 But senior Lebanese officials were divided on the utility of U.S.provided materiel. Many former senior Lebanese military officials praised it; for example, one commented that he received “all the equipment” desired and another exhorted that with “equipment, mortars, machine guns, ammunition . . . no one could beat us.” However, others criticized the nature of the equipment, arguing it was “not new enough,” or “of third or fourth rank,” or “things we do not need.” Further, one former senior Lebanese political figure thought the United States did not give the best equipment available because it was never “100% comfortable about stability and worried that weapons would be given to militias or used against Israel.” Although the equipment’s utility may have been disputed, the United States had helped the military organize its logistical system, which had previously been “26 warehouses jam packed with junk [and] no controls,” according to a former senior military officer involved in the program.78

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7 Brigades

7 Brigades at 75% Strength

4 Light Brigades

1 Ranger Brigade

Figure 5. Updated organization of Lebanon’s military.

Reorganizing Lebanon’s Military for Internal Defense Lebanon’s military was in the process of reorganizing for its internal defense mission and growing quickly. By summer 1983, seven brigades had been organized; the Lebanese military leadership then established the 8th Brigade—a Ranger brigade—and decided to ultimately create a twelvebrigade military. Figure 5 captures this new organization plan for Lebanon’s military. A former senior Lebanese official was impressed that the United States helped reorganize the military “from decentralized units to brigades . . . [and] combat groups were established and organized in a more efficient manner as well.”79 However, U.S. assistance remained focused on the Lebanese Army; neither the air force nor the navy received much support during this period.80 Reorganization had made such progress because the military grew fast once the government began enforcing conscription on April 18, 1983. The Lebanese military grew by 10 percent per month for the next year; it grew so fast that the Lebanese leadership at one point requested an urgent shipment of 5,000 uniforms from the United States to provide the new troops with appropriate attire. By the end of summer 1983, the Lebanese military was “far and away the largest Lebanese armed forces in the country.”81 To be sure, its burgeoning size had some flaws. First, the Lebanese leadership had high aspirations for the military’s ultimate size, hoping for 60,000 personnel, whereas the United States supported a force much

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smaller—no larger than 45,000—which the state could both afford and deftly employ.82 Yet the United States played a limited role in this regard and—in its unwillingness to become involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs—did not seriously counter these plans. More worryingly, many of the new recruits had been active militia members, so their loyalties were invariably uncertain. Although the militias did not appear to encourage their members to flood the military in an effort to influence its activities, at least some did tone down their vitriol against it. For example, the Christian militia leaders no longer “discourag[ed] young men in their territory from joining” Lebanon’s military.83 Muslim and Christian personnel in the burgeoning military appeared to cooperate; as one former senior U.S. national security official emphasized, “The first steps getting recruits from each of the confessions were working.” But as he then warned, “Reports from the field were honest and clear in saying that this was going to take time. . . . I don’t think anybody had any misgivings . . . that this was a done deal.”84 Issues of loyalty and confession even influenced U.S. equipment to the Lebanese military, a dynamic that could have been mitigated if the United States had chosen to become deeply involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs. As one Lebanese security analyst explained, “The U.S. gave assistance to the LAF and the LAF chose who received the assistance.” The result was that most of the heavy equipment was funneled to Christian-led and Christian-majority brigades, the 5th, 8th, and 10th Brigades. Both the Lebanese populace and militia leaders were well aware of this distribution. In trying to work with and support the Lebanese military, the United States had inadvertently given assistance that exploited confessional tensions within it.85 Tannous’s Leadership Is Necessary, but Insufficient On the personnel front, American unwillingness to become deeply involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs was also problematic. Pushing for Tannous’s appointment had been influential, to be sure. He often impressed senior U.S. officials, who described him in glowing terms, including referring to him as “a hero . . . [a] great soldier, great leader.” In particular, his emphasis on U.S.-Lebanese relations was noteworthy because Tannous made it clear that he relied solely on the United States to build Lebanon’s military. Although he could have purchased war materiel on the

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open market, which some U.S. military officers suggested because it would have been delivered more quickly, he refused to do so. He did not want to risk his credibility and the Americans’ trust in him; furthermore, he sought to demonstrate Lebanon’s deepening engagement with and commitment to the United States and its policies.86 But the Lebanese military lacked competent leadership at other levels, and Tannous made changes as he could. Before his tenure began, sixty Lebanese military personnel had been promoted to colonel and ninety to lieutenant colonel; given the military’s limited actions to date and poor performance previously, many of these promotions may not have been warranted. Therefore, Tannous tried to sideline the Military Council, which had “paralyzed” military decision making due to its diverse composition, and made new appointments. But many senior Lebanese military officers did not support his efforts; as one senior U.S. official rued, “You need subordinates at all levels that shared the mission,” implying that Tannous was at times alone in his efforts to transform the military.87 Given the limits set by the United States, however, its personnel in Washington and in Lebanon did not actively support Tannous in these efforts. The confused U.S. mission outlined for Lebanon’s military remained problematic; deeper U.S. involvement in sensitive Lebanese military affairs would have forced it to settle this issue. The program continued to be based on two ideas: a cessation of violent activity and the Lebanese government “asserting[ing] full control throughout its sovereign territory.”88 But how this would be implemented remained uncertain because the United States still had not reconciled this critical flaw in its program, which envisioned Lebanon’s military exerting the government’s sovereignty throughout peaceful territory—territory that was not yet secured. For example, the United States knew that stabilizing south Lebanon was critical, given the substantial Israeli and militia presence there. But its suggested policies for doing so—such as deploying a “territorial brigade” composed jointly of Lebanese military and militia forces outfitted with “sophisticated surveillance equipment”—were not feasible given the military’s weakness and the involvement of antagonistic external actors in supporting these non-state groups.89 Unsurprisingly, therefore, this notion remained aspirational. Focusing on training and equipment, U.S. officials remained optimistic and extolled the program’s success. In language that would be repeated often by members of the administration throughout the next year, Secretary of Defense Weinberger connected the train-and-equip effort to the LAF’s

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ability to “extend the central government’s authority” throughout Lebanon. Nicholas Veliotes, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, emphasized that “already, this assistance has had a notable effect,” and he highlighted that the Lebanese military was in “full control of Beirut.” General Philip Gast, director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, explained the U.S. equipment had “done a great deal to improve the [military’s] morale and to encourage the Lebanese Armed Forces to be prepared to move out when foreign forces withdraw.” And McFarlane— characterizing U.S. successes in Lebanon to date as “spare”—assessed that the program to build Lebanon’s military was the only area in which the U.S. government had made real progress in Lebanon.90 Yet they were missing the larger picture. Limited U.S. involvement in sensitive Lebanese military affairs had laid the groundwork for training and equipping Lebanon’s military, but it had allowed some significant errors. Reflecting on U.S. efforts in Lebanon, McFarlane recognized that further progress would be difficult. He said, “Their unfortunate acronym, LAF, was always a poignant reminder to me of the contradictions inherent in its very existence. The truth was that this army could not amount to anything if there were no political agreement among all the factions that it represented. Only when those factions came together would this be the national army.”91 It had been less than a year since the United States began its program to build Lebanon’s military. Soon the security situation in Lebanon markedly worsened, embroiling the Lebanese military in active warfare and resulting in the United States becoming a co-combatant.

“Tested All the Time”: Fall 1983 In fall 1983, Lebanon’s military was overwhelmed by challenges and “tested all the time,” as a former senior Lebanese official described the increasing instability.92 Although it was the largest armed force in Lebanon, the military was unable to contend with its many opponents; in particular, external actors like Israel, Iran, and Syria further undermined its efforts to exert sovereignty throughout Lebanese territory. The nature of American involvement shifted, but instead of becoming more involved in strengthening Lebanon’s military, the United States focused on its developing role as a co-combatant. “Are we providing any more than a band aid to a situation

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that requires much more?” wondered one former U.S. military official as he continued dispatching U.S. training teams to Lebanon.93 Fighting Against Some Opponents . . . but Not Others Throughout fall 1983, the Lebanese military began countering its opponents in the Chouf Mountains and in Beirut and its outskirts. In both places, it was criticized because of the groups it ignored rather than those that it fought. In the Chouf, the Lebanese military engaged in its first serious combat in years when, beginning in August, it fought Druze militants supported by Palestinians funneled in from Syria. The Israeli military then began redeploying from the Chouf in early September, leaving large swaths of territory open for the Lebanese military or the militias to occupy. President Reagan urged the Israeli leadership to delay its military withdrawal in order to facilitate the Lebanese military’s entrance there. White House staff had been worried about a precipitous Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf since Gemayel’s summer visit to Washington and wondered what role the United States should play should it occur; discussions on this topic among the national security team were inconclusive for months.94 Nevertheless, Israel was unwilling to coordinate its withdrawal in any way with Lebanon’s military. As Israeli officials told U.S. officials, they feared doing so out of concern that it would increase casualties because they did not trust Lebanon’s military and wanted a speedy redeployment, given an upcoming holiday in Israel. Therefore, the Israeli military leadership informed General Tannous of their planned withdrawal only the night before commencing it, and they wholly refused to work with mid-level Lebanese soldiers who raced to the Chouf in the hopes of filling the emerging vacuum.95 This unwillingness deeply undermined the Lebanese military and enabled militias—particularly the Druze—and Syria’s military to fill the vacuum. And simultaneously, the Lebanese military began deploying in and around Beirut, particularly in Suq al Gharb, a critical strategic location that provided entry into the city, overlooking the presidential palace at Baabda, the Ministry of Defense at Yarze, Beirut International Airport (where the Marines were based), and much of East Beirut. Given its significance, the Lebanese political leadership felt it had little choice but to order the LAF’s involvement because losing Suq al Gharb could imperil one of the semifunctioning institutions in Lebanon: the presidency. It was an important

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moment to “protect the institutions of the country,” according to a Lebanese government official. Deploying to East Beirut was especially meaningful insofar as it showed the Lebanese government’s willingness to confront Christian—not just Muslim—militias, particularly important given that President Gemayel’s family was affiliated with the Lebanese Forces Christian militia. But in East Beirut, the Lebanese military established checkpoints and observation posts; it did not try to disarm the Christian militias, a glaring contradiction to its activities in Muslim West Beirut.96 Neither the Lebanese military’s efforts in the Chouf nor in and around Beirut was going well. In a trend that would soon include nearly half of the army, soldiers began deserting, including Major General Nadim Hakim, the LAF’s chief of staff and highest-ranking Druze. Many were frustrated that the military had begun acting against Druze and Muslim militias but had not seriously countered Christian militias or the Israeli or Syrian militaries. Within months, thousands of Druze and Shi’a soldiers defected or deserted; many of the Druze were spurred to do so by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s entreaties. For example, at one point “150 Shiites in the army simply surrendered and were stripped of their weapons and armor before being freed.”97 Moreover, militias began capturing Lebanese military leaders and materiel. General Makkarum, the Bekaa area commander, and four hundred of his troops were taken hostage; he was the most senior officer captured to date, and this represented the largest number of troops taken prisoner at that time, according to the head of Lebanese military intelligence, Simon Kassis. Militias overran the LAF’s Baalbek barracks, seizing nine 122 mm artillery pieces, and captured more than fifty soldiers—along with ten vehicles—in the Chouf Mountains. It was a dire situation, and as one Lebanese political figure described, “We were threatened every night. Tannous would call and say [that] tonight the front may fall, be prepared to evacuate.”98 Deepening U.S. Involvement but as a Co-Combatant, Not an Adviser As violence skyrocketed, given the Lebanese military’s increased activism and the vacuum thrust open by the Israeli military’s withdrawal from the Chouf, the United States changed the nature of its involvement in Lebanon. Violence worsened to such an extent that combat pay was authorized

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for the Marines participating in the MNF.99 However, instead of deepening American involvement in transforming the Lebanese military, the United States chose to focus on continuing training and equipping it and then began supporting it as a co-combatant rather than as an adviser. Early on, the U.S. leadership recognized the shift in Lebanon. Senior officials termed the military’s willingness to deploy to the Chouf an important “turning point” and even described it as maintaining a “successful” presence to the Israeli leadership.100 Such assessments appeared to be tied to the confused U.S. understanding of how the Lebanese military would operate and were quickly proven incorrect because this area was not peaceful territory in which the Lebanese military could maintain a presence, as senior U.S. officials had envisioned in the initial NSDD. Tactically, the United States redoubled its equipment and training support to the military. General Vessey immediately diverted 500,000 rounds of ammunition from the U.S. MNF’s supply to support it; the military desperately required fresh ammunition because—as he described it—it was firing “like a militia,” spraying and wasting bullets. The ammunition was rushed so quickly that two types of unauthorized materiel were accidently diverted to it.101 Separately, the United States sent an additional shipment of tanks, APCs, howitzers, and ammunition, although that materiel took approximately two weeks to arrive.102 More strategically, however, the upsurge in fighting increasingly focused the debate within the U.S. government on striking a balance between indirectly supporting Lebanon’s military through the provision of training and equipment and directly supporting it as it confronted enemies. Shultz, McFarlane, and CIA Director Casey wanted the United States to employ antiterrorism forces and a naval presence and to expand the Marines’ rules of engagement, whereas the Defense Department leadership opposed such steps; this divide worsened throughout fall 1983.103 McFarlane was particularly convinced when he experienced an attack firsthand while visiting Beirut in mid-September 1983. As he warned in a classified cable: “This is a serious threat of a decisive military defeat which could involve the fall of the GOL [Government of Lebanon] within twenty-four hours. Last night’s battle was waged within five kilometers of the Presidential Palace. For those at the State Department, this would correlate to an enemy attacking from Capitol Hill. . . . Ammunition and morale are very low, and raise serious possibilities that an enemy brigade . . . will break through and penetrate the Beirut perimeter. In short, tonight we could be in enemy lines.”104

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On the ground, General Tannous painted a dire picture of the military’s status to McFarlane’s staff. He expressed his doubt that it could defend its positions for “thirty minutes,” based on dramatic reports he received from Michel Aoun, the 8th Brigade’s commander.105 Therefore, President Reagan decided to expand the U.S. military’s rules of engagement in Lebanon, which ultimately distracted from efforts to strengthen the Lebanese military. He issued NSDD-103, which outlined how the U.S. military would help defend Suq al Gharb, including employing naval vessels to fire on Lebanese positions, rather than simply defending American positions. President Reagan did not view the change in rules of engagement to be meaningful; as he wrote in his diary after naval gunfire was first used on September 19, “This still comes under the head of defense.”106 And with U.S. support, Lebanon’s military managed to hold its positions at Suq al Gharb, delighting American and Lebanese officials alike, despite the defections.107 But the nature of American involvement in Lebanon changed markedly once the U.S. Navy had fired 360 five-inch shells at Suq al Gharb, and it continued to do so as President Reagan took additional decisions over the following weeks to support Lebanon’s military at “strategic arteries to Beirut” when they were “in danger of being overrun by hostile forces.” As Colonel Geraghty, commander of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, articulated, the initial step was “a milestone . . . it moved us from a previous, very careful razor edge line of neutrality that we were walking and treating all the Lebanese communities alike.” The U.S. role was slipping from facilitating indirect support to the Lebanese military to directly supporting it and even participating in combat operations. American military personnel now fought on behalf of Lebanon’s military rather than advising its personnel how best to do so. And by the end of 1983, the battleship USS New Jersey was regularly firing on anti-aircraft positions in the Chouf Mountains occupied by the Syrian military and the Druze militia.108 Nevertheless, those Americans involved in strengthening the Lebanese military largely limited their role. In one example, U.S. military personnel training the Lebanese military were under strict orders to immediately leave any site should the military begin engaging in battle. And, as one former senior Lebanese military official explained in an effort to illustrate how foolish this distinction had become, in one training exercise, a U.S. soldier illustrated how to use equipment to jam communications but would not do it himself because, he explained to the Lebanese military officer,

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he believed it would be considered “an act of war.”109 Becoming an active participant in Lebanon’s war was distracting the United States from transforming Lebanon’s military. As Ambassador Dillon found when he came to Washington in the fall—having been replaced by Reginald Bartholomew—U.S. officials there were “only interested in discussing the Marine issue . . . the issue has become just the Marines, not Lebanon,” demonstrating how the program to build the Lebanese military was becoming sidelined.110 Amid these efforts, Iran redoubled its efforts to undermine U.S. policy in Lebanon. It helped Hizballah launch a massive suicide bombing against the U.S. MNF contingent, killing 241 U.S. military personnel in Beirut on October 23, 1983. The attack was devastating, and U.S. officials quickly urged the Lebanese leadership to “tighten security in the south Beirut area . . . to assist in controlling the movement of hostile terrorist factions.”111 Donald Rumsfeld, the new regional envoy, warned after visiting Beirut that opponents in Lebanon were “unscrupulous . . . [have] endless patience and steel and no internal restraints.” Underscoring the role played by other unhelpful external actors in Lebanon, Rumsfeld quipped to the secretary of state, “If Gemayel fears Israel can ‘eat him like a mouthful of bread,’ the Syrians could do so like a potato chip.”112 Spoilers like Iran, Syria, and Israel impeded meaningful progress. And during this period, as the nature of U.S. involvement shifted and antagonistic external actors overwhelmed the Lebanese military in various ways, flaws within the program to strengthen Lebanon’s military became clear. Drawing parallels to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Rumsfeld highlighted concerns about external actors and the confused and complicated U.S. vision and authorities, particularly the U.S. role in the MNF; he stressed, “In the future, we should never use U.S. troops as a peacekeeping force.” Tackling the internal defense mission specifically, he wondered “whether the U.S. may be training and equipping the LAF to fight the wrong war” and described it as “a bit like trying to build a house with a hammer and a saw.”113 Similarly, the intelligence community put together a Special National Intelligence Estimate that came to rare agreement among intelligence analysts: it argued, “the LAF would probably never be able to perform any duty more ambitious than maintaining some internal security, and even that would be beyond it if soldiers were asked to fight against their own religious communities.” As one CIA analyst explained, various senior officials, including Vessey, criticized the assessment.114 But in trying

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to help Lebanon’s military, the United States had propagated a flawed program. And in fall 1983, it had become a co-combatant.

Instead of “Reorientation,” the U.S. Effort Effectively Ends: Winter 1983–Spring 1984 By winter 1983, the ambitious U.S. program to strengthen Lebanon’s military was flailing. Focused on its increasing role as a co-combatant, the United States was distracted from transforming Lebanon’s military as violence increased, the Lebanese grew even more divided, and antagonistic external actors countered efforts to empower the Lebanese government. Although the United States had considered redoubling its involvement in Lebanon—and one U.S. official in Lebanon recognized that the crux of the U.S. program required strong leadership in Beirut—both efforts failed. Within a period of months, U.S. involvement in Lebanon narrowed, and the U.S. program to build its military to exert the government’s sovereignty petered out. Continuing U.S. Support While Reconsidering the Nature of Its Involvement Substantial training and equipment had flowed to the Lebanese military from the United States. By early 1984, the United States had delivered 600 million dollars (out of an expected 720 million dollars) in materiel support. And by this time, the U.S. military had trained 10,000 to 15,000 Lebanese troops over approximately fifteen months. Nearly 300 U.S. military personnel had conducted the training, organizing forty-one separate Mobile Training Team courses focused on basic and infantry skills, while the Rangers received advanced training in “long-range skills, a military euphemism for missions behind enemy lines.”115 And unlike equipment—which was distributed unevenly—training had been relatively equally divided between Muslim and Christian soldiers. As the situation in Lebanon worsened, U.S. involvement in Lebanon reached an inflection point over the winter. In preparation for Gemayel’s third visit to Washington, the U.S. national security team considered what the United States was “prepared to do to support him”; however, they could not come to an agreement. Gemayel’s trip ended up being a veritable failure

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as the United States was unwilling to cancel the May 17 agreement, which the Lebanese blamed for the worsening security situation; the two parties publicly talked past one another, and privately, Gemayel returned from the trip “more lost,” lamented a former senior Lebanese official.116 In Washington, there were weeks of debate about the U.S. role in Lebanon going forward; throughout it, the U.S. co-combatant role intensified as the battleship USS New Jersey and the destroyer USS Tattnall engaged in their most intense fighting to date, firing against Druze militias. Nevertheless, U.S. officials decided a “reorientation” of U.S. involvement in Lebanon was necessary. To that end, President Reagan approved NSDD-123, which outlined a more robust plan to support the Lebanese military by accelerating equipment and training to build a larger, more effective force with enhanced counter-terrorism capabilities through increased ammunition, targeting information, U.S. Special Forces training, and “naval gunfire and air support.”117 But this “reorientation” never came to fruition, as the events of February 1984 would soon demonstrate. The Lebanese military faced serious challenges: save for Tannous, it lacked real leadership that could convince personnel to stay loyal to the force—rather than deserting it—and be willing to fight in the face of strengthened militias and antagonistic external actors. Instead, the Marines quickly redeployed—as the Defense Department hoped—and exhausted from and distracted by their involvement, the U.S. program to strengthen Lebanon’s military soon fell by the wayside. Not Much Military to Support as Adversaries Grow Stronger Throughout the early part of 1984, the Lebanese military’s brigades continued ripping apart along confessional lines. A massive battle—easily the most intense fighting since September 1983—erupted in Beirut and its environs when various Shi’a, Druze, and Palestinian militias attacked Lebanese military positions. In particular, Syrian-supported militias fought the Lebanese military “in retaliation for the U.S. naval bombardment,” referring to the USS New Jersey firing on Druze and Syrian positions, according to a U.S. intelligence report.118 And militias—including those affiliated with Iran—had been infiltrating the capital for months, attacking U.S. and Lebanese military positions via a 3–4 km gap that ran through the village of Shuweifat, between the 4th Brigade stationed near the Chouf Mountains and the 8th Brigade based at Suq al Gharb. One former senior Lebanese

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Figure 6. CIA chart of the gap in Shuweifat. Central Intelligence Agency, “Lebanese Army Controlled,” National Intelligence Daily (Prepared by Director of National Intelligence), February 2, 1984; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Thomas L. Friedman, “Lebanon Factions Locked in Battles in Area of Beirut,” New York Times, February 3, 1984.

military official highlighted his suspicions that this gap had enabled the attack against the Marine barracks in October.119 Illustrating U.S. knowledge of and concerns about this gap, Figure 6, a highly classified CIA graphic, corroborates its existence. Closing it, however, required engaging with some of the antagonistic external actors wreaking havoc in Lebanon, such as the Iranians, because the militias they supported had benefited from its existence. But General Tannous was willing to attempt it. One February evening, he and a few of

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his key officers met with Colonel Fintel. Referring to the gap, he exclaimed, “The Americans are very upset . . . they want to change the status quo and they are willing to support anyone that is going to change the situation. Whoever is going to take the initiative will have U.S. support.”120 His support for the U.S.-Lebanon defense relationship was clear, as was his willingness to take steps that the United States urged. As a former senior Lebanese official described, “We make war together . . . [and] we look to the Americans as [a] partner.”121 But, as one retired Lebanese general who attended this meeting with Tannous and Fintel emphasized, “It’s our fault if we think the United States will bridge the gap [for us].” The United States would not do so. Given all of this, Tannous and his advisors worked to plan an operation for closing the gap two days after meeting with Fintel, but they failed.122 Rogue members of the 4th Brigade facilitated the entry of Palestinian militia members who had been supported by Syria; they took the brigade’s positions and made sealing the gap a much more difficult effort.123 Fighting wreaked havoc on the Lebanese military as its personnel increasingly abandoned it. At best, its strength was one-half of its level before the fighting erupted, and analysts asserted that the number of Lebanese soldiers willing to fight for the military was actually closer to 6,000— and overwhelmingly Christian.124 In Beirut, the Shi’a-dominated 6th Brigade hemorrhaged personnel after the military began dismantling illegal Shi’a homes and its leader, Colonel Lufti Jaber, ceased the brigade’s communications with the Lebanese command but maintained contact with the AMAL militia. The 4th Brigade effectively collapsed during fighting in south Beirut when many of its Muslim soldiers refused to fight. The 3rd, 7th, and 9th Brigades, composed of Muslims and Christians, were extremely weak but continued to maintain a presence in East Beirut. Although the LAF leadership continued to provide salaries to all of its personnel—even those who refused to fight or report to them—this incentive failed to bring these personnel back under the military’s control, and many Muslim soldiers stopped responding to the LAF leadership.125 Therefore, Christians formed the bulk of the remaining military leadership and soldiers, eroding the force’s reputation as a multiconfessional entity and making it tougher to fight non-Christian militias without being perceived as biased. In this vein, Gemayel’s continued refusal to order the Lebanese military to confront the Christian Lebanese Forces militia played into Lebanese fears of his pro-Christian bias. Lebanon’s military was not

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seriously countering Christian militias in Beirut; however, it was taking steps against Muslim militias, including conducting arrests and seizing arms caches.126 America’s Co-Combatant Role and Its Program End The United States was frustrated, distressed, and overwhelmed by Lebanon as the security situation worsened, the military continued fracturing, and the state grew weaker. In one meaningful signal of desperation, a senior U.S. official secretly pulled Tannous aside, inquiring if he would be willing to lead a military coup, according to three different former senior officials from the United States and Lebanon. He immediately refused, not wanting to further sully Lebanon’s fragile institutions.127 The United States failed to organize the coup and its attempt to do so has never been reported before, based on this author’s extensive knowledge of U.S. involvement in the Levant. Nor has it been reported that just a few months later—when Tannous was forced to resign, given increased Syrian influence—a different senior U.S. official offered to covertly supply him with weapons.128 Again, he would not do so. As a capable and willing military leader, Tannous had been critical for the U.S. program to strengthen Lebanon’s military—one example of its few successes—but had he responded favorably to either of these proposals, both he and the LAF would have been even further undermined. Moreover, the Reagan administration narrowed its goals in Lebanon as Congress considered a resolution urging the Marines’ redeployment, some members of the president’s staff worried about Lebanon’s impact on the approaching U.S. presidential elections, and turmoil reigned in Lebanon. And in the latest twist, Lebanon’s government fell when Sunni Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and nine members of his cabinet resigned and, on the same day, as many as 200 LAF Muslim soldiers left the military.129 Although some U.S. officials praised progress in Lebanon—for example, one cited “the steady growth and effectiveness of the Lebanese Army” in congressional testimony while others asserted “the army is still very much in being”—the situation had spun out of control; in a candid moment, Shultz responded that only “a fraction” of Lebanese territory was under the military’s control.130 And defections swelled. As Gemayel explained, “Now it is the supplement troops” who were leaving the military—and he begged the United States to rescue Lebanon from antagonistic external actors like

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Syria and its proxies, who “were making every attempt” to destroy Lebanon’s military.131 Amid the turmoil, President Reagan announced in February 1984 that the Marines would redeploy from Beirut while simultaneously pledging additional support to Lebanon’s military once a “broadly based representative government” was formed. He stated, “We will vigorously accelerate the training, equipping and support of the Lebanese armed forces on whom the primary responsibility rests for maintaining stability in Lebanon. We will speed up delivery of equipment, we will improve the flow of information to help counter hostile bombardments, and we will intensify training in counter-terrorism to help the Lebanese confront the terrorist threat that poses such danger to Lebanon, to Americans in Lebanon, and indeed to peace in the Middle East.”132 Privately, Reagan’s envoy told Gemayel that U.S. aid to Lebanon’s military would nevertheless continue for the “foreseeable future.” Given that just a few days earlier he had said the United States would stand by Lebanon, the Lebanese were no doubt skeptical of such a pledge.133 As the Marines redeployed, the U.S. program to strengthen Lebanon’s military was increasingly disparaged. Some in Washington, particularly in Congress, criticized what they saw as overly optimistic reports from Beirut about the program’s successes. One former U.S. military officer involved in the training program argued that the United States did not make “significant dents” in the Lebanese military’s organizational culture, highlighting the limited American role, and another former U.S. official warned of a “legacy of bitterness” in the military that impeded efforts to change it. Colonel Al Baker—the new LAMP coordinator who had recently replaced Fintel—was defensive about such criticism. He asserted, “There is nothing in our training program that would have prevented that [military collapse] from happening so far as we can tell . . . our analysis is that any problems the Lebanese armed forces have had have not been combat-related.”134 Just as the expanding American effort to become a co-combatant in Lebanon had distracted from the program to strengthen Lebanon’s military, so too did its cessation. Once the Marines departed Mediterranean shores, the partnership markedly narrowed. Equipment deliveries halted because materiel was diverted from Lebanon’s military to militias, according to NSDD-128.135 After a brief period, the United States delivered ammunition and spare parts to Lebanon; however, most planned aid— including 350 M113 APCs and thirty-five M48A5 tanks—never resumed.136

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Table 7. Actual Progress of the U.S. Program to Strengthen Lebanon’s Military Timeline

Military Strength (Personnel, Training, and Equipment)

Fall 1982– February 1983

4 original brigades of 2,400 personnel strengthened and equipped

February 1983– February 1984

1 brigade at 100 percent 4 original brigades strengthened to 70 percent 1 new brigade established

Source: Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 26–27.

To be sure, Lebanese political and military figures insisted, “the main thrust of armament stayed in the Lebanese army,” but leakage of materiel to the militias was evident—even though some of this materiel was too sophisticated for the militias to employ.137 The administration then withheld its supplemental request from Congress, rumored to be between 250 and 300 million dollars for equipment and training. Finally, in late 1984, the United States suspended all Foreign Military Financing for Lebanon, a hiatus that lasted more than two decades.138 And on the training front, Lebanese military personnel continued training in the United States, but training inside Lebanese territory was severely limited after a three-week hiatus. Within just a few months, fewer than thirty U.S. military personnel were conducting training in East Beirut.139 Table 7 and Table 8 illustrate the limited progress that the program made, and they capture the total U.S. funds it received. A few American officials mistakenly believed the U.S. program to build Lebanon’s military would continue. The Joint Staff and U.S., European Command planned a second iteration of the Bartlett report, the Defense Security Assistance Agency requested more staff from Congress for coordinating the LAMP, and the Defense Department established Joint Task Force Lebanon, which was the first time that all military efforts in Lebanon were entirely under a single command. The new report and the additional staff never came to fruition, and Joint Task Force Lebanon was shut down two months after its creation.140 Yet many Americans and Lebanese realized that the program to strengthen Lebanon’s military would be heavily influenced by the Marines’ redeployment and the cessation of America’s co-combatant role. “[When

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Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon’s Military (Millions of U.S. dollars) Fiscal Year 1981 1982 1983 1984

U.S. Foreign Military Sales

International Military Education Training

$20 $25 $100* $15†

$0.326 $0.575 $1.75* $0.75†

Sources: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Subcommittee Recommendations: Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1984–85, Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East (Part 3), 98th Cong., 1st sess., February 1983, 14; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Supplemental Questions Submitted by the Committee on Europe and the Middle East to the DoD and Responses Thereto (Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Oman), 98th Cong., 1st sess., follow-up from February 23 1984, 538. *Includes supplemental funding. †Amount requested by administration and recommended by Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. The administration later requested to reprogram $31 million to Lebanon and then withdrew this request in February 1984.

the] Marines were withdrawn,” explained a former senior U.S. official, “I think Weinberger took that as kind of justifying additional steps internally within the Pentagon to end the mission [to build the Lebanese military].” Two former senior Lebanese officials echoed this assertion that the program then essentially ended. “You could tell [there was a] change in support from the U.S. after February 1984,” remarked one retired Lebanese general. Similarly, a former senior Lebanese political figure despaired, “Once the Marines left, khalas [Arabic for “enough, no more”].” U.S. involvement diminished substantially and within months, the Lebanese military’s role became extremely limited and reluctant.141 The Marines had redeployed, violence overwhelmed a beleaguered Lebanon, there were no signs that Israeli or Syrian troops would depart anytime soon—or that Iran would stem its support—and the Lebanese government soon turned toward Damascus. In particular, this antagonistic external actor had made it clear that—given its efforts to undermine the Lebanese government—its suzerainty of Lebanon would not cease. As a senior Syrian official had recently smirked, “The United States is short of breath. You can always wait them out,” according to Secretary of State Shultz.142 Lebanese President Gemayel soon traveled to Damascus, abrogated the May 17, 1983 agreement, and “switched from peace with Israel to peace with Syria,” reflected a U.S. military official. After Gemayel sought

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out this new patron, “it was pretty much all over,” he bemoaned.143 Pressured by Damascus, the Lebanese established a Higher Security Committee that weakened the Lebanese military’s leadership and Tannous was quickly pushed out, replaced by a weak commander who was mocked for “never put[ting] his foot in the field,” as one retired Lebanese general asserted. Losing Tannous’s leadership was particularly acute; he was widely respected by senior U.S. and Lebanese officials, who roundly agreed that, as one put it, “he did as good a job as any could have prescribed [given that he was] being watched by Iran, Syria, and the vulnerabilities of the strategy were clear to them.”144 It was yet another demonstration that antagonistic external actors had stymied U.S. efforts to strengthen Lebanon’s military and exacerbated the challenge posed by Lebanon’s confessional fractionalization.145 The events of February 1984 illustrated that Lebanon was too chaotic for limited U.S. efforts to become embroiled in Lebanon. When the Lebanese military was challenged in fall 1983, the U.S. changed the nature of the relationship, but instead of becoming more deeply involved in sensitive Lebanese security affairs, it became a co-combatant. By the time a new set of difficulties had emerged in February 1984—coinciding with the Marines’ redeployment—the United States effectively ceased its program to strengthen Lebanon’s military.

