British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1850-1990: Aspects of the Evolution of British Foreign Policy 9781898823742

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BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES AND JAPAN, 1850–1990

Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (left) with Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon outside No. 10 Downing Street, 1924

British Foreign Secretaries and Japan,1850–1990 ASPECTS OF THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY —

Edited by

ANTONY BEST

AND

HUGH CORTAZZI

JAPAN SOCIETY PAPERBACK EDITION Not for resale BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES AND JAPAN, 1850–1990 ASPECTS OF THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

First published 2018 by RENAISSANCE BOOKS P O Box 219 Folkestone Kent CT20 2WP Renaissance Books is an imprint of Global Books Ltd ISBN 978-1-898823-73-5 Hardback ISBN 978-1-898823-74-2 [e-Book] © Renaissance Books, 2018 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. SPECIAL THANKS The Chairman and Council of the Japan Society together with the Publishers wish to express their thanks to the Great-Britain Sasakawa Foundation for their support in the making of this book.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Set in Stone 9 on 10.5 pt by Dataworks Printed and bound in England by CPI Antony Rowe Ltd., Chippenham, Wilts

CONTENTS — Introduction & Chapter Summaries

ix & xvii

HUGH CORTAZZI

List of Contributors

xxiii

Abbreviations/ Names and Name Order

xxv

1. British Relations with Japan, 1852–2017: An Overview

1

ANTONY BEST

2. Lord John Russell, 1792–1878

22

[lst Earl Russell] Foreign Secretary, 1852–53, 1859–69 ANDREW COBBING

3. Lord Clarendon, 1800–1870

32

[George William Villiers, 4th Earl of Clarendon] Foreign Secretary, 1853–58, 1865–66, 1868–70 ROBERT MORTON

4. Lord Granville, 1815–1891

42

[George Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl Granville] Foreign Secretary, 1870–74, 1880–85 ANDREW COBBING

5. Lord Derby, 1826–1893

52

[Lord Stanley & 15 Earl of Derby] th

Foreign Secretary as Lord Stanley, 1866–68; as Lord Derby 1874–78 ROBERT MORTON & ANDREW COBBING

6. Lord Salisbury, 1830–1903

62

[3rd Marquess of Salisbury]

v

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BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES AND JAPAN, 1850–1990

Foreign Secretary, 1878–80, 1885–86, 1887–92, 1895–1900. Prime Minister, 1885–86, 1886–92, 1895–1902 THOMAS OTTE

7. Lord Rosebery, 1847–1929

74

[5th Earl of Rosebery] Foreign Secretary, 1886, 1892–94 Prime Minister, 1894–95 IAN NISH

8. Lord Kimberley, 1826–1902

82

[John Wodehouse, 1 Earl of Kimberley] st

Foreign Secretary, 1894–95 THOMAS OTTE

9. Lord Lansdowne, 1845–1927

91

[Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne] Foreign Secretary, 1900–05 THOMAS OTTE

10. Sir Francis Bertie, 1844–1919

103

Key official in framing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance THOMAS OTTE

11. Sir Edward Grey, 1862–1933

115

[Viscount Grey of Falloden] Foreign Secretary, 1905–16 IAN NISH

12. Arthur James Balfour, 1848–1930

124

[lst Earl of Balfour] Foreign Secretary, 1916–19 Prime Minister, 1902–05 IAN NISH

13. Lord Curzon, 1859–1925 [George Nathaniel, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston]

133

CONTENTS

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Foreign Secretary, 1919–24 IAN NISH

14. James Ramsay MacDonald, 1866–1937

143

Foreign Secretary, 1924 Prime Minister, 1929–31 JOHN FERRIS

15. Austen Chamberlain, 1863–1937

153

Foreign Secretary, 1924–29 Neville Chamberlain, 1869–1940 Prime Minister, 1937–40 ANTONY BEST

16. Sir John Simon, 1873–1954

162

[lst Viscount Simon] Foreign Secretary, 1931–35 ANTONY BEST

17. Lord Lytton, 1876–1947

173

[Victor Alexander George Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton], A key role in advancing Anglo-Japanese Relations in the 1930s ANTONY BEST

18. Sir Samuel Hoare, 1880–1959

179

[Samuel Gurney, 1st Viscount Templewood] Foreign Secretary, June-December 1935 ANTONY BEST

19. Sir Anthony Eden, 1897–1977

184

[lst Earl of Avon] Foreign Secretary 1935–38, 1940–45, 1951–55 ANTONY BEST

20. Lord Halifax, 1881–1959 [Edward Wood, 1 Earl of Halifax] st

Foreign Secretary, 1938–40 ANTONY BEST

192

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21. Lord Hankey, 1877–1963 and R.A. Butler, 1902–1982 and the ‘Appeasement of Japan, 1939–1941

200

Foreign Secretary (Butler), 1963–64 ANTONY BEST

22. Ernest Bevin, 1881–1951

210

Foreign Secretary, 1945–51 ROGER BUCKLEY

23. Winston Churchill, 1874–1965

220

Prime Minister, 1940–45, 1951–55 EIJI SEKI

24. Britain and Japan, 1950–1990: A British Perspective

232

HUGH CORTAZZI

25. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1903–1995

259

[14th Earl of Home] Foreign Secretary, 1960–63, 1970–74 Prime Minister, 1963–64 ANTONY BEST

26. Edward Heath, 1916–2005

265

Prime Minister, 1970–74 HUGH CORTAZZI

27. Margaret Thatcher, 1925–2013

274

[Baroness Thatcher] Prime Minister, 1979–90 HUGH CORTAZZI

28. Sir Geoffrey Howe, 1926–2015

287

[Lord Howe of Aberavon] Foreign Secretary, 1983–89 DAVID WARREN

Bibliography

295

Index

307

INTRODUCTION HUGH CORTAZZI

—

J

apan remains important for Britain and has been a relevant and significant partner for much of the last one and a half centuries. This should not need restating but with the development of China as a superpower, Japan and our relations with it are not always given the attention they deserve. Japanese GDP has been overtaken by China but Japan’s economy remains the third largest in the world. Japan unlike China has developed democratic institutions with firm roots and has a vibrant culture. We need, however, to see our relations with Japan in the context of our relations with the rest of Asia. If only for geographical and cultural reasons Britain has always had to give priority to its relations with its neighbours in Europe and North America. British interests in Japan,1 which shape our policy, are basically the same as our interests in other major industrialized countries. We want a friendly, peaceful and prosperous Japan with which we can have increasing trade in goods and services. These objectives have not basically changed over the period covered in this book, but the balance between political and economic interests has varied greatly. The policies adopted by the British government in order to promote British interests, on which the essays here focus, are only one facet of the relationship which has developed between our two countries. Trade, finance and investment can be facilitated by governments but are carried out by corporations, industrialists and entrepreneurs - advised by lawyers and other experts. This aspect of British-Japan relations is only discussed peripherally in this volume. … From the beginning, Anglo-Japanese relations have been underpinned by Japanese interest in the English language and British education. The contribution of teachers, scholars and missionaries has also been significant and the cultural dimension is fundamental to the relationship. This volume reviews some 150 years of Anglo-Japanese relations from a British perspective focusing on the role played by British foreign secretaries (and some prime ministers). The foreign secretaries during these years who were involved in a substantive way with Japan are covered in separate biographical portraits. Some foreign secretaries were also at times prime minister, e.g Lord Russell, Lord Derby, Lord Salisbury, Arthur Balfour, Ramsay ix

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Macdonald, Sir Anthony Eden and Sir Alec Douglas Home. Two prime ministers, Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, who were never foreign secretary, are covered in separate portraits as they had a significant and personal role in the evolution of post-war British policy towards Japan. Foreign secretaries who were only briefly incumbents of the post or who had no significant interest in, or influence on, relations with Japan do not need individual portraits. Many other government ministers, however, especially chancellors of the exchequer and ministers with trade and industry responsibilities, did influence policy towards Japan. Some of them are referred to in the chapters about individual foreign secretaries but, again, are not the subject of separate biographical portraits. We have also included Antony Best’s study of Lord Lytton and Manchuria, which was a major issue in relations between Japan and Britain in the 1930s, and Thomas Otte’s account of the work of Sir Francis Bertie, under secretary in the Foreign Office who played a significant role in the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. … Policy towards Japan was never entirely set by the foreign secretary acting alone. Many policy decisions would be taken by Foreign Office officials and by the British heads of mission in Tokyo who were guided by their understanding of general government policy towards Japan and their assessment of British interests. This book should accordingly be seen as complementary to British Envoys in Japan 1859–1972.2 Many of the British foreign secretaries included here have also appeared in the Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits series. This volume, however, not only brings these portraits together but also includes a number of new portraits of those who have not yet been the subject of separate treatment in our earlier volumes. In putting these portraits in chronological order, and with the addition of Antony Best’s illuminating historical overview, we have tried to provide an informed perspective on the evolution of British foreign policy over the past approximately one and a half centuries The period post-1990 is not covered mainly because the relevant papers are yet to be released into the public domain, but also because there have not been any significant changes in British relations with Japan since Britain became a member of the European Union. It is too early to judge how this situation will change as a result of the British decision to leave the EU following the advisory referendum of June 2016. … Anglo-Japanese relations began as far back as 1600 when William Adams first arrived in Japan as navigator on board the Dutch ship De Liefde. A British trading post was established by the East India Company at Hirado in 1613 but it failed and was closed in 1623. This was long before there was a British foreign secretary and the story of this first attempt at establishing commercial relations lies outside the scope of this book. Britain’s involvement with modern Japan began in 1852 with Lord Malmesbury who as foreign secretary was told by John Bowring, British consul in Canton, of American plans for a US expedition to Japan to be led by Commodore Matthew Perry. Malmesbury’s response was non-committal. He wrote that ‘Her Majesty’s Government would be glad to see the trade with Japan

INTRODUCTION

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open; but they think it better to leave it to the Government of the United States to make the experiment; and if that experiment is successful, Her Majesty’s Government can take advantage of its success.’ 3 Yet in the 1860s, a decade or so later, Britain was taking the lead in the treaty port of Yokohama. The two British foreign secretaries who were per force most closely concerned with Japan-related issues in these years were Lord John Russell and Lord Clarendon. But they were largely reacting to events. Britain did not have a political or economic policy towards Japan. British ‘policy’ amounted to responding pragmatically to events, bearing in mind its interest in expanding trade and protecting the lives and property of its subjects. British trading interests were the essential driving force for its actions in Japan and have in varying degrees been fundamental in determining its policies towards Japan. The British reaction to the murder of a British businessman at Namamugi, near Yokohama, in September 1862 and the closure of the Straits of Shimonoseki to foreign shipping was violent and led to death and destruction in Kagoshima and Shimonoseki. At the time, Britain was accused of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and its behaviour would today lead to international censure. It did not escape condemnation from liberal-minded politicians at the time. Lord Palmerston, then British prime minister, was forced to intervene in a debate in the House of Commons to defend British actions. These were not out of line with contemporary international standards and were supported by the British merchant community in Japan. … Looking back over the history of Anglo-Japanese relations it is possible to identify British actions which now seem mistaken or politically incorrect by modern standards, but if seen by standards prevailing at the time were not out of the ordinary. Policy-making is constrained not only by the resources available but also by contemporary public opinion as expressed through parliament and the media. The personal element also at times played a significant part. The egos and personalities of some of the main players in the history of our relations were significant factors in policy formation and execution. Although the Americans took the lead in re-opening Japan to trade and contacts with the West the British and the French were the leading powers in the modernization of Japan. The Germans following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 joined them. The American Civil War of 1861–1866 and the opening up of what became the central and western states of the union meant that Japan was not the focus of American attention as it had been at the time of Commodore Perry’s expedition. Russia’s attention, following the Crimean War of 1856, focused on the opening up of Siberia, Sakhalin and Kamchatka. The Dutch although their historical and cultural ties were close lacked the resources to play more than a supporting role in the development of Japan. As Antony Best points out in his historical overview the official policy of Britain in the conflict which led to the Meiji restoration of 1868 was one of neutrality, – shu – and Satsuma, the but British officials managed to keep open channels to Cho two clans which seized leading roles in the new Japan that emerged following the end of the civil war. The British wanted Japan to develop into a profitable trading partner both as a supplier and importer and British policies, in so far as these had

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been formulated in words, were reasonable, but were not always developed consistently or sensitively. The commercial treaties of the five powers (the USA, the Netherlands, Russia, and France) of 1858 which established the treaty-port system were in line with treaties the powers had concluded in other parts of the world and in view of the absence in Japan of a legal system, which the citizens of a developed country at that time could accept as fair, not unreasonable. But within a few years the Japanese had come to see them as ‘unequal’ and as treating Japan and the Japanese as inferior. The Japanese grievance over the treaties came to dominate Japanese foreign policy for the next quarter of a century. The Japanese sense of grievance was exacerbated by the behaviour of some members of the merchant community especially in Yokohama who were inclined to treat Japan with arrogance and condescension. Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister at the time who had a short temper, did not always treat Japanese with the courtesy that they expected. The British government’s response to Japanese pressure for renegotiating the treaty of 1858 was initially at least to stall. They realized that changes would have to be made in due course but under pressure from the trading community were unwilling to give way until substantial progress had been made in the establishment of Japanese legal codes and a modern court system had been established. If the small British garrison in Yokohama had been withdrawn more speedily and if Britain, which had become the leading treaty power, had been quicker in responding to Japanese pressure for treaty revision and readier to recognize Japan’s legal progress would this have deterred the rise of Japanese imperialism? Japanese imperialism, however, had much deeper roots than opposition to the ‘unequal’ treaties. It originated in Japanese self-belief and years of isolation during which the myth of the superiority of the Japanese to the foreigner was nurtured. It was apparent to Japan’s new leaders that Japan was weak and that its first priority must be to modernize and establish forces, which could ensure Japan’s independence. The Japanese had only to look across the sea to China to see the danger. Fukoku kyohei (literally ‘a rich country and strong army’) became the slogan from which Japanese imperialism grew. A more forthcoming British attitude towards treaty revision might have smoothed out some difficulties, but could have led to frictions with the merchants and incidents that could have escalated. John Bull of the last decades of the nineteenth century was not always an attractive character. Some Japanese in the years immediately following the 1868 revolution resented British representations to try to stop the official persecution of Christians in Japan on the grounds that this amounted to interference in the internal affairs of another country. This was a difficult issue and took up a good deal of diplomatic time, but Japanese edicts outlawing Christianity and the persecution of Japanese Christians were not only damaging to Japan’s reputation but also added to pressure for delay in treaty revision. The British decision not to join the Triple Intervention of 1895 was a wise one and certainly helped to prepare the ground for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The revised treaties, which came into force in 1899 (and despite the fact that Japan only achieved full tariff autonomy many years later), represented a significant step in establishing Japan’s world status. The fact that Britain had in the end taken the lead in impelling treaty revision ensured that Britain retained its primary position among the treaty powers. The British interest in peace in Asia and fears about the dangers from growing tensions in the region was the prime British motive in concluding the

INTRODUCTION

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first Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 but it must also be seen against tensions and rivalry in Europe. Britain managed to avoid being dragged by the alliance into war with Russia in 1904 showing particular restraint over the Dogger Bank incident. The second alliance of 1905 was also dictated in part by the British wish to withdraw its capital ships from the China station to meet the increasing German naval threat in the North Sea. Japanese growing power in Manchuria inevitably led to developing Japanese demands on China where there was a potential conflict with British concessions in China. Japanese industry had benefitted significantly from western procurement in the prosecution of the First World War. The balance of power between Britain and Japan had tilted in Japan’s favour. But at the Versailles peace conference in 1919 Japan found that it could not rely on the wholehearted support of its British ally. Britain under pressure from the Commonwealth countries of Australia and Canada, whose forces had suffered significant losses on the allied side during the war, refused to endorse Japan’s demand for a racial equality clause in the covenant of the League of Nations. The British failure to support her Japanese ally in this highly sensitive issue caused much resentment not least because it implied that the Japanese were seen as racially inferior. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance continued but Britain and Japan were drifting apart. The United States, without whose intervention in 1917 the First World War might have dragged on much longer, was becoming an increasingly powerful force in the world despite its refusal to join the League of Nations and the strength of its isolationism. It was concerned by the growing Japanese naval power, which it saw as a threat to American interests in the Pacific. The British government hoped that the Washington conference and the agreements concluded there (the Nine-Power treaty to respect China’s territorial integrity and the Five-Power naval treaty) would somehow enable Britain to satisfy both the United States and Japan and ensure peace in East Asia. This was wishful thinking on the part of British ministers. Japan was not satisfied. Ramsay MacDonald as prime minister at the time tried to allay Japanese fears as far as possible and the strengthening of British Naval base at Singapore was held back. While British and Japanese ministers tried to pretend that the relationship had not changed fundamentally Japanese ambitions in Asia increased. At the same time there was an increasing imbalance in trade between Britain and Japan. Britain, which had been Japan’s largest supplier of both machinery and consumer goods, was of relatively little consequence after the First World War’.4 Japanese sundry goods reaching Britain were seen as cheap and shoddy. Japanese exports of cotton textiles to Asia and Africa threatened the market for British cotton textiles. Japanese competition especially after Britain left the gold standard led to demands for increased protection against unfair Japanese trading practices. Imperial Preference and other related measures provided British industry with some element of protection from Japanese competition but Britain was badly hit by the world economic depression. Trade friction was growing but did not become the main issue in Britain’s relations with Japan in the 1930s and did not reach the top of the agenda for British foreign secretaries prior to the Second World War. The British focus was on the Japanese threat to British interests in China where, as Japanese influence and power grew, British interests were increasingly squeezed. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and the establishment of the Manchukuo puppet state tested the League of Nations

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to breaking point. The British attempt to find a compromise failed as the Japanese stuck obstinately to their demands. In the light of parliamentary and public opinion British ministers felt compelled to support the League resolution criticizing the Japanese. It was surely the correct decision. Unfortunately, British ministers facing the developing threat from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were never able to devote the necessary resources to resist effectively the growing Japanese military threat to China and to British interests there. The British embassies in Peking and Tokyo were often at loggerheads. British diplomats in China became increasingly critical of the behaviour of the Japanese military and concerned about the growing threat to British interests in China. British diplomats in Tokyo especially Sir Robert Craigie, the ambassador, and his military attaché Major General F.S.G. Piggott tried to mitigate British criticism of the Japanese and to slow the slide to war. London’s attempts to maintain a balanced approach inevitably failed. As Oswald White, a British consul-general in China but a Japan specialist, said in his memoir5 British tactics fell between two stools. They ‘were either too strong or not strong enough. It scolded Japan in season and out of season for its doings in China but it merely succeeded in infuriating her.’ Britain in the years leading up to the war does not seem to have had a properly coordinated policy towards Japan. It preferred to react pragmatically to events. This often led to inconsistencies that exacerbated relations and suggested a lack of principle. Vigorous protests were rarely followed through and in some Japanese eyes Britain began to seem little more than a paper tiger. The humiliating British defeat in Singapore and Malaya and Japanese ill treatment of British prisoners of war aroused strong resentment in Britain and the image of Japan and the Japanese became toxic. As a result, in the immediate post-war years public hostility towards Japan, ministerial preoccupation with economic recovery and responding to the Soviet threat meant that Japanese issues were never a priority for ministers. They were only considered when there was a problem that could not be left to fester. … In the early post-war decades British industry and British ministers were slow to recognize that the Japanese economy was recovering quickly. The first reaction was to condemn Japanese trading practices and the use of ‘sweated labour’ and demand protection for British workers against such unfair competition. British industry found it hard to recognize that they had much to learn from the way in which Japanese industry was modernizing fast and to realize that there were significant opportunities for British trade with Japan. British industrialists pressed hard for protection and retaliation. Ministers had to take account of these pressures but recognized that protectionist measures, which went against the principles of the GATT, could not be maintained permanently and would have to be eased gradually. They also had to accept that Japanese retaliation could seriously damage British economic interests and have political repercussions. It was hoped that the revised Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1963 would open the way for a new trading relationship in due course. But British industry and British ministers had first to recognize that despite Japanese

INTRODUCTION

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adherence to mercantilist trade policies Japanese industry had changed fundamentally. This took some time but after many ministerial and industrial visits to Japan Britain began to realize that we had much to learn from Japan and that there were significant opportunities for British trade with Japan. Edward Heath as prime minister saw that there were significant opportunities for British exports. Margaret Thatcher as prime minister realized that Britain could benefit greatly from Japanese investment. Protectionist policies that were no longer compatible with British membership of the European Union were gradually lifted and the main emphasis was placed on trying to overcome Japanese non-tariff barriers. British policies towards Japan continued to be pragmatic and reactive, but planning papers prepared in the FCO and agreed with the cabinet office and other departments in Whitehall meant that Britain had finally developed a more coordinated policy towards Japan.

NOTES 1

In an article for the Japan Times which appeared on 25 August 2017 in advance of a visit to Japan by Mrs Theresa May, British prime minister, leading a British business delegation, I summarized British interests at that time in the following terms:Britain recognizes the political and economic importance of Japan and seeks closer relations and better understanding between our two countries. It is a vital British interest that peace should be maintained in Asia. Britain is worried by the threat to peace posed by North Korea and will support efforts to keep up pressure on the regime through economic sanctions and diplomatic action. Britain attaches importance to the maintenance of American guarantees to the security of Japan and the Republic of Korea. It therefore regards US-Japan security arrangements as of paramount importance, but Britain does not support military action against North Korea. Britain recognizes that there are historical issues between Japan and the Republic of Korea and welcomes all efforts to smooth Korean-Japanese relations. Britain does not recognize Chinese claims in the South China Sea and is concerned by the militarisation of islands created or claimed by China. It considers that the Senkaku issue is best ‘left on the shelf.’ Britain as a parliamentary democracy regards the maintenance of democratic institutions and the upholding of human rights and the rule of law in Japan as a sine qua non. It attaches importance to close relations between the royal and imperial families. The British recognize the valuable role that the Heisei Emperor has played in post-war reconciliation and are pleased that the Crown Prince studied at Oxford. British ministers recognize the important role of language and culture in contributing to better understanding between our two countries although they are unwilling to put increased resources into developing ‘soft power’ relations. Britain’s primary interests in Japan are economic. Britain wants to expand British exports to Japan and therefore attaches great importance to the removal of remaining trade barriers as envisaged in Prime Minister Abe’s third arrow. It welcomes steps to improve corporate governance and accounting practices in Japanese companies. It is likely to seek to expand British sales of defence equipment and access to government contracts e.g. for the Tokyo Olympics. Britain would like to promote an increase in British investment in Japan, greater technological cooperation between British and Japanese companies and more joint ventures in third countries Britain attaches particular importance to Japanese investment in manufacturing industry as well as in services and atomic power. Britain will stress its welcome for further investment and will explain British investment incentives. The City of London recognizes the valuable role played by Japanese banks and security companies.

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Britain regrets the decision by President Trump to withdraw from the TPP negotiations. Britain was an enthusiastic supporter of progress in trade negotiations between the EU and Japan and would like to see an arrangement post Brexit reflecting the advances made in these negotiations. It will look for signs that a mutually advantageous bilateral trade agreement can be concluded after Britain has left the EU and that air and other services can be maintained without interruption or hindrance. Three British envoys who are not covered in this volume, namely Sir Fred Warner, Sir Michael Wilford and Sir John Whitehead, are the subject of biographical portraits in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, volume X, Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), Renaissance Books, 2016. W.G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, Luzac, 1951, page 93. W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945, p,126, OUP, 1985. Consul in Japan, 1903–1941. Oswald White’s Memoir ‘All Ambition Spent’, edited by Hugo Read, Renaissance Books, 2017, page 205.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES —

L

ord Malmesbury (James Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury 1807–89) was the British foreign secretary in 1852 when he heard of Commodore Perry’s expedition to Japan and was content to let the Americans take the lead in re-opening Japan. He was again briefly foreign secretary in 1858 when the Treaty of Commerce with Japan was concluded by Lord Elgin, but Japan was the least of his concerns and is not mentioned in his lengthy anecdotal Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, 1884. LORD JOHN RUSSELL, (2) a leading Whig (Liberal party) politician was an elder statesman by the time he became foreign secretary in 1852, having served as prime minister from 1846–52. He became foreign secretary again from 1859–65. He was again prime minister from 1865–66. As Andrew Cobbing records Russell never had time to give his full attention to Japan. His first concern in relation to Japan was dealing with Russian ships in the context of the Crimean War, but in the early 1860s a series of incidents in Japan and the involvement of the British fleet inevitably forced him to give attention to Japan but he never really understood the issues partly because of the slowness of communications in the days before the existence of the international telegraph. Russell hoped that trade could be developed with Japan and emphasized the need for patience and restraint in responding to provocation. LORD CLARENDON (3) was another Whig aristocrat. His three stints as foreign secretary, described by Robert Morton, covered important developments in Japan. Clarendon whose policies did not differ in essentials from those adopted by Russell instructed Sir Harry Parkes, who had succeeded Sir Rutherford Alcock as minister in Japan to avoid interference in Japan and thus to remain neutral in the civil war of 1868. As Robert Morton notes ‘Clarendon was not concerned about who governed Japan; all he really cared about was trade.’ Nevertheless he felt impelled in his third period as foreign secretary to take up with the Japanese government its persecution of Japanese Christians. LORD GRANVILLE (4) also described by Andrew Cobbing, was twice foreign secretary from 1870–74 and 1880–85. He was a pragmatic and conscientious administrator who relied largely on the advice of Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister in Tokyo. It fell to him to deal with the important Iwakura Mission that visited Britain in 1872. Lords Russell, Clarendon and Granville were Whigs or Liberals as the party came to be called. LORD DERBY (5), known first as Lord Stanley, his courtesy title as heir to the Earldom, was a Tory or Conservative. Party differences however

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did not have any material effect on British policy towards Japan at this period. Robert Morton describes his first stint as foreign secretary as Lord Stanley from 1866–68 and his dealings with Japan in the last years of the Tokugawa bakufu and the Meiji Restoration. In the civil war of 1868 he tried to stick to a neutral stance. His second period of office as Lord Derby from 1874–78 recounted by Andrew Cobbing was rather different. A Japanese legation had been established in London and from 1874 it became possible to send telegrams to Japan although these were expensive. Derby became involved in the early discussions about treaty revision. LORD SALISBURY (6) served as foreign secretary from 1878–80,1885–6,1887–92 and 1895–1900. He was also prime minister from 1885 to 1886, 1886 to 1892 and 1895 to 1902. As Thomas Otte in his account of Lord Salisbury explains Salisbury dominated British foreign policy making over almost a quarter of a century. Salisbury was ‘driven by pragmatic considerations of British strategic priorities; and he regarded diplomacy as a moderating force that helped to identify and then to build on mutual interests.’ For Salisbury Japan’s significance was defined by Britain’s broader strategic interests and by the state of her relations with other Powers, principally those with Russia. He was slow to recognize Japan’s emergence as a significant political power and was reluctant to support treaty revision and the first Anglo-Japanese alliance. LORD ROSEBERY (7) described by Ian Nish was foreign secretary in 1886 and again in 1892–94, and prime minister from 1894–95. This was a Liberal Party interlude in a period dominated by the Conservatives. It fell to him and the government that he served and later led to deal with the crisis, which developed between China and Japan over Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5. In the run up to this war, which he tried to stop, it fell to him to agree to the conclusion and ratification of the revised Treaty of Commerce with Japan. It was also by the decision of his government that Britain did not join the infamous ‘triple intervention’ of 1895 that poisoned relations between Japan and the three powers – Germany, France and Russia – who had demanded changes to the Treaty of Shimonoseki that concluded the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. LORD KIMBERLEY (8) portrayed by Thomas Otte was only foreign secretary for a year from 1894–5, but it fell to him to play a leading part in Britain’s decision not to support the ‘Triple Intervention’. Brief though Kimberley’s spell at the Foreign Office was, it was crucial for Anglo-Japanese relations although his achievement, in a sense, was a negative one. ‘By not joining the triple intervention he helped to steer relations between London and Tokyo in a new direction. His – and Rosebery’s – decision to remain aloof set in train a gradual recalibration of British policy in East Asia, away from its traditional pivot of China and towards Japan’. LORD LANSDOWNE (9), also described by Thomas Otte, was foreign secretary from 1900–05. He was a Whig aristocrat who served as foreign secretary in a Tory (Conservative) led government. It was during his stint that the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded. This was ‘was the accidental product…of tentative and ultimately failed attempts to extricate Britain from her Far Eastern problems.’ His principal object in the region was to stabilize the Chinese Empire, considerably weakened by the encroaching foreign Powers and by internal disturbances.

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He also sought to contain Russian expansion in the Far East. Following the conclusion of the first alliance it fell to Lansdowne to keep Britain from being dragged into the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 and to conclude the second revised alliance with Japan. Although he was never foreign secretary we have included here Thomas Otte’s account of the work of SIR THOMAS BERTIE (10), a senior official in the Foreign Office who made a substantial contribution to the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. SIR EDWARD GREY (11), described by Ian Nish, was foreign secretary for eleven years between 1905 and 1916. Japan was never the top of his agenda but while relations remained cordial they called for constant attention. The Japan British Exhibition of 1910 in London marked a high point, but the Japanese annexation of Korea in that year raised doubts about Japan’s future direction. These doubts were reinforced by Japanese demands on China. Nevertheless Grey retained a favourable image of Japan. Grey recorded that he had found the Japanese government and its ambassadors honourable and loyal allies. ARTHUR BALFOUR (12) who had succeeded his uncle Lord Salisbury as prime minister from 1902–05 served as foreign secretary in the coalition government of Lloyd George from 1916–19. He is also portrayed in this volume by Ian Nish. Nish records that Balfour took a ‘broadly charitable view ‘ of Japan and its aspirations. He showed no sign of interest in Japanese culture and took the view that Britain should treat Japan with normal scepticism – a mixture of trust and distrust. It fell to him to deal with Japanese demands at the Versailles Peace Conference. Having been succeeded as foreign secretary by Lord Curzon it fell to him as Lord President of the Council to lead the British delegation at the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921–22 which led to the FourPower treaty between the US, Japan, Britain and France as a replacement for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Balfour’s skills as a mediator were needed in all these difficult negotiations. LORD CURZON (13), the subject of a further contribution by Ian Nish was foreign secretary from 1919–24. He was also involved with Japan as parliamentary under-secretary under Lord Salisbury from 1895 to 1898. Curzon was the first British foreign secretary to have had personal experience of Japan which he had visited twice. His book Problems of the Far East, Japan-Korea-China was published in 1894. He was fascinated by aspects of Japan but he was not starry-eyed nor a Japanophile. He was an imperialist by conviction and saw Japan in the context of British imperialist interests. RAMSAY MACDONALD (14) whose involvement with Japan is recounted by John Ferris was a liberal internationalist whose views of Japan were middle of the road. He was neither anti nor pro-Japanese. He notes that Japan mattered more to the foreign policy of MacDonald than to that of any other British foreign secretary or prime minister of the interwar years, because of its centrality to his concerns over arms limitation and international conciliation. He stopped military programmes that might alarm Japan, yet were essential to security against it. In 1924, MacDonald was right to believe Britain could hold its hand against Japan. In 1929–31, he delayed the Singapore Naval Base at a crucial moment and weakened Britain against Japan.

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AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN (15), considered with his brother Neville by Antony Best, was foreign secretary from 1924–29. Best notes that Austen Chamberlain at first spoke sympathetically about Japan’s difficulties in China but Japan’s uncompromising behavior towards China and the League of Nations eroded his sympathies. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN’s reputation is that he was an appeaser. He favoured some kind of reconciliation with Japan but there is no evidence that Neville Chamberlain was ever pro-Japanese. SIR JOHN SIMON (16) whose career is also described by Antony Best was foreign secretary from 1931–35 at the time of the Manchurian crisis. He was paralyzed in the face of complexity. His refusal to contemplate the use of sanctions against Japan has been seen as a fateful initial step on the road that led to Munich. His intellectual ability was undermined by his lack of decision and ‘his rather sickly sweetness of manner gave an impression of insincerity’ as one observer commented. LORD LYTTON (17) who was a leading figure in the Manchurian Crisis was never foreign secretary but as this was a key issue in Britain’s relations with Japan in the inter-war years we have included here Antony Best’s account of Lytton’s involvement. Lord Lytton in the report issued by the commission which he chaired aimed at a compromise to satisfy both China and Japan. While Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria should be affirmed, substantial autonomy should be given to a new regional government which would employ advisors chosen by the League and acknowledge Japan’s economic interests. In essence, what this meant was that China would be forced to accept that Japan had legitimate rights in Manchuria. This recommendation was seen as unrealistic by many observers and the Japanese aggressively rejected it. SIR SAMUEL HOARE (18), the subject of another study by Antony Best, was foreign secretary for only a few months in 1935 and is remembered as an appeaser. However, as Best points out Hoare was prepared to refer to Japan in friendly terms in public, but behind the scenes he made it clear on a number of occasions that he was not prepared to engage in trade concessions as he feared the imperial and domestic consequences of alienating the Lancashire lobby. SIR ANTHONY EDEN (19), whose career is described by Antony Best was thrice foreign secretary. His first stint was from 1935–38, his second from 1940–45 and his third from 1951–55 when he succeeded Sir Winston Churchill as prime minister from 1955–57. Best sums up his view of Japan ‘as cold at best and overtly hostile at worst’. In his first stint as foreign secretary while willing to appease Japan by trading concessions that his colleagues rejected he clearly saw Japan as the aggressor in China and believed that Britain should do what it practically could to aid China. In his second stint and in the months prior to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor he rejected the policies towards Japan advocated by Sir Robert Craigie, the then British ambassador in Tokyo, but underestimated the likelihood and impact of Japan’s entry into the Second World War. His condemnation of Japanese ill-treatment of prisoners of war was harsh. In his third stint as foreign secretary he was personally aggravated by American pressure on the Japanese not to recognize the Chinese communist regime in Beijing and his relations with John Foster Dulles who became the US Secretary of State became frosty. He accepted the need for Japanese rearmament in the context of the Cold War and accordingly for Japan to expand her trade.

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LORD HALIFAX (20), foreign secretary 1938–40, is portrayed by Antony Best. Despite his reputation as an appeaser he consistently pushed for a hard line towards Japan in the face of opposition from his fellow Cabinet ministers. Armed with a highly moral, if still pragmatic, view of world affairs, Halifax was naturally disinclined to take a sympathetic view of Japanese aggression in China. LORD HANKEY and R.A. BUTLER (21) was foreign secretary from 1963-64. His contribution to Anglo-Japanese relations at this period was limited and is briefly covered in Antony Best’s study of Home (see 25). But his stint as parliamentary under-secretary at the Foreign Office from 1938-41 was more significant. This and the involvement of Lord Hankey in relations with Japan is covered by Antony Best who discusses the issue of appeasement of Japan in the years leading up to the outbreak of war. ERNEST BEVIN (22) was foreign secretary from 1945–51. His involvement with Japan is recounted by Roger Buckley. Buckley sums up Bevin’s attitude to Japan in the following words: ’Central to his views on how Japan should be handled appears to have been, first, a determination that no other power, aside obviously from the United States, should gain a greater role than that claimed by Britain and, second, that nothing be done to damage the overriding importance of the wider Anglo-American international relationship’. He was at best partially successful. Britain’s power had been greatly weakened by the war and British influence on American policies in occupied Japan was limited. It was also complicated by the Australian factor. Bevin tried to ensure that British interests were protected the Peace Treaty concluded at San Francisco in September 1951, but he and the Attlee government did nothing to confront the public’s antipathy to post-surrender Japan and prepare the way for a new relationship. WINSTON CHURCHILL (23), portrayed by Eiji Seki, was prime minister from 1940–45 and again from 1951–55. He was never foreign minister and was never involved with the nitty gritty of British policies towards Japan, but although he never visited Japan, he maintained, according to Seki, a friendly understanding and generally compassionate attitude towards the country. He was harsh when he felt it appropriate and necessary in the cause of justice to chastise Japan’s unacceptable behaviour. He had supported the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and after the Peace Treaty with Japan had come into force he endorsed the proposal to invite the Japanese Crown Prince to attend the Queen’s coronation in 1953. He demonstrated his support for a new relationship by hosting a lunch in honour of the Crown Prince at No.10 Downing Street where he also in 1954 hosted dinner for Mr Shigeru Yoshida, the Japanese prime minister. BRITAIN AND JAPAN 1950–1990, A BRITISH PERSPECTIVE (24) by Hugh Cortazzi is a review of the factors that shaped Britain’s relations with Japan over these years. It outlines the way in which political cooperation with Japan developed despite some difficult issues. It looks at the resumption of relations between the British and Japanese monarchies culminating in an exchange of state visits. It draws attention to the important and continuing role played by cultural relations between Britain and Japan. But it emphasizes that commercial and investment issues have been key issues for both countries. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOME (25) who was twice foreign secretary from 1960–63 and 1970–74 and prime minister from 1963–64 is the subject of a study by Ant-

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ony Best. Home began the regular ministerial consultations with Japan. He recognized Japan’s growing importance in the world and the need for closer relations between Britain and Japan EDWARD HEATH (26), described by Hugh Cortazzi. was never foreign secretary, but as prime minister 1970–74 he had a significant influence on policy to wards Japan. He was the first British prime minister to visit Japan while in office. He recognized Japan growing economic power and the opportunities for British exports to the Japanese market. He called for an increase in British efforts to penetrate what was then a distant and difficult market. MARGARET THATCHER (27), also portrayed by Hugh Cortazzi, was the second British prime minister to visit Japan. She too recognized Japan’s potential and recognized that Britain and British industry could benefit significantly from Japanese investment. The ‘Iron Lady’ won Japanese respect and did much to refurbish Britain’s tarnished image in Japan. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE (28), described here by David Warren, was foreign secretary from 1983–89. Of all the foreign secretaries in the 1970s and ‘80s he was the only one who took more than a passing interest in Japan. His visit to Japan in 1988 was carefully prepared and he did what he could to develop with Japan a ‘dynamic and plain-speaking partnership’.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS —

BEST, ANTONY, (Dr) Associate Professor in International History, London School of Economics (LSE) BUCKLEY, ROGER, historian and writer, formerly Professor at the International Christian University, Tokyo COBBING, ANDREW, (Dr) Associate Professor in Japanese History University of Nottingham CORTAZZI, HUGH (Sir, GCMG) British ambassador to Japan 1980–1984, chairman Japan Society 1985–95 FERRIS, JOHN.R, (Dr) Professor in the Department of History University of Calgary, Canada MORTON, ROBERT, Professor at Chuo University, Tokyo and former president of the Asiatic Society of Japan NISH, IAN (CBE, Dr), Emeritus Professor of International History at the London School of Economics (LSE) OTTE, THOMAS, (Dr) Professor of Diplomatic History, University of East Anglia (UEA) SEKI, EIJI, former Japanese ambassador and historian WARREN, DAVID (Sir, KCMG), British ambassador to Japan 2008–2012, chairman of the trustees of the Japan Society 2012–2018

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JAPANESE NAMES Japanese names are given in the Japanese order with family name first except where the Western order with given name first has been used by authors of books or where the individual has become generally known by his/her name in the Western order. Long vowels have been marked with a macron, except for common words such as daimyo, and place names such as Tokyo, which have entered the English language. xxv

1

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, 1852–2017: An Overview ANTONY BEST

Antony Best

F

rom the middle of the nineteenth century until today one of the myriad issues that has regularly crossed the desk of the secretary of state for foreign affairs is how to handle British relations with Japan. This relationship has taken on many facets; it has sometimes been close, most notably in the years of the Anglo-Japanese alliance between 1902 and 1922, but it has also had periods of hostility, reaching its peak during the Pacific War and its bitter aftermath. Sometimes, in its moments of high drama, it has warranted constant ministerial attention, but there have also been periods when its management has been left to the permanent officials in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and the legation/ embassy in Tokyo and has rarely reached the foreign secretary’s red box. It is also a relationship in which the key issues have changed over the years. Often it has been primarily a commercial relationship but there have also been periods in which it has taken on great strategic significance. This then is a relationship that has ebbed and flowed over the past century and a half perhaps to a greater degree than most. In providing an overview to a volume which looks at how British foreign secretaries have interacted with the Japanese government over a period of one hundred and seventy years, it is important before surveying the chronology of events to make some general remarks about the constant and the variable factors in the Anglo-Japanese relationship, as observations about the broad context can help to make sense of the story. Some of the comments that follow may seem obvious, but that very fact is why they tend to be overlooked. The first thing to point out is that the varied nature of Anglo-Japanese relations is a simple reflection of geography; after all, the home islands of these two countries are very far apart. In the age of high imperialism this aspect was mitigated by the fact that Britain possessed Asian colonies and had extensive trading interests in China. At this point, Britain’s territorial stake in Asia clearly meant that the question of whether Japan was a friend or an enemy had considerable significance; although even then, it should be noted, that it was never easy to extend British power as far as the West Pacific. With the waning of the British 1

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Empire after 1945 the very different geographical settings of the two countries naturally had a distancing effect; the strategic aspect of the relationship now largely died away, leaving commerce as the most important connection. Geography has, though, not just been important in dictating the degree to which the two countries have needed to interact. The great distance between their respective home islands has also meant that for both countries there have always been bilateral relationships of equal or even greater importance within their own regions of the world. For any student of Anglo-Japanese relations, it is essential to understand that for British statesmen the relationship with the European Great Powers and in the twentieth century with the United States was always more significant than that with Japan. It is also telling in this context that the two periods in which Japanese expansion caused Britain great anxiety short of hostilities, the Great War and the 1930s, coincided with major tensions within Europe. Europe’s misfortune was always Japan’s opportunity. Lastly in terms of geography, it is worth reflecting on some similarities between the two countries that have affected their interaction. It is, of course, important that both countries were island states, for this has helped to dictate their respective national trajectories. In particular, it has meant that both countries have lacked sufficient domestic natural resources to sustain a modern economy. Accordingly, in the most general terms both have needed to sell goods abroad in order to purchase crucial imports; in other words they have needed to export to survive. This, in turn, has led to a history of economic interaction and sometimes competition that has exercised considerable influence on Anglo-Japanese relations and taken much diplomatic skill to finesse. It is also important to note the changes that have taken place in the relative prominence of the two countries in international politics. At the dawn of their modern relationship, Britain was arguably the only world power while Japan was only just emerging from two centuries of virtual isolation. Since then their fortunes have changed greatly. Britain in the twentieth century entered into a period of relative decline until it became just one of a number of medium-ranked European countries in global affairs, while Japan flourished after the disaster of the Pacific War and became by the 1970s the third largest economic power in the world. Naturally this has had a marked effect on Anglo-Japanese relations; Britain has now become the supplicant when once it was the master. Another source of variation has been the individual character of the British foreign secretaries and their relations with other key players within Whitehall. Those in the post of foreign secretary have naturally varied in how they have handled relations with Japan; some have had little interest in the country, while others have been keen to cultivate the relationship for a variety of motives. Before the age of the jet-plane, only one of their number, Lord Curzon, had any direct experience of the country or of East Asia more generally and it was not until 1962 that a serving foreign secretary made a visit to Japan. Thus the only Japanese individuals with whom they came into regular contact were members of the cosmopolitan elite who were not always representative of their country’s ambitions. In addition, the foreign secretaries have had to interact with a variety of prime ministers. Some of the latter, such as Arthur Balfour, have been active players who have been keen to force the pace in Anglo-Japanese relations; indeed Ramsay MacDonald, Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher are prominent enough to warrant their own chapters in this book that is otherwise dedicated to foreign secretaries. Others, such as William

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Gladstone, Stanley Baldwin and Harold Wilson, have clearly been content to give their foreign secretaries virtually free rein. In regard to other government departments, the range of important contacts has changed over time. In the age of high imperialism, the Foreign Office’s most important liaison work was with the Admiralty and the War Office. But then from the 1920s onwards, as Japan began to compete more directly with British commerce in Asia, both the Treasury and the Board of Trade began to challenge the Foreign Office’s primacy, arguably with unfortunate consequences. This process then continued into the post-war era as these two departments of state sought to focus policy on Britain’s economic and financial recovery, thus resisting the Foreign Office’s attempt to stress the primacy of the Cold War. Another important constraint on the foreign secretary’s freedom of manoeuvre is public opinion. To a greater degree than his officials, the foreign secretary has had to be aware of what the public is willing to accept and what would be the political cost of any openings towards Japan that might be unpopular. In this respect the foreign secretary has had to be sensitive about the domestic implications of major policy initiatives. In the case of Japan, this has sometimes been an important consideration, particularly in the troubled years after the Pacific War when the public was notably averse towards any conciliatory gestures towards the Japanese. If this were not enough, the foreign secretary has had also had to bear in mind the imperial and international implications of British policy. Initially in the mid-nineteenth century this was not a major problem as Britain was the predominant Western power in the region, but over time, as France, Germany and Russia began to project their power into the region, policy had to be weighed in terms of its possible effect on the European balance of power. Then from the 1900s onwards, Britain was faced with another knotty dimension to its interactions with Tokyo, namely its consequences for relations with the other major Pacific power, the United States. With the latter becoming ever more prominent in world affairs, the need to consider Washington’s priorities inevitably became a constant factor in British thinking. Making foreign policy towards Japan has therefore never been a straightforward matter. The foreign secretaries under review in this volume have had to deal with a broad range of issues from high strategy to the minutiae of commercial policy but always with one eye firmly kept on the various strategic, political and economic constraints on the Foreign Office’s freedom of movement. In other words, this is not a simple bilateral relationship.

THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS Anglo-Japanese relations in the modern era began in the 1850s following the American opening of Japan. At this point, Japan did not figure greatly in Britain’s view of the world. The former’s emergence from isolation merely offered the prospect of trade with another Asian country. It is telling in this context that when Britain negotiated its first commercial treaty with Japan in 1858 it only did so as part of Lord Elgin’s broader mission to put relations with China on a more stable and advantageous footing. Moreover, the treaty itself was only the latest in a series of unequal treaties that the European states had imposed on countries in Asia; their chief attributes being the creation of treaty ports, the denial of tariff autonomy and the introduction of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

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The signing of the 1858 treaty led in the following year to the arrival of the first permanent British representative to Japan, Rutherford Alcock, who was a member of the consular service in China rather than one of the career diplomats who served in the European capitals. Alcock’s job was to oversee the implementation of the commercial treaty in the hope that regular profitable trade would follow. This aspiration soon ran into difficulties because of the fervent opposition of some of the Japanese feudal fiefdoms to the opening of their country and their challenge to the authority of the Tokugawa shogunate. In 1862 this unrest led to the first serious crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations. Japanese resentment of the West manifested itself in two episodes that had a direct bearing on British interests; first, the murder by samurai from Satsuma of a British merchant, Charles Richardson, and, second, the closure of the Straits of Shi– shu – domain. These events presented the British monoseki at the hands of the Cho government with a dilemma; should it accept Japan’s return to isolation or use armed force to impel the country to live up to its treaty obligations? The first of these options would clearly be a humiliation, but, despite the reputation of this period as one of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, the second was also problematical. In the late 1850s and early 1860s the Palmerston administration’s use of force to coerce the Qing Empire had proved unpopular among radicals and conservatives on the grounds of both cost and morality. Awareness of this popular revulsion forced Palmerston and his foreign secretary, Earl Russell, to ensure that any use of force was commensurate to the nature of the provocation. However, even this led to problems, for, in the age before the telegraph reached East Asia, Britain’s local officials naturally had a good deal of autonomy. The first British response to Japanese provocation came in August 1863 with the Royal Navy’s destruction of the Satsuma port and capital of Kagoshima. While this event helped to convince the Satsuma elite that the West could not be evicted, it proved to be an embarrassment to Palmerston’s government for the Royal Navy was accused both in the press and in parliament of deliberately torching a virtually unprotected Japanese town. The result was that in 1864, – shu –, the when Alcock informed Russell that he intended to use force against Cho foreign secretary ordered the former to act with greater circumspection. Distance, however, negated this message. By the time Russell’s instructions arrived in Japan a British squadron, along with its French, Dutch and American counterparts, had – shu – ’s forts.1 already destroyed Cho – shu – ’s defeat at Western hands changed the dynamic of Japanese politics. Cho From 1864 onwards, the focus was no longer on Japan’s evicting the West but rather on what form of government the country should adopt in order to maintain its integrity. Both the shogunate and its domain rivals were keen to cultivate foreign support for their respective causes and this has led to a persistent historical myth about the role that Britain played in the events that led up to the Meiji restoration of 1868. The argument in short is that the British government, or at – shu – as forces for the least its representatives in Japan, recognized Satsuma and Cho modernization and backed them in their challenge to the shogun’s authority.2 There is, though, little evidence to support this interpretation of events. As far as London was concerned, it had no wish to see political instability in Japan for this would only endanger trade and it naturally felt that it had obligations to the shogunate as its original diplomatic partner. Accordingly, the instructions that Russell sent out in 1865 to the new minister in Japan, Sir Harry Parkes, stipulated that the latter should steer clear of intervention in Japan’s domestic affairs.3 Parkes duly adhered to his orders and focussed his efforts on maximizing British trade.

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In 1866 he successfully negotiated a new tariff regime with the shogunate and gained a promise that the long-delayed opening of Hyogo (Kobe) and Osaka to foreign trade would take place in 1868. However, it is possible that some of Parkes’s juniors may on their own initiative have over-stepped the mark in their inter– shu – , thus helping to create a misleading impression action with Satsuma and Cho 4 of British sympathy. When the Meiji restoration took place in 1868 the new regime was desperate for international recognition and this allowed Parkes to name his price. He duly used this opportunity to enforce the establishment of relations with Japan in line with the European model of diplomacy. He insisted that the new regime live up to its inherited treaty obligations and demanded an audience with the Japanese emperor that was in line with Western protocol.5 A decade of instability in Japan thus finally came to an end with relations at last on a stable basis. The Meiji elite that took power in 1868 was determined to modernize the country as rapidly as possible and across the entire spectrum of state activity. In order to achieve its ambitious goals, it had to turn to the West for advice. For the next quarter of a century one of the roles of British diplomacy was to assist this process in the form of facilitating the employment of foreign advisers (oyatoi) and in providing instruction in the rules and rituals of European diplomatic intercourse. Subsequently, this has led to this period being defined as constituting a ‘teacher-pupil’ relationship. It is possible, though, to take this analogy too far, for it is doubtful that Britain ever saw its relations with Japan in these terms. It is important to note here that one must not be beguiled by later events into thinking that Whitehall always saw Japan as the most significant country in East Asia. During the years up to 1895 China always loomed larger as a potential partner for the future. Even the fact that Japan was more interested in Western-style reform did not necessarily endear it to British observers, for some felt that it was moving too fast and mistaking surface for substance. Indeed, in the 1870s the Conservative Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, argued that the Qing court’s programme of incremental reforms was preferable to the headlong modernization of the Japanese as it was more likely to endure.6 The scepticism that marked British attitudes towards Japan was most evident in the field of treaty revision. In 1872, having already made overtures to the United States, a Japanese diplomatic mission led by Iwakura Tomomi arrived in London with the aim of opening talks about replacing the treaty of 1858, which had infringed Japanese sovereignty, with one negotiated on the basis of equality. Iwakura was to be bitterly disappointed, for the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, informed him that Britain’s policy over extraterritoriality was to ‘yield the local authorities jurisdiction … in precise proportion to their advancement in enlightenment and civilization’.7 In other words, treaty revision was to be a long-term process that would only yield successful results once Japan had thoroughly revised its legal system. For the next twenty years treaty revision continued to be the main issue in Anglo-Japanese relations. At first, Britain’s attitude was unbending, but once Parkes was transferred to Beijing in 1883, the Foreign Office began to take a more liberal stance. In part this reflected the relative success of Japanese reforms, but it was also the result of a sense that the treaty ports acted as bottleneck to commerce and that greater levels of trade would follow once British merchants had unconstrained access to the interior. In 1887 the treaty powers almost reached agreement with Japan on a new treaty that would have established mixed courts as a

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means of overcoming the extraterritoriality issue. This, though, finally proved unacceptable to the Japanese Cabinet as it still involved infringement of national sovereignty. Japan therefore held out for better terms and eventually received them after secret talks with Britain ended in July 1894 with the signing of a new Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. This new agreement promised an end to the treaty ports and all extraterritorial privileges in 1899 and complete tariff autonomy in 1911. The Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1894 can be taken as a turning point in relations between the two countries. To put this in context, it is important to observe that Japan was the first of the Asian states to overturn the treaty-port system; Turkey only freed itself from the ‘capitulations’ in 1923, to be followed by Thailand from 1926, Iran in 1928 and China in 1943. That Japan was so far ahead is, of course, a testament to the thoroughness of its legal reforms. However, it is also more than that. Britain’s decision to agree to a new treaty was not solely due to the certainty that its nationals would now receive a fair trial; it was also a reflection of the fact that if Japan had decided to abrogate the old treaty unilaterally Britain no longer had any easy means of coercing it back into line and that it was not worth fighting a war over the issue. In other words, Japan was now sufficiently strong to exercise full sovereignty. It did not take long for material proof of this judgement to emerge. In August 1894 the first Sino-Japanese War broke out over Korea. At first the expectation in London was that this would be a relatively minor conflict in which China would eventually prevail and that the only issue at stake was ensuring that the hostilities did not disturb European trade. Japan’s success on land and at sea rapidly demonstrated the bankruptcy of this sanguine interpretation, but it was not until the spring of 1895 that the Liberal government of Lord Rosebery had to turn its full attention to events in the east. The problem emerged when some of the European Great Powers, Russia, France and Germany, reacted adversely to the peace treaty between Japan and China which saw the former gain control of the Liaodong peninsula in south Manchuria. In order to coerce Japan, the three powers called on Britain to cooperate with them. This marked the first occasion when the issue of how to handle Japan became an issue of real contention in international politics. The decision taken by Rosebery and his foreign secretary, Lord Kimberley, was that Britain should remain neutral; refusing either to join the ‘Triple Intervention’ or to provide Japan with diplomatic support. As Ian Nish and T.G. Otte outline in this book, there were many reasons for this stance. First and foremost, Britain itself had little problem with the terms that Japan had imposed on China. These appeared proportionate to the scale of the Japanese victory and did not threaten any British interests. In addition, both ministers felt that Japan now represented the future in East Asia and that there was little point in alienating this rising power. The only reason for Britain to act therefore was to avoid isolation from its European counterparts. But, if Britain did act it would be putting itself on the front line against Japan as it maintained the largest naval force in East Asian waters. There were also domestic considerations at play. The Liberal government was weak and a significant faction opposed foreign intervention on both moral and financial grounds. Rosebery’s room for manoeuvre was thus strictly limited.8 In the wake of the crisis, Kimberley let it be known to the incoming British minister to Tokyo, Ernest Satow, that he felt that Britain should improve its ties with Japan. It is therefore tempting to argue that the conclusion of the

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first Sino-Japanese War marked the moment at which the two countries began the process that would end in the alliance. Such an argument should, though, be resisted. When Satow wrote in the autumn of 1895 to Kimberley’s Conservative successor at the Foreign Office, Lord Salisbury, for updated instructions, he received a reply that put a dampener on his expectations, for the latter noted dryly, ‘My impression is that our strategic military interest in Japan can easily be overestimated. She may no doubt be of use in hindering Russia from getting an ice-free port. But how long would her obstruction be effective?’9 As far as Salisbury was concerned the chief issue at stake in relations with Japan was still trade not strategy. Salisbury, who was also Prime Minister, continued to follow much the same line for the rest of his time at the Foreign Office. As T.G. Otte observes in this volume, although Salisbury was concerned about Russian ambitions in Manchuria, particularly after the former obtained a lease over the south Manchurian ports of Port Arthur and Dairen in 1898, he preferred negotiating with the European powers to solve the problem. This meant either reaching a modus vivendi with Russia or persuading Germany to cooperate in applying pressure on the government in St Petersburg. However, in 1900 the situation in China entered a time of flux with the outbreak of the Boxer rebellion. Pre-occupied with the war in South Africa, Britain could only send a small force to assist with the international expedition to relieve the Boxer siege of the legations in Beijing. It therefore had to rely on the other powers. This episode served to confirm its fears of Russia, which took advantage of the situation to occupy Manchuria and demand economic concessions from China as the price of withdrawal, and to increase admiration for Japan, whose troops were a model of discipline.10 Salisbury, however, continued to put the onus on European diplomacy and his last diplomatic effort to constrain Russia still rested on the German card. Germany, though, was playing for high stakes. It was only prepared to help Britain resist Russian expansion in Manchuria if the British government was ready to join the Triple Alliance in Europe and thus tilt the strategic balance towards the Berlin-Vienna axis. Both Salisbury and his successor at the Foreign Office from November 1900, Lord Lansdowne, were not prepared to pay this price. As Otte explains in this volume, they could, however, envisage making a regional agreement with Japan. There were excellent reasons for taking such an initiative. Japan too was unutterably opposed to Russian expansion in Manchuria, for it feared that the latter’s ambitions would soon turn to Korea. Moreover, it had ever since 1895 been preparing for a military and naval confrontation with Russia and the Boxer crisis had revealed that its armed forces had gained European levels of efficiency. Japan was therefore a logical ally in terms of both policy and capabilities. There was, however, more to the alliance than just compatibility. For Britain, the growing tensions in East Asia contained great dangers. If Japan went to war outside of an alliance framework it raised the risk that such a conflict might see France come to the aid of its Russian ally, meaning that Britain could only help Japan at the cost of triggering a global conflagration. There was also the possibility that without the security of an alliance, Japan might feel it had no choice but to cut a compromise settlement with St Petersburg. An alliance therefore had the advantage of creating a greater sense of predictability and control. The precise terms that were agreed in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 1902 stipulated that each signatory would remain neutral if either became involved in a war in East Asia with one other state. If, however, either signatory found itself in a conflict with two or more states then the other ally would come to its aid. On the face

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of it, this might appear to have the intention of pushing Japan towards war. In reality, the goal was different; it was designed primarily to compel Russia to withdraw from Manchuria in the knowledge that if it failed to do so, it might have to fight a war against Japan without any French help.11 For Britain the alliance was a limited commitment that made eminent diplomatic sense. It did not, though, receive universal approval. Within the Cabinet some of Lansdowne’s colleagues were clearly less than enamoured with a treaty that on the surface was more beneficial to Japanese than British interests and a few, including the First Lord of the Treasury, Arthur Balfour, still hankered after an arrangement with Germany. Meanwhile among the Liberal party there was a tradition of supporting Russia due to the latter’s protection of Christians in the Balkans.12 These criticisms were relatively muted, though, for initially it appeared that this new venture had worked; in April 1902 Russia announced that it was beginning a phased withdrawal from Manchuria. Although the logic behind the signing of the alliance was largely strategic, it also led to the blossoming of other aspects of the relationship as well. One new area of activity was the relations between the respective royal courts of the two countries as this constituted a useful symbolic means of underlining the new close ties that had been established.13 Another new development came in the world of finance. Japan was now interested in raising capital in the City of London and in September 1902 Lansdowne duly indicated to Lord Revelstoke, the head of Baring Brothers, that he was willing to put his faith in Japan’s word and efficiency.14 Japan’s first major loan followed in October. It is important to stress, though, that these closer ties did not yet mean that this had become a relationship between equals. Britain was clearly still the senior partner.

YEARS OF ALLIANCE Despite the hopeful signs in 1902 that the alliance would have its desired effect on Russia, this promise soon receded. In April 1903 the Tsarist regime reneged on its commitment to withdraw its troops from Manchuria and the region returned to the uneasy balance that had existed in 1901. Some in Japan, – Hirobumi, were now tempted to cut a most notably the elder statesman, Ito compromise deal with Russia, but when asked for his opinion Lansdowne made it clear to the Japanese government that if Japan agreed to any treaty that compromised the ‘open door’ in China, then Britain would be freed from its alliance obligations.15 Japan’s room for manoeuvre in its negotiations with St Petersburg was thus strictly limited. Making the situation even more difficult was that the Tsar’s government was ill-disposed towards compromise. It was divided within itself and failed to take the Japanese military seriously. The result was that by the end of 1903 the talks had achieved nothing and war appeared to be imminent.16 Britain had, though, prepared itself for this eventuality. If a bilateral war broke out, its policy under the terms of the alliance was simple; it was to be neutral. It was only committed to action if France were foolish enough to provide direct support to its ally, and as Paris rightly feared a war with Britain this was not likely to happen. War is, though, an agent of instability and some in the Cabinet, including Lansdowne, were deeply uncomfortable with the course of events. Ironically it was the prime minister, Arthur Balfour, who in 1902 had expressed doubts about the terms of the alliance, who maintained his cool. He assured his colleagues that the alliance meant that if war did break out its effects could be

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contained. Accordingly, he warned against Britain’s offering any kind of mediation in order to ensure peace, as such a move would only alienate Japan at its hour of need. Britain thus remained on the side-lines and when war finally broke out in February 1904 it quickly declared its neutrality.17 Balfour’s reading of the situation proved to be correct. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 did not drag in other combatants, but instead remained purely bilateral. Moreover, Japan did better than forecast. Its navy was quickly able to dominate the waters around Korea and the Bohai Gulf and thus provide secure lines of communication for its continental army. The latter fought a series of successful if bloody campaigns against the Russians culminating in the Battle of Mukden in March 1905. Japan’s victory was finally sealed at the end of May 1905 when its navy destroyed the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima, thus thwarting Russia’s last attempt to turn the tide of the war. Undermined by unrest at home, in September 1905 Russia was forced to sign a peace treaty at Portsmouth, New Hampshire in which it transferred its south Manchurian lease and control over the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan. During the war the British government remained strictly neutral in the eyes of the world. It refused to provide Japan with a government-backed loan and rebuffed all American and European calls to put pressure on the Japanese to make peace. Behind the scenes, however, it did help Japan’s cause. Unsurprisingly, one area of activity was intelligence collaboration, although the degree of collaboration is not entirely clear.18 It also acted to ensure that the naval balance of power favoured Japan by purchasing for the Royal Navy two British-built cruisers that suddenly came on to the international market in late 1903, thus denying them to the Russians.19 In addition, while the government itself was loath to give financial support to Japan, it did nothing to prevent the Japanese financial representative in London, Takahashi Korekiyo, from negotiating a series of loans with the City of London and Wall Street. Indeed, in May 1904 Lansdowne privately indicated his approval of this business by informing Revelstoke of Barings, the merchant bankers, that he had discussed with Balfour the ‘admirable arrangement which you mentioned to me this morning’.20 Japan’s victory over Russia was a source of great satisfaction for Britain; without having had to fire a shot itself, the threat to its interests in East Asia was now lifted. The only potential danger was that Russia might launch a war of revenge either in East or Central Asia. In order to contain that menace, the Balfour government began from the late spring of 1905 to negotiate a new alliance arrangement with Japan which stipulated that an attack on one signatory would immediately involve the other; this now committed Japan to act if India were attacked. This new alliance was signed in August 1905 but was kept secret until the Treaty of Portsmouth had been concluded. Britain’s new relationship with its ally did not end there, for in a sign of its appreciation it now formally recognized Japan as a Great Power by raising its legation in Tokyo to an embassy and bestowed its highest honour, the Order of the Garter, on Emperor Meiji.21 While the new alliance was directed against Russia, from the British perspective it quickly took on a new and even more important purpose. With Japan now the dominant naval power in East Asian waters, the alliance allowed Britain to withdraw its capital ships from the China station in order to concentrate on containing the growing German naval threat in the North Sea. In other words, the alliance with Japan evolved into a crucial lynchpin in British maritime imperial defence. This was an important development, for events in East Asia in the late 1900s and early 1910s raised serious questions about the alliance’s efficacy. It had

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originally been signed to protect the ‘open door’ in China from Russian efforts to turn Manchuria into a protectorate. Indeed, Japan had publicly declared this to be a war aim in its struggle with Russia.22 However, once Japan inherited the Russian lease in south Manchuria it too began to seek extra privileges for itself and forbade other powers from gaining a foothold. Its behaviour duly aggravated the British merchant community in China, which lobbied the British government to protect its interests. Lansdowne’s Liberal successor as foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was not, though, predisposed to protest to Tokyo, for Japan’s contribution to imperial defence far out-weighed any damage it was doing to Britain’s economic prospects in Manchuria.23 The only problem that did require finessing was that Japan’s new policy created problems for its relations with the United States, where a powerful lobby was intent on investment in Manchuria. Added to this was that the issue of Japanese immigration had begun to breed resentment on the West Coast. As the alliance stood, Britain was committed to come to Japan’s aid in the case of an American-Japanese conflict. In 1911 Grey worked to remove this danger by negotiating a third version of the alliance which stated that a signatory would not be required to protect its ally if the former had an arbitration treaty with the potential enemy; Britain was at that time negotiating just such an arrangement with Washington.24 Grey’s faith in the value of the alliance paid dividends in 1914 with the opening of the First World War. Japan’s dominance in East Asian waters meant that once it decided to enter the war on Britain’s side it was able within a few months to destroy the German naval and military presence in the region and contribute to ousting Germany from the Pacific Ocean. After this initial contribution to the war, Japan settled into a lower profile routine in 1915–16 during which time it helped to protect British convoys in the Indian Ocean and provided much-needed munitions to Russia. In 1917 Germany’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare forced Britain to ask for further help in the form of Japanese destroyers undertaking convoy duty in the Mediterranean. Japan complied with this request, but naturally demanded a quid pro quo, namely Entente support for Japan’s gaining control of the former German lease over Jiaozhou in China and its Pacific island colonies north of the equator. In desperate need of Japanese support, the Foreign Office, which was now led by Balfour, had no choice but to agree.25 Japan’s help was not, though, restricted to the naval sphere. With its economy booming as a result of the war, Japan for the first time became a creditor nation and, accordingly, was able to provide Britain with a number of loans that allowed the Treasury to gain more of that most precious of resources, American dollars. 26 On the face of it, the alliance was working well, but under the surface serious tensions were arising. The Japanese claim to Jiaozhou was symptomatic of the problem, for it marked but one element in Japan’s campaign to use the war in Europe as a means to expand its influence in China. These efforts reached a peak in 1915 when it presented the Chinese government with the Twenty-One Demands, a package that was intended to turn China into a virtual Japanese protectorate. In the end, Japan withdrew its most harmful desiderata as a result of international and domestic pressure, but the episode left a bitter aftertaste. Then in the autumn of 1915 Japan vetoed Chinese entry into the war and began to undermine the position of the central government in Beijing by backing its opponents in the south. Worse still, the media in Japan began to argue that it had backed the wrong side in the war, while the pan-Asian lobby started to reach out to Indian revolutionaries.27

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Unsurprisingly, many British diplomats in East Asia and in the Foreign Office reacted to this series of events by arguing that the alliance had run its course and that there would have to be some kind of reckoning with Japan once Germany had been defeated. Balfour, as ever, maintained his cool and concentrated on the task in hand. He was careful to maintain that Japan should be judged by the actions of its government alone and not by those of free agents such as the media and the pan-Asianists. As Nish makes clear in this book, Balfour was a realist to his fingertips, and thus felt that it was only natural that Japan should pursue its own interests. As long as it did not actively undermine the war effort, everything could be forgiven.28 The Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, took much the same view. In 1921 he placed Japan’s wartime activities in context by observing to the Cabinet that the behaviour of some of Britain’s other allies had been ‘infinitely worse than anything which had been done by the Japanese’.29 Accordingly, at the Paris Peace Conference Britain remained committed to the idea that Germany’s possessions at Jiaozhou and in the north Pacific should pass into Japanese hands, and after some prevarication President Woodrow Wilson of the United States agreed to this arrangement. But the peace conference was not all smooth running. Japan’s reaction to Wilson’s lobbying for the creation of the League of Nations was to demand that the organization’s founding document, the Covenant, should include a commitment to racial equality. For Britain itself this was not a problem, but the Australian Prime Minister, William Hughes, saw this initiative as a stalking horse designed in the long term to prohibit the British Dominions from restricting Japanese immigration. He therefore successfully insisted that the Japanese demand had to be rejected.30 Britain was therefore involved in the awkward task of defeating one of its ally’s main aims at the conference. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance at the end of the First World War was thus battered but still intact. The question now was whether it had any future. It faced a number of problems, including the fact that its raison d’être had disappeared; Germany was defeated and Russia had collapsed into civil war. There was only one power which could now threaten British interests in the east and that ironically was Japan. In addition, the feeling existed after the First World War that alliances were a dangerous anachronism that had actually helped to spark that dreadful conflict. Another difficulty, as Britain discovered at its Imperial Conference of 1921, was that the Dominions were bitterly divided over the alliance. Australia and New Zealand believed that it needed to be extended as a means of containing Japan’s ambitions, while Canada and to a lesser degree South Africa feared that this would offend the United States and thus cause serious damage to imperial interests.31 In order to finesse this damaging stalemate, Britain came up with an ingenious compromise solution; it would suggest to the United States that it should become a party to a watered-down alliance. This proposal was made to the American government in the opening days of a conference that was convened in Washington in November 1921 to find solutions to a number of East Asian problems, including the burgeoning naval race between the United States and Japan. The American response was to dilute the alliance agreement even further and to insist on French membership. Britain and Japan duly agreed to these terms with the result that the alliance was replaced in December 1921 by a new Four-Power Pact that only committed its signatories to consult should there be any threat to the status quo in the Pacific.32 In retrospect, many observers in Britain and Japan were critical of the decision to throw away the substance of the alliance for the shadow of the pact. It

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is important to note, though, that criticism was fairly muted at the time. When Britain’s chief representative, Arthur Balfour, returned to London from the Washington Conference in the late winter of 1922 he was given an enthusiastic welcome and lauded for his diplomatic skill. The alliance had, after all, been given a decent burial without unduly offending either Japan or the United States – a result that could not have been easily predicted beforehand. In addition, the pact came as part of a larger package of agreements that had been concluded at Washington, including the Nine-Power Treaty to respect China’s territorial integrity and uphold the ‘open door’ and the Five-Power Treaty which created a ratio mechanism to limit naval armaments; thus what came to be known as the Washington Order appeared to offer a new era of peace and cooperation to East Asia.33

DESCENT TO WAR In the wake of the Washington conference, the governments in London and Tokyo continued to nurture their mutual relationship by arguing that, although the formal alliance was now over, its ‘spirit’ lingered on. One aspect of this was that the foreign secretary continued to cultivate the royal ties between the two countries. In 1922 the Prince of Wales visited Japan and his brother Prince George made two short trips to the country when he became a naval officer on the China station in the mid-1920s. This series of visits was capped off in 1929 when Prince Henry, the Duke of Gloucester, came to Japan to bestow the Order of the Garter on Emperor Hirohito.34 In addition, Britain responded generously to the earthquake disaster that wrecked Yokohama and Tokyo in September 1923. A committee established under the auspices of the British Academy arranged for the purchase of books to replenish the library of Tokyo Imperial University which had been destroyed. These cosmetic gestures could not, though, paper over the fact that British and Japanese interests were steadily moving apart. The crux of the matter was that the two countries had very different perspectives on the future of China. This became an issue of central importance in the 1920s due to the rise of a new assertive Chinese nationalism that culminated in 1928 with the establishment of the Guomindang government in Nanjing. As far as Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Conservative foreign secretary from 1925–29, was concerned, the problem in essence was that, ‘Our interest would best be served by a strong, stable, united China. Japan does not wish to see China either united or strong.’35 This meant not only that there was little ground left for real cooperation, but also that the potential existed for a serious divergence. The likely cause of a Sino-Japanese clash was easy to identify – south Manchuria. Since Japan had taken over the Russian lease in this region in 1905, this region had turned into an economic powerhouse, most notably in the form of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), which not only ran the track itself but also controlled the world’s largest open-cast coalmine as well as other industrial concerns. South Manchuria was thus a crucial extension of the Japanese economy. In addition, the leased territory provided a vital security buffer for the Japanese colony of Korea. Japan was therefore naturally opposed to returning the lease, but equally the Guomindang’s mission could not be considered complete until all of China, including Manchuria, had fallen under its sway. The two countries were therefore on a collision course.

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The collision occurred on 18 September 1931 when elements of the Japanese army in south Manchuria attacked Chinese positions in Shenyang [Mukden] on the invented pretext that the latter had deliberately damaged the SMR. China responded to this crisis by appealing to the League of Nations for help. As Britain was one of the leading members of the League, it had no choice but to try to help settle this faraway incident that had little direct bearing on its interests in the region. For Britain, the crisis could not have come at a worse time, for the newly formed National Government under Ramsay MacDonald was primarily concerned with stabilizing the economy after the Great Depression had forced it to end sterling’s convertibility into gold. With no money to spare for defence and no desire to see economic sanctions introduced, the government, which had some sympathy for Japan, was averse to taking any coercive action under the League’s auspices. But at the same time, it perceived the League to be a vital pillar of European security which had to be upheld in what constituted its first real test. Caught between these incompatible goals, the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, tried to manoeuvre the two belligerents towards some kind of compromise peace, meaning that Britain would be liberated from having to choose between the League and its former ally. This was a forlorn hope, for Japan refused to compromise and instead moved forward with its own scheme to turn Manchuria into the purportedly independent state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) Simon’s efforts to square the circle thus came to naught. Finally in February 1933 Britain, along with the vast majority of League members, voted to adopt a report criticizing Japan’s action. The Japanese response was to leave the League.36 Manchuria was not, though, the only issue to arise that poisoned Anglo-Japanese relations. The depression itself played its part. In late 1931 Japan followed Britain’s lead in decoupling its currency from gold. The result was that cotton textile goods and other light industrial products suddenly became much cheaper and it was rapidly able to expand its exports, particularly to Asia and Africa. This export drive brought Japan into direct competition with British cotton textile goods from Lancashire. For economic and domestic political reasons, the National Government could not afford to ignore Lancashire’s plight and in 1933–34 it brought into being a number of protectionist measures to contain the Japanese menace.37 Britain’s failure to back Japan over Manchuria and its retaliation in the economic arena ended any talk of the ‘spirit’ of the alliance, but the question now was whether relations could or should be repaired. The debate over this issue led to profound disagreement within Whitehall. The Foreign Office felt that the best line of approach was to pursue a cautious policy of keeping in with both Japan and China in the hope that eventually the regional tensions would abate. Other ministries felt this was far too passive. The Treasury, under Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain, was convinced that Britain could not deal with two enemies simultaneously and therefore, with the Nazi threat now emerging in Europe, Britain had to appease Japan by cutting a new deal over naval arms limitation and accepting the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. The service departments, in turn, also believed that Japan should be bought off, but their favoured solution was economic appeasement. The talk in Whitehall of making concessions to Tokyo has led some historians, particularly in Japan, to argue that Britain followed a policy of appeasement in the 1930s, but it is important to distinguish between what was discussed and what actions were actually taken.38 The reality is that Britain made relatively few concessions to Japan. One reason for this was that there was no coherence

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to British policy. Each department of state argued that the compromise necessary to achieve a rapprochement with Japan should be made not in its own area of responsibility but in that of one of its rivals, meaning that the appeasers cancelled each other out. In these circumstances, despite the powerful challenge to its authority, the Foreign Office was largely able to maintain its reactive approach to regional events. This kept Britain out of trouble in the short term, but it did little to control the whirlwind that was developing in the region.39 In July 1937 the situation worsened with the opening of the second Sino-Japanese War. The majority of British public opinion believed that Japan once again was the aggressor and there were calls for sanctions to be imposed. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was more sympathetic to this call for action than Neville Chamberlain, who had now become prime minister. However, with tensions rising in Europe due to the Spanish civil war, it was clear that Britain could not coerce Japan unilaterally. Consequently Eden tried at the Brussels Conference of November 1937 to see if joint action could be taken with the United States, but the Roosevelt administration was hemmed in by isolationist opinion.40 Unable to take active measures against Japan, the British government opted for the next best policy which was to give measured assistance to China. One of Eden’s last orders as foreign secretary in February 1938 was to approve the building of a new road to connect Burma with Yunnan province in south China. Although Eden’s successor at the Foreign Office, Lord Halifax, was one of Chamberlain’s political allies, he too differed with the prime minister over Japan. In the summer of 1938 Halifax argued forcefully that Britain should support the Chinese currency by providing a government loan. However, Chamberlain and the Treasury saw this as too provocative and forced the Foreign Office to back down. If the former still hoped that the possibility existed for a rapprochement with Japan, then events in the autumn/winter of 1938–39 proved to be a chimera. The Japanese seizure of Hankou and Guangzhou [Canton] and the extension of its influence into the South China Sea demonstrated the scale of its ambition, while evidence of its secret diplomatic contacts with Germany and Italy showed that it was willing to use Britain’s problems in Europe to its own advantage. Accordingly, in March 1939 the Cabinet agreed to provide China with a loan in order to keep it fighting and thus tying down Japanese troops. It was not, however, easy to set a fixed policy towards East Asia. Due to the primacy of concerns about European security, Britain had to roll with the punches and retreat in the face of Japanese force. Thus in the summers of 1939 and 1940, it was twice forced into making short-term compromises with Japan in order to ward off the threat of war. The overall trajectory of British policy, though, remained focussed on supporting China and frustrating Japan short of open provocation.41 In the autumn of 1940 British policy became less passive. By this point Japan had openly aligned itself with the Axis powers in Europe, while the United States had begun to adopt a more assertive approach towards Japanese aggression. Faced with this background and aware that Japan was very sensitive about its over-reliance on foreign sources of raw material including oil, Britain began to cooperate with the Dominions, the Dutch and the Americans in tightening the economic noose around Japan. Meanwhile, in the military field there was liaison with the same powers over joint planning and the sending of reinforcements to the region. Considering that Britain was already over-stretched by the war in Europe and North Africa, this move towards a more belligerent policy may seem unwise, but it is important to understand that it was underpinned by an intelli-

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gence-based assumption that Japan was essentially a cautious power that knew that it could not triumph over an Anglo-Saxon coalition. In retrospect, we know that this was a fatal underestimation of Japanese resources and will, but this was not evident at the time.42 In July 1941 the situation changed once again when the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina led, in turn, to the Western powers introducing oil sanctions. Eden, who had now returned to the Foreign Office, feared that this move might be too provocative, but by this point the importance of keeping in step with the United States outweighed any other consideration. During the autumn of 1941 Britain sent further reinforcements to the region, but the problem was that these, and their American equivalent, were never sufficient to create a ring of steel around Japan. In essence, London and Washington were pursuing a diplomatic policy of deterrence without the military force to back it up. In December 1941 Japan called their bluff by launching the offensives that opened the Pacific War.

THE PACIFIC WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH The opening months of the Pacific War were humiliating for Britain. In quick succession Hong Kong, North Borneo, the Malaya peninsula and Burma fell into Japanese hands, but the event that represented Britain’s nadir was the surrender of the supposedly impregnable fortress of Singapore in February 1942. British prestige in Asia would never be the same again. The issue that would have the greatest influence on the future of Anglo-Japanese relations was not, however, these military defeats, but rather the fate of those British servicemen and civilians who fell into Japanese hands. The first warning came in the winter of 1942 when reports of atrocities being carried out including beheadings arrived from those who had been able to flee Hong Kong.43 Worse was to follow from South-East Asia where a number of intelligence sources indicated that British prisoners-of-war (POWs) were being held in intolerable conditions and being used as forced labour. In January 1944 Eden as foreign secretary made a heart-wrenching statement to the House of Commons and warned that retribution would follow.44 It was hoped that giving publicity to the issue might force the Japanese authorities to moderate their practices. However, when Japan surrendered in August 1945 the liberation of prisoners from camps such as Changi in Singapore revealed them to be in a dreadful state, half-starved like the survivors of Belsen and the other Nazi concentration camps.45 Initially this awful legacy of the war had little influence on British post-war policy towards Japan. While Britain set up a new diplomatic mission in Tokyo during the occupation era between 1945 and 1952, the Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was, as Roger Buckley makes clear in this volume, largely content to leave the running of defeated Japan to the Americans under General MacArthur. The main issue that did concern Whitehall was the shape of the peace treaty. On the whole the British government sought the same goals as Washington, in other words, the creation of a new Japan that would be part of the Western camp and no longer pose a threat to international security. It also agreed that Japan should not be weighed down with a heavy reparations burden. In addition, it had desiderata that were tailored to its own specific interests. These were mainly economic in nature and were designed to forestall any return to the destabilizing economic competition of the 1930s.46 However, when the outline of the treaty

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was made public in the summer of 1951, it created a backlash within Britain for it did not contain any compensation for the former prisoners-of-war. A cross-party campaign of MPs and lobbying outside parliament quickly forced the Labour government to reverse its stance and reparations for the POWs was duly added to Britain’s aims.47 The San Francisco peace treaty of September 1951 met Britain’s goals and in April 1952 the occupation ended and Japan became once again a sovereign country. The question now was how would Anglo-Japanese relations develop and could they ever again revive the warmth of the alliance years? The Foreign Office believed that Britain needed to make both material and symbolic gestures to Japan to demonstrate that the war could be put behind them. Its reason for pushing for this policy was that it recognized that Japan’s future was not settled and that in the context of the global Cold War this uncertainty was profoundly dangerous. Its primary concern was that if Japan developed close commercial ties with the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) it might be dragged into the socialist bloc or, at the least, flirt with neutralism. In order to ward off this danger, Japan needed to be offered access to other commercial markets including those within the British Empire.48 In terms of international politics this made eminent sense and it had the support of the United States, but in regard to British economic policy and domestic politics it created a number of difficulties. To a degree the Treasury was prepared to go along with the Foreign Office, for the expansion of Japanese trade with South and South-East Asia was seen as useful in regard to restoring Sterling as a major international trading currency. Between 1948 and 1954 a series of Anglo-Japanese payment agreements were negotiated in order to allow for the steady expansion of trade.49 The reappearance of Japanese goods in British imperial markets did, though, lead to rumblings of discontent in Lancashire and this public hostility was exacerbated by Japan’s inept and tardy handling of the POW compensation issue. As public dissatisfaction grew, so did its influence on government policy. On a number of occasions in 1953 and 1954 officials in the Far East Department of the Foreign Office argued that friendly gestures should be made towards Japan only to find that the ministers dismissed them as politically impracticable. The most controversial issue was what to do about the Japanese application to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs organization (GATT). The United States was keen to sponsor this move as it would bring Japan both respectability and access to new markets. For the British government, it was a poisonous dilemma, for while it wished to keep in step with America, it knew that it could not allow Japan to trade under GATT rules without causing damage to the Lancashire cotton textile industry. During 1954 and 1955 the Cabinet debated Japan’s application on many occasions and eventually, much to the Foreign Office’s regret, came up with a compromise solution under which it agreed to allow Japan to join the organization but decided to invoke article thirty-five of the GATT treaty against it, meaning that it did not have to give the latter most-favoured nation rights. The British national interest thus trumped Cold War considerations.50 A situation thus developed in which, while Britain and Japan due to their security links to the United States were indirect allies in the Cold War, their mutual relations remained frosty. On the British side, the policy of a slow, incremental thaw was defended by Selwyn Lloyd, the foreign secretary between 1955 and 1960, when he warned one advocate of closer relations that while Britain recog-

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nized Japan’s importance, the government could ‘not run the risk of a snub to the Japanese from the British public who still felt strongly about the war’.51 The tide began to turn in the early 1960s as evidence accumulated that Japan was no longer the threat to Lancashire that it had once been. With Japan no longer a direct rival and memories of the war becoming more distant each year, the government of Harold Macmillan agreed to withdraw its invocation of article thirty-five and to sign a new commercial treaty with Japan. The latter was duly sealed in November 1962 during a visit to London by the Japanese Prime Minister, Ikeda Hayato.52 This was not the only evidence of progress. In addition, Britain sponsored Japanese membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and most notably agreed in 1963 to establish a regular series of bilateral ministerial talks to be held alternately in London and Tokyo.53 Lastly, it should be noted that in the field of public diplomacy, Princess Alexandra of Kent in the autumn of 1961 made the first royal visit to Japan since that of her uncle, the Duke of Gloucester, in 1929.54 There was, though, a limit to Britain’s friendship. On a number of occasions the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home (later Sir Alec Douglas-Home) tried to impress on Macmillan the importance of a prime ministerial visit to Japan, particularly as all of the Japanese post-occupation premiers had come to London. Macmillan on a number of occasions agreed to do so in principle, but then later found an excuse to cancel what he once referred to as ‘a journey of comparatively secondary importance’.55 He argued that this was a matter of priorities, but one cannot but think that it also reflected an element of distaste. The other dominant political figure of the 1960s, the Labour prime minister from 1964 to 1970, Harold Wilson, was similar in his approach. He too did not visit Japan, and what is more had to be pushed strongly by the Foreign Office into even making time available to visiting Japanese dignitaries. In October 1966 when the Foreign Secretary, –, Wilson George Brown was hosting his Japanese counterpart, Shiina Etsusaburo reacted to the idea that he should have a private fifteen-minute talk with the visitor by noting ‘This really is a bore,’ and was even terser in February 1969, writing, ‘Fear I must.’56 While the prime ministers remained distant from Japan, their foreign secretaries did not, for the bilateral talks soon became a crucial element in the relationship. R.A. Butler, Michael Stewart (twice), and George Brown all made the long journey to Tokyo between 1964 and 1970. The initial hope in the Foreign Office was that these conversations may have a policy purpose, such as encouraging Japan to engage in development projects in the Third World and cooperating with Britain in regard to the Confrontation with Indonesia.57 It soon, though, became clear that this was too ambitious and that they existed largely as a means of developing mutual trust. As one steering brief observed in 1971, ‘These regular … Ministerial Consultations are important, not for the substance which is frequently routine, but for the opportunity they provide of demonstrating to the Japanese our willingness to be on terms of confidence.’58 These meetings did not therefore require any new policy initiatives for the foreign secretary’s attention; all the latter had to do was to master his brief and to be charming. The consultations duly raised the profile of Anglo-Japanese relations but it could not be said they led to any great breakthrough in terms of cooperation in world affairs. However, as the 1960s progressed the Japanese economy continued on its seemingly inexorable rise, so that by the end of the decade Britain’s relative indifference was becoming dangerous and unsus-

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tainable, especially as Japanese exporters were now beginning to turn to European markets. Accordingly in 1970–1 Whitehall set in motion a number of Cabinet Office-level reviews of Japan’s likely trajectory and of how Britain should respond.59 These, however, failed to satisfy the new Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who felt that they did not adequately face up to the nature of the Japanese challenge. In response to one document that was submitted to him just prior to the arrival of the Japanese Emperor Hirohito on his firstever state visit, Heath duly noted, ‘This approach is pretty wet. Japan is as ruthless in trade as in war & we must recognize this.’60

A NEW APPROACH Heath’s determination to take Japan more seriously was influenced by the fact that in the early 1970s the international order was in greater flux than it had been for two decades. In East Asia itself a new measure of instability had arisen arose from the American decisions to withdraw from the land war in Vietnam, to force its allies in the region to carry more of the defence burden, and to open ties with the PRC. Meanwhile, in the economic sphere August 1971 witnessed the American decision to decouple the dollar from gold and introduce a surcharge on imports, thus ending the Bretton Woods system that had regulated international trade and finance in the West since the conclusion of the Second World War. In December 1971 Heath met the American President Richard Nixon in Bermuda to discuss these great changes and one of the conclusions that emanated from the summit was that Britain had to do more to help the United States with integrating Japan into international politics and economics.61 Heath accordingly adopted a multi-faceted policy towards Japan. At one level, he was determined to be tough, by showing that the British government was determined to defend its home market from anything akin to Japanese dumping and arguing that Japan had to reduce its own barriers to trade. At another level, he sought to demonstrate that Britain recognized that Japan, along with the United States and the European Economic Community, was one of the three pillars that sustained the world economic order. In other words, Japan had the right to help to determine the nature of any post-Bretton Woods system. In order to add ballast to the relationship in October 1972 Heath became the first British prime minister to visit Japan and in the following year played host in a reciprocal visit by his Japanese counterpart, Tanaka Kakuei. Reporting his impressions of Japan to his Cabinet in 1972, Heath observed that he had been ‘impressed by the size and strength of the Japanese economy which now placed Japan effectively at the centre of international monetary and commercial affairs’.62 All of this augured well for a more fruitful relationship, but it proved to be another false dawn. Heath was defeated in the February 1974 general election and his successor, Wilson, continued to display little interest in Japan, aside from being seen to obstruct its exports. The government of his successor, James Callaghan, continued in much the same vein.63 However, change was under way in the economic sphere that would have important consequences for the future, most notably the recognition by some Japanese firms that the best way to tap the European market was to establish factories within the EEC’s borders, and that Britain, because of the ubiquity of the English language in world affairs, was the most logical site for investment.

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This process, which was encouraged by British regional development agencies, began in a low-key manner in the 1970s, but took flight after 1979 with the arrival of Margaret Thatcher as the new Conservative Prime Minister. Thatcher was determined to overhaul the British economy through a policy of denationalization, the privatization of government utilities, the freeing of capital markets and the crushing of union power. Encouraging Japanese private investment in the form of new manufacturing plant was an attractive adjunct to these objectives, as this would bring into Britain both new technology and superior Japanese labour practices. The most notable triumph in this field came in 1986 with the opening of the Nissan car plant in Sunderland.64 It was not all smooth sailing, however, for the past continued to bedevil the present. In 1989 the death of Emperor Hirohito raised the difficult problem of how Britain should be represented at the funeral of its erstwhile wartime foe.65 Then in the following decade, as the wartime generation entered retirement and old age, the inadequacy of the compensation that had been negotiated for the POWs developed into an embarrassment for the government which was loath to lobby Japan over an issue that was already settled under international law. In 1998 this issue created difficulties on the occasion of Emperor Akihito’s first state visit to Britain, with the result that in 2000 the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, decided to lance the boil by agreeing that the British Treasury would provide more pension money both to the POW families and those of the former civilian internees.66 As Anglo-Japanese relations entered the new century in 2001 they were on a more even keel than they had been since the 1920s. Both the POW issue and the trade disputes that had qualified relations between the two countries were now consigned to the past, and the Japanese economic investment in British manufacturing had proved to be a great success. Perhaps surprisingly, there were even signs that a new low-key strategic relationship was developing. The focus here was their respective disquiet about the rise of China. Most notably, within the EU Britain stood out as the main obstacle to any lifting of the post-Tiananmen sanctions on arms sales to the PRC, and for this Japan was profoundly grateful. In 2016, however, a new potential problem merged when Britain voted in a national referendum to leave the EU. This decision was troubling in two ways. First, it raised a question mark about the future of Japanese investment in Britain as companies such as Nissan were concerned that their access to the EU market might now be curtailed. Second, Britain’s need for new global trading partners led to doubts if it would be prepared to maintain its tough stance towards the PRC. Only time will tell how these problems will be resolved.

NOTES 1 2

3

4 5 6

Grace Fox, Britain and Japan, 1858–1883 (Oxford, 1969) pp.97–150. This interpretation lives on in Mark Ravina, To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan’s Meiji Restoration in World History (New York, 2017) p.109. The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO46/52 Russell to Parkes 8 April 1865 no.5, and Russell to Parkes 23 August 1865 no.10. Fox, Britain and Japan, pp.248–9. TNA FO46/92 Parkes to Stanley 26 March 1868 no.66. Diary entry 20 August 1873, in John Vincent (ed.) A Selection from the Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley 15th Earl of Derby (1826–93): Between September 1869 and March 1878 (London, 1994) p.143.

20

7 8

9 10

11

12

13 14

15 16

17 18

19

20 21 22

23

24

25 26

27

28 29 30

31 32 33

34

35

36

37

38

39

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TNA FO46/160 Aston memorandum 27 November 1872. For Britain and the ‘Triple Intervention’, see T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905 (Oxford, 2007) pp.60–1. Salisbury papers, Hatfield House, 3M/A126/86 Salisbury to Satow 3 October 1895 Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907 (London, 1966) p.91. For the negotiation of the alliance, see Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance pp. 143–218 and Otte, China Question, pp.269–306. See Antony Best, ‘Race, Monarchy and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922’, Social Science Japan Journal, 2006, 9/2, pp.173–4. Ibid, pp.177–9. Baring Archive, London, Partners Filings 200186, Lansdowne to Revelstoke 27 September 1902. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p.265. The best survey of the war’s origins is Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1985). See Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp.273–9, and Otte, China Question, pp.312–18. John Chapman, ‘Britain, Japan and the “Higher Realms of Intelligence”, 1900–1918‘, in Ian Gow & Hirama Yoichi (eds), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000: The Military Dimension (Basingstoke, 2003) pp.75–8. For this episode, see Hiraku Yabuki, ‘Britain and the Resale of Argentinian Cruisers to Japan before the Russo-Japanese War’, War in History, 2009, 16/4, pp.425–46. Baring Archive, London, Partners Filings 200187, Lansdowne to Revelstoke 4 May 1904. See Best, Race, Monarchy, p.181. For Japan’s wartime propaganda, see Robert Valliant, ‘The Selling of Japan: Japanese Manipulation of Western Opinion, 1900–1905’ Monumenta Nipponica, 1974, vol.29/4, pp.415–38. Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911–1915: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy (London, 1969) pp.17–22. Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908–23 (London, 1972) pp.45–59. Ibid, pp.196–211. Simon Bytheway and Mark Metzler, Central Banks and Gold: How Tokyo, London and New York Shaped the Modern World (Ithaca, 2016) pp.51–4. For the most recent overviews of these two episodes, see Naraoka Sochi, ‘Japan’s First World War-Era Diplomacy, 1914–15’, and Antony Best, ‘Britain, Japan and the Crisis over China, 1915–16, in Oliviero Frattolillo and Antony Best (eds), Japan and the Great War (Basingstoke, 2015) pp.36–51 and pp.52–70 respectively. Nish, Alliance in Decline, p.225. TNA CAB23/25 43(21) Cabinet minutes 30 May 1921. Nakao Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London, 1998) is the standard text. Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp.333–53. Ibid, pp.368–77. Antony Best, ‘The “Ghost” of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination into Historical Myth-Making’ Historical Journal, 49/3, (2006) p.818. Antony Best, “‘Our Respective Empires Should Stand Together”: The Royal Dimension in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, (2005), 16, pp.259–79. Austen Chamberlain papers, Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham, AC55/10 Chamberlain to Amery 27 February 1928. See Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (London, 1972). Antony Best, ‘Economic Appeasement or Economic Nationalism?: A Political Perspective on the British Empire, Japan and the Rise of Intra-Asian Trade, 1933–37’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, (2002) 30/2, pp.77–101 See Shigeru Akita, ‘British Informal Empire in East Asia, 1880s to 1930s: A Japanese Perspective’ in Raymond Dumett (ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire (London, 1999) pp.152–5. The best accounts of the mid-1930s are Stephen Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933–1937 (Manchester, 1975) and Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933– 1937 (Cambridge, 1975).

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40

41

42

43

44 45 46

47

48

49

50 51 52 53

54

55 56

57 58

59

60 61

62 63 64 65 66

21

For the Sino-Japanese War period, see Bradford A. Lee, Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939, (Stanford, 1973), Peter Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937–1941 (Oxford, 1977), and Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936–41 (London, 1995). For the immediate origins of the Pacific War, see Lowe, Great Britain pp.322–76 and Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor pp.160–92. For British intelligence and Japan, see Richard Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge, 2000) and Antony Best, British intelligence and the Japanese challenge in Asia, 1914–41 (Basingstoke, 2002). Hansard, 5th series, House of Commons (HC), vol.378, 10 March 1942, c.932. For an overview, see Sybilla Jane Flower, ‘British Prisoners of War of the Japanese’, 1941–5, in Ian Nish and Kibata Yoichi (eds), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, Vol.2, (Basingstoke, 2001) pp.149–173. Hansard, 5th series, HC, vol.396, 28 January 1944, cc.1029–33. ‘A Terrible Indictment’, The Times, 11 September 1945, p.5. Roger Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, The United States, and Japan, 1945–52 (Cambridge, 1982). Hansard, 5th series, HC, vol.487, 10 May 1951, cc.2219–76, and TNA CAB128/20 CM(51)54 Cabinet meeting 23 July 1951. See Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948–53 (Manchester, 1997) pp.73–9. Noriko Yokoi, Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations 1948–1962 (London, 2003) passim. Ibid, pp.110–17. TNA FO371/133958/51 Lloyd minute 17 November 1958. Yokoi, Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery, pp.140–56. Christopher Braddick, ‘Distant Friends: Britain and Japan since 1958 – the Age of Globalization’, in Nish and Kibata (eds), History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Vol.2, p.274. See Antony Best, ‘“We Cannot Pretend That the Past Did Not Exist”: The Windsor Dynasty and Japan, 1941–1975’, in Matthew Glencross, Judith Rowbotham and Michael D. Kandiah (eds), The Windsor Dynasty 1910 to the Present: Long to Reign Over Us? (Basingstoke, 2016) p.249. TNA FO371/158493/59 Macmillan to Home 15 June 1961. TNA PREM13/987 Wilson minute n.d. [October 1966] and PREM13/2470 Wilson minute n.d. [February 1969]. Braddick, ‘Distant Friends’, pp.274–6. TNA FCO21/898 FEJ3/548/4 ‘Anglo-Japanese Ministerial Consultations, London June 1971: Steering Brief’ unattributed n.d. TNA CAB148/100 OPDO (70)8 Revise ‘British Policy towards Japan up to 1985’ FCO memorandum 9 June 1970 and CAB148/116 DOP(71)62 ‘The Japanese Phenomenon’ FCO memorandum 30 September 1971. TNA PREM15/506 Heath minute 2 October 1971. TNA PREM15/1268 ‘Talks between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States at Bermuda, 20–21 December 1971’ unattributed n.d. TNA CAB128/50 CM(72)42 Cabinet meeting 21 September 1972. Braddick, ‘Distant Friends’, pp.283–4. Ibid, 284–8. Ibid, p.291. For a good overview, see Phillida Purvis, ‘Philip Malins MBE, MC (1919–): Prisoners of War and Reconciliation with Japan’ in Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, vol.VII (Folkestone, 2010) pp.624–5.

