British Columbia : historical readings 0888943032

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British Colum bia: H istorical Readings

Compiled atul edited by W. Peter Ward and Robert A .J. McDonald

65953

Douglas & McIntyre Ltd. VANCOUVER

Copyright © 1981 by W . Peter Ward and Robert A.J. McDonald All rights reserved. No part o f this book may be produced or transmitted in any form by any means without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review. Douglas & McIntyre Ltd. 1615 Venables Street Vancouver, British Columbia

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: British Columbia, historical readings isbn

0-88894-303-2

1. British Columbia— History— Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Ward, W . Peter (William Peter), 1943II. McDonald, Robert A. J., 1944FC3811.7.B75 F1087.5.B75

971.1

C81-091073-X

Cover design by Mike Yazzolino Photoset in Itek Bembo by George Payerle and assembled by Gary Wilcox Printed and bound in Canada by D .W . Friesen & Sons Ltd.

This book was published with the financial assistance of the following organizations: VANCOUVER FOUNDATION OPEN LEARNING INSTITUTE THE LEON & THEA KOERNER FOUNDATION

Contents P R E F A C E / vii IN T E R P R E T A T IO N S / J

Allan Smith. The Writing o f British Columbia History / 5 T H E M A R IT IM E F U R T R A D E / 35

Christon I. Archer. The Transient Presence: A Re-appraisal o f Spanish Attitudes Toward the Northwest Coast in the Eighteenth Century / 37 James R. Gibson. Bostonians and Muscovites on the Northwest Coast, 1788-1841 / 66 Robin Fisher. Indian Control o f the Maritime Fur Trade and the Northwest Coast / 96 IN D IA N -E U R O P E A N R E L A T IO N S / i l l

Robin Fisher. Missions to the Indians o f British Columbia / 113 Jean Usher. Duncan o f Metlakatla: The Victorian Origins o f a Model Indian Community / 127 Robin Fisher. Joseph Trutch and Indian Land Policy / 134 Peter A. Cumming and Neil H. Mickenberg. Native Rights in Canada: British Columbia / 184 C O L O N IA L G O V E R N M E N T A N D S O C IE T Y / 213

S.D. Clark. Mining Society in British Columbia and the Yukon / 213 Barry M. Gough. The Character o f the British Columbia Frontier / 232 James E. Hendrickson. The Constitutional Development o f Colonial Vancouver Island and British Columbia / 243 E C O N O M IC D E V E L O P M E N T / 275

J.M .S. Careless. The Lowe Brothers, 1852-70: A Study in Business Relations on the North Pacific Coast / 277 Keith Ralston. Patterns o f Trade and Investment on the Pacific Coast, 1867-1892: The Case o f the British Columbia Salmon Canning Industry / 296 David J . Reid. Company Mergers in the Fraser River Salmon Canning Industry / 306

D.G. Paterson. European Financial Capital and British Columbia: An Essay on the Role o f the Regional Entrepreneur / 328 D.G. Paterson. The North Pacific Seal Hunt, 1886-1910: Rights and Regulations / 343 U R B A N G R O W T H / 367

Robert A .J. McDonald. Victoria, Vancouver, and the Economic Development o f British Columbia, 1886-1914 / 369 Norbert MacDonald. The Canadian Pacific Railway and Vancouver’s Development to 1900 / 396 John C. Weaver. The Property Industry and Land Use Controls: The Vancouver Experience, 1910-1945 / 426 IN D U S T R IA L C O N F L IC T A N D T H E L A B O U R M O V E M E N T / 441

David Jay Bercuson. Labour Radicalism and the Western Industrial Frontier, 1897-1919 / 431 A. Ross McCormack. The Industrial Workers o f the World in Western Canada, 1905-1914 / 474 Stuart Jamieson. Regional Factors in Industrial Conflict: The Case o f British Columbia / 500 P O L IT IC S / 515

Ian D. Parker. Simon Fraser Tolmie: The Last Conservative Premier o f British Columbia / 317 Margaret A. Ormsby. T. Dufferin Pattullo and the Little New Deal / 333 Walter D. Young. Ideology, Personality and the Origin o f the C C F in British Columbia / 333 R A C E A N D E T H N IC IT Y / 579

W. Peter Ward. Class and Race in the Social Structure o f British Columbia, 1870-1939 / 581 Jean Barman. The World that British Settlers Made: Class, Ethnicity and Private Education in the Okanagan Valley / 600 Jorgen Dahlie. Learning on the Frontier: Scandinavian Immigrants and Education in Western Canada / 627 Sanford M. Lyman. Contrasts in the Community Organization o f Chinese and Japanese in North America / 639 Patricia E. Roy. British Columbia’s Fear o f Asians / 637 W. Peter Ward. British Columbia and the Japanese Evacuation / 671

Preface

No comprehensive overview o f British Columbia’ s history has been published since Margaret Ormsby’ s British Columbia: A History appeared almost a quarter century ago. In the intervening years— particularly the last decade— a number o f historians have built upon this foundation, re­ examining old problems in the history ot the region and exploring new paths of enquiry as well. Much o f this work was encouraged by Margaret Ormsby herself, whose students have figured prominently in these investigations. Until now, however, no reliable synthesis o f the prov­ ince’s history has been written that embodies the findings o f a new scholarly generation. Nor do we know o f one that is likely to appear in the near future. To meet the growing need for a textbook bearing the fruits o f recent enquiry, we have selected these essays as representative of the best contemporary scholarship on the history o f British Columbia. This collection does not pretend to offer a new general synthesis. Rather, its purpose is more modest: to provide college and university students with a textbook reflecting the interests o f the province’s most recent historians. Nor have we— like some editors o f books o f readings— erected an elaborate pedagogical apparatus in this volume. Instead, we have deliberately confined ourselves to selecting and organizing these essays; our authors are left to speak for themselves. The essays here reveal that recent scholarly interest has been concen­ trated in four areas o f historical enquiry: Indian-European relations, racial tensions, labour militancy and radicalism, and economic develop­ ment. Previously consigned to relative obscurity by provincial historians, British Columbia’ s Indian peoples have lately attracted growing histor­ ical attention. The studies ofjean Usher and Robin Fisher on the contact experience o f native Indians and European traders, settlers, missionaries

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and government officials have established a comprehensive framework for interpreting Indian-European relations in the nineteenth century. A similar interest in cultural and racial questions is reflected in the analyses o f Asian-white tensions by Patricia Roy and Peter Ward. Insights drawn from the social sciences have informed the conclusions o f both Fisher and Ward; such interdisciplinary approaches, notes Allan Smith, mark an important departure in historical writing about British Columbia. Stuart Jamieson’s schematic analysis o f labour militancy in B.C . in the 1950s and David Bercuson’s interpretation o f labour radicalism in the Canadian west before 1914 add new dimensions to our understanding o f workers’ responses to industrialization in British Columbia. On the subject o f B .C .’ s economic growth, James Gibson, J.M .S. Careless, Keith Ralston and Robert McDonald all emphasize the importance o f commerce in the province’ s history. David Reid’s study o f corporate concentration in the B.C . salmon canning industry and Donald Pater­ son’s essay on the role o f regional entrepreneurs in organizing financial capital from external sources direct our attention to two other aspects o f economic development. But if these readings sketch a picture o f the preoccupations o f British Columbia’s contemporary historians they also reveal gaping holes in the province’ s historical literature. Indeed, much o f the value o f this collec­ tion may lie in its unspoken commentary upon the state o f historical writing about British Columbia. Sad to relate, despite the long tradition which Allan Smith describes and the current surge o f interest which this volume expresses, British Columbia’s history is less fully explored than that o f any other region in the nation. Much basic research remains to be done. We still have only a fragmentary view o f economic development in British Columbia and this is perhaps the most fundamental gap o f all. The histories o f the forest, mining, and fishing industries— to choose three obvious examples— still await comprehensive analysis despite the central importance they have had in the regional economy. N or have we any clear insight into the development strategies pursued by successive provincial governments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all of whom have played active roles in promoting and shaping economic growth. Then, too, despite significant work in provincial labour history, little is known about the labour market and the labour force in British Columbia’s past. N or has close study been made o f the economic relationships which sustained labour radicalism, racism and other forms o f political and social conflict. The nature o f provincial society is also still to some extent unclear. Immigration, historically the predominant source o f population growth

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in the province, has only been partly explored, and then largely in relationship to the region’s more distinctive minorities. W e still know little about British and Canadian migration, particularly the complex processes that have led to immigrant integration into provincial society. Margaret Ormsby’s view o f British Columbia as a community o f com­ munities should also be kept in sight. The history o f the province’ s northern reaches, for example, is still largely unexplored. Nor, as is evident in our section on urban growth, has urbanization been viewed from other than a metropolitan perspective. Finally, although traditionally pre-eminent in historical literature, political history has suffered serious neglect in British Columbia during the past decade. Surprisingly little work has been done on the political culture and institutions o f the province, to say nothing o f the administra­ tive record o f its successive governments, notwithstanding the distinc­ tive behaviour which has characterized the politics ofBritish Columbia. Moreover, we know even less about the province’ s integration into the national political system than we do about internal politics. This is a regrettable oversight. Perhaps, however, it is also a sign that historians o f the province share a marked particularist outlook. In any event it suggests— as does this entire “ shopping list’ ’— that the writing ofBritish Columbia’s history is little more than well begun. Despite their many achievements, the province’s historians still have an awesome task before them. They have only commenced the task o f explaining British Columbia’ s development as a complex, modern society. We hope that this book will fill an obvious need and, in so doing, encourage others to accept the challenge and pleasure o f investigating B .C .’ s past. W. Peter Ward Robert A.J. McDonald

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BIBLIO GRAPH ICAL N O TE These readings were chosen from a large body o f historical writing about British Columbia. Because this book was intended to reflect contemporary scholarship, we necessarily omitted traditional work. N or could anything more than a small sample o f recent literature be included. Students wishing to identify other books, theses, and journal articles on the history o f the region should begin with Western Canada Since 1870: A Select Bibliography and Guide, ed. Alan F.). Artibise (Vancouver: University o f British Columbia Press, 1978). The fur trade and colonial periods, which are not covered in this otherwise excellent bibliography, are included in Keith Ralston’s “ Select Bibliography on the History of British Columbia,” published in Historical Essays on British Columbia, ed. J. Friesen and H.K. Ralston, Carleton Library Series No. 96 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976). Ralston’ s bibliographical essay is select rather than comprehensive but is still the best general introduction to published literature in the field. Frances Woodward’s compilation o f recent monographs, articles, and theses is published regularly in B C Studies. The University o f Victoria’s Social Sciences Research Centre has prepared A Bibliography of British Columbia comprising three volumes: Navigations, Traffiques and Discoveries 1774-1848, compiled by G.M . Strathern (Victoria, 1970); Laying the Foundations 1844-1844, compiled by B.J. Lowther (Victoria, 1968); and Years of Growth 1400-1450, compiled by M.H. Edwards (Victoria, 1975). Each volume provides an annotated list o f imprints published during, as well as books and articles written about, one o f these three periods in B.C . history. Articles and government publications are not included in this bibliography but are featured, in addition to theses, corporate reports, and published monographs, in British Columbia: A Bibliography of Industry, Labour, Resources and Regions for the Social Sciences, compiled by Duncan Kent (Vancouver: B C Studies, 1978).

I

The Writing o f British Columbia History A LLA N SM ITH

I Few collections o f historical literature demonstrate more clearly than the work produced by British Columbia’s historians the truth o f the proposition that the historian’s vision o f the past results from a complex process o f interaction involving his own intelligence, the changing character o f the reality he contemplates and the conceptual lens through which he views it. Each o f the three main divisions into which historical writing about British Columbia falls must, in consequence, be defined not only in terms o f the structure given it by the varying phenomena o f which the historians producing it found it necessary to take account but also by the manner in which their sense o f what formed an appropriate subject o f investigation was shaped by the changing framework o f assumption, hypothesis and value within whose confines they operated. What follows, then, at once records the shifting picture o f the British Columbia past painted by its historians and attempts to explain how that picture acquired the balance and composition that set it apart. In so doing— the point should be made at the outset— it makes no attempt to examine exhaustively the body o f historical writing dealing with British Columbia but concentrates instead on work which seeks to make a com­ prehensive statement about its subject or contributes importantly to the articulation o f a significant point o f view about that subject.1 u The first generation ofBritish Columbia’ s historians approached their task through the agency o f conceptual tools drawn directly from the S O U R C E : B C Studies, 45 (Spring 1980), 73-102. Reprinted by permission o f the author and B C Studies.

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values and experience o f bourgeois Victorians. Human activity, they believed, was to be judged in terms o f the extent to which it released the wealth o f the world, created moral communities and illustrated the truth that the individual was the master o f his fate. In British societies, moreover, such activity had also to stand up under the scrutiny o f those who sought to satisfy themselves that the interests o f an entity o f world­ wide scope were being served. On all o f these counts the shape and content o f the British Columbia experience did more than meet the test, for nothing seemed clearer than that the province was a place o f wealth and splendour whose inhabitants were daily advancing themselves and their community down the road to development, the fulfillment o f its imperial responsibilities, and moral perfection. It helped, o f course, that the province’s inhabitants had been given much with which to work. The generation o f British Columbia’s histo­ rians active from the 1880s to World War I was, in fact, struck more forcibly by the abundance o f its material resources than by any other single factor in its character. Extravagantly endowed with land and fisheries,2 in possession o f vast mineral and timber reserves,3 it seemed truly a land o f plenty.4 One could, indeed, hardly exaggerate its poten­ tial. It comprised, noted two early students o f its past, “ an empire equal in area to a third o f Europe, and, though still in a state o f savage nature, rich beyond measure in political and industrial possibilities.” 5 Even reference to the immense difficulties geography had placed in the way o f realizing that potential— the work, noted provincial librarian and archi­ vist E.O .S. Scholefield, was “ herculean” in its proportions6— served only to magnify the already considerable scope o f what was being accomplished. As Scholefield himself insisted, the province’s “ progress within the fifty years succeeding the fur-trading era is the most remark­ able in history.” 7 Taking their cue from this stupendous fact, moving forward to consider what lay in front o f them, the province’s historians advanced as one man to follow the lead given by Ontario immigrant and popular historian Alexander Begg in his efforts “ to place on record . . . the rise and progress o f British Columbia from its earliest discovery to the present. . . ,” 8 There was, inevitably, disagreement concerning which events in the province’s history were to be assigned special status in its march towards greatness. Some thought it had all begun with the discovery o f gold;9 others took the view that the land-based fur trade precipitated the development o f the colony;10 all, however, agreed that whatever the significance o f these early events, the coming o f the CPR had been deci-

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sive. More than any other that event had opened the way for unimagined growth and even the assumption by the province o f a role o f truly global significance.11 I f the province’ s material progress had been extraordinary, there was, its historians insisted, equally compelling evidence that what it had experienced in the field o f moral improvement was no less worthy o f note. The action o f Douglas in dealing with the American miners o f the gold rush period offered one clear indication that standards o f morality and order prevailed, but those wishing to prove how civihzed life in British Columbia was found no need to stop short after having cited that famihar example. Few commentators, in fact, hesitated to speak in sweeping and all-inclusive terms o f the striking contrast they saw between peaceful and law-abiding British Columbia and the settlements to be found on the American frontier. “ In British Columbia,” reported R.E. Gosnell, the province’s first provincial librarian and archivist, “ towns o f the coast society were leavened with an especially religious and moral element,” 12 while, emphasized Scholefield, “ even when Barkerville reached its high water mark o f prosperity, the population was generally distinguished for its sobriety and orderliness.” 13 Commentators, in fact, found a number o f indications that life in British Columbia had attained a quality and perfection unmatched else­ where. Schooling, noted Scholefield, “ with all its softening and cultural influences” 14 had early been introduced into the life o f the province, a point that the American historian H.H. Bancroft emphasized in closing his volume with a lengthy chapter on “ Settlements, Missions, and Education 1861-1866.” 15 Technology, too, had been instrumental in improving the quality o f hfe. “ Victoria city,” noted Gosnell, “ was one of the first cities in America to be lighted by electric lights,” and the existence o f its people had also been eased by trolley systems and hydro­ electric power.16 Even coal mining in British Columbia had a purer and less debihtating character than was the case elsewhere. “ Beautifully situated with bright skies [and] pure air . . . [Nanaimo],” Bancroft claimed, “ presents little o f that sooty, opaque appearance, either physi­ cal or moral, so common to the colliery villages o f England.” 17 How, enthused Begg, could one doubt that in British Columbia there was much indeed to “ delight the gaze o f the enraptured visitor.” 18 This model society, insisted its historians, at once owed much to, and offered a nearly perfect environment for, the activities o f the individual. While few commentators hnked the themes o f individualism and pro­ gress so exphcitly as Gosnell and Scholefield— they entitled the sections of their history which contained biographical sketches o f the province’s

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great men “ Sixty Years o f Progress” — most were quite as concerned to make the point that the good society could have no real existence apart from the individuals who had shaped it. Captain Vancouver and Alex­ ander Mackenzie, the voyageurs o f fur trading days and the prospectors o f the gold rush, the officials o f the H B C and the businessmen at the end o f the nineteenth century were alike portrayed as men embodying the classic virtues o f will, initiative, character and pluck. Some, like Van­ couver19 and Douglas,20 were celebrated for having lifted themselves far above the common level; others, such as the voyageurs21 and the gold prospectors,22 exemplified an anonymous populist virtue; still others— the words are Gosnell’s, describing Judge Matthew Begbie— were seen as “ men who left strong finger marks on the history o f British Columbia in the plastic day o f its first growth.” 23 In each case, the message was the same: much o f what was valuable and important in the history o f the province had been created by self-reliant and enterprising individuals. The British Columbia experience, as Gosnell put it, was “ illustrative o f a phase o f Canadian individual enterprise that in recent years has evolved so many men o f large affairs out o f the rugged elements o f Canadian life and produced so much wealth from the resources o f a country rich in opportunity and rapid in development.” 24 Important as it was, this emphasis on the individualist theme did not wholly supplant other ways o f assessing the elements o f provincial growth. Given the province’s geography and early dependence on external markets and transportation links, it was, indeed, hardly possible to ignore the fact that what happened to the province and its people had much to do with circumstances beyond the control o f any one individual. “ Success,” as Gosnell put it, “ was in a general way dependent upon railway construction and communication with the outside world. . . .” In making possible the development o f the interior, allowing commer­ cial contacts with the rest o f the Dominion, and opening direct trade with the Orient and Australasia, this mode o f development had done much to make possible the great work o f the province’s citizens.25 Even as they wrote o f the individual’s power, commentators thus devoted no small degree o f attention to at least one part o f the context within which he and his community were working out their destiny. The American Bancroft was, paradoxically, one o f the most deter­ mined o f this group o f historians to insist on the reality and importance o f British Columbia’s association with Canada. The province’ s imperial orientation did not escape his notice, but he was equally anxious to stress the fact that “ we must . . . consider [B.C.] as linked with her sister colonies, with Vancouver Island as one with herself, and with the

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Dominion o f Canada. . . ,” 26 Begg, very much concerned to introduce British Columbia to eastern Canadians, was similarly anxious to locate it in a Canadian context. The CPR, he conceded, might have an imperial dimension, but its construction had also made possible the “ Union o f East and West,” a fact the meaning o f which had been underscored by the visits o f the Governor-General to British Columbia, all o f which Begg chronicled in detail.27 Other commentators were, however, less sure that the Canadian link was to be given pride o f place. Mindful o f the province’s maritime origins, aware o f the role played by the H B C in the formative years o f its history, and much impressed by the fact o f Britain’s imperial power in their own day, it seemed to these observers that the province’s relation­ ship to Canada was to be conceived largely in terms o f its provincial and imperial relevance. This did not mean that British Columbia’s links with the Dominion were held to be o f no importance: Gosnell and his collab­ orator in writing the life o f James Douglas, for example, took the effective development o f British Columbia to have begun with the commencement o f Northwest Company activities on the Pacific Coast. They pointed out that Douglas had considered after 1859 that the prov­ ince’ s population would be built up by settlement from Canada rather than Britain, and they reminded their readers that the westernmost part of the continent had played an important part in the development o f North America as a whole.28 What received consistent emphasis was, nonetheless, British Columbia’s isolation from what lay to the east. In terms both o f its population and its external links, Scholefield insisted, mid-nineteenth century British Columbia was an imperial community completely lacking “ any relations whatever with any other portion o f British North America. . . .” 29 Even after the eastern provinces joined together, the west coast remained isolated. “ Geographically,” noted Gosnell, “ [it] was far removed from the seat o f [Federal] Government. An almost insuperable barrier o f mountains cut it off from the rest o f the British possessions. . . . The country . . . was in every sense foreign to Canada.” 30 What was more, suggested one-time journalist and Speaker of the B .C . Legislature D.W . Higgins, the feeling was mutual: the British Columbia delegates sent to Ottawa to negotiate terms were regarded “ as visitors from one o f the heavenly planets, who, having ventured too near the edge o f their world, had missed their footing and, falling into space, had landed at the federal capital.” 31 This meant, insisted Gosnell, that union with Canada was in no sense a foregone conclusion. What produced it was, in fact, a quite rational calculation o f provincial interest coupled with a strong sense that such a move had an

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important imperial relevance. It was, indeed, unlikely that in the absence o f such a relevance, matters would have proceeded, for “ throughout the length and breadth o f the Empire there is no part where the people as a whole are so wholly and unreservedly devoted to the ideal o f imperial unity and to British institutions as in British Columbia.” 32 This meant that matters affecting the province were to be assessed in terms o f their impact on it as part o f the empire. The CPR, certainly, was very much to be viewed as having an imperial rather than a merely national role to play. The driving o f the last spike, asserted Coats and Gosnell, “ was a grave moment in the history o f Canada and the British Empire. . . . The gateway to the Orient had been opened at last by land.” 33 Even the Panama Canal was to be judged in terms o f its capacity to allow British Columbia to move towards the assumption o f a British-like status in world affairs. That remarkable engineering feat, predicted Gosnell, “ will inevitably build up an industrial and mercantile Britain on the British Columbia coast, corresponding in all material respects to the Great Britain o f many centuries old. . . .” 34 British Columbia, its histo­ rians insisted, was thus very much an imperial rather than a Canadian province, firmly rooted in a larger world. Having, as Gosnell put it, “ interests which are sui generis in a degree greater perhaps than is true o f any other province in Canada,” it had perforce to deepen its sense o f its destiny, enlarge its understanding o f the direction in which the unfold­ ing o f the historical process was taking it, and so avoid the dismal and pedestrian fate o f becoming content with provincial status in a mere agglomeration o f other and lesser jurisdictions.35 in

For all that they were concerned with painting the history o f British Columbia in the brightest and most flattering colours, the early historians o f the province were not entirely unaware that by the end o f the nine­ teenth century the study o f history had become a disciplined and critical undertaking. Begg, to be sure, was largely a compiler o f other men’s work, but Bancroft displayed a Rankean enthusiasm for original sources and the kind o f truth that flowed from them,36 Gosnell was familiar with the germ theory o f historical development and had some awareness o f the relativity o f historical judgment,37 and both he and Scholefield were fully alive to the importance o f documentary evidence.38 It was, none­ theless, only after the Great War that historians o f British Columbia developed an approach to their subject which, in moving them away from the special pleading on behalf o f development, empire and self-

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made men which had characterized so much o f the early work, showed that they were prepared to take matters o f perspective, analysis and objectivity with due seriousness. What they wrote could hardly lose all trace o f its ideological cast— as time passed it in fact more and more assumed the informal duty o f rationalizing the claims o f the regional interest groups that became steadily more prominent in both the econ­ omy and the government— but overall it acquired a noticeably more rigorous, disciplined and methodologically sophisticated quality.39 The fact that growth and development were still basic realities in the province’s life insured, o f course, that they would continue to receive attention, a guarantee also offered by the prevailing conceptual wisdom, which, in emphasizing geographical determinants, made it virtually impossible to ignore the important role played in the shaping o f the province’s history by exploitation o f its resources. None o f this was, however, incompatible with the taking o f a more rounded and analytical view o f the province’s economic history. On the contrary, the applica­ tion o f environmentalist concepts to the study o f British Columbia’s evolution reinforced the moves in the direction o f adopting a more critical perspective which had been encouraged by society’s maturing and the emergence o f history as a university-based discipline.40 These developments, moreover, were in their turn powerfully reinforced by the growth o f a reformist critique o f big business which in conjunction with the onset o f the Great Depression stimulated the impulse to observe the province’s growth from something other than a blandly approving point o f view.41 Even, in consequence, as commentators continued to place emphasis on the ruggedness o f the environment and the difficulties it put in the way o f road and railway builders42 they focused attention on such tech­ nical details as the difficulties created for the timber industry by the immense size o f British Columbia logs43 and began the process o f re­ examining the province’s early economic history, paying particular attention to the relative importance o f the land-based and maritime fur trades.44 Notwithstanding the persistence o f familiar lines o f argument — the University o f British Columbia’s W .N. Sage, for example, never really abandoned his judgment that “ it was the production o f gold in British Columbia which in the end determined the future o f both colonies” 45— other elements in the province’s economic life thus began to receive systematic consideration. The single most important conceptual innovation in these years was undoubtedly that derived from the work o f the staple theorists. Econo­ mist W .A. Carrothers’ early work on the timber industry clearly

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betrayed the influence o f the idea that B.C . development was best understood through the technique o f relating it to the evolution o f resource based industries,46 an approach he pursued in his examination o f the Ashing industry.47 The leading national exponents o f staple theory also interested themselves in the structure o f the B .C . economy. A.R.M. Lower included Carrothers’ work on the B.C . forest industry in his North American Assault on the Canadian Forest, while H.A. Innis examined mining in the Kootenays,48 emphasized the links between the forest industry and the autonomist outlook o f British Columbia,49 and noted the particular character which its land-oriented, inshore nature had given the province’s Ashing industry.50 In all o f this work there was a clear concern not simply to emphasize the importance o f staple production but also to provide a more fully articulated view o f economic development than had previously been made available. At the same time that investigators provided gross accounts of production and growth, they also, therefore, tried to charac­ terize the activity with which they were dealing. Carrothers, certainly, emphasized the peculiar technology that terrain and size made necessary for the forest industry to develop,51 while Margaret Ormsby’s reminder that agricultural activity was firmly rooted in the province’s economic history drew particular attention to the role played by both technological and institutional innovation in that field.52 The more careful look at the province’s economic hfe inspired by the economic and intellectual history o f the interwar period not only resulted in a body o f work that presented the province’s history as the conse­ quence o f the exploitation o f a series o f staples; it also stimulated an attempt— never, regrettably, carried to fruition— to view the province’s social and political life as a function o f these activities. Innis himself, o f course, played a key role in this process. His classic Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto, 1930) outlined the case for viewing geography and economics as the vital determinants o f the political framework within which B.C. had come to operate, while in later work he drew attention to the manner in which the production o f new staples had enhanced the strength o f centrifugal forces in Canadian federalism, thereby strengthening autonomist tendencies in British Columbia as else­ where. 53 Historians closer to home also made contributions in this area. In 1937 Sage suggested the existence o f linkages between mining activity in the province and its peculiar outlook,54 while by 1942 Judge F.W. Howay could emphasize the fur trade’s preparation o f the ground not only for settlement but for political division as well.55 More far-reaching in its impact on the writing o f the province’s