Conclusion The first U.S. program to strengthen the Lebanese military partially failed. Spoilers from around the region undermined the Lebanese state, both on their own and through proxies. Although some aspects of the U.S. program were designed and executed to succeed—such as organizing the Lebanese military for internal defense—others were less so. Antagonistic external actors increased their efforts to weaken the Lebanese state. Iran redoubled its support of Hizballah, which quickly became the most capable non-state actor in Lebanon. Syria continued its assistance to a host of militias. And Israel maintained its occupation of Lebanese territory for nearly two more decades. Overall, the nature of U.S. involvement was mixed. Structurally, the U.S. program was somewhat successful because Lebanon’s military was organized for an internal defense mission—its primary focus. However, the

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parameters of that mission were confused, as NSDD-64 highlighted, given the unresolved differences among senior U.S. officials about the ultimate purpose of U.S. involvement in Lebanon. The United States sought to build the Lebanese military for circumstances that did not exist—quiet peace throughout Lebanese territory—and the continued propagation of a flawed internal defense mission was unhelpful. U.S. involvement in Lebanese personnel affairs was largely limited, but there were some important exceptions. As the case of General Tannous illustrated, it helped facilitate new Lebanese military leadership. Tannous was an inspiring leader who made substantial—but insufficient—reforms, given the Lebanese political situation and the threats Lebanon faced. And the U.S. role slowly slipped into becoming a co-combatant, given the Marines’ presence and the regular intervals of naval gunfire. Above all, this burgeoning co-combatant role distracted the United States from the central task of strengthening Lebanon’s military. Ultimately, there was neither a more enforced nor sustainable monopoly on violence by the Lebanese government. Its military had taken some key steps to maintain internal security and to confront its adversaries. Nevertheless, violence spiraled and the state’s control of its territory remained extremely limited after the U.S. program ended. A host of non-state actors and neighboring militaries continued disrupting and manipulating the Lebanese state. And its mass defections and losses severely influenced the military’s composition and size, rendering it a shell of its former self and a predominantly Christian force. As one scholar described it, “The LAF was restored, restructured, and retrained between 1982 and 1984, and redivided in 1984.”146 The Lebanese military was largely on the sidelines for the rest of the civil war. Three decades later, the United States inaugurated a new program in Lebanon. Again, it attempted to strengthen its military, albeit under very different circumstances. And yet once more, it did not succeed.

Chapter 5

Lebanon II: “The Side That Won Was Willing to Kill and Be Killed”

In 2005, the United States sought—for the second time—to build the Lebanese military for internal defense. It sought to strengthen Lebanese institutions in the wake of Syria’s withdrawal and to limit the ability of state and non-state actors to undermine the fragile state. Its military assistance program partially failed because the nature of U.S. involvement was largely limited, while antagonistic external actors like Iran and Syria continued destabilizing Lebanon, primarily by supporting Hizballah. Structurally, the U.S. program focused on an internal defense mission and on disbursing equipment and training to build the nascent force. However, the United States did not reorganize the military for internal defense, nor did it influence personnel appointments, which limited its impact. It did avoid, however, becoming a co-combatant. The Lebanese military took some key steps to establish internal security, including deploying throughout southern Lebanon and fighting an al Qaeda–affiliated group. Although the Lebanese state had a greater presence throughout its territory, its overall control remained limited. By 2009, when the new U.S. administration came into office, it was clear that Lebanon’s military was incapable of wholly securing the state.

Lebanon’s Initial Capacity: Feeble and Fragile The Lebanese state was fragile and weak when the United States began building its military for the second time. More than twenty years after ripping apart during the internecine fighting in early 1984, the military had ballooned in size. By 2005, it was composed of approximately 70,000

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ground forces organized among eleven brigades and a few other units, in addition to tiny air and naval forces of approximately 1,000 personnel.1 And not only was it large and unwieldy, but its force structure was top heavy and bloated. General officers constituted nearly 12 percent of the LAF officer corps membership. Given that retired generals received significant privileges in addition to financial compensation, including staff composed of active-duty members of the LAF, this force structure imposed a heavy cost.2 Moreover, approximately 3 percent of the Lebanese government’s budget was directed toward the military—and personnel costs accounted for 90 percent of that budget.3 The military also faced considerable equipment and training deficiencies, particularly given Syrian efforts to neuter it during its decades-long occupation of Lebanon. It severely lacked mobility, ammunition (the average LAF soldier fired a total of three to five bullets per year), individual soldier equipment, secure communications, capable air power, and training. As one U.S. official described, “even basic mobility, communications, fire support, and other needs had gone unmet for years as the force was converted into essentially a patronage network during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.” It “was at best a well-equipped boy scout group . . . maybe not that well-equipped,” quipped one former U.S. military official.4 Poorly trained and poorly equipped, the military had neither a coherent formal written and agreed-upon strategy, nor did it have capable leadership. Without the consensus such a strategy engenders, Lebanon’s military was nearly incapable of planning for the future. As one former U.S. official described it, “This is a military whereby the senior officers determine what the national consensus is and what they are willing to do regardless of the guidance given from elected leaders.”5 Such dynamics highlighted the need for capable military leadership. However, Lebanon’s military did not have that luxury. Instead, Michel Sleiman had commanded it since the late 1990s. Described as “cautious . . . weak . . . [and] flaccid” by one individual who had worked closely with him, Sleiman was perceived as a feeble leader who switched allegiances when he deemed it necessary to do so. Moreover, according to a former U.S. official, the Syrian regime selected him for this position because of his pliability. As a test, according to this individual, the Syrian interviewer purposely did not arrive at the scheduled interview time, in order to see how long candidates waited. Sleiman sat the longest, so he was chosen for his “compliance.”6

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A relative bright spot existed: Lebanon’s military had grown more crossconfessional over the last two decades. Segregated brigades or even brigades visibly dominated by one confession or another no longer existed. Although official figures on the military’s confessional composition are difficult to obtain, one senior Lebanese political figure showed me unofficial data on the military’s confessional breakdown from his notebook: he asserted it was 23 percent Christian and 76 percent Muslim; the latter figure fragmented into 38 percent Sunni, 28 percent Shi’a, 5 percent Druze, and the rest minorities. These figures were similar to those offered by a Lebanese security official, who asserted that Lebanon’s military was divided almost evenly among Shi’a, Sunni, and Christians. The one crucial exception was the elite Special Forces regiments, dominated by Maronite Christians. Nevertheless, as one U.S. official asserted, its “effectiveness is also somewhat limited by its sectarian chemistry—its leadership is often hesitant to commit it to diffusing civil conflict . . . for fear of it splintering.” Taken together, these elements illustrate that Lebanon’s military was in disrepair.7 Facing Many Antagonistic Actors Since the civil war ended, five groups had compromised Lebanese sovereignty: Syria, Israel, Iran, militias, and Hizballah. Stability generally reigned because the state remained weak and unwilling to counter these opposition forces. It lived under Syrian control as the Syrian military and political occupation deepened over decades, effectively neutering most Lebanese institutions. This occupation, which began in 1976 under the auspices of an Arab League peacekeeping force, included more than 30,000 Syrian military personnel at its height. Conversely, Israel’s military occupation diminished over this same period—although there were periodic spats between Israel and Hizballah—and the Israeli military redeployed completely from southern Lebanon in May 2000.8 The lengthy tenure of both occupations illustrated the Lebanese military’s inability to exert the state’s sovereignty. A number of non-state actors further undermined the Lebanese state, including the remnants of confessional militias, violent non-state groups based in the Palestinian refugee camps—some affiliated with al Qaeda— and, most significantly, Hizballah. Although the Lebanese military disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated many of the militias after the civil war, traces remained. Nevertheless, the program to integrate militias into Lebanon’s military substantially narrowed the number of armed Lebanese

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working for security institutions other than the state. Unconventional opponents in the Palestinian refugee camps also posed a real threat to Lebanese stability, given their capabilities and the free rein they effectively exercised inside the camps.9 Above all, Hizballah posed the most potent threat to the Lebanese state’s internal security. Hizballah garnered wide support among Lebanese Shi’a as a political force and, more broadly, throughout Lebanese society for its efforts to evict Israel from Lebanese territory. However, Hizballah was also the only violent non-state Lebanese actor that had wholly retained its arms following the civil war; it had successfully argued that strictures against militias should not apply to it as a “resistance group.” It received increasingly sophisticated materiel and training from Iran and Syria. Such aid enabled Hizballah to maintain an effective social services infrastructure and a substantial military capability; as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained, Hizballah possessed “far more rockets and missiles than most governments in the world.” “There is a military there [in Lebanon]— it’s called Hizballah,” quipped one former senior American official; agreeing, a former senior Lebanese official described Hizballah as “like a basketball court with another basket . . . it’s another state.” It had effectively redefined its justification for maintaining its armed capability, allowing it to develop into one of the most well-equipped and best-trained non-state forces in the Middle East. This capability enabled Hizballah to play a special role in Lebanon. And above all, without substantial support from antagonistic external actors like Iran and Syria, it would simply be another militia or political actor in Lebanese society. “It’s not in our hands . . . regional circumstances monopolize,” rued one senior Lebanese official, wary of speaking too directly about Hizballah’s external supporters.10

The U.S. Effort Begins as Syria’s Occupation Ends: Fall 2004–2005 U.S. involvement in Lebanon had been negligible since the events of early 1984, particularly vis-a`-vis the Lebanese military. On rare occasions over the next two decades, the United States sought to quiet the region, including negotiating the 1996 Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Agreement and providing some economic and military support. For example, the U.S. Defense

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Department disbursed excess U.S. Army materiel, including UH-1H helicopters and M113 APCs, and it continued training Lebanese military personnel. Nevertheless, U.S. support to Lebanon’s military was miniscule from 1985 to 2005; it totaled just over 10 million dollars in International Military Education and Training and zero in Foreign Military Financing. The training had a narrow focus: it sought to provide opportunities for interaction between the U.S. and Lebanese militaries in the hopes of establishing “personal working relationships” and helping to professionalize the force—not least to “offer an alternative to training conducted by Syria”—and included uncontroversial engagements such as “port security and search and rescue operations.” Broadly, U.S. interest and interaction with the Lebanese military was minimal.11 But a watershed event by one antagonistic external actor—Syria—catalyzed both Lebanese and American interest in trying to again strengthen the Lebanese military for internal security. Major Assassination Rekindles U.S. Interest in Lebanon U.S. interest in Lebanon burgeoned throughout fall 2004 and early 2005 as senior officials grew frustrated with Syria’s unhelpful regional efforts, particularly as it facilitated the heavy flow of violent non-state actors into Iraq, where the United States was engaged in large-scale conflict. Syria’s decades-long occupation and Hizballah’s continued armed presence— despite the Israeli redeployment from Lebanese territory nearly five years earlier—further piqued U.S. perturbation with Damascus. Throughout this period, senior U.S. officials met with the Syrian regime in an effort to sway them away from these policies. And at the United Nations, the United States advocated for Security Council Resolution 1559, pledging international support for Lebanese sovereignty and calling for “foreign forces to withdraw; [and] disbanding and dis[arming] all Lebanese and nonLebanese militias.” But, these were isolated instances. As one former senior U.S. official explained, “I don’t remember Lebanon being on the front burner really until the killing of Hariri because it seemed to be stable in a rotten situation of Syrian domination. While we decried the situation, nothing much was being done about it.”12 This all changed on February 14, 2005 when former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated and an outpouring of massive Lebanese protests followed. The assassination—which many immediately

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assumed was conducted with the knowledge or support of Syria—catalyzed a popular revolt against Syria’s occupation of Lebanon. Within weeks, Syria’s military redeployed, effectively ceasing its overt military occupation. And for the first time in three decades, no external military force had an overt presence on Lebanese territory, although Damascus did maintain its relations with the Lebanese security services, its intelligence presence, and support to Hizballah.13 Sensing an inflection point, the United States decided to deepen its involvement in Lebanese affairs, particularly to strengthen Lebanon’s military. Moreover, this marked shift in the Levantine landscape aligned with the Bush administration’s regional emphasis on freedom and democracy. Senior U.S. officials immediately pledged American support for Lebanon, including President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who quickly became the most senior U.S. official to visit Lebanon in decades. “This effort fit into the whole paradigm of the freedom agenda,” described a former senior U.S. official, and another rejoiced, “It fit in with our overall policy like a glove.” Moreover, serendipity played a role because many senior U.S. officials had been personally involved in the earlier U.S. effort in Lebanon. As one former U.S. official outlined, “We became involved, in part, because there were a number of people who had been involved [before].”14 Codifying an Internal Defense Mission, but Sidelining a Critical Issue The cornerstone of this heightened U.S. involvement in Lebanon was inaugurating a robust program to build Lebanon’s military for internal defense. It had acted appropriately amid the upheaval, refusing orders from Lebanese President Emile Lahoud to fire on unarmed protestors and instead striving to maintain internal security during the protests. And it was roundly supported throughout Lebanese society where “every village has someone in it, is affected by [it],” according to one senior U.S. official. As he continued, “It needed help. We had helped it before. The officer corps, to a very large measure had benefited from U.S. programs . . . training. The officer corps tended to have an American-style outlook toward things. The equipment, while outdated, in large measure derived from American stocks. The command and control was American-style. It was natural that we looked at the army.” Given the weakness of and uncertainty

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surrounding the loyalties of the other Lebanese security services, Lebanon’s military was perceived to be the sole institution in Lebanon that had the potential to exert the state’s sovereignty throughout its territory.15 The program was structured around an internal defense mission in the hopes that the Lebanese military could uphold the government’s sovereignty. The United States envisioned an active effort with the military “deploying throughout the country and securing Lebanese borders,” according to one senior official—an effort that would limit the ability of those seeking to undermine the state. It would “serve [a] domestic counterterrorism mission” and ensure that “Lebanon is not a safe haven for al Qaeda types,” explained two other senior American officials. And it would fill a vacuum in the wake of Syria’s withdrawal, enabling increased U.S. interaction with the Lebanese military. As one senior U.S. official explained, “If we weren’t going to go in and build the Lebanese military, someone else would. . . . do we really want Lebanese officers to be going to officer school in Homs [Syria] . . . or even in Iran?”16 Senior Lebanese officials largely supported this internal defense mission. They hoped a strengthened military could “maintain [the] stability and integrity and security of Lebanon,” explained a senior Lebanese military official; a former Lebanese official agreed with this emphasis. A senior Lebanese political official highlighted the military’s mission in a similar manner: he stated its “challenges are many . . . protecting the border, stopping terrorism,” among other internally focused efforts. Although the Lebanese military’s publicly stated mission included both internal and external security, its leadership was well aware that the military was, as one U.S. official put it, “simply dwarfed by the capabilities of their neighbors.”17 However, the internal defense mission did not address the issue of Hizballah; both the American and Lebanese leaderships generally sidelined this thorny challenge. On the U.S. side, there was some disagreement, given the context of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and Hizballah’s status as the non-state violent actor responsible for the most American deaths save for al Qaeda. Although one former U.S. official argued, “We ha[d] a theory that the LAF [wa]s the counter-balance to Hizballah,” most instead spoke vaguely about how strengthening Lebanon’s military would reduce Hizballah’s maneuverability. U.S. officials hoped to diminish the ability of violent non-state actors to undermine Lebanese sovereignty, thereby demonstrating that the Lebanese government could sufficiently secure its territory. As one U.S. military official outlined, there “did seem to be a

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possibility for some kind of check—not to try to remove Hizballah from the equation but at least to provide some parameters on their behavior and their policy.” Concurring, another senior official explained, “There was a desire to try to reduce Hizballah’s sway overall,” which could at least be indirectly effected by building Lebanon’s military.18 In a frank statement, a former senior U.S. official emphasized, “No one had any illusions. . . . No one expected the Lebanese military to take on Hizballah,” although “since the other side [Iran] had a train and equip mission, we needed to have one to maintain a national institution.” U.S. officials were cognizant of how difficult success would be; as one U.S. official exclaimed, “You’re attempting to build a military where there is a nonstate military [Hizballah].” But in the long term, a capable Lebanese military might be seen as “a viable alternative to Hizballah” and allow “politicians . . . to at least broach the argument that Hizballah’s weapons are no longer necessary,” but that “requires patience” and “until that force is in place, you cannot have any expectation of pushback against Hizballah’s weapons,” explained various U.S. officials.19 They refrained, however, from delineating the circumstances under which this might come to pass. Similarly, on the Lebanese side, senior officials sought to avoid any connection between the military’s internal defense mission and countering Hizballah. In vague terms, one former senior Lebanese official circumvented this issue, saying an empowered Lebanese military “shows other militias that there is a national militia that could be seen as more equal and in time could be used against them.” Another was more straightforward: “this is a zero-sum game . . . build the Lebanese military and it narrows Hizballah and vice-versa . . . [but] even if you try to build [it] to parity, other groups will not let that happen.”20 Both parties were deeply aware of how difficult it would be for the Lebanese military to do anything more than limit Hizballah’s “operating space,” as U.S. officials referred to Hizballah’s presence, and so the United States “chose not to have this discussion because we wouldn’t come to agreement,” according to one former U.S. official. Tackling it “would, at the very best, start a civil war,” and the U.S. government would “not like the results,” argued two different U.S. officials. And the Lebanese government was simply unwilling to consider what, if any, role it should play in disarming Hizballah.21 The U.S. program to train and equip Lebanon’s military had commenced with a largely appropriate emphasis: internal defense. However, the

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U.S. unwillingness to specify the parameters of that mission within its own government, and to discuss it with key Lebanese officials, enabled misunderstanding and confused expectations on both sides as the program took shape.

Antagonistic Actors Foment Instability but Also Present a Critical Opportunity: Winter 2005–Summer 2006 With the basic purpose of the program to strengthen Lebanon’s military settled, the U.S. military began conducting various assessments of its training and equipping needs. However, the United States did not make an effort to tackle Lebanese military personnel or organizational challenges. Nevertheless, a destructive engagement between Israel and Hizballah presented an opportunity that enabled Lebanon’s military to substantially increase its presence throughout Lebanese territory—and demonstrated its constraints. U.S. Assessments Identify Lebanese Military Needs Although the United States had hoped to strengthen Lebanon’s military in spring 2005, the program took more than a year to take shape. Immediately following Hariri’s assassination, senior U.S. officials asked the small team in U.S. Embassy Beirut that worked with Lebanon’s military to resubmit a proposal advocating 20 million dollars for it—a proposal this very leadership had rejected only weeks before when Lebanon was treated as just another security assistance case. Then, the Lebanese government needed to demonstrate its interest in and willingness to support such an effort by requesting an assessment of its military’s requirements. The request was delayed by Lebanese parliamentary elections and the formation of a new cabinet—which included Hizballah affiliates for the first time—and was not issued until fall 2005. At that point, Lebanon’s new government asked for U.S. help “to determine how the Lebanese military can be rebuilt to help restore the government’s sovereignty.” Then, the assessment team—composed of approximately one dozen staff from U.S. Central Command—did not begin its work until the end of 2005, and their final report was not finished until the beginning of 2006.

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Given these challenges, the first tranche of materiel did not arrive in Lebanon until September 2006—more than one-and-a-half years after “the opportunity” afforded by Hariri’s assassination, Syria’s withdrawal, and the U.S. decision to build Lebanon’s military for internal defense.22 Its equipment needs were relatively basic, however. “Both [parties] agreed that the top initial priority should be to identify existing U.S.-origin equipment that was worth retaining and repair it before any attempts were made to purchase costly new systems,” explained one U.S. official. And overall, its equipment “was in better shape than expected,” according to officials involved in the first of many U.S. assessments of Lebanon’s military. This initial assessment illustrated that the military was “a somnolent organization [that] needs pretty elementary things,” said one former senior U.S. official. Its two most important requirements were ammunition and mobility, the latter of which could be filled by giving it new vehicles and by sending spare parts for the dilapidated ground vehicles and helicopters. These two areas became the initial focus of the program, which sought to build Lebanon’s military so it could “assert its sovereignty and deploy throughout the country,” as Secretary of State Rice described.23 By spring 2006, the United States had located funding to kickstart the program and enable the delivery of materiel to Lebanon’s military. Congress had recently approved a new authorization—nicknamed “Section 1206 authority” due to the section of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act it fell under—that enabled U.S. funds to be disbursed more quickly than the standard multi-year timeframe for security assistance. As long as the partner military was either conducting counter-terrorism operations or participating in stability operations with U.S. forces, it qualified for this authority; the situation in Lebanon was exactly what Section 1206 was designed for.24 In May 2006, President Bush approved the first use of Section 1206 authority funds, which was directed to Lebanon to “bolster [its] ability to exert control over its territory and reduce the operational space of militias such as Hezbollah.”25 His decision to do so illustrated the high level of support for and interest in the U.S. program. As Table 9 illustrates, all of this funding was used to purchase spare parts that would make Lebanon’s military more mobile. Yet no new materiel had actually arrived in Lebanon yet—more than one year after Hariri’s assassination. Several senior U.S. officials visited Lebanon during this period to demonstrate U.S. support.26 Nonetheless, even their support and prioritization of this program could not make the system move faster during the program’s inaugural year.

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Table 9. Section 1206 Authority Funding for FY 2006: Spare Parts Item 5-ton trucks Armored personnel carriers Ground vehicles Helicopters Total

Amount $3,360,000 $2,304,960 $2,363,200 $2,461,230 $10,489,390

Source: Eric Thompson and Patricio Asfura-Heim, Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries: Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, Sao Tome and Principe (Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis and Solutions, 2008), 13.

Antagonistic External Actors Enable Instability Through a Thirty-Four-Day War Before the U.S. program to build Lebanon’s military could even begin having a meaningful effect, Hizballah wreaked havoc across Lebanon during summer 2006 when it kidnapped Israeli soldiers, triggering more than a month of Israeli air and ground attacks on Lebanese territory. The war caused nearly four billion dollars in damage to Lebanese infrastructure and more than 1,000 Lebanese casualties. Hizballah was able to effectively launch and continue the conflict because of the substantial support it received from antagonistic external actors, including Iran and Syria. Its most destructive weapon in the conflict, Kornet anti-tank rockets, came from the Syrian Ministry of Defense, and other sophisticated materiel streamed from Iran, including the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile that damaged the INS Hanit.27 The war was yet another illustration of the Lebanese government’s inability to control Hizballah and of Hizballah’s continued ability to destabilize Lebanon. A “national dialogue” about critical domestic issues had been under way among major Lebanese leaders since March, yet it stumbled on issues related to Hizballah’s arms. Even though a poll taken just before the 2006 war demonstrated substantial support in Lebanon for the military to serve as the only armed force, a substantial confessional divide existed on this issue. More than 80 percent of Lebanese Christians, Sunni, and Druze concurred with this ideal compared to less than 40 percent of Lebanese Shi’a. Despite the war’s costs—and arguments by some that it “brought [Hizballah Secretary-General] Nasrallah down to the level of a

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normal politician”—support for Hizballah among Lebanese Shi’a remained strong.28 As the war rocked Lebanon, its military was largely irrelevant. According to one U.S. military official, when the war erupted, the Lebanese military “immediately pulled off all of their checkpoints, all their resources, [and] redoubled their efforts on the Palestinian refugee camps to make sure no one got in and out.” It “hid out until the end of the war,” he concluded, and maintained a defensive posture. However, its assets became embroiled in the fighting when—suspicious that military assets indirectly helped Hizballah—the Israeli military destroyed its coastal radar system, among a few other Lebanese military targets.29 The War Enables Lebanon’s Military to Deploy and Forces the United States to Consider the Limits of Its Military Involvement The Hizballah-Israel war had a monumental impact on U.S. efforts to build Lebanon’s military. First, it propelled the Lebanese government to deploy the military to south Lebanon, a meaningful step in exerting its sovereignty throughout Lebanese territory. Ten days after the Lebanese cabinet decided to deploy a ground force of 15,000 personnel, the military began moving south and taking over positions as the Israeli military withdrew. Four brigades—the 2nd, 6th, 10th, and 12th Brigades—deployed and, according to one observer, “they were treated as conquering heroes.”30 Although the military had begun deploying to the south, its mission there was in flux. An anonymous Lebanese government minister asserted, “Where there are Lebanese army troops, there can be no other armed presence,” alluding to Hizballah. Yet others in the Lebanese government took pains to emphasize, “its soldiers would neither act against the militia’s guerrillas [Hizballah] nor try to disarm them.” This dialogue displeased Hizballah’s leadership because it demonstrated that a previously taboo topic—Hizballah’s armed status—was becoming less so. Nasrallah mocked the Lebanese military’s deployment, inquiring, “Can the Lebanese Army and the United Nations troops step up to the plate to defend the nation?” Nevertheless, at a minimum, the deployment altered the binary circumstances in south Lebanon; it would no longer be under the sole purview of Hizballah and Israel (with superficial United Nations involvement) but would now also involve the state’s military institution as a relevant actor.31

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Constraints on the military’s deployment and ability to operate in south Lebanon and on its borders grew clear early on. These constraints were best illustrated by the situation surrounding the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In the war’s wake, the international community sought to reinvigorate this peacekeeping force, which had been largely impotent and irrelevant since its 1978 establishment in south Lebanon. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which helped end the 2006 war, called for “no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government; no sales or supply of arms and related material to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government,” and in this vein, UNIFIL was to increase from fewer than 2,000 peacekeepers to nearly 15,000.32 To effectively exert the Lebanese government’s sovereignty, however, both UNIFIL and the Lebanese military needed to deploy throughout south Lebanon and also along the Syria-Lebanon border, a renowned gateway for Iranian and Syrian weapons flowing to Hizballah. But the Lebanese government hesitated to do so. Although 8,000 Lebanese military personnel moved toward the border with Syria soon after the war, they did not stymie weapons flows. The bolstered UNIFIL coupled with the military’s deployment made it harder for violent non-state actors to move throughout Lebanese territory—not least because of the relatively small amount of land involved—however, it did not otherwise have an impact on these groups. It simply could not prevent “a return to the status quo ante in the south,” as Secretary of State Rice had hoped.33 The senior Lebanese political leadership feared requesting UNIFIL’s expanded deployment given the potential response of antagonistic external actors like Syria. In a worrisome exchange, Prime Minister Siniora told U.S. officials that deploying an international force to the Syria-Lebanon border would be “great,” but he “could not ask for it.” One senior U.S. official involved in these negotiations despaired, “On a basic level, yes they agreed they should have secure borders, but they wouldn’t make a request to do anything about it . . . this was a military and a government that wouldn’t even say it wanted to protect the borders of the country.” The Syrian government had publicly threatened that deploying an international force to the Syria-Lebanon border was unacceptable, and Syrian President Assad asserted it would “create problems between Syria and Lebanon.”34 Although the deployment of Lebanon’s military had increased its presence throughout some parts of Lebanese territory, this exchange was a glaring reminder

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of the shadow cast by antagonistic external actors on Lebanese security affairs. The war also influenced the parameters of the U.S. program to strengthen Lebanon’s military in one critical way: it forced the United States to consider the limits it would place on its involvement. U.S. contributions to the expanded UNIFIL signaled that the U.S. military would refrain from any actions that could be construed as becoming a cocombatant in Lebanon. “There has been a history in Lebanon with U.S. troops . . . [deploying them] would create a sensation . . . [and] may not enable us to achieve our objective,” explained President Bush. The U.S. government was unwilling to contribute military personnel on the ground in Lebanon, given the previous iteration of U.S. involvement in Lebanon two decades earlier, but instead it would provide intelligence, “command and control and logistical support.” At a critical moment, the U.S. government chose to avoid any actions that could lead it toward becoming a cocombatant in Lebanon.35

U.S. Focuses on Equipment and Training for Internal Defense, Not on Leadership: Fall 2006–Winter 2007 After the summer 2006 war, U.S. training and equipment finally began arriving in Lebanon. It had been in the pipeline for many months and finally came to fruition, making it appear as though the United States had swiftly responded to the military’s historic deployment. Its delivery was conditioned on ensuring “that the Lebanese army [was] in a position to assert further control over its territory and that equipment provided by the program [was] issued to help reduce Hizballah’s operational space.”36 The definition of Hizballah’s “operational space” was purposely left vague, and it continued to be undefined. Nevertheless, the Departments of State and Defense certified these conditions had been met because the military deployed throughout Lebanese territory. By this period, the Lebanese military—for the first time in more than three decades—had “six brigades/ regiments stationed in the south and three along the eastern and northern border with Syria . . . the remainder . . . deployed on internal security missions.”37 In early fall, the first tangible evidence of U.S. support landed in Lebanon: a hefty supply of ammunition for the Lebanese military.38 Soon

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after, the Lebanese military faced renewed challenges from those seeking to undermine it. Another U.S. Assessment Discounts Organizational and Personnel Affairs Given the summer war and the military’s historic deployment, the United States assessed the Lebanese military again in fall 2006. Led by Brigadier General Joseph Martz from U.S. Army Central Command—visiting the region for his very first time—only four U.S. military personnel conducted this assessment because “we were virtually limited by how many beds there were” available in Beirut because official U.S. personnel were required to stay on the Embassy compound. They consulted with numerous Lebanese military officials and visited a host of units during their brief trip to Lebanon.39 Again, the second assessment envisioned a limited U.S. effort to strengthen Lebanon’s military. Rather than considering areas in which the military required transformation—for example, it ignored the issue of military leadership and simply praised personnel as “hard working [and] innovative”—the assessment focused on the Lebanese military’s equipment and training deficiencies. There had been no senior-level changes in the Lebanese military—except for replacing the chief of staff and head of military intelligence—since Syria’s military occupation ceased more than one year before.40 Moreover, the assessment did not seriously broach reorganization of the top-heavy, fiscally foolish Lebanese military, whose budget was overwhelmingly directed toward its substantial personnel costs.41 Instead, the assessment almost wholly focused on Lebanese equipment requirements, highlighting how the military had been impoverished by the Lebanese state and prescribing “low-cost high-payoff equipment and training assistance.” It asserted that the military did not have the equipment or training to establish border and internal security. It portrayed a dire picture of the Lebanese military’s capabilities, which lacked a headquarters-level “operations center, secure communications, sufficient ammunition,” and had limited maneuverability and disorganized logistics, among other things. UH-1H helicopters, for example, barely operated given their “readiness rates of less than 30%.” Moreover, due to the military’s shortage of parts, it regularly used inadequate and, at times, dangerous equipment. The assessment team found that personnel struggled to rebuild a truck in such

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poor condition that the U.S. Army would have disposed of it. More worrisome, one U.S. military official recounted a similar story in which the marine commandos were outfitted with breathing apparatus for underwater diving missions that the assessment team was “appalled” to find in use. He believed that the Lebanese military’s employment of such extremely poor quality assets “demonstrated its willingness to make the best use of what they have.”42 Martz’s team briefly examined training needs. Although the assessment deemed training “the most important and single most expensive part of the effort to aid” Lebanon’s military, it lacked specificity beyond strengthening the special operations forces, mine removal, and generically professionalizing the military. Most training, instead, focused on equipment-related operations and maintenance, particularly related to air and ground vehicles, secure communications, ammunition, small arms, and night vision devices.43 The closest that the assessment came to highlighting sensitive Lebanese military affairs was its offhand mention that the military lacked a written national military and national security strategy. To be sure, this shortcoming impeded rigorous military planning. However, it was not without its advantages because political circumstances would almost surely dictate a public and vociferous anti-Israel stance, making U.S. support difficult. Such documents would also require the Lebanese military to define its enemy in a very clear manner; although Hizballah posed the major challenge to internal security, neither the military nor the Lebanese government were politically able to state that, for a host of previously articulated reasons. “No Lebanese Army commander will dare answer that question,” asserted one senior Lebanese military official. Concurring, a former U.S. official asserted, “the threat is not politically palatable to put into a document—it’s internal: Hizballah.” Therefore, although the Lebanese military took superficial steps in developing these documents, they were not completed.44 The U.S. government was cognizant of these dynamics, but their existence nevertheless inhibited the program to build Lebanon’s military. As one former U.S. official cautioned, if you “don’t have consensus on threats, on what need to address, then the U.S. can be open to accusations that you’re not doing what they [the partner state military] need.” In addition, some senior U.S. officials publicly described U.S. support under this rubric. For example, Secretary of State Rice asserted it would help “secure the borders and to restore the Lebanese Government’s sovereignty in areas which