2

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, 1792–1878

[1st Earl Russell]

Foreign Secretary 1852–53, 1859–1869

ANDREW COBBING Lord John Russell

I

n June 1859, Lord John Russell, as he was known, took the post of foreign secretary in the first Liberal government formed by the Viscount Palmerston. Queen Victoria described these long-time rivals as ‘two dreadful old men’.1 From an established Whig family, and now nearly sixty-seven years old, Russell was already an elder statesman. Diminutive in stature, he had served in the House of Commons for over forty-five years, and commanded respect. This would be his second term as foreign secretary, having filled the post briefly in the early 1850s. Before that he had spent nearly four years as prime minister, although his Whig government struggled to cope with the Great Famine in Ireland. Known for his liberal outlook, Russell’s reputation rested above all on his influential role in passing the First Reform Act back in 1832. Now in the twilight of his career, he would return to the theme of the franchise, but with Palmerston opposed to electoral reform, would have to wait until his old rival’s death in 1865. That would be his cue to leave the Foreign Office for another turn as prime minister, and a chance to introduce a Reform Bill of his own. Resigning in 1866 when his bill was defeated, he looked on from the House of Lords as the Second Reform Act was passed the following year. Less than two weeks after Russell’s instalment as foreign secretary, a new chapter began in Britain’s relations with Japan. From 1 July 1859, as provided in the Treaty of Yedo the previous year,2 Yokohama, Nagasaki and Hakodate were opened to foreign commerce, and reports were soon arriving in Whitehall from Rutherford Alcock, Britain’s recently appointed consul-general in Japan. An advocate of laissez faire trade, Russell welcomed this opportunity to explore a new market. Given Britain’s current record of costly, far-flung military campaigns he also hoped for a measure of tranquillity, and peaceful relations with Japan. The Crimean War, for example, was fought on a near global scale. In 1854, it had taken Admiral Stirling to Nagasaki in search of Russian ships, and an Anglo-French squadron to the coast of Kamchatka for the siege of Petropavlosk. In India, the Sepoy Rebellion was then suppressed, but left Britain counting the cost of mounting obligations abroad. The Second Opium War was put 22

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, 1792–1878

23

on hold with the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858, but not for long. Even Palmerston, with his reputation for gunboat diplomacy, realized the need for caution these days, after a damning speech by Richard Cobden on British aggression in China had helped bring down his ministry in 1857. Together with John Bright, Cobden led a vocal pacifist lobby in parliament, always ready to question any armed intervention and call the government to account. Less combative than Palmerston, Russell rarely countenanced war. Moreover, the new foreign secretary was immediately preoccupied with threats on the European continent, as French and Austrian troops clashed in Lombardy. Concern over the ambitions of Emperor Napoleon III even prompted the prime minister to raise the defence budget amid talk of war with France. Beyond Europe, however, there was still room for cooperation, notably in China, as Russell and Palmerston felt obliged to fall in with a French initiative to send a joint expeditionary force that ended up marching on Beijing. Throughout his tenure as foreign secretary, in fact, a succession of other conflicts meant that Russell rarely had time to give Japan his undivided attention. Besides China and the gathering campaign for Italian independence, the American Civil War broke out in 1861, while France’s latest intervention in Mexico kept the Foreign Office busy monitoring a bold attempt to install a Habsburg emperor in the New World. Rebellions in Poland and the Balkans, meanwhile, threatened to destabilize the Russian and Ottoman empires. In 1864, moreover, war broke out over the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, as Prussian troops marched through Denmark and the British government, despite Russell’s unsuccessful efforts to broker peace at the London Conference, faced charges of failing to come to the rescue of Copenhagen. In Japan as well, the early years of the treaty ports were often marked by fractious disputes and, eventually, war. In August 1863, seven Royal Navy ships bombarded Kagoshima, capital of the Satsuma domain, in response to the murder of a British merchant the previous year. In September 1864, an allied squadron silenced – shu – domain overlooking the Strait of Shimonoseki, in retalithe guns of the Cho ation against attacks on foreign shipping. Even as Prussian troops marched across Denmark, Russell found himself under pressure in parliament to answer for Britain’s foreign policy in the East. By this stage the foreign secretary had taken to sitting in the House of Lords, having been ennobled as the first Earl Russell in 1861. Now over seventy years old, his energies were beginning to fail, and although generally acquainted with foreign policy issues, he never fully understood the unfamiliar territory of Japan. After all, even British diplomats on site were left perplexed as, having signed a treaty with His Majesty the Tycoon, they became vaguely aware of some higher authority in the shadowy form of the Mikado. Furthermore, it took three months for their letters to arrive from Japan, so events on the ground had often moved on by the time Russell read about them in Whitehall. At least the ageing foreign secretary could call on the professional support of his staff. In charge of the Office for China, Japan and Siam was Edmund Hammond, permanent undersecretary of foreign affairs, who ruled over his diplomats abroad with an iron hand. His parliamentary counterpart was the Lord Wodehouse, subsequently foreign secretary himself and who thirty-five years later, as Lord Kimberley, would sign the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1894 that brought the treaty port system to an end. In 1861, Wodehouse was replaced as parliamentary undersecretary by Austen Layard, a man famous in archaeological circles for his excavations of Nineveh. These officials would pore over the official despatches

24

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES AND JAPAN, 1850–1990

and private letters from Japan, even when the foreign secretary was distracted by troop movements in Europe. Together with advice from vested interests at home, among them the Law Officers, the Treasury, and the Admiralty, these consultations shaped Britain’s emerging policy on Japan. EARLY YEARS: TRADE, PEACE AND CONCILIATION Russell was optimistic, even complacent, in counselling patience, as he believed that a certain level of friction was only to be expected when opening commercial relations in Japan. He was not alone, however, for everyone at the Foreign Office struggled to comprehend this mysterious land. Besides the delays in communication imposed by such distant correspondence, their confusion was compounded by the long, verbose and often circuitous despatches they received from Rutherford Alcock, their man on the spot in Edo.3 Initially, prospects for trade looked encouraging. Soon there were signs of a healthy export trade in tea and silk, even if Japanese consumers did not seem so enthused by British manufactures. Foreign merchants often complained about the officious behaviour of local staff at the Customs House, as Captain Vyse, the British consul in Yokohama, pointed out in his annual trade reports. Yet even though this appeared to be against the spirit of the treaty, so far they had no real evidence that the Tokugawa authorities were using their control over the treaty ports to run a monopoly on foreign commerce. Russell had every reason to hope that matters would settle down. Rather than Japanese officials, moreover, it was the behaviour of British merchants that unsettled minds in the Foreign Office. The first instance of this arose from Japan’s unfamiliarity with global exchange rates. Due to an unusually low rate for gold measured against silver, unscrupulous foreign merchants found they could sell Japanese gold abroad for three times as much as it had cost them to buy. The imbalance was soon addressed, but problems with cultural relations persisted in the new treaty ports. After a visit to Japan in 1860, George Smith, the Bishop of Victoria, condemned foreign residents for their drunken behaviour and reckless riding through the congested streets of nearby towns and villages. Published in London the following year, his Ten Weeks in Japan created ripples of disapproval in the Victorian establishment, which reappeared when Alcock himself criticized such antics in his two-volume memoir, The Capital of the Tycoon, published in 1863.4 Russell, too, was contemptuous of his compatriots in the East, telling Sir Frederick Bruce, Britain’s minister in Beijing, ‘I always agree with you about the British merchants. They are always insolent & overbearing.’5 This became a serious matter when foreign residents assumed that privileges enshrined in the treaties entitled them to not just lawless behaviour, but gave them immunity from local laws as well. The issue came to a head in November 1860, when a young British merchant called Michael Moss accidentally shot and severely wounded a Japanese guard while resisting arrest. The Yokohama community were adamant that local officials had no right to apprehend him, or hold him in a nearby gaol until released by the British consul. In their eyes, it was also of no consequence that he had broken a Japanese law against shooting game within twenty-five miles of the shogun’s castle. Moss received a $1,000 fine and a deportation order from the consular court, while Alcock compounded the aggravation by adding a three-month gaol sen-

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, 1792–1878

25

tence. Embarrassingly, however, his intervention was overruled on procedural grounds by the Supreme Court in Hong Kong, and the Yokohama community even paid Moss’s fine on his behalf. As Russell explained to the House of Commons shortly afterwards, ‘Many of the British subjects in Japan thought themselves entitled to violate the laws of that country.’6 The Law Officers of the Crown addressed this judicial loophole by ruling that a local law could be upheld in a consular court, but only if the offence in question was stipulated in regulations published by Her Majesty’s representative in Japan. In practice, this did not always have the intended effect, in future years empowering the zealous Sir Harry Parkes, Alcock’s successor, to defend British merchants’ complaints of unlawful arrest. As for Moss, he continued to demand compensation from the Foreign Office for loss of livelihood, and even took his case directly to Palmerston. By April 1863, Russell had lost patience and refused any further petitions, having reminded Moss that he was free to pursue his claim through the courts.7 The foreign secretary was broadly sympathetic to Alcock in his battles with the British merchants, but less responsive on questions of security. After all, the initial assaults in the treaty ports were not on British subjects, but Russian and Dutch residents, or Chinese and Japanese servants. Unimpressed by Alcock’s strong remonstrations, Russell instructed him ‘rather to soothe differences than make or insist on peremptory demands’. Conscious also of Japanese grievances, he felt compelled to remind him, ‘Our intercourse is but begun: It should not be inaugurated by war.’8 Soon afterwards, the foreign secretary did ask the Admiralty for some naval protection in Japan, but the timing was inconvenient now that the campaign in China was in full swing. In December 1860, news of the recent looting of the Summer Palace was greeted with relief in Whitehall, but the event turned into a public relations disaster with most newspapers condemning the troops’ conduct in Beijing.9 In Japan, meanwhile, early in 1861 the mood turned following the assassination of Henry Heusken, the Dutch-born interpreter at the US legation in Edo, who although not British, was at least a diplomat. Even so, Russell was disappointed by Alcock’s decision to abandon Edo and remove the legation staff to the relative safety of Yokohama.10 A few months later he was pleased – zenji, the temple allocated to the British there. when they returned to To An attack on the legation building shortly afterwards in July, however, exposed the dangers increasingly facing diplomats in Japan. Laurence Oliphant, the new secretary to the legation, reported to Russell on his return to London, having received a shoulder wound in the incident while famously beating off his assailants with a horsewhip.11 If Russell had been slow to recognize the security threat, he showed more concern than Admiral James Hope, Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies and China Station. Even now, Hope was reluctant to send Royal Navy ships to Japan in case they might have to remain there until all these assassinations had stopped. As Russell pointed out in a terse message to the Duke of Somerset, First Lord of the Admiralty, ‘This may be a good joke, but I do not wonder that Mr Alcock did not see the fun of it.’12 In view of the current unrest, Russell also took a conciliatory stance towards overtures from the Tokugawa bakufu to postpone the opening of further treaty – ports. According to the Treaty of Yedo, two cities (Edo, O saka), and two ports – go, Niigata) were due to open on 1 January 1863. In consultation with (Hyo Alcock, the British demanded ‘equivalents’ in return for any such concessions. There was also talk of a new treaty port to be offered in exchange, though the

26

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Foreign Office quietly overlooked Alcock’s suggestion of opening Tsushima in the Korea Strait. The British minister still harboured suspicions of Russian expansion there after separate visits by two Royal Navy vessels in 1861 were needed to persuade a Russian corvette to leave the area after laying up in Tsushima for several months, purportedly for repairs. Alcock himself helped to orchestrate the bakufu mission that toured across Europe in 1862, and Russell ordered him home for the negotiations in London. Once in town, the ambassadors outstayed their welcome as the vagaries of Japanese politics soon stretched Hammond’s patience.13 Nevertheless, their key request was accommodated in the London Protocol signed in June, which postponed the opening of further cities and ports for five years until 1868. The concession showed the lengths that Russell would go to in order to preserve the prospect of peaceful trade relations. At this stage, moreover, the Foreign Office had no real appetite for antagonising bakufu officials. Handling the impending storm clouds across the Atlantic was a higher priority than challenging infractions of the treaty with Japan.14 THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY IN JAPAN Russell hoped that the London Protocol had settled the matter. For the moment all seemed calm, and patience appeared to have won through. How little the foreign secretary really knew about Japanese politics was apparent when he told Alcock, ‘They appear from a distance to be divided into free trade and protectionist parties, as we have been at home. I trust that in Japan as at Westminster the free traders will carry the day.’15 While puzzling over this unfolding power struggle, British diplomats were not helped either by the duplicity of bakufu officials who deflected attention away from their government’s weakened authority by blaming the recent attacks on a certain anti-foreign faction, masterminded, according to the treaty port press, by the princes of Satsuma and Mito. Their protestations glossed over the growing mistrust of the Tokugawa regime itself after opening treaty ports without imperial consent, and attempting to silence those who complained. Yet even Russell was stirred to action as, with the ink not yet dry on the London Protocol, news of renewed assaults arrived from Japan. At the end of June 1862, a year to the day after the first assault on To–zenji by the Japanese calendar, the British legation was attacked again, claiming the life of two marines. Then in September, a British merchant called Charles Lennox Richardson was cut down and killed at Namamugi, a village near Yokohama, when his party, out on a day excursion, inadvertently ran into the daimyo procession of the Satsuma domain.16 In the corridors of Whitehall, the bakufu’s inability to contain the situation, even after sending an embassy to London to extract concessions, was finally laid bare. In charge of the British legation during Alcock’s absence was Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St John Neale. Russell was grateful to him for the calm head he showed in the aftermath of Namamugi, especially for dissuading an incensed Captain Vyse from leading a lynch mob of foreign merchants into the hills in search of Richardson’s assassin.17 He also appreciated his clarity of expression in summarising events, a welcome change from Alcock’s often emotional, rambling prose.18 The recently knighted Alcock, meanwhile, was still in England on leave, and now demanding a stern response. Queen Victoria felt so worried

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, 1792–1878

27

that reparations might lead to war that she wanted to hear the views of everyone in the Cabinet.19 Palmerston agreed with Somerset’s suggestion that Satsuma’s crime should be handled in isolation, and the Chancellor William Gladstone also advised a limited campaign before the conflict spread to the whole of Japan.20 Early in 1863, the resolve of British diplomats was tested further when their newly completed (though not yet occupied) legation building at Gotenyama was destroyed in an arson attack. Rumours were now circulating, moreover, of an imperial edict to expel foreigners from Japan. While Bakufu officials insisted they would not carry out this order, it was several months before they reluctantly paid –zenji and Namamugi attacks. By this stage seven the indemnity for the second To Royal Navy vessels under the command of Admiral Kuper had arrived in Yokohama, and with no sign of Satsuma paying the $25,000 demanded by the British, this squadron set sail for Kagoshima (with Neale on board the flagship) to seek satisfaction for Richardson’s murder. From his desk in Whitehall, Russell felt unable to follow each turn in this fast-developing scenario, and in an expression of trust he had denied Alcock, told Neale, ‘The mysteries of Japanese intrigue…cannot be fathomed at this distance, and Her Majesty’s government will not trammel you with needless or unsuitable instructions.’21 The bombardment of Kagoshima in August proved to be a watershed, even if the military outcome was inconclusive.22 Satsuma was finally persuaded to engage with the treaty powers, and Britain in particular, as the outstanding indemnity was paid off at last (albeit with funds borrowed from the bakufu). A relieved Russell was generous in his praise for Neale, who was awarded the Order of Bath (CB), and for Kuper as well, though the admiral came under fire in the House of Commons with a motion – in the event defeated – condemning his action in destroying a Japanese city for the sake of a single British merchant.23 Cobden was also in fine form, declaring, ‘It is precisely as though an enemy should lay Bristol in ashes because an individual had been murdered on the highway between London and Brentford.’24 Russell had to tread carefully, as further conflict in Japan now looked imminent. Since July there had been a series of attacks on foreign shipping in the Strait of Shi– shu – domain, which had taken the imperial edict literally and monoseki by the Cho was threatening to close the Inland Sea to trade. Already, American and French warships had retaliated by bombarding the batteries on the shore. To British amazement, moreover, bakufu officials announced they were sending a diplomatic embassy to Europe with a view to negotiating the closure of Yokohama altogether. The Foreign Office refused this overture, though the mission would make it to Paris on the pretext of apologizing for the murder of a French officer, Lieutenant Henri Camus, in October. With security concerns growing, Russell also sanctioned the despatch of a British regiment to protect the foreign settlement at Yokohama, supplementing a battalion of the French colonial infantry, including the unfortunate Camus, which had arrived a few months before. Alcock, meanwhile, was due to return to his post in Japan, and having grown weary of bakufu prevarication, was prepared to use force to uphold the treaties. Now in 1864, and conscious of having handed him the military tools to pursue such an agenda, Russell was at pains to urge restraint. The foreign secretary also had personal reasons to worry about the situation in Japan. On Alcock’s departure, he implored him to seek out a young relative of his, and send him back home. Reginald Russell, the son of his cousin William, had joined the diplomatic service and gone to Japan in 1861, in the company of Laurence Oliphant. No sooner had he arrived than, like Oliphant, he was caught

28

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES AND JAPAN, 1850–1990

– zenji incident. Scarred by this traumatic experience and apparup in the first To ently suffering from ill health, the foreign secretary had asked for Reginald to be sent to Beijing for a change of air. He remained in Japan, however – Sir Frederick Bruce advised that the climate in Yokohama was healthier anyway – and had since ignored repeated instructions to leave. Now en route to Yokohama himself, Alcock discovered him in Nagasaki, settled his debts there with the Scottish merchant, Thomas Blake Glover, and arranged for his passage home. Perhaps it was due to some romantic attachment that the young attaché defied his family and tarried so long, for as Alcock reported, without elaborating, ‘The woman is to be sent away to Yedo tomorrow, with reasonable provision for her expenses.’25 Reginald clearly had some means at his disposal through his agent in Shanghai when he left Japan in 1864. Possibly a keen sportsman, he is credited with introducing the Soemmerring Pheasant to England in July that year, having ‘succeeded in bringing home no less than fourteen alive by the overland route’.26 Native to Japan, adult males of this species had such a striking golden copper tone that, according to those who had seen them, ‘they look like meteors as they flash in the sun when flying.’27 The overland route was also imperative because they would not survive a voyage through tropical waters, although it is unclear whether Reginald returned by sea as instructed or accompanied the pheasants himself on a doubtless challenging journey in the days before the Trans-Siberian Railway. Now in the summer of 1864, to the dismay of the Foreign Office, Alcock adopted a liberal reading of his instructions and was orchestrating an allied squadron for a joint operation to silence the guns at Shimonoseki. Moreover, a pamphlet criticizing ‘British Diplomacy in Japan’ was in circulation, and on 1 July, the Earl Grey delivered a damning summary to the House of Lords in his 14-point ‘Resolutions on Japan’. Although defeated, this recommended radical changes, including removal of the ‘barbarous’ extraterritoriality clause from the Treaty of Yedo.28 On the same day as Grey’s speech, a memorandum also arrived from none other than Russell’s prodigal young cousin Reginald. Now back in London, he – officers then enrolled at Univerhad sought out and interviewed three Cho– shu – Five’, who sity College.29 These were the remaining members of the ‘Cho– shu had travelled to London covertly the year before, although two of them, Inoue – Hirobumi had recently returned to Japan, where they delivered a Kaoru and Ito similar message to Alcock. As the young Russell reported to the Foreign Office, – shu – ’s innocence, having only ever obeyed the Mikado, the officers professed Cho the true sovereign of Japan, and refuted accusations against their domain of obstructing trade, condemning the bakufu instead for running a monopoly on foreign commerce.30 Russell never fully grasped the intrinsic link between the guns at Shimonoseki and the security of the Yokohama foreign settlement. These developments at home, moreover, only compounded his reservations over Alcock’s proposed military adventure. Later in July, Palmerston also voiced concern, remarking, ‘It seems to me that it would be unadvisable to undertake any aggressive operations in the Inland Sea. We might destroy batteries one week, and in a short time they would be rebuilt and armed again and perhaps made stronger against land attack.’31 Russell now sent Alcock instructions that, even if ‘limited to naval operations’, on no account was he to use force, ‘unless absolutely required by self-defence’.32 The following month, as Hammond and Layard grew increasingly agitated by the British minister’s apparent insubordination, he even ordered him to return at once to London. This despatch did not arrive in time, however, to stop the allied squadron

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, 1792–1878

29

– shu – guns in early Sepfrom sailing through the Inland Sea and destroying the Cho tember.33 Stung by Russell’s recall order, Alcock launched into a series of lengthy reports defending his actions. In hindsight, the success of the operation at Shimonoseki seemed to vindicate his actions, and Russell now suggested that his only motive in summoning him back was to consult on future policy. On his return, moreover, Alcock was rewarded with, ostensibly, a promotion to the post of British minister to China, although Queen Victoria had to be persuaded of the wisdom of sending such a bellicose diplomat there.34 The Shimonoseki campaign had now split the cabinet, with Russell still unreconciled to Alcock’s disobedience, while Palmerston, no stranger to gunboat diplomacy, belatedly warmed to this more proactive strategy, reminding his foreign secretary there was ‘some truth in the maxim that a vigorous thrust is a good parry’.35 TOWARDS NEUTRALITY There had been talk of the Mikado in general terms for several years already, but only after the Shimonoseki campaign did the imperial court become the focus of Foreign Office thinking. In 1865, with the legation temporarily in the capable hands of Charles Winchester, alarming reports emerged on French collusion with the bakufu. Léon Roches, the new French minister to Japan, was developing plans to create a silk monopoly, and provide military training for the Tokugawa regime. There was also growing evidence that the bakufu had been running a trade monopoly all along, denying market access to domains that crucially, recognized only the Mikado as the legitimate sovereign. Ito– , for example, resurfaced in Nagasaki, where he and a senior – official discussed plans for Shimonoseki with Alexander Gower, Cho– shu the British consul, on ‘the best means of opening that port to foreign commerce without the intervention of the Tycoon’s government’.36 Simi– kyu – Islands, lar sentiments, and the prospect of an open port in the Ryu were also presented during interviews with both Layard and Hammond by leaders of a group of Satsuma students who appeared in London soon afterwards.37 Ahead of the arrival in Japan of Sir Harry Parkes, Alcock’s successor, there were some lively discussions in the Foreign Office on Britain’s future policy. Now that imperial ratification of the treaties was clearly imperative, Hammond and Layard seemed prepared to bypass bakufu officials altogether and open communications with the court through Britain’s new contacts in – shu – . Averse to confrontation once again, Russell demurred, and Satsuma and Cho in his instructions to Parkes insisted that he should conduct negotiations with – to through the Tokugawa government, as the designated signatory of the Kyo treaties. In all his years as permanent undersecretary it was the only time that Hammond was ever overruled regarding Britain’s policy on Japan.38 For Russell it was a satisfying outcome in November 1865 when, in the same month as he became prime minister, the Mikado was finally persuaded to – ratify the treaties. Under the direction of Parkes, the presence of warships in O saka Bay was required to force the issue, and the news did not reach Whitehall until early the following year. Nevertheless, Russell’s pragmatic stewardship had set the tone for the neutral strategy that would define British policy in the last years of Tokugawa rule, even if his insistence on liberalizing trade served, in effect to

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undermine the ailing regime. During his years as foreign secretary there were only rare glimpses of the peaceful relations he had hoped for with Japan, but he left the post with foundations in place for a more stable future. NOTES 1

2

3

4

5

6 7 8 9

10 11

12 13

14

15 16

17 18

19 20 21 22

23

24 25 26

27

28

29

30 31 32

Frank Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861–1901 (London, Frank Cass & Co., 1963), p. 126. See Britain and the Re-opening of Japan The Treaty of Yedo of 1859 and the Elgin Mission, Sir Hugh Cortazzi, The Japan Society 2008 Sir Hugh Cortazzi, ‘Sir Rutherford Alcock, Minister to Japan, 1859–62’ in Hugh Cortazzi (ed.,), British Envoys in Japan, 1859–1972 (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2004), pp. 9, 17. See Andrew Cobbing, ‘A Victorian Embarrassment: Consular Jurisdiction and the Evils of Extraterritoriality’, The International History Review, 40/2 (2018). Russell papers, The National Archives, Kew (TNA), PRO 30/22/101. Russell to Bruce, 26 November 1863. ’Question’, House of Commons Debate, 21 March 1861. Hansard, vol. 162, cc. 156–7. TNA, FO 46/30. Russell to Thomas Young, 14 April 1863. TNA, FO 46/6 Russell to Alcock, 28 February 1860. Stephen Platt, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War (London: Atlantic Books, 2012), pp. 164–7. TNA, FO 46/10. Russell to Alcock, 8 April 1861. ‘The Attack on the British Embassy at Jeddo’. The Illustrated London News, 12 October 1861. Russell papers, TNA, PRO 30/22/31/56. Russell to Somerset, 12 November 1861. Layard papers, British Library, London (BL), Add MS 38951. Hammond to Layard, 23 September 1862. Scott Gilfillan, Enclave Empires: Britain, France and the treaty-port system in Japan, 1858–1868. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science (2016) [DOI: 10.21963/lse.7ppug1rilwm9], pp. 147–8. Russell papers, TNA, PRO 30/22/101. Russell to Alcock, 26 April 1861. On the Namamugi incident see Hashimoto Mitsuru and Betsey Scheiner, ‘Collision at Namamugi’, Representations, no. 18 (Spring, 1987). TNA, FO 46/20. Russell to Neale, 9 December 1862. Sir Hugh Cortazzi, ‘Lt Colonel Edward St John Neale: chargé d’affaires at Edo/Yokohama, 1862–64’, in Cortazzi, British Envoys in Japan, p. 32. Grace Fox, Britain and Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 102. Russell papers, TNA, PRO 30/22/24/59. Somerset to Russell, 5 December 1862. TNA, Russell to Neale, 5 September 1863. For details see Sir Hugh Cortazzi, ‘The British Bombardment of Kagoshima, 1863’, Appendix 1 in Cortazzi, British Envoys in Japan, pp. 271–80. TNA, FO 46/31. Russell to Neale, 10 November 1863; ‘House of Commons. Tuesday, Feb. 9. Burning of Kagosima’. The Times, 10 February 1864. ‘Mr. Cobden on the Japanese Question’. The Times, 10 November 1863. Russell papers, TNA, PRO 30/22/50. Alcock to Russell, 26 February 1864. Philip Lutley Sclater, Guide to the Gardens of the Zoological Society of London (London: Bradbury, Evans, & Co., 1867), p. 22. George Horne, Pheasant Keeping for Amateurs: A Practical Handbook on the Breeding, Rearing, and General Management of Aviary Pheasants (London: L. Upcott Gill, 1887), p. 45. Diplomacy in Japan: Correspondence Respecting Japan (London, 1864). ‘Japan – Resolutions’, Lords debate, 1 July 1864. Hansard, vol. 176, cc. 585, 589. See Andrew Cobbing, ‘Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915): a controversial statesman’; ‘Yamao Yo-zo(1837–1917): a pioneer of Meiji education’, in Hugh Cortazzi, (ed.), Britain & Japan: Biographical Portraits, vol. VII (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010). TNA, FO 46/49. Reginald Russell, ‘Memorandum’, 1 July 1864. TNA, FO 46/49. Palmerston Note, 22 July 1864. TNA, FO 46/42. Russell to Alcock, 26 July 1864.

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33

34 35 36 37

38

31

For details see Sir Hugh Cortazzi, ‘The Naval and Military Campaign at Shimonoseki’, Appendix II in Cortazzi, British Envoys in Japan, pp. 281–6 Russell papers, TNA, PRO 30/22/15D, Russell to Queen Victoria, 20 March 1865. Russell papers, PRO 30/22/15C, Palmerston to Russell, 26 October 1864. TNA, FO 46/54, Gower to Winchester 17 April 1865. Layard papers, BL, Add MS 38959. Layard to Hammond, 31 July 1865; Add MS 38953. Hammond to Layard, 15 August 1865. Gilfillan, Enclave Empires. pp. 310–1.

3

LORD CLARENDON, 1800–1870

[The 4th Earl of Clarendon]

Foreign Secretary, 1853–58, 1865–66 and 1868–70

ROBERT MORTON Lord Clarendon

INTRODUCTION

G

eorge Villiers, the fourth Earl of Clarendon, was British foreign secretary from 1853 to 1858, 1865 to 1866 and 1868 to 1870, dying in office. Although critical events regarding Japan – the opening of the country and the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration – occurred while he was foreign secretary, there are not a huge number of references to Japan in his papers, the turbulence in Europe seeming far more pressing to him. Nevertheless, he played an important part in the ‘opening’ of Japan to British trade and the establishment of a productive diplomatic relationship with the country.

PERSONAL BACKGROUND A member of the Liberal party, Clarendon was a highly competent administrator and a charming man – Gladstone considered him the pleasantest colleague that he had. Although he was liked by Prince Albert, Queen Victoria came to feel antipathy towards him after Albert’s death, thinking him ‘impertinent’ for his hostile comments about Germany and Germans (and she may have got wind of his jokes about her relationship with her servant, John Brown). Clarendon’s biographer Herbert Maxwell described him as ‘the most finished gentleman’, with the ‘air of refinement which Vandyke was wont to give to his portraits’. He added, ‘even in age … his eye had lost none of its brightness nor his figure any of its unstudied elegance. His manners … had a charm which unbent the most rugged antagonist’.1 Bismarck thought that he might have prevented the Franco-Prussian War had he not died in 1870.2 He was intensely sociable, spending his days gossiping and intriguing, and his nights working on Foreign Office papers. He was a chain-smoker, an unknown thing in England at the time, having picked up the habit when he was minister in Spain in his thirties. He was ambitious, in an age when it was necessary to conceal political ambition, although he never made any real push to get to the very top. He was 32

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33

also a ladies man. The best-known story about him in this regard is when the Countess de Montijo was asked whether her daughter Eugénie, who became Empress of France, was in fact his child, she replied after a pause, ‘Les dates ne correspondent pas’.3 FOREIGN SECRETARY 1853–1858

The opening of Japan Clarendon followed the lead set by his predecessor in the Foreign Office, Lord Aberdeen, with respect to Japan: Britain would welcome relations of amity and commerce with the country but that any armed conflict must be avoided at all costs. The man who was tasked with realising this goal was Sir John Bowring, who was appointed superintendent of trade in China and the fourth governor of Hong Kong in 1854.4 His area of responsibility was immense, stretching from Thailand to the Russian Pacific coast. Clarendon identified for him three places in this area that should be opened to British trade: Cochin China (the southern third of present-day Vietnam, which would be colonised by France in 1862), Siam and Japan, adding that ‘it is unquestionable that Japan is the one which offers the greatest opening for the commercial enterprise of foreign nations, if the system of exclusion within which its government has so long entrenched itself could be broken through’.5 Clarendon felt that it was a good idea to let America do the hard work of overcoming Japan’s seclusion and was happy for the Perry expedition to go ahead without British involvement. However, he had the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Henry Addington, draw up a memorandum along the lines of Aberdeen’s policy towards Japan, outlining some instructions for Bowring. It was made clear to him that China was far more important than Japan; he was not to go there if British interests in China would suffer by his absence and only go if he saw a reasonable likelihood of success. He was also required to prioritise Russia – now that Britain and Russia were at war in Crimea, locating and destroying the Russian ships was much more urgent business than anything to do with Japan. Clarendon told Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling,6 commander-in-chief of the East Indies and China station, ‘You are … clearly to understand that your first object will be to watch closely, and if possible, to fall in with the Russian Squadron in the China seas, to which all other objects are to be considered as subsidiary’.7 When it became clear in 1854 that Perry’s expedition had been somewhat successful in prising open Japan to the West, Clarendon ordered Bowring to go to the country when the opportunity arose, and Stirling was urged to provide as large a force as he could spare to escort it. This was not to be used to threaten the Japanese, although Clarendon gave Stirling the right to punish an insult. At the same time Britain tried some charm with the Japanese, deciding to give the Shogun a steamboat, which it was hoped would impress Japan both with the country’s generosity and its cutting-edge technology. Clarendon explained to Bowring, ‘It is very important to be on friendly terms with Japan when there must already be some apprehension about the designs of Russia’.8 Britain tried to make clear to Japan how serious the Russian threat was. Stirling explained to the Governor of Nagasaki that the Queen had ‘been compelled by the Ambition and Rapacity of Russia to declare

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War against her in defence of the Liberties of Europe’, adding that ‘the gradual encroachments of Russia upon Sagalien [Sakhalin] and the Kurile Islands, point very clearly to the ulterior designs of Russia upon Japan’.9 To the Japanese however, Britain’s aggression in China made it seem unquestionably the more immediate danger to their country’s ability to manage its own affairs. When Clarendon heard that France wanted to negotiate with the Japanese jointly with Britain, he decided that it was ‘on every account’ desirable to allow them to do so and he was also keen to work with the United States.10 However, the Japan mission could only go ahead when there was no danger to British interests elsewhere in east Asia and dangers kept popping up: one was that the East Indies and China station had to make preparations to protect the British settlement in Shanghai from the Taiping rebellion as it neared the city at the end of 1853. Sufficient ships were not available to provide the honour guard Clarendon believed was needed to make the Japanese feel they needed to negotiate seriously about trade. Perry had found that he had had to threaten war to gain even a limited treaty with Japan, which did little to facilitate commerce. It seemed to Clarendon that Britain would have to put on a good show to get any result and he formally postponed the mission to Japan in September 1854. In the same month Stirling, without Clarendon’s knowledge, visited Nagasaki with the intention of signing an agreement that would facilitate his operations against the Russian Pacific squadron. He managed to negotiate the opening of Nagasaki and Hakodate to British ships under Japanese port regulations. Unfortunately, these were so limiting, Bowring told him that his instructions from the Foreign Office would have prevented him accepting them.11 Nevertheless, Clarendon decided that Britain would ratify this convention and in January 1855, the ratifications were sent to Stirling. In a nation preoccupied with the Crimean War, there was very little interest in this matter; a sign of this was that it was only briefly raised twice in the House of Commons.12 Britain’s attitude towards the opening of Japan was tested by people operating on their own. An extraordinary missionary living in Okinawa, Dr Bernát Bettelheim (a Hungarian who became a naturalised British subject), had come to the British Government’s attention in 1849. He suggested that Naha could be used as a stepping stone for trading with Japan, telling Lord Palmerston (who was actually out of office at the time, although Bettelheim probably thought he was still foreign secretary) that he hoped ‘your noble statesmanship and that your favour may ever include toward the – kyu – islands], eventually destined to become a settlement of Loochoo [the Ryu – kyu – government was link between Christendom and Japan’.13 However, the Ryu not keen and nothing came of it. Bettelheim persisted with his suggestions and Lord Palmerston, soon after becoming prime minister in 1855, forwarded letters from him pressing for Japan to be opened to trade to Clarendon, but Clarendon refused to be pressed. In April of the same year, a Liverpool merchant asked the Foreign Office for clarity as to whether the Stirling Convention permitted trade with Japan because he believed the American Convention did. Clarendon ordered a detailed comparison of the two conventions and it appeared that the essential difference between them was that the Perry agreement allowed the exchange of goods and payment, whereas the Stirling one did not. In instructions issued on 9 August 1855 he ordered Bowring to ‘come to a clear understanding with Japan about the Treaty with us being the same as with the U.S.’.14 Like Clarendon, Bowring felt that he had to have sufficient ships to be able to force the Japanese to make concessions. With Stirling on his way to Nagasaki

LORD CLARENDON, 1800–1870

35

for the exchange of ratifications, the fleet was not available to him and by the time it was, in October, Bowring decided that he could not go to Japan until the wind changed in the following spring, although steam ships could sail in unfavourable conditions. He thought his mission would probably end in failure and he was also adamant that he had to be given full authority over the naval forces (overriding Stirling). He was implacably hostile to the commander-in-chief, sending Clarendon long, rambling and repetitive diatribes about him. The permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Edmund Hammond, told Clarendon that ‘He seems to be quite mad, and he has taken the line of other madmen in fancying other people are his enemies’.15 The following gives a sense of what Clarendon had to put up with from Bowring: I thank you from my soul’s depth for kind things you have said and done – but the Shanghae repudiators are right – “I am not – I never can be the instrument adapted to their notions of public duty.” They are entitled to be dissatisfied with me – and they will be yet more dissatisfied when my tongue shall be emancipated from the restraints of official prudence and propriety – for I have yet to be heard – as well as the Mandarins – and the British mind, I believe, will never endure their improbity, – for which the British public may yet have to pay dearly.16

Bowring and Clarendon knew each other well and went back a long way: they had been appointed as commissioners tasked with modifying the customs duties of Britain and France in 1831, which had involved them working closely together. However, in his present situation, Bowring could not see, or did not care, that Clarendon, overwhelmed with other business, simply did not have the time and energy to deal with his outpourings which were ‘so numerous and bulky’. Clarendon added, ‘You need not have repeated your laments … in every letter, – one statement of facts would have been sufficient.’17 Bowring believed that Stirling’s unauthorized trip to Nagasaki had been a disaster, telling Clarendon that Stirling had ‘submitted to many humiliations’, adding that the ‘Admiral had nobody to guide or commit him – his interpreter was a common sailor who knew nothing of the language of the Mandarins, – and the Admiral … was quite bamboozled.’ Bowring did his best to get Stirling into trouble, telling Clarendon to ‘judge of my astonishment when I found that the Admiral, instead of capturing the Russian fleet had been doing my business … for 6 weeks at Nagasaki, – and making a convention – such a convention! with Japanese authorities’.18 Indeed, Stirling was ultimately recalled by the Admiralty over his failure to find and destroy the Russian Pacific squadron. Clarendon was entirely dependent on Bowring and Stirling to carry out his wishes; it took four months or so for instructions to be sent to Hong Kong and a reply to be received. He could not dictate the timing of any move because he did not know what the situation would be when his instructions arrived, which meant that Bowring could keep delaying the mission to Japan, always finding some reason not to go (they were legitimate reasons, but he could have found a way around them had he wanted to). Neither could Clarendon control Stirling’s somewhat amateurish treaty-making, which resulted in what he described as ‘a bungle’.19 Above all, Clarendon needed the two men to cooperate and in early 1855 Stirling offered Bowring a personal reconciliation, which was accepted.20 However, the problem was not just a personality clash but a fundamentally different approach. Stirling was concerned about strategic matters; he wanted the British navy to gain the right to use Japanese ports, the

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better to dominate the China seas and, if anything, believed that British merchants were more likely to hinder than help this. Bowring on the other hand, was most concerned to secure trading privileges. Bowring was angered by the fact that Clarendon had approved Stirling’s clearly flawed convention. Clarendon knew that it had little value in itself, but nonetheless considered it an important first step and decided that Stirling’s negotiations ‘appear to have been marked by great firmness and discretion, and … his conduct should receive the entire approbation of Her Majesty’s Government’.21 In spite of the fact that Clarendon supported Stirling’s efforts, he decided that he had to stop negotiating. Britain could not have two men each pursuing their own policies with respect to Japan. The professional diplomat, Bowring, had to be given charge of the negotiations. Nevertheless, Clarendon thought that a Japanese response to Stirling’s questions had to be obtained and Stirling’s successor as Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies and China station, Rear Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, arrived in Nagasaki on 3 September 1856, accompanied by three ships. He was more assertive than Stirling, forcing his way into the inner harbour in Nagasaki (he gave the Japanese an hour to remove the junks blocking the entrance – which they did). In spite of his tough approach, he found that he could obtain little that added to what Stirling had managed. Clarendon had written on 8 December 1855 that he expected Bowring to go to Japan ‘as soon as practicable’.22 The Crimean War ended in February 1856, freeing up British ships from their duty of pursuing Russian vessels. However, just when things started to look more promising, a diplomatic crisis erupted between Britain and the United States, with the Americans demanding the recall of the British Minister there, John Crampton. They were accusing him of attempting to enlist recruits to fight in the Crimean War, which was an abuse of his diplomatic privilege. War seemed very possible in the spring of 1856 which made Clarendon’s goal of achieving Anglo-American cooperation with respect to Japan impossible. The Admiralty strengthened the China squadron, ostensibly to combat piracy, but with the aim of being available for use against the Americans should war break out. Clarendon pointed out that if it did not, the ships could be used to support negotiations in China and Japan. With the additional vessels, British power became overwhelming, with a total of twenty-two ships, compared to two American and no French. When the Anglo-American diplomatic crisis had blown over, Clarendon identified this imbalance as a source of difficulty: ‘I doubt that we shall obtain any American cooperation … because they would not like to exhibit themselves very inferior to us in force’. 23 Yet again, the mission was delayed until after the winds changed and would not now take place until May 1857 at the earliest.

The Elgin Mission In March 1857, Clarendon announced that the Earl of Elgin24 would lead a mission to China and Japan to secure treaties that would allow trade and establish diplomatic relations. China was the priority and Japan was very much a sideshow. Elgin was an experienced colonial diplomat, far more levelheaded than Bowring and more expert at negotiating treaties than Stirling. He was well aware of what was expected, Clarendon telling him, ‘I do not think it is necessary to give your Excellency any detailed instructions for your negotiations with the Japanese Government.’ Essentially Clarendon wanted Elgin to establish commercial rela-

LORD CLARENDON, 1800–1870

37

tions with Japan on the same lines as existed with China. He should not attempt to claim exclusive rights because Britain was ‘anxious that other countries should reap the full benefit of our exertions for the promotion of civilization and commerce’.25 As before, Clarendon wanted the mission to be backed up by a naval force but instructed that coercion not be used; it was ‘not the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to impose a new Treaty on Japan by forcible means’, adding that they did not wish to ‘compel them to conclude a Treaty the provisions of which might be repugnant to their wishes or interests’. As Hugh Cortazzi points out, this is difficult to square with the instruction to insist on extraterritoriality without reciprocal privileges for Japanese subjects in Britain.26 Yet again, the mission to Japan had to be delayed, this time because of the Indian Mutiny. There were desperate requests from India for troops to be diverted from China there: ‘The need is very great and very urgent’, the Governor-General informed Elgin.27 Clarendon agreed, telling Elgin that the ‘struggle in which the Indian Government is now engaged is of paramount importance’.28 Japan was knocked down another rung in the priorities and by the time of Lord Elgin did go to Japan, in August 1858, Clarendon was out of office. Incidentally, in spite of the fact that both Bowring and Clarendon had been certain that it was essential for the success of a mission to Japan that it be accompanied by an impressive fleet, in the end, Elgin was only escorted by two ships. He realised there was no need for more – the Japanese were well aware that there were many more British warships a few days’ sail away and Britain had proved in China that it was more than able to fight far from home for the right to trade. In the First Opium War, Britain had defeated that nation, which had ten times the population of Japan, while losing only sixty-nine men dead. FOREIGN SECRETARY 1865–1866

Meetings with Matsuki Ko–an When Clarendon returned to the Foreign Office in 1865, there was a British Legation in Edo (Tokyo), and Kanagawa, Nagasaki and Hakodate were open to British trade, all results of the Elgin Mission. Having made these breakthroughs, the Foreign Office returned Japan to the back burner and the country received less of Clarendon’s attention than it had during his first stint as Foreign Secretary. Despite this, in March 1866 the thirty-three-year-old Matsuki – an (Terashima Munenori) from Satsuma managed to have three meetings with Ko him. Matsuki was attempting to get British support for the struggle against the Shogunate by taking control of commercial treaties from the bakufu (the Shogun’s regime) He presented a scheme for a convention of daimyo– (feudal lords) which would select a representative who had the power to exchange treaties with foreign Ministers. Matsuki attempted to make his offer as enticing as possible, telling Clarendon that the Shogunate’s monopoly on trade was damaging and that a unified state under the authority of the Emperor would be a better partner for Britain. Clarendon took the proposal seriously but was cautious. In instructions to Parkes, he wrote that the daimyo– should be encouraged to adopt some general measure in concert with the Mikado and the Tycoon to remove causes of internal dissension and foreign quarrel by putting an end throughout Japan to the restrictive and exclusive system which has been pro-

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ductive of so much mischief already and which if persevered in will probably end in civil and possibly foreign war.29

Ultimately he did not want Britain to interfere in Japanese internal affairs, which he judged that this proposal, if fully adopted would involve, because he thought it would be counterproductive. I need scarcely impress upon you’, he told Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister in Japan, ‘to be … careful against … too zealous an interference with the internal movements of the Japanese government. The change of system if change can be brought about, must appear to originate with the Japanese alone.30 In truth, Clarendon was not concerned about who governed Japan; all he really cared about was trade: ‘H.M.’s Govt. do not seek political influence but merely the development of Commerce in Japan’.31 He told Parkes that he ‘should take every convenient opportunity to impress upon the Govt. of the Tycoon the expediency of strengthening the Tycoon’s position by the creation through the agency of commerce of a prosperous and enlightened middle class throughout the whole country’. 32 Parkes was deeply sceptical about the Satsuma proposal. He thought that it was far from certain that many daimyo– would follow Satsuma’s lead and he doubted whether the Emperor would convene a council of daimyo–. At the same time, Clarendon was very concerned about Russia taking advantage of the turmoil in Japan to seize territory in Sakhalin and possibly beyond. He told Parkes, ‘It will be your duty to watch these proceedings and to put the Japanese upon guard about them. The Russians have shown no disposition to join the other treaty Powers in a common course of action but have steadily pursued their own projects.’33 Clarendon’s concern that Britain stay out of any conflict between the bakufu and daimyo– like Satsuma was part of a consistent strand of British foreign policy that had been sustained in spite of changes in government during the (by British standards) politically unstable 1850s and 1860s; between 1851 and 1853, there were five different foreign secretaries.34 FOREIGN SECRETARY 1868–1870

The Persecution of Japanese Christians By the time of Clarendon’s return to the Foreign Office in December 1868, the Meiji Restoration had largely been accomplished, and although the Boshin War would continue into the following year, a stable – government– headed by the Emperor had been established. The key ports of O saka and Hyo go had been opened to foreign trade (on 1 January 1868) and the British Government was responding positively to Japanese requests for assistance for their programme of modernization. Of the 2,299 foreigners employed by the Meiji Government during the years of 1868–1899, 928 were British.35 From the point of view of the Western powers, events in Japan were proceeding satisfactorily, apart from one very difficult point of dispute. Previously hidden Christians in Kyushu had been discovered by French missionaries in 1865 and these missionaries encouraged them to come out into the open, in spite of the fact that the penalty for being a Japanese Christian was still death. The new regime seemed determined that they should be severely punished.

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39

Clarendon’s predecessor, Lord Stanley, had urged Parkes to do his best to mitigate the punishments, but at the same time, not jeopardise the relationship with the country: ‘A rupture with Japan would paralyse a trade which promises to be of great value, while its immediate effect would scarcely be other than to increase … the pressure for persecution’.36 By the time that Clarendon was in office, there was more pressure at home to do something to stop the Japanese Christians being killed. He was not as heartless as Stanley, avoiding linking the issue with trade. Rather, he instructed Parkes to ‘continue to point out to the Japanese Government the interest felt by all Christian nations in the fate of these Converts … while scrupulously abstaining from giving their proceedings an offensive appearance in the eyes of the Japanese Government and people’. He also believed that the foreign representatives, particularly the French, should tell the Roman Catholic missionaries that they might render most important service not only to the Christian converts, but to the cause of Christianity in general, by impressing on the converts the necessity of not setting themselves up on the strength of this conversion in … opposition to the laws of the Empire. The converts few in number, and therefore weak, should seek to reconcile their rulers to themselves, by showing that the profession of the Christian religion is not incompatible with their duties as good subjects. Political no less than religious considerations may have influenced the Government in its dealings with the Christian converts, and when it is made to appear that it need have no anxiety on the former grounds, it may very possibly be less inclined to trouble itself with the latter.37

The Western powers were eventually able to get a commitment that the Japanese Christians would not be executed but they would still be dealt with harshly, being separated and sent into exile where they would be pressured to recant. Nevertheless, Clarendon was right in this last assertion and in 1873, Christianity was legalized, when the government felt secure enough to withstand any backlash. CONCLUSION There is limited value in attempting to evaluate the success of Clarendon’s actions with respect to Japan because he was essentially following the policy laid down by Lord Aberdeen in the 1840s of working to open Japan to trade while avoiding getting embroiled in any conflict there. Much the most important event of his time was the successful revolution that was achieved with relatively little bloodshed in 1868–1869 and the establishment of a stable regime that set the country on the path to modernisation. Although Britain and the other Western powers had little to do with this success, what can be said for them is that at least they did not wreck it with ill-considered interventions. Japan was also successfully opened to British traders, a goal pursued by successive foreign secretaries and by Clarendon’s death in 1870, largely complete, with the three ports that would turn significant profits for British merchants: Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki, all being open to commerce. Britain duly established friendly relations with the new government and had the advantage of being able to present itself as having been on the side of the Meiji Restoration pretty much from the start (for example, Ernest Satow does this in A Diplomat in Japan).38 The maintenance of unreciprocated extra-territorial rights until 1899 was an ongoing source of Japanese resentment. Nevertheless,

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Britain achieved its goals in Japan and ultimately found in it a useful ally, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. Lord Clarendon deserves credit for maintaining the policies that would lead to this successful conclusion. NOTES 1

2 3 4

5 6

7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19

20

21

Maxwell, Herbert, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, Fourth Earl of Clarendon, London: Edward. Ibid., 366. Ibid., 91. Arnold, 1913, vol. 2. 369. Bowring (1792–1872) was an extraordinary polymath. He claimed to speak 100 languages and read a further 100; among his diverse publications were Servian Popular Poetry, The Kingdom and People of Siam (with a foreword by King Mongkut) and Minor Morals for Young People. He was a radical Member of Parliament from 1835 to 1837 and 1841 to 1849, campaigning for, among other things, universal male suffrage, the abolition of the death penalty and decimalisation. He was far ahead of his time, these things only being accomplished in 1918, 1965 and 1971 respectively. He wrote hymns, including ‘In the Cross of Christ I Glory’ which is still sung. He led the development of a large ironworks in Maesteg, South Wales, and it was only after the failure of this venture in 1848 and the loss of his parliamentary seat in 1849, that he accepted the post of Consul in Canton (Guangzhou), going on to become the fourth governor of Hong Kong and chief superintendent of British trade in China in 1854. His legacy there is very mixed; in Hong Kong he established a water supply system, vastly improved the education system and made efforts to introduce democracy to the colony, but he also started the Second Opium War with China, which in 1857 triggered a major political crisis and general election fought over the issue of peace or war in China, in Britain. (War and Lord Palmerston won the election.) Douglas Hurd wrote this about him: ‘His restless energy, coupled with an almost total lack of discretion, brought him up each slope to somewhere near the top, then rolled him down again. (Douglas Hurd, ‘Sir John Bowring: The Radical Governor’, in History Today 17/10, October 1967.) Foreign Office to Bowring, 13 February 1854, FO 17/210. Stirling (1791–1865) had a varied naval career, which he started at the age of twelve and saw him serve all over the world. He is best remembered for exploring the Swan River in Western Australia, founding the city of Perth in 1829, and becoming the first Governor of the territory of Western Australia. His position as Commander-in-Chief, China and the East Indies Station (1854–1856) was his final command. Clarendon to Stirling, 3 July 1854, FO 17/222. Clarendon to Bowring, June 1855, Clarendon Papers C vol. 132, ff. 548–51. Stirling to the Governor of Nagasaki, 7 September 1854, FO17/224. Clarendon minute of 4 June 1854, Foreign Office Miscellanea, Series II, FO96/24/7. Bowring to Stirling, 27 November 1854, quoted in William Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834–1858, London: Luzac, 1951, 130. Although old, this book is still the best account in English of the efforts to open Japan to British trade and its excellent footnotes guided the research for this essay. Hansard, 21 May 1855, CXXXVIII, col. 834 and 15 February 1856, CXL, cols. 832–3. Bettelheim to Palmerston, 19 September 1852, FO17/195. Clarendon to Bowring, 9 August 1855, Clarendon Papers, C vol. 133, ff.307–310. Hammond to Clarendon, 27 May 1854, ibid., vol. 19, ff. 442. Bowring to Clarendon, 30 January 1855, ibid., vol. 37, ff. 152–153. Clarendon to Bowring, 9 August 1855, ibid., vol. 133, ff. 307–310; Clarendon to Bowring, 8 December 1855, ibid., vol. 134, ff. 415–20. Bowring to Clarendon, 20 July 1855, ibid., vol. 37, ff. 214–215. This word specifically referred to Stirling’s handling of the most-favoured-nation clause in the Convention. Clarendon was informed of this in a letter from Bowring; Bowring to Clarendon, 7 March 1855, ibid., vol. 37, ff. 173–174. FO to Admiralty (draft), 21 January 1856, FO46/1.

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22 23 24

25

26

27

28

29 30 31 32 33 34

35

36

37 38

41

Clarendon to Bowring, 8 December 1855, Clarendon Papers, C Vol. 134, ff. 415–420. Clarendon to Napier, 10 February 1857, ibid., ff. 571–2. James Bruce, the 8th Earl of Elgin (1811–1863) had a varied and successful career, serving as Governor of Jamaica (1842–1846), Governor-General of Canada (1847–1854) and Viceroy of India (1862–1863). He was High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary in China during the Second Opium War and ordered the destruction of the Old Summer Palace in retaliation for the torture and execution of twenty European and Indian prisoners. He was the son of the 7th Earl of Elgin, famous for removing the ‘Elgin Marbles’ from the Parthenon in Athens. Lord Clarendon to Lord Elgin, 20 April1857, Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin’s Special Missions to China and Japan 1859, presented to the House of Lords by command of Her Majesty, 1859. Hugh Cortazzi, Britain and the ‘Re-opening’ of Japan: The Treaty of Yedo of 1858 and the Elgin Mission’, London: Japan Society, 2008, 20. Lord Canning to Lord Elgin, ? May 1857, Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin’s Special Missions to China and Japan 1859. Lord Clarendon to Lord Elgin, 26 August 1857, Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin’s Special Missions to China and Japan 1859. Clarendon to Parkes, 9 April 1866, FO 262/105. Hammond to Parkes, 26 April 1866, FO 46/63. Clarendon to Parkes (draft), April 9 1866, FO 46/63. Clarendon to Parkes (draft), 20 February 1866, ibid. Clarendon to Parkes (draft), 19 April 1866. ibid. This meant that there were a lot of former foreign secretaries around when Clarendon was appointed to the position for the first time in 1853. In the Cabinet with him were three: Russell, Palmerston and Aberdeen, the prime minister, all of whom had strong, but often conflicting, views on foreign affairs. This often placed Clarendon in a difficult situation. Ikeda Kiyoshi, ‘The Douglas Mission and British Influence on the Japanese Navy’ in Sue Henny and Jean-Pierre Lehmann (eds.), Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History: Essays in Memory of Richard Storry, London: Bloomsbury, 2012, 176. Stanley to Parkes, 9 September 1868, British Documents on Foreign Affairs (University Publications of America, 1989) Vol. 1, 27. Clarendon to Parkes, 20 April 1870, FO46/123. Ernest Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1968.

4

LORD GRANVILLE, 1815–1891

Granville George Leveson-Gower 2nd Earl Granville, Foreign Secretary1870–74, 1880–85

ANDREW COBBING

Lord Granville

INTRODUCTION

I

n the course of a long political career as a prominent Liberal statesman the second Earl Granville was best known for his service in the Foreign Office, where he won a reputation for his pragmatic approach to international affairs. Granville George Leveson-Gower, to give his full name, was still in his thirties when he was appointed under-secretary during the first Opium War, and he went on to serve as foreign secretary three times. The first occasion was in his midforties when he very briefly took charge of the Foreign Office from December 1851 to February 1852. He never visited East Asia himself, but during his second and third terms as foreign secretary he often encountered Japan in a professional capacity. Moreover, he was in office during some key episodes in Japan’s campaign to revise the 1858 Ansei Treaties, among them the visit to Britain of the Iwakura Embassy in 1872, and the preliminary conference on treaty revision held in Tokyo a decade later. The question of treaty revision, and relations with Japan more broadly, were important topics but not always the most pressing concerns at the Foreign Office. Granville’s years there were punctuated by international conflicts such as the Franco-Prussian War and the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War, while Britain’s armed forces were kept preoccupied by campaigns stretching from Egypt to the Transvaal and Afghanistan. It was also a time of transition as Britain’s relations with the European Powers moved into a new phase, notably with Russia as the Great Game expanded across Asia, besides growing concern over the emerging power of now unified Germany. Britain’s relations with Japan in these years were often framed within this wider context. Indeed, in the substantial two-volume Life of Granville written by one of his former staff, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, and published in 1905, Japan is mentioned just once, and even then only in the context of narrowly avoiding war with Russia in 1885. This was the occasion when, ‘on April 26 the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Governments were notified that the British had occupied Port Hamilton off the southern coast of Korea’.2 Nevertheless, the ‘Granville Papers’ held at the National Archives demonstrate that in his second and third tenures as foreign secretary this Liberal states-

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43

man handled a substantial volume of material relating to Japan. Besides the usual official files of Foreign Office correspondence between Whitehall and Her Majesty’s representatives overseas, Granville arranged for dossiers to be compiled so that he could make informed judgments for himself. When he took office in 1870, for example, he was in a position to wade through a series of reports prepared by diplomats such as Ernest Satow, which gave him details on the recently concluded Bo– shin Civil War and the emergence of the new Meiji regime.3 Similarly, on taking office a decade later in 1880, he could review some recent developments in the negotiations to revise Britain’s treaty with Japan, at the time a topical issue as arrangements were then being put in place for a preliminary conference in Tokyo. These documents underline Lord Granville’s management style. Such was his consultative approach that his own views or personal opinions rarely shine through in Foreign Office records. As a former member of his staff pointed out, ‘one who had served under him for many years in a confidential post, and had had a long and varied experience of the heads of great Government affairs, said of him that “he was an excellent administrator”; chiefly because when in office if “he had a good man under him, he trusted him while holding all the threads in his own hands”.’4 Granville cultivated a team of administrators to whom he delegated the routine chores of daily management. When appointing a new undersecretary during his first term as foreign secretary, for example, ‘he made a noteworthy selection in the person of Mr Henry Layard, who in 1848 had become famous by the publication of his discoveries [on] the site of ancient Nineveh, and possessed an unrivalled knowledge of the East’.5 Layard went on to play a prominent role in the Foreign Office’s dealings with Japan over the next two decades. During Granville’s last term this post was filled first by Sir Charles Dilke and then the same Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice who would subsequently write up his biography. Other officials he worked with included Sir Edmund Hammond, who was permanent under-secretary for nearly two decades until 1873. To replace Hammond he then chose Charles Abbott, also known as Lord Tenterden, who had won praise for his handling of the arbitration case on the Confederate cruiser Alabama following the American Civil War. And on Tenterden’s death in 1883 he appointed Sir Julian Paunceforte in his place. Finally, there were men like Philip Currie, who after decades in various Foreign Office posts served as clerk on Eastern affairs before becoming assistant-undersecretary in 1882, and eventually permanent under-secretary himself. Discussions on British policy often feature in Foreign Office documents as a running dialogue between these trusted advisors. Suggestions or recommendations were put forward for Granville’s consideration or approval. And if the matter required further guidance from the ‘man on the spot’, in the case of Japan he invariably referred the matter to Sir Harry Parkes, Britain’s resident minister in Tokyo for most of his two later terms as foreign secretary. Parkes epitomized the ‘good man under him’ who could be trusted, even if his abrasive style meant that Granville sometimes had to employ all the tact at his disposal. It was thus no coincidence that in his last term two of the longest-serving diplomats at the British legation in Tokyo should receive official recognition, reflecting his sense of gratitude for their counsel. On 2 December 1881, Granville informed Parkes that on his recommendation he had been appointed ‘a Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St, Michael and St. George’.6 In July 1883 Ernest Satow was received into the same order as a Companion in the order just as he

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happened to be in Britain and assisting the Foreign Office with preparations for the second Tokyo conference on treaty revision.7 AS FOREIGN SECREATARY 1870–1874 In the House of Lords on 11 July 1870, the newly appointed Foreign Secretary Lord Granville reported that Hammond, the long-serving permanent under-secretary ‘had never known so great a lull in foreign affairs’.8 No doubt this opinion included a measure of relief that the Bo–shin War in Japan had now come to an end, but within days of this announcement news arrived of hostilities closer to home with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. By extension this would destabilize relations farther afield in Europe as the Eastern Question loomed back into view when Russia responded by rejecting the Black Sea clauses in the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Russian designs on territory in Central Asia also posed an increasing threat to the security of British India. As far as Japan was concerned, Granville was content to support Parkes’s agenda of reaffirming Britain’s close relations with the new Meiji regime by encouraging trade and nurturing its growing appetite for ‘civilization and enlightenment’. On a practical level this often took the form of securing contracts for foreign oyatoi experts such as Henry Dyer9 in 1873, and making arrangements for the large number of Japanese students now based in Britain to gain permission to visit industrial and military establishments such as Woolwich Arsenal and Portsmouth Naval Dockyard. Granville’s habit of following the guidance from the British legation in Tokyo led to friction at times. It was on the advice of Parkes that early in 1871 he questioned the credentials of Sameshima Naonobu, the first Japanese resident diplomat sent to Europe, following his arrival in London. As the son of a doctor and still in his twenties, Parkes considered him too junior a figure to merit the post of chargé d’affaires. When Granville made it clear that he could only be recognized as a ‘commissioner’, Sameshima crossed the English Channel and set up in Paris where he enjoyed a more favourable reception.10 The Foreign Office had no such doubts ahead of the arrival of the Iwakura embassy the following year. Instead, the first question lay over when this high-ranking mission would actually reach Europe, as Iwakura Tomomi and his vice-ambassadors were held up by protracted negotiations in Washington DC. This caused some suspicion among Granville’s staff that the Americans were trying to exert their influence over Japan at Britain’s expense. There was particular alarm at a rumour that Charles de Long, the US minister to Japan, might accompany the ambassadors to Europe.11 Partly to address these concerns Granville seemed anxious to welcome the delegation. In response to an enquiry from Iwakura transmitted through Sir E. Thornton, the British minister in Washington DC, he declared that he was happy for a conference on treaty revision to take place in Europe, ‘perhaps in Belgium or Switzerland’.12 It was the opening salvo in a dialogue that would feature large in Granville’s experience of diplomacy with Japan. The Ansei Treaties13 signed in 1858, including the Treaty of Yedo with Britain, were due to expire in 1872, so the previous year the Meiji government had declared its desire to revise those terms which, in the light of experience, proved in need of modification, or in the words of the treaty, ‘such amendments as experience shall prove desirable’.14 When Sir Harry Parkes had then canvassed the opinion of British consuls and merchants in Japan, it became clear that the foremost desire of foreign residents was to pro-

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mote trade by gaining access to the interior beyond the designated limits around the treaty ports. For Granville and the Foreign Office, therefore, such preliminary talk of a conference on the subject was largely based on the assumption that it would grant British subjects more privileges in Japan, not less. By the time the Iwakura embassy finally set foot on British soil in August 1872 the dynamics had changed considerably. Stung by the fiasco of negotiations in Washington DC where Japanese ignorance of protocol had exposed them to a ‘catechism of Western diplomacy’, Iwakura and his vice-ambassadors were now more guarded.15 Treaty revision was off the immediate agenda and any related discussion was to serve only as preparation for further talks at some later date. Moreover, there was little opportunity for Foreign Office staff to even meet their honoured guests; there was a welcome dinner at Granville’s London residence on 16 August, but after that the Japanese ambassadors spent much of their four-month stay touring Britain’s industrial heartland.16 It was not until late November that they finally engaged in talks with the foreign secretary during the course of three interviews, with W.G. Aston in attendance as interpreter. These were held on 22 November, 27 November, and 6 December, the day after Iwakura’s audience with Queen Victoria.17 The initial meeting was essentially a courtesy call, but both sides then drew on reinforcements as Granville relied to no little extent on the assistance of Parkes, while Iwakura was accompanied by Vice-Ambassador Yamaguchi Masuka and also Terashima Munenori, Japan’s new resident minister in Britain. The tone was cordial but sharp. On each occasion preliminary salutations were punctuated with mutual assurances of the unrivalled goodwill that existed between Britain and Japan. At the same time, Granville lost no opportunity in pointing out the unequal nature of the dialogue that Iwakura proposed. After all, the ambassador was only there to elicit Britain’s opinion on the matter of revising the Treaty of Yedo, as his instructions explicitly prevented him from disclosing Japan’s own position. Granville was less than pleased at providing information for little in return, but this did not stop him from holding forth on the key features that Britain might wish to see included in any revised treaty. One was access to the interior following on the responses to Parkes’s circular, for he insisted that ‘if Japan wished to assimilate herself with foreign countries, the country must be thrown open more freely’. Another was a guarantee of religious toleration, following on the disquieting reports that the Meiji authorities had exiled and interned numerous Japanese Christians from the Urakami district near Nagasaki. As Granville explained, ‘in England and America, and in an increasing degree in continental countries, the policy of religious toleration was everywhere accepted’.18 During the second interview five days later, Iwakura put forward a host of reasons why it might be difficult to grant foreigners access to the interior at this stage. Parkes was unimpressed by some of the practical obstacles suggested, insisting that ‘these difficulties were in great part the creation of the Japanese Government themselves’, but succeeded in eliciting the underlying grievance behind such reticence. This was the system of consular jurisdiction then operating in the treaty ports that denied the Meiji authorities full sovereign powers in their own land. As Iwakura put it, ‘if…foreigners were amenable to Japanese law, he saw no reason why the same facilities for trade and intercourse should not be granted as exist in England’. Granville responded by pointing out that ‘in all such cases the policy of the British Government was to yield the local author-

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ities jurisdiction over British subjects in precise proportion to their advancement and civilization’.19 At this juncture the foreign secretary creatively suggested a compromise solution of mixed tribunals including both native and foreign judges, along the lines of an experimental system then being considered for Egypt. It was not entirely Granville’s idea as Parkes had previously experimented with mixed courts in China, at Guangzhou during the second Opium War, and at Shanghai from 1864.20 Following Parkes’ arrival in Japan mixed tribunals had also appeared at Yokohama since 1866, and they featured among the themes listed in his circular to British consuls in 1871. Iwakura seemed interested, but given that he was unable to speak for his government, all he could promise was to report this proposal on his return to Tokyo. This did not stop him from despatching one member of his –, to Egypt to investigate in 1873, and the theme would retinue, Fukuchi Genichiro resurface during the Tokyo conference on treaty revision a decade later.21 For the time-being, however, only incremental progress was made on the question of access to the interior, with Parkes managing to secure the introduction of a limited system of passports for travel inland in 1874, although categorically not yet for commercial purposes. Religious toleration was also difficult to realize immediately, Iwakura explained, due to the historical circumstances surrounding its prohibition several hundred years before. Rather imaginatively, he claimed that ‘the introduction of Christianity into Japan was the occasion of a great national disaster. It was the cause of a civil war.’ He must have known that religion alone could hardly account for the Era of Warring States or, on a smaller scale, even the Shimabara Rebellion. Nevertheless, he and his vice-ambassadors were increasingly aware that no other issue damaged Japan’s claims of ‘advancement and civilization’ more. Together with the advice they received from other European diplomats on their subsequent tour of the continent, Granville’s remonstrations had an immediate and apparently tangible effect. In March 1873, R.J. Watson, Parkes’s deputy in Tokyo, was able to report by telegraph: ‘The Japanese Government announce to Foreign Representatives that Proclamations prohibiting Christianity are withdrawn. All banished Christians are to be restored to their homes.’22 Long-held prejudices were not removed overnight, however, as in practice it would take time for discrimination to disappear, and it was not until the 1889 Meiji Constitution before religious toleration was enshrined in law.23 Having listened and responded to Granville’s two points in the second interview, Iwakura ventured a request of his own by calling for the removal of the British garrison that had been stationed at Yokohama since 1863. Guided by Parkes, Granville would acknowledge in the next meeting that there was no longer a need for a large force there, but pointed out that their numbers were so reduced that it had become little more than a ‘guard of honour to the Legation’. Nevertheless, Iwakura insisted that ‘the presence of these troops was injurious to the Mikado’s Government’. In the event, after a strenuous campaign by Terashima in his new role as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the last remnants of this British garrison finally embarked from Yokohama in 1875.24 In another development just before the close of the second interview, Terashima suddenly produced a memorandum on the Shimonoseki indemnity. This issue dated back to 1864 when the British had negotiated terms with the – shu – domain after an allied squadron silenced the guns overlooking the ShiCho monoseki Strait, reopening access to the Inland Sea for foreign shipping. As part of

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the agreement a sum of $3,000,000 in damages was to be paid by the Tokugawa bakufu, half of which remained outstanding when the Meiji government took power four years later. Not yet having had a chance to study the document, Granville observed that ‘it was usual when an agreement was made that it should be adhered to’, but he was placated by Terashima’s assurance that it did at least suggest ‘an equivalent for the three instalments remaining due’. In the last interview, however, Granville questioned Terashima’s claim, although he did agree to defer the next demand for payment until the embassy had returned to Japan. As he put it, this would give Iwakura the opportunity to convey his wish for ‘the removal of restrictions on intercourse and commerce, which was all that was asked for’.25 At this juncture Granville even seems to have been offering to waive part or all of the indemnity in return for some concession on access to the interior. At the same time he took pains to claim the moral high ground by insisting that ‘the British Government would not haggle about a sum of money’, and ‘had no wish to drive a bargain’.26 Unwilling to be drawn, Iwakura insisted on decoupling these issues by pointing out that ‘the indemnity was a question quite distinct from that of the revision of the treaty’. Ultimately, the Meiji government would continue to pay off the indemnity in instalments, finishing off in 1874. For Granville, however, this was not quite the end of the matter, for in 1883 US President Chester Arthur would pay back the Americans’ share, a sum of $785,000.87. This sum had been sitting in an American bank account accruing interest for several years, and the US ships and men had suffered relatively little damage at Shimonoseki anyway. Nevertheless, it won the Americans a measure of popularity in Tokyo, particularly as the interest was then used to pay for the construction of new docks in Yokohama. It was an offer that the foreign secretary could not match. The third interview held on 6 December 1872 was the last time Granville met the visiting Japanese officials before the Iwakura embassy left for France on the next stage of their global tour. As his secretary told Parkes in a note five days later, ‘Lord Granville thinks you had better put off saying anything about the leave taking till after tomorrow evening, when he will have gone out of town. He sends a photograph of himself and Lady Granville, which he begs you to present to the Ambassadors, in his name, with such pretty speeches as you think suitable.’27

AS FOREIGN SECRETARY 1880–1885 Granville was faced with a complex international scene from the outset when he took charge of the Foreign Office for the third time in 1880. The recent Russo-Turkish War had brought the Eastern Question back to the centre-stage of European diplomacy, and debate raged over the future of the Balkan Peninsula. Rebellion against the Khedive in Egypt was causing unease over the security of the Suez Canal, leading to British military intervention in 1882. Quite apart from the question of Irish Home Rule, the outlook was also unsettled on the fringes of Britain’s colonies. The second Afghan War was drawing to a close, but plans to annex the Transvaal would soon provoke the first Boer War. Moreover, France was now showing more ambition in North Africa, and there was concern that Germany might yet have colonial aspirations as well.

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Back at the Foreign Office, Granville’s first decision relating to Japan was on the symbolic question of what to call the capital city of the Meiji state. As undersecretary Sir Julian Paunceforte explained, ‘the Japanese are annoyed at our not using the new name of Tokio’. Parkes, he noted, had always attached particular importance to the old name of Yedo since the treaty of that name signed in 1858 remained in force. Nevertheless, he persuaded the foreign secretary to accept Japan’s request by advising that ‘the ground put forward for not accepting the new name of Tokio, in my opinion, cannot be sustained’.28 Granville could reflect with some satisfaction on the fact that the key issues in his interviews with Iwakura eight years earlier had now been largely resolved. Religious tolerance was acknowledged by the Meiji government, if not yet by the population at large. The British troops stationed at Yokohama had long since left. The Shimonoseki indemnity had been paid in full, even if US President Chester Arthur was to revisit the case two years later by returning the American share. The question of access to the interior, however, remained a point of controversy, as British residents in Japan still railed against the restrictions imposed by the system of limited passports introduced in 1874. Moreover, the attendant issue of consular jurisdiction loomed larger than ever, and with it the privilege of extraterritoriality that the British (and Parkes in particular) held almost sacrosanct, despite growing calls from the Japanese to reclaim full sovereign control. Granville instructed Paunceforte to draw up a report tracing the background to negotiations on treaty revision over the past decade.29 This showed how his predecessor the Marquess of Salisbury had agreed to a preparatory international conference to be held in London, before conceding to a Japanese request for it to be held in Tokyo instead. Before long, Inoue Kaoru, the new Japanese minister for foreign affairs, set out a concrete set of proposals for a revised treaty. Parkes produced a damning verdict on this draft, however, insisting that ‘the Japanese do not contemplate “revision” of the existing Treaty and Convention of 1858 and 1866 respectively, but their total abrogation and the substitution of two entirely new Treaties’.30 Despite the intransigence of Parkes, by this stage the Foreign Office could not entirely discount a growing swell of opinion in favour of treaty revision. In Tokyo this was articulated forcefully in a series of articles that appeared in the Ho–chi Shimbun newspaper, and there were some reservations in British circles as well.31 Some feared, for example, that German, Russian and American diplomats might seek to undermine British influence in Japan by offering more concessions than the Foreign Office would contemplate. In the words of one Member of Parliament, ‘it seems a thousand pities to see a government and people like those of Japan pushed into the arms of Russia and Germany’.32 The first preliminary conference opened in Tokyo in January 1882 and weekly meetings ran for six months until July. No resolutions were reached, although Inoue surprised the foreign representatives on one occasion by announcing that Japan might accept a system of mixed tribunals in exchange for the eventual abolition of extraterritoriality. The compromise solution that Granville had once proffered to Iwakura now seemed to hold the key. Based on a report by Sir Richard Rennie (who was Chief Justice of the British Supreme Court for China and Japan until 1891), however, Parkes remained unconvinced of the competency of Japanese courts, and Britain was still unwilling to surrender the most favoured nation clause in the existing treaties. Agreement was at least reached on the need for a fresh round of talks, and all the powers now accepted that treaty revision was inevitable at some point.

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As preparations for further negotiations took shape, Granville turned to Sir Francis Plunkett,33 the man due to take over in Tokyo now that Parkes had won promotion to the post of British minister in Beijing. On one occasion in – Hirobumi who, as he explained to May 1883 he also held an interview with Ito Parkes, was ‘visiting this country for a short time on his way to the coronation of the Emperor of Russia at Moscow, as Special Representative of the Mikado’.34 Meanwhile, Mori Arinori, the Japanese minister in London sometimes pushed his case too forcefully for the liking of even his own ministry for foreign affairs. Inoue had to apologize to Granville for his excesses, and as Parkes pointed out on one occasion: ‘language of paragraph 9 of Japanese Minister’s memorandum [is] unauthorized by [the] Foreign Minister’.35 Ernest Satow was also now in Britain on leave, helping the Foreign Office with preparations. When a British proposal met with only a lukewarm response from the other treaty powers, for example, he reassured Plunkett that a rival German proposal, initially welcomed on the continent, did not offer substantially any more concessions than their own.36 On his arrival in Tokyo early in 1884, Plunkett was able to strengthen his government’s negotiating hand by preparing a more conciliatory British proposal. At this stage there was growing optimism that a resolution was in sight. As Plunkett informed Granville, ‘I concur in Sir Richard Rennie’s view, that a good system of mixed courts will possibly form the best stepping-stone from the present to the future in Japan.’37 Such was the divergence of opinion among the foreign representatives, however, that preparations for the next conference were considerably delayed. In the event, it was not until 1886 that formal negotiations got underway in Tokyo based on a jointly devised Anglo-German proposal involving mixed tribunals. These would ultimately produce a draft revised treaty, only for the Japanese public to then turn against Inoue when news emerged about his covert strategy of introducing foreign judges into Japanese courts. By this time, however, Granville had retired from the Foreign Office. Faced with the growing challenge of Germany, his conciliatory approach and receptivity to new ideas such as Home Rule were increasingly viewed as a liability within the Liberal Party. Particularly damaging was his failure to uphold British claims to Angra Pequena in Southwest Africa, which Bismarck managed to secure as a German Protectorate in 1884. When the Conservatives took power in 1885, Granville was replaced by the Marquess of Salisbury and, ever faithful to his old friend William Gladstone, when a new Liberal Government was formed the following year, he bowed out gracefully as Lord Rosebery was preferred to the post of foreign secretary in his place. CONCLUSION Granville died in 1891 at the age of seventy-five, and so did not live to see the end of the treaty ports. Nevertheless, his time at the helm of the Foreign Office spanned an important phase in Anglo-Japanese relations. In the early Meiji years the prospect of placing treaty relations on a more equal footing seemed a distant prospect, not least due to Sir Harry Parkes’s vigorous defence of British privileges in Japan. In the event, the compromise solution of mixed tribunals that Granville once suggested to Iwakura in London would prove unworkable, given the rising tide of popular nationalist sentiment in Japan. Within diplomatic circles, however, his more conciliatory style certainly enabled dialogue to progress and help chart a course towards a future agreement.

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NOTES 1

2

3

4

5 6

7 8 9

10

11 12

13

14 15 16

17

18 19 20

21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31

32

Granville George Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl Granville, KG, PC, FRS (11 May 1815 – 31 March 1891), styled Lord Leveson until 1846. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of Lord Granville George Leveson Gower Second Earl Granville, Vol. II (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), p. 440. For example, Inclosure 7 in No. 13. Memorandum by Mr Satow on the present State of Affairs, 5 January 1868. PRO 30/29/250. The Life of Lord Granville, p. 450. This former confidential advisor is identified as Sir Robert Meade, 1891. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 47. Granville to Parkes, 2 December 1881. FO 46/270 To Mr. Kennedy and Sir H. Parkes, January to December 1881. Granville to the Chancellor, 20 July 1883. FO 46/307 Consular Domestic 1883. Hansard 3, 203, 1870, 3. A biographical portrait of Henry Dyer by Olive Checkland is contained in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume III, ed. J.E. Hoare, Japan Library, 1999. Sir Hugh Cortazzi, ‘Japanese Envoys in Britain, 1862–72’ in Ian Nish(ed.), Japanese Envoys in Britain, 1862–1964 (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007), p. 18. Parkes to Hatakeyama Yoshinari (Soogioora), 20 January 1872, FO 46/151. Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville (telegraphic confidential). 18 March 1872. PRO 30/29/250. Plans for a conference in Europe were promptly quashed by US Secretary of State Hamilton Fish. Marlene Mayo, ‘A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: Japan and Hamilton Fish 1872’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, May 1967, p. 404. See Britain and the Re-Opening of Japan, The Treaty of Yedo and the Elgin Mission by Sir Hugh Cortazzi. Japan Society, 2008. Parkes to Granville, 22 May 1871. PRO 30/29/312. See Mayo, ‘A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: Japan and Hamilton Fish 1872’, pp. 389–410. Kume Kunitake, The Iwakura Embassy, 1871–73: A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation Through the United States of America and Europe (Tokyo: The Japan Documents, 2002), p. 54. W.G. Aston’s memoranda of interviews between Granville and Iwakura, 22 November, 27 November, 6 December 1872. FO 881/2138. Ibid. Ibid. Par Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 58, 66. Ange-Maxime Outry, former French Minister to Japan, also suggested waiving the Shimonoseki indemnity for access to the interior just three weeks later in a memorandum drafted on 17 December 1872. Richard Sims, ‘France’, Ian Nish (ed.), The Iwakura Mission: A New Assessment (Folkestone: Japan Library, 1998), p. 78. Ibid, p. 154. FO 46/165. From Sir H. Parkes & Mr Watson, January and February 1873. John Breen, ‘Earnest Desires: The Iwakura Embassy and Religious Policy’, Japan Forum, vol. 10, no. 2, 1998, pp. 153–4. W.G. Aston’s memorandum. 6 December 1872. FO 881/2138. Ibid. Ibid. J.F. Wetherall to Parkes, 11 December 1872. PRO 30/29/113. Paunceforte to Granville.15 May 1880. FO 46/255. Sir Julian Paunceforte Memorandum, 13 January 1881. FO 46/279 Revision of Treaties, January to April 1881. Ibid. ‘These articles, taken as a whole, form an ably-written treatise, from a Japanese point of view, of treaty revision. They furnish a clear and accurate record of the past twenty years…there is no doubt that these articles… have attracted much notice, and have greatly influenced public opinion in Japan.’ Kennedy to Salisbury, 22 February 1880. PRO 30/29/312 Granville Papers – printed for the use of the Foreign Office, July 1881. E.J. Reed. M.P. to Sir Charles W. Dilke. 30 December 1883. PRO 30/29/313.

LORD GRANVILLE, 1815–1891

33

34 35 36 37

51

A biographical portrait of Sir Francis Plunkett by Hugh Cortazzi is contained in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IV, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Japan Library, 2002. Granville to Parkes, 30 April 1883. PRO 30/29/313. Parkes to Granville. Telegraph, 10 May 1883. Ibid. Satow to Plunkett, 6 January 1884. Ibid. Plunkett to Granville, 17 October 1844. PRO 30/29/313.

5

LORD DERBY, 1826–93

[Lord Stanley and 15th Fifteenth Earl of Derby]

Foreign Secretary as Lord Stanley 1866–68 and as Lord Derby 1874–78

ROBERT MORTON

AND

ANDREW COBBING

Lord Derby

INTRODUCTION

T

he Fifteenth Earl of Derby (1826–1893) served twice as foreign secretary in Conservative governments, from 1866 to 1868 and again from 1874 to 1878. This portrait is therefore, after this introduction, divided into two parts, treating his first and second stints in office separately. To make things complicated, he has to be described as Lord Stanley in the first part – the courtesy title by which he was known until he succeeded to the title of Lord Derby on the death of his father on 23 October 1869. The Fifteenth Earl’s father was prime minister three times, albeit for a total of less than four years, and they are the only father and son to have served together in a British Cabinet. In their public manner they were opposites: the father, flamboyant and dazzling, the son, plodding and conscientious. In photographs, the younger Derby looks overweight and sedentary, but the diplomat A.B. Mitford (who served at the British Legation in Japan in the late 1860s), recorded that he regularly exercised in a gymnasium; Mitford considered that his approach at the Foreign Office was the same he showed in the gym: he had ‘the strength of a bull and the determination of a gladiator, [but] without one spark of enthusiasm’.1 The historian John Vincent uses the adjectives ‘punctual’, ‘exact’, ‘careful’, ‘lonely’ and ‘shy’ to describe him.2 He adds, ‘In most ways he was not a remarkable man. He could not speak on his feet. He had no phrases. He was overshadowed by the black genius of his father and by the arts of Disraeli. He did not represent concentrated power in any form. But he represented integrity.’3 FOREIGN SECRETARY, 1866–1868 (Robert Morton)

Lord Stanley’s two and a half years at the Foreign office in the late 1860s exactly coincided with the critical period in Japan that saw the fall of the Shogun and the Meiji Restoration. However, he showed relatively little interest in the country and almost never mentioned it in his diary. There were, of course, far more 52

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pressing matters for a British foreign secretary at the time – to name just two, the American Civil War had just ended and the Franco-Prussian War was about to begin. In Japan, there were few British interests at stake, although Britain’s trade with east Asia as a whole was immense, worth around £40 million a year (for comparison, national taxation in the United Kingdom raised less than £70 million a year at the time).4 Most of this money was made in China – Stanley told the House of Commons that Chinese trade was exactly ten times greater than Japanese.5 He was keen that restrictions be removed that were preventing Chinese levels of trade flourishing with Japan. RELATIONSHIP WITH SIR HARRY PARKES The enactor of Stanley’s policies in Japan was the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes (1828–1885). The two men could hardly have been more different; Derby was the scion of one of the richest and most powerful aristocratic dynasties in Britain, while Parkes was the son of a Walsall iron merchant. Their correspondence suggests a harmonious, correct relationship, with Stanley displaying a high degree of trust in Parkes. For example, in March 1868, Stanley was telling Parkes, ‘Her Majesty’s Government place full reliance on your discretion in dealing with all the difficult and perplexing questions which may arise out of the existing state of things in Japan.’ Parkes reciprocating by hewing very carefully to the line laid down by Stanley.6 At the same time, Stanley must surely have known about Parkes’ often aggressive manner of diplomacy, which was the antithesis of his own measured style. Indeed, Stanley’s letters to Parkes are peppered with requests to Parkes to be restrained in his dealings with Japanese interlocutors, with much use of phrases such as ‘friendly representation and remonstrance’, ‘representation in moderate terms’ and ‘you may point out in a friendly way’.7 But Parkes had learned his trade in rough postings in China and had no experience of the graceful quadrille of European diplomacy. Perhaps he was simply incapable of keeping his temper when he did not get his way. When he left Japan, a Japanese newspaper wrote of his ‘Smashing of glasses at our prime minister’s table; physically assaulting… an individual now of elevated rank; insulting the ex-minister for foreign affairs, Terashima.’8 If Stanley was aware of this kind of thing, he would probably have felt that it was unfortunate, but excusable in a place like Japan which, if it was not exactly barbaric, was certainly a place that followed its own strange rules. BRITISH NEUTRALITY Stanley’s policy aims in Japan were modest. He did not care whether Japan was governed by a shogun or an emperor, and indeed thought this was none of Britain’s business. He certainly did not intend to colonise Japan or create Chinese-style concessions there, as many Japanese feared. He wanted Britain to remain strictly neutral in any internal conflict and avoid any risk of military involvement, while defending its rights. He expressed it like this to Parkes on 10 March 1868: Her Majesty’s Government have only one object in Japan, the maintenance of friendly intercourse and trade with the ruling Powers and the people of the country. They have no intention of identifying themselves with any party that may spring up, or of aiming at any influence beyond what is required for

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upholding their Treaty rights. These rights you will steadily uphold, though without enforcing them by any other means than by argument…. [O]nly in the last extremity… is recurrence to be had to force.9

Nevertheless, Ernest Satow and others claimed that the British had quietly supported anti-bakufu domains from as early as 1864.10 Gordon Daniels has disputed this, but it is nevertheless possible to identify some bias in that direction on the part of Parkes, that was condoned, and even occasionally initiated by Stanley.11 For example, in instructions to Parkes dated 28 November 1867, Stanley tells Parkes to make independent arrangements with domains – something that would undermine the shogunate – instructing him to promote as far as you can any system which, by securing to the Daimios a fair share in the commerce of Japan, will enlist their sympathies in behalf of foreign nations and so promote the development of trade.12

This trade included British arms, such as those being sold with Parkes’ knowledge by Thomas Glover to the Satsuma domain, that would be turned on the bakufu. In another sign of apparent British sympathy for anti-shogunate forces, Parkes admitted to Stanley that his staff (Satow and Mitford) were forging connections with rebellious daimyo–, explaining it in this way in February 1867: It is by no means desirable that our communications with the Daimios should be confined to that section who appear opposed to the existing government, but the efforts hitherto made by myself and the officers of this Legation to cultivate, while in Yedo, the acquaintance of this class, have hitherto met with little encouragement either from the Daimios themselves or from the Tycoon’s Government.13

Satow went well beyond the official policy of neutrality at these meetings, Saigo– Takamori writing after one on 12 January 1867 that Satow had actively encouraged him to challenge the shogun’s regime.14 However, even if Parkes was aware that such things were being said by his juniors, he did not give any hint of it to Stanley. Consequently, Stanley made no comment on issues like this, beyond reiterating the official line of maintaining neutrality. Generally, he left the details of how his instructions would be carried out to Parkes. He did, however, give specific instructions relating to issues that seemed more clear cut, like the problem of Japanese officials showing insufficient respect for Queen Victoria: You will take an opportunity of informing the Japanese Government that you are prohibited from accepting any letter or listening to any verbal communication, in which any title inferior to that of the Mikado, or any foreign sovereign whatever, is applied to the Queen.15

RECOGNIZING THE NEW REGIME Immediately after the shogun resigned, Parkes asked for new credentials as his existing ones named the shogun, not the emperor, as head of state. He told Stanley on 28 November 1867: In view of the change in the constitution of the Government of Japan… I would submit to your Lordship the propriety of my being furnished at once with a

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letter of credence from Her Majesty to the Mikado, whose position as Sovereign of this country de facto, as well as de jure, cannot now, I presume, admit of question.16

Nevertheless, in spite of Parkes’ last comment, the question of who was in charge of Japan was still open, and remained so, the civil war, known as the Boshin War, continuing well into 1869. However, Stanley agreed with him about the need for fresh credentials, and managed to get them quickly prepared – they reached Japan in April 1868, long before any other foreign Minister had them. When Parkes presented them, on 22 May, the emperor’s forces were still not completely in control of Edo (which was about to be renamed Tokyo), much less the north of the country. But Britain was nonetheless sending the message that it was treating the emperor’s government to be that of the whole nation. It turned out to be a shrewd move, but it was a gamble – had the emperor’s forces been defeated, the Shogunate could have regained power and the British would have had to backtrack. JAPANESE CHRISTIANS One of the stickiest problems Parkes and Stanley had to deal with was the persecution of Christians that resumed in 1867. Christianity had been illegal in Japan for two hundred and fifty years, but substantial pockets of ‘hidden Christians’ had held on to the faith through the generations, particularly in western Kyushu. French missionaries discovered these Christians and encouraged them to come out of hiding in spite of the fact that the religion was still illegal in Japan. The initial reaction of the emperor’s regime was harsh – most of his ministers thought they should be forced to recant, and any that did not should be executed. At first Stanley was relaxed about the issue; he himself was not particularly religious and he did not feel it was an issue that Britain could interfere in. He adopted a typically mild tone in his instructions to Parkes: H.M. Govt. regret much to hear that native Christians have been subjected to persecution, and although in this case the Christians seem in some degree to have brought on themselves the persecution to which they have been exposed, yet there does not seem to be any objection to your using your influence privately with the authorities to mitigate any severities which may be threatened against them.17

Some progress was made, with Parkes managing to get an official description of Christianity as a ‘heretical’ and ‘evil’ sect toned down. When he heard about this, Stanley wrote, ‘I have the satisfaction to convey to you Her Majesty’s entire approval of your conduct…, which is in no particular more complete than as regards the manner in which you dealt with the obnoxious Edict respecting Christianity.’18 However, while this appeased the feelings of Westerners, it did nothing to help the Japanese Christians. It looks like pressure mounted on Stanley, because he sounds a good deal more concerned about the problem in September 1868, in a letter which shows him considering a more active policy: It is certain that the ill-treatment of native Christians on account of the religion they profess will not be regarded with indifference either in Europe or the United States; and whatever may be the abstract right of Japan, as an indepen-

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dent nation, to enforce its own laws, however unsuited to modern habits of thought, there is a point beyond which the enforcement of those laws could not be carried without provoking among European nations a feeling of indignation and a demand for action on the part of their Governments which it might be difficult for those Governments to resist. But in seeking to avert the threatened evil, it is necessary to proceed with caution. A rupture with Japan would paralyse a trade which promises to be of great value, while its immediate effect would scarcely be other than to increase, for a time at least, the pressure for persecution which the governing Powers in Japan, however well disposed, might be unable to withstand.19

Many of Stanley’s contemporaries, particularly William Gladstone, who was about to become prime minister, would have been outraged at the idea of treating trade as being a higher British priority than the lives of Christians.20 His victory in the general election at the end of 1868 meant that Stanley no longer had to worry about the Japanese Christians; his responsibilities transferred to Lord Clarendon, who essentially followed the same policies with respect to Japan. Western pressure managed to prevent any executions, but not the separating and dispersing of those Christians who refused to recant. However, toleration of Christianity officially started in Japan in 1872. … FOREIGN SECRETARY, 1874–1878 (Andrew Cobbing) Six years later the former Lord Stanley returned to the Foreign Office as the Earl of Derby with Disraeli’s second Conservative government. In 1875, he assented to Disraeli’s controversial purchase of shares in the Suez Canal. Increasingly, however, it was the Eastern Question21 that dominated foreign affairs. The plight of Japanese Christians may have caught the attention of the Victorian public, but not with quite the sense of alarm that greeted reports of Christian populations massacred in Bulgaria,22 and the resulting Russo-Turkish War. When he did cast his mind farther east to Japan, Derby was surely struck by the changes since his last term in office. Back in the 1860s this was a crumbling regime, facing revolution and the turmoil of civil war. Now it was a unified modernizing state, spared the infighting of all those fractious daimyo, and stunning the world with its remarkable progress. Derby did not seem altogether convinced; on reading Baron von Hübner’s23 A Ramble Around the World, published in 1871 (English translation 1874), he agreed with him that China’s slower implementation of European ideas stood a better chance of success than Japan’s, ‘because they do not adopt them in haste’.24 He also found that managing Britain’s affairs with Japan had become a more complex business these days. Previously it was largely a matter of receiving and responding to despatches from Sir Harry Parkes. Now Derby’s assistants handled a steady flow of correspondence from the Japanese legation, established in London in September 1872. Another innovation was the recently installed telegraph line at Whitehall, connecting the Foreign Office to a growing cable network and various ‘men on the spot’. None were farther away than Sir Harry, but the completion of a Japanese telegraph line between Nagasaki and Tokyo in 1874 allowed messages to be sent from London to the British legation within a matter of hours.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH PARKES The telegraph might come in useful if Derby ever needed to restrain Britain’s single-minded representative in Japan. In these early years, however, telegrams were expensive and unreliable, so the Foreign Office still depended on the usual despatches, taking two months to reach Japan by sea. 25 The Foreign Office could only hope that Sir Harry had mellowed since the days in 1856 when his actions in Canton helped precipitate the Second Opium War. Perhaps the only time Derby hurried to intervene was in 1875 when, convinced of an imminent Russian threat to British interests, Parkes wanted to send Royal Navy ships to occupy the island of Port Hamilton off the south coast of Korea. Viewed from Whitehall this looked more like an unprovoked invasion, and satisfied there was no danger, Derby instructed Parkes to stay his hand.26 The various campaigns involving Japanese troops in the 1870s rarely caused much concern in the Foreign Office. The Saga Rebellion in 1874 and subsequent samurai revolts in 1876 were quickly suppressed. The first stand-offs between Japan and China soon blew over as well. The Formosa expedition in 1874 was resolved by the end of the year, and Japan’s success in securing the Treaty of Ganghwa with Korea in 1876 was generally hailed for opening this ‘Hermit Nation’ to trade.27 The only mention of Sino-Japanese tensions to appear in Derby’s diary was in 1875 when Sir Thomas Wade, the British minister to China, suggested that ‘Russian agents were busy stirring up the Japanese to fight, and advising the authorities at Pekin not to give way.’ Even then his preoccupation with the Eastern Question shone through as he commented, ‘If true, this is exactly their policy in Turkey.’28 Similarly, news of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 sounded alarming at first but posed little danger to British subjects, especially once Saigo– Takamori’s advance north was halted in March. Russia’s declaration of war on Turkey in April caused far more disquiet in Whitehall. CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE JAPANESE LEGATION It was a new experience for Derby to communicate with accredited Japanese diplomats in London. To some extent their presence also reduced his dependence on information from Parkes. Despite the cost of maintaining such permanent missions abroad, the Meiji regime considered this money well spent as they tried to outmanoeuvre Western diplomats in Japan. As a correspondent for the Japan Gazette put it in 1876: The fact of there being Japanese Ministers Plenipotentiary, who are recognized as on an equality with those of other nations, the Government, and it may be added, the more educated people generally, have come to consider ministers much as other men, and not as formerly in the light of ministering or destructive angels sustained by heaven-like power.29

When Derby returned to Whitehall in 1874, the Japanese Legation was housed in a terraced building at No. 9 Upper Belgrave Street not far from Buckingham Palace. Then in September the mission moved into larger premises, if slightly out of the way, at No. 9 Kensington Park Gardens in Notting Hill. Motono Morimichi had recently been supervising there as chargé d’affaires, but now he handed over to Ueno Kagenori,30 the new minister plenipotentiary to Britain. Messages from the legation became a regular feature of the Foreign Office’s dealings with Japan.

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Often these were simple requests on behalf of Japanese students to obtain permission from the War Office or the Royal Navy to visit military installations such as Woolwich Arsenal or Portsmouth Dockyard. Once a year, they also submitted a detailed report on the coinage produced at the new Imperial Mint in Osaka. For most of this business Derby could simply nod when briefed, but occasionally a letter from Ueno prompted some discussion, especially when it concerned the rights of British subjects in Japan. EARLY SKIRMISHES OVER TREATY REVISION It was during the early 1870s that the Meiji government launched its first initiatives to try and revise the Ansei Treaties,31 and inherited from the Tokugawa regime. Derby’s predecessor Lord Granville32 discussed this in general terms when the Iwakura33 Embassy visited London in 1872. In the absence of any specific demands he encouraged his guests to consider mixed courts – a compromise solution introduced in Egypt – and advised (or warned) that any concessions over jurisdiction depended on their reaching some notional ‘standard of civilization’.34 Derby, however, remained sceptical about the reports of progress in Japan, possibly with von Hübner’s counsel in mind. This was surprising given the principled stand he took over Egypt during his earlier term as foreign secretary. As he told the House of Commons in 1868, ‘the exercise of this Consular jurisdiction was an anomaly which it was desirable to remove’ and he even declared, ‘there is no doubt that jurisdiction extra territorial of that kind is in itself an evil’.35 For Derby, however, Japan was a more distant, still mysterious land. The issue first arose in May 1874 when he agreed to meet Frederick Marshall, a British expatriate employed by the Japanese Legation in Paris.36 Sent to London to sound out the views of the Foreign Office, Marshall wanted to know if Britain might follow the lead of the United States in signing a postal convention with Japan.37 Derby seemed sympathetic at first, but ended up disparaging the superficial nature of Japan’s reforms, and anyway the postmaster general objected. More broadly he conceded that tariffs might need some adjustment, but abolishing consular jurisdiction was out of the question.38 Nevertheless, the Meiji state was beginning to show its mettle. The British garrison stationed at Yokohama since 1863 would finally depart in 1875, as agreed in principle when Iwakura had met Granville in London. From a Japanese viewpoint, the treaty port no longer felt quite so much like occupied territory (at least not by the army). The Meiji authorities’ officious new policy of observing regulations to the letter was also now having an effect on life in the treaty ports. As the same Japan Gazette correspondent observed in 1876: The action which the government of this country has lately taken regarding shooting licences, the treaty limits, and other questions, so small and petty in themselves as to be almost beneath the attention of a government, shows nevertheless the determination of the Japanese to keep foreigners to the literal meaning of a treaty so long as it continues in force.39

When Ueno announced the proposals for shooting licences in London, Derby immediately protested, ‘the principle at stake involves in fact the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction’. Lord Tenterden, the permanent undersecretary of state, was also puzzled as this was never a problem in China where ‘foreign residents in Shanghai go up the river great distances on shooting excursions and are

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absent sometimes for weeks’.40 They were now having second thoughts about the desirability of mixed courts as well, for as Derby confessed, ‘I do not think we can trust the Japanese sufficiently as yet to alter our “judicial arrangements”.’41 At the same time, they could no longer be quite so complacent about foreign privileges supposedly enshrined in the treaties. As the Japanese pointed out, these said nothing about shooting at all, so the only way to amend the local ban on hunting then in force was to come to terms over licences. Derby had to admit, ‘the letter of the Japanese Minister is well written, and contains some arguments with which we have not dealt’.42 By this stage, however, he was more distracted by the publication of Gladstone’s pamphlet on Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, condemning the heavy-handed suppression of a Christian rebellion by Ottoman troops.43 Parkes continued to champion the privileges of British subjects, but the Meiji authorities were incrementally extending their control in the treaty ports. In 1876, the British minister conceded their right to apply new press laws to ban the Bankoku Shinbun newspaper published in Japanese by John Reddie Black. Similarly, the Foreign Office sympathized but could do nothing to prevent the rigorous passport checks for Japanese passengers boarding P & O, but not domestic, steamers on the Yokohama-Nagasaki run.44 The abolition of torture in 1876 also suggested that Japanese law was beginning to move towards the ‘civilized’ standards suggested by Granville. In February 1877, Marshall was again in London, this time proposing a conference in Europe to discuss consular jurisdiction in addition to tariff reform. Derby was dismissive: Mr Marshal [sic] is always trying on these extra official communications. The idea of a conference at the Hague is absurd. We cannot pass over Sir Harry Parkes & I agree that a conference at the Hague w’ld be inefficient. But we will bear in mind what Mr Marshall says. He knows the feelings of the Japanese Govt.45

The outbreak of the Satsuma Rebellion just three days before did not help Japan’s cause, particularly when reports on the campaign brought renewed allegations of torture. Nevertheless, by 1879, Lord Salisbury, Derby’s successor, had agreed to hold a conference on treaty revision in London. In the event this convened in Tokyo in 1882, commencing the negotiations that finally dismantled consular jurisdiction by 1899. This seemed a long way off at the start of 1878. Already, however, the Japanese had shown their capacity to run postal services in the treaty ports. Now all Derby wanted to know was if Parkes saw any objection to closing the British post offices there, a concession that duly followed later that year. He was also anxious for news on the movements of Russian ships in Japanese waters.46 As the Russo-Turkish War (and his own tenure) drew to a close, he was doing all he could to prevent British intervention. In January he resigned briefly when the Cabinet decided to send ships through the Dardanelles, and again in April when it called up the reserve. Later he would defect to the Liberals and serve as colonial secretary under Gladstone, but Japan features only rarely in his diary.47 NOTES 1 2

Lord Redesdale, Memories, vol. I (London: Hutchinson, 1915), 114–115. John Vincent (ed.), Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: The Political Journals of Lord Stanley, 1849–1869 (Hassocks: Harvester, 1978), xii-xiii.

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3 4

5 6

7

8

9 10

11

12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20

21

22 23

24

25

26

27

28 29 30

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Ibid., xvii. The figure of £40 million was given by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Henry Lowry-Corry, in Parliament (Hansard, 11 May 1868, CXCII, col. 43). The taxation figure is taken from H.C.G. Matthew (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries, vol. VII, January 1869-June 1871 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), lxxviii. Hansard, 3 July 1868, CXCIII, col. 669–670. Stanley to Parkes, 10 March 1868, ed. Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt, Part 1, Series E, ed. Ian Nish, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1 (University Publications of America, 1989), 120. Stanley to Parkes, 9 September 1868, ibid., vol. 1, 227; Stanley to Parkes, 10 March 1868, ibid., 120; Stanley to Sir Harry Parkes, 23 October 1867, FO262/124. Harold Williams, Shades of the Past: Indiscreet tales of Japan (Rutland, Vermont: Tuttle, 1959), 220. Stanley to Parkes, 10 March 1868, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 120. In his memoir, A Diplomat in Japan (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1968), Satow, as Daniels puts it in his introduction to the 1968 edition, ‘clearly sought to emphasize British support for the activists of the Revolution’ (p. xii). Gordon Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes: British Representative in Japan 1865–83 (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1996), 50. Stanley to Parkes, 28 November 1867, FO 262/124. Parkes to Stanley, 28 February 1867, FO46/78. Mark Ravina, The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigo Takamori (Hoboken: Wiley, 2004), 230. Stanley to Parkes, 23 October 1867, FO262/124. Parkes to Stanley, 28 November 1867, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 101. Lord Stanley to Sir Harry Parkes, 23 October 1867, FO262/124. Stanley to Parkes, 30 July 1868, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1. Stanley to Parkes, 9 September 1868, ibid., Vol. 1, 27. Gladstone once told an audience, ‘Remember that the sanctity of… life in the hill villages of Afghanistan… is as inviolable in the eye of Almighty God as can be your own.’ Bernard Magubane, The Making of a Racist State: British Imperialism and the Union of South Africa, 1875–1910 (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1996), 259. Ed. The ‘Eastern Question’ was a term designating the problem of European territory controlled by the decaying Ottoman Empire in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. In particular the massacre of Bulgarians in Batak by Ottoman irregular troops in 1876. Austrian diplomat (1811–92), later Count. During his visit to Japan in 1871 he met Ernest Satow who made him the subject of his Rede lecture at Cambridge in 1908. 20 August 1873. John Vincent (ed.,), A Selection from the Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby, 1869–1878 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1994), 143. It was only later in the nineteenth century that reduced costs allowed telecommunications to transform British diplomacy in the manner Lord Salisbury proclaimed in 1889 when he told the Institution of Electrical Engineers, ‘We positively exist by virtue of the telegraph.’ Jack Nicholls, ‘The Impact of the Telegraph on Anglo-Japanese Diplomacy during the Nineteenth Century’, New Voices, Vol. 3, December 2009, 12, 15. One British diplomat commented on the ‘foolish telegram from Sir H. Parkes’ and ‘the very proper answer returned by Lord Derby’. F.O. Adams to Odo Russell, Paris, 2 November 1875. FO 918/13. The phrase derives from lectures by William Elliot Griffis in 1881 and the book he published to coincide with the 1882 US treaty with Korea. W.E. Griffis, Corea: The Hermit Nation, (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1882). Diary entry, 31 January 1875. Vincent, Edward Henry Stanley, 193. ‘Treaty Revision’, The Japan Gazette, 18 February 1876. See biographical portrait of Ueno Kagenori by Andrew Cobbing in Japanese Envoys in Britain, 1862–1964, ed. Ian Nish, Global Oriental, 2007. Ed. The Treaties with the USA, Netherlands, Russia, Britain and France, concluded in 1858, were termed the Ansei Treaties as this was the Japanese era name at the time, The Treaty with Britain was concluded by Lord Elgin. For an account of the negotiations see Britain and the ‘Re-opening’ of Japan and the Treaty of Yedo and the Elgin Mission, Hugh Cortazzi, Japan Society Publications, 2008.

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32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

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A biographical portrait of Lord Granville by Andrew Cobbing is in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015. A biographical portrait of Iwakura Tomomi is in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, volume VIII, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2013 ‘[I]n all such cases the policy of the British Government was to yield the local authorities jurisdiction over British subjects in precise proportion to their advancement in enlightenment and civilization.’ Memorandum of an Interview between Earl Granville and Iwakura, Chief Japanese Ambassador, at the Foreign Office, 27 November 1872. Granville Papes, FO 881/2138. See also Gerrit Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). ‘Consular Courts in Turkey and Egypt – Observations’, Hansard, 10 July 1868, CXCIII, col. 1050. Marshall to William Cornwallis Cartwright, 3 May 1874. Cartwright of Aynhoe Collection, Northampton Record Office. C(A) Box 5/418. Memorandum by Frederic Marshall, 6 May 1874. Ian Nish (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part I, From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War. Series E, Asia, 1860–1914, vol. 1 (Frederick MD: University Publications of America, 1989), 330–331. Marshall’s report of his interview to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo contributed to the Japanese decision to abandon immediate talks on consular jurisdiction and focus on tariff reform instead. Inuzuka Takaaki, Meiji gaiko–kanmonogatari (Tokyo: Yoshikawa –bunkan, 2009), 84–85. Ko ‘Treaty Revision’, The Japan Gazette, 18 February 1876. Tenterden to Derby, 22 August, 1876, FO 46/212. Derby to Tenterden, 3 August 1876, Ibid. Derby to Tenterden, 22 August 1876. Ibid. Gladstone’s pamphlet was published on 6 September 1876. Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes, 164. Derby to W.A.R. Cockerell, 1 February 1877. FO 46/225. Telegram from Derby to Parkes, 27 February 1878. FO 46/228. The entry for 2 August 1874. (Vincent, Derby Letters, 177). shows Derby’s reaction when Disraeli asked him what he thought of proposals for a tunnel under the Channel: Commercially, it may do some good, but the rates will probably be too high for ordinary traffic: politically, it brings more foreigners into England, which may not be altogether a gain, but it is too late to imitate Japan.

