Building Downtown Los Angeles: The Politics of Race and Place in Urban America 9781503632530

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BUILDING DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES

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BUILDING DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES The Politics of Race and Place in Urban America Leland T. Saito

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California ©2022 by Leland T. Saito. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Map 5.1 Saito, Leland, and Jonathan Truong. “The L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement: Evaluating the Agreement Results and Shifting Political Power in the City.” Urban Affairs Review 51, no. 2 (2015): 263–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1078087414527064. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Saito, Leland T., 1955- author. Title: Building downtown Los Angeles : the politics of race and place in urban America / Leland T. Saito. Description: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021051934 | ISBN 9781503632394 (cloth) | ISBN 9781503632523 (paperback) | ISBN 9781503632530 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: City planning—California—Los Angeles. | Urban renewal—California—Los Angeles. | Gentrification—California— Los Angeles. | Minorities—California—Los Angeles. | Central business districts—California—Los Angeles. | Los Angeles (Calif.)— Race relations. Classification: LCC HT168.L6 S257 2022 | DDC 307.1/2160979494—dc23/eng/20211022 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021051934 Cover design: Brad Norr Design Cover photo: iStock

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction: Racial-Spatial Formation

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The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

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Staples Center and L.A. Live: 1990s–2010s

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Growth Interests and the Growth-with-Equity Coalition: 1990s

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Negotiating the L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement: 1990s–2000s

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Evaluating the L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement: 2000s

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The NFL Stadium Proposal and Neighborhood Change: 1990–2015

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Conclusion: Implications for Social Justice

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References

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Index

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Acknowledgments

The idea for this book emerged in 2001 when I picked up the Los Angeles Times and read about the L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement, a key part of this project. The roots of this book, however, began much earlier because so many people have contributed to my thinking on this project through their research and/or our conversations. I deeply regret not including some of the key people who have helped me, but this project has spanned two decades and some of the names escape me. The analysis that frames this book began during my time as a graduate student at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), researching Monterey Park with my adviser, John Horton, and student research team José Calderon, Mary Pardo, and Yen Fen Tseng. Others at UCLA who helped me with my dissertation include David Lopez, Don Nakanishi, and Paul Ong. Leaving UCLA, I was fortunate to join the Ethnic Studies Department and Urban Studies Program at UC San Diego and worked with Charles Briggs, Steve Erie, Yen Espiritu, Ross Frank, Ramon Gutierrez, George Lipsitz, Lisa Lowe, and Cecil Lytle. At the University of Southern California (USC), my education continued with Nina Eliasoph, Jeffer Giang, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Elaine Bell Kaplan, Dorinne Kondo, Josh Kun, Paul Lichterman, Viet Nguyen, Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Mike Messner, Natalia Molina, Ann Owens, Rhacel Parrenas, Manuel Pastor, Laura Pulido, John Rowe, George Sanchez, Nayan Shah, Jody Agius Vallejo, and Janelle Wong. I worked with so many wonderful graduate students, including our reading group on race with

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Jennifer Candipan, Robert Chlala, Alfredo Huante, Hyeyoung Kwon, May Lin, Belinda Lum, Ho’esta Mo’e’hahne, and Lizette Solarzano. Our incredible office and academic staff have created a great environment and include Sonia Rodriguez Flores, Melissa Hernandez, Kitty Lai, Stachelle Overland, Jujuana Preston, and Amber Thomas. I was fortunate to work with many undergraduate and graduate students who provided valuable ideas and data including Efrain Escobedo, Lona Lee, Jennifer Muldar, Ryan Steers, Jonathan Truong, Daniel Wu, and Karen Yonemoto. For talking to me about New York City, I appreciate the help of John Mollenkopf, Norman Oder, and Laura WolfPowers. At conferences, I have benefited from interactions with so many people, including Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Angie Chung, Michael Jones-Correa, Joe Feagin, Jan Lin, John Logan, Michael Omi, Howard Winant, and Linda Trinh Vo. Although so many people provided important contributions to my analysis, I would like to emphasize the work of Alfredo Huante, George Lipsitz, and Manuel Pastor. Members of community organizations and corporations that I followed and questioned during fieldwork showed real patience and cooperation. These include Joe Donlin, Gilda Haas, Sandra McNeill, Lizette Hernandez Moore, Martha Saucedo, Cynthia Strathmann, and Ted Tanner. Los Angeles city staff provided invaluable assistance with gathering material, especially Kevin Keller and Esther Morris. I appreciate funding from the Haynes Foundation, USC Equity Research Institute, and USC Lusk Center for Real Estate. At Stanford University Press, I am so thankful for Marcela Maxfield, who guided this project through the publication process, and Sunna Juhn, who handled so many critical tasks. My family has provided the constant and loving support that has made my work possible. My parents, George and Clara Saito. Sonia Ruan, my spouse, and her mother Eliacer and son Alexei. My sister Nadine Tateoka and her extended family, Paul, Joseph, Elise, Benjamin, Alison, Parker, Charlie, Lyla, Anthony, Oliver, Niko, Gianna, and Alexa. My sister Wendy Saito and Albert and Sofie. Sonia and I talk about this as “our” book because the work is felt in both our lives and gets done because of Sonia’s many contributions.

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roadway, a major street in downtown Los Angeles’s historic commercial and business district, had a vibrant and active street life in the 1970s and 1980s because of its popularity among Latin American immigrants. Surprisingly, Broadway at that time had retail sales per square foot equaling those of the world-renowned site of luxury shopping and tourism, Rodeo Drive, located across town to the west in Beverly Hills (Turpin 1986a). Matching the vision of urban planners, a majority of the Broadway shoppers arrived by public transportation, with 67 percent using the bus, in contrast to shoppers on Rodeo Drive who primarily used their own cars or “limousines provided by the stores” (Turpin 1986a:VII–1). In discussions on how to “revitalize” downtown Los Angeles, however, why did city officials and downtown boosters, rather than celebrating Broadway, lump it into characterizations of downtown as the “hole in the doughnut” (Khouri 2015:C4), an empty place after workers in the skyscrapers abandoned the area and fled to their suburban homes? I suggest that it is because the Broadway shoppers were primarily low-income and working-class Latin American immigrants, rather than the explicitly favored affluent consumers and residents that filled the visions and imaginations of downtown boosters when they pictured their “ideal” downtown. While it is not always clear if contemporary urban planners implicitly or explicitly favor Whites, these visions and strategies that favored affluent Whites over lower income racial minorities, I contend, are rooted in the history of racially exclusionary policies and images embedded in US society of “ideal” residents as affluent Whites, 1

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in contrast to the negative images of lower-income racial minorities (Lipsitz 2011; Rothstein 2017). The public discussion and city policies around Broadway reveal the complexity of race and public policies connected to place in urban America. Shoppers packed the sidewalks of Broadway, and while their individual purchases were smaller than those in Beverly Hills, more shoppers making more purchases contributed to the high sales totals per square foot on Broadway (Turpin 1986a). The lively street-level activity, however, concealed the empty, unused upper floors in many of the buildings along Broadway, which posed a major concern for property owners and city officials who wished to increase the economic activity in the neighborhood, property values, and tax revenues. Many of the businesses that catered to Latin American immigrants have now closed, in part the victims of city policies aimed at turning downtown into a place of entertainment, culture, and commerce for affluent business travelers, tourists, and residents. These policies have contributed to a turnover in businesses and a dramatic increase in enterprises that cater to affluent consumers, a rise in luxury housing, and White locals and tourists replacing immigrants as consumers along Broadway. While this demographic and economic shift is in part due to Latin American immigrants increasingly populating the suburbs, and new shopping areas opening up outside the urban core that target this population (Mejia 2016), the movement outward of immigrants and the rise in Whites in the area are also heavily influenced by public policies to transform downtown Los Angeles into a destination for the affluent (Sims 2016). Recognizing the growing success of this effort, the New York Times’ worldwide list of “52 Places to Go in 2014” included downtown Los Angeles and listed several new attractions on Broadway, including Alma Restaurant, Bon Appétit magazine’s choice as the nation’s best new restaurant in 2013, and across the street, the trendy, high-priced Ace Hotel, which opened in 2014 in the historic 1927 United Artists Theatre building. Continuing the trend, Apple opened a major store in 2021 in the historic Tower Theater at Broadway and Eighth Street, a block away from the original 1926 western terminus of Route 66, which changed to Santa Monica a decade later. The transformation of Broadway occurred in tandem with the construction of Staples Center (renamed Crypto.com Arena in 2021) and L.A. Live, which rose a handful of blocks to the west of Broadway. I examine public policies, race, development, and place through two major issues in Los Angeles that are deeply connected to one another. First, an

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analysis of a key set of complementary and adjacent projects that were built over four decades, which have helped define downtown Los Angeles and have served as a catalyst for attracting billions of dollars of private capital from US and international companies. The city of Los Angeles constructed the Convention Center, which opened in 1971, and Anschutz Entertainment Group built the Staples Center sports arena, which opened in 1999, built the L.A. Live entertainment district, which opened in stages through 2010, and spent five years and $50 million through 2015 in a failed attempt to build a National Football League Stadium next to L.A. Live. These projects continued the trend of major urban development projects across the nation that have directly led to the displacement of low-income and working-class racial minorities, often the result of city officials targeting these neighborhoods for demolition through the rationale of removing “blight,” spurring economic growth, and bringing in affluent residents and consumers (Anderson 1964; Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). Second, I examine the rise of a progressive growth-with-equity coalition, composed of unions, community organizations, and faith-based groups, to counter displacement caused by development projects and to work toward city policies that take into account the interests of lower-income residents on issues such as affordable housing, living wages, and local hiring programs. I examine the 2001 L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement as a prime example of the work of this coalition. Using the case of downtown Los Angeles, I propose the term “racialspatial formation” to include the historical and contemporary processes of racial formation and place and the racialization of place, in order to analyze the relationship between race, place, and public policies. In terms of racial formation, I emphasize the foundational work of Michael Omi and Howard Winant (2015) and the view of race as a social construction, a central organizing principle of society, and the focus on the continual struggle and negotiation in the sociohistorical process through which race is given meaning and importance through policies and place. By using the term “racial-spatial formation,” I foreground the importance of the spatial aspect of racial formation (Omi and Winant 2015), and the link between the racialization of place and racial formation (Huante 2021a; Lipsitz 2011). While there is a great deal of research that examines racial formation and place, and other research on the racialization of place, these two areas of research are often analyzed separately (Huante 2021a). Instead, I suggest that

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in some cases, these two areas can be better understood as mutually constitutive processes, as exemplified in the work of Alfredo Huante (2021a) and George Lipsitz (2007, 2011). As Lipsitz (2011:5) explains in his research on racial and spatial inequality, “social relations take on their full force and meaning when they are enacted physically in actual places” and that “we learn that race is produced by space, that it takes places for racism to take place.” Research on racial formation that examines the meaning and importance of race can include issues that do not explicitly include place, such as the US government’s construction of racial categories through the Census. I focus on the spatial aspect of racial formation (Omi and Winant 2015) and how policies related to race and place, such as the history of suburbanization and residential segregation in the United States, directly contribute to racial formation (Massey and Denton 1993; Rothstein 2017). I examine how racial formation occurs through the policies and practices that generate and support the definition of “valued” residents as the affluent, which, although seemingly raceneutral, favors Whites because of the history of racialized capital accumulation. Giving important material consequences to this definition of valued residents, Whites become the beneficiaries of the massive amounts of public and private capital invested in downtown Los Angeles and of the projects and amenities that emerge from that investment. Regarding the racialization of place, important research has examined how neighborhood change and gentrification have affected the racial composition of communities (Brown-Saracino 2017; Freeman 2005, 2006; Hwang 2020), but there are two issues that I raise with this research. First, an examination of the importance of historical events on contemporary processes is often missing. Research on neighborhood change and gentrification that focuses on individuals and groups operating in the housing market, for example, misses the history of capital accumulation and racial disparities in wealth, and the impact of that history on buying a home today. Second, this research tends to treat race as an unchanging category. Race, however, has changing meaning and importance according to the historical context and local circumstances. A key part of my analysis is that the creation and exercise of public policies do not simply affect racially labeled groups. Instead, shifting public policies, such as those regarding residential segregation, the use of eminent domain, and the ownership of land, contribute to the constant struggle over the meaning and importance of race and place as part of the process of racial formation (Huante 2021a; Massey and Denton 1993;

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Rothstein 2017). These changes in the meaning and consequences of racial categories, and the importance of public policies in these changes, are part of the process of racial formation (Molina 2006), and are recognized in the term “racial-spatial formation.” As Lipsitz (2007, 2011) and Huante (2021a) emphasize in their research on race and inequality, historical and contemporary practices come together and mutually support the relationship between race and place in the production of inequality. Omi and Winant (2015:125) use the concept of “racial projects” in racial formation theory to examine the links between racial meanings, the organization and distribution of “resources . . . along particular racial lines,” and how government policies contribute to this process. Racial projects reveal how power is exercised through place by illustrating how ideologies and practices establish the importance of race and class through place. Examples of urban development policies that contribute to racial formation include the establishment of racially segregated neighborhoods, zoning regulations that require single-family homes and prohibit multifamily housing, and urban renewal and highway construction projects that target communities of color for removal. Lipsitz (2007:17) emphasizes that racial projects “have always been spatial projects as well” and that government policies, such as those in downtown Los Angeles supporting demographic change, have played a central role in racial formation and the creation and support of whiteness. Lipsitz (2007, 2011), in some of the key works on structural inequality and place, explains that whiteness involves the ideologies and systemic practices that create and support racial hierarchy and privilege in society, resulting in advantages for Whites and disadvantages for racial minorities. Research on race and whiteness documents that the meaning and importance of race are constantly changing through time and place, rather than fixed and static (Jacobson 1998; Lipsitz 2011; Omi and Winant 2015). The importance of homeownership for capital accumulation for Whites, for example, and the history of exclusion for racial minorities from this important process through the practices of government, financial, and real-estate institutions (including exclusionary zoning, restrictive covenants, mortgage policies, redlining, residential segregation, and racial steering), demonstrate the importance of the relationship between race and place in the production of whiteness (Lipsitz 2007, 2011). The formation and enactment of public policies contribute to the changing meaning of race through time and place (Molina 2006; Pulido 2000). In

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the contemporary United States, there has been a fundamental shift away from the practices of whiteness and policies that explicitly enforced racial exclusion (Feagin 2006; Lipsitz 2006, 2011), such as the policies of the federal government and private financial institutions that created Whites-only suburbs in the post–World War II era (Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993; Rothstein 2017). In contrast, contemporary policies are often intended to be race-neutral; however, such policies can produce racialized effects because the policies operate within a society in which racial hierarchy and privilege are deeply embedded in established practices and institutions. As a result, such policies can have racialized outcomes and support inequality in society (Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2017; Feagin and McKinney 2003; Pulido 2000; Saito 2009). For example, racial disparities in wealth created by explicit racial exclusion and whiteness in the past frame access to today’s housing market, and White homebuyers have advantages created by the history of capital accumulation and the wealth they bring to the marketplace. To analyze the mutually constitutive relationship between policies, place, and race in racial-spatial formation, I examine the process through which policies are created, the ways in which race and class influence policy formation, and how those policies generate racial consequences. That is, race shapes policy formation, policies shape racial formation, and policies racialize place (Huante 2021a, 2021b). By emphasizing the links between race and place, I help bring together the research on urban policies, the racialization of place, and racial formation.

Downtown and the Suburbs Los Angeles, as with urban centers across the country, experienced severe decline in the post–World War II era as residents, businesses, and manufacturers abandoned aging downtowns and increasingly moved outward to the growing suburbs. Government funding for the construction of the infrastructure that made the suburbs possible, such as the highways, and federal mortgage guidelines, supported investment in the suburbs and disinvestment in areas of the urban core inhabited by racial minorities (Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993). These policies also directly enforced an explicit racial divide, with the new suburbs established for Whites, while racial minorities generally remained in the urban core.

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Government funding for regional infrastructure, such as the airports and ports, also made possible the rise of the Los Angeles economy, its prominence as a major world city, and the growth of the surrounding region (Erie 2004). As Steven Erie (2004:46) explains, “public investments were an essential precondition to private development, particularly the burgeoning real estate market.” The rise of suburbia illustrates how powerful business interests who usually opposed government spending favored it when it supported their enterprises. For example, developers pushed for the government construction of the 1913 aqueduct which brought water to Los Angeles, and made possible the vast profits enjoyed by the developers who built housing in the San Fernando Valley (Jackson 1985). As Kenneth Jackson (1985:180) explains in his foundational work on the rise of suburbia, the aqueduct “illustrates many of the basic ingredients of suburban land conversion in the United States. Politically powerful investors used public services and public transportation to raise land values and attract settlers. The influence of the developer made government largesse available.” This is also clearly illustrated in Joe Feagin’s (1988:2, 5) analysis of Houston, which free market supporters in the 1970s and 1980s cited as an example of the success of “free enterprise” while downplaying the “close relationship between the state and business elite” and government funding. This funding helped construct the city’s infrastructure that supported economic growth, such as the highways, port, and funding for the oil industry and Johnson Space Center. Property owners and corporate interests linked to downtowns across the nation convinced the federal government to establish the Urban Renewal Program, and cities partnered with the federal government to revitalize their urban cores from the 1950s through the 1970s. Concern about the destruction of communities, massive displacement of residents and small businesses, and its limited success as an economic stimulus, despite its enormous fiscal and social costs, led to the end of the federal government’s Urban Renewal Program (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). In addition, since World War II, city officials have worked to use public funds to stimulate private investment, and have worked with private corporations to rebuild their urban cores, especially since the 1970s and the decline of federal funds for urban areas (Long 2013). The activities in Los Angeles

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parallel the national trend of restructuring downtowns from declining manufacturing and business districts into modern corporate centers of high-end office buildings, hotels, commercial enterprises, and residences; constructing facilities and services to promote tourism and conventions; and developing cities as sites of culture and consumption through the development of museums, restaurants, shopping centers, sports, and theaters (Feagin 1998; Zukin 2010). In Los Angeles, and the United States in general, the defining trend of urban renewal in the post–World War II era, and economic redevelopment in contemporary times, has been the large-scale demolition of neighborhoods, with the majority inhabited by low-income and working-class racial minorities (Anderson 1964; Mollenkopf 1983). In Los Angeles, the destruction of minority and lower-income communities by public and private development has a long history. Some examples include: the construction of Union Station in the 1930s and the demolition of the city’s original Chinatown; the clearing of Chavez Ravine in the 1950s and the removal of its Mexican American residents, followed by the construction of Dodger Stadium; the construction of the police headquarters, Parker Center, in the 1950s and the destruction of a large portion of Little Tokyo; the rise of office buildings and cultural centers on Bunker Hill in the 1960s and the removal of its working-class residents; and the projects that are the focus of this book, the Convention Center, Staples Center, and L.A. Live, which displaced primarily low-income and working-class Latinos, Latin American immigrants, and African Americans.

Urban Pro-Growth Interests In political economy, research on growth interests and regime theory have provided key conceptual tools to analyze power and inequality in the politics of urban development (Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997). In one of the key early works in political economy, John Mollenkopf (1975:256) examined how city officials, major corporations, real-estate interests, and construction unions formed “pro-growth coalitions” to transform downtowns from manufacturing to knowledge and service economies for government functions, corporations, and affluent residents. Similarly, Harvey Molotch (1976:313) developed one of the principal concepts for the relationship between development and politics, the “growth machine,” which asserted that growth was a

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central concern of local politics and that corporate and political elites worked together to guide development. One of the major development conflicts is between corporate interests who see land in terms of its exchange value (that is, as a commodity in the pursuit of profits) and residents who see land in terms of its use value or how land contributes to quality-of-life issues (Logan and Molotch 2007). Large development projects have a long history of negative consequences; in particular, the destruction of neighborhoods and the displacement of residents, which highlights the class, racial, and spatial dimensions of development because city officials usually target low-income and minority communities for demolition (Feagin 1998; Mollenkopf 1975). While slow-growth movements may occur, research documents that it is primarily organizations that represent the interests of affluent residents that have the resources and political influence to counter corporate growth interests (Logan and Molotch 2007). Research on regime theory—which examines the “informal arrangements” among business interests, elected officials, and community members that contribute to the governance of a city—stresses the importance of development in local politics, the conflict between corporate and resident interests, and the strength of growth coalitions in local politics (Stone 1989:6). An important difference from research on growth coalitions and the growth machine, which emphasizes the dominance of growth coalitions, however, is that regime theory allows for greater influence and power among noncorporate members of society and examines the range of coalitions that may form (Stone 1989). Clarence Stone (1993:18–20), whose work is central to regime analysis, outlines different types of regimes, including “development regimes” focused on growth promotion, “middle class progressive regimes” concerned with affordable housing, linkage fees, and environmental issues, and “lower class opportunity expansion” regimes aimed at improving access to jobs, education, and homeownership. While regime theory acknowledges the possibility of progressive regimes with development policies to help low-income residents, regime theory research reaches a similar conclusion with research on growth coalitions. Progressive regimes are unlikely to form, according to this research, because it is corporate elites who have the necessary resources to work with elected officials to build and maintain coalitions to establish and implement a long-term policy agenda (Stone 1989; 2015).

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I contribute to the research on growth coalitions and regime theory by analyzing how a durable and effective coalition composed of unions and community organizations has formed in Los Angeles since the 1990s to represent the interests of lower-income residents, and aided by the growing Latino electorate, has worked to negotiate major changes in city policies regarding development (Meyerson 2006b; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Soja 2010). Building on emerging research on community activism (Camou 2014; Jones-Correa and Wong 2015), I suggest that this coalition contradicts an important thesis of work on growth coalitions and regimes that argues that these coalitions are unlikely to be effective in the long term because of a lack of resources and political influence.

Downtown Los Angeles: Growth Coalitions and Community Coalitions I contend that a major shift occurred in downtown Los Angeles politics from the 1960s to the 2010s. In the 1960s, growth interests wielded almost unstoppable power, involving a coalition of city officials, corporate executives, and private developers working to rebuild the city. But by the 2010s, that power had fragmented and weakened, which created a political opportunity for change in development policies. Recognizing these changing circumstances and taking advantage of this opportunity, a growth-with-equity coalition has gained power and has become a major voice in local and regional politics (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009). The 1990s proved to be a pivotal decade for Los Angeles for growth interests and community coalitions. During this decade, the continuing loss of major corporate headquarters, the sprawl that spread businesses across a vast region, and the weakening of organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce that once spoke for business elites, contributed to the fragmentation and weakening of growth interests (Fulton 2001; Purcell 2000). In addition, scholars and political analysts suggest that emerging from the 1990s in Los Angeles is a commitment to build broader and stronger coalitions of organizations working on specific projects and issues, as well as wider social change through public policies (Brodkin 2007; Meyerson 2006b; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Soja 2010). The effort to build coalitions to work on social change was given added impetus by the 1992 civil unrest that struck Los Angeles and was one of the

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most destructive civil disturbances in the nation’s history in terms of loss of lives and property damage. The tension between Korean immigrant shopkeepers and their Latin American immigrant and African American clientele highlighted the new racial complexities of the region and led to “serious questions about local progressive leadership” and “a dramatic rethinking” of strategies and policies to address economic and racial problems in the city (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009:107,108). Racial minorities have a long history of activism in Los Angeles involving race and social justice, and this contemporary movement builds on the foundation built by earlier activists to actively reshape the city’s racial geography and politics (Kurashige 2008; Pulido 2006; Sanchez 2021). In contrast to the earlier period, when the benefits of development favored members of the growth coalition while lowerincome residents experienced negative impacts (such as the destruction of their neighborhoods and displacement), the growth-with-equity coalition is now working to spread the benefits of development across a broader spectrum of the population. Los Angeles is a particularly significant place to examine politics and development because of its rapidly growing Latino population, expanding union membership, and the strength of its community organizations. All of these have contributed to the rise of a progressive social justice coalition that has successfully worked for important changes in development politics and policies and, more generally, policies benefiting lower-income residents (Brodkin 2007; Lichterman 2021; Meyerson 2006b; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Soja 2010). For example, the city’s 1997 living-wage ordinance and a 2001 Community Benefits Agreement with the largest project in downtown Los Angeles have become nationwide models, and the city council’s approval of a $15 minimum wage in 2015 made Los Angeles, at the time, the nation’s largest city working toward a minimum wage at that level (Jamison, Zahniser, and Walton 2015; Meyerson 2013). A crucial factor for the coalition is increasing union membership in Los Angeles (in contrast to its early history as an anti-union city and the national trend of declining membership), which has translated into substantial political power in the region (Greenhouse 2019; Laslett 2012; Milkman 2006). Critical to growing union membership and political influence was the rise of new union leaders in the 1990s who established strategies and tactics to successfully organize Latinos and immigrants in the city, in contrast to the traditional view that these populations could not be unionized (Delgado 1993;

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Meyerson 2005). Unions, with an emphasis on social movement unionism with grassroots political organizing and building coalitions with community organizations, provided a key partner for Latinos working to transform their growing population into an effective electoral force (Kotkin 2011; Meyerson 2013). Latinos are the largest group in the city, comprising 48.7 percent of the population; Asian Americans comprise 11.6 percent; African Americans, 8.6 percent; and Whites, 28.4 percent, according to the 2015 American Community Survey (Table 1.1; Chapter 6). While racial minorities dominate the city’s population, Whites remain a powerful political force in the city, with a large share of the voters and elected officials. In cities in which elected officials are working to revitalize their urban core, alliances with corporate interests are key because of the private capital and business expertise needed to fund and build major projects (Sonenshein 1993; Stone 1989). Atlanta and Los Angeles are examples of cities that experienced the growing political influence of racial minorities, as well as major public and private investment to rebuild their downtowns. Translating the population growth of a racial minority into a political force that can enact policies that benefit members of that group has succeeded. However, the challenge is to establish policies that help residents across class lines. Atlanta is an important example of African Americans successfully translating their increasing numbers into electoral victories in the 1970s and 1980s. African American leaders, however, needed the White business elite to establish a governing coalition and the benefits from this coalition generally favored middle-class African Americans (Stone 1989). Similarly, Tom Bradley, the only African American mayor of Los Angeles, held office for two decades from the 1970s into the 1990s and built a multiracial coalition to win office. Bradley’s major accomplishments centered on the development of the downtown area, which benefited downtown business interests, and although his administration offered employment opportunities for African Americans, this again favored primarily the middle class (Sonenshein 1993). Los Angeles today, I contend, provides a different scenario in which Latinos are able to use their growing numbers to enact policies that benefit the large working-class and low-income segments of their population. The rise of unions as a political force that has focused on the interests of working-class immigrants and service workers, in addition to its earlier emphasis on White workers in the building trades, provides the growing Latino population with

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a powerful ally that did not exist for other minority populations earlier in the city’s history. Although corporate interests remain strong in the city, I suggest, however, that the partnership between unions and Latinos provides an important counter to those interests. As a result, while city officials support major corporate-led development projects, these projects now include features that benefit lowerincome residents, such as local hiring programs, living wages, and funds for affordable housing. Service worker unions, with their large numbers of Latinos, women, and immigrants, have been a major force for policies aiding lowerincome residents. Construction unions support large development projects because of the employment opportunities for their members but have also largely supported, or not publicly opposed, the policy goals of the service worker unions. As a result, unions remain a prominent member of the growth coalition through support of new construction, while promoting growth with equity. The growth-with-equity movement is emerging in urban areas across the country as city officials, unions, and community organizations recognize the widening divide between the working poor and the wealthy and see development as a tool to address this issue (Benner and Pastor 2012). For example, in New York, Bill de Blasio, the mayor from 2014 to 2021, addressed inequality and promoted development to generate revenue for affordable housing; predating de Blasio’s election as mayor, New York City linked city contracts with job training and local hiring programs (BAE Urban Economics, Inc. et al. 2015; Wolf-Powers 2006). The key is ensuring that major projects result in concrete benefits for local residents. A pivotal event that I document and analyze to illustrate the rise of the growth-with-equity coalition is the Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) that coalitions negotiated with the developer of L.A. Live in 2001, the largest project in downtown Los Angeles at that time. CBAs are contracts that include benefits such as affordable housing, living-wage jobs, local hiring, and subsidies for displaced residents. Laying the foundation for the CBA, this social justice coalition has successfully worked for the election of city, county, and state officials who are receptive to issues important to low-income and working-class residents, and research has documented the successful policy campaigns by coalitions uniting organized labor, Latinos, and community organizations in the region (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Soja 2010). Considering the demographics of the residents—including lower-income

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Latin American immigrants—involved in the negotiations over the CBA with the L.A. Live project, this case represents a new level of community activism and a reconsideration of neighborhood organizing for working-class, immigrant, and racial minority communities. While successful grassroots organizing has a long history among urban residents in the US, the CBA represents a major leap in scale both in terms of the size of the redevelopment project and the number of organizations involved in the neighborhood coalition. In the years following the establishment of the L.A. Live CBA, the coalition has been working to go beyond negotiating CBAs with individual projects because this is too resource-intensive and is not a sustainable long-term strategy for community organizations (Estolano 2013; Gross, LeRoy, and JanisAparicio 2005; Haas 2007). Instead, the coalition is attempting to establish a fundamental change in the city’s development policy through the implementation of a “growth with equity framework” that recognizes that developers receiving city support for projects should provide community benefits to mitigate the negative effects of their projects (Meyerson 1998:16; Benner and Pastor 2012). An important step toward establishing some of the features of CBAs in city policies occurred in 2016, when Los Angeles city voters approved Proposition JJJ, which requires affordable housing, wage guidelines, and local hiring for large projects requesting zoning changes or General Plan amendments. In using the term “progressive coalitions,” I refer to groups addressing issues of social, economic, and environmental justice and growing inequality; emphasizing grassroots political participation coupled with electoral politics; and recognizing the power of the state to both cause and address inequality (Gottlieb et al. 2005; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Stein 2018). A challenging issue facing progressive coalitions across the country is that policies that are meant to help lower-income residents can contribute to long-term changes that work against the interests of these residents. For example, as mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio instituted a plan in the mid-2010s to increase the amount of affordable housing. Part of this plan makes the production of affordable housing mandatory in areas that the city has rezoned and increased housing density for market-rate units. Although this adds to the amount of affordable housing produced, rezoning also raises property values and contributes to gentrification and displacement (Stein 2018). Gilda Haas (2007), cofounder of Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), one of the key organizations successfully working to negotiate CBAs in Los Angeles, states that “the fact remains that the same projects that will

Introduction: Racial-Spatial Formation

15

provide our members with hard-won benefits, effectively produce the market conditions that are pushing our members out of the neighborhood where they have lived for decades.” Gilda Haas (2007) suggests that CBAs that are implemented for individual projects are “building blocks” that should be adopted into city policies “to create a more equitable and livable city.” Haas (2005), at a Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice meeting in 2005, spoke about the organization’s goals and suggested that “we . . . think about our work in the Figueroa Corridor as a land reform movement,” and that “everyone has a right to participate in planning the future of this city. Owning a piece of dirt shouldn’t be a requirement.” Building on these views, Haas helped organize a 2007 conference in Los Angeles involving representatives from more than thirty organizations from across the country to establish the organization, Right to the City Alliance (Samara 2007), which is working to build “a national movement for racial justice, urban justice, human rights and democracy” (Right to the City Alliance 2019). The Right to the City Alliance (2019) highlights Henri Lefebvre’s (1996) concept “Right to the City” as a guiding resource in their efforts to challenge gentrification and displacement. Building on Lefebvre’s work, Haas and the Right to the City Alliance are working to establish the right and legitimacy of community residents who do not own property to guide the future of a city and counter the prevailing primacy of property owners in a capitalist society. Lefebvre’s (1996:158) assertion of the “right to urban life” by “all those who inhabit” a city is part of the ongoing struggle between exchange value and use value. The Right to the City Alliance (2019) platform recognizes “Indigenous Justice” and “the right of First Nation indigenous people to their ancestral lands that have historical or spiritual significance.” This recognition highlights the importance of establishing the right to be part of the negotiations over the future of a city, the relationship between claims and links to land, and the complexity of working toward multiple social justice goals by coalitions. The recognition of Indigenous Justice is part of the contestation of Indigenous people’s property rights and relationship to the land since the arrival of Europeans and the establishment of settler colonialism, which involved, in part, the removal of natives from their land and ownership of that land by the colonizers (Wolfe 2001). At the same time, however, the support of Indigenous Justice by nonNative peoples demonstrates the complexity of competing interests within coalitions. As the Right to the City Alliance is working to establish the

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legitimacy of non–property owners to participate in struggles over their neighborhoods, this struggle over “integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth”—that is, land taken from Indigenous peoples (Tuck and Wang 2012:7). Rather than seeing the efforts of groups such as the Right to the City Alliance as contributing to settler colonialism and the continued taking of land from Indigenous peoples, these efforts can be viewed as the struggle of people of color and their allies to understand the effects of settler colonialism on Indigenous peoples. In this way, people of color recognize settler colonialism as an “ongoing structure” that historically has shaped the violence and exclusionary practices of White supremacy and continues to structure inequality in the United States today (Glenn 2015:55; Wolfe 2006).

Gentrification, The Racial Wealth Gap, and Racial-Spatial Formation Gentrification is one of the major issues affecting urban areas in the United States, and as a direct result of public policies, a part of racial-spatial formation (Huante 2021b). The projects that I examine in this book are major contributors to gentrification and are a central focus of community coalitions working on displacement and affordable housing in the Los Angeles region. Gentrification and displacement include many forms. I focus on direct displacement, not only through the demolition of residential and commercial buildings serving lower-income residents and consumers and replacement by buildings serving the affluent, but also through rising property values that increase the cost of residential and commercial properties and drive out lower-income residents and the businesses that serve them (Brown-Saracino 2017; Freeman 2005). I also examine indirect displacement, particularly Marcuse’s (1985:207) concept of “exclusionary displacement,” which he defines as “when any household is not permitted to move into a dwelling” because of such factors as “changes in the housing market,” which increase prices and make units “unaffordable.” Zuk et al. (2015:34) contend that most studies on gentrification “ignore or dismiss exclusionary displacement as simply [the] succession and replacement” that occurs in all neighborhoods as people choose to move in and out, rather than through forced displacement because of gentrification. I suggest that the race-neutral policies and projects that I examine have racialized effects and contribute to racially exclusionary displacement.

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Research on gentrification historically has examined the racial aspect of this process as higher-income Whites replace lower-income racial minorities, and the negative impact on the displaced, from the loss of housing and disruption of their neighborhoods (Brown-Saracino 2017; Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008; Zuk et al. 2015). In addition, other research, noting the presence of middle-class racial minorities, examines the importance of class factors in the process of neighborhood change (Freeman 2005, 2006). Hyra (2012), for example, in his important research on downtown redevelopment, notes the displacement of large numbers of African American residents and businesses. Although Hyra (2012:501, 516) discusses the importance of the “intersection of race and class,” he suggests that because some African Americans, especially the more affluent, benefited from redevelopment, “the racial implications of the new urban renewal are tied more to class than race.” This focus on class also arises in a July 21, 2017, editorial on gentrification in the Los Angeles Times (2017c). The growing population of affluent residents in Los Angeles’s downtown region is spreading outward and contributing to demographic change and gentrification in Boyle Heights, a predominantly lower-income and working-class Latino neighborhood just east of downtown. Minimizing the importance of race, the Los Angeles Times editorial contends that “anti-gentrification activists hurt their own cause by focusing on race rather than economics” and “at its core, gentrification is an economic force, not a racial one.” This focus on economic factors and, in other research, consumers operating in a free market, frames much of the national debate in both scholarly research and media depictions of demographic change in neighborhoods. A crucial issue that is often missing in discussions of race and neighborhood change is that when potential home buyers and business entrepreneurs meet in the marketplace, they bring with them a history of exclusion backed by government policies that has resulted in vast disparities in wealth among racial groups. As a result, because capital accumulation is directly linked to race, they should be examined together, and one should not be prioritized over the other. Oliver and Shapiro (2006:2) explain that “wealth signifies the command over financial resources that a family has accumulated over its lifetime along with those resources that have been inherited across generations” and is significant because it provides the economic foundation for improving opportunities in such crucial areas as homeownership and business entrepreneurship.

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Introduction: Racial-Spatial Formation

In 2016, UCLA researchers found that the median net wealth of White households in the Los Angeles region was $355,000, as compared to $3,500 for Mexican Americans, $42,500 for other Latinos, and $4,000 for African Americans (De La Cruz-Viesca et al. 2016:5). The study included wealth figures for Asian Americans by ethnic group, with the wealth of the three largest groups in the region—Chinese $408,200, Filipino $243,000, and Korean $23,400—reflective of the wide wealth range among Asian American groups. The study explains that a large majority of Asian Americans are immigrants, and their wealth reflects their socioeconomic background from their countries of origin and US immigration policies that favor higher-income immigrants, rather than upward movement in the US. These large disparities in Los Angeles among racial groups resemble national trends (Dettling et al. 2017). What explains these huge disparities in wealth among groups? Oliver and Shapiro (2006:3) note that economists often explain that “racial differences in wealth are a consequence of disparate class and human capital credentials . . . , propensities to save, and consumption patterns.” They also point out that this typical explanation leaves out government policies and societal exclusionary practices that have created unequal opportunities for capital accumulation. For middle-class Americans, as research shows, one of the key ways of building wealth and passing that wealth on to their children is through homeownership (Lipsitz 2011; Shapiro 2004). In the history of the United States, however, the systematic exclusion of racial minorities from the new suburban regions created by billions of dollars of government infrastructure funding after World War II meant that this capital accumulation went to Whites while excluding minorities (Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993; Rothstein 2017). In that era of residential segregation backed by restrictive covenants, home mortgage policies, and redlining, this meant that Whites had access to federally backed home mortgages and to suburbs with rapidly increasing home values while racial minorities did not. As Oliver and Shapiro (2006:53) explain about the accumulation of wealth, “the sedimentation of racial inequality” operates because “structural disadvantages have been layered one upon the other to produce black disadvantage and white privilege.” Similarly, public policies are a major contributor to the sedimentation of racial inequality and place. For Whites, access to the new suburbs meant that their children could attend better public schools and build an academic foundation for entering elite universities and high-paying professions.

Introduction: Racial-Spatial Formation

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Access to the suburbs in the post–World War II era, however, was not the only advantage that Whites have had over racial minorities in the sedimentation of inequality (Lipsitz 2006, 2011; Oliver and Shapiro 2006). New Deal policies such as the creation of Social Security and the minimum wage excluded agricultural and domestic workers, who were primarily racial minorities. Unions in manufacturing and the skilled trades helped raise wages that lifted workers into the middle class, turned them into homeowners, and sent their children to college—but unions worked to exclude racial minorities. Research shows that racial discrimination continues in employment practices, including the high tech industry in Silicon Valley in which skill and talent supposedly drive a meritocratic culture (Gee, Peck, and Wong 2015). One might say that this was all in the past and has little to do with battles over gentrification today. However, these past events and policies that led to racial disparities in wealth directly contribute to neighborhood change now. As Lipsitz (2011) explains, research shows that from 1990 to 2020, the baby boom generation will collectively inherit about seven to nine trillion dollars, with most of that capital generated by the exclusionary housing and mortgage markets that existed before 1968 (Shapiro 2004). That capital has helped propel gentrification in places like Boyle Heights and downtown Los Angeles. In addition, racial privilege in the housing market is not just a historical memory but continues today. A study by the National Fair Housing Alliance (2006) on real estate practices in the 2000s found that Whites received financial incentives to help purchase a home that racial minorities did not receive, and that racial steering occurred at the extraordinarily high rate of 87 percent when real estate agents showed houses to clients, and that these practices affected African Americans and Latinos with similar economic profiles to Whites. A study by the US Department of Housing (Turner et al. 2013:xi) shows that although housing discrimination has declined in recent decades, discriminatory practices still persist and “raise the costs of housing search for minorities and restrict their housing options.” In the past decade, the Bank of America and Wells Fargo paid hundreds of millions of dollars in fines because they charged African Americans and Latinos higher interest rates and fees for home mortgages than they charged Whites with similar economic profiles (Hamilton, Popper, and Puzzanghera 2011; Reckard 2012). Being displaced by gentrification is not simply an economic transaction in the marketplace; research on displacement emphasizes the health impacts of

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Introduction: Racial-Spatial Formation

losing one’s place of residence, loss of employment caused by increased commuting distances, and the disruption of children’s education (Corburn 2009). The California Endowment, for example, launched a $1 billion initiative in 2010 to study health inequities in ten communities across the state, including Boyle Heights, and displacement is one of the major factors under study. When residents are displaced, this is in part the result of the racialized housing policies and employment practices that have limited capital accumulation. These residents will have fewer housing options because race continues to play an important role in the housing market through reduced access to home mortgages and the informal practices that continue to enforce racial segregation, such as racial steering by real estate agents and resident hostility toward racial minorities. As a result, lower-income racial minorities are much more likely than lower-income Whites to live in areas of high economic and racial segregation, limiting their access to good schools, medical care, jobs, and transportation and continuing the relationship between race, housing, and economic inequality. This shows how city policies regarding development that are intended to be race-neutral can have a disproportionate impact on lowerincome communities of color and produce racialized results. Thus, as Alfredo Huante (2021a:75) suggests, race is not a static concept, as portrayed in much of the traditional research on gentrification, but instead, “gentrification is involved in race-making as well as place-making.”

Los Angeles and the Future I explore two closely related themes in this book regarding race, public policies, and place. First, as noted earlier, growth interests are working to transform urban areas into places of entertainment, culture, and commerce for affluent business travelers, tourists, and downtown and suburban residents. I examine how city officials worked with business elites in the construction of the Convention Center, Staples Center, and L.A. Live and supported the proposal for a National Football League Stadium, and how these projects contributed to demographic change in downtown Los Angeles. Second, I examine the efforts of a progressive grassroots coalition working to create policies to help build Los Angeles as an inclusionary place in terms of race and class and to counter the long history of displacement generated by large projects supported by city officials and business elites.

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I suggest that the 2001 L.A. Live CBA was a transformative achievement in the struggle for growth with equity and reflects what is happening around the nation. Community, faith-based, labor, and environmental organizations are working in cities across the country to create regional and national coalitions aimed at building a grassroots base, electing progressive politicians, and generating policies that both support growth and address the issues of urban low-income and working-class residents (Benner and Pastor 2012; Clavel 2010; Dean and Reynolds 2009). To document and analyze these issues, my research assistants and I collected reports from community organizations and archival material—such as environmental impact reports, development agreements, city staff reports, and developer reports—from the Los Angeles City Archives, City Clerk, Community Redevelopment Agency, and planning department. We collected articles from the city’s major newspaper, the Los Angeles Times, and the weekly Downtown News. We conducted interviews primarily with members of community organizations, but also with the staff of developers. I also engaged in fieldwork, attending public meetings and events held by the city, developers, and community organizations. I have examined demographic changes in downtown Los Angeles and the city through data from the US Census and the American Community Survey. While I contend that the changes in Los Angeles are transformational and are resulting in concrete improvements for lower-income residents, offering a glimmer of hope for the future, these changes are occurring in a city in which residents are grappling with dismal circumstances that threaten to overshadow any gains or moments of progress. The city has one of the most unaffordable housing markets in the nation in terms of the percentage of income spent on housing, and in combination with being a national center for poverty-wage jobs, this contributes to people living in substandard and unsafe housing, one of the largest concentrations of the homeless in the country, and residents struggling to survive with inadequate funds for critical necessities such as quality education, food, health care, and transportation. The stakes are high. Countering exclusionary racialized policies— whether explicit or implicit—and working toward policies that contribute to a more equal and inclusive society benefits those directly experiencing racism. As research demonstrates, addressing racial inequality and promoting growth-with-equity policies also greatly benefits society by utilizing the talents, skills, knowledge, and increased political and economic involvement

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and contributions of those who experience exclusion (Benner and Pastor 2012; Lipsitz 2011; Pastor 2018). Investment in education, jobs, and housing directly benefits a region by contributing to economic growth; equity and economic growth can work together (Benner and Pastor 2012; Pastor 2018). Social and political unrest can reduce investment and growth in a region, and continued exclusionary and punitive policies are costly, with policing, imprisonment, and social welfare expenses (Alexander 2012; Benner and Pastor 2012). While activists working on issues involving the concerns of low-income and working-class residents often clash with those supporting new projects aimed at more affluent residents and consumers, negotiations around development have also created agreements and understandings of local concerns that have united residents and developers and shaped projects in ways that have benefited both groups (Pastor et al. 2015; Wu 2011). Community coalitions have worked to bring Los Angeles to a point at which transformational change to address destructive inequality is possible. In which direction the city will go and what is possible to accomplish are open questions; the challenge is being taken up by progressive activists in the region.

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The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

Part 1. Building the Los Angeles Convention Center Los Angeles city officials and downtown business interests led the campaign that took over five decades to build a convention center, which finally opened in 1971. The Convention Center was a key part of the city’s strategy to reverse urban decline due to suburbanization and deindustrialization and to rebuild the downtown core into a center of entertainment and commerce for affluent consumers. City officials believed that the Convention Center would enable Los Angeles to enter the extremely competitive national market for major conventions and trade shows and attract regional and out-of-town visitors. The Convention Center, and its expansion two decades later, covered seventy-five acres previously inhabited by hundreds of primarily low-income and workingclass Latino residents. At about the same time the Center opened, the city led the Bunker Hill (located in the northwest corner of downtown) urban renewal project to build a new business center for the city that cleared 136 acres and removed a multiracial community of approximately 11,000 residents. The Convention Center and Bunker Hill projects initiated the huge investment of public funds and exercise of political power in downtown Los Angeles explicitly aimed at bringing in more affluent consumers and residents and removing lower-income residents. These projects laid the foundation for the change in the socioeconomic status of the downtown population in the 2000s that resulted in major racial change, with significant growth in the percentage of Whites and diminishing proportions of Latinos and African Americans. 23

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The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

The city actions that destroyed neighborhoods inhabited by lower-income residents also contributed to the collective memory of activists who would work to form coalitions and develop the growth-with-equity policies that emerged in the 1990s and have continued to grow in strength and political influence in the decades that followed. I cover the Convention Center and its expansion in some detail here because I found little in-depth research on the topic, which I find remarkable considering the amount of public funds used and number of people displaced by these projects. After World War II, city officials and business leaders around the country imagined and planned for growth suited for downtowns as heavy industry and its related environmental problems moved away from cities to places with cheaper costs. Convention centers offered a “smokeless industry . . . that cannot move to the suburbs” and would serve as a “magnet for private land development and investment tied to everything from hotels and restaurants to retail sales and meeting support” (Sanders 1992: 136, 138). Keith Comrie, the Los Angeles city administrative officer, echoed this sentiment when he voiced support for expanding the Convention Center in the 1980s, stating that “it’s a fine project for the community, a good clean industry” (Decker 1985a:B1). The Los Angeles Times (1953:A4) championed the cause in the 1950s, noting in editorials that the “city has long suffered because it does not have an adequate auditorium where conventions, exhibits, sporting events and other affairs can be held.” In terms of the economic feasibility of the project, the newspaper suggested “that the auditorium would pay its own way and more.” The newspaper continued its strong support in the 1960s and another editorial proclaimed, “One of the most glaring gaps in our metropolitan landscape is the absence of a superior exhibition-convention facility,” and noting the economic benefits, explained that “each year numerous trade shows, consumer exhibitions and conventions forgo the other manifest attractions of Southern California because of the lack of an adequate site” (Los Angeles Times 1963:N6). The Los Angeles Times (Hebert 1963:A1) reported the following month that “tremendous pressure is building up for Los Angeles to add a major convention hall and exhibit center” from “hotels . . . and other business interests.” In the contest to compete nationally for large conventions, the Los Angeles Times (Hebert 1963:A1) went on to note that the city is being hurt by its lack of competitive facilities as the “great convention cities of New York, Chicago, Detroit and others . . . draw off more and more of the cream from the fat convention trade.”

The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

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Major projects, such as convention centers and sports stadiums, are also appealing to city officials who have an eye on their legacy. These projects support the “edifice complex” of politicians who can point to such structures as evidence of their effectiveness in completing such visible projects, and promoting growth and economic advancement, especially in comparison to what is happening in neighboring cities (Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie 2010:651). The city of Anaheim is located only twenty-nine miles south of downtown Los Angeles and Anaheim’s success in the construction of a convention center and sports facilities contributed to Los Angeles’s desire to build a convention center. Completed in 1953, the Santa Ana freeway (Interstate 5) connected Anaheim to the Los Angeles region with a major transportation corridor, and Anaheim moved to take advantage of this new highway. Disneyland opened in 1955, then the city of Anaheim built Anaheim Stadium, which opened in 1966 for the Angels baseball team, which Anaheim had convinced to move from Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles. The city also built a convention center, which opened in 1967, across the street from Disneyland. The Rams football team moved to Anaheim Stadium in 1980, leaving the Los Angeles Coliseum. The competition between the two cities continues. Michael Collins of the Los Angeles Convention & Visitors Bureau noted in the early 2000s that with an expanded Anaheim Convention Center and a new addition to Disneyland, “we are going to take it in the teeth” because the competition is a “zero sum game” and “for a city to gain, it has to come out of someone else’s hide” (Hirsch 2000:C5).

Development and Urban Theory How do we understand the politics of development and the importance of business elites, city officials, and local residents? Theories such as urban ecology and neoliberal policies that focus on the importance of the free market tend to emphasize individual choice, competition, and the benefits of development for all city residents through job creation, increased tax revenue, and the attraction of private capital. The role of government, according to this perspective, is to contribute to a healthy business environment and economic growth (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1967; Peterson 1981). Free market thinking assumes that in major developments such as the Convention Center, Staples Center, and L.A. Live, everyone shares similar

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The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

goals. This view, according to its critics, does not adequately consider the vast disparities in power between developers and low-income residents, and how this power is used on city officials in the decision-making process (Hackworth 2007). Since developers view property as a commodity and are interested in its exchange value in the pursuit of profits, their interests often directly collide with those of residents who view property in terms of quality-of-life issues or use value (Logan and Molotch 2007). In contrast, theories emerging from political economy recognize the importance of power, inequality, and conflict in the development process and markets more generally (Feagin 1998; Harvey 1973). These theories focus on the political and economic factors that influence how markets operate, critique the idea that the free market is a neutral force regulating development, and challenge the assumption that development benefits society as a whole. They identify the groups and interests that shape political and economic institutions in ways that produce advantages and disadvantages for particular groups in society. Research in political economy contends that development conflicts dominate local politics, and growth coalitions composed of powerful corporate elites and politicians guide development decisions in downtown areas (Mollenkopf 1992). In a key article, Harvey Molotch (1976) asserts that local political and economic elites form a “growth machine,” aimed at generating profit for major developers, business interests, and property owners, and tax revenue for local governments. In practical terms, major development projects take place in a market that is regulated by government controls, such as zoning and environmental policies. As political economists note, corporations use their resources to influence policies, regulations, and subsidies. With research and legal analysis, developers can influence policy formation and use local, state, and federal laws and policies to their advantage. Moreover, developers are often the major contributors to local political candidates and use these contributions to gain access to elected officials (Mollenkopf 1992). Working in partnership with cities, developers contribute investment capital, while public officials can provide subsidies, favorable zoning, and environmental and other regulations. City officials can also provide assistance in the entitlement process, which is the formal review that projects go through, including review by a number of city boards and commissions, culminating in a vote by the city council (Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie 2010). Also, cities can use eminent domain to acquire and assemble large parcels of land for projects.

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Local newspapers are also an important member of the growth machine, because growth and an increasing population can add to a newspaper’s circulation and ad revenue—which newspapers are struggling to generate in the internet era—and newspapers play an important role by generating public support for growth (Logan and Molotch 2007). While it is growth in general that newspapers support, newspapers do get involved in discussions of specific projects and electoral politics, and since newspaper owners are often major landowners, the support of growth also coincides with their business interests. The history of the Los Angeles Times during the 1900s certainly supports this analysis. The Chandler family, which owned the newspaper until 2000, became one of the largest landowners and developers in the state and used the newspaper to support their interests, such as pushing for use of public funds to create the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and the construction of the aqueduct that would bring water to the city and allow for the development of land that they owned (Jackson 1985). As a member of the growth machine, the Los Angeles Times became a strong supporter of the Convention Center, even while exercising its role as a supposedly neutral public watchdog supplying analyses and critiques of the project’s proposed locations and fiscal feasibility. As Logan and Molotch (2007:73) note, however, in the post–World War II era of urban expansion and the support of newspapers for growth interests, the Los Angeles Times fired its architectural critic John Pastier (who strongly criticized the site of the Convention Center and city plans to lure a World Trade Center to the site) and the New York Times removed a columnist, Sydney Schanberg, because of his critiques of development projects.

Downtown’s Power Brokers and the Growth Machine A strong working relationship between the Los Angeles City Council and downtown business interests led by a tight-knit group of corporate executives sustained the decades-long effort to build the Convention Center and demonstrated the power of the growth machine in the post–World War II era to rebuild downtown into a center of business, commerce, and entertainment. Downtown’s business elite established two organizations, the Committee of 25 and the Greater Los Angeles Plan, Inc., to lead strong growth coalitions. The city’s top business executives established the Committee of 25, which was “all

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The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

white, all Protestant, all CEO, all right-wing” (Meyerson 2004:A8), to serve as a “shadow city government” (Sewell 2011) in the region, from the beginning of the 1950s until the end of the 1960s (Gottlieb et al. 2005). Operating behind the scenes, the group “had no bylaws, no membership roster, no minutes and as little in writing as . . . possible” (Shakely 2012, n.p.). Demonstrating the influence and insider status of this group, a number of them would become members of Ronald Reagan’s Kitchen Cabinet during his presidency in the 1980s (Shakely 2012). A powerful and effective advocate for corporate interests, the Committee of 25, for example, worked to end the city’s plan to build over 3,000 units of affordable public housing at Chavez Ravine, a community of working-class Mexican Americans just north of downtown Los Angeles. Using eminent domain to displace the residents who did not want to move, the city had cleared Chavez Ravine of its residents and structures in preparation for building public housing. With the Los Angeles Times as a major ally, the city’s real estate and business interests argued against public housing and the dangers of socialism, and the city canceled the Chavez Ravine housing project (Avila 2004; Hines 1982; Shakely 2012). With the housing project terminated, the city took a major step in the transformation of the downtown region into a sports and entertainment center. It sold the land to the owner of the Brooklyn Dodgers at a price greatly below market value, pledged $2 million in city funds for site improvements, and construction began in 1959 for Dodger Stadium (Hines 1982). Although business interests warned of “socialism” in the form of public housing, the same group supported public subsidies for the owner of the Dodgers. Canceling the housing project and bringing the Brooklyn Dodgers to Chavez Ravine demonstrated how business interests used city authority and public funds to promote and subsidize corporate interests over those of lower-income residents. Operating more formally and openly than the Committee of 25, top business leaders formed the Greater Los Angeles Plan, Inc. (GLAPI) in 1945 to establish “the cultural, sports and convention facilities a truly great city needed” (Petree 1971a:T16) and to counter the rise of major cultural institutions opening to the west of downtown Los Angeles (Davis 2006). GLAPI spent about $1.4 million to support the construction of the downtown Music Center and a similar amount for the Convention Center (Petree 1971a). Demonstrating the links among the city and business community, Neil Petree, for example, at various times in his career, served as president of the Los Angeles Convention

The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

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Center Authority, the city council, the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce, and GLAPI (Petree 1971a).