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in recent decades had come under de facto control by a Hizballah statewithin-a-state.” One of her staff members, highlighting “a window of opportunity,” explained it would be helpful in “the disarmament of Hizballah.” From the U.S. military, a senior official reminded those U.S. officials who hesitated to strengthen Lebanon’s military, “Hizballah has a greater military capacity than the Lebanese Armed Forces.”45 Equipment and Training Enable Deployment Throughout Lebanese Territory Based on the two assessments, U.S. assistance flowed to Lebanon throughout the last few months of 2006, targeting the military’s immediate needs as it deployed throughout Lebanese territory. In addition to the tranche of ammunition that arrived in fall 2006, the Section 1206 authority assistance also now began reaching Lebanon’s military. Through the provision of spare parts, ammunition, and individual soldier equipment in particular, the U.S. government was helping to bankroll and maintain this deployment, which was the Lebanese military’s most active period in decades. “Without the massive U.S. assistance package devised in 2006, the first tranche of which hit the ground in late 2006 and early 2007, the LAF would have been logistically unable to sustain the deployment in southern Lebanon,” asserted one U.S. official.46 Further, the United States sped a number of Humvees to Beirut during this period to demonstrate U.S. support for Lebanon and its military, given the challenge it faced from Hizballah. As one official described, the decision to send Humvees was deliberate because they are a “prestige issue . . . [and their delivery] said ‘this is an American ally.’ ” Even though U.S. equipment for Lebanon’s military—including its composition, limited amount, and relatively slow disbursal—stood in dramatic contrast to the assistance Iran provided Hizballah, the United States nevertheless sought to make it clear that it was becoming the military’s top patron.47 During the November 2006 visit of Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, the first senior civilian U.S. defense official to visit Lebanon in decades, he pledged, “the United States [was] contributing to the building of a modern, professional Lebanese Army” with its military aid.48 U.S. training also increased substantially. Following the events in 2005, Lebanon’s military had stopped sending officers to Syria for training, and “the U.S. was the only country that offered both funding and course

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positions to fill the void,” explained a U.S. official. Most training was conducted outside of Lebanon due to the heavy force protection–mandated constraints on U.S. personnel in Lebanon that lingered from the civil war. In 2006 alone, more than 200 Lebanese military personnel received training in counter-terrorism and border security or attended professional military courses in the United States. Lebanese military Special Operations Forces were trained in Joint/Combined Exchange Training programs, and between these training events, two U.S. military personnel conducted their own training courses for these elite forces. Also that year, six officers successfully completed U.S. Army Ranger School and one completed the SEAL course. These accomplishments demonstrated the talent among Lebanese military officers; as one U.S. military official attested, “It is basically unheard of for an Arab country to send several officers to Ranger school in a single year and for them to successfully complete the course.”49 One U.S. official heavily involved in this effort was emphatic that training was the best use of U.S. aid. “Dollar for dollar, the greatest impact was in training by far . . . one dollar expended on training was worth two, three or in some cases more than five dollars in assistance for equipment,” he concluded. From the small-unit level to the regimental level, U.S. training influenced the military in “profound” ways; in particular, standard operating procedures and tactics were often “quite similar” to those of the United States military, according to a senior U.S. military official. The training was “helpful in maintaining relationships,” and sophisticated exercises demonstrated Lebanon’s military “was listening to people who were advising them.”50 The United States cobbled together additional support for Lebanon’s military. It scrapped initial plans to provide a few million dollars in training and equipment aid, given events over the past year, and offered a package of nearly forty-two million dollars instead. This would be the most substantial assistance to Lebanon in nearly three decades, providing spare parts for the helicopters and ground vehicles to improve mobility, equipment training, and a set of new vehicles, including 25 five-ton trucks and 285 Humvees. The hefty package was designed “to shore up the Lebanese security forces so they can eventually extend their control over the entire country for the first time since civil war erupted . . . [and] to strengthen the government’s hand over the influence of Hezbollah.”51 Given the scale of equipment and training support, it was unsurprising that it increased the military’s capabilities and enabled its professionalization and alignment with U.S. military procedures; however, this assistance

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was insufficient. Lebanon’s military was confronted by new challenges as its presence extended throughout Lebanese territory. To be sure, morale had increased in the Lebanese military now that its personnel had some capability, as had “unit cohesion,” given that the military accomplished this deployment without pulling apart in any way.52 Its legitimacy had increased, which meant that “four years ago, people reported their problems to Hizballah; now they go to the Lebanese military,” according to one Lebanese security expert.53 For the first time, the Lebanese military “had to deconflict operations with Hizballah” because its expanded presence “opened fissures and created some awkward points of coordination.” As one senior Lebanese official described it, “We circle[d] around with Hizballah.”54 And this was for a military whose personnel—although initially welcomed warmly to south Lebanon—were still sleeping in tents, traveling in private vehicles because they lacked official operational ground mobility, and communicating with one another by cell phone.55 Moreover, Hizballah increasingly challenged the Lebanese government and presented new dilemmas for the Lebanese military. Toward the end of 2006, its affiliates resigned from the Lebanese cabinet—protesting efforts to establish a tribunal that would investigate Hariri’s assassination—and a parliament member affiliated with the anti-Syria, anti-Hizballah, and antiIran coalition was assassinated. Then, Hizballah coordinated a massive sitin complete with protests, striking workers, and a tent city in downtown Beirut, opposing the Lebanese government and virtually shutting down Beirut. Now the Lebanese military not only faced Hizballah in south Lebanon but also in Beirut because thousands of troops were deployed to the capital to stem the worsening situation. The military’s “honeymoon period” had ceased.56 The military, therefore, had deployed throughout Lebanese territory, but it remained unsure of how to act. In late January 2007, the security situation in Beirut grew even more heated as the opposition launched additional strikes and urged more comprehensive protests, spurring fighting between Sunni and Shi’a students at one of the universities in Beirut and then additional scuffles in the downtown area. But Lebanon’s military did not take any action; it did not even keep the roads open. General Sleiman instead lamented, “The army is suffering from pressure . . . [and] has been bearing above its load for months.”57 The resulting violence—and the military’s passivity—resulted in four people killed and hundreds wounded in the ensuing clashes.

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Conversely, a few weeks later, Lebanese border police captured arms destined for Hizballah, and Defense Minister Murr pledged the arms would be redirected to Lebanon’s military. In response, Nasrallah warned ominously, “We will not forgive anyone who confiscates a bullet.” Yet the military’s legitimacy had no doubt grown among the Lebanese populace because Nasrallah found it necessary to highlight the close relationship between Hizballah and Lebanon’s military. He proudly reaffirmed, “The Resistance [Hizballah] will always stand by the Lebanese army, with our weapons, men and blood . . . to defend Lebanon.”58 These two events—over just a few weeks—illustrated that the Lebanese government and the military’s will to counter other powerful actors remained uncertain.

With U.S. Support, Lebanon’s Military Fights an Antagonistic Actor: Spring–Summer 2007 Throughout the first half of 2007, U.S. assistance continued arriving in Lebanon as the relationship deepened; however, the United States still largely refrained from becoming involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs. This materiel support and training enabled Lebanon’s military to wage its first successful campaign in decades during summer 2007. But this engagement—fighting a violent Palestinian non-state actor affiliated with al Qaeda—represented the peak of Lebanese military activity that was possible without transformation. U.S. Equipment and Training: As Much as Possible, as Fast as Possible—but Still Insufficient Given that it had taken nearly two years since Hariri’s assassination for substantial U.S. assistance to arrive in Lebanon, even high-level U.S. government interest and energy could not move the process to build Lebanon’s military more quickly. And such interest existed and resonated throughout the U.S. government, as senior leaders from different agencies in the U.S. government attested. One wistfully remarked that those individuals building the Lebanese military felt like they “were at the center of the world” because of how much attention they received. Others recounted how quickly requests for assistance to the Lebanese military moved through the interagency process because “everything was expedited” and “almost

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nothing was routine.” For example, the standard timeline for moving from a letter of request for materiel to a signed letter of agreement by a minister of defense was usually months; in Lebanon, it was “48 hours.” Explaining that the process often stemmed from requests made by U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Jeff Feltman, one U.S. military official remarked, “I was surprised at how he [Feltman] would send an e-mail, people [would] respond.” As one U.S. official quipped, “Everyone was afraid that word would get out that they weren’t supporting the effort,” and many others affirmed that senior U.S. officials became personally involved if they thought assistance was not moving quickly enough.59 It helped, of course, that the Lebanese military had appropriately accounted for and utilized U.S. assistance. Its monitoring of U.S.-disbursed assistance had been impeccable since the civil war ended. Particularly given how materiel leaked during that period to various violent non-state actors, the United States maintained especially rigorous standards to ensure that would not occur again, including “visual inspections of LAF depots, serial number checks for equipment, and close monitoring of in-country, U.S. government sponsored training.” As one senior U.S. official affirmed, Lebanon’s military now had “one of the best examples of command and control over equipment of any country we’ve given assistance to in the world,” which was particularly demonstrated by its control over materiel during the summer 2006 war.60 But for many Lebanese, U.S. support was simply insufficient. They argued that it was limited in its scope and size due to Israeli concerns— rather than due to the assessment’s findings about the foundational nature of Lebanese military requirements—and lamented that it took too long to arrive in Lebanon. “Israel calls the shots on the U.S. in Lebanon,” claimed one former senior Lebanese official, and another argued that when the Lebanese government would request “smart weapons . . . [there would be] zig-zagging because other [pro-Israel] lobbies in the United States believe Lebanon should not be equipped in that matter.” Echoing these statements, a senior Lebanese official said, “When we ask for specific weapons to counter Hizballah’s argument that we don’t have weapons to fight against Israel, defend against Israel, [it is the] same excuse.” Moreover, Lebanese officials often complained to U.S. officials that they were not getting “big ticket items” because of Israeli opposition, according to one U.S. official. Some U.S. officials working on this program outside of Washington concurred with this line of thinking, concluding, “We talked a good game

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about supporting the Lebanese Army,” but Israeli considerations prevailed.61 To be sure, the U.S. government did consult with the Israelis about materiel given to Lebanon’s military, in an effort to assuage their worries that it would be used improperly or leaked to violent non-state actors. However, U.S. officials based in Washington remarked that neither Israel nor its supporters in Washington were particularly active in pressuring the U.S. government to stem its efforts with the Lebanese military: it could be characterized as “pushback . . . in a general but reasonable form,” according to one former senior U.S. official, although others in the region were frustrated by any Israeli involvement at all. Broadly, the United States tried to make it “clear our aid was not to be used in an offensive manner against Israel” because the U.S. government does not arm its partners to counter one another, underscored one U.S. official involved in this effort.62 Another outlined the materiel delivered to date—including ammunition, vehicles, and spare parts—and said the United States had not “pushed the envelope” yet.63 But this frustration lingered among Lebanese officials, even as U.S. assistance increased and the Lebanese minister of defense made the first visit to Washington ever conducted by someone in his position. In spring 2007, Lebanon’s military received 220 million dollars in supplemental appropriations, including additional vehicles, spare parts for ground and air vehicles, and lethal assistance. In 2007, it also received Section 1206 authority funding again: just over thirty million dollars for “small arms ammunition, weapons, night vision devices and body armor . . . [and] the transport of 200 EDA [Excess Defense Articles] 2.5 ton trucks,” as Table 10 illustrates. The size and scope of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon’s military had skyrocketed. “Truly astronomical by security assistance standards,” exulted one U.S. official, noting that it had increased from four million dollars in 2004 to roughly 250 million by 2007. Senior officials had “laughed” at a funding proposal for 200 million dollars in 2006, and yet one year later, the total assistance package was even larger.64 During Lebanese Minister of Defense Elias Murr’s visit to Washington in spring 2007, senior officials feted him as they engaged in discussions about strengthening Lebanon’s military. One senior U.S. official pledged to help develop the military’s “strategic concept”; however, these discussions remained focused on training and equipment details. Even during the visit,

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Table 10. Section 1206 Authority Funding for FY 2007: Mobility, Communications, Small Arms, and Individual Soldier Equipment Item Ground mobility Helicopter spare parts Small arms spare parts; ammunition Training program assessment Individual soldier equipment Communications equipment; night vision devices Total

Amount $5,469,879 $5,500,000 $7,439,107 $399,000 $4,957,000 $6,632,321 $30,397,307

Sources: el-Hokayem and McGovern, “Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon,” 35; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Defining the Military’s Role Toward Foreign Policy Hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., July 31, 2008, 77; Thompson and Asfura-Heim, Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries, 14.

Murr disparaged U.S. involvement in the region and made patently false declarations about U.S. support to Lebanon’s military, although he did reaffirm the burgeoning defense relationship and the Lebanese military’s increasing capabilities. His visit had presented an opportunity for the United States to become involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs, particularly given the upsurge in assistance; however, it failed to do so.65 Skewed Perceptions as the Lebanese Military Leadership Hesitates: Was It “Die First and Assistance Will Follow”? Throughout summer 2007, the Lebanese military engaged in its most serious conflict since the civil war against a violent Palestinian non-state actor affiliated with al Qaeda. A late May 2007 police raid to capture suspected bank robbers had erupted in violence and triggered an attack on a military post just outside the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp. Twenty-seven LAF soldiers were swiftly killed, making it clear that these were not ordinary criminals. The attack was soon traced to Fatah al-Islam, a Palestinian group based in the camp that controlled about 200 fighters.66 U.S. interest was particularly high, given Fatah al-Islam’s affiliation with al Qaeda and its leader’s recent sentencing—in absentia—for murdering a U.S. official. Rumors swirled of its murky affiliations with various states. It represented what appeared to be a growing presence of al Qaeda affiliates who were taking advantage of the fragile Lebanese state’s inability to control

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its territory. In December 2005, for example, one al Qaeda affiliate claimed that it fired ten Grad rockets from southern Lebanon into Israel, and the next month, thirteen al Qaeda members were arrested in Lebanon for plotting terrorist attacks.67 U.S. interest was also piqued out of growing concern about the actions of antagonistic external actors in destabilizing Lebanon—and more broadly, the region. Over the summer, Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates toured the Middle East and were pummeled by warnings from U.S. allies about increasing Iranian aggression. Therefore, enhancing U.S. defense relations with Lebanon was increasingly “part of a broader effort to try to contest rising Iranian power in the region,” as one senior U.S. official attested.68 Fighting a violent Palestinian non-state actor in a refugee camp was no doubt the least controversial target for Lebanon’s military, although it would still be notable because simply taking any action would embroil the Lebanese military in its “first military engagement in 60 years” outside of the civil war.69 Furthermore, it had generally obeyed the 1969 Cairo Agreement that, though abrogated by the Lebanese government in 1987, gave the Palestine Liberation Organization control over the refugee camps and limited the military’s involvement to the camps’ borders.70 The only serious public condemnation of the military’s effort—when Hizballah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah warned early on that any Lebanese military action in Nahr al-Bared crossed a “red line”—quickly tamped down when it became clear that the military would continue its assault on Fatah alIslam regardless of Hizballah’s stance.71 Nevertheless, Lebanese society largely supported the campaign because it focused on a Palestinian target, rather than on a Lebanese one. Although seemingly indicative of Lebanon’s diversity—a Sunni prime minister had ordered a military led by a Maronite Christian to counter a Sunni Palestinian group—the Lebanese government and the Lebanese military commanded such support in Lebanon precisely because they were fighting Palestinians. That the opponents were Sunni was immaterial; in Lebanon, the Palestinian presence remained a consensus issue, and the level of support would not be equaled were the military to deal with internal problems that affected Lebanese constituencies, such as Hizballah. As one former senior U.S. official explained, fighting the Palestinians is the “goal that unifies Lebanon . . . something the military is interested in, the state is interested in, [and] the parliament is interested in.” Another U.S. official

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concurred: “the only two things Lebanese can agree on is how much they love the army and how much they hate the Palestinians,” thereby making the Nahr al-Bared fight a positive “perfect storm.”72 Early on, the conflict illustrated the need for capable Lebanese military leadership at senior levels. Although Lebanon’s civilian leadership supported and understood the need for military involvement—Minister of Defense Murr “had a strategic sense,” although he assumed the fighting would last no more than seventy-two hours—the military leadership hesitated.73 According to a host of sources, Sleiman did not want Lebanon’s military to engage in urban warfare and “was ready to concede,” particularly given his deep concerns that he, personally, would be attacked. His substantial hesitancy in starting the conflict and his actions ending it— when rumors swirled that he arranged for Fatah al-Islam’s leader to return to Syria, according to one well-connected retired senior Lebanese military official—demonstrated the criticality of capable military leadership at such a crucial moment.74 Sleiman’s weakness and indecisiveness inhibited the Lebanese military at this key moment, and without Murr’s leadership, they may have sat on the sidelines as Fatah al-Islam undermined stability. The conflict also illustrated that Lebanon’s military was ill-equipped for the difficult urban warfare it confronted with Fatah al-Islam’s insurgent tactics. It lacked sufficient equipment, training, and intelligence, among other things. Pictures showed troops—often without helmets and flak jackets—communicating via cell phones. The military managed to push its creative abilities to the limit, however. For example, it made aged UH-1H transport helicopters—the majority of which operated only due to spare parts that the United States had delivered over the past year—combat capable by rolling ordnance off them: they literally “dropp[ed] bombs by hand . . . a hopelessly inaccurate method that resulted in the near-leveling of the camp.” Lacking secure armored vehicles, the military “improvise[d], armoring-up civilian bulldozers by surrounding the cabins with metal cages filled with sandbags and soldered steel plates to protect against snipers and improvised explosive devices.” Creativity aside, Lebanon’s military simply was weak and under-equipped—or “pathetic”—as one former senior U.S. official attested.75 The United States raced assistance to Lebanon, including more than forty C-130 and C-17 planeloads of materiel, over a period of a few weeks. Lebanese television showed the planes landing in Beirut and military equipment being unloaded and placed on helicopters—which were flying because

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of U.S.-supplied spare parts—and then transported directly to soldiers fighting in the refugee camp. This aid included U.S.-supplied materiel and also ammunition from other countries’ stockpiles, which the United States coordinated and transported. It was composed of “480 short tons of ammunition . . . over 5,600 coalition-supplied artillery shells,” nearly 150 vehicles, numerous rifles, rockets, grenade launchers, and shoulder-fired bunkerbusting weapons. This aid had a substantial impact on the military’s capabilities; for example, the Lebanese military’s fledgling fleet of twenty-three UH-1H helicopters doubled in usability.76 In a demonstration of Washington’s enthusiasm for helping Lebanon’s military and its collaboration with U.S. personnel at Embassy Beirut, a heavy dose of creativity was applied to make this support possible. For example, U.S. aid was moved through an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement, which “is not meant to be used the way we used [it] . . . not 25 million dollars’ worth,” admitted one former U.S. official. Another divulged that, focused on racing support to Lebanon’s military, “We . . . probably didn’t do everything as the regulations would have asked.”77 Moreover, to make it much less expensive to send materiel and to streamline assistance, President Bush quickly rescinded a 1985 prohibition on U.S. transportation services to Lebanon.78 And the United States made a controversial delivery—three 50-caliber sniper rifles—whose capability made it both “a war-changer” and one that “scared the heck out of some people in the U.S. government,” who feared their diversion to Iraq. Their sophistication made them a “sleepless nights issue,” as one U.S. official recalled, yet the sniper rifles were hugely effective because Lebanese military Special Forces had just completed a marksmanship training session. According to one former U.S. official, the snipers and Rangers who received training expended their ammunition more effectively and efficiently when compared to other units that had not participated in the training.79 More broadly, the Nahr al-Bared conflict validated arguments that Lebanon’s military was using U.S.supplied training and equipment appropriately, although they still “had to destroy the entire refugee camp to get at the Sunni terrorists,” according to U.S. officials.80 Lebanon’s military managed to fight “a few hundred” Fatah al-Islam members for more than one hundred days, during which nearly 170 soldiers were killed and more than 2,000 Lebanese wounded.81 Various U.S. officials underscored the criticality of U.S. training and equipment in this conflict. One asserted, for example, that the battle “would have been lost”

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without U.S. training and “if we had not tethered together this intricate, massive resupply process.” The United States had done as much as it possibly could during this period, and “if we were to have another crisis in Country X today, I’m not convinced we could react any faster than we did,” reflected one former U.S. official.82 But, senior Lebanese officials again criticized U.S. support as insufficient. Sleiman scoffed, “We didn’t get anything but promises and best wishes and some ammunition, but no equipment. . . . it’s as though they are telling us, ‘Die first and assistance will follow.’ ”83 One senior Lebanese political official even denied that the U.S. government sent any lethal assistance to Lebanon’s military during the Nahr al-Bared conflict, asserting that the military had to “fight with its bodies.” A senior Lebanese military official was insulted when U.S. military personnel showed him classified aerial imagery to assist in the Nahr al-Bared conflict but would not permit him to keep the maps; he was unimpressed even though this level of intelligence cooperation was unprecedented. Another praised Russia for offering a load of sniper rifles and attendant ammunition, and one raved over the tank ammunition that Syria provided, asserting that the military had “not received anything” from the United States. Support could have been “better, quicker, more efficient,” concluded a senior Lebanese political official, though he failed to offer any examples. And a retired senior official explained that the minister of defense, chief of staff, and G-3 were “unhappy” with the nature and delivery of U.S. military assistance. He even divulged that during a meeting with a senior U.S. military delegation, one Lebanese general exclaimed that the United States had not aided the military at all, forcing Minister of Defense Murr to diffuse the situation.84 Although skewed, these perspectives illustrated the limited impact that U.S. training and equipment alone could have in transforming the military. In reality, the only rejected Lebanese request was for “a small number of attack helicopters . . . and new TOW missiles to replace old TOW missiles supplied by the USG in the late 1980s.”85 Logistical issues—locating, acquiring, and shipping the former—posed a serious challenge under such a short timeline, and given the sophisticated capability of armed helicopters, they would no doubt require a serious senior-level dialogue in Washington. As one U.S. military official underscored, “There is a perception that we’ll give assistance, it will tip the balance, and the Lebanese military will come out ahead.”86 The substantial aid had enabled Lebanon’s military to wage this

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key fight for internal defense, but without organizational or personnel changes it did not fundamentally change the Lebanese military.

Defense Relations Expand but Show Different Visions for Achieving Lebanese Stability: Fall 2007–Winter 2008 Although various Lebanese officials were frustrated given their distorted perceptions of American support, the U.S.-Lebanese defense relationship expanded. The United States conducted its third assessment of Lebanon’s military during this period. Nevertheless, this assessment’s findings and the strategic dialogue that later commenced did not tackle sensitive Lebanese military affairs. It grew increasingly clear that the United States and Lebanon had different visions for achieving Lebanese stability. Closer Ties Following Nahr al-Bared’s “Watershed Moment” U.S. access to Lebanon’s military redoubled after the Nahr al-Bared conflict, which one U.S. official described as a “watershed moment” for the program to build its military. The United States and Lebanon “achieved a level of trust from Nahr al-Bared that we had not seen in twenty-five years or so,” estimated a U.S. official, a comment echoed by others. “Not only was I welcomed at Yarze [the Lebanese Ministry of Defense’s] headquarters, but I walked around [the ministry] myself with no escort . . . [and] could park where I wanted,” highlighted another. To be sure, U.S. military personnel had been based in the Lebanese Ministry of Defense during the first program to build Lebanon’s military; nevertheless, the contemporary relationship was deepening.87 Given the magnitude of the Nahr al-Bared conflict, the United States decided to assess Lebanon’s military again. Throughout the last quarter of 2007, a small team led by Brigadier General (Ret.) Les Fuller traveled to Lebanon to examine military training requirements and to update the 2006 assessment, taking a “full-spectrum” look of the military, according to one team member. Their focus on training was due to U.S. plans to use a substantial portion of the 220 million dollars in security assistance for a comprehensive program that would “provide basic and advanced skills, streamline the LAF hierarchy, and serve as an important first step toward comprehensive security sector reform” in light of its internal defense

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mission. Moreover, as one team member asserted, training was critical because, like “planting grass . . . as you train the army, you can weed out and depopulate some of these militias.”88 The final assessment report—compiled after weeks of formal briefings and visits and casual late night debates at the officer’s club north of Beirut—painted a positive picture of Lebanon’s military and largely ignored sensitive Lebanese military affairs. Instead, in the same vein as previous assessments, the team was “tremendously impressed with the heart, mind, education and patriotism of LAF soldiers and officers,” according to the effusive final assessment report, or, as one member attested, “Every soldier we saw was alert, smart, his weapon was clean and he knew what to do with it.” The report’s seventy-three recommendations highlighted the need for training at the officer, NCO, brigade, and battalion levels; the creation of a Special Operations Command and a national maneuver training center; enhanced marksmanship training; empowered regional headquarters; an automated supply system; a secure command and control system; more capable patrol boats; and modernized air force capabilities.89 But although the final assessment largely agreed with the findings of earlier assessments and also painstakingly outlined a large-scale training effort, it did not seriously address many of the military’s strategic shortcomings. These included the need to restructure its force to better fulfill the internal defense mission, the lack of national military and national security strategies, and its problematic budgeting and logistics systems.90 Another opportunity had been missed for delving into structural and strategic issues surrounding the Lebanese military. Training and Equipping Problems: The U.S. System Moves Slowly Both the comprehensive training program and the delivery of equipment moved slowly for many reasons, including problems with the U.S. and Lebanese systems. Although Fuller’s team had actually finished the assessment a week early—enabling them to garner Ambassador Feltman and General Sleiman’s approvals before the tragic assassination of the Lebanese military’s chief of operations—lengthy U.S. contracting procedures resulted in a year-long delay before the contract could be completed.91 To be sure, substantial numbers of Lebanese military personnel still received training in 2007, which focused on professionalization, counter-terrorism,

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and “promot[ing] Lebanese control” over its territory. Throughout 2007, more than 140 Lebanese military personnel received U.S. training.92 Similarly, some equipment—including the Lebanese military’s first secure communications devices—arrived in Lebanon during this period; however, only eleven million of the previous 220 million dollars from the previous year had been committed. This lag, according to Secretary of State Rice, was due to three outstanding issues: (1) the Lebanese military was only beginning to relearn how to use the U.S. government’s security assistance program; (2) the battle in Nahr al-Bared during the previous summer stalled long-term aid in order to rapidly procure and deliver equipment to fulfill immediate needs; and (3) the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Embassy Beirut remained small.93 Her last point, in particular, was neglected for a number of reasons. U.S. officials in Washington did not expand the Embassy’s ODC due to the heavy deployment of U.S. military personnel in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, congressional regulations on the number of U.S. military officials serving in embassies abroad, and most important, heightened U.S. concerns about changing the nature of its involvement in Lebanon, given its historical legacy. One U.S. military official even jokingly described it as “an army of one.” Despite the burgeoning size and scope of its work, the ODC did not expand except on a temporary basis, although it substantially benefited from three extremely capable Lebanese staff employed at the embassy.94 Force protection concerns further exacerbated this dynamic because nearly all members of the Embassy staff—save for the defense attache´— operated under extremely tight security procedures, which had remained in place since the early 1980s. For example, supporting a comprehensive training program was challenging: U.S. military trainers were limited in how long they could be in Lebanon because—like all U.S. government officials—they almost always stayed on the Embassy’s grounds at its hotel equivalent, nicknamed the Tango Inn. Given the impact of these constraints, one U.S. official quipped, “the [U.S.-Lebanon defense] relationship is linked to the Tango Inn’s capacity.”95 Training and Equipping Problems: Lebanon’s Leadership Lacks Focus Importantly, Lebanon’s military was responsible for some of the program’s flaws. For example, its leadership sprinkled equipment throughout

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the military—distributing it to various units upon receiving it—regardless of the unit’s current responsibilities, according to a senior Lebanese military official, a Lebanese security analyst, and multiple U.S. officials.96 Lebanese Special Forces did receive some priority, but given that these regiments were overwhelming composed of Maronite Christians, U.S. officials in Lebanon were cautious about avoiding a “Special Operations” solution because they “want[ed] to avoid what happened before: . . . the perception that the military is a Christian military.”97 Describing this “shotgun approach” to equipment distribution, one U.S. official explained that the Lebanese military leadership “can’t outfit a unit and build it” and instead dispersed assistance across confessions. “Equipment goes with the unit,” lamented a Lebanese security analyst, and Lebanese military personnel swore that they were unable to distribute equipment based on mission priorities “because then they will be seen as favoring certain units.”98 Such a policy enabled a situation wherein one-and-a-half years after deploying to south Lebanon, many Lebanese military troops were still sleeping in tents.99 These equipment challenges further demonstrated the need for capable Lebanese military leadership. Many of the military’s senior officials, particularly General Sleiman, took a laissez-faire approach to the military’s needs and failed to seriously examine its requirements. For example, Sleiman told a retired senior Lebanese military official, “the United States knows what . . . [the military] needs; he [Sleiman] shouldn’t have to tell them,” after being urged to provide a list of requirements to the U.S. military. Highlighting this dynamic, one senior Lebanese official asserted that the Lebanese military should more actively assess its needs. But there is scant evidence that it conducted such assessments, that it meaningfully tried to restructure its force, or that it broached these structural issues with U.S. officials.100 Some Lebanese military officials deflected blame and directed it toward their country’s political leadership—for example, one chastised them for “not hav[ing] a plan for building the army.” To be sure, the Lebanese political leadership posed some real challenges to strengthening the military. One very senior Lebanese political leader was so ignorant of the military that he believed UNIFIL was a much better-equipped force. The Lebanese parliament’s repeated failure to approve annual budgets was another illustration of the political leadership’s feckless support for and neglect of its military. As one Lebanese security official lamented, “There is no financial strategy to build the Lebanese army by the Lebanese government.”101

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Disagreement over the Challenges Undermining Lebanese Stability The defense relationship had made important progress as materiel support surged—albeit with the attendant problems previously delineated— although the nature of U.S. involvement was largely constrained. Senior defense officials streamed to Beirut to establish what Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman referred to as a “strategic partnership.”102 This regular interaction enabled close, regular discussions with the senior civilian defense official, Minister of Defense Murr, who hoped to transform Lebanon’s military into a “light, counter-terrorism force” and was the closest U.S. ally, given Sleiman’s usual passivity. For example, Murr was described by one former senior U.S. official as “the only minister of defense not telling me he wants F-16s. . . . he wanted stuff we could give him.”103 This dialogue made it clear that—although not addressed head-on given U.S. reluctance to become involved in sensitive Lebanese military affairs— there was a noteworthy gap between the two parties. To be sure, they agreed that Lebanon’s military should serve an internal defense mission so that, in the near term, non-state armed actors were less able to function and, in the long term, their ostensible reasons for existing would be minimized. The post-2006 war deployments to south Lebanon and the border with Syria, and the Nahr al-Bared fighting, were manifestations of these efforts. The notion that Lebanon’s military would confront a powerful internal militia like Hizballah was deeply flawed, yet exerting Lebanese government sovereignty throughout its territory simply could not be detached from this issue. The implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 was particularly illustrative. “The U.S. and Lebanon understand [1701] . . . differently,” cautioned one U.S. official. Secretary Rice said the United States was building Lebanon’s military so it would be capable of implementing 1701, including “begin[ning] the process of disarming militias.” Another U.S. official highlighted 1701 implementation and the military’s deployment as evidence that “if appropriately armed and trained, the LAF could be capable of extending government control over Lebanese territory.”104 But the Lebanese leadership understood 1701 differently. Counterterrorism remained a term that applied solely to the Palestinians rather than Hizballah. In one telling example, a visiting U.S. general was shocked when he learned that Lebanon’s military failed to find any Hizballah arms

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caches during its more than 8,000 searches in southern Lebanon; he did not understand, according to the U.S. official recounting this story, that “they aren’t going to look that hard” when materiel involved Hizballah. One senior Lebanese official, almost surely unable to speak about Hizballah directly, used UNIFIL as a foil to address the challenge Hizballah posed to Lebanese stability. He explained that UNIFIL was a “force that [was] completely armed to the teeth,” and those capabilities were the reason Lebanon’s military was having difficulty implementing 1701.105 Regardless of whether or not the Lebanese government was willing to publicly recognize the internal security challenge posed by Hizballah, it soon emerged as the biggest test for both parties in decades.