6

LORD SALISBURY, 1830–1903

[3rd Marquess of Salisbury]

Foreign Secretary, 1878–80, 1885–86, 1887–92, 1895–1900, Prime Minister 1885 to 1886, 1886 to 1892 and 1895 to 1902

Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister

T.G.OTTE

INTRODUCTION

L

ord Salisbury dominated British foreign policy for the better part of a quarter of a century at the close of the Victorian era. Between 1878 and 1902, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, served four times as foreign secretary and was thrice prime minister, for the most part holding the two positions in conjunction. A high Tory, wary of the two mid-Victorian extensions of1 the franchise and given to ‘gloomy thoughts’ about the undesirability of progress, his principal political interests lay in the field of foreign affairs, still relatively shielded from public interference as it then was. The intricacies of international diplomacy, his daughter and biographer reflected, appealed to his ‘instinctive reverence for facts’.2 The conditions of the unreformed,Victorian Foreign Office were a conducive environment for the reclusive Marquess. He took, at best, an intermittent interest in the administration of his department; and in official business he 3 was ‘Olympian and aloof ’, as one of his private secretaries later observed. That characterization might equally well be applied to Salisbury’s attitude towards Japan. Indeed, for all his political longevity and the wealth of his often incisive comments on events elsewhere, it is difficult to establish, with any degree of precision, Salisbury’s views of the East Asian island power. There are few extensive comments from his pen, especially so during his earlier periods in office. This should not come as a surprise to students of Anglo-Japanese relations. In his foreign policy Salisbury was driven by pragmatic considerations of British strategic priorities; and he regarded diplomacy as a moderating force that helped to identify and then to build on mutual interests. For Salisbury Japan’s significance was thus defined by Britain’s broader strategic interests and by the state of her relations with other Powers, principally those with Russia. Sketching Salisbury’s perceptions of Japan thus throws into sharper relief the shifts in the wider international landscape, the emergence of Japan as a major Power, and the evolving nature of Anglo-Japanese relations. 62

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‘THE MUSHROOM CIVILIZATION OF THE JAPANESE’: SALISBURY AND JAPAN 1878–1892 It has been argued by imperial historians that, for the British, ‘the Empire rein4 forced a hierarchical view of the world’. This applied not only to the administration of colonial possessions, but also to foreign policy. The global reach of the Empire and the disparate nature of Britain’s strategic interests dictated a certain order of geopolitical priorities. Key to British policy during Salisbury’s tenure of the Foreign Office was Britain’s rivalry with Russia and France in the crisis crescent that stretched from the Ottoman dominions in the Balkans and North Africa to Afghanistan and India’s northwestern frontier provinces. In consequence, in this well-ordered view of the world, Japan’s position was that of a peripheral Power, distinctly in the second flight of international politics. It changed only in consequence of one of the most important events in Japan’s modern history, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. The defeat of China in this conflict marked a watershed in East Asian politics and beyond. It reversed the traditional power structures of regional politics; and it also shifted the focus of the ongoing Anglo-Russian struggle for mastery in Asia. Salisbury’s attitude towards Japan reflected these changes. Until Japan hove into view as a major international Power in the 1890s, he took only an occasional interest in her affairs.The perusal of Foreign Office files for the 1870s and 1880s underscores that Salisbury paid but scant attention to Japan. Indeed, for the most part, he delegated much of the detailed work to the department’s permanent under-secretary, Sir Julian Pauncefote, a man of some first-hand East Asian experience. Intriguingly, though, Salisbury ignored his PUS’s advice, in 1879, to recall Sir Harry Parkes, the minister at Tokyo, whose abrasive style was much detested by Meiji officials and whose continued presence there Pauncefote regarded as ‘a 5 serious detriment to business’. For Salisbury, abrasiveness was no disqualification for the Tokyo post. His attitude towards Japan was one of benign neglect, tempered only by concerns about Russia’s growing presence in Asia.This underlined the interlinked and global nature of British foreign policy in this period. Thus, in the spring of 1878, as the Powers geared up for the Berlin Congress to settle the affairs of Turkey-in-Europe, Salisbury exercised discreet pressure on Japan not to sell on three British-built warships recently purchased by Tokyo. On no account were the vessels to fall into Russian 6 hands. Similarly, Salisbury appreciated Japan’s friendly attitude during the next Anglo-Russian stand-off in Asia, the 1885 Pendjeh crisis in Afghanistan, when a British naval squadron took temporary possession of the island of Port Hamilton (now Geomun-do), a group of small islands off the southern coast of Korea, to signal Brit7 ain’s offensive capabilities in those waters vis-à-vis Russia. Whilst a friendly Japan was clearly preferable, this did not mean that Salisbury was prepared to accommodate Japan in all her ambitions. On the contrary, where he regarded these as adversely affecting British interests, he acted with firmness. When, in 1887, the Japanese government appeared to favour German rather than British commercial enterprise, Salisbury instructed Britain’s envoy, F.R. (later Sir Francis) Plunkett,8 to warn Tokyo against ‘proceedings so injurious to the interests of Great Britain’. There was an element of ambiguity in Salisbury’s attitude towards Japan. British diplomatic reporting carefully monitored the country’s progress.The growth of railways was a convenient yardstick for measuring how far Japan had come, railways being the harbingers of civilization and modernity to the Victorian

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mind. In the spring of 1885, the Hon. Henry Le Poer Trench, then legation secretary at Tokyo and later minister there, examined Japan’s embryonic railway system, which had been inaugurated by British railway engineers with the opening of a line from Yokohama to Tokyo in 1872 – the Shinkansen of the later twentieth century then still an unimaginable prospect. Trench praised the efforts of the Tokyo government in overcoming well-entrenched opposition from large sections ‘which always endeavoured to impede any progress towards Western civ9 ilization’. By contrast, Salisbury was not much impressed by the outward trappings of Westernization.Tokyo’s renewed efforts, in the late 1880s, to secure the revision of the 1858 Anglo-Japanese Treaty, one of the so-called ‘unequal treaties’ that granted foreigners residing in Japan certain extra-territorial rights, such as exemption from local jurisdiction, elicited a sharp comment from Salisbury: ‘If the mushroom civilization of the Japanese should decay as rapidly10as it has grown, it is probable that the [Japanese] courts will become corrupt.’ Indeed, throughout the protracted talks about treaty revision, Salisbury was reluctant to admit Japan’s desire for change, and threw up all manner of obstacles. He thus refused to accept arbitration in matters affecting jurisdiction in order to extract a commitment from Tokyo granting British warships the use of Japanese naval yards in times of 11 be granted hostilities with another Power. Later he insisted that British subjects 12 the same privileges as other foreign citizens residing in Japan. By 1890, Salisbury had reluctantly come to accept that some form of revision was inevitable: ‘I am afraid that we must assent to the abolition ultimately of consular jurisdiction, but the ill-treatment of Brit[ish] subjects, which is likely to result, will lead to a 13 collision later on.’ To an extent, Salisbury was motivated by pragmatic considerations. He was wary of the influence of British merchants in East Asia, who were largely opposed to surrendering the special privileges granted to them under the ‘unequal treaties’. His insistence on judicial guarantees was thus a means of avoiding future appeals by British subjects for diplomatic action, which would unnecessarily complicate Britain’s relations with Japan. As he impressed on Hugh Fraser, Plunkett’s successor, ‘[s]uch appeals are rare in most of the countries of Europe because the remedies provided by law are sufficient and satisfactory, but in South America (Fraser had been minister in Santiago, Chile, from 1885 to 1887) they are fre14 quent occurrences and form the subject of annoying and protracted controversy’. The reference to Latin America was perhaps intended to spare their blushes, for au profound Salisbury remained mistrustful of the Japanese. Whatever its source, the chop-and-change nature of Tokyo’s policy in this matter was little designed to remove such suspicions. Thus, when, in 1891, Japanese ministers suggested further amendments to the agreed scheme of revisions, Salisbury noted wryly that the ‘departure from the terms which the Japanese Government have15themselves put forward’ had created a ‘somewhat unfortunate’ impression. Salisbury vacated office in 1892, and it was left to his Liberal successor, the Earl of Rosebery, to conclude the treaty talks. ‘STRATEGIC INTEREST OVERESTIMATED’: 1895–1900 The Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 16 July 1894 brought to an end decades 16 of fractious debate, and helped to smooth Anglo-Japanese relations. Equally important in ultimately strengthening the ties between the two countries was

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increased Russian interference in East Asian politics after 1895. Neither development, however, turned Salisbury into an advocate of a re-alignment with Japan. His reluctance to entertain such a move was rooted largely in strategic calculations, but to some extent also in his deep mistrust of Japan. For Salisbury, the overriding priority was the need to balance competing British interests in different parts of the world. Russian expansion in China or Korea, if unchecked, was undesirable. On the other hand, the reverse of Russia’s newly found focus on East Asia was her now reduced interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. An Asian modus vivendi with St. Petersburg was thus preferable to an anti-Russian combination with Japan, hence Salisbury’s public declaration at London’s Guildhall on 9 November 1895 that ‘in 17 Asia there is room for us all’. Meanwhile, the Anglo-French agreement of January 1896 on the frontiers of Burma and Siam helped to loosen the internal coherence 18 of the Franco-Russian alliance at least in Asia. To Salisbury’s mind, direct arrangements with imperial rivals were preferable to one with Japan. He was suspicious of Japan’s ambitions as well as doubtful about her possible value to Britain: ‘[O]ur strategic or military interest in Japan can easily be overestimated’, he impressed upon Sir Ernest Satow, who was appointed Britain’s envoy to Japan in 1895. Salisbury did not doubt Japan’s desire to block Russia’s further expansion, but he questioned her ability to do so, given Russia’s landlines of communication. Besides,‘even if Japan could do it – would she? Russia could always find some bribe in those seas for Japan.’ Russian expansion did not injure Japanese interests: ‘My impression is that the shrewder Japanese ministers will not be sorry to see enough Russian power in those latitudes to counterbalance the power of England.’ Ultimately, he reasoned, Japan was more likely ‘to join with Russia & perhaps with France in cutting up China than to exchange platonic assurances with us’. Satow was not to proffer any political advice to Japanese ministers, nor should he touch on ‘naval or military cooperation either against Russia or China’. Instead, he was to concentrate entirely on promoting 19 British commerce in Japan. Salisbury’s analysis was cynical, but shrewd and cogent.Throughout his final period in office he acted on an assumption that a Russian agreement could offer Japan distinct advantages, and he expected Japanese statesmen to be discerning enough to realize this. ‘[W]e sh[ou]ld not egg on the Jap[ane]se ag[ain]st them [viz. the Russians], but rather counsel them to get on happily with the Russians’, he told Satow in the autumn of 1897.20 He was loath to exploit the latent friction between these two likely rivals for regional dominance. Stability was preferable to the incalculable risks of conflict. Stability, however, remained elusive; and when, at the turn of 1897–98, first Germany and then Russia seized ports in northern China, Far Eastern politics entered a new phase. ‘[W]e are struggling with great difficulties to maintain our position’, Salisbury conceded, because China had not forgiven Britain for ‘our support of Japan against her in the war’ and now looked on Russia as her protector. Britain’s commercial dominance in China ought to have made it imperative ‘that we should be looked upon in the light of reasonable contentment by the Chinese’. Salisbury reserved his ire for Rosebery and his apparent decision to aid Japan. This ‘isolated & somewhat eccentric’ act had yielded no benefits to Britain. On the contrary, in the eyes of the Chinese ‘we are a people that cannot be trusted. Though we had been their allies for many years & had derived enormous profit from their trade, when the crisis came we gratuitously took part with their enemies against them.’ In consequence, he concluded, ‘when very serious questions are at issue, & the European

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States may be said to be competing for the guardianship of China, & the enjoyment of rich commercial advantages … we have to make way against all the prejudice & all the distrust caused by21the gratuitous abandonment of our previous political attitude in the years 1894–5.’ Salisbury continued to cleave to Britain’s traditional policy of leaning towards China throughout the crisis, and resisted suggestions by his colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, that the Japanese ‘would be valuable allies’, and that Britain ‘draw closer to Japan’. If Britain demanded compensation for the Russian and German territorial acquisitions, Japan’s support could be counted upon, provided she was consulted beforehand: ‘I do not suppose that a Treaty of Alliance would be desirable, but I should hope that an understanding might be arrived at which would be very useful.’ He encouraged Salisbury to meet Japanese wishes to have the legation in London raised to the rank of embassy: ‘It would be understood by the other Powers as an indication of an “unwritten Alliance”, without committing us. It would flatter the Jap[ane]s[e] & be worth more than 22 the Garter to the Mikado.’ Salisbury was impervious to such advice. Russian recalcitrance, however, 23 made an arrangement with St. Petersburg, his preferred option, impractical. But this did not make cooperation with Japan a more attractive proposition. It did not require Satow’s warning that ‘nothing would please Japan better than to see England and Russia come24to blows’, to convince Salisbury of the inadvisability of closer ties with Japan. If anything, Tokyo’s efforts to mend relations with France and Russia, which ultimately resulted in the Nishi-Rosen agreement of 25 April 1898, confirmed Salisbury in his assessment. Britain’s acquisition of a northern Chinese naval base at Weihaiwei as a counterpoise to the establishment of a Russian and German territorial presence in the region eventually brought the crisis to a close. Subsequently, Salisbury once more pursued the option of a regional arrangement with Russia as best suited to stabilizing the affairs of China. Competing railway interests in the northern provinces of the Chinese Empire provided the desired opening. The tortuous course of the St. Petersburg talks did little to allay long-held suspicions of Russian diplomacy: 26 ‘Negotiating with them is like catching soaped eels’, Salisbury quipped. Even so, the Scott-Muravev agreement of April 1899 helped to calm East Asian politics and placed relations between the two Asiatic competitors on an even keel. Its precise provisions were less significant than the fact of its existence, as Salisbury explained to the House of Lords: ‘This ...Agreement will be 27 of value in preventing the possibility of collision between the two Governments.’ NO ‘SECOND SEBASTOPOL’: 1900 For once, perhaps, Salisbury’s optimism was misplaced. Events soon overtook the agreement. The Boxer Uprising of 1900 and the disturbed state of China in its aftermath consigned it to the dustbin of international diplomacy. Indubitably, Salisbury underrated the gravity of the nascent Boxer crisis: ‘the Boxers were a mere mob’, he assured Queen Victoria, incapable of seriously threat28 ening the foreign legations in the capital. Partly because he failed to appreciate the full extent of the Boxer threat, he resisted suggestions by some of his ministers that Britain ought to ‘run [the] Japanese as a counterpoise to Russia if we are to boss 29 the show [i.e. a military relief operation]’. Any approach to Russia and Japan would merely encourage them to exact a high price for their military assistance and might,

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at any rate, bring the eventual partition of China nearer still. Salisbury eventually agreed to the despatch of 10,000 troops by each Power, combined with an invitation to the United States to join in the campaign. He was adamant, however, that there was to be no formal understanding. He preferred ‘a Waterloo arrangement. Wellington & Blücher separately’. As his parliamentary under-secretary, St. John Brodrick, the moving spirit behind the scheme of an international expeditionary force, summarized: ‘we get the troops but the organization30is left to settle itself ’. Brodrick and others were not satisfied with this outcome. Supported by senior cabinet ministers, he proposed what amounted to an international mandate for Japan to undertake the relief of the legations. Salisbury remained immovable and raised all sorts of obstacles, all of them little more than a smokescreen to hide his real motives. It suited him to leave the military arrangements as vague as possible, for, in the absence of any binding arrangement involving Russia, he could attempt to use Japan as his cat’s paw: ‘L[or]d S[alisbury] pressed upon the Jap[anese] the fact that the opportunity was now theirs; if they did not intervene effectively disorder might increase, & if there was a general break-up, Russia would dominate Pekin 31 which ought not suit their views.’ This was a direct appeal to Tokyo’s suspicions of Russia. Already before the outbreak of the present crisis, Viscount Aoki Shu–zo–, the Japanese foreign minister, had speculated that only ‘a second Sebastopol’ could stop Russia’s expansion 32 in Asia in its tracks. The Japanese foreign minister was nevertheless reluctant to act as anyone’s cat’s paw.The trauma of the triple intervention of 1895 had left its scars. Aoki shared Salisbury’s assumption ‘that Russia probably means to take advantage of [the] present disturbances’, but resisted the notion of a mandate for Japan, unless 33it were complemented by a formal understanding with Britain and Germany. Brodrick’s scheme fell at this hurdle, though ultimately the relief of Peking by the small international force, spatch-cocked together by commanding officers on the spot, rendered it unnecessary. The manoeuvres of various ministers in the summer of 1900 were indicative of the extent to which Salisbury’s authority over his ministers was now much diminished. Indeed, a cabal of disaffected minister sought to force Salisbury to resign from the government. In this they failed, though he had to relinquish the Foreign Office. Before handing over to his successor, the Marquess of Lansdowne, Salisbury had been pressed by his cabinet to negotiate an Anglo-German agreement on cooperation in China. In vain, Salisbury had sought to resist. In the end, his ministers forced his hand: ‘[Germany] is in mortal danger on account of that long frontier of hers on the Russian side. She will therefore never stand by us against Russia; but is always rather inclined to curry favour with Russia by throwing us over. I have no wish to quarrel with her; but my 34 faith is infinitesimal.’

FROM ENTENTE TO ALLIANCE: 1900–1902 The Anglo-German China agreement of October 1900 was to play a significant, if indirect, role in the genesis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, primarily because the subsequent Anglo-Russian stand-off during the Manchurian crisis proved it to be of no practical use. In an effort to contain Russia in Asia, Lansdowne had initially sought to work with Germany and Japan, with the former35very much his preferred partner and the latter largely a kind of regional adjunct.

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For their part, the Japanese favoured a more energetic anti-Russian policy, much to Lansdowne’s chagrin, who feared an escalation of the post-Boxer crisis in China. In this he was supported by Salisbury, now no longer in charge of the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs but still a powerful presence in the background. Tokyo’s démarche, he argued, was ‘somewhat in excess both of our power and interests’. The promise of material support against attempts to alter China’s territorial status quo would pledge Britain to defend ‘the vast inland frontier which separates the Chinese from the Russian Empire’. Such a comprehensive guarantee would serve no British interests. On the other hand, he observed: ‘It might suit us to defend the littoral of North China though the task would be heavy say the Gulfs of Liaochung [sic], of Pechili & of Corea.’ Unlike Lansdowne, he expected little support from Germany, but was prepared to enter into a limited compact with Japan for the joint defence of ‘the coasts which we think we have 36 serious interests in preserving from Russian grasp’. This was a significant departure from his previous policy of aloofness in Asia. His stipulation of cabinet approval, moreover, was suggestive. Clearly, Salisbury did not envisage an arrangement of only limited duration, but a precisely defined regional agreement that would provide for naval and diplomatic cooperation between the two maritime Powers. In its essence, however, Salis37 bury’s outline of an agreement did not anticipate the 1902 alliance, for the latter was more far-reaching than his scheme. A more apt parallel is the second Mediterranean entente with Austria-Hungary and Italy, which Salisbury had concluded in December 1887, which stipulated cooperation in defence of the regional status quo, whilst eschewing entangling obligations to these two Powers. Salisbury’s projected Japanese entente was confined to the maritime rim of northern China and Korea; and it did not commit Britain to any definite course of action. Such an arrangement with Japan would have complemented the Anglo-German October agreement, and would have furnished British diplomacy with a further tool to secure the regional containment of Russia. Rather than marking a departure from the policy of eschewing peacetime commitments, often associated with Salisbury’s name, the proposed Japanese agreement underlined the nuanced and flexible nature of this policy. For the time being, Lansdowne continued his efforts to win over Berlin to his idea of an Anglo-German-Japanese Far Eastern triple alliance. However, Japan’s apparent bellicosity and Germany’s eventually publicly declared refusal to 38 antagonize Russia in China wrecked the foreign secretary’s initiative. From 39 the outset, Salisbury had been ‘very much ag[ain]st getting tied to Germany’. His opposition was also informed, however, by his altogether more sceptical appreciation of Japan’s military capabilities, as his son and Lansdowne’s parliamentary under-secretary, Viscount Cranborne, elaborated: ‘Should Japan get the worst of it in the campaign our position would become materially and morally damaging and we might be forced to interfere, though still unready, in order to avoid intolerable political inferiority in China. I conclude therefore that in the last resort we must take steps to induce Japan for the moment not to go to war.’ Ultimately, a Russo-Japanese war might be inevitable, but Britain ought ‘to keep the ring ... in order to prevent war until our hands are free’, a reference to Britain’s ongoing South African entanglements. In return, Tokyo ought to give an undertaking that it would ‘have regard to our convenience’ 40 when deciding upon war. Although this fell well short of a constructive solution of Britain’s East Asian problems, it nevertheless went to the heart of the debate within the government about the merits of closer ties with Japan.

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British policy, in fact, was approaching a crucial juncture. A tripartite regional combination with Germany, which Lansdowne had favoured, was clearly not now to be had. If the Manchurian crisis had provided clarification on this point, it still left open the question of Britain’s future relations with Japan. Not the least danger, as F.L. (later Sir Francis) Bertie, the assistant under-secretary at the Foreign Office and one of the principal advocates of a Japanese alliance, repeatedly warned, was that Japan would make terms with Russia, if British support was not 41 forthcoming. A combination with Britain was, in fact, Japan’s preferred option, though an 42 arrangement with Russia had by no means been excluded yet. Since April 1901, however, Viscount Hayashi Tadasu, the Japanese minister on London, was in negotiations with Lansdowne. Crucially, a powerful axis of Foreign Office, Admiralty and Treasury had emerged in the cabinet, and this paved the way for an 43 alliance. By mid-October, the outlines of an agreement had been agreed. But Salisbury’s approval was still required.The principal provision of his ‘preliminary sketch’, Lansdowne explained, was that Britain and Japan would observe ‘benevolent neutrality’ in the event of a war involving either party with another Power. In essence, this reverted to Lansdowne’s idea, first developed in his conversations with German diplomats in the spring, and later reiterated by Salisbury and Cranborne, of ‘holding the ring’ during a Russo-Japanese conflict. Significantly, Salisbury sig44 nalled his general agreement with the draft treaty. It may be inferred, then, that, to his mind, the draft treaty did not differ substantively from his own scheme, in February 1901, for an Anglo-Japanese entente in defence of the Chinese and Korean littoral. Not all the obstacles, however, had been removed. For one thing, the ‘preponderant influence … in many parts of Corea’, conceded to Japan in the draft treaty, 45 caused some concern. After all, Salisbury’s suggestions in the spring and, later, Bertie’s draft ‘Japanese entente’ had envisaged British support for Japan to resist Russian expansion in Korea, but not to extend her own influence over that peninsula. For another, closer coordination of British and Japanese naval policies was deemed desirable, complemented by reciprocal arrangements for the use of 46 naval facilities. The merits of a Japanese alliance were the subject of a wider debate at cabi47 net level at the turn of the year. The most formidable opposition, and the most surprising, came from the Prime Minister. In early January 1902, Salisbury examined the terms of the final draft at length. Britain would find it impossible to restrain Japan in taking actions, ‘which we might regard as provocative but which she would defend upon the ground that they were forced upon her by the conduct of Russia’.The existing drafts pledged Britain to support ‘Japanese action in Corea and in all China against France and Russia, no matter what the casus belli may be.’ This went significantly beyond the limited entente, which he had thrown into the discussion nearly twelve months previously. His verdict was severe: ‘There is no limit: and no escape.We are pledged to war, though the conduct of our ally may have been followed in spite of our strongest remonstrances, and may be avowedly regarded by us with clear disapprobation.’ Such a pledge would not safeguard Britain’s imperial interests. Japan’s ‘formal “declaration of non-aggressive policy”’ gave no security: it was merely ‘a sentiment; not a stipulation’. Salisbury derided the argument advanced by Aoki and Hayashi that a regional crisis might break out suddenly, without allowing time for consultation with London. This meant the wholesale surrender to Japan of Britain’s ‘right of decid-

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ing whether we shall or shall not stake the resources of the Empire on the issue of a mighty conflict’. The memorandum reflected Salisbury’s cool cynicism, but also his underlying suspicions of Japan. It was unwise, he counselled, to rely ‘on the goodwill, or the prudence, or the wise policy of the present Government of Japan’. That policy might change. Unless Japan pursued a policy approved by Britain, the alliance gave Tokyo ‘the right of committing us to a war’. Salisbury did not roundly reject the idea of a combination with Japan, however: ‘There is room for negotiation’; and he was optimistic48that Japan would allow Britain some discretion over the issue of the casus belli. Salisbury’s memorandum was a reasoned and constructive critique of details of the current terms of the Japanese treaty, and their potential risks; it did not reflect a fundamental opposition to the substance of the agreement. Moreover, as he had informed the monarch following the cabinet meeting of 19 December, that there was no substantive disagreement about the idea of a Japanese treaty, his memorandum merely reinforced Lansdowne’s own misgivings on certain points. He also agreed that the Japanese terms needed to be toned down. The ministers in London were alive to the risks entailed in the alliance; nor did they have any illusions about Japan’s ultimate ambitions in Korea. Both sides were anxious to bring the negotiations to a speedy conclusion; and both sides were ready to compromise on the remaining points. Lansdowne accepted that the agreement should apply to the Far East only; a general Asiatic alliance with Japan was not to be had. On the other hand, Hayashi resisted the proposed fixed size of the two Powers’ naval forces; and a compromise was found for the Korean problem: Japan gave assurances of non-aggressive intentions; Britain recognized Japan’s special commercial interests in Korea; and admitted that Tokyo had the right to take measures 49 to safeguard these interests if threatened by aggressive action by a third Power. The very vagueness of some aspects of the Japanese alliance had facilitated the speedy conclusion of the negotiations in January 1902. As predicted by Salisbury, and as presaged by the subsequent Franco-Russian agreement of March 1902, its real test came with the Russo-Japanese clash over Korea two years later. Salisbury himself did not have to deal with this latest twist in East Asian politics, having stepped down as Prime Minister in July 1902. He died a year later in August 1903. CONCLUSION For much of Salisbury’s political career, Japan played a marginal role in his strategic calculations. Given Japan’s position as a regional Power, peripheral to Britain’s global interests until the mid-1890s, this was scarcely surprising. Salisbury’s perception of Japan was conditioned by the state of Britain’s relations with the other Great Powers, principally Russia, less so France and Germany. Unlike Rosebery and Kimberley, Salisbury was slow to appreciate the growing importance of Japan.To an extent, this was rooted in the ‘unspoken assumptions’ that informed his politics. His disdain for the Asian ‘mushroom civilizations’, and his assumption that Japan could be bribed by either Russia or Britain undoubtedly reflected the attitudes, prejudices even, of the high-Victorian generation to which he belonged. And certainly, he signally misunderstood this new Power. By 1900–1901, in light of the sharp deterioration in Anglo-Russian relations, he came to look more favourably on an alignment with Japan, albeit within narrow

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geographical limits. Here the parallel with his 1887 Mediterranean agreements is striking. In 1901–1902, Salisbury did not reject an arrangement with Japan as such. He was, however, anxious to keep Britain’s obligations to a minimum. All of this underscores the subtlety and flexibility of Salisbury’s policy, balancing any alignment against limited commitments so as to retain as much freedom of manoeuvre as was possible. Whatever the true source of his suspicions of Japan, his strategic acuity cannot be faulted. Given that the alliance encouraged Japan to seek a military confrontation with Russia, his scepticism of Lansdowne’s panacea for Britain’s East Asian predicament was well-founded. Though he could scarcely have anticipated it in all its consequences, Japan’s victory in 1905 set her on a course that was ultimately disastrous for her and for the peoples of East Asia. Russia’s defeat, meanwhile, dislocated the balance of power in Europe, and so was a significant contributing factor to the tensions there that ultimately led to the First World War. With hindsight Salisbury’s gloomy pessimism looks remarkably prescient.

NOTES 1

2 3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10

11

12 13 14 15 16

Salisbury to Acla nd, 12 November 1869, Acland MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms Acland d.74. Lady G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (4 vols., London, 1921–32) ii, 13. Sir I. Malcolm, Vacant Thrones (London, 1931), 2; see also A. Ramm, ‘Salisbury at the Foreign Office’, in R. Bullen (ed.), The Foreign Office, 1782–1982 (Frederick, MD, 1984), 46–65; T.G. Otte, ‘“Floating Downstream”: Lord Salisbury and British Foreign Policy, 1878–1902’, in idem (ed.), The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher (Basingstoke and New York, 2002), 98–127. P.J. Marshall,‘Imperial Britain’, Journal of Commonwealth and Imperial History xxiii, 3 (1995), 385. Pauncefote to Salisbury (private), 15 August 1879, Salisbury MSS, Hatfield House, Hatfield, 3M/E/Pauncefote (1878–86). Parkes remained at Tokyo until 1883. Salisbury to Parkes (no. 28, secret), 12 April 1878, The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, FO 46/228, reply (no. 44), 23 April 1878, FO 46/229.The ships (one iron-clad and two corvettes) were built by E.J. Reed at the Pembroke dockyard, see H. Cortazzi,‘Sir Edward Reed (1830–1906): Naval Architect’, in idem (ed.), Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits (Folkestone, 2010), vii, 46–48. Salisbury to Plunkett (no. 73), 14 July 1885, FO 46/326. For some of the background see E.V.G. Kiernan, British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885 (New York, repr. 1970), passim. Salisbury to Plunkett (no. 16), 16 February 1887, FO 46/364. Memo. Trench, ‘Report on the Railways of Japan’, n.d. [c. 10 April 1885], FO 46/326; for some consideration of this see also my ‘Japan and the “Lesser Races” of East Asia: Late Nineteenth-Century British Diplomats and Constructions of Race’, in R. Kowner and W. Demel (eds), Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Western Constructions and Eastern Reactions (Leiden and Boston, 2011). Min. Salisbury, n.d. [c. 14 September 1889], Sanderson MSS,TNA (PRO), FO 800/1. For a recent re-examination of the treaty, see Sir H. Cortazzi, Britain and the ‘Re-opening’ of Japan: The Treaty of Yedo of 1858 and the Elgin Mission (London, 2008), esp. 49–56. Salisbury to Plunkett (nos. 105 and 107), 12 and 24 November 1885, FO 46/326.The treaty revision talks can be followed in FO 46/448. Salisbury to Trench (no. 9), 4 March 1889, FO 46/385. Min. Salisbury, n.d. [c. 6 March 1890], FO 46/398. Salisbury to Fraser (no. 63), 4 September 1889, FO 46/385. Salisbury to Fraser (no. 16), 5 June 1891, FO 46/397. See Ian Nish’s pertinent observations in ‘Lord Rosebery (1847–1929) and Japan’, in Cortazzi (ed.), Britain and Japan vii, 60–1.

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17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25 26

27

28 29

30

31

32

33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40

41

42

43

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The Times, 10 November 1895. Salisbury’s nephew and lieutenant, A.J. Balfour, reiterated this point in a speech at Bristol, combined with an indication that Britain would not oppose Russia’s acquisition of an ice-free port in Korea, ibid., 4 February 1896. See T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905 (Oxford, 2007), 84–5; J.D. Hargreaves, ‘Entente Manquée: Anglo-French Relations, 1895–6’ Cambridge Historical Journal xi, 1 (1953), 65–92. Salisbury to Satow (private), 3 October 1895, Satow Mss, TNA (PRO), PRO 30/33/5/2. It is indicative of Japan’s secondary role for Salisbury that Satow had to request guidance, Satow to Salisbury (private), 15 August 1895, Salisbury Mss, 3M/A/126/1. Satow diary, 6 October 1897, Satow Mss, PRO 30/33/16/1. Memo. Salisbury, n.d., encl. in Salisbury to Cross (private), 30 December 1897, Cross Mss, British Library, Add. Mss. 51264; vice versa (private), 31 December 1897, Salisbury Mss, 3M/E/Cross (1892–1902). Chamberlain to Salisbury (private), 31 December 1897, Salisbury Mss, 3M/E/Chamberlain (1896–7). Satow similarly reported ‘that Japan would do anything England asked of her at the present moment to gain her friendship’, to Salisbury (private), 30 December 1897, ibid., 3M/A/126/34. For a discussion of this see K. Neilson, Britain and the Last: British Policy towards Russia, 1894–1917 (Oxford, 1995), 189–92; Otte, China Question, 161–76. Satow to Salisbury (private), 23 March 1898, Salisbury Mss, 3M/A/126/37; and (no. 38), 23 March 1898, FO 46/496. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 58–60. Salisbury to Chamberlain, 19 February 1899, Chamberlain Mss, Birmingham University Library, JC 11/30/152. Parliamentary Debates (4) lxx (1899), col. 927; also min. Salisbury, 20 May 1899, Bertie Mss, BL, Add. Mss. 63013. Tel.Salisbury to QueenVictoria,16 June 1900,Salisbury Mss,3M/A/84/114. Brodrick to Curzon (private), 15 June 1900, Curzon Mss, British Library Oriental and India Office Collection, Mss. Eur. F. 111/10A; Salisbury to Brodrick (private), 15 June 1900, Midleton Mss,TNA (PRO), PRO 30/67/5. Brodrick to Curzon (confidential), 22 June 1900, Curzon Mss, Mss.Eur. F.111/10A; and to Salisbury, 21 June 1900, Salisbury Mss, 3M/E/Brodrick (1878–1900). Memo. Brodrick, ‘Position at Taku’, 25 June 1900, Midleton Mss, PRO 30/67/5; and to Curzon (confidential), 29 June 1900, Curzon Mss, Mss. Eur.F.111/10A. Whitehead to Bertie (private), 24 May 1900, FO 46/527; J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy:The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London, 2nd ed. 1970), 311. Tel. Whitehead to Salisbury (private), 26 June 1900, Salisbury Mss, 3M/A/126/84. Salisbury to Curzon (private), 17 October 1900, Curzon Mss, Mss. Eur.F.111/159. Note Lansdowne to Salisbury, 16 February 1901, FO 17/1500. Note Salisbury to Lansdowne, 16 February 1901, ibid. For this view L.K. Young, British Policy in China, 1895–1902 (Oxford, 1970), 295. Lansdowne’s alliance offer to Germany is limed in his memo. 12 March 1901, FO 46/547 (circulated to Cabinet, CAB 37/56/30); for some of the background see J.A.S. Grenville, ‘Lord Lansdowne’s Abortive Project of 12 March 1901 for a Secret Agreement with Germany’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research xxvii, 3 (1954), 210; and for a correction Otte, China Question, 250–64. Brodrick to Selborne (private), 13 March 1901, Selborne Mss, Bodl., Selborne 26. Memo. Cranborne,‘Our Policy in Manchuria’, 13 March 1901, Lansdowne Mss, BL, Lans (5) 34. Memo. Bertie, 13 January and 11 March 1901, FO 17/1501. In a series of memoranda in June and July 1901, Bertie set out the diplomatic, strategic and financial rationale of an alliance with Japan, see mema., 20 June 1901, FO 46/547, 2 July 1901, FO 17/1506, 22 July 1901, FO 17/1507; and memo., ‘Anglo-Japanese Agreement’, 22 July 1901, FO 46/547; Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 154–56. On the policy differences at Tokyo, see I.H. Nish, ‘The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty’, STICERD Discussion Papers, no. IS/02/432 (April 2002), 2–3. For the alliance talks see Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 143–84; and Otte, China Question, 286–97, for the dynamics within the British Cabinet. Note Lansdowne to Salisbury, and memo. Lansdowne, both 23 October and min. Salisbury, 25 October 1901, FO 46/547; I.H. Nish, ‘British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1892–

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45

46

47

48 49

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1905’, in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss (eds.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895–1939 (Edmonton, Alberta, 1984), 62–3. MacDonald to Lansdowne (no. 137, secret), 24 October 1901, and vice versa (no. 115, secret), 6 November 1901, BD ii, nos. 106 and 110; Grenville, Salisbury, 399–400. British draft agreement, 6 November 1901, in G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (11 vols., London, 1926–38) ii, no. 125; Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 182–3. Lansdowne’s repeated insistence on such practical measures underlined the decisive role which naval interests played in British decision-making during the alliance talks. Balfour to Lansdowne (private), 12 December 1901, and reply (private), 12 December 1901, Balfour Mss, BL, Add.Mss. 49727. Memo. Salisbury, 7 January 1902, CAB 37/60/3. For the text of the treaty, BD ii, no. 125; Lansdowne to MacDonald (private), 9 January 1902, Lansdowne MSS, TNA (PRO), FO 800/134. The best treatment of the final phase of negotiations remains Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 211–18.

7

LORD ROSEBERY, 1847–1929

[Archibald Primrose, 5th Earl of Rosebery]

Foreign Secretary 1886, 1892–94 Prime Minister 1894–95

IAN NISH

Lord Rosebery

INTRODUCTION

O

ne of the most important events in Japanese history, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, coincides remarkably with the period in office of the Liberal Party in Britain presided over by Lord Rosebery. Rosebery succeeded William Ewart Gladstone in March 1894. He had considerable experience in foreign affairs having served Gladstone as foreign secretary in his 2nd and 3rd administrations and tended to dominate policy-making. He straightaway encountered a serious crisis in East Asia over the claims of Japan and China for the kingdom of Korea. This was the first time that ‘Far Eastern Affairs’ had become a matter of conspicuous public interest in Britain and other European capitals. There was increasing newspaper reportage and debate in parliament which led in turn to discussion in cabinet. There were formidable restraints on Rosebery’s autonomy in pursuing an independent Liberal foreign policy. He belonged to the Liberal Imperialist wing of the party and found himself opposed within the cabinet by Sir William Harcourt who, because of his seniority, was chosen as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Rosebery being in the House of Lords could not present his case in the House of Commons. He appointed as foreign secretary Lord Kimberley who was a senior and well-liked figure in the party and had the unenviable task of acting as mediator between Rosebery and Harcourt. Harcourt was opposed to intervention in foreign adventures. The situation was summed up by Munro-Ferguson who wrote that it was ‘hard if not impossible to work decently with some of this team on Foreign 1 Affairs.’ The other constraint on Rosebery was the international environment. Throughout the Western world there was an appetite for imperial acquisitiveness and the newcomers were particularly jealous; in particular, jealous of Britain and suspicious of Britain’s every act in the foreign field. Rosebery who was a great traveller had not visited either China or Japan. But he had spent time in Australia in 1883–4 which gave him some grasp of the situation there. In 1894 his anxiety about the effect of a possible war on China was expressed in one of his speeches: 74

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The sudden destruction of the central Government of China by a conquering force . . . [would] mean such a scene of chaos and horror as the world has never contemplated. A population suddenly let loose without the control – none too strong as it is – of a dynasty or Government in Pekin, means . . . such an appalling danger to every Christian situated within its limits . . . that I for one consider it might be the gravest catastrophe that could happen to Asiatic civilization.2

Rosebery’s views on Japan were moulded by his contemporaries who had journeyed to the East. For the Conservatives, George Curzon had roamed round East Asia and written detailed letters which were published in The Times and later in his book Problems of the Far East (1894). One of the staff of the Tokyo legation, Cecil Spring-Rice, also expressed his opinions in private letters sent to influential colleagues at the Foreign Office. His assessment of Japan in 1893 was mainly positive but had grains of uncertainty about the future: I am very much impressed with Japan as a power, and it will be interesting to see what it turns out to be – bubble or nugget.3

In July, when war was looming on the Korean peninsula, Kimberley asked whether it would be possible to persuade world powers to intervene to bring about some settlement. But the Powers, especially the US and Germany, were lukewarm in their response. As a result, Britain on her own rebuked Japan on 20 July for acting in violation of the spirit of the 1885 treaty by trying to exclude China from a voice in Korean affairs. But Mutsu Munemitsu, the Japanese foreign minister, while commenting on the ‘severe tone of the British note’, insisted that Britain actually entertained no ill-will towards Japan. While heavy reinforcements of troops continued to be sent to Korea by both Japan and China, Rosebery persisted in rallying the Powers for a combined effort to stop the war. When this approach again failed, Rosebery stated: If we take action it must be in reality against Japan. Would this be politic on our part? In my opinion it would not. We should weaken and alienate a Power of great magnitude in those seas, and which is a bulwark against Russia . . . .We should do no more than we have done.4

ANGLO-JAPANESE COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1894 Britain did not have much leverage with Japan. The only non-military pressure she could apply was that she was in the final stages of negotiating the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1858 and could, therefore, withhold her signature at the last minute. In fact Britain did refuse to sign for a brief period; but eventually the treaty was concluded in London on 16 July. Obviously it was important for Japan whether it would be ratified during the crisis period. Eventually ratifications were exchanged on 25 August.5 Why did Rosebery not defer Britain’s signature – perhaps more tellingly her ratification – of the treaty? Firstly, Britain recognized that after three decades of fractious debate it was inevitable that the treaty should be revised, despite widespread popular disapproval. The Rosebery cabinet accepted that, if it were to hold up the signature for political reasons and then concluded it some months later, it would be blamed for revising the treaty only because of Japan’s success in war. That would have been humbling. One diplomat wrote six months later, justifying the Foreign Office in not using this commercial treaty merely as a bargaining chip:

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No one can say we were forced to it [signing] by Japanese successes in war, for it was signed before war was declared. . . . we are lucky to have signed before the war, & our having done so would enormously strengthen our position in Japan if we wanted to bring pressure to bear upon the Government.6

Such a view was not universally accepted. All that can be said is that, if Britain had refused to sign, it would probably have made no difference to Japan since her plans for mobilization and invasion were already well advanced. In addition, it can hardly be argued that the signature of the treaty enabled Britain to influence Japan’s actions subsequently, since there is no evidence that Japan took much account of any foreign mediation efforts. On the other hand, Japan was grateful. Foreign Minister Mutsu’s conclusion was that Britain had been friendly over treaty revision and cordial over East Asian affairs since Russia had been interfering in the region but that she was not resolute enough to prevent 7 the outbreak of war on her own. STOPPING THE WAR Within a month of the war starting, Japanese forces notched up some important victories, capturing Pyongyang on 16 September and winning the battle of the Yellow Sea. Soon they drove the Chinese forces from Korea and crossed the Yalu River. In response the Chinese leadership were cowed but proud. They were willing to put forward peace concessions provided they need not do so directly to Japan and would channel them through third parties. Rosebery explained in a speech how Britain became involved: Not long ago there reached us, after the first Japanese victory, information from a source which for reasons you will understand I cannot describe exactly, but which I may characterize as the highest, the most authoritative, and the most convincing that we could have on that subject – the news that China was willing to concede honourable terms of peace, such as would considerably exceed the demands of Japan in entering the war, and which Japan would certainly accept without diminution of prestige or advantage.8

That source seems to have been Sir Robert Hart, the Director-general of Chinese Maritime Customs, whose messages came to Whitehall directly and through Lord [Stuart] Rendel, a former Liberal MP. One Hart telegram calling on Britain to 9 arrange for the intervention of the treaty powers was sent on 30 September. Again Rosebery tried this on his European colleagues. But their view was that ‘the time had not yet arrived when conditions could be put forward with any advantage for the consideration of the combatants. But why did Britain not act alone?, asked Rosebery. He explained his position: ‘In any case of this kind, a Foreign Minister would have been grossly blameable if he had not sought in some respect to obtain a concert of the Powers.’ But Rosebery failed largely because of the suspicions which European powers had of Britain. It confirmed his view that ‘it would have been madness for this country to have gone alone and attempted to act as bottle-holder between China and Japan, without incurring the suspicion of 10 every Power interested in the East.’ So Rosebery’s approach was one of cautious inactivity. There was a cluster of Japanese issues which alienated British public opinion and caused the cabinet to be cautious, the Shanghai issue being the most important. Japan had given a guarantee not to undertake naval operations against

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Shanghai. The powers wanted to keep access to the wealthy nations open for trading nations, in the knowledge that one of China’s arsenals was in that area. Rosebery became obsessed with the idea that Japan was ready to break her earlier undertakings and blockade Shanghai and summoned cabinet colleagues from their summer retreats to get their authorization for naval action. The cabinet confirmed that Britain ‘would prevent any Japanese attack on Shanghai’ and approved an order putting11her China squadron in a state of readiness. Eventually the scare came to nothing. Britain was involved in later attempts to stop the war. But she found that the United States was beginning to assume the mantle of the main peacemaker and arranging for negotiators on both sides to meet at talks on 12 1 February 1895 which proved abortive. A QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION Britain’s media and political opinion were unsympathetic to Japan because of her determination to go ahead without taking account of global opinion. Such was the poor reputation that Japan had earned since the war began. One problem was that each country had lost effective representation in the other’s capital. The Japanese plenipotentiary who had taken part in the treaty revision negotiations had been withdrawn to Berlin on 30 August, while British minister in Tokyo Hugh Fraser had died in post in June and his replacement did not take over until September. This was a very undesirable situation. Foreign Minister Mutsu had been expecting active intervention by the Powers from an early stage. As soon as Port Arthur fell in December, it would have suited Japan to end the war because of its exorbitant cost. But China thought that her best way out of the war was by foreign intervention – just the policy Rosebery had been promoting. Mutsu appointed to the London legation Kato– Takaaki, a young official of thirty-four with direct experience of Britain. Kato– set off immediately via Canada to take up Japan’s overseas appointment with instructions to prevent Anglo-Japanese misunderstandings and entice Britain away from her supposed friendship for China. Whether Rosebery was so dedicated to China is a moot point. The British authorities had received negative reports about China’s fighting ability. The army reported that13 ‘a war under existing conditions could only have one result’ – China’s defeat. Following his first meeting with the foreign secretary on 4 February, Kato– reported his feeling that the two had established a fine personal rapport. But, he urged, Japan must still do more. After some false starts, a ceasefire was reached in March. Japan passed over the draft of her peace terms to Li Hungchang who was acting as China’s peace plenipotentiary. Japan’s terms which were both commercial and political were secretly conveyed by the Chinese to most of the Powers including Britain. The Liberal government received no complaints about the commercial terms from ministries involved or from commercial circles which generally welcomed the opening of the Yangtse and Guandong Rivers to foreign trade. Rosebery noted suspiciously: ‘unless there is any secret14article . . . there is no predominant commercial advantage conceded to Japan’. But Britain had reservations about Japan’s political terms which would involve China in ceding the Liaodong peninsula which was already in the possession of the Japanese armies. Rosebery took the firm line that ‘we cannot go to war unless she directly and immediately threatens British interests’. Rumour had

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it that European countries were generally opposed to this on the grounds that it would give Japan a position of strength close to the Chinese capital and were planning to offer friendly advice to Japan not to proceed with that part of the treaty. The foreign secretary’s favoured course was for ‘non-interference as presenting the least objection’. To this Rosebery replied: Is not the line for us to take up that the Japanese terms are not, under the circumstances, unreasonable? And that we could not therefore interfere by force to reduce them? ...If we are not prepared to back the representations by force, it is useless in the present state of Japanese feeling to make any.15

The view that Britain could not go to war unless Japan directly and immediately threatened British interests was endorsed by the cabinet on 9 April. Clearly this line did not appeal to Russia and her European partners who argued that, if Britain would only join them, Japan would certainly capitulate. The treaty of Shimonoseki was concluded by Li Hungchang and Ito– Hirobumi on 17 April. A week later the Rosebery cabinet confirmed its policy of not joining the intervention ‘without knowing the ulterior measures to which it is in contemplation to have recourse in the almost certain event of Japan refusing 16 – in London had to yield to the desires of the Powers’ (my italics). Minister Kato stated that Japan would reject any outside advice. Thus, if Britain had gone ahead with the Three Power (Dreibund) approach, she would have had to contemplate naval action against Japan. On the same day the Tokyo representatives of Russia, France and Germany delivered at the Foreign Ministry their ‘friendly advice’ to reverse the Shimonoseki clauses in respect of the Liaodong peninsula. Even after the first friendly advice had been presented, Russia asked Britain to join the Three ‘on the secret understanding that [Britain] should not be bound to join in measures of force if the communication is disregarded’. Rosebery, however, declined to join as a latecomer. Would Britain now support Japan against the coalition? Minister – had almost daily meetings at the last of which on 27 April he asked how Kato 17 far Japan might count on Britain’s support. Kimberley defined Britain’s policy as being one of non-interference, his principal objective being the restoration of peace. While recommending to China the acceptance of the terms, Britain told Japan that the European powers were in earnest and were unlikely to be fobbed off by unacceptable compromises. Kimberley further reminded Kato– that there was no indignity in a climb-down, since Russia had herself executed one over the treaty of San Stefano in 1878. – ’s report, Foreign Minister Mutsu replied in English: ‘your On receipt of Kato telegram gave us a good guide in determining our action.’ Japan first offered compromise solutions but they were unacceptable. There was no alternative to a climb-down which took place on 5 May: it took the form of a retrocession of the mainland territory granted to Japan under the treaty. In November the two 18 parties concluded a retrocession agreement. On 24 June the resignation of the Rosebery cabinet was accepted. The foreign secretary spent the afternoon taking his leave of the Diplomatic Corps – ‘a very wearisome business’ he admitted. In saying farewell to Kato–, Kimberley was in his usual talkative mood. He said that he was convinced that British and Japanese interests were the same and that the two countries, though geographically distant, should maintain friendly relations and could assist one another. Kimberley spoke in the avuncular way for which he was famous. We cannot say how far these views represented those of Rosebery but they do

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illustrate the increasingly pro-Japanese course which his ministry had been fol19 lowing towards the end of the crisis.

RESIGNATION AND AFTER Rosebery had in effect been moulding British foreign policy for four years. Kimberley was the self-effacing colleague who seems to have accepted interference in his domain from Downing Street. Rosebery refused to continue as leader of the Liberal party in October 1896, and Kimberley was persuaded to take over the demoralized party. The former continued to follow international relations and to express his views occasionally. Thus, he described the Anglo-Japanese Alli20 ance of 1902 as ‘absolutely right.’ During his retirement to the fringe of politics, Rosebery turned to promoting the weird philosophy of Efficiency. In this context he was invited to provide a preface for a new book by Alfred Stead, an important journalist of the day, who had written a book under the title: Great Japan, a Study in National Efficiency in 1906. Rosebery wrote: Japan is indeed the object-lesson of national efficiency . . . but not a hundred or a thousand prefaces will bring this lesson home to our own nation. We have been so successful in the world without efficiency that in the ordinary course of events we shall be one of the last to strive for it without some external pressure. 21

He looks to Japan as a ‘stimulating example’ in his quest for improving Britain’s national competitiveness. Rosebery had just finished penning his remarks as the intimations of Japan’s successes in the war with Russia were coming through. He was impressed by the self-sacrificing nature of Japanese soldiers at the front and their loyalty to the state and the Emperor: Japan is historically speaking a much older nation than ours; and yet . . . she discarded nearly everything but patriotism, and began a fresh career . . . .She not merely retained a peculiar devotion to fatherland but developed it into a religion.

Relating Japan’s experience to the shortcomings of the Liberal party, Rosebery concluded: Politically speaking, we begin and end with party . . . . The fact is that party is an evil – perhaps, even probably, a necessary evil, but still an evil . . . . Efficiency implies the rule of the fittest; party means the rule of something else – not the unfittest, but of the few fit, the accidentally not unfit, and the glaringly unfit. There has no doubt been plenty of party in Japan. But party in Japan has not spelt inefficiency; it tends perhaps in the other direction. It appears to be a rivalry of faction for the goal and prize of efficiency. Japanese parties apparently represent a nation determined on efficiency . . . . We must then, at least, learn from Japan how to obtain efficiency in spite of the party systems. That is the best lesson she can teach us.

Rosebery’s analysis need not detain us; but it is interesting to see the impression which Japan at the turn of the twentieth century was making on him and presumably other foreigners.

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CONCLUSION Rosebery had been at the helm during one of the great tests for the Pax Britannica. He was disappointed over his failure to bring 22 an end to the Sino-Japanese War which he described as ‘this celestial agony.’ He was deeply conscious of the difficulty of securing a just balance between the Chinese and Japanese Empires and remaining on good terms with the continental powers of Europe, because of Britain’s European interests. He was further frustrated by the divisions within his Liberal cabinet. He was sad at failing to do more for defeated China. He wrote that ‘I am a fanatic for the status quo in China’ and that ‘China is almost our only natural ally.’ After the crisis he assured her of Britain’s readiness to assist in her reorganization and development. On the possibility of reorganizing the Chinese navy, however, he ran into opposition from Lord Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral Sir Frederick Richards who took the pessimistic view that China could never operate an efficient fleet.23 But Rosebery agreed with Kimberley that it was unwise to do nothing, fearing that it might ‘result in an Armageddon between European Powers struggling for the ruins of the Chinese Empire’, if China were allowed to collapse.24 On his watch, Britain’s attitude towards the up-and-coming Japan turned a corner during 1895. Although Japan had been seen as an aggressor and an obstacle to stability in the region in 1894, Britain developed a more favourable view, largely due to the goodwill established between Kimberley and Min–. Of course, Rosebery was a realist and well aware that in the long run ister Kato ‘Japanese goods are destined to undersell ours in the Far East.’ He was also forward-looking enough to recognize that the war had generated ‘a great change in the powers of the world, which may possibly end in a combination of the 25 yellow races – Chinese and Japanese – against the white races’. But China had exposed herself during the war by the inefficiency of her army and navy, whereas Japan had impressed by the efficiency of her war machine. Rosebery’s admiration for Japan’s achievement carried forward to the unexpected eulogy that he wrote in 1905. NOTES Good biographical accounts of Rosebery are to be found in Robert Rhodes-James, Rosebery: A Biography of the Fifth Earl. London: Weidenfeld, 1963, and David Brooks (ed.), The Destruction of Lord Rosebery: From the Diary of Sir Edward Hamilton, 1894–5, London: Historian’s Press, 1986. [Hereafter ‘Hamilton Diary’] The letters of Rosebery and Kimberley were consulted at the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, and are cited as ‘RP’ followed by the accession number. An important source is Ito– Masanori, Kato– Takaaki, Tokyo: Ho– bunkan, 2 vols, 1934. [Hereafter ‘Kato– ’] Modern studies of the East Asian crisis of 1894 are: Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 1894–1907, Oxford: University Press, 1995; Nis-Shin senso– to Higashi Ajia sekai no henkyaku, 2 vols, Tokyo: Yumani, 1997; Thomas Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905, Oxford: University Press, 2007; Sarah Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, Cambridge: University Press, 2003. 1

2

R. Munro-Ferguson to Dufferin, 12 July 1894, in Dufferin Papers, D 1071H/03/3 in Record Office, Belfast. Rosebery, speech at Cutlers’ Feast, Sheffield, 25 October 1894 in Lord Rosebery’s Speeches, 1874–96, London: Beeman, 1896, pp. 257–62 [Hereafter ‘Sheffield speech’].

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4 5

6

7

8 9

10 11

12 13

14

15

16 17 18 19 20

21

22 23 24 25

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Spring-Rice to Ferguson, 28 May 1893 in Stephen Gwynn (ed.), Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, 2 vols, London: Constable, 1929, I, 145. Memo by Rosebery, 30 July 1894 in RP 10069. Nish, ‘J. H. Gubbins’ in Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), British Envoys in Japan, 1859–1972, Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2004, p. 243. M. de Bunsen to Curzon, 22 February 1895 in Curzon Papers, MSS Eur F 111/81, in India Collection, British Library. Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku: A diplomatic record of the Sino-Japanese War, Tokyo: University Press, 1982, ch. 9. Sheffield speech, p. 258. J.K. Fairbank (et al. eds), The IG in Peking, 1868–1907, 2 vols, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, II, docs 949–52. Rendel to Rosebery, 2 October 1894 in RP 10069. Sheffield speech, p. 260; Hamilton Diary, 26 October 1894 in Brooks, Destruction, p. 178. Kimberley’s diary entry for 8 October 1894: ‘Rosebery is in a prodigious fuss about China & Japan, and has gone up to town to look after the proposed negotiation for peace.’ Hawkins and Powell (eds), Journal of John Wodehouse, Earl of Kimberley, London: RHS, 1997, p. 428 [Hereafter ‘Kimberley Journal’]. Hamilton Diary, 2 Oct. 1894 in Brooks, Destruction, pp. 171–2. Rosebery to Kimberley, 12 November 1894 in RP 10069. Kato– Takaaki, vol. I, 238–9. Kimberley Journal, 27 February1895, p. 433. Naraoka So–chi, Kato– Takaaki to seitô seiji, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 2006, pp. 35–6, 92. Admiralty to Foreign Office and Army Intelligence to Foreign Office, 16 July 1894, in British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Series E ‘Asia’, Maryland: UPA, vol. IV, docs 89–92. [Hereafter ‘BDOFA’]. Rosebery to T.G. Bowles, 27 April 1895 in RP 10070. Memo by R. Giffen (Board of Trade), 17 April 1895 in BDOFA, vol. V, doc. 353. Kato–, I, 241–2, 248. Rosebery to Kimberley, 6 and 7 April 1895 in RP 10070 and 10243. Hamilton Diary, 12 April 1895 in Brooks, Destruction, p. 239. Kimberley to Trench, 30 April 1895 in BDOFA, vol. IV, doc. 439. Kato–, I, 248–9. Hamilton Diary, 19 April 1895 in Brooks, Destruction, p. 241. Kimberley to Lowther, 29 April 1895 in BDOFA, vol. V. Doc. 437. Kato–, I, 250–1. Kimberley Journal, 24 June 1895, p. 437; Kato–, I, 251–2. J.A.R. Marriott, Modern England, 1885–1945, London: Methuen, 1934, fn. on p. 226. Kimberley Journal, pp. 485–6. A. Stead, Great Japan: a Study in National Efficiency, London: Bodley Head, 1906. This is the first of three quotations taken from Rosebery’s foreword (unpaginated). Rosebery to Kimberley, 7 October 1894 in RP 10069. Rosebery to Kimberley, 11 and 18 May 1895 in RP 10242. Rosebery to Cromer, 22 April 1895 in RP 10136. Minute by Rosebery, 12 April 1895 in RP 10242.

8

LORD KIMBERLEY, 1826–1902

John Wodehouse 1ST Earl of Kimberley Foreign Secretary 1894–95

T.G. OTTE Lord Kimberley

INTRODUCTION

H

istory has treated the Earl of Kimberley with the condescension with which it has treated most Victorian politicians – it has forgotten him.1 In part, his posthumous obscurity reflects his public persona. Removed from the bustle of the House of Commons, he spent much of his career in the more sedate atmosphere of the upper chamber. The inaccessibility of his private correspondence, meanwhile, further prolonged his shadowy historiographical existence. It was only very recently that Kimberley’s historical persona has been retrieved from the abyss into which it had fallen. 2 This is not to reclaim him as a ‘lost Foreign Secretary’. His one brief spell at the Foreign Office does not allow for that. Kimberley’s political career was nevertheless remarkable for its longevity and proximity to the ‘inner group of the Cabinet’.3 For nearly thirty years, from 1868 until 1896, he served in every Liberal administration, and his name was frequently touted in connection with various high offices whenever a new Cabinet was formed or a reshuffle was on the cards. His fifteen months as foreign secretary, from March 1894 until the collapse of the Earl of Rosebery’s government in June 1895, were the culmination of a long career, much of which involved imperial and foreign affairs. CAREER

John Wodehouse (1826–1902), since 1847 3rd Baron Wodehouse, and from 1866 1st Earl of Kimberley, was born into a long-established Norfolk Tory gentry family, but became a Whig while still at Eton. Having served as Earl Russell’s Parliamentary Under-secretary at the Foreign Office for four years after 1852 (and again, 1859–61), he was appointed minister plenipotentiary to Russia at the end of the Crimean War. In that role he was a doughty defender of Lord Clarendon’s firm policy of containment.4 Political rewards eventually came his way and after 1868, he occupied senior Cabinet posts whenever his party was in office. From the sinecure of the Privy Seal he was moved, in 1870, to the Colonial Office where he remained until 1874, returning to it in 1880, before 82

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assuming the seals of the India Office two years later. Kimberley held the India portfolio on three occasions (1882–5, 1886 and 1892–4). He was something of ‘an “Imperial handyman”’.5 The boundaries between imperial and foreign affairs were not always clearly drawn from the 1880s onwards, and Gladstone frequently conferred with Kimberley on matters, which fell more properly into the remit of the Foreign Office.6 His spells at the India Office coincided with two major crises in Anglo-Russia relations, the 1885 Pendjeh and the 1893–4 Pamirs crises, each triggered by Russian expansion in Central Asia and each bringing the two Asiatic rivals to the brink of war.7 Relations with St Petersburg, thus, formed the vital backdrop to Kimberley’s dealings with Asian affairs in general. Becoming foreign secretary had been Kimberley’s ‘object in life’. Indeed, after Clarendon’s death in 1870, senior diplomatists assumed that his former protégé would succeed him.8 It was not to be then, and when his turn eventually came, he had come to prefer his Indian brief, ‘which was more congenial to me, from long habit, than diplomacy. Unraveling knots which tie themselves again as fast as you disentangle them is not a very pleasant occupation, however important.’9 Undoubtedly, the knottiest problem confronting Kimberley was not diplomatic but internal, the frosty relations between Rosebery as Prime Minister and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir William Vernon Harcourt, who led for the government in the House of Commons. The fragile unity of the administration forced Kimberley closely to coordinate foreign policy with Rosebery, a circumstance which has frequently been treated by historians as subordination.10 The two men, in fact, shared the same Whigish outlook on foreign affairs, but Kimberley saw it as his role to neutralize Harcourt’s threat to the stability of the government. FOREIGN SECRETARY In foreign policy, Kimberley proved to be a competent manager, but was largely content to continue the policy inherited from Rosebery and indirectly from Salisbury. His style was somewhat phlegmatic, but this should not be seen as an indication of indecisiveness, however much especially Russian officials amused themselves with the notion of ‘les perplexités et les hesitations de lord Kimberley’.11 In general, he acknowledged that foreign affairs ‘require[d] firm handling’, but entangling commitments were best avoided.12 It was East Asia that required most of Kimberley’s attention. Here the diplomatic knots really did tie themselves again as soon as they had been unraveled, and many proved impervious to all attempts to disentangle them. On Kimberley’s watch, China and Japan went to war, and the Asia-Pacific region became the focal point of Great Power politics. During that time, the ground was prepared for the later Anglo-Japanese Alliance. ‘THE UNIQUE EXAMPLE OF JAPAN’: KIMBERLEY’S VIEWS OF ASIA AND THE ADVENT OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR. Kimberley’s views of the nations of Asia were of their time, and reflected notions of racial hierarchies, defined by martial prowess, and civilizational attainment: ‘It

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is a curious and striking fact that in the extreme East, the Japanese should afford an unique example of an Oriental nation full of life & vigour.’ China, by contrast, was ‘rotten to the core, as regards the governing classes, but the Chinese are an industrious race, who may have a future’.13 The chief problem for Kimberley was that China was the pivot around which British policy in East Asia had come to revolve in the course of the previous four decades. As the two Asian nations inched towards a military showdown over their respective interests on the Korean peninsula, this orientation was gradually called into question.14 For his part, Kimberley was anxious not to force the issue, and ‘earnestly advised Japan not to provoke a collision’ since such an eventuality would bring about Rus– Hirobumi, the sia’s intervention.15 But such moderating counsel was to no avail. Ito Japanese prime minister, and his foreign minister, Mutsu Munimutsu, were not to be deflected from their quest to break China’s regional predominance. Kimberley’s ability to influence Japanese policy was limited, and he was reluctant to use any but diplomatic means to avert war. The sudden death, in June, of Britain’s minister at Tokyo, Hugh Fraser, moreover, left Britain without representation at the appropriate senior level there, and this, too, hampered British diplomacy.16 If Kimberley’s warning of the Russian threat made no impression on the Japanese, it perhaps more accurately reflected his own concerns. Events in Korea had taken a ‘tournure grave’, and there were likely to be repercussions for Anglo-Russian relations.17 Indeed, the Foreign Secretary moved on two fronts simultaneously. He sought to avert a war, but also to ensure that the two rivals did not arrange matters between them at Britain’s expense: ‘in the event of any arrangement either between China and Russia together or between those two powers and Japan to the exclusion of England’ London would ‘take such steps as may be necessary to secure’ its interests.18 Kimberley pursued a parallel track by endeavouring to enlist the other Powers for a joint intervention to facilitate a peaceful solution to the Korean crisis.19 Such efforts, however, were in vain. The United States government immediately declined; those at Berlin and Paris were reluctant to move without Russia.20 The key to any successful move, then, lay in St Petersburg, and there it continued to lie throughout the Sino-Japanese War. Russian diplomacy, however was in no hurry to take a clear position in East Asia until after the conflict, the ill-health and subsequent death of Tsar Alexander III and his long-serving Foreign Minister, Nikolai Karlovich de Giers, further encumbering it. On the eve of war, Queen Victoria intervened by suggesting a ‘joint demonstration by ourselves and Russia’.21 Kimberley and Rosebery agreed that any intervention would have to involve Russia. A unilateral move by her, in fact, was the main reason for their caution so far. Japan, Kimberley ruminated, was ‘bent on war’; and after the failure of all earlier mediation efforts intervention would have to be ‘armed mediation, and will really be directed against Japan’. To succeed in this, Russian cooperation was indispensable. But if Japan were coerced in this manner, the interventionist Powers would be jointly responsible for Korea. Given Britain’s unfortunate experience with such an arrangement in Egypt, repeating it with Russia in East Asia was a ‘disagreeable prospect’. It was better, then, to let the two belligerents fight it out amongst themselves.22 He and Rosebery agreed that any move against Japan would ‘weaken and alienate a Power of great magnitude in those seas, and which is a bulwark against Russia’.23 Even so, neither anticipated the decisive victories Japanese forces were to achieve at sea and on land. Previous experience with Asian warfare seemed to suggest that the coming war would be a protracted business.24

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For now there seemed nothing but to remain passive until the fog of war had lifted from the Korean peninsula. Britain’s ‘present “hand to mouth” policy would have to continue’.25 In practice, it meant that Kimberley’s policy, whilst pledged to strict neutrality, was guided by the twin objects of not alienating Japan, despite her obvious aggression, and allaying Russian suspicions of Britain lest St Petersburg intervene on its own. Kimberley’s policy towards Japan was one of firmness tempered by flexibility. When the British-owned and British-flagged Chinese troop carrier Kowshing was sunk even before the outbreak of war,26 he sought to avoid legal entanglements and diplomatic rows. At the same time, he remained firm to keep open the approaches to Shanghai, the principal commercial entrepôt on the China coast. A firm line was not altogether without risk, as the port was not strongly fortified, and Japan ‘may attempt a coup de main by which we would be compelled to resort to hostile measures’.27 To deter any such move London reinforced Britain’s naval presence in the China seas, the Royal Navy acting once more as the armed wing of British diplomacy. Kimberley had made his point – and he prevailed.28 ‘FUSSINESS IMPEDES REAL PROGRESS’: THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION. The Kowshing and similar incidents were minor diversions. Russia’s likely reaction to the unfolding conflict remained Kimberley’s principal concern. If the Japanese were to push on towards the Chinese capital, or impose a punitive peace on the defeated enemy, he calculated, ‘Russia would certainly make her voice heard with effect.’29 An opening for some form of mediation came in October, when Chinese officials, through Sir Robert Hart, the Ulster-born Inspector-General of the Imperial Chinese Maritimes Customs, signaled their willingness to discuss a mediated peace. The Chinese approach caused ructions between Rosebery, eager for diplomatic intervention, and Kimberley, who had withdrawn to his Norfolk country seat and refused to return to take charge of the mediation effort. He ‘had rigidly barred his gates against all his colleagues’.30 To his mind, Rosebery was ‘in a prodigious fuss about China & Japan ... . I do not believe in the necessity of hurry ... . These matters are not dependent upon a few hours more or less, and fussiness always impedes the real progress of business.’31 Still, their differences were more about the speed of travel than its direction. At a special Cabinet meeting, indeed, Kimberley spoke at some considerable length in support of Rosebery’s scheme of inviting the Powers to join in the mediation: ‘We ourselves in the meanwhile are sending such naval reinforcements as may be necessary.’32 Nothing came of this latest initiative until the Chinese government, shaken by the rapid advance of Japanese forces across the Yalu river, once more sought international support, and Russia accepted its invitation, without, however, offering to lead any collective effort by the Powers.33 The Russian move was an invitation to the other governments to declare their hands, without committing St Petersburg to anything specific. Kimberley’s reply was guarded, but he was ready to issue a joint note to the Japanese government.34 The vagaries of Russian policy aside, there were good reasons for Kimberley to proceed with caution. For one thing, the contemporaneous Armenian atrocities had begun to lay bare the ideological fissures in post-Gladstonian Liberalism; and internal disagreements now constrained official foreign policy.35 And, for another, the rapid movement of events in the Korean theatre of war itself militated against international intervention. As the Japanese advance continued, and with the foreign Powers clearly

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not in accord, Tokyo’s stance on peace terms hardened as much as its opposition to foreign interference stiffened.36 No matter how ready China was for peace talks, the more Japanese troops advanced, the less amenable to foreign pressure the Tokyo authorities became: ‘the recent victories ... [had] shown [Japan to be] fully entitled to the spoils of war to which she could lay claim’.37 Under the circumstances, it seemed best to remain aloof: ‘We ... desire an early restoration of peace, & we have no wish to favour either Power. Our interest is to remain friends with both.’38 Following Mutsu’s rejection of Peking’s peace proposal of 22 November, Kimberley advised the Chinese to despatch a plenipotentiary – government to Japan to negotiate a peace settlement on whatever terms the Ito proposed. China’s position was now so embattled that negotiations should not be postponed ‘for a question of form’.39 Abrupt changes rarely occur in foreign policy, and, to a degree, the decision to leave China to Tokyo’s tender mercies did not come about suddenly. But its wider significance cannot be overstated, for with it began the process which led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Kimberley had resigned himself to sit out the negotiations, scheduled to take place at Shimonoseki. There was the danger that Japan ‘will be so intoxicated with success that she will be tempted to push China to extremities, regardless of the consequences’.40 But the latter were better dealt with once the talks had run their course. For now, his exchanges more especially with St Petersburg, resembled, in Keith Neilson’s felicitous phrase, a ‘sparring’ match. In his interviews with the Russian ambassador, Kimberley stressed the importance of Britain’s commercial interests in China, but confirmed that his government would not oppose Japan’s acquisition of Formosa. Their conversation left the envoy with the distinct impression that Kimberley feared an eventual alliance between the two combatants but under Japan’s tutelage. Tokyo, Kimberley had been told, ‘had no intention whatsoever of destroying the Celestial Empire’, and intended ‘to lift it up again. But it is precisely this role of a ... benevolent tutor which is not agreeable to England.’41 Kimberley’s natural caution was reinforced by a growing foreign policy rift within the Cabinet, exacerbated by the near-civil war between Rosebery and his chancellor. Partly rooted in Harcourt’s frustrated personal ambitions and partly reflecting ideological differences, the internecine Rosebery-Harcourt conflict had the potential of bringing down the government. Something of a ‘Little Englander’, Harcourt inundated Kimberley with notes, critical of the current course in foreign policy and demanding to be consulted. Privately, Kimberley dismissed Harcourt’s many missives as ‘ill-tempered ignorant rigmaroles’.42 He still had to placate him, however. In a sense, Kimberley was the vital ball-bearing of the Cabinet machinery, keeping in place the chancellor, eager to take offence, and the premier, curiously reluctant to deny him the opportunity. The Cabinet row had been triggered by an Anglo-French storm in an African teacup, but Harcourt widened his attack into an all-out assault on the government’s handling of foreign affairs, and ‘those bugbears constantly cooked up in the F[oreign] O[ffice]’. The Chancellor struck a tone perhaps more suited to the hustings than to discussions across the Cabinet table: ‘Is there no pie in the world out of which we can manage to keep our fingers?’ His conclusion, however, was not unreasonable: ‘It would be especially foolish on our part to take leading action hostile to Japan, the rising Power in the East – and allow Russia to pose as her friend.’43 Even Kimberley’s patience was wearing thin: ‘Harcourt practically insists upon playing the part of joint Prime Minister.’ Worse, the commotion caused by him had produced a deadlock in foreign policy, at a time when most of Britain’s external problems ‘require[d] firm handling’, and could only lead to ‘more drifting’.44 The foreign

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secretary was not prepared to compromise with Harcourt on issues of foreign policy; and yet given the latter’s ability to disrupt government business, Kimberley had to assure Harcourt that he had ‘not said a word that can commit us in any way’.45 Meanwhile, international diplomacy ground on, heedless of the near-paralysis in British policy. If possible, Kimberley wished to prevent Japan from acquiring Port Arthur on the Liaotung peninsula, which he feared would hasten China’s decline and eventual collapse. At the same time, he was careful not to oppose Japan openly.46 He was caught on the horns of a dilemma. Pressing Tokyo to moderate its territorial demands, let alone to refrain from making any such gains, could easily backfire. On the other hand, non-intervention would leave China in a much reduced position. Then again, if the Chinese rejected the peace terms offered, ‘we may have a break-up of the Chinese dynasty and disorganization of the Chinese Empire’. All in all, non-interference ‘present[ed] the least objections’. Rosebery concurred: ‘We cannot go to war with Japan unless she directly and immediately threatens British interests.’47 The Cabinet sanctioned this decision on 8 April. If this was the least objectionable course, it was nevertheless not without risk. French and, more especially, German support for the Russian plan for the Powers to intervene had ‘created a new situation’. Kimberley was not slow to appreciate the wider ramifications of the East Asian crisis for British interests in the region and beyond: ‘our separation from Russia would have an effect on our relations in Europe’,48 at a time when, nearer to home, the Eastern Question once more threatened to destabilize the Eastern Mediterranean. The fall-out from the Sino-Japanese conflict, then, underlined both the global reach of British policy and the constraints placed on British power by the wide dispersal of her interests. At this point, Kimberley, distraught at his wife’s brain haemorrhage, had temporarily withdrawn from political life, and Rosebery took sole charge of matters.49 He acknowledged that relations with Germany and Russia had suffered in consequence of the war: ‘both ... are disgusted with us for not pulling their Chinese chestnuts out of the fire’. There was the danger now of the other Powers retaliating in kind by disrupting the financial administration of Egypt. The crises in the Near and Far East had the result: ‘[t]he world is in a very parlous condition’. Beyond the traditional Eastern Question, the Prime Minister concluded: There is an infinitely larger Eastern question upon us at this moment in the situation developed by the peace between China and Japan. That is a situation which it is difficult to judge ... . But one thing is clear: it is really anxious; it is pregnant with possibilities of a disastrous kind; and it might, indeed, result in an Armaggedon between the European Powers struggling for the ruins of the Chinese Empire. [...] We must not scatter ourselves; we must embark on nothing unnecessary; we must be ready at any moment to place our full force in one or both of the regions affected by the Eastern questions.50

Kimberley’s attitude towards Japanese was circumspect throughout. He readily accepted that the war had brought East Asian affairs to the cusp of major change. Yet he neither welcomed China’s anticipated demise, nor did he embrace the prospect of Japanese predominance in Asia. He was subtle enough to comprehend that the stand-off between Japan and the three interventionist Powers could be exploited to Britain’s advantage, without giving offence to the parties involved. – Thus, he urged caution on the new Japanese minister at London, Count Kato Takaaki. London had no intention of depriving Japan of ‘reasonable fruits of her victories’, but would have preferred ‘no disturbance of the status quo’.51 Kimber-

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ley’s subtle diplomacy facilitated Japan’s eventual yielding to the three Powers. It was not solely a matter of skill, however. On at least this occasion, Kimberley and Rosebery had fortune on their side. It was only Tokyo’s decision to give way that prevented a chasm from opening up between Britain and the other Powers. The potential for future tensions with Russia had by no means receded, as Kimberley understood only too well. But there were also clouds on the Anglo-Japanese horizon. The cession of Formosa, more especially, was ‘by no means agreeable to us’. Pending the final settlement of the war indemnity to be paid by Peking, Japan also retained the Chinese naval base of Wei-hai-Wei. If her forces were to be permanently established there, Kimberley reasoned, this would be more detrimental to China’s future stability than the now aborted cession of Port Arthur: ‘If the Japanese were at Wei-hai-Wei they would cut ... the Empire in half and they would be in inconvenient proximity of Shanghai & the great trade route of the Yangtze River.’52 Whatever the short-term challenges, Kimberley was in no doubt about the wider significance of recent events in East Asia. The traditional constellation of the Powers in the region had been reversed, and this affected the orientation of British policy there. Japan, he impressed upon the envoy-designate at Tokyo, Sir Ernest Satow, was now ‘our natural ally, as against Russia’. Russia was likely to contest Japan’s ambitions for mastery over the Korean peninsula, ‘so that strife may yet arise from that’.53 Japan, he reasoned, ‘will no doubt have a powerful fleet, but that will be a counterpoise to the Russians & so far a distinct advantage to us. Our policy must be to make her our ally. [...] What would happen if China were to follow the example of Japan and civilize herself, and Japan & China were to be allied is another affair, but this if is a contingency which need not trouble us now.’54 CONCLUSION Brief though Kimberley’s spell at the Foreign Office was, it was crucial for Anglo-Japanese relations. But Kimberley’s achievement, in a sense, was a negative one. By not joining the triple intervention in the aftermath of Shimonoseki he helped to steer relations between London and Tokyo in a new direction. His – and Rosebery’s – decision to remain aloof set in train a gradual recalibration of British policy in East Asia, away from its traditional pivot of China and towards Japan. The student of the period would nevertheless be wise to resist the temptation of hindsight. Kimberley’s somewhat loose phrase of Japan as ‘our natural ally’ should not be invested with exaggerated significance. As Sir Edward Grey, Kimberley’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary and later Foreign Secretary himself, reflected in his memoirs, ‘British Ministers at the time did not look beyond the moment.’55 Neither Kimberley nor Rosebery foresaw the Anglo-Japanese combination of 1902. It would require a further two turns of the Far Eastern kaleidoscope for it to become a reality. Kimberley’s diplomatic manoeuvres in 1894–5, however, ensured that an alliance was now within the range of practicable politics for both Britain and Japan – and in this, perhaps, lies Kimberley’s significance as an imperial statesman. NOTES 1

Until recently, Kimberley had not been well served by historians: A. Cecil reduced Kimberley literally to a footnote, British Foreign Secretaries, 1807–1916: Studies in Personality and Policy (London, 1927), 306, n. 2; P.J.V. Rolo’s joint assessment of Rosebery and Kimberley

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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

12 13

14

15

16 17

18

19 20 21

22

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is altogether unsatisfactory, ‘Rosebery and Kimberley’, K.M. Wilson (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: from Crimean War to First World War (London, 1987), 138–58, while G. Martel, Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy (Kingston, ON, 1987), 243, is more balanced but tends to privilege Rosebery. For excellent surveys of Kimberley’s career and the fate of his archive see the introductory essays in A. Hawkins and J. Powell (eds), The Journal of John Wodehouse, First Earl of Kimberley for 1862–1902 (Cambridge, 1997), 1–43 [hereafter KJ], and J. Powell (ed.), Liberal by Principle: The Politics of John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley, 1843–1902 (London, 1996). For an earlier assessment see also E. Drus, ‘A Journal of Events during the Gladstone Ministry 1868–1874 by John, First Earl of Kimberley’, Camden Miscellanies, 3rd ser. xxi (1958), 1–49. H.C.G. Matthew, ‘Introduction’, id. (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries: With Cabinet Minutes and Prime Ministerial Correspondence, vol. x, 1881–1883 (Oxford, 1990), lviii. Hammond to Wodehouse (private) 24 June and 3 september 1856, Wodehouse MSS, British Library, Add. MSS. 46694. A.B. Cooke and J.R. Vincent, Governing Passion: Cabinet Government and Party Politics in Britain, 1885–86 (Brighton, 1974), 119. Gladstone to Hartington, 5 March 1885, H.C.G. Matthew (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries: With Cabinet Minutes and Prime Ministerial Correspondence, vol. xi, 1883–1886 (Oxford, 1990), 304; Powell, ‘Introduction’, Liberal by Principle, 52. Rosebery to Kimberley (confidential), 26 August 1892, Kimberley MSS, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS 10246. . Paget to Hammond (private), 28 June 1870, Hammond MSS, The National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, FO 391/23. . Kimberley to Pauncefote (private), 31 March 1894, Kimberley MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms.Eng.c.4408. Rolo, ‘Rosebery and Kimberley’, 149. Chichkin to Staal, 8 Feb. 1895, Baron A. Meyendorff (ed.), Correspondance Diplomatique de M. de Staal (1884–1900) (2 vols, Paris, 1929) ii, 262 [hereafter SC]. Kimberley to Rosebery (confidential), 6 April 1895, Rosebery MSS, NLS, MS 10070. Kimberley to Durand (private), 29 January 1895, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c.4388; for further thoughts on this see my ‘Japan and the “Lesser Races” of East Asia: Late Nineteenth-Century British Diplomats and Constructions of Race’, R. Kowner and W. Demel (eds), Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Western Constructions and Eastern Reactions (Leiden and Boston, 2012), 127–151. Its significance notwithstanding, this conflict has been largely ignored by international historians. Notable exceptions are I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907 (Westport, CT, repr. 1976), 23–35; K. Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and the Last Tsar, 1894–1917 (Oxford, 1995), 147–60. Historians of Japan have invariably paid more attention to this war, cf. W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford, 1991), 41–54; and H. Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868– 1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism (Philadelphia, PA, 1960). Tels. Kimberley to O’Conor (nos. 41 and 42), 21 and 26 June 1894, FO 17/1202, and to Paget (no.18), 3 July 1894, FO 46/439. See Kimberley to Lascelles (private), 7 August 1894, Lascelles MSS, TNA (PRO), FO 800/15. Kimberley’s observation to the French ambassador Albert Decrais, as reported in tel. Hanotaux to Montebello (no.78), 1 July 1894, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (ed.), Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871–1914, 1st ser. (14 vols., Paris, 1930–46) xi, no. 180 [hereafter DDF]. Tels. Kimberley to O’Conor (nos.45 and 50), 2 and 7 July 1894, FO 17/1202; tel. Aoki to Mutsu, 3 July 1894, M. Kajima (ed.), The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894–1922 (3 vols, Tokyo, 1976) i, 78–9 [hereafter DJ]; T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905 (Oxford, 2007), 31–4. Kimberley to Malet (no.177), 9 July 1894, FO 64/1325. Sanderson to Kimberley (private), 8 July 1894, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c.4380. Tel. Victoria to Rosebery, 30 July 1894, G.E. Buckle (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd ser. (3 vols., London, 1932) ii, 617. Kimberley to Rosebery (private), 30 July 1894, Rosebery MSS, MS 10068; circular tel. Kimberley to Lascelles (no. 36), Malet (no. 33), Edwardes (no. 57), 1 Aug. 1894, FO 83/1320; Martel, Imperial Diplomacy, 216.

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27 28

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30 31 32

33 34 35

36

37 38 39 40 41

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45 46 47

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49 50 51

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Memo. Rosebery, 30 July 1894, Rosebery MSS, MS 10134; see also K. Neilson, ‘Britain, Russia and the Sino-Japanese War’, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 in Its International Dimension: STICERD Discussion Paper, no.278 (1994), 2. See Mema. Bridge, ‘Comparative Statement of the Chinese and Japanese Navies’, 16 July 1894, and ‘Memorandum on the Relative Values of the Armies of China and Japan’, 16 July 1894, FO 405/60/89 and 91. Hamilton diary, 5 August 1894, D. Brooks (ed.), The Destruction of Lord Rosebery: from the Diary of Sir Edward Hamilton, 1894–1895 (London, 1986), 161; see also de Bunsen to Spring Rice, 28 July 1894, Spring Rice MSS, Churchill College Archive Centre, Cambridge, CASR 1/4. T.E. Holland, ‘International Law in the War between China and Japan’, Fortnightly Review lvi, 336 (Dec.1894), 917–8. Kimberley to Rosebery, 30 Sept. 1894, Rosebery MSS, MS 10069. Spencer to Kimberley, 29 September 1894, ibid.; see also the exchange of notes, reprinted in DJ i, 155–9. Kimberley to Rosebery (confidential), 3 October 1894, Rosebery MSS, MS 10069. He was also concerned about the safety of the foreign legations at Peking, echoing contemporary fears, see M.R. Davies, ‘A Threatened City: Some Impressions of Pekin’, Fortnightly Review lvi, 336 (December 1894), 793. Murray to Rosebery, 1 October 1894, Rosebery MSS, MS 10143; Otte, China Question, 40–1. Kimberley journal, 8 October 1894, KJ, 428. Kimberley returned to London on 23 October. Murray to Harcourt, 4 October 1894, Harcourt MSS, Bod., Ms.Harcourt dep.57; tel. Rosebery to Kimberley, 2 October 1894, Rosebery MSS, MS 10069. Kimberley to Rosebery (private), 4 November 1894, Rosebery MSS, MS 10069. Tel. Kimberley to Lascelles (no. 91), 9 November 1894, FO 65/1474. Kimberley to Ripon, 17 November 1894, Ripon MSS, BL, Add. MSS. 43526; Harcourt to Kimberley (private), 2 December 1894, Harcourt MSS, Ms. Harcourt dep. 51. Kimberley to Trench (no. 109, confidential), 21 October 1894, FO 46/434, and vice versa (nos. 151, 154 and 156), 23, 24 and 26 October 1894, FO 46/438. Trench to Kimberley (no. 189), 7 December 1894, FO 46/438. Kimberley to Goschen (private), 24 November 1894, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.d.4408. Tel. Kimberley to O’Conor (no. 160), 9 December 1894, FO 17/1203. Kimberley to Trench (private), 25 January 1895, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c.4396. Staal to Chichkin (secrète), 22 February/6 March 1895, SC ii, 263–4. For the ‘sparring’ between Britain and Russia, Neilson, Last Tsar, 152. Kimberley journal, 7 December 1894, KJ, 429; for some of the background see D.A. Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy (Oxford, 1972), 204–206. Harcourt to Kimberley, 5 April 1895, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c. 4378; A.G. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt (2 vols., London, 1923) ii, 338. Kimberley to Rosebery (confidential), 6 April 1895, Rosebery MSS, MS 10070; P. Stansky, Ambition and Strategies: The Struggle for the Leadership of the Liberal Party in the 1890s (Oxford, 1964), 124–5. Kimberley to Harcourt, 6 April 1895, Harcourt MSS, Ms. Harcort dep.52. Kimberley to Malet (no. 103), 3 April 1895), FO 64/1349. Kimberley to Rosebery (private) and vice versa, both 6 April 1895, Rosebery MSS, MS 10070; Neilson, Last Tsar, 154. Kimberley to Rosebery, 9 April 1895, Rosebery MSS, MS 10070; also summarized in tel. Courcel to Hanotaux (no. 41), 10 April 1895, DDF (1) xi, no. 441. Kimberley journal, 18 April and 4 May 1895, KJ, 435; Martel, Imperial Diplomacy, 243. Rosebery to Cromer (secret), 22 April 1895, Cromer Mss, FO 633/7; Otte, China Question, 68. Kimberley to Trench (no. 35, confidential), 24 April 1895, FO 46/449; tel. Kato to Mutsu, 24 Apr. 1895, DJ i, 342–3. Kimberley to Lascelles (private), 1 May 1895, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c.4405. Satow diary, 31 May 1895, Satow MSS, TNA (PRO), PRO 30/33/16/1. Kimberley to Cavendish, 30 May 1895, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c.4396. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years (2 vols., New York, 1925) i, 24.

9

LORD LANSDOWNE, 1845–1927

[Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne] Foreign Secretary, 1900–1905

T.G. OTTE Lord Lansdowne

INTRODUCTION

L

ord Lansdowne occupies a special place in the history of Anglo-Japanese relations as the foreign secretary on whose watch the alliance between the two countries was concluded and then reaffirmed. Even so, as a historical figure he has been curiously neglected. This applies more especially to his five years at the Foreign Office, which tend to be seen as something of an interlude, an epilogue to Lord Salisbury or a prologue to Sir Edward Grey, overshadowed also by his later role during the constitutional crisis of 1909–11 and his advocacy of a compromise peace in 1917.1 Already in 1900, Lansdowne’s appointment to the Foreign Office was ridiculed in some sections of the press as a ‘first-rate joke’. ‘Saki’ lampooned him in his ‘Westminster Alice’ satire as the White Knight who fell from off one horse, the War Office, on to another, Foreign Office: ‘A knowledge of French and an amiable disposition will see one out of most things.’2 CAREER There was more to Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquis of Lansdowne (1845–1927), than a genial personality and fluent French. A scion of the Whig cousinhood, he parted company with his ancestral party over Irish land legislation in 1880, and gradually moved across the party divide, without, however, ever becoming a Conservative. His landed wealth and social position gave him a standing in late Victorian politics. More than that, he was considered ‘a very “safe” man’.3 Having been apprenticed in politics as undersecretary at the War Office in the early 1870s, he held a succession of pro-consular posts between 1883 and 1894, first as Governor-General of Canada and then Viceroy of India. Without doubt, he was more knowledgeable about Asia and also more sympathetic to the East than many amongst the contemporary political class.4 Lansdowne’s imperial career also sharpened his appreciation of the vast future

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potential of the United States and of the more immediate Russian threat in Central Asia, while his superintendence of the unreformed War Office between 1895 and 1900 heightened his sense of the constraints on British power. Lansdowne’s American and Indian experiences provided the vital backdrop to his dealings with Japan. Equally important was his ‘ultra-cautious’, diffident style, which made him appear ‘undecided in character’.5 Until July 1902, moreover, Salisbury’s looming presence, both physical – he had rooms at the Foreign Office – and political as the still indispensable leader of the Unionist constrained Lansdowne,6 and so did the disturbed state of international politics in 1900–1. The affairs of East Asia had entered their most acute phase in the immediate aftermath of the Boxer crisis, and so threw into sharper relief the limits of British power. Britain’s armed forces, limited in number, were scattered across the globe and scarcely able to deal with the upsurge of the Chinese disturbances and the simultaneous South African War. External complications and financial pressures deepened existing divisions within the government as to the correct foreign policy course, ‘isolationists’ and those in favour of a new course beyond the old nostrums holding each other in check. For his part, Lansdowne was ready to tackle Britain’s foreign policy problems. He was a pragmatist, however, and not driven by any grand design, preferring instead the line of least resistance and what was convenient in the short-term. His two most notable achievements, indeed, the Japanese alliance and the Anglo-French entente of 1904, had consequences which Lansdowne never anticipated. ‘ONE PRECONCEIVED IDEA’ Lansdowne’s name will always be associated with the Japanese alliance. That compact, however, was the accidental product of tentative and ultimately failed attempts by the new foreign secretary to extricate Britain from her Far Eastern problems. Lansdowne’s principal object in the region was to stabilize the Chinese Empire, now considerably weakened by the encroaching foreign powers and by internal disturbances, but was privately resigned to seeing more especially its three Manchurian provinces drift into Russia’s orbit.7 To strengthen China, and as one of the sponsors of the Anglo-German China agreement of October 1900, he hoped to build on this understanding. It was his one ‘preconceived idea’: ‘that we should use every effort to maintain, and if we can to strengthen the good relations which at present exist between the queen’s government and that of the [German] Emperor’.8 Lansdowne’s idea was soon put to the test, especially so after The Times’s scoop of the Ts’êng-Alekse’ev agreement in early January 1901, which seemed to presage a Russian protectorate over Manchuria. He was determined not to let Russia have it all her own way, but declined Japan’s proposal of a joint enquiry as a first step towards a formal protest.9 For one thing, such a step would complicate concurrent efforts to force the Russian government to return British railway property seized by Russian troops at Tientsin and elsewhere in Northern China.10 For another, St Petersburg was likely to continue equivocating with ‘the usual explanations and assurances’, while the plundering carried on unabated:11 ‘for the present we must show as few signs as possible of being “fussy” about small matters in China; on the other hand we must not, for Parliamentary & other reasons acquiesce too much’.12 Chinese territorial integrity should have been no ‘small matter’ for British diplomacy, but Lansdowne was encouraged in his policy by the prime minister.13 At the root of his dilatory response was his deter-

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mination to move in tandem with Germany.14 This consideration also explains Lansdowne’s support for Chamberlain’s last bid for an alliance with Germany in 1901, a clandestine manoeuvre undertaken without the prime minister’s knowledge, as a senior diplomat reflected in later years: ‘but A.J. B[alfour] & Lansdowne were privy to the deal’.15 By mid-February, Lansdowne resolved to use the disturbed state of East Asia to tighten relations with Germany and Japan. It was time to ‘make up our minds’ either to resist Russia or to acquiesce in her proceedings. He was ready to go some distance to meet Russian ambitions, effectively selling British commercial and railway rights in Manchuria – British bondholders were in favour – in return for guarantees of British interests in China proper and possibly as part of a general settlement of the Manchurian question. If the time for a grand bargain with Russia had not yet come, there was an alternative, or so it seemed to Lansdowne. Encouraged by the positive noises emanating from Berlin, he suggested a new China declaration by all the powers, in essence a ‘self-denying Ordinance’, which would ‘destroy the validity of the huge concession lately obtained by the Russians at Tientsin’ and elsewhere.16 Throughout the Manchurian crisis Lansdowne sought to triangulate, keeping Berlin on board while ensuring that Tokyo did not press ahead too far, or, worse still, sought a direct arrangement with Russia, convinced, perhaps, that Britain and Germany were weak reeds to lean on. Tokyo’s attitude, indeed, hardened in February, so much so that it toyed with the idea of offering China ‘material support’ against further Russian expansion.17 This was a commitment too far for Lansdowne. Russia’s advances were ‘assuming serious proportions’, it was true, and further concerted efforts might be needed to avert the Manchurian ‘backstairs bargain’. The ‘much longer step’ now suggested by Tokyo, however, was premature. He was ready to warn the Chinese authorities against concluding separate agreements with Russia without prior reference to the nascent Anglo-German-Japanese triplice. To keep this combination intact was at the root of Lansdowne’s calculations. He wished, ‘if possible, [to] carry [Germany] with us’.18 Salisbury, for his part, was more receptive to the idea of an Anglo-Japanese compact for the joint defence of the Chinese littoral,19 but Lansdowne did not pursue the matter. He remained wedded to the idea of cooperating with Germany. Following Anglo-Japanese-German representations at Peking, he was confident ‘that the Chinese Gov[ernmen]t will not be so unwise as to make such private arrang[emen]ts under pressure without telling us what is happening’. Tokyo, meanwhile, was aware of Britain’s commitment to the maintenance of China’s integrity. There was, then, no need to give such a ‘dangerously vague’ pledge as that suggested by the Japanese government.20 Lansdowne slowly gravitated towards a harder line. While he plotted his next moves, the eventuality for which he sought to prepare arose when rumours of Russia’s Twelve Demands hardened into verifiable political facts, and, on 1 March, China’s representatives asked for mediation by the other powers.21 The Russo-Chinese convention meant ‘the virtual establishment of a Russian protectorate over all Manchuria as well as Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan’.22 Russian mastery over large parts of China would be intolerable: ‘If we cannot resist it by force, we ought at least enter a protest and to make it clear that we reserve our Treaty rights in the regions concerned.’ Time was of the essence, however, as Chinese ministers were more likely to resist Russian pressure if they were told soon ‘that we shall not admit the validity of the contemplated transaction’.23 To what extent Lansdowne was prepared to threaten the use of force, let alone actually to deploy force, cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. It was

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generally assumed in Whitehall that Russia’s strained finances acted as a powerful constraint on her policy. Deterring Russian adventurism, however, required some form of international coalition, without which it seemed impossible to harden Chinese resolve. Lansdowne moved at several fronts simultaneously. Peking was urged not to commit itself until the other powers had decided upon their response, and he gave a strong hint at St Petersburg that Britain was alarmed at the agreement, which appeared to be ‘of an enduring character’.24 It was a clear signal that Britain was not disinterested in the Manchurian question, and in sending it Lansdowne risked escalating the crisis further. Japan’s support could be relied upon, it was true, but Lansdowne’s gamble placed Britain in an exposed position, all the more so since Germany’s likely response was far less certain. St Petersburg, meanwhile, would either have to comply with Lansdowne’s ‘reasonable’ request, thereby revealing its hand and perhaps escalating the crisis, or it would have to disengage. While Berlin dragged its feet over Lansdowne’s informal suggestion of a protocole de désintéressement,25 the Japanese government adopted an increasingly militant line. So far, Lansdowne had regarded Japan as a guaranteed, and therefore somewhat negligible, party to his projected Far Eastern neo-Dreibund. But now, the Japanese fleet was reportedly concentrated along the country’s western coast, and the Japanese minister in London enquired whether Tokyo could rely on British support ‘in case Japan finds it necessary to approach Russia’.26 This raised a series of delicate questions. If the ‘approach’ were amplified by any military posturing, there was the real risk of war.27 An added element of uncertainty was the response of France, given that the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance were unknown in London.28 Lansdowne’s Chinese conundrum was profound. To compel Russia to relinquish her gains in Manchuria, German support was needed, as the risk of escalation could only be contained through Germany’s assumed deterrent effect on Russia in Europe. Conversely, appeasing Russian ambitions risked alienating Japan. Tokyo could then be expected to offer Russia a Korea-Manchuria barter, with damaging consequences for British interests in China. Faced with such unpalatable outcomes, Lansdowne was ready to make a bold move and approach Germany with the offer of coordinated action. His draft joint Anglo-German declaration of 12 March revolved around two central ideas. The first was a commitment by both governments to localize any Russo-Japanese conflict, ‘reserving, however, to themselves absolute freedom of action should the course of events require them, in their own interests, to intervene on behalf of Japan’. This notion had evolved organically from ideas which Lansdowne had entertained for some while. The second point was more far-reaching: ‘In the event, however, of any power joining Russia in hostilities against Japan, the British and German governments will give naval assistance to Japan to defend herself against such attack.’29 Lansdowne’s projected Anglo-German declaration has generated a good deal of scholarly debate, much of which lies outside the confines of this collection of essays. It will suffice here to state that the Foreign Secretary’s planned initiative did not aim at a fully-fledged alliance with Germany, but rather at an Anglo-German defence pact, confined to East Asia and support for Japan. The stipulated ‘naval assistance’ was vague enough not to commit London to any definite course of action. Furthermore, given the embryonic size of Germany’s navy, her joining Britain, then, was of largely political value. Indeed, Lansdowne’s project was more akin to the 1887 Mediterranean Agreements, a strictly regional understanding primarily to preserve the status quo in north-eastern China. It incorporated Lansdowne’s own localization scheme, but also evolved from Salisbury’s

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tentative idea of an Anglo-Japanese defence pact as well as the argument advanced by Francis Bertie,30 one of the assistant under-secretaries at the Foreign Office, that supporting Japan would establish a new and viable, regional balance of power. All three elements were compatible. Rather than marking a clear break with previous policy, Lansdowne’s draft declaration underlined a strong strand of continuity in British diplomacy.31 Lansdowne’s project came to nought. While the Cabinet contemplated the next move,32 the German chancellor, Prince Bülow, put paid to any hopes of cooperation against Russia by declaring that Manchuria lay outside the remit of the Anglo-German agreement of October 1900, ‘and [that] the fate of that province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany’.33 Lansdowne sought to put a positive gloss on the episode. Reaching out to Germany had been justified since ‘our South African entanglements make it impossible for us to commit ourselves to any obligation which might involve us in war, unless we can assure ourselves that any obligation which we might incur would be shared by another power’.34 It was an admission of Britain’s limited ability to project her power in different parts of the globe. And yet, the latest twist of events had brought clarity on three counts. In the first place, Berlin would not lift a finger to ease the burden under which Britain staggered in Asia. This was understandable enough, but the manner in which the Wilhelmstrasse had positioned itself left a bitter aftertaste. Commenting in later years on Britain and Germany drifting apart, Lansdowne reflected: ‘It was something to do with Manchuria. I found I couldn’t trust them [the Germans].’35 As for Russia, her attempts to coerce the Chinese government had reached a dead-end, and St Petersburg now essayed to disengage from the Manchurian imbroglio at minimal cost to itself. Lansdowne reciprocated and sought to de-escalate the situation and not be ‘petulant about Manchuria’. Its ‘gravitation’ towards Russia had been recognized by Britain in 1899, and ‘[w]ith a little bonne volonté & mutual confidence the whole affair ought to be capable of settlement’.36 Lansdowne gained more than he had dared to hope, for Russian diplomacy was soon in full retreat. ‘[T]he obnoxious Manchurian agreement’ was off the table by early April 1901. Japan’s cooperation in this, however, had been crucial, and this was the third aspect of East Asian affairs on which recent events brought clarity.37 TOWARDS THE ALLIANCE Tokyo’s decision to support Lansdowne’s scheme for the payment of the Boxer indemnity in Chinese bonds was a further auspicious sign.38 At the Foreign Office, Bertie, the chief advocate of some form of Anglo-Japanese alliance, once more pressed the case for an understanding with the Japanese, ‘and so keep them from gravitating towards our rivals’.39 Lansdowne took the matter up in two conversations with Viscount Hayashi, the Japanese envoy. Both governments were guided by similar interests. ‘[S]upposing the balance of power in the waters of the Far East to be threatened with serious disturbance’, a reciprocal undertaking to preserve the regional status quo would be desirable.40 The reference to ‘the waters of the Far East’ is significant, as it underscored, both, the limited scope of the projected compact and its naval essence. This was little more than an informal feeler. There was as yet no talk of an alliance. Lansdowne was ‘sincerely desirous to make something of the idea’ of a combination between the two naval Powers, but was adamant that Tokyo would have to show its hand first.41 At that point, he had not closed the door on a deal

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with Germany for good, nor did he rule out a general understanding with Russia;42 and it would be erroneous to conclude that an Anglo-Japanese alliance had now become inevitable. However, as summer turned into autumn, the prospects of a settlement with the latter receded. All three of Lansdowne’s options had the same object in view: to blunt actual or potential challenges to British imperial interests. Now, a Japanese understanding was the only viable option left. In contrast to the approaches to Russia and Germany, which were an attempt to use diplomatic means to ameliorate the effects of isolation, financial and naval factors shaped British thinking about an agreement with Japan. Acute Treasury concerns about public expenditure, Admiralty anxieties about the spiralling costs of naval construction, and Lansdowne’s diplomatic designs thus fused together in a new dynamic in British strategic policy.43 Lansdowne concurred with the Admiralty’s view that a naval pact would add materially to Britain’s position in East Asia, and he was optimistic that the Japanese were ‘very keen to go on and are preparing a definite proposal’.44 With the interests of three departments of state converging, the Lansdowne-Hayashi talks gathered pace, and the essentials of the future arrangement were soon established. It was to be a defensive alliance, which would become effective only if either party were attacked by two powers; that Japan’s special interests in the Korean peninsula were to be safeguarded; and neither party would enter into separate agreements with other powers regarding China or Korea. In an attempt to give practical meaning to arguments about the naval advantages of a Japanese alliance, Lansdowne also stressed the need for some form of technical understanding concerning the mutual use of docks, harbour facilities and coaling stations.45 Mindful of Salisbury’s lingering presence in the government, Lansdowne limned the outline of an agreement for his consent. The principal provision of his ‘preliminary sketch’ was that Britain and Japan would observe ‘benevolent neutrality’ in the event of a war involving either with one other power. This was little more than a revised version of ‘holding the ring’ during a Russo-Japanese conflict. Salisbury’s swift approval is suggestive.46 To his mind, Lansdowne’s projected agreement did not differ in substance from his own earlier idea of an entente with Japan for the defence of the Chinese littoral. The Cabinet approved Lansdowne’s draft on 5 November, though there were some rumblings of dissent, largely because ministers had a somewhat limited conception of the Japanese agreement.47 A first hurdle had been cleared, but there remained problems of detail to be resolved. The precise nature of ‘the preponderant influence exercised by Japan in many parts of Corea’ emerged as a potential sticking point.48 Lansdowne’s aim, after all, was to assist Japan to keep Russia out of Korea, not to extend her own influence there. Tokyo, however, was not minded to make such concessions, nor was there much appetite for extending the geographical scope of the alliance. There was certainly a nagging doubt in Lansdowne’s mind that Britain might be dragged into a global war with France and Russia ‘over matters of purely local interest’ to Japan.49 The potential risks inherent in a Japanese agreement were never far from the surface. Arthur Balfour, Salisbury’s nephew and heir apparent, deprecated ‘the perhaps rather hasty decision’ by the Cabinet to approve of Lansdowne’s negotiations: ‘We may find ourselves fighting for our existence in every part of the Globe against Russia and France ... over some obscure Russian-Japanese quarrel in Corea.’ Whatever advantages an alliance might yield in protecting regional interests, these were outweighed by its inherent risks and liabilities.50 Lansdowne’s reply

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was somewhat selective, and reflected his narrower conception of Britain’s strategic problems. The chief advantage of the alliance was its limited nature, the likelihood of the casus foederis arising being significantly lower than would be the case with a European alliance, and the ‘area of entanglement’ being more confined. A formal alliance made public Britain’s interest in preserving Japan as a regional Great Power, and London could ‘get what we can out of the bargain’.51 The breakthrough in the alliance negotiations came with the Christmas visit to London by Ito– Hirobumi, Japan’s senior elder statesman. On New Year’s Eve, Hayashi returned to the Foreign Office to hand Lansdowne a memorandum, detailing desirable amendments to the original draft treaty, and to urge him that ‘no time should be lost in concluding the agreement’.52 On the following day, he had an exhaustive discussion with Ito– at his Bowood country house. Ito– told him that Japan did not seek ‘a “double-handed” arrangement’ about Korea, and, in a second conversation on 6 January, intimated that a Russo-Japanese agreement was unlikely, thus giving Lansdowne the reassurance he had sought.53 He encountered a last-minute, and somewhat unexpected, obstacle in Salisbury’s bulky shape. ‘There is no limit: and no escape. We are pledged to war, though the conduct of our ally may have been followed in spite of our strongest remonstrances’, the premier warned. Even so, Salisbury’s political presence was waning, and his observations on the draft alliance treaty were a reasoned and constructive critique of details rather than an expression of fundamental opposition to the idea of an alliance.54 Indeed, they reinforced Lansdowne’s own misgivings on certain points. The Japanese terms needed to be toned down. Tokyo’s desire ‘to keep for themselves an absolutely free hand as to the pretexts upon which a quarrel might be fastened on Russia as to Corean affairs’ was risky.55 Both sides were anxious to bring the negotiations to a speedy conclusion, however, and both were ready to compromise. Lansdowne accepted that the agreement should be limited to East Asia. Hayashi, meanwhile, yielded on the proposed fixed size of naval forces, which Lansdowne had rejected. A compromise was found also for the Korean problem: Japan gave assurances of non-aggressive intentions; Britain recognized Japan’s special commercial interests in Korea; and admitted that Tokyo had the right to take measures to safeguard these interests if threatened by aggressive action by a third power.56 Lansdowne expected the alliance to safeguard British interests in China, without involving European commitments. Additional expenditure, which the Treasury sought to curb, could thus be avoided. At the same time, there was no need for a break with ‘isolationism’, as advocated by Joseph Chamberlain and others. In this sense, the Anglo-Japanese alliance underscored Britain’s continued aloofness from Europe. The combination of British and Japanese naval forces established a new Russo-Japanese balance of power in northern China and in Korea. Though delicately poised, it provided a strategic umbrella protecting Britain’s own interests in China. It was not entirely without risks, however. As Balfour and Salisbury had predicted, it did not reduce the likelihood of a Russo-Japanese conflagration. ‘KEEPING THE RING’: THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. As the year 1903 declined to its close, the imminent prospect of war in Asia forced Lansdowne to contemplate the broader implications of the alliance. There were two risks involved in a conflict. If the alliance succeeded in containing Russia in East Asia,

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then this left British interests in Central Asia more vulnerable to Russian pressure. The second risk was altogether more real, the failure of the alliance to contain Russia, with the attendant danger of the war escalating beyond the region. Lansdowne was certain that in ‘a few months hence the balance of naval power will incline the other way [i.e. towards Russia]’, and Japan would then be vulnerable to a Russian strike. If Britain were to support Japan in such an eventuality, ‘that will mean war with Russia all over the world, & we have no longer to consider merely the local conditions in the Far East’. It was better, then, to avert war than to embark on a neo-Bismarckian policy, advocated by some, of exploiting any conflict by squeezing concessions out of Russia elsewhere.57 He therefore suggested a joint initiative with France and possibly the United States to extract from St Petersburg the outline of a regional accommodation with Japan. Britain would then ‘tell the Japanese distinctly that they must be content with the bargain they can get as to Corea’.58 This was sensible enough, but Balfour, who had succeeded Salisbury as prime minister in July 1902, was not minded to support mediation. Russia could not cripple Japan’s war effort through a naval blockade, far less invade her. A war between the two Asian rivals would turn into a stalemate, and Japan should be left to ‘work out her own salvation in her own way’.59 As for the alliance, ‘[w]e are only required to “keep the ring”. A conflict, in fact, could be conceived of as being advantageous to us ... . Both “before, during and after” its outbreak it is likely to do wonders in making Russia amenable to sweet reason.’60 Lansdowne did not doubt the ‘incidental advantages’ that might result from Russia’s Asian entanglements, but he thought that these counted for little as compared with Japan’s likely eventual defeat. He predicted that by the autumn of 1904 Russia ‘might be mistress of the situation, and might impose terms on Japan which would wipe the latter out as a military power, and obliterate her fleet’. Mediation to avert war and to facilitate a Russo-Japanese settlement, guaranteed by all the powers with rights in China, was thus urgently required: War involves for us a three-fold risk: (i) (ii) (iii)

the possibility that our ally may be crushed; the possibility that we ourselves become implicated, not on account of our treaty engagement to Japan, but because the British public will not sit still while the crushing is being done; the aggravation of our present financial difficulties, already grave enough.61

These were cogent reasons, and it seems that Lansdowne even mobilised the King to intercede with the prime minister.62 Balfour was not for turning. By giving ‘unpalatable advice ... we should lose Japan in trying to save her’. Even if victorious, Russia would be weakened by the war; and faced with ‘an implacable & unsleeping enemy ... she would be much easier to deal with, both in Asia and in Europe, than she is at present’.63 The parameters of British diplomacy in a war in Asia had thus been established, and although foreign diplomats in London observed pronounced pro-Japanese sympathies, Britain remained strictly neutral.64 It is true, the infamous Dogger Bank incident of 21 October 1904 tested British neutrality almost to destruction. At one point, ‘it looked ... as if the betting was about even as between peace and war’.65 St Petersburg could ill afford antagonising Britain, however, and had to give in to Lansdowne’s demands for compensation – belated confirmation of Balfour’s prognosis that war in Asia would force Russia to moderate her behaviour elsewhere.

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The outbreak of the war in February 1904 presented Lansdowne with two important tasks, the most immediate being the need to localise the conflict by ensuring that Russia’s ally France remained aloof from it. He pursued this aim simultaneously in Europe and in China. Indeed, the war between their two respective allies encouraged Lansdowne and Théophile Delcassé, his French counterpart, to pursue separate talks to resolve the many disputes that had bedevilled AngloFrench relations for the past two decades, although the foreign secretary in particular was determined to make the arrangement stand on its own merits.66 The result was the Anglo-French understanding of 8 April 1904, in reality a series of colonial agreements, with the Morocco-Egypt barter at their core. Ironically, in London, an understanding with France had always been seen in its utility as ‘a stepping stone with Russia’.67 Now, Russia’s involvement in a war in Asia hastened the conclusion of the French entente. Thus, the 1902 alliance with Japan, far from keeping Britain aloof from Europe, had set in motion the process of gradual involvement by Britain in continental affairs. In a further ironic twist, Lansdowne’s second task was to renew the alliance with Japan on much improved terms. The annihilation of the Russian fleet at Tsushima on 27–28 May 1905 dealt the fatal blow to Russia’s war efforts, and it also eliminated her as a naval factor. This consideration played a significant role in British policy planning. Already, before Tsushima, the question of a renewal of the alliance had moved into the foreground, when Tokyo took the initiative in December 1904.68 Lansdowne understood that any renewal had to be accomplished before peace talks got underway. Not renewing the compact, meanwhile, entailed the risk of losing influence in the Far East to a more assertive Japan. Whilst this was an incentive to pursue the talks, it could not remove lingering doubts as to the wider strategic utility of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. A mere renewal of the existing treaty had few attractions for Lansdowne and his advisers.69 Instead, they insisted that the alliance should be extended to cover India, and be tightened in its provisions so that it was triggered by an attack upon one of the two parties by a single Power.70 The Japanese readily accepted these demands, and, in return, obtained recognition of their new position in Korea. The revised alliance was signed on 12 August 1905, just after the commencement of the American-sponsored peace talks at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Lansdowne stressed the defensive nature of the new compact. By extending the scope of the alliance, Britain had merely ‘raise[d] the wall of [her] back garden to prevent an over-adventurous neighbour or that neighbour’s unruly or overzealous agents from attempting to climb it’.71 For now, Russia’s forward policy in Central Asia and her naval expansion in the Pacific had been blocked. Lansdowne’s reference to Russia is indicative of the true purpose of the revised alliance. The common need to contain Russian expansion in Asia had brought London and Tokyo together in 1902; and the treaty revision of 1905 completed Russia’s containment. But international politics, and alliances more especially so, cannot be preserved in aspic; they constantly evolve. In many ways, the years between 1902 and 1905 marked the zenith of Anglo-Japanese cooperation. Thereafter the alliance began to wane. Its purpose now was to control Japan. The reduced significance of the alliance was not, perhaps, immediately palpable. In October 1905, at Lansdowne’s suggestion, the two countries raised their diplomatic missions in each other’s capital from the rank of legations to that of embassies, a symbolic recognition of Japan’s newly-acquired status of a first-rate Power.