Selecting the Convention Center Site Los Angeles city officials put bond proposals on the ballot in 1920, 1939, and 1951 to construct an auditorium and a convention hall in 1953 and 1954. These votes for general obligation bond proposals require a two-thirds majority to pass, and while in some years a simple majority was reached, the proposals all failed to reach the two-thirds requirement (Sanders 2014). City officials, undeterred by the long history of failed bond proposals, with financial support from GLAPI, commissioned multiple studies to examine a range of possible sites for a convention center, including the Westchester neighborhood near the Los Angeles International Airport, the Ambassador Hotel site on Wilshire Boulevard several miles to the west of downtown Los Angeles, and Exposition Park, several miles to the south of downtown. After years of study and debate, three options emerged that focused on the downtown area. A site in Elysian Park, near Dodger Stadium, would take advantage of city-owned land which would greatly reduce overall costs, but building on that site would exacerbate the already low levels of park space in the city and was successfully opposed by “conservation groups” who objected to “using 63 acres of park land for commercial purposes” (Hebert 1966b:I–3). The choice narrowed down to two sites: land in Bunker Hill and a site on the southern edge of downtown bounded by Pico Boulevard, Figueroa Street, and the Harbor freeway (Pico-Figueroa site). Building at the 8.5-acre Bunker Hill site would complement the goals of the major urban renewal plans underway in that area and would place the convention center in the urban core near the major areas for financial and commercial activities, entertainment, and hotels. In addition, a minority among the council members argued that the Bunker Hill site was preferable since the city’s Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) already controlled the land and it was “available for immediate sale,” whereas the Pico-Figueroa land was controlled by a large number of private owners and would take time to acquire through condemnation proceedings for some of the parcels. Further, the Bunker Hill site would generate more parking revenue from the general public because of its location in the urban core, which would “result in a large profit . . . as against a small loss at Pico Figueroa” (Thiel 1966a:2–3). Finally, since the Bunker Hill project

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would be constructed by a proposed nonprofit corporation composed of private businesses, it would show “how a private enterprise can meet a longstanding civic need; in contrast, Pico-Figueroa will call for an annual subsidy from the public purse” (Thiel 1966b:2). The Los Angeles Times (1966a:G6), a convention center booster, reiterated these points in an editorial outlining its preference for the Bunker Hill site. Also, since the Bunker Hill project would be constructed by a nonprofit corporation composed of private businesses (Hebert 1966a), the editorial stated that the project “would be built without any cost to municipal taxpayers” as compared to the other site which faces an annual “city tax subsidy . . . estimated at more than $400,000” (Los Angeles Times 1966a:G6). The mayor, the majority of the council members, and local business leaders favored the Pico-Figueroa site, which at over thirty acres, offered much more space for future expansion than the Bunker Hill site. In addition, supporters believed that public investment would serve as a catalyst to revitalize the immediate area, contribute to the expansion of the business and civic centers, and enhance downtown as the business and entertainment center of the region (Los Angeles Times 1971a; Yorty 1971). Also, in car-centric Los Angeles, the site bordered the intersection of two major freeways, the Santa Monica (Interstate 10) and the Harbor (Interstate 110), allowing easy access by automobile. As the architect for the Center, Charles Luckman, would later suggest, “there is no site in Los Angeles with as much egress and ingress for such a center—10 surface streets in the vicinity and the ready access to the freeway system . . . there are 15 freeway ramps to and from the freeways already in existence” (Los Angeles Times 1967:M1). Strongly backed by the mayor, the city’s Chamber of Commerce, restaurant and hotel organizations, and unions, the city council voted in favor of the Pico-Figueroa site in August 1966 (Hebert 1966c). Although the Los Angeles Times had backed the Bunker Hill site and had concerns over the fiscal burden that the Pico-Figueroa site might place on the city, the newspaper supported the basic goal of constructing a convention center. The newspaper noted that the city “each year loses millions of dollars of convention business” because it “lacked an adequate” facility, that this “has long been a critical item on the civic agenda,” and supported the new site as long as city officials finalized the ultimate plan “only after the most careful deliberation based upon all the facts” involving such issues as “land appraisals, revenue estimates, and other studies” (Los Angeles Times 1966b:A4).

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The Pico-Figueroa Site: Economic Feasibility of the Center While the city finally settled on the Pico-Figueroa site, the critical issue of how to finance the project remained. After repeated failures at the ballot box for proposals to use general obligation bonds, Los Angeles City and Los Angeles County created a special authority in January 1967 named the Los Angeles Convention and Exhibition Center Authority, which had the power to issue tax revenue bonds to construct the Center without a public vote (Hebert 1967). Tax revenue bonds are paid for by revenues generated by a proposed project, as compared to general obligation bonds, which are paid for out of the general fund and preferable because they are usually available at a lower interest rate than tax revenue bonds (Hebert 1968a). According to the agreement between the county and the city, Los Angeles City would be responsible for paying off the bonds, potentially exposing the city to major future payments to cover the bonds if feasibility studies did not accurately estimate Convention Center revenues and costs (Hebert 1967; Hebert 1971b). The history of voting in Los Angeles followed national trends in which the general public voted in favor of infrastructure projects, such as sewers and roads, which were seen as a benefit for the general public, but did not pass bond proposals for convention centers, which the public viewed as favoring specific business interests, such as hotels and restaurants. In addition, downtown projects, such as convention centers, and public policies, such as proposals for hotel taxes, also generated conflict between business interests in the urban core who wanted to use public spending to reverse the decline of the downtown area, and those who supported investment in other parts of the city and region (Sanders 1992). Conflict between downtown versus other areas of the city would result in the San Fernando Valley’s failed secession effort in the 1970s, followed by the 2002 failure of Proposition F, which put the issue before city voters. Voters served as a counter to downtown growth interests during the period when the public needed to vote and approve the construction of a convention center and issue bonds, which required the city to build support among a range of constituencies. The establishment of special authorities eliminated the need for a vote, reduced public input, and allowed the decision for the Convention Center to be made in a limited political field influenced by downtown growth interests, city agencies, and construction unions (Sanders

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1992). This arrangement also gave added importance to the informal relations between city officials and downtown business interests and support for leveraging public spending for downtown growth interests (Sanders 1992; Stone 1989). The Authority commissioned an economic feasibility study of the proposed Convention Center, and the report by Kenneth Clare and Le Roy Smith of Westwood Research (1967:4) concluded that the project was “economically feasible” because the “projected annual net operating income of the proposed facility would be sufficient or very nearly adequate to cover the cost” of paying the bonds issued for the project and the operating costs. The Clare and Smith (1967:46) report noted that if the Authority issued between $35 million to $40 million in thirty-five-year bonds, at an interest rate of 4.25 percent, the annual payments would be $1,939,400 for the smaller amount and $2,216,456 for the larger amount. This would include estimated costs of $14 million to purchase the land and a minimum of $15 million to construct the Center (Clare and Smith 1967:44). Regarding expected revenues, the study calculated $2,483,625 in the first year of full operation, with most of the revenues coming from building rentals and parking revenues, and the report expected revenues to increase by 2 percent per year in the following years as the number of events increased (Clare and Smith 1967:44–45). Operating expenses, including personnel, and operation and maintenance, would be $669,689, giving a net income of $1,813,936 (Clare and Smith 1967:45). As a result, the projected net income would fall short of the annual bond payments by about $125,464 to $402,520, depending on the actual amount of the bonds issues (Clare and Smith 1967:46). In terms of expenditures generated by the Convention Center, the Clare and Smith study (1967:48, 49, 51) estimated that during the first full year in operation, nonresident attendees would spend $21 million, local residents would spend $11 million, and exhibitors and producers of events would spend $16,250,000 for a total of $48,250,000. The study explained that the impact of these direct expenditures on the local economy would be amplified because a portion of these expenditures are respent locally and that a “reasonable estimate of the ratio of indirect to direct expenditures is about 2 to 1,” with indirect expenditures estimated at $96,500,000, giving a total of direct and indirect expenditures at $144,750,000 (Clare and Smith 1967:52). In addition, the city’s annual portion of sales taxes generated just by direct expenditures would be $199,000 and hotel room taxes would be $252,000 (Clare and Smith 1967:55–56).

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The expenditures in the Clare and Smith report, however, do not represent entirely new revenues. One paragraph at the end of the report (1967:57) noted that events already occurring in the region would simply be transferred to the new Convention Center, accounting for direct expenditures of $36 million and indirect expenditures of $109 million. The report estimated that the “additional events attracted to the proposed center would serve to generate new direct expenditures of about $12 million and new indirect expenditures of approximately $35 million” (Clare and Smith 1967:57). The city council approved construction of the Center in September 1967, with only council member Marvin Braude voting against the project because of potential costs to the public, stating, “Let’s not deceive the taxpayers. This will require a huge substantial subsidy” (Baker 1967:A1). Braude noted the following month that the project was “an incredible tangle of unverified claims enticingly packaged in dazzling wrappings” and warned that “no convention center in the country supports itself” (Dreyfuss 1967:A1). After extensive research on convention centers, Heywood Sanders (2005, 2014) contends that the studies commissioned by cities to judge the economic feasibility of convention centers are useful more as marketing tools for growth interests pushing for the construction and expansion of convention centers rather than as realistic and accurate analyses of the probable economic returns of these centers. Sanders expressed this judgment in the 2000s, but it was an accurate assessment of the 1967 Clare and Smith report that proved to be wildly off in its assessment of the costs to the city’s public funds to pay off bond debts in the years following its construction.

The Convention Center Expansion To improve the Convention Center and its finances, in 1985 the city’s chief administrative officer, Keith Comrie, and a Convention Center citizens’ committee proposed a plan that would acquire land south of the Center and double the size of the meeting rooms and exhibition space (Decker 1985a:B1). Repeating the same arguments used for the original center, the president of the Greater Los Angeles Visitors and Convention Bureau, Joseph Woodard, stated that the expansion was “vitally important” to increase the city’s ability to attract new conventions and that “Los Angeles, the second-largest city in the nation, ranks 18th in the nation in the size of convention centers” and that “millions of dollars are being lost each year due to our inability to provide

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adequate exhibit space and meeting space” (Rivera 1985:E3). Los Angeles was losing the space competition to nearby rivals Anaheim, San Diego, and San Francisco, as well as larger national centers in Las Vegas, Atlanta, and Chicago. The vice president of the Visitors and Convention Bureau, James Hurst, speaking about the 1984 Summer Olympics that had just occurred in the city, contended that “what the Olympics did for us was to elevate the image of Los Angeles all over the world to the point where people, when we stage events, want to go to see us and not our competitors” (Decker 1985a:B1). The city council approved the expansion in November 1985, as well as an increase in the city’s hotel bed tax from 10 to 11 percent to help finance the project, with the only objection to the expansion on the city council coming from Joel Wachs, who expressed concerns about the financial repercussions for the city’s general fund (Decker 1985b:B3). The council later approved $390 million in revenue bonds for the expansion (Chavez 1989:B3). As the chair of the Community Redevelopment Agency, James Wood, declared, “The decision to go ahead with this was a bold one . . . but the economic impact of this center will be enormous. And we had to do this if we wanted to compete with other cities” (Chavez 1989:B3). Construction on the expansion began in 1989 and the new center opened in 1993. With the added space, the Center climbed from the nation’s twentyseventh to the eighth largest, and at a cost of about $500 million, was the “most expensive publicly financed building in the city’s history” (Gordon 1993a:B1).

Part 2. “Blighted”: Devaluing and Removing Residents and the Destruction of their Neighborhoods The construction of the Convention Center and its expansion took place on land once inhabited primarily by low-income racial minorities and illustrates how city policies supported projects in this part of downtown that displaced residents and demolished their communities. Assisted by city funds and the use of eminent domain, the displacement began when the city built the Convention Center in 1971 and continued with the expansion of the Center in the early 1990s and the construction of Staples Center and L.A. Live in the 1990s and 2000s. City agencies explained through their reports and projects that a key goal was to remove lower-income residents and bring in higher-income residents.

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The city clearly understood that primarily lower-income residents, and particularly Latinos and Latin American immigrants, would be displaced by these projects. Although not about whiteness and the intentional targeting of racial minorities, the displacement was racialized in its effects and changed the demographic makeup of the neighborhood’s residents and consumers in the process of racial-spatial formation. A 1966 Community Redevelopment Agency statement clearly explained the agency’s support for demographic change and negative characterizations of lower-income communities. That slums breed crime is a social truth. That they fail to produce a fair and just share of public revenues is an economic truth. . . . The return of the populace in the higher-income brackets to the Central City area is now recognized as a new way of life taking advantage of all the amenities now offered in the heart of a metropolis.” (Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury 1995/1996:400)

The construction of the Los Angeles Convention Center, Staples Center, and L.A. Live took place from the 1960s through 2010. As large-scale projects that razed low-income and working-class communities, the effects are similar to the urban renewal projects in the 1950s through the 1970s, such as Bunker Hill and Chavez Ravine in Los Angeles, and the West End of Boston. Declared a “slum” by city officials and marked for demolition in the 1950s, Boston’s West End differed from other urban renewal targets because of its Italian American residents, in contrast to the majority of displaced residents who were racial minorities (Gans 1982). The West End also received attention from researchers who documented the destruction of the neighborhood and surveyed residents after they were relocated, which was not the case with most urban renewal projects (Gans 1982; Hartman 1964, 1971). What the West End shared in common with other urban renewal sites, however, was its prime location; in this case, near the downtown shopping district and Charles River. Major institutions in the city, such as newspapers, nearby Massachusetts General Hospital, and business and civic leaders, supported the effort to rebuild the area into a place for affluent residents (Gans 1982). Similarly, contemporary large projects across the nation, such as Staples Center and L.A. Live, take advantage of their downtown locations and seek to replace lower-income residents with affluent residents and consumers. In one of the early studies of urban renewal, Herbert Gans (1982), who lived in the West End as he studied the neighborhood before its demolition,

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described it as an “urban village” (Gans 1982:4) with long-established residents, a strong sense of community, and local institutions that served the residents, such as churches, stores, and schools. Gans (1985) denounced the “slum” label used by the city to legitimize the razing of the community and later called such labels and policies part of “the war against the poor.” As Gans (1982) noted, the West End residents understood that other projects in the city displaced residents but noted that those projects served a public purpose, such as building highways; the West End project seemingly did not, and the residents opposed the destruction of their community to build housing for the affluent. As Gans (1985:331) found, the loss of their neighborhood caused great pain; as one resident explained: “I’m going to be lost without the West End. Where the hell can I go?” Another stated, “It isn’t right to scatter the community to all four winds. It pulls the heart of a guy to lose all his friends” (Gans 1985:331). In addition, Gans (1985:363) explained that most of the small business owners lost their businesses and one study found that “54 per cent of the women and 46 per cent of the men interviewed expressed severely depressed or disturbed reactions to the tearing down of the buildings in which they lived.” As Gans (1985:363) concludes about the project, the “costs” paid by the West End residents “represent hidden subsidies” that helped raze their neighborhood and build the “apartments of its high-income successor both by its own losses and by its share of the federal and local tax monies used to clear the site. It is doubtful whether the moving allowance . . . can even begin to balance these costs.” Studies following the displaced residents showed that their median rent increased by 73 percent and did not necessarily result in improved housing (Hartman 1964:271). Chester Hartman’s (1964, 1971) review of studies on the relocation of residents displaced by urban renewal explained that the majority of displaced West End residents were White. In contrast, the majority of residents displaced by urban renewal were racial minorities, and because they faced exclusionary policies as they looked for new housing and home mortgages, their housing costs were higher and housing quality lower. Similar to the city of Boston’s characterization of the West End as a “slum,” Los Angeles city reports on the proposed Convention Center, and Los Angeles Times’s articles that covered the debate over the location and construction of the Center in the 1960s, described the Pico-Figueroa area in negative terms that supported building the Center, displacing residents and businesses, and justified the razing of buildings. The city declared the area “blighted” and

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used eminent domain to acquire the land for the project. For example, a 1966 Department of City Planning (3–4) report described the location as a “site surrounded on three sides by blight” and that “police report the area is now an area of high crime incidence.” Similarly, a city-commissioned study (Clare and Smith 1967: 9) noted the “blighted nature of the area.” A Los Angeles Times editorial (Los Angeles Times 1967:M1) titled, “Center Seen as Blight Cure,” supported the negative characterization of the area, echoing the rationale of earlier urban renewal projects across the country that labeled neighborhoods as “blighted” to legitimate the destruction of neighborhoods (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; Gans 1982). The Los Angeles Times depicted the area as a “deteriorating residential-commercial-industrial neighborhood” (Hebert 1968b:C1), and “a run-down section of downtown—a neighborhood of faded houses, shadowy bars and grimy hotels” (Hebert 1971b: C1). In a rare positive note, describing the area’s housing before it was removed, the Los Angeles Times (Hebert 1970:B1) noted that the “comfortable pre–World War I homes have vanished.”

“No Man’s Land”: Resident Displacement and the Convention Center I examined city documents and over two hundred Los Angeles Times articles and editorials from 1963 to 1971 that covered the analysis and debate over the location and construction of the Convention Center and could not find any reports from either source on the number of residents displaced by the project and the number of housing units destroyed. As mentioned earlier, the Los Angeles Times described the original Convention Center site as a “deteriorating residential-commercial-industrial neighborhood” (Hebert 1968b:C1) and “a neighborhood of faded houses” (Hebert 1971b:C1). This suggests that the original site contained a similar neighborhood and population displaced by the Convention Center expansion, which was a community of hundreds of Latino residents. After the Convention Center was completed, negative descriptions of the neighborhood continued. The Los Angeles Times (1971a:T14) noted that “urban planners have referred to the area” around the “center as ‘no man’s land,’” which the newspaper described as an area of “relatively inexpensive underutilized land, with old single-floor industrial buildings.” This image of the area as a “no man’s land” dismisses the hundreds of residents who still remained

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around the Convention Center and struggled to maintain their community as the city worked to transform the area and remove lower-income residents. Major newspapers, such as the New York Times, are often part of the growth coalition (Molotch 1976). In my examination of the extensive Los Angeles Times’ coverage of downtown projects I found consistent support for development as a generator of jobs, tax revenues, and stimulus for private investment. An important change in reporting occurred over time, however, from the mid-1960s’ coverage of the Convention Center to the 1980s and early 2000s’ coverage of Staples Center and L.A. Live. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a glaring absence of coverage of the displacement of residents. But when the city began plans to expand the Convention Center in the mid-1980s, and completed construction in 1993, city documents and the Los Angeles Times reported repeatedly on the impact on the neighborhood, including information on the total number of people and businesses displaced and housing units destroyed. Similar coverage occurred with the construction of Staples Center and L.A. Live. While still describing the neighborhood in negative terms and giving full support for those projects, the Los Angeles Times again provided in-depth coverage on the displacement of the primarily low-income Latino residents and the housing slated for destruction. Patrick Soon-Shiong, who bought the newspaper in 2018, wrote in 2020 about the coverage of racial issues by the Los Angeles Times. Soon-Shiong (2020:AA1), who stated that he had experienced racism while growing up in South Africa, explained that the newspaper, since its origins in the 1880s, “has ignored large swaths of the city and its diverse population, or covered them in one-dimensional, sometimes racist ways.” Framed by the systemic inequality revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic and recent police violence, the newspaper began a project to examine its history of reporting and to diversify its staff. A newspaper editorial examining “the Times’ failures on race,” gave as examples the “newspaper’s support for the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans, one of the most egregious violations of civil liberties in our nation’s history,” and its coverage of the 1943 attacks by military personnel against Mexican American youth in Los Angeles in which the article “blamed the victims instead of their assailants” (Times Editorial Board 2020:AA2). The editorial described a more recent 1981 article examining social issues that “reinforced pernicious stereotypes that Black and Latino Angelenos were thieves, rapists and killers. It sensationalized and pathologized the struggles

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of poor families.” Commenting on growth interests and race, the editorial explained that “for at least its first 80 years, the Los Angeles Times was an institution deeply rooted in white supremacy and committed to promoting the interests of the city’s industrialists and landowners.” The Los Angeles Times’ support of the Convention Center, and the negative assessment of its residents, fits into this history of the newspaper. The difference between the lack of information on the original Convention Center and the numerous reports involving the projects that followed could be explained in part by the 1970 California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the environmental review process which requires developers to conduct a study to examine the effects of major projects and propose ways to minimize these impacts. As a result of CEQA, the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) provides detailed data on the neighborhood, the residents and businesses displaced by construction, and the loss of housing. Another part of the explanation is the rise of grassroots movements to protest the destruction of communities by large development projects, forcing cities and the media to pay greater attention to the negative impacts of these projects (Clavel 2010; DeLeon 1992; Mollenkopf 1983). The Environmental Impact Report (Engineering Science 1986:2–2) for the expansion noted that the Convention Center’s original site covered thirtysix acres and the expansion added thirty-nine acres. The expansion of the Center would demolish an established neighborhood of residents, not just clear a “blighted” “no man’s land” in a “run-down section of downtown.” The expansion would displace 1,466 residents, the vast majority Latino (1,439 residents, or 98 percent), along with 20 Whites, with the others being a mix of African American, Asian American, and Native American residents (Engineering Science 1986:3–111). The CRA, which was involved in the expansion but not with the construction of the original Center, conducted a house-to-house survey and found that residents were primarily low-income, and that “approximately 60% of the resident families” had “combined incomes of under ten thousand dollars,” with a median household income of $8,254 (Engineering Science 1986:3–110). Showing the preponderance of families with young children, the CRA survey showed that 576 residents were children who attended local elementary, middle, and high schools (Engineering Science 1986:3–109). Another CRA report (1986:9) noted that there were “approximately 31 individuals and 342 families . . . including 68 elderly individuals,” and residents were “predominately

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Spanish-speaking.” Four single-family homes and 406 multifamily units would be demolished in the expansion, along with sixty industrial and commercial buildings housing professional service, manufacturing, and wholesale businesses (Engineering Science 1986:3–109). The EIR recognized that the “project would have a significant impact associated with relocation” of the residents, including “disruption of social ties and social patterns; decreasing accessibility to employment or community services; expending time, energy, and money to find and move into new housing; and potentially an increase in housing costs” (Engineering Science 1986:3–111). Of the 309 families surveyed regarding their relocation preferences, 212 wished to remain nearby in the downtown area (Engineering Science 1986:3–112) so that they could live near their place of work, keep their children in the same schools, and continue involvement in their social networks and community organizations, such as religious institutions. With a vacancy rate in the area that was less than 3 percent, reflective of the tight housing market in the city (Engineering Science 1986:3–110), and the added task of finding housing that matched the limited budgets of the residents, remaining in the area was not feasible for many of the displaced residents. The CRA was responsible for helping displaced residents find new housing and providing funds for relocation costs and rental assistance (Engineering Science 1986) and the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles closely monitored the relocation process and advocated for residents. As the Los Angeles Times (Harris 1988:C1) reported, “under pressure from the Legal Aid Foundation, the agency worked out a program thought to be the most benevolent in the city’s history.” One of the critical issues raised by the Legal Aid Foundation was CRA assistance for undocumented immigrants. The Legal Aid Foundation explained that with the largely Latino population that was being displaced, “it is our experience that a large number of these families are undocumented” (Bodaken 1986:8–27). At a public hearing on the project, city staff noted that undocumented residents “would qualify for CRA relocation assistance” (Engineering Science 1986:8–2). The CRA met its responsibility to provide relocation assistance for displaced residents. Rather than supporting the initial city plans to construct housing for a range of income levels near the Convention Center, however, the CRA’s efforts primarily resulted in housing for higher-income residents. As Legal Aid attorney Charles Elsesser explained, the relocation “was good

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for our clients . . . but not good as far as overall housing policy is concerned” since affordable housing was being demolished and replaced with upscale housing (Harris 1988:C1). As the Los Angeles Times notes, “Housing activists portray the relocation as a purge of the poor from South Park to benefit development interests” (Harris 1988:C1). Alice Callahan, head of Las Familias, a Skid Row organization serving low-income residents, explained that “it’s clearly not a mix, because we’re losing housing for poor people down there. . . . They put the whole burden of redevelopment on the poorest in the city. . . . If the poor families mattered to anybody, they all wouldn’t be losing their homes” (Harris 1988:C1).

Part 3. Financing the Convention Center: From “Minimal” Cost to “White Elephant” City financial analyst Arden Siemers, discussing Convention Center finances, explained that “the council said, ‘go ahead with the project, it will pay for itself,’”; however, “it was assumed it could pay for itself because offices and hotels were going on those other two parcels. That never happened . . . the time was wrong in developing those properties” with a recession occurring and developers’ preference for the emerging Bunker Hill site. As a result, Siemers noted, the Convention Center “has never been in the black, it’s a loser every year” (Clayton 1981:C1). From the start, the Convention Center exceeded cost estimates and did not meet revenue predictions. The Convention Center Authority sold $18,000,000 in revenue bonds with an interest rate of 4.76 percent in February 1968 for acquiring the site property, demolition, and architectural fees, and in January 1969, sold $20,500,000 in revenue bonds with an interest rate of 5.71 percent to cover construction costs (City Administrative Officer 1969:n.p.). Reflecting the rising interest rates nationally (Hebert 1969a:D11), both rates were higher than the 4.25 percent rate used in the 1967 Clare and Smith study; the amounts for acquiring the land and construction costs were also much higher than the figures used in the Clare and Smith study. As a city official stated about the 5.71 percent interest rate, which was very high in comparison to other bond sales in the city’s history, “neither the city—nor a city agency—has paid anything like this in nearly a half century” (Hebert 1969a:D11). Concerns, however, that rates could climb even higher, delaying the project and “losing a

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construction bid,” prompted the Authority to move forward with the bond sale, which would cost almost $200,000 more per year as compared to the 4.76 percent interest rates for the bonds purchased in 1968 (Hebert 1969a:D11). Construction soon started, first on the parking structure in March 1969, with work on the convention building beginning that summer (Hebert 1969b). The Convention Center officially opened two years later in July 1971. Mayor Sam Yorty (1971:T9), recognizing the long battle to build the Center, stated that “when I became mayor, I was determined to terminate 30 years of frustrating discussion and delay by forging forward toward construction of a complex . . . which would make Los Angeles one of the nation’s leading convention-exhibition centers.” The center’s completion, Yorty (1971:T9) declared, “represents an historic milestone in the development of Los Angeles” and would provide a powerful economic boost because the city could “compete on a highly favorable basis for the ever expanding convention and exhibit business which yearly totals several billion dollars.” Speaking at the grand opening ceremonies, comedian Bob Hope, referencing the region’s history of demolition generated by highway construction and urban renewal, remarked, “I knew the city had to put something here. They’ve torn up so many buildings for freeways, it used to be that when you got downtown, there was nowhere to go” (Los Angeles Times 1971b:A1).

Financial Problems The 1967 Clare and Smith (46) study estimated that once the Center was in full operation, taking into account the operating costs and the revenues generated from the Center, the city would have to pay roughly $125,464 to $402,520 for the annual bond payments. Three years after the Center opened, however, the city was paying $3 million annually to cover the bond payments (Harvey 1975:D1). In addition to the higher-than-expected interest rates and the total amount of the bonds contributing to the problem, the Clare and Smith (1967) study had estimated that in the first year of full operation, the Center would have 189 days of events and that figure would increase as the Center became established. A Price Waterhouse study showed, however, that in the fiscal year 1973/74, the Center had 174 event days, and at the time of the study, reservations for the following two years showed no major changes (Harvey 1975:D1).

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The Los Angeles Times noted that “a survey of 16 groups who have used the Convention center recently found that six did not wish to return and a seventh had ‘definite reservations’” (Harvey 1975:D1). While users of the Center found it functional and “aesthetically pleasing,” they complained about an unexpected tax for subleasing space to other exhibitors, “deceptively high rates charged by the center,” and the limited number of hotel rooms within walking distance (Harvey 1975:D1). The Los Angeles Convention Center charged “six cents per gross square foot,” which included charges for aisle space, which meant that the Center was “actually charging about 12 cents a square foot” for exhibition space, in contrast to the Anaheim Convention Center which “charged seven cents per net square foot, meaning the customer got the aisle space free” (Harvey 1975:D1). As Los Angeles Convention Center officials pointed out, “conventioneers spent $20 million in Los Angeles in 1974” (Harvey 1975:D1). The 1967 Clare and Smith study, however, mentioned that much of this spending would have occurred at other venues in the city if the city had not built a new convention center. Council member Marvin Braude, who had strongly opposed the construction of the Center, echoed this point and argued that “a lot of the groups would have come here even if there were no Convention Center” (Harvey 1975:D1). Even with the higher-than-expected toll on city funds, the mayor who led the effort to build the Center, Sam Yorty, explained that “these things take time before they can stand on their own feet financially.” He also contended that “the important thing is that we got it built. We couldn’t build it now for what we did then” (Harvey 1975:D1). The much larger than anticipated shortfall in revenues resulting in the city’s $3 million contribution to pay the yearly bond debt clearly showed the inaccuracy of early estimates by the Clare and Smith (1967) study, and assurances by city officials that city payments for the bonds would be minimal. These payments generated discussions on the financial goals of the Convention Center, with supporters stressing the importance of such centers as catalysts for other financial activity, and the policy concerning booking trade shows versus conventions. Supporters for building the Convention Center built their case on the uncertain premise that the Center would require minimal city payments to pay off the bond debt, rather than acknowledging that most convention centers operate at a loss, and the main goal is to generate spending by visitors to the Convention Center. Speaking about the Center a decade after its opening,

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James Hurst from the Los Angeles Visitors and Convention Bureau contended that the Center “got off on the wrong foot because people misunderstood the purpose of the Convention Center. They thought it would generate a lot of money, and that’s never the case for any convention center in any city. Then when it didn’t, people were screaming ‘white elephant’” (Clayton 1981:C1). As the manager for the Anaheim Convention Center noted, “Most centers lose money. The center itself is not a profit center. It’s designed to bring an impact into the community, it’s expected to take a loss” (Clayton 1981:C1). Later in the decade, supporting the idea of convention centers as economic contributors rather than profitable enterprises, James Freed, who would be part of the design team for an expansion of the Los Angeles center, and who had also designed New York City’s Jacob Javits Convention Center, noted that such places “seldom make a profit” (Whiteson 1988:G1). Instead, Freed contended that such places are “architectural machines designed to generate business for the city” (Whiteson 1988:G1).

The Community Redevelopment Agency and Bunker Hill Los Angeles city officials hoped that the construction of the Convention Center would serve as a catalyst for private investment in the neighborhood, but this did not occur in the years following the Center’s opening. The city had already established the Bunker Hill redevelopment area in the 1960s, which proved to be a much more attractive site for the type of private capital and development that the city had hoped to lure to the Pico-Figueroa site. In effect, the city was competing against itself with the Bunker Hill project in its efforts to attract private developers to the Pico-Figueroa site. The city’s redevelopment of Bunker Hill illustrates the work of city officials to demolish older structures, build “modern” business centers, and erase another densely inhabited, walkable neighborhood filled with lower-income residents and small businesses (Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury 1995/1996). As Jane Jacobs (1961:4) argued, these projects did not contribute to the “the rebuilding of cities. This is the sacking of cities.” Jacobs (1961) contended that cities should preserve and recognize the value of historic neighborhoods and the variety of structures and activities that they added to a neighborhood. In the 1870s and 1880s, construction of multi-story mansions established Bunker Hill as a residential community for affluent professionals. As the city

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grew in the 1920s and 1930s, residents of Bunker Hill began to move to new neighborhoods, such as Beverly Hills and Hollywood to the west, and the mansions were transformed into rooming houses for the working class. In 1943, Los Angeles city engineer Lloyd Aldrich, recognizing the value of historic neighborhoods such as Georgetown in Washington, D.C., and Society Hill in Philadelphia, proposed to preserve the housing and turn it into a “veritable architectural jewel” (Hebert 1973b:B1). The California Redevelopment Law of 1945, which allowed cities to establish community redevelopment agencies to address blight and generate economic development and gave cities the power of eminent domain to acquire property, led to the establishment of Los Angeles’s CRA in 1948 (Grigsby and Caltabiano 1998; Marks 2004). In 2011, Governor Jerry Brown eliminated CRAs over concerns about the distribution of funds for public schools and services. The federal government passed the Housing Act in 1949, which created the Urban Renewal Program and provided cities with funds for clearing areas that were “slums” and to revitalize downtown neighborhoods (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). The city council favored demolition over preservation and approved the Bunker Hill plans in 1959. It was the city’s first major CRA project, and covering 136 acres, it was the nation’s largest urban renewal project at the time (Grigsby and Caltabiano 1998; Marks 2004). As with urban renewal projects across the country, the CRA justified the project through its goals of slum clearance and blight removal. The actions of the CRA highlighted the national conflict between the redevelopment goals of cities and those of displaced residents who contested city officials’ negative evaluation of their neighborhoods as “slums.” They instead viewed their communities as established neighborhoods with long-term residents and strong local institutions such as schools and religious organizations (Anderson 1964; Gans 1982; Marks 2004). The project involved the destruction of about 7,000 housing units and the displacement of approximately 11,000 working-class and low-income residents (Grigsby and Caltabiano 1998:67; Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury 1995/1996:399). Bunker Hill residents included an incredibly diverse mixture of immigrants from Latin America and Europe, and US-born people of a range of races and ethnicities, including Filipinos and Native peoples. The 1961 film The Exiles focused on a group of Native peoples living in Bunker Hill. In the 1930s, Harry Hay, who would later be a founder of the gay organization the Mattachine Society in the 1950s, hid from police after throwing a

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brick at an officer during a demonstration in Bunker Hill, under the protection of Clarabelle, a transgender woman who was a major figure in the LGBTQI+ community in the neighborhood (Feinberg 2005). In their research, Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury (1995/1996:402) described the residents of Bunker Hill as a “community of bohemians, retirees, and blue-collar workers,” and noted that Clay Street “for decades had served as an artists’ colony.” As an example of the residents and buildings in Bunker Hill, the first properties that the city acquired were three houses built in the 1890s that the owners had subdivided into twenty-three units housing “23 inhabitants, most elderly. All lived alone” (Hebert 1973b:B1). John Weaver (1972:N33), writing in a negative tone in the Los Angeles Times, described the buildings in Bunker Hill as “rundown Gothic mansions” that “sheltered a ragtag collection of pensioners, prostitutes and petty crooks.” Weaver (1972:N33) selected from Raymond Chandler’s Los Angeles noir writing this bleak description of life in the neighborhood: “Haggard landladies bicker with shifty tenants” and “on . . . front porches . . . sit the old men with faces like lost battles.” These negative depictions contrast with a 1956 documentary film on Bunker Hill which showed “vibrant streets” and “a neighborly life” (Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury 1995/1996:399). What happened at Bunker Hill is similar to urban renewal projects in the 1950s aimed at “slum” clearance that destroyed established communities and displaced residents, such as Chavez Ravine and its Mexican American residents in Los Angeles, and the West End and its Italian American inhabitants in Boston (Gans 1982; Hines 1982). In addition to contributing to socioeconomic change among downtown residents, clearing Bunker Hill also supported the heteronormative, nuclear family image of “ideal” residents. Los Angeles’s main financial, business, and entertainment districts had risen along Spring Street and Broadway in the early 1900s, and the city used the Bunker Hill project, a handful of blocks to the west, to establish a new business district and reverse the decline of downtown, which faced an exodus of businesses that had begun in the 1950s and 1960s. Financial corporations moved about five miles further west to the emerging mid–Wilshire Boulevard area, and to newer, affluent communities on the Westside, such as Beverly Hills (Chapman 1971; Yoshihara 1978). As part of the cultural shift, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art moved from its shared building in the Natural History Museum in Exposition Park to a new cluster of buildings in the mid-Wilshire district in 1965, which at the time was the “largest art museum

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to be built in America in the last quarter century and the largest ever . . . built west of the Mississippi” (Los Angeles Times 1965:C19). Downtown business interests worked to attract and retain companies in the area and the massive Bunker Hill renewal project was crucial in this effort. As Mike Davis (2006:229–230) noted, the city and its CRA, with “site assemblage and clearing on a vast scale,” “at immense public cost,” worked to rebuild Bunker Hill and the Figueroa Corridor into “megastructures” and create a new center for finance and corporate activity. Angels Flight, a funicular railway built in 1901 to connect Bunker Hill to the business district, was removed in 1969 so that thirty feet could be sheared off the top of the hill, which the city considered too steep for businesses (Hebert 1973b; Marks 2004). As Mike Davis (2006) observed, eliminating Angels Flight also served to insulate the new business district from the working-class and racial minority population using the old downtown area. City plans for Bunker Hill replaced the “narrow thoroughfares and alleys that once crisscrossed the old densely populated hill” with wide streets and “superblocks” (Hebert 1973b:B1). While the CRA sold the first parcel in 1965, in the mid-1970s, over half of the land remained vacant because, as a CRA planner explained, “for years, we couldn’t give the land away. Nobody wanted to be pioneers” (Hebert 1973b; Marks 2004:266). Bunker Hill development gained momentum, however, and Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Gail Sansbury (1995/1996:395) note that it has become “the premier office district of downtown Los Angeles.” When referring to the destruction of the old neighborhood, they describe it as a “corporate landscape of high-rise office towers and modernist plazas that has erased any memories of its previous topography.” The 1972 opening of the twin fifty-two story towers of the Atlantic Richfield Plaza, just south of the Bunker Hill redevelopment zone, established the area as the city’s new financial district (Chapman 1971). Atlantic Richfield, an oil company, owned 48 percent of the plaza and moved its headquarters from New York City to the complex. Bank of America, which also owned 48 percent of the plaza, moved its regional headquarters into the complex (Rosenblatt 1972). City officials achieved success in bringing major financial and business enterprises back to the downtown area but failed to create a strong residential community among the thousands of workers who populated the skyscrapers during the day but fled outward to other communities for residential and entertainment opportunities.

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Redevelopment completely leveled the buildings in Bunker Hill and destroyed many of the buildings along the Figueroa Corridor, but by shifting the business district to Bunker Hill, it left the historic core structures intact. Heavily used by African Americans and Latinos, this historic district would be a ripe setting for the return of affluent residents and gentrification at the turn of the next century as city officials and private developers worked to build new structures downtown, such as Staples Center in 1999, followed by L.A. Live in the first decade of the 2000s, and turn historic commercial buildings into market-rate housing for affluent residents.

The World Trade Center An important part of the projections regarding the financial feasibility of the Convention Center relied on the city’s plan to lure private investors to build a 1,000-room hotel and major high-rise office building, possibly a World Trade Center, on six acres acquired for the Convention Center project. The Clare and Smith report (1967:54–55) estimated that the hotel and office building would generate about $940,000 annually in property taxes, well above the $200,000 to $300,000 generated by the site before being taken over for the Convention Center. Neil Petree, president of the Los Angeles Convention Center Authority, strongly supported building a World Trade Center next to the Convention Center (Hebert 1969c:C1). Petree explained that the Chamber of Commerce “made an exhaustive study of the need for a World Trade Center” and the best location, and commissioned Development Research Associates to prepare a “Feasibility Study” which backed the Chamber of Commerce’s viewpoint (Petree 1971b:J1). The Los Angeles Times (1970:A1) described the Chamber of Commerce as the “prime mover” of the World Trade Center and noted that the Chamber of Commerce believed that “there would be no problem filling the World Trade Center office tower,” and that “potential tenants” for the World Trade Center included “U.S. Customs, importers and exporters, custom brokers, freight forwarders, foreign consultants . . . transportation agencies and foreign trade associations.” John Pastier (1971:J1), the architectural critic for the Los Angeles Times, in contrast, disagreed on the Pico-Figueroa site as a place for a convention center and World Trade Center. Regarding the Pico-Figueroa site, Pastier contended, “Rather than contributing to a more cohesive downtown, the Convention

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Center tends to fragment and distend the city’s core.” The hotels in Bunker Hill, as Pastier (1971:J1) pointed out, were over a mile distant from the Convention Center, rather than “within easy walking distance” as preferred by conventioneers. Regarding a World Trade Center, in a battle of dueling studies, Pastier (1971:J1) mentioned an “independent feasibility study” conducted by economist Lawrence S. Cahn that examined “the functional needs of such a project, and comparing them with market demands, available sites, and broad city planning objectives,” and concluded that Bunker Hill would provide the best site. As Pastier (1971:J1) explained, “The functional relationship between a convention center and world trade center is marginal. A trade center’s real links are to legal offices, financial institutions, and non-convention-oriented hotels . . . The best place for such a project is in the heart of downtown.” In early 1972, the city sent out information packets to over one hundred private developers nationwide and requested proposals to build a World Trade Center and a large Convention Center hotel next to the Convention Center, but no proposals were received (Hebert 1972). Instead, in 1973, developers announced that they were building a World Trade Center on Bunker Hill, emphasizing that the location is “within three blocks of all the city’s major financial institutions” (Hebert 1973a:II–1), and it opened in 1974. The history of the construction of the World Trade Center seems to support Heywood Sanders’s characterization of feasibility studies—such as the ones by the Chamber of Commerce and Development Research Associates that supported the site next to the Convention Center—as promotional materials rather than rigorous economic analyses of potential projects. Developers constructed high-rise office towers and hotels in Bunker Hill, attracted to its location near the city’s financial district and civic center, and because land costs were lowered by subsidies from the city’s redevelopment efforts (Clayton 1981). City budget analyst Bert Becker explained that the “nearby Bunker Hill development boom helped discourage development near the Convention Center” and the 1973 recession put a damper on development (Clayton 1981:C1).

The Image of Downtown Los Angeles in the 1990s Mayor Tom Bradley, with construction of the Center expansion underway, established a Convention Center Area Task Force in 1991 (1992:1) “with the mission of developing ‘a work program that will increase the marketability of

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The Los Angeles Convention Center: 1950s–1990s

the expanded Convention Center and stimulate the investment opportunities for the area around the Convention Center,’” a serious concern given the lack of private investment in the neighborhood and the shortfalls in anticipated revenue that followed the opening of the original Convention Center. As the Task Force (1992:2) pointed out, “The Convention Center is isolated and disconnected from the major activity centers and tourist attractions in the downtown area,” confirming Pastier’s (1971) assessment two decades earlier on the Pico-Figueroa site. The Task Force’s Downtown Image Committee (1992:2) explained that “for years, little effort was necessary to promote Los Angeles because of the City’s climate, tourist attractions and trend-setting aura [which] sold Los Angeles to a worldwide consumer base.” The Image Committee (1992:1–2) bluntly stated, however, that now “the image of the City of Los Angeles and of Downtown Los Angeles is the single most important issue facing the Convention Center” because “in the marketing of a travel destination, image is the reality” and “one of the popular images of Los Angeles is that of a generally unsafe crimeridden, drug-infested and gang-dominated city which is further plagued with a variety of traffic and smog problems.” “This is especially true,” the Image Committee noted (1992:1), “in the wake of the recent civil disturbance when television images of riot-torn Los Angeles were beamed throughout the world.” The committee was referring to the 1992 civil unrest that followed the acquittal of the police officers involved in the beating of African American motorist Rodney King despite the beating being caught on video tape. The unrest resulted in the deaths of over fifty people and close to $1 billion in property damage (Connell and Serrano 1992:A1). Nationally, the crime rate rose during the 1960s through the 1980s, peaked in the early 1990s, and was a major public concern. Crime rates, however, steadily declined in the following decades, with the rate of violent crime, for example, dropping by about 50 percent (Roeder, Eisen, and Bowling 2015). Although Los Angeles also experienced a significant decline in crime rates, with 1,094 murders in 1992 and less than 300 in 2010 and the following years, crime remained a serious concern among residents and visitors (Chang and Lau 2016). As part of the city’s image problem, the Task Force Enhancement of Environs Committee (1992:3) advised that the “perception of safety and security of convention participants . . . around the Convention Center . . . must be reinforced. Currently, the homeless, panhandlers, street vendors, vacant poorly

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maintained buildings and graffiti militate against the desired perception of a secure environment.” During the opening of the Center expansion with an amusement park trade show, for example, a British game manufacturer “admitted to being ‘a little edgy’ when he got lost . . . and drove along Skid Row as homeless men were lighting fires in metal drums” (Gordon 1993b:B1).

Hotel Room Shortage As the Convention Center prepared to open in 1971, the Los Angeles Times (Hebert 1971a:A1) noted in an article headline, the “City Convention Center’s No. 1 Worry—Hotels,” and in its subheading, “Lack of Downtown Rooms Spurs Fear That Building Won’t Serve Its Purpose.” One of the major reasons city officials gave for building the Convention Center was the revenue generated by out-of-town conventioneers who would spend money on hotels and restaurants, but the shortage of downtown hotel rooms meant that the largest conventions could not be accommodated. As Neil Petree of the Convention Center admitted, “It’s a long-range problem—not enough hotel rooms” (Hebert 1971b:B6). The general manager of the Los Angeles Convention Bureau, Robert Coyner, explained that some conventions require rooms near the facility and “we don’t even go after conventions that cannot be accommodated” (Hebert 1971a:A1). The Los Angeles Convention Bureau noted that while large conventions require 14,000 hotel rooms, there were only about 4,000 near the facility (Hebert 1971a:A1). Conventions requiring more hotel rooms would have to house their attendees in Hollywood, about seven miles away, or even further, near the airport, or in Santa Monica or Long Beach. As a testament to the undesirability of the Convention Center’s PicoFigueroa location, away from downtown’s business center, in the dozen years following the construction of the Convention Center, four large hotels opened downtown but none next to the Center. The first major downtown hotel in two decades, the 500-room Hyatt Regency Hotel, opened in 1973 about four blocks north of the Convention Center as part of the Broadway Plaza office building and shopping complex (renamed Macy’s Plaza, and later, The Bloc), which included the downtown’s first new department store in half a century (Hebert 1973c). The city’s largest hotel, the 1,474-room Bonaventure Hotel, designed by the prominent architect John Portman, opened in 1976 in Bunker Hill. Portman had also designed the Hyatt Regency in Atlanta in the 1960s, and that hotel

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contributed to the redevelopment of the city’s downtown and the successful effort to turn Atlanta into a major convention city; Portman also designed the Hyatt Regency in San Francisco in 1973 (Seidenbaum 1976). Portman explained that “I’ve dedicated my career to the central city . . . What the country needed was not new cities but a restructuring of our old cities” and noted that “Atlanta didn’t have any tradition of downtown” and the city needed to “create a place where people want to be and want to circulate.” In Los Angeles, Portman explained that “what Bunker Hill needed was a complex” and Portman contended that “there’s never been a hotel in this country built like this place. Not just for people in the rooms but for public activity” (Seidenbaum 1976:D1). The Bonaventure Hotel incorporated elevated pedestrian walkways to connect it to neighboring buildings, a design element encouraged by Los Angeles city planners envisioning “a new urban form . . . a Central city in which automobile and pedestrian are finally liberated from one another, the auto keeping the streets and people acquiring private, aesthetically pleasing walkways . . . above street level” (Chapman 1971:R7). While ostensibly about pedestrian safety in relation to traffic, planners also saw walkways as a way to address suburban residents’ fear of downtown danger and crime, allowing visitors to come downtown, use the hotel, and walk to nearby attractions, while avoiding the street-level sidewalks. As Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury wrote about Bunker Hill, the “doctrines of modernist city planning . . . segregated pedestrian and auto-traffic, created superblocks and megastructures, differentiated one zone of activity from the other, and . . . stripped from these Bunker Hill streets the vibrancy and overlay of functions that had characterized them for almost a century” (1995/1996:395). Pedestrian walkways and “megastructures” are part of a larger strategy that, Mike Davis (2006:229, 230) explained, contributed to a “fortress effect,” part of the “deliberate socio-spatial strategy” that reinforced class and racial “spatial apartheid” in the construction of racial-spatial formation. Davis (2006:229) cited urban affairs journalist Sam Kaplan who argued that the new projects were “hermetically sealed fortresses” that have “dammed the rivers of life.” The CRA staff recognized that some of the features of the Bonaventure Hotel contributed to a fortress effect, but considering some of the “innovative and exciting design” features of the hotel, and the failure several years earlier to negotiate a hotel deal on the same block, the CRA staff worked to make the

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Bonaventure Hotel a reality (Kawaratani 2007:191). Richard Mitchell, director of the CRA, and Yukio Kawaratani, the main CRA city planner who worked on the Bunker Hill redevelopment project, met with a representative of John Portman to review the plans for the Bonaventure Hotel. Kawaratani (2007:191) explained that when he and Mitchell first saw the plans, they appreciated the “spectacular atrium extending up about seven stories, with fountains, plants, elevators, escalators and many restaurants and shops,” and the “five cylindrical towers and how they are organized into a signature landmark.” The soaring atrium and towers were in stark contrast with the exterior, with “the first five stories of the building . . . made of blank concrete except for one small, unadorned entrance on Flower Street and some glass doors and windows along the Figueroa Street taxi and auto turnout” (Kawaratani 2007:191). After the opening of the Bonaventure Hotel, as downtown Los Angeles attracted more development and pedestrian activity, earlier projects that designers built to alleviate fears of downtown crime could be redesigned to become more open to sidewalk activity. With the Bonaventure Hotel, for example, a number of “years later, the architects significantly redesigned the main frontage along Flower Street by putting in more inviting entrances and storefronts” (Kawaratani 2007:193). The opening of the Bonaventure and renovation of the downtown Biltmore and Hilton hotels gave the city enough first-class hotel rooms to finally compete for major conventions, but again, no major hotel was built next to the Convention Center (Yoshihara 1978). As an indication of the resurgence of downtown, in 1976, new owners bought the historic Beaux Arts–style Biltmore, built in 1923, and invested $30 million for renovations. As the head of the corporation stated about the Biltmore, “The guest rooms had furniture which had not been changed since 1923,” which included “horsehair mattresses” (Yoshihara 1978:K1). The 448-room New Otani Hotel opened in 1977 in Little Tokyo, and the 470-room Sheraton Grande Hotel opened in 1983 in Bunker Hill (Yoshihara 1977; Los Angeles Times 1983).

Hotels: Ongoing Problem The 1991 Convention Center Area Task Force commissioned a study by Economic Research Associates (1992:1) that reiterated a long-standing issue, as shown in Table 1.1, that in comparison to the Center’s “principal competitor cities,” which are Anaheim, Las Vegas, San Diego, and San Francisco,

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“the existing hotel base is dramatically inferior, particularly as it relates to the number and quality of rooms within close proximity to the convention center.” The Task Force (1992:8) emphasized the need for a “headquarters convention hotel operated by a nationally recognized chain” with at least one thousand rooms next to the Convention Center, since convention planners favor sites with a nearby hotel that can house convention organizers, speakers, industry officials, and many of their attendees (Hirsch 2000). Ideally, hotel rooms would be right next to the Convention Center, or within a short walk. As a 2017 study states, “The closer the hotels are to the convention center, the better it is for the customer. Industry standard is that most conventioneers won’t walk more than ¾ mile” (Ovrom 2017:9). The Hotel Committee Report (1992:5) of the Task Force reported that the “economic and physical conditions” around the Center “inhibit the development of a flagship hotel . . . by private initiative” because a hotel would not generate “sufficient return on investment” and that “there is a reluctance among lenders to finance a hotel.” For a hotel to be built, the Task Force Hotel Committee concluded that city subsidies would be required, with studies suggesting over $200 million for a 1,000-room hotel. As shown in Table 1.1, The Los Angeles Convention Center had no hotel rooms directly adjacent to the Convention Center. The 195 rooms listed in the 1992 study are actually 0.3 miles away from the Convention Center and the Marriott Hotel and Ritz-Carlton Hotel complex built in 2010 by Anschutz Entertainment Group is also 0.3 miles away, according to the 2017 study. Although the number of hotel rooms within the outer limits—three-quarters of a mile—of what is considered walking distance greatly increased by 2017, the Los Angeles Convention Center remains at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to its main competitors in California and Las Vegas, as shown in Table 1.1.

Convention Centers and National Competition Downtown business leaders and city officials around the country have led the effort to build new convention centers and expand and renovate existing ones, resulting in the increase of exhibit space from 32.5 million square feet in 1986 to 70.5 million square feet in 2011 (Sanders 2014:13, 22). As exhibition space has grown, however, the major conventions and trade shows peaked in the mid-1990s and early 2000s (in terms of the amount of exhibit space used

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TA B LE 1.1 Convention Centers and Hotel Rooms Cumulative Hotel Rooms 1992* Convention Center

1 Block

Los Angeles

195**

5 Blocks

12 Blocks

897

5,884

Anaheim

2,639

5,623

6,260

San Diego

1,355

4,730

7,203

San Francisco

2,175

8,781

15,381

Las Vegas

3,174

15,574

49,373

*Economics Research Associates. 1992. Table 2, page 6.

Cumulative Hotel Rooms 2017* Convention Center Los Angeles

¼ Mile

½ Mile

¾ Mile

0**

2,204

4,637

Anaheim

4,430

9,900

13,490

San Diego

2,120

7,240

10,370

San Francisco

3,290

10,760

21,750

*Ovrom (2017:9). ** The Convention Center Area Task Force (1992) table “Downtown Hotels” and “Exhibit 1 Map” lists the Holiday Inn, with 195 rooms, as one block from the Los Angeles Convention Center. This report uses Economics Research Associates (1992) data. The block that the Convention Center sits on is one block from the Holiday Inn. In the 2017 Ovrom report (p13), however, the distance from the actual Convention Center structure to the hotel, rebranded and renovated as the Luxe City Center Hotel, with 175 rooms, is listed as 0.3 miles.

and attendance) and have generally declined since then (Sanders 2005). Economic recession and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, contributed to the downturn, and although the convention industry has grown since that period, companies have reduced business travel to cut costs, and advancements in technology have provided new ways of providing information and selling products (Sanders 2005; Vrana 2005). As of 2021, the pandemic has also dramatically boosted the use of technology for online meetings. While the number of conventions and trade shows had rebounded in the years before the pandemic, there remains a great deal of unused capacity among convention centers (Sanders 2014), and the postpandemic, long-term future of conventions is unclear. Convention center operators recognize that there is a great deal of overcapacity in the market, that convention centers operate as “loss leaders” since centers rarely generate

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enough revenue to cover the cost of construction and debt service, and few even cover operating costs (Sanders 2014:29). Convention center boosters continue to claim, however, that building centers will attract private investment to build more facilities, such as hotels, restaurants, and bars, and that convention centers will bring in out-of-town visitors (especially those on business, who spend more per day than tourists) who will use the facilities and generate tax revenue for the city. Cities hire consulting firms to analyze the fiscal feasibility of building new centers or renovating or expanding existing centers. Sanders (2014:122) has examined a number of these studies and asserts that “it is impossible to read” some of these studies and conclude that the consulting firms were “offering a reasonable, complete, or balanced market assessment to their clients.” For example, as Sanders (2014:122) points out, the 2011 Conventions, Sports, and Leisure (CSL) study for Los Angeles states that even though there is “limited growth” in the convention and trade show business, in Sanders’s words, the CSL study suggests that “a significant increase in convention business and economic impact” is possible. Considering “the oversupply of convention center space that created a ‘buyer’s market,’” Sanders (2014:123) suggests that these studies “did not convey the realities of convention and tradeshow demand, and the competition for business,” but instead, are meant to “sell the case . . . to the media and the public.” Major cities with amenities to attract out-of-town visitors can be competitive nationally and Los Angeles, with Hollywood, Beverly Hills, its climate, beaches, and established restaurants, is a major contender, especially as new hotels are constructed near the Convention Center. Given the limited number of conventions and trade shows in a market with expanding exhibit space, and the fiscal realities of convention centers as loss leaders, convention centers in secondary cities that do not have the drawing power of major convention center cities such as Las Vegas, New York, or Chicago will have a much harder task of serving as an economic catalyst for development (Vrana 2005). The history of the Los Angeles Convention Center illustrates the maneuvering of downtown business interests and city officials to promote growth interests. After voters repeatedly failed to approve bonds to build the Convention Center, city officials created a special authority in 1967 that could issue bonds without a public vote, bypassing public input and negating a counter to the growth coalition (Sanders 1992, 2014). The city would finance and build the Convention Center, justifying the use of public funds with studies that

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showed that the Center would generate tax revenues that would pay off the bonds. Tax revenues, however, failed to reach projected levels and costs were much higher than anticipated, leaving large deficits that the city had to cover. The use of public funds to build the Center, however, directly benefited corporate interests, such as the hotel and restaurant industries, that would profit over business generated by Convention Center attendees. Critics of public funding for convention centers cite the opportunity costs and the loss of other projects that could have received funding, and reduced funds for public goods such as education, transportation, and police and fire protection (Sanders 2005). The staff of the Legal Aid Foundation who worked with residents displaced by the expansion of the Convention Center concluded that the city fulfilled its obligations regarding relocation funds for the residents. While protests might result regarding the city’s obligation to help displaced residents, these actions did little to stop the larger transformations occurring in neighborhoods due to city policies. Housing activists noted that the expansion of the Convention Center contributed to a “purge of the poor,” that the “poorest in the city” lost their homes, and their communities suffered the costs of redevelopment. The construction of the Staples Center sports arena and L.A. Live entertainment district, covered in Chapter 2, demonstrates city support for major projects by private developers and the continued destruction of neighborhoods. The tragic history of resident displacement by earlier projects contributed to the understanding of the negative effects of city action on lowerincome neighborhoods and a recognition of the need for changes in city policies to better serve lower-income residents. The history of displacement in Los Angeles, and in other cities across the country, helped lay the foundation for the progressive coalition that would emerge in Los Angeles during the 1990s and the coalition’s work to establish growth-with-equity policies in the city. Emblematic of the work of this coalition is the 2001 L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) with the L.A. Live project, which I discuss in Chapter 4. This agreement went beyond assistance for displaced residents, as with the Convention Center expansion, to include provisions to strengthen neighborhoods and help lower-income residents more broadly, through requirements for affordable housing, local hiring, and living wages.