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historians— in fact a fundamental component o f it— was the attention paid to the matter o f situating the province in its appropriate context. Concern with this issue was not, it need hardly be said, new, but where the first generation o f historians had been led by its emphasis on steam technology and its sentiment for empire to emphasize the province’s imperial orientation, the decline o f the Empire coupled with the new investigators’ concern with staples and markets led them to pay close attention to its regional character and its continental connections.56They had, indeed, already been pointed in this direction by their adoption o f the frontierist modes o f thought still fashionable in North American scholarly circles in the 1920s. Much influenced by H.E. Bolton and F.J. Turner, Sage noted in 1928 that “ Canadians have not as a rule regarded their history from the North American point o f view, still less from the standpoint o f an historian o f the Americas who sketches the evolution o f the twin continents from the North Pole to Cape Horn. ” 57 When, he continued, they did look at it from this vantage point they would discover that their history could not be separated from that o f the continent as a whole. Particularly concerned to insist on the existence of a single North American frontier,58 Sage foimd his belief in its reality leading him to support Andre Siegfried’s view that the natural divisions o f the continent ran north and south and that, in consequence, “ each o f the settled regions o f Canada is more closely in touch with the adjoining portion o f the United States than with the next region o f Canada. ’ ’ 59The lesson to be extracted from this was clear— “ I f Canadian historians are to present in the future a more balanced picture it is essential that they should keep the whole development o f the nation and o f the five cultural regions more constantly before them” 61’— and Sage did not hesitate to apply it. In doing so he did not deny the importance o f the orientation to the nation, to the Empire and to the Pacific, that history had given B .C .,61 but he was even more anxious to underscore the fact that geography had made a contribution o f its own: “ The isolation o f the province from the rest o f Canada,” he informed his readers, “ is an essential fact. British Columbians are Canadians with a difference.” 62 Utilizing this perspective, and hearkening back to the role markets and the structure o f the economy played in the orientation o f societies, political scientist H.F. Angus was led in 1942 to conclude that the province was, in fact, part o f no single geographical or economic system. There had, it was true, been much economic involvement with the U.S., but the creation o f political boundaries had created rival economies and so made it “ quite wrong to consider the Pacific slope as constituting a single economic area.” 63 Equally, however, no integrated national

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economy had developed, for the 1920s had seen the province’s export markets oriented increasingly towards foreign buyers. “ British Colum­ bia’s economic interests had,” in consequence, “ become independent o f those o f Canada. ” 64 That the province had links in several quarters but was pointed clearly in none seemed clear to Canadian-born historian James T. Shotwell: “ Although still separated from the East by over a thousand miles o f prairie and a wilderness untamed except by the national railway system, British Columbia found in federal union with the provinces further east, a safeguard for the essentially British charac­ ter o f its traditions and institutions. At the same time its contacts with the western states increased.” 65 The uncertainty to which adoption o f the regional-continental per­ spective had led was unwarranted to some— Innis had little patience with it66— but the difficulty o f locating B .C . in the proper context remained. Even Margaret Ormsby’s work demonstrated a degree o f ambivalence on the matter. Very much committed to a fixed and unchanging view o f the character o f the province’s internal life— she placed much emphasis on coast-interior rivalries, on the character o f the valley comunities, and on the shaping influence o f Anglo-Irish and Canadian elements67— she resolved the larger problem o f B .C .’s place in the world only with the passage o f time. Preoccupied with purely regional concerns in the 1930s, war-time centralism, her sojourn in Ontario, and the influence o f the Rowell-Sirois approach to national issues moved her for a period in the direction o f a centralist view o f the nation’ s history and British Columbia’s relation to it.68 Once back in British Columbia, however, she returned to a more fully provincecentred view o f the region’s relationship to the country at large. Central to her later work— and in this her essential regionalism plainly revealed itself—was the conviction that functions vital to the life o f the province were rooted in the province itself. “ From this time on,” suggests John Norris, “ there is observable in her writings a growing emphasis on the importance o f the province as the true centre o f cultural and social function. The Canadian union was increasingly viewed as a permissive entity, allowing variation— ideally, a loose federation per­ mitting unity in emergencies.” 69 As Ormsby herself put it in her 1966 Presidential Address to the Canadian Historical Association, “ the fact o f the matter was that in nation-building the nation would have to take much o f its energy from tension. It would be desperately difficult to secure the articulation o f regional economies and disparate cultural traditions.” 70 This Sage-like emphasis on the fundamental importance o f regional-

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ism in Canada did not, however, imply a Sage-like continentalism. Where Sage sought to work against the victory o f a narrow provin­ cialism by emphasizing the province’s continental situation, Ormsby moved towards the same end by drawing attention to its British and imperial character. As she argued as late as i960, only i f the region were viewed in this context could its nature be fully understood. “ Above all,” as she put it, “ we need to put the colonies on the Pacific seaboard into the setting o f empire, since, forgetting that they were merely part o f a greater whole, we are still too much inclined to think o f them as isolated political units.” 71 The province, to quote John Norris once more, was thus to be seen as “ a British community whose provincialism is rooted in the large cosmopolitan civilization o f a world-wide empire.” 72 While, then, the middle period had seen historians o f British Colum­ bia move away from the earlier emphasis on progress, development and individualism, it also— as Ormsby’s call to remember the imperial dimension in the province’s past made clear— witnessed an important degree o f continuity. Ormsby’s own work laid undiminishing emphasis on the British and imperial background, and economic development— albeit viewed through different spectacles than in the earlier p e r io d remained very much in the forefront as well. Overall, however, the fact of change was in the air. The impact o f environmentalist modes o f thought had been considerable, and, as Ormsby’s work— synthesized in her 1958 British Columbia: A History— itself made clear, much new light had been shed on the province’s character and development by consider­ ing its internal geography, its location in space, and the rivalries o f its people. It would, a double set o f events in the life o f the province insured, be this thrust in the direction o f changes which would be carried forward in the future.

IV

Just as the changing conceptual framework o f British Columbia’s historians after World War I had combined with alterations in the nature o f the world in which they lived to displace the early emphasis on empire, progress and individualism in favour o f a concern with geo­ graphical and economic determinants, so by the 1960s another concep­ tual shift and further changes in the nature o f reality were moving the focus o f investigation in yet another direction. The complex process, to speak concretely, by which North American historians discovered that society, possessed o f its own structure and dynamic, could not be under­ stood solely in terms o f the impact on it o f the primary environment,

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stimulated an unprecedented interest on the part o f British Columbia historians in the British Columbia variant o f that phenomenon.73 At the same time the changed position o f Indians and orientals in British Columbia society, the arrival o f significant numbers o f European immi­ grants and the clear emergence o f a class-based politics created conditions which, in attracting attention to phenomena which could only be under­ stood as components o f society, invited the deployment o f modes o f analysis appropriate to their study. Moves in the direction o f dealing with themes in the history o f society in British Columbia did not, o f course, involve an absolute break with what had gone before. Even work which continued to concern itself with the familiar themes o f development, growth and external links came, however, to possess a new cast. Not only did it offer a more nuanced look at such matters as investment patterns and the orientation o f the economy— making the point that American involvement had not been so clearly dominant as had earlier been thought74— it also drew on the concepts o f urban historians such as Lampard and Warner to begin the process o f anatomizing the British Columbia city, providing a picture o f urban growth, and specifying the role in it played by the various groups involved.75 For all, however, that changes in approach and emphasis could be discerned in these areas, it remained true that the most dramatic evi­ dence that new developments were occurring came in other fields. One o f them had, indeed, long profited from the attention paid it by the social scientists. In making their extraordinarily fruitful investigations into the lives and culture o f the Northwest Coast Indians the anthropologists had not, however, produced much that historians found worthwhile. Those commentators, sharing the perspective o f the worthies whose exploits in civilizing the province they were recounting, were prevented by the world view in terms o f which they operated from seeing the native population as anything other than a pitiful obstacle to progress and development, doomed to eclipse by the movement o f history. When, therefore, the first generation o f the province’s historians did not ignore the Indian altogether it dealt with him in the accents— disgust, superi­ ority, paternalist condescension— o f the civilization whose accomplish­ ments it was recounting.76 As the movement o f time made clear the magnitude o f the European triumph over the native population and so diminished any sense that it was to be seen as a barrier on the path to progress, historians began to moderate their judgments. It became possible to view the native Indians first as an object o f sympathy77 and then, the passage o f still more time

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having removed them yet further from the sight o f the society from which the historian took his cue, to see them as an irrelevance which, having in relative terms hardly figured in the province’s past, need scarcely be mentioned at all.78 At length the wheel came full circle. The very fact that the Indian had almost disappeared from sight underscored the circumstance that his conquerors lived in a society founded on his displacement. The emerging realization that this was so— in part stimu­ lated, be it said, by a new militance on the part o f the Indians themselves — led to a developing interest in the process which had produced so devastating a result. It was at this juncture that the relevance o f work done in the social sciences finally commended itself to historians, disciplining their inquiry and suggesting— as the emergence o f the field of ethnohistory had already made clear— that they need not seek to make amends for past neglect by indulging in a naive and guilt-ridden romanticization o f the Indians’ experience. Students o f the British Columbia past, like students o f North American history in general, thus found themselves taking a wholly new view o f the Indian component o f it. This shift in perspective was simple but decisive. Once Indian societies began to be viewed as entities possessing societal integrity and co­ herence, the character o f their relationship with the incoming Europeans assumed a much different aspect than it had been earlier thought to have. The components o f Indian society were now seen to have formed a tough and cohesive whole which had been far from passive in its contacts with the Europeans. This was, to be sure, a point the burden o f making which was still largely assumed by the anthropologists,79but by the 1960s there was clear evidence that historians had begun to take up the task. One o f the most remarkable incidents in the history o f contact in British Columbia could, in fact, be viewed by an historian o f the Victorian world with quite remarkable results. William Duncan’s success in build­ ing his model village at Metlakatla had, Jean Usher could insist, as much to do with the Tsimshians’ own powers o f adaptation and with Duncan’ s willingness to adjust his plans to meet their needs as it did with his deter­ mination and the power o f the civilization he represented.80 That the native population had been anything but supine during much o f the contact period was demonstrated with particular force by Robin Fisher. The Indians’ response to the arrival o f the whites was, Fisher argued, in no small measure to be understood “ in terms o f the priorities o f their own culture.” Before 1858, the year the fur trade ceasad to be the dominant element in the province’s economy and society, j Indians and Europeans shared a mutually beneficial economic system!’ 81 in which

>

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the integrity o f Indian civilization was not seriously affected; only after that year, with the advent o f settlement, did the Indian lose his capacity to control in some measure what was happening to him. I f the Indian’ s changing relationship to white society played a part in preparing the way for a new view to be taken o f him, broadly similar alterations in the oriental’s position led to much the same result. So long as the Asian immigrant remained a largely alien presence in a society still very much in process o f formation— a presence linked, moreover, to exotic civilizations with whom neither British Columbia nor Canada at large had significant contact— discussion o f him aroused intense feelings. Most o f those who commented on his life in British Columbia in fact found it impossible to avoid participating in the controversy to which that life had given rise. This was true o f the early historians whose anxiety to support the building o f a British society led them to approve the racial exclusivism they regularly noted,82 it was true o f Chinese historian Tien-fang Cheng’s plea for fair treatment o f his compatriots,8’ it was true o f Lower and Woodsworth’s concern over the relationship a Japanese presence on Canada’s west coast might bear to Japanese expan­ sion,84 and it was true, thanks to their approval o f restrictions on oriental immigration and their advocacy o f a quota system, o f the work o f the first sociologists to investigate the problem.85 With, however, the defeat ofjapan, the fact o f war-time co-operation with China, and the ongoing acculturation o f the Japanese in Canada, the revulsion against racism produced by Nazi excesses could act with the continuing work o f social scientists to produce conditions in which it was possible to take a less heated view o f the Asian minorities in British Columbia. The results the adoption o f such a perspective might yield had indeed been anticipated before the war in the fact that the 1933 study undertaken by sociologists Charles H. Young and Helen R.Y. Reid did not simply implicate its authors in the controversy by virtue o f the policy recommendations it made, but actively sought to locate the roots o f racism itself by drawing on conceptual tools— especially those dealing with the effects in multicultural societies o f competition for status and subsistence— developed by Robert E. Park and others. The key developments, however, came after 1945. Writing in the immediate post-war period, sociologist Forrest LaViolette showed how observers might begin to view white-oriental relations by the expedient o f attempting at least for purposes o f analysis to distance themselves from direct involvement in them. Conceding that “ race prejudice most certainly does have an economic component,” he nonetheless argued that “ more than mere economic competition and its associated pro-

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cesses” were involved in the generation o f anti-oriental feeling in British Columbia.86 A fuller explanation, he suggested, lay in the pecuhar circumstances o f the British Columbia community itself. There the problems o f community building and integration always present in new societies were compounded by geographical isolation, concern about American expansionism, and a desire to remain British. These factors joined to the relative absence o f a creed which, in emphasizing indivi­ dualism and citizenship, would have facilitated integration into the community o f peoples o f diverse backgrounds, ensured that highly visible and culturally distinct elements in the population would be perceived as posing a particularly sharp threat to the building o f a unified community and so would become objects o f discriminatory behaviour and policy. By the 1970s a new generation o f historians, contemplating the changed nature o f the white-oriental relationship, inhabiting a chmate of opinion which did not involve them in the old controversies about racism, and sensitized to the perspectives o f the social scientists, were developing a genuine sympathy towards the idea that white-oriental relations could be best comprehended by employing a way o f viewing behaviour which insisted that all facets o f it— however strong the feelings o f sympathy or revulsion they might arouse— were, in Durkheim’s famous formulation, social facts, rooted in, and intelligible in terms of, a complex social whole to the comprehension o f which a rigorously objective viewpoint was essential.87 To be sure, Ken Adachi’s account o f the Japanese-Canadian experience,88 for all that it provided a valuable insight into the factors inducing the Japanese-Canadians to accept their fate, remained essentially an indictment o f white attitudes and policies, and in that sense did no more than Barry Broadfoot’s popular account to grapple with the causes o f racism.89 Patricia Roy’s sympathy with the more disciplined and critical approach o f the social scientist was, however, clearly evident in her impatience with those who, preferring to see prejudice as the property o f the perverse and wrong-headed, showed little disposition to understand its roots. She insisted, too, on the necessity o f getting a sense o f the time in which the events under study took place, and, no less importantly, on the need to go beyond simple economic explanations for anti-oriental feeling in favour o f an insistence on the central role o f the irrational.90 Carrying forward LaViolette’ s emphasis on the role a concern to con­ solidate and integrate the community in support o f a specific set o f values and modes o f behaviour had played in creating anti-oriental feeling, and insisting, like Roy, on the centrality o f the irrational, historian W.P.

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Ward made effective use o f the concepts o f social psychologist Gordon W. Allport in pointing to the tensions engendered between whites and orientals by British Columbia’s existence as a pluralist society. The province’s whites— thanks, Ward argued, to the important role stereo­ typical thinking played in such circumstances— could do no other than perceive the orientals as a threat to their values and a serious obstacle to the building o f a homogeneous society. “ Cultural pluralism,” he argued, “ was unacceptable to the white community . . . [for] the plural condi­ tion generated profound, irrational racial fears [and] stirred a deep longing for the social cohesion which could only be achieved, it seemed, by attaining racial homogeneity.” 91 The experience o f Indians and orientals notwithstanding, acquisition over time o f a lower profile was only one way in which different elements o f the community might fmd themselves being viewed in a new way. The assumption by certain groups o f a more obvious role in the life o f the province could, it soon became clear, have precisely the same result. Where, accordingly, the relative absence o f continental European stock in the province’s population had allowed the first two generations o f historians to indulge their British bias freely— as late as 1937 Sage could identify the province as “ distinctly British” 92— by 1970 historian Norbert MacDonald found it necessary carefully to underscore the role European immigration had played in the growth o f its largest urban centre.93 The interest in articulating the multicultural character o f British Columbia to the growth o f which MacDonald’s work pointed was, o f course, in part a manifestation o f the concern— widespread in the decades after World War II— to build a strong and integrated community by making all its members feel that they had a place in it. One o f the first attempts to focus systematic and organized attention on the province’s ethnic groups was made in connection with the 1958 centennial,94 while John Norris’ 1971 account o f the ethnic presence in British Columbia took form as part o f the one-hundredth anniversary celebration o f the province’s entry into Confederation.95 Even, how­ ever, in devoting itself to the task o f redefining the character o f the province’s life in a way that legitimized the presence in it o f many ethnic and racial groups, this work exposed to view many o f the factors— prejudice in the host society, the immigrants’ pre-migration background, their expected roles and statuses in their new country— governing the ethnic experience in British Columbia as elsewhere. Attention was not, however, focused only on those adjustments which had been made relatively painlessly; in some instances the character o f the immigrant experience made it necessary for historians to draw particular attention

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to the kind o f conflict which the clash o f cultures produced by that experience could create. In their study o f one o f the most difficult o f these cases, George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumovic sought to explore the tension which resulted when an intensely self-conscious minority— the Doukhobors— determined to maintain its identity collided with a majority no less firmly committed to enforcing what it viewed as minimum standards o f conformity.96 The rise to prominence o f the ethnic fact in British Columbia’ s life was not the only new reality demanding attention in these years. The social, economic and political divisions which seemed to acquire the status o f permanent and central features in the province’s life after 1945 also did their share in producing an altered picture o f the province’s character. There was, o f course, nothing novel about the fact o f conflict itself, for union activity, strikes and a radical politics had been features o f British Columbia’ s life since the late nineteenth century. The general shape o f its political life had, however, conspired to shift attention to other matters and so allowed these to sink into a general and all encompassing oblivion. Where, that is to say, in other British North American and Canadian communities the clash o f rival groups soon became institutionalized in clearly comprehensible political formations, conflict in British Columbia manifested itself in a less coherent rivalry between island and mainland, in faction forming based on attitudes towards the federal tie, and in a politics o f personal attachment and ascendancy o f a distinctly eighteenth-century sort, a circumstance which led to a clear tendency to characterize the province’s politics as without form and substance. As Coats and Gosnell, reflecting this tendency, put it, “ a lack o f leadership and even o f constructive party organization . . . has been a feature o f the politics o f British Columbia . . . to make the obvious comparison with the eastern colonies, there was here no feud o f ruling faces to allay, no Family Compact to uproot, no Clergy Reserve to divide, no complicated fiscal policy to arrange.” 97 Even when party lines did emerge in 1903 they appeared to delineate divisions among the members o f the province’s leading groups which seemed, if anything, more random and indeterminate than those to be found between Liberals and Conservatives in other parts o f the country. “ An examination o f party platforms, resolutions o f local and provincial Associations, speeches from the Throne, [and] debates in the legislature,” Edith Dobie’s 1936 survey o f the first three decades o f party history in British Columbia noted, “ reveal[s] almost complete agreement between Liberals and Conservatives both in theory and in policies.” 98 Where, then, the clearly demarcated struggles between Reformers

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and Tories in Upper Canada or the clash o f rival interests on the prairies invited the writing o f a history that focused on the activities o f distinct political alternatives definable at least to a point in terms o f real differences in outlook, the apparently vague and indeterminate charac­ ter o f conflict in British Columbia elicited only cursory and uncompre­ hending looks from those hurrying by to consider what seemed the manifestly more important, and certainly more readily understood, matters o f growth and development. Even so astute an observer as Gosnell could make little sense o f what he saw ," while later observers were content to repeat D. W. Higgins’ attempts to introduce the catego­ ries o f whig history into their discussion o f the province’s politics100 or deal with such major events as the introduction o f party politics in terms o f its character as a stabilizing measure in a chaotic and volatile situation.101 The clear emergence in the 1930s o f socialism as a key element in the province’s political system forced a reconsideration o f the character of that system which, thanks to the Beardian categories employed by its creator,102 stressed both conflict and the existence o f a relationship between economic interest and political behaviour, but by 1948 Sage, returning to a discussion o f politics before 1903, abandoned this line of analysis in favour o f one cast largely in terms o f the conviction that “ provincial politics in British Columbia was largely a game o f the In’s and Out’s and a struggle between the Mainland and the Island.” 103 Neither John Saywell’ s 1951 discussion o f the relationship between economic interest and political organization in the early history of socialism in British Columbia104 nor Margaret Ormsby’s account o f the difficulties economic geography and sociological background placed in the way o f effective political organization by British Columbia’s farmers105 committed the same oversight, but what resulted from their work was, nonetheless, only a partial account o f the manner in which division and conflict had manifested itself in the province’s life. If this absence o f any sustained and comprehensive discussion of conflict in British Columbia society had meant only that students o f the province’s history were being spared what Donald Creighton once referred to as the “ colossal tedium” o f dealing with it in terms o f the pseudo-struggles o f party,106 it might have been no bad thing; but it meant also that British Columbia’ s historians— with the exceptions noted above— maintained a peculiar blind spot when it came to social and economic conflict in general. The result was to reinforce the tendency to eschew discussion o f the structure o f the province’s society in favour o f situating it spatially, celebrating its growth and develop-

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ment, and concentrating attention on the great individuals who had contributed so much to its making. Captives of the obvious, enmeshed in the surface o f events, British Columbia’s historians not only failed to generate anything approaching the work o f a Morton, a Lipset, or a MacPherson; they did not even duplicate L.G. Thomas’ achievement in writing the history o f an established party.107 That this was an unsatisfactory state o f affairs seemed more than clear by the 1960s. The presence o f division and conflict in the province’s life had been made obvious both by the character o f its politics and by the strength o f its labour movement, facts which almost literally cried out for discussion and analysis. It was, appropriately enough in view o f the awareness she had earlier shown o f the relationship between politics, interest group membership and the character o f the economy, Margaret Ormsby who in i960 made it clear that understanding o f a whole dimension o f the province’s life was lacking. “ W e are ignorant,” she wrote, “ o f the mainsprings o f our pohtical development. We can name our premiers, describe their career, and recount their legislative enact­ ments; but, as yet, we have not probed deeply enough to explain the basis o f our early non-party tradition or the basis o f the schisms and the realignments which have occurred since parties were first estab­ lished.” 108 The convergence o f a clear need to deal with these matters with the realization by Canadian scholars that the concept o f class could be a useful one in the analysis o f the historical process did much to ensure that the task could be carried out largely through the agency o f that analytical tool. Where class and the conflict flowing from it could once have been dismissed as a kind o f infantile disorder bound to disappear with the passage o f time— “ Nowhere in Canada,” observed Coats and Gosnell in 1909, “ have industrial disputes been waged with greater bitterness and violence than in British Columbia. This, however, is but to say that the province . . . is still in its infancy as an industrial community, and that the impulse which it obeys is western” 109— the new circumstances did not allow it to be set aside so easily, for even the most casual observer could see that the province’s political and industrial hfe had come to be affected in what seemed a fundamental way by a species o f class activity. The peculiar militance o f the British Columbia working class now, indeed, became a subject o f discussion in its own right. Labour economist Stuart Jamieson, seeking in 1962 to locate its sources, found them in factors— the province’s frontier character, its strike-prone type o f in­ dustry, the influence o f conditions in the United States, the structure o f the province’s labour legislation— specific to British Columbia,110 while

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Paul Phillips, preferring to explain its existence in terms o f more general factors, emphasized the role played in the rise o f a militant labour move­ ment by the unstable character o f the market for labour in an economy dependent on primary products for export, the impact o f technology, and the effect o f social and economic dislocation.111 This, it should be noted, did not mean that Philhps rejected out o f hand the idea that classbased organizations in British Columbia had a particular character. For him, however, that special character was to be seen not so much in the circumstances which had given rise to those organizations as in the fact that their members had become more politically active than their coun­ terparts in other sections o f the country. In seeking anti-oriental legis­ lation, protection for workers against exploitation by employers, and economic planning that would reduce the instability inherent in a resource-based export-oriented economy, British Columbia workers, Phillips suggested, had early learned the value o f political action and so were more fully influenced than other Canadian workers by the socialist ideology which was “ in the air” at the turn o f the century and after.112 That the British Columbia political system as a whole was class based became the governing assumption o f the most ambitious examination o f the linkages between the province’s politics, society and economy so far undertaken. Arguing that the “ non-partisan” character o f Brirish Columbia’s politics, the nature o f its radicalism and the ascendancy o f Social Credit were all linked to the character o f the province’s social and economic life, political sociologist Martin Robin’s semi-popular account o f the province’s political growth sought to show that the presence o f large enterprises in the timber and mining industry, the growth o f a wage-earning class, the emergence o f a petit-bourgeoisie oriented mainly towards the service sector and the absence o f a significant number of independent commodity producers had produced a political system characterized by a succession o f groupings, parties and coalitions through the agency o f which the large interests could maintain their influence, by an anti-capitalist rather than an anti-eastern protest tradi­ tion, and ultimately by a brand o f populism whose petit bourgeois base made it first the enemy and then the ally o f the large concentrations of power that dominated the economic life o f the province.113 What Robin’s work demonstrated— that the British Columbia poli­ tical experience was, like other departments o f the province’s life, susceptible o f analysis in terms o f perspectives drawn from the social sciences— dramatically underscored the fact that discussion o f the prov­ ince’s character and history had come to occupy ground far different