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CONCLUSION Lord Lansdowne was instrumental in forging the alliance of 1902. If he was more open to Japan than was usual for a man of his time and class, in his decision to pursue the Japanese option he was nevertheless guided by calculations of imperial strategy, above all the containment of Russian influence on the Asian mainland. With the alliance Lansdowne added a new instrument to Britain’s diplomatic toolkit. In its shape it appeared novel; in its essence, it represented continuity with established foreign policy principles of eschewing peacetime commitments to (European) Great Powers. Lansdowne did not set out to secure an agreement with Japan to the exclusion of other options. But he worked with the grain of events and let his decisions be guided by the logic of developments, and, after the autumn of 1901, they pointed to an alliance with Japan. Even so, Lansdowne failed to appreciate the degree to which the alliance encouraged Japan to seek a military confrontation with Russia. When the war eventually came, it had political repercussions well beyond its actual theatre of war. It disturbed the European equilibrium, and thus began the fragmentation of the old world order, and with it Europe’s and Britain’s decline in the period of the two world wars. It is an ironic twist of history that the alliance which Lansdowne helped to conclude, had consequences with which he sought to deal in his advocacy of a negotiated peace in 1917, and which, in turn, cast a dark shadow over his own reputation. Notes 1

2

3 4

5

6

7 8

9

10 11 12

13 14

Lord Newton’s Lord Lansdowne (London, 1927) is still the only biography. A. Cecil, British Foreign Secretaries, 1807–1916: Studies in Personality and Policy (London, 1927), 311–3 and P.J.V. Rolo, ‘Lansdowne’, K.M. Wilson (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War (London, 1987), 159–171, are somewhat superficial; more useful is H. Cecil, Lord Lansdowne, from the Entente Cordiale to the “Peace Letter” of 1917: A European Statesman Assessed (London, 2004). Quotes from anon., ‘Reshuffle’, National Review (December 1900), 462–5; and The Novels and Plays of Saki (H.H. Munro) (London, repr. 1939), 306–309. I. Malcolm, Vacant Thrones (London, 1931), 82. . I.H. Nish, ‘British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1892–1905’, B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss (eds), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895–1939 (Edmonton, Alberta, 1984), 61–2. Knollys to Bertie (private), 19 November 1902, Bertie MSS, The National Archive (Public Record Office), FO 800/163. Lansdowne to Akers-Douglas (private), 7 November 1900, Chilston MSS, Kent Archives Office, Maidstone, C.325/6. Lansdowne to Hamilton, 9 April 1901, Lansdowne MSS, British Library, Lans (5) 28. Lansdowne to Lascelles (private), 11 November 1900, Lascelles MSS, TNA (PRO), FO 800/17; Newton, Lansdowne, 196–7. Min. Lansdowne, n.d., on note Bertie to Lansdowne, 12 January 1901, FO 17/1499; T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905 (Oxford, 2007), 234–6. Min. Lansdowne, 3 January 1901, TNA (PRO), FO 17/1499. Lansdowne to Satow (private), 16 January 1901, Satow MSS, TNA (PRO), PRO 30/33/7/1. Lansdowne to Salisbury (private), 15 January 1901, FO 17/1499; J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London, repr. 1970), 330. Salisbury to Lansdowne (private), 17 January 1901, FO 17/1499. Lansdowne to MacDonald (nos. 6 and 8), 12 and 15 January 1901, FO 46/538; Lansdowne to Lascelles (secret), 17 January 1901, Lascelles MSS, FO 800/10; for some of the background see J.A.S. Grenville, ‘Lord Lansdowne’s Abortive Project of 12 March 1901 for a Secret

LORD LANSDOWNE, 1845–1927

15

16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26

27 28

29 30

31

32

33 34

35

36 37

38 39

40 41

42

43

44 45

46

101

Agreement with Germany’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research xxvii, 3 (1954), 204–5. Tyrrell to Asquith (private), 16 September 1922, Asquith MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms Asquith 34; Otte, China Question, 237–41. Memo. Lansdowne, ‘Northern Railways’, 15 February 1901, FO 17/1500 (printed version in CAB 37/56/23). Tel. MacDonald to Lansdowne (no. 4), 15 February 1901, FO 46/542. Note Lansdowne to Salisbury, 16 February 1901, FO 17/1500. Note Salisbury to Lansdowne, 16 February 1901, ibid. Note Lansdowne to Bertie, 17 February 1901, ibid. Note Lofêng-lu to Lansdowne, 1 March 1901, FO 405/7549/2. Tel. Lansdowne to Satow (no. 49), 1 March 1901, FO 17/1482. Memo. Lansdowne, 1 March 1901, FO 65/1624 (circulated to the Cabinet, CAB 37/56/28). Tels Lansdowne to Satow (no. 55), 4 March 1901, FO 17/1482, and to Scott (no. 54), 4 March 1901, G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (11 vols., London, 1926–38) ii, no. 45 [hereafter BD]. Tel. Lansdowne to Lascelles (no. 67), 8 March 1901, FO 64/1523. Note Hayashi to Lansdowne, 9 March 1901, BD ii, no. 51. For naval preparations see tel. MacDonald to Lansdowne (no. 9), 18 March 1901, FO 46/542; I.H. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 2nd ed. 1987), 101–4. Mins. Bertie and Salisbury, n.d. [9 or 10 March 1901], FO 46/542. Tel. Lansdowne to Monson (no. 27), 8 March 1901, BD ii, no. 40; Lansdowne to MacDonald (no. 27), 16 March 1901, FO 46/538 (the interview with Hayashi took place on 10 March). Memo. Lansdowne, 12 March 1901, FO 46/547 (circulated to Cabinet, CAB 37/56/30). See biographical portrait of Francis Bertie in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015. For the established view, see Grenville, ‘Lansdowne’s Abortive Project’, 210; for a reinterpretation of the evidence, see Otte, China Question, 250–9. Salisbury to Edward VII, 13 March 1901, CAB 41/26/5; J.M. Goudswaard, Aspects of the End of Britain’s “Splendid Isolation”, 1898–1904 (Rotterdam, 1952), 72–3. Lascelles to Lansdowne (no.69), 16 March 1901, FO 64/1520 (original emphasis). Lansdowne to Lascelles (private), 18 March 1901, Lascelles MSS, FO 800/10; Newton, Lansdowne, 199–200. As quoted in A.L. Kennedy, Salisbury, 1830–1903: Portrait of a Statesman (London, 1953), 393. Lansdowne to Scott (private), 26 March 1901, Scott MSS, BL, Add. MSS. 52297. Lansdowne to Hicks Beach (private), 7 April 1901, Hicks Beach MSS, Gloucestershire Record Office, Gloucester, PCC/84. Lansdowne to Whitehead (nos. 66 and 70, secret), 21 and 26 June 1901, BD ii, nos.100–1. Memo Bertie, 2 July, FO 17/1506, 22 July 1901, FO 17/1507, and ‘Anglo-Japanese Agreement’, 22 July 1901, FO 46/547; I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907 (Westport, CT, repr. 1976), 156. Lansdowne to Whitehead (no. 89, secret), 31 July 1901, BD ii, no. 102. Lansdowne to MacDonald (private), 4 September 1901, Lansdowne MSS, TNA (PRO), FO 800/134. The Cabinet had approved further talks in August, Salisbury to Edward VII, 16 Aug. 1901, CAB 41/26/21. Lansdowne’s objectives are outlined in a draft to despatch to Arthur Hardinge, ? September 1901, Lansdowne MSS, FO 800/137; for the context see F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914 (New Haven, CT, 1968), 352–8; D. Mclean, Britain and the Buffer State: The Collapse of the Persian Empire, 1890–1914 (London, 1979), 60–2. Memo. Selborne, ‘Balance of Naval Power in the Far East’, 4 September 1901, CAB 37/58/81; Z.S. Steiner, ‘Great Britain and the Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, Journal of Modern History xxxi, 1 (1959), esp. 27–31. Lansdowne to Selborne, 10 September 1901, Selborne MSS, Bod., Selborne 26. Lansdowne to Whitehead (no. 108A), 16 October 1901, BD ii, no. 105. On the policy differences at Tokyo, I.H. Nish, ‘The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty’, STICERD Discussion Papers, no. IS/02/432 (April 2002), 2–3. Note Lansdowne to Salisbury, and memo. Lansdowne, both 23 October and min. Salisbury, 25 October 1901, FO 46/547; Nish, ‘Foreign Secretaries’, 62–3.

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47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58 59 60 61 62 63

64

65

66

67 68

69

70

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Salisbury to Edward VII, 5 November 1901, CAB 41/26/24; Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 182–3. Lansdowne to MacDonald (no. 115, secret), 6 November 1901, BD ii, no. 110; British draft agreement, 6 November 1901, ibid., no. 125. Lansdowne to MacDonald (no. 128, secret), 12 December 1901, ibid. ii, no. 115; memo. Lansdowne, ‘Anglo-Japanese Agreement’, 16 December 1901, CAB 37/59/133. Balfour to Lansdowne (private), 12 December 1901, Balfour MSS, BL, Add. MSS. 4927; D. Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874–1932 (London, 1968), 67–8. Lansdowne to Balfour (private), 12 December 1901, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49727; Rolo, ‘Lansdowne’, 162. Lansdowne to MacDonald (no. 133, secret), 31 December 1901, BD ii, no. 119; memo. Lansdowne, ‘Anglo-Japanese Agreement’, 1 January 1902, CAB 37/60/1; Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 207–8. Lansdowne to MacDonald (no.2, secret), 7 January 1902, BD ii, no. 120. On Ito–’s visit to Bowood see the important new evidence in Nish, ‘First Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, 7–8. Memo. Salisbury, 7 January 1902, CAB 37/60/3. I am following Prof. Nish’s assessment of the memorandum, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 210. Lansdowne to MacDonald (private), 9 January 1902, Lansdowne MSS, FO 800/134; Lansdowne to Salisbury, 8 January 1902, Lansdowne MSS, Lans (5) 34. For the text of the treaty, see BD ii, no. 125. The best treatment of the final phase of negotiations remains Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 211–8. Lansdowne to A. Chamberlain, 22 December 1903, Chamberlain MSS, Chamberlain MSS, Birmingham University Library, AC 17/1/17. Austen Chamberlain, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, advocated such a course. Lansdowne to Balfour, 22 December 1903, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49728. Memo. Balfour, ‘Japan and Russia’, 22 December 1903, CAB 17/54. Balfour to Selborne (private), 23 December 1903, Selborne MSS, Selborne 34. Lansdowne to Balfour, 24 December 1903, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49728. Edward VII to Balfour (private), 25 December 1903, ibid., Add.Mss. 49683. Draft Balfour to Edward VII, 26 or 27 December 1903, ibid. Lansdowne was instructed to outline a possible agreement with Russia, see memo. Lansdowne, ‘Proposed Agreement with Russia’, 1 January 1904, CAB 37/68/1. See the report by the Netherlands envoy Gericke van Herwijnen to Lynden de Melvil (no. 74), 9 February 1904, C. Smit (ed.), Bescheiden Betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland, 3rd ser., 1899–1919 (5 vols., The Hague, 1957–1962) ii, no. 144. Lansdowne to C. Hardinge (private), 29 October 1904, Hardinge MSS, CUL, vol. 17; K. Neilson, ‘“A Dangerous Game of American Poker”: Britain and the Russo-Japanese War’, Journal of Strategic Studies xii, 1 (1989), 73–87. Lansdowne to Monson (private), 28 December 1902, Monson MSS, Bod., Ms.Eng.hist.c.595; Lansdowne to Bertie (private), 30 March 1904, Bertie MSS, BL, Add. MSS. 63016; E.W. Edwards, ‘The Japanese Alliance and the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904’, History xlii, 1 (1957), 19–27. Cromer to Balfour (private), 15 October 1903, Cromer MSS, FO 633/6. MacDonald to Hardinge, 23 December 1904, Hardinge MSS, vol. 7; Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 299–300. Memo. Clarke, ‘The Afghanistan Problem’, 20 March 1905, CAB 38/8/26. On this point see the pertinent observations by P. Towle, ‘The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India’, Military Affairs xliv, 3 (1980), 114–5. Memo. Clarke, 10 April 1905, CAB 17/54; Committee of Imperial Defence, minutes of 70th meeting, 12 April 1905, CAB 2/1; also K.M. Wilson ‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of August 1905 and the Defending of India: A Case of the Worst Case Scenario’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History xxi, 4 (1993), 324–56. Lansdowne to Hardinge, 4 September 1905, Hardinge MSS, vol. 7.

10

SIR FRANCIS BERTIE, 1844–1919

Key Official in Framing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

T.G. OTTE Sir Francis Bertie

F

rancis Bertie (later Viscount Bertie of Thame) never visited Japan; nor is he known to have shown any particular interest in the country, its history or its culture. To include him in the series of Anglo-Japanese biographical portraits might therefore appear quixotic. It is not. For Bertie helped to shape Britain’s dealings with Japan more than many others who occupy a more prominent place in the history of the relations between the two countries. As assistant under-secretary (AUS) at the Foreign Office between 1894 and 1902 he was instrumental in preparing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, thereby establishing the broad parameters of British policy in East Asia for the next two decades, and perhaps even beyond. ‘THE BULL’ IN WHITEHALL

There was little in Bertie’s early career to indicate his later role in Anglo-Japanese relations. Born in 1844 as the second son of the Earl of Abingdon, he eschewed the army or the church, the traditional destinations for the younger members of the aristocracy, neither of which suited his caustic and cynical temperament. Instead he opted for a career in diplomacy. On leaving Eton, he spent two years at Bonn to perfect his language skills. In 1863, as a callow youth of nineteen, he took the Foreign Office entrance examination, which he passed with flying colours, coming top of his cohort.1 Thus began a career at the Foreign Office that lasted until early 1903, when Bertie secured an appointment in the then still separate diplomatic service first as ambassador at Rome, before being transferred to Paris two years later, in which post he was to remain until 1918. His early years at the Foreign Office were spent on the humdrum duties that were the preserve of junior clerks in those days – ‘largely mechanical, but at the same time confidential’ – copying despatches or encyphering and decyphering telegrams.2 Bertie acquired a reputation as a diligent and efficient official, so much so that, in 1874 – his family’s Tory ties no doubt aiding him – he was appointed private secretary to the Hon. Robert Bourke, parliamentary under-secretary in the incoming administration of Benjamin Disraeli, a posi103

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tion which Bertie held until the fall of the ministry in 1880.3 His first exposure to international diplomacy abroad came in 1878, when he was a junior member of the British delegation at the Berlin Congress that was to settle the outcome of the latest Russo-Turkish war. Indeed, for much of this time Bertie was concerned with the affairs of the Ottoman Empire and the Near East. In 1880, he returned to the Turkish (since 1882, Eastern) Department, where he remained until 1894, except for a brief interlude in the American and Asiatic Department between 1887 and 1889. He continued to impress his superiors, who could not ‘speak too highly of his services’..4 In temporarily taking charge of the Eastern Department, Bertie had shown ‘remarkable ability and untiring energy with which he has conducted the labors [sic] of that Department during a long and troublesome period’.5 Thus he steadily advanced up the career ladder. In 1890, he was made senior clerk of the Eastern department, before being appointed one of the two AUS on 1 January 1894.6 Part of Bertie’s remit in his new role was to supervise the work of the American and Asiatic Department. Over the next few years he would come to wield considerable influence over the framing of British policy in East Asia. His own forthright manner aside, two factors combined to elevate his position at the Foreign Office. For one thing, successive foreign secretaries proved receptive to Bertie’s sharpeyed and shrewd advice. Bertie was ‘a man of the world’, observed the parting permanent under-secretary (PUS), Sir Philip Currie, in 1894; the newly installed Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley, would be well advised to seek the AUS’s advice: ‘You may rely on his giving you honest opinions.’7 The two marquesses who followed on Kimberley took a very similar view of Bertie’s merits. If his relations with Lansdowne (1900–1905) were often a little distant, he found Salisbury (1895–1900) usually receptive to his ideas. The second factor that helped to turn East Asian affairs into Bertie’s bailiwick was his intense personal rivalry with Currie’s successor as PUS, Sir Thomas Sanderson, a more conventional and methodical man than Bertie ‘The Bull’. The latter combined ‘impeccable official precision and extremely able superintendence of public affairs with a crudity and licence of expression... which lifted the hair of the newly joined’, reflected a diplomat who had served under Bertie in the 1880s.8 Bertie was an odd mixture of an overgrown schoolboy, who delighted in impish pranks, and an atavistic throwback to Regency days, who bucked at the straightlaced proprieties of the Victorian era and revelled in crass vulgarities: ‘A dying world breathed through his dilated nostrils; Society meant much, art nothing, to him. Snobbish, sternly practical, resolutely prosaic, he knew no arabesques of humour or irony, but only hard straight lines.’9 At the Foreign Office, no-one suffered more from his barbs than Sanderson. Bertie was wont to ‘indulge in... free and easy language about “Bossy” [his nickname for Sanderson]’ in front of junior clerks, and lost no opportunity to denigrate the PUS.10 In this he went as far as suggesting to King Edward VII that Sanderson was ‘so susceptible to the effects of wine’ and so liable to spill state secrets.11 Their different personalities aside, there was quite possibly also an element of frustrated personal ambitions at the root of Bertie’s dislike of Sanderson. Three years the latter’s junior, he was too close to him in age to stand a chance of succeeding the last of the ‘superclerks’ to the PUS-ship – and, in part, this explains Bertie’s eventual departure for an embassy abroad. Significantly, Bertie’s frustration did not merely exhaust itself in colourful language. He also manipulated the flow of information so as to limit the PUS’s ability to interfere in departmental affairs. ‘Bertie’s disposition does not tend to excessive communicativeness’, as Sanderson himself put it a little more delicately.12 Conversely, for his part, the PUS refrained from

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challenging Bertie in his departmental fiefdom, thus leaving him considerable latitude not merely in superintending its work but also in shaping for himself a prominent role in policy-making. The creation, in 1899, of a separate Far Eastern Department by dividing the old American and Asiatic Department into two separate entities, reflected the growing international importance of Asia, but it also further cemented Bertie’s influential position in Whitehall. ‘A BRITISH WORLD-POLICY’: BERTIE’S VIEWS OF EAST ASIA. Bertie’s superintendence over British policy in East Asia coincided with a crucial period in the politics of that region. Two historic events stand at either end of his tenure as AUS. He had scarcely taken up his new post when the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, in July 1894, ushered in a period of considerable instability and uncertainty in East Asia. Following Japan’s victory over the erstwhile regional hegemon, the ‘China Question’ appeared to enter its most acute phase yet. Bertie’s involvement with the region came to an end not long after the conclusion of the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. In framing his policy advice, Bertie was guided by what he considered to be British interests in the Far East. During one of the many Great Power crises that followed the Sino-Japanese conflict, Bertie offered a succinct definition of the principal object of Britain’s regional policy: ‘our permanent interest is unrestricted trade everywhere and therefore we should discourage spheres [of influence] as long as possible, and only take a position commanding the Yangtsze River when we see that we are to be placed at a disadvantage in other parts of China commercially or that France is on the move to take something’. In securing these interests, Bertie relied on Britain’s naval strength in the China Seas, the Royal Navy’s China Station serving as the armed wing of British diplomacy: ‘A squadron to deal with a Russian-German-French combination would be our best security.’13 Bertie’s comments of late 1897 are indicative of his understanding of British East Asian policy. At its core lay China and the commercial ties with her. Britain’s chief political concern, however, was with the ambitions of the other powers, primarily Russia and France, both established Asiatic Powers and Britain’s traditional rivals in the region, but increasingly also Germany, whose trading presence had begun to make itself felt more especially in China. It was thus in the broader strategic context of the ‘China Question’ and the international tensions surrounding it that Bertie considered Japan an increasingly important factor in regional politics. Bertie represented the views of his political generation. He looked askance at international alliances, and was reluctant to countenance any move that might entail a ‘sacrifice of our liberty to pursue a British world-policy’. Instead he preferred ‘the middle position of “tertius gaudens”’.14 Bertie’s conceptualization of foreign policy was a form of British neo-Bismarckianism. He wished for Britain to remain ‘the country holding the balance between the [Franco-Russian] Dual and the Triple Alliances’.15 ‘GOOD TERMS WITH THE RISING POWER OF THE FAR EAST’ In Asian affairs, Bertie’s stance initially reflected Britain’s traditional leaning towards China. His attitude towards Japan was characterized by a degree of wariness tempered by the essential pragmatism of a ‘man of business’.

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The prolonged negotiations on revising the so-called ‘unequal treaties’, which guaranteed foreigners residing in Japan substantial extra-territorial judicial rights and commercial and tax privileges, illustrated this dynamic tension in Bertie’s thinking. At the turn of 1893–1894, the government of Itõ Hirobumi had come under strong domestic pressure on account of the lack of progress in the matter. The Japanese foreign minister, Mutsu Munemitsu, sought to convert some of that pressure into diplomatic leverage by hinting to the British minister, Hugh Fraser, that Tokyo might in future simply ignore the irksome obligations imposed on it by the ‘unequal treaties’. Bertie was not amused. He drew the attention of Viscount Aoki Shuzõ, Japan’s envoy in London, to the ‘tall talk’ at Tokyo. If, he warned the minister: Japan desired to enter the ‘Comity of Western Nations’ the Japanese Gov[ernmen]t must realize that one of the first principles of those States is the respect for Treaties, which cannot be revoked because the Treaty Provisions happen to be distasteful to it. We could not start negotiations for revision with a more or less veiled threat from Japan that if we did not liberate her from her engagements she would free herself.16

For all his seeming firmness of language, this was mere posturing before any talks commenced. For Bertie understood well enough that the Japanese desire for change had better be accommodated. Insisting on the unadulterated status quo, he reasoned, was likely to produce an anti-foreign backlash in Japan: ‘If we refuse to negotiate or leave unanswered the Japanese proposals, a strong anti-English movement, encouraged by the Japanese Gov[ernmen]t, may ensue.’ Even if the government at Tokyo did not feel strong enough unilaterally to revoke the treaties, its hand might be forced by its domestic opponents. In that event, he warned, Britain would find herself ‘with no trade advantages and without extra-territorial jurisdiction’. Given the recent expansion of the Japanese navy and the strengthening of the country’s coastal defences, moreover, Britain would be unable to enforce her treaty rights. Whatever the short-term ructions in Anglo-Japanese relations caused by the proposed treaty revision, the two countries shared a common strategic goal, Bertie observed: ‘The great object which Japan & China have in common, & which is also an English interest, is to keep Russia out of Corea, as if that Power establishes herself at Port Lazareth [recte Lazarev (now Wônsan, North Korea)] she will be in a position of continual menace to Japan & China.’ There were therefore sound strategic reasons for accommodating Japan. Besides, the readier Britain showed herself to negotiate, the less exacting the price for a final settlement was likely to be. Indeed, Bertie thought that, given the internecine nature of party warfare in Japanese politics at the time, there was every chance of a draft treaty not being ratified by the Lower House of the Japanese diet, in which case the ‘unequal treaty’ rights would remain intact at no cost to British diplomacy.17 The argument Bertie advanced on this occasion revealed something of the essence of his political thinking. At its core was a strong element of suspicion of foreign nations, leavened by a strong dose of cynicism, and all wrapped up in political pragmatism in pursuit of Britain’s wider strategic goals. That pragmatism always prevailed. Such considerations also informed Bertie’s attitude during the Sino-Japanese conflict. He supported the efforts of Rosebery and Kimberley to encourage a negotiated settlement before the two rivals for predominance over the Korean peninsula came to blows: ‘The important thing was that negotiations should begin at once so as to obviate Russian intervention.’18 This was sensible

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advice, but matters had already gone too far for British mediation to prevent a war, as Bertie realized. Neither Tokyo nor Peking was prepared to withdraw their forces from Korea, nor were any of the European Powers prepared to throw their weight behind Lord Kimberley’s initiative. Japan, Bertie reasoned, wished to come to a regional arrangement with China to secure ‘their respective interests as against Russian designs’. In the absence of foreign support, the ‘power of China to turn Japan out of Corea is doubtful’. It was therefore for Peking to seek terms with Japan ‘on the basis suggested by the latter’.19 This was not to be; nor was it possible later, in October 1894 after the tide of war had shifted in Japan’s favour, to mediate a settlement. For his part, Bertie ‘regard[ed] with [the] gravest apprehension the continuance of the war’.20 A comprehensive Japanese victory, he suspected, would trigger Russia’s intervention in the conflict, and this would exacerbate the situation. Under the circumstances there was nothing for it but to await the outcome of the war, and to protect Britain’s regional interests as best as possible. If Bertie’s advice prior to the outbreak of the war was suggestive of a leaning towards Japan, in his defence of British interests he was even-handed. When, in September 1894, Mutsu sought to soften Japan’s commitment to respecting neutral shipping along the maritime approaches to Shanghai, the principal entrepôt for foreign commerce on the China coast, Bertie advocated a firm line: ‘we should certainly “lose face” with the Chinese, we shall let Japanese vessels up the Yangtze river unless the Chinese blocked it’. If that were to happen, Britain’s lucrative trade with the Yangtze provinces would be disrupted; if, on the other hand, Japanese forces pushed upriver, ‘there will probably be risings, massacres of foreigners & total destruction of our trade and consular establishments’.21 British naval reinforcements off Shanghai acted as a sufficient deterrent, and with the main theatre of the war remaining in the north, Mutsu yielded. Following Rosebery’s failed attempt to mediate a settlement in October 1894, Bertie supported the government’s policy of studied neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Japan’s victory and the subsequent intervention by the Russo-French-German triplice profoundly altered the strategic landscape of East Asia. It was now, Bertie observed, ‘very desirable [for Britain] to be on good terms with the Rising Power in the Far East’.22 This last consideration became more important, the more disturbed the politics of the region became. The growing encroachment of the other powers, presaged by the triple intervention of 1895, increased the potential strategic value of Japan to Britain. When, at the turn of 1897–1898, Germany and then Russia seized ports along the northern Chinese coast to establish their naval and political presence there – in the case of the former at Kiaochow, in the latter’s case at Port Arthur – Bertie suspected Russo-German collusion.23 He regarded the territorial presence of other European Powers in China as inimical to Britain’s commercial interests. But whilst Bertie instinctively preferred informal means of preserving British influence, the traditional tools of British imperialism, he concluded that London would now have to make a ‘claim for compensation’.24 This was the more pressing as the power of the Royal Navy to deter the expansionist designs of others was limited. A flying squadron permanently operating in Northern Chinese waters, at a considerable distance from Hongkong, was fraught with practical difficulties. There was also the danger that the establishment of a Russian presence at Port Arthur might persuade St Petersburg and Tokyo to set aside their differences and to arrive at a regional modus vivendi. With a view to such scenarios of future developments, Bertie supported suggestions that the British government ought to secure some countervailing concession. Ultimately, this led to the acquisition

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of Wei-hai-Wei, on the northern side of the Shantung promontory, until the 1894–1895 war the base of the Imperial Chinese Navy in the Gulf of Pechili and since then under temporary occupation by the Japanese. The latter, reported the British minister at Peking, Sir Claude MacDonald, were ‘much perturbed over the occupation of Kiaochow’.25 Japan, observed his colleague at Tokyo, Sir Ernest Satow, ‘would do anything asked of her at the present moment to gain her friendship’.26 Bertie therefore advocated the acquisition of the northern naval base as a counterpoise to Russia and Germany, by force if necessary.27 Such a move would prevent ‘our trade gradually [being] squeezed out of North and South China’, he averred. If Britain did not acquire the place, then Japan ought to be made to stay, in case ‘it would be necessary to promise to back her up in refusing to leave if called upon to do so by Russia, Germany, and France’.28 Whatever precisely Bertie had in mind, this was the nucleus of some form of regional Anglo-Japanese security pact. An en passant remark to the British ambassador at Berlin underlined the growing importance of Japan in Bertie’s thinking. The Far Eastern triplice no longer regarded Britain as a first-class power in the Asia-Pacific region, ‘even if we had little Japan with us’.29 Japan had clearly become a potential strategic partner in East Asia. THE LONG ROAD TO 1902. The events of 1900 sharpened the focus of Bertie’s thinking on the Japanese factor. As China appeared to descend into internal turmoil following the outbreak of the ‘Boxer Rebellion’, Bertie accepted that the ‘China Question’ had entered its most critical phase. If the rumours of the wholesale massacres of the besieged foreigners at Peking were true, Bertie concluded, ‘the integrity of China is at an end; if the Russians occupy Peking we must give up the North and establish a scion of the Mings in the S[outh]’. The powers, Bertie was certain, would coerce the Peking authorities, and so ‘will bring China to the ground & hasten on partition’.30 Against the spectre of a ‘scramble for China’, with all the international complications that would attend to it, Japan acquired a new significance for British diplomacy. Throughout 1900–1901, Bertie was haunted by the spectre of a reconstituted Far Eastern triplice. Since nothing was likely to shake the Franco-Russian alliance, in existence since 1894,31 it was important to keep on good terms with Germany and Japan. For that reason, Bertie advised Lord Salisbury to accept the German proposal to appoint the Prussian field marshal, Count von Waldersee, as the commander of the international force then being assembled to relieve the besieged foreign community in the Chinese capital. London’s refusal would furnish ‘a pretext for a renewal of the German-Russian-French alliance as regards China’.32 His own reservations notwithstanding, Salisbury fell in with his AUS’s counsel. Bertie himself was sceptical of the material value of closer ties with Germany. Given China’s weakness, British policy had to protect its regional interests as best it could, and that now meant securing a sphere of influence. Germany’s cooperation could be had, he noted, but Berlin would seek to ‘exact... [a] high price for any recognition by them of [the] British Yangtze sphere of influence’.33 In Bertie’s analysis any arrangement with Germany would merely serve ‘to tide over the present crisis’, caused by the implosion of the central Chinese government and the uncertainty over Russia’s designs on the Asian mainland. But Britain had already recognized Germany’s privileged position in Shantung

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province in 1898. For Berlin, then, there was little to be gained from an agreement that merely confirmed this, and Bertie reasoned that the Wilhelmstrasse would demand further concessions beyond Shantung. This, he speculated, would entail control over ‘a sufficiently large tract of territory’ between the Yangtze and Hwang-ho rivers. But he warned against pinning any hopes on the idea of using a German-controlled area as a buffer between Britain’s sphere of interest in the Yangtze region and whatever niche Russia would carve out for herself in the northern portions of the Chinese Empire. On the contrary, given Germany’s exposed position in Europe, she was not likely to sacrifice the proverbial ‘Pomeranian grenadier’ for the protection of British interests in East Asia. Indeed, Bertie warned, ‘if Peking remain[ed] then the real capital of China, Russia and Germany will in combination control the Chinese Government to our detriment’. Any agreement with Germany would produce ‘continual friction’ with her about concessions to the north of the Yangtsze ‘and to the South of the River we should have to fight it out with the French who have never recognized our Yangtsze claims’.34 In the face of the persistent antagonism with the Franco-Russian group, and given that Germany’s support was, at best, uncertain or, worse, to be had only at an unacceptable price, Japan hove further into view as a potential strategic partner in East Asia. For now, Bertie’s forceful arguments failed to have any effect on the cabinet, with the result that Salisbury was forced to negotiate the Anglo-German agreement of 16 October 1900, a ‘scrap of paper’ that contained commonplace ‘Open Door’ sentiments but little of any real substance.35 Bertie’s warnings of the limited value of an agreement with Germany, however, were soon to be borne out. In early 1901, a leaked Sino-Russian agreement, the ‘Ts’eng-Alekse’ev’ treaty, seemed to presage the absorption of Manchuria by Russia, and for several weeks the diplomatic dovecote was aflutter with rumours of an imminent Anglo-Russian war. For Bertie the crisis represented an opportunity to obtain clarity on German policy in Asia. The new Japanese minister at London, Baron Hayashi Tadasu, had suggested joint Anglo-Japanese representations at St Petersburg, a scheme supported by Bertie but blocked by the new foreign secretary, Lord Lansdowne.36 Bertie persisted, and repeatedly suggested that Berlin be invited to join Britain and Japan in making formal enquiries at the Russian foreign ministry. This, he observed, ‘may elicit from the German Government a disclaimer of the Anglo-German Agreement having any meaning in regard to such proceedings on the part of the Russians; and it is just as well that we should know the value to be attached to it as regards the German attitude towards Russia’.37 As the tensions mounted in northern China – at one point Russian cossacks and British sepoys faced each other across barbed wire-crowned trenches at Tientsin – the situation arose that Bertie had predicted earlier. Berlin denied that the Anglo-German Agreement extended to the northern portions of the Chinese Empire. German support for some démarche at St Petersburg was not to be had; the idea of a tripartite intervention was dead. Bertie felt vindicated: ‘The honest broker sitting on the fence’, he minuted wryly.38 Ultimately, the international tensions over Manchuria dissipated. Russia was not yet ready to push matters to extremes. But for Britain the situation remained fraught with risks. The next Russian attempt to have a bite at the Chinese cherry was merely a question of time. Whilst the events of early 1901 had proved beyond doubt that a reliable agreement with Germany, in opposition to Russian ambitions in East Asia, was not to be had, this still left the matter of Britain’s relations

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with Japan. Throughout the Manchurian crisis Bertie had warned that, unless Britain unmistakably indicated her willingness to resist Russian expansionism in Asia, Japan would make terms with St. Petersburg.39 In the aftermath of the crisis, Bertie emerged as the chief proponent of a formal Anglo-Japanese arrangement in Whitehall. In a series of memoranda in June and July 1901, partly written off his own bat, partly composed at Lansdowne’s instruction, the AUS sketched the outlines of a combination between the two island Powers. An agreement, pledging London and Tokyo to coordinate their policies in East Asia, would help to stabilize the region, he argued. Indeed, he also suggested that such an understanding be complemented by a secret defence pact. Under its terms, Britain would offer naval support to Japan in defence of her interests in the Korean peninsula in return for Japanese assistance for British efforts to maintain the status quo in the Yangtze and southern provinces of China. In substance, Bertie’s scheme of a consultative and naval defence agreement encapsulated the idea of an Anglo-Japanese regional entente, which Lord Salisbury had suggested somewhat tentatively in February 1901. But Bertie gave it a more definite shape and a broader geographical remit.40 It was imperative, Bertie warned, to signal to Tokyo Britain’s willingness to come to an understanding ‘and so keep them from gravitating towards our rivals’.41 The brittle state of Japanese finances might compel Tokyo to come to an arrangement with the Franco-Russian bloc, combining a loan to Japan with a scheme for the neutralization of Korea. The emergence of such a new Far Eastern triplice, Bertie argued, could not be prevented by ‘general expressions of goodwill’ by Britain. This consideration gained greater urgency because the representatives of the powers in Peking had settled with the post-Boxer Chinese government on the payment of a war indemnity in the form of bonds. But the Treasury now resisted purchasing Japan’s share of the indemnity bonds at face value, which made a loan raised on the Paris bourse, where money was readily available, more attractive to Tokyo. Under these circumstances, Bertie suggested moving beyond the issue of financial assistance, and reiterated his earlier idea of a reciprocal, regional defence pact. Britain would ‘undertake to give Japan naval assistance in resisting any foreign occupation of Corea provided that Japan will promise to give us... military and naval aid in resisting foreign aggression in the Yangtze region and the South of China’.42 In a second memorandum of 22 July 1901, Bertie elaborated further on the situation in East Asia. Germany had proved unreliable – his favourite theme by now. A modus vivendi with Russia would be of limited practical value, if indeed it could be obtained, since St Petersburg ‘would probably not adhere to the spirit of any agreement’. On the other hand, he noted a commonality of Anglo-Japanese interests. Neither Power could tolerate Russian control over Korea. In an obvious nod to Treasury concerns, Bertie argued that a defence pact with Japan would reduce the strains on Britain’s defence expenditure, caused by French and Russian naval expansion and exacerbated by the ongoing conflict with the Boers in South Africa. He concluded that an Anglo-Japanese combination would act as a powerful deterrent on Russia’s ambitions in Asia. Bertie’s two July memoranda lent a sharper focus to British strategic thinking in the Far East. In them, he developed a way forward that would allow British diplomacy in the region to overcome the current financial and naval constraints under which it had to operate. For his part, Bertie did not envisage anything other than a reciprocal defence arrangement. He did not advocate an alliance: ‘an alliance with anyone would be dangerous’.43

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Lansdowne took up Bertie’s scheme in his conversations with Hayashi later in the month, but the matter was left hanging fire for much of the summer. Not the least important reason for the delay on the British side was a clash in the cabinet between the two armed services ministers and the chancellor of the exchequer. At Lansdowne’s instruction, Bertie now refined the arguments he had developed in his July memoranda, weaving together diplomatic calculations, naval considerations and financial factors into a powerful argument in favour of an alliance with Japan. Such a combination, he pointed out, would not only materially strengthen Britain’s naval position in East Asia, without the need to increase the number of ships on the Royal Navy’s China Station, it would also strengthen her diplomatic clout there. The agreement would provide for closer coordination of the policies pursued by the two powers, and pledged them not to conclude separate agreements with the Franco-Russian group. The force and cogency of Bertie’s arguments enabled Lansdowne to persuade a largely sceptical cabinet of the merits of this new departure in foreign policy.44 Initially, Lansdowne and Bertie remained wedded to the idea of an entente with Japan, rather than a full alliance. However, as the foreign secretary’s negotiations with Hayashi gathered pace, it became clear that Tokyo would settle for nothing less than an alliance. It was no obstacle for either Lansdowne or Bertie. British diplomatic strategy had evolved so much since the Manchurian crisis earlier in the year that London was ready to contemplate an alliance with a non-European Power, as long as that combination did not affect Britain’s position in Europe. The events of 1901 had confirmed Bertie in his conviction that ‘[w]hatever hope may be held out to England & Japan of support from Germany[,] no effective aid will be forthcoming from the quarter in opposition to Russia unless there is a general conflagration & Germany finds herself obliged from European considerations to take part in the war’. Germany was all in favour of maintaining the ‘open door’ in China, ‘and relie[d] on England, Japan & America to keep it open but she will never use force when she may come into collision with Russia’, Bertie observed. Freed from the incubus of Russia’s descent on Peking and free from binding obligations towards any of the European Powers, Britain could now ‘hold the balance between the Triple and the Dual Alliances’. Combining with Japan would not entail a ‘sacrifice of our liberty to pursue a British world-policy’.45 To no small degree, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 owed something to Bertie’s persistent pressing for such an arrangement. But in doing so he was guided by what he perceived to be British interests. He was not minded to make undue concessions to Japan. When, for instance, the Rothschild banking house approached the Foreign Office, in September 1902, about plans for a £5 m loan, Bertie refused to be drawn. Writing in Lansdowne’s name, but expressing his own sentiments, he noted that the foreign secretary had ‘formed a high opinion of the energy and enterprise of the Japanese and he is convinced of their desire to introduce some sound methods of administration’. But this was not sufficient reason for deviating from London’s established practice of not vouching for the credit worthiness of foreign governments.46 There were to be no special concession for the Japanese ally. Bertie’s role in the internal discussions about a Japanese alliance marked the zenith of his departmental influence. And yet, wearied by the constant grind of official business, he now sought release from his Whitehall post, and when the ambassador to Italy retired at the end of 1902, he succeeded in mobilizing royal support to secure the embassy appointment for himself.47 Bertie’s involvement with Anglo-Japanese relations thus came to an end.

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CONCLUSION. Francis Bertie was no Japanophile. Indeed, it is difficult to establish with any degree of certainty what he thought or felt about that country. His contacts with it were entirely formal and confined to political business. There is no indication in any of the extant correspondence that he took a particular interest in Japanese art or culture, which enjoyed such a vogue in the 1890s. His interests in Japan were rooted solely in politics and strategy. The country mattered only in relation to Britain’s wider strategic priorities in East Asia; the country’s significance increased in relation to the further encroachment in the region by the other Great Powers. Bertie’s thinking thus reflected the growing strategic importance of Japan. Indeed, from his Far Eastern bailiwick at the Foreign Office, Bertie articulated a clear strategic argument for an alliance with the other island Power. It was he who brought together the diplomatic, financial and financial strands of British policy and wove them into coherent case for diplomatic action that convinced Lansdowne’s cabinet colleagues, wary of the novelty of an alliance. Success will always attract rival paternity claims. Historians rightly take a more sceptical view of such pretensions. Francis Bertie was not the father of the Japanese alliance. But he most certainly was its midwife, and that may have been the more important role. NOTES 1 2 3

4 5 6

7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

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K.A. Hamilton, Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador (Woddbridge, 1991), 4 et seq. For some impressions see A.H. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in Europe (London, 1927), 32–9. Bertie’s political leanings were certainly towards the party, see Satow diary, 28 June 1895, Satow MSS, The National Archive (Public Record Office), Kew, PRO 30/33/15/17. Pauncefote to Salisbury, 15 May 1885, TNA (PRO), FO 366/760; also Hamilton, Bertie, 6. Min. Pauncefote, 15 August 1885, FO 366/724. Min. Rosebery, 1 January 1894, FO 366/760; R.A. Jones, The Nineteenth Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History (London, 1971), 81. Currie to Kimberley (personal), 11 March 1894, Kimberley MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms.Eng.c.4397. Currie and Kimberley were cousins. J.R. Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories (3 vols., London, 1922–5), i, 41; Z.S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914 (Cambridge, 1969), 34 n. and 70–1. R. Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), 54. Rumbold to father, 17 January 1903, Rumbold MSS, Bodl., Ms.Rumbold dep. 11. The stories about Bertie’s rude and lewd behaviour or his extensive pornographic print collection are legion; for a flavour see Hamilton, Bertie, 6–8; also G.W. Antrobus, King’s Messenger: Memories of a Silver Grey- hound (London, 1941), 91. Bertie to Lady Bertie (private), 3 August 1902, Bertie MSS, British Library, Add. MSS. 63011. Sanderson to Scott (private), 9 December 1900, Scott MSS, BL, Add. MSS. 52298. Sanderson’s taking over the Eastern Department from Bertie in 1885 may not have helped matters, min. Pauncefote, 15 August 1885, FO 366/724; see also T.G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865–1914 (Cambridge, 2011), 246–8. Memo. Bertie, [23?] December 1897, TNA (PRO), FO 17/1330 (original emphasis); for the context see T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894– 1905 (Oxford, 2007), 96–7. Quotes from memo. Bertie, 9 November 1901, G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (11 vols., London, 1926–1938) ii, no. 91; and Cranborne to Bertie, n.d. [but 12 April 1903], Bertie MSS, Add. MSS. 63015. Bertie to Spring-Rice, 26 December 1902, Spring-Rice MSS, Churchill College Archive Centre, Cambridge, CASR I/1/2.

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19 20

21 22

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Min. Bertie, 3 April 1894, on Fraser to Rosebery (no. 23), 29 February 1894, TNA (PRO), FO 46/435. Aoki was known in London and Tokyo as ‘your [Bertie’s] admirer’, Spring-Rice to Bertie (private), 17 August 1897, Bertie MSS, TNA (PRO), FO 800/170. Min. Bertie, 12 January 1894, FO 46/445. The Earl of Rosebery accepted the AUS’s advice: ‘This seems to me to sum up our policy at this moment’, min. Rosebery, n.d., ibid. Bertie to Kimberley, 8 July 1894, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c.4380; Otte, China Question, 33–8; M. Munemitsu, Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–5, ed. and transl. by G.M. Berger (Tokyo, 1982), 46–8. Memo. Bertie, 12 July 1894, FO 46/446. Tel. Bertie to Rosebery (secret), 23 October 1894, Rosebery MSS, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS 10134; for some of the context see Otte, China Question, 41–3. Bertie to Kimberley, 29 September 1894, Kimberley MSS, Ms.Eng.c.4380. Min. Bertie, 1 December 1895, on tel. Satow to Salisbury (no. 106), 30 November 1895, FO 46/460. Min. Bertie, 17 January 1898, Bertie MSS, Add. MSS. 63013; see also K. Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy towards Russia, 1894–1917 (Oxford, 1995), 187. Min. Bertie, 20 November 1897, FO 17/1314. MacDonald to Bertie (private), 1 December 1897, Bertie MSS, FO 800/162. Satow to Salisbury (private), 30 December 1897, Salisbury MSS, Hatfield House, 3M/A/126/34. Bertie to Salisbury, 30 December 1897, Bertie MSS, FO 800/169; for Bertie’s advocacy of force, see Bertie to Balfour, 17 March 1898, Balfour MSS, BL, Add.MSS. 49746. Memo. Bertie, 14 March 1898, BD i, no. 24; for the discussions in London prior to the acquisition of Wei-hai-Wei see T.G. Otte, ‘Great Britain, Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1897–8’, English Historical Review cx, 439 (1995), 1157–79; and for further observations id., ‘”Wee-ah-wee”?: Britain at Weihaiwei, 1898–1930’, G. Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000 (London, 2005), 4–34. Bertie to Lascelles (private), 16 March 1898, TNA (PRO), FO 64/1437. Satow diary (on conversations with Bertie), 22 June and 31 May 1900, Satow MSS, PRO 30/33/16/3. The Russian chargé d’affaires at Peking somewhat indiscreetly stated that the French ‘were “very obedient[;] they always did what they were told”’, MacDonald to Bertie (private), 28 February 1898, FO 17/1333. Bertie to Salisbury (private), 8 August 1900, FO 64/1496; for some of the background see L.K. Young, British Policy in China, 1895–1902 (Oxford, 1970), 153–5. Tel. Bertie to Lascelles (unnumbered), 11 September 1900, FO 244/585; for the pressures on Salisbury from within the cabinet, spearheaded by Joseph Chamberlain, to negotiate an Anglo-German China agreement, see T.G. Otte, ‘”A Question of Leadership”: Lord Salisbury, the Unionist Cabinet and Foreign Policy, 1895–1900’, Contemporary British History xiv, 4 (2000), 16–24. Quotes from memo. Bertie, 13 September 1900, BD ii, no. 12; and Bertie to Lascelles (private), 12 September 1900, Lascelles MSS, TNA (PRO), FO 800/6. See Otte, China Question, 208–15. Min. Lansdowne, n.d., on Bertie to Lansdowne, 12 January 1901, FO 17/1499. Memo. Bertie, 13 January 1901, ibid.; a month later, he raised once more the idea of a formal Anglo-German-Japanese démarche, min. Bertie, 17 February 1901, FO 17/1487. Min. Bertie, n.d. [22 March 1901], on tel. Lascelles to Lansdowne (no. 22), 21 March 1901, FO 64/1524; Otte, China Question, 266–7. Memo. Bertie, 13 January and 11 March 1901, FO 17/1501; min. Bertie, 17 February 1901, FO 17/1500. Memo. Bertie, 20 June 1901, FO 46/547; for Salisbury’s scheme see Salisbury to Lansdowne, 16 February 1901, FO 17/1500; also Young, British Policy, 295, and Otte, China Question, 242–4. Memo. Bertie, 2 July 1901, FO 17/1506. Memo. Bertie, 22 July 1901, FO 17/1507; I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Powers, 1894–1907 (Westport, CT, repr. 1976), 154–6. For Japan’s financial vulnerabilities see also Satow to Bertie (private), 6 July 1901, Satow MSS, PRO 30/33/14/2. Memo. Bertie, ‘Anglo-Japanese Agreement’, 22 July 1901, FO 46/547; Hamilton, Bertie, 27.

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Memo. Bertie, 22 September 1901, and marginal notes by Lansdowne, n.d., FO 17/1507. For Lansdowne’s request see Lansdowne to Bertie (private), 27 August 1901, Bertie MSS, FO 800/163; on the link between the July and September memoranda, see Nish, AngloJapanese Alliance, 177–8. Draft memo. Bertie, Nov. 1901, FO 64/1539. Bertie to N.M. Rothschild (confidential), 22 September 1902, FO 46/560; see also D.C.M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914 (Oxford, 1968), 262–307. Bertie to Lansdowne, 19 December 1902, and Balfour to Bertie, 7 January 1903, Bertie MSS, Add. MSS. 63014 and 63015; see K. Neilson, ‘”Quot homines, tot sententiae”: Bertie, Hardinge, Nicolson, and British Foreign Policy, 1906–1916’, T.G. Otte (ed.), Diplomacy and Power: Studies in Modern Diplomatic Practice. Essays in Honour of Keith Hamilton (Dordrecht, 2012), 25.

11

SIR EDWARD GREY 1862–1933

Viscount Grey of Falloden Foreign Secretary, 1905–16

IAN NISH

Sir Edward Grey

B

y inclination Sir Edward Grey (1862–1933) was a countryman, coming from a landed family in Northumbria. To his dying day he enjoyed rural pursuits like fishing, bird-watching, walking and even bicycling and valued detachment from urban conviviality. Yet there was instilled in him a sense of public duty and he was persuaded with reluctance to enter party politics. He devoted himself to the Liberal Party and, when the party took office and triumphed in the general election of January 1906, he accepted the office of foreign secretary. Grey was to occupy this onerous post for a decade and set a record for length of service. It would be misleading to suggest that Japan was at the top of his agenda but it certainly required constant attention, even if its problems were not of the highest priority globally. Compared with other contemporaries, Grey was not a great traveller but he had visited India in 1887–88. It is not our purpose to describe Grey’s policy towards Japan, largely the work of his officials in the ordinary diplomatic correspondence. Instead by looking at his writings, his minutes, the impressions of his closest officials and the impressions of Japanese diplomats, we hope to glimpse part of the thinking which underlay his policy-making. APPRENTICESHIP

Educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford, Grey became member of parliament for Berwick-upon-Tweed in November 1885 as a Liberal Party member. When the party came to power in 1892, he was selected by the foreign secretary, Lord Rosebery, as parliamentary under-secretary for foreign affairs at the age of thirty. Two years later when Rosebery became prime minister, he made it a condition that he would still control foreign policy. Grey continued to serve under the amenable newcomer, Lord Kimberley. Since both foreign secretaries were members of the House of Lords, Grey became in effect the Foreign Office spokesman in the lower house. But he writes self-deprecatingly in his autobiography, Twenty-five Years, 115

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that he was merely supporting and defending policies formulated by the cabinet of which he was not a member and did not really have a policy-making role.1 In his recollections, Grey writes briefly of Far Eastern questions, highlighting the treaty of 1894 which was technically described as ‘the Anglo-Japanese treaty of commerce and navigation’. But Grey emphasizes not the commercial side of the treaty but the aspect of treaty port jurisdiction: We gave up all those rights of jurisdiction over our British subjects in Japan…. We had made up our minds that the time had come when dealings with Japan must be put on the same equal terms as exist between nations of European origin.2 (My italics)

Britain was the first country to put into treaty form this recognition of Japan’s aspirations. It was part of Liberal doctrine to recognize Japan’s progress during the Meiji era. The other aspect, which Grey recalls, is the Triple Intervention of Germany, Russia and France in Far Eastern affairs after Japan’s victory in her war against China in 1895. Invited to join the three, Britain refused to cooperate with the others in telling Japan to give up territory on the Asian continent, which had been transferred to her under the peace treaty. Rosebery made his own decisions and even in Kimberley’s day dominated foreign policy. He suspected that it was a German attempt to divert Russia into activity in the east rather than in Europe and did not want to get involved in these continental intrigues about which he was deeply suspicious. Grey warns against any suggestion that Britain by these two actions showed that she was aiming for a long-term relationship with Japan: There was certainly no thought in our minds then of a future alliance with Japan….I am sure that British Ministers at the time did not look beyond the moment.3

He thought Britain’s attitude was influenced as much by European considerations as by sympathy for Japan. When the Liberal government collapsed, Grey was thrust into ten years of opposition where he became his party’s foreign policy spokesman. In speeches he was broadly favourable to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) and the AngloFrench Entente (1904) which were clinched in these years. This indicates that he had no objection to Britain entering into alliances with other powers rather than observing the Victorian doctrine of Splendid Isolation. In October 1905 when he made a speech in the City of London endorsing existing policies towards France, he was already being spoken of as ‘foreign secretary in waiting’.The Liberal party came into government two months later as an inexperienced coalition. Foreign Office bureaucrats who remembered Grey from 1895 as hard-working and adept at mastering a brief, breathed a sigh of relief when he accepted the appointment. BACK IN GOVERNMENT Grey was in charge at the Foreign Office from December 1905 to December 1916. That period splits broadly into two sections, the first up to 1911 being characterized by cordiality to Japan despite countless irritations and suspicions. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been revised and renewed for ten years in August 1905 by the Conservative government. Grey had not condemned it then and, believing in continuity, was happy to keep it as the centrepiece of his policy.

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Japanese were naturally worried whether the new incumbent would follow the previous Conservative policies. In particular they pricked up their ears at rumours which were circulating in the spring that Britain was engaged in talks with Russia with whom Japan had just fought a war. Chargé d’affaires Count Mutsu Hirokichi pressed Grey on this and received the assurance that Britain was indeed seeking an understanding with Russia over Tibet and Afghanistan but that Japan would be consulted if progress was made. Britain did conclude a treaty with Russia in July 1907, Japan having been fully consulted during the negotiation. Grey’s goodwill was therefore established with the Japanese.4 But Grey had a dilemma over commercial rivalries between Britain and Japan. A good illustration was over the railways of Manchuria. The Chinese government in 1908 appointed Paulings, the British railway building concern, to build a line in central Manchuria. The Japanese claimed that this construction would be in violation of an undertaking the Chinese had given them at the time of signing the Beijing treaties of December 1905. Eventually Grey upheld the bona fides of the Japanese and did not support the British entrepreneur. This must have been a hard decision to make and, while we do not know the entire motivation of the Foreign Office, it was in essence a pointer to the seriousness with which the Japanese Alliance was taken. Japan organized a Japan-British Exhibition from May to October 1910 in London. She wanted to enhance the volume of her trade with the UK and the British Empire. Britain had been running a large surplus with Japan which imported machinery for improving her mills, though that surplus was declining. The exhibition gave rise to all sorts of doubts and dismays on the Japanese side about the vast expenditure incurred with comparatively little result. It was left to Edward Grey to sum up the favourable British assessment of the Exhibition in a speech on 24 November: We have just had a most successful exhibition…. That Japan showed the desire to have increased business relations with us was proved by the intimation that she had given orders for battleships to an English firm, notwithstanding that she could very well build them herself.5

The order placed with Vickers for a Dreadnought battlecruiser (which was later named the Kongo-) was not, of course, a direct consequence of salesmanship at the Exhibition. But it did reflect one strand of Anglo-Japanese goodwill at the time. Clinching the order for a battle cruiser of 27,000 tons – whether its timing was a coincidence or not – dwarfed all the other outcomes of the Exhibition. In August during the London Exhibition Japan annexed Korea. While initially denying that she had any such intention, she did ask Britain in advance for her views. Grey’s officials thought the main problem was that the Japanese tariff (with a new enhanced version due to come into force in 1912) would be applied to Korea which would be a handicap to British traders, small though the number was. Grey was unhappy with this line and called for the underlying principles to be considered: a country under a monarchy which had enjoyed independence for some time before 1905 was about to be absorbed as a colony. Britain had to decide, he said, ‘whether in principle we will agree to annexation’. In a personal letter from Balmoral where he was staying with the king, he wrote I had better see the Japanese Ambassador on Wednesday when I am in London… our negotiations about Korea will take a little time yet.6

He eventually told Ambassador Kato- that Article III of the Alliance ‘did not contemplate annexation [of Corea] and did not entail any positive obligation upon

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us to support annexation of Corea: on the other hand it seemed to me that it would be inconsistent with spirit of Agreement for us to oppose the annexation’.7 (My italics) In the end, therefore, Grey agreed in a slightly lukewarm way that Britain would not stand in Japan’s path, providing satisfactory guarantees were given that the Korean tariff was maintained for a decade. Here Grey shows himself as honourably insisting that principles should not be neglected even if they did not eventually define the policy adopted. This was a politician’s approach rather than a bureaucrat’s one. He knew that many in parliament and the country would protest at the disappearance of a free country as intellectuals were doing.8 Grey had to assess the value of the Japanese Alliance in 1911. The 1905 treaty was due to last until 1915 but there were various factors, which impelled him to consider an earlier renewal. There were doubts about Japanese shipbuilding intentions. As we have seen, Japan had a Dreadnought under construction at Barrow and two others were to be built on the same model in Japanese yards. Grey received the advice that: We are secure while the Treaty lasts, and we shall not be confronted with a very powerful Japanese Fleet after the Treaty is over, an advantage of course which Australia and New Zealand can highly appreciate.9

Grey was worried about the state of Japan-US relations and did not want to become entangled in any confrontation. So the alliance was renewed in July with an extended time-frame, i.e. until 1921, but with the proviso that Britain would not be required to go to the aid of Japan in any conceivable conflict with the US. THE LAMPS GO OUT IN EAST ASIA In Grey’s second period (1912–16), he faced one diplomatic crisis after another in Europe as well as East Asia. Clearly it was the former, which concerned him most. The problems in Europe were increasingly those of military rivalry, whether it was the building of Dreadnoughts or the massing of forces. The problems in East Asia were political and commercial rather than military and required careful handling within the Alliance. For Grey the problem of East Asian stability became a priority with the 1911 revolution in China and the creation of the republic there. A second revolution, more serious than the first, broke out in August 1913 and a number of attacks against Japanese civilians, officers and troops took place. Japan lodged a protest to no effect. The situation deteriorated in September and two Japanese officers were killed. Apart from atrocities, Japan had grave concerns that the revolutionaries might expand into south Manchuria and considered it vital that the garrisons there be increased in order to safeguard her substantial investments.The combination of the army, financiers, traders and adventurers operating south of the Yangtse River also presented a disorderly picture which hindered stability in China. The Tokyo government found it impossible to control these diverse power groupings, which saw it as a time of great opportunity, and the official Gaimusho- policy of ‘studied neutrality’ became suspect. Disappointed that what Japanese seemed to be doing on the ground was out of line with what the diplomats were telling him. Grey protested to Tokyo.10 After serving as ambassador in London since 1908, Baron Kato- Takaaki was recalled to become foreign minister of the Katsura cabinet formed in December 1912. In farewell conversations on 3 and 10 January, Kato- reminded Grey that the

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territory of Manchuria had been leased to Japan under the Sino-Japanese treaty of December 1905 for only twenty-five years of which there were only ten years still to run and that it would then revert to China. Kato- argued that, when that lease expired, no government in Japan would be strong enough to give the territory back to China. In reply Grey said that he saw the difficulty Japan would have in evacuating this territory. ‘As the matter did not arise now’, he added, ‘it was not necessary to discuss it but he would put on record what the ambassador had said, in order that, when the time came, there should be a record at the Foreign Office of what the view of Japan would be.’11 Such was the account left by an experienced foreign secretary who was cautious in the use of language and wary of long-term commitments. Grey was understanding without being responsive. He was made aware of Japan’s intentions and did not directly discourage them.An interesting aspect of the conversation is that Kato- felt Grey could be taken into his confidence. Kato-’s interpretation of the foreign secretary’s remarks differed from Grey’s account. He reported to his government that there was complete agreement between the two. It was music to Katsura’s ears. This is one of those celebrated cases where a conversation is understood differently by two parties. In the short term it mattered little because the Katsura ministry only lasted for two months so Kato- only held office from his return on 29 January until Makino Nobuaki took over on 20 February. 12 But what effect would the conversation with Grey have on Kato- when he - again took over as foreign minister on 16 April 1914 in the more strongly based Okuma cabinet? Kato- was wrong if he imagined that Britain had not been thinking of Japan’s intentions in Manchuria for some time back. Indeed, Ambassador MacDonald had tried to find out what the Beijing treaty allowed Japan to do as early as 1905. Grey himself had been pondering this question. Earlier in a letter to his cousin, Albert, Earl Grey, Governor-general of Canada, on 27 January 1911 in preparation for the colonial conference in London, he wrote: If we denounce the Japanese Alliance, we can no longer rely on the assistance of the Japanese Fleet, and we must prepare for the possibility that Japan may enter into arrangements which may bring her into hostility with us… I do not believe that there is the least danger that Japan will ever attempt forcible measures on the American side of the Pacific. Such action is no part of her policy, and it is not within her power. But I agree with you that we ought not to treat her in the spirit of an attorney in Manchuria or other regions in which she is naturally interested.13

These views were known to some of his cabinet colleagues. Arthur Balfour reported that Grey held the view that, if Japan were to be kept out of North America, Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand, ‘you could not forbid her to expand in China: a nation of that sort must have a safety valve somewhere’. Balfour observed that ‘Grey carried his doctrine to excess’.14 The first months of the war were not without acrimony despite Kato-’s reputation for being an Anglophile. That Japan should want a Far Eastern front came as a surprise to Grey for which he was not prepared. Decisions were taken at breakneck speed and mistakes were made. Japan was prepared to play her part in the war under the alliance; but Kato- claimed he was acting in the spirit of the alliance, not according to its letter.That offer of assistance was invaluable to Britain in view of German activities in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean, a natural area of operations for Japan’s armed forces. But the prospect of unlimited Japanese

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action was repugnant to Britain’s dominions, to China and the USA. To Grey fell the unenviable task ‘of simultaneously expressing our cordial appreciation of Japan’s actions’ but explaining that ‘her action must be limited and her prospective acquisition of German territory must not extend beyond certain bounds. To explain to an ally that her help will be welcome, but that you hope it will not be made inconvenient, is a proceeding that is neither agreeable nor gracious.’15 There was a period of partial collaboration in the Asia-Pacific sector of the war. Thus, a small British force fought alongside Japanese forces in order to dislodge Germany from her leasehold in Shandong and shared in the capture of Qingdao on 7 November. But Britain’s purpose was partly to keep an eye on Japanese activities in China. Meanwhile the Imperial Japanese Navy gave invaluable naval assistance in convoying Australian troops in transit to Europe and captured the German Pacific islands, causing an outcry from Britain’s Antipodean colonies. In view of the sensitivities, the long-term fate of Japan’s acquisitions was left in abeyance.16 But these hiccoughs were as nothing compared to the 21 Demands issue, arguably the most serious crisis in Japan’s foreign affairs between 1894 and 1941. It began when the Chinese leaked to foreign governments what purported to be secret demands, which Japan had presented to them on 18 January 1915. In this indirect manner, Grey was made aware of the notorious 21 Demands, covering Japan’s aspirations now that she had occupied Qingdao and the Shandong railway. Ever since 1912, he had tried to prevent Republican China’s stability being undermined by the actions of the Japanese government and its various interests in China and, now that Europe was preoccupied, China’s survival was for him a paramount consideration.17 It is possible to look at this many-sided crisis from different points of view. Japanese historians tend to interpret it from the standpoint of domestic politics, focusing on factional struggles within political elites and the military. Accordingly they play down the role of foreign countries. Non-Japanese historians consider that foreign influences played their part in resolving the crisis. At the time there was a squalid struggle between the Elder Statesmen (genro- ) and the ministry which came to a head in the spring. Grey sent a well-timed telegram received on 3 May, calling among other things for the omission of Group 5 of the demands. On 6 May the cabinet decided to withdraw the disputed fifth group, which was (in its eyes) only ‘desiderata’ and sent an ultimatum to China. Britain’s envoy in Beijing reported that Japan had landed between 20,000 and 30,000 men in Manchuria and at Qingdao. In these circumstances, Grey recommended to President Yuan Shikai that China should accept the reduced terms in order to prevent any military action on Japan’s part. The Sino-Japanese treaty was concluded on 25 May, thus bringing an end to the crisis. But the Japanese government did not want to admit that this was a climbdown. Instead it sheltered behind Grey’s telegram and argued that it was responding to international pressure. So it is possible to claim that Grey had a mediatory role in resolving this emergency.18 Probably Grey’s intervention was not critical for Japan or China. But it was significant for Britain to intervene on such a remote issue six months into a world war. Lowe praises ‘Grey’s policy combining conciliation with tenacity’. Possibly the communications of Ambassador Inoue Katsunosuke, both official and private, indicating his annoyance at being misled and Britain’s general unease, also played their part. At all events, in view of disapproval of his handling of the 21 Demands disaster, Kato- was forced to leave office as foreign minister in August.19 All that can be said for Kato- was that he thought the world war would be over

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quickly and it was urgent to collect the desires of various parts of the Japanese establishment which were often more extreme than those put to China. He was by no means the master of the situation, a bureaucrat trapped between self-centred politicians and a calculating military anxious to get a settlement quickly. In Britain there was much disillusion with Kato- and the Japanese people who were broadly supportive of these approaches to China which clearly undermined the Alliance whose terms had guaranteed the territorial integrity of China. One of Grey’s closest advisers wrote that he had: …ever since the demands were first brought to our notice, held a very decided opinion that we should not intervene in any way… Of course he has been disappointed in the Japanese. He expected better things of Kato- and does not conceal his opinion that the Alliance has had a shake.20

The recipient, Sir John Jordan in Beijing, would probably have wanted a more robust response against Japan. But it shows that, although Grey enjoyed a cordial relationship with officials at home and abroad, he was by no means their puppet. By sitting at the cabinet table, he was more conscious of the limited options which were available to Britain in this unwelcome crisis.

REFLECTIONS IN RETIREMENT Along with Asquith, Grey withdrew from the Liberal cabinet in December 1916 as the wartime coalition government of Lloyd George took over. He yearned to retire from public life but there were many who thought that his expertise and experience should not be wasted during the war. Eventually he was persuaded to go to Washington as a temporary envoy on a special mission in August 1919. But President Wilson’s illness meant that he could not meet the president and he returned in January without accomplishing his objectives. Despite the urging of friends, he made no return to frontline politics. His biographer sums up the remainder of his life thus: Although Grey’s activities for the Liberal Party and the League of Nations are not without a certain modest importance, he never strayed far, in the post-war period, from his deep-seated desire to be a private man.21

He was increasingly beset by blindness and other ailments. His beloved ancestral home, Fallodon in Northumbria, was destroyed by fire in 1923 and had to be rebuilt. His second wife died after six years of happy marriage and his brothers predeceased him. Death came in 1933 to a man feeling isolated and depressed but consoled by many honours and worldwide respect. What did Japanese diplomats think of Grey? His was not a household name in Japan as Lloyd George and Billy Hughes of Australia were and Winston Churchill later became. He was known mainly to Japanese diplomats. The term of Inoue Katsunosuke, ambassador in London 1913–16, coincided with Grey’s last difficult phase in Whitehall but they got on well together. Shidehara Kiju- rowho had a short spell as counsellor in London held the view that Grey stood out as a model foreign secretary.22 Others who spoke favourably of Grey were Yoshida Shigeru and Wakatsuki Reijiro- who served as junior officials at the London embassy. But it was the Anglophile Kato- who appreciated Grey most. Dr Lowe describes the ‘special empathy’, which existed between the two. He felt sufficient trust in Grey to explain about Japan’s long-term continental

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ambitions in the brief exchange of confidential views in January 1913. He felt (mistakenly in my view) that he had won over a sympathetic Grey to Japan’s way of thinking on Manchuria, Mongolia and central China.23 It could be that Grey, who was devoted to the Alliance despite all the adverse criticisms it was receiving, appealed to the Japanese bureaucratic mentality as ‘open-minded’. Grey published his autobiography in 1926, ten years after he had left office. He called it ‘Twenty-five Years’ thus spanning his two dis-crete periods at the Foreign Office. In commenting on his decade in high office, he exhibits the benignity which comes naturally to a senior citizen in his sixties: When I was secretary of state for foreign affairs Japan was our Ally. In all that period the obligations that the alliance might entail upon us, the advantages that Japan might claim from it, were never unfairly exploited by her. We found in the Japanese Government and its Ambassadors honourable and loyal Allies.24

This was the same doctrine, which the Lloyd George government had used in the anti-Japanese environment of the US at the time of the Balfour mission to Washington in 1917.25 But it was not only geniality and nostalgia.This was also a hard-headed calculation that, if Japan was treated leniently on the Asian continent, it would take the pressure off her desire for acquisitions among the Pacific islands and lead to stability in that area and that a policy of observant inaction was in the long-term interest of the British Empire, the weakness of whose strategic resources had been exposed in trying to bring the armies of Australia and New Zealand to Europe in the early months of the fighting. Perhaps Grey is too full of the milk of human kindness in this. He was much more tolerant than his envoys in Tokyo and Beijing and his Whitehall officials. As we saw, he was by implication quite critical of Japan over the annexation of Korea and was later irritated by Japan’s treatment of China whose integrity he wanted to protect during the war. But in his writing he shows himself to be understanding of the problems of Japan which was still a developing country with a growing population. 1914 presented Japan with an opportunity: In the Great War [the Japanese] took some advantage of the opportunity to strengthen their position with China in East Asia. ….What Western nation with a population feeling the need for territorial outlets would have used such an opportunity with more or even with as much restraint?26

Regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he makes no specific comment but concludes in general terms that ‘no enduring security can be found in competing armaments and in separate alliances’. His mature reflection was for countries to trust instead in the League of Nations.27 ENDNOTES The main sources are Grey’s own writing, Twenty-five Years, 1892–1916, 2 vols, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925 [hereafter cited as ’25 Years’]; G.M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, London: Long-mans, 1937; and F.H. Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy under Edward Grey, Cambridge: University Press, 1977. Biographical sketches of Kato- Takaaki and Inoue Katsunosuke as ambassadors are included in Nish (ed.), Japanese Envoys in Britain, and of Sir Claude MacDonald in H. Cortazzi (ed.), British Envoys in Japan. Both volumes were published by Global Oriental, Folkestone.25

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25 Years, I, pp. 2–3. Diary of Sir EW Hamilton, vol. I, 1885–1906, Hull: University Press, 1993, entry for 3 March 1894. 25 Years, I, p. 23. 25 Years, I, pp. 24–5. Britain’s attitudes to East Asian questions are treated in Nish, ‘Lord Rosebery and Japan’ in Biographical Portraits, vol. VII, pp. 58–68. G.P. Gooch and H.W.V.Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, London: HMSO, 1932, vol. IV, docs 220 and 225. [Hereafter cited as ‘GT’] Speech by Sir E. Grey, 24 November 1910 in Manchester Chamber of Commerce, Monthly – to Komura, 4 January 1912 in Nihon Gaiko– Bunsho, Record, November 1910, p. 310. Kato Taisho 2/I. [Hereafter cited as ‘NGB’] Grey to Sir C. Hardinge, 18 August 1910 in Foreign Office files, 371/878. GT VIII, doc.402. Nish, ‘International Reactions to Japan’s Annexa-tion of Korea, 1910’ in Transactions of the Japan Academy, LXV/3(2011), pp. 251–67. Cf. Ambassador Rockhill’s view: ‘The passing away of Korea is only the beginning of a new period and before many years we will all regret that we were not in a position to stop this step being taken in violation of treaties.’ W.W. Rockhill to Morrison, 8 September 1910 in Lo Hui-min (ed.), Correspondence of GE Morrison, Cambridge: University Press, 1976, vol. I, 1895–1912, doc. 344. Committee of Imperial Defence, 111th meeting, 26 May 1911 in CAB 38/18/46. Aizawa Kiyoshi, ‘Higashi Ajia no haken to kaigunryoku’ in Higashi Ajia kingendai tsu- shi,Tokyo: Iwanami, vol.2, 2010, pp. 57–65. Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911–15, London: Macmillan, 1969, pp. 107–109; Nish, ‘Japan’s Tug-of-war after the Russo-Japanese War’ in Guy Podoler, War and Militarism in Modern Japan, Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2009, pp. 20–1. Nish (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs, part IE, vol. IX, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1989, p. 355. Kato- Takaaki,Tokyo: Hobunkan, 1930, vol. II, 144–6. Naraoka Sochi, Kato– Takaaki to seitoseiji, Tokyo:Yamakawa, 2006, pp. 83–4. Lowe, pp. 221–2. 13 Trevelyan, p. 204. Nish, ‘Japan and China’ in Hinsley, p. 464. Grey to Greene, 17 September 1914 in 25 Years, II, 100. Lowe, ch 6. Hirama Yo- ichi, Dai-1-ji sekai taisen to Nihon kaigun, Tokyo: Keio, 1998, pp. 29ff, 157ff Lowe, ch. 7; F.R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 1914–19, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 87–92; Hirama, p. 166ff. NGB Taisho- 4, vol. IIIA, doc.554. Lowe, p. 258; Nish, Alliance in Decline, London: Athlone, 1972, pp. 154–5; Naraoka, pp. 135– 8. NGB Taisho- 4A, doc. 644. Langley to Jordan, 30 April 1915, quoted in Lowe, p. 220. Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey, London: Cassell, 1971, pp. 363–4. Shidehara Kiju-ro-, Tokyo: Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 1955, pp. 72–8. Kato-, I, pp. 672–4; II, pp. 144–6. 25 Years, II, p. 100. Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp. 213–21. 25 Years, II, p. 101. 25 Years, II, pp. 274–5.

12

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, 1848–1930

[First Earl of Balfour, KG, OM] Foreign Secretary 1916–19

Prime Minister 1902–05

IAN NISH

Arthur James Balfour

A

rthur James Balfour (1848–1930) had a parliamentary career which spanned half-a-century. Educated at Eton, he went on to take a degree in philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge. He entered the House of Commons in 1874. For the next thirty years he rose in the ranks as a Conservative party politician, gradually gaining government responsibilities. From 1895 he was nominally First Lord of the Treasury but in fact acted as deputy foreign secretary. This was followed by five years as prime minister. Then there was the gap of a decade when the Liberal party was in the ascendant. But, when there was a call for politicians to put aside party differences on the outbreak of the First World War, he emerged from the opposition and agreed to act as First Lord of the Admiralty and later as Foreign Secretary in ‘a coalition cabinet’. Even as he retired in the 1920s, he still commanded much respect and served as Lord President in the cabinet of Stanley Baldwin (1925–1929). As the Japanese diplomat Shidehara Kiju-ro- said of him, Balfour was ‘embarrassingly eminent’. He had acquired so much experience in those years that he was a difficult person with whom to negotiate or argue. He was both clever and articulate, a born orator and an incisive composer of closely argued minutes. He was a philosopher-statesman, even if, as someone said, he was only ‘an amateur philosopher’. To many he was a tall, shuffling figure, slightly remote and absent-minded but elegant. Definitely not a minister to run a department of state unless he had massive support. Moreover he made mistakes and misjudgements as is inevitable during half-a-century in public life. He had his critics among his contemporaries and later among historians. As Balfour was pursuing his political career, Japan was coming on to the international map. Indeed the period from 1895 to 1930 was one in which Japan was growing fast industrially and commercially and was gaining wide acceptance in world affairs. She moved from being militarily successful but politically unsuccessful in 1895 to the days of the Manchurian Crisis when she was strong enough to hold her own against the Powers and the League of Nations. 124

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Balfour’s career reflects this change in Japan’s stature. In early days he could afford to give Japan a low priority. But by 1919 and 1921 – the years in focus in this essay – Japanese affairs had to be given high priority. Because Britain was probably the closest of world powers to Japan in those years, Balfour took a broadly charitable attitude towards this up-and-coming country with high aspirations. But it was doubtful if he formed an intimate relationship with any Japanese like Lord Grey of Fallodon.1 There was no sign of him showing any interest in eastern culture. He was deferential to the eminent Japanese statesmen that he met in the course of business but he held that Britain had to look at Japan with the same natural scepticism as a normal Great Power relationship – a mixture of trust and distrust. EARLY PERIOD Balfour was closely connected with foreign affairs while he served as assistant to his uncle, the Marquess of Salisbury. Salisbury acted as prime minister from 1895 to 1902, combining it with the foreign secretaryship. But Salisbury was frequently absent because of old age and illness and was often found to be abroad when global crises arose as in the East Asian crisis of 1898. As a member of the House of Commons, Balfour had to justify government policies and played an important role in decision-making.2 When the cabinet was considering the nature of a possible entente with Japan which was under negotiation in the autumn of 1901, those in favour found that heavy-weights like Salisbury and Balfour had reservations about it. The deputy prime minister in particular thought the dangers of entering an alliance with Japan greater for Britain than with a European country because it covered a region where Britain had little control. He continued to stress the riskiness of Britain’s commitments until the last minute. But, after the treaty was signed on 30 January 1902, it was his task as leader of the House of Commons to defend it, which he did with conviction. Clearly the alliance was not entered into lightly.3 After Salisbury’s retirement, Balfour was chosen as Conservative prime minister in July 1902. His was an unstable Tory administration divided over the issue of free trade and suffering from the consequence of failures in the South African war. In foreign affairs it was the period of the honeymoon of the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance and important military/naval talks were held. Balfour who was much influenced in his thinking by defence and security issues kept a close eye on developments and took a more pragmatic view of the alliance as it took shape. His strategic thinking affected his judgment over the war which was looming between Japan and Russia and Britain’s likely role in it. Some cabinet members tried to persuade the prime minister that Britain should mediate between the two parties. But Balfour’s response was negative: if Britain were to intervene, he argued, ‘we should be giving diplomatic assistance to Russia in her attempt to weaken Japan’s position in Corea; we should profoundly irritate the sentiments of the Japanese people; and we should transfer to ourselves the unpopularity which they now very justly lavish upon their own unpopular Government….. If Japan asks for our mediation with a view to a settlement, I would do all that I could to help her. But I certainly would not thrust myself into a quarrel not my own.’ So war came without intervention by outside parties. And Balfour summed

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up his ministry’s view that the alliance could not be ‘so stretched as to imply something like a moral obligation [on Britain] to help Japan whenever she seems likely to be beaten by Russia’. By and large Britain followed the course of what has been described by historians as ‘benevolent neutrality’, content to observe the progress of war from a distance.4 In August 1905, Balfour’s ministry concluded the second alliance with Japan, by this time a militarily successful Japan. He himself was convinced that the new alliance proposed would impose increased responsibilities on Britain in going to the aid of Japan if attacked. He argued that Britain should be compensated for this. It was at Balfour’s prompting that a provision was included that Japanese armies should go to the aid of India in any emergency on the northwest frontier. The implication was that Balfour wanted the alliance to be recognized as an alliance between equal parties, not one where a Great Power conferred favours on a lesser partner. He may have kept his administration going because of the alliance which was to become an important part of the manifesto for the general election due in January.5 Balfour announced his resignation in December and the divided Conservative party was heavily defeated by the Liberals. Balfour himself lost his seat in Manchester East but returned to the House in February 1906 for the City of London. The party entered a decade in opposition.6 Balfour himself, swayed by a BMG [Balfour Must Go] campaign in the Westminster village, resigned as leader of the Unionist party in November 1911. But he was by no means idle in retirement. Indeed by sitting on some sub-committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence which he had set up while he was in power, he continued to have some say in defence and security issues even when he was in opposition.7 WARTIME OFFICES The onset of war in 1914 and the stalemate which resulted in the first few months forced the Liberal Party administration to look for allies among the political opposition. Balfour became a member of the War Council. In May 1915 when Prime Minister Asquith decided to form a coalition government of both the Liberal and Conservative parties, he faced the problem of who would succeed Winston Churchill at the Admiralty in the aftermath of the Gallipoli crisis. Balfour agreed to take office in the new administration as First Lord of the Admiralty, the most senior post held by a Conservative minister. He had always taken an interest in Britain’s naval position and it was appropriate that he should be appointed. But it proved to be an onerous task for the next eighteen months: Germany was adopting a more aggressive naval policy in the North Sea and was using her submarines in the Atlantic to disrupt food supplies on which Britain depended. When Balfour became a departmental minister, his contact with Japan became more prominent than when he had been prime minister. In desperate straits, the Admiralty suggested to Japan the sale of her old battle cruisers or the participation of new ones in the North Sea. But these requests were turned down by Japan.8 When in December 1916 Balfour became foreign secretary, appeals were made to Japan for the loan of light cruisers for South Africa and destroyers for Malta.The problem for Britain was to know what concessions Japan would ask in return. It was on Balfour’s watch that the Anglo-Japanese secret agreements were eventually signed on 14 February 1917. According to these agreements, it was laid down

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inter alia that ‘Britain will support Japan’s claims in regard to the disposal of Germany’s rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of the Equator on the occasion of a Peace Conference.’ The countries of the British Empire were to claim islands in the south Pacific but, while these were comparable, they were hardly equivalent. There was a note of resignation and inevitability about this appeal; but at the same time there was a recognition that times had changed. Japan was in a strong bargaining position while Britain was in a weak one. In speaking to the War Cabinet, Balfour showed his long-term thinking. There is in every quarter of the Eastern world a certain uneasiness as to whether Japan is in future going to try and play a part in those regions….. A nation of that sort [Japan] must have a safety-valve somewhere; and although I think Lord Grey [of Fallodon] carried his doctrine to excess, I think there is something in it.9

After the US entered the First World War in 1917 it became essential for the British government to make urgent contact with President Wilson’s administration. It was decided that Balfour should head a mission to Washington. He was able on 30 April to discuss a host of issues with the president. One of his most immediate tasks was to acquaint him rather discreetly with the various secret agreements to which Britain had recently subscribed, the Japanese being among the more important. Because of the hostile views which Americans held about Japan’s wartime activities, it was essential to explain Britain’s position towards her ally. When the US asked for copies of these secret undertakings, Balfour could not supply them and had to contact London. Whitehall commented: The trouble is that there is absolutely no record here of what documents were taken by Balfour or what were subsequently sent to him… It is simply a question of memory, in which… Balfour is not particularly strong.10

Nonetheless there was a general consensus that the Balfour mission had been a success both with the administration and the general public to whom he gave many speeches. Not least significant was Balfour’s attempt to impress the president and his sceptical entourage with an account of Japan’s good faith towards the allied cause in spite of her blatant incursions into China – such as the 21 Demands. This was a tricky task but Balfour, having experienced Britain’s naval dilemma and her dependence on such outside help as she could get, portrayed Japan in the most positive light. Was he genuine here or was it a bit of special pleading? There are grounds for believing that Balfour had gone some way towards respecting Japan’s new standing in the world and sympathizing with her ambitions. In the confidential confines of the Imperial War Cabinet, Balfour told his colleagues: Japan with an eye to her own interests is quite genuinely helping the Allies, and helping them to the best of her ability. She is making money so, unlike the rest of us, she is doing well; but I do not think we ought to underrate the services she has given, or the services she is giving.11

So it seems that the sentiments he expressed in Washington were not special pleading. In other words, he was trying to build bridges between the new allies, arguing that Britain’s survival depended on US entry into the war but also security in the Mediterranean depended on naval assistance from Japan. These two countries should somehow try to reconcile their differences. Balfour’s approach was reminiscent of his famous quip: ‘I never forgive but I always forget!’12

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PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919 Balfour had an important role at the Paris Peace conference over the affairs of Japan and China. He attended Paris in his capacity as British foreign secretary but was second in the British delegation to Prime Minister Lloyd George whose place he had to take whenever duty called the Welshman back to London. He also played a large role in steering the British Empire delegation. It is not possible here to undertake an examination of the complex issues of that conference or even the tricky Far Eastern issues that it raised. The Japanese delegates, Makino Nobuaki and Chinda Sutemi, had been given certain targets to aim for: the Shantung peninsula, a racial equality clause in the covenant of the League of Nations and the retention of the Pacific Islands she had occupied. The first two were left undecided in the initial phase of negotiations and were still on the agenda by the middle of April 1919 when delegates were exhausted and the European settlement had been broadly arranged (despite the departure of the Italians). The Japanese let it be known that they would not sign the treaty until it was clear what was to happen to the Shantung province where their armies had been in occupation since 1914. The Council of Three (Council of Four less Italy retired), which was divided between President Wilson who was sympathetic to China and Britain and France which were committed to Japan by their wartime treaties, called in a committee of experts to work out a solution on 25 April. After they had reported, it was necessary to see whether a compromise could be reached and the Council called on Balfour. It was a tribute to Balfour’s placid temperament that he was still able to approach the issue sensitively after three solid months of negotiation. Balfour had a rapport with the Japanese which none of the US representatives had. The Chinese, of course, knew that he had as foreign secretary agreed to the secret understanding of 1917 which Britain was determined (like France) to uphold. In spite of this, he seems to have been acceptable to the Chinese. This was a testament to the respect with which he was regarded by both sides. The critical meeting took place between Balfour and Makino on 26 April. The proposal made was to restrict Japan only to the economic rights which Germany had formerly enjoyed in Shantung, including Tsingtao, German railways and associated mines. It was understood that Japan for her part would be prepared to hand back political control of the occupied area to the Chinese government shortly. Moreover the Japanese delegates stated that their country was agreeable to restore the province of Shantung to China ‘on the conclusion of the peace’. The Council endorsed the undertakings given.13 A deal to transfer Shantung to Japan made Wilson squeamish, the European leaders less so. But Wilson rejoiced that Japan agreed not to pursue the racial equality clause in the League covenant if she was given these assurances. In a formal declaration to Council on 30 April, it was announced that: The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao14

The validity of the ‘promise’ made to Balfour to hand back its concessions in Shantung, which the Chinese did not believe, was marred by the reservation that it refused to define the time-scale in which that would be achieved. The idea of an exclusive Japanese settlement at Tsingtao was, notwithstanding considerable protest in Japan, dropped by Prime Minister Hara once the peace had been signed.15

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We are concerned only with the narrow issue of Balfour’s role, not the overall justice of the Paris settlement. A member of the Chinese team, Dr G.E. Morrison, thought that the Chinese were more angry with Wilson than with Balfour, because they looked upon Britain’s foreign secretary as a cat’s-paw [puppet]. If the ‘ultimate solution’ tilted towards Japan, that was not really Balfour’s doing. The Japanese had played their cards skilfully and achieved their aim by inducing this international forum of the practicalities of their case in spite of all the pious talk about self-determination. In a revealing report to London on his mediation efforts, Balfour revealed that ‘my sympathies up to this point … were entirely with the Japanese...’.16 The implication of this statement surely is that Balfour found the Japanese delegates had become intractable at the last stage of these negotiations. WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921–1922 Over the Washington Conference (November 1921–March 1922), Balfour was the trouble-shooter once again, but this time as leader of Britain’s delegation. In any case, Balfour and Curzon had changed places in October 1919, Curzon taking over the Foreign Office while Balfour became Lord President of the Council. It might have been the expectation that the British prime minister and foreign secretary would attend this first international conference hosted by the United States. But the US-imposed agenda was lengthy and Lloyd George and Curzon professed they could not be spared for an extended period. The former showed willingness to go over to Washington for brief sessions with the leaders of the new Republican administration to smooth over some of the ruffled feathers. But the Irish question and unemployment situation made even this suggestion impossible. So they called in Balfour following the Paris session of the League of Nations in September. Despite his age of seventy-three and his bad health, he accepted and set off by sea in the first week of November for the so-called Disarmament Conference.17 Japanese issues were bound to arise. In general the cabinet gave no instructions except the rather vague ones that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be preserved and global naval disarmament was essential for Britain. The delegates, therefore, enjoyed a considerable measure of discretion over how to secure their objectives. They knew that China hated the alliance and the Republican administration now in power supported them. As Balfour and his party formulated their views on board ship, the reality was that it was a question of finding a formula which would be acceptable to the United States. In actual fact Balfour and his team sketched out a draft arrangement for a tripartite agreement including the United States which read in part: …any two of the HCP shall be at liberty to protect themselves by entering into a military alliance provided (a) this alliance is purely defensive and (b) it is communicated to the other HCP…

This suggests that Britain was initially trying to preserve some of the basic ingredients of the old alliance, while tempting the US to participate. That was a desideratum common to both Britain and Japan. With all the information which Balfour received about American attitudes on arrival in Quebec, he found it impossible to propose this sort of solution. He seems to have been more apprehensive about the opposition from Washington to the continuation of the alliance than about the reactions of the Japanese. He was so preoccupied with American officials that there were cries of Anglo-Saxon collusion from the Japanese press. His problem was that, if the alliance were to

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be continued, the US would not agree to naval limitation and there might be financial consequences for Britain. This was in fact not too dissimilar to the Japanese position. One of its delegates, Ambassador Shidehara, was more anxious to repair fences between Japan and the US than keep up the traditional friendship with Britain. The other delegate, Admiral Kato- Tomosaburo-, was well aware that Japan was inferior to US in funds and resources and had to respect the American line over naval limitation and political issues connected with it. Whatever their differences, the British and the Japanese were happy to be able to prevent the alliance issue appearing on the open conference agenda.18 Finally after secret discussions a four-power treaty was forged on 10 December which united the US, Japan, Britain and newcomer France in a replacement for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The alli-ance treaties were to lapse as soon as the Washington treaties as a whole were ratified by participating states in 1923. Sir Maurice Hankey who had been in charge of British secretarial arrangements both in Paris and Washington described it as a diplomatic triumph for Balfour and himself. Certainly the idea of increasing the number of participating powers had its attractions, but the resulting treaty was at most a consultative document and contained no teeth.19 How does one sum up a many-sided conference? In the main it was a triumph for Balfour and for Britain. Balfour had played a major role even over the naval negotiations where naval limitation suited the British government. More generally, it was saluted as another major achievement for the elder statesman on a prominent global stage. As the recessional on the alliance began, Balfour was conscious that he had to mollify Japanese opinion. In his famous valedictory speech he argued that ‘the only way out of this impasse was that we should annul, merge, destroy as it were, this ancient and outworn and unnecessary agreement, and replace it with something new, something effective, which should embrace all the Powers concerned in the vast area of the Pacific.’ For the Japanese this was harsh. In stressing the ‘effectiveness’ of the new treaty Balfour who boasted of always taking a strategic view revealed that he was in idealistic mood as were the other delegates. In a more rigorous appraisal, Balfour reported to the cabinet: [The Anglo-Japanese Alliance] which was originally designed to secure stability in the East had, with changing circumstances, lost its value for that purpose; and, being out of relation to the existing condition of affairs, had become the cause of misunderstanding rather than a guarantee of peace.20

The Conference ended on 6 February; and Balfour returned home, having spent a ‘working Christmas’ across the Atlantic. He was rewarded by a grateful government with a peerage. ARTHUR BALFOUR (1848–1930) Strictly speaking, this was the end of Balfour’s encounter with Japanese issues. East Asian crises did crop up during the 1920s but they were no longer Balfour’s primary responsibility except for the summer of 1922 when he deputized at the Foreign Office for the ailing Lord Curzon. He continued with his enthusiasm for the Committee of Imperial Defence and soldiered on at the periphery of government until 1929.21 …

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How did the Japanese get along with Balfour? Those who knew him were impressed by his height, dignity and attractive personality. The head of Japan’s Washington delegation, the president of the House of Peers, Prince Tokugawa, continued to send him Christmas cards. Ambassador Shidehara wrote that he was a world figure, a person of embarrassingly great prestige and character. Admiral Kato- acknowledged his experience and authority and admonished those Japanese who criticized the ‘Anglo-American collusion’ at Washington. Kato- especially valued Balfour’s assurance that ‘friendly relations between Britain and Japan would become more and more consolidated even after termination of our alliance.’ Among Japanese negotiators at Paris, Chinda knew him best from the three years he had spent at the London embassy and spoke of him as legendary. The Japanese representative at the Paris and later European conferences, Matsui Keishiro, got to know Balfour well and described him as fair-minded and hard-working.22 Though no Japanese knew him intimately, he was respected and regarded as a friend. How did Balfour view Japan? As prime minister from 1902, he was in charge of a government which was trying to make the new alliance relationship with Japan more friendly and natural. Yet one is reminded how far Balfour was essentially a European politician, like his uncle, Lord Salisbury. He rated the Entente Cordiale reached with France (1904) as highly as the Japanese treaty. Yet his career at the top of British politics was bound up with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He was in the cabinet which signed it in 1902 and, paradoxically, he was directly responsible for it being allowed to lapse. In the final phase of his career, he was unexpectedly thrust into problems between Japan and China. At Paris in 1919 he was called in to handle the Shantung problem and had the task of reconciling China’s rights, Japan’s treaty rights and the interpretation of Germany’s rights. The failure to resolve the Shantung issue at Paris meant that, with the influence of the China lobby in the US, the whole subject had to be revisited at Washington. Although he was not physically present at the sessions devoted to reconciling Chinese and Japanese positions over Shantung, Balfour became involved in his capacity as the head of the UK delegation when he had to have private discussions with both Chinese and Japanese delegates before a final settlement couldbe reached. Thus Balfour played a part in Japan’s destiny and had a special role in addressing what turned out to be the major issue of East Asian history in the first half of the twentieth century: the Sino-Japanese dispute. Balfour slipped languidly into the prickly role as international mediator for his relative success in the short term must surely rank as one of the great statesmen of the century. ENDNOTES 1

2

3 4

5 6 7 8

Nish, ‘Edward Grey’ in Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), Biographical Portraits, vol. VIII, Global Oriental, 2013, pp. 77–8 T. G. Otte, ‘Lord Salisbury’ in Hugh Cortazzi Biographical Portraits, vol. VIII, Global Oriental, 2013, pp. 77–8 R. Mackay, Balfour: Intellectual Statesman, Oxford: University Press, 1985 Nish, ‘Could the Russo-Japanese War have been prevented by British diplomacy?’ in STICERD pamphlet IS/08/534 [International Studies] Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Athlone, 1966, pp. 345–67 Kenneth Young, Arthur James Balfour, Bell, 1963, pp. 313–14 Nish, Alliance in Decline, Athlone, 1972, pp. 201–203 Imperial War Cabinet, 22 March 1917 in Austen Chamberlain papers (University of Birmingham Library), 20/77

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9

10 11

12

13

14 15 16

17 18

19 20 21 22

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Foreign Office 800/158 [Curzon], Campbell to Tyrrell, 4 November 1915. Minute by Balfour on Greene to Balfour in FO371/3233[330807], 7 January 1918 Imperial War Cabinet as 8 above Balfour gives an account of his US mission in his memoir, AJB: Chapters of Autobiography, Cassell, 1930 Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers: Paris Conference of 1919 and its attempt to end war, John Murray, 2001. Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, Routledge, 1998 R.H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East, Archon, 1965, pp. 270–1. Yoshiro- Unno, Kokusai remmei to Nihon, Hara Shobo-, 1972, pp. 18–19 Fifield, Wilson, p. 279 Nihon gaiko- nempyo- narabi shu- yo- bunsho Balfour (Paris) to Curzon, 8 May 1919 in Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–39, first series, vol. 6, HMSO, 1956, pp. 563–4 Blanche E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, Hutchison, 1936, vol.II, pp. 315–17 James Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, Cambridge: University Press, 1997, especially ch. 18 on the Washington Conference. A recent short work is E.H.H. Green, Balfour, Haus, 2009 Stephen Roskill, Hankey Man of Secrets, vol. 2, p. 251 Nish, Alliance in Decline, p. 376. Documents on British Foreign Policy, vol. 14, 1966, doc. 585 Roskill, Hankey, vol. 2, pp. 391–2, 419–20 Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, Naval Institute Press, 2006, pp. 81, 88. Matsui Keishiro Jijoden [autobiography], pp. 103–104. Ishii Kikujiro-, Gaiko– yoroku, Iwanami shoten, 1936, pp. 186–8

13

LORD CURZON, (1859–1925)

[George Nathaniel Curzon, First Marquess Curzon of Kedleston] Foreign Secretary, 1919–24

Lord Curzon

IAN NISH

G

EORGE NATHANIEL CURZON (1859–1925) was not continuously involved with Japan throughout his long political career but had two distinct phases of contact with her. The first was during his responsibility for Britain’s relations with Japan while he was parliamentary under-secretary for foreign affairs and the Foreign Office’s spokesman in the House of Commons (1895–8). The second phase was when he entered the cabinet in 1916, becoming foreign secretary from 1919 to 1924. Few have gained as much from their years at Oxford University as Curzon. He acquired a coterie of friends at Balliol College who rose high in the political and diplomatic world. He became after graduation Fellow of All Souls and the winner of the Arnold History Prize. He showed himself to be a fluent writer and an eloquent orator. It was no surprise, therefore, when at the general election in 1885 he became Conservative MP for Southport and was appointed assistant private secretary to Lord Salisbury. Throughout his long career in government service, he acquired the reputation of being the intellectual in politics and was one of the few experts on Asia in British government cirdes.1 YOUTHFUL WANDERINGS

As a young man Curzon was a compulsive traveller. His first journey round the world in 1887–8 took him for six months to Canada, the US, Japan, Korea and China and thereafter followed the familiar itinerary around colonial outposts of the British Empire. In 1889 he made a journey to Central Asia and wrote a book on Russia in Central Asia in 1889. It was, however, his second journey to the Far East which is most signi£cant for our purposes. At the general election of August 1892 the Salisbury government, in which Curzon had a brief stint as under-secretary for India, was defeated and he was free to travel again. While he remained an MP, he was no longer a minister. He set off for New York and Asia. In Tokyo was his bosom friend, Cecil Spring-Rice, then a third secretary only recently arrived at 133

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the legation. Curzon was, thanks to Spring-Rice, able to meet influential political leaders including the prime minister, Ito– Hirobumi, whom he questioned in the manner of a Balliol tutorial to the horror of local British diplomats. He asked him ‘. . . the most searching questions on man, on nature and on human life, and as to how long the constitution would last, and was parliamentary government a success in Japan etc.’2

–’s replies were hardly satisfactory to the visitor who had not formed a favourIto able view of the parliamentary regime which had just started in Japan. But Curzon’s impressions of the ordinary people, their manners and the countryside itself were favourable. On leaving, he wrote that he was ‘just tearing myself away from the fascinations of Japan for the rugged embrace of Korea’.3 Curzon embarked on an ambitious and energetic tour of Korea and China; but he was never a relaxed traveller and insisted on Victorian standards of treatment and entertainment of which the East was still lamentably ignorant. He was accompanied as far as Shanghai by the long-suffering Spring-Rice whom Curzon appreciatively described as ‘the best, cheeriest, most unselfish, most amusing of travelling companions’. For nearly two months they had been together and had ‘not exchanged one jarring word’.4 Curzon penned a series of articles in The Times (which presumably financed the trip to the East since it did not then have full-time correspondents there) and set out the political conclusions reached on his wanderings. It was not a great step from this to the publication of a book Problems of the Far East: Japan-Korea-China. This was first published by Longmans, Green in 1894; it was then reissued in 1895; and a new and revised edition was published by Archibald Constable in 1896. This work was a critical political-economic analysis rather than the travel narrative which had become increasingly fashionable. Partly its popularity was a reflection of the fact that the British reading public was moving towards an interest in the east. Partly it was the result of fortunate timing: the book appeared just as the Sino-Japanese war broke out in August 1894.5 Curzon had predicted a victory by Japan. This upset those who had exaggerated expectations of the immense armies of China and the potentialities of regeneration in that country. The book therefore provoked a public debate. Curzon responded sarcastically to this criticism in a later edition by saying that ‘the evil odours of Peking seem, after all, to have left a correct impression upon my civilian nostrils’ and convinced him that Japan would defeat China. It was, he added, surprising that the reasons for China’s collapse ‘should have been so long and obstinately ignored, not by Englishmen in China, but by Englishmen at home, for whom the Celestial imposture has always possessed irresistible attractions’.6 By way of contrast, he saluted ‘the brilliancy’ of Japan’s military machine and pointed out that no country ever went to war so well prepared: Skilled topographers in disguise had mapped the high roads of China. Hydrographical surveys had acquainted the Japanese with every inlet in the Korean coast. Her mobilization proceeded with a smoothness and rapidity that excited the admiration of European military attaches. The Japanese Intelligence Department might have been engaged upon, just as it had certainly been preparing for, a campaign for years. Its spies were everywhere, in the offices and the arsenals, in the council chambers and among the ranks of the enemy. The press was manipulated and controlled with a masterly despotism that would have been impossible in Europe. Finally the strategy of Japanese enerals, if not brilliant, was deliberate, scientific and successful.

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This passage seems to have been borrowed from a military observer with intimate knowledge of the scene. Observant as Curzon was and confidently as he wrote, it was beyond his capabilities to comment so knowledgeably on the Japanese army without the advice of intelligence specialists. The decisiveness of Japan’s victory he put down to the ‘debility’ of the Chinese. But it did not follow that Japan ‘could beat any single European Power, much less any combination of a larger number’.8 So Curzon, who had enjoyed his visit to Japan (the last as it was to prove) and had appreciated her beauty and culture, was not starry-eyed about Japan’s politics or its future development. He ends up the 1896 edition with a section entitled ‘Is Japan the enemy?’ In his judgements on foreign countries he was always preoccupied by their relevance to the future of Britain and the British Empire. WHITEHALL AND CALCUTTA The Conservative party returned to power under Lord Salisbury in June 1895. Salisbury appointed Curzon as parliamentary under-secretary to assist him with Foreign Office business in the House of Commons, saying (quite justly) ‘you are more familiar with Eastern questions than any other man’. Salisbury had little enthusiasm for Japan and was content to leave Far Eastern problems to Curzon. Curzon, as we have seen, had the knowledge which comes from direct observation and approached the developing country with respect and realism. Curzon’s custodianship of events east of Suez ran into a crisis which lasted six months from December 1897. It was a China crisis in which Russia and Germany seized leases on her coastline. It was not a Japan crisis; and indeed she did not play a prominent role during the crisis. Curzon steered the British cabinet (in Salisbury’s absence) towards the policy of acquiring the port of Weihaiwei midway between the German and Russian acquisitions. This decision involved Japan insofar as Japanese troops were currently in occupation of the territory. The then Prime Minister, Ito–, whom Curzon had met in 1892 was accommodating enough and pulled out his forces. But he still safeguarded his position by entering into a treaty with Russia. Still it was a remarkable success for a parliamentary under-secretary, who had previously regarded himself as under-used. This crisis caused Curzon to speculate about relations between Britain and Japan and the possibility of an alliance between them which was much talked of at the time. He told the British Minister to Japan who had a hurried audience with him on 13 October 1897 that the Japanese were untrustworthy and it was difficult to have an alliance with them. Yet he wrote to the prime minister at the end of the year: If European powers are grouping themselves against us in the Far East we shall probably be driven sooner or later to act with Japan. Ten years hence she will be the greatest naval power in those seas and the European powers who now ignore or flout her will then be competing for her alliance.10

Curzon did not stay at the Foreign Office long enough to pursue these penetrating insights. In August 1898 Curzon was appointed Viceroy of lndia under the title of Lord Curzon of Kedleston. He took up office in the following January and continued to serve into a second term in 1905. He had, as we have seen, visited India in 1887 and again in 1892. The vast administrative structure of the Government of India suited Curzon’s hard-working temperament; and the hierarchy of the viceregal court appealed to his personality as a ‘most superior person’.

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Curzon had developed during the Salisbury administration an enthusiasm for foreign affairs; and the Government of India had foreign policy concerns of its own, quite separate from those of Whitehall. India’s nearest rival was Russia, which was now allied with France. Curzon often complained of Russia’s continued undermining of British India’s frontiers with Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia. He became by 1900 concerned, not to say obsessed, with finding ways to defend the British Empire as a whole. The simultaneous occurrence of the South African war and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 confirmed Britain’s dependence on the Indian army. Without the lst and 3rd Sikhs, the Royal Rajputs and the Bengal Lancers, Britain could not have provided as many as 21,500 troops for the international force which ultimately relieved the Siege of Beijing in August. Curzon was aware that Britain had to depend on Indian troops for action in the East and keep on relatively good terms with the overweening Viceroy.11 Curzon was an imperialist through and through. When his former friends in the Conservative party obtained high office in the Salisbury cabinet, which was reformed in the autumn of 1900, he sent his congratulations to one in an enlightening letter from India: Well, there you all are now ruling the Empire. Do it strenuously and nobly and with courage. Do not let that cursed Treasury sit upon you. You . . . have got to save this country [Great Britain] from disaster and to ensure its victory in our next big war. It is a splendid responsibility, a glorious task. All luck to you in it, old boy, from beginning to end. 12

In a later reply from one of these friends, Lord Selbome, the first lord of the Admiralty, shared his anxieties about Britain’s over-extension so far as the Royal Navy was concerned: . . . this is a year of special difficulty for us; we have some dozen or more extra ships in commission to meet the emergencies in Chinese and African waters, involving crews of more than 8,000 men, and the Duke of York’s tour [to Australia] to man in addition.13

This shortage of resources on several fronts led the imperialist group to seek an alliance with Japan which they hoped would help to keep Russia in check. So far as we know, Calcutta was not consulted in advance over this secret development. But there is little doubt that the Viceroy would have approved, Curzon describing the alliance when it came about as ‘a cleverly timed and statesmanlike coup’.14 By the time the alliance was publicly announced, Curzon was already planning a coronation Durbar which was to take place in Delhi on 1 January 1903. He was anxious to honour the new monarch, Edward VII, but the King could not attend because of his illnesses. In view of the alliance, it was a natural idea that Japan should be invited to send a delegation. It was, Curzon wrote, ‘an auspicious opportunity for extending reciprocal knowledge of the circumstances and interests of Japan and India’. Curzon thought that Japan should see the British Empire at its proudest moment and in particular observe the manoeuvres of the troops on whom the allies would rely if ever the alliance was to be tested on an Eastern battlefront. Interestingly, Japan interpreted the invitation as a military one and sent a prominent senior officer, Lieutenant-General Oku Yasutaka, who had commanded the 5th Division in the Sino-Japanese War and was later to command the second army in the Russo-Japanese War. Oku stayed in the Imperial Camp and attended the coronation military manoeuvres at the expense of the Government of India. He was present also when Curzon made his state entry into Delhi riding

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on top of the largest elephant in the sub-continent. What Lord Salisbury characterized as a typical ‘Curzonization’ of the event. 15 Oku followed in the footsteps of General Fukushima Yasumasa (1852–1919) who was one of Japan’s India experts and had commanded the Japanese troops in China during the Boxer Rebellion. Fukushima had visited London for the Winchester House conference in 1902 to implement the terms of the alliance and had there requested Britain to send a British army corps to Manchuria in an emergency. This was refused. It is probably for that reason that Fukushima went to India in the autumn and had direct talks with Curzon and possibly General Lord Kitchener who had only recently arrived as commander-in-chief. Fukushima, however, fell sick and had to stay in hospital for six months, only returning to Japan in April 1903. This link between India and Japan was confirmed when Japan declared war on Russia in February 1904 and Major-General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had served in the Indian army and in South Africa as chief of staff to General Kitchener, went to Tokyo to act as observer. Thanks to Fukushima’s influence, he and his team were able to have earlier passage to the front in Manchuria and easier access to senior officers fighting the campaign than those of other nationalities.16 The defence of India continued to be a major worry for Curzon who never missed an opportunity to bombard the India Office with lengthy missives on the subject. London through the newly-formed Committee of Imperial Defence was also regularly investigating the issue. Eventually, India’s strategic difficulties were addressed and became one of the major issues discussed during the negotiations for the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905. The draft as proposed by Britain contained a clause which laid down that Japan will, in the event of war, provide a force . . . which shall be equal to the force of British troops from time to time in India up to the limit of [40,000?]