2

Staples Center and L.A. Live: 1990s–2010s

Building Staples Center Sports Arena and L.A. Live Los Angeles city officials built the Convention Center—which opened in 1971 and was expanded in 1993—and believed that it would act as a catalyst for attracting private capital and development, but the Center clearly failed in that regard. The 1990s marked a decade of transition for Los Angeles, with regional business interests fragmenting and losing cohesion as a unified voice, but the downtown growth coalition remained powerful and received strong support from the building trade unions and the city council for major projects. Investment around the Convention Center finally happened when the Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) constructed Staples Center sports arena, which opened in 1999 (and was renamed Crypto.com Arena in 2021), and the L.A. Live entertainment complex, which opened in stages through 2010. AEG’s Staples Center and L.A. Live demonstrated the continuing political influence of extremely wealthy business owners who leveraged their enormous investments of private capital to gain the crucial assistance of city officials in the entitlement process, the city’s use of eminent domain to assemble the large number of properties required for such massive projects, and the provision of public subsidies. Staples Center and L.A. Live are part of a growing trend of constructing downtown sports facilities to help spur development and transform downtowns into entertainment and cultural centers, rather 58

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than building these facilities in the suburbs, where sports facilities often exist as isolated projects surrounded by huge parking lots (Rosentraub 2010). Contemporary growth policies resonate with the government spending and racially exclusionary policies that built suburbs for Whites in the post– World War II era while disinvestment and redlining contributed to declining conditions in urban areas inhabited by racial minorities. These racial minority communities faced another threat as government policies involving urban renewal and highway construction targeted them for destruction. Presentday growth interests in Los Angeles, working to revitalize the downtown area through such projects as Staples Center and L.A. Live, are once again demolishing neighborhoods and displacing racial minorities. While perhaps not explicitly racially exclusionary, growth interests are aware of the racial and class transformation that occurs when lower-income residents are replaced by higher-income residents, given the higher percentage of Whites among the affluent. The 1990s also saw the emergence of new union leadership and a renewed focus on social movement unionism and the establishment of new community organizations, but the growth-with-equity coalition was in its early stages and had yet to emerge as a unified political force. A clear sign of the growing political influence and cohesion of this coalition around development policies would occur later, with the 2001 L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement (CBA).

Staples Center Staples Center grew out of a long business relationship between Philip Anschutz, a Denver multibillionaire on Forbes’s list of the richest people in the world, and Ed Roski Jr., who heads the company established by his father, Majestic Reality Co., which is in Los Angeles County and is “one of the largest privately held real estate companies in the United States” (Rosentraub 2010:133). Anschutz, who owned land near Los Angeles’s downtown Chinatown, asked Roski for ideas on projects and Roski suggested a sports arena. With this idea in mind, in October 1995, Anschutz and Roski bought the Los Angeles National Hockey League (NHL) team, the Kings, who played nearby in the city of Inglewood at the Forum arena. Jerry Buss, who owned the National Basketball Association (NBA) team the Los Angeles Lakers and the aging Forum (which had opened and been home to the Lakers since 1967),

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understood that the Forum was going to lose a major tenant in the Kings. Buss also understood that moving the Lakers to a new arena could increase revenues and the value of the team, so in June 1996 he granted an option to Anschutz and Roski to buy a 25 percent share of the Lakers (the option was used in 1998), in order to play in the new arena (Hodges 1998; Simers and Wharton 1999). Charles Isgar, an adviser to the mayor of Los Angeles, Richard Riordan, and a member of the Coliseum Commission, believed that a sports arena could help transform the Convention Center neighborhood. Isgar, armed with just a “few notes scrawled on a sheet of paper,” met with Roski to pitch his idea of building the arena next to the Center (Wharton 1999:D1). Roski was not convinced, and the idea might have died, except that Roski and Anschutz toured the country looking at sports facilities in downtown areas. Roski explained that “it became apparent to us that if you put one of these arenas in an urban location, they really work and they make a difference to the city. . . . We came back and decided, ‘You know, we’ve got to consider the Convention Center’” location (Wharton 1999:D1). Meanwhile, Steven Soboroff, a developer, head of the city’s Recreation and Parks Commission, and a friend of the mayor, understood that the Convention Center was costing the city millions of dollars a year from the general fund and that a new arena might help improve business at the Center and generate badly needed tax revenues. Isgar realized that he “hadn’t told the story well” during his first sit-down with Roski, so he worked with some architects to translate his ideas into visual plans (Wharton 1999:D1). Isgar, Soboroff, and the architectural advisers met again with Roski in January 1996, and though nothing was decided that day, the idea began to gain traction. Anschutz and Roski wanted to build more than just a stand-alone arena; they envisioned a sports facility as part of a larger entertainment and hotel complex that would enhance the attractiveness of the arena site as a regional destination and capture a wide range of consumer spending (Rosentraub 2010). As Mark Rosentraub (2010) explains, owners of sports teams wanted to build on the model established by Walt Disney when he built Disney World in 1971. Learning from his experience with Disneyland, which had opened in 1955, Walt Disney wanted to capture as much consumer spending as possible, and in addition to the amusement park, Disney World included a range of hotels, restaurants, and retail shops. The city of Inglewood recognized that the Forum site did not have room for expansion. The city attempted to keep the Kings and Lakers from leaving

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Inglewood, and lure Anschutz and Roski to build their arena complex in the city, through an offer of land for $1 a year near the Hollywood Park Racetrack, with an additional $35 million to help construct the arena (Merl 1997). After a year of negotiations and nineteen drafts, the city of Los Angeles and Anschutz and Roski reached a nonbinding proposal. Similar to arena deals around the country, the city offered the land for a $1 a year lease and the developer would cover the costs to build the arena. As Soboroff, the city’s main negotiator, explained, “We give them the land and they do everything else” (Merl and Simon 1996:B1). The city proposed to use $60.5 million in bonds and the power of eminent domain to purchase and clear the land that would include parking lots for the arena and an entertainment complex that would be built later. How the city would pay for the roughly $7 million yearly fees for the bonds became a major point of contention among city council members and the developers (Merl and Simon 1996:B1). Council member Joel Wachs, equipped with a law degree and a master’s degree in tax law, and with over two decades on the council, had “earned a reputation as City Hall’s most tenacious fiscal watchdog” and represented a San Fernando Valley district with a large working-class population (Martin 1997:B1). Wachs, concerned that the general fund might be tapped to help pay off the sports arena bonds, explained that “something is terribly wrong in taking money that is desperately needed for police, fire, parks, libraries and youth activities and using it to line the pockets of wealthy owners and players” (Merl 1996:B1). In January 1997, the Los Angeles City Council voted 13–2 to support the development of the downtown arena. As council member Nate Holden, who opposed the plan, would later state about subsidies for the arena developers, taxpayers “are fed up with welfare programs for the rich” (Gordon 1997b:B1). Wachs, who had voted against the arena, expressed concern that important aspects of the proposal, such as the number of years the Lakers and Kings would play at the arena, were not revealed. When negotiators of the proposal for the city and developers expressed the need for secrecy to protect “proprietary” information, Los Angeles Times’ columnist Bill Boyarsky (1997:B1), who called for greater transparency in the negotiations and questioned the need for secrecy, investigated the issue, and found that this type of information on existing sports leases was readily available to the public. Later in 1997, Wachs declared that he would launch a voter initiative “requiring an election before any professional sports facility could receive a

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public subsidy” (Rohrlich 1997a:A1), and soon after Wachs filed the initiative with the City Clerk (Dillman and Riccardi 1997:A1). Wachs explained that although he supported having an arena, he was against public funding and wanted fuller disclosure about the financial dealings of the project. Wachs (1997:B9) asserted: I love professional sports. But they’re big business, with billionaire team owners and megamillionaire players. I don’t believe that taxpayers’ money should be used to subsidize them, at least without giving the voters a right to approve it. . . . It reflects the equally grave concern that people have over the countless unkept promises that teams have repeatedly made in an effort to obtain taxpayer subsidies, despite the fact that virtually every prominent economist who has studied the issue has concluded that with few exceptions, stadiums and arenas have little measurable effect on a city’s economy.

Wachs’s stand against public subsidies for owners of professional sports teams for sports facilities goes against the record of cities across the country that have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in public funds to build or renovate sports facilities (Long 2013; Siegfried and Zimbalist 2000). Some cities, such as Los Angeles, however, have changed the script, understanding that these subsidies are not a good economic investment. As John Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist (2000:103) state, “Few fields of empirical economic research offer virtual unanimity of findings. Yet, independent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sports facility construction and economic development.” Proponents of sports facilities cite other benefits, such as spurring development around the facility, the importance of sports in US culture, and that having a team increases media coverage and confers “major league” status to a city (Siegfried and Zimbalist 2000). Given the popularity of sports, elected officials believe they receive positive publicity in retaining or bringing a team to their cities by building sports facilities. A major reason why cities provide subsidies is that owners of professional sports teams have a monopoly and can tightly control the number of teams in their leagues. Since sports teams are a scarce commodity that is in high demand, team owners use their monopoly power in negotiations to pit cities against each other and to threaten to remain or move to a new location based on the amount of public subsidies that cities offer. Moving a team is not an empty threat since the history of professional sports shows that teams move

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regularly. After all, the Dodgers moved from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in 1958, the Lakers moved from Minneapolis to Los Angeles in 1960, and the Rams and Chargers of the National Football League (NFL) moved to the Los Angeles region in the 2010s. Cities such as Los Angeles and states such as California, with their enormous and diverse economies, do not need to offer professional sports teams large subsidies. Teams may forgo large subsidies because they gain in value by locating to a large city such as Los Angeles because of the corporate and wealthy fan base that will buy expensive luxury suites and premium seats, the added media exposure, and the corporate sponsorships. As a result, cities such as Los Angeles have leverage that smaller cities do not have in negotiations with sports team owners. Wachs’s point about “billionaire team owners and megamillionaire players” resonated in Los Angeles, where the Lakers gave Shaquille O’Neill a seven-year, $120 million contract in 1996, a year that saw two other NBA players break the $100 million mark (Corry 2016). Wachs, who had twice run for mayor in the past and lost, and Soboroff, both had plans to run for mayor in 2001 (both lost in the primary). Their critics suggested that part of their heated rhetoric on the sports arena was motivated by their political plans, and council member Mark Ridley Thomas, a strong supporter of the arena, suggested that for Wachs, “it’s part of his ongoing effort to set up his mayoral campaign” (Martin 1997:B1). The city even involved Cardinal Roger Mahony, who supported the arena, in a failed attempt as a mediator to help Wachs and the developers reach agreement (Rohrlich 1997b). The $1.3 billion Getty Center opened in 1997 in Brentwood, on the Westside of Los Angeles. With its massive endowment, it immediately became an internationally important arts and cultural institution. The Getty, along with other cultural and entertainment projects opening around the region, gave added impetus for Los Angeles city officials and business interests working to reestablish the importance of downtown Los Angeles and bring major projects to the area. Two decades after the opening of the Getty Center, its architect, Richard Meier, explained about the Westside location: “[T]here was always a controversy about that. There were people who felt the Getty should build in the downtown area, which would have made it more accessible by public transportation. But the Getty board wasn’t interested in that. They wanted their own place. They didn’t want to be part of downtown renewal” (Hawthorne 2017:F4).

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After Wachs filed his voter initiative, Staples Center developers announced a major concession when they proposed an “ironclad” guarantee in which they would cover the city’s bond costs that were not paid for by arena fees, thereby protecting the city from unexpected shortages, such as those that have plagued the Convention Center since it opened in 1971 (Parlow 2002; Shuster 1997; Wilgoren 1997). Additionally, rather than the city leasing the arena land for fifty-five years for only a dollar a year and giving other parcels free to the developers, the developers agreed to lease the arena land for $302,738 per year as of the early 2000s (Baade 2003:11), and pay the city $4.8 million for the parcels, which equaled the city’s cost for acquiring the land (Parlow 2002:537). The developers also revealed information from their agreements with the sports teams showing that the Lakers and Kings would sign twenty-five-year leases to play in the new arena, addressing Wachs’s concerns about the longterm viability of the arena (Rohrlich 1997a:A1). Referencing Boyarsky’s call for more information, Tim Leiweke, president of AEG, stated, “I think that the columnist is probably right. . . . We’ve made some mistakes here. I’ll take the blame for some of it” (Rohrlich 1997a:A1). In fact, several years later, with negotiations with the city underway for the L.A. Live project, Leiweke said that AEG was “maybe a little combative” with city officials with the Staples project, and that “maybe we were a little, I don’t want to use the word ‘arrogant,’ but, well, we’ve taken a different tone” with the L.A. Live negotiations (Newton 1999:B1). Another benefit for the city was that revenue from such sources as property, sales, and utility taxes and business licenses, would not be used to pay the bond debt but would go to the city (Parlow 2002; White and Dillman 1997:A1). The city’s Community Redevelopment Agency, however, agreed to give the developers $12 million, which Wachs could not block since the CRA was governed by state law and the funds could not be subjected to a city ballot measure (Shuster 1997). The city and developers signed the sports arena agreement on October 31, 1997, and both sides agreed that the final deal improved the city’s position. Wachs declared that the revised agreement would save the city over a $100 million, while the spokesperson for the arena said that the deal would cost the developer additional “tens of millions” (Shuster 1997:A1). The developers agreed to these concessions because the project would still generate significant revenue, partly because of lucrative corporate partnerships.

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The 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles helped establish the relationship between sports and corporations when it generated over $200 million in profit with the help of corporate sponsorships. This occurred despite concerns about the economic outcome when the Soviet Union boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics in retaliation for the US boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics (Elliott 2014; Johnson 1998). Leiweke explained, “[W]e’re using corporate partnerships as an avenue to develop the kind of funds we need to build the most expensive arena ever built,” and “because of the size of the Los Angeles market, we’re able to generate the kind of exposure our partners need to do these kinds of deals” (Johnson 1998:A1). AEG’s $116 million deal with Staples Inc. to name the arena Staples Center set a record for sports venues (Sanders and Silverstein 2000:C1). The Los Angeles Times (1999:31) calculated the expected revenues for the arena in its first year. These revenues included ten corporations that served as the founding partners and paid between $2 to $3 million each, which would generate $25 million; 160 luxury suites, priced from $197,500 to $307,500, which would generate $35 million; the 2,476 premier seats priced from $12,800 to $14,800 which would generate $33 million; plus $12 million from concessions and $9.6 million from parking. In addition, the city allowed the developers to build two high towers facing the freeways with advertising space that they could sell (Rosentraub 2010). Concerts are another important source of revenue for sports arenas. AEG has become a major concert promoter and has turned Staples Center into an important stop for a steady stream of international stars. Rock singer Bruce Springsteen played at the Staples Center grand opening on October 17, 1999, and the final show at the Sports Arena in Exposition Park in 2016 before it was torn down to make way for a Major League Soccer stadium. The $350 million structure was the nation’s highest-priced soccer-specific stadium (Baxter 2019) when it opened in 2018 for a new team, the Los Angeles Football Club. When Springsteen played at the opening of Staples Center, reflecting his New Jersey blue-collar roots, Springsteen joked that there were “too many sky boxes” in the arena, a part of the arena’s high degree of class segregation (Hilburn 1999:F1). Unlike the more open and democratic layout of beloved Los Angeles institutions such as Dodger Stadium and the Hollywood Bowl, which were both built decades earlier, ticket holders for the luxury suites, which are blocked off from the rest of the arena, have their own parking area, entrances, and restaurants (Newton and Shuster 1999).

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Springsteen’s engagements at Staples Center and Sports Arena highlight the relationship between rock concerts and sports arenas, and the role of these arenas as part of the downtown sports, culture, and entertainment complexes that city officials hope to build to attract affluent consumers and residents. In the 1960s, as the NBA and NHL expanded the number of teams in their leagues, teams built new facilities and searched for events beyond the traditional ice skating shows and circuses to fill their venues. Claire Rothman, the general manager of the Forum in Inglewood during the 1970s and 1980s, explained that “for an arena to be viable, you need a couple hundred nights . . . a year” with events (Lewis 2018:F1). The NBA and NHL each had 82-game regular seasons, with half of those at home, leaving many days available for other events. In the 1960s, major rock groups began playing at sports arenas that could hold around 18,000 fans, a major step up from the two- to three-thousandseat facilities that rock groups had been using. Part of the shift occurred because previously concerts often had multiple bands playing short sets from 15 to 30 minutes, but with the “shift from the 45 rpm single as the dominant medium to the 33 1/3-rpm long-playing album,” bands began playing longer shows (Lewis 2018:F1). Major bands could headline arena concerts, and the Forum in Los Angeles and Madison Square Garden in New York City became major stops for bands touring the United States. These new arena concerts dramatically increased live performance revenues, especially with rising ticket prices, with iconic American rock group the Eagles first reaching the $100 per ticket mark in 1994 (Lewis 2018:F1).

Los Angeles Times Sunday Magazine: Staples Center Special Edition Highlighting the relationship between a city’s major newspaper and major development projects, to mark the opening of Staples Center, the Los Angeles Times published its largest and most lucrative Sunday magazine on October 10, 1999, devoted entirely to Staples Center. The Los Angeles Times was already one of the ten founding corporate sponsors of the arena, but the financial link between the newspaper and the developers became a major controversy when the New York Times published a story on October 26, 1999, titled “Newspaper Magazine Shares Profits with a Subject,” that reported that over $2 million in advertising revenue generated by the Los Angeles Times magazine had been

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split with the arena owners (Barringer 1999:C1). This was the first time that many of the Los Angeles Times’ reporters had learned about the agreement and they were “outraged” (Shaw 1999:V1). The next day, the Wall Street Journal printed an article that emphasized that the “decision to split profit . . . with the subject of the issue, the owners of a sports arena, has raised questions about how far a paper can go without damaging its integrity” (Bannon 1999:B8). While “all newspapers tend to have financial relationships with organizations or companies they cover,” for example, “writing about advertisers,” the Wall Street Journal (Bannon 1999:B8) explained that “newspapers have traditionally solved the problem by maintaining a wall between their editorial and business sides.” The corporate CEO of the Los Angeles Times, Mark Willes, however, had been working to remove the wall between the editorial and business parts of the newspaper, stating that he would “use a bazooka, if necessary,” creating the circumstances that allowed for the revenue-sharing debacle to occur (McDougal 2001:436). Willes’s business goals focused on increasing corporate profits; for example, through firing employees and eliminating unprofitable newspapers owned by the company, even if the newspapers had strong reputations for journalistic excellence (McDougal 2001). Before coming to the newspaper, Willes had worked for General Mills and was involved with breakfast items. Because of Willes’s cost-cutting moves and the elimination of employees, the newspaper’s reporters nicknamed him the “Cereal Killer” (McDougal 2001:418). Hendrik Hertzberg (2001:194), a senior editor of the New Yorker, praised the Los Angeles Times’ effort to cover the problem and wrote that “no one reported on the Staples mess better than the L.A. Times” with an “exhaustive account” by its Pulitzer-prize-winning media reporter, David Shaw. Shaw (1999:V1) explained that leading up to the controversy, “increasingly, business concerns seemed to be influencing editorial decisions in ways long forbidden at The Times and at all respectable big-city newspapers.” Shaw (1999:V1) wrote that the agreement between the newspaper and Staples Center “constituted a conflict of interest and violation of the journalistic principle of editorial independence so flagrant that more than 300 Times reporters and editors had signed a petition demanding that their publisher, Kathryn Downing, apologize and undertake ‘a thorough review of all other financial relationships that may compromise The Times’ editorial heritage.’” Shaw (1999:V1) explained that Downing apologized and that she and Willes “acknowledged that the profit-sharing agreement had been a mistake,”

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but that the staff remained concerned about the executives’ “drive-the-stockprice imperative” that could “undermine the paper’s journalistic quality, integrity, and reputation.” The next year, in 2000, the Chicago-based Tribune Company bought the family-owned Times Mirror Co. In 2018, Los Angeles “biotech billionaire” Patrick Soon-Shiong bought the Los Angeles Times, returning it to local control (James and Koren 2018:A1).

L.A. Live The land acquired for Staples Center included the blocks surrounding the arena, which was cleared and used for parking lots while AEG prepared for the next phase of their sports and entertainment district named L.A. Live. Announced in May 2000, the $2.5 billion project would cover about thirty acres, and fulfilling the city’s decades-long effort, a major hotel would finally be built, the key amenity needed to attract large conventions. As Tim Leiweke explained, however, “it’s clearly going to need a subsidy, . . . these large hotels for convention centers don’t get built without one” (Newton 2000:A1). The project would also include luxury condominiums, an office tower, a theater for live performances, a multi-screen movie theater, restaurants, and nightclubs. Staples Center officials carefully prepared for the new plan by establishing relations with unions and council members (Newton 2000). Unlike the earlier effort to build Staples Center when “arena proponents tried to bulldoze their way through the City Council and then resisted attempts to make their proposed contract with the city public,” “Staples officials have laid the groundwork for this fight better,” “stressed Staples’ friendly relationship with organized labor . . . and paid personal calls on nearly all the City Council members” (Newton 2000:A1). As Leiweke stated, “We’re smart enough—or beaten up enough—to do it this way” (Newton 2000:A1). Council member Joel Wachs, however, raised similar fiscal concerns as he did with Staples Center, noting that the project involved “some of the world’s richest real estate developers” and asked the question, “Who’s going to pay for it? The people who own it and are going to profit from it or the taxpayers?” (Newton 2000:A1). Wachs, however, after his third failed attempt for the mayor’s position in 2001, would resign from the city council and leave Los Angeles later that year to head an arts foundation in New York City.

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The city council voted to approve the project in September 2001, although a decision was postponed regarding a subsidy for the hotel, which the developer claimed was essential for the hotel to be built (Daunt 2001c). The developer finally broke ground on the project in September 2005 and Tim Leiweke, whom Sports Illustrated (Wahl 2005:20) noted “has a reputation for hype-slinging,” described it as the “largest and most important development in the history of Downtown Los Angeles” (Roth 2005:1). Leiweke declared that “ultimately, we believe downtown Los Angeles can become a point of destination for the region” and “more importantly, L.A. can be the event capital of the world” (DiMassa 2005:B1). As Leiweke had earlier explained, “We have an opportunity to create something . . . that becomes not just a heart and soul for entertainment, music and nightlife, but also a place where we come together as a community to celebrate our holidays, sporting events, social and civic causes . . . and our accomplishments. What we don’t want is a mall . . . It should be about taking the world’s best events in sports and entertainment and bringing them here” (Mandell 2004b:8). When AEG first proposed L.A. Live, they described it as “Times Square West” to give it stature as a transformative project and major attraction (Gordon 1997b:B1). AEG later dropped that moniker to emphasize what they saw as the uniqueness of L.A. Live, rather than an imitation of Times Square, and following criticism of Times Square as a destination primarily for tourists. It was important to emphasize that L.A. Live should contribute to the downtown infrastructure and serve local residents and workers, as well as tourists (Downtown News 2005). With Staples Center completed and L.A. Live under construction, a 2006 Los Angeles Times’ West magazine article listed Anschutz as number six of the 100 “most powerful people in Southern California” (Los Angeles Times 2006:16), and another Los Angeles Times article noted that Anschutz had “amassed a global empire of more than 100 companies . . . In addition to oil and gas, real estate, movies and sports, his enterprises are active in railroads, telecommunications, agriculture, live entertainment, art and newspapers” (Bunting 2006:A1). On the 2020 Forbes’s list of the “400 Richest Americans,” Anschutz ranked fiftieth, with a net worth of $10.1 billion (Forbes.com 2020). In contrast to AEG president Leiweke, who enjoys the limelight, Anschutz rarely speaks to the media and “with no entourage . . . and not even a reserved parking space in Los Angeles, he goes out of his way to remain anonymous.

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Friends say he enjoys jogging alone or buying a hot dog at Staples Center without being recognized” (Bunting 2006:A1). The following year, in 2007, a 7,100-seat live theater opened in L.A. Live with a performance by rock band the Eagles, and a Grammy Museum, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, bowling alley, movie theater, public plaza, and office space followed (Boucher 2007). The Downtown News (Vaillancourt 2009:1) awarded L.A. Live its 2008 Project of the Year distinction, noting its “impact and contributions” to the neighborhood “and to Downtown’s overall quality of life.” Focusing on the design and architecture of Staples Center and L.A. Live, Los Angeles Times architectural writer Christopher Hawthorne was highly critical of the complex. Hawthorne (2008:E1) stated that the project “is designed like an airtight cruise ship, turning not a welcoming face but the architectural equivalent of a massive hull to the neighbors.” Hawthorne (2008:E1) explained that “the project is relentlessly focused on creating its own wholly separate commercial universe” which might “keep the rest of our blocks underused” and the complex “seems destined to become a hermetic, inwardlooking and car-centric development in the classic Southern California tradition.” Regardless of the architectural merits of the project, city officials pointed to its economic contributions and a report commissioned by council member José Huizar proclaimed that “many factors have contributed to the dramatic economic resurgence of Downtown Los Angeles, but perhaps no development has been a bigger ‘spark plug’ than the success of the Staples Center, the reinvigorated Convention Center and LA Live as the heart of the Sports and Entertainment District” (Ovrom 2017:26).

L.A. Live Hotels In 2002, then-mayor James Hahn noted that the Convention Center was “really a white elephant” because the revenues it generated failed to pay off the bonds for the 1993 expansion and the city had to pay $11.7 million in 2000 and $13.6 million in 2001 from its general fund to help with the debt (McGreevy 2002:B1). Building a major hotel next to the Center would help attract conventions and generate more tax revenue. AEG requested city support to build a convention center hotel.

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At a December 2004 Ad Hoc City Council Committee for the hotel to discuss possible subsidies, Gilda Haas of Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), a key organization in the growth-with-equity coalition, spoke in support of AEG. Haas noted that SAJE’s experience working with AEG had “flipped the script” and whereas community groups in the past generally argued against development projects and subsidies for developers, in this case, SAJE was “speaking in favor of the economic development project” (Saito 2004). Hass explained that in her “experience with AEG,” the developer had been “our partners, professional and rigorous in meeting the terms of the agreement [2001 L.A. Live CBA]” (Saito 2004). Some downtown hotel representatives argued against a subsidy, stating that subsidies would unfairly help a competitor, although most, if not all, of the subsidy opponents had received some form of city subsidy to support their construction (McGreevy 2005b). Tim Leiweke pointed out that the owners of the Bonaventure Hotel, who threatened a lawsuit if AEG received a subsidy, ignored the history of Bunker Hill and the sale of that property at below market prices to lure major projects such as the Bonaventure Hotel (McGreevy 2005b). To support the construction of AEG’s hotel, the city agreed to a $4 million rebate in building permit fees, a $5 million grant from the CRA, and most importantly, a tax rebate for twenty-five years that could add up to $270 million based on “net new tax revenue” from sources such as Transient Occupancy Taxes and property taxes (Galperin 2018:2; Vincent 2007:C1). As Tim Leiweke explained about the hotel, “It will change the economy not just downtown but of Los Angeles” (Vincent 2007:C1). The developer began construction of the hotel in June 2007 and a wide range of elected officials attended the groundbreaking ceremony, including Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. The mood at the ceremony was festive and celebratory and Leiweke suggested that “if I don’t do it right, I will be putting mustard on hot dogs in the Staples Center,” to which union leader Maria Elena Durazo added, “and it will be a good job because it’s a union job” (Saito 2007). Nearly four decades after the completion of the Convention Center, AEG opened the Marriott Hotel and Ritz-Carlton Hotel complex in 2010. With a combined total of 1,001 rooms, along with 224 luxury condominiums in the upper floors of the Ritz-Carlton listed from $1.4 million to $10 million, the

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$1 billion structure marked the completion of L.A. Live, and the hotels added the key missing piece to the Convention Center complex (Martin 2010). At fifty-four stories, the building was the first downtown skyscraper built since 1992 and the tallest residential structure in the city (Hawthorne 2010). As the hotels opened, the nation was in the middle of a recession. California was experiencing a climbing number of hotel foreclosures and declining real estate values, and Los Angeles hotels faced dropping occupancy rates and declining revenues, reinforcing the need for subsidies and the financial risk of building large, luxury hotels (Martin 2010). Highlighting the importance of AEG’s new hotels, in 2011, the Convention Center hosted the largest convention in the city’s history, the Microsoft World Partner Conference, which brought in attendees from over a hundred countries (Guzman 2011). Clearly, the restaurant and entertainment venues at L.A. Live, event space at Staples Center, and the newly opened Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels, made the Microsoft Conference possible. The tax incentives helped AEG move forward with the hotel project when other developers refused to build a major hotel in that location. The Los Angeles Times, however, has raised questions about the necessity of recent city incentives for hotels. The Los Angeles City Controller, Ron Galperin (2018), wrote a report that outlined the Incentive Agreements with tax abatements the city approved from 2005 to 2015, including four agreements for hotels built after the L.A. Live hotels. The city granted the Courtyard Marriott and Residence Inn, which opened in 2014, an Incentive Agreement of up to $67.3 million over twenty-five years; the Wilshire Grand Hotel, which opened in 2017, was granted an Incentive Agreement of up to $250 million over twenty-five years; and the Hotel Indigo, which opened in 2017, was granted up to $18.7 million over six years (Galperin 2018:5). The Los Angeles Times expressed strong reservations about the recent Incentive Agreements, given the downtown building boom. In response to Galperin’s (2018) report, the Los Angeles Times (2018a:A12) wrote that “among the report’s disturbing findings: The city . . . doesn’t have the expertise to negotiate such deals. And it doesn’t challenge developers’ assertions that they can’t afford to build without a tax break.” The Los Angeles Times (2018a:A12) explained that “in theory, tax breaks can boost economic activity and generate tax revenue that the city wouldn’t have otherwise. But if a tax break goes to a project that would have been built even without a subsidy . . . then the city has

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traded away money that could have been spent on police, sidewalks, libraries and other public services.”

Resident Displacement: Staples Center and L.A. Live City officials believed that the Convention Center would act as a catalyst for private investment to address the area’s “blight,” but major projects such as the hoped-for World Trade Center and hotel had not materialized. As a testament to the Convention Center’s failure to attract new development, nearly two decades after its completion, the Los Angeles Times described the area in 1988 as “a corner of downtown Los Angeles where a freeway interchange overlooks a sea of low-rise, run-down stores and dwellings” (Whiteson 1988:G1) and the area around the Center as a “forlorn hunk of downtown” (Harris 1988:C1). The Convention Center’s failure to spur new investment in the neighborhood left some of the surrounding blocks intact. The Staples Center project covered about nine acres that was part of the Convention Center site, so no direct displacement occurred with its construction (Planning Consultants Research 1997:ES2). The proposed L.A. Live project and additional parking for Staples Center, however, would include 27.1 acres and completely cover three city blocks and portions of three others (PCR Services Corporation 2001:38– 39), displacing residents and businesses. Once again, city reports and the Los Angeles Times described the areas in ways that would justify the demolition of the community. The Los Angeles Times described the blocks that would be leveled as an “area . . . troubled with abandoned houses, drug sales and prostitution” (Gordon 1996:B1), “dilapidated, roach-infested apartments that dotted the rough-hewn neighborhood” (Rivera 1999:B1), and a “sleepy and often seedy neighborhood” (Sanchez 1998:D2). The Staples Center Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) (Planning Consultants Research 1997:23) described the properties as containing “many dilapidated, deteriorating, and abandoned structures, characterized by lack of maintenance of building and landscaping, poorly lit streets, and graffiti.” City reports and Los Angeles Times articles described the area in negative terms, and although much of the neighborhood housing was old and substandard, it was a desirable location because the area’s rent-controlled apartments

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offered affordable housing, and it was within walking distance to stores and jobs in the service sector and nearby garment district and warehouses. Since many of the residents had lived there for decades, there was a strong sense of community (Velasquez 2009). It was a place with “ramshackle rooming houses built in 1907 and three-story walk-ups from the 1920s” in which “youngsters play soccer on the asphalt and grandmothers sit on plastic lawn chairs in the shade of sidewalk ficus trees” (Gordon 1997a:B1). As one woman, whose family had lived in the area for over ten years, explained, “I like it here . . . I have everything close by” and because “we don’t have a car . . . I can walk to the laundry and the store” (Gordon 1997a:B1). Enrique Velasquez, an immigrant from El Salvador, had worked on tenant rights issues for a housing organization for about a decade before he joined SAJE in 2000. Recalling his talks with residents displaced by Staples Center and L.A. Live projects, Velasquez (2009) noted that all the families he was able to contact several years after they moved “said they were living worse than before.” One of the major issues was having to leave rent-controlled units for housing that was much more expensive. Once housing subsidies for displaced residents ran out, their rents were much higher than before. Also, the former residents told Velasquez that the move, which scattered the residents across the region, created tremendous hardships in their lives and strained their networks because “we got separated. We lost our friends. We lost our neighborhoods” and to reach “our jobs, we now have to travel long periods by bus” (Velasquez 2009). The DEIR (Planning Consultants Research 1997:132–133) found that the area for Staples Center and L.A. Live contained 184 occupied residential units and four recently demolished units. The DEIR estimated that based on the 1990 US Census data on the average household size, approximately 655 lowincome people lived there. The DEIR (Planning Consultants Research 1997) did not give data on the race of the residents, but the Los Angeles Times described them as “mainly low-income Latino immigrants” (Gordon 1997a:B1). Displaced residents were given a four-year rent subsidy and moving expenses, which, according to the CRA, averaged about $9,300 per family with a total of about $1.3 million spent to help those displaced (Rivera 1999:B1). Some residents believed that they were not given what they were due, in part because they worked in the informal economy and could not document their income, and some were undocumented immigrants and unwilling to push the issue (Rivera 1999:B1). While some tenant advocates questioned the amount

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received by residents, the CRA claimed that the agency had gone “beyond our legal requirements” (Gordon 1997a:B1). The DEIR (Planning Consultants Research 1997:133–134) also found that the main parcels for the future L.A. Live project and parking contained thirtyfour buildings, with thirty-seven businesses, about 750 jobs, and a school district childcare facility. The larger neighborhood surrounding the Convention Center, South Park, was roughly 25 percent parking lots (Sanchez 1998:D2). The high number of parking lots was partly the result of investors buying property, clearing away the buildings, and displacing more residents after the expansion of the Convention Center. Investors anticipated a new hotel and other development, but this did not occur for many years.

The Downtown Boom: Staples Center Staples Center developers had the Lakers and Kings committed to playing in the new arena, and with the NBA Clippers also signing a contract to play there, the arena became the only sports venue in the nation with three major professional teams (Simers and Wharton 1999). Adding to Staples Center coffers, an Arena Football League team and a Women’s NBA team also signed contracts to play in Staples Center. Turning Los Angeles into a sports center proved wildly successful in 2012 as Sports Illustrated reported that in a span of four days, the downtown area hosted “four NBA playoff games, two NHL playoff games, three major league baseball games pitting two first-place teams, and the biggest bike race in North America” (Jenkins 2012:40). The region offered consumers a wide range of entertainment options, but the Lakers’ remarkable run of excellence brought local and national attention and customers to Staples Center, including Hollywood celebrities such as Jack Nicholson, a dedicated Lakers fan with a courtside seat. As Tim Leiweke (Mandell 2004b:8) explained, “We got very lucky with the Lakers. We won three championships in five years.” The Lakers would go on to win a total of five championships from 2000 to 2010 and the Kings hockey team would win the Stanley Cup Championship in 2012 and 2014. Staples Center had over 200 events a year with an assortment of concerts and sporting events. The arena also successfully went after national events, holding the 2000 Grammy Awards and the 2000 Democratic National Convention in which Al Gore was nominated. This was the city’s first national

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convention since 1960 when John F. Kennedy was nominated several miles south in the Exposition Park Sports Arena. The new Los Angeles City Controller, Laura Chick, commissioned a study from economist Robert Baade to evaluate the arena’s contract and economic impact. Baade (2003:4) noted that the city spent $71.1 million to help build the arena, which included $38.5 million in bonds, “$20 million from the Convention Center Debt Service Reserve Fund,” and “$12.6 million from the Community Redevelopment Agency.” Baade explained that the developer guarantee to cover the “debt service on the $38.5 million,” and the “interest lost on the use of the $20 million . . . from the Convention Center Debt Service Reserve Fund,” “would be covered through a dedication of a portion of event parking fees and a tax imposed on tickets.” Baade (2003:5) concluded that “compared to public support for other similar projects throughout the United States, the Staples Center qualifies as exceptionally taxpayer friendly.” Comparing the nonbinding January 17, 1997, agreement with the October 31, 1997, agreement signed after Wachs threatened a voters’ initiative regarding public funds for a sports facility, Baade (2003:10) stated that the earlier agreement “offered little direct financial benefits for the City while exposing the City to potentially significant financial risk,” while the latter agreement contained “better financial terms” because “the City of Los Angeles by virtue of its size and favorable demographic characteristics has the ability to negotiate favorable terms with professional sports leagues and teams.” Law professor Matthew Parlow (2002:528), who specializes in land use and sports law, analyzed the arena deal and concluded that “given the absence of financial risk associated with the investment, coupled with the potential for significant economic gains, the City set a new standard for new sports facility financing deals which offered important, substantive benefits to both parties.” Professor of sports management Mark Rosentraub (2010:142) called the “Staples Center deal the most favorable among any negotiated at the time by any city.” Joel Wachs played hardball, so to speak, during city negotiations with the developer over the arena contract, and his criticism of the use of public funds for a sports arena, and the voters’ initiative he filed with the City Clerk regarding this issue, paid off with a better deal for the city. After the dismal failure of the original construction and later expansion of the Convention Center to significantly boost private capital investment in the neighborhood, the Downtown News celebrated the impact of Staples Center (Mandell 2004b:8). As Carol Schatz—head of the Central City Association,

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a downtown business group—explained, Staples Center was the key project for the downtown “revitalization effort” because “it gave people a reason to come Downtown” (Regardie 2015:10), and that “when people started coming down to a place they hadn’t been to in years, or at all, it changed perceptions enormously” (Mandell 2004a:1). Similarly, Robert Baade said that when he talked to business owners while studying the impact of Staples Center, Baade reported that “most felt that Staples enhanced the general environment Downtown. People felt it was safer, cleaner” (Mandell 2004a:1). The Staples Center opening coincided with economic conditions that favored investment in real estate over the stock market, helping to fuel capital investment downtown. As Mark Tarczynski, a broker with a major commercial real estate company active in the Los Angeles downtown market, explained, “It was kind of the perfect storm of events. . . . With Staples, you had this tremendous catalyst . . . and also the capital markets realigned because of low interest rates and low returns in the stock market. Then people wanted to invest in real estate . . . Now all of a sudden, capital development dollars are flowing into Downtown” (Mandell 2004a:1). As an example of the confluence of factors supporting development, Tarczynski spoke about the events that led to a mixed-use project that included a supermarket and upscale housing. Tarczynski, who brokered the 2001 property transaction, explained that some corporate executives “happened to be going to a Lakers game. . . . They decided to drive around a little bit and see what was going on. That’s when they saw the Shuwa property up for sale” (Mandell 2004a:1). The corporation “purchased the block-and-a-half site for $37 million. The firm is now developing a $220 million mixed-use project that will include the Ralphs market” (Mandell 2004a:1).

The Downtown Boom: The Historic Core The opening of Staples Center in 1999 marked a pivotal moment for the construction of new buildings in downtown Los Angeles. In 1998, Geoffrey Palmer bought land just west of the Harbor Freeway—about a fifteenminute walk from Staples Center—to build the first of his downtown megaapartment complexes that would help spark the construction of market-rate housing in the area (Sanchez and Wedner 2001). Palmer explained that he “knew that with Staples Center coming, there would be an exodus back to the city,” that “it would generate a lot of activity, just as the stadiums in Denver

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and Baltimore did,” and was “an added consideration” in his plans to build housing in the area (Newman 2000:RE7). The year 1999 also marked a key period in the development of downtown’s historic core. Urban renewal in the 1950s through the 1970s resulted in the destruction of many historic downtowns across the United States, with the demolished buildings replaced by modernist skyscrapers. In Los Angeles, urban renewal led to the leveling of the historic residential neighborhood composed of nineteenth-century mansions in Bunker Hill, but by shifting downtown’s business and financial center to Bunker Hill, as Mike Davis explains (2006:230), it also left the city’s historic core largely intact and preserved “most of its circa 1900–1930 Beaux Arts commercial core.” Developers have worked since the 1970s in downtown Los Angeles to preserve and renovate historic structures. Their vision provided an alternative to the common practice of demolishing older buildings and instead recognized their irreplaceable historic and aesthetic contributions to a neighborhood (Vincent 2008). Gene Summers, who had worked with the famed modernist architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe on the Seagram building in New York City and later designed Chicago’s McCormack Place Convention Center, bought the 1923 Beaux Arts–style Biltmore Hotel in 1976 and renovated it (Yoshihara 1978:K1). Also in the 1970s, Wayne Ratkovich bought and began the restoration of the 1926 Romanesque Revival Fine Arts building and the 1928 Art Deco Oviatt building (Ratkovich 2015; Vincent 2008). In the 1980s, developer Ira Yellin acquired and restored a number of downtown landmarks, including the 1917 Grand Central Market, which has become a major dining destination, the 1893 Bradbury Building and its well-known interior court with its ornate ironwork that has appeared in a number of movies, and the 1918 Million Dollar Theater (Ouroussoff 2002; Streeter 2002). A transformative change occurred in 1999 when the city of Los Angeles adopted the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance for the downtown area, which facilitated the conversion of existing commercial buildings to “new residential uses” through changes in “land use ordinances” that “relaxes parking, density, and other typical zoning requirements” and “provides flexibility in the approval and permitting process” (City of Los Angeles 2006: n.p.). Not requiring additional parking proved to be a major contribution to reusing historic buildings (Partnership for Building Reuse 2013). Tom Gilmore, one of the key downtown pioneers, developed the first major project that utilized the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance with a cluster of three

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buildings that he named the Old Bank District. After working in New York City, upon arriving in Los Angeles in 1992 Gilmore stated, “[I]t shocked me that the second-largest city in America didn’t have a workable downtown” (Gelt 2006:E26). Gilmore, speaking about his plans for the Old Bank District, explained that “if our plan works out, people will want to walk downtown streets again. In fact, everything depends on it” (Jones 1999:11). Gilmore suggested that people “are hungry for the kind of neighborhood we are going to build. I think most real estate people downtown don’t have a clue about that hunger” (Jones 1999:11). Standing on Broadway, looking at the under-utilized “stone-covered department stores, Moorish and Beaux Arts office buildings, [and] movie palaces larger than Carnegie Hall” that held largely vacant upper floors, Gilmore stated that “it’s . . . so exciting because you just know it’s going to change” (Jones 1999:11). Gilmore suggested that “Los Angeles’ historic core has great potential precisely because it deserted its downtown and left it as a junkyard of failed businesses” (Kotkin 2000:M2). Many other developers, however, believed that Gilmore was taking a huge risk attempting to create market-rate housing, especially after the failure of so many previous efforts to make the historic downtown neighborhood into more than a 9 to 5 place of work (Jones 1999; Khouri 2016). Gilmore stressed the importance of simultaneously developing multiple, contiguous buildings to establish a lively neighborhood, rather than earlier failed projects that focused on single buildings left isolated in a largely deserted downtown after nightfall. With residential units in the upper floors, a critical part of Gilmore’s plan involved the creation of an active street life with stores, restaurants, and bars on the ground level of his buildings (Jones 1999). As Gilmore explained, “We will win it or lose it on the street. . . . People who rent apartments in the Old Bank District will want to feel like they live in a city with street life. They may love their apartments with the high ceilings and big windows . . . but the essential thing is the street” (Jones 1999:11). Gilmore’s Old Bank District, opening in 2000 through 2001 with 240 housing units and ground floor retail, proved to be a remarkable success, both financially and as a catalyst for further downtown development (Krikorian and Hong 2002; Krikorian 2003). Because of the achievements downtown, the city expanded the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance in 2003 to include sections of Hollywood, mid-Wilshire, Koreatown, Chinatown, Lincoln Heights, and Central Avenue. From 1999 to 2013, developers used the ordinance to renovate

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over sixty downtown buildings to create more than 14,000 living units as apartments and hotels (Partnership for Building Reuse 2013). Following the success of Los Angeles’s Adaptive Reuse Ordinance, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and the Urban Land Institute established the Partnership for Building Reuse in 2012. It studies the contributions of reuse toward environmental sustainability by decreasing carbon emissions and waste, and it advocates for building reuse rather than demolition and for the recognition of the architectural and aesthetic value of older structures (Partnership for Building Reuse 2013). Under discussion in Los Angeles is modifying the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance to include the development of creative office space because of the declining number of suitable historic buildings for conversion to housing and the rising property values in the historic core, which makes the profitable conversion to housing more difficult (Partnership for Building Reuse 2013; Vaillancourt 2013). On Broadway, for example, with about one million square feet of empty space in the upper floors of buildings, natural light does not reach many of the spaces and addressing this issue would be expensive for conversion to housing (Partnership for Building Reuse 2013). Since office spaces could use more artificial light, conversion to offices could be a possibility.

Broadway and Business Improvement Districts The establishment of a Business Improvement District (BID) on Broadway is part of the growing trend of private control of public space by business associations that represent the interests of developers and businesses (Briffault 1999; Selbin et al. 2018). The Broadway BID contributed to racial-spatial formation by implementing policies that supported the displacement of Latino small merchants and homeless people who were primarily African American, and lay the groundwork for the influx of businesses and residential units catering to a more affluent and White clientele (Selbin et al. 2018; Sims 2016). BIDs are “private entities funded by local property assessments” (Selbin et al. 2018:1). BIDs have proliferated across the United States since the 1980s and are part of the joint effort of city officials and business and property owners to address the decline in city funds for local services, improve property values, and bring in more business tenants and affluent shoppers to downtown areas (Sims 2016). The city’s Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) gave $400,000 in 1987 to help establish the BID for Broadway between Second and Ninth streets.

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The city’s first BID, it was approved by the city council in 1994, and followed the establishment of BIDs in the nearby cities of Santa Monica and Pasadena (Torres 1995). Concerned about unlicensed vendors, petty theft, and illegal drug sales, Estela Lopez, the director of the BID, explained that “it was a street out of control” (Torres 1995:D1). The Broadway BID assessed businesses $160 to $12,000 per year for a total of $420,999, and the BID “hired street sweepers, got an extra four tons weekly of trash removal, bought bicycles for police patrols, found space for a police substation and persuaded Metropolitan Transit Authority police to patrol the area because of the volume of bus traffic along the street” (Torres 1995:D1). J. Revel Sims (2016), in his study of evictions and displacement in Los Angeles, explains that the rise of BIDs in the city illustrates the important role of property owners in the struggle for the control and use of commercial areas. As Sims (2016:36) notes, major developers and property owners supported the Broadway BID, while small merchants, many Latino, believed that the BID meant that “they were being unfairly taxed for gains that would go to developers and speculation.” Merchants explained that “a cleaner, safer street hasn’t meant any more business,” and expressed concern about escalating rents that may drive them out of business (Torres 1995:D1). As a vendor who has operated for nearly three decades in the Grand Central Market, which has undergone major changes as it has brought in upscale restaurants, explained, “I think before . . . it was better. . . . Latinos came more and rent was cheaper.” A restaurant owner next to the Grand Central Market noted that “little by little, everybody is getting pushed out” (Mejia 2016:B1). As Sims (2016:51) suggests, “Displacement, rather than following the gentrification process, may actually precede it as a sign of increased conflict over space.” Following the establishment of the Broadway BID, business owners established BIDs in other downtown areas in the 1990s, including the Fashion District, Industrial District, and Toytown, and BIDs now include most of the downtown region (Sims 2016).

The Downtown Boom: Iconic Buildings and Daily Amenities Developers and the private sector continued to lead the resurgence of downtown Los Angeles, with the new cathedral, Our Lady of the Angels, opening in 2002, followed by the Frank Gehry–designed Walt Disney Concert Hall in

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2003 and the Broad art museum in 2015. The $1 billion Grand Avenue residential and retail project by the New York–based Related Companies, designed by Frank Gehry, broke ground in 2019 across the street from the Disney Concert Hall (Thomas 2019). The Disney Concert Hall is not just the product of an edifice complex and a paycheck for a celebrity architect, or an effort to chase “The Bilbao Effect” and tourist dollars through an iconic structure (Rybczynski 2002). The Disney Concert Hall has world-class acoustics and is the home of the acclaimed Los Angeles Philharmonic, which celebrated its one-hundredth season in 2018/2019. The excellence of the Philharmonic in its music world matches the excellence of the Lakers in its sports market and contributed to the successful creation of downtown Los Angeles as a site of consumption for entertainment and culture. Fifteen years after the concert hall opened, the New Yorker’s music critic, Alex Ross (2017), asserted that from the 1990s, when it was “a second-tier orchestra,” the work of its talented and visionary conductors and administrators has elevated the institution and “the ascendancy of the Los Angeles Philharmonic is the salient event in American orchestral life of the past twenty-five years.” Soon after, the New York Times classical music editor Zachary Woolfe (2017:C1) proclaimed that “the Los Angeles Philharmonic is the most important orchestra in America. Period.” As Woolfe (2017:C1) explained, “The Philharmonic puts more energy into new work than any other orchestra. It presents a greater sense of the diversity of today’s music and its creators than any other orchestra. It ties its mission to education and social justice in its city more than any other orchestra. And, yes, more than any other orchestra, it combines a commitment to the future with a fresh eye on the past.” Commenting on the orchestra’s centennial season, Ross (2019:70) stated that the Los Angeles Philharmonic “has no peer in modern orchestral history . . . colossal in ambition and experimental in spirit, [it] has redefined what an orchestra can be.” In addition to world-class cultural institutions, downtown needed businesses to serve local residents. When Ralphs opened in 2007 (followed by a Whole Foods in 2015), the first major grocery store downtown, it significantly added to the everyday amenities needed by the growing residential population, similar to the Ralphs pioneering store in San Diego’s downtown Gaslamp District, which opened in 1996. Both are successful, and two months after opening, the Los Angeles store ranked among the top 15 percent in sales

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of the 262 Ralphs stores in Southern California (Scott 2007:1). The opening of Ralphs also marked a return for the corporation that originated there in 1873 and closed its last Los Angeles downtown supermarket in 1951 (Sanchez 2001). The construction of housing and the growing number of residents provided customers to augment downtown workers, tourists, and conventioneers, and this residential base sparked new retail shops, restaurants, and bars. As the general manager of the Hyatt Regency explained, “I think the absolute key is developing the residential base . . . that’s the only way to upgrade the retail offering and see expansion of the restaurants” (Hirsch 2000:C5). Downtown News (2004) and Mandell (2004b) reported that in the five years since Staples Center opened in 1999, when downtown had about 4,500 market-rate units, about 3,000 units have been added and another 3,000 were under construction, with over a third of those units in the South Park neighborhood next to Staples Center.

The Downtown Boom: Asian Corporations— from the “Yellow Peril” to Welcomed Capital A large trading surplus between Japan and the US had given Japanese corporations access to dollars and rapidly increasing property values in Tokyo provided borrowing power, as well as the impetus to seek lower-priced real estate in the US. Beginning in the 1980s, Japanese companies began buying “trophy properties” in the US, such as Rockefeller Center in New York City and Arco Plaza in Los Angeles, provoking fears of Japanese corporations “buying up” the country (Creswell 2013:B1). The sale of Rockefeller Center prompted a vendor to sell T-shirts with “Welcome to Wokafellar Center” outside the building, which ignored the wok’s connections to China. It is also another example of the long history of racial lumping that groups all Asians together and ignores their differences, contributing to the rise in hate crimes against Asian Americans during the pandemic crisis (Barron 1989:B1). Given that other countries such as Canada and the Netherlands have long histories of buying US properties, the New York Times (1989:A34) suggested that “it would be xenophobic, even racist, to single out Japan because of the size of its American holdings, which . . . are still half the size of Britain’s.” In downtown Los Angeles in 1986, foreign companies owned nearly 75 percent of the major properties (Turpin 1986b). Japanese companies owned roughly 25 percent of the office space, with sixteen major buildings (Fine 2016).