External Actors Foment Violence and Instability While the United States Avoids Becoming a Co-combatant: Spring 2008 During the first half of 2008, the program to strengthen Lebanon’s military faced its most serious test as violence escalated to a new level. This violence was particularly effective at constraining Lebanon’s military because Hizballah’s actions were predicated on the substantial support it received from antagonistic external actors. To the surprise of its partners in Lebanon, the United States refused to become a co-combatant. And to the dismay of senior U.S. officials in Washington—and some key Lebanese officials—the Lebanese military stood by as Hizballah took over large swaths of Beirut. These events demonstrated the insufficient progress made in the U.S. program to strengthen Lebanon’s military, which had focused on disbursing training and equipment, largely ignoring sensitive military affairs. Violent Rumblings as Syria Increasingly Reasserts Its Influence, Destabilizing Lebanon Violence surged throughout this period—particularly given Syria’s efforts to reassert its influence—and the Lebanese military’s actions did not improve the situation. The military had recently fired on a group of protestors—primarily Shi’a—after their demonstrations complaining about government services grew violent. The political and security situation grew increasingly unstable, and the protestors’ deaths stained the military’s

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reputation because Hizballah exploited the events for its own gain. More worryingly, “many former militias in Lebanon . . . [were] reconstituting, rearming, and retraining their fighters.”106 To deal with the threat posed by violent non-state actors, the military established a skeletal Special Operations Command, but it was both weak and miniscule.107 Syria faced little discouragement for its actions in destabilizing Lebanon. The international community had sanctioned and chastised Damascus for years, but the United States had begun reengaging it on affairs related to Iraq’s security and the Arab-Israeli peace process.108 For a host of reasons, many European and Middle Eastern leaders supported this isolation of Syria; however, their resoluteness waned as U.S. policy moved closer toward engaging Syria. Although Damascus did not accordingly shift its role, the relationship with Washington burgeoned, even despite the discovery and Israeli destruction of a covert Syrian nuclear program. Nearly three decades of Syrian occupation had stymied Lebanese progress. And as the regional and global isolation of Damascus lifted, the Syrian regime further obstructed U.S. efforts to empower Lebanon’s military to secure Lebanese territory. The Month That Changed Everything: May 2008 In May 2008, Lebanon’s military faced its biggest test in decades. It failed spectacularly, demonstrating the impact of antagonistic external actors and the limits of U.S. support. The challenge began when Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, an influential leader in the pro-west coalition, pushed Lebanon’s government to target two critical aspects of Hizballah’s capabilities: its independent telecommunications network and its special access in Beirut International Airport. Hizballah interpreted the Lebanese government’s willingness to contest aspects of its state-like apparatus as an existential threat, fomenting protests and bloodshed throughout Beirut and the Chouf Mountains.109 Confident that “international unity and regional solidarity [had] collapse[d], Hizballah felt comfortable turning their arms against [its fellow] Lebanese,” surmised a senior U.S. official.110 Its ally Syria was no longer under serious pressure and it had rearmed since the 2006 war courtesy of its other ally, Iran. Therefore, Hizballah did not hesitate to use its weapons against its fellow Lebanese, fomenting the worst intra-Lebanese violence since the civil war. As Nasrallah proclaimed, “Today is the day to fulfill this

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promise” of “cut[ting] the hand that targets the weapons of the resistance.”111 Without guidance from its leadership to act, Lebanon’s military stood on the sidelines and failed to secure the Lebanese populace as Hizballah wreaked havoc.112 It “could not make any decisions” about how to respond to the worsening situation; the May 2008 events were “highly political, so . . . incredibly small decisions were being taken at the highest levels,” explained a U.S. official. The Lebanese military leadership hesitated due to “fear of its splintering as it did during the Lebanese civil war”; meanwhile, Hizballah seized territory and violence ravaged the country.113 After nearly one week of violence, the military’s leadership finally warned that it would take steps to stem it; however, this comment was superfluous because the cabinet was on the verge of rescinding its decisions against Hizballah’s network. And the few actions Lebanon’s military did take to secure areas, including some Lebanese government offices, came only after Hizballah permitted it to do so.114 The Lebanese military’s hesitation during this critical period illustrated the insufficient progress that the United States had made in transforming it. Choosing to Limit the U.S. Role and Not Become a Co-Combatant These events forced the U.S. government to confront a difficult dilemma about the depth of its support to Lebanon’s military. At a minimum, it was unwilling to become a co-combatant given its palpable and prohibitive neuralgia from the early 1980s military intervention in Lebanon. Shedding light on U.S. decision making during this period, one former senior official recounted, “After Hizballah did what it did, we had to make a decision in Lebanon: [were we willing] to kill and be killed . . . with the history we had in Lebanon, we were not going to” do so, he said.115 But there were other U.S. policy options beyond becoming a cocombatant with Lebanon’s military as it faced a violent non-state actor destabilizing Lebanese territory. One alternative was to direct U.S. aid toward armed entities other than Lebanon’s military, in the hopes that these non-state actors could more effectively confront the immediate threat posed by Hizballah and its allies, given the military’s passivity. For example, the United States could assist groups like the Christian Lebanese Forces militia or Walid Jumblatt’s Druze militia, which “fought courageously

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against Hizballah . . . [but] ran out of ammunition,” according to a senior U.S. official. Lebanon’s military was unable to provide any check on Hizballah’s power, but, argued one former senior U.S. official, “a combination of LAF and militias could have . . . forced Hizballah to decide if they were willing to risk lots of Sunni and Christian casualties.”116 The pursuit of such a policy would have assumed that any effort to constrain Hizballah’s power and maneuverability—even a minimal and ad hoc one organized by various militias—would be more effective than the Lebanese military’s meek stance. However, senior U.S. officials viewed this option as too risky and contrary to long-term U.S. interests in Lebanon because it required empowering entities other than the state military. Outlining this dilemma, one U.S. official explained, “We want to support Lebanese independence and sovereignty, which means pushing back against externally supported groups like Hizballah, [but] on other hand we want to build national institutions,” which would involve supporting Lebanon’s military rather than armed non-state actors. Nonetheless, many senior officials voiced doubts about the decision. One lamented that it still “haunts me” and another exclaimed, “We were naı¨ve not to [aid militias].”117 A number of Lebanese officials had assumed that the United States would establish a military presence in Lebanon or would punish antagonistic external actors like Iran and Syria for their support of Hizballah by attacking their territory.118 They inaccurately interpreted the U.S. government’s rhetoric supporting the Lebanese government and Washington’s condemnation of Damascus’s meddling behavior as evidence of American willingness to escalate its military involvement in the region. Given their misreading of U.S. intentions and subsequently inflated expectations, these Lebanese were distressed and devastated. President Bush released a statement supporting the Lebanese government and condemning Syria and Iran for enabling Hizballah’s onslaught, but this verbal assurance was negligible compared to supporting militias or to becoming a cocombatant. As one U.S. official highlighted, “If he [Walid Jumblatt] assumed the marines were going to come in, he had unrealistic expectations about what the U.S. could and could not do.” Once it grew clear to him that the United States would not change its policy, Jumblatt—trapped in his Clemenceau home by Hizballah fighters—pledged he would “not be dragged into civil war” and slowly shifted his political stance toward Hizballah and Syria over the coming months, helping dismantle the pro-west coalition in Lebanon.119

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The United States had demonstrated that it “was simply unable to react physically in a way to stop Hizballah,” according to a senior U.S. official’s description of Lebanese reactions. Confident of continued Iranian and Syrian support, “Hizballah . . . called the bluff. . . . Were we willing to do the level and form of aid Iran was willing to do? The answer is no,” argued one former senior U.S. official.120 The Lebanese were, therefore, forced to deal with domestic and regional events on their own, making many skeptical of and disillusioned by U.S. support. The Impact of May 2008 Although the United States maintained support for its allies in Lebanon, its coalition for doing so had faced a serious setback, as had its support in Lebanon. Critically, the early May events had demonstrated to the Lebanese that Hizballah remained in control and the Lebanese military would abide by Hizballah’s rules, which would permit the military to act as long as it did not, in any real way, encroach on Hizballah’s operations. These events also underscored that the United States would severely limit its involvement in Lebanon. It would not become intensely involved in strengthening the Lebanese military, an entity whose hesitancy—coupled with the political elite’s concerns about triggering civil war—was a persistent weakness. Moreover, two other events later that month frustrated U.S. efforts to build the military because they strengthened antagonistic external actors and weakened the military’s leadership. First, the Lebanese government, weakened after its inability to prevent a violent non-state actor from manipulating the state yet again, was shocked when it became public that Israel was engaging Syria through indirect peace talks brokered by Turkey.121 With the Israelis engaging Syria, it was much harder for Damascus’s Arab brethren—particularly in Lebanon—to criticize it. Therefore, international pressure on Syria rapidly diminished, which Damascus recognized and exploited. Its toehold in Lebanon increased as western and regional leaders actively courted Syrian support. Second, Qatar brokered the Doha Agreement at the end of May, which represented another triumph for Hizballah and Syria and posed a real challenge for the military’s leadership. The Agreement granted Hizballah’s coalition veto power in the Lebanese cabinet, codifying the weakened influence of the pro-west coalition. Its brokerage resulted in naming the

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Lebanese military commander, General Sleiman, as president of the next Lebanese government. His appointment made the military leadership more politicized. As one senior Lebanese military official lamented, “The worst problem in the LAF [is that] the commander thinks about the presidency,” which impeded the institution’s efficacy.122 In a telling exchange, one former senior U.S. official recounted that the events of May 2008 demonstrated to him that the Lebanese military did not and never would have the will to win. Citing another country with a weak government and a fledgling military that he had dealt with while serving in the U.S. government decades before, he reflected, “Who will [kill and be killed] for Lebanon? Will the LAF? The answer was no . . . they ducked, [and] the rest of Lebanon has said if you’re going to kill and be killed, you can have the country.”123 This response appeared to be a salve for this former official as he wrestled with the disappointment over the Lebanese military’s passivity during May 2008. And in a severe understatement, a different official remarked that Lebanon’s military “is unlikely to be able to prevent or contain largescale internecine conflict on the scale of May 2008 anytime soon.”124 The events of May 2008 illustrated the limits of the U.S. program to strengthen Lebanon’s military for internal defense.

To Lebanese Frustration, U.S. Focuses on Sending Equipment as New Lebanese Military Leadership Takes Over, but with Little Vision: Summer–Fall 2008 During the second half of 2008, the United States continued its focus on training and equipping the Lebanese military rather than transforming it. To be sure, assistance flowed to the military, despite heavy Lebanese criticism of its scope, scale, and delivery; however, even the inauguration of a formal strategic defense dialogue failed to delve into sensitive Lebanese military affairs. New leadership took over the military; however, it too had a constrained view of the military’s role. As the events over the last year had illustrated, the Lebanese military maintained a much greater presence throughout the state’s territory given its deployments, but its actions were largely restricted to countering Palestinian or al Qaedaaffiliated actors.

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Table 11. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon, FY 2006–FY 2009 (Millions of U.S. dollars) Account

FY 2006

FY 2007

FY 2008

FY 2009

Foreign military financing (equipment and training)

$3.713

$224.800

$6.953

$159.700

International military education and training

$0.752

$0.905

$1.428

$2.278

Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY 2011 Request, by Jeremy M. Sharp, RL32260 (2010), 13.

Lebanese Criticize U.S. Assistance but Also Do Not Take Advantage of It U.S. equipment and training flowed to Lebanon’s military and senior Defense Department official visits to Lebanon continued, but so did Lebanese displeasure with this assistance. Materiel aid during this period included more than one million rounds of ammunition, another fifteen million dollars in Section 1206 authority funding, and 6.94 million dollars in additional security assistance. The Section 1206 authority funds focused solely on training and equipping the Lebanese military’s Special Forces and included 150 M24 sniper rifles, 150 M500 shotguns, spare parts for M4s, 16 vehicles, 150 night vision weapon sights, 200 hand-held GPS receivers, individual soldier equipment, and secure communications.125 With U.S. assistance, the military’s presence in Lebanon grew pervasive as soldiers were driving “new American Humvees and some tote[d] gleaming new American rifles and grenade launchers.”126 Training included Special Forces engagements and explosive ordinance disposal, and the United States authorized another 1.2 million dollars in training support for the year. This amount was rather small because the military had received hundreds of millions in supplemental funding just one year before, and U.S. officials were concerned about its absorption capacity.127 U.S. assistance had skyrocketed since 2006—as Table 11 highlights—yet by mid-October 2008, less than half of the more than 400 million dollars in training and equipment had arrived in Lebanon, and Lebanese officials disparaged U.S. materiel assistance. Although President Bush had pledged that that the United States, “will continue to support the Lebanese Armed Forces,” this equipment arrived slowly; for example, the package of 7.2 million dollars in counterterrorism support—which included 150 sniper

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rifles (including the three previously discussed) and additional vehicles, arms, and night-vision devices—took more than eighteen months to fully arrive.128 Out of frustration with U.S. assistance, Minister of Defense Murr enthusiastically endorsed a Russian offer to sell MiG-29s to Lebanon, despite the impracticality of this aircraft given its high maintenance costs and the small size of Lebanese territory. Praising the offer, Murr publicly and pointedly criticized the U.S. effort to build Lebanon’s military.129 A Lebanese television show, mocking U.S. aid, depicted U.S. government officials “handing out socks and toy airplanes to Lebanese generals.”130 The Lebanese military was much more pleased with U.S. training. “Training is more helpful than equipment,” asserted one Lebanese military official. They particularly praised Special Forces training and even requested more engagements, which was impossible due to the strain on U.S. Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, they appreciated mobile training teams given the wide range of skills they taught.131 In both the equipment and training arenas, however, the Lebanese military’s lackluster leadership failed to take advantage of U.S. support. For example, the military’s leadership positively responded when the U.S. Defense Department leadership offered to facilitate the transfer of M60 tanks from Jordan, yet it did not survey the tanks before requesting them, and it then complained about the tanks’ condition once they arrived. In the training arena, Lebanese military personnel trained by the United States were not always appropriately utilized or given positions concordant with their qualifications. One egregious example concerned a respected officer who returned from counter-terrorism training in the United States and was promptly placed in charge of exercise facilities at the Beirut officers’ club. The Lebanese military leadership repeatedly did not take ownership of the U.S. program; as one former senior Lebanese military official asserted, the military leadership was simply unwilling to build a plan for strengthening the military. Instead, “the idea was it was the U.S.’s fault . . . [so] the U.S. should do something.”132 A Limited Role Has Limited Impact: New Military Leadership Is Selected Without U.S. Involvement and a Strategic Defense Dialogue Is Inaugurated Yet the U.S. role remained limited, generally confined to training and equipping, despite the emergence of a new Lebanese military leadership

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and the creation of a strategic dialogue. Given Sleiman’s appointment to the presidency, the slot for military commander was open, but the United States decided it would not become involved in the selection process. U.S. officials, cognizant of the different candidates who could have replaced Sleiman, decided that U.S. involvement in influencing this selection would be unhelpful to whoever was ultimately appointed, particularly given the potential for this individual to, at some point, become Lebanon’s president. As one U.S. official explained, If anti-U.S. actors suspected that the new LAF commander had been backed by the United States, he would be discredited and have little leeway to pursue modernization of the LAF and to conduct operations in areas of the country that might be perceived as impinging on militia [Hizballah] influence. U.S. backing for a LAF commander would also likely diminish the prospects for the commander becoming the Lebanese president one day. The United States decided to risk working with a LAF commander who was willing to negotiate with—and concede to—the political pressures of Lebanon, in order to have a greater chance that the commander could become a viable leader of the most important institution in Lebanon. That is precisely what it got with Jean Kahwagi.133 Soon after becoming the Lebanese military’s commander, General Jean Kahwaji proclaimed the military’s close relationship with Hizballah: it stood “shoulder to shoulder with the people and the resistance [Hizballah],” he asserted. Such a declaration at that moment was particularly worrisome, given that a Hizballah operative had just shot down a Lebanese military helicopter—killing a Lebanese soldier—after mistakenly assuming it was Israeli. Although the nature of Lebanese society invariably required some interaction between the two entities, the military leadership’s public embrace of Hizballah was disconcerting.134 Lebanon and the United States enhanced their defense relationship in October 2008 when they established a Joint Military Commission, but it operated within limited parameters, focusing solely on areas of agreement and avoiding sensitive issues. Officially, this formal dialogue was launched to “institutionalize the bilateral military relationship” between the two countries by providing “an annual opportunity . . . to commit to military cooperation goals for the coming years and to review commitments made

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in the past year.” The inaugural event remained focused, however, on training and equipment; the parties signed three contracts worth sixty-three million dollars in military assistance.135 In practice, the dialogue was not a forum for annually outlining the Lebanese military’s mission and the program to build it. Instead, it delved into those areas on which the two countries agreed; as one senior U.S. official explained, “we have overlapping agendas, but they’re not perfectly overlapping.” Expanding, he remarked that issues such as “Sunni extremism, al Qaeda–type issues” could be addressed, whereas the two states severely disagreed on Syria-Lebanon border security because Hizballah received arms from that route. In that vein, the U.S. government simply avoided discussing issues surrounding Hizballah with the Lebanese military. Rather than discussing sensitive Lebanese military affairs, “ambiguity was built into the program,” explained a senior U.S. official. Moreover, “we weren’t forcing them to say we’re an enemy of Syria and we weren’t forced to say we support the army that is an enemy of Israel.” The two governments defined terrorism differently. Hizballah simply would not be included in the Lebanese definition, so the United States refrained from discussing it to allow the program to continue.136 Illustrating the limits of the U.S.-Lebanon dialogue, one former senior U.S. official explained, We never had that discussion with the LAF at the most fundamental levels. We had it at a more operational level. As in, we’re worried about Palestinian camps . . . yeah, so are we [the LAF would respond]. What do you need to police them better? The philosophicallevel discussion was a not very good one. We skipped a key step. It was fine at its most general level and at the nitty-gritty level. [For example], every country needs a monopoly on violence, multiconfessional LAF, etc. . . . and now, do you get a single engine or twin engine? What was missing—every country needs an army—but what precisely is it that you think this military is going to do?137 In a severe understatement, one U.S. official explained that the two countries shared “common goals” of exerting Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory, but had “different visions of how to get there.”138 By this time, the narrow impact of U.S. support to Lebanon’s military was evident. At best, it could “deal with isolated threats, including militant

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groups based in refugee camps,” but it could not exert a monopoly on violence throughout Lebanese territory. In a frank illustration of how the military had not transformed, one U.S. military official explained, “The last thing anyone [in Lebanon] wants is active LAF patrols. . . . Success is that there are no big fights. Counterterrorism is [solely] against Palestinians. [On] the borders . . . the LAF winks, doesn’t do much, [and] leaves it to Hizballah.” The Lebanese military’s focus remained on “how to keep Lebanon quiet today.”139 And thanks to U.S. assistance, it was more capable of doing so, but only within limited parameters—for example, at the end of 2008 it “found and dismantled” a number of rockets in south Lebanon, likely placed by a Palestinian militia.140 And, antagonistic external actors had assured that violent non-state actors like Hizballah grew stronger and increasingly capable. Following the 2006 summer war in which Hizballah expended much of its arsenal, Iran and Syria had re-armed it, despite the presence of both UNIFIL and the Lebanese military throughout south Lebanon.141 As one Lebanese security expert quipped, “Hizballah has a strategy, which most of Lebanon does not.”142 The Bush administration ended in early 2009, and President Obama continued the program to strengthen Lebanon’s military largely within the same parameters. Senior U.S. officials visited Lebanon, hosted senior Lebanese military officials in Washington—including the first counterpart visit by a sitting Lebanese military commander—and redoubled equipment flows, to include twelve Raven unmanned aerial vehicles and a Cessna Caravan aircraft outfitted with Hellfire missiles.143 Lebanon’s military remained constrained in its willingness to exert the government’s sovereignty, particularly given the increased U.S. engagement with Syria. “We bought something with this couple million dollars . . . but the LAF does not really extend the power of the state,” explained one former senior U.S. official.144 And in a moment of sober reflection on the second U.S. effort to strengthen the Lebanese military for internal defense, a former senior Lebanese military official rued, “Looking back, very rarely do you see [a] people given an opportunity twice. In 1982 and 2005. And we blew it.”145

Conclusion The second U.S. program to strengthen the Lebanese military partially failed. The military had grown increasingly capable and took some meaningful steps to maintain internal security; however, it was unable to exert

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the government’s sovereignty throughout its territory, making insufficient progress in establishing a more enforced or sustainable monopoly on violence. Even at its speediest, training and equipping did not transform the Lebanese military, particularly as Syria and Iran redoubled their support to Hizballah during this period. The nature of U.S. involvement in sensitive Lebanese military affairs was largely limited. The United States refrained from facilitating a serious reorganization of the top-heavy and passive Lebanese military. Although the program was centered on an internal defense mission, it nevertheless ignored the key issue of Hizballah. Both the United States and the Lebanese government emphasized areas of agreement—such as al Qaeda affiliates— and sidelined more controversial threats to Lebanese stability. The United States made no attempt to influence personnel appointments. As the cases of Sleiman and Kahwaji illustrated, the Lebanese military lacked an inspirational, transformative leader who could sufficiently guide it. Nor, however, did the United States become a co-combatant; it refrained from extending the monopoly on violence on behalf of the Lebanese state. But, it also refrained from strengthening alternative entities that might have minimized the opposition’s willingness to use force. As the events of May 2008 highlighted, the United States focused on institution building rather than on limiting the ability of groups like Hizballah to destabilize Lebanon. Antagonistic external actors continued undermining the Lebanese state, largely through supporting Hizballah rather than more overt ways. For example, Syria no longer occupied Lebanese territory. Nevertheless, with robust assistance from Damascus and Tehran, Hizballah demonstrated both its increasing capability and willingness to employ its arms against the state. There was now neither a more enforced nor sustainable monopoly on violence by the Lebanese government. Its military had taken some meaningful steps to establish internal security and to confront certain adversaries. The state’s presence throughout its territory had substantially increased as the military deployed throughout southern Lebanon following the 2006 war. The military now could better defend Lebanon from internal threats posed by Palestinians or al Qaeda affiliates and it was actively doing so, which had contributed to an increase in violence. But there were limits to its increasing control, and the military was unable to fully exert the government’s sovereignty, particularly because its willingness to target its opponents lay strictly within certain parameters. These dynamics illustrated that simply training and disbursing materiel was

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insufficient for transforming Lebanon’s military, particularly given the role of antagonistic external actors. By 2009, it was clear that that the Lebanese military remained relatively weak. Its government was fragile and easily manipulated by external parties, their proxies, and other non-state actors. And the Lebanese military was heavily constrained in its ability to secure Lebanese territory.

Chapter 6

Findings and Implications

As a U.S. defense official, I facilitated a multibillion-dollar program to support Pakistan’s military. We gave Pakistan equipment and training and reimbursed its military for operations it supposedly conducted, but for too long, we didn’t ask the hard or uncomfortable questions. This book, an exploration of when, why, and under what circumstances U.S. programs to strengthen partner militaries for internal defense succeeded, has put all of those issues on the table. It is based on the assumption that the United States builds militaries in fragile states so that the partner state is able to extend the monopoly on violence throughout its territory. Through a rich cross-case analysis, a few key findings emerge whose policy implications are both meaningful and disconcerting.

Research Findings First and foremost, we’re doing it wrong. The United States traditionally approaches the problem of building militaries in fragile states by emphasizing training and equipment and by distancing itself from key political issues. This method wastes time, effort, and resources. Moreover, it represents a critical policy failure. Put simply, it is fundamentally flawed. There are two critical variables that influence the extent to which the U.S. program to build a partner military results in a more enforced and sustainable monopoly on violence extended by the partner state. These two elements—the nature of U.S. involvement and the role of unhelpful external actors—were explored through a structured, focused examination of

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four case studies. Each case study involved deliberate examination of structure, personnel, and limits as they relate to the nature of U.S. involvement; shifts in support to the insurgents, including materiel and sanctuary; and broader efforts to undermine stability by antagonistic external actors. This concentrated exploration showed that these programs were more likely to succeed when the United States became deeply involved in the partner state military’s sensitive affairs—influencing personnel and organization but refraining from becoming a co-combatant—and when antagonistic external actors played a diminishing role. The interaction of these two elements—the nature of the U.S. effort and the external threat environment—had a critical impact on the partner state military’s ability to enforce and sustain internal security throughout its territory. Notably, this finding suggests that the literatures’ emphasis on establishing a shared agenda and grounding assistance programs in local ownership is incomplete. The ideal scenario—demonstrated by the Greek case study—illustrated that the partner military could capably maintain internal security when the United States was deeply involved in its sensitive military affairs and when antagonistic external actors receded. Conversely, the South Vietnam case study demonstrated the opposite result: the United States overreacted and maintained a singular focus on external actors, failing to build a capable military and also becoming a co-combatant. The Lebanon case studies particularly draw attention to these two decisive elements. In the first case, spoilers undermined the U.S. program, as did its flawed understanding of internal defense. In the second case, limited U.S. involvement in Lebanese military affairs resulted in limited—and insufficient—progress. These findings underscore that our traditional understanding of how to strengthen partner militaries for internal defense is inadequate. They indicate that the United States should pursue a two-pronged strategy: become deeply involved in partner state military affairs and limit antagonistic external actors’ ability to undermine the fragile state by supporting violent non-state actors. To be sure, making policy—let alone sensitive security policy—on small fragile states is difficult for a large, powerful actor like the United States that has an extensive array of international commitments. “Our tanks are too big for your streets,” asserted one former senior U.S. official to various Lebanese during the early 1980s as he crystallized this challenge.1 The following construct, although artificial, brings together some key characteristics of a military that is capable of conducting foreign internal

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Table 12. Some Key Characteristics of a Capable FID Military Influenced by Training

Influenced by Equipment

Influenced by Leadership

Characteristic

Description

Dynamic

Taking the initiative, prioritizing requirements, and willing and able to counter insurgents effectively and without alienating the host population

Moderate

Limited

Heavy

Joint

Cohesive, disciplined, interoperable, unified, and able to effectively communicate throughout the military

Moderate

Moderate

Heavy

Judicious engagement

Appropriate, positive engagement with the host population

Moderate

Limited

Heavy

defense. Prominent counterinsurgency theorists highlight the importance of a military that is cohesive, interoperable, offensive, and fosters a positive and appropriate relationship with the host population.2 Three key characteristics integrate these elements as they relate to a partner state military (see Table 12). A military that is “dynamic” is able to target and undermine its opponents while maintaining popular support. A “joint” force is unified and interoperable. And “judicious engagement” can strengthen a force’s legitimacy and subsequently enable it to more effectively gather intelligence and to secure the host population. These are essential aspects for U.S. programs to strengthen militaries in fragile states for internal defense. They affect the military’s morale, loyalty, and overall efficacy in exerting the state’s sovereignty. And notably, deep involvement in a military’s sensitive affairs—as illustrated here by the role of leadership—heavily influences these characteristics. Moreover, the traditional U.S. approach—disbursing training and equipment—does not have an overwhelming impact on them. Therefore, becoming involved in delicate military affairs—namely, personnel and organization—directly shapes

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key characteristics of a force capable of conducting foreign internal defense. Orienting a U.S. program toward these characteristics increases the likelihood of its success (though, to be sure, context remains highly relevant). Although controversial, the CIA’s Birds of Prey program during the later years of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam offers an example worth studying. Although Birds of Prey emphasized elite units focused on gathering intelligence and conducting assassinations—not strengthening a partner state military—it nevertheless represented an effective effort in which the United States became involved in sensitive affairs and controlled personnel appointments. Birds of Prey units “on average, performed much better than other South Vietnamese forces,” which advisors attributed to their leadership because the CIA was empowered to shift personnel and, when required, to fire them. “The unit was as effective as its leader,” explained one adviser, and another concurred, “The Vietnamese themselves were very good fighters; they just needed to be led.”3 These findings can be extrapolated to inform U.S. programs in other fragile states. Yemen is one particularly relevant example. From 2007 to 2011, the United States supported a robust program to assist the Yemeni military as it countered a mix of domestic insurgents and al Qaeda affiliates. More than 500 million dollars in military assistance were disbursed through this effort to build the Yemeni military. However, the program focused heavily on delivering equipment and hardware.4 Given these findings, the United States should examine in the future how it might influence sensitive Yemeni military affairs, such as personnel and organization, rather than simply train and equip its military. Moreover, both the United States and the Yemeni government should not underestimate the unhelpful role played by antagonistic external actors, namely Iran, in undermining Yemeni stability. When possible, they should seek to minimize it. To be sure, U.S. military involvement in Iraq since 2003 presents a markedly different set of circumstances than Yemen and the cases explored in this book. Nevertheless, these findings can and should inform those efforts moving forward. Despite a robust U.S. effort to disburse twenty billion dollars to build Iraq’s military, it collapsed not long after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal.5 Coupling the worsening security situation there with an unwillingness to deploy large amounts of U.S. troops to again occupy the country unearths the key question of how to more effectively build this partner military. Extrapolating from this book’s analysis, a hard look at the nature of U.S. involvement going forward—particularly given allegations

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about poor Iraqi military leadership—and the role of external actors, such as Iran, may make this next iteration more successful.

Future Research This book laid the groundwork for future research on strengthening partner militaries for internal defense. There are myriad avenues for expanding this underdeveloped literature. The book’s findings illustrate the criticality of looking beyond the equipment disbursed and training proffered to partner militaries. They underscore that leadership, organizational structure, external actors, and, in particular, the U.S. posture toward its partner state must be deliberately considered in future scholarship on this topic. Although my focus was limited to smaller states, examining large states struggling with similar issues may be illustrative. More complex cases characterized by deeper internal divisions—such as Pakistan, where elements of the government are primary supporters of the insurgency—may identify additional and important elements. Looking at variation in success as U.S. involvement waxes and wanes even within the same conflict—which Pakistan case studies offer—could be illuminating. The transitioning Middle East states that have been undergoing revolutions since 2011 also provide worthwhile fodder, given their fragility. Libya and Tunisia are especially worth studying, given both their shift from authoritarian rule and their previous political leadership’s oppression of the state military. And relevant to internal defense, but broader, is expanding the research to examine U.S. programs to build partner militaries in the shadow of great power competition. With the return of great power challenges to the United States in the form of Chinese and Russian aggressive regional behavior, the United States may inaugurate programs to strengthen partner militaries to support regional war-fighting capabilities. Moreover, two other variables are worth shifting for future research: the state conducting the program and the type of entity that state seeks to build. Although this study focused on U.S. programs, those led by other states could shed light on best practices. For example, the French military’s efforts to build partner state militaries in Africa provides a number of rich case studies. And although this book focused on strengthening state militaries, another avenue to explore is building effective violent non-state actors. For the United States, this could involve the disparate elements seeking to

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overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Examining how a state like Iran has successfully built capable groups like Hizballah and Hamas can also shed light on this critical topic.

A Framework for Policymakers Rethinking U.S. Orientation These findings suggest that the United States must rethink its traditional orientation when it seeks to strengthen partner militaries. At a minimum, simply training and equipping partner militaries is not a panacea for the United States to secure fragile states facing insurgencies. Over the last seventy years, the United States has not had overwhelming success in pursuing this policy. Moreover, the current fiscal environment imposes certain constraints on the U.S. ability to help these states, although based on my findings, the solution does not lie with greater funding. Instead, it involves a markedly different understanding of the U.S. role. The current focus on providing training and equipment to the partner state military is misguided. Put simply, training and equipping a military is not transforming it. Transforming partner militaries in fragile states requires deep American involvement in the partner military’s affairs, including structure and—critically—personnel. It is not the resources that are the “game-changers” when building militaries for internal defense, but rather the nature of U.S. involvement. Deep U.S. involvement within certain parameters—namely, not one that slides into becoming a co-combatant, but one that allows the United States to influence sensitive affairs—can transform the military. Rather than limiting its involvement to training and equipping a partner military, the United States should make a concerted effort to influence the partner military’s agenda by advising it at all levels and on all affairs. Organizational success is directly related to the capabilities of the personnel. “People are policy” is a common refrain in U.S. government circles. It is misguided to assume partner militaries are any different. Personnel embody the nature of an organization, and this maxim particularly applies in cases of weak institutions—such as a fragile state’s military—where leadership is critical. “Talented military personnel” can help transform a military in unstable circumstances.6 As the Greece and the first Lebanon case

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studies highlighted, deep U.S. involvement in the military appointments process had a meaningful impact on the U.S. program. Yet this finding is unsettling. Delving into delicate military affairs such as personnel appointments makes sense as a way to influence an institution, but it runs counter to how the United States perceives itself and its role. Such involvement is rife with colonial undertones and therefore difficult to digest for the United States, undermining its romanticized self-vision. Of course, how this approach is implemented is also relevant. Influencing sensitive partner state military affairs does not, in and of itself, require the United States to bluster and push its partners around. Sovereign backlash and resentment on the part of the partner state over the intrusive U.S. role may be a challenge; it is crucial that the United States account for these dynamics to avoid worsening them. It does, however, imply that the United States should become involved in areas that it has not historically considered appropriate. This issue of personnel also underscores the crucial impact of those U.S. personalities involved in strengthening the partner state’s military. As the Greece and South Vietnam case studies illustrated in stark terms, the different operating styles and decisions taken by Van Fleet and Williams also influenced the U.S. program. The first Lebanon case—wherein one senior U.S. military official in Beirut sought to have the military commander conduct a coup and another tried to establish a slush fund following his resignation—is similarly illustrative of the role of personalities. If U.S. programs to strengthen partner militaries in fragile states are to succeed, then U.S. policymakers must give serious consideration when they select personnel for these influential positions. This broad perspective of the nature of U.S. involvement also calls into question the traditional assessment process. If the United States seeks to transform a partner military by becoming involved in its sensitive military affairs, assessments of these militaries should be conducted with a wider aperture than simply examining training and equipment requirements. Therefore, rather than assigning active or retired U.S. military generals to lead these assessments, the United States should organize diverse teams composed of civilian and military personnel with regional and functional expertise who are better able to identify and address these delicate issues. The gravity of the U.S. government becoming involved in these affairs is considerable. Functional and regional expertise is critical to ensure the

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United States understands which personnel are appropriate for such positions. Moreover, the United States must have sufficient influence with the partner state to convince its leadership that U.S. involvement in sensitive military affairs is worthwhile and defensible. To be sure, a healthy skepticism about the U.S. ability to do all of these things is warranted.