This was eventually modified in the fmal text to read (Art.VII): Conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other ... will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties.17

The revised alliance was eventually signed in August 1905 at the tail-end of the Russo-Japanese War. Although Japan’s commitment to India had been watered down, there was still a strong implication that the second alliance was not just an alliance between Britain and Japan but between the British Empire and the Japanese Empire. How far Curzon was behind this specific provision is difficult to judge. Probably not. At all events he gave up the viceroyalty just as the second alliance was being signed and left India on 21 August 1905 after a quarrel with his commander-in-chief, Lord Kitchener, in which he was not supported by the government in London. In fact London’s criticisms of Curzon went much deeper: To allow the Viceroy to run his own foreign policy would be a blunder which has brought Russia to disaster and humiliation - the blunder namely of having one Foreign Minister in the Far East and another at home, not necessarily acting in accord.18

Kitchener in due course reversed any suggestion that India needed Japanese military support. Paradoxically, Japan’s victory in war over Russia showed up the vulnerability of European powers in Asia and was to become an unsettling factor

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for Curzon’s successors in India. Domestic unrest was to take a higher priority than foreign affairs, which had been Curzon’s priority. BACK TO WESTMINSTER It was not in Curzon’s nature to go into retirement at the age of 46. Entering the House of Lords in 1907, he became a frequent and influential commentator on foreign and imperial affairs. But he was distrusted and he felt that for a decade he was neglected politically. He served as president of the Royal Geographical Society and as chancellor of Oxford University. But it was only during the First World War that his fortunes rallied. He became lord privy seal in Asquith’s coalition government in 1915 and lord president in Lloyd George’s War Cabinet in the following year. From this point on, Curzon was frequently asked to express his views on Japan and they proved to be remarkably inconsistent. An early case was when Foreign Secretary Balfour negotiated the difficult Anglo-Japanese secret treaty of February 1917, promising Japan advance support over certain of her key demands at any future peace conference. In spite of Balfour’s strong recommendation, Curzon opposed this treaty, doubtless because of his suspicions over Japan.19 Yet, in striking contrast, he was convinced that Japan should be encouraged to send her forces into Siberia as part of an anti-Bolshevik front in 1918. This suggests that he did have confidence in Japan as an armed power and the contribution she could make to the allied war effort. But it was typical of the contradictions which sometimes appeared in Curzon’s thinking in high office.20 In 1919 it became necessary for Balfour as foreign secretary to accompany Lloyd George to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The prime minister asked Curzon to take charge of the Office while Balfour was away. From February till October he was acting foreign secretary; thereafter he was appointed in place of Balfour until he left government in January 1924. During this period Curzon was a dominant figure in British policy-making, especially in the Asian sphere. But our concern is with Japan with which relations were at a critical stage during the Curzon years. The Alliance had dragged Britain into dealing with Japan’s policy in China which was a major headache for delegates to the Paris Conference. China insisted that her province of Shantung should be surrendered to her unconditionally by the peace settlement, whi1e Japan relied on her treaties of 1915 and 1917 to justify retaining the territory which had been occupied by her armies since 1914. Eventually, it was agreed by the Treaty of Versailles that the unexpired part of the German lease should be given to Japan. Accordingly, China refused to sign. Because time had not allowed the powers to deal adequately with the Chinese problem at Paris, it was left to post-conference diplomacy to try to unravel the knots. Curzon had to try to resolve the impasse over Shantung. At an interview with the Japanese Ambassador on 22 July, Curzon pointed out that during the war Japan had pursued a policy which aimed at securing commercial and political supremacy in China by any form of pressure and loans. These tactics were responsible for China’s refusal to sign the treaty; the day had gone by when China could be cut up into spheres of influence. Chinda Sutemi, the Japanese ambassador in London (1916–20), put up a long and almost impassioned defence of Japan’s actions which he referred to his govemment.21 In a related issue the powers under America’s lead decided to create a financial consortium to channel loans to China. Japan insisted that South Manchuria,

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Eastern Inner Mongolia and Shantung should be excluded from the consortium. Chinda discussed this on 1 September with Curzon who admitted that Japan’s claims over South Manchuria had been recognized but could not recollect any engagement of that nature as far as Eastern Mongolia was concerned. The United States was even more adamant. On 19 November Curzon declined to agree to the exclusions which Japan wanted. On another issue, which did not surface at the Peace Conference, Curzon had to be equally severe: Japan’s conduct in her colony, Korea. In response to extreme measures taken by the Japanese garrison army, there were serious riots in Seoul which spread throughout the country on 1 March 1919, the so-called ‘Mansei jihen’. This independence movement was put down harshly by the Japanese authorities; and the numbers of casualties were fully reported in the British press. Curzon had to tell the Japanese ambassador of the deplorable effect which the publication of the barbarous methods of quelling the disturbances had had on the British public. His remarks to Chinda may have been one factor which led to General Hasegawa’s recall in the summer; and a more benign regime eventually came into being under Admiral Saito Makoto as governor-general.22 These complaints lingered on over the next few years. On the nitty-gritty elements of international relations like trade, the financial consortium, territorial acquisitions, there were hardly any issues on which there was cordial agreement between Britain and Japan. Curzon’s conversations with Chinda seem to have been fairly explosive sessions, though the reports are couched in the form of avuncular advice from Curzon.23 On the other hand, Chinda who eventually left London on retirement in the summer of 1920 cannot have taken it too badly since he agreed to accompany the Japanese crown prince during his state visit to Britain in 1921. This stands in marked contrast to the attitude which was being taken over the most important issue between the two countries, the renewal (or otherwise) of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The third alliance of 1911 had survived into the post-war period but was due to lapse in July 1921. There was always the question of compatibility between it and the covenant of the League of Nations of which both Japan and Britain were founder members. The head of the Far Eastern Department reported that the alliance could not be continued in its present form, condemning it as ‘an unnatural and artificial compact based neither on identity of interest nor on sympathy with common aims and ideals’.24 Then the Foreign Office bureaucrats set up a specially appointed Alliance Committee which by and large accepted this incompatibility and reported that the alliance would have to be terminated. Curzon, now responsible as foreign secretary, thought otherwise. He was impressed that Japan had been helpful during the war; and the alliance, if continued, would be beneficial to the stability of Japan and the Pacific region. Curzon put the matter fairly to the Imperial Conference and, supported by Lloyd George and Balfour, recommended that the alliance should be continued in some form, possibly acceptable to the United States. Otherwise, he thought, ‘we shall lose the advantages of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which have been and are considerable. [I allude] to the steadying influence which the Agreement has exercised in international politics.’25 The majority of Dominion prime ministers shared his views. On 4 July 1921 Curzon, having agreed that the alliance would continue ad interim, asked Hayashi Gonsuke, the new Japanese ambassador, to contemplate some changes being made in it. The situation had, he said, changed altogether from the time when it was first concluded and there was no longer any danger

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to India, thus implying that in Curzon’s view the defence of India had been the prime purpose of the original alliance. While the two countries were generally in agreement, politicians in the United States and China were opposed to the alliance continuing. Curzon wanted to know how Japan felt about holding a Pacific Conference at which Japan, Britain and the United States (and China if she wished) would attend. At any such conference, which would be held in America at the end of the year, Japan and Britain would be joined by representatives of the British Empire. 26 Japan did not have to respond because the American government did not endorse Curzon’s ideas and instead took the initiative by itself calling the conference. After this the future of the alliance slipped out of Curzon’s control. It was in fact external forces that brought about the end of the alliance, notably the strong line taken by the Republican Party, which had been in power in the United States since March 1921. It called what came to be known as ‘the Washington Conference’ to deal with the three large subjects: China, the Pacific and global naval development. But in the early stages of the conference priority was given to the future of the alliance. Curzon who was by virtue of all the conferences in which he had been engaged something of a ‘conference expert’ certainly considered the proposed conference to be ill-conceived. This was not because of the alliance but because the conference, with such a large canvas to cover, would be bound to last several months and no world statesmen could possibly attend for such a long time. But Curzon did offer that Lloyd George and he could ‘run over’ to the States for preliminary talks in August. He was understandably hurt when this offer was turned down by Washington.27 Against this background of mounting disagreement, why did Curzon not insist on going to Washington in order to try to convince the Americans? The general argument is that Lloyd George had his hands full in the autumn with Ireland and unemployment while Curzon was preoccupied with the Egyptian treaty and could not be spared. This is not wholly convincing. Oddly enough, there was some talk that the prime minister would visit Japan in early August for two weeks.28 It came to nothing. But the suggestion that they were abnormally hard-pressed may have been exaggerated. Eventually, the British delegation was led by A.J. Balfour who as a bachelor was presumably able to tolerate a long absence from home. Curzon wrote to congratulate Maurice Hankey, the secretary to the cabinet, on going, which in his view guaranteed the success of the conference - probably an indication of his diminished confidence in the administrative abilities of Balfour.29 In spite of Curzon’s prediction that the Washington Conference when it was convened in November would ‘peter out in talk’, it was remarkably successful. In due course the alliance was merged into the Four-power Treaty which came into effect with the exchange of ratifications in July 1923.30 Throughout his career, Curzon was interested in, and relatively well disposed towards, Japan; but he was never a Japanophile. In a book published in 1923, he included an essay dealing with Kyoto whose beauty he admired: The town is exquisitely situated in a cup between mountain ranges, quaintly outlined, and clothed with an astonishing wealth of trees. From the eastern range, where the visitor is probably lodged, he will get a wonderful outlook, both at sunrise and at nightfall. In the early dawn the entire city is drowned in a sea of white vapour, from which only the huge hooded roofs of the temples emerge, black and solemn, like the inverted hulls of gigantic ships. Suddenly, across the mist booms the sonorous stroke of the vast temple-bell, and rolls away in melancholy vibrations.31

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Although Curzon had the poet’s eye, his prime political concerns were Britain and the British Empire. Japan was welcomed as a friendly ally insofar as she fitted in with British interests but, when in the war and post war periods Japan pursued her own self-interest regardless of Britain’s advice, Curzon was distinctly less favourable. So he wavered in his attitude later in his career, becoming more critical the stronger Japan became. From first to last there was a strong element of paternalism in his attitude towards the Japanese. Curzon died in 1925. His final years in office were marred by overwork, illness and political disappointment. In reflecting on his life, one can discern a thread of Asia running through it. It is striking that the places he visited in his twenties - India, Persia, Japan – played a part in his later career and were still relevant to his experience as a sixty-year-old foreign secretary. Beyond the political sphere he was an admirer of Asian culture from Moghul architecture to the shrines and temples of Japan. The Japanese saw in him someone who, despite his formidable presence, was well-informed, approachable, understanding, even if loquacious. NOTES 1

2

3 4 5

6 7 8

9 10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

Major biographies of Curzon include (Lord) Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 3 vols, London: Benn, 1928; Kenneth Rose, Superior Person, London: Weidenfeld, 1969; and David Gilmour, Curzon, London: Murray, 1994. The most detailed account of this journey is to be found in Stephen Gwynn (ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 2 vols, London: Constable, 1929, I, 125. Ronaldshay, I, 190–1. Spring-Rice, I, 125–40. An alternative view of the book is to be found in G. Daniels and Tsuzuki Chushichi (eds), The History of Anglo-fapanese Relations: Social and Cultural Perspectives, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 7–8. Problems of the Far East (1896 edition) was reprinted by Palgrave-Macmillan in 2002. Curzon, Problems (1896), Introduction and p. 366. Curzon, Problems (1896), pp. 363–4. Clearly a reference to the Dreibund (Russia, Germany, France) of 1895. Curzon, Problems (1896), p. 387. Salisbury to Curzon, 27 June 1895 in Ronaldshay, I, 234–5. The information comes from the Satow diaries through the kindness of Mr Ian Ruxton. Curzon to Salisbury, 29 December 1897 in Ronaldshay, I, 277f. For details of the 1897–8 crisis, see Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, London: Athlone, 1966, pp.47–57. For the British-Indian troops present according to British War Office estimates, see Ian Nish (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs, series E (Asia, 1860–1914), vol. 13, doc. 34. Following this, the Indian army began sending officers for the study of the Japanese language in Tokyo. Curzon to Selbome, 9 Nov. 1900 in D.G. Boyce (ed.), The Crisis of British Power, 1895–1910, London: TH Press, 1990, p.104. Selbome to Curzon, 19 April 1901 in Boyce, p.113. Curzon to Edward VII, 24 Feb. 1902 in the Royal Archives, Wl/18, quoted in Nish, Alliance, p. 369. Ian Nish, ‘Alliance and Empire’ in Collected Writings, Part I, ‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, Richmond: Japan Library, 2001, pp. 100–9. Andrew Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, London: Weidenfeld, 1999, p. 779. Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap-book during the Russo-Japanese War, 2 vols, London: Edward Arnold, vol. I, 1905. G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898– 1914, London: HMSO, 1929, vol. IV, no. 155. CAB 1/16, 6 Sept. 1905. The quotation is interesting for the Committee of Imperial Defence’s interpretation that the Russo-Japanese War came about because of independent action by Russian officials in the East.

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20

21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

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Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–39, series I, vol. xiv, no. 167 fn. (hereafter cited as DBFP). Curzon was critical of Balfour politically and even more critical of Balfour as Foreign Secretary. On 8 March 1918, Curzon called on Hankey before the start of a cabinet and attacked Balfour, suggesting himself as foreign secretary. Salisbury had trained him, he alleged, and had always designated him as his successor. While Hankey told the prime minister of this, nothing happened for a year. Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, 3 vv., London: Collins, 1972, II, 506. DBFP, I (vi), no. 436 and p. 562. DBFP, I (vi), no. 484. Ku Daeyeol, Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations, Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 1985. chs 2 and 3. DBFP, I (vi), nos 761, 789. DBFP, I (xiv), no. 97. DBFP, I (xiv), no. 405. DBFP, I (xiv), no. 328. DBFP, I (xiv), nos 335, 340. Hara Kei Nikki, vol. 9. Curzon to Geddes, 25 Sept. 1921 in DBFP, I (xiv), no. 384. Curzon to Hankey, 17 Oct. 1921 in Roskill, Hankey, II, 236. GNC, ‘The palaestra of Japan’ in Tales of Travel, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923, p. 174.

14

RAMSAY MACDONALD, 1866–1937

Foreign Secretary, 1924 Prime Minister, 1929–35

JOHN FERRIS Ramsay MacDonald

INTRODUCTION

T

his chapter considers how the prime minister and foreign secretaries of two Labour governments, those of 1924 and of 1929–31, viewed and handled Japan. One man, James Ramsay MacDonald, held three of these positions. The fourth, Arthur Henderson, foreign secretary between 1929–31, struggled with MacDonald over foreign policy. Henderson dominated the government’s decisions on China and Europe, but mattered little to those on Japan.1 Hence, this chapter focuses on MacDonald and Japan. RAMSAY MACDONALD’S LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE MacDonald’s role in the collapse of the second Labour government, and his leadership of a National government in the 1930s as his mind failed, overshadow his prior record as a politician.2 Between 1890–1931, MacDonald was a founder of the Labour Party, and a politician of courage and principle. His opposition to British involvement in the Great War won him enemies, and friends, as did his struggle for the social democratic movement against the USSR. Despite hostility from many colleagues, he dominated the Labour Party between 1924 and 1931. Within his Party and government, he was a vain and opinionated micro-manager, but politically skilful. He did not entirely trust any of his colleagues, or officials. More than any other prime minister of his time, he challenged the Foreign Office and the fighting services on strategic policy. MacDonald had powerful and radical views on foreign policy. He yearned for Britain to promote liberal internationalism and arms limitation or disarmament. In these Labour governments, his leading priority in foreign policy was to create international agreements on arms limitation. His principal aim was to cancel military programmes, which, he believed, might cause other peoples to prepare for war with Britain. Peoples did not want war, although some of their leaders might do so. MacDonald accepted the theory of arms races, the idea that for any state to maintain powerful military forces or to expand them, created fear and suspicion among other peoples, and 143

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drove them to reciprocate. Britain could stop this danger only by avoiding military expansion, and by changing the psychological balance of power within and between countries. As he said to Parliament in 1927, What we are coming down to more and more is this, that if we are to give peace to Europe, we have to attack the psychology of the people. In the beginning, how are we going to get Europe and the world into that frame of mind which takes security for granted, and which pursues arbitration and the ordinary civilised methods of settling disputes?3

These views were naïve. MacDonald also overrated the power of Britain and of the liberal order, which he thought were stronger than was true when he cancelled armament programmes. He did not generally reduce British armed forces, and authorised some expansion programmes, but his views about arms races and disarmament drove his perceptions and policies toward Japan. The danger was not that Japan would threaten Britain, but that Britain might make Japan a threat. He aimed to stop programmes that might alarm the Japanese people; unfortunately, these actions imperilled imperial security. Among British politicians, MacDonald fell among the largest group of views toward Japan, those with neutral opinions, against a substantial minority of people suspicious of that country, and the small group of Japanophiles. Many systems of ideas, complementary and contradictory, influenced British perceptions of non-western peoples; imperial anthropology, racism, orientalism (of many kinds), Whig paternalism, ideas of national characteristics, cultural ethnocentrism, and a model of the evolutionary modernization of all peoples on western (especially British) lines. These concepts are difficult to handle, because they took many permutations, as ideas and viewpoints. Britons used the word ‘race’ as a euphemism for ‘nation’, and relied on concepts of ‘national characteristics’ to describe and explain the behaviour of peoples. Hence, language, which we interpret as racist, often actually compared Japanese on the same scale as Britons used to gauge any western peoples, or themselves.4 Britons viewed Japan in a complimentary fashion, above many western and any other non-western peoples. MacDonald’s views on race and non-western peoples were complex, and conventional. He thought western civilization led the world, while non-western ones were inferior, in various ways. Yet cultures changed, peoples advanced, and non-western ones were rising. As regards relations with the subjects of the British empire, MacDonald had moderate rather than radical opinions.5 He was paternalistic, though not chauvinistic. He favoured greater political rights for the more advanced peoples within the empire, but not its abandonment. India would become independent, someday, but not yet. Meanwhile, Britain should liberalise its rule, and promote social and political development. Indians who criticized him for opposing immediate independence for India offended him.6 MacDonald’s views of Japan are hard to define, because he rarely expressed them (significant evidence in its own right, given the frequency with which he discussed the country, and his claims to monitor developments there). He never argued that Japan was an unusually aggressive country, which would play into the hands of exponents of British programmes against that country. However, he knew that Japan recently had attacked several of its neighbours, could do so again, and had a ‘power of mischief in the Pacific’.7 Military forces and militarist ideas were powerful in Japan, more than in most countries. Though he never explicitly said so, perhaps these perceptions drove his fears of an arms race with Japan: Japanese militarists must respond aggressively to any programmes, which they thought

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threatening, and use their power to arouse public fears. Yet he compared Japanese admirals to British ones, and the Japanese League of Nations Union (which warned that the Singapore base may give ‘the militarists in power the pretext for competitive armaments and materials for their propaganda’) to its British equivalent, and ‘to the very worthy body of Members of Parliament which meets once a fortnight upstairs to consider questions affecting the objects of the League.’8 One speech demonstrates the difficulty in assessing MacDonald’s views of Japan. In 1925 he warned Parliament that to construct the Singapore naval base would weaken ‘the Empire because it will increase the war-making impulses in the world’. Some argued ‘that Singapore is necessary as a naval base in order to maintain a white Australian policy’; yet this ‘political and racial policy will inevitably result in a military conflict between Australia and Japan’ and drag Britain into ‘war. That may be necessary. It may be inevitable’. It was not wise. The problem of the immigration of Asiatics into territories governed by whites, if allowed to be met, and to be foreshadowed, by preparations such as are suggested at Singapore, is going to impose inevitably an all-round challenge by certain races against certain other races. It is one of those beginnings in racial psychology which cannot possibly be ended until there is an engagement all along the line — the white races and the yellow races — the coloured races, whatever the colour may be.

MacDonald emphasised ‘the possibility of a conflict between the white and the yellow races on pure racial lines, backed to a certain extent by economic evolution’. Britain should seek ‘to shunt that problem — just to push it over the plane of a military solution and get it on to the plane of a judicial solution in some shape or form’. Given ‘the ferment that is going on in the East’, the Singapore base turns ‘the mind of the East towards the military position’ and makes ‘the East assume that this conflict, to which I have referred repeatedly, is going to happen and that they must be prepared for it’.9 In passing, MacDonald noted as an authority the views of Professor Karl Pearson, eugenicist, socialist and social Darwinist, although the reference was unnecessary to his argument, and contradicted it. Pearson approved of precisely the struggle MacDonald wished to avoid: History shows me one way, and one way only, in which a high state of civilization has been produced, namely, the struggle of race with race, and the survival of the physically and mentally fitter race…when the struggle between races is suspended, the solution of great problems may be unnaturally postponed; instead of the slow, stern processes of evolution, cataclysmical solutions are prepared for the future.10

This speech included debating points, but it suggests that MacDonald did not reject a common view, which combined orientalism and social Darwinism, regarding relations between Europeans and east Asians, that of a looming struggle between races, perhaps to the death. In 1921, the Committee of Imperial Defence noted ‘the most likely war for some time to come would be one between the white and yellow races whose interests lay in the Pacific’.11 Possibly, the combination of these perceptions and of the power of militarism in Tokyo, led MacDonald to see a real danger of arms races and race wars in the Asia-Pacific region. MacDonald expressed a view common among advocates of military preparations against Japan, but subverted it. The logic of arms races overcame that of racism: if Britain behaved nicely, ‘the East’ might adopt western ideals of liberal internationalism. His comments about Japan show traces of orientalism, but not of

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racism, and essentially follow an ethnocentric and evolutionary discourse. MacDonald viewed Japanese as though they were like any western people. All peoples behaved in similar ways, and evolved in the same direction, predicted by the predicates of liberalism and moral socialism. His theories of international relations suggested that all peoples acted the same way, regardless of culture – or race. THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT OF 1924: DEFENCE ISSUES, THE SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE AND JAPAN When MacDonald came to power in January 1924, he and his colleagues canvassed professional views on security, so to learn and not to appear doctrinaire, while pursuing their own policies.12 Britain was preparing to construct cruisers, to defend British and attack enemy trade in war. The Cabinet approved a reduced but significant programme for these warships, because it was a simple means to reduce unemployment, ostensibly defensive, and not obviously escalatory. The Cabinet also let the Air Ministry develop a major programme of expansion, which was widely seen as a defensive response to French policy and airpower. MacDonald handled only one programme differently. The Singapore Naval Base aimed to let the main fleet fight in the Pacific Ocean. It was directed against Japan, which the Admiralty regarded as a threat, though not an immediate one. The navy’s war plans focused on distant blockade, with the fleet cautiously advancing north toward Japan.13 However, in order to justify the base, the Admiralty (and its acolytes in press and parliament) advanced alarmist arguments about the likelihood of war with Japan. This campaign provoked some alarm in Japan, which fit the pattern of an arms race, and made that danger seem real. MacDonald may have reacted more to this publicity campaign, than to the programme itself. Plans had been developed and preparatory work begun, but the programme really was slated to begin in 1924. One of MacDonald’s first actions on taking office was to call a Cabinet committee on the matter, involving his leading colleagues. The Admiralty, believing that it confronted a problem of education, outlined its policy, highlighting the defensive purposes of the base and downplaying British offensive actions. Japan threatened the eastern possessions of the British empire which, at present, the Royal Navy could not defend. This weakness tempted Japanese aggression, and war. The Singapore base would let the fleet defend the eastern empire, deterring danger from Japan, and the possibility of war. The committee accepted the Admiralty’s case, so far as it went. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Phillip Snowden, said that ‘if there was a reasonable probability of a war with Japan, the Navy should have Singapore and whatever strength was necessary for that encounter’. The committee did not think that probability reasonable, at the moment. The Colonial Secretary, J.H. Thomas, agreed that the Admiralty ‘had made out a most admirable case for a base at Singapore from a strategical point of view and he considered that nothing more need be said in that direction. He suggested that the committee should now go into the question from the other points of view’. MacDonald outlined the Foreign Office’s arguments in support of the base, and rejected them. We were at present in a position after a great war when we were able to hold our hand. Later, when the world had settled down and the balance of power becomes more settled, it might then be folly to hold our hand. It would be wise policy and strategy to take the opportunity to reach agreement on the problem of limitation of armaments. Once a start was made in building bases and

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work of that sort, although our intentions might be limited, the consequences passed beyond our own power…He did not say a base at Singapore should never be built, but not at the present moment. The scheme should be prepared but pigeon-holed…Once Singapore was commenced circumstances would inevitably contrive to build up a military situation in the East until we reached a state similar to that in the North Sea in 1914.

The committee suspended the Singapore base, ‘in the light of the new atmosphere the Prime Minister is attempting to create in regard to foreign policy’.14 MacDonald hoped to exploit that opportunity to improve this atmosphere through international naval disarmament, but abandoned the idea as impracticable, at the moment.15 An attempt to address the problem through other means also failed. MacDonald routinely asked British ambassadors how to improve relations with their host government. He told Charles Eliot,16 the British ambassador to Japan, I watch with great interest the moves of Japan, and recognise that your corner of the earth has now become the centre of policies that in due course produce absolutely new developments in the history of the world. I would like to know if we can pursue any policy which will make our disinterested friendship axiomatic in the mind of Japanese Governments; and particularly in relation to China, what can be done, not to prevent the expansion of Japan, but to give it limits which will curb its power of mischief in the Pacific. I am afraid these questions may sound to you rather elementary, but from this distance they raise precisely the problems which our Foreign Office must try to solve by a clearly understood and constantly pursued policy.

Eliot replied that Japanese relations with Britain were good, better than with the United States and the USSR. The power of militarist forces in Tokyo was ‘on the wane’. Japanese policy would be peaceful for the foreseeable future. Anglo-Japanese relations were damaged by the resentment (sometimes expressed through racist behaviour) of British businessmen to Japanese competition in east Asia, and resistance by Whitehall to Japanese commercial expansion in China. The only means to improve relations were for Britain to treat Japan with respect, as it had done in cancelling the Singapore base, and to support Japanese hopes for ‘a special position’ regarding commercial activities in north China. Victor Wellesley, head of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, accepted Eliot’s analysis, but emphasised that Britain never tried to block Japanese commerce in China. Britain would not do so in north China, yet neither could it let Japan create ‘a special position’, an exclusive economic (or even worse, political) zone, there. Such an act would create international tension and perhaps turn the Chinese people against Britain.17 MacDonald circulated their replies to the Cabinet, but left the matter be. These comments showed that Anglo-Japanese relations could not be improved quickly and simply, and involved complex issues which MacDonald did not know well. In his first government, to transform Anglo-Japanese relations was among MacDonald’s leading ambitions. That hope stalled. Nothing less interested him. He could constrain Britain’s hand only so long as he was in office. Instead, MacDonald turned to transform the psychology of Europe on security and disarmament, unsuccessfully. In his Labour governments, MacDonald paid less attention to Asia, than Europe, and perhaps understood his ignorance of the issues involved there. In 1929–31, when the Labour government was longer in office, and east Asia was febrile, MacDonald and Henderson took few steps there, as they pursued greater matters across the world.18

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RETURN TO POWER IN 1929: LONDON NAVAL TREATY After MacDonald’s government fell, his successors restored the Singapore base, and expanded British military forces. Naval disarmament was MacDonald’s central aim when he returned to power in 1929, the peak moment of liberal self-confidence in the stability of the postwar order. So to ease international tension, a committee of Labour heavyweights again suspended the Singapore base. Many saw a naval race beginning to emerge, which would threaten peace. Meanwhile, the Washington Naval Treaty required the naval powers to begin a massive programme of battleship replacement in 1931, which many politicians were reluctant to do. When new governments took power in Washington and London, they pursued naval arms limitation, with different aims. Herbert Hoover, the American President, married national interest to idealism, aiming to weaken British power compared to the United States, while making a better world. Britain should cut its fleet while letting the United States build many cruisers. MacDonald sought to spur world disarmament, rather than further narrow interests. He did not aim to maintain Britain’s position against the United States, but instead to change American psychology, to gain their support for further moves toward liberal internationalism and disarmament in Europe. Like George Canning a century before, he called the new world in to redress the balance of the old, with even less success. So to impress Washington, MacDonald accepted many of Hoover’s demands, in particular, that Britain scrap large numbers of battleships and cruisers, far more than any other country, reduce the level of tonnage in cruisers to the size demanded by Washington, and let the United States build more new warships in that class, including heavy ones, than Britain. Ultimately, this compromise crippled British sea power; immediately, it weakened Whitehall on disputes with the United States; but it enabled a new disarmament conference, at London during 1930, where no power exceeded Japan’s importance to Britain.19 The Washington Naval Treaty centred on a 5-5-3 ratio between Britain and the United States, and Japan, in battleships, battle-cruisers and aircraft carriers. Any change in this treaty required Japanese cooperation on a host of complex technical issues, involving every type of warship. When MacDonald and Stimson, the United States Secretary of State and head of its delegation, briefly thought that Japan would reject an agreement, they agreed their countries must overturn their policies and sign a two-power arrangement, maintaining the replacement programme of the Washington Naval Treaty. A naval disarmament conference would produce a naval arms race. After that issue was settled, however, Japan slipped to tertiary importance for MacDonald and Henderson, as they focused on security and disarmament in Europe. MacDonald kept his colleagues out of naval disarmament, perhaps because he recognised how controversial the negotiations must be. He bargained with Hoover in 1929, and Stimson during 1930, but left the negotiations in London to the diplomat, Robert Craigie.20 Britain’s position was complex. It could not block some American demands, which it disliked, nor look as though it was manipulating Japan into opposing them. The American delegation initially insisted on the right to build 21 heavy cruisers. While Britain really preferred that the US navy possess just 15 heavy cruisers, it agreed that the United States could have 18, Britain 15 and Japan 12. Britain also knew that if the United States insisted on having more than 18 heavy cruisers, Japan would demand more than 12, forcing Britain to increase its requirements in that class, producing a cascade that might wreck the conference. Equally, compromise was possible. Britain worked for one, using

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the clash between Japan and the United States to play each against the other, and reduce both of their demands, so to further liberal internationalism and British interests. Craigie knew they must not let American statesmen think ‘that we are using the Japanese difficulty as a lever to get the Americans even below their figure of eighteen. Any such policy on our part would be a breach of the “Gentleman’s Agreement” which at present exists between the United States and ourselves’.21 Shaping Japanese policy without detection was essential to MacDonald’s leading priority. Craigie ably executed that aim. Thanks to the efforts of the code-breakers at the Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS), Craigie and MacDonald knew the debates within the American and Japanese delegations, and their negotiations.22 To further liberal internationalism, and prevent an arms race, MacDonald read gentlemen’s mail and manipulated them. Craigie, a shrewd bargainer who grasped the technical issues at stake, was the GC&CS’s main consumer and Britain’s chief actor. The ability to monitor these issues at the same time, in real time, illuminated American perspectives and policies, but particularly those of the Japanese delegation, which, like its government, was bitterly factionalised. GC&CS provided all Japanese reports between London and Tokyo, including material, which its naval and civilian sides hid from each other. Britain understood the divisions between the factions in the Japanese delegation, better than they did. GC&CS illuminated what arrangement these factions would accept, and the conflict between Japanese and American policies, including details both sides kept from Britain. GC&CS penetrated the position of the Japanese Admiralty (Kaigunsho), and the Japanese naval delegation. These authorities would oppose any agreement which Britain or the United States could accept, and thus hamper the freedom of action of their civilian colleagues and the chances for success at the conference. By 13 March 1930, after a month of secret talks, the British, American and Japanese civilian delegations accepted a complex deal which let all claim victory. The Japanese naval delegation and the Kaigunsho rejected it, preferring the conference to collapse. Japanese civilian leaders thought that time would defeat their naval colleagues. Through public and secret sources, the Foreign Office saw ‘a strong possibility of the naval element in the Japanese delegation overwhelming their political colleagues and preventing an agreement’, while ‘a most determined effort is being made by Japanese naval authorities to reject this compromise and nothing should be left undone to prevent such a disaster occurring’.23 This assessment was alarmist. Little could be done about it. As Britain opposed further concessions to Japan, it could neither appease sailors nor strengthen civilians. It had no effective leverage in Tokyo. The Foreign Office, reinforced by decryptions of Japanese telegrams indicating that naval officers were manipulating opinion against the 13 March compromise, thought the Kaigunsho had little power in the government or with the public. Public opposition to arms limitation was artificial.24 The Japanese Cabinet was strong and wise enough to accept the compromise, and not to subvert the conference. The delay, however, irritated MacDonald and Stimson, who believed Japanese militarists were preventing progress, and driving the world to danger. They ordered the British and United States ambassadors in Tokyo, John Tilley25 and Joseph Castle, to press civilian authorities to sign the 13 March agreement: to ‘use all your influence with the Japanese Government in favour of a reasonable settlement of this particular question at the earliest possible moment’.26 That pressure would have been barely acceptable between western liberal powers, however much it angered the factions, which foreigners were attacking. British authorities

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never would have done so with any continental monarchy before 1914, because they understood that such actions would backfire. To act thus in Japan must arouse memories of western imperialism, and enrage a powerful interest group, and perhaps the population. MacDonald and Stimson, sympathetic to Japan, but driven by urgency, self righteousness, and the view that Japan was a liberal and weaker state, which should not threaten world peace and progress, missed that point. Castle and Tilley refused these orders, which they believed would defeat their own aims. Such pressure could not remain secret, and would anger civilian and naval officers (as even these ambassadors’ cautious actions did). They trusted Japanese civilian authorities to solve these problems. Ultimately, those leaders committed Japan to the London Naval Treaty. However, this Anglo-American pressure irritated precisely the Japanese with whom they were working. MacDonald apologized to the head of the Japanese civilian delegation in London, Wakatsuki Reijiro, for these actions, perhaps after reading a telegram in which the latter said that they ‘savour of coercion’ and had ‘stiffened perceptibly’ the ‘antagonism’ of his naval delegation. Wakatsuki replied, ‘some members of his delegation had been indignant at what they considered an exertion of pressure. He himself had thought it an indifferent plan but he was more concerned with a general settlement than with such a question of procedure’.27 His countrymen proved less understanding. CONCLUSION Japan mattered more to the foreign policy of MacDonald than to that of any other British Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister of the interwar years, because of its centrality to his concerns, arms limitation and international conciliation. Unlike them, he stopped military programmes that might alarm Japan, yet were essential to security against it. In 1924, MacDonald was right to believe Britain could hold its hand against Japan. In 1929–31, he delayed the Singapore Naval Base at a crucial moment and weakened Britain against Japan. The great loser at the London Naval Conference was Britain, which sacrificed more warships than its partners and gained little new construction, so crippling its shipbuilding industry. During the 1920s, the Royal Navy maintained a two power standard against Japan and any European navy. The London Naval Treaty gutted that position, by scrapping five battleships — obsolete, but equalling the battle line of the Italian navy in 1940 — and damaging Britain’s position in cruisers. The Treaty weakened British warship building capacity and delayed the moment when it could begin naval rearmament. These actions castrated Britain against Japanese expansion between 1931 and 1939, and opened the three-power problem. Concerns about a Japanese danger constrained British actions toward Italy and Germany, and vice versa, which these powers exploited. Above all, MacDonald was wrong on two issues: his grasp of ‘the psychology of the people’, and of the causes of war. He hoped that the London Conference would boost the power of liberal internationalist rules in the world. Instead, it drove Japan to become a revisionist power, attack liberal internationalism, and break the armed liberalism that underlay international stability. During 1930–31, the role of code-breaking at the Washington Conference and of Anglo-American pressure on Tokyo during the London Conference, became public knowledge. This publicity delegitimized these agreements, psychologically and politically, and the Japanese liberals who made them. The London Naval Treaty lit the fuse

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for a political explosion which blew Japan down the road to the Pacific War.28 The effect of MacDonald’s policies toward Japan invalidated his theory of international relations: weakening British power and drove Japan into the paths not of righteousness, but of revisionism. An arms race might have avoided a race war. NOTES 1

2

3 4

5

6

7 8 9 10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21

David Carlton, MacDonald versus Henderson, The Foreign Policy of the Second Labour Government, (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 1970) David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, (Jonathan Cape, 1977), Austen Morgan, James Ramsay Macdonald, (Manchester University Press, 1987) are decent biographies of Macdonald. Lucian M. Ashford, International Relations and the Labour Party, Intellectuals and Policy-Making from 1918 to 1945, (Tauris, 2007), John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy, A History, (Routledge, 2007) and Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World, Volume One: The evolution of Labour’s foreign policy, 1900–1951, (Manchester University Press, 2004), outline the foreign policy of the Labour Party. House of Commons Debates, Volume 210, 24 November 1927, columns 2096–7. John Ferris, ‘Worthy of Some Better Enemy?’: The British Estimate of the Imperial Japanese Army, 1919–41, and the Fall of Singapore’, The Canadian Journal of History, XXVIII (August 1993), pp.223–56. Useful accounts of the positions of Labour and MacDonald on these issues are P.S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914–1964, (Cambridge University Press, 1975) and Nicholas Owen, The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885– 1947, (Oxford University Press, 2007). M.S. Venkataramani, ‘Ramsay MacDonald and Britain’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations, 1919–1931: A Study Based on a Study of MacDonald’s Letters to an American Friend’, Political Studies, June 1960, 8/3, pp. 231–249. MacDonald to Elliot, 16.3.24, FO 800/219. House of Commons Debates, 23.3.25, Volume 182, Column 85. Ibid, column 75–90. Though MacDonald did not cite the work to which he referred, almost certainly it was Karl Pearson, National Life from the Standpoint of Science, (Adam and Charles Black, London, 1901), p 19–20, quoted above. 140thmeeting of the CID, 10.6.21, CAB 2/3. For MacDonald’s policy in 1924, cf. John Robert Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–1926, (MacMillan, London, 1989), pp. 122–58, and Carolyn J. Kitching, ‘Prime minister and foreign secretary: The Dual Role of James Ramsay MacDonald in 1924’, Review of International Studies, July 2011, 37/3, pp 103–22. Ferris,ibid.; Christopher Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars (Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2000), pp. 59–99. First, Second, Third and Fourth meetings of Replacement of Fleet Units Other than Capital Ships Committee, 27.2.24, 3.3.24. 5.3.24 and 11.4.24, CAB 27/236. Fourth meeting of Replacement of Fleet Units Other than Capital Ships Committee, 11.4.24, CAB 27/236; Chelmsford to MacDonald, 16.5.24, ADM 1/8666. See ‘SIR CHARLES ELIOT, Ambassador to Japan, 1919–25’ by Dennis Smith, in British Envoys in Japan 1859–1972, ed. Hugh Cortazzi et al, Global Oriental, 2004. MacDonald to Elliot, 16.3.24, FO 800/219; Eliot to MacDonald, 3.5.24, minute by Wellesley, 24.6.24, F 1968, FO 371/10319. Carlton, Henderson versus MacDonald, pp. 174–84. John Ferris, “’It is our business in the Navy to command the seas’: The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919–1929”, in Keith Neilson and Kennedy, Greg, Far Flung Lines, Maritime Essays in Honour of Donald Schurman, (Frank Cass, 1996), pp 124–71. The essays in Christopher Bell and John Maurer, At The Cross Roads Between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2013) offer the best (and a good) account of that matter. See ‘SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE, Ambassador to Japan, 1937–41’ by Antony Best in British Envoys in Japan 1859–1972, ed. Hugh Cortazzi et al, Global Oriental, 2004. Minute by Craigie, 22.11.29, FO 371/13526, A 126.

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23

24 25

26 27 28

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John Ferris, ‘Information Superiority: British Intelligence at London’, in Bell and Maurer, London Naval Conference, pp. 181–200. Minute by Thompson, 25.4.30, and Tokyo embassy to Foreign Office, despatch No 145, 25.3.30, A 2796, FO 371/14263; Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Second Series, Volume 1, (London, HMSO, 19XX), pp. 249–66. NC 183, 11.3.30, HW 12/126 (this is a British decrypt of a Japanese naval telegram). See ‘SIR JOHN TILLEY, Ambassador to Japan. 1926–31’ by Harumi Goto-Shibata in British Envoys in Japan 1859–1972, ed. Hugh Cortazzi et al, Global Oriental, 2004. Ferris, ‘Information Superiority’ and ‘Gentlemen’s Agreements. Ibid. James William Morley (ed), Japan Erupts, The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1984).

15

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN 1863–1937

[Sir Joseph Austen Chamberlain KG] Foreign Secretary, 1924–29

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN 1869–1940

Prime Minister, 1937–40 Austen Chamberlain

ANTONY BEST

INTRODUCTION n his post-war memoirs, Gaiko- Kaisoroku, the Japanese diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru, who had, among his many other appointments, served as ambassador in London from 1938 to 1941, included a long passage on his impressions of the Chamberlain family.1 The fact that such a figure should have included detailed observations about Austen and Neville Chamberlain stands as a perhaps unexpected testament to the important place that these men played in British public life, and particularly in the formation of foreign policy. Here is evidence that their influence was not just felt in Europe but in Asia as well. As Shigemitsu notes in his memoirs, the Chamberlains at one time or another had an important say in the construction of British foreign policy towards East Asia. Austen Chamberlain’s moment of prominence came between 1924 and 1929 when, as foreign secretary in the second Baldwin government, he had to deal with the profound ramifications for British interests of the rise of Chinese nationalism, which naturally also had important implications for Britain’s relations with Japan. For his part, Neville Chamberlain became a key player in British policy towards the region from 1933 until his death in 1940, and is typically seen as the leading figure within the National Government who sought a rapprochement with Tokyo. Thus in the early-twentieth century transition from alliance to enmity the Chamberlains played a vital role. Studying the Chamberlains and their role in British policy towards Japan does not, however, just reveal the extent of their influence, for it also provides an interesting perspective on their political reputations precisely because Japanese interpretations of their policy often contrast with how they are viewed in Britain.

I

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN (1863–1937) The originality of Japanese thinking about Austen Chamberlain is particularly evident in Shigemitsu’s writings. In both the memoirs he published during his lifetime and in other essays he makes the controversial and perhaps surprising claim that in Austen’s period as foreign secretary the latter oversaw a very significant shift in British policy away from Japan, thus paving the way for the eventual 153

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confrontation in 1941.2 At first glance such a view seems perplexing, for when historians, such as Brian McKercher, have dealt with this subject, they have usually characterized Austen’s policy towards Japan between 1924 and 1929 as cautious and correct.3 Shigemitsu’s charge, however, is not based on how Austen directly treated Japan, but rather on his belief that the Foreign Office’s Christmas memorandum of December 1926, in which it offered to take a more liberal approach to treaty revision with China, represented not just a change in British policy towards the Chinese problem but a fundamental reappraisal of Britain’s attitude towards the region as a whole. As Shigemitsu put it, the choice facing Britain in the mid-1920s was that it could either: . . . manage the China problem in co-operation with Japan as it had done in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance period or by establishing a new China policy it could defend itself from the new power of Kuomintang China and in East Asia change horses from Japan to China . . .4

The decision to adopt the Christmas memorandum was therefore, as far as Shigemitsu was concerned, a conscious decision to favour China over Japan. Indeed, as the Japanese foreign minister, Shidehara Kijuro-, was at this point pursuing his own conciliatory line towards China, Shigemitsu argues that Austen’s policy brought Britain into direct competition with Japan. He does not, however, see Austen as an overtly anti-Japanese figure, but rather stresses that this transformation in British thinking represented ‘the trend of the times.’5 In making this controversial argument, Shigemitsu conveniently removes much of the complexity out of the period. In reality when Austen came into office he consistently attempted to pursue a policy of friendship and co-operation with Japan. For example, one of his first initiatives on taking office was to ensure that when the Conservative government reintroduced its plans for a naval base at Singapore, the statement to the House of Commons by the first lord of the admiralty, Sir William Bridgeman, stressed clearly that the facility was not intended in any way to be aimed at Japan.6 Then when Chinese nationalism first began directly to target British interests in the May Thirtieth movement Chamberlain sought on a number of occasions to work with Japan to ease tensions. Thus just before the tariff conference began in Peking in September 1925 Sir Ronald Macleay, the incoming British minister to China, was told that while passing through Tokyo to his new post he should stress to Shidehara that Britain and Japan should work together ‘in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation that befits former allies and close friends.’7 Then in January 1927, in other words in the month following the publication of the Christmas memorandum and with Kuomintang opinion still clearly unappeased, Chamberlain asked Shidehara if Japan could contribute to a joint task force to defend the International Settlement at Shanghai. The problem, however, was that Shidehara remained largely indifferent to these overtures with the result that over time Austen became steadily less convinced that co-operation was possible. In particular, Austen reacted adversely to Shidehara’s refusal to assist in the defence of Shanghai or to take joint action over the Nanking incident of March 1927. This led him in April to agree with King George V that Britain should not go ahead with a plan to send a Garter mission to Japan to honour the new Sho-wa Emperor. As Austen noted to Sir John Tilley, the British ambassador in Tokyo, ‘I share His Majesty’s view that the general attitude of Japan towards us and her attitude throughout the troubles in China in particular has been unhelpful and does not merit special recognition.’8 Thus if

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Shigemitsu claims to have detected a British shift away from Japan, it only came after provocation. Given this background it is not surprising that in the spring of 1927 Austen reacted positively to the news that the Minseito- government of which Shidehara was a member in April 1927 had resigned and made comments about how he now hoped for greater cooperation from the Seiyu-kai government of Tanaka Giichi.9 The experience of the previous few years had, however, left him doubtful if this was a realizable goal. In February 1928 he presciently observed to his Cabinet colleague, Leopold Amery: Japan’s policy in China is a strictly selfish one. She will cooperate with us just in so far as our interests coincide with hers or we are prepared to sacrifice our interests to her. But our interests do not always coincide and we cannot always make the sacrifice. Our interest would best be served by a strong, stable, united China. Japan does not wish to see China either united or strong.10

This was an interesting observation, for it suggests that perhaps Shigemitsu was not so far from the truth as one might imagine in his belief that Austen had overseen a shift in policy because one can conclude from the comment above that Chamberlain’s experience over the past three years had led him to the judgement that Britain could no longer afford to tie itself to Japan in East Asia. This did not mean, as indeed Shigemitsu acknowledges, that Austen was an anti-Japanese figure; it was rather that as Foreign Secretary he recognized that the two countries’ interests were simply no longer congruent. That Austen held no ill-will against Japan was also evident from the speeches he made at the start of the Manchurian crisis. By this stage, he had returned to the back-benches, but he obviously spoke with considerable prestige and influence during debates on foreign policy. At the time of the fighting in Shanghai in March 1932, Austen spoke with sympathy about Japan’s difficulties when faced with the disorganized state of affairs in China and the latter’s provocative behaviour.11 However, Japan’s uncompromising behaviour both towards China and the League of Nations steadily eroded his sympathy for its cause. In November 1932, shortly after the publication of the Lytton report, he spoke in the House of the need for the League to succeed in obtaining a settlement of the dispute, but at this point was still careful to note that he treasured ‘memory of our old alliance’ and he called on Japanese statesmen to take Lytton’s conclusions seriously in order ‘to make it easy . . . for their old friends [in Britain] to maintain their old admiration for that Island Empire’.12 By February 1933 his patience had finally run dry and he endorsed the government’s decision to vote at Geneva to adopt Lytton’s conclusions, noting in sorrow to the House that: Gradually as the situation has developed my sympathy with Japan and Japanese policy has diminished . . . I think Japan has been hurried, rashly and unwisely, into an adventure the end of which may be far distant and the expenditure of which in blood and treasure may be far greater than her people now foresee.13

These were prophetic words from a wise statesman. Indeed, the overall impression with which one comes away when studying Austen Chamberlain’s East Asian policy in the 1920s and his attitude towards the region in the 1930s is that he was a very astute political figure. If he did, as Shigemitsu contends, oversee a shift in policy that took Britain away from Japan, he did this for well-thought out reasons and with a keen understanding of British interests. He was not motivated by any kind of anti-Japanese animus and went

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Neville Chamberlain

out of his way to express his loyalty to the memory of the alliance. However, at the same time he did not let sentiment cloud his judgement. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN (1869–1940) While Austen was perhaps an unwitting or reluctant precursor of Anglo-Japanese competition, Japanese contemporaries and historians have been almost at one in viewing his brother Neville Chamberlain as a sympathetic figure who possessed a ‘shin-Nichi’ (pro-Japanese) attitude and who attempted to engage in the appeasement of Japan.14 This view contrasts with the view taken by historians in the West. For example, the works by Ann Trotter and Stephen Endicott provide a balanced account of the friction between the Treasury and the Foreign Office. Subsequent works have continued in much the same vein. While some writers, such as Peter Bell, have expressed a greater admiration for Chamberlain’s ideas than others, Western historians have not tended to see British policy as amounting to appeasement.15 It has, of course, long been clear that between 1933 and 1937 Neville, even though he was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, played an important role in the formulation of British policy towards Japan. He took on this responsibility largely because he was convinced that a rapprochement with Japan was necessary in order to avoid Britain’s dissipating its financial resources by having to build up its defences both in Europe and Asia. According to Trotter the result was that Britain evolved a ‘dual diplomacy’ towards East Asia in the mid-1930s, with the Treasury pushing for a pro-Japanese policy while the Foreign Office tried to maintain a balance between Japan and China.16 The roots of the Japanese perception of Neville as appeaser lie partly in the observations made by contemporary Japanese diplomats and statesmen in the 1930s. From about 1934 onwards it became clear to the Japanese embassy in London that Neville Chamberlain and Sir Warren Fisher, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, favoured some kind of reconciliation. Over the next few years, and particularly during the period when Yoshida Shigeru was ambassador between 1936 and 1938, Chamberlain reinforced this impression by indicating his desire for rapprochement both to Japanese diplomats and visiting politicians. In one private lunch with Yoshida in October 1936 he went as far as to promise to exert

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his influence in favour of a general understanding between the two countries, thus setting the scene for the Eden-Yoshida talks.17 Neville’s public sympathy for better relations led to great hopes being placed in him by the Anglophile lobby in Japan. Yoshida, for one, sent back a number of letters to senior figures in Tokyo, most notably to his father-in-law, the lord privy seal, Makino Nobuaki, in which he singled out Neville as the key figure on the British side.18 Moreover, Baron Harada, the secretary to Prince Saionji, made a telling reference to Chamberlain when he noted in his diary on 11 February 1936 that Neville was considered to be the head of a pro-Japanese group within the Conservative Party.19 The important position that Chamberlain held in Japanese eyes can best be understood by once again turning to Shigemitsu, who was ambassador for much of the time that Neville was Prime Minister. In Gaiko- Kais oroku, Shigemitsu produced a pen portrait of Neville that laid great stress on the fact that the latter was the leading representative of the ‘orthodox wing’ of the Conservative party; a group that also, in his eyes, contained such luminaries as Lord Halifax, Sir Samuel Hoare, and R.A. Butler, and which was supported in the media by Howell Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post. As far as Shigemitsu was concerned, ‘the politically distinguishing feature that they possessed was that they valued the past and tradition. Consequently they favoured Japan more than they did China in regard to the China problem.’20 In addition, this ‘Morning Post’ faction within the Conservative Party, as Shigemitsu termed it, stood opposed to the Soviet Union, to the League of Nations and to the infiltration of American influence into British life. He contrasted this group with a ‘Times’ faction in the Tory ranks that he saw as being influenced by progressive, pro-American and pro-Chinese sentiments. The leaders of this ‘radical’ faction, he contended, were the ‘idealists’, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Alfred Duff Cooper, with Eden being the most suspect due to his sympathy for diplomatic overtures towards the Soviet Union.21 Thus for Shigemitsu, Neville was important both for what he represented, a policy of co-operation with Japan, and for being a strong force that could contain the dangerous ideas espoused by the ‘Times’ faction and counter the pro-League views of the Foreign Office. Armed with beliefs of this sort Japanese observers in the 1930s felt that as long as Neville Chamberlain was in a powerful position there was always the possibility of a rapprochement being achieved. Indeed, there was a sense in Tokyo that the known anti-Soviet sentiments of the Conservative Party meant that Chamberlain and his supporters would welcome renewed relations as Japan stood as the most obvious obstacle to Russian expansion in Asia. The question that then arises is whether in fact this Japanese perspective enriches our understanding of Neville Chamberlain’s role. The answer is mixed. The first point to make is that the use of the expression ‘shin-Nichi’ to describe Neville’s attitude towards Japan is far from accurate. There is no evidence that he was ever pro-Japanese in his attitude. The reasoning behind his attempts to push for a rapprochement was based purely on strategic considerations rather than sentiment. Indeed, when it suited him he indulged in activities that frustrated Japanese ambitions. Thus in December 1933, in order to influence the Indian-Japanese cotton textile talks in favour of British commercial interests, Neville agreed to provide a financial guarantee to the Indian government so that the latter could afford, if necessary, to purchase the indigenous raw cotton crop, thus calling Japan’s bluff over its threat to boycott Indian cotton.22 Moreover, his letters to his sisters indicate no special respect for Japan; indeed, at times of Sino-Japanese tension he often indicated profound irritation with the Japanese.23 It is interest-

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ing to note in this context that in May 1938, when Yoshida was speculating that Chamberlain might intervene to mediate an end to the China incident, Henry ‘Chips’ Channon, the parliamentary private secretary to R.A. Butler, recorded in his diary that, ‘Decidedly the P.M. does not like the Japs! And I always notice that he corrects Japanese questions, and makes them terser.’24 A second criticism is that too much emphasis has been put by Japanese commentators on the significance of Chamberlain’s efforts at diplomacy while he was chancellor of the exchequer. In reality one has to express doubts about the extent of his influence for much of the period between 1933 and 1937 for, while he may certainly have been very vocal about his opinions, his ability to influence other key players was limited. For example, in the autumn of 1934 his efforts to push for a non-aggression pact were quickly stamped upon by the Foreign Office and his wooing of the foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, proved largely abortive. Indeed, in an October 1934 letter to the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, Simon proudly explained that he had parried Chamberlain’s idea of a pact by noting the attendant difficulties that would be caused with the United States and the Soviet Union.25 Chamberlain’s relative lack of authority is also hinted at in an entry in MacDonald’s diary from February 1935, in which the Prime Minister noted his frustration at the fact that the Treasury’s memoranda on East Asia were ‘causing much waste of time owing to fundamental errors which experts & men of experience have to clear away.’26 Arguably it was only with the elevation of Hoare to the position of foreign secretary in June 1935 that Chamberlain was truly able to hold sway, for only then was the Foreign Office explicitly told to co-operate with, rather than carp at, the Treasury.27 This was a short-lived truce that did not survive Hoare’s ousting in December of that year, but it does explain Chamberlain’s success in pushing forward with the hotly disputed Leith-Ross mission. Another reservation that ought to be aired is that if one looks closely at his proposals during this period Chamberlain’s attempts at appease-ment towards Japan hardly went very far. More often than not his ideas seemed to involve ministries other than his own making the necessary concessions. Most notably Neville sought to force the Foreign Office to accept a non-aggression pact with the hope that this would then pave the way for a mutually acceptable naval agreement between Britain and Japan. However, when it came to issues of British trade and finance the chancellor proved largely unwilling to agree to con-cessions to the Japanese.28 Even in the case of the Leith-Ross mission which was designed to achieve an economic and political settlement in East Asia, Chamberlain kept British interests firmly in view, hoping that a revived Chinese economy would prove a fruitful market for British business.29 Moreover, it is interesting to note in this instance his steadfast belief that Japan was only bluffing in its aspirations for hegemony in East Asia and that it would back down and be willing to follow Britain if only the latter took a strong lead. In a letter to one of his sisters on 6 April 1935 he thus noted with implicit approval the view taken by British businessmen with Chinese interests that: . . . while Japan will certainly take our place as China’s mentor if she thinks we don’t care, we have only to assert ourselves a little and she will be quite ready to work alongside of us as there is room for both.30

In so arguing he was clearly being considerably less astute than his brother Austen, who, as we have seen, had already concluded in 1928 that British and Japanese interests in China were no longer compatible.

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Doubts can then be expressed about the extent to which Chamberlain was committed to a policy of appeasement, about the depth of his pro-Japanese feelings, and most importantly about his ability to get Whitehall to do his bidding. Even as prime minister, when theoretically many of the obstacles to his desire for rapprochement should have been reduced, there is little evidence that he thought that a diplomatic revolution in relations with Japan was practically possible. At a few Cabinet and Committee of Imperial Defence meetings between 1937 and 1939 he mentioned in passing that he had not given up on the appeasement of Japan.31 However, frustrated by Japanese outrages in China and by more pressing concerns in Europe, he never followed up on these vague declarations. The view that Neville propelled Britain to adopt a policy of appeasement towards Japan is thus difficult to substantiate, but it is nonetheless interesting that his historical reputation is such that Japanese historians feel bound to couch discussion of his policy in this way. Perhaps of greater analytical value to historians is Shigemitsu’s argument that Neville represented one particular factional approach towards foreign policy. Shigemitsu presents a somewhat crude outline of the battle for influence within the Conservative Party and Whitehall, but there is a more than a kernel of truth in what he says. For example, even if one considers simply the issue of how Conservatives viewed the alliance in retrospect, it is clear that very deep divisions existed which reflected, in turn, profound differences about how to approach foreign policy. Some Conservatives, such as Austen, talked fondly of the alliance, but recognized that by 1921 it had become an anachronism and that Britain had no choice but to replace it with the Four Power Pact.32 This practical brand of conservatism thus cautiously accepted the arrival of internationalism and the need for Anglo-American accord. Others, however, including Neville, felt that the termination of the alliance had been unnecessary and foolish and, in contrast to what they saw as the ill-conceived League of Nations, lauded it as an exemplar of the certainties of old diplomacy.33 In addition, one might take heed of the comments made by those on the right of the Conservative Party about their frustration with the coalition and their desire to see a real Tory administration. For example, it is notable that Hoare told Yoshida on the latter’s arrival in Britain in the summer of 1936 that the restoration of Anglo-Japanese relations would have to wait until the next Conservative Government was formed, but that it would not be possible for the moment.34 Shigemitsu’s analysis is therefore significant in reminding us that Neville followed a particular brand of conservatism and that we need to take on board the ideological underpinnings of his foreign policy if we are to understand his intentions. CONCLUSION Japanese perceptions of both Austen and Neville Chamberlain thus do offer us interesting if controversial interpretations of their careers, which focus attention on aspects that might otherwise be overlooked. In Austen’s case, Shigemitsu’s writings highlight what a dramatic change of course the former oversaw during his time at the Foreign Office, thus stressing the quiet practical radicalism of this conservative man. In regard to Neville, Japanese commentators provide us with more evidence of the way in which, for good or ill, his name will forever be associated with appeasement and not just in terms of European policy. What we also have though is something of greater use, namely a stress on his place within the

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Conservative Party and the National Government, and the importance of seeing him in the context of his political allies and comprehending that there were other trends in British thinking. In coming to terms with his legacy these are important considerations, for they help to reduce the myth to human proportions. NOTES 1

2

3

4 5 6

7 8

9

10

11 12 13

14

15

Mamoru Shigemitsu, Gaiko- Kais oroku [Diplomatic Memoirs] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1978) pp.201–204. Yoichi Watanabe & Takeshi Ito- (eds), Shigemitsu Mamoru shüki [Memoirs] vol.1, (Tokyo: Chuo- Ko- ronsha, 1993) pp.97–8, and Shigemitsu, Gaiko- Kais oroku pp.201–3. Brian McKercher, ‘A Sane and Sensible Diplomacy: Austen Chamberlain, Japan and the Naval Balance of Power in the Pacific Ocean, 1924–29’, Canadian Journal of History, vol. XXI, 1986, pp.187–213, Harumi Goto- Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925–31 (Basingstoke: St. Antony’s/ Macmillan, 1995), and Ian Nish, ‘Echoes of Alliance, 1920–30’ in Ian Nish & Yoichi Kibata (eds.), History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: The Political and Diplomatic Dimension, Vol.1, 1600–1930 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) pp.255–78. Watanabe & Ito (eds), Shigemitsu Mamoru shuki p.98. Shigemitsu, Gaiko- Kais oroku, p.202. The National Archives, Kew (TNA) FO371/10958 F129/9/61 Selby (FO) to Hardinge (BP) 10 January 1925 and Parliamentary Debates, third series, HC, vol.181, c.2525 (19 March 1925). TNA FO371/10939 F4633/190/10 Chamberlain to Eliot 3 October 1925 tel.161. Austen Chamberlain papers, TNA, FO800/260 Chamberlain to Tilley 14 April 1927. See also Antony Best, ‘“Our Respective Empires Should Stand Together”: The Royal Dimension in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 2005, vol.16, no.2, pp.266–7. See Austen Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain 15 May 1927, in Robert Self, Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters: The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916–1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.314, and Austen Chamberlain to Winston Churchill 9 May 1928 in Martin Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill, vol.V, Companion, part 1 (London: Heinemann, 1979) p.1282. Austen Chamberlain papers, Special Collections, Birmingham University (SCBU), AC55/10 Austen Chamberlain to Amery 27 February 1928. I am grateful to the Special Collections division of Birmingham University for permission to quote from the papers of Austen and Neville Chamberlain. Parliamentary Debates, third series, HC, vol.263, c.914–5 (22 March 1932). Parliamentary Debates, third series, HC, vol.270, c.557 (10 November 1932). Ibid, vol.275, c.67–8 (27 February 1933). He wrote on similar lines to Prince Tokugawa, see Austen Chamberlain papers (SCBU), AC40/5/3 Austen Chamberlain to Tokugawa 1 March 1933. See, for example, Hosoya Chihiro, ‘1934-nen no nichi-ei fukashin kyo-tei mondai [The Problem of the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact in 1934], Kokusai Seiji [International Politics], (1977) pp.69–85, T. Inoue, ‘1934-nen no Nihon no fukashin kyo- tei ko- so to Ei-Bei notaio- ’ [Anglo-American Responses to Japan’s Envisioned Non-Aggres-sion Pact in 1934], Kindai Nihon Kenkyu [Journal of Modern Japanese Studies], 11 (1989) 93–119, Yoichi Kibata, ‘Risu-Rosu shisetsudan to Ei-Chu kankei’ [The Leith-Ross Mission and Anglo-Chinese Relations], in Y. Nozawa, (ed.), Chukogu no heisei kaikaku to kokusai kankei [The Chinese Currency Reform and International Relations], (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1981), Sumio Hatano, ‘Risu Rosu no kyokuto- ho- mon to Nihon: Chu- goku keisei kaikaku o megutte’ [The Leith-Ross Mission and China: Concerning Chinese Currency Reform] Kokusai Seiji [International Politics], (1977) pp.86–100, and Shigeru Murashima, ‘Yoshida Shigeru chu-Ei taishi to Myunhen kaidan’ [Ambassador to Great Britain Yoshida Shigeru and the Munich Conference], Ningen Yoshida Shigeru, [Yoshida Shigeru – The Man] (Tokyo, 1991) pp.326–45. See, for example, Ian Nish, ‘Japan in Britain’s View of the International System, 1919–37’ in Nish, (ed.), op.cit., pp.27–56, Gill Bennett, ‘British Policy in the Far East 1933–1936: Treasury and Foreign Office’, Mod-ern Asian Studies, 26 (1992) 545–68, Peter Bell, Chamberlain, Germany and Japan, 1933–4 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), Antony Best, ‘The Road to

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16

17

18

19

20 21 22

23

24

25

26

28 29 30

31

32

33

34

161

Anglo-Japanese Confrontation, 1931–41’ in Ian Nish & Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: The Political and Diplomatic Dimension, vol.2, 1931–2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) and Greg Kennedy, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East 1933–1939: Imperial Crossroads (London: Frank Cass, 2002). See Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933–1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) and also Stephen Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933–1937 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975). Neville Chamberlain papers, SCBU, NC/7/11/29/60 Neville Chamberlain to Yoshida 24 October 1936 and NC2/23a, diary entry 25 October 1936. Yoshida to Makino 10 April 1937, in Yoshida Shigeru Foundation (ed.), Yoshida Shigeru shokan (Tokyo, Chuo Koronsha, 1994) p.645. Diary entry for 11 February 1936, Saionji/Harada diary, (Washington, State Department, 1977) p.1414. Shigemitsu, Gaiko Kaisoroku, p.203. Ibid, pp.204–207, and Watanabe & Ito (eds), Shigemitsu Mamoru shuki, p.107–108. TNA CAB23/77 68(33) Cabinet meeting 6 December 1933, and Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain 17 December 1933, in Robert Self (ed.), The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters: vol.3: The Heir Apparent, 1928–33 (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2002) p.417. Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain 19 July 1936, Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain 29 August 1937, and Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain 9 January 1938, in Robert Self (ed.), The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters: vol.4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) pp.202, 267–8 and 296. Robert Rhodes James (ed.), ‘Chips’: The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon (Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967) p.156. Ramsay MacDonald papers, The National Archives, Kew (TNA), PRO30/69/680 part 2 Simon to MacDonald 3 October 1934. MacDonald papers, PRO30/69/1753/1, diary entry 18 February 1935. 27 TNA FO371/19243 F5081/6/10 Hoare minute 10 August 1935. See Best, ‘The Road to Anglo-Japanese Confrontation’, pp.35–6. Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise pp.82–101. Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain 6 April 1935, in Self (ed.), Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters: vol.4, p.127. He expressed similar views soon after in a meeting with the Dominion Prime Ministers, see TNA CAB/125 PM(35) 2nd meeting 7 May 1935. Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia (Routledge, London, 1995) p.45 and p.52. Austen Chamberlain papers, BUL, AC54/264 Austen Chamberlain to Howard (Washington) 25 April 1927. See Antony Best, ‘The “Ghost” of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance:An Examination into Historical Mythmaking’, Historical Journal, 2006, vol.49, no.3, pp.811–31. For Neville’s retrospective lauding of the alliance, see TNA CAB2/6 CID 261st meeting 9 November 1933. Yoshida to Makino 7 August 1936, in Yoshida Shigeru shokan p.643.

16

SIR JOHN SIMON 1873–1954

[1st Viscount Simon]

Foreign Secretary 1931–35

ANTONY BEST Sir John Simon

INTRODUCTION

O

f all of the Foreign Secretaries who have served in modern times, Sir John Simon is the only one whose political reputation has been strongly tarnished by his association with Japan. This is largely due to the unfortunate fact that his tenure at the Foreign Office coincided with one of the most difficult conundrums that ever dogged a British government in regard to East Asian politics – the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933. For left-wing contemporaries and post-war critics of appeasement, the failure of the British government to stand up to Japanese aggression in Manchuria in these years and Simon’s refusal to contemplate the use of sanctions against Japan marked a fateful initial step on the road that led to Munich. Furthermore, his central place in this indictment is under-scored by the fact that the American Secretary of State at the time of the crisis, Henry Stimson, later claimed to have wanted to take multilateral coercive action against Japan but that Simon had turned down all his requests for joint action. Simon, though, also has his defenders. They have emphasized that the strategic circumstances that existed in the early 1930s made it impossible to apply pressure on the Japanese. Accordingly, the Foreign Secretary was faced with the well-nigh impossible task of navigating the crisis without alienating Japan or undermining the League of Nations and that, given these circumstances, Simon succeeded in defending British interests to the best of his abilities.1

CAREER AND PERSONALITY Sir John Simon was one of the most senior Liberal figures of his generation. A lawyer by training, he served in the Asquith government as first solicitor-general, then attorney-general and finally home secretary before resigning in 1916 over the introduction of compulsory conscription. Between 1927 and 1931 he chaired the Simon Commission on Indian constitutional reform, which paved the way for the India Act of 1935. His prominence might have ended there, but for the economic and political storm that hit Britain in the summer of 1931 and 162

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led to the collapse of the second Labour government under Ramsay MacDonald. In this turbulent period Simon emerged as the head of a group of Liberals who were prepared to accept a move towards protectionism in order to uphold the British economy. As such, Simon was prepared to support the National Government that MacDonald formed in August 1931 and in early November, following the previous month’s general election, the prime minister offered him the post of foreign secretary. For MacDonald, Simon’s presence in the Cabinet was important as it helped to negate the impression that the National Government was really Conservative in all but name. Whether Simon was personally suited to the job of Foreign Secretary is, however, a matter of debate. Many contemporaries and later critics argued that his lawyer’s inclination to see every side of every question and his tendency only to be able to argue to a brief were unfortunate weaknesses in a job that required the ability to lead. In addition, much has been made of his cold manners and austere image, which did little to win him the support of his colleagues or his civil servants. To quote but one example, the always astute wife of one of his closest colleagues noted of him: ‘His ability is fully recognized, but his lack of decision, his rather sickly sweetness of manner gave an impression of insincerity which is extremely unfortunate.’2 These faults have been singled out as indicating that he was simply not up to his job. However, his biographer, David Dutton, makes an important point when he asks if anybody could really have dealt with the challenges posed to British interests in the early 1930s when the country was financially weak and ill-placed to defend itself due to the disarmament measures passed up until 1930.3 In addition, it is important to note that he was serving under a prime minister who had once held the same post and who still took an active interest in foreign affairs and such situations are never easy.

THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT There is nothing in Simon’s life or career that suggests that he had any great interest in or knowledge of East Asian affairs prior to his tenure at the Foreign Office. What is clear, however, is that on coming to power he had to learn fast as he was immediately thrust into what he called ‘this Manchurian briar-patch’.4 By early November, when he took office, the Mukden incident of 18 September, in which Japan’s Kwantung Army had sabotaged the South Manchurian Railway and then used this as an excuse to seize the cities of south Manchuria, had expanded into a Japanese military campaign that threatened to reach into the west and north of the region. Moreover, the Chinese decision in late September to appeal to the League of Nations for help had made this much more than a bilateral dispute; it had now become a test case for the principles of collective security.5 Simon’s predecessor, Lord Reading, had in his two months at the Foreign Office been keen to work through the League to solve the dispute. Simon was, however, inclined towards a more cautious policy. Conscious that American non-membership restricted the League’s ability to project power into the Pacific, he tried to reduce the possibility that the organization might take precipitant action, which it could not back up with real force. Thus in his first report to the Cabinet on 11 November he noted the importance of being realistic about what Geneva could achieve and the necessity of not allowing the Chinese to invoke Article XVI of the League Covenant and thus start a debate about sanctions.6 Underlining this atti-

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tude was also his strong belief that Britain must not allow the crisis to compromise its relations with Japan. His policy therefore was to try to use the League only as a means to achieve reconciliation between the two protagonists, thus avoiding any recourse to coercion and, in turn, any long-term damage to Anglo-Japanese relations. It might be argued that this brought a useful measure of realism into British thinking, in contrast to those enthusiasts for the League who called for decisive action without considering how practically this might be achieved against a strong naval power such as Japan. This would be, however, to ignore the fact that there was a dangerous strain of naivety in Simon’s belief that conciliation was possible and that Britain could avoid having to take sides. This tendency is illustrated in a letter that he sent to the journalist and internationalist Evelyn Wrench at this time in which he noted that ‘we should show that we are friends of all nations’.7 A further unfortunate and ultimately unrealistic trait was his desire to ensure that if the League did engage in any criticism of Japan that Britain should not take the lead in these proceedings, which was an abnegation of responsibility and a recipe for drift.8 Working on the lines set out above, Simon worked hard in late November and early December to organize a League Commission of Inquiry that would travel to East Asia to report on the situation on the origins of the crisis and make recommendations for its solution. At the same time, believing that it was still necessary for the League to reaffirm that no state had the right to take unilateral military action, he privately pushed the president of the League Council to make a statement upholding this principle, but simultaneously made it clear to his cabinet colleagues that he had no intention of Britain unilaterally asserting this opinion lest Japan take offence.9 With the League Commission established under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton in December 1931, Simon hoped that tempers would subside and circumstances improve, leading to the possibility of an eventual solution. This outcome was disturbed by two factors. First, in early January 1932 Stimson, having learnt that President Hoover was irrevocably opposed to economic sanctions against Japan, decided to increase the international pressure on Japan by instead invoking the diplomatic policy that the United States had adopted at the time of the twenty-one demands in 1915, namely to announce that it would not recognize the transfer of sovereign territory through the use of force – the non-recognition doctrine. In order to make this initiative as effective as possible, Stimson was keen for Britain to take parallel action, hoping that this would lead to its wider adoption among the international community.10 For Simon, this was an inconvenient overture, as it was felt that any such action risked alienating Japan without any certainty that it would have a deterrent effect. Moreover, it would mean Britain taking action independent of the League. The Foreign Office therefore decided not to take any action on this proposal aside from issuing its own statement that it believed that Japan would adhere to its past promises to uphold the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 which committed its signatories to respect the ‘open door’ in China.11 Meanwhile, an editorial in The Times, criticized Stimson’s grandstanding, which was extremely unfortunate considering that many people outside Britain saw this newspaper as the mouthpiece of the British government.12 The second blow to Simon’s policy came in late January when, following the steady escalation of tensions between Japanese and Chinese forces in Shang-

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hai, the former launched an offensive against the suburb of Chapei, which even involved the use of bombers against built-up areas. For Britain, this was a much more profound threat to its own interests than the fighting in Manchuria, for it had a substantial commercial presence in Shanghai. Its priority therefore was to try to bring the hostilities to an end as quickly as possible in order to forestall any long-term threat to its position. Clearly it was easier to achieve this in cooperation with the League and the other Great Powers, which once again raised the possibility of having to work with the United States. At the same time, however, Simon still wished to avoid jeopardizing Anglo-Japanese relations and was therefore opposed to any overt coercion. The situation therefore finally forced Simon to recognize that it was not easy to be a ‘friends to all nations’ and that, as he observed to MacDonald on 29 January, ‘we are in grave danger of falling between two stools – offending Japan without completely satisfying America.’13 To identify the problem, though, was one thing; to find a practical way through the jungle was another. At first Simon found it possible to cooperate with the Americans in dealing with the Shanghai fighting. However, the evasive negotiating stance of the Japanese government and its apparent willingness to escalate the conflict soon led Stimson to call for firmer action. On 9 February the secretary of state informed the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, that the time had come for ‘a very strong indictment’ to be sent to Tokyo and that this could be based on the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, which committed its signatories to respect Chinese sovereignty and the ‘open door’.14 Despite strong opposition within the Foreign Office to any such move, over the next few days Simon held a number of transatlantic phone calls with his American opposite number to try to come to some mutually agreeable initiative. However, once again the problem was that Simon was averse to acting separately from the League. Moreover, the Foreign Office believed that any attempt to link the fighting in Shanghai with events in Manchuria would be entirely counter-productive. The result, after a series of delays and requests to tone down his demands, was that Stimson finally decided that the British government would not be forthcoming and thus opted to take independent action by writing his own criticism of Japan in his famous open letter to Senator Borah of 23 February.15 Simon’s apparent failure to cooperate with Stimson over the Nine-Power treaty demarche is one of the chief cases cited by the prosecution in their attacks on his stewardship of the Foreign Office. Certainly he does not come out well from this episode, for his initial willingness to consider Stimson’s overture only helped to raise false expectations. However, it is also important to observe, as Christopher Thorne has noted, that the final decision to go ahead with a League statement rather than associating Britain with Stimson’s initiative lay with a meeting of the Cabinet’s China sub-committee.16 In the end, therefore, the problem was not that so much that Simon misled Stimson, but that the former was typically trying to keep all his options open until given a definite steer by his senior colleagues within the cabinet. This, in turn, goes to the heart of the problem of Simon’s tenure at the Foreign Office, his inability to give a lead and to state clearly his preference for a particular policy. This, it should be noted, was not just a problem in connection with the Cabinet but also affected his civil servants at the Foreign Office; one of whom noted in March 1932 that Simon’s behaviour, ‘practically brings the whole machinery to a standstill, and his staff are getting practically nearly desperate.’17

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The unfortunate irony of the situation in the winter of 1932 is that, in the wake of the Anglo-American disagreement, Britain did finally take more decisive action; in early March Simon went to Geneva and took a leading role in getting the League Assembly to affirm its own version of the non-recognition doctrine. This was not, though, a tougher line that was entirely of Simon’s making, for the prime minister was now insisting on a more assertive policy that would bring Britain and the League closer into line with the United States.18 However, even at this point Simon was careful to ensure that the League’s non-recognition pronouncement was not formally aimed against Japan, although the inference was clear. The problem, though, was that this announcement had come too late in the day and clearly could not have the impact that a simultaneous parallel statement to that of the United States might have had. In the spring of 1932, with Japan and China having settled the Shanghai incident, less attention was paid to events in East Asia, but this was merely a lull before the next storm, for in the region the Lytton Commission was working busily to diagnose the origins of the crisis and find a cure. The Lytton report was published on 2 October. It concluded that the crisis had come about in part because of Chinese provocation, but that Japan had also over-reacted. It asserted that the new state, Manchukuo, which had been founded in March 1932, had no basis in self-determination and called for renewed Sino-Japanese talks under League auspices to decide the future of the region.19 While the report strove to be fair and impartial, it was clear that its terms would be unacceptable to Japan, which had formally recognized Manchukuo even before Lytton had presented his conclusions. For Simon, this was a cause for great concern, for if the League adopted the report in the face of Japanese protests, this could lead Britain into uncharted and potentially dangerous territory. The problem, though, as ever, was how to placate both Japan and the League. Unfortunately, while Simon once again was very good at describing the problems that might emerge, he had few practical ideas about how to handle the situation except to say that Britain should try to maintain a low profile at the League and that ‘we must not involve ourselves in trouble with Japan’.20 Nor did it help that, even though he had been at his post for over a year, he still felt the need to please his colleagues; he observed to his Liberal colleague Sir Walter Runciman at this time that ‘Ramsay [MacDonald] has been very good to me, & feels happily in his own mind about me, I believe’, which is a statement that hardly strikes one as the epitome of self-confidence. Adhering to his essentially passive stance Simon once again travelled to Geneva in December 1932, but soon found that the torrent of anti-Japanese sentiments from the smaller League members required him to make a stand. He therefore on 7 December made a speech in which he admonished those who were rushing to judgement to read the Lytton report carefully and to recognize that China too had been at fault. To those at Geneva who were looking to Britain for leadership this speech was a grave disappointment and did great damage to what remained of Simon’s reputation, for, instead of coming over as impartial, he appeared for many observers to be pro-Japanese.21 Nor did it help that his words were followed by an injudicious speech by the head of the Canadian delegation, C.H. Cahan, which cast doubt on whether China could even be considered to be a modern state.22 Simon, it should be said, had read and approved this speech before it was delivered.23

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The all too predictable result of this perceived tilt towards Japan was that it led to an outburst of protest from the Chinese. Thus one more problem was now added to Simon’s in-tray, the possibility that British inaction might provoke a Chinese boycott of its goods. Boxed in by his desperate attempts to please everyone and to be all things to all people, by the end of the month Simon was reduced to explaining rather forlornly to the Conservative leader and lord president of the council, Stanley Baldwin, that, ‘My own hope would be that by handling the Japs nicely they could be kept in the League without an explosion.’24 On the same day, he also drafted a note for his Foreign Office staff, which observed that, ‘We should keep out of the limelight, take no unnecessary responsibility, & let the whole thing drag on till the end of January.’25 But this was an attitude, not a policy. If Simon’s hope was that buying time would prove useful, he was sorely mistaken, for January 1933 saw instead a continued Japanese unwillingness to make any concessions, and, moreover, the outbreak of renewed fighting with Japan’s advance into Jehol. These events clearly demonstrated the futility of Simon’s policy. Moreover, the fact that Japan could not accept even so patently fair an assessment of the situation as the Lytton report meant that opinion at home and abroad was shifting towards upholding the League’s principles. The moment of truth was therefore fast approaching when Simon and the government would be forced to take the decision they had struggled so long to avoid – at the last, should they back the League or their former ally Japan. Knowing the significance that the public attached to the Covenant and jealous to maintain Britain’s international prestige, this was, in reality, no choice at all; it had to be the League. Thus when the question of whether to adopt the recommendations of the Lytton Report came before the League Assembly on 24 February 1933, Britain voted for the motion. The British government’s desire to be even-handed had not, however, disappeared and in one of the most farcical foreign policy episodes of the 1930s Simon announced three days later that Britain would introduce an arms embargo of both Japan and China and asked other members of the League to consider adopting this policy. The origins of this idea lay with Simon’s link to Sir Gilbert Murray, one of the leading lights in the League of Nations Union. Originally the idea, which was not popular in Foreign Office circles, was that it should be aimed simply at Japan, but typically after Simon consulted with his Cabinet colleagues it transformed itself into its new and even less defensible guise.26 This led to despair within the Foreign Office, with one diplomat complaining in his diary, ‘Hear Simon has announced embargo on arms to both China and Japan. Quite insane as it can’t do anybody any good – ourselves least of all – and contrary to our advice.’27 Not surprisingly, no other state was willing to sign up to this dog’s breakfast of a policy and Britain within a month consigned it to an ignominious death.28 Meanwhile, Japan showed its contempt for the League by announcing its withdrawal from the organization. The Manchurian crisis thus came to an end in March 1933 with Britain having finally been forced to make a stand against Japan and committing itself not to recognize Manchukuo. This was clearly not the outcome that Simon had been seeking. In attempting to please everyone, he had, in fact, strained relations with all of the main players and brought into question Britain’s loyalty to the League. He could, however, claim some measure of success in having managed to prevent the crisis from turning into a much larger conflict, but the questions remained of at what cost had this been achieved and whether any lessons had

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been learnt from what in the end was still a humiliating reverse for the principles of collective security. Simon had indicated before the vote was taken at Geneva that he hoped that Japan would understand that any such action was, in the end, only designed to uphold the League and was not intrinsically anti-Japanese.29 However, by the end of 1932 a new threat to Britain’s policy of neutrality began to emerge, namely that the Chinese boycott of Japan and the latter’s recent depreciation of the yen had led to a sudden surge of Japanese exports to British possessions in Asia including India. Coming at a time when Britain’s economy was already in a desperate state, the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade argued that it was essential for this issue to be addressed, preferably by asking Japan to limit its exports.30 Simon, fearing that this trade dispute might tarnish his impartiality in Japan’s eyes, pushed for the issue to be put aside for two months or at least until the League vote had been taken.31 While this line was logical enough, it was, however, just postponing the inevitable with the result that by March 1933, when it was finally placed before the cabinet, the president of the Board of Trade, Sir Walter Runciman, was adamant that action be taken and in this he received strong backing from Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister and Sir Samuel Hoare, respectively the secretaries of state for the colonies and for India.32 Consequently, Simon’s efforts to patch together Anglo-Japanese relations received a further blow when in the spring and summer Britain removed its colonies in West Africa from the ambit of the commercial treaty of 1911 and India increased the tariff on Japanese cotton textile imports. Thus instead of the ending of the Manchurian crisis leading to an amelioration of tensions, Simon was now faced with a situation in which Anglo-Japanese relations were worsening by the day. His ability to rectify this situation was hampered not only by his perennial indecisiveness but also by his steadily declining reputation, which was by the autumn of 1933 so bad that some officials and politicians were referring to him as the worst ever Foreign Secretary and calling privately for his dismissal.33 Even the Prime Minister himself had affirmed to the visiting Stimson in July 1933 that, ‘Simon had never understood the Far East.’34 However, his most significant critic was Neville Chamberlain, the ever-ambitious and self-confident chancellor of the exchequer, who was exasperated by Simon’s policy of drift towards East Asia and thus felt obliged to make his first fateful forays into the murky waters of East Asian politics. Chamberlain’s interest was stimulated by his conviction that Britain could only afford limited rearmament, that it had to focus on the German menace, and that this meant that the potential threat from Japan had to be neutralized through some kind of rapprochement. The result was that from October 1933 Chamberlain began to press with ever greater force for a concerted effort to be made to offer an olive branch to Japan.35 Never the strongest of men, Simon for the rest of his period at the Foreign Office down to June 1935 gives the impression of a straw man being buffeted by the sharply contrasting views of Chamberlain and his pro-Japanese acolytes and the much more cautious advice put forward by his Foreign Office subordinates and not being able to decide on which side to come down. Thus, in Cabinet meetings, such as those in March 1934, Simon would wilt under Chamberlain’s fire and appear to preach the cause of rapprochement, but the memoranda that he would then circulate to his colleagues after returning to the safety of the Foreign Office would backtrack, noting all of the problems that such a radical

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turn of direction might generate.36 Naturally the result of this unedifying spectacle was that policy continued to drift, but, even more dangerously, Simon’s inability to win Cabinet backing for a policy of caution or to bring the Foreign Office to heal and dictate a clear policy of rapprochement meant that the chancellor and his backers began to be tempted to start their own amateur efforts at diplomacy. This was a serious problem because 1934 saw an important issue come to the fore, namely the future of the naval arms limitation process that had begun at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. In this field Japan and the United States were entirely at odds over the issue of quantitative limitation and both countries looked to Britain to support for their respective views. On the Japanese side this – that it might be possible to negotiate involved vague hints from the Gaimusho an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact, which, of course, came as manna from heaven to Chamberlain. As usual, Simon indicated initial interest in this idea, but then, under pressure from his advisers, rapidly backtracked and produced memoranda that exhaustedly outlined the obstacles to any such arrangement. Chamberlain’s pained response was to observe in a letter to his wife that Simon’s draft was ‘one of the most miserable documents I have ever seen’ and to lament about the Foreign Secretary himself that, ‘It is maddening to have to use instruments so blunt and soft.’37 Furthermore, while having given Chamberlain to understand that he was sympathetic to his ideas, Simon wrote to the pro-American MacDonald noting that, while the prime minister had been away on an extended break, he had authoritatively noted to his Cabinet colleagues all of the problems that a non-aggression pact might generate.38 With Simon continuing his impersonation of Janus, the pro-American lobby in British politics decided that it was necessary to take the defence of the link with Washington into its own hands and launch a public campaign to ward off the flirtation with Japan. Thus in November 1934 The Times, The Observer and The Economist published speeches and ran a series of special articles and editorials that stressed the significance of British ties with America and statesmen such as the South Africa Jan Smuts and the former prime minister David Lloyd George rallied to the cause. This intervention came at an important time, for it helped to reassure the Roosevelt administration, which had begun to express serious doubts about British policy and Simon’s position at the Foreign Office.39 By the time that Simon left the Foreign Office in June 1935 Anglo-Japanese relations were in a confused and uncertain state. The haemorrhaging of his authority had led to a dangerous situation where the Treasury felt emboldened to try its own hand at diplomacy and this would soon reach its apogee with the Leith-Ross mission.40 Moreover, relations with the United States were strained as he had come to be seen as a problem in his own right. Much of this was clearly the result of the flaws in Simon’s character, most notably his seeming refusal to give a lead or to defend his authority as foreign secretary. It should, however, be noted that he was also not well advised during these years. The senior Foreign Office experts on East Asia during these years such as Sir Victor Wellesley, Sir John Pratt and Charles Orde were themselves not dynamic figures with a clear vision of how British interests in the region needed to evolve and adapt but were instead cautious and even out-dated in their attitudes. Only Sir Alexander Cadogan, the minister in Peking, gave any real sense of what Britain should be striving to achieve.

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AT THE TREASURY After leaving the Foreign Office, Simon went on to become home secretary; he was, after all, still the leading National Liberal figure and thus had to hold one of the main offices of state. In this capacity he had little input on East Asian policy, but he once again become a prominent voice in foreign policy when in May 1937 Chamberlain as prime minister moved him to the Treasury. As Chancellor of the Exchequer Simon clearly had an important role to play in regard to the granting of foreign loans and this brought him back into contact with East Asian affairs. The occasion arose in the summer of 1938 when the Foreign Office argued that Britain should provide a currency loan to China or at the very least underwrite the efforts of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in this field. The Treasury, which was still suffused with pro-Japanese sentiment from Chamberlain’s time as chancellor, was vociferously against this proposal, as it feared that any such move would alienate Japan. It is little surprise that this was also the view of Simon himself, who argued strongly in the Cabinet’s Foreign Policy committee and before the Cabinet itself that such a loan would be unwise.41 At least initially, with Chamberlain’s support, he was able to defeat this measure, but in the spring of 1939, with the United States having announced its first sizeable loan to China, he reluctantly removed his objections. And with this his link to East Asia and Japan was finally broken. ASESSMENT The problem in coming to any assessment of Sir John Simon as a political figure is that he is somewhat of a chimera. He produced many memoranda for the Cabinet and wrote fairly frequent letters to his colleagues, but there is always a sense in these communications that he was more interested in producing ideas for an audience and seeking their approbation rather than in providing a clear direction with the qualities of leadership that that would imply. In other words, it is not easy to know what he actually believed. This difficulty in coming to a clear understanding of the man provides an insight into why, in the end, he must be judged to have been a poor foreign secretary. As can be seen during the Manchurian crisis and after, Simon’s desire to ingratiate himself, with Stimson, MacDonald and Chamberlain, and his chronic indecision meant not only that he did not provide the leadership required from the head of the Foreign Office but that he encouraged expectations in others only for them to be dashed when he did not deliver. Simon was, to a degree, culpable in creating the split with the United States that developed in 1932 and would come back to haunt Anglo-American relations intermittently during the 1930s. In addition, he helped to engineer the conditions that led from 1933 to 1935 to the development of a dangerous ‘dual diplomacy’ in Whitehall where the Treasury pursued its own foreign policy out of exasperation with the Foreign Office. One can therefore, while still accepting David Dutton’s judgement that the challenges that emerged in the early 1930s would have taxed any politician, lament that Britain at this crucial time possessed a foreign secretary who was inclined him to be paralysed in the face of complexity and who, through his own desire to please, only sowed further complications of his own making.

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NOTES 1

2

3 4

5

6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25 26

27

28 29

30

31 32

33

For Simon’s contested reputation as Foreign Secretary, see David Dutton, Sir John Simon: A Political Biography (Aurum Press, London, 1992) pp. 117–24. Runciman papers, Robinson Library, University of Newcastle, WR Add.9 Hilda Runciman diary December 1934. I would like to thank the Librarian at the Robinson Library, University of Newcastle, for permission to use material from the Runciman papers. Dutton, op. cit., p. 121. Cecil papers, British Library, London (BL), Add.Mss.51082 Simon to Cecil 10 November 1931 ff. 63–4. For the international history of the Manchurian crisis, see Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972) and Ian Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931–33, (London: Kegan Paul, 1993). The National Archives, Kew (TNA) CAB23/69 75(31) Cabinet Conclusions 11 November 1931. See also PREM1/116 Simon to MacDonald 17 November 1931. Wrench papers, BL, Add.Mss.59544 Simon to Wrench 14 November 1931. TNA CAB24/224 CP294(31) ‘Manchuria’ Simon memorandum 23 November 1931. TNA CAB24/224 CP294(31) ‘Manchuria’ Simon memorandum 23 November 1931. Thorne, op. cit., pp. 210–11. Ibid., p. 211. The Times, 11 January 1932. TNA PREM1/116 Simon to MacDonald 29 January 1932. TNA FO371/16147 F1156/1/10 Lindsay (Washington) to Simon 9 February 1933 tel.99. Thorne, op. cit., pp. 247–66. Christopher Thorne, ‘The Shanghai Crisis of 1932: The Basis of British Policy’, American Historical Review, 1970, vol. 75, p. 1638. Pratt papers, SOAS Library, PPMS 5, file 53, Pratt to ‘Edith’ 5 March 1932. MacDonald papers, TNA, PRO30/69/295 MacDonald note undated [7 March 1932?], and Bland (FO) to Hankey 10 March 1932. Thorne, Limits of Foreign Policy, pp. 283–4. TNA CAB24/235 CP404(32) ‘The Lytton Report. Japan and the League of Nations’ Simon memorandum 19 November 1932. Runciman papers, Newcastle University Library, WR254 Simon to Runciman 24 December 1932 ff. 171–2. F. H. Soward, ‘Forty Years On: The Cahan Blunder Re-Examined’, B.C. Studies, 1976–77, no.32, pp. 126–38. Bennett papers, Library/Archives Canada, Ottawa, MG26-K microfilm c,1094, Cahan to Bennett 9 December 1932 (272783). See also TNA FO371/16183 Price (DO Geneva) to Clutterbuck (DO) 5 December 1932. Baldwin papers, Cambridge University Library, vol.118, Simon to Baldwin 20 December 1932. TNA FO371/16185 F8695/1/10 Simon note 20 December 1932. Simon papers, TNA, FO800/288 Simon to Murray 1 February 1933, TNA FO371/17146 F1210/923/61 Eden (Geneva) to Simon 23 February 1933 tel.119 LN, and Wellesley minute 24 February 1933, and CAB23/75 12(33) Cabinet conclusions 27 February 1933. Cadogan papers, Churchill Archives Centre Cambridge (CACC), ACAD1/1 diary entry 27 February 1933. TNA CAB23/75 17(33) Cabinet conclusions 13 March 1933. TNA CAB24/235 CP404(32) ‘The Lytton Report. Japan and the League of Nations’ Simon memorandum 19 November 1932. TNA FO371/16250 F8773/8773/23 Cunliffe-Lister to Runciman 18 November 1932, and Runciman to Simon 19 December 1932. TNA FO371/16250 F8773/8773/23 Simon to Runciman 20 January 1933. TNA CAB23/75 15(33) Cabinet conclusions 8 March 1933 and 22(33) Cabinet conclusions 29 March 1933. Cadogan papers, CACC, ACAD1/1 diary entry 5 July 1933; diary entry 20 October 1933, in J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (eds) The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929–1945 (Hutchinson, London, 1988) and MacDonald papers, TNA, PRO30/69/1753/1 diary entry 11 December 1933.

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34

35

36

37

38 39

40

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Henry L. Stimson, Herman Kahn, Bonnie B. Collier, and Pauline Goldstein, (eds), The Henry Lewis Stimson diaries in the Yale University Library microfilm edition (New Haven, 1973), Micr.246/5, vol.26, diary entry 15 July 1933, Oxford, Vere Harmsworth Library. TNA CAB23/76 57(33) Cabinet conclusions 26 October 1933, and CAB2/6 Committee of Imperial Defence 261st meeting 9 November 1933. See, for example, TNA CAB23/78 9(34) Cabinet conclusions 14 March 1934, and CAB24/238 ‘Imperial Defence Policy’ Simon memorandum 16 March 1934. Neville Chamberlain papers, Cadbury Research Room, University of Birmingham, NC1/26/502 Neville Chamberlain to Anne Chamberlain 11 October 1934. MacDonald papers, TNA, PRO30/69/680 part 2, Simon to MacDonald 3 October 1934. See Antony Best, ‘“A Trumpet Blast of Sanity in a Mad World”: The Smuts Speech, the ‘Cliveden Set’ and Anglo-American Relations, 1934–35’, forthcoming Antony Best, ‘The Leith-Ross Mission and British Policy towards East Asia, 1934–37’, International History Review, 2013. Vol. 35, no. 4 TNA CAB27/623 FP(36) 30th meeting 1 June 1938 and CAB23/94 31(38) Cabinet conclusions 6 July 1938.

17

LORD LYTTON, 1876–1947

[Victor Alexander George Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, K.G] Anglo-Japanese Relations in the 1930s

ANTONY BEST Spy cartoon of Lord Lytton in Vanity Fair

INTRODUCTION

O

ne British historical figure whose name will always be associated with Japan is Victor Bulwer-Lytton, the second Earl of Lytton. This is not because of any long association with the country – his first visit to Japan came, after all, in his fifty-fifth year – but because of his involvement in one momentous episode, the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry into the Manchurian crisis and its subsequent report in October 1932.1 Having been elected by its other members to the chairmanship of the commission, Lytton became its public face and lightning rod. Consequently, its report would forever be associated with his name, and, depending where one stands in regard to the crisis, he is seen either as a symbol of naivety or a wise man who proffered the only feasible solution to an otherwise intractable problem. Lytton’s connection with the crisis in East Asia did not, though, end with the commission’s conclusion. In its aftermath, he emerged in the Anglo-American world as a reluctant expert on the region’s problems and, exasperated by Japan’s rejection of his recommendations, as one of China’s more vocal supporters. BEFORE MANCHURIA The irony in this story is that in December 1931 Lytton was not the first choice to be Britain’s representative on the League inquiry. He was only nominated because the initial candidate, the noted jurist Lord Macmillan, turned the job down.2 When offered the post himself, Lytton originally refused it on the grounds of the inadequate financial compensation offered.3 It was only when the Conservative politicians, Leo Amery and Lord Zetland, also refused and the League agreed to increase the honorarium that Lytton finally agreed to what he had always seen as an attractive opportunity.4 What would have transpired if perhaps Amery had accepted is impossible to say, but as a more conservative and less abstract character than Lytton and certainly no fan of the League, it would surely have been a very different outcome. But why was Lytton one of the candidates? 173

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Lytton was born in 1876 in India where his father was then viceroy. This Indian link continued to be important in his working life. In 1920 he was, as a Tory peer, appointed as under-secretary of state at the India Office and then between 1922 and 1927 took on the role of governor of Bengal. Briefly, during 1925, in the interregnum between the viceroyalties of Lord Reading and Lord Irwin, he also became acting viceroy. Lytton was therefore an establishment figure who had a rich understanding of Asian affairs. In addition, Lytton emerged as a promising candidate for the commission because of his interest in the League of Nations. Lytton was deeply if idiosyncratically Christian and this led him, like Lord Robert Cecil, to be a keen advocate of internationalism as the best guarantee of peace. In 1927 and 1928 he was a member of the Indian delegation to the annual meeting of the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva, and then in September 1931, went as one of the British representatives.5 From this perspective, Lytton was clearly a suitable choice to represent Britain on the commission. It is also evident from the letters that Lytton wrote from Geneva to his wife Pamela in mid-September 1931, as the first news arrived of the fighting in Manchuria and China’s wish for the League to deliberate, that he felt that this crisis was going to be important for the organization. Hearing of the actions of the Kwantung Army, he observed on 22 September that, ‘This open act of war is of course unjustifiable & China has brought it before the Council. It is a fresh illustration of the value of the League machinery.’6 However, he also, ironically, noted that the League’s work was not made easy by its distance from ‘the scene of the trouble’, as it was difficult to know which of the protagonists was telling the truth; little knowing, of course, that it would soon be his mission to assess precisely that point.7 Over the next three months the problem of distance, among many others, inhibited the League from ever getting ahead of events and led to a wave of criticism from those who had always doubted the organization’s practicability. For Lytton, these expressions of doubts were disturbing and in address on 23 November at York Minster, where prayers were being held for peace, he called for the League’s defenders to speak out in its defence. However, at the same time he observed that it was important to keep an open mind about the nature of the dispute in Manchuria and not jump to conclusions and indulge in ‘unrestrained condemnation of Japan’.8 This attitude might also have recommended Lytton to the government. MANCHURIA The League of Nations Council decided on 10 December to send a commission of inquiry to East Asia to determine the facts of the case and to offer proposals for its solution. On 7 January it was announced that Lytton would be the British representative. Shortly after, he was voted chairman at the commission’s first meeting and sailed with his colleagues for East Asia.9 The commission’s first port of call was Japan, which made an initially positive impact on him. Indeed, he observed to Pamela in mid-March that, ‘I am now head over heels in love with the country and shall never rest till I have brought you there.’10 What impressed him most, having lived before in India, was the modernity of Japan and its cleanliness. However, once he arrived in Shanghai later in the month he quickly came to the conclusion that the Japanese were less attractive as a people than the Chinese. The latter, he thought, were friendly and open, while with the former ‘it was a surgical operation to extract each word’.11 Moreover, the fact that he was in Shanghai fur-

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ther contributed to his disillusionment in that he was now exposed to the working methods of the Japanese military, which was attempting to settle the fighting that had ravaged the Chinese parts of the city since late January. In particular, Lytton was shocked by Japan’s resorting to aerial bombing and offended by its claim that it had tried to avoid civilian casualties, which did not tally with the information he received about air sorties taking place at night. He noted grimly to his wife, ‘The Japanese are very like the Prussians in their methods. They must think we are very simple-minded.’12 If the situation that Lytton found on the ground in Shanghai affected his view of the Japanese adversely, this was as nothing to the conclusions he reached once he visited Manchuria in April and May. As a number of writers have noted, his stay in Manchuria was chiefly marked by the effort of the local Japanese authorities and their Chinese minions to prevent him from getting any accurate gauge of local feeling.13 On the grounds that he needed ‘protection’, Lytton was guarded throughout each day and was only allowed to meet with handpicked representatives of public opinion, leading him to note, ‘we are treated virtually like prisoners’.14 Nor did it help that the new Japanese-backed puppet state of Manchukuo had introduced a swingeing censorship regime, which included a complete ban on all newspapers from China.15 Accordingly, he and his colleagues had to resort to subterfuge to meet those who were opposed to the creation of Manchukuo. Shortly after leaving Mukden for Peking in early June, Lytton wrote to his son, Antony, that: I am heartily glad to be out of Manchuria. Our position there was foul. The present government of that country consists of a number of very inferior minor Japanese officials who like to advertise their importance by being as offensive as they can.16

His positive first impressions of Japan were, thus, receding fast. Despite having undergone this disturbing journey into the heart of a police state, Lytton’s experience did not cause him to lurch towards hostility towards Japan. He was now aware, as he had always suspected, that there was no genuine majority support for Manchukuo and he was certain that the Japanese account of the Mukden incident was a sham, but he kept to the front of his mind the thought that mere condemnation of the Japanese, while perhaps morally satisfying, would not solve the crisis.17 In this vein, he wrote in late May to his sister Betty Balfour (the husband of the former Cabinet minister Gerald Balfour) that he believed that the Japanese people would back the military if the nation were forced into a corner, but that ‘unchallenged, with no fruits to show for their violence, the liberal opinion … will begin to assert herself, and the military party will be criticised for the mess they have got the country into.’18 This, in turn, raised the issue of what Lytton could do in his report to help tilt the balance in Japan. The obvious answer to this question was, in the words of a journalist who interviewed Lytton in late May, to ‘concentrate on a solution which … will be acceptable to the Japs, who, having got themselves into a mess, may be thankful to find a way out, provided they are not arraigned and can compromise with credit’.19 This was, of course, easier said than done, and the situation was made considerably more difficult by the steady drift within Japan towards unilateralism. Lytton was personally exposed to this trend in July 1932 when he made his second trip to Japan and held a talk with the new foreign minister, Uchida Yasuya. In this interview, Uchida made it abundantly clear that his government had little concern for the future of the League and that it favoured diplomatic recognition of

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Manchukuo, which would, in turn, make any kind of Japanese retreat more difficult and unlikely.20 In writing their report, Lytton and his colleagues therefore faced a difficult task; to condemn or exonerate was easy but facile, to solve was something infinitely more complex. THE LYTTON REPORT The commission’s report was completed in early September 1932. In the light of its desire to provide a way out of the morass, it was scrupulously fair in its assessment of the causes of the crisis. It noted that the Chinese had broken their treaty commitments in Manchuria, but that Japan’s response had been out of proportion to the provocation and that it had infringed the Nine-Power treaty of 1922 and the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928. Moreover, it affirmed that Manchukuo had no legitimacy in terms of self-determination of its inhabitants. For Lytton, however, the most important element in the report was its recommendations for the future. These included the idea that, while Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria should be affirmed, substantial autonomy should be given to a new regional government which would employ advisors chosen by the League and acknowledge Japan’s economic interests. In addition, it urged the League to commit funds to the economic development of China. In essence, what this meant was that China would be forced to accept that Japan had legitimate rights in Manchuria. Lytton’s hope was that this compromise, added to the promise of the League’s contributing to the region’s future prosperity and stability, would provide the Japanese government with a justification for retreat.21 Once the report was published on 2 October 1932, its future lay in the hands of the politicians. Lytton did, however, attempt to influence the diplomatic and political environment by making a number of speeches in London, including one at Chatham House, which underlined its most important observations and proposals.22 His efforts, though, brought him little satisfaction. In early February 1933 he visited Geneva just as the League’s Committee of Nineteen prepared to announce its recommendations, but was not impressed by what he saw. In a despondent mood, he wrote to Pamela from Switzerland noting that, ‘There is a deplorable lack of leadership there [Geneva] and without a leader the League is pretty helpless.’23 His criticism rested, in particular, on his sense that too much attention was being paid to the first eight chapters of the report on the origins and course of the crisis and not enough to its proposals for the future.24 As he put it two years later, the essential problem was that at this crucial juncture the League lost sight of the need for a solution and concentrated merely on reaching a judgement about who was to blame. As such, the vote taken by the League of Nations Assembly on 24 February 1933 to adopt his report was but a hollow victory, for with no willingness in Geneva to act on his plans for changing the governance of Manchuria, this action could only ever succeed in alienating Japan. The latter, after all, was hardly being offered any incentive to engage with the international community. As he noted in retrospect, ‘The League has done nothing but condemn … It has offered no help. It has made no representations.’ 25 Disappointed by the outcome in Geneva, Lytton’s return to public life in Britain saw him become a leading light in the League of Nations Union; he acted as its vice-chairman of its executive committee between 1935 and 1938 and thereafter as chairman until its demise in 1945. In addition, he became an active member of Chatham House and served on its council between 1935 and 1938. In regard

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to events in East Asia, Lytton continued to preach his gospel. During a visit to Washington in February 1935 he reiterated that there was no point in merely condemning the Japanese and contended that if the West desired the former to change direction then it had to offer a solution to Japan’s economic and population woes.26 Moreover, in a meeting with the American secretary of state, Cordell Hull, he stressed that Japanese advisors would have to be involved in any kind of international supervision of Manchuria.27 While Lytton no doubt saw his stance as entirely logical, it struck many diplomatic practitioners and right-wingers as simply not grounded in reality.28 Nor did his search for compromise win him any praise in Japan, instead he was perceived there as the architect of its humiliation at Geneva. For example, the revelation in the summer of 1935 that he was to be involved in an international exhibition of Chinese art in London apparently almost led the government in Tokyo to bar Japanese collectors from contributing their treasures to the event.29 However, within the increasingly vocal pro-Chinese faction in London, there was much respect for his work. Accordingly, it is not surprising that after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 he emerged as one of the Establishment figures who associated himself with the Chinese cause. For example, in early October he was one of the speakers at the famous Royal Albert Hall meeting that was controversially chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and in November agreed to be associated with the China Campaign Committee’s plans for a Chinese art exhibition to raise funds for widows, orphans and refugees.30 Later in August 1940 he was the leader of a League of Nations Union delegation that met the foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, to protest against the government’s decision to close the Burma Road.31 CONCLUSION Lord Lytton’s place within the history of Anglo-Japanese relations was sealed by the publication of the report that took his name in October 1932, but there is little clarity in much of the historiography about what he actually said. Most historians, as with Lytton’s contemporaries, have looked little beyond his very balanced judgement of what had led to and transpired during the Manchurian crisis and the way in which his words were then manipulated by the protagonists. For Lytton this was never the point of his report. For him, its significance always lay in its proposals for a solution to East Asia’s problems. In these, he sought not to isolate Japan but to provide it with an incentive to return to the international community without suffering humiliation. This was the response of a profoundly moral man to a crisis where the heat of the debate had, in his view, come to obscure the issues at stake. Unfortunately, however, Lytton’s appeal to reason did not find a receptive audience in Japan, China or the West, for tempers were too frayed in the former two powers and the latter by 1933 simply wanted the whole episode to end as quickly and expediently as possible. Whether Lytton’s proposals constituted a practical way forward can only be a matter of debate, but, as it is, they stand as yet another road not taken. NOTES 1

For the history of the League’s involvement in the Manchurian crisis, see Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931– 1933 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972), Ian Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism:

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13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22

23 24 25

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Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931–33 (London: Kegan Paul, 1993) and Thomas W. Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914–1938 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008). The National Archives, Kew (TNA) FO371/15505 F7560/1391/10 Macmillan to Simon 16 December 1931. TNA FO371/15506 F7731/1391/10 Lytton to Simon 22 December 1931. Diary entry 23 December 1931, in John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds), The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929–1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1988) p. 225, and FO371/15505 F7688/1391/10 Simon to Zetland 23 December 1931. Jason Tomes, ‘Lytton, Victor Alexander George Robert Bulwer‘, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, accessed 16 April 2015. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, K401105, Lytton to Lady Lytton 22 September 1931. The archives can be accessed through www.knebworthhouse.com. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, K401105, Lytton to Lady Lytton 24 September 1931. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, ‘Address at York Minster’, 23 November 1931. See also ‘The Manchurian Crisis’, The Times, 24 November 1931, p. 11. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, ‘A Biography of Victor Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton’ by C.M. Woodhouse. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton diary letter to Lady Lytton 12 March 1932. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton diary letter to Lady Lytton 20 March 1932. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton diary letter to Lady Lytton 21 March 1932. Nish, op. cit., pp. 125–36. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton diary letter to Lady Lytton 28 April 1932. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton diary letter to Lady Lytton 9 May 1932. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton to Knebworth 7 June 1932. Cecil papers, British Library, Add.Mss.51139, Lytton to Countess Balfour 23 May 1932 f.91. Cecil papers, British Library, Add.Mss.51139, Lytton to Countess Balfour 23 May 1932 f.91. Dawson papers, Times Newspapers Limited Archive, News UK and Ireland Limited, London, TT/ED/GD/1/David Fraser, Fraser to Dawson 29 May 1932. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton diary letter to Lady Lytton 14 July 1932. Thorne, op. cit., pp. 283–4, Nish, op. cit., pp. 173–9, and Burkman, op. cit., p. 170. For the Chatham House lecture of 20 October, see Lord Lytton, ‘The Problem of Manchuria’ International Affairs, November 1932, vol.11, no.6, pp. 737–56. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton to Lady Lytton 7 February 1933. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, Lytton memorandum undated [1933]. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, ‘The Far Eastern Problem and World Peace’, Lytton speech 10 February 1935. Lytton papers, Knebworth House, LH27, ‘The Far Eastern Problem and World Peace’, Lytton speech 10 February 1935. Phillips papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Ms.Am.2232, Box 3, Diary 16 November 1934–29 March 1935, folder 7, diary entry 11 February 1935. See, for example, Simon papers, the National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO800/288 Vansittart minute 2 March 1933, and London Chamber of Commerce papers, London Metropolitan Archive, City of London, CLC/B/150/MS.16528/001 Smallwood lecture 3 May 1933. ‘Priceless Chinese Art for London’, The Observer, 21 July 1935. ‘The Archbishop’s Speech’, The Times, 6 October 1937, and Lang papers, Lambeth Palace library, Ms.Lang 6, Listowel to Don 23 November 1937. Lang papers, Lambeth Palace library, Ms. Lang 17, Dixon to Lang 12 August 1940.