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That year, Shuwa of Japan bought Arco Plaza, which covers an entire block, for $640 million, a purchase of what “real estate experts” considered the “crown jewel of downtown’s commercial projects” (Myers 1986:H2) and the city’s “best corporate address” (Vincent 2003:C1). Rather than a threat, Los Angeles Times writer Dick Turpin (1986b:H1) saw the influx of foreign capital as an investment “in the future of this city. That’s a compliment to the city’s vital stature and its global position.” Many of those purchases, however, turned out to be financial disasters for the Japanese corporations and major windfalls for their American sellers. In retrospect, “some Japanese investors wildly overpaid” for some of these properties and “suffered one of the biggest property market collapses in history” (Creswell 2013:B1). Mitsubishi, which bought an 80 percent share of Rockefeller Center for $1.4 billion in 1990, lost the property after declaring bankruptcy on it and returning it to the company holding the mortgage (Allen 1995). When Japan entered a deep recession in the 1990s, Shuwa faced a cash shortage and began selling some of its US properties (Vincent 2003). The US had also entered a period of declining property values and Shuwa sold Arco Plaza in 2003 for less than $300 million, roughly half of what Shuwa paid for it in 1986 (Vincent 2003:C1). Similar to conditions in Japan in the 1980s which led to international investment, China’s growing economy and rising property values in the 2010s, plus experience with massive development projects in China, have led to Chinese companies establishing projects across the world, with Los Angeles a major site of investment and construction. During the peak years of Chinese investment in Los Angeles, from 2014 to 2016, Chinese companies have “been involved in at least seven of 18 land deals” worth individually over $19 million in the downtown area (Pierson 2016:A1). In 2018, Chinese companies were building two billion-dollar projects within a few blocks of L.A. Live— Oceanwide Plaza by Oceanwide Holdings (construction stopped in 2019 due to financial issues and has not resumed as of the beginning of 2021) and Metropolis by Greenland—with luxury hotels, condominiums, and retail space (Vincent 2018). Oceanwide executive Thomas Feng explained, “The draw power of this location is tremendous. We’re in the heart of the entertainment and sports district” (Khouri 2017:C1). To the north of L.A. Live, China Communications Construction Group invested $290 million in the Grand Avenue Project (Vincent 2018). Other Asian capital has contributed to downtown’s growth, including Korean Air’s

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$1.35 billion Wilshire Grand Center hotel and office building, which opened in 2017 and is the tallest building west of the Mississippi (Vincent 2017a:A1). In 2019, the Chinese company City Century bought a site next to L.A. Live for a $1 billion retail and housing project (Vincent 2019). These Asian corporations have contributed to downtown’s “largest construction boom in modern times—an explosion juiced by foreign investment” that will “easily surpass the 1980s—a time when developers built office skyscrapers on Bunker Hill” and completed sixty-four major projects (Khouri 2017:C1). In one of the foundational works on Los Angeles, The City of Quartz (2006), Mike Davis provides an in-depth and deeply insightful analysis of politics and power in the development of Los Angeles. Tinged with negative connotations, however, his writing contains a racialized portrayal and echoes some of the racist sentiments of that time of Japanese corporations buying US properties, which Davis (2006: 135, 138) described as a “tsunami of Japanese capital” and “the kamikaze dive of the Tokyo stock market.” In contrast to the American racial backlash against Japanese investment in the 1980s, contemporary Chinese investment is “welcomed, even celebrated” (Creswell 2013:B1). One critical difference is that Chinese corporations are constructing major projects, rather than buying high-profile properties (Fine 2016). Also, Los Angeles city officials welcomed Chinese capital after the Great Recession of the late 2000s, and the Oceanwide Holdings and Greenland billion-dollar projects are moving forward on land that has gone through multiple owners and stalled projects (Fine 2016). Chinese investment rapidly declined, however, when the Chinese government instituted new guidelines in 2017 to control capital leaving the country (Vincent 2018). The construction of the Convention Center failed to attract investment and transform the neighborhood in the quarter century following its opening. City officials hoped that with the enormous capital investment in downtown represented by AEG’s projects, Staples Center might finally lead to other private investment in the area. AEG required city help to use land in the Convention Center complex for Staples Center, as well as the city’s power of eminent domain to assemble the huge parcel of land required for off-site Staples Center parking and the future L.A. Live project. AEG also wanted city subsidies for the projects and support through the long and complicated entitlement process. The threatened voters’ initiative by council member Wachs involving Staples Center, however, demonstrated that some members of the city council

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would drive a hard bargain to win concessions from the developer in exchange for city support and subsidies. The final contract between the city of Los Angeles and AEG represented a better fiscal deal for the city as compared to similar deals around the country, as the Baade report concluded. Demonstrating the influence of growth interests, which I examine in more detail in Chapter 3, the city still contributed about $71 million to Staples Center and would later agree to tax rebates that potentially could total over $200 million for the L.A. Live hotels. Considering the building boom that followed the construction of Staples Center and L.A. Live, in economic terms, the city finally appears to have benefited from the subsidies provided for these projects. Community activists around the country, however, are trying to reframe the debate around large public subsidies, contending that projects receiving city support should make contributions to the communities affected by these projects and create livingwage jobs, not jobs with such low pay that they perpetuate poverty. As a result, in recent years, working with growth-with-equity coalitions, city officials around the country are establishing higher minimum wages, job training programs to bring women and racial minorities into trade unions that have had a history of exclusionary policies, and affordable housing programs. City officials are also working to create more comprehensive agreements—such as the 2001 L.A. Live CBA discussed in Chapter 4—to ensure that, in exchange for subsidies, corporations fulfill their obligations regarding the creation of jobs, tax revenues, local hiring programs, and other promised benefits (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005; Weber and Santacroce 2007). Contributing to the rise of a progressive coalition in Los Angeles during the 1990s (to be examined in Chapter 3), was the growth of unions in Los Angeles, even though they were losing membership in other areas of the nation. The focus of unions on forming coalitions with other organizations, the increasing political strength of Latinos, and the rise of community organizations have combined to form a dense and durable infrastructure for grassroots activism, research, and policy formation in the region.

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ity officials and downtown business interests successfully supported the construction of the Convention Center, Staples Center, and L.A. Live. Given the continued strength of the growth interests, the powerful corporate actors working against redistributive policies, and research that suggests that only affluent residents possess the resources necessary for political influence (Deener et al. 2013; Stone 1993), what explains the emergence of the growth-with-equity framework in Los Angeles? Jones-Correa and Wong (2015) contend that, in places such as Los Angeles, progressive coalitions have developed the resources and capacity for sustained political action. As Jones-Correa and Wong (2015:168) suggest, “They may not direct policy for the city as a whole, but the actions of these actors accrete over time, shaping local environments over years and often with broader effects for their neighborhoods and communities.” The rise of organized labor and community organizations, and the growing Latino population, have contributed to transformative changes in the city’s politics and demographics and established the foundation for the emergence of a progressive coalition in Los Angeles (Laslett 2012; Meyerson 2013; Milkman 2006; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Soja 2010). The coalition has analyzed how power and politics work in the city and has recognized that trying to stop development is often not possible because of the shared interests of city officials and developers and the potential benefits for a broad spectrum of the population that come from the tax revenues and jobs created 87

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by these projects. Instead, the coalition has developed a strategy to leverage their political influence and support projects in the entitlement process in exchange for benefits that include higher wages, local hiring, and funds for affordable housing. These benefits, provided by the developer, help not only the workers building the projects, but also the service workers employed in the completed projects and the lower-income residents in the neighborhoods surrounding the projects.

The Trajectory Of Growth Interests and the Emergence of Regime Theory Richard DeLeon (1992) and Pierre Clavel (2010) note the resistance to growth interests in the 1980s by slow-growth organizations protecting the rights of middle-class homeowners and the rise of progressive regimes advancing the interests of residents. During this period, regime theory emerged; it considered these challenges to the growth machine, proposed a range of coalitions that might form to govern a city and has become one of the dominant theories in political economy to examine politics and development (Elkin 1987; Stone 1989). In Clarence Stone’s (1989:227, 229) research, he discussed his “socialproduction model” of governance and the need for cooperation and diverse resources among different groups to establish “power to” accomplish policy goals, rather than “power over” and social control. In the social-production model, Stone (1989:6) emphasized the “informal arrangements” between city officials and business leaders and the resources that each group controlled that contributed to the governance of the city and downtown development. Neither group controls the resources necessary to carry out large projects alone, but, working together, city officials can manage the entitlement process and can assist projects through subsidies, zoning variances, the use of eminent domain to acquire property, and build infrastructure. Corporate executives, on the other hand, provide much needed capital and business expertise to fund and build major projects, networks and leadership to help guide the planning process, and projects that can generate tax revenues and jobs. Logan et al. (1997:606) explain that “because regime theory treats the local political balance as a variable not to be taken for granted, some analysts consider it to be distinct from” work on growth coalitions that assumes the dominance of growth interests. Logan et al. (1997:607) suggest, however, that

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both bodies of work agree that there is an “inherent conflict between the business community and residents over growth policy” and recognize the power of growth coalitions and the centrality of development in city politics. Where they differ, however, is in regime theory’s recognition of the “influence accorded to other groups” in the politics of development (Logan et al. 1997:607). Regime theory notes that there is a range of coalitions possible, with varying degrees of influence exerted by growth interests, and seeks to examine differences in coalitions in cities, rather than taking it as a given that politics is dominated by a growth coalition (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2014; Imbroscio 2010). Stone (1993:17) explains that a “governing coalition . . . must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda,” and because of this need for resources for major policy initiatives, Stone (1989, 1993) concludes that progressive regimes are predominantly found in, and represent the interests of, communities with a strong middle class. In the last several decades, an emphasis on growth has eroded in cities in which deindustrialization and the rise of service and knowledge industries have transformed urban areas. In many communities, the emphasis on new high-rise construction and increasing density is meeting resistance because of such problems as increasing traffic and pollution and is being replaced by slow- and smart-growth strategies, with San Francisco and Portland, Oregon, serving as prime examples of this change (Clark et al. 2002; Clavel 2010). In Los Angeles, Mayor Tom Bradley strongly supported growth interests during his time in office from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. As Bradley (1975:G5) explained, One minute you are strolling next to a towering smoked-glass skyscraper, and a few blocks later you pass a rundown flophouse built decades ago. Unhappily for all of us, the ugliness is spreading. It is threatening to choke the beauty that exists downtown. . . . This is the one thing that many major cities have in common today—they are being destroyed from within. You’ll find evidence of an urban cancer eating away their central cores and infesting other communities. . . . Unless we act soon to save the huge investment all of us have in our Central City, the entire area will pay the consequences.

Rapid growth in Los Angeles, however, contributed to increasing density, gridlocked traffic, and highly toxic levels of air and water pollution and sparked a strong slow-growth movement in the 1980s, which was led largely by homeowners’ associations representing affluent residents in suburban areas

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of the city and by environmental groups. Research suggests that, as a result of these slow-growth efforts, the loss of business leaders because of corporate mergers, competition from emerging business centers in the region outside the city, and the increasing involvement of national and international developers without roots in the community, the power of growth interests in the Los Angeles region has declined and fragmented (Fulton 2001; Whittemore 2012). The regional coherence of growth interests has declined, but the political involvement and influence of growth interests varies across the city of Los Angeles. Deener et al.’s (2013) analysis of the slow-growth movement notes that it contributed to a new city charter in 1999 that included the formation of neighborhood councils and local planning commissions, which contributed to more resident participation in local planning decisions and a decentralization of the planning process. Deener et al. (2013) contend that the democratizing and decentralizing reforms led to successful efforts by homeowners’ groups to limit growth in the suburbs, refocused development downtown, and allowed for developers to have greater control of development in downtown Los Angeles. Deener et al. (2013:396) also suggest that, while community activists have protested the displacement of low-income residents in the downtown region “with a large minority population and an area filled almost exclusively by multifamily residents . . . it is an area that is unlikely to produce a strong political movement opposed to major projects.” Deener et al.’s (2013) analysis of Los Angeles supports research on growth coalitions and urban regimes that finds that organizations representing affluent residents are much more likely to have an impact on development policy than organizations representing lower-income residents. Also, policies to help low-income residents face major obstacles because cities are reluctant to establish redistributive policies that may deter private capital investment; the rise of neoliberal policies that favor market forces to regulate development and the use of government actions and resources to assist private investment also work against such policies (Logan and Molotch 2007; Peterson 1981). I suggest, however, that the fragmentation of growth interests in the region and the decline in the region’s business elite created a political opportunity for the emerging growth-with-equity coalition to gain support for equitable development policies in Los Angeles.

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The Growth Of Unions and Social Movement Unionism in Los Angeles Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009), in their study of grassroots, community-based efforts to address issues of social justice and inequality at the regional level in urban areas across the United States, examine the importance of social movements for major societal change. Based on their case studies, Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009:60) describe social movements as collective action through coalitions that include a range of groups, such as community, labor, environmental, and faith-based organizations. For such efforts to bring about concrete results, Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009:60) contend that “a vision for regional equity” needs to be “combined with experienced political leadership, sufficient resources, and the organizational capacity to mobilize large numbers of people to engage in political action and realize social change.” Regarding the importance of establishing a vision, Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009) stress the importance of movements to establish a narrative or frame that explains their analysis and goals and that counters established or commonsense ways of understanding an issue. The research of Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009:14–15) shows that, in order for grassroots activism to be effective, it should be built on a broad base of support because it depends on the committed and informed involvement of the members of the organizations, not just their leaders. Also, the activities of the members have to be grounded in a clear and in-depth understanding of the structure of power in a region, how policy gets made, and armed with a strategy to effectively engage in this process. As Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009:14–15) explain, “community-based efforts at regional equity are more likely to succeed when their advocates have a firm analysis of power and an explicit strategy for organizing . . . it’s about politics, movement building, and social change.” In their study of social movements in urban communities, Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009) also examine the importance of changing circumstances in society, such as demographic, political, and economic shifts that produce political opportunities. The rise of organizations and community coalitions, and the election of progressive city officials, contribute to a shift in the political-opportunity structure and the range of resources that groups

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can utilize to take advantage of new circumstances (Clavel 2010; Kriesi 2007; McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Walder 2009). Also, in Los Angeles, the fragmentation of growth interests, growing union membership, and the increasing political power of Latinos provided an important opportunity for change. Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka (2009) emphasize the importance of resource mobilization and the organizations, coalitions, funds, research capacity, and political influence that social movements need to effectively utilize political opportunities (Morris 1984). Unions are a vital part of the effort to establish a social movement for major changes in Los Angeles and there are strong links between these unions and the United Farm Workers Union (UFW). Marshall Ganz (2009), examining the establishment of the UFW in California during the 1960s, stressed the importance of “strategic capacity,” which is the effective and innovative strategy and tactics utilized by Cesar Chavez and other leaders and organizers, based on their deep roots in the community and knowledge of the workers. The UFW used strategic capacity to successfully create a farmworkers’ union when other, more powerful, labor groups, such as the American Federation of Labor, had failed. The UFW led the successful grape boycott in the 1960s and the 1975 passage of the only state legislation in the country covering farm workers, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (Ganz 2009). Although important, while others point to the political opportunity structure and the national “political environment” that supported such efforts (Jenkins and Perrow 1977:249) or increased resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977), Ganz’s (2009) analysis points to the importance of strategic capacity to explain the success of the UFW. Los Angeles was a strong anti-union city in the early twentieth century but, with transformative changes in union leadership and organizing strategies, the Los Angeles region has emerged as a major center of contemporary union activity and growth, even as, nationally, unions have experienced declining membership since the 1950s (Laslett 2012; Milkman 2006; Wong 2017). As Meyerson (2001:18) states, “What was in the early years of the last century the bastion of the open shop is now home to the most dynamic union movement in the land.” Critical to growing union membership and political influence was the rise of leaders in the 1990s such as Miguel Contreras of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor and Maria Elena Durazo of the Hotel and Restaurant Union. Contreras and Durazo grew up in Californian farmworker families

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and understood the struggles and concerns of Latinos and immigrants. They both learned about organizing from Cesar Chavez and his achievements with the UFW and used their experience and knowledge to establish strategies and tactics to successfully organize Latinos and immigrants in the Los Angeles region (Meyerson 2005; Orleck 2018). The goals of the UFW included issues of race and immigration, as well as the rights of workers, in a broader struggle for social justice (Orleck 2018). For Durazo, who had a brother who died in childhood due to a lack of medical care (Sipchen 1997), the UFW efforts to improve wages and benefits represented the everyday struggle for survival: “No job security, negotiating for pennies. To the bosses, those pennies were business. To my family, it was food on the table” (Orleck 2018:94). Durazo became president of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE), Local 11, in 1989; head of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor from 2006 to 2014, following the death of Contreras in 2005 (the two had also been married); and successfully ran in 2018 for a State Senate seat representing part of the Los Angeles region. Miguel Contreras began working with his family picking grapes at the age of five, later became a member of the UFW, worked on the grape boycott campaign, and learned about the power and effectiveness of grassroots activism among farmworkers and the sense of empowerment that the UFW instilled in the farmworkers. As Contreras explained, some of the farm owners viewed the workers “as nothing more than agricultural implements, to be used and discarded like you would discard an old shovel or an old hoe,” but the UFW “gave us a feeling of real self-worth and a feeling of breaking away those imaginary shackles you had to the grower and standing up for yourself” (Wong and Viola 2009:8). For Contreras (2005:M3), union activism with the UFW began “in 1973 at 4:30 a.m., when the ranch supervisor and crew bosses assembled the entire Contreras family in front of our little home in Dinuba . . . they fired us all because, as the supervisor told my father, ‘Julio, you’re the best worker we ever had, but we can’t have any more Chavistas.’” Contreras explained that, for his father, “after 24 years, there was nothing. No severance. No vacation pay” (Sipchen 1997:E1), and that summer “I was arrested with my dad 18 times in three months for violating anti-picketing injunctions” (Contreras 2005:M3). Unions in Los Angeles, as in other cities around the nation, faced deindustrialization and declining membership in their traditional base in manufacturing. Utilizing new leadership and organizing tactics, unions in Los

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Angeles moved from the historical focus on White, male, US-born workers, and the active exclusion of racial minorities, to major union expansion that was driven largely through growth in service-worker unions and the recruitment of women, racial minorities, and immigrants (Laslett 2012; Milkman 2006). The change in union membership and occupations contributed to the growth-with-equity framework because of an increased focus on living wages or union representation for the service jobs created in completed major development projects, along with continued support by the construction trades for development because of the jobs created (Meyerson 2006b). Thus, as I have emphasized, unions managed to be part of the traditional growth coalition through support of new construction, while promoting growth with equity with support for living wages. With their growing membership base, political influence, and funds, unions are one of the few counters to the political influence of corporations (Dean and Reynolds 2009; Wong 2021). In Los Angeles, union resources, changes in union organizing, and new tactics regarding development mark the emergence of a new regional effort to address development issues (Meyerson 2006b; Milkman 2006). The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), the largest union in California, owes part of its growth to a strong effort to organize service occupations that had not been part of the union or had been deunionized. The union targeted jobs, such as building services, that were rooted in a particular place, and employers could not shift the jobs to other regions to escape union efforts (Milkman 2006). The national SEIU developed a countrywide campaign in the 1980s to organize building service workers, named Justice for Janitors, and the effort in Los Angeles, where the majority of the janitors were immigrants from Latin America, began in 1988 (Milkman 2006). Utilizing the media and demonstrations, union officials targeted the office buildings in Century City and, during a 1990 march from Beverly Hills to Century City, the police aggressively attacked the demonstrators. Police violence resulted in numerous injuries to the marchers, including children and pregnant women among the injured, and the resulting news footage generated strong public and political support for the workers, with a contract negotiated that year (Waldinger et al. 1998). In the 2000s, the union organizing efforts successfully continued, targeting security guards, who are often employed by the same corporations that employ janitors (Wong 2021).

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The SEIU also successfully organized homecare health workers in the Los Angeles area in 1999 (Milkman 2006). With about 74,000 workers in the county at that time, it was the largest successful unionization effort in the nation since the United Auto Workers gained “112,000 General Motors workers” in 1937 (Greenhouse 1999:A1). As of 2021, there are over half a million homecare workers in unions in California (Wong 2021). In another remarkable victory in the state, about 45,000 childcare workers became unionized in 2020 (Wong 2021). The growing public support in the region for unions was illustrated by the remarkable change from 1990, when marching janitors “were met by police wielding clubs,” to 2000, when demonstrators “were joined by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Senator Edward Kennedy, Cardinal Roger Mahony, Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan, Vice President Al Gore, numerous Los Angeles city and county officials, and members of the state legislature” (Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001:91). The Los Angeles Justice for Janitors and homecare worker campaigns, with more resources for organizing and targeting a new sector of workers, exemplify changing union goals and tactics and are changing union demographics from its traditional White, male, and US-citizen base (Milkman 2006). In contemporary Los Angeles, because of successful organizing efforts by unions and immigrant groups, immigrants, especially from Latin America, make up a large percentage of union membership and dominate some occupations (Milkman 2006). The growing Latino union membership provided clear evidence of the fallacy of the taken-for-granted assumption by traditional union leadership that immigrants, particularly the undocumented, could not be organized (Delgado 1993). As Durazo explains, “It’s not just that immigrants need a labor movement. If we want to grow as a labor movement, we need immigrants and women” (Orleck 2018:95). Durazo’s statement is rooted in the history of labor organizing in Southern California, where Luisa Morena, an immigrant from Guatemala, worked to organize cannery and agricultural workers in the 1930s and 1940s, and Josefina Fierro de Bright, an immigrant from Mexico, worked with Morena to establish the civil rights organization, El Congreso, which emphasized unions and Latino organizations working together (Sanchez 1993). The complex relationship among Latinos, unions, and immigrants is illustrated by the history of the UFW and Cesar Chavez, who initially opposed undocumented immigrants entering the United States because of concerns

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that growers used undocumented immigrants to break strikes and lower wages (Garcia 2012). Variations on these concerns about immigrants existed among other Latino organizations. For example, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), which was founded in 1929 and is one of the oldest Latino civil rights organizations in the country, was very moderate and assimilationist at its founding. LULAC restricted membership to US citizens and was concerned that the growing number of Mexican immigrants contributed to conflict between Whites and Mexican Americans (Marquez 1993). The UFW and LULAC eventually came to view the immigrant/nonimmigrant and documented/undocumented divide as a cause of harmful divisions in the Latino community, as well as within families where members had varied statuses. These organizations came to recognize that issues involving the undocumented and immigrants were part of the larger struggle for social justice waged by US citizens and that all members of the community had to be included in efforts to address racial and class inequality. Exemplifying the importance of new union leadership and strategies, especially efforts to organize immigrants, Maria Elena Durazo became the president of HERE, Local 11, in 1989 and worked to improve the wages of the union’s hotel and restaurant workers and boost union membership. Previously, HERE, with its White leadership, had been “losing its members at the rate of 1,000 a year and reeling from strife” between the leaders and Latino workers (Sipchen 1997:E1). As Durazo explains, “There was a lot of racism. No respect for the members. . . . The union would refuse to translate meetings into Spanish” and would not translate union contracts into Spanish (Milkman and Wong 2000:17). Harold Meyerson (2005) describes the dramatic shift in the city’s unions: “Los Angeles was both the whitest and most anti-union big American city outside the South for much of the 20th century. That it should become the most dynamic union city in the nation, chiefly through labor’s mobilization of the Latino immigrant workforce, is the most astonishing and significant civic transformation in recent American history.” Kent Wong, director of the UCLA Labor Center and former staff attorney for the SEIU in Los Angeles, describes the importance of the city for unions and the dramatic shift in the AFL-CIO’s view toward immigrants. Wong (2017) explains that “Los Angeles has emerged as a focal point for the new American labor movement, and a crucial part of this change has been the dynamic campaigns involving and often led by immigrant workers.” Describing

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the changing views among unions toward immigrants, Wong (2017) writes that the “national debate on immigration policy . . . erupted at the AFL-CIO convention in Los Angeles in 1999. When a group of day laborers organized a contingent to join the convention, they were thrown out by union members who opposed immigrant workers.” Wong (2017) describes the change in the AFL-CIO when the convention returned to the city in 2013, and events showed that “the leaders of the American labor movement now embrace labor-community alliances” and “the fight for immigrant rights.”

Social Movement Unionism, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, and Growth with Equity In Los Angeles today, there is a return to organized labor’s early roots and social movement unionism, in contrast to decreasing membership nationwide that has contributed to a shift toward business unionism and a narrowed focus on the interests of union members. Social movement unionism includes efforts to use resources to build organizations, establish coalitions with community groups, develop grassroots political efforts, and address broader social justice issues. It also involves working closely with other unions to strengthen central labor councils and reestablish political influence in regions (Hauptmeier and Turner 2007; Milkman 2006). To add members and build political power, “unions have engaged in broad coalition-building as a survival strategy” (Orleck 2018:95). Since the 1990s, labor, environmental, faithbased, immigrant, and community organizations have worked to form deep and durable ties to build effective and influential coalitions working on social justice issues in Los Angeles (Brodkin 2007; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Soja 2010). Back in the 1970s and 1980s, the building trades wielded the most power among unions as massive projects transformed downtown and generated jobs for construction workers. Illustrating the link between unions and elected officials and the support for development, Mayor Tom Bradley appointed James Wood, the director of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, to the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) board in the late 1970s, and Wood became the chair of the CRA board in 1984 and through the early 1990s (Frank and Wong 2004). Critics noted, however, that these construction projects caused the displacement of low-income residents and the loss of affordable housing and asserted that the city “poured billions of dollars of tax

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revenue into private construction . . . subsidizing powerful real estate interests while giving short shrift to the city’s poor” (Clifford 1996). Whereas, among unions, the building trades once exerted the most political influence in the city, in the past several decades, the major gains in union membership have been occurring among service workers and the power dynamic has shifted. The building trades had backed major projects because those projects resulted in union construction jobs. Those well-paying jobs, however, were temporary, and this strategy ignored the long-term consequences of service workers earning poverty wages in the new buildings, leading to long and often unsuccessful struggles to gain living wages. The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor is a major contributor to the emergence of unions as a political force in the region and state, the shift to social movement unionism, and effective grassroots political activism (Milkman 2006). The Los Angeles County Federation (2019) is the central labor council and the lead labor organization in the region, and it represents over 300 unions and about 800,000 workers. Miguel Contreras (2005:M3) became the director of the County Federation in 1995 and he “asked himself . . . how do we produce jobs that supply basic needs, from healthcare and retirement to dignity and respect? How do we help workers provide a better life for their children than they had?” In its early years, when the area’s “unions were dominated by white building trade unions” (Newton 2000), the County Federation practiced “checkbook politics” and supported political candidates with major campaign contributions (Frank and Wong 2004:158). Contreras (2005:M3) explained the shift in strategy: We changed the way unions deal with politics in L.A. We stopped being an ATM for political parties and a piggy bank for politicians. Instead, we invested resources reaching out to the rank-and-file: getting them to become citizens, registering them to vote, educating them on the issues, and getting them to the polls. We became a powerful force for progressive change in L.A. politics.

Contreras explained that unions needed to help elect officials who would be “warriors for workers,” and citizenship and voter registration drives aimed at immigrants strengthened this strategy. As a result, Madeline Janis, head of the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, stated that “we started to elect real warriors” (Orleck 2018:255). Contributing to growing union power in

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electoral politics included changing the organization’s campaign strategy and strengthening its grassroots political base. With their growing membership and assets at their disposal, unions have greatly impacted political fundraising and campaigns tactics in the Los Angeles region. Given the large population and sprawling geography of the region, campaigning depends heavily on television and radio spots and mailing campaign literature, and unions provide prodigious fundraising for these purposes. Also, unions have gone beyond outreach to their members and have added massive, grassroots campaigning involving direct contact with voters through phone banks and precinct walking, which has proven very effective (Meyerson 2020; Sonenshein 2006). Recognizing the potential leverage that comes when developers seek city subsidies for their projects, in the 1990s, unions began to ask for living wages and the right to organize in the permanent jobs created by these projects in exchange for union support (Meyerson 2006b). As Contreras explained, regarding the change in tactics, “We learned our lesson in downtown Los Angeles” because “unions . . . have struggled ever since to organize the janitors, cafeteria workers and hotel staffers who wound up working in the new downtown skyscrapers” (Rohrlich 1998:B1). Contreras, continued: “We’re going to the new developers . . . and saying, ‘if you’re going to go to the public table and ask for subsidies . . . then you have to guarantee a “living wage” and guarantee that workers have the right to organize’” (Rohrlich 1998:B1). The 1997 passage of a living-wage ordinance by the Los Angeles City Council, overriding Republican Mayor Richard Riordan’s veto, demonstrated the support of labor by the council. Surveying the city’s politics, Raphael J. Sonenshein suggests that organized labor is now the major political power, displacing the business elite that once ruled the city. Sonenshein (2006:M1) writes that “labor is now a central force in L.A. politics. . . . Labor is particularly effective in district-level campaigns—City council and School board— where grassroots efforts and endorsements carry the most weight.” Harold Meyerson (2006a:22), a noted analyst of Los Angeles politics, concurs, stating that for the past decade, for instance, the shock troops of L.A.’s most effective political operation, the County Federation of Labor, have come from those local unions that consist preponderantly of immigrants who can’t themselves

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vote—the janitors and hotel workers in particular. In a sense, the most civically engaged among us have actually lacked legal status, but have made up for that with a level of electoral involvement that has changed the composition of the City Council, the state Legislature and California’s congressional delegation in Washington.

Michael Woo—former Los Angeles City Council member, candidate for mayor in 1993, and former member of the city planning commission—offered a more cautious estimate of the power of labor in city politics during that period. Woo (2007) explained that labor can be effective in electoral politics, but its efforts are geared more toward union members rather than making broad changes in society. I think that organized labor has a lot of influence in the electoral process in terms of campaigns, endorsements and things like that. But I think that they are very selective in terms of what they ask for. I think they are very narrowly focused on things that will directly benefit their members, as opposed to say being a general party of the working class.

In response to a question about the political power of unions as compared to developers, Woo (2007) stated that “I think you have to be careful to not overstate what the influence of organized labor is. I don’t think that the influence of business or real estate developers is really diminished. So, I’m not sure whether you could say that labor has more power now than before.” Regarding the L.A. Live and Grand Avenue projects—two major projects in downtown Los Angeles—Woo (2007) explained that the projects demonstrate the continued political influence of developers. These are not grassroots agendas, these are both developer driven. These are both ideas that were hatched by developers. The elected officials have been able to extract some concessions or to get something called a community benefits package. . . . Both the LA Live and the Grand Avenue Project really sprang out of developers wanting to do them and then coming to the city and saying we want to do it. And then the city responds saying “you gotta give us this, this and this.” It’s not a grassroots or labor agenda.

As Woo makes clear, unions are a powerful political force, but other groups, especially developers, remain key shapers of the city’s political and economic agenda. L.A. Live and the Grand Avenue projects demonstrate the

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continuing centrality of growth policies in city politics and major roles played by developers in the formation of public policy (Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie 2011). In urban areas across the nation, developers are major contributors to elected officials who vote on matters such as project approvals, city subsidies, and zoning variances, and these contributions are a way to gain influence in city hall (Mollenkopf 1992). This is certainly the case in Los Angeles where studies on campaign contributions show the importance of funds to city council members who will vote on issues affecting their contributors (Shuster 1998; Zahniser and Reyes 2016). Cecilia Estolano (2016), former head of the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency, speaking about the power that city council members have over development, states that “council members zealously protect the extraordinary discretion that they have over how developments will move forward. Los Angeles is a city that grew on real estate speculation. It’s always been a source of quite a bit of power for council members, and they haven’t been willing to give it up.” The power that city council members have over development in their council districts opens the possibility of undue influence or corruption involving donors, and numerous Los Angeles Times (2017a; 2017b; 2018b) editorials have called for an end to developer contributions. As a 2019 editorial explained, The unwritten understanding in Los Angeles is that City Council districts are like fiefdoms, over which council members have sole discretion to make development decisions, including whether a project gets an exemption from zoning and land-use rules, or whether it should be granted a tax break. That concentration of power leads, unsurprisingly, to campaign contributions from those hoping to curry favor . . . Even if laws are not broken, the whiff of corruption is unavoidable . . . It’s time to end the conflict-of-interest culture at City Hall . . . city leaders could get moving . . . to ban campaign contributions from real estate developers seeking city approval for their projects.” (Los Angeles Times 2019:A10)

The Los Angeles City Council finally passed a law in December 2019 banning real estate developers from giving contributions to city officials and candidates for office while their projects are under review and for one year following final approval. Watchdog groups and some council members criticized the law for its many loopholes, with council member Mike Bonin stating that “I actually don’t think this is a . . . particularly important or significant piece

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of legislation” and that the council needs to stop passing “piecemeal crap” (Reyes and Zahniser 2019:B1). Developer Tom Gilmore notes that the law is “a nice PR stunt at best” and that it is “all form and no substance” because, as he and other critics note, the law does not ban developers from raising money from others for an elected official (Reyes and Zahniser 2019:B1). In addition, the law does not prevent major subcontractors on a proposed project from giving donations to elected officials. Nor does the law prohibit donations to charities favored by officials or independent expenditure committees, which some council members defended, explaining that it is important for organizations such as unions, environmental organizations, and others to be able to support officials who champion issues important to these groups. While donations from developers are legal but an ethical problem, bribes and other illegal activity are another matter, and, in 2018, an FBI investigation came into public view when FBI agents searched council member José Huizar’s office and home (Zahniser and Reyes 2020; Zahniser, Reyes, and Rubin 2020). While the Huizar case and investigations of city staff members are ongoing, as of the summer of 2021, former council member Mitchell Englander received a fourteen-month prison sentence for lying to FBI agents and prosecutors about money and gifts received from a businessman (Finnegan and Zahniser 2021). Speaking on the FBI investigation and charges, council member David Ryu said that “my worst fears about the kind of pay-to-play politics I have been working against are being realized” (Zahniser and Reyes 2020:B1).

Latinos and Growing Political Power Countering developer contributions is the growing political influence of the coalition of Latinos and unions through their campaign contributions, grassroots political mobilization, and election of candidates supportive of issues important to working-class and low-income residents. Critical to the strength of this coalition is the rising number of Latinos, who are now the largest group in the city, at 48.7 percent of the population in 2015 (Table 1.1; Chapter 6). A growing population does not automatically translate into increased political power, however, as Latinos have lower rates of participation in electoral politics than the population as a whole because of factors such as the number of immigrants and noncitizens, and younger population (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001).

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Since the 1990s, however, the trend has been toward greatly increased participation in electoral politics and grassroots activism, driven in part by the Latino perception of California propositions (such as Proposition 187 in 1994, which would have cut off public services to undocumented immigrants) as anti-Latino and anti-immigrant. As Miguel Contreras explained about Governor Pete Wilson’s support of these propositions, “Wilson was actually our best organizer . . . Wilson’s state of hate politics enabled us to branch out and reach out to Latinos, to African Americans and to labor families” (Rohrlich 1998:B1). Latino organizations, such as the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP), and Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), have transformed that passion into electoral activity through programs involving naturalization, voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, and leadership training. These efforts have resulted in increased Latino political incorporation in Los Angeles, with the election of representatives seen as responsive to the interests of Latinos (Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005; Contreras 2005; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001). Unions also contributed to this effort, as Contreras (2005) explained: “We invested resources reaching out to the rank-and-file: getting them to become citizens, registering them to vote, educating them on the issues, and getting them to the polls.” Unions worked to educate Latinos about the importance of voting as part of a larger social justice effort; for example, going to the homes of potential voters and using “compromisos, commitment sheets. . . . The person at the door signed and kept one copy . . . and the commitment was focusing on making voting a social act. The commitment form said, ‘Por la amnistia, por derechos, mi familia vota 100 percento’ (For amnesty, for rights, my family is voting 100 percent)” (Frank and Wong 2004:164). During the 1990s, over one million new Latino voter registrations occurred in the state, and the Latino share in Los Angeles city elections rose from 10 percent in 1993 to 24 percent in 2013 (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2005; Sonenshein et al. 2014). Democrats had concerns over voter-registration drives for Latinos because registration efforts in the early 1980s showed that fewer than half registered as Democrats while more than 30 percent registered Republican (Frank and Wong 2004). The support of Republicans for propositions seen as antiimmigrant and anti-Latino, however, contributed to a vast majority of new

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Latino voters registering as Democrats and showing support for labor issues (Frank and Wong 2004). Illustrating the growing political power of Latinos, Antonio Villaraigosa began his term as mayor of Los Angeles in 2005, becoming the city’s first Latino mayor since 1872 and marking a high point for the number of Latino elected officials in the region (McGreevy 2005a). Although election records and information on race and ethnicity are incomplete, the records suggest that, in 2005, a number of Latinos held city office for the first time in over a century, with Alex Padilla the president of the city council and Rocky Delgadillo the city attorney (McGreevy 2005a). The county sheriff and chairs of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and Metropolitan Transportation Authority were also Latino (McGreevy 2005a). As José Huizar, Latino president of the Los Angeles school board, noted, “It’s a huge accomplishment. . . . I remember in the ’80s people were talking about the decade of the Hispanic but, really, 20 years later it’s finally coming to fruition in terms of political advancement” (McGreevy 2005a:A1). At the same time, these elected officials won their elections through broadbased platforms, as Huizar explained: “Although we all happen to be Latino, all of us in these positions push a very inclusive agenda that’s very important for the well-being of the city as a whole” (McGreevy 2005a:A1). Similarly, Villaraigosa noted, “I’ve always said the Latino agenda is the American agenda. . . . It’s an agenda of jobs and education, safe neighborhoods and healthcare” (McGreevy 2005a:A1). In fact, when Newsweek featured Villaraigosa on its May 30, 2005, cover after his mayoral election with the caption “Latino Power: L.A.’s New Mayor—And How Hispanics Will Change American Politics,” Villaraigosa was not pleased that Newsweek emphasized his Latino identity rather than his campaign to represent the entire city (Bruck 2007). Additional factors contributing to political mobilization among immigrants from Mexico and Central America include a history of involvement in labor and political activities in their countries of origin and strong networks because of organizations formed in Southern California (such as hometown associations) that serve social, political, and economic functions (Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001; Milkman 2006). The dense networks that lead to concentrations of workers from the same communities in the same occupations and work sites, and strong organizations established by these workers, greatly aid the organizing efforts of political activists and union organizers (Milkman 2006).

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Half a million demonstrators took to the streets of downtown Los Angeles on March 25, 2006, in support of immigrant rights, a testament to the strength of organizing activities in the immigrant communities, which often operate apart from “mainstream” institutions and out of the public eye. Four DJs on Spanish-language radio stations played crucial roles in generating publicity and support for the demonstrations, which, Harold Meyerson (2006a:22) wrote, “came as a complete surprise” to the English-language media, who did not expect such a massive turnout. One of the DJs, Eddie Sotelo, had been an undocumented immigrant who “crossed the border in the trunk of a car in 1986 and gained legal status a decade later” and pledged to use his position as a DJ “to help my people” (Watanabe and Becerra 2006:A1). The turnout, however, did not surprise those closely connected to the Latin American immigrant community, who knew about the strong networks and commitment to social and political issues that existed among immigrants in Southern California and how these networks and dedication to social justice could generate the large number of marchers.

Latinos and Unions Unions have worked closely with Latino leaders and grassroots activists to establish a political base, and political analysts suggest that the Latinoorganized labor alliance is a crucial regional and state political bloc (Kotkin 2011). Meyerson (2004:A10) explains that “the key institution in the rise of Hispanic political power in both Los Angeles and California has been the city’s Latino-led labor movement, which mobilizes more Latino voters, anoints more Latino candidates, and constructs more progressive coalitions than any force in the state.” As a result, Sacramento Bee writer Dan Walter states, “it’s the closest thing you have to an omnipotent political machine anywhere in the state” (Maddaus 2010). Showing the strength of these efforts, unions and Latinos have successfully backed union staff members, and pro-labor candidates across all racial groups, to the Los Angeles City Council, mayor’s position, County Board of Supervisors, and the state legislature and Congress. The active involvement of Latinos in social issues translated to union activity as well. As a union organizer explained, “At heart and soul, there has to be a mobilized workforce. . . . The reason that L.A. is the shining star of the union is that we’ve had the highest percentage of workers’ participation, have

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the highest worker turnout, and the highest percentage of workers going to jail and getting arrested” (Milkman 2006:158–159). The involvement of Latin American immigrants in labor or political activities in their countries of origin meant they had organizing experience and skills. Some had been “imprisoned and tortured” or “narrowly escaped death” (Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001:74). This led some to avoid labor organizing in the US, but others did become involved, noting that the “worst thing that can happen is you lose your job” (Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001:75). For example, “with the Salvadorans. . . . Sometimes you found people who fought there. And there, you were in a union they killed you. Here, you [were in a union] you lost a job at $4.25” (Waldinger et al. 1998:117). Latinos have provided members and key union leadership, including Maria Elena Durazo and Miguel Contreras. This has strengthened unions, and helped shape organized labor’s policy agenda and emphasis on social movement unionism. With shared interests, and because unions in Los Angeles have become a political force, unions offer Latinos a potential political partner that other emerging racial minority groups and elected officials have lacked in other regions. As a result, the rising working-class Latino electorate and unions could form a coalition, and the two groups have worked closely together to become one of the major political blocs in the region, with the resources and capacity for sustained political activity (Kotkin 2011). In contrast to the contemporary conditions in Los Angeles, Clarence Stone’s (1989) study of Atlanta revealed a different option for African Americans. The growing African American population and voting power in Atlanta in the 1970s and 1980s led to electoral control of the city’s government. As Stone (1989) emphasized, however, African American leaders needed the longestablished ties and organizations, economic opportunities, and investment capital of the White business elite to establish a governing coalition. The Atlanta White business elite backed the development of the downtown into a business and convention center and needed the African American–led city hall to support this agenda. This coalition produced important agreements in terms of jobs and business contracts that helped middle-class African Americans but did less for low-income African Americans (Stone 1989). During the same decades in Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, the first and only African American mayor of the city, had a much smaller African American population to draw support from in comparison to Atlanta and used a diverse voting base to win election for two decades, including progressive Jewish

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Americans from the city’s Westside who had been excluded from the previous mayor’s circle of power (Sonenshein 1993). As in Atlanta, Bradley’s governing coalition strongly supported growth interests during his time in office from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, and this period saw the rise of many of downtown’s skyscrapers. Bradley used his two decades in office to strengthen affirmative action programs in city and union hiring, but similar to Atlanta, these actions tended to benefit middle-class rather than lower-income African Americans. In the 2000s, comparing two cities with large Latino populations, Los Angeles and Houston, Harold Meyerson asks, Why do Latinos in Los Angeles have more political clout? Both cities in the mid-1900s had majority White populations, but, by 2000, Whites numbered less than a third in each city as the number of Latinos rapidly grew (Meyerson 2004:A8). Meyerson contends that the lack of a strong labor movement in Houston is the major difference. As Meyerson (2004:A8) explains, unions and Latinos work together and “under the leadership of Miguel Contreras . . . L.A. labor has registered and mobilized hundreds of thousands of new immigrant voters, turning out thousands of activists at election time to walk precincts and work phone banks.” Other factors contributing to the difference in Latinos’ political power in Los Angeles and Houston include: the mobilization of Latin American immigrants in Los Angeles, in contrast to the established Mexican American population that controls Latino politics in Texas and has done less to bring in Latin American immigrants; and White Democrats in Los Angeles who support Latino candidates unlike White Republicans in Texas who do not (Meyerson 2004, 2015). The fact that Los Angeles is in a state now dominated by Democrats also contributes to the rise of progressive policies, in contrast to the Republican domination of Texas. Los Angeles officials can pass initiatives that will not be countered by a conservative state government. In Wisconsin, for example, the city of Milwaukee negotiated a project labor agreement for the construction of a sports arena receiving public subsidies for the Milwaukee Bucks professional basketball team. Following Milwaukee’s agreement, however, the state passed legislation supported by Republicans barring local governments from requiring project labor agreements on government-funded projects (Elving 2017; Stone 2019). Another challenge facing coalitions is that Latinos and African Americans have both experienced racialized exclusion in the United States, and

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this subordinate position in a racialized hierarchy sometimes pits one group against the other for scarce resources, such as jobs, housing, and political office. Black/Brown conflict in Los Angeles has received a great deal of media attention, and while much of this is exaggerated, tensions around real issues, such as the way resources are used in public schools, and the electoral power of African Americans and Latinos, are critical concerns for these communities (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Pastor 2021; Kun and Pulido 2014). Given that the growing power of the partnership between Latinos and unions is such an important part of the growth-with-equity coalition, how does the Black/Brown conflict fit into this partnership and what does it mean for building and maintaining broad-based coalitions? Are Latino gains in politics and employment coming at the expense of African Americans? Historically in Los Angeles, African Americans have provided strong support for unions, understanding that, even with the exclusionary history of unions, unions provided an opportunity for better wages and jobs, and African Americans have long struggled through grassroots activism and electoral politics for civil rights and political representation for racial minorities (Laslett 2012; Milkman 2006; Pulido 2006; Sides 2003; Wong 2021). In the 1970s and 1980s, unions and African Americans had a strong relationship and African Americans held leadership positions in unions serving bus drivers, city employees, school employees, and letter carriers (Frank and Wong 2004). A shift, however, was underway in the 1980s and “onceunionized industries began contracting out traditional African-American jobs in hotels and building services, and began filling these ‘new’ jobs with nonunion Latino workers” (Frank and Wong 2004:166). Directly addressing this issue, unions have made a concerted effort to include African Americans in union efforts; for example, by using resources to unionize jobs held by African Americans, such as security guards (Pastor 2018; Wong 2021). The UCLA Labor Center helped establish the Los Angeles Black Work Center, which is now an independent organization working on employment equity. In one of their major accomplishments, the organization increased the number of African Americans working on the construction of the Crenshaw/ LAX rail line from zero to 20 percent in 2015 (LABWC 2021). In the 2000s, union programs to increase the number of racial minorities in the building trades and diversify union hotel workers added substantial numbers of African Americans (Bonacich and Alimahomed-Wilson 2012). Unions have also worked to successfully support African Americans running for elected office

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(Frank and Wong 2004; Pastor 2018). Unions working to increase the number of African Americans in union jobs, however, also had to gain the support of Latinos, who now dominate many of the unions. Educating Latino workers about the history of African American workers displaced by Latinos and the vital support of African American faith and community leaders for unionizing built support for this effort (Bonacich and Alimahomed-Wilson 2012).

Los Angeles Community Organizations Lorrie Frasure-Yokley’s (2015) study of politics in suburban cities emphasizes the long history of community organizations providing services to residents and politically incorporating immigrants and racial minorities and demonstrates that providing services and advocating for residents have become particularly important after the cutbacks in federal funding since the 1980s. Frasure-Yokley (2015) adds to regime theory’s focus on city officials and business leaders who establish an informal coalition in the governance of a city and for building large projects. City officials control the entitlement process and eminent domain, while corporate executives provide capital and business expertise to build projects. Adding community organizations, along with city officials and business leaders, is key to understanding how community organizations have worked to translate the interests of lower-income residents into major changes in the politics of development in Los Angeles. Critical to this change is the growth-with-equity coalition that gives political power to resident interests. In addition to unions and the growing Latino population, community organizations established in the 1990s provide another key component in the rise of a progressive coalition in Los Angeles. These include the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), which have led campaigns for living wages and community benefits. Other organizations provide additional resources, such as Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice, which, as a faith-based organization, adds moral authority to arguments about inequality (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2008); Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, which works on affordable housing, health care, and economic development in South Los Angeles and provides community outreach and education to local residents; and the Environmental Health Coalition, which provides key analysis on health and legal issues regarding development.

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Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) LAANE has become a key organization in the region and plays a central leadership role by conducting research, formulating policies, developing campaigns, building coalitions, and advocating for the interests of low-income workers (Greenhouse 2019; Meyerson 2013; Narro 2004). LAANE has helped craft policies dealing with some of the city’s major labor and development struggles and established a transformational shift in city policies by linking the approval of large development projects with growth-with-equity policies and reframing the narrative of development (Greenhouse 2019; Meyerson 1998). The 1992 civil unrest in the city served as a catalyst for union and community activists to rethink their strategies to address economic and social problems in the city. Underscoring the importance of unions for the growthwith-equity coalition, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Union (HERE), Local 11, started LAANE in 1993 as part of a larger effort to improve the pay, benefits, and working conditions in the tourism industry (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009; Zabin and Martin 1999). Madeline Janis, LAANE’s director, explained that the 1992 events “crystallized for me the overpowering devastation of poverty. . . . In the aftermath of the riots, what most upset me was the utter lack of strategy to deal with the underlying causes” (Fine 2010). As Janis explained, “It was a bread riot significantly about low-wage poverty,” but “there weren’t enough organizations representing regular people, organizing regular people” (Orleck 2018:254). Janis understood that “the pragmatic part, even the cynical part, is that it’s about power. And fundamentally, poor people in this city don’t have power. So if we are going to create a better society, we have to have a big vision, but we also have to be smart and practical about how we achieve it” (Newton 2007:M6). Janis had previously worked as an attorney for one of the region’s top law firms, Latham & Watkins, and saw first-hand how large corporations used power and resources in the city’s land use and development process. Janis understood that with “comprehensive campaigning . . . you need a lot of different types of tactics to accomplish something big, . . . you need research, communications, policy development, and a legal strategy. And, of course, you need money” (Orleck 2018:254). Janis also engaged in immigrant issues as director of the Central American Refugee Center in Los Angeles; directly influenced Los Angeles development when she became a commissioner on

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the city’s Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) from 2002 to 2012; and cofounded, in 2012, the national organization Jobs to Move America to scale up LAANE’s work of building coalitions and leveraging government spending to create good jobs and address environmental concerns. LAANE’s first major achievement was the Los Angeles City Council’s 1996 passage of the “country’s first worker retention ordinance that required existing workers to be hired during a change of contractors,” and its impact was soon felt at the city’s airport, where it protected the jobs of nearly 1,000 workers when a contractor changed (Frank and Wong 2004:173). Building alliances with community groups, LAANE worked closely with the religious leaders who established Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE) in 1996, and CLUE worked with LAANE to win the city council’s passage of the living-wage ordinance in 1997. LAANE also led the 2014 effort to establish a $15.37 minimum wage for hotel workers (Greenhouse 2019). Janis noted the importance to “really look at the relationship between government and the private sector” to examine and establish “ways we could impact corporate behavior” and “impact regional, state, and national economies by using the power of government” (Orleck 2018:255). Corporate leaders criticize government involvement in public affairs unless it benefits corporate interests, Janis explains, noting that these leaders suggest that we “keep the government out of business except when we need money: subsidies, tax breaks, bailouts” (Orleck 2018:256). Leveraging city subsidies for development projects, LAANE led the effort to win Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) with some of the largest projects in the city, such as the expansion of the airport and L.A Live. To critics who claim that these agreements interfere with the free market, Janis says that “we are pursuing a very capitalistic notion. Public money is an investment on behalf of the community and taxpayers. We’re saying that the developers who receive the benefit of public investment should give a return on that investment to the community” (Greenhouse 2019:275). Harold Meyerson (1998:16) described the effectiveness of LAANE: “Combining a keen instinct for political organizing with groundbreaking approaches to land-use and economic-development law, LAANE has become one of the most important forces—and surely the most innovative one—for social justice in L.A.” As stated on LAANE’s (2006) website, by “combining [a] vision of social justice with a practical approach to social change, [LAANE]

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has helped set in motion a broad movement based on the principle that hard work deserves fair pay, good benefits and decent working conditions.”

Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) is one of the key community organizations working in the neighborhoods surrounding downtown, and its history and activities are illustrative of the effort of local grassroots organizations to mobilize low-income residents, participate in city politics, and counter the influence of growth interests. Gilda Haas and Kent Wong led the effort to establish SAJE. Urban theorist Edward Soja (2011:96) has called Haas “one of the world’s leading urban activists.” Haas was a lecturer in the UCLA Urban Planning Department and had established the Community Scholars Program in the early 1990s, which brought together graduate students with labor and community activists on projects examining economic development in the Los Angeles region. Wong was the director of the UCLA Labor Center. In 1994, Haas and Wong initiated a number of meetings with community and labor groups to discuss the possibility of creating links to connect their various efforts. As Haas (2004) explained, “The compelling idea was to start a popular education center that would be a safe space for grassroots people to shape their own agendas and see them through into genuine social change.” From these talks, SAJE emerged, with Haas as the executive director, and was established in 1996 near the University of Southern California (USC) in Los Angeles, several miles south of the downtown core where Staples Center would later emerge. As Haas (Benitez, Haas, and Wells 2003:25) explained, SAJE’s goals were “economic justice” and “organizing for social change” by establishing “political power” and “intellectual power among the people who live here” to help shape development in ways that would benefit local residents. SAJE began working with “residents, religious institutions, workers, community organizations, and labor unions” in 1998 and helped establish the Coalition for a Responsible USC (Haas 2002:91) when food and service workers at USC began a three-year struggle to negotiate a union contract. Ultimately, the coalition effort paid off and a contract was signed. During the time of the USC contract negotiations, the Coalition for a Responsible USC became increasingly concerned about the plans of city officials, developers,

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and USC—an informal growth coalition of archetypal participants—to transform the “forty-block strip” along Figueroa Street from Staples Center in the north to USC and the Los Angeles Coliseum (the main site for the 1932 and 1984 and future 2028 Summer Olympics) in the south into a “Sports and Entertainment Corridor” (Haas 2002:92). As plans for the “Figueroa Corridor” unfolded (Simers 1996:A1), and as Haas (2002:92) explains, the Coalition for a Responsible USC noted that there was “virtually no consideration” among the proponents of the Figueroa Corridor for the impact of the prospective development on the “200,000 workingclass people who lived in the surrounding neighborhoods.” The Coalition for a Responsible USC broadened its scope from USC to the Figueroa Corridor to monitor development and work on issues such as illegal evictions, affordable housing, and employment opportunities in the corridor and changed its name to the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ) in 1999 (McNeill 2010). Critical to the community activism that will be examined in Chapter 4, LAANE and SAJE work closely together, with LAANE central to regional policy formation, and political and organizing efforts, complementing SAJE’s work at the local level in the Figueroa Corridor (Narro 2004). SAJE served as the umbrella group for the community organizations during the negotiation of the 2001 L.A. Live CBA, and FCCEJ served as the lead group for the organizations monitoring the implementation and compliance of the CBA. As its community work has grown, SAJE has helped launch other organizations, including a community land trust in 2005, TRUST South LA. SAJE also established United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement (UNIDAD) in 2009 and has been instrumental in negotiating CBAs with major projects in South Los Angeles. The regional growth coalition was fragmenting in the 1990s; however, as Michael Woo noted, downtown business interests remained strong, and city officials continued to support major projects such as Staples Center, L.A. Live, and the Grand Avenue complexes. Community organizations and unions wielded significant political influence in the previous decades; for example, Mayor Tom Bradley had appointed labor leader James Wood to the CRA in the 1970s and Wood became the chair of the agency in the 1980s. During this period, however, there was no strong and unified coalition that brought together community organizations, voters, and unions around the issue of growth with equity; that coalition had its roots in the 1990s and would emerge

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and grow in strength in the following decades. That the 2001 L.A. Live CBA— discussed in Chapter 4, along with the coalition that supported it—is now considered a “landmark” that “catalyzed a national movement” (Ahern et al. 2010:5) is a clear sign of the political influence of the growth-with-equity coalition and of the change in the politics of development in Los Angeles.