Rethinking Internal Defense Less worrisome—but relevant nevertheless—is the suggestion in these findings that there is simply no such thing as internal defense. As each case study illustrated, antagonistic external actors support and enable insurgencies. Limiting this support is crucial for limiting the impact of insurgents’ efforts. As both the Greece and South Vietnam case studies highlighted, changes in the extent of support flowing from antagonistic external actors to the insurgents substantially influenced the partner state military’s ability to counter the insurgency. But, the South Vietnam case also demonstrated the implications when the United States overwhelmingly focused on the role played by antagonistic external actors; because of this focus, the United States built the military to face the wrong threat. Therefore, antagonistic external actors play a consequential role in undermining a weak state’s sovereignty. Given the current interconnected global environment, it is even easier for them to do so. At a minimum, policymakers should be cognizant of the destabilizing role these entities play. When and where possible, the United States should consider how to limit their meddling. It should be cautious, however, of fixating on these actors to the detriment of the fragile state’s internal requirements.

Key Questions to Consider Based on this book’s findings, there are a handful of key questions that policymakers should consider when commencing a program to strengthen the partner military of a fragile state. Moreover, policymakers should regularly revisit these questions and reconsider their responses while implementing the program. These questions look beyond issues related to training and equipping, under the assumption that an assessment of the partner military will be conducted early on to identify capability gaps and shortfalls. Instead, they delve into the fundamental—and

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often uncomfortable—issues that invariably shape these programs and the extent to which they succeed. What is the program’s purpose? Why? Is the partner military organized for internal defense? Is the internal defense mission clear to key partner political and military officials? What potential is there for the United States to influence partner military personnel? Which key positions would particularly benefit from different personnel? How unified is the U.S. vision and initiative, both in Washington and among U.S. officials in the partner state? Under what circumstances would the United States expand its role to become a co-combatant? What indicators and warnings might precede this debate? Who are the key antagonistic external actors? In what ways are these external actors undermining state stability? Why are they doing so? This framework can be useful not only in facilitating internal U.S. government debates, but also in enabling a fruitful dialogue with the partner military. What If Transforming Is Not an Option? Training and equipping is not transforming, but at times, it is the only alternative. For instance, the partner state may be unwilling to allow the United States to become deeply involved in its sensitive military affairs due to natural discomfort about a prying external actor, uncertainty about American staying power, complacency, or more simply a belief that the United States will provide assistance no matter what. Conversely, the United States might be uninterested in getting involved in sensitive military affairs, particularly given its traditional posture to wholly avoid such delicate issues. Or, the United States might have a very short time horizon, which would preclude a substantial transformation effort. Furthermore, a host of antagonistic external actors may be seeking to undermine the partner state military. The United States often discounts or fails to factor the impact of such nefarious involvement on its programs.

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Under such circumstances, the United States must either recognize that it is pursuing light security sector reform or avoid launching such programs altogether. Training and equipping a military are complementary and necessary components for strengthening its capabilities. But relying solely on them is problematic. Equipment is, of course, expensive. And not only does the U.S. system move slowly even in the best of circumstances when senior officials enthusiastically support the program—as the contemporary Lebanon case illustrated—but the quality and quantity of equipment deliveries will almost surely fail to meet the partner state’s expectations. Indeed, the refrain “more, better, faster” encapsulated the Lebanese response in that same case. Partner states are, therefore, unlikely to be satisfied with the extent and timing of U.S. equipment. Indeed, the very nature of a fragile state facing a violent non-state actor undermining its stability illustrates the different timelines that the two actors hold. Moreover, symbolic equipment deliveries, as disbursed in the South Vietnam and two Lebanon cases, did not appear to have a meaningful effect. To be sure, there is utility in conducting light security sector reform. It can provide greater insight into the partner state and its military, enable cooperation on issues of mutual agreement, and potentially make military personnel more professional, Western-oriented, and amenable to greater U.S. influence. Training, in particular, comes with minimal costs and, by its very nature, provides an opportunity for the United States to consistently interact with and influence partner military personnel. Moreover, partner states appeared to find fewer flaws with U.S. training than equipment—as the two Lebanon cases illustrated—provided that the training is geared toward appropriate personnel. Nevertheless, it is shortsighted for the United States to assume that such limited involvement will markedly change a partner state military. It must be sober about what is possible under these circumstances.

Conclusion The findings presented in this book present a nontraditional way of looking at how to effectively build partner militaries, a key national security question. Given the complex and complicated global security environment, declining U.S. defense budgets, and an increasingly connected (and often unstable) world, the United States has an ever-deepening interest in

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strengthening fragile states. It has often chosen to do so by strengthening partner militaries; however, its record of success is thin. Yet this book shows a different approach that has real merit. It is not only the equipment and the training that is critical to building militaries. Instead, U.S. engagement must be wholly reconsidered to include sensitive partner military affairs, and antagonistic external actors must limit their meddling. By focusing on these crucial elements, the United States is more likely to succeed in its efforts to build partner militaries that can maintain internal defense. Following Churchill’s sage advice at the beginning of this book, I examined the results of U.S. programs to build partner militaries in fragile states. What I found underscored critical ways to think about this challenge for academics, policymakers, and the military. The United States will continue wrestling with the dilemmas posed by weak states. And if it hopes to improve its track record, there is much to be changed.

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Notes

Chapter 1 1. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” (lecture, Munich University, Munich, Germany, January 1919). 2. Robert M. Gates, “Remarks upon Receiving the Nixon Center’s Distinguished Service Award” (speech, Nixon Center, Washington, DC, February 24, 2010). 3. Marcus Weisgerber, “DoD Begins Cutting Staff Sizes, Will Reorganize Policy Office,” Defense News, December 5, 2013. 4. Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (2009): 29–30. 5. U.S. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), http://www .defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), http://www .defense.gov/pubs/2014_quadrennial_defense_review.pdf; Barack Obama, National Security Strategy February 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_ national_security_strategy_2.pdf. 6. Weber, “Politics.” 7. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 67–95. 8. This type of state can be described as fragile, weak, or failing, among others. There is no consensus on the terminology; hence, I use them interchangeably. 9. OECD-DAC, The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (Paris: OECD-DAC, 2006). Scholars who examine these elements include Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of Statebuilding,” Journal of Democracy 15, no 2 (April 2004): 17–31; Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007); Nicole Ball, “Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Conflict-Affected Countries,” Journal of Public Administration and Development 25 (2005): 27; Barnett R. Rubin, “The Politics of Security in Postconflict Statebuilding,” in Building States to Build Peace, ed. Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 35. 10. Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 136. 11. Daniel L. Byman, “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 79–115; David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global

206 Notes to Page 6 Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 600–603; James Amos and David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Counter-Insurgency Handbook (New York: Skyhorse, 2007), chap. 1; Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), xiii–xiv, xvii, 2–3, 84; Daniel L. Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 12. Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005): 153–63. 13. Indeed, the most well-known historic scholars of insurgency are British or French, such as T. E. Lawrence, Charles Callwell, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940). 14. Samuel P. Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962), 28; Robert Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 15. In the 1990s, Helman and Ratner described a failed nation-state as an entity “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.” However, Stewart Patrick argues that fears of failed states are overblown; his research has found weak links between failed states and either international terrorism or weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy 89 (1993): 3–20; Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 16. Richard I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 127–40; George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates repeatedly echoed this concern. See, for example, Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (2010): 2–6; Gates, “Remarks.” 17. David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 (2007): 111–30; Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004); Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (MayJune 2005): 11; Eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (March-April 2006): 49–53; Amos and Petraeus, U.S. Army CounterInsurgency Handbook. 18. Fukuyama, “The Imperative of Statebuilding.” 19. Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O’Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport: Praeger Press, 1997); George Liska, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); William H. Mott, United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002); Paul Y. Hammond, David J. Louscher, Michael D. Salomone, and Norman A. Graham. The Reluctant Supplier: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983); Chester J. Pach, Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

Notes to Page 7 207 20. Ball, “Strengthening Democratic Governance,” 26; Sepp, “Best Practices,” 9; Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency; Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes,” 49–53; Timothy Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation,” in Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment, ed. Wilhelm N. Germann and Timothy Edmunds (Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003), 11; Dylan C. Hendrickson, A Review of Security Sector Reform (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1999), 30; International Alert, Saferworld, and Clingendael, Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate (The Hague: International Alert, Saferworld, and Clingendael, 2002), 7. 21. Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 12–16. Other definitions that resonate with Edmunds’s include OECD-DAC, Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD-DAC, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf; U.S. Department of State, Agency for International Development, Security Sector Reform (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/ detail/4532/security-sector-reform-usaid-dod-dos-policy-statement. 22. Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, vi; Byman, “Friends Like These,” 87–88; Sepp, “Best Practices,” 10; Nicole Leader and Peter Colenso, Aid Instruments in Fragile States (London: UK Department for International Development, 2005), 6–7; OECD-DAC, From Fragility to Resilience: Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile States (Paris: OECD-DAC, 2007), 23; OECD-DAC, Handbook on Security Sector Reform; Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges, and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Ball, “Strengthening Democratic Governance,” 31; Mark Sedra, ed., The Future of Security Sector Reform (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2009), http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/e-Conference%20%20Report%20Final .pdf; Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 20–21; Sarah Cliffe and Nick Manning, “Practical Approaches to Building State Institutions,” in Building States to Build Peace, ed. Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 165; Rubin, “The Politics of Security,” 27; Charles T. Call, “Building States to Build Peace?” in Building States to Build Peace, ed. Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 365–88. 23. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 174–75; Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing. Paris chastised this argument, warning, “It is too easy to prescribe improved coordination as a remedy for the shortcomings and contradictions of statebuilding, which run much deeper.” Roland Paris, “Understanding the ‘Coordination Problem’ in Postwar Statebuilding,” in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London: Routledge, 2009), 53. See also Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” 608; David Kilcullen, “3 Pillars of Counterinsurgency” (speech, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, September 28, 2006); Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 111–30. Other contemporary scholars emphasize the importance of a unified effort, including Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 29; Sepp, “Best Practices,” 11; Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes,” 49–53; OECD-DAC, Handbook on Security Sector Reform, 69; International Alert et al., Towards a Better Practice Framework, 6–12; Ursula C. Schroeder, Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators, occasional paper no. 20 (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], 2010).

208 Notes to Pages 7–9 24. Paris and Sisk call this process “inherently contradiction-filled.” Paris and Sisk, Managing Contradictions, 1. 25. The major documents on security sector reform, including those compiled by leaders in the field such as the OECD and DFID, strongly emphasize the long-term nature of conducting successful security sector reform. International Alert et al., Towards a Better Practice Framework, 12; Simon Chesterman, “Transition Administration, State-Building and the United Nations,” in Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance, ed. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 353; Rotberg, “Failed States,” 131. 26. A conference led by the Centre for International Governance Innovation found broad acknowledgment by the participants that “donor support frameworks simply do not lend themselves to such long-term thinking.” Sedra, The Future of Security Sector Reform, 4. 27. Paris and Sisk term this the “duration dilemma.” Paris and Sisk, Managing Contradictions, 5–7; David M. Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London: Routledge, 2009), 81; Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform,” 10. 28. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 225, 41–46, 238; Mark McGillivray, Aid Allocation and Fragile States (Helsinki: United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2006); Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 7, 177, 179; Mott, United States Military Assistance, 16. For examples of contemporary work, see Jeffrey Isaac et al., “Review Symposium on the New U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual,” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 2 (2008): 348; Amos and Petraeus, U.S. Army Counter-Insurgency Handbook; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 29. T. E. Lawrence, “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence,” Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence, Article 15. 30. Amos and Petraeus, U.S. Army Counter-Insurgency Handbook, 6–1–6–3, 6–9–6–12; Sepp, “Best Practices,” 10; Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, 29, 32–33; Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes,” 49–53. 31. Byman, “Friends Like These,” 81–83, 88, 109–10. 32. See, for example, Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991); Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004); Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003); LTG (Ret.) James M. Dubik, Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2009); Captain Jason C. Howk, A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002–September 2003) (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); Paris and Sisk, Managing Contradictions, 5–7; Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries,” 81. 33. Byman, “Friends Like These,” 91. For example, two key contemporary texts in the counterinsurgency field give short shrift to this issue: Amos and Petraeus, U.S. Army CounterInsurgency Handbook, 6–2; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup.

Notes to Pages 9–12 209 34. Liska, The New Statecraft, 32–34; Stephen Browne, Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder? (London: Earthscan, 2006), 44, 47. 35. These scholars discuss the larger issue of state-building rather than military support specifically: Marina Ottaway, “Promoting Democracy After Conflict: The Difficult Choices,” International Studies Perspective 4 (2003): 321; Paris and Sisk, Managing Contradictions; Thomas Carothers, “How Democracies Emerge: The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,’ ” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007). Works that discuss the difficulties of institution-building and measuring progress include Roger C. Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 19. Birdsall sounds a particularly cautionary note: “without baseline information and a controlled experiment, it is difficult to attribute [aid] program success or failure to the programs themselves, as opposed to the environment in which they operate and the unpredictable shocks, positive and negative, that influence their effectiveness.” Nancy Birdsall, Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2005), 11. 36. The high priority that democracies place on protecting noncombatants makes it harder for them to fight counterinsurgencies. Numerous scholars explore this broader challenge, although Zambernardi’s discussion of the “impossible trilemma” is particularly salient. Lorenzo Zambernardi, “Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2010): 22; Byman, “Friends Like These,” 90; Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jason Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration,” International Organization 64, no. 1 (2010): 167–92. 37. Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977); D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). One example of this hyperbolic advice: “the cost in U.S. aid should be commensurate with the anticipated ‘saving’ in direct American military effort, discounted by the uncertainty, and possibly, inferiority of local performance”; Liska, The New Statecraft, 226. 38. Chanaa, Security Sector Reform, 8, 10. 39. Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon (New York: Free Press, 1979), 61–62. 40. The U.S. Defense Department outlined three methods by which it conducts Foreign Internal Defense—indirect support (e.g., security assistance), direct support (e.g., operational planning), and combat operations. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Publication 3–07.1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), I-5. 41. In this vein, I took into account Alexander George’s suggestion that “scholars should include in their research design variables over which policymakers have some leverage.” Alexander L. George, “Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History,” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 51. 42. This framework is consistent with Goertz’s methodology wherein the constituent parts of each variable are developed in an effort to illustrate their meaning, relevance, and

210 Notes to Pages 13–22 interaction. Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). 43. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2, 21, 25–26, 252–53, 261. 44. Carl Builder, The Masks of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 7. 45. Consistent with Alexander George, I selected “cases of both success and failure in order to identify the conditions and variables that seemed to account for this difference in outcome,” that is, the observable differences in the dependent variable. George, “Case Studies,” 55. 46. Ibid., 61–62. 47. Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955).

Chapter 2 1. Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World and the Cold War 1946–1962 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 19. 2. Calculated based on 2010 dollars. Amikam Nachmani, “Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946–49,” Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 4 (1990): 491; Ralph T. Tierno, Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC): Preconflict Period (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, February 1971), 119. 3. Colonel J. C. Murray, “The Anti-Bandit War,” Marine Corps Gazette 38, no. 1 (January 1954): 21; Paul F. Braim, The Will to Win: The Life of General James A. Van Fleet (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 160; Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 24–25; Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 224–25; Field Marshal Alexander Papagos, “Guerrilla Warfare,” in Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 235; Nachmani, “Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece,” 504. 4. Embassy Athens to the Secretary of State, telegram, September 26, 1946, Record Group 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 5. Nachmani, “Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece,” 504. 6. Jones, A New Kind of War, 25. 7. Scholars dispute whether this event occurred as Churchill recalled; however, the USSR’s minimal involvement in Greek affairs gives credence to the notion that the Greecerelated discussion may be accurate. See Panos Tsakaloyannis, “The Moscow Puzzle,” Journal of Contemporary History 21, no. 1 (1986): 37–55. 8. Elia Delaporta, “The British Military Mission and Army in Greece 1942–1952,” Anistoriton 7 (2003): E033; Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21–June 5, 1947) (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 75. 9. John T. Malakasis, The Advent of the United States Intervention in Greece: The Fading British Preponderance Against the Background of the Trembling Social Regime of Athens (Ioannina, Greece: University of Ioannina, 1999), 95; Embassy Athens to the Secretary of State, telegram, September 26, 1946, General Records of the Department of State.

Notes to Pages 22–25 211 10. Lt. Col. Edward R. Wainhouse, “Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946–49: A Case Study,” in Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 220, 223; Papagos, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 231. 11. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 58; Wainhouse, “Guerrilla War in Greece,” 220. 12. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 67–68; Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 58; Wainhouse, “Guerrilla War in Greece,” 220. 13. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 68; Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 21; Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 225; John Gunther, Behind the Curtain (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 132; Nachmani, “Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece,” 495; Papagos, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 223. 14. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American And NATO Influences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 25–26; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VII: The Near East and Africa (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), 88–288; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 43–44. 15. Memorandum by George F. Kennan to Charles E. Bohlen, “The Political Strategic Background of U.S. Aid Programs,” February 1948, Record Group 59, Box 61, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 16. Dean Acheson, interview, February 17, 1955, transcript, 2–3, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO; Harry S. Truman Papers, Post-Presidential Files, Memoirs Files, Box 1, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. 17. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 195; Memorandum by Colonel James McCormack Jr. to Colonel Reid, “U.S. Security Interests in Greece,” September 6, 1946, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 223–26, 235–37, 240–45, 255, 278–83. 18. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 75; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 286–88. A few weeks before his visit, Tsaldaris asked the Greek Embassy in DC to suggest the United States assist the GAF, but the ambassador may not have delivered the message. John O. Iatrides, ed., Ambassador MacVeagh Reports (Greece, 1933–1947) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 433–37; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 199; Photini Tomai, ed., Documentary History of Greece (1943–1951) (Athens: Papazisis, 2011), 91–92; Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 1944–1947 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), 451; Hon. Constantine Tsaldaris, interview by Philip C. Brooks, May 4, 1964, transcript, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. 19. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 263, 278–79, 282–83; Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, 707. 20. Robert Frazier, Anglo-American Relations with Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942–47 (London: Macmillan, 1991), 120. 21. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Volume Two: Years of Trial and Renewal (New York: Doubleday, 1956); Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 76. 22. “Aide-Me´moire,” February 21, 1947, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State.

212 Notes to Pages 25–30 23. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 17–22. 24. Central Intelligence Agency, “The Greek Situation,” February 7, 1947, assessment, 3–4, 11–12, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/ collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection. 25. Loy W. Henderson, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, June 14 and July 5, 1973, transcript, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. 26. General (Ret.) Fotis Metallinos, The American Contribution to Restructuring and Promotion Entrepreneurship of the Greek Armed Forces in the Context of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Athens: Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 27. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 221; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 29–31. 28. Memorandum for the Secretary of State, “Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece,” February 21, 1947, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State; David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 540–49; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 219–20. 29. Department of State Bulletin Supplement: Aid to Greece and Turkey, May 4, 1947, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_ collections/doctrine/large/index.php; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 69–71. The official Greek archives states that both the Americans and Greeks wrote the aid request: Tomai, Documentary History of Greece, 93–94; Henderson, interview. 30. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 221. 31. Harry S. Truman, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” March 12, 1947, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. 32. Ibid. 33. Department of State Bulletin Supplement: Aid to Greece and Turkey, 833–34. 34. Ibid., 840. This figure is based on 1947 dollars. 35. Ibid., 848, 878; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 176. 36. Department of State Bulletin Supplement: Aid to Greece and Turkey, 848, 873, 883, 891; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 1947, 108; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 1947, 53–56; Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 100; Tomai, Documentary History of Greece, 270–71. 37. Judith S. Jeffrey, Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies: The Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947–1952 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), 286–88. 38. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 69–71, 152–53, 162, 204. Tsaldaris held a few roles during this period, including PM, Deputy PM, and MFA. 39. Malakasis, The Advent of the United States Intervention in Greece, 105. 40. Ibid. 41. “AMAG Monthly Historical Report,” August 1947, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 42. Jones, A New Kind of War, 70. 43. Diary entry June 13, 1947, William G. Livesay Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. Livesay’s detailed diary from his tenure in Greece illustrates these tendencies (e.g., see diary entry August 31, 1947).

Notes to Pages 30–34 213 44. Diary entries September 21–24, 1947, Livesay Papers. 45. Cable 822 from Embassy Athens for the Secretary of State, June 4, 1947, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State; Jones, A New Kind of War, 7; “British Taking Part: Guerrilla Charges,” Manchester Guardian, July 16, 1947; Diary entries August 31, 1947 and July 4, 1947, Livesay Papers. 46. Diary entries August 11, September 30, October 6, 1947, Livesay Papers; “Confidential Memo for the Prime Minister from General Livesay and General Rawlins Concerning Possible Changes in the High Command of the Greek Army,” October 21, 1947, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 47. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 333; Cable 5770 from the Secretary of State to Charge Rankin, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 48. “British Taking Part: Guerrilla Charges,” Manchester Guardian. 49. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 68; “Memo for the Secretary of War,” letter from Secretary of State to Secretary of War, July 17, 1947, Record Group 107, 091 Greece (Patterson’s File), Box 8, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, VA. 50. Robert Warren Selton, “United States Military Assistance to Greece During the AntiBandit War (1947–1949)” (MA thesis, American University, 1964), 61; “AMAG Monthly Historical Report,” August 1947, 10–13; Diary entry August 22, 1947, Livesay Papers. 51. Diary entry June 19, 1947, Livesay Papers. 52. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Note to the British Government Covering the Provision of Military Supplies by the U.K.,” letter from Secretary of State to British charge´ d’affaires ad interim, July 25, 1947, OSA 091 Greece (Royall’s File), Box 73, Marshall Papers; Diary entry August 29, 1947, Livesay Papers. 53. “AMAG Monthly Historical Report,” August 1947, 1–3, 14. 54. Ibid., 1–2; Murray, “The Anti-Bandit War,” 17–18; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 272. 55. Diary entry August 4, 1947, Livesay Papers. 56. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 193; “AMAG Monthly Historical Report,” August 1947, 10. 57. Jones, A New Kind of War, 71–72; Diary entries June 20–21, 1947, Livesay Papers. 58. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 272–73; Diary entry June 23, 1947, Livesay Papers. 59. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 224–25, 265– 67, 294; Diary entries July 4, 7, 15, 1947, Livesay Papers. 60. Diary entry August 31, 1947, Livesay Papers. 61. Delaporta, “The British Military Mission”; Frazier, Anglo-American Relations with Greece, 165–66. 62. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945–1959 (New York: Viking Press, 1987), 396. 63. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 303–4. 64. “Review of the Military Situation in Greece,” given to General Omar Bradley in Rome, Italy, September 10, 1948, Livesay Papers (document year is mislabeled as 1948; however, Livesay was no longer stationed in Greece at that time and details make it clear the intended year was 1947); Diary entries June 22, August 31, 1947, Livesay Papers.

214 Notes to Pages 34–39 65. Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume II, 1947–1949 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979), 20. 66. U.S. Department of State, “Memo of Meeting with State Department Representatives on the Greek Situation,” September 17, 1947, RG 319, Box 51, Case 46, Marshall Papers; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 375–77; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21–23. 67. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 361–63, 377– 78, 385–86, 391–93; Yiannis P. Roubatis, Tangled Webs: The U.S. in Greece, 1947–1967 (New York: Pella, 1987), 60; Jones, A New Kind of War, 104. 68. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 356, 385. 69. Tomai, Documentary History of Greece, 184–86. 70. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 338; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20; Roubatis, Tangled Webs, 58. 71. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 393. 72. Griswold’s announcement was ironic given that he had not yet seen the full directive outlining President Truman’s decisions. Jones, A New Kind of War, 108–9; “Dwight Griswold Press Conference,” New York Times, November 19, 1947. 73. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 399. 74. Jones, A New Kind of War, 102. 75. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 337–38; “AMAG Monthly Historical Report,” September 15, 1947; Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 231; CIA, “The Current Situation in Greece,” 2, 5, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/reading room/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection; “Greek Reds Form Regime: Guerrillas Name Cabinet and Call for Holding of Free Elections,” Los Angeles Times, December 25, 1947. 76. George C. McGhee, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, June 11, 1975, transcript, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/mcgheeg.htm. 77. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 199, 622; Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, 717–21. 78. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 104–5. 79. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 318–19, 398; Pogue, George C. Marshall, 396. 80. U.S. Department of State, Cable 2600, cable from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, November 29, 1947, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary .org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/in dex.php. 81. “Directive Governing the Establishment and Operation of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece,” letter from Secretary of Defense Forrestal to Secretary of State Marshall, January 5, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 82. Amen, American Foreign Policy in Greece, 180. 83. “Address to American Advisers to Greek Army,” January 16, 1948, 1–8, William G. Livesay Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. 84. “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” September 15, 1949, 3, U.S. Army Reports and Records, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA; “Greek

Notes to Pages 39–42 215 Aid ‘Ample’ to Win Civil War: U.S. Mission Has Armed Athens’ Forces Adequately, If People Back Regime, Report Says,” New York Times, December 14, 1947. 85. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 467–69; Neal Stanford, “U.S. Military Aid Held Vital to Greece: Funds ‘Transferred’ Sherman Shifted,” Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 1948. 86. Tsaldaris, interview. 87. Stanford, “U.S. Military Aid Held Vital to Greece.” 88. U.S. Department of State, “Memo from Secretary of State to Secretary of War,” memo, July 17, 1947, RG 107 (Patterson’s File), Box 8, Marshall Papers. 89. “National Security Council Meeting Notes,” December 17, 1947, Box 177, 2–3, Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. 90. Tomai, Documentary History of Greece, 239–40; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Vol. IV: Eastern Europe: The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 3–6, 47–51. 91. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 8–9; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24–27; U.S. Department of Defense, “State Department Views Reference Greek Problem,” memo for General Wedemeyer, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 29, 1947, OSA 091 Greece (Royall’s File), Box 73, Marshall Papers; “Minutes of the National Security Council,” January 13, 1948, Box 177, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files; “Memo to the NSC,” memo from Secretary of Defense to the NSC, April 19, 1948, Box 177, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files. 92. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 9–14, 21–29; U.S. Department of Defense, “State Department Views Reference Greek Problem”; “Minutes of the National Security Council,” January 13, 1948. 93. CIA, “Consequences of Certain Courses of Action with Respect to Greece,” April 5, 1948, assessment, 1, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/ readingroom/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection. 94. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 93–95, 98–99. 95. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 101; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28–29; “National Security Council Transmittal Memo: The Position of the United States with Respect to the Use of US Military Power in Greece,” June 4, 1948, Box 177, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files. 96. Henderson interview; Eyes Only Cable 4692 for Griswold from Secretary of State Marshall, January 26, 1948, RG 59, Box 7059, General Records of the Department of State. 97. Braim, The Will to Win, 156; Eyes Only Cable 4692; Eyes Only Cable 950 for Griswold from Secretary of State Marshall, February 5, 1948, RG 59, Box 7059, General Records of the Department of State. 98. Braim, The Will to Win, 54–55, 68, 134. 99. Pogue, George C. Marshall, 394–95, 398. 100. Henderson interview; Braim, The Will to Win, 222. 101. Van Fleet adopted the expression “will to win” to describe Greece’s effort against communist guerrillas. He was inspired after seeing it at the National Archaeological Museum in Athens; “Greece: With Will to Win,” Time, May 23, 1949, 26–28; James A. Van Fleet, “How We Won in Greece,” Balkan Studies 8, no. 2 (1967): 388; Braim, The Will to Win, 156; Eyes Only Cable 4692; Eyes Only Cable 950.

216 Notes to Pages 42–46 102. “Nomination,” Memo for the President from Secretary of the Army, February 6, 1948, Folder 206-F, Truman Papers; Newspaper clipping on Van Fleet’s confirmation and promotion, February 26, 1948, Folder 206-F, Truman Papers. 103. Jones, A New Kind of War, 136–37; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 36–37. 104. Braim, The Will to Win, 164; Van Fleet, “How We Won in Greece,” 389. 105. Braim, The Will to Win, 163, 167–68; Van Fleet, “How We Won in Greece,” 389–90; AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, February 28, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, James A.Van Fleet, Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, VA; AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 3, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers. 106. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 3, 1948; CIA, “Consequences of Certain Courses of Action with Respect to Greece.” 107. Roubatis, Tangled Webs, 63. 108. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 3, 1948; AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers; Braim, The Will to Win, 171. 109. Braim, The Will to Win, 171, 173. 110. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 3, 1948. 111. Van Fleet, “How We Won in Greece,” 392; Letter of instructions to Major General James A. Van Fleet from Major General Lauris Norstad, Director, Plans and Operations, February 10, 1948, RG 334, Box 145, General Records of the Department of State. 112. AMAG Memos from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, April 20, May 6, May 14, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers; AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Major General Ray R. Maddocks, Feb 12, 1949, Van Fleet Papers. 113. Braim, The Will to Win, 170–71. 114. Spiro Constantinos Manolas, American Arms, Greek Blood (Mount Vernon, WA: Phoenix, 2009), 143; Jones, A New Kind of War, 160. 115. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 95–96; American Mission to Greece, Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, April 20, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers. 116. LTC Frederic H. Loomis, “Report from Greece,” Military Review 30 (1950): 5, 8; “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 23. 117. David Colley, “Hot Spot in the Cold War: American Advisors in Greece, 1947– 1949,” VFW Magazine (May 1997): 36. 118. “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 7; Selton, United States Military Assistance to Greece, 92–93. 119. Braim, The Will to Win, 171–72. 120. Ibid., 26–28, 183–84; Manolas, American Arms, Greek Blood, 170–71; “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 8. 121. Greeks referred to Van Fleet as “Van Flit” because, according to one journalist, it was a “pun that he is giving them Flit guns to fight the Black Crows (guerrillas)”; “Greece: With Will to Win,” Time, 26–28. 122. “Van Fleet Escapes Dynamite Attempt: Greek Guerrillas Fail in Attempt to Blast Train of U.S. General,” Washington Post, March 8, 1948; Van Fleet, “How We Won in Greece,” 391–92.

Notes to Pages 46–49 217 123. Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 102–8. 124. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 102–9, 112–13; “NSC 42/1: U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” memo for the President from Sidney Souers and National Security Council Report, March 22, 1949, Box 179, 7, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files; U.S. Department of State, “A Factual Summary Concerning the American Mission for Aid to Greece,” June 15, 1948, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/in dex.php; Jones, A New Kind of War, 160; U.S. Department of State, “President’s Reports to Congress on Assistance to Greece, 1947–1949,” Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_ collections/doctrine/large/in dex.php. 125. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, April 20, May 14, May 28, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers. 126. Braim, The Will to Win, 164. 127. U.S. Department of State, “President’s Fourth Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece, 1947–1949,” 5–6; Manolas, American Arms, Greek Blood, 141–46, 157, 170. 128. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 102–8; “Memo from Chief,” memo from Dwight Griswold to all employees and former employees of the mission, June 15, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, 3, General Records of the Department of State; Braim, The Will to Win, 174–80; “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 21. 129. U.S. Department of State, “A Factual Summary Concerning the American Mission for Aid to Greece,” June 15, 1948, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.truman library.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/index.php; Jones, A New Kind of War, 160. 130. “Further U.S. Military Aid Asked by Greece,” Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1948. 131. Jones, A New Kind of War, 179. 132. “Greece: With Will to Win,” Time, 26–28. 133. Cable 1449 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, July 28, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 134. Marquis Childs, “Calling Washington: Problems of the Greek Army,” Washington Post, September 25, 1947. 135. Manolas, American Arms, Greek Blood, 158. 136. Ibid., 151. 137. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 112–13, 124– 29, 132–37, 146. 138. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 102–8. 139. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers. 140. Quoting JUSMAPG figures: Colley, “Hot Spot in the Cold War,” 36. 141. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 255.