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than that on which it had earlier stood. How long scholars would continue to find the components— ethnic, racial and class— o f which society consisted an appropriate object o f investigation would depend, as always, on what resulted from the interplay between the data historical reality presented for consideration and the conceptual tools by means o f which those data were perceived and assessed; at the end o f the 1970s there was, however, little evidence that this critical process was altering the framework within the confines o f which those concerned with the British Columbian past had been working for much o f the preceding two decades. The focus o f study, it seemed likely, would remain firmly fixed on society and its nature. v For all that the perspective on the province’s past employed by British Columbia’ s historians altered through time, one element in the changing picture they painted remained fixed and constant. Whether they placed emphasis on the province’s imperial and national linkages, on its geog­ raphy, on its orientation towards external markets or on its intelligibility in terms o f concepts based on the experience o f society at large, they demonstrated a strong and consistent commitment to the idea that British Columbia could not be understood without taking full account of its relationship to the world around it. Even as the regional focus o f their activities anticipated Canada’s national historians in underscoring the legitimacy o f the regional approach, they thus avoided falling victim to a narrow provincialism.114 This did not mean that they knew at all times to what larger entity— nation, continent or empire— the province was linked; it certainly did not mean that they had a clear sense o f the major realities— the individ­ ual, class— animating its internal life; least o f all did it mean that they were able to produce a fully realized vision o f the province’ s character and history. What, however, it did signify was that the province’s most able and representative historians— no matter in what period they wrote— never fell victim to the illusion that the community o f which they spoke could be understood in terms o f anything other than its place in a larger world. The result was a body o f writing which in its attempts to grapple with problems o f context, orientation and social dynamic at all times showed its authors anxious— within the conceptual limits specified above— to situate British Columbia in an appropriately com­ prehensive framework o f analysis and discussion. At the same time that it

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demonstrated the complex nature o f the relationship between the histo­ rian’s circumstances, the reality he contemplates and the work which results, that writing thus also made plain the cosmopolitan thrust o f those who concerned themselves with the past and the character o f Canada’s westernmost province.115

N O TES 'F o r a good general bibiliography o f B .C . history, see H .K. Ralston, “ Select Bibliog­ raphy on the H istory o f British Colum bia,” in J . Friesen and H .K . Ralston, eds., Historical Essays on British Columbia (Toronto, M cClelland & Stewart, 1976), pp. 28193. For an excellent discussion o f the work o f some o f the province’s leading historians, see J . Friesen, “ Introduction,” in ibid., pp. v ii-xx v. 2Hubert H ow e Bancroft, History o f British Columbia 1872-1887 (San Francisco, 1887), pp. 743- 48’R.E. Gosnell, A History o f British Columbia ([Vancouver?], 1906), pp. 273, 289. 'T he maker o f these remarks was D .W . Higgins, one-time editor o f the Victoria Colonist and a former speaker o f the B .C . Legislature, who contributed pp. 110-45 to R.E. Gosnell, A History of British Columbia ([Vancouver?], 1906). For the comments referred to here, see p. 122. 5Robert Hamilton Coats and R.E. Gosnell, Sir James Douglas (Toronto, 1909), p. 94. 6E.O .S. Scholefield, “ Part O ne,” in E.O .S. Scholefield and R.E. Gosnell, A History of British Columbia (Vancouver and Victoria, 1913), p. 156. “ N o other part o f Canada,” Scholefield emphasized, “ had so much to contend with in this particular as had the C olony o f British Colum bia,” p. 187. 7lb id., p. 67. “Alexander Begg, History o f British Columbia From its Earliest Discovery to the Present Time (Toronto, 1894), p. 7. ‘'Bancroft, op. cit., p. 758; Scholefield, op. cit., p. 153. "’“ The sailor,” wrote Coats and Gosnell, “ showed the way, but it was the overland traveller who entered and took possession." Coats and Gosnell, op. cit., pp. 49-50; see also ibid., pp. 79, 310—11. " “ The period from 1886 to 1892,” noted D .W . Higgins, “ was one o f unexampled prosperity . . . throughout the province.” Coats and Gosnell claimed that “ the completion o f the Canadian Pacific Railway marks from many points o f view the beginning o f a new era in the development o f British Colum bia” and Gosnell himself argued in 1913 that “ progress . . . since the C P R has been completed, has been rapid and during the last decade phenomenal.” See Higgins, op. cit., p. 141, Coats and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 328, and R.E. Gosnell, “ Part T w o ,” in E.O .S. Scholefield and R.E. Gosnell, A History o f British Columbia (Vancouver and Victoria, 1913), p. 3. l2Gosnell, op. cit., p. 7. "Scholefield, “ Part O ne,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 174. 14Ibid., p. 180. "B an croft, op. cit., pp. 707-39. "G o sn ell, “ Part T w o ,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 178. "B an croft, op. cit., p. 574.

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tsgegg, op. cit., p. 7. ,9Ibid., pp. 5 0 -ji. "C oats and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 353. "Gosnell, op. cit., p. 39. "Bancroft, op. cit., p. 758; Gosnell, op. cit., pp. 100-01; Scholefield, “ Part O ne,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 178. "G osnell, op. cit., p. 94. "Gosnell, "P art T w o ,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., p. i86n. “ 1 bid., pp. 13, 4. “ Bancroft, op. cit., pp. v iii-ix. 27Begg, op. cit., pp. 457, 434-40, 509-45. 28Coats and Gosnell, op. cit., pp. 56-57, 253-54, 2. "Scholefield, “ Part O ne,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 179. ’"Gosnell, op. cit., pp. 200-01. "H iggins, op. cit., p. 123. "Gosnell, “ Part T w o ,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 5. "C oats and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 326. See also Gosnell, “ Part T w o ,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., p. 114. "Gosnell, “ Part T w o ,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., pp. 196-97. See also Gosnell, op. cit., pp. 295-96. 35Gosnell, “ British Colum bia and British International Relations," Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science, X L V , 1913, 2. 36“ The simple truth in plain language was all,” he once wrote, “ I aimed at, and i f any doubted my judgm ent or questioned my inferences, there before the reader should be the sources o f m y information from which he might draw his own conclusions. Hubert H owe Bancroft, Retrospection: Political and Personal (N ew York, 1912), p. 324. "G osnell, “ A Greater Britain on the Pacific,” Westward Ho! Magazine, II(i), [January?] 1908, 8; Gosnell, “ Prefatory,” in Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit., n.p. 38"M an y hundreds,” reported their editor, “ indeed thousands, o f authorities and origi­ nal sources o f information— represented in individual recollections, old manuscripts, diaries, official documents and state papers, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets and books— were consulted.” See “ Editor’s Foreword,” Scholefield and Gosnell, op. cit.,

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’“T h is shift was not equally clear in all quarters. F.W . Howay, one o f the middle period’s most prolific historians, continued to trade very largely in the intellectual commodi­ ties o f the pre-war era. The Victorian certitudes which informed his major work, written in collaboration with Scholefield and published in 1914, were equally in evidence in what he produced in later years. He was particularly captivated b y the myth o f the self-made man. Cook, he would assert in 1928, was “ the son o f a day labourer . . . [who] by sheer industry and merit . . . rose rapidly,” while David Thompson was also “ a wonderful example o f a self-made man.” H e continued, too, to believe that the province’ s history could best be written around the theme o f progress, a fact underscored b y the title o f his 1930 contribution to the Cambridge History o f the British Empire. Even University o f British Colum bia historian W .N . Sage, very much alive to new currents o f thinking, did not w holly escape the influence o f the old. His 1930 biography o f Sir James Douglas showed him to be still very much impressed b y the role the individual could play in the historical process— Douglas, he wrote, was “ a great man, the greatest in the history o f British Colum bia” and had done much to shape its future— and as late as 1946 he was prepared to

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advance the proposition that the history o f the province’ s largest city could be usefully approached in terms o f the concept o f progress. See E .O .S. Scholefield and F.W . Howay, British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present (4 vols., Vancouver, 1914); F.W . Floway, British Columbia: The Making o f a Province (Toronto, 1928), pp. 15, 60; F.W . Floway, “ The Settlement and Progress o f British Columbia, 1871-1914,” Cambridge History o f the British Empire (vol. 6, Cam bridge, 1930); W alter N . Sage, Sir James Douglas and British Columbia (Toronto, 1930), p. 347; and W alter N . Sage, “ Vancouver— 60 Years o f Progress,” British Columbia Journal o f Commerce Yearbook, 1946 (Vancouver, 1946). 4nW hat H .F. Angus had in mind when he suggested in 1929 that the time had come for historians and social scientists to consider in a close and detailed w ay the province’s social and economic history, focusing, in particular, on the experience o f representa­ tive communities in order to get a sense o f the manner in which the community as a whole had developed. See H.F. Angus, “ A Survey o f Economic Problems Awaiting Investigation in British Colum bia,” Contributions to Canadian Economics, II, 1929, 47. 41B y the early 1940s Angus could dismiss the overweening concern with development which had been characteristic o f British Colum bia’s businessmen at the turn o f the century as the outcome o f a “ predatory psychology,” while ten years after that Margaret O rm sby balanced whatjohn N orris called her “ hinterlander’s” approval o f development as something that brought “ comfort, leisure, education, and civiliza­ tion” against the fact that such development was often uneven in its impact, and, in consequence, productive o f serious social and economic inequities. See F.W . Howay, W .N . Sage and H .F. Angus, British Columbia and the United States (Toronto and N ew Haven, 1942), p. 379 and Joh n N orris, “ Margaret O rm sby,” in Joh n N orris and Margaret Prang, eds., Personality and History in British Columbia: Essays in Honour of Margaret Ormsby (Victoria, 1977), p. 17. “^Especially noticeable in such works as N oel Robinson, “ Mining, Roads, and Develop­ ment,” in F.W . H oway, ed., Builders o f the West: A Book o f Heroes (Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1929), pp. 218-31, but also to be seen in Howay, Sage and Angus, op. cit., p. 228. 43A theme developed by W .A . Carrothers, “ Forest Industries o f British Colum bia,” in A.R .M . Lower, The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest (Toronto and N ew Haven, 1938), p. 246, reference to which is also made in H oway, Sage and Angus, op. cit., p. 302. -14In which work H ow ay took great interest. For a summary o f his views, see F.W . Howay, British Columbia: The Making o f a Province (Toronto, 1928), p. 90. 45Sage, Sir James Douglas and British Columbia (Toronto, 1930), p. 237. 4ee the vast potential ofthe fur trade and envisioned a great triangular system encompassing the entire Pacific Ocean. Furs from the northwest coast would be carried to China where they would be exchanged for silk, porcelains, and other Oriental products for Mexico as well as supplying the needs o f the new settlements. Pexliaps evenmorc important for Mexico, however, was the possibility o f opening a commerce in Chinese mercury, a metal o f vital importance in the production o f silver which was the chief industry o f New Spain. If this proved to be a viable alternative to mercury produced in Spain, the viceroyalty would be able to increase silver production and free itself from wartime disruptions which customarily saw Britain sweep the Atlantic clear o f vital Spanish shipping. Finally, Mexican industry would be stimulated by the expansion to the northwest coast. Here, Bodega y Quadra and others would agree with Martinez that Mexicans should be able to dominate trade in copper, abalone shells, iron, and textiles to meet the almost insatiable demands o f the Indians. Even i f one did not fully agree with the idea o f a monopoly company, the mere proximity o f Mexico convinced many observers that Spaniards should have a definite advantage in commercial competition against the British and Americans. Then the existing commercial connections with the Spanish Philippines by way o f the Manila galleons would allow easy access to Chinese markets.71 Viceroy Florez rejected what he considered to be the grandiose projects o f Martinez, but Revillagigedo saw merit in some aspects o f the plan. The possibility o f obtaining mercury itself demanded further consideration o f the idea. With the existing commercial machinery o f the Consulados72 o f Mexico and Manila, both the American and Asian operations o f the fur trade could be managed without difficulty.73 To test the market potential, Revillagigedo dispatched a shipment o f 3,356 sea otter skins on the British sloop Princess Royal which was to be returned to its owners at Canton. The consignment included a variety o f skins from different locations to gauge market acceptance with 208 o f the finest quality pelts from the Strait o f Juan de Fuca.74 The results o f this commercial experiment while not altogether negative did not attract the speculative capital of Mexican merchants. O f the 2,803 skins actually marketed, the government received a total o f 45,717 pesos o f which 7,370 pesos were paid out for expenses. This left a sum o f 38,347 pesos, without considering the original purchase price o f

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the furs on the northwest coast or costs o f curing and shipment from the north to San Bias and Acapulco. While these figureihardly drew capital from private sources, the government did manage to obtain 351 quintales75 o f mercury which after extensive tests proved to be equal in quality to the European metal.76 Any remaining interest which might have been generated in the fur trade was soon lost when reports arrived from Manila that the Chinese Empire subsequently had prohibited the import o f furs. The statistics spoke for themselves even without the negative news from C hina and indications o f rising prices on the northwest coast as the Indians became accustomed to dealing with theTuriradet^f f this was not sufficient deterrent, some Spaniards began to fear that over­ killing o f the sea otter resource would soon destroy the fur trade.77 Without an economic base o f any kind, the Spanish occupation of Nootka Sound could hardly be justified except for strategic and political reasons. As long as the possibility remained that a passage might be discovered to Europe and until the conclusion o f the controversy with Britain over the capture o f the merchant vessels and British rights on the coast, Spain would not budge from Nootka. Even in 1709, however, Viceroy Revillagigedo stated that in the event o f war with Britain, Nootka should be abandoned in order to improve the defences o f the older settlements o f California.78 This does not mean that Spanish activities on the northwest coast during the early 1790s would lose significance or interest for the historian. The very lack o f economic exploitation combined with traditional Spanish ethnological approaches to the Indians and the modem scientific spirit from the European Enlightenment, made these men into interested observers and recorders o f this early period in coastal history. Since the Spanish settlements remained military rather than civilian posts the discipline which was so sadly lacking amongst the maritime fur traders could be maintained in all but a few instances, fh e Indians suffered less from the presence o f Spain than they did from any o f the other nations there to make profits from the fur trade. "" The settlements at Nootka Sound and Puerto de Nunez Gaona79 in the Strait ofjuan de Fuca provided much more opportunity for observation and experimentation than did occasional visits by fur traders. At Friendly Cove, Francisco Eliza and Pedro Albemi laboured to form a permanent garrison on the site previously occupied by Maquinna’s summer village. Albemi, in addition to his duties as commander o f the fort, interested himself in testing the agricultural potential o f the new land. On several garden plots, he experienced great success cultivating cabbages, lettuce, onions, garlic, salt-wort, radishes, turnips, carrots, parsley, and arti­

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chokes—all o f which helped to reduce scurvy and to maintain general health and morale. While com, wheat, and chickpeas did not mature, barley produced 12 to 14 fanegas80 for every one planted; beans and peas were a little less bountiful, ripening well only i f the rains were not excessive.81 The soil proved to be richer than might have been expected, but with the gardens located on the site o f the old Indian village, the land was very well manured.82 Poultry, sheep, pigs, goats, and Mexican cattle thrived in the northern climate although limited feed in the winters caused problems.83 The only major concern in agriculture and animal husbandry as well as in the storage o f all kinds o f goods was the plague o f rats which had multiplied prodigiously after their introduction from the ships which stopped at Nootka. '• f Juan Francisco de la JBodega^y Quadra, an exponent o f northern settlement and resident at Nootka Sound in 1792 during the negotiations with Captain_George Vancouver,Jauded the fertility, of-the land. H e saw no reason why a permanent garrison could not be maintained without difficulty for potatoes grew to enormous sizes and in quantities sufficient to supply the needs o f the entire population in cases o f necessity. His surveys in the vicinity o f the post indicated that there was enough land to raise grain and maize for a population o f about 1,000 persons.84 Even if all cereal crops failed, he pointed out, the settlers could always eat the plentiful Kamchatka lily which might even provide bread for the inhabit­ ants once they learned how to cultivate and utilize it. In addition to the agricultural potential, Bodega could not help being impressed by the vast forest resources which might permit the development o f a ship building industry. There was even evidence o f mineral deposits located in the mountains surrounding Nootka Sound. While the commandant lacked equipment needed for analysis, he collected samples o f ores which he identified as copper, lead, iron, and other metals which he forwarded to Mexico C ity.85 By 1702 , the Npo.tka-settleme.nt, while not at all self-sufficient in any sense, had developed a degree o f respectability which impressed both Spaniards and foreigners. Houses, barracks, warehouses, bread ovens, arid other out buildings were more than sufficient for the garrison o f 200 to 250 men. Time solved early problems experienced in constructing buildings o f green lumber and Bodega introduced the practice o f burning oyster shell to make whitewash and mortar. The governor s house was by this time a fairly large two-storey edifice which Bodega made into the centre for his lavish hospitality.86 I f the fortress which guarded the port did not particularly frighten foreign visitors, it was more than sufficient to maintain Spanish sovereignty against foreign

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competitors as well as to deter the Indians from violence.87 Under Bodega, the establishment which once excluded foreigners, now became a famous stopping place for the fur traders. Not only did the governor provide repair facilities and generous gifts o f supplies, but his banquets, served on solid silver plates, often seated more than 50 guests.88 Archi­ bald Menzies, the botanist with the Vancouver expedition, summed up the foreign reaction to Spanish Nootka when he stated, “ . . . the Spaniards seem to go on here with greater activity and industry than we are led to believe o f them at any o f their other remote infant settle­ ments.” 89 It becomes quite clear from many o f the accounts left by foreign visitors that the Spaniards had developed a highly successful relationship with thelndians. Vancouver expressed what he described as " a mixture o f surprise and pleasure” at seeing how Bodega had completely gained the confidence o f the Nootka tribes. C h ief Maquinna, turned away unrecognized when he went to visit Vancouver’s ships, complained openly to Bodega about the possibility o f the Spaniards abandoning his people to some other European power.90Joseph Ingraham o f the Ameri­ can vessel Hope expressed the same surprise at seeing how the Indian chiefs had adopted European manners, “ . . . meeting and parting with strangers with a great deal o f bowing and scraping ‘Adios Senor’ in the most approved Castilian style.” He went on to exclaim “ . . . that i f the Spaniards had the tuition o f these people but a few years longer they would be quite civilized.” 91 The achievement o f such excellent relations with the Indians seems remarkable in view o f the barbarities committed by many o f the fur traders. Certainly the shooting o f Callicum had not done anything to endear the Spaniards to the Indians. Cool relations had been patched up by Pedro Alberni, who learned that the Indians used flattery and songs in diplomacy; he taught his troops to sing a simple verse in praise o f Maquinna to a European tune.92 The song attracted Maquinna, as had been planned, but injustices continued to result from the basic lack of humanity o f the common soldiers and sailors toward the Indians. The troops opened fire at night upon Indians who came to steal barrel hoops and other bits o f metal; excessive punishment for the crime. On several other occasions during the construction o f the settlement, seamen dis­ patched to purchase lumber from Indian villages could not resist using a show o f force to steal boards from Indian houses.93 The worst breach occurred at the new settlement o f Nunez Gaona where in Ju ly 1792 a Spanish pilot named Antonio Serantes was murdered by the Indians. The commander, Salvador Fidalgo, fell into a rage when he received this

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news and opened fire on two canoes killing all but two o f the occupants.1 This was the single Spanish act which was comparable to the atrocities committed up and down the coast by the fur traders. The only difference was that Fidalgo received severe reprimands from Bodega, the viceroy, SttHhnaHy from the Spanish king.94 From the daTe o f his arrival at Nootka, Bodega had done everything within his power to halt even minor incidents with the Indians and to open a radically different kind o f relationship. To begin with, Maquinna always received treatment as a special friend and was distinguished from all other chiefs by clear demonstrations o f esteem. When he came as he often did to dine at Bodega’s residence, the Spanish commander under­ took to serve him and to provide special gifts. Maquinna was soon boasting about his special friendship with Bodega to all other chiefs he encountered.95 Before long, the Indians were adept at managing forks and spoons, thoroughly impressed with the privilege o f eating with the commandant. Maquinna developed a taste for wine which he called “ Spanish water,” leaving it to his subordinates to limit his intake so that he should not become overly intoxicated. Indians filled Bodega’s house, often spending the night there without causing any damage other than a few small thefts.96 Bodega described his policy as having resulted from his own natural propensity to establish “ a system o f humanity.” The results were excellent: Spaniards were almost always welcome in Maquinna’s villages. With the addition o f gifts such as a showy tin-plate coat o f mail presented to the Indian chief, Bodega solidified good relations.97 Besides the policies o f Bodega, the Spaniards who accompanied the scientific and exploratory expeditions under Alejandro Malaspina in 1791, and the following year under Dionisio Galiano and Cayetano Valdes, brought little other than credit to their nation. Wherever pos­ sible, they exercised great care to respect Indian customs and civilization. Often this meant that robbery, poor faith, and other insults would be tolerated in the name o f science and humanity. These men fully under­ stood that they were the agents o f an enlightened Europe and that as Spaniards, they must exercise special care in order to avoid the misrep­ resentations which enemies in the past had used to stain the Iberian record.98 The accounts o f these scientists and explorers provide insights into Indian societies which were undergoing transformations resulting from the onslaught o f European culture.99 The view seen by the highly moralistic and exceptionally puritanical Spanish observers is most interesting. Modesty was not an encumbrance to many o f the tribes whose traders would literally sell the sea otter skin

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garments o ff their backs i f the bartering was good. This amused more than bothered the Spaniards although when the Indians purchased old European clothing, they were often difficult to distinguish from the Mexican sailors. Where the women appeared indecent, however, the officers were considerably less willing to express amusement. It was difficult enough to restrain the seamen even where provocations were not offered. The Nootka women caused no trouble in their deportment, but those o f Nunez Gaona dressed only in a cloak o f skins tied at the neck and an absolutely insufficient fringed sash about the waist; they “ . .. carried themselves in their canoes with little restraint and very little modesty.” 100 Some o f the Indian entertainments provided even more concern, evoking comparison by the Spaniards to the debauched spec­ tacles o f the ancient Greeks and Romans.101 With considerably more discipline than the fur traders, the Spaniards did not accept frequent offers o f women slaves or prisoners o f war which were made.by the Indians. Although the Indians appeared to be curious or amused to experiment with the sexual behaviour o f Europeans, it was almost certain that any contacts would introduce venereal diseases into their societies. Most i f not all ships o f the several nations which fre­ quented the northwest coast carried venereal complaints.102 Cook’s expedition, which might in many ways be described as a voyage of seduction as much as exploration o f the Pacific, introduced the Nootka women to the lusty sexual appetites o f Englishmen. Beauty applications o f rancid whale oil, soot, red dirt, and other things which completely extinguished the lust o f most Spaniards and other foreigners, increased the interest o f Cook’s sailors.103 Cook made efforts to prevent those of his men who suffered veneteaLdiseases fixMH-gQmg-ashareffmtjie failed miserably. The Spaniards had absolutely no intention o f permitting any repetition o f the British example.104 When C h ief Maquinna expressed fears that Spanish seamen would molest the women o f his tribe i f he moved his village close to the Nootka settlement, he was given absolute promises that no passage o f mariners to his houses would take place under any circumstances. The chiefhad to agree that the Spanish officers had never given any cause for disgust in their relationships with the Indians.105 Spanish observers feared that venereal diseases introduced by the fur traders would within a relatively few years destroy the Indians o f the northwest coast in the same way that they had wiped out the tribes of Baja California. With only about 2,000 Indians in the Nootka tribe and small populations scattered in other locations, it appeared quite evident that sterility would greatly contribute to a disastrous population decline

y

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which seemed already to have begun.106 In 1791 for example, Cassacan, Chief o f the Nitinat tribe suffered from venereal disease and passed it to his wife. Apparently he sold a female slave to a trading vessel for some copper sheets; when it departed, she had been sent ashore infected with the disease. The chief later cohabited with the woman, caught the disease and passed it on to his w ife.107 Disease was only one threat to the Indians perceived by the Spaniards. Another was the deleterious influence o f the fur traders who introduced some o f the worst aspects o f their own culture and permitted the Indians to gain possession o f large numbers o f muskets which were dangerous both to themselves and to subsequent visitors. B y 1792, they had begun to abandon their traditional arms in favour o f muskets and pistols. Warfare, often stirred up_hy the fur traders to stimulate the arms market, became much more bloody when fought with the new weapons. It took very littleTime t q J earrT h ow tp fire accurately anH m refuse fAr anything but muskets, ammunition, and powder.108 The Spaniards, true to their traditional policies, refused to join in this practice although a few of their muskets did find theifw ay" to the Indians. At times, the fur traders used Spain’s rejection o f this trade in the development o f their propaganda. James Colnett, for example, told one chief that Spanish policy proved beyond any doubt their intentions to extirpate the Indians from the face o f the earth.109 jrhe_Spaniards were never strong enough to guard the Indians against the fur traders. Fraud and violence were regular occurrences particularly since"the traders knew that they never had to return to a given locality. Often the muskets received by the Indians at highly inflated prices exploded in their faces when discharged.110 Cannon fire destroyed entire villages after real or imagined attacks against vessels. I f the Indians refused to trade or set prices too high, it was not unusual for the traders to remove their furs by force and to pay whatever sum, i f any, that the captain considered adequate. Certainly a large number o f the atrocities went unrecorded, but even when Maquinna complained to the Spaniards, nothing could be done.111 Violence caused by one ship against a certain tribe bred hostility and the desire for revenge which could only be taken when the next fur trader arrived in the vicinity. Sometimes, the cruelty of the visitors owed more to their own lack o f humanity than to their desire for profits. Maquinna told Martinez o f an incident which had taken place when he went on board the English vessel Sea Otter com­ manded by Captain Hanna. Several seamen had placed a little black powder under the chief explaining that this was an honour given only to princes. The “ honour” became evident when they ignited the charge

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and blew Maquinna from his seat. He received burns and scars which he exposed to show Martinez the extent o f the damage.1' 2 Without complete control over the fur trade, the Spaniards could not hope to exercise much influence over the Indian cultures. Since no large scale missionary assault upon the pagan religions was possible during the 1790s, the few friars available at Nootka and on the various expeditions o f discovery had to improvise. They began to promote the purchase of children who were brought to the Spaniards for sale by the Indians. At first, such a policy seemed only humane because the accounts o f Meares and widespread rumours circulated by the fur traders purported that the chiefs, or at least Maquinna, frequently feasted upon human flesh.113 But even i f the charges o f cannibalism were completely false as Malaspina believed after interviewing a number o f Indians,114 some Spaniards continued to purchase children. The friars believed that the political ancT religious interests o f Spain would be served by sending them to Mexico where they might be raised as Christians by persons o f good quality. Upon reaching adulthood, they would be free to do what they pleased or could be sentifack to their~tnbeT to spread their new religion.115 Malaspina was not at all convinced about the merits o f this traffic which dispatched 22 children to San Bias during his short stay at Nootka in 1791. Although Father Nicolas de Luera had been zealous in his efforts to acquire children, offering one or two sheets o f copper, a musket barrel, or some lengths o f cloth for each one, the danger o f committing them to near slavery made it necessary to place severe restrictions over the traffic. He did agree, however, that the conversion o f the tribes to Christianity might be served by training a few o f the children in Mexico. He noted from the journal o f the English traveller, Jonathan Carver, that the French Jesuits in Canada had purchased Indian children in the hope o f using them later to establish a beachhead with the Indian population.116 The negotiations between Bodega y Quadra and Vancouver in 1792 to settle the controversy over Nootka Sound ended in failure, but by this time the strategic importance o f the northwest coast had begun to wane. The expedition o f the Sutil and the Mexicana which circumnavigated Vancouver Island proved beyond doubt that there was no fabled passage to Europe. Certainly Bodega emerged victorious in the negotiations if one cares to look into the relative merits o f the claims,117 but since Vancouver refused to accept the Spanish offer o f a boundary at the Strait o f Juan de Fuca, a complete stalemate resulted. Without an agreement on the frontier, Bodega ordered the abandonment o f the new settlement at Nunez Gaona and returned to San Bias. B y 1793 and 1794, the Nootka settlement had become little more than a liability to the Mexican

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uthorities; even Bodega y Quadra lost his enthusiasm for northern 3 ttlement because o f chronic shortages o f shipping and supplies at San Bias 118 Viceroy Revillagigedo agreed with his naval commander, proosing to the imperial government that a more realistic policy in the pacific would be to concentrate what forces there were in the California settlements.119 With no support for the maintenance o f the northern post coming from Mexico and with the British alliance to consider in Europe, Spain agreed to a mutual withdrawal from Nootka Sound. In March 1795, the Spanish commissioner, Brigadier Manuel Alava, met with the English commissioner, Lieutenant Thomas Pearce, to complete the ceremonies of the Nootka settlement.120 What remained after the removal o f useful materials was taken over by the Indians. They were overjoyed at the restoration o f their summer village site and fell upon the Spanish buildings to salvage bits o f metal, planks, and anything else which had been left behind. Having removed the visible remains, they attacked the cemetery and removed coffins to recover nails which could be turned into useful fish hooks.121 When the American captive, John Jewitt, resided with the Nootka Indians in 1803, the Indian village had com­ pletely replaced the Spanish settlement; the only visible signs o f the Spanish presence were the foundations o f the governor’s house arid the church, and a few degenerated self-propagating European plafUsT172 The Spanish abandonment o f the northwest coast was hardly irra­ tional or overly hasty. The alliance with Britain proved to be an unmitigated disaster almost from the beginning and even in the Pacific Ocean, the Spaniards became convinced that the extended negotiations over Nootka Sound were nothing more than a front to spy on Mexico and California. British seamen and negotiators travelled overland through the Viceroya'lty o f N ew Spain which could not help but provide them with information on the military strengths and weaknesses. Captain Vancouver’s vessels and others seemed to visit Monterey and San Fran­ cisco muchTocToften for mere social calls. With only 740 men o f all ages to defend the vast underdeveloped province, it was little wonder that the Spanish regime saw the need to entrench rather than to expand.123 When the xenophobic Marquis o f Branciforte became viceroy in 1794, he determined to tighten up controls over foreign visits and to enlarge the military garrisons in the California settlements.124 Like his predecessor, Viceroy Florez, he feared the United States— particularly if Britain supported American claims to the north o f Spanish territory.125 After War broke out between Spain and Britain in 1796, there were no more attenipts to exert a Spanish presence to the north o f California.