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ith urban renewal from the 1950s through the 1970s, and with contemporary major development projects, the defining themes have been the displacement of primarily lower-income racial minorities, the destruction of lower-priced housing, and the partial or complete destruction of communities. Because of the massive displacement of racial minorities, nationally, urban renewal earned the nickname “Negro Removal”; in Los Angeles, Mexican Americans called the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) the “Chicano Removal Agency.” While cities attempted to help displaced residents by funding relocation, this was aid aimed at supporting individuals, rather than rebuilding demolished neighborhoods or strengthening remaining ones. By constructing housing and amenities for affluent residents, these projects also set into motion the class and racial transformation of the destroyed areas and nearby communities. Los Angeles city officials and private developers have fueled tremendous growth in the Figueroa Corridor, building on their plans to establish a sports and entertainment district along Figueroa Street, from downtown Los Angeles to Exposition Park, two miles south of the Convention Center complex. AEG completed Staples Center in 1999 and built L.A. Live in the 2000s. In Exposition Park, the California African American Museum opened in the 1980s; major renovation and expansion of the Natural History Museum and Science Center continued through the 2010s; the Banc of California Stadium opened in 2018 for the Major League Soccer team, the Los Angeles Football Club; and 115

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construction broke ground in 2018 for the billion-dollar George Lucas Narrative Museum. The University of Southern California, across the street to the north of Exposition Park, continues to expand, including the Galen Center sports arena, which opened in 2006, and the fifteen-acre, $700 million USC Village, which opened in 2017. In 2002, Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) staff members Gilda Haas and Andrea Gibbons gave a tour of the area to a group of artists who were creating posters about displacement and gentrification in the neighborhood around Figueroa Street. Haas (Benitez, Haas, and Wells 2003:31) explained that “the artists were getting the picture of a stable community thrown into turmoil by real estate forces.” As Gibbons (Benitez, Haas, and Wells 2003:31–32) noted, “The residents are primarily . . . Central American or Mexican immigrants,” and based on her work with tenants, she explained that “there is a big misconception that this is ‘a transitory community,’ but in our experience this is not true. In almost every building we’ve gone into there are people who have lived there for twenty or thirty years.” Gibbons (Benitez, Haas, and Wells 2003:32) recalled some of the extreme measures that landlords used to illegally get their tenants to leave, stating that these landlords owned another house on the block and they evicted all the families, one by one. And then, as the families were evicted, they blocked off their rooms with wood and just let them sit there, so it’s full of rats. When I visited the building to organize there, there was only one family left, and you could hear the rats running around upstairs. It was full of bugs and cockroaches. The landlords didn’t fix things, they didn’t fumigate, they just allowed things to get worse and worse. That often does more than anything else towards getting people out; because how can you let your family stay in those conditions? It becomes less and less worth it to fight and stay.

The progressive coalition of unions, community organizations, and residents countered the “turmoil” caused “by real estate forces” in the Figueroa Corridor, with the 2001 L.A. Live Community Benefits Agreement (CBA). I suggest that this CBA represents a fundamental change in urban politics and inequality regarding development and illustrates the rise of a progressive coalition in the Los Angeles region and a key accomplishment in the coalition’s support of growth with equity (Meyerson 1998; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009).

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CBAs are “project-specific contracts between developers or cities and community coalitions. CBAs are legally binding, enforceable agreements that call for a range of benefits to be produced by the development project” (Janis 2007:10). To ensure that local residents benefit from projects, CBAs generally include provisions for affordable housing, living-wage jobs, local hiring, and subsidies for displaced residents. CBAs have emerged with some of the largest development projects in cities across the nation, and rather than the limited focus of relocation costs with earlier projects, CBAs attempt to go much further by helping to build and strengthen communities through jobs and housing (Janis 2007).

History of Redistributive Policies Historically, there have been important periods when low-income residents and their political allies have attempted to contest major projects and reshape public policy, such as movements in the 1960s and 1970s against urban renewal and the destruction of communities (Mollenkopf 1983). The 1980s saw the rise of progressive city governments in some cities, such as San Francisco and Boston, and policies connected development with community benefits that assisted low-income residents, such as inclusionary zoning and linkage fees for affordable housing (Clavel 2010; DeLeon 1992). The contemporary Los Angeles movement clearly resonates with those earlier efforts, but in Los Angeles, the efforts are more focused on bringing benefits to the neighborhoods directly affected by development, are negotiated by broad-based community coalitions rather than city staff and elected officials, and are backed by stronger enforcement mechanisms (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2007; Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005; Kaye and Mendoza 2008). Residents may be critical of the results of programs negotiated by city officials because they may not adequately address the interests of residents most impacted by major projects (Been 2010). For example, a developer may be allowed to build projects larger than permitted by zoning ordinances if the developer contributes to a housing fund, but the funds could go to housing built elsewhere in the city and not benefit those affected by the project. Also, jobs generated by the project may not be filled by local residents. In addition, city officials may not have the resources or motivation to monitor such provisions as wage levels and local hiring once the project is built, whereas the

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community coalition has the legal authority to monitor the L.A. Live CBA (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005; Wolf-Powers 2010).

Living-Wage Ordinances and Los Angeles Efforts to change the development debate in Los Angeles correspond with the national living-wage movement that started in the mid-1990s. This movement worked to reframe policies by supporting the principle that municipal governments should address inequality and have contracts with firms that pay a living wage, rather than with companies with full-time workers earning poverty-level wages (Dreier 2014). Concern over the rise in service sector jobs that paid below poverty wages, and growing inequality in society, prompted a living-wage movement across the country in the mid-1990s. A living wage is generally set higher than an area’s minimum wage and is calculated to financially sustain a family or provide an income for a family of four at or above the federal poverty standard (Fairris et al. 2005). In general, living-wage ordinances “apply to private sector firms that have particular financial relationships to government, either as contractors, recipients of subsidies or tax breaks, concessionaires, or tenants on publicly-owned property” (Zabin and Martin 1999:3). In comparison, federal and state minimum wage regulations apply to all workers in the covered geographic region. While efforts to substantially increase the minimum wage at the state and federal levels have often failed, living-wage campaigns in cities have had much greater success. Baltimore’s city council passed the nation’s first living-wage ordinance in 1994, prompted by the members of labor unions and faith-based organizations who had noted that increasingly, people with full-time employment were using the city’s homeless services. In the following decade, 123 cities, counties, school boards, and other governing bodies passed living-wage ordinances (Luce 2005). Proponents note that since contractors usually did not include benefits in their pay packages, cities reducing costs by contracting out to private companies end up paying for health care and other public services used by low-paid workers. Opponents believe that living-wage ordinances could have a negative impact on a city’s business climate and would discourage private investment, new businesses locating in the city, and encourage businesses already in the area to leave in search of lower costs. As Paul Peterson (1981) explained, in an

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era of highly mobile capital, investment may be negatively affected by policies that increase the cost of doing business in a city as investors seek locations with fewer costs and regulations. Jack Kyser was the chief economist for the Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, and he opposed Los Angeles’s living-wage ordinance. Kyser explained that business owners were concerned about the economic impact of a range of approved and proposed ordinances, stating that “it’s just another . . . black mark . . . Los Angeles is a difficult place in which to do business . . . business taxes . . . inclusionary zoning, this living wage, and I think they’re afraid that sooner or later, there will be an effort to expand that” (Life & Times 2005). Richard Riordan, a Republican businessman elected mayor of Los Angeles in 1993, contracted out some city services to private firms. As a result, labor and community organizations, including the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, Metro Alliance, Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Development Alternatives, and Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE), formed a coalition to enact a living-wage ordinance in the city (Gottlieb et al. 2005; Zabin and Martin 1999). City council member Jackie Goldberg sponsored the ordinance and she worked closely with community and labor organizations to generate support for the ordinance. The ordinance overcame a veto by Mayor Riordan by a 11–1 city council vote in April 1997, and became the tenth living-wage ordinance in the nation (Fairris et al. 2005). This was a key victory that demonstrated city council support for the growing economic justice movement in the city and helped established strong ties among organizations in the region (Fairris et al. 2005; Zabin and Martin 1999). A great deal of research followed the action of cities across the nation to increase the minimum wage or institute living-wage ordinances and this research showed that major reductions in jobs by employers in reaction to increased wages did not occur (Schmitt 2013). Instead, employers adjusted to higher wages in a variety of ways, such as passing on costs to the consumer or the city, and employers experienced positive results, such as reduced turnover and absentee rates and increased worker productivity (Farris et al. 2005; Schmitt 2013). Eric Garcetti was elected to the Los Angeles City Council in 2001 and was a strong supporter of the living wage. Garcetti (2005), commenting on research on the topic, stated in 2005 that “the myth that higher wages

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will destroy our business climate is a marginal idea with unfortunate persistence. It’s a myth that’s used to perpetuate the appalling gap between rich and poor, which continues to grow at an alarming rate.”

Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) Hollywood and Highland CBA Jackie Goldberg, elected to the Los Angeles City Council in 1993, helped establish the city’s living-wage ordinance and the city’s first Community Benefits Agreement (CBA). The 1998 CBA involved the project built by developer TrizecHahn at the corner of Hollywood Boulevard and Highland Avenue, next to the iconic Chinese Theatre with its foot and hand prints of entertainment luminaries set in concrete (Meyerson 2006b). As Goldberg began her time on the city council, the 1992 civil unrest, nationwide recession, and major cutbacks in federal defense spending that translated into the enormous loss of aerospace jobs in Southern California greatly impacted the economy of Los Angeles and her district in Hollywood. This was in addition to the movement of people and businesses out of Hollywood due to its deteriorating infrastructure and increasing crime rate. Adding to the problems, the January 1994 Northridge earthquake severely damaged some of the historic buildings in Hollywood. Goldberg believed that there were three critical components of Hollywood’s economy: housing, entertainment, and employment related to the film industry. Before addressing the needs of Hollywood Boulevard, she focused on housing and used her city powers to get slum lords to sell their buildings so that others could improve them. As Goldberg explained, “We realized that if we didn’t do something about the housing, we would never fix the rest of it” (Fine 2005). Goldberg understood that business had to be a partner to improve the local economy and generate new jobs that paid a living wage. As Goldberg explained, “I learned early on that a lot of the goals I was pursuing—living wage, better health benefits—all derive from having good quality jobs . . . That’s the reason why I started paying attention to economic development and the businesses in my district. You don’t kill the goose that lays the golden egg” (Fine 2005). As a first step, Mayor Richard Riordan and Goldberg worked with property owners and established a Business Improvement District (BID) in December 1996 with forty-one members, to help clean up the area and address

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crime (Kenyon 1998). “That was the key, convincing people to invest in their own property.  .  .  . Then others began to look at investing in Hollywood,” Goldberg explained (Fine 2005). Leron Gubler, head of the Hollywood Chamber of Commerce, noted about Goldberg’s efforts, “Before she came on board, Hollywood was known for two things: crime and grime. . . . None of the great things that have happened in recent years would have happened if perceptions weren’t change[d] in the mid-1990s” (Fine 2005). Around the country, the building of shopping malls in the suburbs had slowed as land became more expensive and large vacant parcels harder to find. The earlier construction of numerous suburban malls had created intense competition among retailers, reducing the demand for new stores. As a result, the trend of suburban city officials luring developers with generous subsidies was shifting, with cities requiring greater contributions from developers for creating the necessary infrastructure for the shopping centers (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). The slowdown in the suburbs provided an opportunity for projects in urban areas but many developers were reluctant to build downtown. One of the largest shopping mall developers in the US, Edward DeBartolo, explained the prevailing view in 1973, stating that “I wouldn’t put a penny downtown . . . It’s bad. . . . Face it, why should people come in? They don’t want the hassle, they don’t want the danger” (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989:5). Other developers, however, recognized the value of historic downtown areas and successfully redeveloped major downtown properties. The redevelopment of Ghirardelli Square and the Cannery in San Francisco in the 1960s; Faneuil Hall in Boston and Pike Place Market in Seattle in the 1970s; and Horton Plaza opening in San Diego in 1985 demonstrated that private developers and city officials could work together on successful downtown projects (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989:5). While the earlier projects in cities such as Boston and San Francisco had involved historic structures, Goldberg wanted to lure a developer to build a new project and take advantage of Hollywood’s worldwide fame and tourism. As Goldberg explained, “So the first task we faced when we came into office was to get people to remember that they were sitting on, as owners, the bestknown piece of real estate in the world” (Proffitt 1997:M3). As Kerry Morrison, the executive director of the Hollywood BID, explained about increasing interest in Hollywood, “What seems to be a national wave back to Main Street USA” was occurring, rather than the “suburbanization of the retail experience in the ’80s” (Kenyon 1998).

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Goldberg worked to get a major developer interested in building a project that would act as a catalyst for other investment. Goldberg sought out David Malmuth who, as an executive of the Disney corporation, had participated in the revitalization of New York City’s Times Square. Working with TrizecHahn, Malmuth proposed a project for the property at the corner of Hollywood Boulevard and Highland Avenue. Malmuth compared Times Square with Hollywood and proclaimed that Times Square is what inspired me to see the potential on Hollywood Boulevard. . . . I saw this extraordinary rebirth taking place, and I was convinced we could do something similar . . . What they do share is a street with an extraordinary history, and a great name. When someone comes to the city, whether it be New York City or Los Angeles, one of the places they have to see is either 42nd Street and Times Square or Hollywood. (Kenyon 1998)

In the mid-1990s, the Chinese Theatre served as the main tourist destination, with little else to convince tourists to spend time and money in the area. As Goldberg explained, “We now get about 9.5 million tourists a year, but they only stay 15 minutes. . . . I met with some travel agents a few years ago . . . and what they said was we had to make Hollywood a destination” (Orlov 1998). The TrizecHahn project would include a theater, and the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences agreed to have the Academy Awards—which had not taken place in Hollywood since 1960—there (Kenyon 1998). Goldberg also negotiated to have the city contribute $90 million in subsidies to help the project. Before Goldberg began her time on the city council, the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) of Los Angeles had heavily subsidized the construction of the New Otani Hotel in Little Tokyo, which had destroyed a large portion of the historic neighborhood, displacing small businesses and residents. Labor organizations have accused the hotel management of violating worker rights, and Goldberg wanted to ensure that this would not be repeated at the TrizecHahn project. Goldberg explained that the CRA had put a fortune into the New Otani Hotel downtown, which has had continuously terrible relations with its employees. I was determined that if we were going to put money into Hollywood-Highland, the employees would be treated well (Meyerson 2006b:39). I wanted Hollywood to thrive, but I wanted the money spread around a little. I provided developers with access to some things to get the job done and I promised not to abandon them when the going

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got rough. But in turn, they had to guarantee to me that all boats would rise; they had to use union workers and local source hiring. (Fine 2005)

The city council voted for final approval of the project in October 1998 and as Goldberg explained, in describing the contribution of the developer, TrizecHahn, “I believe we have . . . asked the developers to go way beyond what was required and they have stepped up to the plate” (O’Donoghue 1998). Goldberg worked to put together a CBA with TrizecHahn, using city subsidies as leverage. The city contributed $30 million to help build the theater and $67 million to construct a parking structure at the $615 million center (Fine 2002). Among the important CBA provisions, workers at the project’s hotel would be covered by the same conditions as the union hotel workers in Los Angeles; the city’s living-wage ordinance would cover TrizecHahn’s service employees; TrizecHahn would attempt to bring in retail tenants who would pay their employees a living wage; and the Center would attempt to hire local workers (Meyerson 2006b). Harold Meyerson (2006b:39) suggests that the 1998 Hollywood and Highland agreement was the city’s first CBA and was important because it “set a template” in Los Angeles that community organizations and city officials “have expanded and refined over the years on subsequent major projects around town, including the Staples Center . . . and the expansion of LAX.” Nicholas Marantz (2015:264), however, disagrees with Meyerson’s characterization of the agreement as a CBA because the developer did not sign an agreement with community organizations, which is a key part of the definition of a CBA, since the agreement was negotiated between the developer and city agencies. Marantz (2015) raises an important point, and participants in major CBAs around the country share that definition which includes community organization participation (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005; Janis 2007). Jackie Goldberg, however, worked closely with LAANE in the creation of the CBA (Meyerson 2006b), and LAANE was the key community organization that helped formulate major CBAs in the city that followed. With this in mind, I suggest that while the Hollywood and Highland agreement does not strictly fulfill the definition of a CBA, I agree with Meyerson’s (2006b) assertion that it is a landmark agreement that set an important precedent that helped shape the CBAs that followed. Showing the growing impact of community organizations and support for benefits agreements, also in 1998, a coalition negotiated an agreement for a

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job training program, local hiring for residents, and business contracts for minority-owned businesses for the Alameda Corridor project, built and managed by a public/private partnership (Liegeois, Baxa, and Corkerey 1999). The $2.4 billion Alameda Corridor project, which is a twenty-mile-long rail cargo transportation system connecting the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to the downtown rail system, opened in 2002, following earlier projects such as the ports, aqueduct, and airport that provided the infrastructure for growth in the city. While the negotiation for the Hollywood and Highland CBA was a success, the actual project turned out to be a major financial failure for TrizecHahn, and the builder sold the Center for a loss in 2004. Opening at the end of 2001, and geared toward affluent tourists, the slump in tourism nationally following the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center hurt the Center. With tourists gone, the Center had to attract local residents, but fared poorly in competition with other larger and better established shopping malls in the region that also offered free or much cheaper parking (Kotkin 2002). The Center’s design may have contributed to its financial struggles. Commenting on the design of the Center and its impact on the neighborhood, the editors of Curbed LA, a blog examining architectural and planning issues in the city, wrote that “perhaps Hollywood & Highland’s most egregious sin is that the mall turns its back on the street, creating a pedestrian dead zone along Highland Avenue, a disjointed landscape where neighboring buildings and occupants fail to interact” (Williams and Smith 2007:M7). While a financial problem for TrizecHahn, the Center helped Hollywood by generating further private investment and a boom in hotel and residential construction.

L.A. Live CBA In May 2001, representatives of AEG, in exchange for support for the proposed L.A. Live project, signed a precedent-setting Community Benefits Agreement (CBA), officially called the “Community Benefits Program,” with a community coalition. The CBA marked a major change in the history of large development projects that resulted in the destruction of neighborhoods and displacement of residents, with few, if any, benefits going to the residents experiencing the negative effects of these projects. As council member Eric Garcetti stated, “This agreement really begins to chip away at the idea that

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economic prosperity and social justice cannot go hand in hand . . . We showed . . . that we can put those together” (Daunt 2001b:B3). The L.A. Live CBA (also known as the Staples Center CBA because of the sports arena constructed earlier on the site) is significant because it was the nation’s first comprehensive CBA and the agreement received media attention across the nation (Lunsford 2001; Murray 2001). The Los Angeles Times (Romney 2001a:A1) described it as “the first of its kind nationwide to take such a broad array of community concerns into account” and a 2010 New York City Task Force on CBAs stated that it was a “landmark” that “catalyzed a national movement” (Ahern et al. 2010:5). The L.A. Live CBA has served as a model for CBAs across the country. Bertha Lewis (2013), former head of Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), explained that her organization and coalition studied the L.A. Live CBA because it was the “gold standard” as they prepared to negotiate a CBA with the developer, Forest City Ratner, for the Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn. The Atlantic Yards CBA was signed in 2005 and was considered the first CBA in New York City (Ahern et al. 2010:5). The L.A. Live CBA has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars and policy makers as a potential tool for more equitable development policies (Ahern et al. 2010; Marantz 2015; Salkin and Levine 2007; Wolf-Powers 2010).

L.A. Live CBA: Building the Community Coalition AEG introduced their preliminary proposal for L.A. Live at a May 2000 city council meeting (Newton 2000:A1). SAJE and LAANE began working together to formulate a plan to consider how L.A. Live could benefit the residents, as well as the developer, and analyzed what had happened with Staples Center. Community and labor organizations had engaged in negotiations with Staples Center developer, AEG, and reached agreements on issues such as wages, relocation funds, and union contracts. However, as Gilda Haas (2002:92), the head of SAJE, explained, the organizations did not form a coalition and independently engaged in negotiations with AEG. In fact, as Haas (2002:92) noted, “most of the groups involved were not aware of the others’ efforts. As a result, when the Staples Center was built the developer got a lot from the city in terms of subsidies and entitlements. Residents and workers got relatively little.”

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SAJE recognized that building coalitions was a key way to increase political power and in the mid-1990s had begun the process and organized a Figueroa Corridor meeting “between diverse parties from local churches, unions, and community organizations, many of whom worked within a tenblock radius of each other but had never been in the same room before” (Haas 2002:95). The Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ) was not in place and prepared to negotiate collectively for the Staples Center project, which opened in 1999. Established in 1999, FCCEJ would be ready for L.A. Live. During the L.A. Live CBA negotiations, LAANE helped coordinate the labor unions, and SAJE and FCCEJ mobilized the local residents and jointly served as the umbrella group for the community organizations. The Los Angeles County Federation’s effort to strengthen relations among unions, establish alliances with community organizations, and successful campaigns for increasing wages and benefits for workers, laid the foundation for strong union support for the L.A. Live CBA coalition. Also, in the 1990s, when AEG was negotiating with the city council over the proposed Staples Center and faced opposition from Council member Joel Wachs, the County Federation and the hotel and restaurant workers union strongly supported the project because AEG had verbally agreed to living-wage jobs and neutrality during unionizing efforts (LeRoy and Purinton 2005; Newton and Shuster 1999). After AEG received city subsidies and variances for Staples Center, however, AEG argued that it was “not subject to the living wage” and “stalled on signing a card check/neutrality agreement,” forcing the unions to renegotiate with AEG (LeRoy and Purinton 2005:6). Tense negotiations followed, but council member Jackie Goldberg, a major proponent of living wages, helped keep the negotiations on track and the two sides reached a new deal (Newton and Shuster 1999). LAANE’s Madeline Janis, after the new labor agreement, noted that retailers have argued that higher wages would not allow them to operate profitably, but that the new agreement would show that “this is cutting right through that myth. That’s hugely important in this symbolic center at the heart of downtown . . . these are new jobs downtown, real jobs for entry-level people” (Newton and Shuster 1999: B1). This experience provided a strong impetus for unions to partner with the community to negotiate the L.A. Live CBA, to get an agreement in writing and to build on the living wages won with Staples Center.

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Five unions (all nonbuilding trade unions), twenty-nine community organizations (with about 25 percent affiliated with religious organizations), and over 300 residents who were primarily Latin American immigrants, entered the L.A. Live negotiations with the understanding that, as part of a broadbased coalition, the political power of unions would be augmented by the moral and place-based claims of faith-based and resident groups (Benitez, Haas, and Wells 2003). The coalition also analyzed the L.A. Live Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and raised the possibilities of a lawsuit or a lobbying effort for a revised report. Either action could have resulted in a long delay for the project (Cummings 2007/2008; McNeill 2010).

L.A. Live CBA: The Negotiations To begin negotiations between the coalition and AEG, Rita Walters, then the council member for the area, arranged one of the first meetings held in a community setting with Tim Leiweke, President of AEG. When Leiweke did not show up for the meeting, “organizers placed his name placard on an empty chair, addressing him angrily in his absence” (Romney 2001a:A1). The early meetings were “attended by hundreds of residents,” according to Gilda Haas (2002:93), the executive director of SAJE. Once the negotiations between the community coalition and AEG began, the coalition wanted an AEG representative present who had the authority to make decisions, rather than “a representative who had to go back and check anytime you wanted to do anything” (McNeill 2010). Ted Tanner, executive vice president for real estate development for AEG, who supervised the development of a number of AEG projects worldwide since joining the company in 1998, became AEG’s lead negotiator with the L.A. Live CBA. An architect, he had a deep history in development issues through his earlier work as a city planner for Philadelphia, and with the Economic Development Office for Mayor Tom Bradley from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, a period of major growth in downtown Los Angeles. Clearly, Tanner’s job was to represent the interests of AEG; nonetheless, coalition members developed a good working relationship with Tanner and viewed him as a sincere and thoughtful negotiator. Tanner understood through his experience working for the city of Philadelphia and discussing development projects with community organizations, that for the L.A. Live project, “our goal in continuing negotiations was to win true support and

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advocacy for the project,” and for the coalition, “their goal was the same—to see if we could make this project better and improve benefits for the community” (Romney 2001a:A1). Demonstrating the effort he put into establishing a solid rapport with the coalition, in one of the early large community meetings between AEG and the coalition, Tanner gave his presentation in Spanish. As Tanner (2017) explained, many of the residents were Spanish speakers, and although translators worked at the meetings, Tanner believed that it was important for him to try to get his information and intent delivered directly, because “the process of translating things sometimes is awkward” and meaning and nuance can be lost. Tanner (2017) explained that “I’ve taken Spanish in school but I’m not fluent so I had my presentation translated for me.” Residents applauded after his presentation (Romney 2001a), recognizing his consideration and respect for the audience. Sandra McNeill (2010), a SAJE staff member, noted that while some residents had difficulty understanding Tanner’s Spanish, Tanner “had obviously practiced really hard” and that this effort “said something . . . that he felt that he” should “step up to enhance communication.” Discussions between community members and developers over major projects usually take place at city-run public hearings, but in the case of L.A. Live, developer AEG and the community coalition negotiated directly, which created its own set of challenges for the coalition. Given the legal and political complexity of the entitlement process, AEG, as Haas (2002:93) noted, brought a team of “lobbyists, lawyers, and planning consultants” to guide the L.A. Live proposal through the process. Similarly, during the CBA negotiations, AEG and the community coalition had attorneys present so that the CBA language could be worked out at the meetings, expediting the process of formulating the final document. The entitlement process, and negotiating, implementing, and monitoring CBAs, highlights the importance of community organizations having access to resources to effectively participate in these processes. In a review of CBAs around the nation, a New York City task force (Ahern et al. 2010:21) emphasized the importance of organizations with technical and legal expertise regarding development partnering with residents because “without outside help, community coalitions are generally not well matched in a negotiation with a development team, which can include a cadre of lawyers and consultants.” As the report noted, organizations “such as LAANE” supply expertise

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to “evaluate project impacts,” “devise mitigations,” and conduct “contract negotiations” (Ahern et al. 2010:21). With the establishment of the Hollywood and Highland project CBA in the late 1990s, a precedent was set for these types of agreements. The coalition that formed to negotiate with AEG on the L.A. Live project included organizations—such as LAANE—that had participated in the Hollywood and Highland discussions. Thus, the coalition had the knowledge and experience of the successful Hollywood and Highland CBA effort, which had established the groundbreaking work to gain political support and legitimacy for CBAs and served as a practical model for a benefits agreement. Public funding for development projects and the support of growth historically is based on the rationale that these projects provided benefits for all members of the community (Logan and Molotch 2007). Residents, faithbased organizations, and community groups provided personal testimonies and research reports that documented the negative impacts of such projects in Los Angeles. Through the organizing efforts of SAJE, about three hundred residents who were mainly immigrants engaged in a major lobbying effort. They spoke to their city council representatives and members of city agencies and commissions, they provided comments on the EIR, and delivered testimony at the numerous public hearings (Velasquez 2009). At the early public meetings, residents expressed the impact of Staples Center on their lives, especially rising housing costs and displacement. In addition, while city and Staples Center officials valued the financial benefits and publicity of the 2000 Democratic National Convention, the residents spoke about “the tear gas, the rubber bullets, the fear that kept them cowering in back bedrooms or near-frantic when they were denied access to their apartments by police battling protestors” (Romney 2001b:C1). With other Staples Center events, residents expressed deep concern for the increased traffic and the “danger posed by reckless motorists to their children, who have no parks to play in,” “shattered car windows, stolen radios and beer bottles thrown . . . after sports events,” and “stacks of $60 parking tickets” because of the parking problems caused by Staples Center (Romney 2001b:C1). On the part of AEG, their previous experience with the Staples Center entitlement process demonstrated the problems that their L.A. Live plans could face. Council member Joel Wachs, who was concerned about the financial agreement between AEG and the city, had filed an initiative with the City Clerk in 1997 requiring a public vote before subsidies were given to a sports

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arena (Shuster 1997). Although never put on a ballot, the initiative added pressure to AEG to make concessions with the Staples deal. Concerning the L.A. Live project, Wachs (Newton 2000:A1) stated that “I have a particular concern about the financing of this project.” Wachs was on the council during the L.A. Live CBA negotiations and his actions resonated with those of city officials around the country who have worked to create more comprehensive agreements to ensure that in exchange for subsidies, corporations fulfill their obligations regarding promised benefits (Weber and Santacroce 2007). As compared to the mid-1990s when Staples Center went through the entitlement process, AEG faced a new set of circumstances that promised to make an already difficult process even more challenging. Due to term limits and a recent election, key supporters of the project on the city council would be leaving office. The Republican mayor, Richard Riordan, had supported Staples Center and strongly favored the L.A. Live project, and he would be replaced by a Democrat, James Hahn, who had received strong union support. Riordan hoped to put the entitlement process on the “fasttrack” and complete the process before he left office in July 2001 (Cummings 2007/2008:64). Thus, there was a small window of opportunity to approve the project before the new mayor and council members began their terms in office. In Gilda Haas’s (2002) analysis of the process, the complicated review and public hearing process, which could take two years for such a large project, was one of the major factors motivating AEG to negotiate with the coalition. Haas (2002:93–94) believed that the upcoming change in city officials offered the community coalition leverage, and it would be to the advantage of AEG if the approval process was completed as quickly as possible. As Haas (2002:93– 94) explained, “The developers knew that any substantial organized opposition would slow things down. In fact, to meet the developers’ goal, the project really needed organized community support.” L.A. Live representatives became more involved in discussions after they submitted the project’s Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) in January 2001. Led by an attorney with the Environmental Defense, FCCEJ (Environmental Defense 2001) submitted a detailed analysis of the DEIR in February 2001. One of the major points raised by the FCCEJ report was that the DEIR failed to “include an analysis of the energy impact of the project,” an omission given added significance by the energy crisis and blackouts which

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California experienced in 2000 (Cummings 2007/2008:66). This omission could have been challenged by a lawsuit, or FCCEJ could have lobbied to have the developer address this issue; either action resulting in a long delay (McNeill 2010). A key factor in the success of the negotiations leading to the L.A. Live CBA was the coalition of immigrant, community, environmental, faith-based, and labor organizations that brought together an impressive array of resources involving research, organizing, policy advocacy, and political influence. Considering the vast and varied constituencies represented by the various organizations in the coalition, the coalition faced a number of challenges as the groups worked through the difficult task of negotiating a common set of interests among its members while putting aside potentially divisive differences. Despite the overall success of the coalition effort to maintain internal cohesiveness, two community organizations pulled out of the negotiations because they did not agree with the CBA provision of a “waiver of the right to oppose the project” (Cummings 2007/2008:66). In addition, the work of one of the groups that pulled out focused on the control of liquor licenses, which was not part of the CBA (Romney 2001b). Gilda Haas (2002:93) explained that one of the strengths that the coalition brought to the table was that the unions, community organizations, and residents supported one another’s goals and had an “all for one, one for all” strategy “in which no one would sign an agreement until everyone had an agreement to sign.” While organized labor, for example, focused on union jobs, wages, and benefits, local residents’ negotiations emphasized displacement, affordable housing, and parking issues. Again, these varied interests did create tension between the groups and “there were strong pressures on FCCEJ to negotiate a deal” because the unions wanted to see the project go forward because of the jobs that would be created (Cummings 2007/2008:63). While this put pressure on FCCEJ to agree to the CBA, it also served as an added incentive for the unions to negotiate a comprehensive CBA that would also satisfy FCCEJ members. From the rocky beginning when Leiweke failed to show up for a meeting with the community group, the coalition and AEG spent about 100 hours negotiating a benefits program, and after months of negotiations, AEG and the community organizations signed a CBA in May 2001 (Romney 2001a:A1). Leiweke, reflecting on the history of conflict with Staples Center, explained that with the L.A. Live negotiations, “we have done this with the community.

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We learned from our last experience how things should get done” (Daunt 2001a:B1). The CBA included provisions for living-wage jobs, local hiring, affordable housing, and housing for displaced families. As one resident said about the CBA, “What we’re hoping is to get work, to get housing, to have a better way of living . . . in the beginning it didn’t seem possible, but now we see that it’s a reality” (Romney 2001a:A1). Madeline Janis (LAANE) noted that the CBA “includes an incredible, unprecedented jobs program” and that “we hope this will become a template for future projects” (Daunt 2001b:B3).

Developers and Community Benefits Agreements Considering that CBAs drive up the costs of a project, why would developers sign a CBA with community coalitions? By establishing a CBA with community organizations, developers gain their support in the entitlement process (which is particularly important when the city council votes on a project) and avoid disputes and possible lawsuits that would create delays and drive up costs (Rappleye 2002). With the 2001 L.A. Live CBA, for example, the developer recognized the political influence of the labor and community organizations and would leverage the importance of having their support in the entitlement process and request for tax rebates. Also, considering the resources the city used to help the developer with L.A. Live, the developer understood the CBA as a cost of doing business (Lunsford 2001)—and a relatively small cost in relation to the city’s use of eminent domain to help the developer acquire property, hotel tax rebates (were estimated at over $200 million), other city subsidies and support, and the overall cost of the project (McGreevy 2005b). Discussing conditions which favor the enactment of CBAs, the former director of the Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles, Cecilia Estolano, explains that such agreements “work best when there is substantial agency money invested, when they’re big projects, and when they’re in hot markets or emerging markets” (Meyerson 2006b:40). Similarly, Laura WolfPowers (2010) pointed out three key common features in the local political and development context among CBAs nationwide. First, a strong real estate market that makes a place desirable for private investment. Second, large public subsidies for the project create a potential point of leverage in bargaining for a CBA. Third, the community coalition pressing for a CBA must have the

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political power to possibly block government support for the project. In short, the real estate market must be strong enough to make an investment attractive, even with the added cost of a CBA. Ted Tanner recognized the necessity for gaining community support and avoiding drawn-out conflicts (Romney 2001a) and understood CBAs as “a sign of the times with all of these broad community coalitions forming” (Lunsford 2001:B7). Tanner (2017) explained that AEG’s “groundwork” with community groups to establish the L.A. Live CBA was essential for the community support that AEG received because community members “bought into our project” and “wanted to see it succeed” because of the benefits it would bring to the neighborhood. When asked if a CBA helped with the L.A. Live entitlement process with the city council, Tanner (2017) replied, “absolutely,” “there were hundreds of people that came to various hearings and meetings” and the city council members were “literally stunned that there was so much vocal support.” Gilda Haas (SAJE) shared this view, noting that there was “enormous community support for the project” (Daunt 2001a:B1). Regarding the CBA, Haas explained that it was a “very broad agreement that is reflective of the breadth of our coalition,” and that through the negotiations, “not only is Staples making a contribution to the community, but we feel that we have made their project better too” (Lunsford 2001:B7). Similarly, Cliff Goldstein, a partner in J. H. Snyder, a major Los Angeles commercial development company, explained that with the company’s mixed-use project in North Hollywood, which received a subsidy from the city, negotiating a CBA in the early 2000s was an important part of managing the entitlement process. As Goldstein explains, “The best way to get our project approved is to join with the community . . . Once we’ve crafted an agreement, we walk hand in hand downtown to the council” (Meyerson 2006b:39). Goldstein notes, “As a developer we’re looking for a win-win . . . it’s self-interest. We’re being realistic” (Rappleye 2002). CBAs have been negotiated in a range of other projects in the region and around the country (Ahern et al. 2010; Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005; Salkin and Levine 2007; Wolf-Powers 2010). A notable example is the CBA negotiated in 2004 with the $14 billion renovation and expansion of the Los Angeles International Airport (known as LAX), which is expected to be completed in 2023 (Los Angeles World Airports 2017). The airport is surrounded by densely populated neighborhoods housing primarily African Americans

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and Latinos. Building on the success of the L.A. Live CBA, members of that coalition—such as LAANE and the unions—joined with organizations specific to the LAX community to form the LAX Coalition. In 2004, the Board of Airport Commissioners and the Los Angeles City Council approved a CBA that included provisions for local hiring, job training, soundproofing homes, health and environmental studies, and the involvement of local small businesses (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005). The Environmental Defense Fund (2008) and LAANE note that the LAX CBA is worth $500 million, and the Los Angeles World Airports, which runs LAX, declared that this CBA “represents the largest and most comprehensive CBA ever negotiated” (LAWA 2004). This CBA is different from the L.A. Live CBA, however, because it is between a community coalition and a government agency, rather than a private developer, but similar to the L.A. Live CBA, it was negotiated by a broad coalition and demonstrates the growing support of local governments for these type of agreements (Gross, LeRoy, and JanisAparicio 2005).

CBAs: Lessons Learned One of the key issues for examining the establishment of CBAs is the relative political strength of business and community interests in the region. As regime theory explains, cities are often run by informal coalitions and an important area of study is examining the members of community and business alliances and the influence they exert in the political arena (Elkin 1987). The history of the L.A. Live CBA, and other CBAs around the country, suggests that there are four major factors involving political influence and local economic context that contribute to the negotiation of a CBA. First, growth coalitions have dominated politics in many urban communities, but their power has begun to erode in the past several decades due to the fragmentation and weakening of growth interests in communities such as Boston, Los Angeles, Portland, and San Francisco (Clavel 2010; Purcell 2000). At the same time, however, major corporations, such as development companies, still wield significant political influence through the private capital they can invest in projects and through political contributions. The challenges and limits faced by progressive city governments are illustrated by Seattle’s passage in 2018 of a tax on the city’s largest corporations to fund affordable housing and aid to

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the homeless. Faced with intense pressure by Amazon, Starbucks, and other major corporations in the city, the council repealed the tax. Second, in these communities, labor, environmental, slow-growth, faithbased, and community organizations have worked to form coalitions to support the interests of working-class residents (Leavitt 2006; Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009). These broad-based coalitions contributed to the growing strength of grassroots and electoral politics that has resulted in the election of city officials supportive of the interests of lower-income residents. Taken together, the rise of organizations and community coalitions and the election of progressive city officials have contributed to a shift in the political opportunity structure and the range of resources that groups can utilize to take advantage of new circumstances (Kriesi 2007; McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Walder 2009). The L.A. Live CBA emerged from a strong foundation and durable links among coalition members, established by the history of the coalition successfully working on a range of issues, such as the city council’s passage of a living-wage ordinance in 1997 and the city’s first CBA with the Hollywood and Highland project in 1998. As a result, the difficult task of establishing the political and economic legitimacy of CBAs had already been accomplished, giving the community coalition a working model to follow. Third, a change in local politics occurred due to a major shift by organized labor. Historically, unions have supported growth interests because of the union construction jobs generated by development projects. In locales such as Los Angeles, however, unions have shifted their strategy, and while continuing to support development, now back CBAs as part of their efforts to organize and improve the wages of service workers employed in these projects once they are completed (Meyerson 2005, 2006b; Rohrlich 1998). Fourth, in economic terms, CBAs are more likely to occur in regions with strong real estate markets that are attractive to investors and can absorb the added costs of CBAs. Also, projects that receive substantial subsidies from local governments can make a project economically attractive for a developer, but can also be leveraged by community groups and city officials for benefits (LeRoy and Purinton 2005). Recognizing the limitations of CBAs, Meyerson (2006b:39) points out that the conditions favoring CBAs exist in only selected areas of Los Angeles and can easily change, and community organizations are compelled to “go project by project, creating an archipelago of decent living standards in a sea of working-class stagnation.”

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The 2001 L.A. Live CBA marked a major turning point in grassroots community politics and development policy in Los Angeles. The agreement was the culmination of the rise of a progressive coalition with resources and political clout, the election of city officials open to new policies around issues such as living wages and affordable housing, and developers recognizing a changing political climate in which city officials wanted stronger agreements and guarantees regarding community benefits in exchange for significant city support and subsidies for large projects. In contrast to policies that focus on relocation assistance for residents directly displaced by large projects, CBAs attempt to broaden the benefits to improve conditions in the neighborhoods affected by these projects. Regarding the L.A. Live CBA, in the decade that followed, did AEG and the community coalition work together to deliver the benefits laid out in the L.A. Live CBA? Also, does the L.A. Live CBA represent the endpoint in development policies, or a step toward policies that can have a more significant impact on neighborhoods? These questions are addressed in the next chapter.

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T

he coalition of unions and community organizations signed the Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) with developer AEG for the L.A. Live project in May 2001. Members of the Community Coalition celebrated the CBA, recognizing it as a landmark agreement in negotiations between developers and local residents. In the decade following the signing of the CBA, AEG completed the project. How did AEG fulfill the CBA requirements during these years, especially the major provisions regarding affordable housing and local hiring? Victor Narro, a key negotiator and attorney with the coalition, stated at the time of the signing, “If they comply with everything they agreed to, then we get something that we’ve never been able to get before, from any developer” (Romney 2001b:C1). In contrast, nearly a decade later, an immigrant familiar with the neighborhood stated that he was initially pleased with the CBA, but in retrospect, stated that the developer “gave us pebbles” (Saito 2009). I document and analyze the CBA results, and the changing contexts that frame the positive early impressions and later mixed reactions.

L.A. Live CBA: Housing The shortage of affordable housing is a critical issue in urban areas around the country, but is especially dire in the Los Angeles region, which ranked last among the forty-five major metropolitan areas in the “ratio of low-income renters to low-cost units” in the 1990s when AEG proposed the L.A. Live 137

TA B LE 5.1 AEG Contributions to Affordable Housing and Credit for Housing

Units. Table created by Jonathan Truong.

Developer

AEG Contribution in Dollars/Type of Contribution

Project Completed

Number of Units

Number of Units at Area Median Income (AMI) Affordability Level

Affordable Housing Unit Credits

Esperanza Community Housing Corporation

$350,000 Interest Free Loan 2

20041

15 units1

1 at 30%, 4 at 45%, 9 at 50%1

Loan Fund 2

1010 Development Corporation

$1,015,000 Interest Free Loans2, 4

20065

30 units3

14 at 40%, 15 at 50%; 1 manager’s unit6

152

1010 Development Corporation

$3,000,000 Interest Free Loan4

20087

61 units7

29 at 40%, 16 at 50%, 15 at 60%; 1 manager’s unit6

612

Mercy Housing

$1,550,000 Forgivable Loan8

20052

62 units8

7 at 35%, 10 at 45%, 32 at 52%, 12 at 60%; 1 manager’s unit8

312

Pico Union Housing Corporation

$520,000 Grant9

200710

13 units11

2 at 30%, 2 at 45%, 7 at 50%, 2 at 60%10

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Notes: 1. Esperanza Community Housing Corporation (2010); 2. Goldberg (2013); 3. 1010 Development Corporation (2010a); 4. Buente (2010); 5. 1010 Development Corporation (2006); 6. Rose (2010); 7. 1010 Development Corporation (2010b); 8. Cortez (2010); 9. Alberts (2010); 10. Farias (2010); 11. Pico Union Housing Corp. (2009).

MAP 5.1 The L.A. Live CBA Organizations and Housing Projects.

Map created by Jonathan Truong.

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project (Daskal 1998:50). The CBA requires that AEG “develop or cause to be developed affordable housing equal to 20% of the units constructed” (Development Agreement 2001:A–9). AEG built 224 luxury condominiums at the top of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, which opened in 2010, requiring forty-five units of affordable housing. AEG contributed $6,435,000 in loans and grants for developments that included 181 housing units and received credit for 120 units of affordable housing, well in excess of AEG’s requirement, but which helped AEG prepare for future market-rate housing that might be built. The CBA housing provisions required that half of the affordable housing units needed to be constructed before the market-rate housing could be occupied, and the remaining units completed within three years, establishing concrete, enforceable guidelines (Development Agreement 2005:39). All the affordable housing units were built by 2008, well before the condominiums were ready in 2011. Collectively, the units have a higher percentage of housing for lowerincome residents than required by the CBA. One hundred eighty-one units were built and 116, or 66 percent as compared to the 30 percent requirement, were reserved for those with incomes up to 50 percent of the Area Median Income (AMI). Sixty-one units, or 34 percent compared to the 33 percent requirement, were reserved for those with incomes up to 60 percent of the AMI (see Table 5.1). Research observes that having the infrastructure necessary to carry out the coordination and supervision of the provisions is critical for the success of a CBA, particularly in the production of affordable housing (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005). Community Development Corporations (CDCs) are community-based, nonprofit organizations that produce affordable housing. Since they were first established in the 1960s, CDCs now represent the largest sector of nonprofit housing developers in the nation (Schwartz 2010). The well-established CDCs around L.A. Live contributed to the fulfillment of the housing provisions. SAJE established the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ) in 1999 to work on housing and employment issues. FCCEJ served as the lead group for the organizations monitoring the implementation of the L.A. Live CBA. SAJE and FCCEJ met with local CDCs who supported the replacement of demolished units near L.A. Live to maintain a demographically diverse neighborhood (Weist 2010). Discussing the issue with residents, however, revealed that they did not wish to live in the area because the construction of Staples Center and L.A. Live had erased much of the physical and social structure of

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their community. Furthermore, events at the venues would create problems such as vandalism, traffic, noise, and bright lights at night (Moore 2011; McNeill 2010). With these concerns in mind, funding went to four CDC building projects outside the L.A. Live area in neighborhoods with large numbers of low-income and working-class Latino and African American residents. Three local CDCs had long roots in the neighborhood. Sister Diane Donoghue (2010), a community organizer for St. Vincent Church, established the Esperanza Community Housing Corporation (ECHC) in 1989. AEG established a revolving loan fund and contributed $350,000 in interest-free loans to ECHC for the 2004 rehabilitation of a 15-unit affordable apartment complex. Reverend DarEll Weist of the First Methodist Church established the 1010 Development Corporation in 1991. The 1010 Development Corporation had a number of projects that were far along in the planning process at the time CBA funding became available, and it became the major recipient of AEG funds, receiving $4,015,000 in interest-free loans for two projects with ninety-one units. Local residents established the Pico Union Housing Corporation (PUHC) in 1971 after the rezoning of their neighborhood from residential to commercial and industrial in 1969 led to the development of a Pep Boys industrial center that destroyed affordable housing. AEG contributed a $520,000 grant to PUHC for the development of twelve condominiums for first-time homeowners. In, addition, founded in 1981, Mercy Housing is a national organization with its headquarters in Denver, Colorado. Through its Los Angeles office, the organization received a $1,550,000 loan from AEG to help finance a 62-unit complex (see Table 5.1). AEG also helped fund the construction of childcare facilities for 128 children in these housing projects; a requirement added in 2005. Fulfilling CBA provisions regarding community services, AEG funded a 2002 study to assess the parks and recreational facilities in the area and committed $500,000 to help fund the construction of a park and $500,000 toward construction of a recreation center. AEG funded a resident parking program, which began in 2004, and paid the permit fees for residents for five years (Goldberg 2013; Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005).

L.A. Live CBA: The Land Trust Developer Williams & Dame purchased 2.7 acres from AEG directly east of L.A. Live and planned to build 648 condominiums. The property was covered

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by the CBA and Williams & Dame sought a special exemption in 2005 on the affordable housing requirement. A Los Angeles City Planning Department Report (2005:S–3) explained that the “Agreement . . . does not set a minimum value of the contribution for each required affordable unit” and that “Staff recommend” an amount of “$40,000 per unit” which is “in keeping with actual development costs to ‘cause to construct.’” Based on the proposed fee, and units for a future project, the developer wished to pay $8 million and receive credit for 200 affordable units in a planned $43 million downtown Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) residential and job training center for young adults (CRA 2006:2). Considering that the coalition negotiated the CBA to address the housing issues of local residents and families, the YWCA housing did not meet those intentions, since participants in the YWCA programs may not be from that population. Also, the coalition wanted a higher amount since $40,000 was much less than the cost of building a unit, but this was the maximum that Williams & Dame and AEG would accept (Moore 2011). FCCEJ understood, however, that the Williams & Dame proposal had strong support from AEG and city officials. FCCEJ had been researching land trusts and concluded that acquiring land and building projects would be a major step toward having some control of development in the area (Moore 2011). FCCEJ decided to agree to the Williams & Dame proposal if an amendment to the Development Agreement would list the land trust as an approved community-based organization, thus allowing developers to satisfy their affordable housing requirement by giving funds to the land trust. The Development Agreement was amended in 2005 to reflect those changes and a partnership of community organizations established TRUST South LA the same year. AEG and Williams & Dame each contributed $200,000, a city agency established a $2 million fund to help set up the land trust, and Williams & Dame paid $8 million to the YWCA (CRA 2007, 2008). Due to the recession, however, the developer did not build the condominiums and sold the property. Five years after its founding, TRUST South LA had not acquired any property. Rising land prices, the competition for property from other developers, the complex process of putting together funding from multiple sources, and the 2007 financial crisis proved to be difficult obstacles to overcome. That would finally change in 2012 when the land trust purchased a 2.3 acre, 48-unit apartment complex, Rolland Curtis Gardens, one block from USC. The affordable housing covenant that covered the property had expired in 2011 and

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the owner planned to convert the units into market-rate student housing. The property managers gave notice to the tenants to vacate their apartments, but with the help of the Legal Aid Foundation, the tenants were able to remain, and the owner was required to address 300 code violations. TRUST South LA (2012) made an offer to buy the property, and reported that, “after the preceding year of tenacious organizing work” by the tenants, “the owner agreed to sell.” After evaluating the physical problems with the housing and the need for more affordable units in the neighborhood, TRUST South LA decided to demolish the complex and embarked on a participatory planning process with tenants, local residents, and other interested parties to create plans for a new housing project (Pasciuto et al. 2013). The project broke ground in 2017 and opened in 2019 with 140 units of housing, ranging in size from one to three bedrooms, and ground floor commercial space. As of 2021, Rolland Curtis Gardens housed two community health clinics to serve lowincome residents.

L.A. Live CBA: The Local Hiring Program City officials are reluctant to attach local hiring programs to development agreements because of the concern that added burdens to developers will drive off scarce capital. Developers are wary of these programs because of the expenses and new requirements added to an already complex approval process, the responsibility of managing the program, and concern over the quality of job applicants. Mulligan-Hansel’s (2008) study of nine hiring programs across the United States, however, concludes that well-run programs can benefit the developer by forging ties and improving communication among the developer, tenants, and community groups, which can facilitate the hiring process and help address problems that might arise between the developer and community. As part of the CBA, AEG worked with the coalition to establish a hiring program that included “individuals whose residence or place of employment has been displaced by the STAPLES Center project,” “low-income individuals living within a one-half-mile radius of the Project,” and “individuals living in low-income areas throughout the City” (Development Agreement 2001:Attachment A, A–7). AEG provided $82,000 to help establish a program to locate, train, and refer potential applicants to AEG when jobs became available (Goldberg 2013).

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SAJE and FCCEJ implemented their training program in 2003 and included classes on financial literacy, English as a Second Language, and computers. Ten students from the early courses and twenty other local residents successfully obtained full-time union janitorial positions (SAJE n.d.). When L.A. Live businesses began hiring for other service positions, such as ticket takers and ushers, however, very few students from these classes were hired. Samantha Quintero (2011), SAJE staff member and coordinator of the community jobs coalition, explained that AEG viewed workers in these positions as ambassadors because they came in direct contact with the public. Quintero (2011) noted that “we had participants who were very dedicated” and extremely “motivated” to learn English, but they could not reach the level of fluency needed. As one of the job announcements stated, duties included “greeting guests, providing information and directions, assisting with problems/issues” (Staples Center 2009). An AEG human resource manager explained, “Sometimes people come in and are super nervous and timid and that is not going to cut it; we need the smile, we hire the smile” (Gomez 2011). From a rocky start that saw only a few members obtain guest services jobs, the community coalition and AEG worked together to create a hiring program that greatly benefited both groups and resulted in the hiring of hundreds of coalition applicants. As Mulligan-Hansel (2008:21) notes in her study, this is a common trajectory among job programs, which in the early stages “may have placed a handful of workers, but over the course of a decade or more, the maturity of the system and cumulative number of placements may have a significant effect on employment opportunities for local residents.” As Quintero (2011) recalled, at the first hiring fair, AEG had about 300 jobs available, and with high unemployment in the city, over 3,000 applicants came that day. The approximately 200 members sent by the coalition stood in line with all the other applicants and very few were hired, but AEG technically complied with the CBA because, as Quintero (2011) explained, “the folks that were hired were local and because the majority were from South L.A. from low income” areas. Joe Herrera, director, and Perlita Gomez, manager, of human resources for L.A. Live and Staples Center, ran AEG’s local hiring program. As Herrera (2011) explained, the program was “an ever evolving process” being worked out through the meetings held with the roughly thirty community groups in the program. Reassessing the program after the early hiring fairs, AEG and the coalition arranged to have special days or hours reserved for coalition

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candidates, which proved to be an effective tool, because, according to Herrera (2011), “it allowed us to track who came from the job coalition and the effectiveness of their training and job preparation. We found that as we continued doing this, we were getting more and more hires from the group as opposed to the general public just walking up.” Studies of local hiring programs across the country note that a key for success is the ability of community organizations, and their job training and referral operations, to supply qualified applicants in a timely fashion (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005). In Los Angeles, the coalition included a number of well-established job training programs. As Gomez (2011) explained, “Our fear was that the community groups wouldn’t be able to give us enough people, but they proved that if we needed a hundred they would give us a hundred within days.” Now that the program was well established, Gomez (2011) noted that “they know what our expectations are . . . because they are familiar with us since they have worked with us for so many years,” and, as Herrera (2011) added, “everyone that comes to us is a viable candidate.” Recognizing the quality of the job applicants, Herrera explained that he was able to convince the guest services managers to adjust the hiring requirements so that more community applicants would be eligible. Herrera (2011) noted that “one year of customer service experience” was usually required, and many of the community candidates did not qualify. Herrera (2011) suggested to the community groups that “if you provide customer service training, I’ll sell it to my team that it is the equivalent . . . so they put it together, we showed it to the managers, and they were in agreement.” One of the major benefits of the program for AEG is the reduction in hiring costs since large hiring fairs are no longer needed. As Herrera (2011) explained, “The cost savings alone made the whole project completely worth it” because it might cost “$80,000 a year on advertising” in local newspapers, plus the cost of staffing the events and supplies. Background checks are another area of savings since the community organizations carefully screen their candidates. Applicants who go through the initial AEG screening and meet the minimum requirements, such as possessing a high school diploma, go through a background and drug check that costs AEG about $125 per person. Herrera (2011) noted that with the “general public, we had an almost 40 percent failure rate,” but with the job coalition candidates, the rate was “3 percent.” In 2011, there were about 300 full-time and 1,700 part-time jobs at Staples Center and L.A. Live; some were union jobs, and the others, including the

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part-time jobs, paid living wages (Herrera 2011; Guzman 2008). Herrera (2011) explained that “the turnover for full-timers is almost non-existent,” but when an entry-level full-time position opens up, “there are some specialized jobs that we have to go outside, but almost 90% of the time we draw from our internal candidates.” Herrera (2011) said that their employees from the community organizations are “great candidates who are completely promotable, but we don’t have the positions.” With the money saved from the hiring program, to help part-time employees advance in their careers, Herrera (2011) stated that we “created a program called LEAP, the Lifelong Educational Advancement Program. We hired a firm to teach skills in communication, leadership, goal setting, things that anyone would need to manage people, and we tell our staff ‘if you take everything you learn here and find a better job somewhere else, we are happy for you.’” The program is free, voluntary, and very popular among the employees (Gomez 2011). The 7,100-seat Nokia Theater was the first major L.A. Live venue to open. With hiring fairs beginning in 2007, the coalition managed to place 338 workers at Nokia Theater and Staples Center through the end of that year (Mulligan-Hansel 2008:42). In 2009, the 14–movie screen Regal Cinemas opened and the coalition reported that they placed over 120 workers there (United Way 2009:2). The two Marriott Hotels opened in 2010 and the director of human resources reported that they met the CBA obligation by hiring over 50 percent from the required zip codes (Spaade 2011).