218 Notes to Pages 49–52 142. “NSC 42/1: U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey,” 7; Manolas, American Arms, Greek Blood, 410–11. 143. CIA, “Current Situation in Greece,” February 28, 1950, assessment, 2, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/nationalintelligence-council-nic-collection. 144. CIA, “Current Situation in Greece Analyzed,” October 21, 1948, assessment, i, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/ national-intelligence-council-nic-collection. 145. Braim, The Will to Win, 179–80; “Greece: With Will to Win,” Time, 26–28; Papagos, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 238; U.S. Department of State, “Fifth Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” December 6, 1948, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, 3–4; CIA, “Current Situation in Greece Analyzed,” 1. 146. AMAG Memo from General Omar Bradley to Van Fleet, November 3, 1948, Box 52, Folder 19, Van Fleet Papers. 147. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, March 31, 1948; Cable 1700 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, August 28, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 148. U.S. Department of State, Memo for the Secretary of State, “Greek Concern over Internal Security,” September 27, 1948, Item 2055, Marshall Papers. 149. CIA, “Current Situation in Greece,” 1. 150. Ibid., 1–3. 151. CIA, “Current Situation in Greece,” 1; U.S. Army, “Albania: Arms Supply to Greek Guerrillas,” October 19, 1948, U.S. Army Reports and Records, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA; CIA, “Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas,” assessment, October 8, 1948, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection; CNO Translations of Intercepted Enemy Radio Messages and Miscellaneous Material, 1940–1946, RG 38, Box 2746, General Records of the Department of State. 152. Pogue, George C. Marshall, 402–3. 153. “Greece Asks More U.S. Military Aid,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1948; Cable 493 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, October 1, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. A representative from the Department of the Army had already been sent to Greece to begin assessing how to reduce the Greek military; Cable 1581 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, September 29, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 154. Pogue, George C. Marshall, 403; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 151–52, 161–66, 178–79. 155. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 168–70, 187–91. 156. “Letter from AMAG Chief to PM Sophoulis,” November 2, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 157. CIA, “Review of the World Situation,” December 16, 1948, Box 178, 6, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 156–57. 158. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 195–204; Letter from Acting Secretary of the Army to Acting Secretary of State, December 24, 1948, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State.

Notes to Pages 52–55 219 159. Braim, The Will to Win, 188–89. 160. Tomai, Documentary History of Greece, 331–32. 161. Ibid., 333. 162. Cable 2175 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, October 26, 1948, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 163. Henry F. Grady and John T. McNay, ed., The Memoirs of Ambassador Henry F. Grady (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 144; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 176–77. 164. “Greece: With Will to Win,” Time, 26–28. Despite Papagos’s record of accomplishment, a State Department assessment before his appointment said he lacked a strong personality; “Alexander Papagos,” August 28, 1947, RG 59, Box 7057, General Records of the Department of State. 165. The document was marked “Henley,” which meant that it should not be shared with Greece. “Letter from General Papagos to Greek Prime Minister Sophoulis,” November 11, 1948, RG 334, Box 145, General Records of the Department of State; “Appointment of General Papagos as Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army,” memo from Embassy Greece to Secretary of State, January 27, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 166. “Appointment of General Papagos as Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army.” 167. Ibid.; “Letter from Amb Grady to Deputy PM Diomedes,” memo from Embassy Greece to Secretary of State, February 16, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 168. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, 209; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 42–43, 235–36. 169. “Size of Greek Armed Forces,” memo from NEA to Secretary of State, February 8, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State; “Letter from Amb Grady to Deputy PM Diomedes.” 170. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 245–48. 171. “Size of Greek Armed Forces.” 172. “Letter from Amb Grady to Deputy PM Diomedes.” 173. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 248–49. 174. “Letter from Amb Grady to Deputy PM Diomedes.” 175. Metallinos, “The American Contribution to Restructuring,” 11; Braim, The Will to Win, 188–91. 176. “Communist Assassination Group (Van Fleet),” USAGG-JUSMAPG Memo, February 25, 1949, Box 52, Folder 20, Van Fleet Papers. 177. Grady and McNay, The Memoirs of Ambassador Henry F. Grady, 144; Papagos, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 239. 178. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 237–38; Jones, A New Kind of War, 194; Grady and McNay, The Memoirs of Ambassador Henry F. Grady, 141–43. 179. Braim, The Will to Win, 189–90; Cable 35 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, March 30, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 180. Jones, A New Kind of War, 196. 181. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Major General Ray R. Maddocks, February 12, 1949, Box 52, Folder 20, Van Fleet Papers; Cable 35 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State.

220 Notes to Pages 55–60 182. “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 16; Selton, United States Military Assistance to Greece, 128. 183. Cable 15 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, February 14, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 184. Braim, The Will to Win, 181–84. 185. Ibid., 181; Wainhouse, “Guerrilla War in Greece,” 225; Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 252; Jones, A New Kind of War, 199. 186. Cable 35 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State. 187. Cable 36 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, March 30, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 188. CIA, “Review of the World Situation,” March 16, 1949, Box 179, 13, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files. 189. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 360–61; “A Study of the Military Situation in Greece Based on Assumptions Given by the American Ambassador to Greece,” study conducted by Van Fleet for Grady, June 18, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 190. “NSC 42/1: U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey,” 6–7, 12, 16; Manolas, American Arms, Greek Blood, 203; U.S. Department of State, “President’s Seventh Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece, 1947–1949,” p. 19; Braim, The Will to Win, 193. 191. Papagos, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 239–40; Cable 22 from Secretary of State to Embassy Athens, April 5, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 192. “Memo for the Chief of Staff: Data for Department of the Army,” memo from JUSMAPG to U.S. Army, April 6, 1949, RG 334, Box 56, General Records of the Department of State; “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 10. 193. Braim, The Will to Win, 205. 194. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 378–79; Papagos, “Guerrilla Warfare,” 240; Braim, The Will to Win, 202–3. 195. “Van Fleet Sees Greek Peace,” Washington Post, May 29, 1949; Walter H. Waggoner, “Van Fleet Affirms Greece’s Recovery,” New York Times, June 24, 1949. 196. CIA, “Review of the World Situation,” June 15, 1949, Box 179, 7, Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files; “NSC 42/1: U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey,” 2, 14–15; U.S. Department of State, “President’s Seventh Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece, 1947–1949,” 11, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum. 197. “NSC 42/1: U.S. Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey,” 2, 14–15. 198. Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 30–31; C. M. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece: 1941–1949 (New York: Beekman/Esanu, 1976), 273. 199. Thomas A. Haase, “United States Military Assistance to Greece, 1947–1949” (MA thesis, University of Cincinnati, 1974), 122. 200. Cable 1191 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, June 20, 1949, RG 59, Box 7059, General Records of the Department of State; AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, June 22, 1949, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers. 201. A. C. Sedgwick, “Greeks to Get Dive-Bombers,” New York Times, August 11, 1949; AMAG Memo from Van Fleet to Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer; U.S. Army, Letter from Major General Charlie Bolte to Van Fleet, August 1, 1949, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers. 202. Memo for the Record, July 13, 1949, Folder 206-F, Truman Papers.

Notes to Pages 60–63 221 203. “Greece: With Will to Win,” Time, 26–28; “Greek Offensive Planned,” New York Times, July 30, 1949. 204. Braim, The Will to Win, 214. 205. Ibid., 216–18. 206. Gunter, Behind the Curtain, 129. 207. Loomis, “Report from Greece”; Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 253. 208. “Guerrillas Wiped Out, Gen. Van Fleet Reports,” Washington Post, August 16, 1949; “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 20; Braim, The Will to Win, 219. 209. “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 22; CIA, “Current Situation in Greece,” 1–3. 210. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, 284–85. 211. “JUSMAPG Quarterly Report,” September 1949, Box 53, Folder 38, Van Fleet Papers. 212. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 428–29, 431– 33, 436, 453–56, 461–62; Cable 59 from Acting Secretary of State to Embassy Athens, November 22, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 213. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 410–12; “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 23; Memo from T. S. Timberman to Van Fleet, November 16, 1949, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers. 214. “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 22. 215. Cable 2175 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, October 27, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, 440–43; “Aide Me´moire,” cable from Secretary of State to Embassy Greece, October 21, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State; Cable 79 from Embassy Athens to Secretary of State, November 3, 1949, RG 59, Box 7058, General Records of the Department of State. 216. “JUSMAPG: Brief History 1 January 1948 to 31 August 1949,” 22. 217. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 387–90, 398– 99, 410–12; AMAG Memos from Major General Reuben E. Jenkins to Van Fleet, August 8, 11, 1950, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers. 218. AMAG Memo from Van Fleet for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, August 7, 1950, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers; Personal letter from Van Fleet to Major General Reuben E. Jenkins, August 7, 1950, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers. Van Fleet’s departure from Athens was filled with accolades; the entire U.S. national security leadership in Washington was positively disposed toward him. President Truman described him as “tops in my book.” Memo for Secretary of Defense from the President, May 27, 1950, Folder 206-F, Truman Papers; Letter for Van Fleet from the President, August 26, 1950, Folder 206-F, Truman Papers; Memo for the President from the Secretary of State, August 24, 1950, Folder 206-F, Truman Papers; Memo for Secretary of Defense from the Acting Secretary of State, May 18, 1950, Folder 206-F, Truman Papers. 219. Letter from Van Fleet to Jim [appears to be Van Fleet’s son], August 11 1950, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers; Letter from Van Fleet to Colonel Levidas, August 11 1950, Box 52, Folder 21, Van Fleet Papers. 220. Paul M. Edwards, Korean War Almanac (New York: Infobase, 2006), 517.

222 Notes to Pages 63–67 221. Tomai, Documentary History of Greece, 423, 434–35; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 397. 222. “NSC 103: The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece,” National Security Council Report, February 6, 1951, 2, 6.

Chapter 3 1. Building the military “American style” is an expression attributed to Robert Komer, a former senior official who dealt with Vietnam-related affairs in Kennedy’s administration. Describing how MAAG inappropriately built the South Vietnamese military, he stated, “we organized, equipped, and trained the RVNAF to fight American style.” Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 37. 2. Anthony James Joes, The War for South Vietnam 1954–1975 (New York: Praeger, 1989), 4. 3. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 153–55; Brigadier General (Ret.) James Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army: 1950–1972 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975), 4, 8–9; U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), Part II, A-2 (hereafter The Pentagon Papers); Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 247; Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), 8. 4. The Pentagon Papers, Part II, A-19, A-24. 5. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2: Indochina (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 2210–13, 2238–51. 6. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 131–34; The Pentagon Papers, Part II, A-2; Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 247; Collins, The Development and Training, 4, 9; Cosmas, MACV, 8. 7. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 124. 8. William Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion and Public Order (London: Routledge, 2005), 33. 9. Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie (New York: Random House, 1988), 168; Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 18; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 42–43. 10. Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 22; Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 166–68. 11. CIA, “Prospects for the Defense of Indochina Against a Chinese Communist Invasion in Indochina,” September 7, 1950, assessment, National Intelligence Council Collection, https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection; CIA, “Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action in Indochina through 1954,” December 18, 1953, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia .gov/library/readingroom/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection; Willard J. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Prelude to the War in Vietnam, 1954–1959 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), 33. 12. Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 25; Collins, The Development and Training, 151; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 124, 225. 13. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 225. 14. Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 36; Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam, 31; CIA, “The Crisis in Saigon,” memo for the DCI from the Board of

Notes to Pages 68–72 223 National Estimates, April 4, 1955, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia .gov/library/readingroom/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection. 15. The Pentagon Papers, Part II, A-17, A-35–36, IV.A.4, h-i. 16. Ibid., Part II, A-17, A-35–36; Collins, The Development and Training, 1. 17. The Pentagon Papers, Part II, A-2. 18. Edward Geary Landsale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 135. 19. The Pentagon Papers, Part II, A-2, A-38. 20. General Cao Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 2. 21. William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), 92; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 206; The Pentagon Papers, Part II, B-5–13; Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 26–28. France’s program to build South Vietnam’s military is ripe for further research; however, the French occupation and colonial history present a dramatically different case study than those addressed in this book. 22. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 1889–90; The Pentagon Papers, Part II, B-5–13; Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 26–28. 23. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 1, 1062–63, 1120–21. 24. Ibid., 683–89, 1022, 1062–63, 1120–21. 25. Ibid., 1582–83, 1646–47. 26. Ibid., 1358–59; “The Problem of Creating an Effective VNA,” 1960, Virtual Vietnam Archive, Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University, http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/ virtualarchive. 27. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 1883–85. 28. “The Problem of Creating an Effective VNA.” 29. The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.3, 3. 30. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 1925–27. 31. Ibid., 1022, 1889–90, 2020–21, 2027–28, 2059–61, 2075–78; David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 85; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 233–35. 32. More information on these nonmilitary efforts can be found in Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam. 33. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 229. 34. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2250–52. 35. Ibid., 2153–58; The Pentagon Papers, Part V.B.III.c, 768. 36. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 1954–56, 2088–91. The debate regarding “preconditions” can be found in The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.3, 7–11, Part V.B.III.c, 771. 37. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2153–58; The Pentagon Papers, Part VIII.IV.A.3; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Letter to the

224 Notes to Pages 72–77 President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam Regarding Assistance for That Country,” October 25, 1954, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid⳱10104. 38. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2161–62. 39. The Pentagon Papers, Part V.B.III.c, 783–88; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 39. 40. The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.3, iii, 9–10, Part V.B.III.c, 771. 41. His formal title was “Special United States Representative in South Vietnam,” and he held the post for six months after Ambassador Heath departed South Vietnam in November 1954. The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.3, 18; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 231–32. 42. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2315–19; Anderson, Trapped by Success, 87–88; The Pentagon Papers, Part V.B.III.c, 800; Merle L. Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 9; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 237–39. 43. Collins to Diem, “Need for Decision on Force Structure and Appointment of Defense Minister,” December 7, 1954, letter, Digital National Security Archive, http://search .proquest.com/dnsa. 44. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2415–17; Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, The RVNAF (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 9; The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.4, W. 45. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2188–90, 2279–83; The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.4, U. 46. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 95–97; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2341–44, 2362–66. 47. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 2, 2020–21, 2027–28, 2059–61, 2075–78, 2128–30, 2172–74; Joes, The War for South Vietnam 1954–1975, 37. 48. The Pentagon Papers, Part V.B.III.c, 811–13. 49. Ibid., Part IV.A.3, viii. 50. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 241; Collins, The Development and Training, 3; Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 3. 51. Collins, The Development and Training, 4. 52. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 241; Collins, The Development and Training, 1–2. 53. The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.4, Tab 1, 26; Collins, The Development and Training, 4; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 240. 54. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 199–201. 55. Ibid. 56. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 252. 57. MAAG, “Briefing of Sect Military Leaders by Lt. Gen. O’Daniel,” Memo, March 17, 1955, Digital National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com. 58. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I: Vietnam (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), 99–102. 59. Quoted in Anderson, Trapped by Success, 104.

Notes to Pages 78–81 225 60. CIA, “The Crisis in Saigon”; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 307–12. 61. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 247–51; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 99–102. 62. CIA, “The Crisis in Saigon”; The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.4, 17; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 265. 63. The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.4, 17. 64. Collins, The Development and Training, 10–11. 65. Ibid. 66. CIA, “The Crisis in Saigon.” 67. Collins, The Development and Training, 10–12. 68. Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 88; Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 78, 86; Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, Strategy and Tactics (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 8. 69. Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 8. The United States faced a dynamic in South Vietnam similar to the one it had faced early in Korea, where the military was politicized by prioritizing loyalty over capability. With the help of Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet—who had just transformed the Greek military—the Korean military’s leadership was effectively strengthened; James S. Corum, Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007), 217. 70. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 506–10, 522. 71. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 263, 272–73; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 523–24. 72. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 506–10, 522; Collins, The Development and Training, 6, 8–9. 73. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 2, 41; Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 14. 74. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 113–14. 75. Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 64–65; Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 64. 76. Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 15, 64. 77. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 544–45. 78. Jessica M. Chapman, “Staging Democracy: South Vietnam’s 1955 Referendum to Depose Bao Dai,” Diplomatic History 30 (2006): 671–703. 79. Cosmas, MACV, 10–11; Collins, The Development and Training, 1; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 92–94; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 598–99. 80. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 355–56. Although many people assumed he was given the nickname “Hanging Sam” because he was stationed at Nuremberg during the war crime trials, it was actually because he sought to have a rapist hanged; Samuel T. Williams, interview, March 2, 1981, transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy. For more information about Williams, see Col. Harold J. Meyer, Hanging Sam: A Military Biography of General Samuel T. Williams (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 1990).

226 Notes to Pages 81–86 81. Samuel T. Williams, interview; Meyer, Hanging Sam, 141–42. 82. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 275; Meyer, Hanging Sam, x. 83. Meyer, Hanging Sam, 94–95, 98–99. 84. “Why U.S. Is Losing in Vietnam: An Inside Story,” U.S. News and World Report, November 1964, 62. 85. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 272–73. 86. Meyer, Hanging Sam, 135–37. 87. Samuel T. Williams, interview. 88. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 22. 89. Meyer, Hanging Sam, 139–41; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 90. CIA, “Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956,” national intelligence estimate, October 11, 1955, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/ readingroom/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection. At least one scholar has argued that, given the RVNAF’s weak state and the North Vietnamese military’s comparably larger capabilities, “it would have been folly not to have provided South Vietnam with a conventional force large enough to at least delay or harass an invading army”; Anderson, Trapped by Success, 136. 91. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 602–10. 92. Ibid., 610–15. 93. Samuel T. Williams, interview; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 275–76. 94. Quoted in Meyer, Hanging Sam, 137; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 95. Samuel T. Williams, interview. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid.; Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 90. 98. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 616–18. 99. Ibid., 626–27. 100. Ibid., 644–47, 669–71. 101. Ibid.; Walter S. Robertson, “United States Policy with Respect to Vietnam,” speech, American Friends of Vietnam, Washington, DC, June 1, 1956, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/ acad/intrel/willard.htm; Collins, The Development and Training, 6–7; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 102. Collins, The Development and Training, 5. 103. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 4; “Why U.S. Is Losing in Vietnam: An Inside Story,” U.S. News and World Report, 64. 104. Collins, The Development and Training, 7; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 618–21; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 260–62. 105. Collins, The Development and Training, 6; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 148–49; Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 3. 106. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 683–85. 107. Ibid., 672–74. 108. Ibid., 658, 672–74.

Notes to Pages 87–90 227 109. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 159. 110. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 695–703. 111. Ibid., 703–9. 112. Ibid., 733–35. 113. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 160. 114. CIA, “Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957,” national intelligence estimate, July 17, 1956, National Intelligence Council Collection, https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/national-intelligence-council-nic-collection. 115. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10; CIA, “Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957”; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 747–49. 116. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 124; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 282, 292. 117. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 286, 288–89; Stephen T. Hosmer, Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflicts (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1987), 145. 118. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 31–32. 119. Hosmer, Constraints on U.S. Strategy, 145; Maxwell D. Taylor, interview, September 14, 1981, transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/ diplomacy. 120. Maxwell D. Taylor, interview. 121. Cosmas, MACV, 11. 122. Collins, The Development and Training, 129–30; Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 93–94, 113–14, 184. 123. Cosmas, MACV, 11; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 294. 124. The document was marked “NOFORN,” meaning no foreigners could view it; Samuel T. Williams, “What Is Wrong,” September 1957, Box 14, Folder 4, Samuel T. Williams Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA. 125. Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 85; Collins, The Development and Training, 129–30; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 293. 126. Komer, Bureaucracy, 35. 127. Cosmas, MACV, 11. 128. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 115. 129. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 759–60. 130. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 17–18, 93–94, 113–14, 184. 131. Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 69; Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 8. 132. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 728–32; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 127. 133. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 133; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 658, 733; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 278–79. 134. Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 53–54. 135. Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 76–91. 136. Samuel T. Williams, interview; Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 85; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 301, 306; Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 53–54.

228 Notes to Pages 91–94 137. Elbridge Durbrow, interview, June 3, 1981, transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress, http:// memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy; Samuel T. Williams, interview; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 276. 138. Samuel T. Williams, interview. 139. Ibid. 140. Elbridge Durbrow, interview. 141. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 277. 142. Elbridge Durbrow, interview; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 143. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 862–63; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 144. Elbridge Durbrow, interview; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 145. Collins, The Development and Training, 14–15; Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 162, 189, 205; Major General Samuel L. Myers, “Building a Strong National Vietnamese Army,” speech, Conference on Vietnam, April 1959, Virtual Vietnam Archive, Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University, http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive. 146. Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 209. 147. Quoted in Meyer, Hanging Sam, 23. 148. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 34–35. 149. Maxwell D. Taylor, interview. 150. MAAG Quarterly Activities Report: March–May 1958, MAAGV 370.2, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; Memo to Williams from MAAG Chief of Staff Outlining New Advisors Briefing on 10 Oct 1958, MAAGV 337, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; MAAG Senior Advisors Conference: 20–21 March 1958, MAAGV 337, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 151. Collins, The Development and Training, 123. 152. Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 79. 153. Quoted in Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 285; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 154. Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, 204–5. 155. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 292, 344. 156. The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.5, 20–21. 157. Samuel T. Williams, interview. 158. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 149. 159. Samuel T. Williams, interview; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 787–92. 160. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 787–92. 161. Elbridge Durbrow, interview. 162. “General O’Daniel’s Confidential Report,” October 8, 1958, Virtual Vietnam Archive, Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University, http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/ virtualarchive.

Notes to Pages 94–98 229 163. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 343. 164. Ibid., 291, 344; MAAG Senior Advisors Conference: 20–21 March 1958; MAAG Senior Advisors Conference: 13–16 August 1958, MAAGV 337, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 165. MAAG Senior Advisors Conference: 13–16 August 1958. 166. Ibid.; MAAG Senior Advisors Conference: 20–21 March 1958. 167. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 119, 202–3. 168. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 160–61; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 795–99, 820–22. 169. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 168; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 100–102, 854–56; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 140. 170. Revision of Country Statement for Vietnam as of 31 December 1957, MAAGV 091.7, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; MAAG Quarterly Activities Report: March–May 1958. 171. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 306. 172. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 40–54, 827–28. 173. Ibid., 10–15, 844–45, 854–56, 888–94. 174. Ibid., 844–45. 175. Revision of Country Statement for Vietnam as of 31 December 1957. 176. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Joint Statement Following Discussions with President Diem of Viet-Nam,” May 12, 1957, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid⳱ 11033. 177. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 853; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 315–16; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 156–57. 178. Cosmas, MACV, 12. 179. Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 21, 47. 180. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 888–94. 181. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 5. 182. Cosmas, MACV, 13. 183. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 155; Duiker, Sacred War, 114. 184. The Pentagon Papers, Part V.B.III.d., 1103–7; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 158; Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 21, 47; North Vietnamese document translated by MAAG in March 1958, MAAGV 091.411, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 185. Frederik Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War (Harlow, England: Longman, 2001). 186. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 312; Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 88–89; Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 5. 187. Samuel T. Williams, interview; Letter to Hon Tran Trung Dung: 23 Sep 1957, MAAGV 091.7, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam,

230 Notes to Pages 98–100 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; Collins, The Development and Training, 9; Document on Joint Reorganization Committee: 1958, MAAGV 092, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; “Why U.S. Is Losing in Vietnam: An Inside Story,” USNWR, 63. 188. Van Vien et al., The U.S. Adviser, 28; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. I, 795–99, 807–11; The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.5, 20–21. 189. Samuel T. Williams, interview; Cosmas, MACV, 11. Separately, MAAG strengthened the South Vietnamese Navy and Air Force; both were generally modernized, but not reorganized. 190. Samuel T. Williams, interview. 191. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. I: Vietnam (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 281–88, 290–93; Elbridge Durbrow, interview; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 349–51. 192. Collins, The Development and Training, 18; Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 65–66; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 64–65, 348–49; Cosmas, MACV, 11; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 296, 298. 193. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 320–24, 396–404. 194. Ibid. 195. Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 69; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 421–25; Samuel T. Williams, interview. 196. Cosmas, MACV, 11; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 144–70, 255–71. 197. Collins, The Development and Training, 129–30; Williams, “What Is Wrong.” 198. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 352–57. 199. Ibid., 131–34, 225–27; Meyer, Hanging Sam, 143–44; Anderson, Trapped by Success, 178–79, 181–82; Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 162; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 162; The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.5, 34 and Part V.B.III.d, 1275, 1279–80. 200. During this period, the international body charged with overseeing the Geneva Accords grew cognizant of TERM’s duplicitous mission and pressured the U.S. government to disband it. Broadly, various U.S. government entities increasingly supported Williams’s position on increasing MAAG’s size, although major changes would not occur for more than a year when the nature and degree of American involvement would dramatically change. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 209–13, 357–59; The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.B.III.d, 2, 1236–51; Major General George S. Eckhardt, Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950–1969 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 7, 9–10, 14–15; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 239–40, 252, 290–91; Collins, The Development and Training, 7. 201. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), 14; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 182–83, 199–200, 203–4; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 346. 202. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 295, 344, 379. 203. Samuel T. Williams, interview.

Notes to Pages 101–103 231 204. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 295. 205. Ibid. 206. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 295, 344, 379; MAAG Senior Advisors Conference: 27–28 April 1960, MAAGV 276, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; MAAG Assessments: 1957, MAAGV 319.1, RG 472, Records of the Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1950–1964, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 207. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 140; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 100–2, 138–44. 208. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 181–2, 250–4. 209. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 327, 336; Cosmas, MACV, 13; Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, xii, 50–51. 210. Joes, The War for South Vietnam, 47; Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 15, 44; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 329–31; Anthony James Joes, America and Guerrilla Warfare (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 214; CIA, “Short-Term Trends in South Vietnam,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 23, 1960. 211. Lung, Strategy and Tactics, 65; CIA, “Prospects for North and South Vietnam,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, May 26, 1959. 212. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 329–31. 213. Cosmas, MACV, 13–14; Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, xii, 52–53; Duiker, Sacred War, 122. 214. Duiker, Sacred War, 122–24, 137. 215. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 242–43; Race, War Comes to Long An, 72–73; Collins, The Development and Training, 151; Elbridge Durbrow, interview; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 296, 300–320; Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 59. 216. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 300–20. Notably, their efforts demonstrate the inaccuracy of a key argument made by scholar Mark Moyar—that “Diem and his top generals had rid the South Vietnamese army of its worst flaws by removing incompetent leaders.” Moyar provides no evidence for this claim. Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 339. 217. Samuel T. Williams, interview. 218. Webb, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 150–51; Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 302, 334, 340; The Pentagon Papers, Part V. B.III.d, 1275, 1279–80; Myers, “Building a Strong National Vietnamese Army.” 219. Collins, The Development and Training, 127; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 412–25, 523–24. 220. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 188. 221. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 362–63; Collins, The Development and Training, 17–20. 222. CIA, “Short-Term Trends in South Vietnam,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 23, 1960. 223. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 283–86.

232 Notes to Pages 103–110 224. Anderson, Trapped by Success, 185–86; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 396–404, 471–83, 524–25. 225. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 502–8. 226. Samuel T. Williams, “Final Formal Recommendation from Williams to Diem,” August 24, 1960, Box 14, Folder 4, Samuel T. Williams Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA. 227. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, 300. 228. Ibid., 379. 229. The Pentagon Papers, Part IV.A.5, Tab 1, 27. 230. Ibid., Part IV.A.4, 1.1, Part IV.A.5, 34–35. 231. According to its official history, the North Vietnamese military also saw 1961 as the year that American involvement markedly changed; Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 81; Cosmas, MACV, 20; Interview with Vietnam military scholar 噛1, Washington, DC, October 27, 2011; Interview with Vietnam military scholar 噛2, November 30, 2011. 232. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Vol. I: Vietnam (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), document 325, document 326, document 334; Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 474–75. 233. Pribbenow, Victory in Vietnam, 68; Douglas Pike, The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 81.

Chapter 4 1. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010. 2. Ronald D. McLaurin, “Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present and Future,” in The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality, ed. Edward E. Azar (New York: Praeger, 1984), 82; Wadi D. Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (New York: Praeger, 1985), 28. 3. McLaurin, “Lebanon and Its Army,” 82. 4. Dani Berkovich, “Hizbollah’s Primary Agent of Change: The Role of the Lebanese Army,” Strategic Assessment (Israel) 9, no. 3 (2006): 34; Oren Barak, The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009); McLaurin, “Lebanon and Its Army,” 84. 5. Robin Wright, “As the Military Downsizes, the War-Hardened Vietnam Generation Is Retiring, Including Army Legend Alfred Baker,” Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1994; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010. 6. Cable, “Habib Mission: Initial Talks in Beirut,” May 1981, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 7. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1982 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 51–64; Jonathan C. Randal, “U.S. Training Officer Takes Issue with Critics of Lebanese Army,” Washington Post, March 26, 1983; Ralph A. Hallenbeck, Military Force as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982–February 1984 (New York: Praeger, 1991), 37; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010. 8. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010. 9. McLaurin, “Lebanon and Its Army,” 96.

Notes to Pages 110–113 233 10. Ibid., 72, 95; Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 20; Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 68; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 11. Oren Barak, “Commemorating Malikiyya: Political Myth, Multiethnic Identity and the Making of the Lebanese Army,” History and Memory 13 (2001): 60–84; Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 24–25. 12. Ronald D. McLaurin, “From Professional to Political: The Redecline of the Lebanese Army,” Armed Forces & Society 17, no. 4 (1991): 546. 13. Robert S. Dillon, interview, May 17, 1990, transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress, http:// memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy; Barak, The Lebanese Army, 95, 113. 14. David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta, “Lebanon and the Intelligence Community: A Case Study,” Studies in Intelligence 73, no. 2 (2007): 37–51; Cable, “Habib Mission: Initial Talks in Beirut”; Cable, “Habib Mission: Temporary Return to Washington for Consultations,” May 1981, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; “An Action Plan for the Lebanese-Israeli Arena,” February 6, 1982, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. Few senior U.S. officials made time to see Dillon before he departed for Beirut; Robert S. Dillon, interview. 15. Peter Rodman, Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 150–51; Casper W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: 7 Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 142. 16. Secretary of State to the President, “Strategy for the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Lebanon,” June 16, 1982, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; Cable, “Habib Mission: U.S. Goals,” June 1982, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 17. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner’s, 1993), 47; U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 82 (November 1982): 4; “Lebanon,” Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Paper, July 12, 1982, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 18. Shultz and McFarlane underscore that the U.S. government sent the Marines back to Beirut because they felt guilty about the Sabra and Shatila massacres; Israel’s role further weighed on senior U.S. officials. It should have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with Lebanon that Gemayel’s militia would respond spectacularly. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 24, 105–6; Robert C. McFarlane, Special Trust (London: Cadell and Davies, 1994), 211; U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 82, 50–51. 19. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks of President Reagan and President Amin Gemayel of Lebanon Following Their Meeting,” October 19, 1982, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index .php?pid⳱41883; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011; Ronald Reagan, “Next Steps in Lebanon: National Security Decision Directive 64,” October 28, 1982, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directives, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/. Shultz states the United States sought to

234 Notes to Pages 114–119 facilitate the departure of these forces because once they left, “Lebanon could stand on its own again”; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 52. 20. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 21. Reagan, “Next Steps in Lebanon”; U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1984–85; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Joel Brinkley, “As the Lebanese Army Caves In, U.S. Evaluates Training Program,” New York Times, February 17, 1984. 22. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 23. Hallenbeck, Military Force, 30–31, 36. 24. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010. 25. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. 26. Interview with former American military official 噛1, December 17, 2010. 27. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Security and Development Assistance, 98th Cong., 1st sess., February 17, 1983, 79. Despite consulting National and DoD Archives, I have not acquired a declassified copy of this report. This information is based on an interview with a member of Bartlett’s team and on secondary sources. During field research in Lebanon, multiple former Lebanese military officials pointed to a copy of the (presumably) still-classified report on their bookshelves. Although they offered to give me a copy, I refrained from looking at it because its classification status remained unknown. Hallenbeck, Military Force, 38; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 16, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. 28. U.S. National Security Council, “Memorandum to William Clark from Robert Lilac regarding a U.S. Commitment to Lebanese President Amin Gemayel to Provide Military Assistance to That Country,” memorandum, November 3, 1982, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records 1981–1987, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; Michael Collins Dunne, “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army,” Defense and Foreign Affairs (June 1983): 19. 29. Hallenbeck, Military Force, 40. 30. Interview with former American military official 噛1, December 17, 2010; George C. Wilson and John M. Goshko, “U.S. Planning to Rebuild Armed Forces of Lebanon,” Washington Post, October 28, 1982; Interview with former senior American military official 噛2, February 25, 2009. 31. Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 32. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011. 33. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. 34. David Ignatius, “How to Rebuild Lebanon,” Foreign Affairs 61, no. 5 (1985): 1139–56; Dunne, “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army,” 18; Oren Barak, “Towards a Representative Military? The Transformation of the Lebanese Officer Corps Since 1945,” Middle East Journal 60, no. 1 (2006): 86–87; E. J. Dionne, Jr., ”US Instructors Again Training Lebanon Troops,” New York Times, February 29, 1984; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010.