18

SIR SAMUEL HOARE 1880–1959

[Samuel John Gurney Hoare, 1st ViscountTemplewood]

Foreign Secretary, June to December 1935

ANTONY BEST

Sir Samuel Hoare

INTRODUCTION

O

ne of the shortest periods of service of any secretary of state for foreign affairs is that held by the Conservative politician, Sir Samuel Hoare, who only took charge of the Foreign Office between June and December of 1935. His brief time in office was dominated by one issue above all others, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and it was his cynical attempt with his French counterpart, Pierre Laval, to find a compromise solution to that crisis that led to his rapid downfall. Hoare’s name is thus rarely associated with Japan, but in his months as foreign secretary he did make decisions about British policy towards East Asia that were to have significant implications for the future. Moreover, in assessing his influence on Anglo-Japanese relations it is important to remember that Hoare had an extensive ministerial career in the 1930s aside from his unhappy time at the Foreign Office. Between 1931 and 1935 he was the secretary of state for India, acted as the first lord of the Admiralty in 1936–37 and went on to become home secretary between 1937 and 1939. In each of these jobs, both as a minister and as a trusted confidant of the prime minister, he exercised some influence on British policy towards Japan. Indeed, it would not be going too far to see him as an exemplar of how Conservatives thought that Britain ought to interact with its erstwhile ally. In this regard, it is notable that Shigemitsu Mamoru, the Japanese ambassador to London between 1938 and 1941, classified him as one of the ‘orthodox Tories’.1 When the National Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald formed a coalition government with his Conservative and Liberal allies in August 1931, he was forced to distribute the prize positions in the Cabinet with a careful eye on the balance between the parties. One of the most important non-economic posts was the India Office where a project of major constitutional reform for the Raj was in the offing, following the Simon Commission report of 1930. This was a controversial issue in British politics, for some Conservatives were opposed to reform on principle, while others feared that any move towards greater Indian fiscal and tariff autonomy would have a deleterious effect on British trade. Among the latter was the powerful bloc of Conservative MPs from Lancashire, who were deter179

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mined to defend the textile industry from any restrictions on exports to India, and whose votes could make the difference between success and failure.2 It was therefore necessary for MacDonald to appoint a Conservative as secretary of state for India in order to corral the Tory backbenchers into line. One way in which Hoare attempted to manage the situation was by continually reminding the Viceroy of India, Lord Willingdon, of the necessity of dampening down any commercial proposals that might enflame the Lancashire lobby. This was not, though, the only tool at his disposal; he could also attempt to appease Lancashire by pressing his colleagues in London and the authorities in New Delhi to take action against British cotton’s greatest international rival, the Japanese textile industry. JAPANESE COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS In the early 1930s the devaluation of the yen, combined with a number of other comparative advantages, meant that Japanese cotton textile exports began to surge into South and South-East Asia. At first, the British government was loath to take firm action because it did not want to allow this issue to be seen as influencing its stance towards the Manchurian crisis. Once, however, Britain and the League of Nations voted to adopt the Lytton report in February 1933, the Cabinet was released from this vow and began to investigate how British commercial interests could be defended. Unsurprisingly, Hoare was at the vanguard of this movement. In March 1933 he persuaded his Cabinet colleagues that the time had come to terminate the 1911 Indo-Japanese trade convention and followed this in May by raising the tariff on non-British cotton textile goods entering India from 50% to 75%.3 This latter move, he argued to his fellow ministers, would ‘benefit Lancashire which is suffering so severely from Japanese competition in the East’.4 Hoare’s willingness to take a hard line was most apparent in December 1933 when he decisively intervened in industry-level textile negotiations between India, Japan and Britain to ensure that the Japanese agreed to a new quota arrangement that protected British interests. On this occasion he warned his colleagues that the consequences of inaction might be that ‘those who are opposed to the White Paper [on India] would seize upon this to further their aims’.5 Hoare’s willingness to call for tough action is interesting because the historical orthodoxy is that the Conservatives were inclined to take a sympathetic line towards Japan in the early 1930s. This may have been the case in regard to political relations where Japan’s overt anti-Bolshevism and adherence to the certainties of ‘old diplomacy’ appealed to their sensibilities, in contrast to the vague principles of the League and the double-dealing of the United States. However, in the field of international commerce the need to safeguard British trade interests in the midst of the depression out-trumped security concerns and it is notable that even the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, was supportive, if reluctantly, of Hoare’s policy.6 AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN In the end, Hoare’s pandering to the Lancashire lobby paid dividends, for in the summer of 1935 the India Bill successfully passed through Parliament. His reward in June 1935 for this considerable legislative achievement was to be elevated by the new Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, to the post of foreign secretary. Much

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was expected of Hoare in his new role, as he was seen as a far more dynamic figure than his National Liberal predecessor, Sir John Simon, who in his effort to be ‘all things to all people’ had let foreign policy drift.7 Hoare had by this stage already come into Chamberlain’s orbit and accepted the need to improve relations with Japan. Showing consistency of thought, he was not prepared for any concessions to be made in the commercial sphere and reiterated his opposition to this in a letter to MacDonald in March 1934.8 It does appear, though, that he was interested in Chamberlain’s idea for a political settlement that would link the situation in China to an Anglo-Japanese deal on naval disarmament and it is notable that in September 1934 he was present at a meeting where the chancellor attempted to bring Simon around to his way of thinking.9 Hoare came into office in the summer of 1935 at a time when both events in East Asia and British policy towards the region were in flux. In regard to Japanese policy, the most recent development was that its army in north China had begun to sponsor an autonomy movement in that area. Accordingly, one of Hoare’s first acts was to use a Foreign Office supply debate in the House of Commons to warn ‘our Japanese friends’ that recent events had ‘disturbed and disquieted’ British opinion.10 Behind the scenes, however, Hoare was concerned that Japan might take advantage of any future problems in Europe to expand its interests even further and asked his staff to look into whether it would be appropriate for Britain to propose a sphere of influence policy to Tokyo, with Britain predominant in south China and Japan in the north.11 The diplomats parried this rather naïve suggestion by observing that as Britain was not even in a position to defend its interests in the south it might be awkward to make any such suggestion at the current time.12 In taking this line, the diplomatic staff continued to display the passivity that had bedevilled policy during the Simon period and which had infuriated Chamberlain and his acolytes. Worse was to follow, for in August the same officials carped at a proposal from the Treasury that one of its senior civil servants, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, should lead a mission to East Asia. The idea behind this mission was that Leith-Ross would help to boost British trade and simultaneously negotiate a deal that would see Britain and Japan promise a joint loan to China in return for the latter agreeing to recognise the puppet state of Manchukuo.13 For the members of the Far Eastern Department the latter proposal was at best wishful thinking and at its worst a scheme that could heap universal odium on Britain.14 Hoare, however, who had already discussed the idea with Chamberlain, thought differently and used the occasion to bring his recalcitrant underlings into line, observing: I do not at all wish to take a negative or over-critical attitude to this proposal. There are objections to every possible course of action. There are equally strong – perhaps in my view stronger – objections to any proposal for inaction.15

And then when further prevarication became evident, he reacted by requesting to see all important telegrams in draft form before they were despatched.16 Hoare’s appointment thus threatened to bring about a profound change to British policy by forcing the Foreign Office into line with the Treasury’s more proactive stance. This, however, proved to be a false dawn, for Hoare’s attention was increasingly distracted by the Ethiopian imbroglio while at the same time the Treasury’s policy began to tie itself in knots due to the basic contradiction between trying both to support British trade and woo Japan. Therefore, when Hoare resigned in December 1935, he bequeathed to his successor, Anthony Eden,

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a confused situation that was even more unsatisfactory than the one he had discovered on coming into office. Hoare’s exile into the political wilderness was brief. In June 1936 he returned to the frontbench as first lord of the Admiralty. In this post his main concern in regard to Japan was that it constituted one third of the triumvirate that now threatened British imperial defence and at the May 1937 Imperial Conference he had the knotty task of reassuring Australia and New Zealand that the Royal Navy was still committed to their defence.17 The heavy burden on his shoulders and his first-hand knowledge of Britain’s over-stretched defences meant that he kept an eye on the need to improve relations with Japan. In the summer of 1936 he met with the new Japanese ambassador to London, Yoshida Shigeru, and told him that if a purely Conservative government came into power it would be likely to restore Anglo-Japanese cooperation.18 He was not, though, a supporter of appeasement of Japan at all costs, for he retained his aversion to compromise in the commercial field. For example, in June 1937, shortly after becoming home secretary, he argued forcefully in a meeting of the Cabinet’s foreign policy committee against a Foreign Office memorandum that proposed that Britain should make trade concessions to Japan in order to bring about a political settlement. As ever, the stumbling block for him was Lancashire, which clearly would not be prepared to accept any such deal.19 ASSESSMENT While it is apparent that Sir Samuel Hoare was not a major figure in the history of Anglo-Japanese relations, his career sheds light on a few important issues. In regard to the historical narrative, he is most significant as the foreign secretary who sided with the Treasury against his own civil servants and thus allowed the fateful Leith-Ross mission to take place with all of its unintended consequences. More broadly, he is important because his interaction with Japan through the 1930s reveals the degree to which it is difficult to talk of British appeasement of the Japanese. While he was prepared to refer to Japan in friendly terms in public, behind the scenes he made it clear on a number of occasions that he was not prepared to engage in trade concessions as he feared the imperial and domestic consequences of alienating the Lancashire lobby. And, as this was one of the few areas in which Britain could actively assist Japan, this was a severe constraint on Britain’s room for manoeuvre. Hoare’s stance thus reveals the contradictions that inhibited any British rapprochement with Japan. NOTES 1

2

3 4

Ito Takashi and Watanabe Yukio (eds), Shigemitsu Mamoru shuki [Memoirs] vol.1, (Tokyo, 1993) p.100. For the textile issue and India, see Carl Bridge, Holding India to the Empire: The British Conservative Party and the 1935 Constitution (New Delhi, 1986) passim, and Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party (London, 2000) pp.142–99. Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933–1937 (Cambridge, 1975) p.30. The National Archives, Kew (TNA), CAB24/241 CP137(33) ‘Proposal by the Government of India to Increase the Duty on Cotton Piece Goods of non-British Origin to 75 per cent Ad Valorem under the Powers Conferred by Section 3(5) of the India Tariff Act’ Hoare memorandum 23 May 1933.

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10 11 12 13

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TNA CAB24/245 CP282(33) ‘Negotiations between India and Japan in regard to the Cotton Trade’, Hoare memorandum 27 November 1933. On this episode, see Basudev Chatterji, Trade, Tariffs and Empire: Lancashire and British Policy in India 1919–1939 (New Delhi, 1992) pp.390–5. TNA CAB27/556 IC(33) Cabinet Indian Cotton Committee 3rd meeting, 1 December 1933. For Simon’s contested reputation as Foreign Secretary, see David Dutton, Sir John Simon: A Political Biography (London, 1992) pp.117–24. TNA PREM1/175 Hoare to MacDonald 7 March 1934. Chamberlain papers, Cadbury Research Library, University of Birmingham, NC2/23a Chamberlain diary entry 9 October 1934. Hansard, Fifth Series, House of Commons, vol.304, 11 July 1935, col.522. TNA FO371/19287 F4811/84/10 Hoare minute 16 July 1935. TNA FO371/19287 F4811/84/10 Vansittart (PUS FO) minute 28 July 1935. For the most recent overview of the Leith-Ross mission, see Antony Best, ‘The Leith-Ross Mission and British Policy towards East Asia, 1934–37’, International History Review, 2013, vol.35, no.4, pp.681–701. TNA FO371/19243 F5081/6/10 Wellesley (DPUS FO) minute 9 August 1935. TNA FO371/19243 F5081/6/10 Hoare minute 10 August 1935. TNA FO371/19243 F5195/6/10 Hoare minute 20 August 1935. TNA CAB32/128 E(PD)(37) Imperial Conference 7th meeting 26 May 1937. Yoshida to Makino 7 August 1936, in Yoshida Shigeru Foundation (ed), Yoshida Shigeru shokan (Tokyo, 1994) p.643. TNA CAB27/622 FP(36) Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee 12th meeting 11 June 1937.

19

SIR ANTHONY EDEN, 1897–1977

[1st Earl of Avon]

Foreign Secretary, 1935–38, 1940–45, 1951–55, Prime Minister, 1955–57

Sir Antony Eden

ANTONY BEST

INTRODUCTION

I

n the period between 1936 and 1955, when Anglo-Japanese relations suffered their deepest ever blows, Anthony Eden acted as the British foreign secretary on three different occasions (1935–1938, 1941–1945 and 1951–1955). While Eden is not often associated with policy towards Japan, the fact that he was in office for these years does beg the question of what attitude he took towards Britain’s former ally and contemporary adversary. Considering the events that he faced as foreign secretary over this period, it should come as no surprise that his view of Japan was cold at best and overtly hostile at worst. He was though a politician and had to approach the making of policy in a pragmatic manner that would benefit British interests. As such, in his last period in office he tried, despite the bitter legacy of the Pacific War, to rebuild relations with the Japanese in the realization that Britain could not afford, against the background of the Cold War, to leave Japan isolated lest it fall into the communist orbit. FIRST PERIOD AS FOREIGN SECRETARY, DECEMBER 1935–FEBRUARY 1938 Anthony Eden was appointed foreign secretary in December 1935 following the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare over the signing of the Hoare-Laval Pact. He entered office with the reputation as being one of the Conservative Party’s leading experts on foreign policy. He had, after all, already acted as the private secretary to Austen Chamberlain in the 1920s, then been promoted to the post of the parliamentary under-secretary of state for the years 1931 to 1934, and finally been elevated to the position of the secretary of state for League of Nations Affairs from May 1935 until Hoare’s resignation. During this long apprenticeship, Eden had acquired a reputation as a keen enthusiast for the League and, accordingly, was seen by many of his peers and the public as someone who was perhaps more in tune with the spirit of the age than most of his elders.1 His elevation was therefore not particularly good news for Japan, which had, after all, been the first of the Great Powers to throw down the gauntlet to the League of Nations. However, 184

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up to the point at which he came to lead the Foreign Office Eden had had little to do with British policy towards East Asia and it was therefore not entirely clear where he stood on the Sino-Japanese divide, even if it be might be inferred that his sympathies would probably lie with the Chinese. Eden’s lack of direct exposure to the complexities of East Asian affairs would not though last long, for December 1935 witnessed two important events that affected the region. The first was the Japanese Army’s efforts to establish an autonomous regime in north China. Herein lay the immediate origins of the war that was to break out in China eighteen months later. The other event was the holding of the second London Naval Conference in which Britain and the United States forlornly attempted to persuade Japan to continue to accept limits on naval armaments. His first month in office thus presaged the difficulties to come. However, for the first half of 1936 it was to be the crisis in Ethiopia and the disturbance to the European states system created by Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland that was to occupy most of Eden’s time and he accordingly did little in terms of shaping a new policy towards East Asia. Eden only began to deal with Japan on a day-to-day basis with the arrival in the summer of 1936 of the new Japanese ambassador, Yoshida Shigeru. The catalyst for this change came from Yoshida, who claimed that he had arrived in Britain with a remit to bring about a rapprochement in Anglo-Japanese relations. The result was that in the autumn the new ambassador held a number of meetings with Eden in which he advanced a variety of ideas about how the bilateral relationship might be put back on track. The problem for Eden, as his civil servants made clear to him, was that in these conversations Yoshida was largely speaking for himself rather than acting on instructions from the Gaimusho-; a fact that was confirmed by the Foreign Office’s access to intercepts from the Japanese Tokyo-London telegram traffic.2 Despite this problem, Eden was sympathetic in general to the idea that relations with Japan needed to be improved. After all, following the Ethiopian crisis, the declaration of the Axis in October and the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in the following month, it was clear that Britain was faced with three potential enemies who were already in contact with each other, and thus any diplomacy that could reduce this threat was welcome. Moreover, Eden did not believe that Japan had been irretrievably lost to the Axis camp. For example, his reaction in November 1936 to the Anti-Comintern Pact was to note that news of the latter had received a cool reception in Japan and that accordingly the Foreign Office ‘must be active and not lament’.3 The result was that, while Yoshida’s initiative ran out of steam in the early months of 1937, Eden remained keen to see if something could be done. He was therefore encouraged by the arrival of the Hayashi government in February 1937 and the subsequent appointment of the moderate and pro-Western Satõ Naotake as Foreign Minister. Eden’s sense of optimism is evident in a Cabinet sub-committee meeting in May 1937 in which he stated that, while he recognized that there was no chance of going back to the alliance, he did believe that it might be possible in the new circumstances to arrange an agreement that ‘rested on a community of interests as regards the joint policy of England and Japan towards China’.4 In order to achieve this goal he was willing to look at a number of ways in which Britain could actively display its goodwill. One field, which he saw as important, was that of court relations. He was determined to ensure that the visit to Britain in the spring of 1937 by Prince Chichibu, who was to represent Japan at King George VI’s coronation, was an unqualified success. As such, he demanded that the prince, who was the only representative from a monarchical Great Power,

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should be at the top of the order of precedence for foreign guests and resisted all attempts by the minor European royals to plead their respective cases.5 Meanwhile, in the field of commercial and imperial policy he was a keen advocate of the idea of introducing an ‘open door’ for trade in Britain’s African colonies, as he believed that providing Japan with overseas markets for its flourishing export sector would reduce its need to expand its influence in China.6 In late May and early June of 1937 he brought this desire for a new agreement into the Imperial Conference that took place in London. Indeed, when discussing the plan put forward by Australian Prime Minister Joseph Lyons for a Pacific non-aggression pact, Eden indicated his approval with the telling words that, ‘It did … seem that the present was the psychological moment for a détente in the Far East.’7 There were though obstacles to achieving such an outcome. Within Whitehall, one problem was that, while Eden supported the idea of the ‘economic appeasement’ of Japan, many of his fellow Cabinet ministers felt the need for caution lest such concessions enrage the electorate at home and undermine the system of imperial preference.8 In addition, in the face of hostile questions from the Labour benches in the House of Commons, he was forced to give an assurance that any forthcoming talks with the Japanese would not involve the sacrificing of Chinese sovereignty or interests.9 Despite these parameters being placed on his work, by the start of July 1937 it had been agreed, through Yoshida, that talks should open with Japan in London in the next few days and a long Foreign Office memorandum, which had gone through a number of drafts since the winter, was prepared for circulation to the cabinet.10 But at this late juncture, the most serious of all obstacles reared into view, for on 7 July fighting broke out between China and Japan at the Marco Polo Bridge south-west of Peking. At first Eden’s reaction to the Sino-Japanese War was to see if it was possible to work in parallel with the State Department to prevent the fighting from escalating into a full-scale conflict. However, by the end of July it was clear that the fighting was expanding in both its geographical scope and intensity. At this point both sides were escalating and thus it was not possible to single out one as the aggressor and the other as the victim. That position changed in August when the fighting spread to Shanghai, for, while the Chinese proved amenable to the British plan for both sides to pull back their forces, the Japanese rejected this proposal on the grounds that only they could defend their own nationals. At the same time the Japanese also announced their intention to blockade the Chinese coast, thus threatening the smooth operation of British trade, and a few days later some of their pilots shot at a car containing the British ambassador to China, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, almost killing him. As if these issues were not enough, the end of August and into September saw Japanese bombers unleashed on a number of Chinese cities, including not just Shanghai, but also Nanking and Canton. Not surprisingly, this series of events placed Japan in the dock of world and British opinion.11 Eden was therefore faced with a restive British public, and there were calls for the government to express its disapproval of Japan’s actions, perhaps even going as far as to introduce sanctions. In addition, he also received a number of letters from his Cabinet colleagues expressing their own sense of outrage and wondering what could be done to bring pressure to bear on Japan.12 Eden’s own reading of the situation was along similar lines. He clearly saw Japan as the aggressor and believed that Britain should do what it practically could to aid China. Indeed, on one occasion he noted that many believed ‘that Japan was going to her “1812” in China’ and that Britain’s role was to ‘do what we cautiously can to make it possible’.13 His inclination in this regard was to work for cooperation with the United

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States and in this he was greatly encouraged by Roosevelt’s ‘quarantine speech’ of 5 October, which appeared to indicate that there was a limit to American patience with Japan. His efforts to move in this direction were, however, frustrated by the Roosevelt’s administration’s frustrating tendency of never living up to its rhetoric and the lack of backing he received at home from the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. Thus, although Eden represented Britain at the Brussels Conference of the Nine-Power Treaty signatories in November 1937, nothing came of this venture. Moreover, at the end of the year his hopes were once again raised and then dashed by Roosevelt’s musings on the need for an Anglo-American naval demonstration against Japan. With the complicated situation in Europe meaning that the Royal Navy could not afford to take unilateral action against Japan, Eden was therefore limited to arguing that Britain should do what it could to assist China in material terms. At a meeting of 9 February 1938 he accordingly won agreement for the idea that Britain should finance a road linking China with Burma. He was not, though, able to persuade the Treasury to agree to provide a currency loan to China, as it was felt that this might be too provocative a move.14 SECOND PERIOD AS FOREIGN SECRETARY: JANUARY 1941 TO JULY 1945 As is well known, the month of February 1938 saw Eden’s resignation as foreign secretary due primarily to his disagreement with Chamberlain about the latter’s desire to engage in the appeasement of Italy. For the next three years, both out of and in office, Eden’s career did not bring him into much contact with Japan, and there is little evidence that he was much concerned about affairs in the east. However, in January 1941, following Churchill’s decision to send the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, to Washington as the new British ambassador, Eden once again assumed responsibility for the Foreign Office. He did so, of course, at a very tense time for Anglo-Japanese relations, as Japan was now seeking to use the eclipse of the Western colonial powers to advance its interests in SouthEast Asia.15 Indeed, almost immediately on re-entering office he was faced in early February with rumours that Japan, prompted by Germany, might be about to launch a strike against Singapore. Despite concern about Japan’s intentions, Eden was not very much involved in the day-to-day running of policy towards Japan. His attention was taken up by events in North Africa and the Balkans, to which areas he undertook a month-long visit in the late winter of 1941. Instead, he left the job of looking after Japan in the hands of his parliamentary under-secretary, R.A. Butler, who had also acted in this capacity during Halifax’s tenure at the Foreign Office.16 From July 1941, however, with Butler having moved on to a post in the Cabinet and with Japan threatening to occupy southern Indochina, Eden had to pay closer attention to events in the east. One of his key considerations, as had been the case in the autumn of 1937, was that Britain should stay in close contact with the United States. This was necessary not just for the defence of British interests against Japan, but also because of the broader need to do nothing that might imperil American aid to the war effort in Europe, as symbolized by the Lend-Lease scheme. When therefore in July 1941 he learnt that the United States intended to go as far as introducing an oil embargo against Japan, he argued to the Cabinet that Britain had to follow suit even if felt that this was too provocative to move.17 This desire to stay in step with the Americans also influenced the cautious attitude that he and his officials took towards the Hull-Nomura talks

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that intermittently took place in Washington from the spring of 1941, which can be summed up as only offering opinions when invited to do so. The British ambassador to Japan, Sir Robert Craigie, felt very differently about these talks. He believed in the autumn of 1941 that the Japanese wanted a settlement and that if none was forthcoming they were prepared to go to war. He therefore argued that Britain should put pressure on the State Department to be more open with the Japanese. Eden declined to follow this advice, fearing that any such intervention would prove unwelcome and unproductive.18 Underlying Eden’s view of affairs was also the belief that Japan’s aggression was essentially based on a policy of bluff, which was an impression that he, in part, obtained from Britain’s ability to read the main Japanese diplomatic cypher. In one note that he sent to Churchill in September 1941 he even went as far as referring to Japan as ‘this probably over-valued military power’.19 Based on this reading of Japan, his contention was that the latter could be deterred from entering the war if Britain and the other interested powers made clear their intention to defend their interests. Most importantly this meant publicly demonstrating their collective willingness to reinforce their military and naval power in SouthEast Asia and the Pacific. His response therefore in mid-October 1941 to the fall of the Konoe Cabinet was to argue to Churchill that the time had come to revive an idea that had been first mooted two months earlier of sending a number of capital ships to the region.20 This was the germ of the fateful decision to dispatch HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse to Singapore. In the final days of peace, Eden continued to take a relatively hardline towards Japan. While Churchill was initially enthused about the ‘modus vivendi’ proposal that the Japanese made to the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in late November, Eden was more circumspect and, on the advice of his officials, instructed Halifax in Washington to tell the State Department that he did not think Japan’s scheme went far enough. He insisted that if Japan meant to withdraw from southern Indochina then it could not merely remove its forces from Saigon to the north of the country but had to withdraw them completely so that its garrison in Tonkin returned to its pre-July level. In addition, he insisted that Britain and the United States should only give minimal economic concessions in return. Moreover, it appears from Eden’s diary that he played a crucial role in the dispatching of Churchill’s note to Roosevelt on 26 November in which the Prime Minister expressed his concern about the effect that any deal might have on Chinese morale.21 Eden thus continued to the last to underestimate the likelihood and impact of Japan’s entry into the Second World War, but in this he was hardly alone. He was also not alone in another way, namely that his response to the news that Japan had attacked after all was not to engage in pained introspection, but rather to feel that Britain’s victory was assured for the Americans were now finally in the war, for this was Churchill’s reaction too.22 Once the war began day-to-day policy towards Japan rested primarily with the service departments and the Foreign Office retreated into the background. The major role that Eden was to play over the next three and a half years was discussing with the United States and other allied nations broad strategic issues on how to pursue the war, but not to reflect much on Japan itself. He did, though, have one important public responsibility; he was the main figure who revealed to the British public what was known about the condition of British prisoners-of-war (POW) in Japanese custody. His first statement to Parliament in this regard came in March 1942 when he publicized the atrocities that had been committed following the fall of Hong Kong. He did not mince his words, but rather stated that

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the evidence before him demonstrated that, ‘The Japanese claim that their forces are animated by a lofty code of chivalry, Bushido, is a nauseating hypocrisy.’23 In January 1944 he made a further statement on the position of the POWs in SouthEast Asia, revealing on this occasion that the Japanese had engaged in large-scale ill-treatment of the men, including using some of them as forced labour on the Burma Railway.24 This experience was hardly likely to have endeared the Japanese to him, and it is probable that the loss of his son Simon, an RAF pilot, missing in action over Burma in the summer of 1945, only reinforced this sentiment. THIRD PERIOD AS FOREIGN SECRETARY: OCTOBER 1951 TO APRIL 1955 In July 1945 Eden left government after the general election of that month and remained in opposition until the Conservative victory over Labour in October 1951 at which point he returned to the Foreign Office. Much, of course, had changed in the interim. In regard to Japan, it had undergone the Allied occupation and had only recently, in September, taken its first major step towards the regaining of its sovereignty at the San Francisco peace conference. In the run-up to the signing of the peace treaty the two main political parties in Britain had taken a broadly bipartisan approach towards Japan. This involved agreeing with the United States on most of the essential issues, such as limited Japanese rearmament, but arguing for some protection of British trade, compensation for POWs, and for Japan to be able to decide its own future course over relations with China. The latter point was important because in January 1950 the Labour government had decided, in stark contrast to American policy, to recognize the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) and break off all links with the rump Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan.25 It was this issue of the future of Sino-Japanese relations that was the first to arrive on Eden’s desk on his return to office. In December, under pressure from the Senate, the American official responsible for the peace treaty, John Foster Dulles, arranged for the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, to send him a letter in which he committed Japan to recognizing the KMT government. Dulles did this without consulting the Foreign Office, and Eden naturally reacted with fury once this subterfuge was revealed. Eden’s anger arose primarily from the fact that he had been misled rather than that Japan had been forced to take sides between the two Chinas.26 In the years to come he largely followed the American lead in regard to Japan. What this meant in policy terms is that he accepted the argument that Japan was an important player in the Cold War in East Asia and that Britain should cooperate with the United States in ensuring that it remained in the ‘free world’ camp. In practice this meant that he became an advocate within both Britain and the Commonwealth of the need for Japanese rearmament. In addition, he argued within the British government for a relatively lenient policy to be adopted towards the revival of Japan’s overseas trade on the grounds that its prosperity would help to keep it out of the Soviet orbit. This latter line was not, however, an easy one to hold, for British public opinion was clearly not happy at the prospect of jobs being lost in the textile sector in order to accommodate exports from a former wartime enemy. The public controversy over this issue peaked in February 1954 when the latest Sterling Payments Agreement, which regulated trade between the Sterling Area and Japan, came before the House of Commons and led to heated criticism of the government from both the

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opposition benches and Conservatives from constituencies in Lancashire and other affected areas.27 In the end the government won the debate, but the fact that this issue had caused such a furore led Eden to put before the Cabinet a memorandum that laid out the Foreign Office’s thinking on Japan. This document noted the vital importance of keeping Japan onside and argued that all government policy towards the country should be framed with that goal in mind. Moreover, it argued that an effort should be made to re-educate the public in order to reduce its natural disinclination to trust the Japanese.28 The Cabinet agreed to accept this recommendation, but in the months that followed Eden found it difficult to make his colleagues live up to their promise.29 In part, it was the Japanese government itself who created difficulties, for their failure in the summer of 1954 to agree on a sum to be paid as reparations to the POWs did Japan no favours. In addition, however, there was the problem that a new election was looming on the horizon and that no ruling party could afford to stand on a platform of sacrificing British jobs to the Japanese. Thus, while Eden did his level-best in the autumn and winter of 1954–55 to argue against the Board of Trade’s policy of not extending full tariff privileges to Japan when Japan entered the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1955, he did not prevail.30 Eden’s willingness to take a relatively moderate line towards Japan does not mean, however, that he saw the country through rosetinted spectacles or believed that it had made amends for its wartime behaviour. In a letter that he sent to Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner-General for South-East Asia, in May 1952 approving the latter’s idea of visiting Japan, he did so with the words, ‘It is not easy to like the Japanese, but clearly they count for a great deal and will count for more.’31 His attitude towards the Japanese in regard to court relations between the two countries also showed that he was wary of showing too welcoming a face. When in 1952 some of his officials began to speculate about the need to restore the Emperor to the Order of the Garter, he abruptly intervened, informing his civil servants that ‘I think all this is going a good deal too fast … I feel pretty sure that … the Emperor’s Garter restoration [would be] resented. Cabinet would have to see.’32 In addition, in contrast to his position in 1937, he argued in 1953 that the Japanese should be dropped down the order of precedence at Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation by stipulating that only royal families linked to the monarch through blood ties should receive special treatment.33 CONCLUSION For a man who was at the head of the Foreign Office for so many of the dramatic events that shaped Anglo-Japanese relations in the mid-twentieth century, Anthony Eden has left relatively little trace of his views of Japan. The reality of the situation was that he had so many other issues to address and that East Asia was often no more than a distraction to him compared to Europe and the Middle East. What does emerge from the records is that he was generally sceptical about Japan. One can, for example, find no trace in his thoughts of the yearning for the days of the Anglo-Japanese alliance that one sees in contemporaries such as R.A. Butler. Eden was aware that Japan, even if it was of little interest to him, was an important player in international politics and in general he followed a policy of trying to cultivate good relations in the cause of regional stability and keeping the Japanese away from enemy camps. The only time he showed real enthusiasm

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about policy was in the early days of the Sino-Japanese War when, within the bounds of practicality, he argued that Britain should do all it could to support China and thus erode Japan’s power. Eden thus was no friend to Japan, even though he was forced so many times to adjudicate on Anglo-Japanese relations. NOTES 1

2

3

4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15

16

17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25

26

27 28

29 30 31 32 33

The best biography of Eden is David Dutton, Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation (Edward Arnold, London, 1997). Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936–41 (Routledge, London, 1995) p. 23. The National Archives, Kew (TNA) FO371/20285 F7223/303/23 Eden minute 29 November 1936. TNA CAB16/181 DP(P) Defence Plans (Policy) Sub-committee meeting 2nd meeting 11 May 1937. TNA FO372/3234 T6849/1/379 Bland minute 30 April 1937. TNA FO371/21246 W7323/393/98 Eden minute 24 April 1937. TNA CAB32/128 E(PD) (37) Imperial Conference 11th meeting 2 June 1937. TNA CAB27/622 FP(36) Foreign Policy Cabinet Sub-committee 12th meeting 11 June 1937. Hansard, 5th series, House of Commons (HC), vol.325, 25 June 1937 cc.1601–2. Best, op. cit., pp. 31–2. Ibid, p. 39. Ibid, p. 42. Documents on British Foreign Policy, series two, volume XXI, doc.326, F8982/9/10 Eden minute 7 November 1937, p. 418 footnote 3. Best, op.cit., p.52. Antony Best, ‘Britain and the February 1941 War Scare in East Asia’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 1994, vol.5, no.3, pp. 642–65. See Antony Best, ‘Lord Hankey, R.A. Butler and Japan’ in Hugh Cortazzi, (ed.), Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits Vol.V, (Global Oriental, Folkestone, 2005) pp. 107–16. Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, p. 164. Ibid., pp. 172–3. TNA FO371/27981 F9615/1299/23 Eden to Churchill 12 September 1941. TNA FO371/27096 F10942/33/23 Eden to Churchill 16 October 1941. Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, pp. 182–3. Lord Avon, Memoirs: The Reckoning (London, Cassell, 1965) pp. 285–6, and Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Book Club Asoocates, London, 1985) p. 539. Hansard, 5th series, HC, vol.378, 10 March 1942, c.932. Hansard, 5th series, HC, vol.396, 28 January 1944, cc.1029–33. For British policy towards the peace treaty, see Peter Lowe, ‘Uneasy Adjustment, 1945–58’, in Yoichi Kibata and Ian Nish (eds), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, vol. 2, The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931–2000 (2000) pp. 181–6. For the ‘Yoshida letter’ crisis, see Noriko Yokoi, Japan’s Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations 1948–1962 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) pp. 43–6. Ibid, p. 95. TNA CAB129/66 C(54)92 ‘British Policy Towards Japan’ Eden memorandum 8 March 1954. Yokoi, op. cit., p. 96. Ibid, pp. 110–13. TNA FO800/781 Eden to MacDonald 23 May 1952 no.FE/52/33. TNA FO372/7133 TD10051/2 Eden minute undated [November 1952]. TNA CAB129/59 CP(53)61 ‘Coronation of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II: Precedence of Special Representatives from Foreign States’ Eden memorandum 16 February 1953.

20

LORD HALIFAX 1881–1959

[Edward Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax] Foreign Secretary 1938–40

ANTONY BEST Lord Halifax

INTRODUCTION

I

n accounts of the life of Edward Wood, the first Earl Halifax, it cannot be said that his thoughts on the subject of Anglo-Japanese relations loom large.1 However, considering the fact that he was the foreign secretary between February 1938 and December 1940 and then the ambassador in Washington during the time of the Hull-Nomura talks in 1941, it is clear that he was an important figure during this difficult time when the ties between Britain and Japan became increasingly frayed. The question, arises therefore, of what attitude he took towards Japan and what role he played in this period of increasing tension. Considering that Lord Halifax’s historical reputation rests largely on the fact that he served under Neville Chamberlain during the period when the latter was determined to reach an accommodation with Hitler, it might be thought likely that he, as with the prime minister, was sympathetic towards the idea of appeasing Japan. Certainly, this was the view of the man who was the Japanese ambassador in London for most of the time when Halifax was at the Foreign Office, Shigemitsu Mamoru. In his post-war memoirs Shigemitsu described Halifax as one of what he called the ‘orthodox faction’ within the Conservative Party, which he saw as pro-Japanese in its outlook.2 However, the historical record presents us with a far more complex figure than this simple classification would have us believe. Even in regard to Germany, Halifax’s views were subject to great change; he realized a long time before Chamberlain that Hitler could not be appeased. In particular, it needs to be recalled that his biographer has put much emphasis on the impact that the events of Kristalnacht (9–10 November 1938) when the Nazis’ anti-Semitism exploded into overt attacks on Jewish lives and property, had on toughening his stance towards Germany.3 What this reveals is that there was a strong moral core to Halifax, based on his devout high-church Christianity, and that he felt distinctly uneasy about interaction with regimes that he found morally repugnant. It was this outlook that coloured his attitude towards the Japanese government, for in his time as foreign secretary, contrary to Shigemitsu’s belief, he consistently pushed for a hard-line towards Japan in the face of opposition from his fellow Cabinet ministers. 192

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AS FOREIGN SECRETARY That Halifax as foreign secretary was unlikely to take a sympathetic line with Japan was evident almost as soon as the Sino-Japanese War began in the summer of 1937, for in late September he wrote a short exasperated note to the then incumbent at the Foreign Office, Anthony Eden, about Japan’s war conduct, observing: I am terribly shocked with the Japanese indiscriminate bombing – Can we – with the USA – do anything more effective than protests ? Trade ? Withdrawal of Craigie It does seem to me to be the worst thing – for morality and civilization – that we have yet seen!4

By the time that Halifax succeeded Eden in February 1938 the question that he had raised about whether Britain could coerce Japan into adopting a different policy had been thoroughly investigated only to be dismissed. The fact of the matter was that, with little likelihood of American cooperation, Britain was in no position to bring pressure to bear on Japan unilaterally, largely because of the perilous state of affairs in Europe. However, in the last days of Eden’s tenure, Foreign Office thinking had shifted to a new policy, which, while accepting that direct coercion of Japan was impossible, noted that this did not rule out providing assistance to the Chinese as long as the aid was not provocative enough to ensure a hostile Japanese response.5 This then was the thinking on East Asia that Halifax adopted when he took up the reins of the Foreign Office in late February 1938. Clearly, there was a potential difficulty when putting this policy into practice, namely judging the degree to which Japan would perceive any act of support for China as being provocative. It did not take long for this problem to manifest itself, for one of the issues that arose in the spring and summer of 1938 was whether Britain should provide China with a £15–20 million loan that would help to stabilize its currency, the fapi. Coming at a time when tensions were rising in Europe over the future of the Sudetenland, this question led to heated debate in London. The Treasury, which was now led by Sir John Simon, was bitterly opposed to any such loan being offered, for it believed that nothing should be done that might alienate Japan at such a critical juncture. In addition, it thought that in any case a Japanese victory over China was inevitable and that Britain therefore needed to be ready for that eventuality. This view was also shared by Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador to Japan. The Foreign Office thought very differently; it did not believe that Japan would vanquish China any time soon or perhaps ever, and accordingly argued that it was worth assisting the Chinese to contain Japan. At the same time it also saw the loan as being a useful means of aiding the hard-stretched British business community in Shanghai and the other treaty ports.6 Halifax backed this policy.7 In the Cabinet’s Foreign Policy Sub-Committee in June and at the Cabinet in July he spoke up strongly for a loan and made it clear that he did not agree with Craigie’s gloomy prognosis.8 Indeed, to make his point he went as far as to circulate to his Cabinet colleagues a report from a Red Cross official in China which provided information about recent Japanese casualties and falling morale.9 In the end he did not win this battle, for Chamberlain shared Simon’s sense of caution, and, in the light of the steadily worsening international situation, Halifax agreed to drop his proposal.10 However, what does clearly emerge from this debate is that Halifax was not by inclination an appeaser when it came to Japan.

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Furthermore, in November 1938 Halifax returned to the fray with a new plan for a British loan to China that would be put at the disposal of a currency stabilization fund. The sum on this occasion was not as great as it had been in the summer and Halifax therefore argued that it would not be too provocative an act.11 Despite continued opposition from the Treasury, this time Halifax’s efforts bore fruit and in March 1939 a loan of £5 million was made.12 In addition, in the face of the recent Japanese advance into the South China Sea and its alliance talks with Germany and Italy, Halifax raised with his colleagues the prospect of Britain’s introducing some measures of economic coercion against Japan.13 This was, however, strongly opposed by the Treasury and the Board of Trade and the idea subsequently dropped, but it is interesting that Halifax even agreed to these fairly radical views being circulated to his fellow ministers in the form of a Cabinet memorandum. In June 1939, Halifax was faced with his first really serious crisis in Anglo-Japanese relations when the Japanese army blockaded the British concession at Tientsin. The foreign secretary had little to do with this crisis erupting because ever since mid-March and the German seizure of Prague his attention had been squarely on Eastern European affairs.14 At first he was reluctant to admit how serious the situation was, noting on 14 June at the cabinet that, ‘his impression was that it was unlikely to that there would be any catastrophic events in Tientsin’. In addition, in keeping with his persistently uncompromising attitude towards Japan, he was reluctant to give in to the latest Japanese demands believing that any concessions now would mean that ‘we should be subjected to increasing pressure throughout the Far East’.15 Halifax proved, however, to be too sanguine, for by 19 June with a full blockade of the British and French concessions at Tientsin having been introduced, it was clear this was a major crisis. The foreign secretary’s natural inclination was for Britain to stand firm as he feared that any climb-down would be humiliating. However, at the same time he agreed with the chiefs of staff that, if American support were not forthcoming, Britain’s strategic situation was too perilous to risk war. He therefore proposed that Craigie should be given the chance to break the deadlock by opening negotiations in Tokyo, but was insistent that simultaneously preparations should be made for retaliation should these talks fail.16 The latter prospect worried some of his Cabinet colleagues, but Halifax, on the basis of advice from the Foreign Office’s greatest expert on Japan, Sir George Sansom, who had just returned from Tokyo, felt that the Japanese might be bluffing and that, if so, Britain could take action in the economic field.17 To enable this to happen, he therefore pressed a reluctant Board of Trade to prepare legislation that would allow for the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1911.18 Over the next few weeks Tientsin came to dominate Halifax’s time as much as any other issue. Indeed, in early August he admitted to his cabinet colleagues that the situation in Tientsin was ‘causing him more anxiety than the position in any other part of the world’.19 By this stage, Craigie had managed to concoct with the Japanese foreign minister, Arita Hachiro, a formula on how the British concessions in north China should conduct themselves. Halifax was not averse to this compromise, but he still held that there were limits to how far he was prepared to go over the more substantial issue of the fate of the silver that the Chinese government had deposited in the concession. Thus, in early August when Craigie proposed that Britain should allow the silver to be handed over either to a Japanese bank or one controlled by the local puppet regime, Halifax baulked at the suggestion. His new harder line did not though just arise from the belief that Craigie was too willing to compromise, for it was influenced

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by other factors. These included the fact that in late July the Roosevelt administration had announced its own intention to abrogate its commercial treaty with Japan and that Sansom once again acted to stiffen the foreign secretary’s backbone. In a minute for Halifax on 3 August Sansom was dismissive of the idea that short-term concessions would lead to long-term gains and of the chances that Japan would risk going to war with Britain.20 Armed with this advice, Halifax’s stance notably hardened. In response to Sansom’s views, he observed to his staff, that, ‘There is a point beyond which we cannot go – and the dangers of what would be generally regarded as surrender on vital principles are not less great than the danger of breakdown of conversations.’21 Accordingly, he wrote to Chamberlain on 16 August opposing Craigie’s proposal, noting that Britain would ‘get very little positive result [from the Japanese] in exchange for the great worsening of our present position vis-à-vis the United States and China’.22 Whether he would have continued to hold this stance if relations had continued to worsen is unknown, for in late August the signing of the Ribbentrop/Molotov Pact and flooding around Tientsin left the crisis in abeyance. With the start of the European war in September 1939 Britain clearly had to adjust its foreign policy to suit the new circumstances. In regard to Japan, this meant that Halifax was keener than before on keeping relations on an even keel, although not to the extent that Britain was prepared to sell out China or offend the United States.23 Indeed, as early as 4 September he told the cabinet that a new Anglo-Japanese alliance was not on the cards.24 In real terms what this policy meant was that Halifax supported the renewal of talks to reach an agreement at Tientsin and was open to the idea of negotiating a war trade agreement that would set quotas for Japanese imports from the British Empire. In addition, he was keen to ensure that the British blockade of Germany did not put too great a strain on relations with Japan, although on occasions his efforts to restrain the belligerence of Churchill’s Admiralty were overruled.25 However, in a sign of his burgeoning commitments now that war had broken out, it is notable that he handed over the day-to-day supervision of policy towards East Asia to the parliamentary under-secretary of state, R.A. Butler. This was an interesting decision, for Butler was close to Chamberlain, had a reputation as a keen proponent of appeasement, and had cultivated quite close relations with Shigemitsu.26 It therefore reinforced the impression that Britain was keen to retreat from the tensions that had marked relations in the summer of 1939. By the spring of 1940 there were some signs that Halifax’s new policy was paying dividends, for Japan agreed to a settlement over Tientsin and gave the green light to trade talks in London.27 However, while the prudent attitude that he had taken suited the period of the Phoney War, it was ill-equipped to deal with the rapid shifts in the world situation that were sparked by the German assault on Western Europe that began on 10 May 1940. The rapid collapse of French resistance to Germany and the seemingly inevitable defeat of Britain stimulated profound changes in Japanese thinking. They could see that the new situation meant that the European hold over the colonies of South-East Asia was now extremely fragile. Japan was therefore faced with the possibility that it could carry out two initiatives that might well transform its strategic situation. First, it could put pressure on Britain and France to close their colonial borders with China, thus denying Chiang Kai-shek vital resources including munitions. Second, it could put pressure on the imperial powers to increase Japan’s access to raw materials, such as oil, rubber and tin. Consequently, in late June, the Yonai government put the first of these options into action, asking France and Britain to close their borders with China. The French quickly acquiesced and Craigie telegraphed to London urging the Foreign Office

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to agree to the Japanese demand and close the Burma Road and to use the present moment to come to a fuller agreement with Japan. As in the Tientsin crisis, Halifax realized that something needed to be done to assuage Japan’s ambitions, but he was loath to go as far as closing the Burma Road altogether. Instead, he proposed to the Cabinet in early July 1940 that Britain should only agree to put a ceiling on trade with China that would keep it at the level set in 1939.28 With Churchill now having replaced Chamberlain as prime minister, one might expect that on this occasion Halifax would have received full support from No.10 or even been criticized for being too soft. The opposite was the case; Churchill, on the basis of advice from the chiefs of staff, was highly averse to taking any risks in Asia. The prime minister therefore overruled Halifax’s proposal and instead accepted an idea that had originated with Craigie under which Britain would close the Burma Road for three months during which time Japan would purportedly try to reach a fair peace with China. Halifax was not at all pleased at this turn of events. His belief was that the Japanese were bluffing and when he finally agreed to follow Churchill’s lead, he noted afterwards in his diary, ‘I think it may be necessary, but it is very distasteful to me to give way to Japanese threats.’29 In a number of private letters around this time, he also made the same point. For example, in a letter to his former cabinet colleague, Sir Samuel Hoare, who had now been ‘exiled’ to the embassy in Spain, he observed: I wanted to call the Japanese bluff and tell them to go to the devil, but the Chiefs of Staff were greatly alarmed and Winston was not prepared to take the risk. The United States, as usual, said they would do nothing and Menzies [the Australian Prime Minister] was very much disturbed, especially as we told him we could no longer promise a fleet for Singapore.30

Thus when Halifax received letters of protest about recent Far Eastern policy, including one from the Archbishop of York, William Temple, all he could do was to answer with platitudes while silently sympathizing.31 Halifax’s distaste for the Burma Road agreement contrasts sharply with that of his deputy, Butler. While Halifax regretted the agreement’s terms might not have been necessary, Butler believed, as did Craigie, that it might now be possible to turn over a new leaf in Anglo-Japanese relations. Accordingly, Butler took it upon himself to force the Far Eastern department at the Foreign Office to look into the possibility of reaching a comprehensive settlement with Japan and to consult about this more widely in Whitehall. These eventually fruitless consultations and the worsening situation in East Asia with the arrival of the Konoe government in Tokyo soon put paid to this idea. In late September Halifax reviewed the situation and concluded that no settlement was possible as the only concessions that Britain could usefully make to Japan would interfere with the war effort against the Axis Powers.32 Indeed, Halifax was so frustrated by Japan’s recent behaviour that his inclination was to move in the opposite direction. On 28 September he wrote to Churchill recommending that Britain should give early warning of its intention to reopen the Burma Road and on 3 October this line of action was accepted by the cabinet.33 From this point on British policy notably hardened. Over the next few months, Britain collaborated with the Dominions and the Dutch government-in-exile to cut raw material exports to Japan and also began preparations for top-level military talks with the United States. Halifax oversaw the start of this process but was soon on the move himself. In late December 1940 Churchill took the opportunity provided by the death of the British ambassador to the United States, Lord

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Lothian, to move Halifax to the United States as his successor, with Eden resuming his previous role as foreign secretary. AS AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON Halifax’s exile did not mean that his connection with policy towards Japan was now broken, for clearly the Japanese loomed large as a threat to the Americans as well as to the British and there was a need for increasing cooperation to contain the potential menace in the east. Consequently, one of Halifax’s first tasks in Washington was to relay to President Roosevelt and his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, the ‘straws in the wind’ that led Britain in February 1941 to believe that war with Japan might be imminent. He handled this delicate task with considerable skill, with the result that the United States proved to be more amenable than hitherto to consultations about Far Eastern policy. Indeed, Halifax was moved to write to Churchill on 21 February that, ‘I feel there has been a considerable movement of opinion in the direction of recognizing how closely the Far Eastern business may react upon our present efforts.’34 Despite his presence in Washington, Halifax played little role in the famous Hull-Nomura talks that dragged on from March to November in an always doomed attempt to reach a mutually acceptable American-Japanese settlement. On one occasion in late May, on instructions from the Foreign Office, he tried to elicit some information from Hull about their progress, only to find himself at the end of a tirade from the secretary of state about Britain’s lack of trust in his judgement.35 Taking this lesson to heart, he was henceforth careful to express an interest in the talks only when Hull wished for consultation. For the rest of the year the most notable aspect of Halifax’s thinking was his sanguine attitude in regard to Japan’s future intentions, which probably reflected his years of service in the Foreign Office, which generally held a similar view. On 10 July, as news filtered through from intelligence sources about Japan’s latest intentions, he observed in his diary that the Japanese were ‘cautious people’, and that he was disinclined to think that they would make any dramatic move.36 Further comments in the same vein were made in October and November, as tensions were clearly escalating. Indeed, on 19 November he bet his wife Dorothy that Japan would not be in the war by 1 January 1942.37 These doubts about Japan’s bellicosity did not mean, however, that he was averse to a negotiated settlement. When on 22 November he learned from Hull about the possibility of a modus vivendi proposal being put to the Japanese, he reported back to Eden his belief that, ‘if we can … get the Japanese out of Indo-China without giving away too much on the line of economic relief, we should be wise to take it.’38 This was not, though, the view adopted in London and over the next few days as Halifax made clear British misgivings he once again became an object of Hull’s ire. Despite Hull’s breaking off of the talks with Japanese on 26 November, Halifax continued to remain optimistic, noting on the following day, ‘It remains to be seen what they [the Japanese] do now. If I had to bet, I would bet nothing.’39 It was only on 4 December, when faced with evidence that the Japanese embassy in Washington was burning its ciphers, that he accepted that war might be a possibility.40 By this stage, this news was not as disturbing as it might once have been, for he was also privy to the most important information he could have – Roosevelt’s promise that the United States would stand by Britain in the face of a Japanese attack.41

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ASSESSMENT Despite Shigemitsu’s belief that Halifax was an orthodox Tory with pro-Japanese sympathies, it is clear from his record as foreign secretary that he was no such thing. Armed with a highly moral, if still pragmatic, view of world affairs, Halifax was naturally disinclined to take a sympathetic view of Japanese aggression in China. Thus, the common themes of his time at the Foreign Office are his efforts to do more for China and to try to take as tough a stand as circumstances allowed during crises with the Japanese. As such, any study of Halifax’s tenure as foreign secretary must raise doubts about whether Britain had a determined policy of appeasement towards Japan during these years. The fact that Halifax supported appeasement of Germany up until the autumn of 1938 should not be read necessarily as indicating that he felt likewise about Japan. If he did agree to compromises being made, these were usually short-term measures or ones of limited utility, such as the Craigie-Arita formula. The more important long-term trends during his years at the Foreign Office were disapproval of Japan’s intentions and the collection of the information about its economy that would later be used as the foundation of Britain’s sanctions policy. Indeed, if anything, Halifax’s diary entry entries from 1941 reveal not that he was an appeaser, but that he was too sanguine about the prospect of war with Japan. NOTES 1

2

3 4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23

For a biography of Lord Halifax, see Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox: A Life of Lord Halifax (Macmillan, London, 1991). Shigemitsu Mamoru, Gaiko Kaisoroku [Diplomatic Memoirs], (Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo, 1978) p.192. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 128–9. Avon papers, Cadbury Research Library: Special Collections, University of Birmingham, AP20 38/46 Halifax to Eden 27 September 1937. Documents on British Foreign Policy, Second Series, vol.XXI doc.517 (F1788/78/10) Interdepartmental meeting 11 February 1938, pp. 659–60. Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia 1936–41 (London, Routledge, 1995) pp. 52–5. See Harvey diary entry 5 June 1938, in John Harvey (ed.), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937–1940 (Collins, London, 1970) p. 149. The National Archives, Kew (TNA) CAB27/623 FP(36) 30th meeting 1 June 1938, and CAB23/94 31(38) Cabinet meeting 6 July 1938 and 32(38) Cabinet meeting 13 July 1938. TNA FO371/22044 F6706/2/10 Halifax minute undated [20 June 1938?]. TNA CAB23/94 32(38) Cabinet meeting 13 July 1938. TNA CAB23/96 57(38) Cabinet meeting 30 November 1938. Best, op. cit., pp. 65–6. TNA CAB24/284 CP76(39) ‘The Situation in the Far East’ Halifax memorandum 30 March 1939. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 142–63. TNA CAB23/99 32(39) Cabinet meeting 14 June 1939. TNA CAB27/625 FP(36) 52nd meeting 19 June 1939. TNA CAB2/9 CID 362nd meeting 26 June 1939. TNA FO371/23438 F6279/44/10 Halifax minute 6 July 1939. TNA CAB23/100 40(39) Cabinet meeting 2 August 1939. For Sansom’s views, see TNA BT11/694 CRT65/39 Ministerial meeting 31 July 1939 and FO371/23529 F8502/6457/10 Sansom minute 3 August 1939. TNA FO371/23529 F8502/6457/10 Halifax minute 11 August 1939. TNA PREM1/316 Halifax to Chamberlain 16 August 1939. For a clear statement of Halifax’s views, see TNA CAB99/1 DMV(39) 1st meeting 1 November 1939.

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TNA CAB65/1 WM2(39) War Cabinet meeting 4 September 1939. 25 TNA CAB65/2 WM115(39) War Cabinet meeting 14 December 1939. For Butler, see Antony Best, ‘Lord Hankey, R.A. Butler and Japan’ in Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits vol.V, (Global Oriental, Folkestone, 2005) pp. 107– 16. Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, pp. 88–110. TNA CAB65/8 WM189(40) War Cabinet conclusions 1 July 1940 and WM194(40) War Cabinet conclusions 5 July 1940, Earl Halifax papers, Borthwick Institute (BI), University of York, Halifax/A7/8/4 diary entry 15 July 1940. For the comment about Japan’s bluffing see the diary entry for 6 July 1940. Halifax to Hoare 17 July 1940, cited in David Day, Menzies and Churchill at War (Angus & Robertson, London, 1985, p. 76. Halifax papers, TNA, FO800/310 Halifax to Temple 16 July 1940. TNA FO371/24710 F4772/193/61 ‘The Possibility of a General Far Eastern Settlement’ Sterndale-Bennett memorandum 25 September 1940. This was written following consultation with Halifax. TNA FO371/24670 F4646/43/10 Halifax to Churchill 25 September 1940, and CAB65/9 WM265(40) War Cabinet meeting 3 October 1940. TNA PREM4/27/9 Halifax (Washington) to Churchill 21 February 1941. TNA FO371/27908 F4430/86/23 Halifax to Eden 24 May 1941. Halifax papers, BI, Halifax/A7/8/19 secret diary entry 10 July 1941. Halifax papers, BI, Halifax/A7/8/9 diary entry 19 November 1941. TNA FO371/27912 F12654/86/23 Halifax to Eden 22 November 1941. Halifax papers, BI, Halifax/A7/8/19 secret diary entry 27 November 1941. Halifax papers, BI, Halifax/A7/8/19 secret diary entry 4 December 1941. TNA FO371/27912 F13114/86/23 Halifax to Eden 1 December 1941.

21

LORD HANKEY, 1877–1963

[Maurice, 1st Baron Hankey]

R.A.BUTLER, 1902–82

[‘Rab’, Richard Austen, Barron Butler of Saffron Walden] THE ‘APPEASEMENT OF JAPAN’ ANTONY BEST

Lord Hankey

R. A. Butler

INTRODUCTION

I

N October 1950 a group of individuals in Britain sent a letter to the American Parole Board in Japan calling for the early release of the former Japanese ambassador to Britain, Shigemitsu Mamoru, who had recently been sentenced to seven years imprisonment by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. Among the signatories of this letter were those who might be termed the ‘usual suspects’ among British Japanophiles, such as Lord Sempill, Sir Robert Craigie and Major-General F.S.G. Piggott, in other words the various pillars of the post-war Japan Society. However, the man most responsible for organizing the letter, Lord Hankey, and another of the signatories, R.A. Butler, might seem more surprising names to conjure with, for both were prominent political figures who had been members of Churchill’s wartime Cabinet. Why should they have risked their reputations in arguing the case for a man who had been found guilty of failing to do all he could to control the

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excesses of the Imperial Japanese Army? The answer lies in the period between 1939 and 1941 when Hankey and Butler were two of the most senior figures in the government arguing for a policy of reconciliation with Japan and were in regular contact with Shigemitsu, who they believed to be a sincere partner for peace. R.A. BUTLER AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE The more important of the two in shaping policy in these years was Richard Austen Butler, who in February 1938 was appointed the parliamentary under-secretary for foreign affairs. This was a consider able achievement for the still young politician, because as the foreign secretary was Lord Halifax, Butler had the responsibility for handling foreign affairs in the House of Commons. Butler stayed in this post for the next three and a half years until in July 1941 Churchill made him the secretary of state for education. In retrospect, these were controversial years in his political life for, under the premiership of Neville Chamberlain, Butler was an ardent supporter of the appeasement of Germany and later in the summer of 1940, after Churchill’s accession, was involved in a damaging dalliance with defeatism.4 It is in the context of his interest in appeasing Britain’s enemies that one has to analyse Butler’s efforts to tilt the Foreign Office towards a more accommodating policy regarding Japan. Before taking office Butler showed scant interest in the subject of Japan. One of the few letters of his prior to 1938 that mentions the country was one to his cousin Lord Braboume in December 1935. In this letter he stated that at the recent naval limitation conference he had found the Japanese delegation to be very friendly, and affirmed that ‘I would like to go back to the good old days of the Anglo-Japanese treaty’.5 This yearning for the assumed certainties of the alliance period was typical of contemporary opinion in the Conservative Party and identifies Butler not necessarily as a Japanophile but rather as one being swept along by the general air of nostalgia that pervaded the Tory ranks. On his appointment to the Foreign Office, Butler had at first very little to do with Japan. The situation only began to change in 1939. One of the main reasons for this was that Halifax was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with meeting the representatives of regimes for which he only had contempt. Accordingly, whenever possible he passed on to Butler the responsibility for meeting with the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Maisky, and with Shigemitsu.6 Another possible reason for Butler’s higher profile in Anglo-Japanese relations was that his orthodox Tory views on Japan seem to have become apparent to the Japanophile lobby in Britain, who for years had struggled to receive a sympathetic hearing from the Foreign Office. For example, it is notable that in March 1939 he received a letter from George Sale, the British businessman with interests in Japan, who wrote to say that the Japanese were now taking a more conciliatory line towards British firms in China. Shortly after Butler indicated to the officials of the Far Eastern Department that he was happy to encourage people like Sale and ‘any efforts which the new Japanese ambassador [Shigemitsu) may make to bring our countries closer together’.8 During the summer of 1939 and the Tientsin crisis, Butler continued to play a fairly marginal role, for Halifax stepped into the foreground in an effort to find the correct balance between ameliorating tensions and adhering to British principles. Butler’s position began to change only in late August when the worst of the crisis was over. His new prominence came about in part because Halifax was

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now caught up again in European affairs, but perhaps just as significant was the fact that the Japanese Embassy began a concerted campaign to attract his interest. The conduit for this was Arthur Edwardes, the Japanese embassy’s adviser on world affairs. Since late 1932 Edwardes had been a representative in London of the Manchukuo government and had attempted to interest British firms in investing in Manchuria. Knowing that Edwardes had valuable contacts within the British elite, the Japanese embassy had also attempted to use him to communicate its professed desire for better relations to Whitehall. However, while Edwardes had developed good contacts with those close to Chamberlain, such as Sir Warren Fisher and Sir Horace Wilson, he had always been treated as persona non grata by the Foreign Office. In 1939 he was able to finally get around this problem, in part because his formal link with Manchukuo was severed, but also because he had an entree to Butler, being a distant cousin by marriage.9 Edwardes first used this channel on 25 August when he saw Butler in order to ascertain whether the British government would be amenable to a proposal designed to deal with one of the more intractable issues raised by the Tientsin talks. In this venture Edwardes cleverly presented himself as not merely an employee of the Japanese embassy but also as a patriot and honest broker who wished to restore good relations between the two countries.10 Butler duly showed enthusiasm for this proposal, but more importantly now that the first contact had been made the two men began to meet regularly and to correspond with each other. In September 1939 Edwardes stressed on a number of occasions that the opening of the European War provided an opportunity for Britain and Japan to begin again and sent Butler a long memorandum on the subject.11 Butler reacted enthusiastically to these overtures largely because he believed that now Britain was at war with Germany it had somehow to relieve the pressure on its interests further afield. In his own memorandum of 22 September he stated that Britain had to get closer either to the Soviet Union or to Japan, and plumped for the latter on the grounds that it, too, desired a rapprochement, that it shared the British antipathy towards communism and that it might be possible to mediate a settlement of the Sino-Japanese War.12 Butler’s views did not, however, presage any change in British policy, for his was an isolated voice. Indeed, the chiefs; of staff contradicted his views a few days later when they observed that it was in Britain’s interest for the war in China to continue as long as possible, as this tied down Japan’s forces.13 Butler’s sympathy for better relations was not, however, without its uses, for the start of the war in Europe meant that Britain now had to engage in war trade negotiations with Japan in order to regulate the latter’s access to raw materials from the Empire. Clearly as Butler had developed a cordial relationship with the Japanese Embassy, he was the best placed to supervise such intricate and potentially difficult talks. For the next six months this became Butler’s most important area of activity. In this he was again encouraged by the enthusiasm of Shigemitsu, whom he had come to see as a sincere ‘friend’ of Britain.14 The atmosphere of optimism surrounding the talks led him to believe that progress in this field would lay the basis for a broader move towards more cordial relations.15 For example, in April 1940 he observed to the Minister for Economic Warfare, Ronald Cross, that the war trade talks had the potential to lead to a further lowering of tensions with Japan, which could only benefit the world situation.16 In addition, he once again toyed with the idea that Britain should make more of the common Anglo-Japanese antipathy towards the Soviet Union. When Sir Robert Craigie raised the question of whether Britain and Japan might exchange information about the

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Comintern, Butler enthused that ‘Such an exchange could do nothing but good . . . and would have a slight diplomatic flavour of a piquant character’.17 The idea, however, came to nothing. After extensive preparations and a number of false starts the formal war trade talks finally opened on 10 May 1940; an inauspicious day which witnessed not only Chamberlain’s resignation as Prime Minister but also the start of the German attack on the Low Countries. Against the turbulent background in Western Europe the negotiations stood no chance of success, for with every Allied defeat the Japanese became ever more intractable. Indeed by June, when the talks were called off without result, all that Butler had strived to achieve appeared to be in ruins, for Japan reacted to the fall of France by demanding that Britain close the Burma Road. While the British War Cabinet debated the delicate issue of whether to appease Japan over the Burma Road, the Japanese embassy maintained its pressure on Butler to take an optimistic view of events. In particular, Shigemitsu stressed in his frequent meetings with Butler that this was Britain’s chance to come to terms with Japan and ease its strategic position. Ironically, considering the course of future events, he used the appearance of Matsuoka Yosuke as the new Japanese foreign minister as evidence that Japan would seek to come to mutually acceptable terms.18 While Butler did not share this sense of optimism, he did recognize that Britain’s strategic position made it imperative to address how the tensions in the East could be resolved. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the signing of the Burma Road agreement, on 17 July he ordered the Far Eastern Department to investigate what form an Anglo-American-Japanese settlement in East Asia might take.19 In particular, Butler felt that it was important to press the United States to say what it wanted to achieve in the Pacific, rather than merely criticizing from the side-lines, which is what it had done during the Burma Road crisis. Butler’s line, which echoed the impatience that Chamberlain had always expressed in regard to American diplomacy, brought him into collision with officials in the Foreign Office, who were disinclined to do anything that might provoke Washington’s disapproval. Faced with stonewalling by the American and Far Eastern Departments, an exasperated Butler minuted: ‘Let me make quite plain that I do not contemplate “hectoring” methods nor do I contemplate telling them [the Americans] what to do. I simply wish an acceleration of that process of close consultation and less academic exchanges.’20 Butler’s prompting led in early August to the Foreign Office circulating a memorandum to other interested ministries in Whitehall calling on them to consider what areas would need to be addressed in any rapprochement with Japan. Meanwhile, Butler continued to look into other possible avenues that might lead to better Anglo-Japanese relations. This involved further consultations with Edwardes, and contacts with other British figures close to the Japanese embassy, such as Sempill and Sale.21 These activities raised eye-brows in the Foreign Office, but Butler remained unrepentant, noting at one point that ‘I am sorry to keep such funny company’ and at another that he refused ‘to be turned into a robot by our Gestapo’.22 These manoeuvres, however, failed to lead to any practical proposals. By September, Butler’s idea of mapping out a general settlement had led to a series of gloomy responses being returned to the Foreign Office, which seemed to suggest that there was little room for reconciliation. Given Butler’s mood in July, one might have expected that he would have been angered by these further examples of bureaucratic obstructionism, but by September his own feelings towards Japan were undergoing a metamorphosis. One of the main reasons for

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this was that events in late July and August contradicted Shigemitsu’s predictions that Matsuoka would be able to bring about a positive upturn in Anglo-Japanese relations. In particular, the arrest of over twenty British subjects in Japan and Korea on suspicion of espionage suggested that the new Konoe government was becoming even more confrontational than its predecessors had been. Accordingly, on 18 September a resigned Butler recorded: The head of steam on which Prince Konoye [sic] is sitting, so far with comforting success, seems to me too strong for us to consider a ‘settlement’ at present. I do not think ... things can be ordered this way in the Far East. Any temptation I had to think so was killed when I realized the forces under the new Govt.23

Over the following fortnight his outlook became even more pessimistic as Japan in rapid succession forced Vichy to allow it to station troops in north Indo-China and signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Japan’s new confrontational policy did not just lead to a change in Butler’s thinking but also in his responsibilities, for as British policy hardened he was appointed the chairman of the Cabinet’s Far Eastern sub-committee. Among other things, this new body was established to oversee the introduction of a concerted policy of economic warfare against Japan. Butler was thus ironically now in the forefront of the British struggle to contain the Japanese threat. This was not a role that made him uncomfortable. Indeed, by the end of the year he was pressing forcefully for the Royal Navy to send a squadron to Singapore in order to boost Britain’s regional defences.24 LORD HANKEY’S INVOLVEMENT While Butler’s role was changing, so also was Shigemitsu’s thinking, for in the late summer of 1940 the latter began to make approaches to two other ministers within the cabinet, Lord Lloyd, the Colonial Secretary and long time Churchill confidant, and Lord Hankey, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and former Cabinet Secretary. While there is little evidence of any prior contacts with Lloyd, Hankey had for some time been seen as a useful contact by the Japanese Embassy. In the spring of 1938 Shigemitsu’s predecessor, Yoshida Shigeru, had held a number of meetings with Hankey about the thorny question of Japan’s attitude towards the 1936 naval limitation treaty.25 On coming to London in the autumn of 1938, Shigemitsu had not initially kept up these contacts, although he had previously met Hankey at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. However, in March 1939 a Swedish entrepreneur, Carl Sandberg, acted to bring the two men. together and they began to meet occasionally to discuss political affairs. Hankey felt such meetings were useful, for from his position as Cabinet secretary and secretary to the Committee of lmperial Defence he realized how greatly Britain’s security relied on Japan’s neutrality.26 Shigemitsu’s sense of Hankey’s worth seems to have risen in the summer of 1940 largely due to the idea, originally propounded by the Japanophiles close to the Japanese Embassy, that Britain should send a mission to the celebrations in 1940 to mark the so-called 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan. Shigemitsu was keen that Hankey should lead any such mission, and in September he aired this proposal at two lunches that he hosted for the latter at the Savoy, with Lloyd, Piggott and Sale also in attendance. However, before anything substantial could be agreed, events interceded in the shape of the Tripartite Pact, which, as

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Hankey observed to Piggott, made it certain that ‘there is not the smallest chance of the Government agreeing to anything of the kind’.28 During the autumn of 1940 both Shigemitsu and Piggott continued to urge Hankey to agree to a mission which, even if it did not formally represent the Cabinet, could proceed to Japan under the auspices of the British Council of which Lloyd was president. Hankey, however, continued to try to bring a sense of reality into proceedings, noting that until Lloyd had managed to win over Halifax to the idea of a mission no further progress could be made.29 Meanwhile, Lloyd did his best to impress Halifax with the wisdom of dispatching a mission to Japan, citing Shigemitsu’s view that there was ‘still a very strong, if silent, body of pro-British opinion worth cultivating at the present time’. Halifax, however, had no time for such views and observed in a letter to Lloyd on 17 December that such a mission might be misunderstood both in Japan and the United States and that the best policy was to continue to contain the Japanese menace.30 After this rebuff, the mission proposal was forgotten until finally it received its coup de grace in February 1941 when Lloyd died. Even this setback and the concurrent worsening of Anglo-Japanese relations in the winter of 1941 culminating in the February war scare did not, however, lead Shigemitsu and Piggott to give up on Hankey as a channel to the heart of government. In late February Piggott asked Hankey to come to his house in Ewhurst in Surrey to meet with Shigemitsu. Little of importance was discussed at this gathering, which eventually took place on 22 March, but in its immediate aftermath Shigemitsu hit upon a new idea that could only come to fruition with Hankey’s assistance. The ambassador’s proposal was that he should take advantage of Matsuoka’s imminent trip to Europe to meet with his foreign minister and, among other things, bring to his attention that German victory in Europe was by no means certain. However, in order to visit Europe in wartime, Shigemitsu needed to arrange a transit flight to Portugal from where he would proceed to Switzerland for his rendezvous with Matsuoka. This was where Hankey came in, for as this transit was needed at short notice and Shigemitsu’s flight would need official sanction, it was thought that he could use his influence to square the highest authorities.31 Hankey believed that Shigemitsu’s scheme had value and on 24 March wrote to Butler asking the Foreign Office to help facilitate the ambassador’s journey.32 Despite the tougher stance that Butler had taken over Japan since September 1940 he, too, felt that a meeting between Shigemitsu and Matsuoka could be useful. This reflected his belief that, while Japan itself was becoming more bellicose, the former was sincere in his protestations of friendship towards Britain and had a sound belief in the likelihood of British victory. Butler’s hunch did not rely just on his frequent conversations with Shigemitsu, for he also had other ways of knowing the ambassador’s thoughts, namely his access to the deciphered Japanese diplomatic traffic produced by Bletchley Park. On 5 February Butler noted just prior to the first conversation that the new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, had with Shigemitsu that: I have always followed the secret accounts of the Japanese Ambassador’s reports since I have had the responsibility of seeing him for so long. We have fortunately not had reasons for qualms about his understanding of this country’s spirit.33

Confident that Shigemitsu would communicate the right message to Matsuoka, Butler on 28 March duly informed Churchill, who was acting foreign secretary in Eden’s absence, about the ambassador’s plan?34 The prime minister in turn also

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believed that if Shigemitsu met Matsuoka it could do some good and approved his passage to Lisbon. Unfortunately, however, the ambassador was not able to co-ordinate his movements with those of his foreign minister and therefore the plan came to naught. With this initiative proving as abortive as those that had preceded it, there was little more that could be done to save Anglo-Japanese relations. Indeed, the vital point of contact with Japan, Shigemitsu, returned soon after to Tokyo. In his final days in Britain, the ambassador met a few more times with Butler and Hankey. On 9 June the latter gave a farewell lunch at the Savoy for Shigemitsu in which the only other guest was the Australian High Commissioner, Stanley Bruce. Hankey subsequently recorded in his diary: ‘... the ambassador was extraordinarily moved when he bade me farewell. Said he valued: my opinion and friendship more than that of any man in this country.’34 Following Shigemitsu’s departure, the ability of Butler and Hankey to influence the course of events was reduced further by the Cabinet reshuffle of July 1941.. Butler was promoted, but his new post at the Department of Education could not have been more remote from foreign affairs. Hankey for his part was demoted to paymaster-general. This was ostensibly to free his former position for a political appointment, but probably arose from his flirting with Churchill’s opponents in Whitehall?36 Butler now concentrated on pastures new, but Hankey still continued to correspond with the Japanophiles, although he held out little hope for the future. When Sempill proposed in August 1941 that Eden should send a British mission to Japan for talks, Hankey replied gloomily that ‘Unfortunately we live in days of catch-words and anything of the kind you suggest would at once be dubbed “appeasement”’37 Hankey was right in his judgement, for when in October he wrote one last letter to Eden stating the need to do something to prevent hostilities breaking out with Japan, the foreign secretary minuted: ‘The old appeasement again. Of course we do not want to fight Japan, but I fear that Lord H. will never learn that to be gentle with aggressors does not avoid hostilities.’38 Rebuffed once again, in November Hankey rejected a proposal from Piggott that he should espouse the idea of King George VI writing directly to Emperor Hirohito, noting: ‘Unless I have something entirely new to suggest I do not think they would listen.’39 ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR SHIGEMITSU For the rest of the war Hankey and Butler had little to do with Japan. Their interest only re-emerged in 1946 when the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal laid down charges against Shigemitsu. The indictment, which largely originated with the Soviet Union, accused him of being involved in conspiracy to wage aggressive war and his failure to prevent crimes against humanity while foreign minister between 1943 and 1945. In December 1946 Shigernitsu’s American counsel, George Furness, came to Britain to collect affidavits that could be used in his client’s defence. Both Hankey and Butler produced material on his behalf in which they argued that, far from planning aggressive war, Shigemitsu had done all in his power to stop the conflagration. Indeed, Hankey concluded his affidavit by affirming: ‘Throughout the whole series of conversations, extending over six months, I cannot find or recollect a word to cast doubt on Mr Shigemitsu’s bona fides and I believe that my associates would confirm that view.’40

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These efforts to exonerate Shigernitsu only had limited success for in November 1948 the former ambassador was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Butler and Hankey now became involved in an effort organized by Piggott to send a telegram to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan, calling for clemency. This, too, failed to have any effect. Frustrated by the British government’s refusal to support this campaign, in 1949 Hankey used his position as a member of the House of Lords to raise Shigernitsu’s case and enter into a more general attack on the iniquities of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. Building on this, in the following year he published a book, Politics, Trials and Errors in which he criticized the proceedings both in Nuremburg and Tokyo by utilizing the arguments developed by the dissenting judges, and helped to organize the petition sent to the parole board in Japan.41 While these efforts to assist Shigemitsu did not lead to any curtailment of his sentence, both the former ambassador himself and Japan in general showed their gratitude. In 1953 when Crown Prince Akihito came to Britain to represent Japan at the Queen’s Coronation, he not only met Hankey at official functions but also paid a short visit to his home.42 CONCLUSION How then should we assess the role played by Butler and Hankey in AngloJapanese relations before the war started? On the face of it they may appear to be rather naïve in their efforts to stem the descent towards war. However, it is important to see that while they attempted to use their influence to bring about a rapprochement, they did so for sound political rather than sentimental reasons. Their assessment of the situation from 1939 to 1941 was that Britain had quite enough on its plate in Europe without opening up yet another front in Asia. In this view they were not alone, for the ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, felt similarly. The experiences of the late summer of 1940 steadily weaned Butler away from this interpretation of events as he began to see that the Japanese problem had to be seen from a global perspective in which American support for Britain was crucial. However, Hankey like Craigie, never really learned this lesson and thus remained interested in improving the state of Anglo-Japanese relations until the end and criticized the Churchill government for doing too little. Hankey though never entertained the same delusions as the more rabid Japanophiles such as Edwardes, Piggott and Sempill. With his vast bureaucratic experience to draw on, he retained a sense of perspective, understood the ‘art of the possible’ and treated the wilder schemes of the sentimentalists with disdain. Finally, therefore, while their hopes and efforts were dashed by events, it was with their honour intact that Butler and Hankey could lobby for Shigemitsu’s release from 1948 onwards. Indeed, it is a testament to their common decency that they did so. NOTES 1

Sir Maurice Pascal Aiers, First Baron Hankey (1877–1963). He was commissioned into the Royal Marines and served in naval intelligence from 1902 to 1906. He became Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1912, and later Secretary to the Imperial War Cabinet until its dissolution in 1919, when he became Secretary to the Cabinet. He also became Clerk of the Privy Council. He retired in 1938. At the outbreak of the Second World War he became Minister without portfolio in the War Cabinet. In 1940 he was appointed Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and from 1941 to 1942 Paymaster General.

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Richard Austen Butler, Baron (1902–82). He was elected as Member of Parliament for Saffron Walden in Essex in 1929. He held various junior ministerial offices, including at the Foreign Office. He was Minister of Education from 1941 to 1945. In post-war Conservative Party governments he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Privy Seal, Leader of the Houseof Commons, Deputy Prime Minister and finally Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1962–3. As Foreign Secretary he made an official visit to Japan. In 1965 he was appointed Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. ‘Once described as “both irreproachable and unapproachable” he will go down as one of the most progressive, thoughtful and dedicated of Tory leaders.’ Chambers Biographical Dictionary, 1990. S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, vol.Ill, 1931–1963 (Collins, London, 1974) pp.649–50. A. Howard, R.A.B: The Life of LA. Butler (Jonathan Cape, London, 1987) pp.70–87, and P. Stafford, ‘Political Autobiography and the Art of the Plausible: R.A. Butler at the Foreign Office 1938–39’, Historical Journal, 1985, 28/4, pp.901–72. Brabourne papers, IOLR, Mss.Eur.F97/20A7 Butler to Brabourne, 12 December 1935. R.A. Butler, The Art of Memory: Friends in Perspective (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1982) p.40. PRO F0371/23483 F3368/372/10 Sale to Butler, 30 March 1939. PRO F0371/23571 F3144/2691/23 Butler minute, 7 April 1939. See A. Best, “‘That Loyal British Subject”?: Arthur Edwardes and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1932–41’ in J.E. Hoare (ed.,) Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Vol.Ill (Japan Library, Richmond, 1999) pp. 227–39. PRO F0371/23532 F9583/6457/10 Butler minute, 26 August 1939 and F9638/6457/10 Edwardes to Butler, 26 August 1939. PRO F0371/23556 FI0295/176/23 Butler minute, 18 September 1939, and FI0459/176/23 Edwardes to Butler, 22 September 1939. Ibid., FI 0710/176/23 Butler memorandum, 22 September 1939. PRO CAB66/2 WP(39)56 ‘Sino-Japanese Hostilities’ COS memorandum, 28 September 1939. PRO F0371/24650 FI638/5/10 Butler minute, 8 March 1940. See A. Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936–41 (Routledge, London, 1995) pp.92–95 and 102–7. F0371/25077 W6205/8/49 Butler to Cross, 5 April 1940. F0371/24724 F2169/23/23 Butler minute, 1 April 1940. F0371/24667 F3597/43/10 Butler/Shigemitsu conversation, 11 July 1940 and F3590/43/10 Butler/Shigemitsu conversation, July 1940. 19. PRO F0371/24708 F3633/193/61 Butler minute, 23 July 1940. Ibid., Butler minute, 26 July 1940. Butler papers, Trinity College Library Cambridge, E3/19 1 Sale to Butler, 15 August 1940, E3/19 66 Sempill to Butler, 19 August 1940 and E3/5 42, Edwardes to Butler, 2 September 1940. PRO F0371/24725 F3592/23/23 Butler minute, 12 August 1940, and Butler papers, E3/5 46 Butler minute, 6 September 1940. PRO F0371/24710’F4770/193/61 Butler minute, 18 September 1940. PRO CAB96/1 FE(40) 10 th meeting, 28 November 1940. PRO CAB21/1008 Hankey-Yoshida conversation, 18 February 1938. Hankey papers, Churchill College Cambridge, HNKY4/31 Sandberg to Hankey, 1 March 1939, and HNKY8/35 Hankey to Wilson, 31 August 1939, and Roskill, op.cit. pp.410–11. Piggott papers, Imperial War Museum, Edwardes to Piggott, 17 June 1940. Hankey papers, PRO, CAB63/177 Hankey to Piggott, 8 October 1940. See also Hankey affidavit for Shigemitsu, defence exhibit 3457, in R.J. Pritchard & S.M. Zaide (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, vol.xiv, (Garland, New York, 1981) pp.34512–13. Hankey papers, PRO, CAB63/177 Hankey to Piggott, 10 December 1940. PRO F0371/27901 F234/27/23 Lloyd to Halifax, 4 December 1940, and Halifax to Lloyd, 17 December 1940. R.J. Pritchard & S.M. Zaide (eds), op. cit. pp. 12–13. PRO F0371/27889 F2303/17/23 Hankey to Butler, 24 March 1941. PRO F0371/27886 F648/17/23 Butler minute, 5 February 1941. PRO PREM3/252/6A Butler to Churchill, 28 March 1941.

LORD HANKEY, 1877–1963

35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42

209

Hankey papers, Churchill College Cambridge, HNKY1/7, 9 June 1941. Roskill, op. cit., p.519. Hankey papers, PRO, CAB63/177 Hankey to Sempill, 8 August 1941. Eden papers, PRO, F0954/6 466 FE/41/35 Eden minute, 5 October 1941. Hankey papers, PRO, CAB63/177 Hankey to Piggott, 14 November 1941. Hankey affidavit for Shigemitsu, defence exhibit 3457, in R.J. Pritchard & S.M. Zaide (eds), op.cit., p.34521. Lord Hankey, Politics, Trials and Errors, (Pen-in-Hand, Oxford, 1950). Roskill, op. cit., p.652–3.

22

ERNEST BEVIN (1881–1951)

Foreign Secretary, 1945–51

ROGER BUCKLEY

Ernest Bevin

INTRODUCTION Mr Bevin has not, in directing foreign affairs, been ruled by the party, but has been trying to do what he thought was right in the great stream of history, of which he had a deep consciousness. (Sir Oliver Franks to Secretary of State Dean Acheson1)

E

rnest (better known as Ernie) Bevin (1881–1951) remains the first and only postwar British foreign minister with substantial claims to the title of statesman. His achievements are widely recognized and stand in contrast with both the decidedly greyer, smoother personalities of the majority of his successors and the ice-cold reality of the ever diminishing assets at their command. Bevin’s lengthy years in office mark an attempt to protect and promote the concept of Britain as a great power with substantial global political, strategic and economic interests. Central to Bevin’s stance was the determination that Britain should be seen as a victor nation that could stand up to and deal from a position of strength, though rarely full equality, with the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet even as the Labour government gained power at what proved to be an unexpectedly swift end to the war in the Asia-Pacific, American commentators were confidently predicting that it was ‘clear, first of all, that there are now only two nations – America and Russia – of really predominant power. They alone possess the resources to wage war on a global scale... most of the lesser nations are now being drawn by a sort of Law of Political Gravity into the orbits of one or the other of the two Super-Powers.’2 The overwhelming importance of preparing appropriate policy in the deteriorating atmosphere of what was already being defined as ‘an armed truce’ and would soon be dubbed the Cold War inevitably left the foreign secretary with relatively little time to supervise the secondary field of Japanese business. THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN – BRITISH POLICY AND THE AUSTRALIAN DIMENSION British occupation policy was handled by Bevin’s Foreign Office officials. When challenges from the Board of Trade, the Treasury and the Dominions Office (later 210

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renamed the Commonwealth Relations Office) emerged these were met and generally rebuffed as likely to jeopardize the overall thrust of British policy. The Foreign Office reckoned it knew best and was able to count on the support of its experienced master in Cabinet and through his substantial influence in the Labour party and his decades-long domination within the trade union movement to maintain control. Given the unenviable succession of international crises that Bevin struggled with during his tenure from 1945 to 1951 this was the only possible working arrangement. Bevin had to wrestle – the list is almost endless – with Greece, Berlin, German rearmament, Palestine, Egypt, the birth of NATO and finally Korea, to say nothing of bitter antagonism from Moscow and uncertainties over the extent of Washington’s commitment to Europe. By contrast business over occupied Japan was handled relatively smoothly and silently by officials keen both to rebuff rival departments and conscious that public opinion was ever wary of even hints of possible reconciliation with Tokyo. Since Bevin rarely put his thoughts on paper (when he did the resultant hand writing might charitably be described as a scrawl that required careful translation by his minions) it is only possible to gain glimpses of what he may have intended for Japan. Central to his views on how Japan should be handled appears to have been, first, a determination that no other power, aside obviously from the United States, should gain a greater role than that claimed by Britain and, second, that nothing be done to damage the overriding importance of the wider Anglo-American international relationship. Any positive assessment of how well Bevin and the Foreign Office managed to follow these guidelines needs, however, to recall the generally tense half decade of smouldering ties with Australia and the failure to establish a less frigid atmosphere with Tokyo. Ministers from the Attlee years (and long after) refused to explain to the wider public at home that the constant harking back on pre-war fears of Japanese competition and wartime brutalities was only part of the story. By failing to suggest why post-war attitudes needed also to incorporate the more positive shifts associated with the major reforms of the occupation, the government and much of Fleet Street lessened the prospect of genuine reconciliation in some indeterminate future. Britain was associated to a degree with the establishment of new institutions and new behaviour during MacArthur’s occupation, but the public was rarely encouraged to reckon with Japan’s new deal. It was only selective injustices of the past that seemingly mattered – Japan would never change its spots. Talk of Britain’s ‘Forgotten Armies’ in South East Asia needs to be balanced by long-remembered improper trading practices and POW scars. Bevin’s personal interventions concerned the big picture. He took no more than casual note of specific constitutional or socio-economic programmes for occupied Japan. When he did get involved, at the very outset in the autumn of 1945 and again towards what would become the endgame, his interest was in seeing how he could protect Britain’s corner as it negotiated at the highest level with the other Pacific powers. Bevin played a considerable role in both the discussions over the initial control arrangements for Japan and in pressing for a belated Japanese peace settlement. In both instances his concerns were with regional and global factors that carried weight and had important consequences for Britain and its rivals. It was the international context that mattered. Once Bevin was appointed, in a last minute change of plan that had Attlee switching round Hugh Dalton, intended for the Foreign Office, and Bevin, almost made chancellor of the exchequer, in order to keep Bevin and his arch-rival Herbert Morrison out of each oth-

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er’s hair on the domestic front, the new foreign secretary was faced with what to do over Japan. The surrender and early days of the occupation had caught Whitehall out both through a general lack of information on what the United States had long been preparing for the post-surrender period and more importantly by the lack of clarity on British policy. As a result Bevin and his advisors had to struggle to make up for lost time on answering two key issues: what should be the roles of the powers in running the occupation and what British military commitment should or should not be made to the overall venture. Yet the United States, by having largely won the war in the Asia-Pacific and by taking the surrender of Imperial Japan through a massive show of naval strength in Tokyo bay, had effectively pre-empted moves by its Allies to demand more than a thin slice of the pie. What worried Bevin was less the position of the United States, quickly confirmed by British consent to General MacArthur’s appointment as vice-regal supreme commander for Japan, than how to fend off other nations equally eager to stake out claims to a share in the occupation. By 10 September 1945 Bevin was already noting that it was ‘important that we should not play a lesser part in the control of Japan than Russia and China, as otherwise our prestige and standing as one of the Big Four Powers might suffer damage’.3 This would prove heavy going and it was only after months of strenuous negotiations at the highest international level that a rough and ready compromise was achieved. The outcome required a nominal reduction in what had begun as an American monopoly of power in August-September 1945 through the eventual establishment of two international supervisory bodies, the Far Eastern Commission due to meet in Washington DC, and the merely advisory Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) that was to be based in Tokyo. In all this Bevin found he had to fight on two fronts. The opposition of the Soviet Union to the United States and Britain can hardly be said to have come as much of a surprise, but differences within the Pacific Commonwealth revealed major challenges that would long persist with regard to what might be termed a ‘friendly foe’ for British officials involved with the occupation. From the outset Bevin and the Foreign Office had also to row along with the United States and tread carefully when it came to offering criticism of what frequently turned out to be American unilateralism – issues of greater import beyond Japan were judged to demand a softly-softly approach to the occupation.4 British policy towards post-surrender Japan clearly faced constraints. Churchill might sound off about American deviousness in not having come clean over what its ambitious planners had in mind for the occupation but Bevin and his officials had to work within current realities. Diplomats attached to the UK Liaison Mission in Tokyo did not need to be instructed to develop cordial relations with MacArthur and his headquarters; this was a given that would only be risked at rare moments over the next six years. The paramount importance of the United States to overall British foreign policy was not to be jeopardized by local Anglo-American differences other than on rare occasions during the occupation. To underline the importance of this connection the wartime procedure of appointing a prime ministerial representative to General MacArthur was continued with General Sir Charles Gairdner working ably in that position until 1948. SCAP’s dealings with Sir Alvary Gascoigne, who was appointed as Gairdner’s successor with the rank of ambassador, were also initially cordial, though this changed later with MacArthur ‘displaying fits of temper’ as he found fewer effective Allied constraints on his behaviour. In Gascoigne’s final report of February 1951, MacArthur was seen for all of his dictatorial ways to have achieved a great deal with an increasingly self-con-

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fident Japan about to gain a non-restrictive peace and reckoned at least potentially to be ‘a most useful ally’ at ‘a time of world crisis’. While the Allied control arrangements were slowly being worked out the Cabinet was faced also with a strong challenge from Australia on a host of political and military issues. Rather perhaps to their surprise Bevin and his officials found that Australia was determined to gain both a more substantial say on occupation affairs and a wider wish to represent the Pacific Commonwealth in Japan and beyond. Although these differences were partly papered over by arrangements whereby Australia represented the Commonwealth on the ACJ and an Australian general headed what was to become known as the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) the underlying competition between London and Canberra persisted. No clear-cut resolution of differences from the initial surrender and control processes to the final peace settlements proved possible. By 1946 the idea of British leadership of the Commonwealth in the region was under severe challenge, while the initialling of the ANZUS pact in 1951 that saw both Australia and New Zealand relying on Washington for future security to the exclusion of Britain, finally buried for good the idea that London had much to offer to the politics and the defence of the south Pacific. British military failures in the early days of the Asia-Pacific War and the key role played by the United States in the gradual advance of MacArthur from his Melbourne headquarters to Tokyo, in addition to challenging speeches, such as the one made by Australia’s Minister for External Affairs Vere Evatt to an audience in California in March 1945, ought to have provided warning bells aplenty that major change could not be long delayed.5 Given these tensions with Canberra, Bevin had little choice but to take a personal interest in Commonwealth affairs for occupied Japan and the region. Clearly Britain was in retreat, though attempts to maintain its position in Japan were more successful than some have suggested. Australia did not always get things its own way, thanks both to the cultivation of cordial personal relations between senior British officials and MacArthur and through a less than whole-hearted welcome for Australian claims within SCAP GHQ, The British position in Japan, working to disown the reputation that MacMahon Ball, the somewhat egocentric Australian representing the Commonwealth on the Allied Council for Japan, had acquired, rightly or wrongly, may also have been assisted somewhat fortuitously by a rather hesitant recognition by officials within SCAP of the extent of Australia’s role. For example, American organization charts depicting how the occupation was to be run had the Commonwealth’s seat on the Allied Council for Japan being designated as in British rather than Australian hands. Britain may not have been alone in only slowly adjusting to what Canberra at least hoped would be new realities in this sphere. Later clues from the Dean Acheson papers suggest that Truman’s secretary of state too could be taken aback to hear claims from Evatt that Australia should always be present when the United States discussed Japanese peace proposals and Far Eastern affairs with interested parties in Washington. Acheson explained politely but firmly to the Australian ambassador that Evatt’s insistence was ‘a most surprising one, and that I was not at all sure that I understood it’. Acheson told a ‘somewhat apologetic’ Norman Makin, the Australian ambassador in Washington, that his master should be ‘under no illusion about the matter but to understand that we would continue to proceed as we had’. The United States would not shift from its existing view that it ‘must, of course, continue to have the most complete freedom to discuss these and other matters with other Governments’.6 No special relationship here. The control arrangements agreed to at the Moscow conference reflected both Bevin’s wish to gain a position of some strength for Britain, while at least out-

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wardly working to ensure that Australia too had a voice in how the occupation might be overseen. The eventual Moscow deal saw an acknowledgment by the Truman administration that it could not have affairs entirely its own way, though it was highly reluctant to grant anything that might give the Soviet Union an opening to do mischief in Tokyo. (The number of personnel formally attached to the USSR’s mission was extensive, thanks to the fact that Moscow had been neutral until the fag end of the Asia-Pacific War thus allowing its former embassy staff to stay on in Japan as the occupation began.) The difficulty, of course, from the British point of view was how to agree with the sidelining of the Russians, while still pressing simultaneously for a voice for London that would place it above all other Allied powers both through formal institutional arrangements and, more importantly, via informal contacts with MacArthur and SCAP GHQ. Bevin’s policy concerns remained to work for strong Anglo-American ties internationally and resist attempts by parties on all sides who wished to downgrade the global position of post-war Britain with its claims to great power status. Japan was one area where this strategy generally worked out. Personal dealings with key American figures certainly helped in this regard. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for example, treated Sir Oliver Franks as a conduit for personal communications with Bevin that on occasion were sent outside official lines. There was far less success though in dealings with Canberra. Hints of the problems appear even before Japan’s surrender when Alanbrooke, if his diaries are any guide, spoke of plans for what he called ‘our Imperial Expedition for the invasion of Japan with a corps of 1 British, 1 Canadian and I Australian Division’.7 Following Japan’s surrender, however, he noted in the penultimate entry to his massive diaries that on 30 August: ‘This morning we had representatives from the Dominion Office in whilst we discussed Australia’s latest claim to run an occupational force quite separate from ours in Japan. We were recommending another attempt to try and get Australia to join with our Commonwealth united force. They are trying to run out on their own. Dominion Office are not showing much guts in returning to the attack.’8 PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN Bevin’s main personal initiatives for Japan concerns the linked issues of Commonwealth cooperation and the road to the peace conference that soon after his death would be formalized at San Francisco. He was already seriously ill by 1949 but made substantial efforts to attend, discuss and gain approval for a joint Commonwealth approach, while working at the same time with Secretary Acheson to rekindle a peace process that MacArthur, for one, had first urged upon his nominal masters in 1947 in a very public, on-the-record, press conference in Tokyo. In all this Bevin wished to see Japan within an American-led regional order – there was already much talk in the State Department and the Foreign Office of an ‘arc’ stretching from Hokkaido to South East Asia and a ‘line’ from California to Tokyo. Bevin took a personal role in working with and around Australia, although his influence on the United States over the possibility of a Japanese peace was harder going. This proved to be a slow and tortuous affair thanks both to the situation in East Asia where it was clear long before 1949 that the Communists in China were eventually going to win power and because of skirmishes within the American bureaucracy over how best to aim for a pro-Western Japan and yet maintain an American military presence in the post-occupation era. The temptation was to continue to postpone any decision over peace until the China scene was played

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out and to underline that any agreement on a peace treaty with Tokyo simply did not exist as long as the Soviet Union insisted on Allied unanimity on the provisions of the treaty by all the powers nominally involved in the occupation. Resolving issues such as the substantial Pentagon-State Department differences and the near certainty of a Soviet veto appeared to leave the situation in limbo. The reformist vein of MacArthur’s rule in Japan had ended by 1948 but the occupation would have to continue until there was resolution on what to do next. It was a recipe for drift. The delay in working towards an agreed approach by the Truman administration towards the ending of the occupation had repercussions on Bevin’s dealings with the Commonwealth. Secretary Acheson was well aware that hopes of a joint Anglo-American front would be impaired by an inability to present at least the outlines of probable US peace policies to Canberra. The difficulties that this presented to Bevin were fully recognized by Acheson who, while wanting Britain to be on-side, appreciated too ‘the undesirability of Mr Bevin becoming at the Ceylon Conference the spokesman of the American point of view’.9 Despite his doctor’s advice Bevin was determined to attend the Colombo Commonwealth conference of January 1951. Since it was judged too risky for Bevin to fly, he went slowly by sea to recuperate. The journey certainly did him good, though not without its share of setbacks when he overdid the brandy on his now less than robust frame. Once there he alternated bouts of dozing at the sessions with sharp professorial interventions. His biographer sees Bevin’s promptings over the beginnings of economic and technological cooperation in the region that would lead shortly to the Colombo Plan as being comparable to his role in the formation of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe. (In truth, much of the actual financing of the Colombo Plan would come from first American and later Japanese sources; an indication of the economic difficulties that beset all British governments for much of the initial post-war decades.) British earlier involvement on the ground centred on military contributions to BCOF, some reform initiatives of varying degrees of success, a role in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and important trade and financial agreements that were initialled at the very end of the occupation. In most of these instances Bevin played little or no role, either because he was not foreign secretary at the time or through the inevitable delegation of business. When he did hold a personal interest, however, he could have an impact on British approaches to the Commonwealth and the issue of belated peace terms for Japan. Yet this should not be exaggerated as Bevin hoped for more unity than proved possible with Australia, at least in the 1945–1947 period, and his efforts to galvanize the Truman administration over terminating the occupation were only a part of a campaign led by the State Department. The last months of Bevin’s tenure at the Foreign Office were a disappointment. Sir Oliver Franks in a blunt discussion with Dean Acheson in April 1951 stated that ‘the Foreign Office had been practically leaderless’ as a result of Bevin’s final illness and a series of almost weekly crises that included both the question of German rearmament and the highly divisive issue of the recognition of Communist China. Franks also felt that both the State Department and the Foreign Office had been guilty of digging in their heels over their own Japanese peace treaty drafts and that ‘pride of authorship’ was part of the problem. Acheson’s record of the meeting reports Franks as saying that ‘So far as British policy was concerned, he thought it was a matter of their not having any.’10 Over Japan, Acheson stressed to Ambassador Franks that ‘only American and Japanese power – the latter potential

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– existed in the Far East. Japan was now a primary end in itself. We had to move and move fast. We could not be paralyzed by looking only at all the difficulties.’11 Franks is said then to have ‘agreed and thought that there would be no difficulty in London.’12 All roads to Tokyo were apparently to be via Washington. BEVIN’S FAILURES In addition, it may be useful to look at areas where Bevin failed. This can tell us something both about the limits of London’s influence vis-à-vis the United States and also over the highly controversial debate on the lack of what would later be termed an industrial policy for post-war Britain. The contrast between Britain’s swift slippage down the economic league tables and the continuingly impressive performances of Germany and Japan, at least until recently, has its origins over what the Attlee government did and did not attempt to do with regard to domestic reconstruction and foreign policy after 1945. Bevin’s trade union background led him to press for detailed reform legislation in occupied Japan that would have substantially altered the relative power of unions against management at a time of bitter struggles between the two sides. His officials pressed MacArthur’s staff to give a far larger role to Japan’s large and influential left-wing public sector unions than SCAP GHQ was prepared to grant with the result that the right to strike of these newly formed and militant unions was forbidden.13 The British model did not carry the day, though Bevin could at least point to his experiment of introducing labour attachés to the UK Liaison Mission in Tokyo and selected other British posts overseas. A wider flaw concerns the unwillingness of Bevin and the Cabinet in general to consider some measure of protection during the stop-start, protracted negotiations over the peace treaty that could have been beneficial to a number of British industries. What is surprising is that the extensive lobbying from the textile, shipbuilding and pottery sectors was met with such a generally unsympathetic response from a government that relied heavily on the finance and votes of its northern constituents. The explanations for this rejection appear to have been three-fold: none of the three industries was subject to nationalization, the economic situation for each particular sector was not judged to be particularly dire as post-war reconstruction got underway and lastly the Foreign Office emphasized that the United States would be unlikely to agree since it was determined to help restore the Japanese economy as a key part of its Cold War strategy for East Asia. All three factors left important British industries out in the cold. Of course it is impossible to demonstrate that both greater domestic state-private intervention by the Attlee government would have necessarily worked to rebuild out of date factories and encourage more modern work practices or that competition from a revitalized Japan could have been met any more successfully but, to give one illustration of the speed of Tokyo’s own more cooperative policies, its shipbuilding industry would become the largest in the world by as early as 1956. Even the liberal trade practices of the United States during the initial post-San Francisco years would gradually be bent, particularly after Richard Nixon used the southern strategy behind his 1968 presidential campaign to call for restrictions on Japanese textile exports.14 Britain’s contribution to BCOF fails on a host of accounts. If it was judged to be politically necessary to underline the nation’s war efforts in the defeat of Imperial Japan then its deployment in the distant Chugoku-Shikoku regions can hardly

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be said to have greatly underlined any such contribution, while the fact that its components were withdrawn so quickly indicates a lack of real commitment to the intended task. BCOF in the last resort did little to enhance British prestige; neither SCAP GHQ nor other Allies could take it too seriously. To arrive late on the scene and disappear so rapidly impressed few observers. At least some of the Foreign Office’s BCOF-watchers were sceptical from the outset, claiming that the troops had little to do and noting like everyone else that its command was in Australian hands, though Bevin, of course, went along with his Cabinet colleagues in agreeing to the despatch of British ground and air contingents to Japan. TRADING LINKS One, perhaps, indirect linkage to BCOF’s political influence was pressure from Britain to gain the restoration of private trade and the return of its traders to occupied Japan. Here progress was slow largely due to General MacArthur’s wariness over what he dubbed ‘carpet-baggers’ of all nationalities whom he held more likely to exploit rather than to contribute positively to Japan’s hesitant recovery. When permission was eventually granted the numbers of British and Commonwealth individuals eager to restart their businesses surprised the British mission in Tokyo and some foundations at least were in place by the termination of the occupation for banking, shipping and import-export trade. The 1948–1949 sterling-area agreement and subsequent renewals, including one initialled moments before the peace conference, can be seen as a positive move indicating that Japan’s economic future might not have to depend exclusively on support from the United States. American business interests irate at the red-tape holding back their own opportunities plus Congressional and press disquiet over the scale of disbursements to Tokyo probably helped smooth the passage of the Japan-Sterling area agreements, though the issue of whether Tokyo ought to use dollars for at least partial reduction of its balance of payments deficits had to be conceded. BRITAIN AND JAPAN Unfortunately there were few other signs of any improvement in Anglo-Japanese ties. Here the fault surely lies with Westminster as Prime Minister Yoshida went out of his way to encourage ties through seemingly meeting each and every British diplomat, businessman and journalist who requested an interview. Japan might be changing but the British public recalled only the humiliation of early defeats in Asia, the treatment of POWs and the conviction that occupation-imposed reform would not last once the ink on the peace treaty was dry. In retrospect, as with the lack of any substantial wish by the Attlee government to support industries likely to face intensive Japanese competition in the future, there was a general unwillingness to think positively. Collective memory overruled reconciliation. Politicians during the first two post-war decades of first Labour and then Tory rule much preferred to do as little as possible to mend fences with Tokyo, while failing to overhaul the British economy when it still had a brief opportunity to outperform its industrial rivals in Japan and West Germany. Too little was done to reconstruct clapped-out industries (or to sponsor new hi-tech ones) which, in turn, ensured that renewed competition in export markets only added to the political difficulties of repairing troubled relations with Tokyo. With the historian’s twin luxuries of hindsight and the release of fresh archival material, it

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is surely clear that insufficient attention was paid by Attlee and Bevin to getting British industries more ready and more able to contend with old rivals in third markets overseas, while simultaneously taking a highly ambitious approach to foreign policy. Within a generation Britain’s international and economic decline would be all too obvious and London would soon be joining its Western European and North American partners in demanding a raft of official and unofficial restraints, gentlemen’s agreements and protective quotas in the face of Japan’s economic onslaught. The jeremiahs, who had got short shrift when Japan’s reconstruction was still in its infancy, had indeed been proved right. Britain’s ‘Years of Recovery15 only lasted in the immediate aftermath of the war when there had been a lucrative seller’s market in export trades; once its traditional rivals had successfully reorganized their politico-economic systems the familiar calls for assistance began to be heard again in the land. This time Westminster took the demands far more seriously.