L.A. Live CBA: Assessing The Problems The L.A. Live CBA is significant because of the real benefits it provided for local residents directly impacted by the project, but critics also note its problems, such as a lack of penalties if AEG did not meet the living wage and local hiring goals as long as the developer followed the CBA guidelines and attempted to reach the goals (Cummings 2007/2008), and inadequate funding for housing given the cost of land and construction in Los Angeles (McNeill 2010). AEG, however, has met the CBA goals. AEG exceeded the number of required housing units, worked closely with community partners to establish an effective local hiring program, and helped fund a newly created land trust. Compliance was likely motivated in part by AEG’s need for continued

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coalition support as it sought over $200 million in rebates for hotel bed taxes, which the city council approved in 2005 (McGreevy 2005b). Another issue is that monitoring and coordinating job and housing programs add to the workload of community organizations and studies of the implementation of CBAs suggest that funding for staff should be a part of such agreements. For example, while there was some L.A. Live CBA funding to help set up the initial worker education program, it covered only a fraction of the staff resources that went into the hiring program. Nicholas Marantz (2015) has conducted one of the most comprehensive studies on the results of the L.A. Live CBA and he points out how difficult it is to evaluate the effectiveness of CBAs. While Marantz (2015:263) concludes that the L.A. Live developers “technically satisfied most of the CBA’s requirements . . . the effect of this compliance on outcomes is ambiguous.” As Marantz (2015:263) explains, regarding important benefits such as “jobs, affordable housing units, or park and recreational facilities,” it is difficult to disentangle what is being produced because of the CBA and what “would have resulted from municipal mandates, federal regulations, and agreements between unions and employers.” Also, Marantz (2015:264) points out that “collecting and verifying the necessary data may be challenging, even if reporting requirements are clearly spelled out in the CBA.” For example, Marantz (2015:252) notes that he was “unable to obtain the required targeted hiring reports despite extensive efforts.” Why use CBAs, since they appear to duplicate existing government policies, as Marantz’s study points out? Cities have approval processes for projects that require review by city staff and elected officials and provide opportunities for community input through public hearings (Been 2010). Proponents of CBAs argue that low-income residents, racial minorities, and immigrants are often marginalized or excluded from significant participation in the approval process. Negotiating with a developer during the entitlement process is the one time that community organizations have significant leverage; once the project is approved, that leverage disappears (Gross, LeRoy, and JanisAparicio 2005). Negotiations over a CBA provide one of the few opportunities for residents to express their concerns with developers, and are a way of promoting an open and democratic process (Baxamusa 2008). Rather than a form of civic engagement, however, critics of CBAs argue that such agreements are a form of extortion perpetrated by special-interest groups against developers,

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or a bribe given by developers to community groups for their support (WolfPowers 2010). Practices that require developers to contribute in important ways, such as inclusionary zoning or linkage polices that require funds for affordable housing or job creation, have a long history (Been 2010). These policies, however, have mixed outcomes, in part because benefits are often based on developer predictions rather than concrete, enforceable objectives. Also, city officials and staff may not have the resources or motivation to monitor the developer’s performance once a project is built and the attention of staff and officials has shifted to uncompleted projects. In Los Angeles, for example, an audit by the city controller showed that the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) had done “a poor job ensuring that the public receives the benefits promised in exchange of subsidies given to private developers” and the Agency often did not “verify that the units created for low to moderate income housing are actually being used for that purpose” (Marantz 2015:254). In contrast, community coalitions have the legal right to monitor and enforce CBAs (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005). Even when effective, inclusionary zoning and linkages policies focus on a single issue, while CBAs cover a broad range of concerns, and can include issues that are usually excluded from these policies, such as local hiring and living wages (Been 2010). Perhaps most importantly, according to proponents, CBAs are a way to direct benefits to residents most directly experiencing the negative effects of the project, such as displacement and increased traffic and pollution.

CBAs: New York City In the decade following the 2001 signing of the L.A. Live CBA, developers have negotiated CBAs with major projects across the United States (Ahern et a. 2010; Wolf-Powers 2010). New York City, with its established community organizations, politically influential unions, and valuable real estate, offers a comparison with Los Angeles. In contrast to the positive characterizations of the L.A. Live CBA, however, community organizations and legal analysts have criticized three of the major CBAs established in New York City between 2005 and 2008 for failing to adequately include community representatives in the process and consider ways to effectively address the impact of the projects on local neighborhoods. Forest City Ratner, the developer of Atlantic Yards (renamed Pacific Park in 2014) in Brooklyn, New York, actively pursued and negotiated a CBA in

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2005 with eight community organizations. It was considered the “first CBA” in the city with a “mega-project” (Ahern et al. 2010:10), which included a sports arena (The Barclays Center, completed in 2012) and fifteen high-rise towers (construction started in 2013 with the first residential high rise completed in 2016) for residential, retail, and commercial activities covering twenty-two acres. Critics suggested that the Atlantic Yards CBA process involved organizations “hand-picked” by the developer that did not fully represent neighborhood interests (Wolf -Powers 2010:155). Since the organizations who signed the Atlantic Yards CBA primarily serve low-income and workingclass African Americans, critics of the CBA saw it as a tool used by the developer against the middle-class and affluent Whites who opposed the project, creating a racial and class divide. Residents expressed concern about the use of eminent domain; the “sheer size” of the project, which is “the equivalent of four Empire State Buildings”; the displacement of residents and small businesses; and the impact on traffic, public transportation, local schools, and character of the neighborhood (Confessore 2005:B3; Oder 2012). New York city and state officials approved construction of a new Yankee Stadium and parking structures with a combination of public and private funds on twenty-two acres of public parkland near its old location. A CBA was signed in 2006 between the Yankees organization and four elected city officials for the stadium, which opened in 2009. Provisions included local hiring, contracts with local businesses, and yearly grants to community groups. Opponents noted that the Yankee Stadium CBA negotiations included no community representatives and residents and community organizations claimed that the CBA served to provide “political cover” for the elected officials who negotiated the CBA (Wolf-Powers 2010:155). Critics of the CBA also note (1) that it lacked adequate monitoring and enforcement provisions, (2) the neighborhood lost the use of park space until the city built replacement parks years later, (3) the long delay in the start of the benefits program, (4) the relative small size of the benefits package in comparison to the enormous subsidies provided to the wealthy Yankees organization, and (5) that these subsidies to the wealthy Yankees corporation took place in the “poorest Congressional district” in the country (Damiani, Markey, and Steinberg 2007:2). Columbia University planned a 17-acre expansion of its campus into the African American community of West Harlem and residents raised concerns about displacement, the loss of affordable housing and light industry jobs, and the use of eminent domain. The West Harlem Local Development

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Corporation composed of community representatives and elected officials, established a CBA in 2009 for the campus expansion that included $150 million in community benefits (Ahern et al. 2010). The Columbia University CBA negotiations included elected officials and critics argued that the politicians exerted undue influence on the process and did not always represent the interests of the community (Salkin and Levine 2007). Although Columbia University agreed to significant benefits, residents remained concerned about such issues as gentrification, the relocation process, and the lack of specificity regarding the benefits and enforcement of the CBA (Fisher, Zients, and Donnelly 2015; Salkin and Levine 2007). Critics note that the Yankee Stadium CBA was negotiated by city officials rather than a community coalition, the Atlantic Yards CBA coalition contained eight organizations that did not represent the full range of community residents, the Columbia University CBA submitted to heavy involvement of elected officials, and there were weak enforcement provisions for all three CBAs. In contrast, based on the experience of the L.A. Live CBA process, CBA supporters suggest that if a community coalition is broad-based and representative of neighborhood interests, negotiations are open and transparent, and the resulting agreement is public and a legally enforceable contract, the process contributes to CBAs that are more likely to address the concerns of local residents and contribute to participatory democracy (Baxamusa 2008; Wolf-Powers 2010). What explains the differences between the Los Angeles and New York City CBAs of the 2000s? The major involvement of unions in the community coalitions negotiating Los Angeles CBAs, and the lesser role of unions in the New York City CBAs, is a key difference between the two regions. Considering the substantial political influence of unions in both locales, this difference is most likely an important contributing factor to the relative success of community coalitions in Los Angeles regarding CBAs as compared to New York City. Three factors help explain this difference. First, while there is a long history of strong unions with major political influence in New York City, union action has focused primarily on the interests of its members, and there is relatively little involvement in broader coalitions. This is in contrast to the comparatively recent political influence of organized labor in Los Angeles and the social movement unionism of labor geared toward coalition building and broader social justice issues (Hauptmeier and Turner 2007).

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Second, since large projects in New York City routinely use union labor, and construction unions are dominant among organized labor, unions were not involved in CBA community coalitions to avoid antagonizing elected officials (Wolf-Powers 2010). Third, in contrast to New York City, service worker unions are a much larger force in organized labor in Los Angeles. This is important because service unions are interested in CBAs that include living wages and the right to organize with jobs created by large projects, and these unions were an important part of the labor coalition negotiating the L.A. Live CBA. Kent Wong (2021) notes that he has not studied New York City CBAs. Regarding the relative strength of the construction unions versus service worker unions in New York City as a possible explanation of the difference between CBAs in that city and Los Angeles, however, Wong (2021) explains that it is a “gross oversimplification to say that the building trades are strong” and the unions representing the service workers are weak in New York City. In fact, Wong notes that the unions representing the service workers who would be employed in completed projects, such as Atlantic Yards, are very strong. Wong (2021) explains that “unions have tremendous influence and power in the city of New York,” and that the two cities have “very different environments” in terms of city politics and the power structure, so explanations regarding CBAs need to account for local and regional circumstances. Wong (2021) points out that unions in California have been a national leader on issues such as organizing immigrants, immigration reform, access to health care, and living wages. I suggest that one of the key differences for Los Angeles is the long and deep history of union involvement in the creation and negotiation of CBAs, and union contributions for the establishment of organizations, such as LAANE, that are trying to change the politics of development through tools such as CBAs. When the deal with AEG for Staples Center fell through and had to be renegotiated, unions sought a stronger agreement in writing, which became the 2001 L.A. Live CBA. Demonstrating another difference in union strategy in the two regions, and less cohesiveness among New York City unions, several years after the Columbia University CBA was negotiated, construction unions in New York City reached an agreement with Wal-Mart that guaranteed union workers would be used for any construction, while retail and grocery unions remained strongly opposed to Wal-Mart entering the city (Massey 2011). In comparison, both construction and retail unions in general either supported or remained

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neutral in efforts to keep Wal-Mart out of Inglewood City and Rosemead City in the Los Angeles region in the mid-2000s as part of their strategy to only support construction projects that resulted in permanent jobs with living wages (Felch 2005; Lin and Morin 2004).

Going Beyond CBAs For community residents and organizations, CBAs have become an important tool in the struggle to counter the displacement of low-income and workingclass residents by development and gentrification, and address concerns about affordable housing and living-wage jobs. In contrast to the historical conflict between use and exchange values, CBAs can change the relationship between developers and communities by fostering collaboration and turning adversaries into partners, which can help developers in the city approval process and avoid costly delays and lawsuits. I suggest, however, that CBAs are both an important policy tool and, in cities with strong progressive coalitions, an intermediate step in the long-term process of changing city policies regarding housing, wages, hiring practices, and public subsidies for large projects. The Los Angeles experience reveals both the achievements and limitations of CBAs. Gilda Haas (2007) explains, “As a coalition, we are really proud of our shared achievement and our ability to extract material benefits for our members.” Haas notes, “so here’s the good news . . . The developer, AEG, has acted with integrity, has lived up to the terms of the agreement, and, in 2005, joined forces with the Coalition to take on another developer who tried to evade the pact.” Since the L.A. Live project CBA, community organizations such as SAJE, FCCEJ, and LAANE have negotiated other agreements with developers and the city of Los Angeles. Community organizers are addressing three key problems with CBAs. First, Julian Gross, Greg LeRoy, and Madeline Janis-Aparicio (2005), who are among the most prominent figures nationwide working with community organizations on CBAs, point out that negotiating CBAs is extremely resourceintensive, both for developers and community coalitions, and project-byproject negotiation is a costly long-term strategy for community organizations. Second, as Haas (2007) explains, “while piecemeal agreements are important to our community, they remain insufficient responses to such a largescale problem.” Harold Meyerson (2006b:39) reaches a similar conclusion on CBAs: “This is, of course, justice by increments, but in the absence of a federal

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government interested in raising the minimum wage, providing health coverage for all, or enabling workers to join unions, incremental justice is as good as it gets.” Third, another problem is that CBAs aid projects involving upscale housing and commercial activity that, as Haas (2007) points out, contribute to “market conditions that are pushing our members out of the neighborhoods where they have lived for decades.” Haas (2007) says that “this is not an indictment of community benefits agreements. It is, rather, a placement of these agreements in the big scheme of things.” To address these issues, Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio (2005:75) conclude, “The goal of the community benefits movement is to avoid this situation by changing the paradigm of land use planning.” For community organizations, the ideal scenario would be for local, state, and federal governments to enact policies that would address the issues covered in CBAs, rather than community groups struggling, project by project, to negotiate CBAs (Belongie and Silverman 2018). Haas (2007) explains that “if the points in the agreements were lifted up into city-wide policy, Los Angeles would be a better place for everyone. The goal is to make the content of these agreements the norm for Los Angeles, not the exception. Community benefits agreements can be the building blocks of policies that need to be adopted to create a more equitable and livable city. . . . we have our eyes on a much bigger prize—a right to the city for all.” Los Angeles is demonstrating the next step in two ways. First, going from CBAs with individual projects, to incorporating some of the major aspects of CBAs involving wages and hiring practices in city policies in projects involving significant public subsidies and/or large contracts. Cecilia Estolano (2013:149) explains that this marks a shift in city agencies’ earlier “condemnand-clear approach” that destroyed neighborhoods, to a “sustainable growth with equity” model that attempts to address persistent poverty by leveraging public spending to increase service job wages and open up well-paying construction jobs to groups historically excluded from these occupations. In a major step in this direction, over the past decade, the Los Angeles community college district, unified school district, and county transportation authority, have established living-wage ordinances and community workforce agreements with local hiring provisions, construction apprenticeship, and career programs geared toward increasing the number of women and racial minorities in unions. Similarly, New York City signed an agreement

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in 2009 with the building and construction trades for hiring and apprenticeship programs with provisions to include more women and minorities on major public projects. The city council also passed a living-wage law in 2012 requiring developers receiving significant public subsidies to pay living wages (Emerald Cities Planning Committee 2010). This is a major change with building trades unions which have a long history of actively working to exclude racial minorities, such as in New York City, where, in the 1960s, over 90 percent of the members were White as a result of these exclusionary practices (Figueroa, Grabelsky, and Lamare 2013; Waldinger and Bailey 1991). Following the World War II era, unions controlled more than 80 percent of construction work, as compared to less than 15 percent in the mid-2000s, and while a number of factors have contributed to the decline, such as major contractors and corporations supporting nonunion construction, as Jeff Grabelsky (2007:50) of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and AFL-CIO suggests, the “critical contributing factor was the failure of the building trades to organize and bring into membership the rapidly growing nonunion workforce,” including immigrants and racial minorities. Faced with costly lawsuits over exclusionary union practices, declining membership, and projects built with nonunion labor, unions had to rethink their membership policy and strategize to increase the use of union workers. In cities where construction unions have political power, unions attempt to negotiate Project Labor Agreements (PLAs), which have been used on private and public construction projects and are “comprehensive, legally-binding documents that are negotiated and signed by the developer or project owner, general contractor and labor unions” (Mulligan-Hansel, Owens-Wilson, and Beach 2013:29). PLAs are important for unions because they establish wages and hiring practices, and PLAs are beneficial to project owners because they establish work standards among the various subcontractors and workers that help a project meet its deadline and budget (Mulligan-Hansel, Owens-Wilson, and Beach 2013). Joining with community organizations gives unions more leverage to negotiate PLAs, especially with city projects and private projects receiving city subsidies. Given the unions’ long history of racial exclusion, however, unions faced a difficult task in the attempt to establish coalitions with community organizations representing communities of color. Mark Ayers, president of the national Building and Construction Trades, explained that to build these

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coalitions, they had to demonstrate that their membership policies have changed and that their agenda included social justice issues (Grabelsky 2010). Emerging from the attempt to build new relations among unions and community organizations, and with city officials pressing construction unions to diversify their membership in order to gain PLAs with city projects, unions have worked with cities and community organizations to establish Community Workforce Agreements (CWAs). CWAs are “Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) that include provisions to . . . create career opportunities for economically disadvantaged populations” and “typically include targeted hiring programs, apprenticeship utilization requirements, and other instruments to create viable pathways into unionized building trade careers” (Figueroa, Grabelsky, and Lamare 2013:8). CWAs address one of the major barriers for racial minorities and women for entering the construction and building trades; that is, the informal networks that are key for recruiting and training workers (Fuchs, Warren, and Bayer 2014). What are the results of efforts aimed at hiring local residents and integrating construction unions? The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is the second-largest employer in Los Angeles County and spent $8.68 billion on construction projects from 2003 to 2011. Between 2004 and 2011, LAUSD employed over 96,000 workers on projects with PLAs and had a number of hiring goals. LAUSD had a 50 percent local hiring target for workers living within the school district but only achieved 41 percent, although the last several years saw continuous and major improvements and was on track to reach the goal. Also, showing that most workers were from the region, 68 percent came from Los Angeles County. LAUSD set a 40 percent goal of first-year apprentices among the apprentices and surpassed this goal with 41.5 percent. Although not required by law to track the race of the workers, LAUSD wanted the workforce to reflect the demographics of the region and found that in terms of percentages, 3.8 identified as African American, 1.45 as Asian or Pacific Islander, 61.05 as Latino, 23.07 as White, 2.28 as Other, and 7.97 declined to answer. In addition, 1.48 identified themselves as female and 98.52 identified themselves as male (Le 2011:18–20). Although these numbers show that women, African Americans, and Asians and Pacific Islanders remain underrepresented, racial minorities represented a majority of the workers in an industry that Whites have historically dominated and shows movement of Latinos from nonunion construction jobs to the union membership pipeline. The PLAs do not contain specific racial

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hiring criteria because this would open them to possible legal challenges. Instead, local hiring provisions, given the demographics of Los Angeles, are a way to increase the racial diversity of the workforce (Wong 2021). Also, to help increase the number of racial minorities and women, LAUSD established the “We-Build” program for local residents, which helps prepare them for apprenticeship programs. Another major employer of construction workers is the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, known as Metro, which is the agency in charge of bus and rail transportation in the county. Metro agreed to a PLA with a Construction Careers Policy (CCP) in 2012 with the Building and Construction Trades Council. Metro is undergoing a period of major expansion, and up to 2021, the PLA has covered projects worth over $8 billion. The PLA includes provisions for workers in “economically disadvantaged areas,” “apprentice participation,” and “disadvantaged workers,” including the homeless, veterans, those on public assistance, those without a high school degree or GED or with a criminal record (Metro 2021:2). Regarding women workers, Metro’s goal is 6.9 percent, with a current average of 3.6 percent, which is above the national average of under 3 percent (Metro 2021:3–4). In 2021, Metro became the “first transit agency in the nation to adopt a PLA that includes a targeted hiring emphasis on apprentices, low income and previously excluded members of society in the trades” on projects receiving federal funds (Metro 2021:3). Previously, federal regulations required policies with “full and open competition” and could not use guidelines that used “an exclusionary or discriminatory specification” (Department of Transportation 2021:27672). The federal government began a program in 2021 to allow “geographic, economic, or other hiring preferences” to “create employment opportunities and promote workforce development . . . particularly for economically or socially disadvantaged workers who may otherwise have significant barriers to entry to the transit construction industry” (Department of Transportation 2021:27672). Important for residents in the county, hiring policies can include local hiring criteria. Illustrating the growing effort to form partnerships among employers, unions, and workers, and moving beyond construction jobs, is the California Workforce Development Board—which is a state agency working to coordinate and strengthen programs aimed at improving worker skills and upward mobility—and its $10 million, eighteen-month program that it launched in

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2011. The program involved working with established organizations in a range of industries across the state, such as hospitality, transit, transportation, and healthcare. Two of the major goals were to improve equity in terms of economic opportunity and mobility for those previously facing exclusion, and job quality in terms of pay, benefits, pensions, and promotion opportunities. In the Los Angeles region, for example, the program worked with the Building Skills Partnership in janitorial services and the Worker Education and Resource Center involving Los Angeles County agencies and jobs in the public sector. The Hospitality Training Academy was established in 2006 and provides English classes, job training, and job placement services for service workers in the food, entertainment, and tourism industry. The Academy involves more than 170 establishments, including the Marriott Hotels at L.A. Live (GonzalezVasquez and Lopez 2021). The involvement of the Marriott Hotels continues their work involving worker training and promotion established with the 2001 L.A. Live CBA, showing the continuing results of industry-worker alliances. The second way that Los Angeles is going beyond CBAs is by establishing policies that include a wider population than is possible with individual CBAs. Led by a strong effort by unions, Los Angeles became the largest city in the nation—following San Francisco, Seattle, and Chicago—to pass a substantial increase in its minimum wage, which took effect in 2016 and increased in stages to $15 an hour in 2020 (Jamison, Zahniser, and Walton 2015). With the passage of a living-wage ordinance in 1997, these wage increases demonstrate the transformational shift in the city’s politics over the past several decades as organized labor has gained influence and the city’s business leaders have conceded to these changes (Meyerson 2013). The union focus on the minimum wage also shows how unions are working on policies that go beyond its members and have a broader impact on society. It also shows the change from business unionism to social movement unionism. This is a major change from Michael Woo’s (2007) observations as a city council person in the 1980s and 1990s, and member of the city planning commission during the early 2000s, when he noted that unions primarily focused on matters affecting their members. Unions and affordable housing advocates joined in the successful 2016 passage of Proposition JJJ in Los Angeles, another example of citywide change. As Cynthia Strathmann (2016:A15), executive director of SAJE, explains, Proposition JJJ addresses the “housing crisis” and poverty wages in the city. For residential projects over ten units requesting variances in the city’s land-use regulations,

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provisions were added regarding affordable housing, wage levels, and hiring. This follows the growth-with-equity goals of supporting development and capital investment that spread the benefits to a broader segment of the population and support higher-paying jobs, affordable housing, and local residents. Developers and business interests opposed the proposition because of the added costs of construction, which they suggest could hamper construction of new housing (Beacon Economics 2016). Advocates of the proposition, however, note that variances in land-use regulations would allow developers to build larger projects, which would substantially increase the value of their projects, and increase housing units in the city, although this increased density is opposed by some neighborhood advocates who wish to preserve the low-density character of the city (Aron 2016). Community organizations viewed the 2001 L.A. Live CBA as a landmark agreement that changed the development narrative by including benefits for residents and neighborhoods directly impacted by large projects. These organizations, however, also realized that such agreements were not a longterm solution because negotiating and monitoring CBAs, project by project, required resources that strained the capacity of local groups. Progressive coalitions have worked with some success to turn some of the key provisions of CBAs into city policies, including issues dealing with affordable housing, local hiring, wages, and underrepresented groups in the workforce. One of the challenges is addressing the needs of populations that have not exercised the kind of political power that the union-Latino political bloc has demonstrated. In Chapter 6, I discuss AEG’s proposal to build a National Football League (NFL) Stadium next to their Staples Center and L.A. Live complexes. I suggest that the rise of a new coalition, which advocated for the rights of the homeless, and successfully negotiated a CBA with AEG involving the NFL stadium, demonstrated several points. First, the fact that a CBA had to be negotiated shows that there is still a great deal of work to do to create city policies that will one day make CBAs unnecessary. Second, the ability of the new coalition to successfully and relatively quickly reach an agreement for a CBA with AEG—one of the most influential corporations in the city—while advocating for the interests of one of the most powerless groups in the city—the homeless—shows that the growth-with-equity framework is gaining strength in the city. It also shows the ongoing effectiveness of coalitions working for the interests of lowerincome residents.

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The NFL Stadium Proposal and Neighborhood Change: 1990–2015

Part 1. The National Football League (NFL) Stadium Proposal The Play Fair at Farmers Field Coalition (Play Fair Coalition), which represented lower-income residents in Los Angeles, filed a lawsuit in August 2012 involving Anschutz Entertainment Group’s (AEG) proposed National Football League (NFL) Stadium in downtown Los Angeles. AEG was one of the most powerful developers operating in the region, but less than three months later, the coalition reached a favorable settlement with AEG. Considering that the homeless were one of the Play Fair Coalition’s main constituents and were one of the most disenfranchised groups in the city, and given the strength of growth interests and powerful corporations working against redistributive policies, how did the coalition muster the political influence and resources necessary to compel the developer to settle the lawsuit? I suggest that the settlement is additional evidence of the political influence of a progressive coalition in the region that is working to establish a growthwith-equity framework that recognizes that developers receiving city support for projects should provide community benefits to mitigate the negative effects of their projects on lower-income residents. This demonstrates that the growing grassroots and electoral influence of unions and Latinos, and their support of community benefits, contributed to the effectiveness of this progressive coalition. In addition, over the past several decades, as part of this 158

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larger regional progressive movement, a coalition of community organizations in the downtown and South L.A. region has emerged and become an important force in the negotiation of community benefits agreements (CBAs) in the area. I suggest that AEG recognized the coalition’s resources to support the lawsuit and, to avoid costly delays, quickly settled. I also argue that the developer’s decision to settle and provide concessions to the community coalition was in part due to the recognition of growing city council support for the growth-with-equity framework. Surprisingly, considering the success of the coalition’s lawsuit, the unions and community organizations that had negotiated major policy changes and CBAs since the 1990s were not a part of the new coalition. I contend, however, that the work of these groups contributed in two important ways to a growth-with-equity framework that made the lawsuit settlement possible. First, these unions, and community organizations such as Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE) and Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), established the groundwork with previous projects for the understanding that developers receiving city support for large projects, such as subsidies and zoning variances, should provide community benefits. Considering that AEG had the resources to contest the lawsuit, what did the developer AEG gain from settling the lawsuit? In other words, why do developers agree to provide community benefits? The second contribution of unions and community organizations to growth with equity is that these groups are active in the entitlement process. By agreeing to these benefits, developers recognize that they will receive community support rather than opposition in the city entitlement process, which improves the chances of city officials approving a project and cuts down on costly delays in the entitlement process.

The National Football League Stadium Proposal and the Play Fair at Farmers Field Coalition Adding to the Bradley-era of the 1970s’ and 1980s’ emphasis on constructing high-rise office buildings, since the 1990s, developers and city officials have worked on transforming downtown Los Angeles into a place of entertainment, culture, and tourism, a prominent strategy in cities across the nation (Zukin 2010). The construction of sports facilities and convention centers is a

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key aspect of this strategy, which I examine through AEG’s proposal to build an NFL Stadium in downtown Los Angeles next to the city’s Convention Center, Staples Center sports arena, and L.A. Live entertainment complex. AEG’s NFL proposal follows the success of AEG’s Staples Center and L.A. Live projects and builds on AEG’s sports strategy with the $150 million Home Depot Center that opened in 2003 in the city of Carson, south of Los Angeles, with facilities for a range of sports, including the LA Galaxy Major League Soccer team owned by AEG (Bunting 2006). In terms of the city’s NFL history, two NFL teams played in the Los Angeles region in 1994, but searching for more lucrative stadium deals, the Raiders moved back to Oakland and the Rams left Anaheim for St. Louis. Los Angeles city officials and local corporate leaders failed in their multiple attempts to bring an NFL team back to the region in the following two decades. In 2010, AEG announced its interest in building an NFL stadium next to L.A. Live and signed a $700 million naming rights deal in 2011 with Farmers Insurance—the proposed stadium was then called Farmers Field (Farmer 2011). The Play Fair Coalition emerged in the fall of 2011, after a city hearing generated concerns about the impact of the proposed NFL stadium on nearby neighborhoods. Although the coalition that negotiated the 2001 L.A. Live CBA worked to be broad-based and involved low-income residents and racial minorities, the Play Fair Coalition involved organizations that had not participated in the 2001 L.A. Live CBA. The Play Fair Coalition included a constituency, Skid Row homeless residents, who previously have wielded little influence in city development politics. Central to the new Play Fair Coalition was the Los Angeles Community Action Network (LA CAN), which advocates for the interests of low-income residents and the homeless, who are predominantly African American. LA CAN (2021) emerged in 1999 to “organize and empower community residents to work collectively to change the relationships of power that affect our community” and to “create an organization and organizing model that eradicate the race, class, gender barriers that are used to prevent communities from building true power.” The Los Angeles Chapter of Physicians for Social Responsibility, part of the national organization that won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985 for their work to reduce nuclear weapons, was the other key Coalition organization, with important legal assistance provided by the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.

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The AEG Stadium Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) and the Coalition’s Health Impact Assessment A key step for proposed development projects is the entitlement process, in which projects go through formal review by a number of city commissions and the city council before approval. A major part of the entitlement process is the Environmental Impact Report submitted by developers to disclose the effects of their projects and propose ways to minimize the negative impacts as mandated by the 1970 California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In September 2011, state legislators passed SB 292 for the AEG NFL stadium project to speed up the environmental review process in case of lawsuits. The legislators and unions supported the bill, along with similar bills crafted for other proposed sports venues around the state, because the US was in the middle of a deep recession and the projects would generate capital investment and jobs. Union representatives joined with AEG officials and lobbied legislators in Sacramento, explaining that “we’re making our case for good jobs in Los Angeles. . . . We’re telling them there is enormous urgency” (McGreevey and Riccardi 2011:AA1). SB 292 changed the judicial process if a lawsuit was filed. To avoid protracted legal battles, a case would skip the Superior Court and start in the state Court of Appeals and would have to be decided within 175 days. The Judicial Council of California (2014, n.p.), which is the “policymaking body of the California courts,” objected to this provision because, as Los Angeles Times business writer Michael Hiltzik (2012:B1) reported, the Courts of Appeals are “‘not well suited’ to function like trial courts: They have fewer judges and therefore can handle fewer cases, they have fewer locations and therefore are harder for litigants (especially poor litigants) to get to,” and “giving CEQA cases special access means pushing all other cases to the back of the line.” The Judicial Council also stated that “the courts are charged with dispensing equal access to justice for each and every case . . . without regard to the economic position of the parties. . . . Singling out this special category of cases for such preferential treatment appears at odds with how our justice system has historically functioned” (Hiltzik 2012:B1). Simply put, Hiltzik (2012:B1) criticized SB 292 for “shifting the balance of power in land-use policy further

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away from the average citizen and more in favor of wealthy and politically powerful developers.” Marking a key step in the entitlement process, in April 2012, AEG released the stadium Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) (Matrix Environmental 2012), an enormous document approximately 10,000 pages long that cost $27 million to produce (Farmer and Fenno 2015). The standard city procedure gives the public forty-five days to review and provide comments on the DEIR. Pete White of LA CAN explained that this period was “unrealistic” because it required that “residents and stakeholders read, digest, and analyze nine pages per hour, twenty-four hours per day, starting the day the DEIR was released up until the comments are due” (Bloomekatz 2012). The Coalition requested an additional forty-five days for the comment period, but the Department of City Planning declined the request. Understanding the tremendous support that the stadium proposal had among Los Angeles city officials and state legislators, and that AEG was working to get city approval as quickly as possible to attract an NFL team and start construction, the Coalition considered what they could do under these conditions. Eric Ares (2014), an LA CAN staff member, stated, “What leverage do we have, what can we do?” Ares noted that the Coalition decided to do a Health Impact Assessment (HIA), which “uses an array of data . . . and considers input from stakeholders to determine the potential effects of a . . . project on the health of a population” (Human Impact Partners 2012:12). Ares (2014) explained that the HIA would provide the Coalition with “its own analysis that can be our official response to the EIR and provide a more specific community response.” The National Research Council (2011:3) notes the growing use of HIAs in the US since the early 2000s and sees the HIA “as an especially promising way to factor health considerations into the decision-making process” when projects are in the planning stage. Martha Dina Arguello (2014), the executive director of Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles, contends that environmental impact reports should include “a more robust health analysis” to take into account the impact of displacement, in addition to the traditional environmental concerns such as traffic, parking, and pollution. Arguello (2014) explains that displacement is “one of the major stressors in life if you’re forced to move, if you’re evicted, or, if you can no longer afford” housing payments. The HIA (Human Impact Partners 2012:28–29) refers to the extensive research that examines the health impact of these changes on residents:

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Gentrification can lead to increases in housing costs, which can threaten food security and financial security, and lead to overcrowded living conditions, displacement, and acceptance of substandard housing conditions [and] . . . increase risks for mortality, infectious disease, poor mental health, and poor childhood development. For adults, displacement and relocation can disrupt social ties and result in job loss [and] . . . in childhood has been linked to . . . academic delay, school suspensions, and emotional and behavioral problems.

San Francisco is a leader in the effort to consider the health impacts of development, and Jason Corburn (2009) explains the roots of this effort. In 2003, a developer proposed to demolish a rent-controlled apartment building and replace it with market-rate condominiums. At the urging of community organizations, the city’s Department of Public Health carried out a study to examine the health impacts of displacement and submitted the findings to the city’s Planning Department. Responding to the study and community concerns, the Planning Department asked the developer to analyze the impact of displacement. Instead, because of increasing costs due to delays, the developer revised the proposal to include rent-controlled units for the existing tenants in the new project. Building on this experience and other development projects, the city’s Public Health and Planning departments adopted the Healthy Development Measurement Tool as a way to review the health effects of development projects. As Corburn et al. (2014:623) point out, the City of Richmond, across the bay from San Francisco, carried this a step further in 2014 and became one of the first cities in the country to establish a “health ordinance and strategy” to work toward “health equity” in “city services and policymaking.” Building on research developed in the San Francisco Bay Area, The California Endowment launched a ten-year $1 billion program in 2010, called Building Healthy Communities, to address health inequities through policy and neighborhood change in fourteen communities across the state. The California Endowment (2015) program focused on the “social determinants” of health; that is, the “social, political, and economic environments” that influenced access to quality food, housing, jobs, and schools in neighborhoods. Recognizing the importance of health disparities in the city, the Los Angeles City Council, working with The California Endowment, adopted the Plan for a Healthy Los Angeles in 2015. The Plan recognizes that serious neighborhood health disparities exist, and the city will attempt to improve the health of communities when shaping new policies and distributing resources.

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The California Endowment selected South Los Angeles to be part of the Building Healthy Communities program and a central part of the initiative is funding to strengthen the infrastructure among community organizations. As Pastor et al. (2015:22) found in their research on the program, “regularly convening” the groups “helped solidify the common narrative for social justice and community health” and “created strong cross-organizational ties.” The program included key members of the L.A. Live CBA coalition, such as SAJE and Esperanza, as well as members of the Play Fair Coalition, including the Legal Aid Foundation, LA CAN, and Physicians for Social Responsibility. Organizations that played major roles in local CBAs, such as SAJE, Esperanza, LA CAN, and Physicians for Social Responsibility, have a long history of working on health issues and the Building Healthy Communities project is building on that work.

The NFL Project: LA Can, Pico Union, and Skid Row The Play Fair Coalition was concerned with the NFL project’s impact on a number of neighborhoods, including Pico Union, an area of low-income and working-class Latinos located directly west of the project. The Draft EIR (2012:VI–26, IV A–30) stated that, “since the opening of STAPLES Center in 1999, there is little evidence of widespread gentrification in the Pico-Union area” and the NFL stadium project “would not adversely affect this community.” In contrast, Ares (2014) explained that with Staples Center and L.A. Live next door, and the University of Southern California (USC) several miles to the south, residents had felt the pressure of growing development from both ends, which was “leading to more criminalization, an increase in rents, and more displacement.” On July 6, 2012, the Coalition released their NFL stadium project HIA. Since Staples Center had been built, the report (Human Impact Partners 2012:38) had found in local communities, “increases . . . in nationally recognized measures of gentrification, such as rising rents, and characteristics of neighborhoods that are at risk for gentrification, such as . . . high renter vs. owner occupancy, and high percentages of households paying a large share of household income for housing.” The report (2012:53–54) documented that “since the development of LA Live was approved . . . an estimated 2,151 units of extremely low-income housing were lost or otherwise impacted” in the immediate area, because of “illegal evictions,” “illegal conversions to . . .

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upscale/high income development,” and rent increases. Coalition members presented the HIA results at public hearings and city meetings involving the stadium. As James Porter (2014), a resident of Skid Row for thirty years and board member of LA CAN, explained about the loss of affordable units, “tearing down a house, you’re tearing down the community. What happened to those people?” The Coalition also focused on the homeless population in nearby Skid Row. The Coalition (Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles et al. 2012:63) stated that the Draft EIR “fails to analyze the impact of . . . segregation . . . from keeping the predominantly non-white population away from the majority white and affluent population likely to attend events,” and “aggressive police tactics” on this population. The city had adopted a plan in 1975 to preserve single-room occupancy hotels and social service agencies in Skid Row, an area of about fifty blocks, later called the “containment strategy,” isolating the homeless from growing city and private investment in the downtown areas of Bunker Hill and the Convention Center (Connell 1985). In 2013, during the discussion of the NFL stadium, an estimated 3,463 homeless people lived in Skid Row, with 71 percent in shelters for the homeless and the remainder unhoused, with an estimated 57,737 homeless people in the county (LAHSA 2014). In 2017, California had the highest number of homeless people, 134,000, of any state in the nation and the highest percentage that went unsheltered: 68 percent for California as compared to 24 percent for the other states (California State Auditor 2018:22). While New York City had the largest number of homeless people among the nation’s cities, the Los Angeles region was second, but whereas New York City’s percentage of unsheltered people was 5 percent, Los Angeles’s was 75 percent (California State Auditor 2018:22). Today, Skid Row continues to have the largest concentration of homeless people, and housing and services to support the homeless, in the region. As capital investment and development continue to grow and spread to other areas of downtown, Skid Row residents and service organizations are in conflict with the growing number of projects built close to or in the neighborhood, including high-end restaurants, luxury housing, and growth in a range of industries, such as in toy distributing and garment manufacturing. The Central City Association (2002:7), a policy group that represents the region’s business interests, stated in 2002 that “Downtown Los Angeles is on the cusp of an urban renaissance. . . . However, this renaissance is threatened every day

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by street encampments, drug deals, overdoses, and panhandlers.” The Central City Association (2002:7) recommended that “only by dispersing ‘homeless’ services throughout the city can we properly manage the public health and safety” of the homeless. Carol Schatz, chief executive of the Central City Association and the Downtown Center Business Improvement District for two decades, explained that “some of us have spent almost half of our lifetimes making downtown come back. . . . This has been an economic miracle that is in great jeopardy” because of the homeless crisis (Holland 2018:A1). In the ongoing struggle between the homeless and business interests, in 1999, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a class action suit against four downtown Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), claiming systematic harassment in clearing the homeless from public areas; an out of court settlement was reached in 2001 (Sims 2016). The City of Los Angeles launched its Safer City Initiative in 2006, adding fifty police officers to Skid Row. Thenmayor Antonio Villaraigosa explained that the effort would help protect the homeless who were targeted by thieves and drug dealers and “preyed upon on a daily basis,” but Pete White, codirector of LA CAN, asserted that the police were targeting the homeless and that “it’s created a situation where long-term residents of color feel that they are under siege” (Heland and Winton 2007: B2). White noted that “over a number of years, there has been a no holds barred approach at demonizing an entire community” and a “labelling of criminals and drug dealers” (Voices from the Frontlines Radio 2013). Becky Dennison, codirector of LA CAN, noted the increased presence of police in the area as a “tool of gentrification and displacement” (Voices from the Frontlines Radio 2013). The coalition Human Impact Partners (2012) report referenced Gary Blasi’s (2007:29) research on policing in Skid Row that found that in the first ten months of the Safer City Initiative, the police issued 10,342 citations for such infractions as pedestrian violations (citations issued at forty-eight to sixty-nine times the rate in other areas of the city) and littering. Unpaid citation fines can lead to jail time and the loss of social services, housing, jobs, and possessions (Human Impact Partners 2012). A 2018 United Nations (12) “report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights” in the United States noted that “in many cities, homeless persons are effectively criminalized for the situation they find themselves in.” In Los Angeles, the report suggested, “homelessness on this scale is far from inevitable and reflects political choices to see the solution as law enforcement rather than adequate

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and accessible low-cost housing, medical treatment, psychological counselling and job training” (United Nations 2018:12–13). Los Angeles city voters, in 2016, motivated by a complex set of concerns, such as improving the situation for the homeless, or clearing the homeless away from their properties, approved Proposition HHH, which would increase property taxes to fund $1.2 billion in bonds to build supportive housing for the homeless. Los Angeles County voters approved a sales tax increase in 2017 to help fund services for the homeless. Housing and temporary shelters built in neighborhoods across the city help the homeless by placing them closer to their communities and networks and potential help and support from friends, families, and familiar supportive facilities. Implementing the plan for housing for the homeless, however, has been slow, due to problems with planning and cost overruns and strong resistance from vocal groups and residents opposed to such housing in their neighborhoods (Smith and Smith 2018:A1; Reyes and Kim 2018:B1). The Los Angeles Times has written a number of articles on the rapidly growing homeless population and the inadequate efforts of the city and county to address the issue, including an editorial (Times Editorial Board 2018:A18) headlined by “Los Angeles’ Homelessness Crisis is a National Disgrace.” In the opening paragraphs, the editorial (Times Editorial Board 2018:A18) stated that there are few sights in the world like nighttime in skid row, the teeming Dickensian dystopia in downtown Los Angeles where homeless and destitute people have been concentrated for more than a century. Here, men and women sleep in rows, lined up one after another for block after block in makeshift tents or on cardboard mats on the sidewalks. . . . Criminals prey on them, drugs such as heroin and crystal meth are easily available, sexual assault and physical violence are common and infectious diseases like tuberculosis, hepatitis and AIDS are constant threats. Skid row is—and long has been—a national disgrace, a grim reminder of man’s ability to turn his back on his fellow man.

Demonstrating the successful effort of city officials and downtown business interests to transform downtown Los Angeles into a tourist destination, but with the continuing concerns generated by the nearby Skid Row, Fodor’s Travel list of fifty-two places to visit in 2019 included downtown Los Angeles. Fodor’s noted that “not long ago, it was a desolate, terrifying land—its old buildings rotting on dirty silent streets, its sidewalks empty by nightfall” but now is full of “fashionable hotels” and “trendy restaurants.” Fodor’s Travel

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(2018, n.p.), however, warns that “just east of Downtown’s heart, in the shadows of million-dollar apartments, Skid Row remains an American tragedy” in which “the largest population of homelessness in the country exists together. The Calamity of the Row spills out beyond its boundaries.” Expressing concern about government policies supporting tourism and gentrification, and countering neoliberal beliefs about factors driving development, Pete White noted that when “people think about displacement and gentrification, they love to think . . . that it is done by . . . market forces” (Voices from the Frontlines Radio 2013). White, however, emphasized that development is assisted by “policy and . . . state action” (Voices from the Frontlines Radio 2013). Discussing these policies, Becky Dennison added that the city council gave priority to “capital investment in downtown L.A., at the expense of longtime residents, including residents in Skid Row” and in “the historic core” and “throughout long-standing communities of color” (Voices from the Frontlines Radio 2013). The concerns of White and Dennison are rooted in the history of government policies that contribute to the ongoing struggle over neighborhoods involving race and class (Lipsitz 2011). Examples include urban renewal that led to the targeted destruction of communities inhabited by low-income racial minorities and the use of restrictive covenants and mortgage policies to exclude minorities and create suburbs for White residents. The construction of Staples Center and L.A. Live—aided by the city’s use of eminent domain and the demolition of 184 residential units housing 655 predominantly Latino residents (Planning Consultants Research 1997)— served as catalysts for private investment as domestic and international developers poured billions of dollars into projects in the downtown area. The contemporary policies to support development and contain and police the predominantly African American Skid Row residents, or contribute to gentrification and displacement of Latino residents in Pico Union, may not be driven by the explicit racial intent of earlier policies, but the results disproportionately affect racial minorities (Blasi 2007).

The Coalition Lawsuit and the Politics of Development Beginning in early June of 2012, AEG and the Play Fair Coalition entered mediation, which SB 292 required between AEG and interested parties. From

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the perspective of LA CAN, however, “AEG has not engaged in serious discussions around many of the mitigation measures . . . (including neighborhood protection plans for South Park, Pico Union . . . ) which would address impacts described in the Health Impact Assessment” (Play Fair At Farmers Field 2012). The Coalition and the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles et al. 2012:1) filed a lawsuit on August 30, 2012, which addressed SB 292 and challenged the “constitutionality . . . wherein the state legislature granted special treatment  to  a  special interest.” The lawsuit (Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles et al. 2012:8) also described problems with the DEIR, including the “inadequacy of the mitigation measures, particularly regarding . . . housing and population.” On September 28, 2012, the city council voted unanimously to approve the stadium project. As Ares (2014) of LA CAN stated, “AEG has powerful publicity to create their message . . . and in a town full of sports fans . . . they say, ‘We are bringing football back,’” along with creating jobs and providing a catalyst for economic development. To establish a counter-narrative, Ares explained that the Coalition utilized a number of tactics, including social media, speaking at city public hearings, holding press conferences, and developing a website—playfairfarmersfield.wordpress.com—that contained a wide range of information on the stadium project, including press releases and reports from the Coalition. As an example of Coalition tactics, the group held a press conference to publicize the HIA across the street from the L.A. Live Ritz-Carlton Hotel, in a parking lot that previously contained one of the last affordable housing complexes in the neighborhood before it was demolished for parking. The Coalition’s message made clear that “this isn’t just about football, this is about people’s lives and this project is going to displace people” (Ares 2014). According to Ares’s (2014) assessment, the press conference was covered by “every media in Los Angeles.” The coalition put the coverage of their campaign by local television stations, newspapers, and radio programs on their website. The holding of a press conference in a parking lot that formerly contained affordable housing exposes the problem of editorials with headlines like “The Myth of Downtown Gentrification” (which appeared several years later in the Downtown News [2015:4], a Los Angeles weekly newspaper that is pro-business and pro-development). That editorial stated that the new affluent residents “are coming . . . without displacing anyone,” claiming that the new units are “frequently on former surface parking lots.” What its explanation ignores,

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however, is that what are empty parking lots today often contained older, affordable housing that was demolished. The Coalition lawsuit and mediation request for “$60 million for affordable housing” added to the obstacles faced by AEG to realize its plan to sign a contract with an NFL team and have the stadium in place by the 2015 football season (Zahniser and Linthicum 2012, n.p.). AEG had to give the Coalition lawsuit serious consideration, given that, in 2002, the Legal Aid Foundation had successfully filed a lawsuit—Wiggins et al. v. CRA—against the city’s Community Redevelopment Agency regarding plans for the downtown area. The settlement included provisions to protect affordable housing and provide job opportunities for low-income residents. Since the Legal Aid attorneys had been in contact with the AEG representatives through the mediation process, the 2012 lawsuit came as no surprise to AEG, and AEG was aware that a second lawsuit might be filed challenging the EIR (Gaytan 2014; Schultz 2014).

The CBA Context—2010s: Developer Geoff Palmer and the University of Southern California (USC) Events framing the settlement of the Play Fair Coalition lawsuit involving AEG included two CBAs involving nearby projects, one in 2011 with Geoff Palmer and another with USC in 2012. These CBAs illustrate the concerns that developers have regarding community benefits and the various reasons that drove developers to eventually agree to include benefits with their projects. Palmer, one of the major developers building apartments in the region, bought a vacant 9.5-acre site south of downtown Los Angeles in 2006 that previously held a hospital (that the owners had demolished), and which had housed a neighborhood health clinic and health outreach program (Wu 2011). Palmer planned to build a high-rise luxury apartment complex called the Lorenzo. In 2009, Palmer won a lawsuit against the city’s affordable housing requirement involving another apartment project, arguing that the state’s 1995 Costa-Hawkins Act gives landlords the right to set rents for new units. The court decision established a statewide precedent that inclusionary housing ordinances that restrict rents are not permissible unless public subsidies or zoning exceptions are provided for the project (Kautz 2011). The land for Palmer’s Lorenzo project had a Q zoning that restricted its use to medical and educational purposes. UNIDAD, a community organization

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associated with SAJE and involved with displacement issues in South L.A., worked with other community organizations, and they produced reports on the project, lobbied city officials, and spoke at public hearings. They argued that, since 2006, the area had lost four other hospitals and that the project’s DEIR did not adequately address what the loss of the Q zoning would mean for health services and affordable housing in the neighborhood. Los Angeles County officials were spending billions to expand the public transportation system and the Palmer site was across the street from a stop for a new light-rail line under construction. The new line would serve USC to the south, and the Lorenzo would target those students as potential renters, and Staples Center/L.A. Live and downtown to the north. Community members voiced their concerns that, although low-income residents were the core riders for public transportation, housing costs tended to rise near public transportation and displaced lower-income residents, and the Palmer project with its luxury units would contribute to this trend (Wu 2011). As Serena Lin, an attorney working with the coalition, stated, “We were also able to get key officials and planners to recognize that developments near transit should be accountable in part because they receive the benefits of public transportation” (Wu 2011:41). Recognizing the problem that modifying the Q zoning presented, Palmer negotiated a CBA in 2011, which the coalition characterized as “groundbreaking” because CBAs are usually negotiated with projects receiving city subsidies, but the Palmer project was privately financed (Wu 2011:38). The CBA included a 7,500-square-foot community medical clinic in the project, with construction costs paid for by Palmer and no rent to pay for twenty years, affordable housing, and a local hiring program. Considering Palmer’s successful lawsuit against affordable housing, why did Palmer decide to negotiate a CBA rather than contest the Q zoning? In an interview after the project was completed, Palmer explained: “We didn’t want to litigate it because we were paying interest on $70 million at the time. We thought ‘We gotta get this thing going’” (Planning Report 2015). Palmer acknowledged the importance of the CBA to get community organizations to support modifying the Q zoning and stated that “we were bludgeoned into having to deal with the social justice groups” (Planning Report 2015). Noting the leverage community organizations gained through the zoning change, Palmer stated, “I’m not going to take something that I’ve got to rezone, where they can come in and bludgeon me again” (Planning Report 2015).

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While the Coalition lawsuit involving the NFL stadium unfolded, and the Lorenzo CBA settled, UNIDAD was involved with another major project, this one guided by the University of Southern California (USC), called the USC Village. Demonstrating the city’s support for affordable housing, and responding to UNIDAD’s sustained campaign that highlighted the long history of local residents displaced by the expansion of USC and rising rents, the city council’s Planning and Land Use Management (PLUM) Committee delayed a vote at their August 2012 meeting on USC’s $1.1 billion expansion plan. The PLUM Committee initiated studies on the neighborhood’s housing and found that USC housed only 29 percent of its undergraduate students in universityowned housing, while four other private urban universities surveyed housed from 64 to 97 percent of their undergraduate students (LoGrande 2012:4–5). USC did not house any of its graduate students at that time, which were about half the student population, and the report did not have sufficient information on the other universities to make a comparison on this point but noted that one university housed about 15 percent of its graduate students and another had 1,300 units of graduate student housing (LoGrande 2012:4–5). Another city report (LAHD 2012) noted the increasing number of students, staff, and faculty moving into the neighborhood, the displacement of residents, and the shortage of affordable housing. Responding to concerns raised by the city and local residents, USC agreed to a range of community benefits, increased its affordable housing contribution from $2 million to $20 million, and established a legal clinic at its law school to help local residents with housing issues. The city council approved the project in December 2012.

AEG and the Coalition Lawsuit Settlement The key to AEG’s plan to build an NFL stadium in Los Angeles was having one, or preferably two, NFL team owners agree to move into the stadium. SB 292 was important to the process because it ensured that lawsuits would be settled according to a set timeline and the Play Fair Coalition’s lawsuit challenged SB 292. Ted Tanner (2017), executive vice president for real estate development for AEG, who was part of the lawsuit negotiations, explained that “timing was everything” because “we were active in conversations with the league about bringing a team to L.A” and it was necessary “to have definitive deadlines so we could go to team owners, to the NFL, to the city and say that it will get sorted out.” Settling the Play Fair Coalition lawsuit would preserve

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SB 292. In addition, although the city council had already approved AEG’s NFL stadium plans, Tanner (2017) noted that the council would support AEG settling the lawsuit because “they would rather not have an angry constituent group . . . opposing something that . . . had enormous local, regional, and citywide benefits.” Making government expectations clear regarding community benefits assists developers as they plan and calculate the fiscal feasibility of projects. In the long and complicated entitlement process, Tanner (2017) stated that “from a developer’s perspective, what you want is predictability, you want certainty” and not problems with unexpected city approvals and community lawsuits. “Acquiring that certainty requires developers to have greater sensitivity” to a project’s impact on a “community,” Tanner (2017) noted, and benefit agreements have become a “way of doing business and a cost of doing business.” Discussing community benefits such as living wages, affordable housing, and local hiring, Tanner (2017) explained that “those have become more the norm than the exception,” especially if the developer is asking the city for something, such as “special zoning, street realignments, or public assistance.” As Tanner (2017) stated, CBAs are “absolutely . . . vital . . . to enable big projects like this to navigate through the landscape of community, political, and agency approvals.” On October 25, 2012, the Coalition and AEG reached a Settlement Agreement, and in Ares’s (2014) estimation, the results were “exponentially better” than the provisions offered by AEG during mediation. The agreement (2012:5–7,13) included $15 million for affordable housing and“$300,000 . . . for a health promoter” to work to “promote healthy and safe units as a means of preservation and prevent illegal displacement, conversion, demolition, or other means of unit loss.” In January 2013, building on the relationship developed through the years of collaboration to successfully implement the 2001 L.A. Live CBA, AEG and SAJE established a CBA for the NFL stadium project and improved some of the major provisions of the L.A. Live CBA. For example, the living-wage goal of “70% of the jobs” (Development Agreement 2001:A–4) was increased to “100% of the jobs” in the 2013 CBA (CJSBA FFP 2013:7), and the previous $100,000 commitment for job training and local hiring programs (Goldberg 2013:5) was increased to $500,000 (CJSBA FFP 2013:5). A new provision was added to the 2013 CBA local hiring program to include “disadvantaged

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workers,” such as the “formerly homeless” and those “in contact with the judicial system” and “veterans” (CJSBA FFP 2013:5; Development Agreement 2012:11). SAJE gained important benefits from AEG through mediation in terms of the increased percentage of living-wage jobs and funding for organizations and the addition of disadvantaged workers to the local hiring program. This agreement, however, did not address the issue of affordable housing, and the Play Fair Coalition had to file a lawsuit to gain the leverage they needed to obtain a $15 million commitment from AEG on this issue. Considering the public resources that go into these projects, such as the use of eminent domain and hotel tax rebates for the Staples Center and L.A. Live projects, and a faster approval process with community groups as allies rather than opponents, developers see CBAs as an acceptable tradeoff and a cost of doing business. Ted Tanner of AEG acknowledged the utility of CBAs considering the growing political strength of community coalitions supporting equitable growth (Lunsford 2001). An important lesson learned from the Los Angeles experience is that a pivotal moment in CBA negotiations occurs if relations can be transformed from adversaries representing opposing interests to allies seeking to find a way to build a project that can serve the developer and the community. As Tim Leiweke (Mai-Duc and Linthicum 2012:A1) explained, the NFL stadium negotiations “evolved into a cooperative dialogue about how we could work together to achieve the common goal of serving the needs of all segments of the community.” Similarly, with the USC Village project, the relationship between UNIDAD and USC changed to one focused on “shared success,” and how the project could contribute to “a more inclusive vision of people, place, and prosperity” (Pastor et al. 2015:31). Zahirah Washington, a Legal Aid Foundation attorney, discussing the Lorenzo CBA, pointed out that the CBA brought “both commercial and community interests to the table” and demonstrated that “community and economic interests do not have to be at odds” (Wu 2011:41). Looking back at the Lorenzo negotiations, Serena Lin points out that, in creating projects that benefit the developer and the local residents, “the lesson for planners, politicians, and developers is that communities need to be involved from the start and not as an afterthought to development” (Wu 2011:40). Although Palmer was less enthusiastic, stating that they “were bludgeoned into” the CBA process, they did negotiate a deal that allowed his apartment project to go forward.