Notes to Pages 119–123 235 35. Cable, “Habib/Draper Mission: U.S. Non-Paper: Security Arrangements in South Lebanon,” March 16, 1983, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 36. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. One senior Lebanese military official even asserted that President Gemayel sought to have Kassis assassinate Tannous. However, a senior Lebanese political official disagreed and said the two had an “honest” relationship; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011. 37. Robert S. Dillon, interview; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛2, February 25, 2009; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011. 38. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1985: Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., February 23, 1984; U.S. National Security Council, “Memorandum to William Clark from Robert Lilac.” 39. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 40. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010; U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1984–85, 135. 41. Wilson and Goshko, “U.S. Planning to Rebuild Armed Forces of Lebanon”; Scott Macleod, “Army Defeats Wreck U.S. Training Effort,” United Press International, February 18, 1984; Jonathan C. Randal, “U.S. Training Officer Takes Issue with Critics of Lebanese Army,” Washington Post, March 26, 1983. 42. Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 43. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010. 44. Dunne, “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army,” 21; David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Resumes Training Shaky Lebanese Army,” Washington Post, February 29, 1984; Interview with former American military official 噛1, December 17, 2010. 45. Dennis Mullin, “Can Lebanon’s Army Save U.S. from a Bigger Role?” U.S. News & World Report, August 1, 1983. 46. Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 47. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 48. Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 26. 49. Lou Cannon, “Setbacks in Beirut Bare Conflicts, Uncertainty at White House,” Washington Post, February 19, 1984. 50. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Rodman, Presidential Command, 170, 288. 51. Kennedy and Brunetta, “Lebanon and the Intelligence Community.” 52. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011.

236 Notes to Pages 123–127 53. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 43; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 54. George C. Wilson, “Eye on Postwar Stabilization: U.S. Set to Assess Lebanon’s Weapons Needs,” Washington Post, September 8, 1982; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 108. 55. Interview with former senior American military official 噛2, February 25, 2009; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 56. Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Robert S. Dillon, interview; Kennedy and Brunetta, “Lebanon and the Intelligence Community.” 57. Kennedy and Brunetta, “Lebanon and the Intelligence Community.” 58. U.S. National Security Council, “Talking Points for William P. Clark Prepared by Geoffrey Kemp,” memorandum, February 3, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “William P. Clark Talking Points for the President,” memorandum, February 3, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “George Shultz Memo to the President re Lebanon,” memorandum, March 9, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “William P. Clark Memo to the NSPG re: Meeting,” memorandum, March 18, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 59. Ronald Reagan, “Accelerating the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Lebanon: National Security Decision Directive 92,” April 27, 1983, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directives, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ nsdd. This NSDD is entirely redacted. 60. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 61. Literature on the varied elements that enabled Hizballah’s emergence includes Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004); Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985). 62. R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 157; Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon (New York: Macmillan, 1997), 33; Judith Harik, The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994), 23. 63. Interview with former American military official 噛1, December 17, 2010. 64. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 65. Mullin, “Can Lebanon’s Army Save U.S. from a Bigger Role?” 66. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY84–85: Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East, 98th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 1983, xiv. 67. Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 27–28; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010.

Notes to Pages 127–131 237 68. Interview with former American military official 噛1, December 17, 2010. 69. Timothy J. Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983: The Marine Commander Tells His Story (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), 45; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛1, Lebanon, March 15, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010. 70. Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, 48. 71. Joel Brinkley, “The Collapse of Lebanon’s Army: U.S. Said to Ignore Factionalism,” New York Times, March 10, 1984. 72. U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY84–85: Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East, 145; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 73. Interview with former senior American military official 噛2, February 25, 2009. 74. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010. 75. Mullin, “Can Lebanon’s Army Save U.S. from a Bigger Role?” 76. Tom Clancy, General (Ret.) Carl Stiner, and Tony Koltz, Shadow Warriors (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 2002), 239; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 16, 2010; Walter Andrews, “General’s Trip Spurs Lebanon Tank Sale,” Washington Times, August 8, 1983; Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, 47. 77. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010. 78. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 16, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛6, Lebanon, March 3, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛8, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 79. Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 26–7; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011. 80. Dunne, “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army,” 22. 81. Ibid., 18. Conscription existed for years but had not been implemented for many reasons, including the ongoing violence and the weak Lebanese government; McLaurin, “Lebanon and Its Army,” 104–5. 82. McLaurin, “Lebanon and Its Army,” 107. 83. Ibid.; Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army”; Dunne, “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army,” 19. 84. Brinkley, “The Collapse of Lebanon’s Army”; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 85. Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Military Program in Beirut Grinding to Halt; Renewed Warring Among Factions Undercuts Plan to Rebuild Army,” Washington Post, May 8, 1984; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 86. Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛2, February 25, 2009; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010.

238 Notes to Pages 131–134 87. Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 24–25; Dunne, “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army,” 19–20, 24–25; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 88. Cable, “Habib/Draper Mission.” 89. Ibid. 90. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY84–85: Executive Branch Request for Foreign Military Assistance, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., February 22, 1983, 172; U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY84–85: Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East, 97, 122; McFarlane, Special Trust, 244. 91. McFarlane, Special Trust, 244. 92. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010. 93. Interview with former American military official 噛1, December 17, 2010. 94. The decision concerning how the United States responded to the Lebanese government’s request for the U.S. contingent of the MNF to deploy to the Chouf remains classified. U.S. National Security Council, “President Reagan Talking Points Re: Phone Call to PM Begin,” memorandum, September 3, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “NSPG Discussion Paper Re: Lebanon,” memorandum, September 3, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “William P. Clark Memo to NSPG Re: Meeting,” memorandum, July 14, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “William P. Clark Talking Points for the President,” memorandum, July 14, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “Philip Dur/Geoffrey Kemp Memo to William P. Clark Re: State Paper,” memorandum, July 19, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “William P. Clark to the NSPG Re: Meeting,” memorandum, July 20, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “William P. Clark Talking Points for the President,” memorandum, July 19, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “Philip Dur/Geoffrey Kemp Talking Points for Judge Clark,” memorandum, July 19, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 95. U.S. National Security Council, “NSPG Discussion Paper Re: Lebanon”; Clancy et al., Shadow Warriors, 243; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. 96. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010; U.S. National Security Council, “NSPG Discussion Paper Re: Lebanon”; U.S. National Security Council, “William P. Clark to the NSPG Re: Lebanon Morning Update,” memorandum, September 3, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 97. Kechichian, “The Lebanese Army,” 32; David B. Ottaway, “Crisis Tests Lebanon’s U.S.-Trained Army,” Washington Post, February 6, 1984; McFarlane, Special Trust, 250. 98. Cable, “McFarlane/Fairbanks Mission: GOL Near Despair,” September 3, 1983, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College

Notes to Pages 135–137 239 Park, MD; Herbert H. Denton, “Lebanese Army Reports Loss of Armor to Druze,” Washington Post, August 15, 1983; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010. 99. Benis M. Frank, The U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982–1984 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1987), 151. 100. U.S. National Security Council, “NSPG Discussion Paper Re: Lebanon”; U.S. National Security Council, “Don Gregg thru Admiral Murphy to the Vice President re: NSPG Meeting,” memorandum, September 2, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; U.S. National Security Council, “President Reagan Talking Points Re: Phone Call to PM Begin.” 101. Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, 58; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 102. The shipment “had crashed into a pier in Italy”; Clancy et al., Shadow Warriors, 250; Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, 81. 103. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 230–33; McFarlane, Special Trust, 250–51; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 151, 361; Robert S. Dillon, interview; Herbert H. Denton, “U.S. Warships Shell Foes of Lebanese Army: Barrage Widens American Role,” Washington Post, September 19, 1983; U.S. National Security Council, “Geoffrey Kemp Talking Points for Robert McFarlane,” memorandum, December 1, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 104. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 368; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, 361; McFarlane, Special Trust, 250–51. 105. Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 200. Aoun, however, had a poor reputation among the LAF’s senior leadership because he rarely went into the field; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 106. Denton, “U.S. Warships Shell Foes of Lebanese Army”; Ronald Reagan, “Strategy for Lebanon: National Security Decision Directive 103,” September 10, 1983, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directives, http://www .fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd. This NSDD is highly redacted; John H. Kelly, “Lebanon: 1982– 1984,” in U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force, ed. Jeremy M. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 45. 107. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, 65, 72. 108. Ronald Reagan, “Next Steps Toward Progress in Lebanon and the Middle East: National Security Decision Directive 111,” October 28, 1983, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directives, http://www.fas.org/irp/ offdocs/nsdd. This NSDD is heavily redacted; Frank, The U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 88–89, 152. 109. Frank, The U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 36–49; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛4, Washington, DC, March 4, 2010. 110. Joel Brinkley, “Beirut Envoy Doubts Value of Marines’ Role,” New York Times, December 31, 1983. 111. Ronald Reagan, “Responding to the Lebanon Crisis: National Security Decision Directive 109,” October 23, 1983, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration

240 Notes to Pages 137–142 National Security Decision Directives, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd. This NSDD is heavily redacted. 112. Rumsfeld was appointed when McFarlane was promoted to assistant to the president for national security affairs; “Information Memorandum from Rumsfeld to Shultz: ‘The Swamp,’ ” November 23, 1983, http://www.rumsfeld.com. 113. Ibid. 114. Kennedy and Brunetta, “Lebanon and the Intelligence Community.” 115. Richard C. Gross, “Shipment of Personnel Carriers to Lebanon Suspended,” United Press International, February 23, 1984; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1985: Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., February 23, 1984, 539; E. J. Dionne, Jr., “U.S. Instructors Again Training Lebanon Troops,” Washington Post, February 28, 1984; Ottaway, “U.S. Resumes Training Shaky Lebanese Army.” 116. U.S. National Security Council, “Geoffrey Kemp Talking Points for Robert McFarlane”; U.S. National Security Council, “Remarks of President Reagan and President Amin Gemayel Following Their Meetings,” December 1, 1983, Box 91306, National Security Planning Group Records, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010. 117. Frank, The U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 152; Ronald Reagan, “Next Steps in Lebanon: National Security Decision Directive 123,” February 1, 1984, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directives, http://www.fas.org/irp/ offdocs/nsdd. 118. CIA, “Syria-Lebanon: Pushing Political Talks,” February 10, 1984, National Intelligence Council Collection, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/national-intelli gence-council-nic-collection. 119. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010. 120. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010. 121. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. 122. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010. 123. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010. 124. E. J. Dionne Jr., “Lebanon’s Army Chief Offers to Resign,” New York Times, March 13, 1984. 125. Ottaway, “U.S. Military Program in Beirut Grinding to Halt”; Barak, “Commemorating Malikiyya,” 60–84; Ottaway, “U.S. Resumes Training Shaky Lebanese Army.” 126. Thomas L. Friedman, “Many Lebanese Question Gemayel’s Leadership,” New York Times, February 5, 1984; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010. 127. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 16, 2010. 128. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010.

Notes to Pages 142–144 241 129. Thomas L. Friedman, “Lebanese Cabinet Quits as Protests by Moslems Grow,” New York Times, February 6, 1984. 130. “Excerpts from U.S. Aide’s Statement on Reagan’s View of Marine pullout,” New York Times, February 3, 1984; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY85: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., February 9, 1984, 89–90, 102, 128. 131. Cable 100320Z, “Rumsfeld Report: 2–8-84,” February 8, 1984, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 132. “Recent Events Only Confirm Importance of ‘Decisive New Steps,’ ” Washington Post, February 7, 1984. 133. Clancy et al., Shadow Warriors, 257–58. 134. Ibid., 146–49; Interview with former American military official 噛1, December 17, 2010; David Hoffman, “Reagan Denies U.S. Failed in Lebanon,” Washington Post, February 18, 1984; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Ottaway, “U.S. Resumes Training Shaky Lebanese Army.” 135. Ronald Reagan, “Lebanon: National Security Decision Directive 128,” February 26, 1984, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directives, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd. 136. Press reports discuss militia members capturing LAF equipment and the suspension of security assistance, including Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Lebanon Decisions Temporarily on ‘Hold,’ ” Washington Post, February 26, 1984; Jeffrey Ulbrich, “Christian Forces Get Windfall of Military Equipment,” Associated Press, February 20, 1984; Scott Macleod, “U.S. Training of Lebanese Army Continues,” United Press International, February 21, 1984; Richard C. Gross, “Shipment of Personnel Carriers to Lebanon Suspended,” United Press International, February 23, 1984. 137. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010; Ulbrich, “Christian Forces Get Windfall of Military Equipment.” 138. Oberdorfer, “U.S. Lebanon Decisions Temporarily on ‘Hold’ ”; Unused funding allocated for Lebanon was reprogrammed for Grenada; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY86–FY87: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st sess., February 26, 1985, 110; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Lebanon, by Alfred B. Prados, November 23, 2007, 34. 139. U.S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY86–FY87: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101. Although rumors suggest the United States covertly built a counterstrike unit in the LAF to act against terrorists, notably the perpetrators of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks bombings, this initiative does not appear to have come to fruition due to concerns about the unit’s reliability. However, the NSDD that appears to outline it remains classified; Ronald Reagan, “Support to Govt of Lebanon in Planning for Counter Terrorism Operations: National Security Decision Directive 149,” November 1, 1984, Federation of American Scientists, Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directives, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd; Bradley Graham, “U.S. Aides Curb Moves in Beirut,” Washington Post, October 20, 1984. 140. Hallenbeck, Military Force, 126, 135; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs,

242 Notes to Pages 145–151 Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY85: Overview of Security Supporting Assistance Programs, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., February 21, 1984, 50. 141. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010. 142. According to Secretary of State Shultz, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam made this quip about the United States and its role in the Middle East; U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 84, April 1984, 29–30. 143. Interview with former senior American military official 噛2, February 25, 2009. 144. Barak, The Lebanese Army, 131; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛8, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛1, June 10, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 145. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛5, June 19, 2011. 146. McLaurin, “From Professional to Political,” 545.

Chapter 5 1. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004–2005 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), 129–30. 2. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010. In the U.S. Army, fewer than 0.5 percent of officers hold this rank. Aram Nerguizian, U.S. Military Assistance to Lebanon: A Net Assessment and Implications for U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 23. 3. The LAF’s budget was 531 million dollars, less than 3 percent of Lebanon’s GDP, in 2005. Lebanon’s parliament failed to pass a defense budget for years following the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri (Nerguizian, U.S. Military Assistance to Lebanon, 20). Further, the military lacked meaningful civilian oversight; for example, “very few members of parliament on the Defense Committee are even aware of what the defense budget is” (el-Hokayem and McGovern, Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon, 12, 20, 32). 4. el-Hokayem and McGovern, Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon, 25; Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011. 5. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 6. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011. 7. Ibid.; Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 8. Hizballah did not recognize the withdrawal as complete; Hassan M. Fattah, “Syrian Troops Leave Lebanon After 29-Year Occupation,” New York Times, April 26, 2005; “Israel’s Withdrawal Is Certified by UN,” New York Times, June 17, 2000. 9. Elizabeth Picard, The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1990).

Notes to Pages 151–154 243 10. Ibid.; Dan De Luce, “Gates: Hezbollah Getting Improved Missiles,” Defense News, April 27, 2010; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 11. U.S. training funds were not disbursed in 1992–1993 due to wrangling in the Lebanese military regarding which personnel would be sent to the United States; Ed Blanche, “U.S. Seeks to Rebuild Lebanon’s Armed Forces,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 22, 2006; Nerguizian, “U.S. Military Assistance to Lebanon,” 35; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Lebanon, by Alfred B. Prados, December 30, 2005, 14, 21. 12. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, “Taken Question on U.S. Official Visits to Syria,” March 3, 2009, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1559, “The Situation in the Middle East,” September 2, 2004; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 13. Fattah, “Syrian Troops Leave Lebanon After 29-Year Occupation”; Robin Wright, “Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31, 2005; Ed Blanche, “Upheaval in Lebanon’s Security Service,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1, 2005; Lebanese Army Role for Hizbullah?” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, August 10, 2005. 14. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,” Washington, DC, November 6, 2003; Jim VandeHei, “Bush Calls Democracy Terror’s Antidote,” Washington Post, March 9, 2005; “Lebanese Premier, Rice Hold News Conference in Beirut,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 22, 2005; Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. At the Defense Department, this included Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who served as President Reagan’s Middle East envoy; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) Eric Edelman, who worked as Secretary of State Shultz’s special assistant; and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman, who headed the State Department’s Policy Planning office during that period; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011. 15. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011. 16. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, Lebanon Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess., July 28, 2005, 63; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with former senior American military official 噛1, June 26, 2010; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011. 17. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛6, Lebanon, March 3, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese official 噛1, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010; Ministry of Defense, Lebanese Armed Forces, The Mission of the Lebanese Army, https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/mission-lebanese-army.

244 Notes to Pages 155–158 18. Richard Armitage, “America’s Challenges in a Changed World,” speech, United States Institute of Peace conference, September 5, 2002; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛1, Washington, DC, November 9, 2010; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011. 19. Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛1, Washington, DC, November 9, 2010. 20. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛8, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 21. Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; U.S. Congress, Lebanon Reborn? 63. 22. Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010; U.S. Congress, Lebanon Reborn? 63; Blanche, “U.S. Seeks to Rebuild Lebanon’s Armed Forces”; Christine Spolar, “U.S. Studies Lebanon’s Military,” Chicago Tribune, March 3, 2006; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The President’s Budget for Foreign Affairs Hearing, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2006, 129. 23. Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010; Spolar, “U.S. Studies Lebanon’s Military”; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010; U.S. Congress, The President’s Budget, 129. 24. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Security Assistance Reform: ‘Section 1206’ Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino, March 3, 2011, 2. 25. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Foreign Aid to Lebanon: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp, 2007, 2. 26. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “SecState Rice’s Visit to Lebanon a Show of Support,” press release, February 23, 2006, http://lebanon.usembassy.gov; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Commander of U.S. Army Forces Central Command Visits LAF,” press release, April 22, 2006, http://lebanon.usembassy.gov; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Dr. John Hillen Visits Lebanon,” press release, May 5, 2006, http://lebanon.usembassy.gov; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Visit of Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton,” press release, May 23, 2006, http:// lebanon.usembassy.gov. 27. The war erupted just before the executive branch notified Congress of its intention to use 10.6 million dollars in Section 1206 funding to strengthen Lebanon’s military; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, by Jeremy M. Sharp et al., 2006, 14; “Israel Accused over Lebanon War,” BBC, September 6, 2007; Adrian Blomfield, “Israel Humbled by Arms from Iran,” Daily Telegraph (London), August 15, 2006; Frank Gardner, “Hezbollah Missile Threat Assessed,” BBC, August 3, 2006.

Notes to Pages 159–164 245 28. “Opinion Poll on Economic Conditions and Resolution 1559,” al-Nahar, May 18, 2006; Interview with senior American military official 噛1, Washington, DC, November 9, 2010. Polling found 40 percent of Lebanese Shi’a reported their view of Hizballah had actually grown more positive after the war; Shibley Telhami, “Lebanese Identity and Israeli Security in the Shadows of the 2006 War,” Current History 106, no. 696 (2007): 23. 29. Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010. 30. Ibid. 31. Anthony Shadid, “Lebanese Army Begins to Deploy Across South; Troops Are Welcomed as Hezbollah Remains a Powerful Presence,” Washington Post, August 18, 2006. 32. United Nations Security Council, Resolution1701, “The Situation in the Middle East,” August 11, 2006. 33. Warren Hoge, “Lebanon Insists It Can Control the Syrian Border by Itself,” New York Times, August 29, 2006; Thom Shanker, “Peacekeepers Have ‘Robust’ Mandate, Rice Says,” New York Times, September 26, 2006. 34. Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; “Syria Warns Over UN Peacekeepers,” BBC, August 24, 2006. 35. Office of the Press Secretary, “The President’s News Conference with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,” Crawford, Texas, August 7, 2007; Thomas E. Ricks and Robin Wright, “Proposed Force in Lebanon Not to Include U.S. Troops,” Washington Post, July 22, 2006. 36. Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Donna Miles, “Lebanon to Be Among First Beneficiaries of New DoD Funding Authority,” American Forces Press Service, August 4, 2006. 37. U.S. Department of Defense, Executive Summary: The Lebanese Armed Forces: Assessment of 8–13 September 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). 38. This materiel was disbursed using an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement—a nontraditional way of delivering security assistance; U.S. Department of Defense, Martz Report Findings, Recommended Strategy for Assistance: The Lebanese Armed Forces: Assessment of 8–13 September 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). 39. Interview with senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, January 21, 2011. 40. Blanche, “Upheaval in Lebanon’s Security Service.” 41. U.S. Department of Defense, Executive Summary: The Lebanese Armed Forces; U.S. Department of Defense, Martz Report Findings. 42. U.S. Department of Defense, Executive Summary: The Lebanese Armed Forces; U.S. Department of Defense, Martz Report Findings; Interview with senior American military official 噛1, Washington, DC, November 9, 2010. 43. U.S. Department of Defense, Martz Report Findings. 44. U.S. Department of Defense, Executive Summary: The Lebanese Armed Forces; Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011. 45. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The President’s Foreign Affairs Budget Hearing, 110th Cong., 1st sess., February 8, 2007, 80; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Lebanon: Securing a Permanent Ceasefire Hearing, 109th

246 Notes to Pages 164–168 Cong., 2nd sess., September 13, 2006, 32; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism Hearings, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., November 15, 2006, 68–69. 46. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Interview with American political official 噛1, January 23, 2016. 47. “U.S. Delivers 20 Humvees to Lebanese Army,” Reuters, January 12, 2007; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Sharon Behn, “U.S., Hezbollah Vie to Rebuild for Lebanese; Hope to Win Public Opinion,” Washington Times, August 18, 2006. 48. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “United States and Lebanon Sign Agreements on Military Assistance,” press release, November 9, 2006, http://lebanon .usembassy.gov. 49. Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010; U.S. Embassy Beirut, “United States and Lebanon Sign Agreements on Military Assistance”; Nerguizian, “U.S. Military Assistance to Lebanon,” 35; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, by William C. Story, Jr., January 26, 1999, 4; Interview with senior American military official 噛1, Washington, DC, November 9, 2010. 50. Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛1, Washington, DC, November 9, 2010. 51. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Lebanon,” 3–4; Robin Wright, “U.S. Readies Security Aid Package to Help Lebanon Counter Hezbollah,” Washington Post, December 22, 2006. 52. Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010. 53. Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 54. Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 55. Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010. 56. Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010. 57. “Suleiman Says Army Is Trying to Keep the Peace,” Daily Star (Lebanon), January 27, 2007. 58. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Lebanon,” 6. 59. Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Interview with American political official 噛1, January 23, 2016. 60. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010; Jeffrey Ulbrich, “Christian Forces Get Windfall of Military Equipment,” Associated Press, February

Notes to Pages 169–172 247 20, 1984; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, by Casey L. Addis, 2009, 6; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011. 61. Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese official 噛1, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010; Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010. 62. Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛1, Washington, DC, November 9, 2010. 63. Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 64. Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010. 65. Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011. Murr declared that Secretary of State Rice pledged U.S. aid to the LAF “without any conditions”—an impossibility given that all U.S. military assistance is subject to conditions, such as end-use monitoring and human rights concerns; “U.S. and Lebanon Defense Secretary Counterparts Meet,” Associated Press, March 9, 2007. 66. “Fatah al-Islam, Lebanon’s New Jihadists,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, April 11, 2007. 67. Nicholas Blanford, “Sunni Rising: The Growth of Sunni Militancy in Lebanon,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2008; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; “Al-Qaeda in Lebanon,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, March 15, 2006. 68. Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011. 69. el-Hokayem and McGovern, Towards a More Secure and Stable Lebanon, 9. 70. Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 47. 71. Nada Bakri and Hassan M. Fattah, “18 Dead in Lebanon as Army and Camp Militants Clash,” New York Times, June 2, 2007. 72. Hassan M. Fattah, “Army Provides a Sense of Unity in Fractured Lebanon,” New York Times, June 20, 2007; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010. 73. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. 74. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 14, 2010. 75. Interview with former senior American political official 噛1, January 13, 2011; Robert F. Worth and Eric Lipton, “U.S. Is Resupplying Lebanon’s Military in Effort to Stabilize a

248 Notes to Pages 173–174 Strategic Ally,” New York Times, October 26, 2008; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Blanford, “Lebanon Declares Victory Against Fatah al-Islam”; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 76. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009 Hearings, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 2008, 11; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Policy in the Middle East, 110th Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 2007, 62–63; Thompson and Asfura-Heim, Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries, 16. 77. U.S. Congress, U.S. Policy in the Middle East, 62–63; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010. 78. Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Determination No. 2007–22: Memorandum for the Secretary of Transportation: Partial Resumption of Travel to Lebanon to Promote Peace and Security,” Washington, DC, June 5, 2007; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011. 79. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011. 80. Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011. 81. Josh Wood, “Syria War Triggers Rifts in Palestinian Camps in Lebanon,” New York Times, April 4, 2012. 82. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010; Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010. 83. LAF Commander Sleiman criticized U.S. aid during the Nahr al-Bared conflict, asserting the U.S. government was unwilling to send sufficient assistance until the LAF had substantial losses; Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Declares Victory Against Fatah al-Islam,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 12, 2007. 84. Blanford, “Lebanon Declares Victory Against Fatah al-Islam”; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛1, Lebanon, March 15, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛1, Lebanon, March 16, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese official 噛1, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 85. U.S. Congress, U.S. Policy in the Middle East, 62–63. 86. Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010.

Notes to Pages 175–179 249 87. Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 88. Comprehensive Training Program (CTP) for the Lebanese Armed Forces: Initial Brief to the LAF Chief of Staff (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 2–3; Interview with former senior American military official 噛3, January 11, 2011; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, by Casey L. Addis. 2010, 4. 89. Comprehensive Training Program (CTP) for the Lebanese Armed Forces: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007); Interview with former senior American military official 噛3, January 11, 2011. 90. Interview with former senior American military official 噛3, January 11, 2011. 91. Interview with former senior American military official 噛3, January 11, 2011. 92. U.S. Department of State, FY2008 International Affairs (Function 150) Congressional Budget Justification, February 16, 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007); Nerguizian, “U.S. Military Assistance to Lebanon,” 35. 93. U.S. Library of Congress, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, 2009, 3; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The President’s Foreign Affairs Budget Hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 13, 2008, 86. 94. Interview with former senior American military official 噛2, February 25, 2009; Interview with senior American military official 噛5, December 26, 2010. 95. Interview with senior American military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 96. Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 97. Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; “Lebanese Army Role for Hizbullah?” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, August 10, 2005. 98. Interview with senior American military official 噛3, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 99. Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010. 100. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese official 噛1, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 101. Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese official 噛1, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010. 102. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “USDP Eric Edelman Visits Lebanon,” press release, October 16, 2007, http://lebanon.usembassy.gov; Christopher J. Castelli,

250 Notes to Pages 179–183 “DoD to Equip Lebanon’s Special Forces with Small Arms, Vehicles,” Inside the Pentagon, April 10, 2008. 103. Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011. 104. Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010; U.S. Congress, The President’s Foreign Affairs Budget Hearing, 20. 105. Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese official 噛1, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 106. “Seven Killed in Beirut Violence,” BBC, January 27, 2008; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States Hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2008, 23. 107. U.S. Congress, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States Hearing, 23. 108. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Syria: Issues for the 112th Congress and Background on U.S. Sanctions, by Jeremy M. Sharp, 2011, 16. 109. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by Casey L. Addis, 2009, 10. 110. Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011. 111. Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, “Hezbollah Seizes Swath of Beirut From U.S.Backed Lebanon Government,” New York Times, May 10, 2008. 112. Ibid. 113. Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010; Alia Ibrahim, “Opposition Seizes Most of Beirut: Hezbollah Supporters Criticized in Lebanon for Armed Clashes,” Washington Post, May 10, 2008; Worth and Bakri, “Hezbollah Seizes Swath of Beirut.” 114. Thomas Erdbrink and Robin Wright, “In Lebanon, A Call for U.S. Action: Governing Politicians Decry Level of Response to Hezbollah,” Washington Post, May 13, 2008; Anthony Shadid and Alia Ibrahim, “Cabinet Backs Off in Scrap with Hezbollah: Shiite Group Sees Victory as Government Rescinds Moves That Sparked Violence,” Washington Post, May 15, 2008; Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010; Ibrahim, “Opposition Seizes Most of Beirut”; Worth and Bakri, “Hezbollah Seizes Swath of Beirut.” 115. Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 116. Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 117. Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 118. Erdbrink and Wright, “In Lebanon, A Call for U.S. Action”; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010; Interview with senior Lebanese official 噛1, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010.

Notes to Pages 183–187 251 119. Erdbrink and Wright, “In Lebanon, A Call for U.S. Action”; Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; Ibrahim, “Opposition Seizes Most of Beirut.” For more detail on the significance of Jumblatt’s role and the disproportionate influence played by the Druze community in Lebanon, see Mara E. Karlin, “The Druze Factor: Why Lebanon’s Stability Depends on This Small Community,” Foreign Affairs, February 16, 2011. 120. Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 121. “Israel-Syria Confirm Peace Talks,” BBC, May 21, 2008. 122. Sleiman’s ascendancy to the presidency marked the third time in Lebanese history in which the military’s leader took power; Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010. 123. Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 124. Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010. 125. Shadid and Ibrahim, “Cabinet Backs Off in Scrap with Hezbollah”; U.S. Embassy Beirut, “USDP Eric Edelman Visits Lebanon”; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “LTG Martin Dempsey, Acting Commander of U.S. Military CENTCOM Visits Lebanon,” press release, May 14, 2008; “Stronger Defense Ties with Lebanon Needed: DoD,” American Forces Press Service, June 1, 2008; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “GEN David H. Petraeus Commander of the MNF-I Visits Lebanon,” press release, August 6, 2008; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy for the U.S. CENTCOM Visit Lebanon,” press release, August 27, 2008; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “The United States Provides More Support to the LAF,” press release, May 30, 2008; U.S. Library of Congress, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, 3; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; U.S. Library of Congress, Security Assistance Reform, 32; Castelli, “DoD to Equip Lebanon’s Special Forces.” 126. Worth and Lipton, “U.S. Is Resupplying Lebanon’s Military.” 127. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “U.S. Embassy Announces Continued Training for the LAF,” press release, July 11, 2008; U.S. Library of Congress, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, 3; Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011. 128. Worth and Lipton, “U.S. Is Resupplying Lebanon’s Military”; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Letter from U.S. President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora,” press release, February 12, 2008; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “The United States Government Continues to Support the LAF,” press release, January 2, 2008; Castelli, “DoD to Equip Lebanon’s Special Forces.” 129. Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Gets Caught in Power Play as Russia Offers MiG-29s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 19, 2008; Many Lebanese military officials were dismayed because the military lacked the training, financing, and requirement for MiGs; the government later deferred the offer; Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010. 130. Worth and Lipton, “U.S. Is Resupplying Lebanon’s Military.”

252 Notes to Pages 187–190 131. Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “U.S. Military Provides Special Forces Training to the LAF,” press release, September 2, 2008; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “U.S. Military Provides Special Forces Training to the LAF,” press release, December 9, 2008; Interview with senior American military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 132. Worth and Lipton, “U.S. Is Resupplying Lebanon’s Military”; Interview with senior Lebanese military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛4, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Notably, the U.S. government transferred these tanks to the LAF despite Israel’s concerns they could be diverted to Hizballah; Yaakov Katz, “Jerusalem Worried the U.S. Will Sell Tanks to Lebanon,” Jerusalem Post, November 22, 2008; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛5, Lebanon, March 12, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010. 133. Interview with former senior American military official 噛4, Washington, DC, February 1, 2011; Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010. 134. “LAF Officers to Visit Pentagon for Talks on Aid,” Daily Star (Lebanon), October 9, 2008; Anna Fifield, “Hizbollah Accused of Attacking Helicopter,” Financial Times, August 29, 2008. 135. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Inaugural U.S.-Lebanon Joint Military Commission,” press release, October 6, 2008; “LAF officers to Visit Pentagon for Talks on Aid,” Daily Star; “Washington and Beirut Set Up Joint Military Panel,” Daily Star (Lebanon), October 7, 2008. 136. Interview with senior American political official, Washington, DC, January 19, 2011; Interview with senior American military official 噛6, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010; Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010; Interview with American political official 噛1, April 4, 2010. 137. Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 138. Interview with senior American military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 139. Interview with American political official 噛2, November 3, 2010; Interview with American military official, Lebanon, March 10, 2010; Interview with senior American military official 噛2, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 140. Robert F. Worth, “Lebanon Army Dismantles Eight Rockets Aimed at Israel,” New York Times, December 26, 2008. 141. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Middle East Peace Process: Progress and Prospects Hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 25, 2008, 32. 142. Interview with Lebanese security expert 噛1, Lebanon, March 10, 2010. 143. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “U.S. Government Provides Humvees to the LAF,” press release, January 13, 2009; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “United States Government Provides Tank Ammunition to the LAF,” press release, March 4, 2009; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “U.S. Government Provides Tactical Vehicles to the LAF,” press release, March 25, 2009; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Lebanese Armed Forces Pilots Receive U.S. Training on “Raven” Aircraft,” press release, April 14, 2009; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “U.S. Delivers the Caravan Combat Air Support Aircraft to the LAF,” press release, April 20, 2009; “U.S.