CONCLUSION Bevin played his hand in the traditional manner. Throughout his tenure he aimed to maintain British global power and prestige, much to the disquiet of those on the vocal left of his party who wanted a break with the past – it was no wonder that he was personally close to Anthony Eden and the Tories’ vision of the world. (Bevin might address his officials as ‘m’boys’ in contrast to Eden’s equally archaic ‘my dears’ but such legendary differences in style hardly begin to disguise similar approaches to international relations.) Yet for all the undoubted ambition, British contributions to the occupation provide something of a case study in many of the traits of external relations that would receive criticism in later years: initial determination to stay everclose to Washington, large troop deployments abroad, relatively little organized support for what would soon prove to be declining industries either through state-subsidized reconstruction and/ or protective measures plus a widely shared determination to maintain London’s position in the world, despite the substantial costs of global involvement and major problems of reconstruction at home. It is also necessary to add a factor specific to British approaches to post-surrender Japan. The Attlee government was clearly wary of doing overmuch to confront the public’s antipathy to post-surrender Tokyo. If the phrase ‘Bad Haters, Good Losers’16 can be used to describe how the United States and Japan generally approached each other during the occupation, it is surely true that for many in Britain (and the Pacific Commonwealth) it would long-remain a case of ‘Good Haters, Bad Losers’ when it came to viewing their ex-enemy after what would shortly be dubbed the war of the British succession in Asia. Prospects for genuine friendship were slim, given that Anglo-Japanese ties had to restored against the backcloth of renewed industrial competition, the question of Tokyo’s possible rearmament and the stability or otherwise of occupation-era political reform. Yet at the elite level it was different and in the short-term it can be said that Bevin and the Foreign Office achieved some decent measure of success in their occupation policies: Anglo-American ties between the UK Liaison Mission in Tokyo and General MacArthur and his men were particularly strong for most of the period, the challenges from Australia were frequently met and substantial sterling-area trading links with Tokyo were restored, even if events quickly overtook any hopes of a sustained role for Britain in both Japan and the Asia-Pa-

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cific region. It soon proved impossible, however, to build the New Jerusalem at home and maintain a major role overseas on the old broken-backed industrial system. The revisionists are correct: recollections of past military prowess and skilful diplomacy rarely provide much of a substitute for underlying economic weakness. There is no disguising the structural faults that continue to constrain all serious bids for power. NOTES 1

2

3

4

5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15

16

Memorandum of meeting, 2 April 1951, Acheson papers, box 68, Truman Presidential Library. Franks was ambassador to Washington. John Fischer ‘Odds Against Another War’, Harper’s Magazine, August 1945. Seen and commented on by the Foreign Office. FO memorandum, cited in John Charmley, Churchill’s Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–57 (London, 1995) p. 185. See Roger Buckley Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945–1952 (Cambridge, 1982). Bevin’s biographer has little to say on his hero’s dealings with Japan. See Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (Oxford, 1985). Evatt, The Future of the Pacific, The Pacific Historical Review, June 1945. Dean Acheson, 21 September 1949, Acheson papers, memo of conversation, box 65. Danchey and Todman (eds.) Alanbrooke War Diaries, 1939–1945, diary entry for 2 August 1945, pp. 714–15. ibid. Diary entry for 30 August 1945, p. 721. Acheson memorandum, 24 December 1949, box 65, Acheson papers. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. See Roger Buckley, ‘The British Model: Institutional Reform and Occupied Japan’, Asian Studies, April 1982. See Roger Buckley US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 122–6 See Alec Cairncross Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy, 1945–51, (London, 1987)Martin Wiener English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980, (Cambridge, 1981) and the four volumes of Correlli Bar-nett’s ‘The Rise and Fall’ series. For Bullock’s robust defence of Bevin’s foreign policy see Bullock op. cit. pp. 843–8. See Roger Buckley introduction to The Post-War Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952, Selected Contemporary Readings, vol. 1, (Leiden, 2013)

23

WINSTON CHURCHILL 1874–1965

Prime Minister, 1940–45, 1951–55

EIJI SEKI

INTRODUCTION

W

Sir Winston Churchill saying goodbye to Crown Prince Akihito, the present Emperor of Japan, after lunch at No. 10 Downing Street on 30 April 1953. (Mainichi archive photo)

inston S. Churchill was born six years after the Meiji Restoration (1868). The politically active part of his life almost coincided with the emergence, decline and rebirth of modern Japan. In 1900, he had been elected as a member of parliament and he took part in the vote on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. He followed with close interest the 1904–5 war, which Japan narrowly won against Russia under the aegis of the Alliance. As first lord of the Admiralty before, and at the beginning of, the First World War he strongly advocated extensive naval collaboration with Japan. Initially,Japan was not a major focus of interest for him, but Anglo-Japanese relations came to demand his attention increasingly as he climbed the ladder in politics and government. Through the years, he acquired enormous knowledge and information about Japan. He had an insatiable intellectual curiosity and carefully followed political trends in Japan through the statements and writings of Japanese leaders and military officers. The extensive information he accumulated is reflected in his numerous speeches and articles. In this respect he was singularly different from other world leaders like Roosevelt and Stalin. Churchill’s exposure to Japan was negligible until his parents went on their long tour of Japan in 1894, the year in which Japan went to war with China. The impressions of Japan, which his mother conveyed to him, appear to have left indelible marks on Churchill. He was then twenty years of age and emotionally attached to his mother whom he ‘loved dearly though at a distance’.1 Lady Randolph Churchill’s intelligent, unbiased and aesthetically active mind enabled her to have penetrating views of ‘Things Japanese’ as amply demonstrated in her excellent article ‘A Journey in Japan’.2 Churchill never visited Japan but maintained a friendly, understanding and compassionate attitude towards the country. He once contemplated a visit in conjunction with his lecture tour in the United States in 1933 but in the end did not go there.3 Anglo-Japanese relations were far from agreeable at that time and it is debatable whether his sympathetic attitude towards Japan would have changed, if the visit had taken place. He wrote for Collier’s Magazine in 1936: 220

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I am one of the dwindling band of Members who voted for the ratification of the original Anglo-Japanese Alliance. I watched with enthusiasm the loyal co-operation of Japan in the Great War. The impression left on my mind by many years of working with the Governments of the Mikado has been that the Japanese are sober, steady, grave and mature people; that they can be trusted to measure forces and factors with great care, and that they do not lose their heads, or plunge into mad, uncalcuated adventures. But of late years we have been confronted with a somewhat different Japan. The elder statesmen and their sagacious power seem to have dispersed. For the last four or five years the political movement of Japan has seemed to effect itself through the murder of statesmen who were deemed too prudent or circumspect, or in other ways were objectionable to secret societies of Army officers. Great and honourable Japanese leaders have fallen in a swift succession to the sword or bullet of honourable assassins.

His view of Japan was based on up-to-date knowledge. He was harsh when he felt it appropriate and necessary in the cause of justice to chastise Japan’s unacceptable behaviour. However, he was always fair and sincere in his comments: It will be better if we all treat each other with justice and mutual respect, and with an earnest desire to find out, not how we can gratify our own ambitions, but how we can meet the reasonable grievances of others.5

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was generally accepted in Britain as likely to contribute to peace in the Far East, although some feared that it would have the opposite effect. One of these was Lt Colonel A.G. Churchill, a former military attache in Tokyo, who wrote: ‘Japan was an aggressive Power’ as demonstrated by her history since the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), and that in ‘a country like Japan, still partially civilized, the preservation of peace for its own sake is not an end in itself and the opportunity of entering a war with a good chance of success would be an irresistible temptation outweighing all other considerations’.6 The alliance was basically for co-operation at sea rather than on land. The Royal Navy was generally in favour of the alliance in spite of its scepticism towards international co-operation.7 It was Japan that reaped handsome dividends from Britain’s benevolent neutrality in the Russo-Japanese War. Though it ought to have been Britain’s turn to benefit from the alliance when the First World War began in 1914, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey wavered as to how and when Japanese assistance should be sought. He tried to restrict the areas of Japanese naval operations because of the fears in Commonwealth countries and the United States of Japanese expansionism. Neither did he want British interests in China disturbed by Japan coming into the war. Grey’s vacillations and lukewarm response to the Japanese offer of help alarmed Churchill who was then first lord of Admiralty. He rebuked Grey, writing: I think you are chilling indeed to those people. I can’t see any half-way house myself between having them in and keeping them out. If they are to come in, they may as well be welcomed as comrades. Your last telegram to Tokyo is almost hostile. You may easily give mortal offence - which will not be forgotten - we are not safe yet - by a long chalk. The storm has yet to burst. 8

The severity of his rebuke must have come from his self-confidence as one of the few leaders with any real knowledge of military matters. He was energetic and

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completely absorbed in his work as first lord of the Admiralty.9 He was resolved to put the Japanese naval cooperation to the best use in winning the war. As he predicted, Japanese co-operation soon proved indispensable in dealing with the German menace in Asia and the Pacific and protecting ANZAC troopships through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. By the end of May 1915, he had resigned from the Admiralty finding solace in painting, but he felt ‘like a sea-beast fished up from the depths, or a diver too suddenly hoisted, my veins threatened to burst from the fall in pressure. I had great anxiety and no means to relieving it.’10 He returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Munitions in 1917, secretary of state for war and Air in 1919 and colonial secretary in 1921. In July the same year, he drastically shifted his position on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance arguing against its extension. In a memorandum which he circulated to the Imperial Conference, he warned: ‘Japan was the only real danger to Imperial interests in the Pacific.’ He further wrote: ‘Getting Japan to protect you against Japan is like drinking salt water to slake thirst.’ His action hugely irritated the Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon.11 They took it as interference in foreign policy matters and formed a common front against him on the issue. Undaunted, Churchill retorted: ‘In these gt [sic] matters we must be allowed to have opinions.’ 12 In June 1921, he lost his mother who ‘had already become a rather minor figure in his life compared with her role as his central confidante around 1900’. He spoke as if he had been released from the spell of his mother’s attachment to Japan. He may have felt it necessary or politically obligatory for him to look after the interests of the Dominions which increasingly influenced British foreign policy. Or he could have been wary of the imperialist trends of Japanese policies which became more pronounced during the war as shown by the notorious Twenty-One Demands to China of 1915. But, it is not easy to justify the diametrical change in his position because, in the early 1920s, Japan was actually pursuing enlightened and co-operative foreign policies, unprecedented in her history. Prime Minister Hara Takashi, who was assassinated on the eve of the Washington Conference in the autumn of 1921, and Minister of the Navy Kato Tomosaburo were exerting themselves to adopt diplomatic positions accommodating to Britain and the United States in support of the Washington Treaties. Whatever the real intentions of Britain, Japan and the United States, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was finally laid to rest in Washington and replaced by the Four Power Pact (United States, Britain, Japan and France) for security and friendship in the Far East and Pacific which was ‘more suited to the international climate of opinion of the 1920s’.14 In 1923, Churchill was appointed chancellor of the exchequer by Stanley Baldwin in the Conservative Cabinet. He was to reverse again his views of Japan in the following year when he was faced with the Admiralty’s demands for a substantial increase in the Naval Estimates. He wrote to the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin: ‘A war with Japan! But why should there be a war with Japan? I do not believe there is the slightest chance of it in our lifetime.’ He continued: Japan is at the other end of the world. She cannot menace our vital security. The only war it would be worth our while to fight with Japan would be to prevent an invasion of Australia, and that I am certain will never happen in any period, even the most remote, which we or our children need foresee.

He was once again representing his departmental interests.

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He stated in his book The Second World War: The United States made it clear to Britain that the continuance of her alliance with Japan, to which the Japanese had punctiliously conformed, would constitute a barrier in Anglo-American relations. Accordingly, this alliance was brought to an end. The annulment caused a profound impression in Japan, and was viewed as the spurning of an Asiatic Power by the Western world. Many links were sundered which might afterwards have proved of decisive value to peace.... Thus conditions were swiftly created by the victorious Allies which, in the name of peace, cleared the way for the renewal of war.15

He repeated a similar line in his speech at the dinner for Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru on 27 October 1954: Here I do not want to argue the merits or demerits of the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but the world situation would have been greatly different if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had continued. And he added: I was not in the government at that time.16

This was not correct, but his listeners probably did not realize this. Churchill’s views are shared by some writers such as G.P. Gooch who pointed out that the termination of the alliance with Japan was one of the two major post-war decisions of British policy along with Britain’s entry into the League of Nations. He wrote: Influential British voices argued that we should be guilty of gross ingratitude in dropping our partner when we no longer required her services, and that the wounded pride of a Great Power might ultimately prove a danger in the Far East... A difficult corner had been turned at the cost of weakening our position in the Far East; for Japanese sentiment could hardly be expected to remain as An-glophile as it had been for twenty years. The temperature fell still further with the decision to create a naval base at Singapore, which was rightly regarded in Tokio [sic] as a token of mistrust. Henceforth she showed scanty consideration to the interests of her old ally.17

The demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not solely due to policy decisions taken by Britain and the United States. The alliance began to lose its intrinsic value soon after it was concluded through the imperialist and colonial designs which Japan started to pursue after the Russo-Japanese War. By 1920, the Alliance had become ‘hollow’ or ‘empty letters (kubun)’ as admitted by both British and Japanese diplomats. There was no way in which the alliance could be kept alive in spite of the good intentions of its supporters on both sides.

1930–45 From the early 1930s onwards, Churchill’s attention was focused on German rearmament, in particular the rapidly expanding German air force. In 1934, he warned: ‘Germany has already created a military air force which is now nearly two-thirds as strong as our present home defence air force.’ At the same time he was not oblivious to the ominous situation caused by Japanese military aggression in Manchuria since 1931. Eventually, in 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations after she rejected the Lytton Report. Yet Churchill had sympathetic words for Japan:

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I hope we should try in England to understand a little the position of Japan, an ancient state with the highest sense of national honour, and patriotism and with a teeming population and a remarkable energy. On the one side they see the dark menace of Soviet Russia. On the other the chaos of China ....18

He even showed a degree of understanding of Japanese colonial rule in Korea and Manchuria, writing: I have admiration and long-founded regard for the empire and people of Japan. I recognize the expansion needs of their teeming, vigorous and adventurous population. We have seen their work in Korea. lt is stern, but good. We have seen their work in Manchuria . It is also good, but also stern.19

He did not regard Japan as a military threat to Britain in view of her weak economic and industrial capacity. Unlike Germany she had no means of ‘striking at the heart of the Empire and destroying its power to wage war’.20 His view inevitably changed as Japan drew closer to Nazi Germany under increasing pressure from militarist and nationalist extremists. What alarmed him was the Germany-Japan Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, which, in his view, was nothing but a military alliance against Russia. He followed with misgivings about Japan’s degeneration into a totalitarian fascist state ‘where every voice of moderation is silenced by death; where the murder of political opponents has been for some years the accepted practice’.21 But he still hoped that wisdom and sanity would prevail one day. In fact, he had not given up hope of keeping Japan away from Germany. It was not easy as Anglo-Japanese interests in China had clashed more sharply since the Japan-China Incident. He commented on the Incident: ‘Japan has done for the Chinese people what they could, perhaps, never have done for themselves. It has unified them once more.’22 His perception was correct. He could also have said that Japan was the chief culprit in bringing the communists into power in China by her long harassment of Chiang Kai-shek. Japan’s infatuation with Nazi Germany culminated in the Axis Treaty of September 1940 when she aligned herself with Hitler’s Nazi Germany. It turned out to be the biggest diplomatic blunder Japan ever committed. lt severely reduced the diplomatic leeway for the modus vivendi which the Japanese Ambassador to Britain (1938–41) Shigemitsu Mamoru was trying to reach with Britain on China and other Far Eastern issues. But the chance of achieving anything was extremely remote as no significant change could be expected in Japan’s confrontational foreign policy and in Japan’s militarist and totalitarian regime, which was obsessed with fantasies such as Asian Brotherhood (Hakko Ichiu) or the self-appointed master of Asia (Daitoa Kyoeiku). Moreover, there was no possibility of Britain deviating from her policy of supporting the League of Nations and the Washington Treaties as well as that of strengthening her relations with the United States and China. Inspite of the hopeless situation, Shigemitsu kept up his dialogues with Churchill and Foreign Secretaries Eden and Halifax. Maurice Hankey, the linchpin of the Whitehall administrative system, R. A. Butler, one of the Chamberlain loyalists and appeasers in the Foreign Office, and their friends helped to ease the way.23 Churchill responded to Shigemitsu’s demarche. Their interests coincided in that, if the impending crisis were averted, it would gain time for Churchill. He took pains to explain why he believed it would really be in the interest of Japan to stay out of the European war. He also made it clear that there was no chance of Japan and Germany winning the war. In early 1941, he even hinted

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at his willingness to co-operate with Japan in friendship with regard to post-war world politics.24 When Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke was on a trip to Moscow, Berlin and Rome in the spring of 1941, Shigemitsu wished to convey personally his assessment of the situation in Europe, i.e. Japan should steer her course with the greatest caution as the war in Europe was not progressing in Germany’s favour. It was already clear to observant eyes that Germany was the loser in the Battle of Britain and that dark days were in store for her. Churchill, too, wanted to take advantage of the chance to deliver his personal message to Matsuoka in an effort to lessen the effect of onesided German propaganda which the latter had swallowed. He tried to arrange for a seat on flights to Switzerland for Shigemitsu, although the plan was aborted because Matsuoka abruptly cut short his trip. The letter handed to Matsuoka in Moscow by the British ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps on 13 April1941 contained eight questions. Churchill ended the letter by stating that the avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe and a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and the two great sea powers of the West might spring from the answers to these questions.25 These poignant but pertinent questions fell on deaf ears on the part of Matsuoka and other Japanese leaders. Towards the end, Shigemitsu26 cut a poor figure as he spent more time explaining the fait accompli forced upon him by the military control of Japans’ foreign policy. ln practice, there had been little room for his diplomatic overtures. He left London greatly disappointed. In his post-war memoirs Churchill confessed: Very few among our experts could form any true impression of the Japanese mind. It was indeed inscrutable. It had seemed impossible that Japan would court destruction in war with Britain and the United States, and probably Russia in the end. A declaration of war by Japan could not be reconciled with reason. I felt sure she would be ruined for a generation by such a plunge, and this proved true. But Governments and peoples do not always take rational decisions. Sometimes they take mad decisions, or one set of people get control who compel all others to obey and aid them in folly. I have not hesitated to record repeatedly my disbelief that Japan would go mad. However sincerely we try to put ourselves in another person’s position, we cannot allow for processes of the human mind and imagination to which reason offers no key. Madness is however an affliction which in war carries with it the advantage of surprise.27

In their last meeting on 16 June, Shigemitsu was deeply moved by Churchill’s sincerity when he noticed tears in his eyes as he expressed his firm determination to lead the nation through the war, and assured Shigemitu that he desired fundamentally to improve Anglo-Japanese relations under his guidance in the future. Then he shook hands with Shigemitsu wishing him good luck and God’s protection.28 lt seems that through these personal contacts Churchill had come to confide in Shigemitsu. ln one of his secret session speeches at the House of Commons in the same month, Churchill described him as ‘a man most friendly to peace between our countries’.29 When Shigemitsu was added to the list of Japanese A-class war criminals at the insistence of the Soviet Union and indicted in April 1946 at the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo, his British and American friends tried to introduce Churchill’s speech as evidence in support of their plea for Shigemitsu’s acquittal. But the Russians were determined to ensure that Shigemitsu was convicted as a war criminal for his known stand against communism. In spite of Churchill’s attestation to Shigemitsu’s bona fides, he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in November 1948.30

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On 2 July 1941, the situation in the Far East and the Pacific took a fatal turn towards final catastrophe when Japan decided to deploy her armed forces to the southern part of Indochina. This constituted a serious direct threat not only to the Philippines but also to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The United States quickly responded by freezing Japanese assets and this was followed by Britain and The Netherlands. These measures and the Anglo-American policy declaration in the Atlantic Charter of 1 August 1941 failed to bring Japan to her senses. Sending troops to southern lndochina was another grave mistake by Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro who panicked and turned pale when he was warned by Baron Shidehara Kijuro, a former ambassador to Washington, that this action would definitely lead to war.31 The antagonistic relationship between Japan and the Allies had become irreversible. In what was considered his last peacetime warning to Japan, delivered at the Lord Mayors’ Day celebration on 10 November 1941 at the Mansion House, Churchill was again fair and frank in expressing his true feelings: I must admit that, having voted for the Japanese alliance nearly forty years ago, in 1902, and having always done my very best to promote good relations with the Island Empire of Japan, and always having been a sentimental well-wisher to the Japanese and an admirer of their many gifts and qualities, I should view with keen sorrow the opening of a conflict between Japan and the English-speaking world.

At the same time, he made it clear that Britain would declare war on Japan within the hour should the United States become involved in war with Japan. He went on to say: Viewing the vast sombre scene as dispassionately as possible, it would seem a very hazardous adventure for the Japanese people to plunge quite needlessly into a world struggle in which they may well find themselves opposed in the Pacific by states whose populations comprise nearly three-quarters of the human race. If steel is the basic foundation of modern war, it would be rather dangerous for a power like Japan, whose steel production is only about 7 million tons a year, to provoke quite gratuitously a struggle with the United States, whose steel production is now about 90 million; and this would take no account of the power-ful contribution which the British Empire can make. I hope therefore that the peace of the Pacific will be preserved in accordance with the known wishes of Japan’s wisest statesmen.

Churchill’s words to the leaders of Japan were more in the nature of pertinent and even friendly advice rather than a warning. But they were not heeded at all.32 In the autumn of 1941, Britain was determined to resist Japanese armed intrusions against Thailand or Malaya. Churchill was seriously worried whether, because of domestic politics, United States support would be immediately forthcoming. He had to exercise caution not to give the impression that Britain was trying to drag the United States into war. Churchill wrote: ‘If Japanese aggression drew in America I would be content to have it.’33 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December made all his worries vanish in an instant. He quoted Cromwell’s words: ‘The lord hath delivered them into our hands.’34 No wonder he ‘slept the sleep of the saved and thankful’ after he heard the news. He wrote: ‘I expected terrible forfeits in the East; but all this would be merely a passing phase.’35 While Britain was in the thick of the Battles of Britain and the Atlantic, she was militarily ill-prepared for hostilities with Japan. Her policy was to try ‘our best to avoid war with Japan by both con-

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ceding on points where the Japanese military clique can perhaps force a rupture, and by standing up where the ground is less dangerous’.36 Archival evidence indicates that Churchill endeavoured to keep the Japanese armed threat away from Malaya and Singapore, rather than scheming to entangle Japan in hostilities with the United States. Now that ‘the United States was in the war, up to the neck and in to the death’ fighting Japan shoulder to shoulder with Britain and the Commonwealth nations in the Far East and the Pacific, he could continue to concentrate on Germany as his first priority.37 No doubt the loss of Singapore was a terrible blow to Churchill’s pride. He called it ‘the worst disaster and the largest capitulation in British history’, but it did not disturb his global strategy of war. In less than four years, British forces were poised to drive the Japanese out of Malaya and Singapore after Burma had been retaken. President Franklin Roosevelt first broached the concept of ‘unconditional surrender’ to Churchill at the Casablanca conference in early 1943. Though supporting the idea, Churchill was more flexible about its actual application than Roosevelt who refused to change his position. In discussion with President Harry Trurnan at Potsdam about various possible measures for dealing with the Japanese military clique who were still determined to fight to the bitter end, Churchill suggested that they should be allowed ‘some show of saving their military honour’. Truman rejected this outright declaring that the Japanese had no military honour left after Pearl Harbor.38 Churchill’s voice already tended to carry less weight among the Great Powers because his domestic political position had weakened and because of the fact that, with the war in Europe coming to an end, the main theatre was shifting to the Pacific and Japan, where the Americans were preponderant and the Soviet Union was emerging as another key player. Japan’s surrender was not in reality ‘unconditional’ being accompanied by various conditions set out in the Potsdam Declaration. ‘Unconditional surrender’ was demanded only of the Japanese armed forces. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the coup de grace for Japan. The Japanese Navy had already been decimated and her air force was unable to put up any meaningful resistance against Allied aircraft. It was estimated on the basis of the casualty rates of the Iwojima and Okinawa campaigns that the offensive against the mainland would cost more than one million American and British lives. The foremost concern of the Anglo-American leaders was how to avoid the huge human cost expected if war had to be waged on the Japanese mainland. Churchill wrote: At any rate, there never was a moment’s discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not. To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to by healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance.39

It was agreed that cities and urban areas should be given prior warning by leaflets scattered by bombers. AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR The first major event in Anglo-Japanese relations after the war was Crown Prince Akihito’s visit to attend the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. An account of this visit was given in ‘Crown Prince Akihito in Britain’ by Hugh Cortazzi in

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Biographical Portraits, Volume V, Global Oriental, 2005. I do not want to repeat here the details given in this essay, but the initiative taken on this occasion by Churchill demonstrates his continuing interest in Japan and sympathy for the Japanese. The atmosphere was far from auspicious. Asakai Koichiro, minister at the embassy, warned Tokyo: The feeling towards Japan has not changed from what I described previously. It would be incongruous with the climate here to equate the visit directly with the improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations as some Japanese celebrities are already doing.40

Churchill, being informed of official concern about the security of Prince Akihito at his landing at Southampton on 28 April, decided personally to host lunch at 10 Downing Street two days later in order to introduce him to prominent British leaders. He also arranged for the Crown Prince’s audience with the Queen on 5 May to take precedence over all other foreign representatives. He approached leaders in the media asking for their co-operation. Thanks to these steps there was a definite improvement overnight in the atmosphere.41 Immediately he learnt that Prince Akihito was fond of horses, he had a pair of bronze horses placed at the centre of the table. Churchill conversing with the Prince was heart-warming to the Japanese as if an old grandfather was talking to his young grandson.42 Sports and horses were the main subjects. Churchill said that he was too old to play his favourite game of polo, and mentioned that his horse Colonis II would be racing that afternoon adding that it would be the winner.43 Asakai later recalled that the speech which Churchill delivered at the luncheon contained all the necessary elements such as courtesy to the Crown Prince, talks on the unique features of British political institutions imbued with his political instructions for the young prince, and that he dispelled all the uneasiness and awkwardness entertained by the Japanese because of the hostile atmosphere in their host country. Asakai believed that no other leader could have achieved all this just by one brilliant stroke.44 To the great relief of the Japanese, there was a marked abatement in the intensity of anti-Japanese reports following the lunch. It was indeed Japan’s good fortune that Winston Churchill had been at the helm of the British Government at a crucial period in Anglo-Japanese relations. Yoshida Shigeru met Churchill when Yoshida was the ambassador in London, 1936–38, but it did not develop into a close relationship. It was only after Yoshida’s visit to Britain in 1954 that their friendly contact started.45 Yoshida was impressed by the warm and hospitable personality of Churchill and felt as if he had known him as a friend for many years. Hearing Churchill reminisce about the beauty of Mt Fuji as heard from his mother in childhood, Yoshida in 1956 presented a painting of the mountain which he had commissioned from the famous Japanese painter Yasuda Yukihiko.46 Churchill who loved ‘the classic purity and colour’ of the painting had it hung in his house at 28 Hyde Park Gate and it gave ‘pleasure to all who see it’. When Matsumoto Shunichi accompanied Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to the same house in 1958, he recalls seeing Churchill tell with tears that he had longed to see Mt Fuji but it would now sadly be difficult for him to do so.47 CONCLUSION Churchill is widely admired in Japan as the greatest statesman of the twentieth century. The Japanese feel far closer to him than to any other world leader not

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only because of his personal interest in Japan but of his dramatic life which contains all the human elements: literary and artistic talents, ambition, determination, defiance, adventure, success, failure, impetuosity, gallantry, egocentricity, compassion, loyalty, impatience, affection, generosity, magnanimity, resolution, goodwill and all the rest. The adoration or fascination the Japanese show for Churchill is sincere and genuine, transcending national boundaries. When he died, Yoshida said in a condolatory contribution to the Asahi newspaper of 25 January 1965 that the world had lost the greatest statesman of the twenteeth century and the large footprints he left would remain forever in the mind not only of the British people but of all the people of the world. The leading newspapers joined the nation with editorials eulogizing in superlative terms the man and his great achievements.48 To prove Churchill’s popularity among the people in Japan, several Japanese famous writers and actors got together in a restaurant in Ginza, Tokyo, in 1949 and organized themselves into a ‘Cha–chiru-kai’ (Churchill Association) for promoting painting as a pastime. They were encouraged by Churchill’s words about the excellent value of painting as a pastime: ‘just to paint is great fun. Try it if you have not done so - before you die.’49 The association expanded and there are now more than fifty ‘Cha–chiru-kai’ throughout Japan with 2,000 members representing all walks of life. Each year they hold exhibitions of their works for charity. In the 1970s, the Japanese National Institute of Defence Studies carried out a comprehensive joint research project on Churchill’s wartime leadership. Churchill’s personality, his gifts and shortcomings as well as the political, social, military, historical and family background were analysed in depth.50 The conclusion was: Japan must find a Japanese Churchill in the event of national emergency and the people ought to support and follow his leadership in national unity. The Japanese must remember that the foremost reason for the victory of the Allies was that their wartime leaders, namely Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, were far superior to the leaders of the Axis nations.

For the Japanese it has been their ill fortune that they did not have leaders of such calibre as to enable them to deal with the problems that confronted them in the 1930s and 1940s. It is beyond doubt that Konoe, Matsuoka, Tojo and other Japanese leaders miserably failed in their responsibilities by inviting catastrophe to the nation. The Japanese should bear in mind that the history, culture, political institutions and the people of Britain produced Winston Churchill. NOTES 1 2

Roy Jenkins, Churchill A Biography, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2001, p. 8. Churchill Papers, CHAR 28/85/46–52, Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Churchill College, Cambridge (CCC). Lady Randolph Churchill’s travelogue in the Pall Mall Magazine of July 1904 makes an interesting reading even to the Japanese today retelling the customs and social conditions now almost forgotten. She was shocked to see married women with ‘shaved eyebrows and blackened teeth, in which hideous custom they indulge in order to remain faithful to their husbands’, but she ‘feared it might have the reverse effect on the husbands’. The beauties of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s temple in Nikko far surpassed her imagination whilst Yokohama was a town ‘where they try to please foreign taste by forcing themselves to forget all that is best in Japanese art, producing vulgar atrocities’. When she left Kobe, she was ‘more than sorry to leave Japan - rest-

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ful country of enchantments, land of courteous men and soft-voiced women’. Her ears were ‘still listening for the two most characteristic sounds in Japan — the tap-tap of the little pipe as it is emptied before being refilled, and the mournful notes of the reed lute which the blind masseur plays as he walks through the village street’. These sentiments were later often to echo in her son’s words and deeds. Churchill’s letter to Louis F. Alber of 11 August 1933, Winston S. Churchill by Martin Gilbert, Companion Volume Part 2: 1929–1935, p. 643. Churchill Papers, Japan and Monroe Doctrine, CHAR 8/545, CAC:CCC, p. 16. Churchill Papers, ibid., p. 17. Lt Colonel A.G. Churchill, Letter to the Director of Military Intelligence, 18 March 1902, The National Archives/The Public Record Office (TNA/PRO), F.O. 46/563. He further said, ‘It should not be an impossible task for Japanese diplomacy to entangle a third Power in any quarrel she might pick with Russia’, i.e. to get Britain involved, and that it would be wrong to expect much of the Japanese army, as it was overrated compared to European troops. Ian H. Nish, Alliance In Decline: A Study In Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908–23, University of London, The Athlone Press, 1972, p. 47. Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Vol. Ill 1914—6, London: Heinemann 1971, p. 43. Juliet Gardiner (ed.), The History Today Who’s Who in British History, Collins & Brown, 2000, p. 180. Winston Churchill, Painting As A Pastime, from Thoughts and Adventures, 1932, CHAR 8/319, CAC/CCC, p. 307. Ian Nish, ‘Lord Curzon and Japan’ in Biographical Portraits, Volume V Folkestone: Global Oriental 2005. Gilbert, op. cit, Vol. IV, 1917–1922, pp. 258–259. Jenkins, op. cit., p. 243. Nish, op. cit., p. 396. Churchill, The Follies of The Victors, 1919–1929, The Second World War, Abridged Edition, Pimlico 2002, p. 9. Yoshida Sori Obeihomon Kankei Ikken (Prime Minister Yoshida’s Visit to Europe and the United States), Resume of Churchill’s Speech, reel No. A’-0136, Diplomatic Record Office (DRO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). G.P. Gooch, Studies in diplomacy and statecraft, London, New York: Longmans, Green, 1948, pp. 165–6. Gilbert, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 457. Churchill, ‘Defense in the Pacific’, Collier’s, 17 December 1932, CHAR 8/318, CAC:CCC, p. 43. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 105. Churchill, ‘Germany and Japan’, The Evening Standard, 27 November 1937, CHAR 8/543, CAC:CCC. Churchill, ‘An “Incident” In China’, The Daily Telegraph, 27 May 1938, CHAR 8/611, CAC:CCC. ‘Lord Hankey (1877–1963), R.A. Butler (1902–82) and the ‘Appeasement’ of Japan, 1939—41 ’ by Antony Best in Biographical Portraits, Volume V, Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005. Shigemitsu to Acting Foreign Minister, Nichi-Ei Gaiko Zassan (Anglo-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, Misc.) A134—1, 4 April 1941, DRO/MOFA. FO 371/27889, TNA/PRO. ‘Shigemitsu Mamoru, 1887–1957 and Anglo-Japanese Relations’ by Antony Best in Biographical Portraits Volume II, Folkestone: Japan Library, 1997. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume III The Grand Alliance, London: Cassell & Co. Ltd, 1950, pp. 516, 536. Shigemitsu Mamoru, Gaiko Kaisoroku (Diplomatic Memoirs), Mainichi Shinbun, 1978, p. 243. Churchill, The Battle of The Atlantic, June 25 1941, Robert Rhodes James’ edition of Churchill’s speeches, CAC:CCC, p. 6443. Lord Hankey, Politics, Trials, and Errors, Oxford: Pen-In-Hand, p. XII. Shidehara Kijuro, ‘Gaiko 50nen (The Fifty Years Diplomacy)’, The Yomiuri Newspaper, 1951, pp. 202–4. Churchill Papers, Warning to Japan, WSC: Complete speeches, R. Rhodes James Edition vol. VI, CAC:CCC, p. 6504,.

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33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41

42 43 44 45

46

47

48 49

50

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Churchill, The Second World War, op. cit., p. 530 and p. 522. Ibid. p. 536. Churchill, The Second World War, Abridged Edition, Pimlico, 2002, pp. 492–493. Prime Minister to Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, CAB 65/14, TNA/PRO. Churchill, The Second World War, Abridged Edition, op. cit. p. 492. Churchill, ibid., p. 942. Churchill, ibid., p. 941. Asakai to Matsui Akira, Counsellor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence, 9 February 1953, L-005/9/3, DRO/MOFA. Matsumoto Shunichi, ‘Chachiru no Nihonjin eno Aijo’ (Churchill’s Love for the Japanese), Bungei Shunju, May 1967, p. 98. Also Asakai Ko–ichiro, Tsukasacho Kanwa-Ichi Gaikokan no Kaiso (A Diplomat’s Memoirs), Obayashi Gumi Ltd., 1986, p. 170 and Takanobu Mitani, Kaisoroku (Memoirs), private edition, 1980, p. 268. Matsumoto to Okazaki, Cablegram No.269, 1 May 1953, L’-005/9/ 3DRO/MOFA. The Mainichi Shinbun (Newspaper), 1 May 1953, evening edition. Asakai, op. cit., pp. 173–5. Hugh Cortazzi (ed.), ‘Prime Minister Yoshida in London 1954: The First Visit to Britain by a Japanese Prime Minister’, Biographical Portraits Vol. VI (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007) pp. 15–22. Shigeru Yoshida, Kaiso no lOnen (Memoirs of Ten Years), Chud Koronsha, 1998, pp. 181–4. Churchill, Letters to Yoshida, 11 August 1956 and 14 August 1957, CHUR 2/439, CAC:CCC. Also Matsumoto, op. cit., p. 98. For example, the Asahi and the Nikkei newspapers, 25 January 1965. Churchill further wrote: ‘The colours are lovely to look at and delicious to squeeze out. Matching them, however crudely, with what you see is fascinating and absolutely absorbing.’ ‘This heightened sense of observation of Nature is one of the chief delights that have come to me through trying to paint.’ ‘Try it, then, before it is too late and before you mock at me. Try it while there is time to overcome the preliminary difficulties. Learn enough of the language in your prime to open this new literature to your age.’ ‘Painting is complete as a distraction. I know of nothing which, without exhausting the body, more entirely absorbs the mind. Whatever the worries of the hour or the threats of the future, once the picture has begun to flow along, there is no room for them in the mental screen.’ ‘When I get to heaven I mean to spend a considerable portion of my first million years in painting, and so get to the bottom of the subject. But then I shall require a still gayer palette than I get here below.’, Painting As A Pastime, op. cit., pp. 309–10, 313 and 318. Churchill’s wartime leadership has also been the subject of a lecture series at the Maritime Defence Forces Staff College for more than ten years. It is still on the curriculum of the Staff College. (See National Institute of Defence Studies, Lecture Syllabus 74 Lo Gun-9 1974, Churchill’s Wartime Leadership, National Diet Library, GK421-E19. Also Kawai Hidekazu, Churchill, (Chuo Koron Shinsho), 1998, p. 343.) The emphasis the Japanese place on Churchill’s wartime leadership is interesting when one considers the view of Basil Liddell Hart who said: ‘In that dark time of disaster, Winston Churchill shone by his fighting spirit. But although full recognition should be given to the example he set, it would be a mistake to equate this, in a historical judgment of events, with its influence on the situation. The British have always been less dependent than other people upon inspiring leadership. Their record embraces relatively few spectacular victories, but they have a unique record in winning “soldiers’ battles” .’ (Liddell Hart, Encounter, vol. 26, No. 4, 1966, pp. 17–18.) The point made by Liddell Hart may be a moot question for the British people themselves.

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A British Perspective1

HUGH CORTAZZI

OVERVIEW

S

Hugh Cortazzi

ince the end of the Second World War policy towards Japan has rarely been a priority issue for the British government and has only occasionally been discussed in the cabinet. Two main aims dominated British policy towards Japan in the forty years covered in this chapter. The first was to ensure that Japan did not again pose a threat to world peace and British interests. The second was to develop beneficial economic relations through trade and investment. This became the main priority from about 1965 During the Cold War deterring Japan from joining the communist bloc was always a dominant consideration. Wartime memories also ensured that Britain remained conscious of the threat from right-wing extremist nationalism.As trade issues dominated relations with Japan during these years ministers responsible for trade, industry and finance were often more involved in determining policy than foreign secretaries. The day to day work on the formation of policy was largely delegated to officials, but ministers especially those who made official visits to Tokyo while they were in office ensured that policies reflected political pressures on ministers from MPs, businesses and trade unions as well as from public opinion reflected in the media. Few foreign secretaries since Anthony Eden gave much attention to relations with Japan. In the forty years covered in this essay only R.A. Butler, Sir Alec Douglas Home (who visited Japan in 1963 and was due to go again in 1972 but his visit had to be cancelled) and Geoffrey Howe in the latter half of the 1980s took more than a passing interest in Japan. Other foreign secretaries who visited Japan were R.A. Butler who went there in 1964, Michael Stewart who followed in 1965 and went again in 1970, George Brown who made a truncated visit to Japan in January 1968, Anthony Crosland tagged a short visit to Tokyo onto a tour of China in 1976 (he had been to Japan previously in other capacities) and Lord Carrington who visited Japan in 1982. The main purpose of these visits was to take part in the regular Anglo-Japanese consultations at foreign minister level, which began in 1963. The international topics discussed were wide-ranging, covering world affairs, UN issues and aid but 232

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the main focus tended to be on the Asian region. While assessments and interests might differ there was a wide community of views on most international themes. Trade and economic subjects were also discussed but these were generally secondary matters in the annual consultations although in the 1970s they began to dominate Anglo-Japanese relations.2 The most important political figures in determining British policy towards Japan in these years were two prime ministers, Edward Heath in the early 1970s and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. Heath was persuaded that the Japanese market could be prized open by a sustained effort by British firms supported by DTI and British officials in Japan. Margaret Thatcher recognized Japanese industrial performance and realized that Japanese firms investing in Britain could not only help to alleviate unemployment in deprived areas but also to make British industry more competitive. This recognition had a profound impact on the automotive, household electrical goods and emerging IT sectors. The export trade and inward investment sectors identified by these two prime ministers thus exerted a significant influence on the formation and implementation of policy towards Japan in the post-war era. BACKGROUND There was much resentment in Britain after the war ended about the mistreatment by the Japanese imperial forces of British prisoners of war in South East Asia and civilian employees who were captured and interned in Singapore and Hong Kong.3 The humiliation of the British surrender in Singapore in 1942 added to popular resentment.4 These negative feelings became less acute as time passed but lingered in popular memory.5 At the end of the war British industry, which had been committed almost fully to the effort to win the war, was in a bad state. The cotton industry, which was then a major employer in Lancashire, resented and feared Japanese competition. These fears were shared by other British manufacturing industries6 reflecting the former strengths of Victorian economy. The Japanese were accused of copying designs and trademarks and producing shoddy goods with sweated labour. There was thus strong pressure on the government from both managements and unions to adopt protectionist policies. After the war ended Britain retained control of important areas of South East Asia (Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Hong Kong) until they achieved independence. Japan could not be ignored in the process of decolonization. Hong Kong was a particular concern because of Sino-Japanese relations. THE AMERICAN DIMENSION AND THE COLD WAR Britain had contributed to the allied occupation of Japan.7 But the Americans were firmly in charge and General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) had semi-dictatorial powers. Inevitably therefore British policy towards Japan was dominated by the need to consult and generally follow the American lead. However over relations with the People’s Republic of China Britain stepped out of line by recognizing the government in Beijing. During the Cold War the paramount aim of both the Americans and the British was to keep Japan out of the communist bloc. Limited Japanese rearmament,

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the maintenance of the American nuclear umbrella and US bases in Japan were essential. Communist infiltration from Russia, China and North Korea was seen as real threats. A NEW RELATIONSHIP HAD TO BE BUILT Against this background the British government took slow and cautious steps towards developing a new relationship with Japan. As Japan’s economy grew, managing the economic and trading relationship became the lead issue. The first steps towards a new relationship were taken by the conclusion of the Allied peace settlement with Japan.8 The next steps were to develop contacts at the political level as well as to reestablish relations between the royal and imperial families. From 1962 regular exchanges at Ministerial level were started. Parliamentary exchanges were also developed. In 1984 the UK-Japan 2000 Group (now the UK-Japan 21st century Group) was established. Visits by ministers and senior officials both ways became increasingly frequent. By the mid -1980s Whitehall were beginning to see Japan as a genuinely useful global partner. Royal visits to and from Japan played an important role in renewing British relations with Japan.9 Political and economic relations have been bolstered by the development of cultural relations.10 The value of ‘soft power’ was recognized implicitly rather than by conscious decisions at ministerial level. The British Council opened an office in Tokyo soon after ratification. Cultural exchanges in all fields have burgeoned.11 THE TRADE AND INDUSTRY AGENDA Establishing good economic and trade relations was much more difficult. The Japanese economic recovery spurred on by American procurement in Japan for the Korean War began to take off in the 1950s. But British officials, conscious of the many barriers to exports to Japan, doubtful about the prospects for increasing exports and aware of the concerns of British industry about imports from Japan, gave little priority to trade with Japan. The scale of Japan’s economic recovery made a policy review necessary. A revised treaty of commerce and navigation was signed in London in November 1962. Following the conclusion of the new treaty a sustained export drive began.12 But Japanese policies remained mercantilist and protectionist until the 1980s. Progress was slow and impeded by Japanese reluctance to take any steps that might undermine their efforts to boost Japanese industry and prevent foreign take-overs. Under pressure from Britain, reflecting representations made by the British industries affected and in the light of arrangements made with other countries, the Japanese agreed a series of ‘voluntary restraint arrangements’ (VRAs) to limit temporarily increases in exports of specific products to Britain.13 The British recognized that these restrictions could only be temporary.14 Nevertheless the VRAs15 amounting to a form of managed trade continued to operate for some time as the Japanese authorities recognized that the disruption, which would follow immediate abolition, was not in their interests. Despite VRAs and major efforts to overcome Japanese tariff and non-tariff barriers, Britain faced an apparently permanent balance of trade deficit with Japan.

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One way of mitigating the imbalance was the promotion of Japanese manufacturing investment in Britain. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japanese corporations increasingly saw the advantage of increased manufacturing investment in Britain as a way to enhance their access to the European market. These investments were resisted by some unions who feared that Japanese work practices would undermine the traditions of British trade unions and by some industries who feared that their factories would be unable to compete, But led by a far sighted realization by British local authorities of the potential benefits, such hostility gradually dissipated. It nonetheless took a long time for British industry to recognize that their practices, technology and productivity were falling behind and that they needed to adopt Japanese quality and just-in-time systems. Frustration in Britain and other European countries especially France and Italy over Japanese trade policies lasted to some degree until the Japanese economic bubble burst in the early 1990s. AN ERA OF WARMTH AND MUTUAL RESPECT Japanese manufacturing investment in Britain, which began in the 1970s, gradually became a significant element in British industry in the 1980s and 1990s and was responsible inter alia for the revival of a competitive automotive sector. Japanese banks, securities houses and trading companies became an increasing force in the City of London and played an important role in promoting business in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. There was reciprocal focus on the Japanese financial market by UK banks and securities firms. By the end of the 1980s relations with Japan had changed from suspicion and latent hostility on the British side to a recognition of Japan as a friendly and important power with which Britain should develop still closer ties. Political, economic and cultural exchanges had blossomed and the image of Japan in Britain during the sixty-five years since the peace treaty had been transformed.16 The Japanese image of Britain as a country suffering from ‘the British disease’ (Eikokubyo) with constant strikes and low productivity had also been largely erased. Japanese recognize that they need English language skills as well as access to British expertise in legal, financial, scientific and technical matters. CONCLUSION The Japanese government responded positively to British approaches for constructive dialogue and welcomed British efforts to revive friendly relations between the British and Japanese monarchies. In trade and investment the mercantilist and legalist attitudes of the Japanese government and business, combined with belief in the myth of Japanese uniqueness, however, meant that progress towards a more balanced economic relationship was slow and fitful. British government policy towards Japan and Japanese responses cannot claim credit for all the changes in Japan’s image here and Britain’s in Japan. But these improvements could not have occurred if a conscious effort had not been made by both the British and Japanese governments to establish a new relationship between the two countries.

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ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS The 1950s Following the entry into force of the Peace Treaty with Japan in April 1952 British relations with Japan had to be reset. The first significant step was the decision to invite Crown Prince Akihito to attend the Queen’s coronation in 1953. Winston Churchill gave a lunch for the crown prince.17 The invitation to the coronation aroused some adverse publicity due to the continuing public hostility towards Japan especially over the treatment of British prisoners of war by Japanese Imperial forces. In October 1954 Yoshida Shigeru,18 the Japanese prime minister, made an official visit to Britain. The objective as set out in Foreign Office briefing was ‘to show Mr Yoshida as much consideration as possible in order to strengthen his position in Japan and to help towards keeping Japan aligned with the West’. Winston Churchill gave a dinner for him at No. 10 Downing Street and the Queen gave him lunch. Unfortunately, his meeting with members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union where he faced some aggressive questions did not go well. EARLY POST-WAR CONTACTS A labour attaché had been appointed to the staff of the British mission in Tokyo during the occupation and this post continued for some years after the peace treaty came into force. It aimed to further understanding between British and Japanese trade unions. Britain was a pioneer in the development of atomic energy for the generation of electricity and British know-how was employed in the development of Japan’s first nuclear power station at Tokai-mura. An atomic energy attaché was appointed to the staff of the embassy to deal with issues that arose. British Nuclear Fuels continued in subsequent decades to play an important role in relation to Japanese nuclear developments.

The 1960s Contacts between British and Japanese officials both in London and Tokyo increased. The aim of keeping Japan aligned with the West was a key factor in British efforts to expand dialogue with Japan. Arrangements were made for meetings between experts from London and their counterparts in Tokyo at which briefing papers were exchanged. Attempts were made to solve outstanding bilateral issues such as obtaining permission for a British doctor to treat foreign residents in Kobe and permission for Japanese doctors to treat Japanese patients in London. Scientific and technology exchanges were an important element in the development of understanding between the two countries and a science counsellor was appointed to the embassy in Tokyo. As the Japanese economy developed and development assistance began to become an increasingly important element in Japanese foreign policy cooperation over foreign aid was explored.

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With a view to establishing closer relations between the British royal family and the Japanese imperial household the young and charming Princess Alexandra was deputed to visit Japan in the autumn of 1961. The Japanese made great efforts to arrange a suitable programme for her, which included meetings with the Emperor and Empress. Princess Chichibu, whose father had been Japanese ambassador in London, acted as her main Imperial hostess. Princess Alexandra went again to Tokyo in 1965 for a trade exhibition. Princess Margaret visited Tokyo to attend British week in 1969.19 The Prince of Wales went to Japan in 1970 in the context of Expo ’70 in Osaka.20 They all received a warm welcome from the Imperial Household Exchanges between British and Japanese officials led to agreement to hold annual talks at foreign minister level. The–first of these meetings was held in 1963 when the then Japanese foreign minister Ohira Masayoshi visited Britain for talks with the foreign secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home. Unfortunately because of time pressures the annual ministerial talks sometimes had to be cancelled, postponed or held at a lower level. But the principle was upheld and British commitment to improving relations with Japan was confirmed by the visits to Japan, which were made by British foreign secretaries and other British ministers and senior officials. Anglo-Japanese consultations began to become routine. Consultations covered a wide range of topics from aid to issues at the United Nations including voting on candidates for election to UN committees and UN appointments. A British-Japan parliamentary group, which was led for many years by Sir Julian Ridsdale MP, 21 arranged regular visits by members of parliament to Japan. This led to a better understanding of Japan in the British parliament. The grievances of former prisoners of war and internees about their ill-treatment by Japanese forces during the war prompted private attempts to find ways to achieve reconciliation where this seemed possible.

The 1970s THE SHOWA EMPEROR’S STATE VISIT 1971 In consultation with Buckingham Palace the government decided to invite the Showa Emperor to make a state visit to Britain. This was unprecedented, as no reigning Japanese emperor had ever travelled abroad. Moreover, as unanswered questions remained about his responsibilities in relation to Japanese participation in the Second World War, there were dangers that his visit might lead to anti-Japanese demonstrations and embarrassment all round. The Japanese government welcomed the invitation and decided that the Emperor and Empress would also visit six other European countries including Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium where they were received by reigning monarchs. One tricky protocol issue, which the British had to decide in advance of the visit, was whether the Emperor of Japan who had been expunged from the roll of the Order of the Garter on Japan’s entry into the war could be reinstated. This was eventually agreed on the understanding that in future only Christian foreign royalty would be eligible for honorary appointments to the Order. There were some protests from former prisoners of war of the Japanese and a somewhat chilly reception from the British public. The visit, nevertheless and to quote Sir John Pilcher,22 the then British ambassador to Japan, ‘from a Japanese point of view caused far more pleasure and pride than pain’.

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EDWARD HEATH AS PRIME MINISTER The Emperor’s state visit and a spate of reports from Sir John Pilcher23 had increased awareness in Whitehall of the growing power and international importance of Japan. Edward Heath, the prime minister, had had a serious discussion about trade with Fukuda Takeo, the Japanese foreign minister, at the Lord Mayor’s banquet for the Showa Emperor at the Guildhall on 6 October 1971.24 In December 1971 when he met President Nixon in Bermuda the president raised the issue of Japan’s place in the world.25 In a note of 11 January 197226 about Anglo-Japanese relations Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the foreign secretary, declared: ’There are many fields in which we are making a conscious effort to stimulate closer relations between Britain and Japan… the desire “to bring Japan into the Western family”’. This became the basic purpose of the annual exchanges at ministerial level instituted in 1963. Douglas-Home added: ‘These talks cover predominantly political matters, but include also economic, financial and bilateral trade items.’ In addition, there were regular talks between the FCO planning staff and their Japanese opposite numbers as well as regular meetings of the Anglo-Japanese mixed commission set up under the 1960 cultural agreement. There were also regular meetings of officials dealing with trade issues, air traffic rights, UN matters, scientific and technological questions and atomic energy. The minute went on to list various exchanges between non-governmental organizations. It noted that Britain had ‘welcomed more Japanese ministers to London in recent years than we have sent British ministers to Japan.’ The foreign secretary concluded: ‘I am sure that we are going to have to handle them [the Japanese] with some care. They are being given bitter medicine by the Americans and, as a country desperately anxious to be regarded as a full member of the Western Club, they are at present in a sensitive frame of mind. If the relations between Japan and the West were to go badly wrong, our interest could be adversely affected over a very wide front indeed’. ‘THE JAPANESE PHENOMENON’ The prime minister instructed officials to set out the main factors in the Japanese phenomenon’. A paper so entitled was submitted to the defence and overseas policy committee of the Cabinet on 30 September 1971.27 The parliamentary under-secretary, who signed the covering note in the absence of the foreign secretary, noted that Japan had the second largest gross national product in the free world. ‘Her rate of growth has averaged 10% over the past ten years’. He declared: ‘We welcome Japan’s political emergence on the world scene and should do all we can to encourage Japan to cooperate fully in the free world and to maintain her basic alignment with the West’. Much of this paper was devoted to the commercial aspects of relations with Japan (see below). But it emphasized (paragraph 27) that ‘ The main British interests in relation to Japan are that she should continue in basic alignment with the West; should not again become a totalitarian power with a militarist and expansionist policy; that she should contribute to the stability and the economic development of Asia; and should liberalize her trading and investment policies…With these interests in mind we should seek to maintain the closest possible contacts with Japan at all times.’ The paper reviewed Japan’s relations with the USA, which were particularly fraught at that time. The Japanese had been shocked by the American failure to

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give them advance warning of the decision to send Kissinger to Beijing and fundamentally change US policy towards China. This raised doubts in Japan about the extent to which they could rely on the Americans to defend Japan. The huge Japanese trade surplus with the US was a major source of friction. Nevertheless ‘the key role in keeping Japan in basic alignment with the West and encouraging her to cooperate with the free world will lie with the United States.’ The drafters considered that Japan because of its increasing economic success was bound to become more self-assertive. ‘The period of the low posture is now at an end.’ This raised the possibility that Japan would ‘adopt a more nationalist or Gaullist posture’ and might ‘decide that her self-defence required development of her own nuclear weapons’, but concluded that ‘considerations of Japanese self-interest will militate against’ such a scenario. The paper expected that Japan would try to open relations with the PRC but that relations with the Soviet Union would not change quickly. The private secretary to the prime minister sent a letter to the FCO28 in which he recorded that ‘the Prime Minister is doubtful if this paper gives sufficient weight to the problems with which we may be faced and has commented that we must recognize that Japan is as ruthless in trade as in war.’ EDWARD HEATH – THE FIRST BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT JAPAN The visit by Mr Heath, which was the first by a British prime minister to Japan while in office, took place in September 197229 (see chapter 26 and Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, volume VI.) The political objectives in the steering brief were stated rather differently than in the 1971 paper on ‘The Japanese Phenomenon’. The first objective was ‘To encourage Japan to play a part on the world stage in keeping with her economic strength and to assume the responsibilities appropriate to a nation playing this part’. The second objective was ‘To exchange views with the Japanese’ about the international situation and about the enlargement and development of the European Economic Community (EEC).’ The others covered economic and trade issues (see below), which in practice dominated the discussions. Sir Fred Warner, who had succeeded Sir John Pilcher as British ambassador, assessed the visit as ‘undoubtedly a great success and should yield valuable results. He noted that ‘The political discussions…showed no real difference of views between us.’ The prime minister in a brief report to the Cabinet on 28 Sept 1972 on his visit to Japan30 said ‘ he had been impressed by the size and strength of the Japanese economy which now placed Japan effectively at the centre of international monetary and commercial affairs. At the same time Japan was assuming a more important political role in the Pacific area…With proper encouragement Japan could be helpful to us both economically and politically.’ JAPAN AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) One issue, which Mr Tanaka Kakuei, the Japanese prime minister, raised was Japan’s wish for permanent membership of the UNSC. ‘Mr Heath promised to consider this sympathetically but drew attention to the very serious obstacles, The Foreign Office in November 1972 sought agreement31 from No. 10 for a more positive line to be summed up in the words: ‘We are sympathetic to the Japanese claim to a perma-

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nent seat which, judged on its intrinsic merits, is a strong one’. The prime minister agreed on the assumption that the Japanese could find a way round the obstacles to an increase in permanent membership of the Security Council. THE QUEEN PAYS A STATE VISIT TO JAPAN The next major step in cementing the Anglo-Japanese relationship was the state visit to Japan made by the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh in 1975. Lady Warner, wife of the British ambassador at that time, recorded her impressions of the visit and its preparations (see account in Japan Experiences, Fifty Years, One Hundred Views: PostWar Japan through British Eyes).32 Vast crowds gathered in Tokyo to catch a glimpse of the Queen whose open car ride down the Ginza was rated an overwhelming success. The Japanese had been most reluctant to agree to any open car ride but the Queen had insisted. The visit was an important milestone in Anglo-Japanese relations. The Queen invited Crown Prince Akihito and the Crown Princess to be her guests at Windsor in 1976. They then undertook as guests of the government a tour including visits to Scotland and Wales. Other royal visits to Japan took place in subsequent years33 and arrangements were made for Prince Hiro, the Crown Prince’s elder son, who on the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1989 became Crown Prince Naruhito, to study at Merton College, Oxford from 1983–5. 34 A FURTHER POLICY REVIEW As fears grew over what came to be termed ‘torrential and concentrated’ Japanese exports to America and European countries including Britain officials became concerned that trade friction could undermine political cooperation. As background for a visit by the foreign secretary the planning staff in 1976 35 reviewed policy towards China and Japan. The paper on Japan, which had little new to say, began by noting Japan’s lack of mineral resources, small territory and large population and her dependence on trade. Japan’s economy ‘seems certain to go on growing’ and ‘was the most striking post-war success story‘ but ‘Japan has not yet assumed the responsibilities of an economic superpower’. The planning staff thought that although there could be a return to right-wing extremism, Japan would be unlikely to revert to the militarism of the past. Britain should develop contacts with Japan and try to encourage the Japanese to deploy their economic power in cooperation, as well as competition with other developed countries.

The 1980s Policy was reviewed again in 1981 and 1982.36 This review arose out of an exchange which I as ambassador in Japan (1980–84) had with Sir Michael Palliser, the permanent under-secretary at the FCO, in which I had expressed misgivings about the apparent lack of coordination in policy towards Japan which covered our political as well as our economic interests’. We needed to assess the threat to our prosperity from Japanese competition and ‘formulate a more coherent strategy which is not solely dominated by the trading relationship’. I was ‘not opposed to being firm and tough with the Japanese, but threats need

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to be thought through. The Japanese may well call our bluff and if we want to escalate we need to be ready to face consequences’. The paper on policy towards Japan, which emerged after interdepartmental consultations in Whitehall and much redrafting in May 1982, reiterated that Britain’s strategic objectives were that: ‘a. Japan should remain a reliable and cooperative member of the Western family; b. Japan should accept greater responsibility for the international consequences of her economic success, and adapt her economic and trading policies accordingly.

The two objectives interlock. There are limits on how far we can go on b. without jeopardizing a., but, equally, the development of closer political relations with Japan could increase her interest in not antagonizing the EC and US on the trade front.’ The paper recommended that political consultation should be developed through the seven-power economic summits, which at that time were the only top-level meetings to include Japan. Political co-operation should be enhanced with the then ten members of the EC and through bilateral contacts at ministerial and official level. The Japanese should be encouraged to provide ‘more economic aid to strategically vulnerable countries like Pakistan’. Increased Japanese defence expenditure was likely to be gradual. Britain’s defence interest lay in developing equipment sales and manufacture under licence in Japan. Discussions at permanent secretary level did not reach a conclusion on ‘whether the emphasis should be on threatening the Japanese with stringent action or attempting to beguile them into changing their ways…diplomatic action within the European Community had so far not produced a united or effective front. The Community had vacillated for years.’ The Japanese wished to remain a member of the club but ‘tried to do so on their own terms without paying the full subscription’. They watched to see what other countries were doing ‘before making any constructive moves. When they saw that action by Japan was inevitable, they had then only been prepared to do the absolute minimum.’ MARGARET THATCHER – THE SECOND BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT JAPAN The 1982 planning paper was the basis for the briefs for the visit,which Margaret Thatcher, then British prime minister, made to Japan in September 1982. I have described this and her subsequent visit in 1989 in my biographical portrait ‘Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013): Pragmatist Who Radically Improved Britain’s Image in Japan and Successfully Promoted Japanese Manufacturing Investment in Britain’ (see chapter 27).37 In 1984 agreement was reached on the formation of an Anglo-Japanese group of leading individuals within and outside parliament to meet annually to discuss themes of mutual interest and make recommendations to the two governments. This was called initially the UK-Japan 2000 Group, now the UK-Japan 21st Century Group.38 By the mid-1980s Whitehall not only recognized that good relations with Japan were in Britain’s national interest, but we should also try to build a closer partnership with Japan in international affairs generally. Britain’s political relations with Japan became closer as war memories faded and trade friction lessened, but there were some difficult political moments in these years. The following are a few examples:

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Some Difficult Political Issues FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR Resentment over the treatment of prisoners of war of the Japanese Imperial Forces continued throughout this period. Former prisoners of war who had received a sum of seventy-six pounds under the terms of Article 16 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty,39 complained bitterly that this was a derisory sum in compensation for their suffering. The British government, which had signed the treaty, were inhibited from pressing the Japanese government for increased compensation and the Japanese government argued obstinately and legalistically that they had no obligation to pay any further compensation even when the Japanese economy had recovered and achieved a huge balance of payments surplus. The agitation finally died down when in 2000 the British government agreed to pay the sum of ten thousand pounds to survivors and widows. Former prisoners of war staged protests during the state visits of both the Showa Emperor in 1971 and the Heisei Emperor in 1998. UN FORCES IN JAPAN British forces taking part in the Korean War had rear bases in Japan. Their status had been protected until the Peace Treaty came into force as they were regarded as members of the occupation forces.40 A new status of forces agreement was needed for US forces who would be remaining to defend Japan. In parallel a status of forces agreement had to be agreed for UN Forces. In practice this meant personnel of UK, Australian and New Zealand forces. The negotiation of this agreement should have been easy if the Japanese government had agreed to apply the same terms for both US and UN forces. But the Japanese wanted to use the UN agreement to put pressure on the American to accept modifications especially in relation to offences committed by members of their forces in Japan. Under the American agreement, which had been carried over from the occupation, jurisdiction in the case of criminal offences by American personnel rested with the American authorities. The Japanese understandably wanted such offences to be tried by Japanese courts. The British felt strongly that as their forces were fighting alongside the Americans in Korea in a UN operation there should be parity of treatment in Japan. Antony Eden in a paper to the cabinet dated 13 August 1952 and headed JAPAN: JURISDICTION OVER BRITISH FORCES41 recommended that if a final effort to obtain equal status with the Americans failed ‘the only practicable course’ would to negotiate for NATO status under which members of the forces were immune from local jurisdiction only when on duty. The issue had been given much publicity following the arrest by Japanese police in Kobe of two drunken ratings from HMS Belfast. After official protests had been made in Tokyo and they had appeared in a Japanese court in Kobe,they were released. CHRISTMAS ISLAND ATOMIC TESTS 1957 The atomic bomb tests of 1957 on Christmas Island in the Pacific aroused fears in Japan that fall-out from the tests would pollute fish in the Pacific and would be dangerous to eat. Japanese fears were exacerbated by the fallout from the series of American tests on Bikini Atoll. One of these had caused radiation dam-

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age to the crew of a Japanese fishing boat Daigo Fukuryu– Maru (‘Lucky Dragon No. 5’). One member of the crew had later died from radiation poisoning. Having suffered as a result of the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 the Japanese were particularly sensitive. Official protests were made to the British government and there were anti-British demonstrations outside the British Embassy in Tokyo. MALASIA-INDONESIA‘CONFRONTATION’ 1963/4 Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in 1963/4 led to some fairly bitter exchanges between Britain and Japan. Britain was involved because there were still British forces in Malaysia. Japan was thought to be too supportive of Indonesia and too close to President Sukarno. An account of the exchanges over the issues involved is contained in my biographical portrait of Sir Francis Rundall,42 British ambassador in Tokyo at that time. Exchanges included messages between Sir Alec Douglas Home, then British prime minister, and Ikeda Hayato, Japanese prime minister. It was one of the main topics at the Anglo-Japanese ministerial consultations held in May 1964 in Tokyo when RAB Butler, then British foreign secretary visited Japan. FALKLAND ISLANDS The failure of the Japanese government of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko to back British action in 1982 to recover the Falkland Islands aroused irritation in London. An account of this episode is contained in my biographical portrait of Mrs Thatcher and Japan43 and in my memoir.44 CULTURAL RELATIONS Cultural relations between Britain and Japan generally developed independently from government to government relations. Japanese students had come to Britain in significant numbers after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and English became the first foreign language studied by Japanese. English literature studies featured prominently at Japanese Imperial Universities and there was much Japanese interest in British institutions and culture. The war with Japan inevitably set back English studies, but these quickly revived once the war was over. The importance of cultural relations was recognized by officials and given as much priority as the strained resources of the British Council permitted. Little could be done to further cultural relations during the occupation. But Edmund Blunden who had taught in Japan before the war was sent out as cultural attaché in the United Kingdom Liaison Mission (UKLM) to SCAP. An information department under Vere Redman,45 who had also worked in Japan before the war,was established in the mission. As soon as possible after the peace treaty with Japan came into force in 1952 a British Council office46 was established in Tokyo. Reginald Close was its first director. He received a warm welcome and the services of the British Council were in much demand. The Council facilitated Japanese students to study at British universities. As Japan was very short of foreign exchange until Japanese growth took off the British Council arranged a scholarship scheme

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under which selected scholars were enabled to study at British universities. The scheme ended when Japanese scholars were free to travel and exchange controls were relaxed. In 1960 a cultural agreement was concluded between the British and Japanese Governments. It was duly ratified and came into force in 1961. Mixed commissions established under this agreement were to meet regularly, review cultural relations and make recommendations about the application of the agreement. The council organized visits by British scholars, writers and cultural figures to Japan. They facilitated visits in the fields of opera, ballet and music. There was much demand for performances by British companies and soloists who were acclaimed by Japanese audiences. Exhibitions of British art and artifacts in Japan were helped in various ways e.g. by providing insurance guarantees for transport and assistance from the British embassy and British Council in Tokyo. Japanese department stores putting on promotions of British products were keen to host exhibitions as these attracted Japanese visitors to their stores. The British Council became increasingly involved in promoting English language studies for which there was an insatiable demand in Japan. A major development was the establishment of the English language teacher scheme (known as the JET). This was initiated in 1978 and has contributed significantly to mutual understanding.47 The Japan Foundation opened an office in London in 1972. It supported cultural exchanges and the teaching of Japanese language. It also did its best to promote Japanese studies in schools and universities. The British government recognized at the end of the war that Japanese studies had been neglected in Britain and that this had harmed the national interest. Accordingly a number of posts in Japanese language and culture were established in British universities, but funding cuts put some of these posts in jeopardy. In 1984 the government commissioned Sir Peter Parker to survey the provision for hard languages. As a result of his report in 1985 the provision for Japanese studies at universities was strengthened and Japanese studies are now part of the curriculum in leading British universities. But as a study48 made in 2016 shows there is room for improvement. A major Japanese art exhibition ‘The Great Japan Exhibition’ of Edo culture was held at the Royal Academy in Piccadilly in 1980/81 with British and Japanese sponsorship.49 The Japan Festival in the UK in 1991 marked the centenary of the Japan Society in London. Various aspects of Japanese culture, ancient and modern, were celebrated. The patrons of the festival were the Prince of Wales and the Crown Prince Naruhito. Together they opened the Kyoto Garden in Holland Park as a permanent memorial of the Festival. Interest in Japanese culture in Britain has spread largely without official involvement and Japan’s image has been transformed. Manga and Anime have inspired some young people to take up Japanese studies. Modern Japanese artists, however outré, attract large numbers of visitors to their exhibitions. Japanese films are another popular attraction. Japanese restaurants proliferated especially in London and sushi, unheard of in the past except by British people who had lived in or visited Japan, became available from sandwich shops to supermarkets. The British image in Japan especially in the 1970s and early 1980s was of a country in decline suffering from what the Japanese called Eikokubyo or ‘the English disease’ where trade unions were alleged to rule the roost, and the Brit-

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ish were thought to be hide-bound to tradition and out-dated working practices. This image changed after Mrs Thatcher became prime minister. Ano onna or ‘that woman’ fascinated the Japanese. And even if they did not always like what they heard, they admired her not least because she recognized Japan’s industrial and technological success. These altered perceptions contributed to the general improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations in this period, but this was largely due to circumstances rather than conscious acts of policy. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS While the importance of political and cultural relations was always recognized trade friction was the dominating feature of these years. If strenuous efforts had not been made to find a modus vivendi it could have had a serious impact on the overall relationship. In the Second World War most of Japanese industry had been destroyed. By 1945 Japanese cities were in ruins and Japanese people were on the verge of starvation. In the occupation years from 1945 to 1952 the foundations for recovery were laid down and inflation tamed, but the Japanese were poor and life was tough. American procurement in the context of the Korean War provided a significant boost to Japanese recovery. This took off under the ‘double the income’ economic policies adopted by Ikeda Hayato, prime minster from 1960 to 1964. The ministry of international trade and industry (MITI) managed with generally ruthless efficiency what was in fact a planned economy. Britain had survived the war and participated in the victory over the allies. But it had huge debts and its industry, which had been geared for war production at any cost, was run down and out of date. The textile industries of Lancashire and Yorkshire faced greatly increased competition and had lost many of their former markets. The days of empire were over, but many executives did not recognize that root and branch changes were required. Japan managed to revive fairly quickly an efficient cotton textile industry based on low wages and young women housed in dormitories. Japanese manufactured textile products soon posed a significant threat to the textile industry in Lancashire that remembered all too well Japanese competition over cotton textiles in the 1930s. Japan also quickly revived sundry goods industries based on private small firms and workshops. Their cheap products soon undercut similar British products. The commercial image of Japan was one of shoddy products produced by sweated labour. Japanese traders were accused of copying British designs and ignoring intellectual property rights. This image was reflected when Yoshida Shigeru, then Japanese prime minister, visited the House of Commons in October 1954 and had a difficult meeting. Imports into Japan were strictly controlled and limited. There seemed little prospect that Japan could become an important target for British exports. THE 1950S By the end of the 1950s the textile industry in Lancashire was less concerned about Japanese competition as it had been almost overwhelmed by Indian and Pakistani competition. But there was little inclination in the Board of Trade

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to give much priority to promoting trade between Britain and Japan. Britain acted for the sterling area, which included the remaining British colonies, and responsibility for sterling area payments negotiations rested with the Treasury. Accordingly it fell in October 1955 to RA Butler, then chancellor of the exchequer, to circulate a lengthy memorandum50 to his colleagues in the cabinet about negotiations for a new trade and payments agreement with Japan. This memorandum showed how closely trade with Japan at that time was controlled and limited. The first British objective in these negotiations was ‘to obtain a general statement of intention by Japan to facilitate imports, visible and invisible, from the sterling area to the amount of Japan’s total earning from the area’ i.e. trade should be equalized. The Japanese were prepared to give an undertaking to buy not less than £127.5 million for visible and invisible exports from the sterling area. This was regarded as acceptable, but little of this was available for UK-Japan trade. In 1954 Britain had granted import quotas of £3 million for grey cloth for re-export after processing (needed by the textile industry in Lancashire) and of £1.35 millions for manufactured goods. Japanese quotas for UK exports amounted to only £2.4 millions (for wool textiles, whisky and confectionery). The Japanese under pressure agreed to offer a quota of £1 million for machinery and what seemed to amount to another £1 million for miscellaneous items, mainly food. The pound was still relatively strong against the yen. The devaluations, which Britain had to undertake in subsequent years, were of little help to British exports at least until Japanese import restrictions were modified. THE 1960S AND THE REVISED COMMERCIAL TREATY In March 1960 the Cabinet51 approved a recommendation by the President of the Board of Trade that Britain should resume negotiations for a commercial treaty with Japan. A further memorandum to the cabinet52 from the chancellor of the exchequer in May 1960 headed ‘Commercial Treaty with Japan: Probable Effect on UK Industries’ explained the hesitations on the British side about concluding a revised treaty. The economic policy committee of the Cabinet had ‘considered a list of sensitive industries for which we should claim continued protection’. The committee recognized that the list they had drawn up made up ‘about half of Japan’s exports to the world…our experience of competition in third markets and the political considerations involved make it wise for us to propose such a comprehensive initial list’. Items on this list included cameras, cigarette lighters, cutlery, sewing machines, nets, optical instruments, pottery, textiles, toys and transistors. A further memorandum53 from the chancellor of the exchequer in December 1960 explained the line, which it was proposed to take when negotiations resumed. Britain by invoking article XXXV of the GATT was able to impose quantitative restrictions on imports of most Japanese manufactures. If a way could be found under which Britain ceased to invoke article XXXV this ‘would remove a constant irritation to our political relations with Japan. From the economic standpoint the negotiation of a treaty would give our exporters permanent most-favoured-nation [MFN] rights in the Japanese market, which is expanding rapidly. Imports of many goods into Japan are closely restricted at present, but there are plans for removing restrictions in the next few years…a firm framework for future trade

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between the two countries is an indispensable preliminary to any vigorous effort by our exporters to develop this important and expanding market.’ The memorandum noted the Japanese preference for restrictions on sensitive items to be operated wherever practicable at the exporting end and drew attention to the willingness by some countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia to rely on the Japanese operating ‘voluntary’ restrictions on exports. The secretary of state for the colonies wanted British negotiators ‘to insist that the restrictions to protect Colonial interests in our market should cover all items of Colonial interest’. The report on a visit to Japan in 1961 by Sir Norman Kipping of the Federation of British Industries (now the CBI) gave an impetus to the negotiations. His report confirmed those from the British embassy about the growing Japanese market. This was also the view of Frederick Erroll, president of the Board of Trade, who visited Japan in April 1962 and concluded that Britain should press the negotiations to a conclusion. The negotiations were finally concluded in 196254 and the new treaty was signed in London on 14 November in the presence of the British and Japanese prime ministers (Harold Macmillan and Ikeda Hayato). Its provisions covered not only trade in goods, but also shipping, insurance and investment, all of which were controversial issues. While the British were prepared to accord national treatment virtually without qualification to Japanese companies investing in Britain, the Japanese, who were doubtful about Britain’s willingness to provide such treatment, wanted to exclude British companies from participation in banking, public utilities and a wide range of other activities. The most important clauses of the treaty related to British agreement to the application of MFN treatment to imports from Japan and the dis-invoking Article XXXV of the GATT. The British wanted an assurance that if imports of items from one party to the agreement came in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten material injury, the two countries would consult on action needed to deal with the threat and if agreement could not be reached, MFN provisions could be overridden, but the other party would be free to retaliate. This safeguard clause formed a protocol to the Treaty. Similar protocols were contained in agreements, which Japan concluded with some other countries. The British never invoked the protocol not least because of the damage it would have done to Anglo-Japanese commercial relations but also because of the fear that Japanese retaliation might wreak serious damage to particular British exports such as Scotch whisky. In a formal letter attached to the treaty the British agreed to remove all their import controls on Japanese goods by 1968 at the latest. For their part the Japanese agreed that some of the products on which British restrictions would cease would come under their ‘voluntary‘ export controls. These included a wide range of textiles, some radio apparatus and some pottery. Japanese economic growth had taken off. Tokyo hosted the Olympic games in 1964. High speed railways (the shinkansen, popularly called ‘bullet trains’) and motorways were built and there was a frenzy of construction in major Japanese cities especially Tokyo, Yokohama and Osaka. Japanese steel production reached 100 million tons a year. Japanese shipbuilding was highly competitive and won a large share of the market for cargo vessels and carriers. The Japanese motor industry began to export quality vehicles. Japanese electrical goods of modern design and high quality were soon in demand in the developed economies of the West. The conclusion of the revised treaty and the development of the Japanese economy spurred efforts both in London and Tokyo to open up the Japanese market to British goods both in the consumer and capital goods sectors. The first

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requirement was to ensure that British exporters were made aware of the potential of the Japanese market, which was both distant and considered to be difficult because of language problems and different ways of doing business. In London the commercial relations and exports division of the Board of Trade and the Japan committee of the British National Export Council took the lead. In Tokyo the British embassy’s commercial department was strengthened and a series of papers, which were later printed, was produced under the title ‘Trading with Japan’, which covered various aspects of doing business in Japan from business etiquette to patents and trade marks. Numerous trade missions to Japan were organized both from chambers of commerce and industry associations. A group from the British shipbuilding industry, which came to Japan to see how Japan managed to produce so many ships so quickly, returned home chastened. Lord Stokes, then chairman of British Leyland, who visited Japan, however, was condescending about Japanese motorcars and declined to appoint a full time representative in Japan.55 It took many years and study visits before British industry as a whole recognized how much the Japanese industrial scene had changed and that we could learn much from Japanese manufacturing techniques. The Japanese had learnt from American management consultants the importance of quality control. They had honed and perfected these and developed ‘just-in-time’ systems which increased their ability to compete. For consumer goods Japanese department stores were targeted and persuaded to put on week-long promotions of British goods often supported by cultural exhibitions and British traditional symbols such as bagpipers. British Week in Tokyo56in the autumn of 1969 when every major department store in Tokyo held simultaneous promotions and the Budokan in a park behind the Imperial Palace hosted a ‘Britain in Tokyo Exhibition’. ‘British Week in Tokyo’, which was attended by Princess Margaret, the Queen’s sister, was a popular event in Japan and a commercial success. The capital goods sector was even more important if a balance of trade was to be achieved. In addition to trade missions and participation in trade fairs, a British medical and scientific instruments exhibition was organized in the Tokyo science museum to coincide with British Week. To back up the trade promotion campaign continuous efforts were needed to persuade the Japanese to grant increased quotas for consumer items such as biscuits, sugar confectionery and dairy products where Japanese import policies were very restrictive. Japanese protection for their whisky distillers was particularly aggravating as Scotch whisky was a product for which there was a significant demand in Japan and which was then distinctly British. (Whisky sold in bottle was subject to stringent quotas whereas Scotch whisky in bulk which Japanese distillers wanted to blend with their own product was not subject to quota).57 British commercial staff also had to try to deal with the obstacles and restrictions, which faced British companies investing and operating in Japan including the oil majors. In addition they had to try to find ways of helping British companies threatened by a surge in Japanese imports from Japan such as a company making fishing reels. As a result of British Week and associated efforts a significant increase in British exports to Japan in 1969 of £100 million was achieved. For the first time, British exports and imports from Japan were in balance. This figure, even bearing in mind the inflation,which has taken place since then, seems puny in comparison with the figures for later years. A small dent had, however, been made in the carapace protecting the Japanese market but much more remained to be done.

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THE 1970S: EDWARD HEATH AND ‘THE JAPANESE PHENOMENON’ I have outlined above the general conclusions of the paper on ‘The Japanese Phenomenon’ submitted to the cabinet on 30 September 1971 in advance of the visit of the Showa Emperor. This stressed that it was in our interests ‘to dissuade Japan from any retreat into protectionism’. It also called for a special effort by British business to take full advantage of the rapidly expanding Japanese market and increase our share in it But account had to be taken of the various protectionist demands, which were made to the prime minister and his government by British industries affected by Japanese competition. Sir Val Duncan, chairman of Rio Tinto Zinc the mining company, sent the prime minister a memorandum on 30 September 1971. In this he expressed fears that as a result of the protectionist policies adopted by President Nixon towards Japanese imports ‘the Japanese hosepipe’ was likely to be ‘diverted with great strength on Western Europe including the U.K.’ He declared: ‘The Japanese tactics are clear from their record. In general they enter a market by the simple policy of undercutting indigenous competition by15%.’ Among industries threatened were cars, motorcycles and steel products. ‘The fundamental problem is to contain the Japanese capital expansion programme.’ He called for a joint demarche by the governments of the U.K. and EEC countries.’ The Radio Industry Council sent a memorandum, on 29 March 1972 expressing the concerns of the electronics industry, which claimed to be ‘the key industry for industrial modernization, for national defence, for raising the standard of living and for public information and entertainment.’ The memorandum declared that if the Japanese ‘attack’ was ‘not contained and blocked now by means of import quotas, it could lead to the virtual extinction of the consumer products sector and areas of the components sector within a few years.’ The council declared that ‘Japan is in effect a corporate State’. It had gained ‘a stranglehold on component manufacture in the Far East.’ ‘The Japanese will pay no heed…to polite requests to limit their exports’. On 16 June 1972 the prime minister lunched with directors of I.C.I. who told him of their problems with polyester fibre production. ‘The Japanese were making ‘a dead set’ at the United Kingdom market following the difficulties they had encountered in the American market as a result of measures taken by the US authorities against imports from Japan. John Davies, the secretary of state for trade and industry, in a minute of 22 December 1971 drew attention to the way in which Japanese exporters had taken advantage of the undervaluation of the yen but he pointed out that Japan’s phenomenal growth has been a significant factor in the expansion of world trade. British trade with Japan since the signature of the 1962 treaty had roughly trebled although it still only amounted to two per cent of UK’s total overseas trade. In the decade 1960–70 Britain had a small surplus in direct trade with Japan and a substantial surplus on indirect trade. He recognized the pressures from Japanese competition. Britain could use the safeguards clause attached to the treaty, but this could provoke Japanese retaliation and it would be much better if the Japanese voluntarily took measures to restrain exports, which threatened to cause disruption overseas. He was concerned by Japanese restrictions on British investment in Japan and suggested that Britain might threaten restrictions on Japanese investments in the UK. He concluded that we needed ‘to impress on Japanese Ministers more forcibly’ than in the past the need for action to bring exports of sensitive items under effective control in good time and the importance of liberalizing remaining barriers to British exports in Japan.’

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In a further minute dated 29 March 1972 John Davies noted important changes. The yen had increased in value by 14% since 1 January 1971. US-Japan trade talks had brought ‘a firm Japanese commitment to join with the other main trading powers in a major attack on the problems of world trade and payments, as well as some useful Japanese concessions on foreign investment.’ Britain needed to act promptly against ‘any disruptive penetration of our home market by Japanese goods’. However action ‘must not be taken lightly, but must be solidly based on evidence of serious injury or the threat of it.’ He agreed with the foreign secretary that ‘It would not serve our interest to ostracize Japan; our objective must be to treat her, make her behave, like a member of the Western family.’ Officials had reviewed Japanese imports in 1970–71 and found that there had been an increase in imports of iron and steel of 320% and of umbrellas of 89%, but none of these imports apart possibly of polyester yarn would justify invocation of the protocol. However on his forthcoming visit he [John Davies] would warn Japanese ministers that action might have to be taken if imports threatened serious disruption. He thought that there was no likelihood of a dramatic increase in Japanese investment in the UK ‘but inward investment from Japan would be no bad thing, provided it was of the right kind. Indeed, investment in both directions could be the means of easing existing tensions. His main emphasis was on boosting British exports to Japan. Special measures to leapfrog Japan’s complex import structure’ were needed. It was against this background that Mr Heath made his pioneering visit to Japan in September 1972 (see my account of Edward Heath and Japan).58 He told the Cabinet at their meeting59 on 21 September 1972 that ‘There was great potential for a major effort to increase our trade with Japan. The going might at first be hard in the light of language difficulties and differences of techniques; but an urgent and careful study of the means of overcoming such obstacles should now be put in hand,’ In a minute of 21 September 1972 he noted that the Japanese had declared that it was their aim to reduce their current account surplus to one per cent of GNP by improving the Japanese standard of living. In the short term we could expect that Japan would limit exports of goods threatening the existence of an important British domestic industry, as had been the case with ball bearings and polyester fibre. In the longer term we had to ‘make a determined and sustained effort to redress the trade balance by increasing our exports of goods and services to Japan’. But there were formidable difficulties. The prime minister endorsed various proposals for promoting exports to Japan including the establishment of a British trade centre in Tokyo, efforts to sell defence equipment and to further invisible exports such as insurance and investment services. John Davies responded on 30 October 1972 attaching a memorandum outlining steps that were being taken to carry out the Prime Minister’s wishes. In his covering minute herepeated that Japan was a tough market and we needed to convince British business that the efforts required to sell to Japan would bring adequate rewards. Paul Dimond in ‘The British Export Marketing Centre and the promotion of British exports from 1972’60 has summarized the action taken following Mr Heath’s visit to Tokyo. A trade centre was established and export promotion efforts were intensified. Trade friction, however, continued throughout the 1970s and was exacerbated by the Nixon shock measures of 1971 which included a surcharge on imports and suspension of the convertibility of the US dollar. The Japanese were accused of

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currency manipulation and currency issues became significant factors in the management of international trade. Until responsibility for trade matters passed to the EC Britain continued to rely on Japanese voluntary restraint arrangements and inter-industry agreements such as that between SMMT (The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders) and JAMA (The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association) for motorcars. Japanese industry increasingly recognized that to stop a slide into a trade war they would have to set up manufacturing subsidiaries in export markets. British industries and trade unions raised objections to Japanese factories being set up in Britain. But local governments and regions, where there were depressed areas following deindustrialization and the decline in coal mining, welcomed investment and the government through grants and administrative measures did their best to facilitate Japanese manufacturing investments. One of the first investments was that of Sony at Bridgend in Wales in 1974.61 Other Japanese manufacturers of consumer electronics mainly colour television but also microwave ovens including Toshiba, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric,62 Sharp and Sanyo followed. Toshiba’s investment was originally in a joint venture in Plymouth with Rank. Hitachi had wanted to invest in the North East but was ‘persuaded’ to invest in a joint venture in Hirwaun in Wales with GEC where colour television sets were manufactured under Hitachi and GEC labels. The Hitachi labeled sets sold better than those with the GEC label as Japanese electronic manufacturers were regarded as of better quality. NSK, a major manufacturer of ball bearings, opened production facilities at Peterlee in 1976.63 The FCO planning paper on Japan of March 1976, after reviewing Japanese economic development and pointing out that nine member countries of the EEC took 10% of Japan’s exports, declared that the persistent impression that the Japanese market was manipulated and thus closed to British exporters was mistaken but Japanese habits ‘make determined salesmanship necessary.’ Britain, the paper declared in a rather avuncular way, should aim to persuade the Japanese not to try ‘to monopolize existing markets, but follow orderly marketing plans, taking care not to antagonize, or disrupt the traditional interests of, current suppliers’. THE 1980s AND MARGARET THATCHER When I took over as ambassador to Japan in the autumn of 1980, Japan was booming and full of self-confidence. MITI was still very much in control of Japanese trade and investment although some of the more independent industrialists such Honda Soichiro,64 founder of Honda, and Morita Akio of Sony were prepared to go against MITI’s efforts to put their firms into a government-tailored straitjacket. Some Japanese leaders thought of Britain as a country in decline and our products as traditional and out of date. They questioned whether Japan really needed what we produced but felt impelled to buy a few token products to show that Japan was adhering to the principles of free trade. The strong Japanese preference for Japanese goods, the closed nature of the Japanese distribution system and the tendency of the Japanese to want to make everything for themselves were seen as serious obstacles to the expansion of exports to Japan. Britain maintained its efforts to overcome the various obstacles to expanding British exports to Japan. Further efforts were made to promote British exports. An exports to Japan unit (EJU) which had been set up in London launched various

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campaigns (variously called from the 1980s onwards ‘Opportunity Japan’, ‘Priority Japan’ and ‘Action Japan’) to persuade British exporters to work hard to open up the Japanese market and refine the quality of their products to meet the exacting standards of Japanese consumers and industry.65 Pressure for the removal of non-tariff barriers continued with limited success and British officials still had to investigate allegations of dumping and counterfeiting by Japanese firms. The Japanese had to recognize that Britain was trying hard and responded by sending missions to London and assisting British missions in Japan. There was considerable frustration in Whitehall that all our export promotion efforts had yielded limited gains while Japanese exports to Britain continued to increase and the trade imbalance grew. Arnold Weinstock, chairman of GEC, did not hide his anti-Japanese feelings. Other voices called for protection against Japanese ‘torrential and concentrated exports’ (shu–chu– gouteki yushutsu). These feelings infected the European Commission, which took over trade policy from member states. Sir Roy Denman, director general for trade, called the Japanese ‘work-aholics living in rabbit hutches’.66 It was clear to officials directly involved that without more Japanese investment in production in Britain there was no chance of achieving a balance of advantage and mitigating trade friction. Thus it became one of my first priorities as ambassador in Tokyo to try to push forward negotiations with Nissan67 to build a motorcar plant in the North East. But there were doubts in London about the costs involved in providing financial incentives, which would not fall foul of European Community rules then being developed as the community took over responsibility for trade negotiations. 1982 PAPER ON POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN I have described above the origins of the 1982 planning paper on Japan. The paper [in paragraph 11 declared that the first essential was for the U.K. ‘to put its own house in order so that we can more effectively meet Japanese competition and the future threat from the NICs [newly industrializing countries]. But Japan must also accept the need for structural change. The world trade system cannot operate effectively if a major trading nation is in fundamental disequilibrium with the rest of the world economy.’ By the end of 1979 Britain had attracted over 40% of Japanese investment in the EC, but this only amounted to 25 companies with a value at that time of £75–100 million. Britain could benefit from Japanese investment in Britain through technology transfer, advanced production methods including robots, improved managerial practices, quality control and increased employment opportunities. Britain should maintain a generally open but selective policy on inward investment, but should not seek to attract projects offering marginal employment, technological or managerial benefits. Better coordination was needed to reduce overlap [competition] between the promotional efforts of the various regions in the U.K. The paper pointed out that the opportunities for unilateral UK action against Japan were ‘severely limited’. Invoking the safeguards clause in the treaty would require Community approval and the Japanese could retaliate. The value of inter-industry export restraint agreements was declining. Britain had to work through the Community, which had more leverage than we had operating alone. The Community would not agree to adopt protectionist measures against Japanese exports.

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In addition to pressing for the removal of non-tariff barriers to British manufactures, we should urge the Japanese to open up their market to trade in invisibles such as insurance. When the paper was discussed at permanent secretary level note was taken of the ‘widespread agreement in Britain that it had been a mistake to handle the Japanese with kid gloves. But it was difficult to carry our allies with us in adopting a tougher approach.’ MARGARET THATCHER’S FIRST VISIT TO JAPAN AS PRIME MINISTER This paper was the basis for the steering brief for the visit which Mrs. Thatcher made to Japan in September 1982 and which is summarized in my account in Mrs. Thatcher and Japan (see Chapter 26 ‘Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013): Pragmatist Who Radically Improved Britain’s Image in Japan and Successfully Promoted Japanese Manufacturing Investment in Britain’.) Mrs. Thatcher in a statement in Cabinet on 30 September 1982 about her visit said that she had concentrated on trading affairs. ‘She had seen at first hand the formidable efficiency of Japanese industry and the extent to which it was making use of new technology. Japanese industry was applying technological discoveries – many of them made in Britain – which British industry was failing to follow up’. In her contacts with Japanese government and industry representatives ‘she had repeatedly emphasized that Japanese penetration of British markets – especially in particular sectors such as numerically controlled machine tools – had reached wholly unacceptable levels: unless the Japanese placed more orders for capital goods overseas, accepted voluntary restraint agreements and were prepared to channel more investment overseas, they would inevitably find themselves confronting increased recourse by their trading partners to protectionist measures.’ JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM Japan in the 1980s was booming and Britain was seen by Japanese companies as a good place to invest in manufacturing, not least because of the English language but also because of the generally welcoming attitude of the British authorities. In due course Nissan established a manufacturing plant in Sunderland. Britain worked hard to ensure that Nissan were able to export the cars which they produced there to EC markets even though initially questions were raised about the extent of the local content of the vehicles. Nissan’s investment acted as a catalyst not only for Toyota but also for Japanese parts manufacturers. Honda expanded their plant in Swindon and the possibility that they might take over British Leyland was explored, although this eventually fell to BMW. In addition to establishing manufacturing subsidiaries Japanese companies including Japanese trading companies, which had been long established in Britain began to invest in British companies and Japanese takeovers followed. Among the first of these takeovers was that of Sumitomo Rubber which took over the ailing Dunlop rubber and tire company. Another significant investment was that of Fujitsu in ICL. This too led to a take-over of a British company, which employed a significant number of staff and was in a key technology

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industry. Nippon Sheet Glass at that time a relatively small Japanese company invested in Pilkington Glass and ended up by taking over the larger company. These investments not only ensured continuing employment for British staff but also brought Japanese management, technical knowhow and skills as well as quality improvement. Although Britain had much to learn from Japan, Japanese companies recognized that they too could benefit from British scientific research. A number of companies including Toshiba, Sharp and pharmaceutical companies such as Chugai and Eisai set up research facilities in Britain.68 In the defence equipment field, despite US pressure on Japan to buy from America, the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) was persuaded to buy Rolls Royce69 engines for their destroyers. Japanese banks and securities companies greatly expanded their business in the City of London. Some of Japan’s regional banks opened representative offices and sought Bank of England permission to open branches. But there was reluctance to grant licences because the Japanese authorities were not prepared to grant seats on the Tokyo stock exchange to British merchant banks.70 Sir John Whitehead, British ambassador in Tokyo from 1986–92, believed that if the British were consistent and persistent in their demands the Japanese might eventually yield on this issue, but did so only following Mrs.Thatcher’s second visit to Japan in 1989. The Japanese concession was too late as the Japanese bubble was soon to burst. CONCLUSION By 1990 the trade relationship had greatly improved. The volume of trade between the two countries had vastly increased although British exports were only about half that of Japanese exports to Britain.71 Japan had become less wedded to mercantilism and the British had been weaned from their fears of unfair Japanese competition. Protectionist tendencies on both sides were reduced by the realization that they were damaging in the long run to both countries. Japanese investment in the UK, which had brought significant benefits to British industry and exports, had made a significant contribution to changing Japan’s image in Britain.72 But much still remained to be done to achieve a fully balanced and friendly understanding. In particular Japan’s corporate governance was geared to an age long past. Japan had still a long way to go to rid itself of the belief in Japanese uniqueness and to open up to the outside world. By 1990 the Japanese economic miracle had run its course. The bubble burst and what came to be called the lost decade began with deflation and minimal growth. In the 21st century Japanese society wedded to concepts of racial harmony based on highly restrictive immigration policies would have to cope with a declining and aging population. Britain for its part was not in 1990 as open and international as its more enlightened leaders wished it to be. Elements in the media continued to pander to the prejudices about Japan of some of their readers. Some politicians conscious of declining British interests in East Asia were disinclined to give Japan the attention it deserved. Britain needed to learn and understand more about Japan, its culture and its achievements not least in technology. Neither Japan nor Britain could afford to be complacent.

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NOTES 1

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This selective account is based on personal memories, published material and papers in the National Archives in Kew. It does not claim to be a comprehensive history of the Anglo-Japanese relations during the forty years covered not least because it only gives a British view of a two-sided relationship. A full-length book would be needed to cover even in limited detail all the complicated facets of Anglo-Japanese relations in these years particularly in trade and investment. I must record here my thanks to former colleagues and friends who have seem this chapter in draft for valuable comments and suggestions. The briefs prepared for these consultations, the records of the conversations and the reports on these visits are of a routine character and do not call for detailed analysis in this essay or provide the basis for biographical portraits of these foreign secretaries in their consideration and execution of British policy towards Japan. Michael Stewart’s visit in April 1970 was so overshadowed by other events that it was not even mentioned in the British ambassador’s review of the year 1970.Some planned visits had to be cancelled, postponed or truncated because of developments elsewhere or political problems at home. This aroused some irritation in Japan as it suggested that relations with Japan were not a top priority for British ministers. British ministers for their part found it difficult to achieve an open and frank dialogue with most of their Japanese opposite numbers who tended to stick rigidly to the line to take set out in their official briefs and seemed unable or unwilling to express personal views. The humiliation of the British surrender in Singapore in 1942 added to popular resentment. In some areas such as Cambridge and Norwich where locally recruited regiments had been captured there were particularly strong anti-Japanese feelings. They were occasionally provoked by particular events such as the state visit of the Showa Emperor in 1971. Such as engineering, consumer electronics, ceramics, cutlery and toys. Through the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, which had been allocated a limited role in Western Japan. The Peace Treaty, which was signed in San Francisco in September 1951, came into force in April 1952 following ratification The then Crown Prince (Akihito) was invited to the Queen’s coronation in 1953 and to make an official tour in Britain. Princess Alexandra was the first British Royal to visit Japan in 1962 and went again in 1965. Princess Margaret attended British Week in Tokyo in 1969. The Prince of Wales visited Japan in 1970 for EXPO 70 in Osaka and went again to Japan with Diana, Princess of Wales in 1986. The Showa Emperor made a state visit to Britain in 1971 and the Queen went to Japan in 1975. The Duke of Edinburgh went to Japan in 1982. Prince Hiro (later Crown Prince Naruhito) spent some 18 months in Britain from 1983 and studied at Merton College Oxford. The British Council opened an office in Tokyo soon after ratification of the peace treaty. It progressively broadened its role in Japan, playing a major part in the market for English language teaching. English language teaching in Japan has benefitted from the Japanese government’s English language teachers (JET) programme whose alumni now fill important roles in the UK especially in business links with Japan. The Japan Foundation opened its office in London in 1972. Japanese studies in Britain were boosted by the Parker report of 1985 and by growing interest in Japanese popular culture and cuisine. Cultural exchanges in all fields have burgeoned. The initiatives described here were largely uncontroversial although sections of the popular press sometimes attempted to make difficulties by highlighting, e.g. during the state visits by Japanese emperors, the grievances of former Japanese prisoners of war. The British argued hard for increases in the quotas set by the Japanese authorities for imports of certain goods still subject to quantitative controls. Lowering Japanese tariffs and reductions in non-tariff barriers were also priority targets for Britain. VRAS covered among other items cars, ball bearings, TV tubes and machine tools. Britain was not the only EEC country wanting controls on Japanese imports. VRAs, which were presented as an autonomous decision of the Japanese, were thought to be more palatable to the Commission as they did not constitute direct import controls that would be a clear breach of GATT rules. Other EC country wanting protection from Japanese exports

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in particular France and Italy took an even tougher stand that the UK towards imports of sensitive items from Japan. The French insisted at one stage that Japanese products should be processed at a customs post in Poitiers. Germany was at this stage the main advocate of free trade with Japan. They were incompatible not only with international trading rules being developed under the GATT but also with the commercial policies being developed by the European Economic Community (EEC), which Britain had joined in 1973. The VRAs were managed by the relevant industrial associations in Britain and Japan in consultation with the government departments responsible for trade and industry. In 1952 many British people viewed the Japanese, if they thought of them at all, through popular cartoons of vicious looking small men in spectacles brandishing bayonets. In trade they were seen as untrustworthy, copyists and producers of shoddy goods made by sweated labour. Japanese cuisine had not yet become popular and any mention of eating raw fish evoked horror. Today Japanese products are noted for their quality and reliability. Japanese restaurants have won over the British to sushi. Japanese popular culture, manga and anime as well as Japanese films aroused the interests of many young people and induced some to study Japanese seriously. Japanese exhibitions beginning with the Great Japan Exhibition at the Royal Academy in 1980 attracted much public attention. The number of British visitors to Japan increased and young English men and women who were recruited to teach English in Japan generally returned to Britain with not only a better understanding of Japan but also a real interest and enthusiasm for aspects of Japanese culture. See biographical portrait of Winston Churchill and Japan by Eiji Seki in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, volume VI, Global Oriental, 2006 and my account of the Crown Prince’s visit in Volume V, Global Oriental, 2005. See ‘Prime Minister Yoshida in London 1954: The First Visit to Britain by a Japanese Prime Minister’ by Hugh Cortazzi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI, Global Oriental,2006. See ‘British Week in Tokyo’ by Ben Thorne in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015. See ‘Expo ’70, Osaka’ by Sir John Pilcher in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015. A biographical portrait of Sir Julian Rdsdale by Dugald Barr is contained in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VII, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2019. For an account of the visit and background of the Showa Emperor see The Growing Power of Japan 1967–1972: Analysis and Assessments from John Pilcher and the British Embassy, Tokyo, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015, part 5, pp. 235–273. The Growing Power of Japan, 1967–1972: Analysis and Assessments from John Pilcher and the British Embassy, Tokyo, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015 PREM 15/504 Heath-Fukuda Conversation 6 October 1971. PREM 15/1268 Talks between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States at Bermuda, 20–21 December 1971. PREM 15/1230 Dongles-Home to Davies 11 January 1972. CAB 148/116/52 DOP (71) 62; ‘The Japanese phenomenon’ FCO memo 30 September 1971. PREM15/506 P.J.S. Moon to Patrick Grattan, FCO, 4 October 1971. For an account of this visit see ‘Edward Heath (1916–2005) and Japan: The First Visit of a British Prime Minister to Japan in 1972’ by Hugh Cortazzi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2006 and chapter 26. CAB128/50/43 CM (72) 42nd Conclusions, 21 September 1972 Letter from Michael Alexander, FCO, 17 November 1972 to Lord Bridges in the Prime Minister’s office and reply from him of 18 November 1972 in PREM 15/1049 Ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Japan Library, 2001, pp. 584–588. See also Envoy: A Diplomatic Journey by Nicholas Barrington, (I.B. Tauris, 2014,) pp. 161–165. See note 8. Prince Hiro became Crown Prince Naruhito on the death of the Showa Emperor. His memoir in Japanese of his stay in Britain was translated by Hugh Cortazzi as The Thames and I and published by Global Oriental, 2006. See FCO 49/674 for this planning exercise. FCO 49/921 for 1981 and FCO 49/1033, 1034, 1035 and 1036 for 1982.

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Originally published in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, (ed. Hugh Cortazzi) Renaissance Books, 2015. An account of the group by Marie Conte-Helm is contained in chapter 69 of Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume X, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2016. Japan agreed to transfer its assets in neutral countries and other states at war with the allies to the International Committee of the Red Cross to ‘liquidate and distribute the resultant to appropriate national agencies for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families’. See note 6. CAB 129/54/31 C.(52) 281 ‘Japan Jurisdiction over British Forces’ Eden memo 13 Augest 1952. British Envoys in Japan 1859–1972, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental 2004, pp. 196, 197 Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015, pp. 648 and 652. Japan and Back and Places Elsewhere, Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 1998. Pp.158–160. See biographical portrait of Sir Vere Redman by Hugh Cortazzi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume II, ed. Ian Nish For an account of the resumption of cultural relations with Japan see chapter 4 pp. 73–89 of Japan Experiences, Fifty Years, One Hundred Views, Post-War Japan Through British Eyes, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Japan Library, 2001. See ‘Britain and the JET programme’ by Graham Healey and Nicolas Maclean, chapter 49 in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume X, Renaissance Books, 2016 See Japanese Studies in Britain, A Survey and History, ed. Hugh Cortazzi and Peter Kornicki. Renaissance Books, 2016 See “The Great Japan Exhibition’ by Nicolas Maclean in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015. CAB 129/77/42 C.P. (55) 142 ‘Japan: Trade and Payments Negotiations’ Butler memo 1 October 1955. CAB 128/33/16 C. C. (60) 16th Conclusions, Minute 2. CAB 129/101/28 C. (60) 70 ‘Commercial Treaty with Japan: Probable Effect on United Kingdom Industries’, Heathcoat-Amory 6 May 1960. CAB 129/103/31 C. (60) 181 ‘Commercial Treaty with Japan’ Lloyd memo, 2 December 1960. For background on the negotiations and on the treaty see ‘The Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1962: A British Perspective’ by Robin Gray and ‘Memories of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty: A Japanese Perspective’ by Sosuke Hanaoka in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume II, ed. Ian Nish, Japan Library, 1997. Page 113 of Hugh Cortazzi’s memoir Japan and Back and Places Elsewhere, Global Oriental, 1998 See ‘British Week in Tokyo, 1969’ by Ben Thorne in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015 For an account of the difficulties which limited exports of Scotch to Japan see ‘Scotch Whisky in Japan’ by Stuart Jack in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015, Originally published in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2007. CAB 128/50/43 CM (72) 42nd Conclusions. 21 September 1972 Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2015. See biographical portrait of Akio Morita, one of the founders of Sony, by Hugh Cortazzi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2007. See ‘Mitsubishi Electric’s Manufacturing Investments in Scotland’ by Yoshio Noguchi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume X, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2016. See ‘NSK at Peterlee: A Successful Japanese Manufacturing Investment in the UK’ in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume X, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2016.