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N O TES 'M argaret A. Orm sby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver, 1958), p. 5. 2B .A . M cK elvie, Pageant o f B .C . (Toronto, 1955), p. 33. 3T .A . Richard, Historic Background of British Columbia (Vancouver, 1948), pp. 141 and 146. AIbid., p. 141, and J.H . Stewart Reid, Mountains, Men and Rivers: British Columbia in Legend and Story (Toronto, 1954), p. 40, and H enry J . Boam, British Columbia: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources (London, 1912), p. 24. 5There are notable exceptions to this statement. Hubert H. Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, I (San Francisco, 1884), made an effort to locate available Spanish documents and to evaluate the role o f Spain on the coast. H enry R. W agner, Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca (Santa Anna, 1933), set out with the purpose of presenting the Spanish contribution. Recently, several American historians have added much new material o f use to British Colum bia historians. M ichael E. Thurman, The Naval Department o f San Bias: N ew Spain's Bastion for Alta California and Nootka, 1767 to 1798 (Glendale, 1967), and IrisH . W ilson ed. Noticias de Nutka: A n Account o f Nootka Sound in 1793 by Jose Mariano Mozino (Seattle, 1970). For useful articles by the above historians see John Alexander Carroll, ed. Reflections o f Western Historians (Tucson, 1969). Unpublished Masters theses b y Joh n E. Baird, Tomas Bartroli, and Oakah L. Jones provide lengthy treatment o f the Spanish stay at Nootka Sound. “For full coverage o f the European diplomatic crisis sparked by the incident see William R. Manning, The Nootka Sound Controversy (Washington, 1905). ’ Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Audiencia de M ejico (hereafter cited as AGI, Mexico), leg. 1530, Conde de Revillagigedo to Antonio Valdes, no. 193, December 27, 1789. 8Jav ier de Ybarra y Berge, De California a Alaska: Historia de un Descuhrimiento (Madrid, 1945), pp. 25-27. “Thurman, p. 135. 10A G I, M exico, leg. 1529, Esteban Jose Martinez to V iceroy Manual Antonio Florez, Nootka Sound, Ju ly 13, 1789. "Ju an Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, “ Ano de 1775: Navegacion hecha por don Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, Teniente de Fragata de la Real Armada y Comandante de la Goleta Sonora; a los descubrimientos de los Mares y Costa Septentrional de California,” in Colecion de Diarios y Relacionespara la Historia de los Viajes Descubrimientos, II, ed. Roberto Barreiro M eiro (Madrid, 1944), p. 102. ,2Ibid., p. 108. ,5Ibid., p. 118. uIbid., p. 119. ,5Ibid., pp. 123-124. Relations with the northern Indians were relatively friendly although the well developed concept o f sovereignty amongst the tribes caused near hostilities. W hen the Spaniards attempted to take water, the Indians informed them that it belonged to them and must be purchased. ' “Ybarra y B erge, p. 81. 17J .C . Beaglehole, ed. The Voyage o f the Resolution and the Discovery, 1776-1780, I (Cam­ bridge, 1967). p. 322. ' “Beaglehole, ed. II, “ Charles C lerk e’s Journal,” p. 1329 19So pervasive was the b e lie f that even the Spaniards began to accept the British claims o f C o o k's discovery o f Nootka. The Enciclopedia Universal Uustrada, X X X V III (Madrid, 1964), p. 1062, still reports that N ootka was discovered by C ook in 1778.

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z»For 2 study o f the early British fur trading voyages see Bancroft, 1. 2iSce George Dixon, A Voyage Round the World; But More Particularly to the North-West Coast of America: in the King George and Queen Charlotte, Captains Portlock and Dixon (London, 1789), and John Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast o f America (London, 1790). jTThurman, pp. 257-259, and Henry R. W agner, The Cartography of the Northwest Coast of America to the Year 1800 (Amsterdam, 1968), p. 202. «AG 1, Estado, leg. 43, Report to V iceroy Florez, San Bias, O ctober 30, 1788. 1‘ lbid. »Ybarra y Berge, p. 105, and H enry R. W agner, Cartography, p. 203. According to Delarof, the total Russian population was 422 men in six establishments. aAGI, M exico, leg. 1529, Martinez to Florez, Decem ber 5, 1788. ” lbid. 28AGI, Estado, leg. 43, Report to Florez, San Bias, October 30, 1788. 2')AG I, M exico, leg. 1529, Martinez to Florez, Decem ber 5, 1788. "'Frederick W . H oway, ed. Voyages o f the “ Columbia" to the Northwest Coast 1787-1790 and 1790-1793 (Boston, 1941). The viceroy was incorrect in some o f his assumptions. The American vessels Columbia Rediviva and Lady Washington had been fitted out in Boston by the merchant Joseph Barrell to participate in the trans-Pacific fur trade. ’ 'Jonathan Carver, Travels Through the Interior Parts o f North America in the Years 1766,1767, and 1768 (London, 1778). This account was w idely read by Spaniards interested in the northwest coast as will be seen later in this paper. 32AGI, M exico, leg. 1529, Florez to Valdes, no. 702 reservado, December 23, 1788. siIbid. The Viceroy did not neglect the British threat. He supposed that once Botany Bay, Australia, had been settled, an attempt to take possession o fN o otk a Sound might take place. "Esteban Jose Martinez, “ D iario,” in Colecion de Diarios y Relaciones para la Historia de los Viages y Descubrimientos, VI, ed. Roberto Barreiro M eiro (Madrid, 1964), p. 25. 35AGI, M exico, leg. 1529, Florez to Valdes, no. 702 reservado, Decem ber 23, 1788, and Florez to Martinez, December 23, 1788. “ Esteban Jose Martinez, “ D iario,” p. 25. "Tomas Bartroli, “ The Spanish Establishment at Nootka Sound, 1789-1792,” Unpub­ lished M .A. Thesis, University o f British Columbia, i960, pp. 158-159. “ Estebanjose Martinez, “ D iario,” p. 59. Captain Viana and Supercargo Douglas, signed the document presented to them by Martinez, well aware that neither o f them had the right to bind the owners o f the vessel. After their hasty preparations, the Portuguese vessel set sail on M ay 31st. “ AGI, M exico, leg. 1532, Thomas Hudson to V iceroy Florez, September 18, 1789. “ Esteban Jose Martinez, “ D iario,” p. 82. 'Frederick W . H oway, ed. Voyages o f the “ Columbia, ” p. xxi. In a letter John H owell explained tojoseph Barrell, “ . . . I hardly ever saw a man in your North W estEm ploy who was not either a fool or a rogue, and your commanders united both those characters.” AGI, M exico, leg. 1529, Florez to Valdes, no. 1182, August 27, 1789, and Esteban Jose 4j Martinez, “ D iario,” pp. 83-84. , M exico, leg. 1529, Martinez to Florez, Nootka, Ju ly 13, 1789. Esteban Jose Martinez, “ Diario,” p. 92. For Captain Colnett’ s side o f the affair see EAV. Howay, ed. The Journal o f Captain James Colnett aboard the Argonaut from April 26, j 7^9 to November 3, 1791 (Toronto, 1940). A great deal o f ink has been spilled over this

Christen I. Archer

incident which developed into the Nootka Controversy. W hile far too much attention has been placed upon the behaviour o f the individual participants rather than upon the greater issues o f control over the coast, it should be noted that Colnett was an untrustworthy observer. His own officers seemed to have no respect for him whatsoever, hindering rather than helping him both at Nootka and during the period o f captivity in M exico. A fter the arrest o f his vessel, Colnett com pletely lost his mind and attempted suicide. J5A G I, M exico, leg. 1532, Hudson to Florez, September 18, 1789. 46Meares did have reason to be bitter at the turn o f events which damaged his interests in the profitable fur trading operation. Martinez captured two o f his vessels, expelled the Efigenia, and appropriated the schooner Northwest America which Meares had constructed at Nootka the previous year. "M eares, pp. 216-217. 4,Ibid., p. 115, and British Colum bia Provincial Archives, Victoria, Manuscript Section (hereafter cited as B C PA ), Viaje a la Costa N .O . de la America Septentrional por Don Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, del O rden de Santiago, Capitan de N avio de la Real Armada, y Comandante del Departamento de San Bias en las Fragatas de su mando Sant Gertrudis, Aranzazu, Princesa, y Goleta Activo, Ano de 1792. "E steban Jo se Martinez, “ D iario,” p. 94. “ Meares, p. 117. 5'Ibid., p. 210. 52Some o f the most enlightened Spaniards, Jose M ariano Mozino, for example, accepted Meares’ interpretation o f Martinez’s actions. See Iris H. W ilson, ed. Noticias de Nutka by Jose Mariano Mozino (Seattle, 1970), p. 74. Alejandro Malaspina was less ready to adopt the M eares account about the killing o f Callicum. He interviewed an Indian named Natzapi who clarified the incident and demonstrated the distortion o f Captain Meares. Even so, Malaspina did not pardon the actions o f Martinez. See Pedro de N ovo y Colson, ed. La Vuelta al Mando por los Corbetas Descubierta y Atrevida al mando del Capitan de Navio Don Alejandro Malaspina desde 1789-1794 (Madrid, 1885), p. 354. “ Esteban Jo se Martinez, “ D iario,” p. 95. 54Ibid., p. 105. 55Ibid., p. 99. “ Thurman, pp. 296-297, and Charles L. Stewart, “ W hy the Spaniards Temporarily Abandoned Nootka Sound in 1789,” Canadian Historical Review, X V II (1936), p. 168. 57A G I, M exico, leg. 1530, Revillagigedo to Valdes, no. 193, Decem ber 28, 1789. Viceroy Florez was completely on his own until the matter had been considered in Spain by the Consejo de Estado. N ot until April 14, 1789, did the imperial government issue an order calling the M exican viceroy to em ploy active means to sustain the California settlements, explore the northern coast, and prevent the designs o f foreign powers. 58A G I, M exico, leg. 1529, Martinez to Florez, Nootka, Ju ly 13, 1789. 5,A G I, M exico, leg. 1529, Florez to Valdes, no. 1182, August 27, 1789. WIA G I. M exico, leg. 1515, Florez to Valdes, no. 155, February 25, 1788. Since historians often confuse the nature o f these troops in various ways, a little background is in order. In 1768, a company had been removed from the Regiment o f Catalonia for service in N ew Spain and another had been raised in M exico C ity. During the 1770s and 1780s, both companies saw service on the frontiers and in mining towns like Guadalajara and Pachuca where the population caused numerous disturbances. The Catalonian enlistment fell o ff with the passage o f time, but efforts were made to

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secure European replacements from the ranks o f illegal immigrants and vagabonds found in Mexico. siAGI

M exico, leg. 1525, Florez to Valdes, no. 1245, September 26, 1789, and B C P A , Pedro Albem i Correspondence (Photostats from the Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico), Antonio Villa Urrutia to Florez, Guadalajara, September 4, 1789. «AGI, M exico, leg. 1525, Florez to Valdes, no. 1245, September 26,1789. The viceroy did not believe that the Argonaut and Princess Royal would be declared legal prizes. O ne o f the problems was that Spanish law still regarded any foreign vessel found in the Pacific as enemies whether or not they flew the flag o f friendly nations. The Viceroy o f Peru had removed the Governor o f the Island o f Juan Fernandez for not having detained the vessel Columbia. «AGI, M exico, leg. 1531, Revillagigedo to Valdes, Veracruz, August 31, 1789. MAGI, M exico, leg. 1532, Revillagigedo to Valdes, no. 50, October 27,1789, and no. 530, May 1, I79°65fad. The imperial government ordered the release o f the prisoners onjanuary 26,1790. In the meantime, however, both the Argonaut and the Princess Royal had been pressed into the Spanish service to re-establish the base at Nootka. “ BCPA, Pedro Albem i Correspondence, Alberni to Florez, Guadalajara, September 25, 1789. On this occasion, replacements were sent from the Regiment o f Puebla which was being formed and could spare a few o f the men who had been sent from Spain. "B C P A , Pedro Albem i Correspondence, Albem i to Revillagigedo, Guadalajara, December 18, 1789. 6"AGI, M exico, leg. 1537, Instrucciones secretas para el Teniente de N avio, Don Francisco Eliza, Comandante de la Fragata Concepcion, San Bias, January 28, 1790. MAGI, M exico, leg. 1530, Martinez to Florez, Nootka, Ju ly 24, 1789. ™AGI, M exico, leg. 1530, Revillagigedo to Valdes, no. 199, December 27, 1789. 71BCPA, Viaje a la Costa N .O . por Don Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, 1792, and Novo y Colson, pp. 371-372. Also seeJosePorruaTuranzas, ed. Relation del Viaje Hecho por las Goletas Sutil y Mexicana en el Ano de 1792 para Reconocer el Estrecho de Fuca (Madrid, 1958), p. C X L V III. In the lengthy introduction to this journal which was published in 1802 by Martin Fernandez de Navarrete, the commercial potential o f the fur trade was finally made known to the Spanish speaking world.

,2Merchant guilds. "A G I, M exico, leg. 1530, Revillagigedo to Valdes, no. 244, January 12, 1790. 74AGI, M exico, leg. 1540, Revillagigedo to Pedro de Lerena, no. 320, March 31, 1791Most o f the remainder o f the skins had come from trade conducted by the friars o f the California missions. ,sOne 1juintel equals100 pounds orabout46 kilograms. 76AGI, M exico, leg. 1548, Revillagigedo to D iego de Gardoqui, no. 118, Jun e 30, 1792. ’ ’ Novo y Colson, p. 368. "AGI, M exico, leg. 1532, Revillagigedo to Conde del Cam po de Alange, no. 22, Ju ly 27, 1790. 7,'Neah Bay on the Washington State side o f the Straits o fju a n de Fuca. ""Onefanega measures 1.60 bushels. ^'Novo y Colson, p. 363. C.F. Newcombe, ed. Menzies’ Journal o f Vancouver's Voyage, April to October, 1792 (Victoria, 1923), p. in. 'Ibid., and B C PA , Viaje a la Costa N .O . por Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra 1792.

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"Ibid. “Hbid. Ibid, and George Vancouver, Voyage o f Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and Round the World, I (London, 1798), p. 393. 87Frederick W . Howay, ed. Voyages o f the “ Columbia," p. 410. Boit reported in his journal that . their fort was no great thing, mounted with 6 twenty-four and 30 six pounders the platforms would not bear the weight o f the metal.” mIbid., p. 411. 89N ewcom be, p. in. ’ "Vancouver, I, pp. 385-386. 91F.W . H oway, ed. “ The Voyage o f the Hope: 1790-1792,” Washington Historical Quarterly (1920), p. 25. 92W ilson, Noticias de Nutka, p. 78. The song went, “ Maquinna, Maquinna, Maquinna, is a great prince and friend o f ours; Spain, Spain, Spain is the friend o f the Maquinna and N ootka.” 9,Ibid., p. 79. '■ 'Wagner, p. 64. 95B C P A , Viaje a la Costa N .O . por Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, 1792. 9bRelacion del Viaje Heclto por las Goletas Sutil y Mexicana, p. 16, and W ilson, Noticias de Nutka, p. 84. 97B C P A , Viaje a la Costa N .O . por Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, 1792. 98Francisco X avier de Viana, Diario de Viaje, II (Montevideo, 1958), p. 62. "S e e N o vo y Colson, and the Relacion del Viaje Hecho por las Goletas Sutil y Mexicana. m'Relacion del Viaje Hecho por las Goletas Sutil y Mexicana, p. 30. >17BCPA, Viaje a la Costa N .O . porjuan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, 1792. Bodega collected testimony from witnesses who had been in Nootka during 1788 when Meares claimed to have been granted lands and control. From Maquinna to every foreigner interviewed, all denied M eares’ ridiculous claims. The evidence pointed towards the suggestion that M eares’ vessels sailed under the Portuguese flag which made the British defence o f his claims even weaker. " “Michael E. Thurman, “Juan Bodega y Quadra and the Spanish Retreat from N ootka,” in John A. Carroll, ed. Reflections o f Western Historians (Tucson, 1969), p. 61. " ’ Manning, p. 469. ,xtlbid., p. 471. I2IF.W. H oway, “ The Spanish Settlement at N ootka,” Washington Historical Quarterly, VIII (July 1917), p. 170. l22John R. Jew itt, Narrative o f the Adventures and Sufferings ofJohn R. Jew itt; only survivor of the crew of the Ship Boston, during a captivity o f nearly three years among the savages o f Nootka Sound (N ew York, 1815), p. 51. 12’AGI, Estado, leg. 28, Jose M iguel Azanza to Luis de Urquijo, December 20, 1799. ,24Archivo General de la Nacion, M exico, Correspondencia de los Virreyes, Vol. 32, Brancifortc to the Duke o f Alcudia, no. 133, Ju ly 3, 1795. i 25AGI, Estado, leg. 24, Branciforte to the Prince o f Peace, no. 64, M ay 27, 1796.

Bostonians and Muscovites on the Northwest Coast, 1788-1841 JA M E S R. G IB S O N

In 1785 an association o f merchants was formed in Siberia for the purpose o f collecting furs in the North Pacific. In 1799 they were chartered under the name o f the “ Russian American Company,” with the exclusive privilege o f procuring furs within the Russian limits, (54° 40') for a period o f twenty years, which has since been extended. The furs collected are sent across Siberia to Kiatska, the great mart for peltries in the northern part o f China, or to St. Petersburg. For a number o f years the company obtained a large portion o f their supplies from American vessels, giving in return seal-skins and other furs, and latterly, bills on St. Petersburg. William Sturgis, “ The Northwest Fur Trade,” H unt's Merchants’ Magazine, X IV (June, 1846), 537.

The formation o f the Russian-American Company in 1799 marked the culmination o f half a century o f Muscovite activity in the far North Pacific and two centuries o f Tsarist eastward expansion. The Russians had moved rapidly across Siberia, and its virtual monopoly on prized sables both stimulated and financed its conquest. The scattered and primitive natives had offered weak resistance, and there had been no rival powers to challenge the Russian frontiersmen. Furthermore, the flatfish terrain, laced with a dense network o f interlocking rivers, had also facilitated the advance. At first the Russians likewise pushed quickly across the Okhotsk and Bering seas, drawn by even more valuable sea otters and guided by the stepping stones o f the Kurile, Commander, and S O U R C E : Thomas Vaughan, editor. The Western Shore: Oregon Essays Honoring the American Revolution. [Portland]: Oregon Historical Society and the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission o f Oregon, [ 1975?], pp. 81-119. Reprinted by permission o f the author and the O regon Historical Society.

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Aleutian chains, whose aboriginal occupants were no more able than their Siberian brethren to match the firepower o f the promyshlenniks (fur hunters). The Northwest Coast, however, was another matter. Here in “ the straits” or Inside Passage between Puget Sound and the G u lf o f Alaska the Russians were finally stopped by stiffTlingit (Kolosh) opposi­ tion and unbending American and British competition. B y now, too, the continental Russians were being slowed by uncharted and stormy waters, and their supply line had become overextended. The year 1784 was a turning point in this international contest for the territory and resources o f the Northwest Coast. Until then the Russians had a free hand in the exploitation o f the sea otter and fur seal grounds. In that year this enterprise was secured with the establishment-o f the first permanent Russian .base-in North America— Three Saints Harbor on Kodiak Island. In the same year the official account o f Captain James Cook’s ill-fated third voyage (1776-1781) was published in London. In volume three Captain James King, who had taken command after the deaths o f Cook and Clarke, related that some sea otter pelts obtained by the expedition’ s two ships on the Northwest Coast had brought as much as $120 each at Canton. King said that the desire o f his crew to return to the American coast for more furs had been “ not far short o f mutiny.” He added that “ the advantages that might be derived from a voyage to that part of the American coast, undertaken with commercial views, appear to me o f a degree o f importance sufficient to call for the attention o f the Public.” 1 Some members o f the reading public were quick to follow King’s advice, the first being Captain James Hanna in 1785 in a British brig appropriately named Sea Otter. Americans were not far behind. Besides reading King’s account, they may also have listened to John Ledyard, a Connecticut Yankee who had accompanied Cook on his last voyage. N ew England, particularly Massachusetts, where “ maritime commerce was the breath o f life,” 2 sorely needed the lucrative “ Northwest trade.” The Yankees were still trying to overcome the depression resulting from the W ar o f Indepen­ dence, when the chief markets for their cod and whale fisheries— the British Isles and the West Indies— were lost. The N ew Englanders now discovered that they could get teas, silks, porcelains, and-curios them­ selves directly from China rather than more dearly through the British and Dutch. But Canton, the sole Chinese port open to the Americans, accepted primarily Oriental products and specie. Johnny Bull had both (opium and silver), but Brother Jonathan, in the wake o f the costly Revolutionary WafTwas short o f precious metal, while only a hmited amount o f the demulcent aromatic root ginseng could be obtained and

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marketed. The requisite medium was provided by the sea otter, that playful and bewhiskered “ old man o f the sea” who frequented the kelp and shellfish beds o f the North Pacific Coast from the Sea ofjapan to the G u lf o f California. PaptamJdQhexL.Gra y o f.t he Co lumbia, who opened the Northwest maritime fur trade for the United States with the first American circumnavigation in 1787-1790, discovered what the Russians had long known— that the sea otter’s fluffy and lustrous coat washighly prized not for its warmth but for its beautiful appearance (mainly as trimming) by the large Manchu upper class o f North China. Esteemed by the Northwest Coast Indians as a symbol o f wealth and prestige, the pelt o f the “ sea beaver” was extolled by William Sturgis, a prominent Yankee merchant: A full grown prime skin, which has been stretched before drying, is about five feet long, and twenty-four to thirty inches wide, covered with very fine fur, about three-fourths o f an inch in length, having a rich je t black, glossy surface, and exhibiting a silver color when blown open. Those are esteemed the finest skins which have some white hairs interspersed and scattered over the whole surface, and a perfecdy white head. Mr. Sturgis said that it would now give him more pleasure to look at a splendid sea-otter skin, than to examine half the pictures that are stuck up for exhibition, and puffed up by pretended connois­ seurs. In fact, excepting a beautiful woman and a lovely infant, he regarded them as among the most attractive natural objects that can be placed before him.3

Thus, a lovable marine mammal enabled American traders to tap the exotic wealth o f the Celestial Empire. The Chinese goods were readily sold for a handsome profit in Europe and the United States. So the American China-tradefs-prcrfitedlfiHce— on the initial barter with the Northwest Coast Indians, on the inter­ mediate exchange with the Chinese mandarins, and on the final sale to European and American customers. This threefold transaction spread their risk and raised their profit, as did their eventual diversification of the trade. B y 1790 the Boston-Nootka Sound-Canton-Boston route, the “ golden round,” had been firmly dehneated. N or’west voyages proved more profitable than any others for owners, masters, mates, and crews, and many well-to-do Boston famihes were spawned by them; no wonder that they enjoyed more prestige and popularity among N ew England seamen than any other voyages.4 The Yankees’ British and Russian rivals on “ the Coast” were less fortunate, however.* The B ritish eventually did have superior trade ‘ The French also entered the Northwest trade, beginning with the La Perouse expedition (1785-1788), which was lost in the South Pacific. O nly four other French trading voyages were undertaken because o f the Napoleonic Wars.