Notes to Pages 190–198 253 Approach to LAF Is Chaotic, Analysts Say,” Daily Star (Lebanon), October 21, 2008; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “GEN David H. Petraeus, Commander of U.S. Military Central Command Visits Lebanon,” press release, December 2, 2008; Interview with former senior American political official 噛2, Washington, DC, February 14, 2011; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “LAF Commander Visits the United States,” press release, February 27, 2009; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Beirut, “Lebanese MoD Sees Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, Special Envoy Mitchell,” press release, April 13, 2009. 144. Interview with former senior American political official 噛3, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011. 145. Interview with former senior Lebanese military official 噛7, November 3, 2010.

Chapter 6 1. As Reagan’s special Middle East envoy, Donald Rumsfeld often said it was harder for the United States to make policy decisions on small countries than on peer competitors; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛2, Lebanon, March 11, 2010; Interview with former senior Lebanese political official 噛3, Lebanon, March 15, 2010. 2. These elements are highlighted by Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers (London: War Office, 1906), 71–83, 115–24, 150, 392, 492, 496; David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 82–83; Byman, “Friends Like These,” 91; Kilcullen, “Three Pillars”; Sepp, “Best Practices”; Amos and Petraeus, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Handbook; Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes.” Connable’s metric selection discussion helped bring these elements together: Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), chap. 5. Some relevant characteristics, such as healthy recruits, are excluded from the construct for parsimony. 3. William Roseneau and Austin Long, The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 10–12; Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 169–70. 4. David S. Cloud, “U.S. Weighs Plan to Send Military Aircraft to Aid Yemen,” Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2012. 5. Loveday Morris and Missy Ryan, “After More Than $1.6 Billion in U.S. Aid, Iraq’s Army Still Struggles,” Washington Post, June 10, 2016. 6. Rosen, Winning the Next War, 2, 21, 25–26, 252–53, 261.

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Index

Acheson, Dean, 24, 26–27, 37, 60–61 Afghanistan, 1, 3, 6, 17, 177, 187 Albania, 22–23, 31, 34, 49–50, 56, 58–60, 64 Allied forces, 21–22, 44, 53 American Friends of Vietnam lobby, 87, 94 American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), 33, 35, 38, 47 Aoun, Michel, 136 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 116, 121, 128, 135, 143, 152, 158, 172 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 81. See also South Vietnamese military Assad, Bashar al-, 160, 198 assassinations, 55, 96, 101–2, 113, 116, 152–53, 156–57, 166–67, 176, 196 Baker, Al, 124, 143 Bao Dai, 66 Bartholomew, Reginald, 137 Bartlett, Gerald, 116–18, 121, 144 Binh Xuyen, 67, 77 Birds of Prey program, 196 Black September, 109 Bradley, Omar, 34, 50 Brink, Francis G., 68 Britain, 6, 21–25, 31, 33–34, 36, 40, 44, 57–58 Bulgaria, 22–23, 31, 34, 49–50, 56, 58–59, 64 Bush, George, 153, 157, 161, 173, 183, 186, 190 Byrnes, James, 24 Cairo Agreement, 171 Cambodia, 65, 68, 106 Cao Dai, 67, 77 Casey, William, 135 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 25, 37, 41, 43, 50, 57, 59, 85, 135, 137, 140, 196

Chamberlin, S. J., 34–35, 37 China, 3, 65, 67, 69, 79, 93, 97, 106, 197 Chouf Mountains, 133–36, 139, 181 Churchill, Winston, 21, 203 Clayton, William, 27 Cold War, 7, 11, 20, 24, 26, 41, 62 Collins, James Lawton, 73–74, 78 Colombia, 18 COMINFORM, 49, 59 Defense Department (U.S.), 1, 3, 11, 40, 68, 72, 117, 123–24, 135, 139, 144, 151–52, 161, 186–87 Diem, Ngo Dinh: assessment reports, 94–96; coup threats, 74, 79; Dwight Eisenhower support, 72, 95; Elbridge Durbrow observations, 91; external defense strategies, 86; force requirements, 71, 98–100; James Lawton Collins, relations with, 73–74, 78; John Foster Dulles meeting, 77, 86; loyalty obsession, 73–74, 78–79; military appointments, 73–74, 79, 90, 94, 100, 104; repressive domestic policies, 94, 97, 102; Republic of Vietnam establishment, 81; ruling challenges, 66, 77–79; Samuel T. “Hanging Sam” Williams, relations with, 82–83, 89–92, 95–96, 100, 104; troop involvement, 78, 80, 89–90, 94, 98–100, 104; U.S. visit, 95. See also South Vietnam Dien Bien Phu, 69 Dillon, Robert, 111, 124, 137 Doha Agreement, 184 Druze, 111, 133–34, 136, 139, 150, 158, 181–83 Dulles, John Foster, 71, 77, 86 Durbrow, Elbridge, 91–92, 94, 101, 103

274 Index Eckert, George L., 45 Edelman, Eric, 179 Eisenhower, Dwight: James Lawton Collins appointment, 73; James Van Fleet support, 42; military leadership, 34, 42; Ngo Dinh Diem support, 72, 95; Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) expansion, 87; South Vietnam support, 69, 71–73, 76–77, 86–87, 103; Soviet Union concerns, 24 El Salvador, 6, 18 Fatah al-Islam, 170–73 Feltman, Jeff, 168, 176 Fintel, Arthur “Tom,” 117–18, 122, 124, 127, 141, 143 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, 116–17, 120 Forrestal, James, 36, 40–41, 51 Fort Benning, 121 France, 6, 10, 15, 65–70, 73–76, 83–86, 109, 111, 197 Frederika (queen of Greece), 42, 51–52, 63 Fuller, Les, 175–76 Gast, Philip, 132 Gates, Robert, 3, 151, 171 Gemayel, Amin, 113, 117–20, 128, 133–34, 137–39, 141–43, 145–46 Gemayel, Bashir, 112–13, 116 Geneva Accords, 66–67, 69–70, 72, 81, 83, 85, 96 Geraghty, Tim, 127, 136 Germany, 20–22, 49 Giap, Vo Nguyen, 66–67 Grady, Henry, 46–48, 50–51, 53–55, 57, 61–62 Grammos mountains, 47, 50, 58 Greece: economic environment, 20; George Marshall visit, 33, 50–51; German occupation, 20–22; Grammos mountains, 47, 50, 58; Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 7; Harry Truman support, 24, 26–28, 36, 50; King Paul role, 42–43, 55, 63; National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), 22; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, 63; political environment, 21, 31, 33, 36, 42–43, 51–53, 55, 63; Queen Frederika role, 42, 51–52, 63; strategic location, 23–24, 26; Supreme National

Defense Council, 33, 43, 53; unification background, 20–21; Varkiza Agreement, 21 Greek military: Alexander Papagos role, 27, 52–57, 60, 63–64; American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) involvement, 33, 35, 38, 47; British support, 21–25, 29, 31, 33–34, 36, 40, 44, 57–58; co-combatant, 20, 39–41, 56, 63; equipment needs, 26–28, 31–32, 35, 44–48, 56, 59–63; external actors, antagonism, 15, 19–20, 22–23, 25, 31, 34, 49–51, 56, 58–61, 63–64, 200; Greek government meddling, 40, 52–53; Home Guard, 35, 51; internal defense mission, 21, 27–29, 32, 38, 40, 49–53, 57, 59; James Van Fleet role, 39, 41–49, 53–60, 62–63; Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) involvement, 38–47, 51, 53, 55–58, 60, 62; Korean conflict assistance, 62–63; leadership challenges, 21, 30, 34, 40–45, 47–48, 50–53, 57–58; mobility requirements, 31–32, 56, 61–62; morale levels, 21, 34, 50–51, 58; offensive posture, 30, 32, 34, 39, 41, 45, 47, 51, 57–60, 63–64; Operation CROWN, 47; Operation DAWN, 45; Operation PIGEON, 58; Operation ROCKET, 58; Operation TORCH, 58, 60; organizational structure, 28–30, 41, 45, 47, 50–51, 56–58, 63; Peloponnesus focus, 46, 57–58; size, 21, 23, 28–29, 32–33, 39, 51, 53–54, 57, 62; training, 26–29, 31, 33–35, 39, 44–47, 51, 56–58, 61–63; U.S. Army Group–Greece (USAGG) involvement, 29, 31, 35, 38–39; William Livesay role, 29–34, 36, 39, 42, 48; World War II efforts, 21. See also guerrilla movements (Greece) Greek-Turkish Aid Act, 7 Grigolopoulos, Major General, 43 Griswold, Dwight, 33, 35–39, 42, 46 guerrilla movements (Greece): Albania, role of, 22–23, 31, 34, 49–50, 56, 58–60, 64; Alexander Papagos efforts, 55–56; assassination attempts, 55; Bulgaria, role of, 22–23, 31, 34, 49–50, 56, 58–59, 64; casualty rates, 47, 57, 60; communist ideology, 16–17, 20–21, 23, 27, 49, 56, 64; external actors support, 19–20, 22–23, 25, 31, 34, 49–51, 56, 58–61, 63–64;

Index 275 Grammos mountains fighting, 47, 50, 58; internal conflicts, 56; Konitsa stronghold, 39; military capability, 22–23, 25–26, 37, 40, 50–51, 56, 59, 64; mountainous terrain impact, 22, 56, 58; organizational structure, 23, 37, 49–50, 56; size, 23, 37, 40, 56, 60, 62; Soviet Union, role of, 23, 49, 58–59; Varkiza Agreement, 21; Yugoslavia, role of, 22–23, 31, 34, 49–50, 56, 59, 63–64 guerrilla movements (South Vietnam), 17, 76, 82–83, 99, 102–3, 106 Habib, Philip, 110, 119, 123–24, 126 Haig, Al, 112 Hakim, Nadim, 134 Hamas, 198 Hariri, Rafiq, 152–53, 156–57, 166–67 Heath, Donald, 71–72, 74 Higher Military Council (Greece), 30 Hizballah, 109, 126, 137, 146, 148, 150–61, 163–67, 179–84, 188–91, 198 Hoa Hao, 67, 77 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 102 Home Guard (Greece), 35, 51 Indochina, 68–69 INS Hanit, 158 insurgents (South Vietnam): assassination attempts, 96, 101–2; Binh Xuyen, 67, 77; Cambodia, role of, 65, 68, 106; Cao Dai, 67, 77; China, role of, 65, 67, 69, 97, 106; external actors, support, 65–67, 69, 72, 96, 102; France, role of, 67; guerrilla movements, 76, 82–83, 99, 102–3, 106; Hoa Hao, 67, 77; Japan, role of, 67; Laos, role of, 65, 68, 102, 106; military capability, 67, 106; National Liberation Front, 106; North Vietnamese threat, 65–67, 70, 73, 79, 82, 86–88, 93, 96–98, 101–2, 104–6; organizational structure, 67; Soviet Union, role of, 65, 67, 97; stay-behinds, 67, 96–97, 101–2, 106; Viet Minh, 66–67, 69, 72; weapons captures, 102. See also South Vietnamese military Iran, 16–17, 108–9, 125–26, 132, 137, 139–40, 145–46, 148, 150–51, 158, 160, 164, 171, 183–84, 190–91, 196–98 Iraq, 1, 3, 6, 17, 110, 152, 173, 177, 181, 187, 196–97

Islamic State, 1, 3 Israel, 11, 108–15, 123, 125–28, 131–35, 137, 145–46, 150, 156, 158–59, 163, 168–69, 181, 184, 189 Italy, 22 Jaber, Lufti, 141 Japan, 66–67 Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.), 34–35, 38, 40, 72, 81, 83, 85–88, 90, 93, 103, 123 Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG), 38–47, 51, 53, 55–58, 60, 62 Jordan, 1, 109, 187 Jumblatt, Walid, 134, 181–83 Kahwagi, Jean, 188, 191 Kalogeropoulos, Panos, 43, 48 Kassis, Simon, 120, 134 Kennedy, John F., 105 Khoury, Issam, 110 Khoury, Victor, 110 Kitrilakis, Major General, 43 Konitsa, 39 Korea, 62–63, 68, 81 Krusia, 47 Lahoud, Emile, 153 Laos, 65, 68, 102, 106 Lawrence, T. E., 8 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) (1980s): Chouf Mountains engagements, 133–36, 139; co-combatant, 19, 108, 132–39, 142–47; confessional groups, integration, 111, 119, 130, 137–39, 141–42, 146–47; desertions, 110–11, 134, 136, 139, 141–42, 147; Druze militants, conflict with, 111, 133–34, 136, 139; equipment needs, 110, 116–18, 120–22, 124, 127–28, 130–32, 135, 138–39, 143–45, 202; external actors, antagonism, 15, 108–10, 112–15, 123, 125–28, 130–43, 145–47; Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, 116–17, 120; French support, 109, 111; Hizballah, conflict with, 109, 126, 137, 146; Ibrahim Tannous role, 119–20, 122, 124, 130–31, 133–34, 136, 139–42, 146–47; internal defense mission, 108–12, 114–16, 123, 126, 129–32, 137, 146–47; Iran, conflict with, 108–9, 125–26, 132, 137, 139–40, 145–46; Israel,

276 Index Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) (1980s) (continued ) conflict with, 108–10, 112–15, 123, 125–27, 131–35, 137, 145–46; Joint Task Force Lebanon involvement, 144; leadership challenges, 110–11, 119–20, 131, 139, 141, 146; Lebanese Army Modernization Program (LAMP), 115–22, 124, 127, 143–44; Marines (U.S.), role of, 108, 114–15, 118, 121–22, 135, 137, 139, 142–47; militia groups, conflict with, 109–10, 114–15, 128, 130–31, 133–34, 136, 139–42, 146; morale levels, 118–19, 135; Multi-National Forces (MNF) involvement, 112–14, 121, 123, 125, 127, 135, 137; National Security Planning Group (NSPG) involvement, 125; Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) involvement, 117–18, 122, 124, 127; organizational structure, 116–17, 119, 122, 129–31; origins, 109; Palestinian militants, conflict with, 112, 133, 139, 141; Shuweifat engagements, 139–41; size, 109–10, 112, 116, 129–30, 138, 141, 147; Suq al Gharb engagements, 133–34, 136, 139; Syria, conflict with, 108–10, 113–15, 123, 125–27, 132–34, 136–37, 139, 141, 143, 145–46; training, 110, 116–18, 120–22, 127–28, 131–33, 135, 138–39, 143–45, 202 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) (2000s): Al Qaeda, conflict with, 148, 150, 154, 167, 170–71, 185, 189, 191; co-combatant, 148, 180–84, 191; confessional groups integration, 150, 158, 178; equipment needs, 148–49, 152–53, 156–58, 161–65, 168–70, 172–74, 176–78, 185–91, 202; external actors, antagonism, 15, 148–53, 158–61, 170–75, 179–85, 189–92; Fatah al-Islam, conflict with, 170–73; Hizballah, conflict with, 148, 150–55, 157–61, 163–67, 179–84, 188–91; internal defense mission, 148, 153–57, 162–63, 176–80, 185, 189–91; Iran, conflict with, 16, 148, 150–51, 158, 160, 164, 171, 183–84, 190–91; Israel, conflict with, 158–59, 163, 168–69; leadership challenges, 149–50, 162, 172, 176–78, 182, 185, 187–91; mobility requirements, 149, 157, 162, 165, 170, 186–87; morale levels, 166, 176; Nahr al-Bared engagements, 170–75, 177, 179;

organizational structure, 149, 161, 176, 178, 191; Palestinian militants, conflict with, 151, 159, 167, 170–72, 179, 185, 189–91; Section 1206, impact of, 157–58, 164, 169, 186; size, 148–49; Special Forces regiments, 150, 163, 165, 173, 178, 186–87; Syria, conflict with, 16, 148–53, 158–60, 179, 181, 183–84, 189–91; training, 148–49, 152–53, 156, 161–65, 168, 172–77, 185–89, 191, 202 Lebanon: Bekaa Valley, 126, 134; Chouf Mountains, 133–36, 139, 181; civil war origins, 109–10; Condoleezza Rice support, 153, 157, 160, 163–64, 171, 177, 179; coup threats, 109, 142, 199; George Bush support, 153, 157, 161, 173, 183, 186, 190; George Shultz support, 112, 122–24, 135, 142, 145; Ministry of Defense, 118–19, 133, 175; Multi-National Forces (MNF) suicide bombing, 137, 140; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), impact of, 109–10, 112–14; political environment, 109–13, 117–20, 123, 133–34, 142–44, 147, 156, 163, 166, 178, 185; Ronald Reagan support, 112–13, 122–23, 125, 128, 133, 136, 139, 142–43; Shi’a, 110, 126, 134, 139, 141, 150–51, 158–59, 166, 180; Sunni, 111, 142, 150, 158, 166, 171, 173, 183, 189; U.S. Embassy bombing, 126–27 Lehner, Charles, 29 Libya, 197 Livesay, William, 29–34, 36, 39, 42, 48 MacVeagh, Lincoln, 25, 28, 33–34, 37–38 Makkarum, General, 134 Marines (U.S.), 6, 108, 114–15, 118, 121–22, 133, 135, 137, 139, 142–47 Marshall, George, 33, 38, 41–42, 50–54 Martz, Joseph, 162–63 McFarlane, Robert “Bud,” 123–24, 126, 132, 135–36 McGarr, Lionel, 105 Mexico, 3, 18 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)–Indochina, 68–73, 76–81 Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) –Vietnam, 81–92, 94–97, 99–103, 105 Miner, Russell, 101

Index 277 monopoly on violence, 2, 11–12, 14, 16–19, 56, 63–64, 105–7, 147, 189–91, 193 Montevideo Convention, 5 Multi-National Forces (MNF), 112–14, 121, 123, 125, 127, 135, 137 Murabitun, 110 Murr, Elias, 167, 169–70, 172, 174, 179, 187 Muslims, 111, 119, 123, 130, 134, 138, 141–42, 150 Mutual Security Act, 7 Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, 170–75, 177, 179 Naousa, 46 Nasrallah, Hassan, 158–59, 166, 171, 181–82 National Defense Authorization Act, 157. See also Section 1206 National Liberation Front, 106 National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), 22 National Security Council, 35, 40–41, 72, 77, 87, 92, 103 National Security Decision Directive 64 (NSDD-64), 114, 135, 147 National Security Decision Directive 92 (NSDD-92), 125 National Security Decision Directive 103 (NSDD-103), 136 National Security Decision Directive 123 (NSDD-123), 139 National Security Decision Directive 128 (NSDD-128), 143 National Security Planning Group (NSPG), 125 Nepal, 1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 63, 68 North Vietnam, 65–67, 70, 73, 79, 82, 86–88, 93, 96–98, 101–2, 104–6 NSC 5, 40 NSC 5429/2, 72 nuclear weapons, 87, 181 Obama, Barack, 4, 190 O’Daniel, John Wilson “Iron Mike,” 70–72, 74–75, 77–81, 83, 87, 94 Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), 177 Office of Military Cooperation (OMC), 117–18, 122, 124, 127 Operation CROWN, 47

Operation DAWN, 45 Operation PIGEON, 58 Operation ROCKET, 58 Operations Coordinating Board, 103 Operation TORCH, 58, 60 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 5 Pakistan, 1, 18, 193, 197 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 109–10, 112–14, 171 Palestinian Authority, 1, 17 Papageorgious, General, 30 Papagos, Alexander, 23, 52–57, 60, 63–64 Patterson, Robert, 28 Paul (king of Greece), 42–43, 55, 63 Peloponnesus, 46, 57 Philippidis, General, 30 Philippines, 17 policymaking framework, 198–201 Public Law 793, 46 Qaeda, al, 148, 150, 154, 167, 170–71, 185, 189, 191, 196 Qatar, 184 Radford, Arthur, 90 Reagan, Ronald: Al Haig removal, 112; Amin Gemayel visit, 113, 128, 133, 138–39; consensus requirements, 123; envoy appointments, 124; George Schultz advice, 112; Israel, relations with, 125, 133; Lebanon support, 112–13, 122–23, 125, 128, 133, 136, 139, 142–43; NSDD-92 signing, 125; NSDD-103 signing, 136; NSDD-123 signing, 139 Reinhardt, Frederick, 81, 90 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), 81, 83–91, 93–94, 98–100. See also South Vietnamese military Rice, Condoleezza, 153, 157, 160, 163–64, 171, 177, 179 Robertson, Reuben, 86 Rodman, Peter, 164 Roumeli, 47 Royall, Kenneth Claiborne, 36 Rumsfeld, Donald, 137 Russia, 3, 174, 187, 197 Sabra, 113 Sadr, Imam Musa, 126

278 Index Saudi Arabia, 116 Section 1206 (National Defense Authorization Act), 157–58, 164, 186 September 11 terrorist attacks, 6–7, 154 Shah of Iran, 17 Shatila, 113 Shi’a, 110, 126, 134, 139, 141, 150–51, 158–59, 166, 180 Shultz, George, 112, 122–24, 135, 142, 145 Shuweifat, 139–41 Siniora, Fouad, 160 Sleiman, Michel, 149, 166, 172, 174, 176, 178, 185, 188, 191 Sophoulis, Themistoklis, 30 South Vietnam: Dwight Eisenhower support, 69, 71–73, 76–77, 86–87, 103; France, relations with, 65–70, 73–76, 83–86; Geneva Accords impact, 66–67, 69–70, 72, 81, 83, 85, 96; geographical challenges, 66, 68; Harry Truman support, 68; institutional weaknesses, 65–66, 71; Japanese occupation, 66; John F. Kennedy support, 105; Ministry of Defense, 73, 76, 78, 102; North Vietnam separation, 65–66; political environment, 65, 69, 73–75, 81, 106; refugees, 67. See also Diem, Ngo Dinh South Vietnamese military: Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 81; Birds of Prey program involvement, 196; cocombatant, 19, 104–6, 194; communism opposition, 65, 76, 82, 86–87; desertions, 67, 102; Dien Bien Phu battle, 69; equipment needs, 66, 68–69, 77, 84–85, 88, 95, 99, 102, 105–6, 202; external actors antagonism, 15, 65–67, 69, 72, 82–84, 86, 96–97, 101–6, 200; external defense mission, 69, 74–76, 79–84, 86–88, 91–93, 97–99, 101–2, 105–6; French support, 15, 65–70, 73–76, 83–86; internal defense mission, 65, 69, 71–74, 76–79, 82–83, 86–87, 94, 96–103; John Wilson “Iron Mike” O’Daniel role, 70–72, 74–75, 77–81, 83, 87; leadership challenges, 66–67, 73, 76, 78–79, 83, 89–90, 93, 100, 104; Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) involvement, 68–73, 76–92, 94–97, 99–103, 105; morale levels, 66, 78, 88; organizational structure, 67, 71, 73, 78–81, 97–98, 104; origins, 66; politicized environment, 78–79; Republic of Vietnam

Armed Forces (RVNAF), 81, 83–91, 93–94, 98–100; Samuel T. “Hanging Sam” Williams role, 81–82; size, 72–73, 77, 79–80; Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) involvement, 85–86, 88, 95, 100; training, 66, 68, 71, 73, 75–78, 84–86, 88, 92–94, 99–100, 104, 106; Training Relations and Instructions Mission (TRIM) involvement, 75–76, 79, 86, 100. See also insurgents (South Vietnam) Soviet Union, 21, 23–24, 26, 35, 41, 49, 58–59, 63, 65, 67, 79, 81, 97 Sri Lanka, 1 State Department (U.S.), 25–28, 32, 37, 41–42, 49, 62, 71–72, 74, 82, 85, 161 stay-behinds, 67, 96–97, 101–2, 106. See also insurgents (South Vietnam) Stefanopoulos, Coordination Minister, 52 Stiner, Carl, 124 Sunni, 111, 142, 150, 158, 166, 171, 173, 183, 189 Supreme National Defense Council, 33, 43, 53 Suq al Gharb, 133–34, 136, 139 Syria, 3, 16, 108–10, 112–15, 123, 125–27, 132–34, 136–37, 139, 141, 143, 145–46, 148–53, 157–60, 174, 179, 181, 183–84, 189–91, 198 Tannous, Ibrahim, 119–20, 122, 124, 130–31, 133–34, 136, 139–42, 146–47 Taylor, Maxwell, 81, 88–89, 93 Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), 85–86, 88, 95, 100 Tilly, Charles, 5 Tito, Josip Broz, 59 Training Relations and Instructions Mission (TRIM), 75–76, 79, 86, 100 Treaty of Westphalia, 5 Truman, Harry: Dwight Griswold appointment, 33; Greece support, 24, 26–28, 36, 40–41, 50; Henry Grady friendship, 46–47; James Van Fleet support, 42, 59–60; Lincoln MacVeagh removal, 38; Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) establishment, 68; NSC 5 approval, 40; South Vietnam support, 68; Soviet Union, relations with, 26; speech to Congress, 27

Index 279 Tsakalotos, Thrasyboulos, 43 Tsaldaris, Constantine, 24, 28, 33, 52 Tsigounis, Major General, 43 Tunisia, 197 Turkey, 17, 27, 184 United Nations: Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, 31; Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 114, 160–61, 178, 180, 190; Security Council Resolution 1559, 152; Security Council Resolution 1701, 160, 179–80; Special Committee on the Balkans, 49–50, 59 U.S. Army Group–Greece (USAGG), 29, 31, 35, 38–39 U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration, 55 USS New Jersey, 136, 139 USS Tattnall, 139 Van Fleet, James: Alexander Papagos support, 53–55, 63; assassination attempts, 55; battle predictions, 46, 49, 58; British military relations, 44; external actors concerns, 49–50, 62; George Marshall recommendations, 42, 51; Greek military, impact on, 39, 41–49, 53–60, 62–63; Harry Truman support, 42, 59–60; Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) leadership, 39–42, 44, 56; leadership style, 39–42, 52, 63, 199; offensive strategies, 45–47, 58, 62; personnel changes, 43–45, 47–48, 58, 63; Second United States Army command, 62; training priorities, 45–46; troop visits,

42–43, 47–48, 60; World War II experience, 42 Varkiza Agreement, 21 Veliotes, Nicholas, 132 Vessey, John, Jr., 123–24, 128, 135, 137 Viet Minh, 66–67, 69, 72 Vietnam War, 6, 107 Vimblis, Major General, 43 Vitsi mountains, 58 War Department (U.S.), 24, 26, 28–29, 32, 34–35, 71 Wazzan, Shafiq al-, 142 Weber, Max, 2, 5 Weinberger, Casper, 112, 122–23, 131–32, 145 Williams, Samuel T. “Hanging Sam”: assessment reports, 94–96, 100–104; Elbridge Durbrow, relations with, 91–92, 103; equipment focus, 84–85, 99, 104; external defense strategies, 82–84, 86, 91–93, 97–99, 103–4; France, relations with, 83–85; leadership style, 82–84, 89, 101, 106, 199; Maxwell Taylor recommendation, 81; Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) leadership, 82–84, 88–89, 98; military experience, 81–82; mission preparation, 82; Ngo Dinh Diem, relations with, 82–83, 89–92, 95–96, 100, 104; personnel involvement, 89–90, 98–99, 102, 104; training priorities, 92–93, 99–100, 104 Wilson, Charles Erwin, 84 Yemen, 18, 196 Yiatzis, Dimitris, 43–44, 52 Yugoslavia, 22–23, 31, 34, 49–50, 56, 59, 63–64

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Acknowledgments

Perplexity is the beginning of knowledge. —Khalil Gibran, 1950

I had spent a number of years as a Pentagon policymaker building partner militaries in fragile states, watching colleagues struggle to do the same, and I couldn’t understand the gap between what we were trying to achieve and the results we were having. This book began with that perplexity, although it was completed only due to the constant support of many, many people. A tremendous number of scholars helped as I wrestled with the tome. I am grateful to Eliot Cohen for his sharp insights, quick wit, and deft ability to wield a red pen; Dan Byman for his consistent and useful suggestions regarding literature, methodology, and contemporary security affairs; Tom Keaney for his thoughtful, practical perspective; and Eric Edelman for his unparalleled grasp of diplomacy and for sharing my Levantine fascination. Paula Thornhill has been an exceptional mentor, helped broaden my analysis of U.S. foreign policy, and her willingness to always put the most uncomfortable issues on the table makes her presence in Washington unique—and crucial. All of these individuals have been generous with their time, their knowledge, and their support. I offer them my deepest gratitude. Many librarians, archivists, and researchers helped me locate relevant reference material. The Johns Hopkins University–SAIS Library staff, particularly Linda Carlson and Kate Picard, never flinched when I sent them esoteric inquiries. I am also grateful to Randy Sowell from the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Valoise Armstrong from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Jeffrey Kozak from the George C. Marshall Research Library, Stephen Bye from the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Kelly D. Barton from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Carol

282 Acknowledgments

Leadenham from the Hoover Institution Archives, Martin Gedra and other staff at National Archives II, Matthew Hancox from Archives Unbound, and Photini Tomai-Constantopoulou, Director of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives. I must also highlight my appreciation of Thayer McKell for her constant and enthusiastic encouragement and assistance. I interviewed dozens of people in Lebanon and in Washington, DC for the two Lebanon case studies. Although they are unnamed, given the sensitivity of the topics we discussed, each and every discussion was worthwhile. While I was living in Jerusalem at the start of the new millennium, a professor suggested I start learning about the Levant to help me untangle the complexity of the Middle East, the region my father fled decades ago. And sixteen years later, I haven’t stopped. The devoted and talented people serving in the U.S. Defense Department during my various tours there (2004–2016) have taught me more than they can imagine. In particular, Todd Harvey, a thoughtful and incisive policymaker, generously made this work better. I am also grateful to Dan Kliman and Dan Folliard for their insights. Mike Horowitz, the everpractical scholar, infused this work with rigor. A number of scholars, including Ron Spector, Steve Biddle, Andrew Wiest, Edward Miller, Steve Randolph, Tom Ricks, Tom McNaugher, and the professors and participants at the 2011 Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research (SICAR) and the 2011 Basin Harbor Teachers’ Workshop were generous with their time and advice. I must also express my thanks to Andy Hoehn for his constant support. I am grateful to a number of entities for funding my research, including the Johns Hopkins University–SAIS, the SAIS Strategic Studies Department, the Smith Richardson Foundation, William and Marie-Daniele Zartman, and the International Studies Association. The talented team at the University of Pennsylvania Press has been the best partners an author could have. Many thanks to Peter Agree, in particular, for his consistent efforts to refine this book and make it as cogent and compelling as possible. I am grateful to have learned from him. The book has also benefited from Erica Ginsburg’s superb feedback. Many friends have helped me throughout this process by reading portions of my work, helping me think through sticky issues, or simply keeping me motivated: thanks to Chris Clary, Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Frances Z. Brown, Caitlin Talmadge, Malka Older, Amal Mudallali, Ashley Buckholtz,

Acknowledgments 283

Julia Doan, Deborah and Ethan Saxon, Carol Soble, Kelly Magsamen, Ali Brennan, Julia Zuckerman, and Nora Rigby for their unflagging support. My parents, Charlene and Hooshang Karlin (the real Dr. Karlin), gave me endless encouragement and unflagging support as I wrestled with this book. My siblings, Tami and Raymond Rokni, David Karlin, and Jen Karlin; my nephews, Arya and Alex Rokni; my in-laws, Bonnie and Jack Jacobson; and my beautiful children, Daniel Amir and Emma Yasmine, were supportive and helped me keep perspective. And I am especially thankful to my oldest sister, Tami, whose consistent support, brilliance, and enthusiasm infuse everything I attempt, and my adored, extraordinary husband, Reuben Solomon Jacobson, without whom none of this would have ever been possible.