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AEG Exits and NFL Teams Enter The Stadium Competition On March 9, 2015, AEG announced that it was ending its stadium effort. Precipitating this action, the owner of the Saint Louis Rams had declared in January 2015 that he planned to build an NFL stadium in Inglewood, eight miles to the southwest of Los Angeles. The owners of the San Diego Chargers and Oakland Raiders stated in February 2015 that they were working together to build a stadium in Carson, seventeen miles south of Los Angeles. These plans involved team owners, in contrast to the Farmers Field project, in which AEG needed to attract a team to its stadium. In January 2016, the NFL team owners voted to permit the Saint Louis Rams to move to Inglewood and gave the San Diego Chargers “a one-year option to join the Rams in Inglewood” and, if the Chargers did not move, gave a similar option to the Raiders (Farmer and Fenno 2016:A1). In January 2017, the Chargers decided to move to Los Angeles, and, two months later, the NFL owners voted to approve the Raiders’ proposed move to Las Vegas. The Rams and Chargers, as well as the Raiders, played in their new stadiums in 2020. The developers of the Rams stadium and Inglewood city officials announced that the project would be built entirely with private funds. While there was some concern about the amount of public funds that would be given to the developers once the project was completed and producing tax revenues for the city, the amount of public money would be a small fraction of the public subsidies common in sports projects around the nation (Logan and Jennings 2015). There is another public cost, however, that is often overlooked in the debate on stadiums, and that is the amount of time and energy spent by city officials on sports projects while other important concerns in the city do not receive the attention that residents believe they deserve. Police violence against residents, given national attention with the rise of the Black Panthers in the 1960s and their patrols of Oakland to monitor police actions, and in the current Black Lives Matter movement, continues to be a central issue in Inglewood. The US Department of Justice investigated the city after a series of fatal police shootings and issued a report in 2009 that was critical of the Inglewood Police Department’s use of force policy and procedures for handling complaints about police officers. While the city established the Citizen Police Oversight Commission in 2002, according to an investigation by the Los Angeles Times (Jennings 2016),

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the commission often cancels meetings and the assistant city manager, who works with the commission, explained that the “commission has no authority” and “has no ability to discuss or oversee or even hear any cases of . . . officer involved shooting” (Jennings 2016:A1). Inglewood Mayor James T. Butts, who was elected in 2011, had become an Inglewood police officer in the 1970s and rose to the position of deputy chief before he became the chief of police for Santa Monica, where one of his major tasks was to address police officer shootings (Wharton 2015). Mayor Butts “would not comment about the role of the commission” when asked by the Los Angeles Times and he “declined to release details” of a police shooting that resulted in the death of two people in 2016, noting that “it remains under investigation” (Jennings 2016:A6). In early 2016, after the NFL owners had voted to approve the Rams move from St. Louis to Inglewood, the Los Angeles Times wrote about Inglewood’s schools, noting that an elementary school student “waits until he gets home to use the restroom” because the school’s “toilets . . . are so dirty” (Torres 2016:B1). In addition, the majority of the Inglewood School District schools underperform academically, and, because of budget problems, the state of California took over the school district in 2013 (Torres 2016:B1). In 2019, as the NFL stadium rose in the city, Los Angeles Times columnist Steve Lopez (2019) wrote about the girls’ softball team at Inglewood’s Morningside High School that had to cancel its games because the field was in such poor condition. Lopez (2019:B1) wrote that “it’s not the responsibility of private pro sports teams to bail out struggling public school districts, but there’s something obscene about a multibillion-dollar sports and entertainment colossus rising in a city of falling-apart schools, here in a state of remarkable wealth that has plummeted in national rankings of funding per student.” Community residents and leaders worry about the quality of life in Inglewood with such poor public schools, even as the city gains national attention with the new stadium and NFL teams (Torres 2016). Ironically, the Rams had a direct and negative impact on the public school system in St. Louis, attended primarily by lower-income African Americans, when city officials diverted funds from the public schools to help pay for their share of the NFL stadium. This stadium was constructed for the Rams entirely with public funds through $258 million in bonds paid for by the state, county, and city (Lipsitz 2011; Nocera 2016).

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The Inglewood mayor and city council do not directly control the school district, given that there is a school board and it is currently controlled by the state of California. City officials, however, can use their position to bring attention to school issues and policies, as Antonio Villaraigosa did when he was mayor and made improving education in the Los Angeles School District one of his top priorities (Watanabe and Blume 2013). As Mayor Butts stated, “While people are proud of the progress the city has made, we definitely need to see that replicated in the school district” (Torres 2016:B1). The issue, however, is the time and attention paid to the NFL stadium by the mayor and other city officials in comparison to other critical concerns, such as the public schools and police conduct. Given Mayor Butts’s years of experience in law enforcement and experience addressing the issue of police violence in Santa Monica, he has expertise and experience in this area and has much to offer the community, and his position as mayor provides an opportunity to bring more attention to the public schools. AEG ultimately canceled its plans for an NFL stadium, but the $50 million and five years invested in winning city and state support show the significant outlay of monetary and political capital that the developer spent on the project (Farmer and Fenno 2015). The political effort proved successful and demonstrates that growth interests remain powerful in California and Los Angeles, as shown by the special state legislation SB 292 crafted for the Farmers Field project and strong support from city officials. The lawsuit settlement and CBA, however, also revealed significant changes in the politics of development in the city due to the growing strength of organized labor, community coalitions, and Latino voters, which have contributed to the rise of the growth-with-equity movement.

Part 2. Neighborhood Change in Downtown Los Angeles 1990s–2015 City officials failed to attract capital investment in this corner of downtown with the Convention Center until AEG decided to build Staples Center. I examine the impact of city policies supporting the influx of affluent residents on demographic changes in the downtown region from 1990 to 2015. I use data from the 1990 and 2000 US Census, and from the 2008–2012 and the 2013– 2017 American Community Survey five-year estimates (for brevity, referred to as 2010 and 2015 respectively in reference to the mid-points).

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MAP 6 .1 Downtown Los Angeles (DTLA) and the Staples Center Area.

Map created by Jeffer Giang, USC Equity Research Institute.

Using data from this period allows for tracking the impact of the opening of Staples Center in 1999, and the building boom that followed, on neighborhood change. The Staples Center area in Map 6.1 represents the three census tracts including and surrounding the Convention Center, Staples Center, and L.A. Live. DTLA (downtown Los Angeles) represents the twelve census tracts in the shaded area of Map 6.1, including the three census tracts of the Staples Center area. City policies finally generated major DTLA population growth and residential construction as shown in Table 6.1. Cities trying to revive their downtown areas implement policies to increase the number of higher-income residents because this population provides a customer base for the commercial and cultural activities taking place in restaurants, bars, stores, and museums. These amenities also enhance the attractiveness of convention centers and sports arenas as part of a growing urban economy. From 1990 to 2015, the

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Staples Center area population doubled and the DTLA population grew by about 72 percent, while growing by just 12 percent in the city. City support for new residential units such as the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance, subsidies, property tax reductions, and support in the entitlement process contributed to the larger percentage of new housing in DTLA and the Staples Center area as compared to the city. While the DTLA and Staples Center area had a higher percentage of new housing than the city in 1990—before Staples Center opened in 1999—and all three areas show a decline in the percentage of new housing through the years, the decline is larger in the city. Also, showing the impact of capital investment and new construction in the Staples Center area, the percentage of new housing has remained much higher in that area as compared to DTLA as a whole and the city. Examining the impact of the population gains in terms of race and class shows major changes in these areas. As shown in the descriptive statistics in Table 6.1, the main racial change in DTLA was the growth in the number of Whites, who have become the largest group. Their DTLA numbers doubled from 1990 to 2015, while declining in the city. The number of Asian Americans (including Pacific Islanders) has more than tripled in DTLA during this period, growing at a much faster rate than in the city, and Asian Americans now outnumber Latinos by a small margin, to become the second-largest DTLA group. The African American population increased slightly, while Native Americans, a relatively small group in DTLA, have decreased in number (not shown in Table 6.1 due to small size; fewer than 200 single-race, nonHispanic in 2015). Latinos, the largest group in DTLA in 1990, declined in size from 1990 to 2010, then increased slightly in 2015. Overall, their numbers held steady, but this is the opposite of the city trend showing strong growth. I suggest that racially exclusionary displacement caused by the increased cost of housing explains the relatively static numbers of Latinos in DTLA. The recent population gains are likely from Latinos with higher levels of income and education moving in, including fewer immigrants, in comparison to earlier Latino residents. This would be consistent with the research of Owens and Candipan (2019), who find that an increase in neighborhood socioeconomic status (SES) is primarily due to higher SES residents moving in, rather than an increase in SES among long-term residents. The percentage of youth under eighteen declined

1,359

3,018

526

3,425

16.0

8.4

9.9

Asian or Pacific Islander

Latino

% White

% Black

% Asian or Pacific Islander

Median Housing Value

$722

*

18.1

$587

$5,97,225

$23,130

15.1

34.3

$1,496

$5,14,995

$38,338

36.2

34.2

43.5

38.6

12.0

36.3

0.2

9.2

29.1

3,041

2,010

768

2,435

8,375

2010

$1,918

$6,42,022

$63,865

18.1

27.7

61.2

39.2

9.1

29.0

30.0

9.7

29.3

3,322

3,442

1,109

3,364

11,465

2015

$565

$3,32,363

$19,211

15.1

41.3

16.3

38.5

10.9

41.7

11.2

22.8

22.9

10,050

2,714

5,504

5,528

24,126

1990

$478

$4,69,078

$16,485

6.5

43.8

19.8

38.9

8.6

30.8

22.2

24.4

18.6

8,137

5,860

6,436

4,900

26,405

2000

$856

$4,41,524

$25,138

17.2

39.7

35.9

33.9

5.9

24.3

24.3

19.5

29.4

7,695

7,717

6,180

9,327

31,704

2010

$1,464

$5,50,754

$37,222

8.6

33.8

47.7

32.2

5.2

22.5

24.7

17.5

30.2

9,317

10,251

7,281

12,520

41,495

2015

DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES (DTLA)

$1,136

$4,50,880

$58,208

11.7

18.8

23.0

38.3

24.6

39.2

9.4

13.1

37.7

13,80,326

3,30,342

4,61,121

13,26,495

35,17,576

1990

$1,004

$3,26,724

$55,263

6.2

22.0

25.8

40.8

26.3

46.3

10.0

10.7

30.0

17,33,538

3,72,489

3,99,602

11,23,936

37,42,997

2000

$1,289

$5,26,663

$56,400

6.0

21.2

30.8

39.1

20.7

48.4

11.4

9.2

28.7

18,40,058

4,34,921

3,50,232

10,90,516

38,04,503

2010

LOS ANGELES CITY

$1,291

$5,32,453

$54,705

1.8

20.4

33.0

37.6

19.0

48.7

11.6

8.6

28.4

19,22,879

4,59,951

3,39,659

11,23,131

39,49,776

2015

Source: Analysis by Jeffer Giang, USC Equity Research Institute; GeoLytics, Inc.: 1990 Long Form in 2010 Boundaries, 2000 Long Form in 2010 Boundaries; US Census Bureau: data for 2010 are drawn from American Community Survey 2008–2012 estimates and data for 2015 are drawn from American Community Survey 2013–2017 estimates; Dollar amounts adjusted to 2017 values. New housing units are defined as housing units built in the decade prior to the reference year; 1990: 1980-1989; 2000: 1990-1999; 2010: 2000-2009; with the exception of 2017 which refers to housing units built from 2010 to 2017 (listed on Table as 2015). Notes: Race/ethnicity for “White,” “Black,” “Native American,” and “Asian or Pacific Islander” refers to single-race and non-Hispanic categories. “Two or more races” and “other” are not included in these counts but are included in the total population count. “Latino” refers to all people who identify as being of Hispanic origin. *Insufficient data.

Median gross rent

$26,188

13.2

% New housing

Median household income

18.3

43.5

% Below poverty

62.8

61.1

% Foreign born

% Bachelor’s degree or higher

21.4

% Youth under 18

55.2

20.0

64.6

% Latino

24.9

7.2

10.5

395

445

Black

572

5,468

847

5,300

2000

White

Total population

1990

STAPLES CENTER AREA

TA B LE 6 .1 Downtown Los Angeles (DTLA) and the Staples Center Area.

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much more in DTLA than in the city overall, which could indicate that Latinos with children are moving out, and fewer Latinos with children are moving in. This is in contrast to Latinos displaced by the Convention Center expansion in the 1980s. That group had a higher percentage of youth, with 40 percent of their population consisting of children attending elementary, middle, and high schools. Showing the effectiveness of city policies supporting the socioeconomic ascent of the area through the movement of higher SES residents in DTLA from 1990 to 2015, median household income and the percentage of those with a bachelor’s degree has increased more in DTLA than in the city. Median housing values and rents are also higher for DTLA than the city. While DTLA and the city both show increases in the number of foreign-born residents, as a percentage, the numbers are fairly stable in the city, while declining in DTLA, indicating that relatively more nonimmigrants are moving into DTLA than the city. Considering the growth of the Asian American population in DTLA, many of the new downtown immigrants are likely Asians. The three census tracts in the Staples Center area, with a much higher percentage of new housing than the city, show dramatic neighborhood change as developers have demolished older buildings and built upscale housing. The area’s 2015 median household income, median housing value, and median gross rent are higher than in DTLA in general, and the city. The percentage of those with a bachelor’s degree in the area is nearly double that of the city. The percentage of those living below the poverty level has decreased in DTLA since 2010, while remaining fairly stable in the city. The 2015 DTLA poverty level overall, however, is much higher than in the city, and this is also the case in the Staples Center area. This shows that, while the effort of city officials and developers to increase the overall SES of DTLA is having a major impact, the changes are not uniformly occurring throughout DTLA. There remain significant areas where older buildings continue to house lowerincome residents and the businesses that cater to this group, as well as large concentrations of homeless residents. These results are consistent with Owens and Candipan’s (2019) study of metropolitan neighborhood ascent caused by higher SES households moving into a community. Owens and Candipan (2019: 1570) found that “when White neighborhoods ascend, they remain White” but “when minority neighborhoods ascend . . . the proportion White increases,” and this is occurring as the percentage of Whites nationally is decreasing. Owens and Candipan

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(2019:1552) also found that, while Latinos and African Americans moving into a neighborhood may have higher SES than long-term residents who are racial minorities, Whites and Asian Americans have “even higher SES.” The research by Owens and Candipan (2019) is an important refinement and counter to the gentrification research that suggests that racial minority residents are not being displaced by higher SES White residents as noted in reviews of gentrification research (Brown-Saracino 2017). City support for the construction of the Convention Center, Staples Center, and L.A. Live, the transformation of Broadway into an upscale tourist destination, the establishment of downtown BIDs, and the policing of Skid Row, all resulted in the displacement or increased police surveillance of Latinos and African Americans. This illustrates the process of racial-spatial formation in which the power of city officials and developers is exercised through the policies and practices that favor the affluent in DTLA and establishes the importance of race and class through place. Racial formation occurs as the affluent are defined as “valued” residents and consumers. Considering the racialized and exclusionary history of capital accumulation in the United States, which has resulted in stark differences in household wealth among racial groups, Whites and Asian Americans are favored by these policies. Giving material importance to this definition of valued residents, Whites become the beneficiaries of the public and private capital invested in the area and the projects and amenities that emerge from that investment. The case of Asian Americans in DTLA illustrates the aspect of racial formation involving the continual struggle and negotiation through which race is given meaning and importance through policies and place. Whites have viewed Asian immigrants and Asian Americans as the “yellow peril,” “unassimilable aliens,” and the “model minority” (Ngai 2004; Tuan 1998). Asian immigrants and Asian Americans have faced racially explicit exclusionary policies in areas such as housing and the use of restrictive covenants and racial steering, and race-neutral policies in development that have resulted in racialized spaces that favored Whites (Cheng 2013; Saito 1998, 2015). Demonstrating the complexity of race, because of the high levels of wealth and income among some Asian Americans, their numbers have increased in downtown Los Angeles, fitting the preference of city officials for affluent consumers, while the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in an increase of anti-Asian American racism and the reoccurrence of the fear of the “yellow peril.”

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One of the major implications of neighborhood change in DTLA, is that when city resources are used to help in the construction of major projects and to increase amenities in communities to attract higher-income consumers and residents, the result is racial change. As in metropolitan areas around the country going through neighborhood ascent with higher SES households moving in (Owens and Candipan 2019), in DTLA, these public funds go primarily to Whites, and in the case of Los Angeles with its large Asian American population, that group as well.

Conclusion: Implications for Social Justice

U

sing the case of downtown Los Angeles, I proposed the term “racial-spatial formation” to include the historical and contemporary processes of racial formation and place and the racialization of place in order to analyze the relationships among race, place, and public policies. I use this term to emphasize and make explicit the link between racial formation and the racialization of place. City policies and major construction projects illustrate how city officials exercise power through place and how ideologies and practices establish the importance of race and class through place. I examined racial-spatial formation through projects built over the last half century that have shaped contemporary downtown Los Angeles and served as a catalyst for attracting billions of dollars of private capital. The city of Los Angeles constructed the Convention Center, and Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) built Staples Center and L.A. Live, and spent five years in a failed attempt to build a National Football League (NFL) Stadium.. These projects took place on land previously inhabited primarily by lowincome racial minorities and demonstrate how city policies have supported development that displaces residents and demolishes their neighborhoods. City officials and staff explained that a major goal was to remove lowerincome residents and bring in higher-income residents. A 1966 Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) statement of support for demographic change made this point clear, stating that lower-income residents “fail to produce a fair and just share of public revenues” and that “the return of the 184

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populace in the higher income brackets to the Central City area is now recognized as a new way of life taking advantage of all the amenities now offered” (Loukaitou-Sideris and Sansbury 1995/1996:400). City officials labeled neighborhoods, such as Bunker Hill and PicoFigueroa, as “blighted” and “slums” to justify their razing, while residents contested these labels and viewed their communities as stable neighborhoods with strong local institutions and long-term residents deeply connected to the community. The city also displaced communities for the “public good,” demolishing the original Chinatown in the 1930s to build Union Station, and, as Japanese Americans worked to reestablish their lives, businesses, and community after the years of WWII internment, using eminent domain to acquire major sections of Little Tokyo for a new police headquarters in the 1950s, the Parker Center. From the post–World War II era to today, government policies have undergone a major shift, from those based on racism and whiteness (and created to support explicit racial exclusion that, for example, created all-White suburbs, and targeted racial minority communities for destruction through urban renewal and highway construction) to the race-neutral policies of today. However, although contemporary policies may not intentionally target racial minorities for displacement, I’ve emphasized that they can have racialized effects because they often directly contribute to racial change in neighborhoods’ residents and consumers. These policies create racial and spatial effects today because of the long US history of the sedimentation of inequality in such areas as housing and jobs, which have created structural advantages for Whites in terms of capital accumulation and produced a racial wealth gap. As a result, racial formation occurs through the promotion of affluent residents as “valued,” and although seemingly race-neutral, invariably favors Whites because of the historical and contemporary factors that have contributed to racialized capital accumulation. Giving material meaning to race, in downtown Los Angeles, Whites became the beneficiaries of the massive amounts of capital invested in the area. City policies providing support for the construction of projects such as the Convention Center and Staples Center, the transformation of Broadway into an upscale shopping destination, and Business Improvement Districts that contribute to the private control of public space by organizations that represent the interests of developers and businesses, facilitate neighborhood change. The city and the developers had commissioned studies to determine

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which residents would be displaced by these policies and projects, and clearly understood that primarily lower-income racial minorities would be displaced. Although city officials could argue that they were not intentionally targeting racial minorities, because the goal was to bring in more affluent residents and consumers, the displacement was clearly racialized in its effects and changed the demographic makeup of the neighborhoods’ residents and consumers in the process of racial-spatial formation. From 1990 to 2015, the major racial change in downtown Los Angeles (DTLA) was the growth in the number of Whites, who have become the largest racial group. Their DTLA numbers doubled, while declining elsewhere in the city over that period. While the total number of Latinos was relatively static, since the number of DTLA residents grew by about 72 percent over that period, it is clear that Latinos have not shared in the population growth of DTLA. I suggest that increasing housing costs contributed to Latinos’ racially exclusionary displacement. The number of Asian Americans has more than tripled in DTLA, growing at a much faster rate than in the city overall, and Asian Americans have become the second-largest DTLA group and outnumber Latinos by a small margin. The growth in the number of Asian Americans in DTLA offers evidence of the categorization of the group as “honorary Whites,” a change from when Asian Americans were excluded by Whites through restrictive covenants but are now able to move into neighborhoods because of their socioeconomic status (SES). Demonstrating the constant struggle over the importance and meaning of race in the process of racial formation, however, research shows that economic success does not necessarily translate into a lack of racism in the lives of racial minorities (Bonilla-Silva 2004; Lee and Bean 2010; Tuan 1998). As research on middle-class African Americans has long pointed out, higher-income people of color continue to face racism in the form of microaggressions in their everyday lives as they navigate public spaces such as sidewalks and restaurants, and in extreme forms of racial profiling through police violence (Alexander 2012; Feagin and Sikes 1994; Perez Huber and Solorzano 2015). Elijah Anderson (2015:10) describes “the white space” as “settings in which black people are typically absent, not expected, or marginalized when present” and where, when African Americans enter, they can face harassment by Whites through words and actions. For Asian Americans, the rise of COVID-19 has added another element to the microaggressions and hate crimes they encounter in public spaces,

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including Los Angeles, and the return of the view of Asian Americans as the “yellow peril.” Although Chinese immigrants first arrived in the city in the 1800s, they are often seen by Whites as “perpetual foreigners,” even if born in the US. Earlier in US history, Whites described Chinatowns as filthy and diseased, and the racism arising from COVID-19 ties into this history of characterizing Chinese immigrants as carriers of disease (Shah 2001; Tchen 1999). Since Asian Americans are often lumped into one group by non-Asian Americans, hate crimes based on COVID-19 affect all Asian Americans, not just Chinese Americans.

The Growth Coalition and the Progressive Coalition in Los Angeles The 1990s marked a decade of transition for Los Angeles and other cities. First, the power of the growth coalitions—composed of corporate and political elites that had worked together to guide development and had dominated politics in many urban communities since World War II—began to erode due to the fragmentation and weakening of growth interests. Corporations, however, still exercised political influence through the capital they invested in major projects and political contributions. Second, in communities with growth interests on the decline, broad-based coalitions have formed that have elected city officials open to policies that support the interests of lower-income residents. This has led to a change in the political opportunity structure, and organizations have worked to take advantage of these new circumstances. Research on social movements in Los Angeles has examined the factors that contribute to concrete results, including “a vision for regional equity,” which establishes a frame that explains the movement’s analysis and goals and that counters established or commonsense ways of understanding an issue (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009:60). In successful movements, this vision is then “combined with experienced political leadership, sufficient resources, and the organizational capacity to mobilize large numbers of people to engage in political action and realize social change” (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009:60). Emerging from the 1990s and Los Angeles’s civil unrest, a progressive social justice coalition successfully worked for transformative changes in development politics and policies and, more generally, the establishment of policies that benefit lower-income residents. Understanding how government

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policies contribute to racial-spatial formation, this coalition has worked to create policies that would protect and support lower-income racial minority residents, workers, and consumers. Also, in Los Angeles, the weakening of growth interests, significant growth in union membership, and the increasing political power of Latinos provided an important opportunity for change. The progressive coalition embraced this political opportunity by mobilizing resources, including the organizations, coalitions, funds, research capacity, and political influence, to take advantage of the changing conditions. This durable and effective coalition has worked to negotiate major changes in city policies regarding development and demonstrates how effective, longterm community activism can emerge among lower-income residents (Camou 2014; Jones-Correa and Wong 2015). This is in contrast to the research on traditional growth coalitions and regime theory that suggests that community activism in these communities is not likely to be effective because of a lack of resources and political influence (Logan and Molotch 2007; Stone 1989, 1993). Unions proved to be the crucial member of the Los Angeles progressive coalition. Due to new union leadership and organizing tactics, Los Angeles went from an anti-union city to one of the nation’s major centers of union organizing and political power. Unions in the region moved away from the focus on White workers and grew through organizing service-sector workers and recruiting racial minorities, women, and immigrants. In Los Angeles, there is a renewed focus on social movement unionism, which includes coalition building with community organizations, developing grassroots activism, and engaging in social justice issues. This contrasts with other areas of the country where business unionism and an emphasis on the interests of union members drive union activity. Also in the city, the building trades previously exercised the most political influence among unions and were part of the traditional growth coalition through support of new development. Unions’ major gains in membership, however, are now among service workers, and power has shifted. As a result, unions continue to support growth interests because of the union construction jobs generated by development projects, but as noted, in locales such as Los Angeles, unions have altered their strategy. Unions today also promote growth with equity and support for Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) because of the difficulties unions have historically faced trying to organize and improve the wages of service workers employed in major projects once they were completed. Unions, with their

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resources and political influence, are an important counter to the political influence of corporations. The involvement of unions in development issues has greatly contributed to the regional effort to transform development policies.

Latinos and Community Organizations Critical to the 1990s rise of a coalition focusing on issues important to working-class and low-income residents in Los Angeles was the growing number of Latinos, who were the largest group in the city, with 39.2 percent of the population in 1990 and 46.3 percent of the population in 2000 (Table 6.1, Chapter 6). The region also has a history of progressive Whites who have played an important role in multiracial coalitions, such as in the election of Tom Bradley to mayor of the city and in grassroots activism in the Boyle Heights community (Sanchez 2021; Sonenshein 1993). Latino organizations and unions have transformed their growing numbers into electoral power through programs involving naturalization, voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, and leadership training. These efforts have resulted in increased Latino political incorporation in Los Angeles, with the election of representatives seen as responsive to the interests of Latinos. In addition, Latinos have strengthened unions by providing members and key leaders, such as Maria Elena Durazo and Miguel Contreras, and have helped shape labor’s policy agenda and emphasis on social movement unionism. In Los Angeles, unions and Latinos have common interests. Because unions have become a major political force in the region, they are a valuable political ally for the growing Latino electorate. The two groups have joined forces to become one of the major political blocs in the region, with resources for sustained political activity. In addition to unions and the growing Latino electorate, community organizations emerged from the 1990s and recognized the need for new regional strategies because of the problems exposed by the city’s 1992 civil unrest. These organizations developed a wide range of resources involving research, coalition building, grassroots activism, policy advocacy, and political influence and provided a major component in the rise of a progressive coalition in Los Angeles. These include Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), both established with union support, which have led campaigns for living wages and community benefits and established a transformational shift in city policies. They

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have done this by linking the approval of large development projects with growth-with-equity policies and by reframing the narrative of development.

The Growing Latino Middle Class and the Progressive Coalition Latinos are an incredibly diverse population politically, and one question this diversity raises is that, as Latinos improve their economic status, will affluent Latinos support issues important to low-income and working-class residents? I suggest that Latinos will continue to support progressive policies for two important reasons. First, because affluent Latinos, as with African Americans and Asian Americans, are still intimately connected to these issues, either through their own backgrounds as they rise from lower-income roots or through their connections to lower-income family members and relatives (Vallejo 2012). Second, the majority of Latinos, like most African Americans, believe that structural barriers to economic advancement for racial minorities remain, and because of this belief are likely to support government policies to address these barriers. The strong links among family members of varying class backgrounds who live in different neighborhoods in a metropolitan region are not adequately acknowledged in research that examines the growing class divides among racial minorities. William J. Wilson (1987) makes an important point about the growing concentration in the 1960s and 1970s of low-income residents in urban African American neighborhoods. Wilson (1987) explains that with higher-income African Americans moving out, in part because of a reduction in racial segregation leading to greater housing choices, lower-income residents lost the role models provided by higher-income residents in terms of the importance of education, work, and stable families. Thomas Sugrue (1996) argues against Wilson’s point about growing class segregation caused by the movement of higher-income African Americans, noting that even in the period when lower- and higher-income African Americans shared the same neighborhoods, spatial segregation by class occurred within those neighborhoods. I suggest, however, that the emphasis on class and spatial segregation by Wilson (1987) and Sugrue (1996) does not adequately acknowledge the ties that continue to connect family members across class lines and geography (Heflin and Pattillo 2006; Pattillo-McCoy 2000).

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Jody Vallejo’s (2012) research on Mexican Americans in the Los Angeles region who enter the middle class finds that those who rise from lower-income backgrounds retain strong links with lower-income family members and relatives. A large majority give financial support and social support, such as help navigating government agencies or translating documents, to their extended families. Also, some interests, such as housing affordability, as middle-class professionals struggle to find housing within a reasonable commute to work, and environmental issues, such as air quality, cross class lines, affecting both working- and middle-class communities. The second reason upwardly mobile Latinos will continue to support progressive policies is the different way Latinos view the impact of race on life chances as compared to Whites. Whites are more likely than racial minorities to believe that cultural factors and individual effort and behavior are the cause of economic differences among racial groups (Bobo and Charles 2009; Pew Research Center 2019). In contrast, the majority of African Americans and Latinos believe that structural barriers to economic equality remain and are more likely than Whites to support government policies to address these barriers (Bobo and Charles 2009). These beliefs among Latinos were reflected in the 2020 California presidential primary in which polls showed that Latino support for progressive Bernie Sanders was much stronger than for any other candidate and the top concerns among Latinos included health care, wages, immigrant rights, jobs, and affordable housing (Latino Decisions 2020). Latinos supported “Medicare for All” while Whites who held negative stereotypes of racial minorities have opposed any expansion of Medicaid because of racial resentment and views regarding the “undeserving poor” (Bobo and Charles 2009; Latino Decisions 2020; Tesler 2012). In addition to the growing Latino electorate is the rise in the number of Latino elected officials. With the history of political activism among Latinos and African Americans in the Los Angeles region, voters have elected officials who are concerned with social justice issues and have supported progressive policies, such as a higher minimum wage and requirements that projects granted zoning variances include affordable housing. Elected officials, however, also understand the need for growth, and often choose to support projects that can increase jobs and raise the tax revenues that help the city function and fund services for residents, even though the projects also contribute to displacement.

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This is similar to the conundrum faced by community organizations that leverage support for large projects and CBAs that can benefit lower-income residents, while at the same time, understanding that these projects contribute to higher property values and housing costs that displace working-class residents. The policies of city council member José Huizar reflect the challenges of growth with equity. Huizar, an immigrant from Mexico who shopped and went to theaters on Broadway as a youth, was first elected to the city council in 2005. Downtown Los Angeles was in his council district, and he strongly supported new development there. Huizar worked on a number of projects to spur downtown growth, including new ordinances for the adaptive reuse of older commercial buildings on Broadway by converting their upper floors (which had remained unused for years) into residential units. Asked about displacement, Huizar stated that “we are opening up historic buildings and floors that haven’t been used in decades, not removing people” (Vincent 2014:B1). This statement, however, does not acknowledge that these projects also raise property values, contribute to displacement, and continue the transformation of Broadway into a destination for the affluent. (The city council removed Huizar from office in June 2020 after he was indicted on charges of corruption and he continues to be the target of an FBI investigation. As part of this same investigation, former council member Mitchell Englander received a prison sentence.)

Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) A key event that I document and analyze to illustrate the rise of the growthwith-equity coalition is the negotiation of the Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) that the coalition agreed with the developer of L.A. Live in 2001. The negotiations and the CBA set a precedent and became a model for other community organizations across the nation (Ahern et al. 2010). The entitlement process, which is the city’s review of projects, requires public hearings and provides an opportunity for community organizations to submit their analysis of projects and offer support or resistance to major development proposals. This is a key stage at which community organizations have significant leverage to negotiate CBAs with developers in exchange for support of a project,

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and highlights the importance of community organizations having technical and legal development expertise when negotiating with developers who bring a team of lawyers and consultants to the table. In terms of the lessons learned, CBAs are more likely to occur in areas with robust real estate markets that are appealing to investors who can take on the additional costs of CBAs; with projects that receive significant subsidies from local governments that can make a project economically attractive for a developer (these subsidies can also be leveraged by community coalitions and city officials for benefits); and when the community coalition pressing for the CBA has the political power to possibly block government support for the project or substantially slow down approval. The conditions and practices in Los Angeles that led to the CBA reflect nationwide trends regarding civic engagement and development. City officials still offer major support in the form of subsidies and eminent domain for large projects. Developers are clearly aware of the changing climate affecting city subsidies for large development projects, with unions, religious leaders, community organizations, and residents forming coalitions with the resources necessary to advocate for the concerns of low-income and workingclass residents. Around the country, city officials are driving harder bargains to ensure that, in exchange for public support, projects deliver the benefits promised by developers. In Los Angeles, for example, council member Joel Wachs threatened to place an initiative on the ballot regarding subsidies for sports facilities unless developers made fuller disclosure about the financial aspects of the Staples Center project, which led to a better deal for the city. Growth coalitions remain a major force in city politics, but the increased influence that community coalitions bring to the political arena has helped them become effective advocates for low-income residents. The lawsuit and relatively quick settlement about the proposed NFL stadium in downtown Los Angeles is another testament to the significant changes in the politics of development in the city due to the growing strength of organized labor, community coalitions, and Latino voters. As Benner and Pastor (2012) conclude in their study of regions across the US that have made progress in addressing the conflicts between use and exchange values and between residents and developers, a key element is establishing a process that brings together diverse constituencies with varying goals and perspectives to negotiate and agree on an agenda. CBAs in the Los Angeles region reflect the successful efforts of regional and community

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organizations such as LAANE, SAJE, and LA CAN, as well as city officials and business leaders, to build relations to resolve conflict, develop a common understanding of goals, and agree on a growth-with-equity agenda. As Benner and Pastor (2012) explain, CBA negotiations make it necessary for developers to consider community interests and for community organizations to consider the factors that promote economic growth. When this happens, and the interests of developers and community members are taken into account, large projects can contribute to growth with equity and “community and economic interests do not have to be at odds” (Wu 2011:41). In practical terms, CBAs also represent the specific interests of the parties involved in a CBA. By signing a CBA with community organizations, developers gain their support in the entitlement process and avoid community protests and possible lawsuits that would result in delays and drive up costs. Considering the public resources that make these projects possible, such as the use of eminent domain and hotel tax rebates for the L.A. Live project, developers recognize CBAs as an acceptable tradeoff and one of the costs of doing business. The events in Los Angeles reveal both the accomplishments and limitations of CBAs. As community activists explain, CBAs are both an important policy tool and, in cities with strong progressive coalitions, a transitional step in the long-term goal of transforming city policies regarding key issues such as housing, wages, hiring practices, and public subsidies for large projects. Activists point to three drawbacks. First, negotiating CBAs is extremely resource-intensive, both for developers and community organizations, and negotiating CBAs for every major project is a costly long-term strategy. Second, as Gilda Haas (2007) notes, CBAs generate important benefits for local communities. CBAs, however, do not adequately address, on a regional scale, issues such as the lack of affordable housing and jobs that pay a living wage. Third, as Haas (2007) points out, CBAs contribute to housing and businesses aimed at affluent consumers that result in gentrification and the displacement of long-term residents. To address these concerns, the ideal scenario would be for local, state, and federal governments to enact policies that address the issues covered in CBAs, rather than community groups struggling, project by project, to negotiate CBAs. Los Angeles is demonstrating the next step in two ways. First, by incorporating some of the major aspects of individual projects’ CBAs involving wages and hiring practices in city projects involving significant public subsidies and/

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or large contracts. Showing progress in these areas, the Los Angeles community college district, unified school district, and county transportation authority have established living-wage ordinances and Community Workforce Agreements (CWAs) that include local hiring provisions, construction apprenticeships, and career programs geared toward increasing the number of women and racial minorities in unions. This is a major change for the building trades unions, which have a long history of actively working to exclude racial minorities and women. Another way that Los Angeles is moving beyond the limited impact of CBAs is by establishing policies that affect a larger number of workers, rather than targeting those associated with CBAs. Los Angeles joined the national movement to increase the minimum wage to $15. Unions in Los Angeles played an important role in the minimum wage campaign as well as in advocating for the city’s 1997 living-wage ordinance. These changes reflect the growing political influence of organized labor, the emphasis on social movement unionism and how unions can support policies that go beyond their members, and the city’s business leaders acknowledgment of the importance of reducing poverty. Unions and affordable housing supporters worked together in the 2016 passage of Proposition JJJ in Los Angeles, another step toward citywide change. As Cynthia Strathmann (2016:A15), executive director of SAJE, explains, Proposition JJJ addressed both the extreme scarcity of affordable housing and the low wages in the city. For housing projects larger than ten units seeking variances in the city’s land-use regulations, requirements were created involving affordable housing, wage levels, and hiring. This supported the growth-with-equity goals of generating projects and capital investment that established higher wages and affordable housing for a greater portion of the local population. In addition, Los Angeles City voters passed Proposition HHH in 2016, which increased property taxes in order to raise funds to build supportive housing for the homeless, and Los Angeles County voters approved a sales tax increase in 2017 to help fund services for the homeless. How can CBAs in other cities help us understand how local factors contribute to negotiations between community organizations, developers, and city officials? The differences between Los Angeles and New York City CBAs in the 2000s offer insights into the importance of regional contexts. In Los Angeles, unions played a key role in the coalitions negotiating CBAs in contrast to the smaller role of unions in New York City CBAs. This an important

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difference between the two areas when considering the significant political influence of unions in both cities. The different level of union involvement is probably an important factor with the relative success of community coalitions in Los Angeles negotiating CBAs, as compared to those in New York City. Two factors help explain this difference. First, while New York City unions have a long history of major political influence, unions have focused more on the interests of their members than on participation in broader coalitions. This is in contrast to the comparatively recent political gains of unions in Los Angeles and the social movement unionism of labor geared toward coalition building and broader social justice issues. Second, given the strength of the building trade and service worker unions in New York City, in large projects, there is a stronger history there than in Los Angeles regarding the use of union labor during construction and the paying of living wages for service workers in completed projects. Taken together, these two factors probably contribute to the lesser involvement of New York City unions than Los Angeles unions in CBA negotiations.

Political Support for Developers and Large Projects As former council member Michael Woo makes clear, unions are a powerful political force, but other groups, especially developers, remain key shapers of the city’s political and economic agenda. Even given the decline of the growth coalition and the rise of a growth-with-equity coalition in Los Angeles, the L.A. Live and Grand Avenue projects demonstrate the continuing political influence of extremely wealthy business owners. These corporate elites use their massive investments of private capital and political contributions to gain the assistance of city officials in the entitlement process, the city’s use of eminent domain to assemble the properties required for such large projects, and the provision of public subsidies. The construction of the Convention Center failed to attract private investment and transform the neighborhood, and nearly three decades after its opening, city officials wanted to try again, this time with the investment in downtown represented by the Staples and L.A. Live projects. AEG needed the city’s cooperation to acquire the land next to the Convention Center for the Staples Center, the city’s power of eminent domain to assemble the huge parcel of land that would be required by the future L.A. Live project and parking

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for the Staples Center, city subsidies for the projects, and the city’s support through the long and complicated approval process for the projects. Showing the enormous support that large projects and sports have among elected officials, California State legislators have passed a number of bills since 2009 to speed up the process for building sports facilities; for example, by expediting lawsuits and easing environmental regulations (Dillon 2017). These bills have strong support from labor unions and local city officials because these projects generate capital investment and jobs. In September 2011, for example, state legislators passed SB 292 for the proposed AEG NFL stadium to shorten the judicial process in case of lawsuits. Although many of these projects, such as the AEG NFL stadium, were never built, SB 743 passed on behalf of the Sacramento Kings National Basketball Association organization played a key role in the construction of the team’s arena, which opened in 2016 (Dillon 2017). Projects, such as L.A. Live, Grand Avenue, and the sports arenas demonstrate the continuing centrality of growth in city and state politics and the major role played by developers in the formation of public policy.

Housing Policies The lack of affordable housing is often portrayed as an issue for racial minorities because of the history of racialized capital accumulation, but is important for everyone with limited wealth, regardless of race. Affordable housing is a vital issue for businesses trying to attract employees and for communities trying to hire public employees such as teachers, firefighters, and nurses who want to live within a reasonable commute of their workplace. Affordable housing also helps families by increasing the resources available for education, transportation, and medical care. One of the major obstacles for addressing critical issues such as housing, health care, transportation, and the environment is that action involves a varying combination of local, regional, state, and federal agencies. The difficulty in addressing affordable housing is an example of this problem. Zoning regulations are a major impediment to increased housing production. Historically, the state’s zoning for single-family housing and large lot sizes was intended, in part, for exclusionary purposes to control the class and racial makeup of certain communities. The history of grassroots, neighborhood mobilization to address housing shows that these movements can be

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progressive and aimed at bringing government resources to neglected communities, or exclusionary, such as the neighborhood associations that worked to enforce restrictive covenants. In California, as in much of the United States, housing is regulated at the local level, and attempts to enact housing legislation at the state level is a major shift in policy making. The January 2020 failure to pass Senate Bill 50 illustrates the difficulties involved in enacting legislation to increase the production of housing in California and address the availability of affordable housing, suburban sprawl, and long work commutes. The bill included provisions for increasing housing density by allowing the building of apartments near major public transit sites and job centers and fourplexes in neighborhoods zoned for single-family housing. The Los Angeles City Council opposed the bill because of concerns that local control of planning decisions would shift to the state, and city voters had already approved Measure JJJ, a Transit-Oriented Communities program that would increase housing density (Tso 2019; Zahniser and Dillon 2019). Affordable housing advocates expressed concerns that new multi-unit housing would be built for higher-income residents and that older, more affordable housing might be demolished and replaced by these higher-priced units. State Senator Maria Elena Durazo of Los Angeles—former head of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees, Local 11, and the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor (Dillon and Luna 2020)—and a coalition representing over twenty-five organizations that worked with lower-income communities (including the Los Angeles area groups: Esperanza, Strategic Actions for a Just Economy [SAJE], and TRUST South LA) expressed their opposition to the bill because they believed that it did not do enough to create affordable housing and address displacement (Letter to Scott Wiener 2020). Strong opposition also came from residents and city officials defending zoning for single-family homes; they were concerned about decreased property values and the increased density and population in their neighborhoods if zoning ordinances were changed. Similar conflicts arose after the Barack Obama/Joe Biden administration attempted to address the long history of racial exclusion with a 2015 federal regulation requiring that local governments study and address housing discrimination. The regulation did not abolish single-family zoning, but was falsely attacked on those grounds. For example, in July 2020, gearing up for the presidential elections, then-president Donald Trump tweeted to

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“Suburban Housewives of America,” “Biden will destroy your neighborhood and your American Dream” (Beaumont 2020). Trump also tweeted that “I am happy to inform all of the people living their Suburban Lifestyle Dream that you will no longer be bothered or financially hurt by having low-income housing built in your neighborhood . . . Your housing prices will go up based on the market, and crime will go down” (ABC7News 2020). Trump coauthored an August 2020 Wall Street Journal opinion piece with Ben Carson, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, in which they stated that “we reversed an Obama-Biden regulation that would have empowered the Department of Housing and Urban Development to abolish singlefamily zoning [and] compel the construction of high-density ‘stack and pack’ apartment buildings.” Patricia McCloskey, who came into the national spotlight after she and her spouse waved guns at Black Lives Matter protestors passing outside their home in St. Louis, was a featured speaker at the 2020 Republican National Convention. She stated that “they want to abolish the suburbs altogether by ending single-family home zoning. This forced rezoning would bring crime, lawlessness and low-quality apartments into thriving suburban neighborhoods” (Beaumont 2020). Although race is not mentioned in these statements, given the long history of dog-whistle politics connecting crime to racial minorities, the message is clear, even though one of the messengers, Ben Carson, is African American. The struggle has continued in the state legislature and Los Angeles City Council with efforts to pass legislation that would increase housing density and address the severe shortage of housing. As noted, the passage of Proposition JJJ in Los Angeles in 2016 established the Transit Oriented Communities Program, which provides incentives to build affordable housing near major bus and rail stops and is a step toward producing more housing. Discussing the importance of building more affordable housing, especially in higherincome areas, a Los Angeles Times (2021:A10) editorial argued, “today, restrictive or exclusionary zoning perpetuates racial and economic segregation by prohibiting lower-cost apartments and townhomes in high-opportunity single-family neighborhoods with good schools, parks and other amenities.” In September 2021, a series of housing bills addressing zoning regulations became law. Perhaps most important among them, Senate Bill 9 allows for up to four housing units on land in areas previously zoned for one unit. The bill also attempts to protect rental and affordable housing and prevent

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displacement by prohibiting the demolition of low-income and rental units (Healey and Ballinger 2021). Given the many compromises that went into the bill so that it could finally muster the votes to become law, the end results in terms of housing production may be limited, but the bill was still an important move toward changing highly restrictive zoning regulations and increasing housing production.

Growth with Equity: Can Changing Attitudes Translate into New Policies? Economic inequality continues in Los Angeles, the United States, and globally. One perspective among economists is that if a region focuses on government policies to increase wages and access to affordable housing and improve public education and health care, it will put burdens on businesses and other taxpayers and decrease the attractiveness of the region for investment. In contrast, Benner and Pastor (2012:174) emphasize that “finding and articulating these fundamental connections between prosperity and inclusion” is a “key part of the challenge”—and a task that successful regions in the nation have accomplished. The past several decades have witnessed remarkable changes in public attitudes toward essential aspects of society. These changes suggest that new views about social justice have the potential to create new possibilities for economic prosperity working together with greater economic and social inclusion. For example, when Antonio Villaraigosa successfully ran for mayor of Los Angeles in 2005 as a progressive candidate with long roots in the labor movement as a union organizer, his promise to increase the number of police officers to bring down the crime rate resulted in broad support among voters for expanding the police force. Fifteen years later, with concern about police violence in communities of color and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, the climate regarding policing had shifted in California. In a 2020 poll of registered voters, 72 percent supported reducing “police responsibilities as first responders on matters relating to the homeless, substance abusers and the mentally ill and redirecting some of its funds to increasing social and mental health services” (DiCamillo 2020a:4). In terms of race, 82 percent of African Americans, 74 percent of Asian Americans, 72 percent of Latinos, and 70 percent of Whites supported this change (DiCamillo 2020a:4). At the same

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time, however, 70 percent of California-registered voters (63 percent in Los Angeles County) were satisfied “with the job” that their “local police department is doing” (DiCamillo 2020a:3). Again, these results differed by race with 50 percent of African Americans, 72 percent of Asian Americans, 64 percent of Latinos, and 74 percent of Whites satisfied with their local police departments (DiCamillo 2020a:3). Since this poll was conducted in Spanish and English, it may have missed Asian immigrants who live in lower-income-majority minority communities and who may have more concerns about police conduct in their neighborhoods. A 2020 poll of California-registered voters showed that 63 percent had a favorable opinion of the Black Lives Matter movement, including 61 percent of Whites, 86 percent of Democrats, but only 15 percent of Republicans (DiCamillo 2020b:6,7). The same poll showed that 70 percent of the state’s registered voters (and also 70 percent of all White registered voters) answered that African Americans were “more likely” than Whites to “experience police violence”; 89 percent of Democrats but only 30 percent of Republicans gave the same answer (DiCamillo 2020b:7). Earlier research shows that Whites are more likely to explain economic differences among racial groups through cultural factors and individual initiative, as compared to African Americans and Latinos who believe that systemic barriers remain. The 2020 polls, showing that a majority of Whites have a favorable opinion of the Black Lives Matter movement and believe that African Americans are “more likely . . . to experience police violence” than Whites, could still be interpreted through the lens of culture and individuality, but suggests that more consideration is being given to systemic factors— especially, I would argue, given the difference between Democrat and Republican responses. While the poll covered only a segment of California’s population, registered voters, this is important because of the history of voting and propositions in the state. Daniel HoSang’s (2010) study of the state’s passage of propositions from the 1940s to the early 2000s shows the state’s long history of enforcing whiteness and inequality, even as supporters of many of the propositions used supposedly race-neutral explanations about individual rights and equal opportunity in public discussions. As HoSang (2010) makes clear, however, many of these propositions directly supported racial inequality in the state, such as 1964’s Proposition 14, which supported discrimination in housing, 1994’s Proposition 187, which denied public services to undocumented

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immigrants (struck down by the courts), 1996’s Proposition 209, which ended affirmative action in public institutions, and 1998’s Proposition 227, which ended bilingual education in many public schools. In the past two decades, as Manuel Pastor (2018:19) has explained, California voters and the state generally have undergone a transformational shift, from widespread support for the “right-wing social movements” that pushed for the racialized propositions to support of the “progressive social movements” that have successfully raised wages in the state, increased privileges for undocumented immigrants (such as drivers’ licenses for adults and health care for children and older residents), and increased funding for public schools in low-income neighborhoods. Pastor (2018:16) recognizes the importance of the broader context, such as the relative health of the economy and the demographic shifts as racial minorities have grown in number, but emphasizes the role of social movements and notes that “the state has become a hotbed of movements for decent wages, immigrant rights, racial equity, and environmental justice.” Similarly, Harold Meyerson (2015:A15) notes the rise of social movements led by coalitions of Latinos, “unions, immigrant rights groups, African American community organizations and environmental groups” and supported by White progressive voters. In contrast, Meyerson (2015) explains, “Texas, whose racial history and composition is similar to California’s, has politics that could not be more different,” and has not had these kinds of social movements and progressive White voters. Growing economic inequality in Los Angeles, along with the rising number of homeless, scarcity of affordable housing, poverty wages, and lack of access to quality education and health care, creates a daunting portrait for vast segments of the population. What I have hoped to show, however, is that grassroots coalitions in Los Angeles, working with community and faithbased organizations, business leaders, unions, and government officials, are moving toward a vision and plan for social justice and economic growth. Local policies can have a significant impact on people’s everyday lives, and progress in Los Angeles is occurring. Emblematic of that change is the nation’s first comprehensive CBA in 2001 with L.A. Live, which has served as a model for CBAs across the nation. That and the subsequent Los Angeles CBAs were the result of relations established among community organizations, business leaders, unions, and government officials working to address issues of economic growth and social justice issues and have served as a foundation for

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developing city policies involving wages, job training and hiring programs, and affordable housing development that affect a greater portion of the population than individual CBAs. Ted Tanner (2017) of AEG, who negotiated the 2001 L.A. Live CBA, explained that benefit agreements have become an accepted part of the business process and are increasingly important to help large projects successfully move through negotiations with community organizations and the city’s approval process. Tanner (2017) also explained that negotiations with the community coalition led to changes in the project, and in the end, community members “wanted to see it succeed” because of the benefits it would bring to the neighborhood. As Gilda Haas, a founding director of SAJE and one of the community leaders in the L.A. Live CBA negotiations explained, the CBA meant that L.A. Live provided benefits to the community, but also, SAJE’s ideas made L.A. Live a better project for the developer as well (Lunsford 2001). I have stressed that race-neutral policies can have racialized effects because of whiteness and the ways that racial hierarchy and privilege are deeply embedded in the practices and institutions of society. To overcome these barriers, I suggest that policies aimed at addressing racial inequality are more effective when they are race explicit. For example, job training programs that target women and racial minorities, who have faced exclusion from the building trades, can help dismantle barriers that have long worked to hinder economic mobility. The L.A. Live CBA was race-neutral and focused more on class and geography in the structure of its programs, yet its advocates argued that it would benefit lower-income racial minorities because of their large numbers and the legacy of segregation that had created geographic concentrations of minorities. This is similar to an early position taken by William J. Wilson (2009:141), who explained that in an era when Whites supported color-blind policies, he “called for the framing of issues designed to appeal to broad segments of the population” and he believed that this would result in public support for “policies that would directly benefit all groups,” not just racial minorities. Wilson has changed his thinking on the best ways to address persistent and deeply entrenched issues of poverty and inequality and now argues for “an explicit discussion of the specific issues of race and poverty.” Similar to Wilson’s current position regarding the need to be race explicit when addressing issues of racial inequality, Chetty et al. (2020:778) studied racial disparities in income across generations and found that “the black-white

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gap—the largest gap among those we study—is driven entirely by sharp differences in the outcomes of black and white men who grow up in families with comparable incomes.” Chetty et al. (2020:716) also find “large intergenerational gaps even between black and white men who grow up in the same Census tract . . . or block.” This finding points out some of the limitations of race-neutral approaches, such as that of the L.A. Live CBA, which targeted some programs on neighborhoods with concentrations of lower-income racial minorities but did not specify who would receive the benefits. Chetty et al. (2020:778) suggest that effective policies need to target groups, such as “mentoring programs for black boys,” or anti-racist programs for Whites. Chetty et al. (2020:718) also contend that to address the income gap between Blacks and Whites, “will require policies whose effects cross neighborhood and class lines and increase intergenerational mobility specifically for black men.” The University of Southern California Equity Research Institute, Committee for Greater LA, and the University of California Los Angeles Luskin School of Public Affairs (2020) released a report in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic that starkly illustrated the racialized impact of the virus in Los Angeles. The report (2020:90) stated that the death count for African Americans is twice as high as it is for Whites, Latinos’ death count is 2.7 times higher than Whites’, and Pacific Islanders’ is more than three times higher than Whites’. The report (2020:45) notes that “while some want to attribute the pattern of health issues, such as diabetes and hyper-tension,” as the explanation for differential death rates, “those conditions are themselves a result of living and working conditions that include poverty, poor food quality, lack of park access, and job characteristics that reflect patterns of structural racism.” People of color living in more crowded housing and working in jobs requiring contact with people, as compared to higher-income people working remotely from home, have higher chances of infection and are part of the long pattern of systemic inequality in housing and employment. The report (2020:12,15) states that there “is the growing recognition—by the public, policy makers, and business leaders—that the current levels of inequality and racial disparity threaten public health in the short-run and prosperity in the long-run” and that “we must move forward together for an equitable and inclusive Los Angeles.” The report (2020) clearly and forcefully states that to address the long history of structural racism that has created the inequalities that exist today, we need programs that directly address racial

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discrimination in housing, employment, health care, and other vital aspects of society. For example, in the area of jobs, the report (2020:25) recommends that we “continue with workforce development partnerships that tackle key growing sectors, such as health, biomedical, and advanced manufacturing” and that we “work closely with the community college system to create pathways to those sectors for students of color.” To appeal to basic American values, Wilson (2009:141) notes that discussions on social justice should be framed by “a sense of fairness and justice to combat inequality.” Just as Benner and Pastor argue in their analysis of growth with equity, Wilson (2009:142) states that “our country would be better off if these problems were seriously addressed and eradicated.” Wilson (2009) notes that Whites support programs that improve opportunities for employment, such as educational and job training programs, but not affirmative action programs for actual jobs. This view, I argue, is rooted in many Whites’ belief in cultural rather than structural causes of inequality. The COVID-19 report on the differential death rates by race in Los Angeles during the pandemic points out the importance of rooting out systemic racism in society and going beyond cultural explanations. I argue that the same principles of directly addressing racial inequality by having race-based programs apply to our policies regarding development. City officials across the country offer strong support for large development projects which they believe will contribute jobs, tax revenues, and private investment. Residents and community organizations are concerned about the negative impact of large projects on neighborhoods, particularly the displacement of local residents and businesses. The growth-with-equity movement aims to spread the benefits of city support for large projects to a wider swath of society. Improving critical areas, such as wages, housing, education, health care, and public transportation, helps people who have historically faced exclusion and benefits everyone by promoting economic growth and civic engagement by incorporating the skills and talents of more members of society. The mortality rates of COVID-19 are a clear demonstration that the effects of systemic racism are a life-and-death matter and need to be addressed. Research shows that equity and economic growth can work together—this is not an unrealistic demand of local activists, but something actually happening in neighborhoods and regions around the country. Heather McGhee (2021), however, brings up a major challenge to racebased programs and transformative social change in the US. McGhee focuses

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on the research of Norton and Sommers (2011:215) which has found that since the 2000s, Whites have believed that bias against African Americans has declined, while bias against Whites has increased to the point that Whites “have replaced Blacks as the primary victims of discrimination.” According to this view, racism is a “zero-sum game” and advances by racial minorities come at the expense of Whites, such as in gains in access to education and jobs. McGhee points out that societal elites have pitted Whites against racial minorities and immigrants to generate divisions and support policies that favor the elites, such as lower tax rates. Increasing taxes to support health care and public education, for example, is resisted because of the view of the “undeserving poor” as lazy and not as contributors to society. McGhee points out, however, that there have been major instances of interracial alliances to achieve important change, such as the successful fight for the $15 minimum wage. The goal is to replace the view of progress as a zero-sum game, with the understanding that it is possible to make society work better for everyone, across racial and class lines; for example, by improving the health care system and public schools and reducing pollution. A sign that we are moving in this direction is the multiracial public response to the police violence that resulted in tragic deaths in 2020. The ensuing rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and widespread peaceful demonstrations, contrasts sharply with the 1965 Watts Rebellion (Los Angeles Times 1965), sparked by a traffic stop by California Highway Patrol officers, and the 1992 civil unrest following the not guilty verdict in the trial of Los Angeles Police officers in the beating of Rodney King. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968:1), also known as the Kerner Report, following the civil unrest that spread across the nation in the 1960s, in an often-cited conclusion, stated that “our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.” The report also stated that “white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.” The report explained that “white Americans have never fully understood” this, but the events of today, I believe, show that greater understanding of the need for structural change is occurring across racial lines. As noted elsewhere in this book, Madeline Janis explained that after the 1992 civil unrest, “What most upset me was the utter lack of strategy to deal

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with the underlying causes.” Nearly three decades later, what is different now in places such as Los Angeles is the establishment of organizations joining in multiracial coalitions with the resources, strategy, and political influence to effectively work on policies generating real structural change. Kent Wong (2021) points to the major changes already accomplished in the region and state, such as greater access to health care, increased wages, and rights for undocumented immigrants, spearheaded by unions working as part of a larger social justice movement. Wong (2021) explains that “the labor movement . . . represents hope for the future and . . . giving power to workers” who can help in “transforming our society.” Manuel Pastor (2021), part of the research team that clearly demonstrated the racialized death rates of COVID-19, discussing the importance of social justice movements in response to police violence, stresses that these movements are part of a “broader justice agenda” and that “our current reckoning on race is an opportunity to renew hope and pursue action for a more inclusive America.” I believe that the work in Los Angeles is part of the long history of community activism aimed at social justice described in the research of Daniel HoSang (2021:1, 6, 8). In HoSang’s analysis of local movements, he writes that these efforts establish a “wider vision of economic justice and redistribution” and “build the capacity of everyday people to transform structures of domination into conditions of collective liberation,” and he argues that “the abolition of particular forms of racial domination can yield universal horizons of freedom.” Lofty goals, but in a concrete example of how they are being accomplished in Los Angeles, trade unions, once the bastion of White male privilege, are now working with government agencies and grassroots community organizations to create and improve programs to harness the spending of billions of dollars of public funds to support good wages and benefits that will help all workers, regardless of race. In addition, these programs are strengthening training and hiring initiatives to bring women and people of color into unions to address the long history of low wages, poverty, and job discrimination in the region.