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o0ds and (from 1833) trading posts on the coast itself but these advan­ tages were exerted later by the Hudson’s Bay Company when the Northwest trade had already declined. Earlier the British traders suffer^ from monopolistic practices. They had to obtain licenses from the South Sea Company to hunt in its territory and from the British East India Company to sell in its territory. Moreover, even i f the British traders did manage to obtain the latter license, they were obliged to exchange their furs for specie, which then had to be deposited with the East India Company, so that they could not import Chinese goods. And less value was gained in coin than in merchandise. Even the influential Honorable Company failed to infringe this monopolistic privilege o f the “John Company.” * So the British N or’westmen incurred not only additional expense and delay but were also denied the profitable sale o f Chinese goods at home. Consequently, the sea otter pelts were perforce an end in themselves for the British but not for the freewheeling Americans, whose “ bold enterprise” was not hamstrung by such restric­ tions.** Furthermore, from 1789 until 1815 Europe was almost constantly racked by war, and England herself was at war with France from 1793 until 1815. B y the time that the fledgling United States became embroiled in the hostilities in 1812 the heyday o f the maritime fur trade was over. The Russian entrepreneurs likewise benefited from having their own trading posts amid the hunting grounds; indeed, they were founded half a century before the British factories. In addition, the Russians had monopolized sea otter hunting for another half century, j" and they still controlled the habitats o f the Kurilian, Kamchatkan, and Aleutian varieties o f sea otter, which were superior to the Northwest Coast and California subspecies. Then, too, the Russians owned the Aleuts. These “ marine Cossacks” with their maneuverable baidarkas (kayaks) and unerring harpoons were peerless hunters o f sea otters. And the RussianAmerican Company, being under the aegis o f the Tsar, had the backing of the Russian government, just as the Hudson’s Bay Company had the support o f the British Crown. But the Russians labored under several handicaps. Owing to their long and hazardous supply fine overland via ‘ The East India Com pany’ s monopoly on British trade with the O rient finally ended in 1834, but by then the maritime fur trade had nearly ended. For the same reason the opening o f four new Chinese ports to foreign commerce in 1842 by the Treaty o f Nanking had even less effect. “ “Jefferson’s Embargo Act,” however, prevented the sailing o f trading vessels from the Atlantic Coast o f the United States from 1807 until 1809. And during the W ar o f 1812-1815 British naval supremacy discouraged American ships from plying the Northwest trade. ffh u s , the maritime fur trade was begun in 1742 by the Russians, not in 1785 by the

British.

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Siberia or overseas via the Horn or the Cape and their underdeveloped industry and marine, they possessed fewer and poorer trade goods and fewer and poorer trading vessels.* Also, Canton, the most convenient Chinese port o f entry for Northwest Coast furs, was closed to the Russians, whose trade was confined to Kyakhta on the Sino-Russian border just south o f Lake Baikal in the heart o f Siberia. Having reached this remote mart via the lengthy and difficult land route from Okhotsk Russian furs were outpriced by American furs that had reached Canton via the faster and cheaper oceanic route. Finally, the resourceful and shrewd bargaining bent o f the Yankees, as exemplified by the improvi­ sation o f clothes from old sails and iron collars from rod iron, may also have been a factor in their success, although their commercial cunning has probably been exaggerated by ethnocentric American historians, just as they have tended to overpraise the merits o f the private enterprise of the American mountain men as opposed to the monopoly o f the Hudson’s Bay Company’s servants. But perhaps the appealing array of the Yankee traders’ wares, ranging from mirrors to thimbles and from ermine skins to colored duffels, did attest to their better business sense. At any rate, these advantages enabled the Americans to quickly dominate the coastal trade, i f not to become Washington Irving’s “ lords o f the Pacific.” The number o f American and British vessels trading on the Northwest Coast totalled, respectively, 15 and 35 from 1785 through 1794, 50 and 9 from 1795 through 1804, and 40 and 3 from 1805 through 1814.5 B y the turn o f the century the British had been virtually elimi­ nated. So successful were the American N or’westmen that some o f the sea otter skins procured by their Russian-American Company and North West Company competitors had to be shipped to Canton in American bottoms. Most o f the American ships, skippers, and crews hailed from Boston. From 1787 through 1826 there were at least 127 voyages from the United States to China via the Northwest Coast, principally out of Boston.6 O f the 72 American voyages to the Northwest Coast from 1787 through 1806, 61 were made from Boston.7 Little wonder that in the C hinook ja r g o n -of-the coast all Americans were' “ Bostonians’ ’ or “ Boston men,” just as all Englishmen were “ King George’s men.” “The “ Boston ships” were small (100-250 tons) and sound for navi­ gating the intricate channels and inlets o f the fiorded Northwest Coast, copper-bottomed for frustrating barnacles and seaweed in tropical seas, and heavily manned and armed (up to 20 cannons) for discouraging Indian attacks. They usually cleared Boston Harbor in the late summer or early autumn, rounded the high latitudes o f the Cape o f Good Hope * The few er and poorer trade goods did not constitute a crucial disadvantage, however, since the Russians obtained most o f their pelts by hunting, not trading.

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or the more dangerous but less distant Cape Horn during the Antarctic summer, and sighted the rugged and wooded Northwest Coast in the spring o f the following year. Here they traded inshore from village to village, bartering trinkets, textiles, metals and weapons for various furs, primarily sea otters. In the fall they made for Whampoa, the anchorage for foreign merchantmen 12 miles downriver from Canton, the “ C ity o f the Rams,” where the “ foreign devils” exchanged their furs with the Hong merchants for Chinese teas and silks. That winter the “ Boston pedlars” followed the northeast monsoon down the China Sea, through the treacherous Strait o f Sunda, and across the Indian Ocean. In the spring o f the next year they doubled the Cape, caught the southeast trades, and squared away for Cape Cod. Morison has rightly observed that “ It was a difficult and hazardous trade, requiring expert discrimi­ nation in making up a cargo, the highest skill in navigation, and increasing vigilance in all dealings with the Indians.” 8Tradingxequired much initiative, ingenuity* and patience on account o f the fickleness and whimsicalness o f the Indians, whose desires might change from season to season or even from day to day, let alone from tribe to tribe. Besides the unpredictable Indians on the Northwest Coast, the traders had to worry about the watchful guarda de costas on the Spanish Main, ferocious typhoons in the China Sea, numerous Chinese pirates (ladrones), and occasional British and French privateers and warships. Also, trading at Canton’ s “ Thirteen Factories” was costly because o f duties, commis­ sions, gifts, and bribes, which could amount to half o f the value o f the cargo o f furs. And the coastal trade was “ liable to great fluctuations” because “ laws o f supply and demand were frequently disregarded,” 9 meaning that the keenness o f competition varied from year to year and that some traders were ruthless and greedy. Nevertheless, the trading voyages were usually quite lucrative, for the cost o f the initial cargo was low, the worth o f the sea otter skins was exceptional (they were the most valuable o f all furs), and the value o f the Chinese merchandise was high. “ More than once” a Yankee investment o f $40,000 netted $150,000, and in one instance an outfit worth $50,000 grossed $284,000.10 In 1799, when the first vessels on the coast could get 800 pelts in four days or 1.000- 2,000 pelts in one season, seven American ships obtained 11,000 sea otter skins which fetched $25 each at Canton.11 In 1800 American ships procured 18,000 sea otters (including 15,000 obtained by “ Boston ships” ).12 According to the Russian-American Company, during the 1790s from six to ten American and British vessels annually obtained 2.000- 3,000 sea otter pelts each for a yearly average o f 10,000-12,000 pelts and a decade total o f 100,000 pelts (one pelt every hour!) which fetched $3,000,000 at Canton; and around the turn o f the century the

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American traders collected 10,000-15,000 sea otter skins annually.13 The largest single catch was 6,000 furs by Captain John Suter o f the Pearl in two seasons on the coast in 1808-1809. Unlike the continental fur trade the maritime fur trade lacked continuity, for few ships or captains made more than two or three voyages.* From such short-term operations “ there naturally resulted a policy o f seizing the present advantage regardless o f its effect on subsequent relations.” 14 The abuses included forcing Indians at gunpoint to trade, ransoming rescuedTndian captives for pelts, outright steahng o f Indian goods, vengeful destruction of Indian villages, and mindless oyerhunting o f sea otter and fur seal grounds. This indiscriminate slaughter took a devastating toll o f sea otters in particular, which were nearly exterminated and never recovered. The catch o f sea otters peaked at 59,346 in 1804-1807 (17,445 in 1805 alone) and ebbed at 16,627-16,927 in 1815-1818 (only 4,500-4,800 in 1818).15 In 1802 American traders garnered 15,000 and Russian hunters 10,000 sea otters; by the middle 1840s a total o f only 200 sea otters were taken yearly.15 In acccordance with changing supply and unflagging demand, the value o f a prime sea otter skin on the Canton market fell from $120 in 1779 to S30 in 1792 and $20 in 1802 and rose to $30 in 1818, $64 in 1829, and $150 in 1846. The boom years o f the coastal trade (1788-1812) peaked in 1801; they were over by the War o f 1812-1815. At the end o f 1817 Thomas Perkins, one o f the foremost “ Bostonians,” wrote that “ The Northwest Coast trade . . . is nearly extinct.” 17 Actually, it hngered for another two decades, thanks to diversification. B y the late 1830s Boston’s “ high school o f commerce” had ended. B y then the remnants o f the trade were controlled by the Russian-American Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company. This trend is reflected in the pattern of American trade with China (Table 1). TABLE I

Average Annual Value o f American Exports to and Imports from China, 1805-1844 Period

Exports

Imports

1805-1809 1810-1819 1820-1829 1830-1839 1840-1844

53,900,000 4,600,000 6,200,000 3,600,000 1,700,000

$3,900,000 4,600,000 6,100,000 6,600,000 4,600,000

S O U R C E : Kenneth Scott Latourette, “ Voyages o f American Ships to China, 1784-1844,” Transactions o f the Connecticut Academy o f Arts and Sciences, X X V III (April, 1927), 269 -71. ’ Also, o f course, the continental fur trade was based upon different species__in Siberia the sable and in North America the beaver, whose coats were less valuable but more utilitarian than that o f the sea otter.

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The increasing competition and the diminishing peltry made the Northwest trade more and more protracted, complex, dangerous, and unprofitable. Initially, during the “ beads and buttons, bangles and baubles” stage, the trading vessels simply sailed close to shore, usually around Vancouver Island, signalled their presence by firing a gun, and waited for the Indians to paddle the several miles from shore in their dugouts. Mainly trinkets were bartered alongside the ships. Also at fust__until the middle 1790s— the ships traded one season (M aySeptember) on the coast and then wintered at “ Owyhee” or sailed directly to Canton, being absent from Boston for two years. But the Nor’westmen came to rely more and more upon the Sandwich Islands, the “ great caravansary” on the seaway halfway between the Far East and the Americas, for relaxation, procreation, refreshment (hogs, plantains, yams, sweet potatoes, taro, coconuts, salt, rope), firewood, water, and repairs, as well as eventually seamen (the valued Kanakas) and sandal­ wood, thanks to the central location and the bountiful and salubrious environment o f the archipelago. The mounting pressure o f keener competition, fewer fur bearers, and wiser Indian customers* soon prompted some adjustments. N ow the shipmasters sailed their vessels right into the myriad bays and coves and anchored beside the Indian villages; moreover, they dealt with the Indians aboard ship in order to curry their favor. This recklessness increased the risk o f attack and capture. Fewer trinkets and more substantials— utensils, tools, weapons, clothes, metals, foodstuffs— were traded. Before long.products from other parts o f the coast were being traded: clamons (tanned elk hides or “ armor” ) from the Colum­ bia, hiaqua shells from Vancouver Island, shrowton (oolachan or candlefish oil) from the Nass, and even Indian slaves. The Queen Charlotte Islands became the centre o f trading as the sea otter rookeries to the south were exhausted. Better knowledge o f the coastal climate and waters enabled the ships to skip “ the islands” and winter on the trading ground itself in some safe and snug channel or inlet. B y about 1802 the custom o f wintering in the Sandwich Islands had ceased. The favorite Entering place on the coast was Revillagigedo Channel in th c'Alaska Panhandle, while the most popular resort ol vessels during the trading season was Nahwhitti (Newettee or INew'tity) ontne northwestern end of Vancouver Island; another popular anchorage was Kaigahnee (Kaigani or Kigamie) on Dali Island in Dixon Entrance. From about 1807 the shipmasters traded during the winter, too, so that more trade goods suitable for winter conditions, like bread, rice, and molasses, were £2£hanged. From about 1801 the trading ships spent from two to three between 1792 and 1794, for example, the price paid to the Indians for furs doubled.

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years on the coast and were away from home port for from three to five years. B y now, too, the higher costs and lower prices stemming from the fewer animals, keener competitors, and greater risks had narrowed the trade to three or four firms, such as Lamb, Lyman, and Perkins in 18051810 and Boardman and Pope, Bryant and Sturgis, and Marshall and Wildes in 1820-1825. By the latter date the Northwest trade had lost its monolithic char­ acter and had become a congeries o f diverse ventures in the Pacific. Originally the trade had a unique basis in sea otters, so much so that it was called the “ sea otter trade,” but as these precious animals were swiftly depleted by the growing number o f traders, the improving means o f hunting, and the lengthening seasons o f trading more and more other fur bearers were taken from the middle 1790s, especially fur seals on the islands o f both the North and South Pacific (Commanders, Pribilofs, Farallones, Santa Barbara Channel Islands, Galapagos, Juan Fernandez). Fur seals or “ sea bears” brought much less than sea otters but the “ sealskinners” could easily club so many animals that the trade was profitable. During the 1820s the European market was inundated with sealskin hats. Some Yankee traders even scoured the South Sea Islands for edible birds’ nests, sharks’ fins, tortoise shell, and beche de mer (sea cucumber or trepang) to use as mediums in the mandarin market. As early as 1810 sea otters were so scarce that “ dividing the skins” (joint trading by two ships with equal division o f the take) became common. Another substitute medium was the sandalwood o f the South Sea Islands, particularly o f the Sandwich Islands. The traffic in sandalwood from the “ summer isles o f Eden” dates from about 1790, but the years 1810-1825 were the apogee o f “ sandalwood fever.” This fragrant wood, whose odor repels insects, was much in demand in China for fine furniture and incense. In 1827 5,000 Hawaiians felled and dragged 15,000 piculs (1,000 tons) o f sandalwood in the archipelago; the king received half o f its value in money or kind at $4.00 per picul.18 Another early adjunct to the maritime fur trade from about 1800 was trading and hunting along the western coast o f N ew Spain or, more correctly, smuggling and poaching, since these activities were in viola­ tion o f the Laws o f the Indies. The ordinary cargo o f a genuine North­ west merchantman seldom exceeded $20,000 but some vessels cleared N ew England’s ports for the “ Northwest Coast and Canton” with cargoes worth several hundred thousand dollars which were plainly intended for contraband trading. These ships put in at Valparaiso, Callao, Guayamas, San Francisco, and elsewhere on the pretext of “ under stress o f weather” and promptly commenced their clandestine operations, usually with the connivance o f the local officials and

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missionaries, whose needs were neglected by Madrid. One American trader admitted that such smuggling became riskier after the Treaty o f Amiens in 1802 because o f “ the increased number and vigilance o f the guardacostas hitherto confined to their ports by the presence o f a superior hostile force [England].” 19 But in the middle o f the revolutionary decade after 1810, when Spain halted shipments to her rebellious Latin American colonies, 250 American ships annually visited the Pacific Coast of New Spain; half o f them engaged in contraband trade and reaped “ enormous profits,” usually evading capture by outsailing the Spanish warships.20 From 1815 Chilean copper even became an object o f trade for a decade. But it was chiefly on the coasts o f Alta and Baja California, whose needs o f manufactures were especially acute (thanks largely to the barrier effect o f the Sonora Desert), that the Yankee traders turned poachers as well as smugglers. More correctly, they became joint poachers with the Russians. Both Califomias harbored sea otters and fur seals, as well as undersupplied dons and padres. The N or’westmen had originally been attracted to the Californias as a wintering place but this attraction turned to the virtually untapped rookeries as competition and native hostility increased to the north. However, they lacked able hunters. The Russians, who were edging down the coast, also coveted this peltry. But they lacked sufficient ships. So from 1803 through 1813 the two rivals collaborated in joint hunting, with the Muscovites providing Aleuts and baidarkas and the Bostonians furnishing ships and crews. The catch was split evenly. The Americans were also prompted by the growing risk o f smuggling in Californian ports in the wake o f height­ ening Spanish patrolling, guarding, and inspecting. Moreover, the Spaniards knew the real value o f sea otter pelts, having shipped them to China via the Manila galleons since 1786. * N ow the American vessels did not have to put into port; rather, they could anchor more safely offshore. And it was difficult to detect the small, swift baidarkas, which used the mother ship and the offshore islands as bases. In one month in the spring of 1811, 130 baidarkas were sighted between San Francisco and Bodega bays, and 100 were operating in San Francisco Bay itself under the very noses o f the Californios.21 Altogether the Russians and the Americans undertook 10 joint ventures which yielded the former 11,751 and the latter 12,414 sea otters.22 Joint hunting was finally obviated by the founding by the Russians o f their own base (Fort Ross) on the coast o f Alta California in 1812 and by the war between the United States and *So the Americans w ere the last to enter the Northwest trade, being preceded b y the Russians in 1742, the British and the French in 1785, and the Spaniards in 1786. But the Americans were likely the most successful participants.

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England which broke out in the same year. The Americans then renewed smuggling under more favorable conditions, for during the wars of independence in Central and South America Spanish warships were distracted and Alta California's usual lines o f supply were disrupted. In the words o f Governor Jose Arguello, “ Necessity makes licit what is not licit by the law.” 23 Smuggling ended when Mexico’s ports were opened to unrestricted foreign trade following its attainment o f independence in 1821. Then began two decades o f the hide and tallow trade— but that is another story. Like sealing, whaling was yet another extension o f the Northwest trade. But in this instance not Boston but N ew Bedford, with 330 whalers in 1857, dominated the oil fleet. Although American whaling’s golden years were 1830-1860, it began in 1791 in the South Pacific. It was not really launched in the North Pacific until 1820, when the Japanese whale fishery was opened. Then the Kodiak right whale ground was opened in 1835 and the Kamchatka bowhead whale ground in 1843.* The whalers also found the Hawaiian emporium useful as a source o f provisions, sailors, and even ships. In the summer o f 1822,60 American whaling ships visited the Sandwich Islands; by the late 1820s, 100 Yankee whalers called at the Islands annually.24 B y 1827 the Hawaiian king was earning from $20,000 to $25,000 each year from the sale o f provisions and the lease of Kanakas and vessels. From 100 to 200 foreign ships, mostly traders but also whalers, stopped at the Islands for provisions, each ship buying from $100 to $300 worth o f pigs and potatoes. They also hired up to 300 o f the king’s subjects as sailors at $10 each per month. And the king leased his own ships to the foreigners on halves, paying half o f the expenses and taking half o f the profits.25 All this exploitation soon despoiled the “ Islands o f the Blest,” which became a dumping ground for human derelicts and a proving ground for rapacious merchants and selfrighteous missionaries. ** And the debauched natives could no longer be suckered. As Captain John Jones, Jr. wrote Marshall and Wildes at the end o f 1823: Times I believe are as hard here as they are at home, the days for making a voyage to the S. Islands have past, the natives are now too much enlightened, they know well the value o f every article, i f they do not there are plenty of canting, hypocritical missionaries to enform them, even though unasked.26 ‘ See Howard I. Kushner, “ ‘ Hellships’ : Yankee W haling along the Coasts o f RussianAmerica, 1835-1852,” The N ew England Quarterly, X L V (March, 1972), 81-95. **B y 1817, for example, more than 200 Americans and Englishmen were living in the Sandwich Islands (M. Louis Choris, Voyage pittoresque autour du monde. . . (Paris, 1822), 20).

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And in 1822 two American captains wrote that “ the off scourings o f the earth is [sic] here” and that “ Woahoo is becoming one o f the vilest places on the globe,” 27 what with numerous taverns, degenerate natives, white riffraff (deserters and beachcombers), and overcut hillsides. Finally, the American N or’westmen also diversified their maritime fur trade by trafficking with the Russians o f Alaska. From its founding in 1799 and refounding in 1804 New Archangel (Sitka) on N orfolk Sound was a welcome island o f civilization to the Bostonians in a sea o f savagery. It almost immediately became a source o f profit, too, in the same spirit o f cooperation that was manifested in joint poaching on halves along the Californian coast. American shipmasters and ship­ wrights were hired to command and to construct vessels for the RussianAmerican Company. From 1806 American ships occasionally trans­ ported that company’s furs to Canton from N ew Archangel in exchange for part o f the cargo (usually five per cent) and all o f the freight charges both ways. But a more important source o f additional furs for the Americans was the trading o f provisions to the under-stocked Russians. Foreign vessels had begun to call regularly at Russian America’s ports from 1799-1800, when eight American and British ships dropped anchor at New Archangel to trade.28 Apparently nothing was transacted, however. Then the company’ s Siberian supply line collapsed; by 1803 no ships had arrived from Okhotsk for five years, and the colonies were faced with starvation. This drastic situation forced the “ hyperborean veteran” Governor Alexander Baranov to swap pelts with Yankee ships for not only “ everything necessary for the provisionment o f the colonies, but even their ships themselves,” 29 despite the fact that the sale of company furs was prohibited, since until the abandonment o f the share system in 1818 all furs were supposed to be split between the company and its promyshlenniks. But “ Necessity alters laws,” 30just as it did for Arguello. Only the chance arrival at N ew Archangel o f a British vessel in 1801 and an American vessel in 1802 prevented disaster. In 1805 the colonial capital was saved from starvation by Baranov’s purchase o f the Yankee shipJuno and its cargo from Captainjohn D ’Wolf. From the same year foreign (overwhelmingly American) ships began to visit New Archangel “ very often” ; during the first decade o f the century from six to ten American and British ships docked at N ew Archangel every year.31 The “ golden round” o f Boston-Nootka Sound-Canton-Boston became Boston-Norfolk Sound-Canton-Boston. The first American ship to trade was the Enterprise o f N ew York under Captainjames Scott in 1801 at Kodiak. B y then Baranov badly needed supplies, and the American goods were cheaper than the Russian goods delivered by the

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unreliable Okhotsk ship or the occasional Cronstadt ship. In 1803 Baranov and several Yankee captains concluded a loose agreement that formally inaugurated regular trade for the next four decades (as well as joint hunting along the coasts o f the Califomias). Thus, the exigencies o f the maritime fur trade caused two ardent rivals to cooperate for their mutual benefit. This cooperation saved the Russian colonies. The Head Office o f the Russian-American Company acknowledged that: This trade with foreigners was a most beneficial event for the Company, and it was essential to its rapid recovery. On the one hand it spared the Company the necessity o f sending all essentials to the colonies at great expense and difficulty via Okhotsk and around the world; and on the other hand it facilitated the local sale o f those surplus furs that could not be marketed in Russia and which would rot or bum from long storage, as formerly often happened to fur seal pelts. Baranov bought from the foreigners not only everything necessary for provisionment o f the colonies but even their ships, which were superior to all o f his own ships o f local construction.32

B y 1811, thanks largely to the Bostonians, the Russians had enough provisions to last three or four years. The problem o f food supply, one of Russian America’s most serious weaknesses, had at least been eased and at most been solved. The Americans also benefited, for they exchanged supplies o f moderate value for skins o f high value. The Boston firm ofj. and T.H. Perkins admitted in 1808 that it had “ some good business” supplying Russian Alaska.33 In the same year Captain John Ebbets o f the Enterprise wrote his employer, John Jacob Astor, that “ it would appear the Bostonians think this part o f the world opens a wide field for speculation— as they leave no means untry’d to gain the esteem of G[overnor] Bjaranov] which I assure you is no easy matter.” 34 B y 1811 American competition to supply N ew Archangel was such that Baranov was able to buy provisions for 50% less than he had paid in 1803.35 The supplies brought by the American vessels consisted mostly of provisions from N ew England (flour, groats, butter, lard, gin, vinegar, tobacco) and the West Indies and Brazil (rice, sugar, molasses, coffee, rum), plus some American manufactures (utensils, textiles, soap, guns, gunpowder).* Between 1805 and 1811 the Russians took mainly flour, millet, salted beef, sugar, salt, molasses, vinegar, rum, brandy, wine, tobacco, soap, plates, guns, cloth, and blankets.36 From the late 1810s fewer provisions were taken because considerable grain and beef were being obtained from both Mexican and Russian California. During the ‘ For example, see the cargo sold by the Beaver at N ew Archangel in 1812 ( K e n n e t h W iggins Porter, John Jacob Astor, Business Man (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), I: 513-19)'

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|aSt half o f the 1820s principally such “ colonial” provisions as millet, nioca, sugar, salt, molasses, vinegar, rum, wine, gin, and tobacco, plus ]I)Uch tea, and such manufactures as woolen blankets, flannelette, broad­ cloth, cottons, silks, and soap were bought from the Americans— from ^0 to 100 tons annually.37 More grain was included in the last half o f the jStos in the aftermath o f the decay o f mission agriculture in Alta California. For example, the cargo delivered by the Boardman firm in [837 on the Hamilton comprised entirely flour, bread, rice, sugar, molasses, rum, tobacco, and calico.38 Similarly, the cargo brought by the Fam ham firm’s Thomas Perkins in 1839 consisted o f 50 barrels o f flour, 2.000 pounds o f bread, 23,000 pounds o f rice, $,000 gallons o f rum, 1,200 gallons o f madeira, 600 gallons o f cherry brandy, 200 gallons o f port, 22.000 pounds o f tobacco, 50 barrels o f gunpowder, 18,000 yards of linen, and 800 shirts.39 The Russians obviously liked liquor and tobacco, although much o f the latter was Traded to the Indians.-As Captain Ebbets advised Astor in 1811: You will be very reserve’d with him [Governor Baranov] on any observations I may make on the Settlement, particularly as it respects Liquor— you may recollect in his list o f Cargo he mentioned none and Yett without any we should have been unwelcome visitors it is the Idol o f the Common people as they all drink an astonishing quantitey G B himself not excepted, and I assure you it is no small tax on a person’ s health that does business with him, a Cargo o f Rum would I beheve sell.40

The provisions purchased from the Boston men by the RussianAmerican Company were used by its employees; most o f the manu­ factures were traded to the natives. The more luxurious items— millet, ham, rum, wine, cheese, jam, chocolate, cigars— went to the colonial officials and officers. This helps to explain the maintenance o f the Boston trade by the colonial administration in spite o f the Head Office’s disapprobation. In 1829 Governor P.E. Chistiakov reported that colonial officials spent 90% o f their living expenses on American imports and 10% on Russian imports and that colonial laborers spent one-third o f their salaries on Russian goods (clothing) and two-thirds on American goods (foodstuffs).41 Every month a laborer bought 4V2 pounds o f rice, 3 pounds o f sugar, 2 pounds o f tobacco, and 1 pound o f tea, and on hohdays Be also bought 2V2-3V2 pounds o f fine flour and one or two glasses o f turn— almost all brought by American traders.42 Thus, Boston supplies were vital to the sustenance o f company employees— high ana low— ^Bd to thejgrbsecution o f the Indian trade. In fact, during Baranov’s governorship (1799-1818) they were the mainstay o f colonial supply.43 So lniportant were American supplies that the governors o f Russian

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America persisted in acquiring them in the face o f Head Office dis­ couragement and even Russian government prohibition. Not even the Tsar’s Regulations o f 1821, which banned foreign ships from Russian Alaska’ s waters, were able to stop this traffic, for it was “ often the only source from which the colony could draw indispensable merchandise and even provisions.” 44 The Boston trade, however, was a two-edged sword that cut both ways. The Yankee and Limey traders alike were ruthless competitors who traded wantonly and rapaciously and often on what the Russians regarded as their territory. More seriously, the Americans (who only traded for furs, whereas the Russians both hunted and traded) offered the Indians more and better goods for pelts than did the Russians, including spirits,* knives, and guns, even demonstrating how to use them against the promyshlenniks.** In 1808 the company’s Head Office complained that: In the northwestern part o f America the Russian-American Company is establishing trade, hunting, forts, settlements, shipbuilding, and all possible kinds o f pursuits . . . but all o f these efforts are encountering formidable obstacles. The sole and weighty reason is the fact that beginning in 1792 from 10 to 15 seagoing trading vessels o f citizens o f the North American United States have been coming there each year to bypass the Company and trade with the American savages living in various places on the islands and the mainland, exchanging goods that they bring— especially weapons, such as cannons, falconettes, rifles, pistols, sabers, and other destructive things and gunpowder, which they even teach the savages to use— for up to 15,000 sea otters and up to 5,000 river otters alone every year, besides other pelts, which they sell at Canton.45

Formerly friendly Indians in the straits now exchanged shots instead of skins with the promyshlenniks. Armed and riled by American traders, the Tlingits captured and destroyed N ew Archangel in 1802 and Yakutat ’ See F.W . H ow ay, “ The Introduction o f Intoxicating Liquor amongst the Indians of the Northwest C oast,” British Columbia Historical Quarterly, VI (April, 1942), 157-69. * ’ According to Baranov, in 1800 for one sea otter pelt from the Tlingits the Americans exchanged more than six yards o f heavy woolen cloth or three capotes (parkas), plus one pail, one cup, one mirror, knives, scissors, and two handfuls ofbeads; or one gun with 10 cartridges, powder, and lead; or three to four pounds o f gunpowder and six to eight pounds o f lead; or 108-44 pounds o f iron (P. Tikhmenev, Supplement o f some Historical Documents to the Historical Review o f the Formation o f the Russian-American Company . . . , trans. b y Dim itri Krenov (Seattle, 1938), 201). In the middle 1820s the Americans bartered five to six large blankets and some flour, sugar, and molasses for one sea otter pelt from the Tlingits (Materialy dlya istorii russkikh zaselenii po beregam vostochnavo okeana [Materials for the History o f Russian Settlement on the Shores of the Eastern Ocean] (St. Petersburg, 1861), III: 88).