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See biographical portrait of Soichiro Honda by Hugh Cortazzi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2007. For an example of these efforts see the two part essay ‘Selling British Electronics to Japan’ by Sir Ivor Cohen and Peter Bacon in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume X, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2016 Self-deprecating Japanese began to refer to their small houses as rabbit hutches or usagi-goya See ‘Nissan, History of a Negotiation’ by Robin Mountfield in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2007. See ‘Sharp Corporation’s UK Research Investment: Sharp Laboratories of Europe Ltd’ by Clive Bradley and ‘Chugai Pharmaceutical in the United Kingdom’ by Martin Edelshain in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume X, ed. Hugh Cortazzi, Renaissance Books, 2016 Rolls Royce developed close relations with Kawasaki Heavy Industries. In fact the Japanese regional banks, whose applications for licences were delayed, were insignificant institutions in the expanding markets at the time. British delaying tactics probably did nothing to further the British case for seats on the Tokyo stock exchange. According to figures in the 1991 edition of the Japan Statistical Yearbook the value of Japanese exports to the UK in 1990 amounted to roughly 1563 billion yen whereas Japanese imports from the UK in 1990 amounted to roughly 757 billion yen. In 1970 the number of Japanese residents in the UK was 2806. The number had increased by 1990 to 44,351 reflecting Japanese investments in British manufacturing industry as well as in the City of London.

25

SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME 1903–1995

[14th Earl of Home] Prime Minister 1963–64

Foreign Secretary, 1960–1963, 1970–74

ANTONY BEST

Sir Alec Douglas-Home

I

n the post-war period the number of issues that demanded the foreign secretary’s attention escalated prodigiously. Accordingly the time that any of the incumbents could allocate to overseeing relations with countries on a day-to-day basis dwindled away. It is therefore much more difficult for the years after 1945 to talk about how any individual foreign secretary put his own particular stamp on relations with Japan,which was, after all, a country that did not loom large in the British imagination as hitherto now that the empire in Asia was very largely a thing of the past. One exception to this rule is Lord Home (Sir Alec Douglas-Home). In his two periods of office (1960–63 under Harold Macmillan and then 1970–74 under Edward Heath), Home saw more clearly than most that Britain could not afford to neglect its relations with Japan and therefore took a number of significant steps to work for their improvement, while at the same time encouraging other government departments to consider what they could to assist. HOME AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 1960–63 Alec Douglas-Home was born in 1903. He came from a prominent Scottish aristocratic family and was educated at Eton and Oxford. He entered politics as a Conservative MP in 1931 and famously served as parliamentary private secretary to the prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, between 1937 and 1940. In 1951 he succeeded to the peerage as the fourteenth Earl of Home and served in a number of cabinet posts under Macmillan before becoming foreign secretary in October 1960. Home entered the Foreign Office at an important time for Anglo-Japanese relations as 1960, for a number of reasons, concentrated attention on the future of Japan. The most obvious factor was that the summer of 1960 witnessed large-scale demonstrations in Tokyo and other cities against the ratification of a new security treaty with the United States. These disturbances caused the cancellation of a state visit by the American President, Dwight Eisenhower, and eventually the resignation 259

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of the Japanese prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke. This tide of unrest led to concern in Whitehall because it raised the spectre of Japan possibly moving towards a more neutralist stance in international affairs.1 At the same time concern was expressed specifically about the current state of Anglo-Japanese relations. In 1959 Kishi had visited London and had invited Macmillan to reciprocate by coming to Japan, but in the interim nothing had been done on the British side to follow up this proposal. Accordingly in July 1960 the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Oscar Morland, wrote to the Foreign Office pressing for the prime minister or foreign secretary to make a visit in the near future. In doing so, he stressed that the Japanese government was playing an increasingly important role in South-East Asia and the United Nations and thus could not be ignored.2 Similar representations were made by other interested parties, such as the Italian ambassador in London,the Conservative MP Julian Ridsdale who visited Japan in September that year, and by the Japanese ambassador in London, Ohno Katsumi.3 In response to this lobbying, in the autumn of 1960 the Foreign Office prepared a letter for the parliamentary under-secretary of state, Lord Lansdowne, who had visited Japan earlier in the year, to send to Home for his consideration setting out the reasons why a prime ministerial visit had become a necessity.4Home concurred with its conclusions and duly forwarded this communication to Macmillan with the recommendation that the latter should accept the invitation in principle although he need not yet set a date. He also added as a personal observation that, ‘I believe that an improvement of Anglo-Japanese relations is of great importance both to us and our allies.’5 Subsequently Home met with Macmillan on the following day and agreed to aim for a visit in late 1961.6 Due to a variety of circumstances, such as the Berlin crisis of 1961 and Britain’s tortuous negotiations to join the European Economic Community (EEC), Macmillan’s visit to Japan failed to transpire. However, Home kept an eye on Anglo-Japanese relations and continued to do his best to further their improvement; this included at a Cabinet meeting on 19 July 1962 pushing for the quick completion of the negotiations for a new commercial treaty.7Most importantlyHome stepped into the prime minister’s place in regard to a top-level British visit to Tokyo. This idea was first raised in spring 1962 when it was clear for a second year running that Macmillan would have to postpone his own trip.8 At first, it was assumed that Home would have to go that year, but once it was apparent that the Japanese prime minister, Ikeda Hayato, intended to come to London for the signing of the commercial treaty in November, it was felt sufficient to hold it over for a short while. Accordingly, the idea that Home would become the first serving foreign secretary to visit Japan was put to Ikeda as a sign of Britain’s renewed friendship during the latter’s stay.9 Initially, as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, Home’s visit in March 1963 was intended to be largely symbolic in purpose, with his time being split equally between Tokyo and the Kansai region.10 THE START OF MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS As the time of the visit drew near, recent events in South-East Asia and concerns about Japanese trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) showed that there was a need to tackle issues of substance.11 Above and beyond that was the fact that the Foreign Office had begun to mull over an important new initiative, namely the idea that the British and Japanese governments should begin to engage in regular consultations about world affairs.This idea had first been mooted in a rather

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vague form by the Gaimusho- in November 1962 just prior to Ikeda’s departure for Britain.12 The Foreign Office’s initial response was to support the concept of consultations in principle but it was unsure what form they should take.13 It was therefore clear that this would have to be discussed during Home’s visit.14 Home duly arrived in Tokyo on 27 March 1963 and in the first – few days of his visit held a number of talks with Ikeda and his Foreign Minister, Ohira Masayoshi. These conversations touched on a wide range of international issues, including British support for the creation of Malaysia and Western trade with the PRC. The topic that required the greatest delicacy from Home was Ikeda’s proposal for the creation of an Anglo-US-Japanese agency to coordinate policy towards South and South-East Asia. This clearly was a non-starter but Home had to let the prime minister down gently.15 There were two areas in which substantial progress was made. First, Home was able to report to Ikeda that the Treasury might be willing to –agree to Japan’s raising a loan on the City of London.16 Second, Home indicated to Ohira that while the Foreign Office was content with the present level of consultations, it would not object if the Gaimusho- wished to put them on a more regular, perhaps twice-yearly, basis.17 To the consternation of the Foreign Office, the Japanese responded all too positively to Home’s suggestion and before Whitehall knew it was faced with the prospect of six-monthly consultations at the ministerial level. In early May 1963 the Japanese ambassador in London advised the Foreign Office that his to begin in early Septem– government wished the consultations 18 While this timing made eminent ber and that Ohira would lead the delegation. – sense to the Japanese as it meant that Ohira could combine his visit to Britain with attending the UN General Assembly session in New York, for the British it raised problems. As parliament was not in session and the grouse season had started, many members of the British elite, including Home, tended at this time of year to retreat to their country estates. The Foreign Office thus speculated whether the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, might have to act as host.19 Home, though, was determined to ensure that Ohira’s visit was a success and therefore decided to invite the foreign minister to a shooting party at his ancestral home of Castlemains in Lanarkshire prior to the opening of the formal talks in London.20 – Ohira arrived at Castlemains on 3 September and, amid the socializing, held two conversations with Home about international affairs. The foreign secretary briefed his Japanese counterpart on his recent visit to Moscow to sign the partial test-ban treaty and they exchanged views about the growing Sino-Soviet split. Again one difficult issue emerged, namely Singapore’s recent claim for reparations from Japan. Home reluctantly said that he could not help with this problem as any British intervention might well exacerbate rather than improve the situation.21 On the whole the talks went well. They did not lead to any revelations but as the Foreign Office noted to Morland, ‘… the Japanese… value this opportunity to exchange news outside the framework of normal diplomatic contacts as a concrete demonstration that they are full and important members of the free world “club”.’22 THE BUTLER INTERLUDE – Shortly after Ohira’s visit, Home’s time at the Foreign Office came to an end. In October Macmillan resigned and within days the newly minted Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who had to renounce his peerage so that he could sit in the House of Commons, became the Conservative prime minister. He duly appointed his rival for the leadership, R.A. Butler, as his successor at the Foreign Office. Accordingly,

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in May 1964 the first of the regular ministerial consultations to be held in Japan saw Butler represent the British side. Unfortunately Butler was by this point at the end of his long ministerial career and was feeling the pace; indeed, before his arrival in Tokyo the embassy had been warned not to make his schedule too onerous.23 As one might expect given this background, the talks on this occasion were more routine than those of the previous year. Most notably there was little meeting of minds over the one issue where Japan could feasibly assist Britain, the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation.24 Butler thus failed to maintain the momentum that his predecessor had brought to the relationship. FOREIGN SECRETARY 1970–74 In October 1964 Douglas-Home lost a general election to Harold Wilson’s Labour Party. He soon stepped down as Conservative party leader and was replaced by Edward Heath. Douglas-Home’s career was, though, not over yet. In June 1970 Heath, after winning that month’s general election, asked Douglas-Home to return to the Foreign Office as he respected the latter’s knowledge of world affairs. While much had changed in international politics during the six years of Labour rule, Douglas-Home found Anglo-Japanese relations in much the same condition as he had last known them. The ministerial consultations that he had initiated back in 1963 had continued to take place on a more or less annual basis under the Labour government, but it was clear that, despite the best efforts of the officials at the Foreign Office, relations remained correct rather than close. This was troubling because by the end of the 1960s Japan was fast becoming an economic superpower; a fact that Britain could only neglect at its peril. Fortunately, out of the blue in the autumn of 1970 the Japanese provided the Heath government with a catalyst that forced the latter into a reassessment of British relations with Japan – namely the news that the Emperor intended to visit Britain in the following year. As Douglas-Home noted to Heath, this dramatic and unexpected ‘self-invitation’ was handled by Tokyo in a ‘ham-handed’ manner, but it was clearly a significant event and ‘our reaction to it will be extremely important’.25 Douglas-Home was duly determined to make sure that the visit should go ahead and that it should be a success. Over the next few months, with assistance from the very capable ambassador in Tokyo, Sir John Pilcher, he worked hard overseeing the necessary preparations for the Emperor’s visit, including the latter’s readmission to the Order of the Garter.26 In addition, in June 1971 Douglas-Home held the annual consultation talks in London with his Japanese counterpart, Aichi Kiichi, which mainly focussed on the issue of the PRC’s admission to the UN.27 By the time that Emperor Hirohito eventually arrived in London in early October 1971, relations with Japan had taken on even greater significance. In July and August of that year the American President, Richard Nixon, unleashed his two ‘shocks’ on the world, namely that he intended to visit China and that the United States was suspending dollar convertibility into gold and raising tariffs, thus ending the Bretton Woods international financial order. Both of these unilateral measures had implications for Britain and Japan, with the former particularly concerned that higher American tariffs might drive Japanese exports into European markets instead.28 Accordingly during the Emperor’s visit both Heath and Douglas-Home met for important conversations with Aichi’s recent successor as Foreign Minister, Fukuda Takeo, who had accompanied his sovereign to Lon-

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don. Fortunately Fukuda’s words provided some comfort, for he stressed that that he was concerned about a global retreat to protectionism and that he believed that multilateral fora provided the best means of overcoming the present difficulties.29 In retrospect, Douglas-Home told the Cabinet that, despite some awkward episodes, the Emperor’s visit had gone reasonably well and that in any case it was no bad thing for the Japanese to be made aware ‘that further efforts would be needed to persuade European opinion that they were acceptable members of the comity of nations’.30 On the back of the visit and the conversations with Fukuda, Heath decided that the issue of the future of Japan should be discussed at the upcoming summit meeting with Nixon in December 1971.31 This summit proved to be a turning point, for the President too had come to recognize that Japan was becoming an increasingly significant player in international politics. In particular, Nixon was adamant that there must be greater American-EEC-Japanese cooperation over the world economy, noting that ‘The Japanese must be made to feel that they were part of the free world community.’32 Heath duly came away from the summit convinced that Britain had to do more itself to improve relations with Japan and felt that he should visit at some point in the following year.33 With the prime minister now taking a personal interest in Anglo-Japanese relations, the foreign secretary tended to retreat into the background except for occasional indications of his support for this new policy. For example, in early January 1972 Douglas-Home wrote to John Davies, the secretary of state for trade and industry, agreeing that Britain should raise its concerns over Japanese exports with the government in Tokyo but stressing that Japan had to be handled with care as it was ‘in a sensitive frame of mind’ since the Nixon shocks.34 It is also worth noting that Douglas-Home may have had more input had he not in February 1972, because of the parliamentary debate on entering the EEC, had to cancel his second visit to Japan where he was due to head the British delegation in the latest ministerial consultations. His lack of prominence was clear after Heath’s eventual visit to Japan in September 1972 when the prime minister produced a memorandum on what needed to be done in Anglo-Japanese relations, for while the foreign secretary was the primary recipient of this report, it was readily apparent that its recommendations were largely directed at the Department of Trade and Industry instead.35 From this point on, although relations with Japan were to be further improved when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei came to Britain in late September 1973, it is difficult to see Douglas-Home as shaping the agenda. CONCLUSION Although there is little evidence to suggest that Home took a great interest in Japan, his two periods at the Foreign Office proved to be significant. He accepted the view of his officials that more needed to be done to put relations on a proper footing and he contributed to this process to a greater degree and with more enthusiasm than many of his fellow holders of this office of state in the post-war period, both Conservative and Labour. In particular, he deserves praise for the skilful way in which he handled the first of the ministerial consultations in September 1963, when it would have been easy for him to have isolated himself in Scotland and devolved responsibility to one of his junior ministerial colleagues. In this context, one might also note that the record of the conversations he held

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– with Ohira at Castlemains probably constitute the most impressive briefing that any foreign secretary gave to a Japanese counterpart. ENDNOTES 1

2

3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26

27 28

29

30 31 32

33 34 35

See Macmillan’s diary entry for 19 June 1960, in Peter Catterall (ed.), The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After (London: Macmillan, 2011) p.309. The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO371/150580 FJ1051/25 Morland to Hoyer Millar 28 July 1960. TNA FO371/150569 FJ1021/3 Trench minute 27 July 1960, FO371/150580 FJ1051/29 Ridsdale to Heath 5 October 1960, and FO371/150581 FJ1051/35 Hoyer Millar minute 2 December 1960. TNA FO371/150581 FJ1051/40 Lansdowne to Home 9 December 1960. TNA FO371/150851 FJ1051/40 Home to Macmillan 12 December 1960 no.PM/60/133. TNA FO371/150851 FJ1051/41 Du Zulueta to Samuel 13 December 1960. TNA CAB195/21/13 CC(62)48 Draft minutes of Cabinet meeting 19 July 1962. TNA FO371/164971 FJ1051/20 Peck minute 5 April 1962. TNA FO371/164976 FJ1052/21 Macmillan-Ikeda meeting 14 November 1962. TNA FO371/164979 FJ1053/1 Morland note 15 November 1962 and FJ1053/2 de la Mare note 26 November 1962. TNA FO371/170758 FJ1052/6 Trench to Mackenzie Johnston 15 February 1963. TNA FO371/164974 FJ1051/62 Trench to de la Mare 2 November 1962. TNA FO371/164973 FJ1051/67 Morland to Home 21 December 1962 no.115. TNA FO371/170759 FJ1052//22 Foreign Office brief 22 March 1963. TNA FO371/170759 FJ1052/27 Home/Ikeda meeting 3 April 1963. TNA FO371/170759 FJ1052/24 Foreign–Office to Morland 29 March 1963 tel.185. TNA FO371/170759 FJ1052/58 Home/Ohira meeting 3 April 1963. TNA FO371/170755 FJ1051/11 MacLehose note 7 May 1963. TNA FO371/170755 FJ1051/19 ‘Anglo-Japanese Consultations’ MacLehose note 5 June 1963. TNA FO371/170556 FJ1051/19 Home to – Morland 27 July 1963 tel. 606. TNA FO371/170757 FJ1051/46 Home/ O hira meeting 3 September 1963 5pm, and FJ1051/47 – Home/Ohira meeting 3 September 1963 9.45pm. TNA FO371/170757 FJ1051/55 Home to Morland 13 September 1963 no.81. TNA FO1109/491 Henderson – to Rundall (Tokyo) 26 March 1964. TNA FO371/176016 Butler/Ohira meeting 2 May 1964. TNA PREM15/504 Douglas-Home to Heath 12 November 1970 no.PM/70/130. TNA FCO73/133 Greenhill to Adeane 10 February 1971, and FCO57/330 TXVII/306/1 Tomlinson to Pilcher 19 March 1971. TNA FCO21/900 FEJ548/6 Home/Aichi meeting 10 June 1971. TNA PREM15/1230 Duncan to Heath 30 September 1971 and Heath minute 2 October 1971. TNA FCO21/901 FEJ548/7 Heath/Fukuda meeting 6 October 1971 and Douglas-Home/ Fukuda meeting 7 October 1971. TNA CAB128/49/49 CM(71)49 Cabinet meeting 12 October 1971. TNA PREM15/712 Steering brief – 2nd draft n.d. [November 1971]. TNA PREM15/1268 ‘Talk between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States at Bermuda, 20–21 December 1971’. TNA FCO21/896 FEJ/548/2 Moon to Barrington 30 December 1971. TNA PREM15/1230 Douglas-Home to Davies 11 January 1972 no.FCS/72/3. TNA PREM15/1052 Heath to Douglas-Home 21 September 1972 no.M92/72.

26

EDWARD HEATH, 1916–2005

Prime Minister 1970–74 The First British Prime Minister to visit Japan

HUGH CORTAZZI Edward Heath

INTRODUCTION

E

dward Heath (1916–2005),1 who was the British prime minister from 1970 to 1974 and leader of the opposition from 1974 to 1975, had a distinguished career in politics, which he described in his autobiography The Course of My Life, published in 1998. He was an accomplished yachtsman and musician. This essay focuses on his visit to Japan in 1972 and covers briefly his later involvement with Japan primarily as a member of the advisory council of the Praemium Imperiale Awards.2 In 1998, he was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun by the Japanese government in recognition of the contribution he had made to deepening and developing Anglo-Japanese relations. OFFICIAL VISIT TO JAPAN

Preparations and background Mr Heath had been prime minister at the time of the state visit to London of the Japanese Emperor in the autumn of 19713 and had had a lengthy discussion over dinner at the Guildhall with the then Japanese foreign minister Mr Fukuda Takeo, largely about US-Japan economic relations and Japanese exports of textiles. Mr Heath in his autobiography4 simply recorded that in September 1972 he had been the first British Prime Minister to visit Japan. In a telegram to President Nixon on 11 September 1972, he said that he had begun to think that he should go to Japan after talking with the President in Bermuda in December 1971, but he had no doubt realized before then the growing importance of Japan and the need for Britain to pay greater attention to relations with such a significant economic power. The visit took place at a time when economic relations with Japan were strained and there was a significant imbalance in trade between the two countries. In his meeting in Tokyo on 18 September 1972 with Mr Tanaka Kakuei, the Japanese prime minister, Mr Heath said that he could not understand why none of his predecessors had come to Tokyo before. 265

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There had been a steady increase during the 1960s in British interest in Japan. It had been agreed in principle that the two Foreign Ministers should meet annually but more often than not these meetings had been postponed. The commercial department of the British Embassy, with the backing of the Board of Trade and the Asia Committee of the British National Exports Council, had stepped up efforts to penetrate the Japanese market. These had culminated in a major ‘British Week’ in Tokyo in 1969 involving all the main Japanese department stores in Tokyo who were persuaded to put on promotions of British consumer goods. There had also been an exhibition of British scientific and medical equipment in the Science Museum. But it was recognized that much more needed to be done to promote British exports to Japan. In 1972, there were major monetary issues which involved Japan. There were fears in Japan that the European Economic Community, to which Britain would accede from 1 January 1973, might become too inward-looking. President Nixon in the United States faced major trade and monetary problems. Japan was looking to develop its relations with the People’s Republic of China. There was much to discuss and a prime ministerial visit was overdue. A great deal of effort was put into preparing the briefs which included voluminous submissions on trade and financial issues. The steering brief was the subject of many redrafts. The purpose of the visit was described as being ‘To make clear in public the importance which the government attaches to the consolidation of close and friendly relations between the United Kingdom and Japan in the political, economic, monetary and consumer fields.’ The confidential aims were: (a) ‘To encourage Japan to play a part on the world stage in keeping with her economic strength and to assume the responsibilities appropriate to a nation playing this part.’ (b) ‘To exchange views with the Japanese (i) about the prevailing international situation and to obtain from them an account of Japan’s interests and objectives, (ii) about the enlargement and development of the European Economic Community (EEC), (iii) about the prevailing international monetary situation and seek their cooperation in working for international monetary stability and the long term reform of the monetary system;’ (c) ‘To encourage Japan to pursue policies which would prevent the disruption of the British market by Japanese exports and which would give British firms a better opportunity to sell to and invest in Japan’; (d) ‘To encourage Japan to work for an improvement in the quantity and quality of Japanese aid to developing countries’.

The steering brief also emphasized that we regarded ‘Japan as one of the chief centres of power in the contemporary world’. On trade, the prime minister was asked to point out that American restrictions on imports from Japan had led to an increase in Japanese exports to Europe. At his briefing on arrival in Tokyo, Mr Heath asked officials at the British Embassy for their advice about what should be done about the trade imbalance.5 Officials pointed out that the options were limited. We could put up barriers to Japanese exports, but this would be contrary to our international treaty obligations and to our general policy of moving towards freer world trade. It would also damage relations with an important power. Officials suggested instead that the Japanese would be prepared to consider temporary ‘voluntary’ restrictions

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on some products. At the same time, we should take further steps to increase our exports to Japan. We should press the Japanese to allow freer access to the Japanese market where high tariffs and non-tariff barriers hindered our exports. We should also mount a determined campaign to persuade British business that there was a lucrative market for their products in Japan. British companies were sending missions to China where at that time there were few chances of success and neglecting the more open and richer Japanese market. The commercial department of the embassy was frustrated by the bureaucratic approach of officials in the Department of Trade through which they had to operate. A specialized unit was needed in London staffed by officials with experience in the Japanese market and knowledge of Japanese ways of doing business. The head of the unit should be sufficiently senior to enable him to approach companies at a high level. Before his departure for Japan, Mr Heath in his personal and confidential message to President Nixon of 11 September referred to above, said that Mr Tanaka’s recent appointment as prime minister made ‘this a logical moment to talk over our problems with him’. Mr Heath thought that the problems in Britain’s bilateral relationship with Japan were ‘not unlike those which face the United States’. But there were also ‘broader multilateral problems concerning Europe as a whole. European countries must strive to promote a sensible relationship with the Japanese which protects the interest of the Europeans and Japan in a manner which will contribute to stability for us all.’ In a despatch dated 31 August 1972, Sir Fred Warner, the recently arrived British Ambassador in Tokyo, described Mr Tanaka, Mr Heath’s Japanese opposite number. After giving a brief account of Mr Tanaka’s rise to power from his first appointment as the youngest ever minister of posts in 1957, through other party and cabinet posts, Warner noted that Mr Tanaka had become very rich with the expansion of his private construction company. After the Nixon shocks, including the Nixon visit to China, Tanaka had played his political cards well and had arranged matters so that he rather than Mr Fukuda Takeo ‘the heir apparent’ should replace Mr Sato Eisaku as prime minister. Tanaka had let it be known that he favoured the normalization of relations with the PRC and had produced a best-selling book explaining his ideas for decentralizing Japanese industry. Although Mr Tanaka’s cabinet was ‘disappointingly elderly’ he had made a good start and was popular. Mr Tanaka was described as: . . . not at ease at Western social functions and speaks practically no English. He has energy and a good brain and a reputation for being decisive. He is also good at personal relations and has a sense of humour. His sincerity comes across, with no chip on his shoulder. To sum up, he is a refreshingly new type of political leader in Japan. He will defend Japan’s interests and will not be bullied, but one can do business with him.

Programme for the visit The programme was shorter than originally intended because of time pressures on Mr Heath. He had a packed schedule which ‘called for the Prime Minister’s most resolute endurance’. His party, including private secretaries and officials, arrived by air on Saturday, 16 September, in torrential rain. The Japanese Prime Minister was there to greet him. On Sunday, 17 September, a quick visit was made to Nikko where he was able to observe Japanese traditional dances and listen to classical Japanese Gagaku music. Back in Tokyo, the prime minister was entertained to dinner

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in a high-class Japanese restaurant by Mr Ohira Masayoshi, the Japanese foreign minister, with geisha in attendance. On 18 September, after a round of talks with Mr Tanaka, he met members of the Federation of Japanese Economic organizations (Keidanren) and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He then had an exchange of views with the Japanese foreign minister, attended a reception given by the Japan British Society and had dinner with the Japanese Prime Minister. Tuesday, 19 September, was equally busy. After meeting with members of the British Chamber of Commerce in Japan, he gave an interview to NHK, the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation. He was received by the Emperor at the palace where he was entertained to lunch.6 A further round of talks was held with Mr Tanaka in the afternoon followed by a press conference. In the evening, after giving a dinner for Mr Tanaka at the embassy and attending an after-dinner reception given by the ambassador at the residence Mr Heath and his party left for the airport for a night flight home by an RAF VC10 via Anchorage.

How the visit went Sir Fred Warner, in his despatch of 28 September 1972, described the visit and gave his assessment of it. ‘The visit was’ he wrote, ‘undoubtedly a great success and should yield valuable results.’ Mr Heath had managed ‘through a veil of interpreters to establish firm relations with Mr Tanaka during three-and-a-half hours of talks’ and by sitting next to one another during ‘a rather oppressively formal dinner at Mr Tanaka’s house and a much more lively meal to which Mr Heath invited Mr Tanaka in return’. Mr Tanaka ‘was clearly very interested in what the Prime Minister had to say’ and had accepted an invitation to visit London. ‘The political discussions with Mr Tanaka, and also with Mr Ohira, showed no real difference of views between us.’ Mr Tanaka said that he would carry through to its conclusion his policy of establishing relations with communist China, although he was troubled over how to deal with Taiwan. After going to Peking ‘he would hope to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union’, but he had no intention of making concessions over the disputed northern islands. Mr Tanaka and Mr Ohira made it clear that ‘whatever the development of relations with China and the Soviet Union’ Japan ‘would continue to have the closest possible relationship with the US’. Mr Tanaka ‘asked for British help to get permanent membership of the Security Council for Japan. Mr Heath promised to consider this sympathetically but drew attention to the very serious obstacles.’ Mr Tanaka ‘showed great interest in British views on international monetary reform’, but Mr Heath ‘turned aside a question on whether the pound would be devalued on our entry into Europe’. Mr Tanaka’s main economic preoccupation and that of most other Japanese to whom Mr Heath spoke ‘was to know what would happen to the European Community after 1 January [1973] and whether Britain was prepared to play an active part in preventing it from becoming an inward-looking protectionist bloc’. Mr Heath stressed that he could not speak for Europe but the steady increase in Europe’s foreign trade and its performance in giving foreign aid made it clear that Europe had not been ‘inward-looking’. When oil supplies were discussed, Mr Tanaka made it clear that Japan was considering large oil investments in Eastern Siberia and the Middle East. Mr Heath

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‘pointed out the dangers of competition between the major oil-importing countries if they allowed their international companies to bid each other up’. Bilateral trade issues were an important subject for discussion not only with Japanese ministers but with Japanese and British businessmen. There had recently been talks between British and Japanese industries about man-made fibres, ball-bearings and television sets as well as talks between British and Japanese officials. Mr Heath hoped that the understandings reached in these talks ‘would be honoured by the Japanese; he pressed hard for the liberalization of Japanese imports and foreign investment in Japan; and he spoke of the merits of Concorde, of British Government backing for Rolls-Royce RB-211 aero-engines and of the British nuclear achievement. He asked for an end to high tariffs on British whisky and wool.’ Mr Tanaka responded by saying that ‘the Japanese economy was growing too fast and this caused a most difficult problem of how to dispose of the products. Much more Japanese investment must go into the social infrastructure instead of productive industry. Japan should and would become a major importing country and liberalize foreign investment.’ Japan would increase aid to developing countries. ‘The specific matters raised by Mr Heath were all under consideration.’ At the lunch with Japanese businessmen, Mr Nagano Shigeo, President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said ‘the Japanese business community intend to spare no efforts for voluntary control of exports of the products in question (polyester fibres, ball-bearings and colour televisions) so that the (British) market will not be disturbed. On the other hand, we will try to take concrete steps for the promotion of manufactured goods from your country such as by despatching a Buying Mission to England.’ Another group of Japanese businessmen who saw the prime minister separately said that ‘British businessmen must make more effort to seize opportunities open to them in Japan’. British businessmen ‘drew much comfort’ from Mr Heath’s interest in their affairs’ and the opportunity he had given them ‘to air their favourite project for a British Trade Centre’ in Tokyo. Mr Heath’s television interview and press conference ‘were most successful and ensured, together with much firm guidance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a highly friendly and favourable reporting of the visit’. Sir Fred Warner in his conclusion to his despatch noted that there was now ‘a link of understanding, trust and interest’ between the two prime ministers and the ‘channel of communications opened. . . . must yield valuable results’. He thought that there was ‘a much surer understanding of British views and aims and a feeling that to say that Japan and Britain have much in common is not just politeness but a valuable and significant truth’. AFTERMATH On 21 September, almost immediately after his return from Tokyo, Mr Heath sent a minute marked Secret to the foreign secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home, recording some of the conclusions he had formed about British trade and investment in Japan. This was copied to the chancellor of the exchequer, the secretary of state for defence, the lord privy seal, the secretary of state for trade and industry and the chief secretary to the Cabinet. It was, in fact, primarily intended for action by the Department of Trade and Industry. It reflected closely the briefing given him on his arrival by officials of the British Embassy.

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Mr Heath said that the Japanese Prime Minister and his colleagues were: . . . well aware of the problems caused by the size of their trade surplus and the risks of increasing protectionist reactions if the surplus is not reduced . . . But they will not be prepared to reduce their surplus by restricting their rate of growth . . . by artificially limiting their exports. They prefer to operate on the surplus by improving the standard of living of their people, by increased Government spending on infrastructure projects in Japan, by increasing imports and by liberalizing inward investment.

Mr Tanaka had told him that Japanese tariffs were coming down and they were ready to consider further reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers and further liberalization of rules governing inward investment. But ‘there remain formidable difficulties for potential British exporters to Japan to surmount: notably the geographical remoteness of Japan, the language barrier, and the complexity of the Japanese distribution system’. Mr Heath proposed firstly that ‘in advance of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT we should maintain pressure on the Japanese Government to make unilateral reductions in tariffs and other barriers to trade’. Secondly, ‘we should do more to promote British goods and services in Japan’ and he urged that proposals for a British Trade Centre in Tokyo for a series of specialized exhibitions should ‘be energetically examined’. Thirdly, more should be done to ‘bring the opportunities of the Japanese market to the notice of British industry and to encourage and help British businessmen to surmount the difficulties’. Mr Heath went on to say: In the short term we may be able to achieve voluntary limitations on Japanese exports to this country of particular ranges of goods where the exports are clearly threatening the existence of an important domestic industry, as we have done with ball bearings and polyester fibre. In the longer term, however, I am sure that we must make a determined and sustained effort to redress the trade balance by increasing our exports of goods and services to Japan.

Mr Heath had been much impressed by the knowledge and competence of the commercial staff in the British Embassy in Tokyo and he commended proposals under consideration enabling staff ‘to come back more often to this country, to try to interest firms in opportunities [in Japan] and to keep up to date their own knowledge of the capacities of British industry’. He also thought that a full-time appointment might be made in the Department of Trade and Industry of someone (businessman or member of the diplomatic or civil service) ‘whose business it would be to encourage and help firms to enter the Japanese market’.7 Mr Heath also urged that discussions be held with British banks already established in Japan or/and with banks about to open offices in Japan about ‘what more they can do to help their clients to export to or invest in Japan’. He also suggested that consideration be given to the establishment of ‘an institution on the lines of the US Export-Import Bank’. Finally, Mr Heath urged investigation of what more the British government ‘could do to encourage Japanese purchases of British goods in fields where the Japanese Government is closely concerned with purchasing policy’ e.g. ‘equipment for the Japanese self-defence forces and commercial aircraft’. He added that while his minute was written in terms ‘of visible trade’ there was, he thought, ‘scope for furthering our invisible exports to Japan, particularly in the fields of insurance and investment services’.

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On 22 September, Mr Heath sent a secret and personal message to President Nixon about his visit to Japan. In this he said that he was ‘more than ever convinced that the relationship between Japan and the other industrialized free nations is of fundamental importance for the stability and prosperity of us all’ but ‘there may well be difficulties ahead, for example in our bilateral economic relations, since instinctive caution and domestic pressures may combine to prevent the Japanese moving ahead to relax their existing restrictions sufficiently fast to meet our real needs’. Mr Heath said ‘it was evident that they [Japanese ministers] intend to abide by Japan’s existing security arrangements with the United States. . . . The future external policies of Japan are nevertheless at an interesting moment, and I doubt if we shall be able to determine their likely course until we see the outcome of their negotiations with China and the Soviet Union.’ Mr Heath also mentioned Japan’s wish to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council. Something he ‘was not opposed to in principle’ and would like to talk to the President about it at their next meeting. Tanaka himself struck Mr Heath, ‘as a highly intelligent leader.’ A RE-ASSESSMENT The visit clearly helped to ensure that ministers and officials in Whitehall gave greater attention to Japan and recognized the increased importance of co-operation with Japan. It also ensured that British trade promotion in Japan shifted up a gear. A British Trade Centre was established in Tokyo and a series of specialist exhibitions of British products were held in the centre up to the beginning of the 1980s when it was decided that it was no longer needed as British firms were increasingly taking part in Japanese trade fairs. Mr Heath’s words on Japanese tariffs and non-tariff barriers were pointed and no doubt registered with his interlocutors, but the problems persisted into the 1980s and 1990s and it is doubtful whether they had much effect on speeding up the far too gradual moves by the Japanese authorities towards the liberalization of trade and investment. Mr Tanaka did not last as long as Sir Fred Warner thought likely. He was too much mired in corruption. He did carry through normalization of Japan’s relations with communist China, but he did not succeed in breaking the deadlock with the Soviet Union over a peace treaty and the northern islands and the issue still stands as an obstacle to improved relations with Russia. Japan has still not achieved its aim of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council although Mr Heath’s cautious endorsement of this aim is now accepted by the British Government and British representatives co-operate with Japan in trying to achieve the necessary reform of the United Nations’ constitution and structure. HEATH AND JAPAN 1975–2005 After he ceased to be leader of the opposition Mr Heath remained active in politics until he retired from the House of Commons in 2001. He had, however, more time in these years for other activities. He was soon on the Japanese lecture circuit where lectures by world statesmen commanded substantial fees.8 He also visited Japan twice as an orchestral conductor.9 His lecture in 1986 was on the theme of ‘Enjoying music as part of everyday life’.

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Two of his lectures entitled ‘The Growing Role for Japan and Europe in our Changing World’ and ‘a A Life of Many Interests’ delivered at the third Ishizaka Memorial Lectures in September 1979 were published by the Ishizaka Foundation in December 1980.10 In the first of these lectures, Heath drew attention to weaknesses in relations between Japan and Europe.11 ‘Both Western Europe and Japan are’ he said, ‘still far too inclined to see their world view and their relations with each other in terms of their respective bilateral relations with the United States.’ He also said that ‘our relationship has suffered from a great deal of misunderstanding on both sides about each other’s attitudes, intentions and decision-making processes’. He deplored the slowness of Japanese decision-making through consensus. He urged Japan12 to do more to contribute towards a more balanced trade relationship with Europe especially through removing non-tariff barriers and by ‘modifying its export propensity from one which concentrates massive flows of a few products to particular countries to one which involves a more even development of export potential’. He urged greater cooperation in energy policy and in direct investment into Japan and into Europe. He advocated13 an increase in Japanese self defence efforts and closer coordination in defence policy between Japan and the West. His comments generally reflected the messages being conveyed by other European politicians at the time, but he was ahead of his fellow Europeans in advocating a greater Japanese defence effort and of many British politicians by his advocacy of a European rather than a national policy towards Japan. His main involvement with Japan in his later years was through his involvement with the Praemium Imperiale Awards. These were founded by the Japan Arts Association14 to replicate in the arts the Nobel Prizes in the sciences and literature. The awards sought ‘to extend the same principles into the realm of artistic attainment by recognizing and rewarding international contributions to the arts’.15 Sir Edward Heath was one of six international advisers to the committee16 which selected winners each year of prizes worth $100,000 in the categories of music, architecture, film and theatre, painting and sculpture. Every year after they were established Heath went to Japan for discussions on the awards and greatly enjoyed the lavish way in which he was treated by the organizers. It fell to him to organize the celebration of the winners every fifth year in London. In 1990, the celebration dinner was held at Hampton Court Palace and, in 1995, at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich. One important Japanese businessman with whom Heath struck up a friendly relationship during these years was Mr Saba Shoichi, former president and chairman of Toshiba Corporation, who was the chairman of the Japan Committee for the Japan Festival in the UK in 1991. They would invariably meet when he came to Tokyo in the 1990s and Saba would take Heath to his favourite tempura house and enjoy a free-ranging conversation and a glass or two of malt whisky.17 Saba visited Britain specially to attend Heath’s eightieth birthday party. Ted Heath, as he was generally known, thus contributed in various ways to the development of Anglo-Japanese cultural relations. NOTES 1

2 3

His full title was the Right Honourable Sir Edward Heath KG, MBE. He became a Knight of the Garter in 1992. Known in Japanese as the Sekai Bunkasho. See separate account of this visit in the present volume.

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4 5

6

7

8

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16

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The Course of My Life by Edward Heath, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998, p. 495. I am indebted for the information in this paragraph to Sir Peter Wakefield, who was Minister (Commercial) in Tokyo, at the time. Sir Fred Warner (despatch of 28 September 1972) noted that ‘By the end of the meal the habitually silent and constrained atmosphere of the court when foreigners are present was lifted and an unwonted cheerfulness prevailed.’ Mr Heath explained that: ‘Drawing on the information available to the Embassy and to British business concerns already in Japan, he would be able to devote all his time to the domestic side of the job. He could, for example draw the attention of firms to the size and rate of growth of the Japanese market to put them in touch with British concerns already in Japan who would be willing to provide Japanese speakers as interpreters, to help them to understand and satisfy Japanese Government regulations and controls, to indicate possible openings for joint ventures, and to guide them on the complexities of the distribution system in Japan.’ According to a note about his career provided by the Japanese Embassy in London He lectured in Japan in 1980, 1981, 1984, 1985 and 1990. According to the note referred to 7 above he did a recording in Japan in 1983 and conducted in 1986. With a foreword by Mr Inayama Yoshihiro, Chairman of the Foundation. Section 7. Section 11. Section 20. With funds provided by the Shikanai family and the Fuji Sankei group. The Course of My Life, p. 688. The others were Dr Helmut Schmidt, the former German chancellor, Professor Amintore Fanfani, former prime minister of Italy, Mr Nakasone Yasuhiro, former Japanese prime minister and David Rockefeller Jr. A sixth was to have been Jacques Chirac but as President of France he did not have the time to participate. Email from Saba Shoichi of 3 March 2006 who added that Heath could be very generous with his time and once visited the Toshiba headquarters to observe a rehearsal by the Toshiba Philharmonic Orchestra, which was a symphony orchestra formed by employees of the corporation.

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MARGARET THATCHER 1925–2013

[Baroness Thatcher] Prime Minister, 1979–1990

HUGH CORTAZZI

Margaret Thatcher

INTRODUCTION

M

argaret Thatcher made a significant contribution to relations between Britain and Japan. She recognized Japan’s post-war economic achievements, urged the Japanese to open up their market and promoted British exports to Japan. The reforms, which she instituted in the British economy, ensured that Britain was no longer seen as suffering from what the Japanese called eikokubyo(the English disease). But her most long-lasting and important success was in promoting Japanese manufacturing investment in Britain. Edward Heath in 1972 had been the first British prime minister while in office to pay an official visit to Japan. Mrs Thatcher (as she then was) paid two official visits to Japan in 1982 and 1989. She first visited Japan as leader of the opposition in 1977, attended the Tokyo economic summit in 1979 and the G7 summit meeting in Tokyo in 1986. She revisited Japan on a few occasions after her retirement either to give lectures for which she was well rewarded by her Japanese admirers or for ceremonies such as the launch in Kobe of a giant Taiwanese container ship in 1994 or as the guest of Kawasaki Heavy Industries in 1996 for their centenary celebrations. She also met Japanese leaders at intenational conferences elsewhere and received at No.10 Downing Street leading Japanese politicians visiting London. As a result she came to know and was respected by top Japanese politicians including Nakasone Yasuhiro, Takeshita Noboru, Kaifu Toshiki, Fukuda Takeo and Miyazawa Kiichi as well as outstanding Japanese businessmen such as Morita Akio, PART I OVERVIEW

Margaret Thatcher. On Japan Mrs Thatcher in her memoir The Downing Street Years1 included some seven pages of observations about Japan (pages 495–501). She saw Japan as ‘a great economic power and a leading democratic nation’. She noted that: 274

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… the main subject of (often difficult) negotiations during my time as Prime Minister was trade. We pressed the Japanese to open up their markets to our goods, to liberalize their financial and retail distribution systems and to work towards the reduction of their huge and destabilizing balance of trade surpluses with the West.

She saw two big obstacles to expanding British exports: The first was that their distribution system was inefficient, fragmented and overmanned and their administrative system was difficult to get around. The second was a cultural difference. For example Japanese consumers automatically prefer to buy home-produced goods: government action can do little to change that.

She thought that: Much of the criticism of the Japanese was unfair. They were everybody’s scapegoat. The Japanese should not have been blamed for prudently saving more…Nor should the Japanese have been blamed for producing first-class cars, cheaper video recorders and advanced cameras, bought eagerly by British consumers…The fact that… much Western criticism is unfair does not, however, mean that we should be anything other than tough-minded and realistic in dealing with Japan.

But the Japanese must also be treated with genuine (and deserved) respect and their own sensitivities understood. She also included just over twenty pages about Japan in her book Statecraft, Strategies for a Changing World, published in 2002. In this she seems to have drawn substantially on studies made by others, but some assertions have a distinctly Thatcherite flavour especially her comments on Japanese capitalism. After analysing what seemed to her the key features of Japanese capitalism she noted that Japanese ‘government interventions often contrived to limit competition, which, as always, resulted in inefficiencies’. She thought that too much government involvement in the selection of strategic industries was unwise. Noting that ‘once profit ceases to be the driving force, companies become dependent not upon satisfying the customer but rather upon satisfying the government and the banks’. She praised the Japanese workforce although some Japanese work practices e.g. joint singing of company songs, grated with her.2 In Statecraft3 she reiterated: During my time as Prime Minister, I tried repeatedly to persuade the Japanese that opening up their markets made sense for them as well as for us. But at the time this was met with polite scepticism

JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN BRITAIN In their book The Blunders of our Governments4 Anthony King & Ivor Crewe list some stupendous and costly blunders made by British governments, Labour and Conservative. Among successes they draw particular attention to the successful efforts to persuade Nissan to invest in production facilities in the UK. They note that: Thatcher, her ministerial colleagues and the DTI officials involved sought to create jobs at a time of high unemployment, to improve the economic prospects of

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the North East of Emgland, to curb trade union power in the heavily unionised motor industry and to use Nissan as a demonstration project, showing other UK car manufacturers what could be achieved if they adopted Japanese methods and a Japanese style of management. They were succesful on most counts if not all.

These successes could not have been achieved without Mrs Thatcher’s personal involvement. Even before Mrs Thatcher came to power, the British embassy in Tokyo and the Department of Trade and Industry together with regional development agencies had for some time been doing all they could to induce Japanese manufacturers to invest in Britain and had had significant successes especially in the electonics industry. Manufacturing plants had been established in Britain by a number of leading Japanese electronics manufacturers including Sony, Toshiba, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric and Sharp, but while these were valuable investments they did not have the same multiplier effect as investments in the car industry. The story of the Nissan investment and of Honda and Toyota’s investments in Britain was set out in volume VI of Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits5 and need not be repeated here, but the role played personally by Mrs Thatcher must not be underestimated. TRADE ISSUES Trade issues featured high on Mrs Thatcher’s agenda when dealing with Japanese ministers. She gave strong backing to British efforts to expand exports to Japan. She made sure that on her visits she met members of the British business community in Japan and was ever ready to take to task British businessmen who in her view were not trying hard enough. But her main fire was directed at Japanese bureaucratic regulations and unfair taxes which restricted and frustrated British efforts to expand trade. She took every opportunity to press the British case against the discriminatory Japanese tax on imported spirits which limited Scotch whisky exports and when this was eventually achieved drew Japanese attention to the way in which Scotch imports were being limited by other unfair measures. She criticized, to Japanese ministers and in speeches to Japanese businessmen, the way in which Japanese distribution systems tended to restrict imports and urged reforms of the Japanese distribution system. Before and during her second official visit in 1989 she pressed for the opening of the Tokyo Stock Exchange to British brokers who were applying for membership. Her efforts were finally successful, but the bursting of the Japanese bubble in the 1990s reduced British interest in the Japanese stock exchanges and this issue has now been largely forgotten. POLITICAL ISSUES Mrs Thatcher did not overlook in her talks with Japanese ministers the important political issues of her time. The changing scene in the USSR under Gorbachev interested Japanese ministers who wanted to learn her views. China and Hong Kong were very much in her mind during both her official visits. Indeed during her 1982 visit she was preparing for crucial talks in Beijing with the Chinese leadership over the future of Hong Kong.6

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She attached importance to the maintenance of close relations between Japan and the United States and made clear to Japanese leaders her support for the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Japanese were conscious of and rather envious of her special relationship with President Reagan. Mrs Thatcher backed close political relations and diplomatic exchanges with Japan on a broad range of issues and generally took a favourable view of Japan as a world power.7 But she was frustrated by what she saw as the vapid nature of many Japanese ministerial responses. She was irritated though not surprised by the failure of the Japanese to support Britain at the United Nations over the Falklands.8 REPUTATION IN JAPAN Although one or two Japanese male chauvinists referred to her as ano onna (that woman) her reputation at least in the business community and the Japanese establishment was high. Indeed she was, many observers noted, more respected and popular in Japan than at home. The fact that she, a woman politician, had managed to be selected as prime minister astonished many and added to her prestige. Japanese did not always like her forthright way of speaking which was so different from their own, but many found it refreshing. Her confrontational approach was also alien to Japanese ways, but was usually accepted as part of the British tradition. They took her hectoring generally in good part and although it rarely led to Japan making immediate concessions, it ensured that the message conveyed by other British ministers, diplomats and officials was effectively registered. It was often the final bang on the stone door of Japanese bureaucracy. HER ATTITUDE TO JAPAN Mrs Thatcher admired Japanese achievements and said so publicly. She was particularly impressed by Japanese technology and wanted to see Japanese research and development transferred to Britain. She noted Japan’s success in producing and training engineers and was impressed by the number of engineers who had become CEOs of major Japanese companies. She wished that Britain could emulate these developments. She was not really interested in Japanese art and culture.9 She was not culturally illiterate and gave appropriate official backing to UK 90 in Japan and the Japan Festival in the UK in 1991. But her interests were primarily material ones. She was like some of her Japanese hosts a workaholic and was determined that her visits not only were but were seen to be working ones. For someone with Mrs Thatcher’s character and single-minded puirsuit of what she saw as the national interest it is probably inappropriate to ask if she ‘liked the Japanese’. It is doubtful if she ever thought about such a question. Did she understand the Japanese character and approach? Probably not, but many of us who have lived and worked in Japan and studied Japanese culture might also have difficulty in giving a simple affirmative reply to such a question. Did she trust Japanese ministers to deliver what they seemed to promise? Probably not, but nor did her officials who knew Japan pretty well. Robin Harris, one of Mrs Thatcher’s policy advisers, in his recent book10 about Mrs Thatcher wrote:

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If you asked Margaret Thatcher what she thought of the Japanese, she would initially dwell on their ‘infinite courtesy’, though what she really meant was formality. She also had a high view of their industrial and engineering capacity. Beneath the surface, though, she was distrustful. She did not launch into attacks on Japan’s wartime conduct in the way she did in respect of Germany. But she was quite open in saying that she did not think that Japan should be given a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Since Mrs Thatcher’s time as prime minister the British policy on this issue has changed and Britian now gives full support to Japan’s request for permanent membership of the Security Council. PART II DETAIL

Visit to Japan as Leader of the Opposition

Mrs Thatcher with Prime Minister Suzuki reviewing guard of honour, September 1982

Mrs Thatcher visited Japan in 1977 as leader of the opposition. She had originally planned to go only to China, but was persuaded to include Japan. The Conservative Party at the time were much concerned about Japanese competition and there was presure for the adoption of protectionist measures. Mrs Thatcher returned much impressed by Japanese industry and believed that a firm approach to Japan rather than protectionism was needed. TOKYO SUMMIT 1979 ‘Mrs Thatcher was pleased with Tokyo because she was the centre of vast media attention’.11 But she was not amused when the Japanese proposed to provide her with twenty ‘karate ladies’ to guard her and she was ‘particularly impatient of the Japanese fondness for platitudinous communiqués’. OFFICIAL VISIT TO JAPAN IN 1982 The visit was carefully prepared. A detailed programme was agreed with Mrs Thatcher’s staff and full briefs were produced. Mrs Thatcher, unlike some ministers, studied her briefs carefully and mastered the arguments. She was a stickler for detail and had an insatiable appetite for statistics. She was not the easiest of

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guests as I have related in my memoir Japan and Back and Places Elsewhere,12 but as I reported in my despatch of 4 October 1982 her visit was a success and left some important and clear messages for her Japanese hosts. The discussions with the Japanese Prime Minsiter and other leaders were ‘warm, constructive and potentially useful’. But much depended on follow through. Mrs Thatcher told her hosts about the efforts of her administration to change attitudes in Britain and in particular the climate for British industry, but she said on several occasions that fair words were not enough; ‘we must look at the figures’. If the figures showed real improvements in industrial production, a reduction in days lost because of strikes and in inflation and in due course unemployment. the despatch noted, British stock in Japan would rise and the climate for Japanese investment in Britain would turn fair. Mrs Thatcher’s overall message on trade was tough. World recession and high unemployment would produce protectionist pressures which would be hard to resist unless the trend in visible trade between Britain and Japan were reversed and unless industrial collaboration (Japanese investment in the UK and tie-ups between Japanese and British firms) produced results. She also emphasized that Japan should shoulder more of the responsibilities of her economic success. These messages ‘were received loud and clear’, but Japanese responses ‘were for the most part guarded without appearing negative’. Mr Suzuki Zenko, the colourless Japanese prime minister, with whom she had to deal, ‘was quick to emphasize the importance of the free trading system but had nothing to say about the prospect of a $17 to 20 billion surpus on visible trade next year. None of the Japanese Ministers suggested that they were prepared to embark on a policy of stimulating domestic demand to any noticeable extent, preferring to concentrate on the importance of reducing the budget deficit and public expenditure.’ Mr Suzuki wanted to promote joint research and development in advanced technology as well as investment and industrial collaboration in third countries. Mrs Thatcher, who had used her time before the talks to visit a factory making robots, the Tokai atomic reactor, with whose construction Britain had been closely involved, and the Tsukuba science complex, was also keen to further technological cooperation. She announced that Britain would participate in the Tsukuba ’85 Exposition and agreement was reached to go ahead with some form of Anglo-Japanese technology agreement ‘provided that it led to tangible results’. She was unstinting in her praise for Japanese efficiency and research but reminded her hosts of Britain’s ‘long and distinguished record in research’. On bilateral issues the Japanese described the measures which the government had recently taken ‘to ease the import regime’. They agreed that ‘inter-industry contacts were valuable in dealing with particular sectoral industry problems’.13 Mrs Thatcher regretted having to raise the problem caused by Japanese exports of numerically controlled machine tools as she had been most impressed by her visit to the Fujitsu-Fanuc factory on the slopes of Mt Fuji manufacturing robots. But, ‘Japanese penetration of the UK market in these tools had risen from 1 per cent in 1977 to 60 percent in 1981 and it was clearly impossible to allow the market for our UK firms to be destroyed in this way.’ She also mentioned ‘one or two other areas of concern, including fork-lift trucks’, The Japanese government agreed to welcome a proposed mission from the British machine tool industry.

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Mr Suzuki reminded Mrs Thatcher of the measures which the Japanese government had already taken to ease trade. They had implemented two years in advance reductions in tariffs agreed at the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations and had proposed the abolition of tariffs on ninety-six products including high technology items. An ombudsman had been appointed to deal with complaints over nontariff barriers. Mr Suzuki had personally made a statement urging Japanese business to welcome foreign products and overseas investment. On Japanese investment in Britain Mr Suzuki said that the Japanese government attached importance to the UK as a location for further Japanese investment ‘while making it clear that this was essentially a matter for commercial decision’. The Japanese response on industrial collaboration, technical tieups and joint ventures ‘was somewhat less positive than had been expected’. Mr Suzuki had invested a good deal of political capital in this topic, but his brief was ‘querulous and defensive, concentrating too much on apportioning blame for the slow progress so far’. The Japanese government were aware of the political importance of the issue but said while they could encourage Japanese industry it was up to the latter to reach commercial decisions. Japanese industry were ‘less inclined in general to see commercial and technical advantage to themselves in joint ventures with foreign companies’. Of the eighteen specific project proposals from the British side Mr Suzuki said that six ‘were agreeable to the Japanese, covering robots and other electronic projects. Five cases were not agreeable and the rest were still under consideration. The Japanese had proposed three project proposals, on which they were still awaiting a response.’ In the discussions on political matters both prime ministers agreed that they should meet more often and that there should be more contact at ministerial and official level. Mrs Thatcher invited Mr Suzuki to visit London. China was discussed at some length. Mr Suzuki ‘urged the UK, US and other Western countries to cooperate with the modernization policies’ [of the Chinese government]. In the light of Mrs Thatcher’s forthcoming visit to Bejing they discussed Hong Kong. Mr Suzuki advised Mrs Thatcher to deal directly with Deng Xiaoping on the matter. They also discussed the situation in the Lebanon. On the Falklands Mrs Thatcher referred in passing to ‘a misunderstanding between Britain and Japan in the past, but said she wished now to concentrate on the future. She put the Japanese clearly on notice that Britain would not find it possible to negotiate with Argentina over sovereignty and would resist pressure at the UN to do so.’ Mrs Thatcher’s dinner with Japanese businessmen at the embassy was a particularly important engagement. It gave her the opportunity to stress Britain’s welcome to Japanese manufacturing companies wanting to invest in Britain. Among those she met was Mr Ishihara Takashi, president and later chairman of Nissan, which was then investigating the advantages to them of setting up manufacturing facilities in Britain. ‘Coverage14 of the visit by the Japanese media was extensive and almost entirely laudatory’. In particular, the prime minister’s forty-five minute interview on NHK made a major impact on Japanese in almost all walks of life: the reaction could be summed up in the comment ‘that is how a Prime Minister should be’. A picture of Mrs Thatcher with Sumo champions was captioned ‘Iron Lady meets Man Mountain’:

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OFFICIAL VISIT TO JAPAN IN 1989

In the seven years between Mrs Thatcher’s first visit in 1982 and her second in 1989 much had changed. Exchanges between ministers and officials had become more regular and frank. On many international issues Britain and Japan took similar positions although Britain would have liked to see Japan take a more positive and active position on international issues such as developments in the Middle East. The UK-Japan 2000 group, which had been established with Mrs Thatcher’s blessing, held annual meetings for frank discussions on topics of interest to both countries. Senior politicians, businessmen and representatives from academia and the media, attended these meetings, Japanese manufacturing investment in Britain had grown substantially. The Nissan plant at Sunderland had been opened in 1986. Honda’s cooperation with Rover had led in 1986 to the Rover 800 and Honda Legend being jointly developed and Honda had expanded their manufacturing facilities at Swindon. In April 1989 Toyota decided to construct a vehicle manufacturing plant at Burnaston and an engine plant at Deeside. These investments had induced Japanese car parts manufacturers to set up their own facilities in Britain. By 1989 more than one hundred Japanese manufacturing companies had established facilities in Britain. The Japanese bubble economy had not yet burst and Japanese banks and securities companies were increasingly active in the City of London. Japanese regional banks were demanding licences to operate in the London market. British exports to Japan had grown thanks to officially sponsored efforts such as ‘The Opportunity Japan’ campaign, but the imbalance in visible trade was as wide as ever and there was continuing frustration among British exporters over the perceived difficulty of the Japanese market because of non-tariff barriers and bureaucratic obstruction. Japanese restrictive practices also greatly hampered

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British lawyers and other professionals working in other service sectors. British stockbrokers who wanted a share in the expanding Japanese stock market were frustrated by the refusal of the Tokyo stock exchange to alter its restrictive practices and two British firms still awaited agreement to their admission to the exchange. The stock exchange problem may seem esoteric now but it was very much a hot Anglo-Japanese topic in the late 1980s. Sir John Whitehead, then British ambassador in Tokyo, thought in early 1987 that ‘there was some reason to believe that the Japanese might be brought to move on some points’, provided the British were persistent and consistent. When the issue came before the cabinet Mrs Thatcher spoke in favour of accepting Sir John’s advice and it was decided to send out to Japan Michael Howard (later Lord Howard), then parliamentary under-secretary in the Department of Trade and Industry. He helped to put pressure on the Japanese to get some movement on the stock exchange issue, but it had not been fully solved by the time of Mrs Thatcher’s 1989 visit. Sir John Whitehead in his telegram of 25 September 1989 summing up the visit said that it ‘had carried Anglo-Japanese relations a significant step forward. A vista of the 1990s as a “decade of unprecedented partnership and friendship between Britain and Japan” had been opened up.’ ‘The key long term themes were the need for further effort by the Japanese to open up their economy and the importance of developing a closer political relationship.’ The programmes in 1982 and 1989 inevitably had similarities. For Sir John the centrepiece of the visit was the dinner given for Mrs Thatcher in the embassy ballroom for some sixty Japanese VIPs. Mrs Thatcher in her speech to Japanese businessmen on 20 September 1989 praised Japanese design, research and development and high technology against a background of low inflation, high savings and prudent fiscal policies. She emphasized the importance of the free trade system and the single market in Europe, but she criticized Japanese protectionist policies for agriculture and service industries and stressed the need for structural reforms. Japan required ‘more open unrestricted competition’. Mrs Thatcher’s visits to Jaguar Japan, Laura Ashley and a bank dealing with BT and Reuter’s equipment earned her the title from one Japanese paper of the ‘Iron Saleswoman’. She took every opportunity to draw attention to British efforts to encourage British businessmen to take advantage of the opportunities in the Japanese market. Mrs Thatcher had become aware of the dangers of climate change and she emphasized the need for cooperation and research on the environment. This was a central theme in a joint television broadcast, which she undertook with Prime Minister Kaifu. In her talks with Mr Kaifu and other leading politicians she took up ‘three specific areas where bilateral problems persist’. On the Tokyo stock exchange, she received useful assurances that a successful conclusion would be achieved. On whisky look-alikes too, she was assured that the Japanese government saw the need to ensure that whisky and ‘new spirits’ were perceived as different and said that they would continue their efforts to ensure that this did not become a serious issue. On air services, the prime minister pressed for progress on deregulation at the official-level talks to be held that October 1989. The political discussions with Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama covered a wide range of international topics, including East-West relations, China after the Tienanmen massacre, Hong Kong, Vietnamese boat ref-

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ugees and Cambodia. On Hong Kong Mrs Thatcher urged action including Japanese investment to help restore confidence in the territory. Nakayama raised the issue of Japan’s dispute with the USSR over the northern territories. On this point Mrs Thatcher reiterated that we supported the principle that no one should gain territory as the result of war. Mrs Thatcher in her speech at the dinner at the embassy summed up her aim in making the visit to Japan by reiterating: I want my visit to Japan to demonstrate beyond all doubt Britain’s determination to have the best possible relations with Japan at every level: trade, political, cultural, investment.

RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL JAPANESE

Nakasone Yasuhiro The Japanese prime minister with whom Mrs Thatcher developed the closest relationship was Nakasone Yasuhiro. At the Williamsburg summit in June 1983 where he put a great deal of effort into developing a good personal relationship with President Reagan he met Mrs Thatcher and recognizing her prestige in Japan and her resounding victory in the general election that year he decided to work towards a closer relationship with her.15 On 10 June 1983 in congratulating her on her election victory Nakasone expressed his admiration for ‘the correct judgements and the firm views’ which she had expressed at the Wiilliamsburg summit. This was not just diplomatic flattery. When Nakasone visited Britain in June 1984 he had constructive talks with Mrs Thatcher. She felt that she ‘was dealing with a Japanese leader who understood and sympathized with western values and had shown that he was prepared to make steps in the right direction on economic policy’.16 The two prime ministers’ talks on 11 June in London covered a wide range of international issues including relations with China and the USSR, but Mrs Thatcher toook the oportunity to stress the welcome which Britain gave to Japanese investment.17 When Mrs Thatcher visited Tokyo for the G7 meeting in 1986 she and President Reagan: … were keen that it should be a success for the Japanese. The President was a strong supporter of Prime Minister Nakasone and was rather more inclined to be optimistic about the changes which had been promised in Japan’s economic policies than I was. But I had to agree with him that Mr Nakasone had the right instincts in international affairs and it was important not to endanger his position.18

But trade issues were still very much on her mind. British efforts to open up Japanese markets had achieved little. Whisky exports were still constrained by ‘the heavy discriminatory tax on imported liquor’. Japan’s trade surplus was sharply up and the yen had risen in value. However there were by then ‘forty Japanese manufacturing companies operating in the UK, creating over 10,000 jobs’. Unfortunately as she noted: Japanese politics are sui generis…And in spite of his achievements in establishing Japan as a major player on the international stage. Mr Nakasone was unable to buck the convention by which the nominees of other factions in the governing Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) must have their turn in office.

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TAKESHITA NOBORU Prime Minister Takeshita who came to London in 1987 and met Mrs Thatcher was the Japanese leader ‘who took the most important decisions to make structural changes in the Japanese economy’. From the British point of view she thought that the most important decisions were those that removed the discrimination against Scotch whisky and ‘opened up the Japanese Stock Exchange to two of the best known British stockbrokers’. When he saw Mrs Thatcher she told him that he was the fourth prime minister with whom she had raised the issue of the Stock Exchange. Mrs Thatcher had a brief meeting with Mr Takeshita on 21 September 1989 on the occasion of her second official visit to Japan. They discussed briefly the problems which had been raised in London. In Statecraft19 she described him as ‘a party boss, who though very successful in his own culture would probably never have risen to the top in a Westerrn Country’s political system’. SUZUKI ZENKO Mr Suzuki Zenko was Japanese Prime Minister at the time of the Falklands war and of Mrs Thatcher’s first visit as Prime Minister in 1982. In her memoir she does not mention him by name, perhaps because he was one of the least impressive Japanese politicians she had met and because he had singularly failed to respond to her appeals for support over the Falkland Islands issue.20 KAIFU TOSHIKI Kaifu Toshiki was Japanese Prime Minister in 1989 when Mrs Thatcher made her second official visit to Japan. She found him ‘sincere, serious and well-intentioned if rather light-weight’.21 She wrote of him later22 that he was ‘a breath of fresh air in Japanese politics’. KOIZUMI JUNICHIRO Although Koizumi became Japanese prime minister after Mrs Thatcher’s time they met on various occasions and he admired her greatly. MORITA AKIO Mrs Thatcher devoted two pages of Statecraft23 to Morita Akio24 whom she met at the dinner which I gave on her 1982 visit. She regarded him as ‘the outstanding Japanese businessman of modern times’. She noted that he was not only cosmopolitan and an internationalist, but also ‘lively, individualistic, direct and much more outspoken than the great mass of his countrymen’. She thought that ‘Japan desperately needs more like him.’ CONCLUSION No other British politician has so far been as influential in terms of British relations with Japan as Mrs Thatcher. Some of her comments on the need for

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structural reforms in Japan are still valid a quarter of a century after they were made. ENDNOTES 1 2

The Downing Street Years by Margaret Thatcher, Harper Collins, 1993. Statecraft, Strategies for a Changing World, (hereafter Statecraft), Harper Collins 2002, pp. 132–137. Her summing up on Japanese capitalism was as follows: 1. So we should be wary of oversimplifications: Japan was never quite as successful, nor is it now as successful, as we are often led to believe. 2. Japan’s economic success owed more to capitalism without adjectives (‘Japanese’, ‘Asian‘, etc.) and less to government than many pundits suggested. 3. But Japanese management techniques have been exported to good effect and should continue to be so. 4. Japan’s underlying strengths are unchanged and will help ensure that its mighty economy rises again. 5. And as the younger generation of Japanese brings in new thinking to leaven old ways the economic results may again astound us.

3

4 5 6

7

In Statecraft, page 140, Mrs Thatcher added: ‘More recently, however, Japan has somewhat reluctantly undertaken reforms along similar lines to those which Britain undertook in the 1980s.’ On page 141 she wrote: ‘I am more sceptical about the fiscal measures that have been taken, especially the public spending packages. While it is true that these helped produce a resumption of growth, I am not at all sure that they will make it sustainable – quite the opposite, in fact.’ Published by Oneworld, 2013. Global Oriental, 2007. She summoned HM Ambassador in Beijing Sir Percy Cradock to Tokyo to brief her personally. For a summary of her mature reflections on Japan’s position in the world see pages 144– 148 of Statecraft. Her summing up made the following points: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

8

9

10 11

12 13

We should welcome Japan’s strengthening of its armed forces, which should continue. Japan has a vital role in counterbalancing China. Japan will remain America’s principal strategic partner in Asia and should be treated accordingly. Japan must know that she is able to rely not just on the American nuclear umbrella, but also on the shield of ballistic missile defence. The Japanese could undoubtedly fulfil more international roles, and this should be encouraged. But it is neither in their nor our interests that Japan should become a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council.

For a personal account of this episode see Hugh Cortazzi’s Japan and Back and Place Elsewhere, Global Oriental, 1998, especially p.144. In her comments in Statecraft she refers in one sentence on page 130 to ‘the quasi-mystical attitude towards the Japanese landscape that echoes through Japanese poetry’. But that is all. Not for Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher, Robin Harris, Transworld, 2013. Margaret Thatcher, The Authorized Biography, Volume I, Charles Moore, Allen Lane, 2013, pp. 416–417. Global Oriental, 1998, pp. 186–188. In 1982 there was still much discussion in Britain of how to deal with the increasing waves of Japanese exports, often referred to as ‘concentrated and torrential’ (shu-chu- go- uteki) and there was considerable protectionist pressure from some British industries, but the government’s response had to take account of British obligations under the GATT and Mrs

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15 16 17

18 19 20

21

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Thatcher was an advocate of free trade. A way round was found in inter-industry arrangements despite the fact that these were in contravention of rules governing free competition and at the very least the spirit of GATT rules. Mrs Thatcher at least toyed with the possibility of giving government backing to stricter limits on imports of Japanese cars (see page 187 of my memoir Japan and Back and Places Elsewhere, Global Oriental, 1998). With the agreement of Mrs Thatcher’s press secretary Bernard Ingham we arranged for a photograph to be taken of Mrs Thatcher with Taka-miyama, the huge Hawaiian sumo wrestler. This evoked the caption ‘Iron Lady meets Man Mountain’. Tokyo telegram to FCO number 311 of 10 June 1983. The Downing Street Years, p. 497. Ibid p. 498. When Nakasone said that half of the Japanese companies established within the European Community were in the United Kingdom Mrs Thatcher replied: ’Not enough. I would like two dozen more.’ The Downing Street Years, p. 498. Statecraft, p. 128. For an account of this saga see Hugh Cortazzi’s memoir Japan and Back and Places Elsewhere, Global Oriental, 1998, especially pages 158–160. Reporting letter dated 20 September 1989 signed by Charles Powell, FCO private secretary to the prime minister. Statecraft p. 128. Statecraft, pp. 137–139. See biographical portrait by Hugh Cortazzi in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume VI, edited by Hugh Cortazzi, Global Oriental, 2007.

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SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, 1926–2015

[Lord Howe of Aberavon] Foreign Secretary, 1983–89

Sir Geoffrey Howe

DAVID WARREN

INTRODUCTION

S

ir Geoffrey Howe (1926–2015) was foreign secretary during Margaret Thatcher’s second and (most of her) third terms as prime minister, from June 1983 to July 1989. He was not her first choice for that post. She had already decided to appoint Cecil Parkinson, who as chairman of the Conservative Party had masterminded the successful 1983 general election campaign. But on election night Parkinson warned her that his former secretary was pregnant with his child, and she reluctantly concluded that sending him to the Foreign Office would be unwise. She turned instead to Howe, who had been chancellor of the exchequer since 1979, and with whom, despite their close ideological affinity, there were the beginnings of temperamental and psychological differences that were to widen over the next seven years into a full-blown, and eventually for her, fatal rift. The 1980s was the decade in which the UK-Japan relationship bore real fruit. Japanese industrial investment in Britain began to develop, with the opening of the Nissan plant in Sunderland paving the way for a major presence for the Japanese automobile industry to match that already achieved by electronics companies. With the revaluation of the Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985,1 the trade environment for exporters to Japan began to improve. Official government-to-government dialogue, as well as broader contacts in the political, business and cultural spheres, began to expand, and Britain’s image in Japan, which only a few years before had been one of decline – the so-called Eikokubyo– or ‘English disease’ improved. Much of this was driven by Margaret Thatcher, who despite her ambivalence about and in some respects distrust of Japan, greatly admired its technological and economic dynamism, and recognised its wider global significance. The full story of the Japan/Britain relationship of those years is told in Sir Hugh Cortazzi’s essay on Mrs Thatcher (see 26).2 Geoffrey Howe played an important role in that work, particularly in the second half of the decade, especially in expanding political contacts and thickening up the dialogue on foreign policy. It is difficult to argue conclusively that he was integral to giving Japan a higher profile in the government’s international priorities: much of that work was underpinned by ministers and officials in other departments. But he was active in helping to shape the closer relationship that 287

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came to support the broader trade and investment contacts, and the care with which he attempted to manage the prime minister’s more impetuous and mercurial instincts was a valuable element in the exercise. Japan had not featured prominently in Geoffrey Howe’s political career before he became chancellor of the exchequer in 1979, although he had visited as a junior trade minister in April 1973, when he issued the first of what would be a long series of warnings to the Japanese government about the need for Japan’s domestic economy to become a fuller part of the world’s international market-place.3 As chancellor, he attended the 1979 Tokyo economic summit within weeks of the Conservatives coming into government, and had more extensive and continuing contacts with his Japanese opposite numbers in the group of five finance ministers and group of seven summits (G7). But his autobiography, in common with many such political memoirs of that and indeed later generations, gives fewer pen-pictures and less detailed comment about Japan’s contribution to international policy deliberations compared with the US and European countries. He respected the Central Bank Governor Maekawa Haruo, ‘a fluent and effective participant in discussions of this kind ahead of most of his countrymen’, and Takeshita Noboru, the ‘Finance Minister who was most involved in my period’.4 But there is not much else about Japan in his recollection of the early years of the government’s taking the world stage, and seeking to influence the management of the international financial system – other than an anecdote about Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi at the 1979 summit, ‘[who] had a habit of closing his eyes, so that even his closest friends were frequently uncertain whether he was just thinking or was actually asleep. When he was presiding over the Tokyo summit he truly did doze off for several minutes. The meeting was reduced to embarrassed silence until a ministerial neighbour prodded him back to life.’5 FIRST VISIT TO TOKYO AS FOREIGN SECRETARY 1984 With the coming of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1982, perceptions of Japan’s potential on the international stage began to change, and Howe noted, in his account of the 1983 Williamsburg summit, ‘the extent to which it marked . . . the political coming of age of post-war Japan. For it was the first time the Japanese had committed themselves to, and actually shared in, the preparation of an important Western text on arms control and security . . . with the significant sentence: “The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis”.’6 However, in bilateral contacts, it was the trade agenda that continued to dominate when he moved across King Charles Street to the Foreign Office the following month. In April 1984, he paid his first visit to Japan (of four, including the 1986 Tokyo economic summit). He held talks with the Foreign Minister, Abe Shintaro, on trade liberalisation and reductions in tariffs, noting that the moderate steps so far taken by the Japanese Government had had little effect on the bilateral trade imbalance. The British press damned him with faint praise: ‘In his first major tour abroad, Sir Geoffrey has emerged as rather a low-key Foreign Secretary. He makes no attempt to be false to his character, which is decent but diffident. He behaves sometimes if enthusiasm was a dangerously contagious condition which ought if possible to be stamped out . . . Those who crave the bold diplomatic gesture had best look elsewhere, or pin their hopes on

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Mrs Thatcher, who increasingly has come to dominate British foreign policy. Sir Geoffrey avoided gaffes in the Far East, but he hardly set the pulses racing.’7

SECOND VISIT TO TOKYO AS FOREIGN SECRETARY 1988 With the impact of the realignment of currencies beginning to be felt in 1986 and 1987, the foreign secretary took the initiative to work for closer inter-departmental co-operation on policy towards Japan. He also pressed for a firmer European Community statement on macro-economic strategy and the desirability of Japan expanding domestic demand, as well as closer monitoring of the Japanese Government’s performance. By early 1987, plans were underway for a return visit to Japan. Howe was now focusing on how to present the case against Japan with lawyerly attention to detail and a careful assembling of arguments that would stand up to scrutiny – as much, one suspects, to head off Mrs Thatcher’s natural inclination to take a more aggressive stance, as she had in the wake of the controversy at the 1985 Bonn economic summit on Japanese ‘predatory pricing’ enabling them to win the contract to build the second Bosporus bridge. An article of April 1987 in The Sun newspaper, setting out ten ‘dirty tricks’ that Japan used to restrict trade was subjected to forensic analysis. Most of the assertions, however improbable, were found to have some substance. The secretary of state’s visit was initially planned for May 1987, but it is striking that as late as six weeks before the trip, in an inter-departmental policy-planning meeting, Howe ‘underlined the need for manifest progress, to allow this visit to go ahead as planned. The option of cancellation should not at this stage be ruled out.’8 The political context – with continued criticism of discriminatory taxes on whisky imports, and the EC’s case in the GATT against Japan on this dossier,9 and pressure for additional seats for UK firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, as well as support for Cable and Wireless’s application (with the Japanese firm C. Itoh) for an international telecommunications licence – remained fragile. In the event, the visit was postponed when the 1987 general election was called in the course of May, and rescheduled for early 1988. This gave more time, not simply to concert pressure on the outstanding trade issues, but to lay the groundwork for a more intensive and elaborate approach, and for what would eventually be known as a ‘dynamic and plain-speaking partnership’. Geoffrey Howe began to map this out soon after his reappointment as foreign secretary in the wake of the election, and his thinking extended further than the traditional trade dossiers. In a note dated 13 July, his assistant private secretary noted: The Secretary of State . . . agrees that: a) Japan is of crucial importance given her major role in world trade, investment, credit and macro-economic management. She has 10% of the world’s GNP, and is the world’s largest creditor. Japan’s foreign policy is likely to become increasingly active; b) We should base our approach to the Japanese on an appeal to their own national interest in adopting a more substantive and responsible role in the major international economic institutions (G5/G7, GATT, IMF, etc.) as well as on broader political issues; c) We should apply strong and effective pressure, if necessary through the EC, over specific and carefully-chosen trade barriers. But spasmodic stridency on marginal complaints is becoming counter-productive, and could reduce our influence on the Japanese, thereby reducing our ability to achieve b).10

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He went on to commend the principle of subject-specific visits by ministers, on the model of a recent visit by Michael Howard, then a junior minister at the Department of Trade and Industry, on the stock exchange applications; and the need to do more to help British companies exploit the opportunities opening up in the Japanese market. A plan of action was commissioned to work up a serious and substantive agenda for discussion with the Japanese. The prime minister was invited to convene a high-level business seminar for this purpose. And marshalling the support of the European Community on trade barriers, to avoid the UK becoming too over-exposed on these points, was also an important element. Howe noted specifically: ‘The authority of the Prime Minister should not be mobilised for dud issues.’ A paper on policy towards Japan was submitted to the foreign secretary by David Gillmore, then FCO deputy under-secretary for Asia, and Rodric Braithwaite, the FCO’s economic director, on 6 November. It made a powerful case for the growing importance of Japan in both economic and political terms. Integral to this was the increasing inter-dependence of the Japanese and US economies. Failure to sustain continued Japanese capital inflows to the US could precipitate higher US interest rates or a lower dollar, or possibly both. ‘It is thus in the interests of all that the Japanese should continue to finance the US deficit’. But the consequential risk of bilateral trade deals instead of a common front against protectionism was real; and there were, the authors of the paper argued, politico-military risks also: ‘. . . there is an inherent non-sense in a situation where the world’s biggest debtor is the defender of the world’s biggest creditor’. Quite apart from the potential difficulties of the Japanese becoming more militarily assertive, ‘the prospect of a world economic, and increasingly a world political, order arranged over our heads between Washington and Tokyo is singularly unappealing’. The foreign secretary wrote in the margin: ‘And we must seek to respond to all this by maximising our European leverage.’11 Extensive preparations ensued, with the two deputy under-secretaries visiting Japan in December (in the whimsical-sounding language of the FCO of that day, for ‘John the Baptist’ talks). Position papers on key economic and political issues were exchanged with the Japanese, and a speech for the foreign secretary to deliver to the Nippon Press Club went through at least five separate and heavily reworked drafts. Howe was clear, as his thinking developed on how he wanted to present these themes publicly in Tokyo, that the UK should not be seen as demandeurs of the larger economy. The UK should be presenting itself as the leader of a new East/West relationship with the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev; as the leader of agricultural reform in Europe, and by implication, more widely; as the main promoter of the privatisation revolution; as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council; and as the influential hub of the Commonwealth. Gillmore reported back to the foreign secretary after the official talks in December that the aim had been ‘to focus Japanese attention on key issues of substance where we thought exchanges, as free-ranging as possible, might be most useful . . . we were reasonably successful’. He defined the context for ministerial talks as ‘a period of transition from the post-war system of Pax Americana to a new system based on co-operation and co-ordination among the major industrial economies’. There had been a new openness in discussing US/Japan relations, and a sense of concern about ‘Japan’s geo-political isolation and beleaguerement’, tempered by a new sense also of Japan’s economic strength. But none of this, he argued, meant that we should be talking down to the Japanese or denigrating US policy or actions.12

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As he left London for Tokyo in January 1988, the foreign secretary briefed the Japanese press on his desire to open ‘a new chapter’ in relations between Britain and Japan. The trend was now decisively towards a resolution, or at least a softening, of the trade irritants. The Cable and Wireless consortium had been approved, four British firms had been admitted to the Tokyo Stock Exchange (although some applications were still pending), and British exports to Japan had risen in 1987 by around 30%. There were also signs that the Nissan car plant in Sunderland would be expanding its capacity from 1992. The aim was now to rise above seeing the relationship with Japan as purely economic, and develop a more substantive political dialogue as well. Formally, as the reporting telegram from the British Embassy in Tokyo noted, the visit was for the 17th round of post-war foreign ministerial consultations – but the context was ‘the weakening of the predominance of the two [world] superpowers outside the military sphere . . . [and] a common measure of concern between the UK and Japan about American economic policy and striking agreement . . . that Japan should play her part in steering the world economy through a difficult period ahead’.13 Howe’s visit was successful in these terms. Although one of the benefits of its having been postponed by seven months was that he had a heavier-weight Japanese foreign minister to deal with than Nakasone’s crony Kuranari Takashi, the Japanese officials with whom Gillmore and Brathwaite had prepared the visit had been nervous about whether their new Minister, Uno So– suke, would be up to speed on the breadth of issues that his British counterpart would want to discuss with him. But in the event, Howe found Uno a confident interlocutor across a wide range of policy dossiers, and had useful sessions also with Prime Minister Takeshita, the finance minister Miyazawa Kiiichi, the Minister for International Trade and Industry Tamura Hajime, as well as other senior figures. With these meetings carefully prepared by his officials and by the embassy in Tokyo under the ambassador, Sir John Whitehead, the foreign secretary found the exchanges ‘much less of a dialogue of the deaf than when I first went [to Japan] 15 years ago’. He noted, in his report to the prime minister, that some senior figures were taking about ‘the need for structural reform in agriculture and other sectors of the economy (but we must judge them by their deeds)’; and that the Japanese recognised, that ‘with the US administration’s failure to grapple with the federal deficit (which [the Japanese] are largely financing . . . there is growing realisation that the world economy needs support from Japan if a recession is to be avoided’. Finally, although in more general language, he recorded his impression that on the main political issues where the UK was seeking ‘sustained Japanese co-operation: particularly the Gulf, aid to sub-Saharan Africa, and the management of East/West relations. . . I detected unease among the Japanese about what has up to now been the bedrock of their attitude to the outside world, their reliance on American leadership’. And export opportunities, according to ‘the strikingly high calibre British business representatives whom I met’ were improving, although ‘the Japanese market will continue to be difficult. . . [and] British companies [will] need to make a deliberate commitment to Japan extending over many years’.14 Uno wrote a warm letter to Howe after the visit, endorsing the principle of follow-up discussions on foreign policy, and a visit on bilateral economic relations in March 1988 by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Lord Young.15 The visit also helped to shift Japanese perceptions of the UK as well as British views on Japan. As Sir John Whitehead noted in his reporting telegram, ‘the Japa-

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nese recognised the revitalised economy and dynamic policies which were being pursued consistently in the United Kingdom and the important role that we were therefore playing as a leading member of the European Community’. Japanese politicians and officials agreed broadly with the British analysis of the major foreign policy questions. But they continued to assert, gently, a subtly different perspective – on Russia, where they agreed that the West should be open-minded but realistic in responding to Gorbachev, but sceptical that this would make much difference to Japan, given its own problematic bilateral history since 1945; and Iran, then facing international sanctions for continuing to hold out against implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a ceasefire with Iraq, but an economic and energy partner of potential importance to Japan. However, the Howe visit did initiate much more regular contact at ministerial level, and ‘the development on both sides of a new reflex of consultation’.16 A telegram instructing all British ambassadors to follow this up with their Japanese opposite numbers worldwide issued shortly after the foreign secretary’s return to London. The new emphasis on high-level contact continued with Prime Minister Takeshita’s visit to London in May 1988, although there is no evidence from the Foreign Office files that the foreign secretary was involved in, or made any policy contribution into,17 the preparation for these talks (in which the prime minister took a tough line with Takeshita for the slow progress that was being made on Tokyo Stock Exchange listings). Geoffrey Howe was to see Uno again in January 1989, when he visited London, and they had a generally positive stocktaking of developments, including some movement on the question of whisky, Japanese appreciation of the prime minister’s and foreign secretary’s strong line with the French over Japanese cars manufactured in Britain being regarded as British, not Japanese imports into the EU, and the growth of cultural relations, with the preparations for the 1991 Japan Festival. Geoffrey Howe was to visit Japan once more as foreign secretary, a month later when he attended the funeral of Emperor Sho–wa, during which brief visit he had another short meeting with Uno. CONCLUSION In July 1989, he was abruptly moved from the Foreign Office, he assumed in retaliation by the prime minister for the way that he had boxed her into making a more positive statement than she had wanted to about eventual British membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism at the Madrid EU summit the previous month. He became deputy prime minister and leader of the House of Commons, and it was his resignation from that position in November 1990 that precipitated the events that led to her eventual departure from office. His counterpart Uno, with whom he had established good relations, had himself already departed the Japanese political scene in humiliating circumstances, after succeeding Takeshita as prime minister in June 1989, but then having to resign two months later following the revelation not only of an extra-marital affair but also his refusing to give appropriate financial support to his mistress. If Howe’s memoir is a guide, Japan did not feature very prominently in his foreign policy priorities, which during the years 1983 to 1989 focused on developments in the European Union, relations with Southern Africa in the final years of the apartheid regime, East-West relations in the era of perestroika and glasnost, the negotiations with China over the future of Hong Kong and the

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Anglo-Irish Agreement. Nonetheless, he saw the significance of Japan in more than simply economic terms at a moment of international change. And he initiated a process of closer and more systematic contact that survived the dramatic reversals of the next few years – the crash of the Japanese stock market and consequent economic failure in the years after 1989, the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the eventual rise of China to surpass Japan as the second largest economy in the world. Howe retained some contact with Japan in retirement from active politics.18 In his memoir, he noted that one of the ‘long-standing problems’ whose resolution or management the prime minister had never given him credit for was ‘the recognition of Britain as ‘the keystone in the arch of Japan’s relations with the European Community’19 – a point that had been made to him by Kaifu Toshiki, Uno’s successor as Japanese prime minister. There was one further intervention. In July 1992, Geoffrey Howe wrote an article for The World Today, the Chatham House journal, entitled ‘Japan and the United States – a European perspective’. In this, he developed the thinking that had informed his launch four years before of the ‘dynamic, plain-speaking partnership’. He analysed the continuing tensions in the US-Japan relationship, and how ‘Japan’s capitalist success story seems to have moved from the credit to the debit side of the equation’, adding that ‘the political dimension has become more problematic too. How is Japan to match its economic superpower status with a political role that can overcome its inhibitions and hesitations on the world stage? And how sure can America be that such a political role would be exercised in a way consistent with wider Western interests?’ If Europe was to not only build a more productive relationship with Japan, but avoid the US and Japan ‘get[ting] together to resolve their problems without taking account of European problems (or anyone else’s, for that matter)’, a number of questions needed to be actively addressed. First, there should be meaningful joint action to halt the drift towards protectionism. Secondly, the strengthening of the multilateral trading system, then enshrined in the GATT, now in the WTO. Thirdly, rebuilding the structure for worldwide macro-economic coordination lost with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. Fourthly, the industrialised countries should forge a new tripolar system for burden-sharing and common action in defence. And finally, ‘we need together to visualise a more substantial foreign-policy role for Japan, as a valuable partner in advancing economically liberal and democratic goals around the world’.20 It is beyond the scope of this essay to assess the extent to which the agenda that Geoffrey Howe advanced has been achieved in the thirty years since he initiated the intensified process of consultation between Britain and Japan. But his work was of value and importance in both setting out the terms in which Japan should be engaged in this process by successive British governments, and also identifying ‘the dynamic and plain-speaking partnership’ as an objective which Japan could see as an important political asset in which they too were prepared to invest time and effort. Most significantly, looking at this articulation of policy from the perspective of Britain in 2018 after the Brexit referendum and at a time when Japan is increasingly concerned about future British engagement with Europe he saw the influence that the UK could exert within the EU, and the support of other European countries for the wider agenda, as integral to achieving what was in our national interest. Much of this agenda still stands. The extent to which Britain will be equipped to pursue it once it has detached itself from the European Union is more open to question.

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NOTES 1

2

3

4 5 6

7 8 9

10 11 12

13 14

15 16 17

18

19 20

The Plaza Accord was signed (in the Plaza Hotel in New York) on 22 September 1985. It committed the governments of the US, Japan, France, Germany and the UK to intervene in the currency markets to depreciate the US dollar (which had risen by 50% over the preceding five years) relative to the yen and the deutschemark. ‘Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013): Pragmatist who radically improved Britain’s image in Japan and successfully promoted Japanese manufacturing investment in Britain’ in Biographical Portraits, Volume IX, edited by Hugh Cortazzi, 2015, Renaissance Books. It was Howe who announced the plans to open the British Export Marketing Centre in Tokyo in a British Overseas Trade Board press conference in January 1973: the Centre was opened by HRH the Duke of Kent in September that year. Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, 1994, Macmillan, p 265 Howe, op. cit., p 138 Howe, op. cit., p 294. The summit communiqué had given a robust presentation of the G7 position on intermediate-range nuclear forces deployment and negotiations. ‘Sir Geoffrey touts for trade deals’, Nigel Hawkes, ‘The Observer’, 29 April 1984, p 5 Memorandum by R N Culshaw, 13 April 1987, FCO 21/3817 See the essay “Scotch Whisky in Japan” by Stuart Jack, in Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Vol IX (cited above), which gives the full background to the protracted negotiations on this question. Memorandum by R N Culshaw, 13 July 1987, FCO 21/3817 Quotations from Gillmore/Braithwaite memorandum, 6 November 1987, FCO 21/3818 Quotations taken from minute by D Gillmore to Private Secretary, 16 December 1987, FCO 21/3820 Tokyo telegram no 70 to FCO, 14 January 1988, FCO 21/4055 Foreign Secretary’s memorandum to Prime Minister, PM/88/005, 21 January 1988, FCO 21/4055 Uno’s letter, dated 29 February 1988, is on FCO 21/4055 Quotations in this paragraph taken from Tokyo telegram no 70 to FCO, FCO 21/4055 Other than an eccentric suggestion that Takeshita should be given a billiard cue as a gift rather than a (more conventional) book on art. The idea, drawn from too close a reading of Takeshita’s CV, which included a reference to billiards as having been a student pastime of his at Waseda University, was quickly suppressed by Sir John Whitehead. For example, having visited the regional prefecture of Oita in south-western Japan during his 1988 visit to see Japanese agriculture at first hand, he hosted the Governor of Oita during a visit to the UK in 1991. The present writer recalls interpreting on this occasion, with some difficulty given the impenetrability of the Oita dialect, when the official translator turned up late for a lunch at the Garrick Club. Howe, op. cit., p 688 Quotations from ‘Japan and the United States – a European perspective’, The World Today, Royal Institute for International Affairs, July 1992

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INDEX —

Abbott, Charles, 43 Abe Shintaro, 288 Aberavon, Lord Howe of, see Howe Aberdeen, Lord, 33, 39 Abingdon, Earl of, 103 Acheson, Dean, 210, 213, 214, 215 Addington, Henry, 33 Akihito, Crown Prince, 207, 227, 228, 236, 240 Emperor, 19 Alanbrooke, 214 Albert, Prince, 32 Alcock, Rutherford, xvii, 4, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 Alexandra, Princess, 17, 237 Amery, Leo, 155, 173 –, Viscount, 67, 69 Aoki Shuzo Arita Hachiro, 194, 198 Arthur, Chester, 47, 48 Asakai Koichiro, 228 Attlee, Clement, xxi, 211, 216, 217, 218 Avon, lst Earl of, see Eden Baldwin, Stanley, 3, 124, 153, 167, 180, 222 Balfour, Arthur James, ix, xix, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 93, 96, 97, 98, 119, 122, 124-131 Foreign Secretary, 138, 139, 140 Balfour, Gerald, 175 Ball, MacMahon, 213 Bertie, Sir Francis, x, xix, 69, 93, 95, 103-112 Bettelheim, Dr Bernát, 34 Bevin, Ernest, xxi, 15, 210-219 Black, John Reddie, 59 Blair, Tony, 19 Blunden, Edmund, 243 Bourke, Hon. Robert, 103 Bowring, Sir John, x, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 Brabourne, Lord, 201 Braithwaite, Rodric, 290 Bridgeman, Sir William, 154 Bright, John, 23 Brodrick, St. John, 67 Brown, George, 17, 232

Brown, John, 32 Bruce, Sir Frederick, 24, 28 Bruce, Stanley, 206 Bülow, Prince, 95 Bulwer-Lytton, Victor Alexander George Robert, see Lytton Butler, R.A., xxi, 17, 157, 187, 190, 195, 196, 200-204, 205, 206-207, 224, 232, 243, 246, 261-262 Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 169 Cahan, C.H., 166 Callaghan, James, 18 Camus, Lieutenant Henri, 27 Canning, George, 148 Carrington, Lord, 232 Castle, Joseph, 149, 150 Chamberlain, Austen, xx, 12, 153-156, 159160, 184 Chamberlain, Joseph, 66, 97 Chamberlain, Neville, xx, 13, 14, 93, 153, 156160, 168, 169, 170, 180, 181, 187, 192, 193, 195, 196, 201, 202, 203, 224, 259 Chiang Kai-shek, 195, 224 Chichibu, Prince, 185 Chichibu, Princess, 237 Chinda Sutemi, 128, 131, 138, 139 Churchill, Lt Colonel A.G., 221 Churchill, Winston, xx, xxi, 121, 126, 157, 187, 188, 195, 196, 197, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207, 212, 220-229, 236 Clarendon, Lord, xi, xvii, 32-40, 56, 82, 83 Close, Reginald, 243 Cobden, Richard, 23, 27 Cooper, Alfred Duff, 157 Craigie, Sir Robert, xiv, xx, 148, 149, 188, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 200, 202, 207 Crampton, John, 36 Cranbourne, Viscount, 68, 69 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 225 Crosland, Anthony, 232 Cross, Ronald, 202 Cunliffe-Lister, Sir Philip, 168

307

308

INDEX

Currie, Sir Philip, 43, 104 Curzon, Lord, xix, 2, 75, 129, 130, 133-141, 222 Dalton, Hugh, 211 Davies, John, 249, 250, 263 Deng Xiaoping, 280 Denman, Sir Roy, 252 Derby, Earl of, see Derby, Lord Derby, Lord, ix, xvii, xviii, 5, 39, 52-59 Dilke, Sir Charles, 43 Disraeli, Benjamin, 52, 56, 103 Dorothy, Lady Halifax, 197 Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, x, xxi, 17, 232, 237, 238, 243, 259-264, 269 Dulles, John Foster, xx, 189 Duncan, Sir Val, 249 Dyer, Henry, 44 Eden, Sir Antony, x, xx, 14, 15, 157, 181, 184191, 193, 197, 205, 206, 218, 224, 232, 242 Edinburgh, Duke of, 240 Edward VII, King, 104, 136 Edwardes, Arthur, 202, 203, 207 Eisenhower, Dwight, 260 Elgin, Earl of, xvii, 3, 36-37 Eliot, Charles, 147 Elizabeth II, Queen, 190, 227 Erroll, Frederick, 247 Evatt, Vere, 213 Falloden, Viscount Grey of, see Grey Fisher, Sir Warren, 156, 202 Franks, Sir Oliver, 210, 214, 215, 216 Fraser, Hugh, 64, 77, 84, 106 –, 46 Fukuchi Genichiro Fukuda Takeo, 238, 263, 265, 267, 274 Fukushima Yasumasa, General, 137 Gairdner, General Sir Charles, 212 Gascoigne, Sir Alvary, 212 Gascoyne-Cecil, Robert Arthur Talbot, see Salisbury George V, King, 154 George VI, King, 185, 206 George, David Lloyd, xix, 11, 121, 122, 128, 129, 138, 139, 140, 169, 204, 205 Giers, Nikolai Karlovich de, 84 Gillmore, David, 290, 291 Gladstone, William Ewart, 2-3, 27, 32, 49, 56, 59, 74, 83 Gloucester, Duke of, 12, 17 Glover, Thomas Blake, 28, 54 Gorbachev, 276, 290, 292 Gower, Alexander, 29 Gower, George Leveson, see Granville, Lord Granville, Lord, xvii, 5, 42-49

Grey, Earl Albert, 28, 119 Grey, Sir Edward, xix, 10, 88, 91, 115-122, 221 Gurney, Samuel, see Hoare Gwynne, Howell, 157 Halifax, Lord, xxi, 14, 157, 177, 187, 188, 192198, 201, 205 Hamilton, Major-General Sir Ian, 137 Hammond, Edmund, 23, 26, 28, 29, 35, 43, 44 Hankey, Maurice, Lord, xxi, 130, 140, 200201, 204-207, 224 Hara Takashi, Prime Minister, 128, 222 Harcourt, Sir William Vernon, 74, 83, 86, 87 Harris, James, see Malmesbury Harris, Robin, 277 Hart, Sir Robert, 76, 85 Hayashi Gonsuke, 139 Hayashi Tadasu, Viscount, 69, 70, 95, 97, 109, 111, 185 Heath, Edward, x, xv, xxi, xxii, 218, 233, 238, 239, 249-251, 259, 261, 262, 263, 265-272, 274 Heisei Emperor, 242 Henderson, Arthur, 143, 147, 148 Henry, Prince (Duke of Gloucester), 12 Heusken, Henry, 25 Hiro, Prince, 240 Hirohito, Emperor, 12, 18, 19, 206, 262 Hitler, Adolf, 185, 192, 224 Hoare, Sir Samuel, xx, 157, 158, 159, 168, 179182, 184, 196 Hoover, Herbert, 148, 164 Hope, Admiral James, 25 Howard, Michael, 282, 290 Howe, Sir Geoffrey, xxii, 232, 287-293 Hübner, Baron von, 56 Hughes, William, 11, 121 Hull, Cordell, 177, 187, 188, 192, 197 Ikeda Hayato, 17, 243, 245, 247, 260, 261 Inoue Kaoru, 28, 48, 49 Inoue Katsunosuke, Ambassador, 120, 121, 122 Ishihara Takashi, 280 – Hirobumi, 8, 28, 29, 49, 78, 84, 86, 97, 106, Ito 134, 135 Iwakura Tomomi, xvii, 5, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 58 Jordan, Sir John, 121 Kaifu Toshiki, Prime Minister, 274, 282, 284, 293 – Takaaki, Baron, 77, 78, 87, 117, 118, 119, Kato 120, 121 – Tomosaburo, 130, 131, 222 Kato

INDEX Kedleston, 1st Marquess Curzon of, see Curzon Kent, Princess Alexandra of, 17 Kimberley, Lord, xviii, 6, 7, 23, 70, 74, 78, 79, 80, 82-88, 115, 116 Kipping, Sir Norman, 247 Kishi Nobusuke, 228, 260 Kissinger, Henry, 239 Kitchener, General, 137 Knatchbull-Hugesson, Sir Hugh, 186 –, 284 Koizumi Junichiro Konoe Fumimaro, 188, 196, 204, 226, 229 Konoye, Prince, 204 Kuper, Admiral, 27 Kuranari Takashi, 291 Lansdowne, Lord, xviii-xix, 7, 8, 9, 10, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 91-100, 104, 110, 111, 112, 260 Laval, Pierre, 179, 184 Layard, Austen, 23, 28, 29, 43 Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 158, 169, 181, 182 Li Hungchang, 77, 78 Lindsay, Sir Ronald, 165 Lloyd, Selwyn, 16 Long, Charles de, 44 Lothian, Lord, 196-197 Lyons, Joseph, 186 Lytton, Lord, x, xx, 155, 164, 166, 167, 173-177, 180, 223 MacArthur, General Douglas, 15, 207, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 233 MacDonald, Ambassador, 119 MacDonald, James Ramsay, ix-x, xiii, xix, 2, 13, 143-151, 158, 163, 165, 166, 169, 170, 179, 180, 181 MacDonald, Malcolm, 190 MacDonald, Sir Claude, 108 Macmillan, Harold, 17, 247, 259, 260, 261 Macmillan, Lord, 173 Maekawa Haruo, 288 Maisky, Ivan, 201 Makin, Norman, 213 Makino Nobuaki, 119, 157 Malmesbury, Lord, x, xvii Margaret, Princess, 237, 248 Matsui Keishiro, 131 – an (Terashima Munenori), 37 Matsuki Ko Matsumoto Shunichi, 228 Matsuoka Yosuke, 203, 204, 205, 206, 225, 229 Maxwell, Herbert, 32 Mitford, A.B., 52 Mito, Prince of, 26 Miyazawa Kiichi, 274, 291 Montijo, Countess de, 33

309

Montijo, Eugénie, 33 Mori Arinori, 49 Morita Akio, 251, 274, 284 Morland, Sir Oscar, 260, 261 Morrison, Dr G.E., 129 Morrison, Herbert, 211 Moss, Michael, 24, 25 Motono Morimichi, 57 Murray, Sir Gilbert, 167 Mutsu Hirokichi, Count, 117 Mutsu Munemitsu, 75, 76, 77, 78, 84, 86, 106, 107 Nagano Shigeo, 269 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 274, 283, 288, 291 Nakayama, Foreign Minister, 282, 283 Napoleon III, Emperor, 23 Naruhito, Crown Prince, 244 Nathaniel, George, see Curzon Neale, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St John, 26, 27 Nixon, Richard, 18, 216, 238, 249, 250, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 271 – Ohira Masayoshi, 237, 261, 264, 268, 288 Ohno Katsumi, 260 Oku Yasukata, Lieutenant-General, 136, 137 Oliphant, Laurence, 25, 27 Orde, Charles, 169 Palliser, Sir Michael, 240 Palmerston, Lord, xi, 4, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 34 Parker, Sir Peter, 244 Parkes, Sir Harry, xii, xvii, 4, 5, 25, 29, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 63 Parkinson, Cecil, 287 Paunceforte, Sir Julian, 43, 48, 63 Pearson, Professor Karl, 145 Perry, Commodore Matthew, x, xvii, 33, 34 Petty-Fitzmaurice, Henry Charles Keith, see Lansdowne, Lord Piggott, Major General F.S.G., xiv, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207 Pilcher, Sir John, 237, 238, 239, 262 Plunkett, Sir Francis, 49, 63, 64 Pratt, John, 169 Reagan, Ronald, 283, 277 Redman, Vere, 243 Rendel, Lord Stuart, 76 Rennie, Sir Richard, 48, 49 Revelstoke, Lord, 8, 9 Richardson, Charles Lennox, 4, 26, 27 Ridsdale, Sir Julian, 237, 260 Roches, Léon, 29

310

INDEX

Roosevelt, Franklin, 14, 169, 187, 188, 195, 197, 220, 227, 229 Rosebery, Earl of, see Rosebery, Lord Rosebery, Lord, xviii, 6, 49, 64, 65, 70, 74-80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 106, 107, 115, 116 Runciman, Sir Walter, 166, 168 Rundall, Sir Francis, 243 Russell, Lord John, ix, xi, xvii, 4, 22-30 Russell, Reginald, 27 Saba Shoichi, 272 – Takamori, 54, 57 Saigo Saito Makoto, Admiral, 139 Saki, 91 Sale, George, 201, 203, 204 Salisbury, Lord, ix, xviii, xi, 7, 48, 49, 59, 62-71, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 104, 108, 109, 110, 125, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137 Sameshima Nonobu, 44 Sanderson, Sir Thomas, 104 Sansom, Sir George, 194, 195 Sato Eisaku, 267 – Naotake, 185 Sato Satow, Ernest, 6, 7, 39, 43, 49, 54, 65, 66, 88 Seymour, Rear Admiral Sir Michael, 36 –, Baron, 121, 124, 130, 131, Shidehara Kiju– ro 154, 155, 226 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 179, 192, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 224, 225 –, 17 Shiina Etsusaburo Showa Emperor, 237, 238, 242, 249 Simon, Sir John, xx, 158, 162-170 Smith, George (Bishop of Victoria), 24 Snowden, Phillip, 146 Somerset, Duke of, 25, 27 Spring-Rice, Cecil, 75, 133, 134 Stalin, 220, 229 Stanley, Lord, see Derby, Lord Stewart, Michael, 17, 232 Stimson, Henry, 148, 149, 150, 162, 164, 165, 168, 170 Stirling, James, Admiral, 22, 33, 34, 35, 36 Stokes, Lord, 248 Sukarno, President, 243 Suzuki Zenko, 243, 278, 279, 280, 284 Takahashi Korekiyo, 9 Takeo Fukuda, 238, 263, 265, 267, 274 Takeshita Noboru, 274, 284, 288, 291, 292 Tamura Hajime, 291 Tanaka Giichi, 155 Tanaka Kakuei, 18, 239, 263, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271

Temple, William, Archbishop of York, 196 Templewood, 1st Viscount, see Hoare Tenterden, Lord, see Abbott Terashima Munenori, 37, 45, 46, 47, 53 Thatcher, Margaret, xv, xxii, 2, 19, 233, 241, 243, 245, 253, 254, 274-285, 287, 289 Thomas, J.H., 146 Thornton, Sir E., 44 Tilley, Sir John, 149, 150 Tokugawa, Prince, 131 Trench, Hon. Henry Le Poer, 64 Truman, President, 213, 214, 215, 227 Uchida Yasuya, 175 Ueno Kagenori, 57, 58 – suke, 291, 292, 293 Uno So Victoria, Queen, 22, 26, 29, 32, 45, 54, 66, 84 Villiers, George William, see Clarendon, Lord Vyse, Captain, 24, 26 –, 121, 150 Wakatsuki Reijiro Waldersee, Count von, 108 Wales, Prince of, 12, 188, 237, 244 Warner, Lady, 240 Warner, Sir Fred, 239, 267, 268, 269, 271 Watson, R.J., 46 Weinstock, Arnold, 252 Wellesley, Sir Victor, 147, 169 White, Oswald, xiv Whitehead, Sir John, 254, 282, 291 Willingdon, Lord, 180 Wilson, Harold, 3, 17, 18, 261, 262 Wilson, President Woodrow, 11, 121, 127, 128, 129 Wilson, Sir Horace, 202 Winchester, Charles, 29 Wodehouse, John, see Kimberley, Lord Wood, Edward, (1st Earl of Halifax), see Halifax Wrench, Evelyn, 164 Yamaguchi Masuka, 45 Yasuda Yukihiko, 228 Yoshida Shigeru, xxi, 121, 156, 157, 158, 159, 182, 185, 186, 189, 204, 217, 223, 228, 229, 236, 245 Young, Lord, 291 Yuan Shikai, President, 120 Zetland, Lord, 173