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INDEX

Page numbers in italics indicate tables and figures. Entries beginning with numbers are alphabetized as if spelled out; 9/11, for instance, is located in the Ns. Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences/Academy Awards, 122 Ace Hotel, Broadway, 2 ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), 168 ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now)˜Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Development Alternatives, 119 Adaptive Reuse Ordinance, 78–80, 179 AEG. See Anschutz Entertainment Group aerospace jobs in California, losses of, 120 affordable housing. See housing/affordable housing AFL-CIO, 96–97, 153 African Americans: beliefs about relationship between race and economic difference, 191, 201; Black/Brown conflict in L.A., 107–9; Broadway

BID and displacement of, 80; Bunker Hill urban renewal project and, 48; COVID-19, racialized impact of, 204; displacement, intersection of race and class in, 17; downtown L.A., change in population of, 179, 180, 182; homeless problem and, 160, 166, 168; Korean shopkeepers and, 11; L.A. Times coverage of, 38–39; LAX CBA and, 133–34; middle-class African Americans, effects of growth of, 186, 190; NFL stadium proposal and, 160, 168; on policing, 200–201; political influence of, 12, 106–7; racial wealth gap and, 18, 19; St. Louis public school system and Rams NFL team, 176; union membership and, 12, 108–9; urban development and displacement of, 8; urban renewal as “Negro Removal,” 115 Alameda Corridor project, 124 Aldrich, Lloyd, 45

239

240

Index

Alma Restaurant, Broadway, 2 Amazon, 135 Ambassador Hotel site, Wilshire Boulevard, 29 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 168 American Community Survey, 12, 21, 177 AMI (Area Median Income), 139 Anaheim, Anaheim Stadium, and Anaheim Convention Center, 25, 34, 43, 53, 160 Angels Flight, 47 Anschutz, Philip, 59–61, 69–70 Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG): CBAs, advantages of, 133; community coalitions and, 124–26; construction of Staples Center and L.A. Live entertainment district by, 3, 58, 64, 65, 68–72, 85–86; Convention Center and, 54; Figueroa Corridor development, community concerns about, 115. See also L.A. Live CBA; L.A. Live entertainment district; NFL stadium proposal; Staples Center Apple store, Broadway, 2 aqueduct (1913), 7, 27 Arco Plaza, 83, 84 Area Median Income (AMI), 139 Arena Football League, 75 Ares, Eric, 162 Arguello, Martha Dina, 162 Asian Americans: Chinatown, 8, 79, 185, 187; conflicting racial views of, 182, 186–87, 190; COVID and hate crimes against, 83, 182, 186–87; COVID-19, racialized impact of, 204; downtown L.A., change in population of, 179, 180, 181, 183, 186; Koreatown, 79; Little Tokyo, 8, 53, 122, 185; on policing, 200–201; racial wealth gap and, 18; riots of 1992 and, 11

Asian corporations and downtown boom, 83–85 Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), 125 Atlanta, 12, 34, 51–52, 106–7 Atlantic Richfield Plaza, 47 Atlantic Yards CBA, Brooklyn, NYC, 125, 147–48, 150 Ayers, Mark, 153 Baade, Robert, 76, 77, 86 Baltimore, 78, 118 Banc of California Stadium, 115 Bank of America, 47 Barclays Center, NYC, 148 Becker, Bert, 49 Benner, Chris, 91–92, 187, 193–94, 200, 205 Beverly Hills, 1, 2, 45, 46, 56, 94 Biden, Joe, 198–99 BIDs (Business Improvement Districts), 80–81, 120, 166, 182, 185 Bilbao Effect, 82 Biltmore Hotel, 53, 78 Black Lives Matter movement, 175, 199, 200, 201, 206 Black Panthers, 175 Blasi, Gary, 166 “blighted,” characterization of neighborhoods as, 34–37, 184–87 Bonaventure Hotel, 51–53, 71 Bonin, Mike, 101–2 Boston, 35–36, 117, 121, 134 Boyarsky, Bill, 61, 64 Boyle Heights, 17, 19, 189 Bradbury Building, 78 Bradley, Tom, 12, 49–50, 89, 97, 106–7, 113, 127, 159, 189 Braude, Marvin, 33, 43 Broad Art Museum, 81–82 Broadway, 1–2, 46, 79, 80–81, 182, 185, 192 Broadway Plaza (later Macy’s Plaza, later The Bloc), 51

Index

Brown, Jerry, 45 Bucks (Milwaukee NBA team), 107 Building Healthy Communities program, 163–64 Building Skills Partnership, 156 Bunker Hill: Convention Center and, 23, 29–30, 44–48, 49; displacement caused by renewal project, 8, 45–46, 48, 185; as historic neighborhood, 44–45, 48, 78; homeless and, 165; hotels in Bunker Hill, 49, 51–53; pedestrianism and walkability of, 44, 52; urban renewal project, 44–48 Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), 80–81, 120, 166, 182, 185 business unionism, 97, 157 Buss, Jerry, 59–60 Butts, James T., 176, 177 Cahn, Lawrence S., 49 California African American Museum, 115 California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, 92 California Endowment, 20, 163–64 California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, 1970), 39, 161 California Redevelopment Law (1945), 45 California Workforce Development Board, 155–56 Candipan, Jennifer, 179, 181–82 Cannery, San Francisco, 121 car-centricity of L.A., 30, 42, 70 Carson, Ben, 199 CBAs. See Community Benefits Agreements CCPs (Construction Careers Policies), 155 CDCs (Community Development Corporations), 139–40 Census, US, 4, 21, 177 Central American Refugee Center, 110 Central Avenue, 79

241

Central City, 94 Central City Association, 76–77, 165–66 CEQA (California Environmental Quality Act, 1970), 39, 161 Chambers of Commerce, 10, 29, 30, 48, 49, 121 Chandler, Raymond, 46 Chandler family, 27 change, race as category subject to, 4–6, 20, 182 Chargers (NFL football team), 63, 175 Chavez, Cesar, 92, 93, 95–96 Chavez Ravine, 8, 28, 46 Chetty, Raj, 203–4 Chicago, 34, 56, 78, 156 Chick, Laura, 76 childcare facilities funded in L.A. Live CBA, 140 childcare workers, unionization of, 95 China Communications Construction Group, 84 Chinatown, 8, 79, 185, 187 Chinese Americans. See Asian Americans Chinese corporations in L.A., 84–85 Chinese Theatre, 120, 122 Citizen Police Oversight Commission, 175–76 City Century, 85 The City of Quartz (Davis), 85 civil unrest: 1965 (Watts Rebellion), 206; 1992 (Rodney King riots), 10–11, 50, 110, 187, 206–7 Clarabelle, 46 Clare, Kenneth, 32–33, 37, 41, 42, 43, 48 Clavel, Pierre, 88 Clay Street, Bunker Hill, 46 Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE), 109, 111, 119 Clippers (L.A. NBA team), 75 CLUE (Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice), 109, 111, 119

242

Index

Coalition for a Responsible USC, 112–13 Coliseum, 25, 113 Coliseum Commission, 60 Collins, Michael, 25 colonialism and Indigenous Justice, 15–16 Columbia University CBA, NYC, 148–49, 150 Committee for Greater LA, 204 Committee of 25, 27–28 communities, displacement/destruction of. See displacement Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs): achievements and limitations of, 151–52, 194; Alameda Corridor project, 124; community organizations working for, 111, 159; conditions favoring, 135; defined, 117, 123; developers and, 132–34, 135, 146, 170–72, 174; displacement and gentrification, as means of countering, 151, 192; enforcement of, by CRA, 147; Hollywood and Highland CBA, 120–24, 129, 135; LAX CBA, 133–34; Lorenzo project CBA, 171, 174; moving beyond, 152–57, 194–96; in New York City, 125, 147–51, 195–96; for NFL stadium proposal, 173–74; as policy building blocks, 152–53, 195; reasons for using, 146–47; as social justice mechanisms, 192–96; union support for, 188–89; USC Village CBA, 172. See also L.A. Live CBA Community Development Corporations (CDCs), 139–40 community organizations/coalitions, 10–16, 109–14, 125–27, 159, 189–92. See also growth-with-equity coalitions; specific organizations Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA): Broadway BID, funding of, 80–81; Bunker Hill and, 45–48, 52–53; CBAs, enforcement of, 147;

community organizations and, 111, 113; Convention Center and, 29, 34, 35, 39–41; displacement, deliberate intention of/justifications for, 184–85; establishment and elimination of, 45; known as “Chicano Removal Agency,” 115; L.A. Live hotel, financing of, 71; New Otani Hotel, subsidization of, 122; relocation of Staples Center/L.A. Live district residents, 74–75; Staples Center and, 64; unions and developers, political power of, 97, 101; Wiggins et al. v. CRA (2002), 170 Community Scholars Program, 112 Community Workforce Agreements (CWAs), 154, 194, 195 Comrie, Keith, 24, 33 Construction Careers Policies (CCPs), 155 Contreras, Miguel, 92–93, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106, 107, 189 Convention Center, 3, 20, 23–57; approval of construction, 33; bonds and bond proposals, 29, 31, 32, 34; building of, 23–34, 42; Bunker Hill urban renewal project and, 23, 29–30, 44–48, 49; changes in convention industry and, 54–57; costs of holding event at, 43; displacement due to, 8, 23–24, 34–41, 56; economic feasibility of, 24, 31–33, 48, 49, 54–57; environmental justice concerns and, 39–40; expansion plan, 33–34; failure to stimulate new investment and profits, 57, 73, 76, 85, 177, 196; financial issues, 41–44, 50, 64, 70, 76; growth-with-equity coalitions and, 24; homeless and, 165; hotels/hotel rooms and, 49, 51–54, 55, 70–73; image of downtown L.A. in 1990s and, 49–51; NFL stadium proposal and, 160; as “no man’s land,” 37–38,

Index

41; opening of, 42; Pico-Figueroa site, 29–31, 48–49, 50, 51; politics of development and urban theory, 25–27; pro-growth coalition formed to construct, 27–29; purposes and aims of, 24–25, 44; racial-spatial formation and, 35; relocation of displaced residents, 40–41; site selection, 29–30; “slum” and “blighted,” characterization of neighborhood as, 34–37; Staples Center/L.A. Live and eventual success of, 58, 60, 70, 72, 73; urban development strategy, place in, 23; as “white elephant,” 44, 70; World Trade Center and, 48–49 Convention Center Area Task Force, 49–51, 53–54 Convention Center Debt Service Reserve Fund, 76 convention centers, as urban renewal drivers, 24–25 convention industry, changes in, 54–57 Conventions, Sports, and Leisure (CSL) study for Los Angeles (2011), 56 Corburn, James, 163 COVID-19 pandemic, 38, 55, 83, 182, 186–87, 204, 205, 207 Coyner, Robert, 51 CRA. See Community Redevelopment Agency Crenshaw/LAX rail line, 108 crime rates, 37, 50, 164, 166, 199 Crypto.com Arena. See Staples Center CSL (Conventions, Sports, and Leisure) study for Los Angeles (2011), 56 Curbed LA, 124 CWAs (Community Workforce Agreements), 154, 194, 195 Davis, Mike, 47, 52, 78, 85 de Blasio, Bill, 13, 14 DeBartolo, Edward, 121

243

Deener, Andrew, 90 DEIRs. See Draft Environmental Impact Reports DeLeon, Richard, 88 Delgadillo, Rocky, 104 Democratic National Convention (2000), 75–76, 129 Dennison, Becky, 166, 168 Denver, 77–78 developers: CBAs and, 132–34, 135, 146, 170–72, 174; political power of, 100–102, 134–35, 169, 196–97; subsidies for, 26, 28, 30, 33, 49, 54, 58, 61–63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 86, 88, 123, 125, 126, 135. See also Anschutz Entertainment Group Development Research Associates, 48, 49 Disney, Walt, Disney World, and Disneyland, 25, 60 displacement of low-income and working-class racial minorities: in Boston’s West End, 35–36; Broadway BID and, 80–81; Bunker Hill urban renewal program and, 8, 45–46, 48, 185; CBAs as means of countering, 151, 192; Convention Center and, 8, 23–24, 34–41, 56; deliberate government intention of/justifications for, 184–86; direct and indirect, 16; gentrification and, 16; growth-withequity coalitions combating, 15; health and housing impacts of, 19– 20, 163; as hidden subsidy for urban building projects, 36; L.A. Live CBA provisions regarding, 132; L.A. Live entertainment district and, 8, 34, 35, 38, 57, 59, 73–75, 168; loss of affordable housing/loss of communities associated with, 115, 200; neighborhood change in downtown L.A. illustrating, 182–83; neoliberal beliefs about factors driving, 168, 169–70;

244

Index

displacement of low-income (continued) NFL stadium proposal and, 164–65, 169–70; relocation efforts, 40–41, 57, 74–75; “slums” and “blighted,” characterization of neighborhoods as, 184–87; Staples Center and, 8, 34, 35, 38, 57, 59, 73–75, 168; urban development leading to, 3, 8, 17; urban renewal’s association with, 115; USC expansion leading to, 172 disruption caused by development projects and events, community testimony regarding, 129 Dodgers/Dodger Stadium, 8, 25, 28, 29, 63, 65 Donoghue, Sister Diane, 140 Downing, Kathryn, 67 downtown boom: Asian corporations and, 83–85; Broadway BID and, 80–81; historic core and, 77–79; homelessness issue and, 165–66; housing, 82, 83; iconic buildings, construction of, 81–82; local amenities, installation of, 82–83; Staples Center/L.A. Live district and, 75–77, 83, 85–86, 178 Downtown Center Business Improvement District, 168 Downtown Image Committee, 50 downtown L.A.: Fodor’s Travel Guide on, 167–68; image of, in 1990s, 49–51; L.A. Live entertainment district as downtown revitalization project, 58–59; neighborhood change in, 177–83, 178, 180; SES (socioeconomic status), changes in, 179–82, 180; Staples Center, as downtown revitalization project, 58–59; suburbs versus, 6–9, 58–59, 60, 121. See also downtown boom; politics of race and place in downtown Los Angeles Downtown News, 21, 76–77, 83, 169–70

Draft Environmental Impact Reports (DEIRs): for NFL stadium proposal, 161–62, 165, 169; for Palmer’s Lorenzo project, 171; for Staples Center and L.A. Live district, 73–75, 130–31 drivability, car-friendliness, and freeway access, 30, 42, 70 DTLA. See downtown L.A. Durazo, Maria Elena, 71, 92–93, 95, 96, 106, 189, 198 Eagles (rock group), 66, 70 ECHC (Esperanza Community Housing Corporation), 109, 140, 164, 198 Economic Research Associates, 53 Eighth Street, 2 EIRs (Environmental Impact Reports), 39, 129. See also Draft Environmental Impact Reports El Congreso, 95 Elsesser, Charles, 40–41 Elysian Park, 20 eminent domain: Chavez Ravine and, 28; city officials controlling, 109, 185; Convention Center and, 34, 37, 45; in politics of development and urban theory, 26; power of developers and, 193, 194; racial-spatial formation and, 4; in regime theory, 88; Staples Center/L.A. Live entertainment district and, 58, 61, 85, 132, 148, 168, 174, 193, 196 Englander, Mitchell, 192 entitlement process, 161 Environmental Defense Fund, 130, 134 Environmental Health Coalition, 109 Environmental Impact Reports (EIRs), 39, 129. See also Draft Environmental Impact Reports environmental justice, 39–40 Erie, Steven, 7

Index

Esperanza Community Housing Corporation (ECHC), 109, 140, 164, 198 Estolano, Cecilia, 101, 132, 152 exclusionary displacement, 16 The Exiles (film, 1961), 45 Exposition Park, 29, 46, 65, 115 Faneuil Hall, Boston, 121 Farmers Field. See NFL stadium proposal Farmers Insurance, 160 Fashion District, 81 FBI investigation of Huizar, 102, 192 FCCEJ (Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice), 15, 113, 126, 130–31, 139, 141, 143, 151 Feagin, Joe, 7 Fierro de Bright, Josefina, 95 Figueroa Corridor, 47, 48, 113, 115–16, 126 Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ), 15, 113, 126, 130–31, 139, 141, 143, 151 Figueroa Street, 53, 113, 115–16 Fine Arts Building, 78 First Methodist Church, 140 Flower Street, 53 Fodor’s Travel Guide on downtown L.A., 167–68 Forbes, 59, 69 Forest City Ratner (developer), 125, 147–48 Forum arena, 59–61, 66 Frasure-Yokley, Lorrie, 109 free market theory, 25–26 Freed, James, 44 Galen Center sports arena, 116 Galperin, Ron, 72 Gans, Herbert, 35–36 Ganz, Marshall, 92 Garcetti, Eric, 119–20 Gehry, Frank, 81–82

245

gentrification, 4, 16–20; CBAs as means of countering, 151; displacement and, 16; growth-with-equity coalitions challenging, 15; health impacts of, 19–20, 163, 164–65; home ownership/ housing discrimination and, 18–20; neoliberal beliefs about factors driving, 168, 169–70; race and class, intersection of, 17; racial wealth gap and, 17–20 George Lucas Narrative Museum, 115 Georgetown, Washington, D.C., 45 Getty Center, 63 Ghirardelli Square, San Francisco, 121 Gibbons, Andrea, 116 Gillmore, Tom, 78–79, 102 GLAPI (Greater Los Angeles Plan, Inc.), 27, 28–29 Goldberg, Jackie, 119, 120–23, 126 Goldstein, Cliff, 133 Gomez, Perlita, 143, 144 Gore, Al, 75, 95 Grabelsky, Jeff, 153 Grammy Awards, 75 Grammy Museum, L.A. Live entertainment district, 70 Grand Avenue project, 82, 84, 100–101, 113, 196, 197 Grand Central Market, 78, 81 Great Recession, 85 Greater Los Angeles Plan, Inc. (GLAPI), 27, 28–29 Greater Los Angeles Visitors and Convention Bureau, 33 Greenland, 84, 85 grocery stores, downtown, 77, 82–83 Gross, Julian, 151, 152 growth coalitions and interests, 8–16, 88–90, 134, 177, 187–89. See also growth-with-equity coalitions; progressive coalitions; pro-growth coalitions; slow-growth movements and organizations

246

Index

growth machine, 8–9, 26, 27, 88 growth-with-equity coalitions, 3, 10–16, 20, 87–114; African American union membership and, 108–9; African Americans, political influence of, 106–7; Black/Brown conflict in L.A. affecting, 107–9; community organizations in L.A. and, 109–14; contributions from development projects in return for subsidies, working for, 86, 87–88; Convention Center and, 24; L.A. Live CBA and, 11, 13–14, 57, 59 (See also L.A. Live CBA); Latino political influence and, 102–5, 107; Latino union membership and, 105–9; NFL stadium proposal and, 158–59; regime theory and emergence of, 88–90; rise of, 87–88, 135, 158–59; social justice and, 188, 190, 192, 194, 195, 196, 200–207; social justice and rise in, 187–89; social movement unionism, 97, 99, 106; social movements and societal change, 91–92; union membership in L.A.,, growth of, 91–97; unions, political power of, 97–102. See also Community Benefits Agreements Gubler, Leron, 121 Haas, Gilda, 14–15, 71, 112, 116, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 151, 152, 194, 203 Hahn, James, 70, 130 Harbor freeway (Interstate 110), 30, 77 Hartman, Chester, 36 Hawthorne, Christopher, 70 Hay, Harry, 45–46 Health Development Measurement Tool, 163 Health Impact Assessment (HIA), NFL stadium proposal, 162–65, 169 health impacts of gentrification, displacement, and poverty, 19–20, 163–65, 204–5

HERE (Hotel and Restaurant Employees) Union, 92–93, 96, 110, 198 Herrera, Joe, 143–45 Hertzberg, Hendrik, 67 HIA (Health Impact Assessment), NFL stadium proposal, 162–65, 169 Highland Avenue, 120 Hilton Hotel, 53 Hiltzik, Michael, 161 historic neighborhoods/core, 44–45, 48, 77–80, 121, 122, 168 Holden, Nate, 61 Hollywood, 45, 56, 79 Hollywood and Highland CBA, 120–24, 129, 135 Hollywood BID, 120–22 Hollywood Boulevard, 120 Hollywood Bowl, 65 Hollywood Park Racetrack, 61 Hollywood Walk of Fame, 120 homecare workers, unionization of, 95 homelessness: containment strategy for, 165; downtown boom threatened by, 165–66; high levels of, in L.A., 21, 51, 80, 157, 165–68, 181; Los Angeles Times on, 167; NFL stadium proposal and Skid Row homeless residents constituency, 158, 160, 165–68, 174; Proposition HHH (2016), 167 Hope, Bob, 42 Horton Plaza, San Diego, 121 HoSang, Daniel, 201 Hospitality Training Academy, 156 Hotel and Restaurant Employees (HERE) Union, 92–93, 96, 110, 198 Hotel Indigo, 72 hotels/hotel rooms: in Bunker Hill, 49, 51–53; Convention Center and, 49, 51–54, 55, 70–73; Incentive Agreements for, 72; in L.A. Live entertainment district, 68, 69, 70–73; Los Angeles Times on, 72–73; minimum wage for hotel workers, 111; national

Index

hotel room numbers, 53–54, 55; sports arenas as part of larger entertainment/hotel complex, 60. See also specific hotels by name Housing Act (1949), 45 housing/affordable housing: CBAs as means of ensuring, 151, 152; displacement and loss of, 115, 200 (See also displacement); downtown boom and, 82, 83; gentrification and home ownership/housing discrimination, 18–20, 163; HIA on, 163, 164–65; L.A. Live CBA and creation of, 137–42, 138; land trust, L.A. Live CBA, 140–42; NFL stadium proposal and, 174; Proposition JJJ, 156–57, 199; public transportation and, 171, 198, 199; real estate market in L.A., 21, 135; upscale housing and commercial activity, market conditions inevitably affected by, 152; USC expansion affecting, 172; zoning regulations and, 197–200 Houston, 7, 107 Huante, Alfredo, 4, 5, 20 Huizar, José, 70, 102, 104, 192 Human Impact Partners, 166 Hurst, James, 44 Hyatt Regency Hotel, 51, 83 Hyra, Derek, 17 immigrants: changing union attitudes toward, 95–97, 153; downtown L.A., change in population of, 180, 181; racial wealth gap and, 18; undocumented, 40, 74, 95–96, 103, 105, 201–2, 207. See also Latinos and Latin American immigrants income inequality: living wage myths and, 119–20; racial wealth gap, 4, 6, 13, 17–20, 185 Indigenous Justice, 15–16, 45 Industrial District, 81

247

Ingelwood City, 59–61, 151, 175–77 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 153 intersectionality of race and class, 17, 190–92 Isgar, Charles, 60 J. H. Snyder (developer), 133 Jackson, Jesse, 95 Jackson, Kenneth, 7 Jacob Javits Convention Center, NYC, 44 Jacobs, Jane, 44 Janis, Madeline, 98, 110–11, 126, 132, 206–7 Janis-Aparicio, Madeline, 151, 152 Japanese Americans. See Asian Americans Japanese corporations in L.A., 83–84 Jewish Americans in L.A., 106–7 Jobs to Move America, 111 Jones-Correa, Michael, 87 Judicial Council of California, 161 Justice for Janitors, 94, 95 Kaplan, Sam, 52 Kawaratani, Yukio, 53 Kennedy, Edward, 95 Kennedy, John F., 76 Kerner Report, 206 King, Rodney, 50, 206 Kings (L.A. NHL team), 59–61, 64, 75 Kings (Sacramento NBA team), 197 Korean Air, 84–85 Korean Americans. See Asian Americans Korean shopkeepers and minority clientele, 11 Koreatown, 79 Kyser, Jack, 119 LA CAN (Los Angeles Community Action Network), 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 169, 194

248

Index

L.A. Live CBA, 3, 21, 115–57; affordable housing, creation of, 137–42, 138; assessment of, 136, 137, 145–47, 151–52, 157; Building Healthy Communities program and, 164; childcare facilities funded by, 140; community coalition, creation and importance of, 112–13, 125–27, 131, 135; definition of CBA, 117; developers and CBAs, 132– 34, 135, 146; enforcement of, by CRA, 147; Figueroa Corridor, growing concerns about development of, 115– 16; growth-with-equity coalitions and, 11, 13–14, 57, 59; Hollywood and Highland CBA and, 120–24, 129, 135; land trust, 140–42; LAX CBA and, 133–34; lessons learned from, 134–36; living-wage ordinance and, 118–20; local hiring program, 142–45; Los Angeles Times on, 125; moving beyond CBAs, 152–57; as national model for CBAs, 202–3; negotiations with AEG, 71, 127–32; New York City CBAs compared, 147–51; NFL stadium proposal CBA compared, 173–74; parks and recreational facilities funding, 140; provisions of, 132; race-neutral policies, racialized effects of, 201, 203–4; redistributive policies, history of, 117–18; resident parking program, 140; significance of, 116, 124–25; signing of, 124–25, 131; social movement unionism and, 59; Staples Center problems as object lesson for, 129–30, 131–32; unions, role of, 126–27, 131 L.A. Live entertainment district, 3, 20, 68–73; Broadway, transformation of, 2; community organizations and, 113; construction and opening of, 69–70; Convention Center and, 58, 60, 70, 72; DEIR description of neighborhood, 73–75; developers,

political power of, 196–97; displacement due to, 8, 34, 35, 38, 57, 59, 73–75, 168; downtown boom and, 75–77, 83, 85–86; as downtown revitalization project, 58–59; financing and development deal, 64, 68–69; historic core of L.A. and, 77–80; historic neighborhoods and, 48; hotels, 68, 69, 70–73; Los Angeles Times on, 69–70, 72, 73, 74; NFL stadium proposal and, 160; parking lots versus buildings, 75; political influence of developers and, 100–101; relocation of residents, 74–75; Staples Center and, 68, 70; theater and other entertainment amenities, 70; as “Times Square West,” 69 L.A. Times Mirror. See Los Angeles Times LAANE. See Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy Lakers (L.A. NBA team), 59–61, 63, 64, 75, 77, 82 land trust, L.A. Live CBA, 140–42 Las Vegas, 34, 54, 56 Latham & Watkins (law firm), 110–11 Latinos and Latin American immigrants: beliefs about relationship between race and economic difference, 191, 201; Black/Brown conflict in L.A., 107–9; Broadway, negative racialized perception of, 1–2; Broadway BID and displacement of, 80, 81; Bunker Hill urban renewal project and, 48; Chavez Ravine, redevelopment of, 8, 28, 46; community organizations and, 189–92; Convention Center and, 35, 37; COVID-19, racialized impact of, 204; CRA known as “Chicano Removal Agency,” 115; displacement of, 17, 35, 192; downtown L.A., change in population of, 179–81, 180, 182, 186, 189; Figueroa Corridor development

Index

and, 116; Korean shopkeepers and, 11; L.A. Live CBA, negotiations over, 128; L.A. Times coverage of, 38–39; LAX CBA and, 133–34; middle class Latino population, effects of growth of, 190–92; NFL stadium proposal and, 164–65, 168; on policing, 200–201; political influence of, 86, 102–5, 107, 188, 191; racial wealth gap and, 18, 19; Staples Center/L.A. Live district area, living in, 73–75; union membership in L.A. and, 12–13, 86, 95–96, 105–9, 189; urban development and displacement of, 8, 28 LAUSD (Los Angeles Unified School District), 154–55 LAX (Los Angeles International Airport), 29, 108, 123, 133–34 League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 96 LEAP (Lifelong Educational Advancement Program), 145 Lefebvre, Henri, 15 Legal Aid Foundation, 40–41, 57, 160, 164, 169, 170, 174 Leiweke, Tim, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 75, 127, 131–32, 174 LeRoy, Greg, 151, 152 Lewis, Bertha, 125 LGBTQ+ community, 45–46 Lifelong Educational Advancement Program (LEAP), 145 Lin, Serena, 171, 174 Lincoln Heights, 79 Lipsitz, George, 4, 5, 18 Little Tokyo, 8, 53, 122, 185 living wage/minimum wage: CBAs and, 151, 152–53, 194–95; hotel workers, minimum wage for, 111; income inequality and myths about, 119–20; interracial alliance on $15 minimum wage, 206; living-wage ordinance (1997), 11, 99, 111, 118–20; living-wage

249

ordinances in U.S., 118–19, 153; NFL stadium proposal CBA and, 173; Staples Center and, 126; union focus on, 153–55, 156, 194–95; Wal-Mart and, 151 local hiring programs: in L.A. Live CBA, 142–45; in New York City, 152–53; NFL stadium proposal CBA and, 173–74; PLAs and CWAs, 153–55 Logan, John, 88–89 Long Beach, 51, 124 Lopez, Steve, 176 Lorenzo project and CBA, 170–71, 174 Los Angeles. See politics of race and place in downtown Los Angeles; specific locations Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), 110–12; growthwith-equity coalitions and, 98, 109, 110–12, 113, 194; L.A. Live CBA and, 119, 123, 125–26, 128, 132, 134, 150, 151; NFL stadium proposal and, 159; progressive coalitions, rise of, 189 Los Angeles Black Work Center, 108 Los Angeles Coliseum, 25, 113 Los Angeles Community Action Network (LA CAN), 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 169, 194 Los Angeles Convention and Exhibition Center Authority, 28–29, 31, 41, 48 Los Angeles Convention Center. See Convention Center Los Angeles Convention & Visitors Bureau, 25, 44, 51 Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, 119 Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, 92–93, 97, 98, 119, 126, 198 Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro), 155, 171 Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 46–47

250

Index

Los Angeles Football Club (soccer), 65, 115 Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), 29, 108, 123, 133–34 Los Angeles Philharmonic, 82 Los Angeles Times: on Asian corporations and downtown boom, 84; on Bunker Hill, 46; on Convention Center, 24, 27, 28, 30, 36–38, 40–41, 43, 51; on gentrification and class, 17; on homelessness, 167; on hotel room shortage, 51; on hotels, 72–73; on L.A. Live CBA, 125; on L.A. Live entertainment district, 69–70, 72, 73, 74; on NFL stadium proposal, 161–62; ownership of, 27, 68; on police violence in Inglewood, 175–76; on political power of developers, 101; racial minorities, coverage of, 38–39; as source material, 21; Staples Center, financial ties to, 66–68; on Staples Center, 61, 65, 67–68, 73, 74; on World Trade Center, 48–49 Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), 154–55 Los Angeles World Airports, 134 Loukaitou-Sideris, Anastasia, 47, 52 Luckman, Charles, 30 LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), 96 Luskin School of Public Affairs, UCLA, 204 Madison Square Garden, NYC, 66 Mahony, Cardinal Roger, 63, 95 Majestic Realty Co., 59 MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund), 103 Malmuth, David, 122 Mandell, Jason, 83 Marantz, Nicholas, 123, 146 Marcuse, Peter, 16 Marriott Hotels, 54, 71, 72, 145, 156

Martin, Isaac, 118 Matsuoka, Martha, 91–92, 187 Mattachine Society, 45 McCloskey, Patricia, 199 McCormack Place Convention Center, Chicago, 78 McGhee, Heather, 205–6 Measure JJJ, 198 Meier, Richard, 63 Mercy Housing, 140 Metro Alliance, 119 Metropolis by Greenland, 84 Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 7, 27 Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), 103 Meyerson, Harold, 92, 96, 99–100, 105, 107, 111–12, 123, 135, 151–52, 202 microaggressions, 186 Microsoft World Partner Conference (2011), 72 mid-Wilshire district, 46, 79 Mies van der Rohe, Ludwig, 78 Million Dollar Theater, 78 Milwaukee, 107 minimum wage. See living wage/minimum wage Mitchell, Richard, 53 Mitsubishi, 84 Mollenkopf, John, 8 Molotch, Harvey, 8–9, 26 Morena, Luisa, 95 Morrison, Kerry, 121 Mulligan-Hansel, Kathleen, 142, 143 Music Center, 28 NALEO (National Association of Latino Elected Officials), 103 Narro, Victor, 137 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 206 National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), 103

Index

National Fair Housing Alliance, 19 National Research Council, 162 National Trust for Historic Preservation, 80 Native Americans: downtown L.A., change in population of, 179, 180; Indigenous Justice, 15–16, 45 Natural History Museum and Science Center, 46, 115 NBA, 59, 63, 66, 75 neighborhood change in downtown L.A., 177–83, 178, 180 New Deal policies, racial exclusions in, 19 New Otani Hotel, Little Tokyo, 53, 122 New York City: affordable housing in, 13, 14; Atlantic Yards CBA, Brooklyn, 125, 147–48, 150; Barclays Center, 148; CBAs in, 125, 128–29, 147–51, 195–96; Columbia University CBA, 148–49, 150; as convention center city, 56; development as tool to address inequality in, 13; downtown in, 79; homelessness in, 165; Jacob Javits Convention Center, 44; local hiring programs in, 152–53; Madison Square Garden, 66; Pacific Park, Brooklyn, 147–48; Rockefeller Center, 83, 84; Seagram building, 78; Times Square, 69, 122; unions/union membership in, 149–51, 196; Yankee Stadium CBA, 148, 149 New York Times, 2, 38, 66, 82, 83 New Yorker, 67, 82 Newsweek, 104 NFL stadium proposal, 3, 20, 158–77; CBA for, 173–74; DEIR (draft environmental impact report), 161–62, 165, 169; displacement projected due to, 164–65, 169–70; emergence of Play Fair Coalition in response to, 160; HIA (health impact assessment), 162–65, 169; initial proposal

251

and historical background, 159–60; LA CAN and, 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 169; lawsuit by Play Fair Coalition, settlement of, 158–59, 168–70, 172–74; Lorenzo project and USC Village CBAs compared, 170–72; Los Angeles Times on, 161–62; Pico Union area, impact on, 164–65; SB 292, 161, 172–73, 177, 197; Skid Row homeless residents constituency and, 158, 160, 165–68, 174; unions and, 161; withdrawal of AEG, takeover by NFL teams, and construction of Inglewood stadium, 175–77 NHL, 59, 66, 75 Nicholson, Jack, 75 9/11, 55, 124 Ninth Street, 80 Nobel Peace Prize, 160 Nokia Theater, 145 non-property owners, rights of, 14–16 North Hollywood, 133 Northridge Earthquake (1994), 120 Norton, Michael L., 206 Oakland, 160, 175 Obama, Barack, 198–99 Oceanwide Holdings, 84, 85 Oceanwide Plaza, 84 Old Bank District, 79 Oliver, Melvin L., 17, 18 Olympics: boycotts, 65; Los Angeles Summer Olympics (1984), 34, 65; Moscow Summer Olympics (1980), 65 Omi, Michael, 3, 5 O’Neill, Shaquille, 63 Our Lady of the Angels cathedral, 81 Oviatt Building, 78 Owens, Ann, 179, 181–82 Pacific Park, Brooklyn, NYC, 147–48 Padilla, Alex, 104

252

Index

Palmer, Geoffrey, 77–78, 170–71, 174 Parker Center, 8, 185 parking, 75, 140 parks and recreational facilities funding, L.A. Live CBA, 140 Parlow, Matthew, 76 Partnership for Building Reuse, 80 Pasadena, 81 Pastier, John, 27, 48–49 Pastor, Manuel, 91–92, 164, 187, 193–94, 200, 202, 205, 207 pedestrianism and walkability, 44, 52, 53, 54, 74 Peterson, Paul, 118–19 Petree, Neil, 28–29, 48, 51 Philadelphia, 45 Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles, 160, 162, 164 Pico Union area and NFL stadium proposal, 164–65, 168, 169 Pico Union Housing Corporation (PUHC), 140 Pico-Figueroa site, 29–31, 48–49, 50, 51, 185 Pike Place Market, Seattle, 121 place and race in Los Angeles. See politics of race and place in downtown Los Angeles Plan for a Healthy Los Angeles, 163 Planning and Land Use Management (PLUM) Committee, 172 PLAs (Project Labor Agreements), 153–55 Play Fair at Farmers Field Coalition (Play Fair Coalition), 158–59, 160, 162, 164–65, 168–70, 172–74 PLUM (Planning and Land Use Management) Committee, 172 police and policing: in BIDs, 81; changing political climate regarding, 200–201; civil unrest of 1992 and, 10–11, 50, 110, 187; crime rates, 37, 50, 164, 166; development projects

and priority afforded to, 57, 61, 73; LGBTQ+ community and, 45–46; neighborhood change in downtown L.A. and, 182; Parker Center, construction of, 8, 185; race and attitudes toward, 200–201; Safer City Initiative, 166; Skid Row homeless and, 165, 166, 168, 182; social/political unrest and costs of, 22; violence by police, 38, 50, 94–95, 165, 175–77; Watts Rebellion (1965), 206 policy building blocks, CBAs as, 152–53, 195 policy formation and racial-spatial formation, 6 political donations from developers, law against, 101–2 political economy theory, 8, 26, 88 political power and influence: of African Americans, 12, 106–7; of developers, 100–102, 134–35, 169, 196–97; of Latinos, 86, 102–5, 107, 188, 191 politics of race and place in downtown Los Angeles, 1–22; consequences and future of, 20–22; corporate versus resident interests, 9, 25–26; displacement, urban development leading to, 3, 8, 16 (See also displacement); downtown versus the suburbs, racial divide of, 6–9; gentrification process, 4, 16–20 (See also gentrification); growth-with-equity coalitions, 3, 10–16, 20, 87–114 (See also growth-with-equity coalitions); progrowth coalitions, 8–10, 20 (See also pro-growth coalitions); racialized perceptions of downtown L.A., 1–6; racial-spatial formation, 3–6 (See also racial-spatial formation); social justice implications of, 184–207 (See also social justice); sources and methodology, 21. See also Convention Center; L.A. Live CBA; L.A.

Index

Live entertainment district; NFL Stadium proposal; Staples Center Porter, James, 165 Portland, OR, 89, 134 Portman, John, 51–52, 53 poverty levels in L.A., 21, 181 Price Waterhouse, 42 private investment in urban core, 7–8, 30, 48 progressive coalitions, 14, 86, 87, 88, 158–59, 187–88, 190–92. See also growth-with-equity coalitions pro-growth coalitions: concept of, 8–10, 20; Convention Center and, 27–29, 38; power of, 134, 177, 187–88 Project Labor Agreements (PLAs), 153–55 Proposition 14 (1964), 201 Proposition 187 (1994), 103, 201–2 Proposition 209 (1996), 202 Proposition 227 (1998), 202 Proposition F, failure of (2002), 31 Proposition HHH (2016), 167, 195 Proposition JJJ (2016), 156–57, 195, 199 public transportation: housing/affordable housing, 171, 198, 199; Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro), 155, 171; Transit-Oriented Communities Programs, 198, 199 PUHC (Pico Union Housing Corporation), 140 Q zoning, 170–71 Quintero, Samantha, 143 race and place in downtown Los Angeles. See politics of race and place in downtown Los Angeles race-based policies and social justice, 185, 201, 203–7 race-neutral policies, racialized effects of, 6, 16, 20, 182, 185, 201, 203–4

253

racial formation, 3–6, 20, 182–83, 184–87 racial projects, 5 racial wealth gap, 4, 6, 13, 17–20, 185 racialization of place, 3–4 racialized impact of COVID-19, 204, 207 racial-spatial formation, 3–6; Broadway BID and, 80–81; continuing experience of racism by minorities, 186–87; Convention Center and, 35; defined, 184; displacement, deliberate intention of/justifications for, 184–86; downtown versus the suburbs, 6–9; gentrification and, 16–20; modern megastructure building as reinforcement of, 52; neighborhood change in downtown L.A. and, 179–83, 180. See also African Americans; Asian Americans; Latinos and Latin American immigrants Raiders (NFL football team), 160, 175 Ralphs market, 77, 82–83 Rams (NFL football team), 25, 63, 160, 175, 176 Ratkovich, Wayne, 78 Reagan, Ronald, 28 real estate market in L.A., 21, 135 redistributive policies, history of, 117–18 Regal Cinemas, 145 regime theory, 8–10, 88–90, 188 resident parking program, L.A. Live CBA, 140 Richmond, CA, 163 Right to the City Alliance, 15–16 Riordan, Richard, 60, 95, 99, 119, 120, 130 Ritz-Carlton Hotel, 54, 71, 72, 139, 169 Rockefeller Center, NYC, 83, 84 Rodeo Drive, Beverly Hills, 1, 2 Rolland Curtis Gardens, 141–42 Rosemead City, 151 Rosentraub, Mark, 60, 76 Roski, Ed, Jr., 59–61 Ross, Alex, 82

254

Index

Sacramento Bee, 105 Sacramento Kings (NBA team), 197 Safer City Initiative, 166 SAJE. See Strategic Actions for a Just Economy San Diego, 34, 53, 121 San Fernando Valley: failed secession effort, 31; water access and development of, 7 San Francisco, 34, 52, 53, 89, 117, 121, 134, 156, 163 Sanders, Heywood, 33, 49, 56 Sansbury, Gail, 47, 52 Santa Ana freeway (Interstate 5), 25 Santa Monica, 2, 51, 81, 176, 177 Santa Monica freeway (Interstate 10), 30 SB 9, 199–200 SB 50, 198 SB 292, 161, 172–73, 177, 197 SB 743, 197 Schatz, Carole, 76–77, 166 Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 71 Seagram building, NYC, 78 Seattle, 121, 134–35, 156 Second Street, 80 SEIU (Service Employees International Union), 94–95, 96 September 11, 2001, 55, 124 Service Employees International Union (SEIU), 94–95, 96 SES (socioeconomic status) in downtown L.A., changes in, 179–82, 180 settler colonialism, 15–16 Shapiro, Thomas M., 17, 18 Shaw, David, 67–68 Sheraton Grande Hotel, 53 Shuwa, 77, 84 Siegfried, John, 62 Siemens, Arden, 41 Sims, J. Revel, 81 Skid Row, 51, 160, 165–68, 182 slow-growth movements and organizations, 9, 88, 89–90

“slums,” characterization of neighborhoods as, 34–37, 184–87 Smith, LeRoy, 32–33, 37, 41, 42, 43, 48 Soboroff, Steven, 60, 63 social construction, race viewed as, 3 social justice, 184–207; affordable housing and zoning regulations, 197–200; CBAs and, 192–96; continuing experience of racism by minorities, 186–87; displacement, deliberate government intention of/justifications for, 184–86; growth coalitions, changes in, 187–89; growth-withequity coalitions and, 188, 190, 192, 194, 195, 196, 200–207; intersectionality of race and class, 190–92; Latinos and community organizations, 189–92; political shift toward, 200–203; political support for developers/large projects and, 196–97; race-based policies, importance of, 185, 201, 203–7 social movement unionism, 12, 59, 97, 99, 106, 149, 156, 188–89, 195–96 social movements and societal change, 91–92, 187–89, 200–203 Society Hill, Philadelphia, 45 socioeconomic status (SES) in downtown L.A., changes in, 179–82, 180 Soja, Edward, 112 Sommers, Samuel R., 206 Sonenshein, Raphael J., 99 Soon-Shiong, Patrick, 38, 68 Sotelo, Eddie, 105 South Los Angeles, 164 South Park, 75, 83, 169 Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP), 103 Soviet boycott of L.A. Summer Olympics, 65 sports arenas: city officials’ priorities and, 175–77; concerts as revenue generators for, 65–66; developers,

Index

political power of, 196; downtown versus suburban development of, 58– 59, 60; financing of, 62–63; land and development deals for, 61; as part of larger entertainment/hotel complex, 60. See also specific structures Sports Illustrated, 69, 75 Spring Street, 46 Springsteen, Bruce, 65–66 St. Louis, 160, 176, 199 St. Vincent Church, 140 Stanley Cup, 75 Staples Center (now Crypto.com Arena), 3, 20, 59–68; bonds, financing, and development deal, 61–66, 76, 193; Broadway, transformation of, 2; community coalition related to, lack of, 125, 126; community organizations and, 113; community testimony about disruption due to, 129; concerts at, 65–66; Convention Center and, 58, 60, 70; DEIR description of neighborhood, 73–75; developers, political power of, 196; displacement due to, 8, 34, 35, 38, 57, 59, 73–75, 168; downtown boom and, 75–77, 83, 85–86, 178; as downtown revitalization project, 58–59; HIA on, 164–65; historic core of L.A. and, 77–80; historic neighborhoods and, 48; L.A. Live CBA, Staples Center problems as object lesson for, 129–30, 131–32; L.A. Live entertainment district and, 68, 70; Los Angeles Times, financial ties to, 66–68; Los Angeles Times on, 61, 65, 67–68, 73, 74; naming of, 65; neighborhood change in downtown L.A. and, 177–83, 178, 180; NFL stadium proposal and, 160; relocation of residents, 74–75; skyboxes and class stratification at, 65 Staples Center CBA. See L.A. Live CBA Starbucks, 135

255

Stone, Clarence, 9, 88, 89, 106 Strategic Actions for a Just Economy (SAJE), 112–14; Building Healthy Communities program and, 164; on developers and CBAs, 14–15, 133; FCCEJ, establishment of, 139; growth-with-equity coalitions and, 109, 112–14, 194; L.A. Live CBA and, 116, 125–29, 133, 139–40, 143, 202–3; local hiring program, 143; negotiation of other CBAs by, 151; NFL stadium proposal and, 159, 173–74; progressive coalitions, rise of, 189; Proposition JJJ and, 156–57; SB 50, opposition to, 198; Staples Center/ L.A. Live entertainment district construction and, 71, 74; UNIDAD and, 170–71 strategic capacity, 92 Strathmann, Cynthia, 156–57, 195 subsidies: contributions from development projects in return for, 86, 87–88, 123, 135; for development projects, 26, 28, 30, 33, 49, 54, 58, 61–63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 86, 88, 123, 125, 126, 135; for displaced residents, 13; displacement of low-income and workingclass racial minorities as form of subsidy, 36; public ballot initiative regarding, 129–30; in regime theory, 88; for suburban shopping malls, 121. See also specific subsidized building projects suburbs: affordable housing and, 198–99; downtown versus, 6–9, 58–59, 60, 121 Sugrue, Thomas, 190 Summers, Gene, 78 SVREP (Southwest Voter Registration Education Project), 103 Tanner, Ted, 127–28, 133, 172–73, 203 Tarczynski, Mark, 77

256

Index

tax revenue bonds, 31 taxation: city corporate taxes, 134–35; on Convention Center subleases for exhibitors, 43; hotel taxes, 31, 32, 34; hotels, Incentive Agreements and rebates for, 72–73, 174; revenues, development as means of increasing, 2, 25, 26, 38, 48, 56, 57, 60, 64, 70, 71, 87–88; sales taxes, 32, 64; Staples Center, taxpayer-friendliness of, 76; subsidization of development projects and, 30, 33, 36, 61, 62, 68, 71, 72–73, 86 1010 Development Corporation, 140 terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 55, 124 Thomas, Mark Ridley, 63 Times Square, NYC, 69, 122 Town Theater, Broadway and Eighth Street, 2 Toytown, 81 Transit-Oriented Communities Programs, 198, 199 transport: drivability, car-friendliness, and freeway access, 30, 42, 70; parking, 75, 140; pedestrianism and walkability, 44, 52, 53, 54, 74. See also public transportation Tribune Company, 68 TrizecHahn, 122–23, 124 Trump, Donald, 198–99 TRUST South LA, 113, 141–42, 198 Turpin, Dick, 84 UAW (United Auto Workers), 95 UCLA Labor Center, 108, 112 UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, 204 UCLA Urban Planning Department, 112 UFW (United Farm Workers Union), 92–93, 95–96 undocumented immigrants, 40, 74, 95–96, 103, 105, 201–2, 207

UNIDAD (United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement), 113, 170–72, 174 Union Station, 8, 185 unions/union membership: AEG, union negotiations with, 126; African Americans, 108–9; business unionism, 97, 156; CBAs, support for, 188–89; growth of, 11–13, 59, 86, 91–97, 135, 153, 188; immigrants, changing union attitudes toward, 95–97, 153; L.A. Live CBA negotiations and, 126–27, 131; Latino membership, 12–13, 86, 95–96, 105–9, 189; Latino political influence and, 103; living wage/minimum wage, focus on, 153–55, 156, 194–95; NFL stadium proposal and, 161; NYC unions/ unionization compared to L.A., 149–51, 196; PLAs (Project Labor Agreements), 153–55; political power of, 97–102; Proposition JJJ, 156–57; racial minorities and women, participation of, 153–55; social movement unionism, 12, 59, 97, 99, 106, 149, 156, 188–89, 195–96; USC, unions at, 112–13. See also specific unions by name United Artists Theatre, 2 United Auto Workers (UAW), 95 United Farm Workers Union (UFW), 92–93, 95–96 United Nations, 166–67 United Neighbors in Defense Against Displacement (UNIDAD), 113, 170–72, 174 University of California Los Angeles. See specific entries at UCLA University of Southern California (USC): Coalition for a Responsible USC, 112–13; continued expansion of, 116, 164; Equity Research Institute, 204; Lorenzo project and,

Index

171; unions at, 112–13; USC Village project, 116, 172, 175 Urban Land Institute, 80 Urban Renewal Program (federal government), 7, 45 US Census, 4, 21, 177 USC. See University of Southern California USC Village, 116, 172, 175 Vallejo, Jody, 190 Velasquez, Enrique, 74 Villaraigosa, Antonio, 71, 104, 166, 177, 200 violence by police, 38, 50, 94–95, 165, 175–77 Wachs, Joel, 61–64, 68, 76, 85, 126, 129–30, 193 Wall Street Journal, 67, 199 Wal-Mart, 150–51 Walt Disney Concert Hall, 81–82 Walter, Dan, 105 Walters, Rita, 127 Washington, Zahirah, 174 water access in L.A. and urban development, 7, 27 Watts Rebellion (1965), 206 Weaver, John, 46 Weist, Rev. DarEll, 140 West End of Boston, urban development and displacement in, 35–36 West Harlem Local Development Corporation, 148–49 Westchester, 29 Westside, 46, 63, 107 Westwood Research, 32 White, Pete, 162, 166, 168 Whites: beliefs about racial bias, 206; beliefs about relationship between race and economic difference, 191,

257

201, 205; creation and support of whiteness, 5–9, 59, 182, 185–87, 201, 203; on policing, 200–201; population of downtown L.A., increase in, 179, 180, 181–82, 186 Whole Foods, 82 Wiggins et al. v. CRA (2002), 170 Willes, Mark, 67–68 Williams & Dame (developer), 140–41 Wilshire Boulevard, 29, 46 Wilshire Grand Center Hotel and Office Building, 85 Wilshire Grand Hotel, 72 Wilson, Pete, 104 Wilson, William J., 190, 203, 205 Winant, Howard, 3, 5 Wolf-Powers, Cecilia, 132 Women’s NBA team, 75 Wong, Duane, 87 Wong, Kent, 96–97, 112, 150, 207 Woo, Michael, 100, 113, 156, 196 Wood, James, 34, 97, 113 Woodard, Joseph, 33–34 Woolfe, Zachary, 82 Worker Education and Resource Center, 156 worker retention ordinance (1996), 111 World Trade Center, 48–49 Yankee Stadium CBA, NYC, 148, 149 Yellin, Ira, 78 Yorty, Sam, 42, 43 Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) housing, 141 Zabin, Carol, 118 Zimbalist, Andrew, 62 zoning regulations: affordable housing and, 197–200; Q zoning, 170–71; for single-family houses, 198–99 Zuk, Miriam, 16

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