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in 1805; up to 200 Aleuts and more than 100 Russians were killed.46 Baranov told the Bostonians not to traffic with the Tlingits but “ they answered him with laughter, saying that they had heard nothing about it from their Government.” 47 The aging governor was powerless to prevent American poaching and smuggling because o f his shortage o f ships and men (e.g., only some 400 promyshlenniks in 181748). As Captain Ebbets informed Astor in 1811, “ from him [Baranov] no information Could be obtaine’d Concerning their settlement, but they Cannot yet extend it as thy hav not men and the numerous tribes near them are ever on the watch to cut them off.” 49 So Baranov wisely joined his adversaries instead, making deals for the delivery o f furs to Okhotsk and Canton and for joint hunting along the Californian coast. In the Head Office’s words: “ Baranov, not being strong enough to prevent such intercourse with the savages by foreigners, repeatedly complained about the acts o f citizens o f the United States o f America, but at the same time he tried to derive all possible and not unimportant benefits from trade with them.” 50 The motherland could not readily or easily help its faraway colonies. It was not uncommon that necessities reached N ew Archangel from Russia two or three years after they had been requested.* “ In these extreme cases,” added the Head Office, “ the late Baranov always resorted to citizens o f the United States o f America and bought various supplies, materials, and ships from them much more cheaply than they cost the Company’s Head Office.” 51 The Russians still tried to stop Yankee smuggling and poaching by means o f official representations to the American government. In 1808 Count Nicholas Rumyantsev, Russia’ s Minister o f Commerce and Foreign Affairs, lodged a written protest on the company’s behalf with the American Consul-General in St. Petersburg, stating “ that the ships of the United States, instead o f trading with the Russian possessions in America, have there carried on a clandestine trade with the savages, to whom, in exchange for otter skins, they furnish fire-arms and powder, the use o f which, till then unknown to these islanders, has been in their hands very prejudicial to the subjects o f his Imperial Majesty.” 52 The Russian Consul-General in Philadelphia, Andrew Dashkov, was instructed by Rumyantsev to pursue the matter. He did but without success. In late 1809 the Russian-American Company was officially advised that representations would be made through Russian Ambas­ sador Count Theodore Von Pahlen in the United States and American Ambassador John Adams in Russia to try to stop the arms trade on the *By contrast, it took Yankee ships about five months to sail from Boston directly to N ew Archangel via the Horn.

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Northwest Coast. But these attempts also failed, the American govern­ ment arguing that its citizens had the right to trade wherever and however they wished. In 1810 Von Pahlen informed the company that “ the Government o f the United States has neither the desire nor the power to stop this ilhcit trade. Many individuals who have influence in the East o f this nation and who greatly dislike the present administration share in the profits o f this trade, and the Government is afraid of annoying those who act against its interests.” 53 Thus, bowing to pressure from N ew England members o f Congress who had a stake in the Northwest trade, Washington resorted to the principle o f laissezfaire as an excuse for its unwillingness to halt a distasteful commerce. Ambassador Von Pahlen added a brief but cogent analysis o f this commerce: Expeditions to the Northwest Coast o f America are usually organized in the following way. The captain and his crew do not receive a salary but get a certain share o f the profits, so that they try to sell as much as possible to increase their earnings. A sailor who will endure every hardship in the hope o f handsome pay cannot be very scrupulous in his choice o f means, and no prohibition whatever will prevent him from selling firearms i f he is sure o f profiting from the deal. So experience shows that with this kind o f trade all sorts o f infamies occur quite naturally. The captains, having loaded their ships on the Northwest Coast of America with a considerable quantity o f furs and having sold to the savages everything that they need for fighting the Russian settlers, then proceed to these same settlers and sell to them at exhorbitant prices the remains o f their original cargo. Then they set course for Canton to sell their furs there; usually they return to the U SA only after an absence o f several years. Under such conditions all complaints made by the Russian setders to the government o f the U SA will be useless. At most it can be shown that the savages have firearms but it cannot be legally proven that the firearms were sold to them by this or that person, and this means that the American courts would never indemnify the Russian settlers for damages, and the latter would even have to pay the court costs.54

It was at this point thatjohnjacob Astor came forward with a proposal aimed at resolving the dispute and furthering his goal o f curtailing the British fur trade on the Northwest Coast. In 1809 Consul-General Dashkov had also been instructed to seek a “ means o f establishing regular trade with citizens o f the United States to provide our settle­ ments with necessities in the most profitable way and to avoid the harm done locally to hunting and trading by repubhcans through improper commerce with the savages on the northwestern shores and islands of America.” 55 Dashkov learned that Astor was a prominent American merchant with interests on the Northwest Coast, so he wrote him in

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New York, saying that “ I cannot tell you how much I wish to See the trade o f furs in Canton only in the hands o f both you and Mr. Baranoff. Indeed it is a . . . matter o f no Small importance, particularly when I will Succeed (what I hope very much) to put the adventurers on these N.W . coasts out o f their way.— Then the business Should become very fair.” 56 Astor replied that he would agree for at least three years to send two or three ships annually to N ew Archangel with supplies and take Russian furs to Canton, where he would act as the Russian-American Company’s sole agent. He elaborated his ambitious proposal in a letter to his son-inlaw, A.B. Bentzon, in early 1811: Long experience, dearly bought by the different Canada traders, has proved, both, that the Indian trade can not be carried on, but by companies, and that, when two companies come in contact, they must join and come to a friendly understanding or both be ruined.— in the present case another important circumstance seems to augment the necessity o f such a combination; The Russian establishments have repeatedly been exposed to serious dangers from the hostile disposition o f the Indians, who surround them, and who receive with great facility implements o f war from citizens o f the United States, who transiently trade with them. It is therefore evident, that, i f by any means these transient traders, could be prevented and discouraged from trading in these parts, that the trade would be not only more beneficial, but beyond comparison more safe and secure. The furnishing o f arms by the transient American traders must be well known to the Russian Fur company, at whose instance, I presume, the Government o f H.I.M. has made representations to the Government o f this country on that subject; but how so ever well the Executive o f the U.S. may be dispos’d to please his Majesty, the Emperor o f all the Russias, there is no constitutional power vested in said Executive, by which any citizen could be prevented from a trade not illegal by municipal law, and were the government ever to obtain a law for this purpose, it would have no means o f enforcing such a law, as has been seen in parallel cases.— This peculiar situation o f the Russian Fur company and the general consider­ ation o f the advantages accruing to companies, liable to come in contact, whenever they come to an amicable understanding, has occasion’d the con­ ception o f a plan, which i f adopted, w ill no doubt, be effective in all its points and secure every desirable object in view relative to the trade in question— viz; The American Fur Company proposes to the Russian imo. a most cordial and friendly understanding in aiding and supporting each other on the Northwest Coast and in excluding transient strangers from the same. 2do. to fix limits for the trade o f each company, so as not to interfere widi each other either by trading or by supplying the natives within the respective boundaries with arms or ammunition.

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3to. to enter into an engagement to furnish the whole or parts o f the

Russian establishments in that quarter o f the world with regulat supplies— on terms as per statement. . . 4to. to carry for the Russian Fur Company any furs, or skins, which they

may from time to time be disposed to send to Canton, to sell them there for Act. o f the R. Company, and to receive payment for the supplies above mention’d in the proceeds o f such furs at Canton or in Furs and Skins at the Russian Establishments on the Northwest Coast, at the option o f the Russian Company. 5to. T o prevent as much as possible any interference o f trade from the

Canada North West company who are now making their way fast towards the coast in high latitudes and who intend soon to be in contact with the Russian company, for which purpose they have already estab­ lish'd several posts on the North branch o f the Columbia river near the Rocky mountains.— 6to. It shall always be understood, that the terms o f arrangement are to be on principles o f reciprocity and that each company shall on all occasions endeavour to promote the interest o f the others, but in order effectu­ ally to check the Canada N .W . company it is indispensably necessary that the American Fur Company should carry on an extensive opposi­ tion trade in the Interior o f North america; from hence w ill be drawn sundry articles o f furs and skins, for which Russia is the only good market, but o f which some are at present subject to the payment of a heavy duty and others totally excluded. The taking o ff this duty and prohibition by the Russian government in favor o f the American Fur company would encourage it greatly in opposing with vigour the dangerous rival o f both Russian and american enterprise in this quarter, the Canada Company— W e should thereby be enabled to prevent them completely from extending themselves to the Northwest Coast, it is expected that this proposal will meet with a friendly reception, especially when you state, as is the case, that Russian furs are admitted free o f duty in this country and that the articles, for which the permis­ sion is desired, are neither amounting to a great quantity nor found but in the interior o f this continent,— at least form no part o f Russian fur articles viz: black bears— Fishers & raccons: and that the exclusive permission will have . . . so decided an effect on the prosperity o f the Russian Company as to arrest in its progress and prevent from coming in Contact with the coast a company, as powerful and intelligent as that o f the actual Canada traders. I f the safety and success o f the establishment on the Coast are o f any consi­ deration to the Russian Government or Company, I have no doubt, if the project here in contemplation is well understood, o f your meeting with ready success, perhaps not exactly in the form proposed, but at all events in some shape or other.57

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Clearly Astor hoped that the prospective expansion of his Pacific Fur ComPany northward from Astoria and o f the Russian-American Company southward from N ew Archangel would squeeze out the [slorth West Company. The British, not the Russians, were his main conceit* , In May, 1812 Astor’s American Fur Company and the RussianArnerican Company signed an agreement whereby the two sides mised to respect each other’ s hunting grounds above and below 55° N latitude and not to trade weapons or ammunition to the Indians; also, the Americans agreed to deliver supplies to N ew Archangel from Astoria for pelts or bills o f exchange at fixed prices and to convey Russian furs to Canton and Chinese goods to N ew Archangel on a commission basis, while the Russians agreed to buy supphes from nobody else. The Russian government, however, did not agree to let Astor import certain furs into Russia duty free as he had hoped. The main advantage o f the agreement for the Russians was the fact that “ The Russian settlements will buy provisions at cheaper prices, o f better quality, and much more regularly.” 58 For the Astorians there was the prospect o f pushing other American traders o ff the Northwest Coast by monopolizing their supplementary market o f N ew Archangel. In describing the deal Washington Irving noted that “ This agreement was to continue in operation four years, and to be renewable for a similar term, unless some unforeseen contingency should render a modification necessary.” 59 Such an “ unforeseen contingency” arose almost immediately— the War of 1812-1815. Astoria, the Pacific Fur Company’s base o f operations, was hurriedly sold to its owner’s arch-rival, the North West Company, in 1813 (and renamed Fort George) before it could be captured by the British Navy. The agreement with the Russians perforce lapsed. Russian disappointment was probably not very great, however, since the supphes that Astor had been able to deliver on two ships had proven insufficient, unwanted, or overpriced. With the return o f unregulated trade the old evils reappeared. In 1823, for instance, Governor N .N . Muravyov reported that the Bostonians Were trading guns and ammunition to the Tlingits and inciting them agatnst the Russians; “ many Kolosh [Tlingit] chiefs” even had cannons. He added that some “ sensible” Boston men desisted, however, for N ew Archangel afforded them security and assistance in “ unfortunate” circumstances; they also felt that the Russians were a negligible threat to fteir trade anyway and even regretted the nefarious activities o f their oountrymen.60 The mercurial Yankees had other worries, too. B y now the Sea otters were much less numerous and the Indians were much more

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dangerous than during the “ fur rush” around 1800. In the early 1820s Boston ships procured from 3,000 to 4,000 sea otter pelts annually on the coast,61 or from one-quarter to one-third o f the catch o f the late 1700s and early 1800s. They bartered mostly blankets and flannelette but acquired at least one-third o f their skins in exchange for rifles,62 which the Indians were now using more indiscriminately. “ The N. W. coast has become very dangerous, without a large compliment o f men well armed,” wrote Captain Eliah Grimes tojoseph Marshall in 1821.63 “ Very often” the trading vessels were attacked with the very arms that they themselves had traded, and even on the day o f the trade, although most o f them were securely defended by from eight to 14 cannons.64 Ironi­ cally, these attacks were occasionally profitable in that Indian chiefs captured during the fighting could be handsomely ransomed. Meanwhile, the Head Office o f the Russian-American Company became increasingly alarmed not only by the growing number o f Ameri­ can firearms traded to the Tlingits but also by the growing number of Russian sea otter and fur seal pelts traded to the Americans. From 1805 through 1817 Governor Baranov acquired 585,000 dollars or piasters (1,170,000 rubles) worth o f goods (including five ships) in return for bills o f exchange worth 94,587*72 piasters (189,175 rubles) and 362,730 fur seals, 9,694 beavers, 4,884 sea otter pelts and 3,845 sea otter tails, 864 river otters, and 235 foxes worth 490,4i2x/2 piasters (980,825 rubles).65 This was a sizable drain o f valuable furs. Moreover, the company suffered “ con­ siderable losses” when the ruble/piaster rate o f exchange increased from 2:1 to 5:1 during the period from Baranov’s issue o f the bills o f exchange to the time when they were cashed in St. Petersburg.66 So in 1814 the Head Office ordered the crusty Baranov to halt the Boston trade. Fortunately for the company, by now it could afford to curtail this pernicious traffic because the supply o f its colonies had recently improved. During the War o f 1812-1815, when the British Navy discouraged American ships from plying the Northwest trade, many Yankee skippers in the Pacific repaired to N ew Archangel and sold their cargoes and/ or ships there at bargain prices. More important, from 1814 the company began to obtain provisions from Alta California’ s missions via Fort Ross, where, moreover, incipient farming was also expected to produce surpluses. In the words o f Captain William Pigot to Astor in early 1816, “ I sincerely hope, that you have not embark’d in any more shipments to Shitka; the Company have taken new grounds, no more skins are to be sold to foreigners. California supplies them with provisions.” 67 In 1818, when the veteran Baranov, the hard-drinking trading partner o f the Bostonians, was unceremoniously replaced, the Russian American

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colonies were reorganized. The new order included a resolute stand against the Boston trade. Connivance was no longer simply disapproved; rather, it was strictly forbidden. In 1818 and in 1820 the Head Office expressly prohibited the sale o f colonial furs to foreign vessels. Finally, at the behest o f the Russian-American Company, which was increasingly anxious to protect its monopoly against American gunrunning and rumrunning, the Russian government issued the “ Rules Established for the Limits o f Navigation and Order o f Communication Along the Coast of Eastern Siberia, the Northwest Coast o f America, and the Aleutian, Kurile, and Other Islands.” This unilateral decree, which helped to generate the even more arrogant Monroe Doctrine two years later, banned all foreign vessels from approaching within 115V4 miles o f the Northwest Coast north o f 51° and the eastern coast o f Siberia north o f 45° 50', as well as the Aleutian and Kurile Islands, unless in genuine need o f repairs or provisions. * Paradoxically, this ukase was linked with another of the same year that did just the opposite— the edict o f 1821 that opened Alta California’s ports to foreign traders. This opening meant that the Russians could regularly obtain Californian foodstuffs, so that they would no longer have to rely upon deceitful Bostonian suppliers. At the same time the Russians announced that henceforth supplies would also be sent to Alaska from Russia on an annual ship, whose cargo would both supplement and complement the imports from California and hence even further reduce dependence upon the Bostonians. In addition, the Russian N avy ships, bringing force o f arms as well as supplies from Cronstadt, would enforce the terms o f the regulations o f 1821 by deterring American traders in the G u lf o f Alaska and American sealers and whalers in the Okhotsk and Bering seas. The new system o f supply proved a dismal failure, however. Whereas formerly N ew Archangel could obtain exactly what it had needed from foreign vessels, now it had to be content with whatever was shipped from Cronstadt. Too much, too little, or none at all o f some items was received, and other items such as rope, mooring chains, glass, and shoes arrived damaged and unusable, so that expenditures were “ in vain.” Formerly, too, all o f N ew Archangel’s needs had been procured in exchange for pelts, but now these pelts had to be sold elsewhere, which took at least three years, and there were “ unfortunate accidents” like the spoilage o f furs and the loss o f supplies. Also, under the old system fur seals had been traded to Americans because they could not all be sold in ’’ For an American fur trader’ s reaction see [W illiam Sturgis], “ Examination o f the Russian Claim s to the Northwest Coast o f Am erica,” North American Review (October, 1822), 370-401.

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Russia, but under the new system a “ considerable number” were shipped to Russia to deteriorate in warehouses for several years. Further­ more, formerly colonial supply had been “ certain” because some American vessels had always to dock at N ew Archangel (for rest, water, firewood, repairs, etc.), but now supply was “ conditional” because it depended upon the “ political interrelationships o f the naval powers” and upon “ safe navigation.” Finally, the supplies delivered to New Archangel from Cronstadt proved twice as expensive as those brought by the efficient Americans.68 To make matters worse, vaunted Alta California did not prove a very satisfactory source o f provisions, owing to occasional crop failures (particularly during the last half o f the 1820s) and exorbitant export charges, while agriculture in Russian California sputtered. Consequently, the traffic between N ew Archangel and Boston con­ tinued in spite o f the regulations o f 1821. Even before American ships were officially re-admitted to N ew Archangel by the American-Russian Convention o f 1824, the Head Office o f the Russian-American Company had anxiously petitioned the Tsar to repeal the ban. At any rate, the new convention was valid for 10 years.* During that time the American traders received almost solely fur seals in exchange for supplies, for by now sea otters were very scarce. In the middle 1820s, for example, three or four American ships traded annually with the Tlingits in the straits and each managed to procure no more than 500 sea otter pelts.69 And in 1827 the Louisa under Captain William Martin, who was considered the best American fur trader on the coast, obtained only 160 sea otters and 1,000 beavers.70 During the last half o f the 1820s some 60,000 rubles ($12,000) worth o f fur seals were bartered yearly to American traders, and from 1826 through 1830 87,740 fur seals— perhaps 60% o f the colonial catch— were exchanged for American supplies.71 The company’s Head Office soon became alarmed at this heavy loss o f fur seals, for since the depletion o f the fur seal herds from the middle 1810s there were no longer enough animals for both the company and the Bostonians. The company, which stood to lose 25% o f its income, believed that cessation o f the Boston trade would save 10,000 fur seals annually.72 So in 1830 the Head Office ordered Governor Ferdinand Wrangel to trade fur seals to the Americans in emergencies only because the company could not satisfy the growing demand for them in Russia and because they were traded at low prices to the Americans for goods at high prices. The fur seal skins were bartered to the American traders at N ew Archangel for eight to nine rubles each but brought 25 rubles each at Moscow and 30 *The Russians concluded a similar convention with the British in 1825.

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rubles each at Kyakhta.73 Moreover, at N ew Archangel the Russians paid the Americans (in fur seal pelts) one ruble per pound for sugar, 75-100 rubles per eight-gallon keg for rum, and 36 kopecks per pound for millet, whereas these commodities sold for 30 kopecks, 15 rubles, and 15 kopecks, respectively, at their source (Brazil), and could be brought to New Archangel on a hired ship and sold for 42 kopecks, 29V2 rubles, and 26 kopecks, respectively.74 Some items were cheaper; for example, in 1831 tea was bought from the American Captain John Jones, Jr., for two and one-half rubles per pound, whereas Kyakhta tea cost no less than five and one-half rubles per pound at N ew Archangel.75 Generally, however, the Russians figured that the Bostonians made a profit o f at least 50% on their transactions at N ew Archangel, thanks to their lower might and insurance costs.76 In order to conserve fur seals the Russians from 1831 paid the Ameri.ns in bills o f exchange or letters o f credit (redeemable at St. Petersourg) instead o f in skins. This measure reduced the cost o f American supplies by half.77 Also, more fur seals were now sent to Russia— 21,600 pelts in 1831-1833 as against 17,105 pelts in 1826-1830.78* Sometimes, however, the bills o f exchange were presented for payment at St. Petersburg when company funds were low. And the transactions at N ew Archangel became less and less remunerative; the company’ s average annual profit from the Boston trade fell from 181,000 rubles in 1826-1830 to 102,000 rubles in 1831-1833.79 This decrease resulted from the fact that fewer and fewer American trading vessels visited the Northwest Coast during the 1830s in the face o f the decimation o f the Bering Sea fur seal herds from the late 1820s and the advent o f Hudson’s Bay Company competition on the coast from the first half o f the 1830s. Between 1821 and 1830 the number o f foreign vessels in the Northwest trade dropped from 13 to two, and during the late 1820s only two to four foreign ships called at New Archangel each year.80 Even during the ten-year period o f unrestricted navigation allowed by the Conventions o f 1824 with the United States and o f 1825 with Great Britain only four to six American and British ships annually traded on the Northwest Coast.81 In 1830 Governor Peter Chistiakov reported from N ew Archangel that Ameri­ can vessels visited the colonial capital “ very rarely.” 82 From the last half of the 1820s the resourceful American traders sought more and more land furs to replace the overhunted sea otters and fur seals, but here they met the unrelenting opposition o f the powerful Hudson’s Bay Company. "During the early 1830s the Russian-American Com pany needed 30,000 fur seals annually (United States National Archives, M u , “ Records o f the Russian-American Company 1802-1867: Correspondence o f Governors General,” roll 36, 51).

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During the 1830s the Americans were gradually ousted from the coastal trade by Governor George Simpson’s vigorous policy o f the use o f both vessels and posts to trade cheaper and better goods. This was no easy task, for, as C h ief Trader John W ork o f the Honorable Company discovered in 1835, their supplementary traffic in supplies with the Russians in effect subsidized the American “ Coasters” and enabled them to pay the Indians high prices for fin's. In W ork’s words: The Americans never calculate on making more than a part o f their voyage on the coast. They dispose o f part o f their cargo at the islands, and make further sales to the Russians, and then come on here with the residue . . . which is disposed o f at almost any price rather than take it home. Their Captains act in the double capacity o f Master and supercargo for which they are allowed a very moderate monthly wages, and a percentage upon their sales, so that it is their interest (as they express themselves) to “ get rid o fit’’ even should the owners be no gainers by the bargain. From these causes, their mode o f dealing with the natives is calculated to be detrimental to us who are permanently trading with them, because they estimate the greater part o f their commodities by the rate they stand themselves in, and not by the value they are to the Indians. For instance they never give less than 12V2— and mostly 25 lbs. o f powder for a beaver skin, and most other articles in proportion. Hence the Natives obtain these things, which should be so essential to them, in such abundance that they lay little or no value upon them.83

The response o f the British was to offer more than the Americans. As W ork noted: A Stikine Indian who has been at Pearl Harbour some days paid us a visit, and was kindly received. He has some beaver but w ill not accept o f our prices but insists upon having rum with the blanket. Y et we learn that the Russians give only a blanket. There are a few skins among the Natives here, but they will not part with them at our prices, in expectation that the American vessels will cast up, when they will get more from them, and hearing that another vessel was come on the coast inclines them still more to hold up their skins. Seeing that there was no hopes o f getting the beaver at our present price and that should the American vessels cast up, which there is no doubt they will, we would either have to raise the price or allow all the skins to go to our opponents, and even when we did raise the price then we would get only a part o f the beaver, we have deemed it advisable to apprise the Indians that we w ill give them the gallon of liquor with a blanket for each large beaver skin, & also instead o f 2 that we will give 3 gallons o f liquor per beaver. B y this means it is hoped we will get the most o f what furs they have among them before our opponents make their appear­ ance, and that it may also be the means o f inducing the Stikines to bring a good many o f their beaver here, which it is probable they would not do i f they got no more from them here than from the Russians. The Stikine Chiefs with a large

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party are expected here in a short time, at least the man who is here informs us that they are coming. It is also expected that raising the price will induce the Tongass people to come here also as well as some other strangers. It is intended to reduce the price immediately when our opponents leave the coast. It is with much reluctance we raise the price after having had so much trouble reducing it, but we must either do so, or allow the furs to go to our opponents, which w ill be the means o f encouraging them to perservere in opposing us, which will incur an annual heavy expence without any adequate returns.84

The coup de grace for the American traders came in the form o f more direct Russian trade in the straits from the middle 1830s as a result o f the Russian-American Company’s use o f its enlarged and improved fleet. Another disadvantage o f the Boston trade for the Russians had always been the fact that the Yankee skippers were not very reliable in that they did not always keep their word and sometimes failed to appear at New Archangel, leaving the settlement to rely upon chance visits. This uncertainty was particularly marked during the last half o f the 1830s, when so few Boston ships put in to N ew Archangel that the Russians tried to regularize trade by making contacts with such reputable Boston firms as Boardman, Farnham, French, and Thompson. The Boardman firm, for example, supplied the Russians in 1836 and 1837. One o f its contracts is here reproduced. I Seth Barker Agent for William H. Boardman ofBoston in the United States o f America agree to deliver to the Russian American Company at Sitka during the year 1836 or the beginning o f the year 1837 the merchandise mentioned in this agreement, o f good quality, and at the price affixed to each article upon the following conditions. Article it. That the Company will receive every article at the Invoice weight and measure; except in case o f damage or leakage then an allowance to be made to be settled by the parties at the time o f the delivery o f the merchandise.— 2d. That on delivery o f the merchandise at Sitka payment to be made in Drafts on the Directors o f the Russian American Company at St. Petersburg speci­ fied in Spanish Dollars; one h alf the amount to be drawn in due sett o f Exchange payable in thirty days after sight; and the other half in another sett o f Exchange payable in sixty days after sight.— 3d. That the Directors o f the Company will furnish me with a letter to the Governor at Sitka directing him to receive said merchandise at the terms and conditions here agreed upon.— 4h. It is perfectly understood and agreed upon by the parties that the contractor stipulates only for the sailing o f a vessel with the merchandise, the Company taking the chance o f its arrival.—

But should War or any other Commercial restriction take place so as to prevent

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the Contractor from getting his vessel Insured at the usual rates; then this agreement to be considered N ull and Void.— 10.000 Gallons Rum at i Dollar pr Gallon. 10.000 Gallons Molasses at 40 Cents pr Gallon. 25.000 pounds Virginia L eaf Tobacco at 15 Cents pr pound. 5.000 pounds Manufactured Tobacco at 20 Cents pr pound. 100 Barrels Flour at 10 Dollars pr Barrel. 25.000 pounds Rice at 8 Cents pr pound. 10.000 pounds Ship Bread at 10 Cents pr pound. 18.000 pounds White raw Sugar 17 Cents pr pound. 36.000 pounds Brown raw Sugar 14 Cents pr pound. 25.000 yards Brown American Cotton 15 Cents pr yard. 5.000 yards Bleached American Cotton 23 Cents pr yard. St. Petersburg 20th October 1835 / signed/ Seth Barker Agent for W illiam H. Boardman Verified by Bazhenoye as Director o f the O ffice.85

The signing o f an agreement between the Russian-American Com­ pany and the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1839 ended the Boston trade and thereby removed the American advantage in the Northwest trade. By the terms o f this pact the British agreed to deliver annually to New Archangel certain amounts o f provisions and manufactures at specified prices and to rent the lisiere (the coastal strip between Cape Spencer and Cross Sound) for 10 years, beginning in 1840. These terms freed Russian Alaska from any dependence upon American supplies (as well as any need for problematical Russian California, which was accordingly sold in 1841). In 1840 Governor A d olf Etholen reported from Sitka that “ I have fully noted the will o f the Head Office— ‘not to place any orders or make purchases from foreigners other than the agent o f the Hudson’s Bay Company’— which will be faithfully observed during my adminis­ tration.” 86 The last order was placed with the Bostonians in 1839 and delivered in 1841. B y then they could no longer compete with the Londoners on the coast. But the American traders probably did not rue the passing o f the old Northwest trade very much, for the sea otters and the fur seals had all but disappeared anyway, and even the beavers had been greatly depleted. Besides, they were already turning to whaling and trading elsewhere, including Kamchatka, where foreign vessels were allowed to trade duty free from 1837 to 1845. Undoubtedly the Russians likewise did not regret the end o f the trade, for it had always been a mixed blessing— an informal and irregular source o f supply whose steadfastness had depended upon the improbabilities o f an abundant

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population o f fur bearers and a state o f friendly relations between Russia and both the United States and Great Britain. Nevertheless, the trans­ actions between Muscovites and Bostonians had both sustained Russian Alaska and extended the American China trade for a third o f a century. That was no mean achievement.

NO TES 'Captain Jam es C o o k [and Captain Jam es King], A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean . . . (London, 1784), III: 437. ’Samuel Eliot M orison, The Maritime History o f Massachusetts 1783-1860 (Sentry Edition, Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 41. ’William Sturgis, “ The Northwest Fur Trade,” Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, X IV (June, 1846), 534. ’Morison, Maritime History, 76-77. 5F.W. Howay, “ An Outline Sketch o f the Maritime Fur T rade,” Annual Report o f the Canadian Historical Association (1932), 7. ‘ Kenneth Scott Latourette, “ Voyages o f American Ships to China, 1784-1844, Trans­ actions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, X X V III (April, 1927), 255-61. ’Anonymous, “ Early Com m erce in the North Pacific,” Bancroft Library, M s P -K 29, ' - 3"Morison, Maritime History, 55. ’ Sturgis, “ Northwest Fur Trade,” 537. '"Sturgis, “ Northwest Fur Trade,” 537. "W illiam Sturgis, “ Extracts from Sturgis’ Manuscript,” Bancroft Library, Ms P -K 3 3 , 1, 1, 11, II, 1. '’ [William Dane Phelps], “ Solid men o f Boston in the N orthwest,” Bancroft Library, Ms P-C 31, 9, 77. "Anonymous, “ Zapiski o torgovle severo-amerikantsev v russkikh koloniyakh v Amerike, dekabrya 23 dnya 1816 goda” [“ N otes on the Trade o f the North Americans in the Russian Colonies in America, Decem ber 23, 1816” ], Archive o f the Foreign Policy o f Russia, f. Kantselyariya, d. 12,182, 3, 5V.; K. Khlebnikov, “ Zapiski o Koloniyakh Rossiisko-Amerikanskoy Kompanii” [“ N otes on the Colonies o f the Russian-American Com pany” ], Archive o f the Geographical Society o f the U SSR, raz. 99, op. 1, no. 112, 9, 36. "H oway, “ Outline Sketch,” 9. "Cam ille De Roquefeuil, Journal d un Voyage autour du monde. . . (Paris, 1823), II: 308-10. “ Sturgis, “ Northwest Fur Trade,” 536. "Kenneth S. Latourette, “ The History o f Early Relations between the United States and China 1784-1844,” Transactions o f the Connecticut Academy o f Arts and Sciences, X X II (August, 1917), 55. ,8[K. Khlebnikov], “ Zapiski o Koloniyakh v Am erike Rossiisko-Amerikanskoy kom­ panii” [“ N otes on the Colonies o f the Russian-American Com pany in Am erica” ], pt. 1, Archive o f the Geographical Society o f the U SSR, raz. 99, op. 1, no. ill, m -iiv . ’’ Howay, “ Oudine Sketch,” 12. “ M. Louis Choris, Voyage . . . autour du monde . . . (Paris, 1822), 8.

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21Adele Ogden, “ N ew England Traders in Spanish and M exican California,” in Greater America, Essays in Honor o f Herbert Eugene Bolton (Berkeley, 1945), 397. “ Khlebnikov, “ Zapiski,” 11-12 . “ O gden, “ N ew England Traders,” 399. 24S.E. Morison, “ Boston Traders in Hawaiian Islands, 1789-1823,” Washington Historical Quarterly, X II (April, 1921), 175, 196. “ [Khlebnikov], “ Zapiski,” n o -11. “ M orison, “ Boston Traders,” 192. “ Morison, “ Boston Traders,” 198. “ Alaska History Research Project, Documents Relative to the History o f Alaska (College, >936-1938), III: 203. “ Anonymous, “ Kratkaya Istoricheskaya Zapiska o sostoyanii Rossiisko-Amerikanskoy Kompanii” [“ A B rie f Historical N ote on the Condition o f the Russian-American Com pany” ], Archive o f the Geographical Society o f the U SSR, raz. 99, op. 1, no.

29. 3‘"K .T . Khlebnikov, Baranov, C hief Manager o f the Russian Colonies in America, trans. by C olin Beam e (Kingston, 1973), 35. 31Materialy dlya istorii russkikh zaselenii po beregam vostochnavo okeana [Materialsfor the History o f Russian Settlement on the Shores o f the Eastern Ocean] (St. Petersburg, 1861), III: 4,13. 32Anonymous, “ Kratkaya Istoricheskaya Zapiska,” 3. “ Harold Whitman Bradley, “ The Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific Fur Trade, 1785— 1813,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly, X X X (July, 1939), 280. “ Kenneth W iggins Porter, John Jacob Astor, Business Man (Cambridge, Mass,, 1931), I: 450. “ M ary E. W heeler, “ Empires in Conflict and Cooperation: The ‘Bostonians’ and the Russian-American Com pany,” Pacific Historical Review, X L (Novem ber, 1971), 427. “ Khlebnikov, “ Zapiski,” 17. “ [Khlebnikov], “ Zapiski,” 102; United States National Archives, M 11, “ Records o f the Russian-American Com pany 1802-1867: Correspondence o f Governors General” [hereafter N A ], roll 7, 13V., 20V. 38N A , roll 10, 153, 154V.

39NA, roll 12, 239-39V. 40Porter, John Jacob Astor, I: 451. 41N A , roll 31, 326V. 42N A , roll 31, 327. 43P. Tikhmenev, The Historical Review o f Formation o f the Russian-American Company. . ., trans. b y Dim itri Krenov (Seattle, 1939-1940), I: 397. 44Frederic Lutke, Voyage autour du Monde . . . (Paris, 1835), 1: 128. “ Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii X IX i nachala X X veka [The Foreign Policy o f Russia o f the 19th and Early 20th Centuries], First Series (Moscow, 19 6 1- ), IV: 241. “ Archive o f the Foreign Policy o f Russia, f. RA K, d. 314, 3. “ Anonymous, “ Zapiski,” 3. “ Anonymous, “ Zapiski,” 2-2v. “ Porter, John Jacob Astor, I: 450. “ Archive o f the Foreign Policy o f Russia, f. RA K, d. 314, 3V. “ Archive o f the Foreign Policy o f Russia, f. RA K, d. 314, 3V. 52U .S. Congress, American State Papers, Foreign Relations (Washington, D .C ., 1938), V:

439-

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“ Anonymous, “ Zapiski,” 6V.-7. “ U.S.S.R., Vneshnyaya politika Rossii, V: 478-79. “ U.S.S.R., Vneshnyaya politika Rossii, V: 270. “ Porter, John Jacob Astor, I: 429. “ Porter, John Jacob Astor, I: 455-J9. “ Archive o f the Foreign Policy o f Russia, f. G lavny Arkhiv II—3, d. 8, 90. s9Washington Irving, Astoria (Clatsop Edition, Portland, n.d.), 387. “ Archive o f the Foreign Policy o f Russia, f. Kantselyariya, d. 3, 646, 22. 61NA, roll 28, 244V. 62NA, roll 28, 244V. “ Morison, “ Boston Traders,” 186. "Choris, Voyage, 9. “ Khlebnikov, “ Zapiski,” i6v. “ Khlebnikov, “ Zapiski,” 17. "John Jacob Astor, “ Astor Papers,” Baker Library, B o x 20. “ Anonymous, “ Kratkaya Istoricheskaya Zapiska,” 6V.-7. k9Materialy, III: 91. ™NA, roll 31, 76. “ Rossnsko-Arnenkanskaya Kompaniya, Otchyot Rossiisko-Amerikatiskoy Kompanii Glavnavo Pravleniya za odin god, po 1 yanvarya 1843 goda [Report o f the Head Office o f the RussianAmerican Companyfor One Year up toJanuary 1,1843] (St. Petersburg, 1843), 37; N A , M n , op. cit., roll 36, 31, 32V. 72Tikhmenev, Historical Review, I: 433; U SN A , M 11, roll 34, 53V.-54. ?3NA, roll 7, 13. 74NA, roll 7, 12V.-13. 75NA, roll 8, 183. 76NA, roll 8, 328. 77NA, roll 8, 89V. 78NA, roll 36, 53-33V. 79NA, roll 36, 52V.-53. “ Howay, “ Outline Sketch,” 14; Lutke, Voyage, I: 131. *'58 Cong., 2 Sess., Sen. Doc. 162, Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal. . . (Serial 4600, 1904), II: 233. ,2NA, roll 32, 235V. “’Henry Drummond D ee, ed., The Journal o f John Work, January to October, 1833 (Victoria, 1945), 36. *4Dee, Journal o f John Work, 31-32. *5NA, roll 10, 154-34V. “ NA, roll 44, 7.

Indian Control o f the Maritime Fur Trade and the Northwest Coast R O B IN F IS H E R

Historians have actually characterized the maritime fur trade on the northwest coast as a trade in which gullible Indians were exploited by avaricious and unprincipled European traders. Stanley Ryerson has asserted that the maritime fur trade “ depended on ruthless exploitation o f Indian labour. . . backed wherever necessary by force or open threats o f force.” 1 Others, with less obvious ideological commitments, have made similar comments. H.H. Bancroft wrote o f Captain James Cook buying furs from the “ guileless savage/’ 2 while F.W. Howay, the most meticulous student o f the maritime fur trade, described it as a predatory affair, ^ merely a looting o f the coast.” 3 Like much historical writing on Indian-European relations, these conclusions are an attempt to pass judgment on European behaviour rather than to analyse Indian re­ sponses to the culture contact situation. The first contact with the Indians o f the area that was to become British Columbia was in Ju ly 1774 when the Spanish navigator, Juan Perez, met a group o f Haida o ff the northwest point o f Langara Island. But this first fleeting contact between the two cultures was not renewed for four years4 and a decade was to pass before the first fur trading expedition came to the coast. In 1778 James Cook, leading his third voyage to the Pacific, spent nearly a month refitting at Nootka Sound. While he was there his crews obtained a number o f sea otter skins from the Indians and the story has often been retold o f how these pelts fetched fabulous prices in China. However, rumours o f the profits to be made by selling sea otter furs in China were not confirmed until the publiS O U R C E : D .A. Muise, editor. Approaches to Native History in Canada. N ational Museum o f M an Series: History Division, no. 25. Ottawa: National Museums o f Canada, 1977, pp. 65-86. Reprinted b y permission o f the National Museum o f Man.

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cation o f the official account o f Cook’s third voyage in 1784, and Captain James King’s revelation that some o f the best skins had sold for $120.5 In the following year the first fur trading vessel, appropriately named Sea Otter, under James Hanna, arrived at Nootka. In the next few years, as explorers began to probe the sounds and circle the islands, the continental foreshore was opened to the maritime fur trade. For the first three seasons all the trading ships were British, but in 1778 the first American ships arrived on the coast. In 1792 the maritime fur trade really began to burgeon. In that season there were twenty-one vessels engaged in the trade, nearly double the number o f the previous year, and more than half o f them were British. But in the following year the American outnumbered the English, and this trend was to continue until by 1801 the trade was dominated by American vessels, most o f them out of Boston. The peak years o f the maritime fur trade were from 1792 to about 1812. B y 1825 the Hudson’s Bay Company was becoming active on the northwest coast and the maritime fur trade had virtually ceased to exist as a separate entity. During the very early years o f the trade it was true that pelts were relatively easily acquired and some European traders made considerable profits. On 2 Ju ly 1787 Captain George Dixon was tacking into a bay that was later to become famous as Cloak Bay when some Haida approached in their canoes. As Perez had found, curiosity was the initial reaction of the Indians. The Haida could not, at first, be tempted to trade; “ their attention seemed entirely taken up with viewing the vessel, which they apparently did with marks o f wonder and surprise.” 6 Only after the Indians had satisfied their curiosity about the vessel could they be induced to trade. Later in the day Dixon ran his snow, the Queen Charlotte, further up the bay and a scene is described “ which absolutely beggars all description.” The crew was “ so overjoyed, that we could scarcely believe the evidence o f our senses,” because the Indians were falling over each other to trade their cloaks and furs: “ they fairly quarrelled with each other about which should sell his cloak first; and some actually threw their furs on board i f nobody was at hand to receive them.” In half an hour Dixon obtained three hundred furs.7 A month later, when he left the islands that he had named the Queen Charlottes, his vessel had 1,821 furs in its hold.8 In 1789, two years after Dixon’ s visit, the crew o f the American ship Columbia emulated his example. John Kendrick, the master o f the Columbia, made one o f the best deals ever when, in a few minutes, he traded 200 pelts at the rate o f one chisel each

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at the Indian village o f Kiusta on the northern end o f Graham Island.9 In the first years o f the trade these furs, so cheaply purchased, brought high prices in China. It was claimed that the 560 sea-otter pelts that Hanna collected on his first trip realized 20,600 dollars,10 and that the Dixon and Portlock expeditions sold 2,552 furs for 54,875 Spanish dollars.11 Prices such as these moved Dixon’s associate, Nathaniel Portlock, to remark that this branch o f commerce was perhaps “ the most profitable and lucrative employ that the enterprising merchant can possibly engage in.” 12 Yet, even in these early years, the Indians were not passive objects of exploitation. Rather they vigorously asserted their demands. Northwest coast Indians were, for example, never very interested in baubles and beads as trade items. Cook noted in his journal that European beads could not supplant the Nootkans’ own ornaments.13 So the old stereo­ type o f the avaricious trader stealing Indian furs for a few trinkets never apphed to the maritime fur trade. Furthermore, the comparatively easy trading and high profits o f the first frantic years o f the trade were not to continue. As vessels visited the coast with increased frequency the maritime fur trade settled into a more consistent pattern, and it was a pattern o f trade over which the Indians exercised a great deal o f control. It was, after all, Indian demands that had to be satisfied before sea otter pelts changed hands. For one thing the Indians rapidly lost their curiosity about the Europeans and their vessels. A ship under full sail was an impressive sight, but to the trading Indians it became commonplace. In contrast to the curiosity with which the Queen Charlotte was received in 1787, the Indians o f Cloak Bay wandered all over Jacinto Caamano’s ship, Aranzazu, in 1792 without showing wonder at anything, nor was there any object o f which they did not appear to know the use.” 14 As in most contact situations, the initial phase, when the white men were inexpli­ cable and were perhaps even regarded as supernatural beings, soon passed. It quickly became apparent to the Indians that their visitors were quite human, and though some o f their behaviour might be curious, many o f their demands and desires were famihar. As the Indians grew accustomed to the presence o f the Europeans they also became shrewder in their trading with them. Even after his brief encounter with a group o f Haida in 1774, Perez declared that the Indians were expert and skilful traders.15 The members o f Cook’ s expedition reached similar conclusions. As one o f them put it, “ They are very keen traders getting as much as they could for everything they had; always asking for more give them what you would.” 16 The consequence o f their

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rtriteness was that the Indians o f Nootka “ got a greater middly and variety o f things” from Resolution and Discovery than any other people that the vessels had visited.17 When John Meares left on a trading expedition to the coast in 1787, he was warned that “ it appears that the natives are such intelligent traders, that should you be in the least degree lavish, or inattentive in forming bargains, they will so enhance the value of their furs, as not only to exhaust your present stock, but also to injure, if not to ruin, any future adventure.” 18 The Indian demand for metals, particularly iron, was recognized by most early traders. Cook’ s ships left Nootka with hardly any brass left on board, and his crews had also traded a considerable amount o f iron.19 Like the explorers, the early fur traders found that the coast Indians were most partial to iron. Members o f the Spanish expedition led by Perez had noted that the Indians particularly wanted large pieces with a cutting edge, and Dixon’s staple medium o f exchange was “ toes,” or iron chisels.20 Early in 1789 the crew o f the Columbia, trading in the Straits o f Juan De Fuca, were mortified to see seventy prime pelts escape them “ for want o f Chizels to purchase them.” 21 Another indication o f Indian control o f the maritime fur trade was the rapid increase in the price o f furs in the early 1790s. Traders in those years who hoped to follow the example o f those who were first in the field and purchase large numbers o f furs cheaply were often disap­ pointed. John Boit returned to the coast in 1795 and found that the price of pelts at Dadens on Langara Island had increased 100 percent since 1792 when he had been there on the Columbia.22 Archibald Menzies observed a similar rate o f increase in Johnstone Strait when he returned there with Vancouver in 1792,23 while another member o f Vancouver s expedition claimed that prices generally had quadrupled since the earliest voyages.24 At Nootka, where Meares had traded ten skins for one piece of copper in 1786, the asking rate six years later was one pelt for one piece of copper.25 Price increases such as these led the Spaniard, Alejandro Malaspina, to conclude that the great profits o f Cook’s and Portlock’ s voyages should be forgotten as unattainable.26 There were, o f course, other tactors that artected prices, including the growing scarcity o f furs. However, the depletion o f the sea-otter was not as significant in the early 1790s as it was to be after the turn o f the century. The Indians had learned to demand higher prices while furs were still relatively plentiful. Not only did the Indians quickly learn to demand a greater quantity o f goods for their furs, but they also became very discriminating about the Mature o f the goods they acquired. It is a commonly held view that the Indian taste in trade goods was “ strangely whimsical and constantly

*

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variable.” 27 B y citing examples from widely differing points in time and place it is possible to create the impression that Indian demands were merely fickle,28 and to obscure those patterns that their requests con­ formed to. Initially the Indians wanted articles that had meaning and use within pre-contact society. They possessed both iron and copper at the time o f contact,29 but these metals were not plentiful. For this reason iron and other metals were highly valued and in great demand in the early years o f the maritime fur trade. The iron chisels brought by the traders were sufficiently similar to indigenous tools to be readily under­ stood, hence the heavy initial demand for them. As the market became saturated with these items their value dropped, other needs began to operate, and new demands were made. The trade meant that the furs were not used as much for clothing as they had been prior to the arrival o f the European. The need for an alternative arose, so the Indians turned their attention to trading cloth, clothing and blankets. The demand for blankets particularly remained fairly constant, and they became a staple in the trade. As a garment they served an important function for the Indians. But the blanket was also an article that could be easily counted and compared. It was, therefore, a useful medium o f exchange both in the fur trade and for Indian potlatches. During the later years o f the trade the Indians acquired some more exotic tastes. A liking for rum, smoking tobacco, and molasses gradually developed, and muskets also became an important trade item.30 Naturally, there were exceptions to this pattern, as the Indian market was as much subject to fads as any other. Yet most o f these were also related to Indian usages. The popularity o f the iron collars forged aboard the brigantine Hope has been seen as the height o f Haida fadishness,31 but this demand was consistent with the Haida taste in personal ornamenta­ tion. Copper bracelets, for example, were frequently worn and Joseph Ingraham made his collars from the pattern o f one he had seen a Haida woman wearing.32 The same point can be made about the ermine skins 'that William Sturgis sold with considerable profit at Kaigani.33 Ermine pelts were an important wealth item among the coast Indians. But demand for this kind o f article was temporary and the market quickly became glutted. There were other factors that created the impression that the Indians would take a great variety o f goods. At times they would receive as presents items, such as beads and trinkets, that they would not accept as trade.34 Often when Indians accepted these baubles they were as an addi­ tional gift to facilitate trade and not as a part o f the actual trading transaction. These presents added to the diversity o f goods that changed

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hands but not to the number o f articles that would buy furs. Trading Indians not only paid great attention to the type o f goods that they acquired, but they were also discriminating about the quality and trade articles were examined closely and carefully before bargains were struck.35 Iron that contained flaws or was too brittle was o f little value to the Indians because they worked it while it was cold.36 Indians showed great “judgment and sagacity” when selecting firearms;37 woolen goods of insufficient quality were turned down,38 and porcelain imitations o f dentalia shells were treated with contempt.39 Usually the Indians knew what they wanted when they were trading and they were determined to get it. Nor were Indian traders easily diverted from their purpose. One captain hoped that a few hours o f conviviality in the house o f the chief would bring him more furs, “ but, no sooner was traffic mentioned, than from being the engaging master o f the house, he became a Jew chapman and dealer.” 40 There are numerous comments in the journals o f trading expeditions to the northwest coast about the enterprise o f Indian traders whose trading acumen meant that many captains “ had the sorrow to see valuable furs escape us, the acquisition o f which was the principal object of the expedition, for want o f suitable objects to exchange.” 41 As vessels came in search o f furs with increasing frequency the Indians became very tough-minded manipulators o f competition. They forced prices upwards, particularly at places often visited by traders. As a consequence, in the early years furs were found to cost more at Nootka than at other places.42 Later, harbours such as Newitty, Masset, and Kaigani became centres o f trade and o f high prices. At Kaigani John D’W olf found in 1805 that the Indians were “ so extravagant in their demands. . . that it was quite impossible to trade.” 43 When more than one vessel was at anchor the Indians would move from one to another comparing prices and bargaining to force them upwards; and, as one trader observed, it was easy to increase one’s price but always impossible to reduce it.44 The American, Richard Cleveland, while on the northern coast in 1799, was told by another captain that he could expect ten other vessels from Boston to be trading in the area that year. He was, therefore, anxious to dispose o f his “ articles o f traffic” before competi­ tion reduced their value, because, he said, . . . the Indians are sufficiently cunning to derive all possible advantage from competition, and will go from one vessel to another, and back again, with assertions of offers made to them, which have no foundation in truth, and showing themselves to be as well versed in the tricks of the trade as the greatest adepts.45

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Even the captains o f solitary vessels who felt that Indian prices were exorbitant were informed that other traders would soon follow who would be willing to pay what was asked.46 Such exploitation o f competi­ tion by the trading Indians was one o f the reasons why, far from making a killing, many fur trading voyages were ruinous to their promoters.47 As the Indians raised their prices captains were apt to overestimate the value o f their cargo and, therefore, their margin o f profit. Indian traders were not above adding a few tricks to the trade. When Cook was at Nootka he found that the Indians were not quite as “ guile­ less” as Bancroft would have us believe. The explorer discovered that the Indians were deceiving his men by selling containers o f oil that were partly filled with water. In fact “ once or twice they had the address to impose upon us whole bladders o f water without a drop o f Oil in them.” 48 Another captain found a Nootkan trying to pass o ff a land otter pelt as a sea otter in the dusk o f evening.49 Meares went as far as to claim that in their commercial transactions the Indians would play a thousand tricks. He was probably exaggerating when he added that Europeans were “ more or less, the dupes o f their cunning,” 50 but it is undeniable that Indians behaved with confidence when they were trading. The Indians were able to assert their demands with such vigor that European captains had to modify their trading methods to accommo­ date them. I n the early years o f trade Dixon had largely coasted along the shore line and relied on the Indians to paddle out to him to trade. He was convinced “ that this plan was attended with better and speedier success than our laying at anchor could possibly be.” 51 Only four years later, in 1791, Ingraham collected 1,400 sea-otter skins o ff the Queen Charlotte Islands, and he attributed his success to the opposite tactic o f remaining at one village until no further furs could be secured. The Indians pre­ ferred this approach to paddling out four or five miles to a moving vessel.52 The tendency was for captains to have to spend more and more time in one place instead o f moving about. It also became apparent that one season was insufficient time to gather a profitable cargo. Crews began to winter on the coast and, by 1806-1808, to trade all year round.53 Initially most trading was conducted over the side o f vessels with the Indians remaining in their canoes, but increasingly they had to be allowed to come on deck to display their wares. Changes such as these resulted from the fact that the Indians preferred to trade at their leisure. They had plenty o f time at their disposal and liked to use it to bargain over prices. Even though captains were invari­ ably in a hurry to fill their holds, Indian concepts o f time operated increasingly. Many “ would wait alongside several hours— nay all day—

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to obtain their price.” 54 D ’W olf complained that the Kaigani Indians would he about the deck for days on end endeavouring to extort unreasonable prices for their furs, while affecting the utmost indif­ ference as to whether they sold them or not.55 Other Indian usages had to be observed by captains hoping to acquire furs. The journals show that a considerable amount o f Indian ceremonial accompanied trading contacts. One observer noted that it was a constant custom to begin and terminate commercial transactions with strangers with singing.56 Although traders often found such ceremonies irritating and time consuming, they had to be patiently accepted before the exchange o f goods began. However fixed European notions o f the nature o f trade might be, traders also had to accede to the custom o f gift exchange with Indian leaders.57 This ritual was observed in spite o f the feehng on the part o f some captains that furs exchanged as presents were sure to prove the dearest that they obtained.58 European traders were also adapting to the patterns o f northwest coast Indian society by conducting most o f their trading with Indian leaders rather than the general population. Some o f the trading was done with individual families, but the people did not possess such an abundance o f furs as their leaders.59Those chiefs who had the good fortune to be in the right place at the right time were able to exercise great control over the trade, and their wealth and, consequently, their prestige were greatly increased. Perhaps the most famous, if not the most powerful, was Maquinna, the leader o f the Indians whose summer village was at Yuquot in Nootka Sound. Probably newly succeeded to chieftainship when the maritime fur trade began, Maquinna was able to tap the wealth of his own people as well as that o f neighbouring groups. During the Nootka Sound controversy he was feted by both the Spanish and the English, and European traders recognized him as the leading trading chief in the area. B y manipulating the fur trade Maquinna became incredibly wealthy by Indian standards. In 1803, for example, it is reported that he gave a potlatch at which he dispensed 200 muskets, 200 yards o f cloth, 100 chemises, 100 looking glasses and seven barrels o f gunpowder.60 There were other Indian leaders whose power was comparable to that of Maquinna. It is possible that Wickaninish, the leader at Clayoquot Sound, was even more powerful.61 On the northern Queen Charlottes, Cunneah, who resided at Kuista, was the first mentioned and best known chief. Also very important was Kow, who initially lived at Dadens, but during the 1790s moved across Dixon Entrance and established himself permanently at his summer village at Kaigani.62 Like Maquinna, these

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leaders acquired great wealth. In 1799, when the author o f the Eli^ journal visited the house o f Kow, the chief proudly displayed his wealth The house was lined with boxes o f goods acquired in the trade, hut Kow drew particular attention to his hoard o f ermine skins which were valued as gold or silver. B y virtue o f his collection o f 120 o f these pelts Kow claimed that, next to Cunneah, he was the wealthiest chief in the area.63 So great was the power and influence o f some o f these leaders that European leaders found it very much in their interest to cultivate their friendship and they had to be treated with much o f the deference that they expected from their own people. Richard Cleveland was one trader who generally could not abide the presence o f Indians on the deck o f his ship. When he was at Kaigani, however, Kow had to be indulged with hospitality on board. It would, said Cleveland, “ have been folly to have prevented him.” 64 Indian leaders who were unwittingly insulted had to be mollified, while supposed insults from Indians were tolerated in the hope o f driving a bargain.65 European traders were further subject to Indian trading patterns to the extent that those Indians who sold them furs were often middlemen who had their own mark-up. The first Europeans to arrive on the coast noticed how Indian traders made efforts to prevent other Indians from trading with them. While he was at Nootka, Cook, who by 1778 was an experienced observer o f the behaviour o f indigenous peoples, noted that the Indians that he first contacted attempted to monopohze the trade with the Resolution and the Discovery. Whenever strangers were allowed to trade with the ships, the transactions were managed by the people of Yuquot,66 and in such a way as to increase their own prices while lowering the value o f the English commodities.67 On other occasions the local Indians used force to prevent outsiders from trading with the ships.68 It was evident that these explorers had not arrived in a commer­ cial desert, but that definite trading patterns already existed. Much is often made by European historians o f the trading abilities o f the Yankee captains out o f Boston, but it is less frequently remembered that the Indians had a long tradition o f trading among themselves. Many, perhaps most, o f the furs that changed hands during the period o f the maritime fur trade were not captured by the Indians who traded them. When captains were exhorted, as they often were, to wait a day or two so that Indian traders could gather more furs, it did not mean that those Indians intended to hunt for them. Indian leaders on the outer coast collected furs from those who lived deeper inland, either as plunder or by trade. Some chiefs quite frankly told white traders that if

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they would wait they would go and fight for furs which they would then bring to sell.69 N o doubt this method o f gathering pelts was not uncom­ mon. R was well known that Maquinna controlled a trading network with the Indians who lived near the mouth o f the Nimpkish River on the east coast o f Vancouver Island. When European explorers established the insularity o f Vancouver Island, they also found that the Indians who had villages along Johnstone and Queen Charlotte Straits were quite familiar with their merchandise. These Indians, in contrast to the Coast Salish to the south, had passed through the stage o f high demand for iron and were also much sharper traders.70 Maquinna nevertheless made considerable profit in his trade with these people.71 Wickaninish, the chiefof Clayoquot Sound, exercised a similar control over the trade o f that area.72 The Haida likewise traded with mainland groups. B y 1799 it was considered that not half o f the furs traded at the Queen Charlottes were collected there.73 Indians on the outer coast exchanged European goods with inland Indians at two and three hundred percent profit margins,74 and in this way furs were collected at the central locations o f the trade with European vessels. Thus, one seaman observed, “ we see the untutored Indian influenced by true Mercantile principles.” 75 Certainly, i f there was exploitation in the maritime fur trade, it was not confined to Europeans. It has been argued that because trading captains seldom expected to return to a specific locality, they were frequently able to defraud Indian traders and regularly took violent action against them.76 In fact there was more continuity in the trade than might be expected. There are records of some 300 fur trading vessels coming to the northwest coast during the forty years between 1785 and 1825. O f this total 40 percent spent more than one season trading on the coast, and about 23 percent made three or more visits.77 N o t only did many vessels and captains return to the coast more than once but also a large percentage o f the trade was done with a few Indian leaders at a limited number o f entrepots. So a European trader who made more than one voyage was very likely to return to the same place to trade, particularly i f relations with the Indians had been amicable during the first visit. The possibility o f a return trip militated against the indiscriminate use o f fraud and violence. During this early period o f culture contact there was a certain amount ° f inter-racial violence but its extent should not be exaggerated. Such Were the demands made by the Indians on European traders that it was considered that ‘ ‘ a man ought to be endowed with an uncommon share patience to trade with any o f these people.” 78 O f course, many fading captains lacked their fair share o f patience and, caught in the

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squeeze between increasing costs on the northwest coast and declining prices in China, they were apt to become annoyed with Indians who made what they considered to be unreasonable demands. When the early method o f coasting became unfruitful, vessels had to stay longer in one place to negotiate trading terms and the extended contact added to the possibility o f friction. Given these circumstances, what is sur­ prising is not that there were some outbreaks o f violence, but that hostilities were not more frequent. It is clear that the degree o f mutual hostility between the two races during the maritime fur trading period has beati exaggerated in Euro­ pean records. Captains came to the coast expecting"the Indians to be hostile and often perceived hostility where it did not exist. Some captains tried to deter others from trading with the Indians by telhng tales o f their “ Monstrous savage disposition.” 79 Sometimes Indian leaders also tried to prevent traders from calling on neighbouring groups by emphasizing their uncooperative and warlike nature. In an effort to protect their trading interests, both races exaggerated the hostility o f thejathgr. The anticipation o f violence occasionally brought its expected result, yet the number o f violent incidents were still relatively few. A delicate balance o f gains and losses had to be weighed up by those who contemplated an attack. The immediate advantage o f plunder had to be assessed against the long term disadvantage o f losing trade. Both races realized that trad­ ing possibilities were not enhanced by attacks on potential customers. The Indians o f the northwest coast, rather than feeling exploited by the European traders, became annoyed when opportunities to trade escaped them. I f Europeans rejected offers to trade, particularly when furs were offered by the Indians in the form o f reciprocal presents, the refusal could be, and sometimes was, taken as an insult.80 Indian groups also became dissatisfied when the maritime fur trade passed them by. Sea otter were rare at Nootka Sound by the turn o f the century, and vessels were neglecting the area in favour o f visiting the more lucrative inner harbours. The Nootka resented this development and their resentment was part o f the motivation behind their famous attack on the trading vessel, Boston, in 1803. During the maritime fur trading period the Indians o f the northwest coast were not, like some pre-Marxist proletariat, the passive objects of exploitation. Rather, they were part o f a mutually beneficial trading relationship over which they exercised a good deal o f control. Because the amount o f overt coercion used against the Indians was limited they were involved in a process o f non-directed culture change.81 Within the trading relationship they selected those goods that they wanted and

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ejected those that they did not. The maritime fur trade was not “ an unequal trade with a primitive people.” 82The overwhelming impression that emerges from the journals is that the Indians were intelligent and energetic traders, quite capable o f driving a hard bargain. John Meares, after several months o f trading with the northwest coast Indians, expressed the view o f many European traders when he noted that “ we learned to our cost, that these people, . . . possessed all the cunning necessary to the gains o f mercantile file.” 83

NOTES ’ Stanley B. Rverson, The Founding o f Canada: Beginnings to 1815, Toronto. 1963, p. 262. 2Hubert Howe Bancroft, History o f British Columbia, San Francisco, 1890, p. 4. JF.W. Howay, “ An Outline Sketch o f the Maritime Fur Trade,” The Canadian Historical Association Report, 1932, p. 14. 4In 1775 Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra passed up the coast in the schooner Sonora. Although he discovered and named Bucareli B ay on the west coast o f Prince o f W ales Island he did not make a landfall between latitudes 49° and 54°4o' N. 5James C o o k andjam es King, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean. . . .Performed under the Direction of Captains Cook, Clerke, and Gore, in His Majesty’s Ships the Resolution and the Discovery. In the years, iyy6, tyyy, tyy8, tyyg, and 1 y8o, London, 1784, III, p. 437. 6George Dixon, A Voyage Round the World; but more Particularly to the North- West Coast of America: Performed in iy83, iy86, iy8y, and iy88, in the King George and Queen Charlotte, Captains Portlock and Dixon, London, 1789, pp. 199-200. Although D ixon’ s name appears on the title page o f this work, it was actually written by W illiam Beresford who was supercargo on the Queen Charlotte. 7Ibid., p. 201. ‘Ibid., p. 228. ’ Robert Haswell, Log, [June 1789], in Frederick W . H ow ay (ed.), Voyages o f the “ Columbia" to the Northwest Coast ty8y-iygo and tygo-iygy, Boston, 1941, p. 96. 10D i x o n , A Voyage, pp. 315-16. "George Dixon, Remarks on the Voyages o f John Meares, Esq. in a Letter to the Gentleman, London, 1790, in F.W . H ow ay (ed.), The Dixon-Meares Controversy. . . . , Toronto, etc., [1929], p. 30. " N a t h a n i e l Portlock, A Voyage Round the World; but more Particularly to the Northwest Coast °J America: Peformed in 1 y8y>, iy86, ty8y and ty88. . . . . London, 1789, p. 382. "Juan Crespi, D iary, 21 Ju ly 1774, in Geo. Butler G riffen (ed.), Documents from the Sutro Collection, Publications o f the Historical Society of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1891, II, part 1, p. 192. Cook, Journal, 30 March and 26 April 1778, in J.C . Beaglehole (ed.), The Journals of Captain James Cook on his Voyages o f Discovery; the Voyage o f the "Resolution" ond "Discovery", iyy6-iy8o, Cam bridge, 1967, part 1, pp. 297, 302, and 314. Caamano, Journal, 19 Ju ly 1792, Jacinto Caamaiio, “ The Journal ofjacinto Caam ano,” The British Columbia Historical Quarterly, II, Ju ly 1938, p. 215. C ook had made similar temarks about most o f the Nootka Indians as early as 1778. See Cook, Journal, 12 April ■778, in Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, p. 301.

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15Perez, Diary, 20 Ju ly 1774, in Margaret O live Johnson, “ Spanish Exploration o f the Pacific Coast b y Juan Perez in 1774,” Master o f Letters Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1911, p. 59. ' ‘ Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part I, p. 302, fn. 2. 17C ook, Journal, 18 April 1778, in Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part 1, pp. 302-303. l8The Merchant Proprietors to Meares, 24 December 1787, Joh n Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North West Coast o f America. . . . , London, 1790, appendix no. 1, unpaginated. 19C ook, Journal, 18 April and 29 March 1778, in Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part 1, pp. 302 and 296. “ Pena, Diary, 21 Ju ly 1774, in G riffen (ed.), Documents, p. 123; Dixon, A Voyage, pp. 200201. 21Haswell, Log, 19 April 1789, in H ow ay (ed.), Voyages o f the “ Columbia,” p. 81. 22Boit, Journal, 9 Ju n e 1795, Joh n Boit, Journal o f a Voyage Round the Globe, 1795 and 1796 [in the Union] M S, Special Collections, the University o f British Columbia Library (hereafter cited as SC). “ George Vancouver, A Voyage o f Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, and Round the World;. . . .Performed in the Years 1790,1791,1792,1793,1794 and 1793 in the Discovery Sloop of War and Armed Tender Chatham under the Command o f Captain George Vancouver, London, 1798, I, p. 348. “ Edmund S. M eany (ed.), A N ew Vancouver Journal on the Discovery o f Puget Sound by a Member o f the Chatham’s Crew, Seattle, 1915, p. 40. “ C ecil Jan e (trans.), A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-West Coast o f America being the Narrative o f the Voyage made in the Year 1792 by the Schooners "Sutil" and "Mexicana” to Explore the Strait o f Fuca, London, 1930, p. 90. See also Vancouver, A Voyage, I, p. 349. “ Alessandro Malaspina (sic), Politico-Scientific Voyages Around the World. . . from 1789-1794, typescript, SC , II, p. 244. 2,F.W . Howay, “ The Voyage o f the Hope: 1790-1792,” The Washington Historical Quar­ terly, X I, January 1920, p. 28; H oway, “ An Outline Sketch,” p. 8; Paul Chrisler Phillips, The Fur Trade, Norman, 1961, II, p. 54. 28See Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the Northwest Coast, San Francisco, 1884, I, pp. 370-71. 29Pena, Diary, 20 Ju ly and 8 August 1774, in G riffen (ed.), Documents, pp. 121 and 132. C ook noted that the Nootka had a word for iron and other metals, Cook, Journal, [April, 1778], in Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part 1, p. 328. ’"This kind o f pattern has been delineated for other areas o f the Pacific, see Dorothy Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood, a Study o f the Sandalwood Trade in the South-West Pacific, M elbourne, 1967, pp. 145 and 150. 3'H ow ay, “ Voyage o f the H ope,” p. 10. 32Ingraham, Journal, I2july 1791, M ark D . Kaplanoff (ed.),Joseph Ingraham'sJoumalofthe Brigantine “Hope" on a Voyage to the Northwest Coast o f North America, Barre, Mass., 1971, p. 105. 33F.W . H ow ay (ed.), “ W illiam Sturgis: the Northwest Fur Trade,” British Columbia Historical Quarterly, VIII, January, 1971, p. 22. “ Vancouver, A Voyage, I, p. 349. 35C .P . C laret Fleurieu, A Voyage Round the World, Performed during the Years 1790,1791 and 1792, by Etienne Marchand. . . . , London, 1801, I, p. 449. “ Meares, Voyages, p. 368, Burney, Journal, 24 April 1778, Journal o f the Proceedings o f

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His Majesty’ s Sloop Discovery— Chas. C lerke, Commander, 1776-1779, photocopy. Provincial Archives o f British Colum bia (hereafter cited as PA BC ). ’ ’John D ’W olf, Voyage to the North Pacific and a Journey through Siberia more than H alf a Century Ago, Cam bridge, 1861, p. 19. ,8M. Camille D e Roquefeuil, A Voyage Round the World, between the Years 1816-1819, London, 1823, p. 87. ” G.H. Von Langsdorff, Voyages and Travels in Various Parts o f the World, during the Years 1803, 1804, 1803, 1806 and 1807, Carlisle, 1817, p. 413. “ Fleurieu, A Voyage, I, p. 422. “ Roquefeuil, A Voyage, p. 92. “ John Hoskins, Memorandum [August 1792], in H ow ay (ed.). Voyages o f the "Columbia, p. 486; Puget, Log, 27 April 1793, Peter Puget, Log o f the Proceedings o f His M ajesty’ s Armed Tender Chatham Lieutenant Peter Puget Acting Commander 12 D ay o f January 1793, microfilm, University o f British Columbia Library, p. 40. “ D’W olf, Voyage, p. 18, for N ew itty see p. 17. “ Samuel D orr to Ebenezer Dorr, 16 August 1801, Ebenezer D orr, D orr Marine Collec­ tion, 1795-1820, M SS, PA BC . “ Richard J . Cleveland, Voyages and Commercial Enterprises of the Sons o f N ew England, N ew York, 1865, p. 94. “ Haswell, Log, 25 April 1792, in H ow ay (ed.), Voyages o f the “ Columbia,” p. 323. “ Howay (ed.), “ W illiam Sturgis,” p. 20. “ Cook, Journal, 18 April 1778, in Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part 1, p. 302; and cf. Bancroft, History of British Columbia, p. 4. “ Roquefeuil, A Voyage, p. 97. “ Meares, Voyages, p. 148. 51Dixon, A Voyage, p. 204. “ Ingraham, Journal, 2 September 1791, in Kaplanoff (ed.), Ingraham’s Journal, p. 146. “ Howay, “ An Outline Sketch,” p. 10. “ Ingraham, Journal, 2 September 1791, in Kaplanoff (ed.), Ingraham's Journal, p. 147. “ D ’W olf, Voyage, p. 18. “ Fleurieu, A Voyage, p. 283. 5,See for example Meares, Voyages, p. 120; and Ingraham, Journal, 5 August 1791, in Kaplanoff (ed.), Ingraham's Journal, p. 126. “ Ingraham, Journal, II August 1791, in Kaplanoff (ed.), Ingraham’s Journal, p. 130; Hoskins, Narrative, January 1792, in H ow ay (ed.), Voyages o f the "Columbia, p. 265. s9Suria, Journal, 13 August 1791, in H enry R. W agner (ed.), Journal o f Thomas de Suria o f his Voyage with Malaspina to the Northwest Coast of America in 1791, Glendale, 1936, p. 274. “ Jewitt, Journal, 24 N ovem ber 1803, Joh n Jew itt, A Journal Kept at Nootka Sound . . . , Boston, 1807, p. 13. '■ 'Puget, Log, 16 April 1793, Puget, Log o f the Chatham, pp. 39-40. “ Cf. Ingraham, Journal, 10 Ju ly 1791, in Kaplanoff (ed.), Ingraham ’s Journal, p. 102, and Eliza, Journal, 27 M arch 1799, [Eliza], Journal o f the Eliza, February-M ay 1799, photocopy, S C , p. 13. 63Eliza, Journal, 27 March 1799, p. 28. K o w owned these ermine skins before Sturgis glutted the Kaigani market with them in 1806, see H ow ay (ed.), “ W illiam Sturgis, p. 22. “ Cleveland Log, 27 Jun e 1799, R.J. Cleveland, Log Kept by Capt. Richard Cleveland, 10 January 1799 to 4 M ay 1804, M S, SC . “ Cleveland, Log, 17 June 1799; Meares, Voyages, p. 128; D ’W olf, Voyage, p. 18; and

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Hoskins, Narrative, Ju ly 1791, in H ow ay (ed.), Voyages o f the "Columbia,” p. 198. “ C o o k did not anchor at Yuquot (called Friendly C o ve b y Europeans) but at Ship Cove (now called Resolute Cove) on the southwest tip o f Bligh Island. But it seems likely that the people who had a summer village at Yuquot were the ones controlling the trade with the expedition. 67C ook, Journal, 18 April 1778, Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part 1, p. 302. “ C ook, Journal, 1 April 1778, in Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part 1, p. 299. See also Charles C lerke, Journal, [April 1778], in Beaglehole (ed.), Journals, part 2, p. 1326. “ Ingraham, Journal, 2 August 1791, in Kaplanoff (ed.), Ingraham’s Journal, p. 121. 70Vancouver, A Voyage, I, pp. 331-332,346 and 349; Jan e (trans.), A Spanish Voyage, pp. 7475; Menzies, Journal, 20 Ju ly 1792, in C .F . Newcom be (ed.), Menzies Journal of Vancouver’s Voyage April to October 1792, Archives o f British Columbia Memoir No. V, Victoria, 1923, p. 88. 71Hoskins, Narrative, January 1792, in H ow ay (ed.), Voyages o f the "Columbia," p. 265. 72Meares, Voyages, p. 142; M agee, Log, 31 M ay 1793, [Bernard M agee], Log o f the Jefferson, photocopy, SC . 1'Eliza, Journal, 5 M ay 1799. 7iEliza, Journal, 4 March 1799, p. 13. 75Puget, Log o f the Chatham, p. 52. '’See H oway, “ An Outline Sketch,” p. 9; and Christon I. Archer, “ The Transient Presence: A Re-Appraisal o f Spanish Attitudes toward the Northwest Coast in the Eighteenth Century,” B C Studies, no. 18, 1973, p. 29. 77The figures are based on a series o f articles by F.W . H oway, “ A List ofT rading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1785-1794,” Transactions o f the Royal Society o f Canada (hereafter cited as T R S C ), third series, X X IV , section 2, 1930, pp. m -13 4 ; “ A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1795-1804,” T R SC , third series, XXV, section 2, 1931, pp. 117-149; “ A List o fT rad in g Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1805-1814,” T R SC , third series, X X V I, section 2, 1932, pp. 43-86; “ A List ofTrading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1815-1819,” T R SC , third series, X X V II, section 2, ■ 933. PP- i>9- ' 47; “ A List o fT rad in g Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1820-1825,” T R SC , third series, X X V III, section 2, 1934, pp. 11-49. The percentages o f vessels making more than one visit are probably a little conservative as the records for some o f the single season voyages are o f dubious authenticity. For the same reason the total figure is only approximate. 78Ingraham, Journal, 12 August 1791, in Kaplanoff (ed.), Ingraham’s Journal, p. 132. "'Haswell, Log, 16 September 1788, in H ow ay (ed.), Voyages o f the "Columbia," p. 49. “"Puget, Log, 2 7 ju ly 1793, Puget, Log o f the Chatham, p. 71; Edward Belcher, Narrative of a Voyage Round the World Performed in Her Majesty’s Ship Sulpher, during the Years 18361842..........London, 1843, I, p. 111. alThe distinction between ‘directed’ and ‘ non-directed’ culture change is made by Ralph Linton (ed.), Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes, Gloucester, Mass., 1963, p. 502. 82F.W . Howay, W .N . Sage, and H .F. Angus, British Columbia and the United States, the North Pacific Slope from Fur Trade to Aviation, Toronto etc., 1942, p. 12. “'M eares, Voyages, pp. 141-142.

Missions to the Indians of British Columbia r o b in f i s h e r

Effective missionary work among the Indians o f British Columbia did not begin until the middle o f the nineteenth century, and yet the early missionaries apparently met with rapid and remarkable success. B y the beginning o f the twentieth century virtually all o f the Indians were sufficiently convinced by missionary teaching to declare themselves Christian. Many factors explain this Indian response to Christianity. The nature of the traditional Indian cultures, the consequences o f contact between the Indians and the European fur-traders and settlers, the back­ ground and objectives o f the missionaries, and the techniques that they used in British Columbia all had a bearing on the Indian reaction to the missionaries and their message. THE TRADITIONAL INDIAN CULTURES

By the time o f the coming o f the European, the Indians o f the area that was to become British Columbia had, over many centuries, developed cultural patterns o f great richness and diversity. On the coast, where the population was concentrated, the Indian cultures were among the most vigorous and elaborate in North America. The boundaries o f these cultures may be defined along linguistic lines. There were at least twenty-four mutually exclusive languages, representing seven o f the eleven major Indian language families in Canada. The great cultural diversity makes generalizations about the Indians SO U RC E: Joh n Veillette and G ary W hite, editors. Early Indian Village Churches: Wooden Frontier Architecture in British Columbia. Vancouver: University o f British Columbia Press, 1977, pp. 1—11. Reprinted by permission o f the author and University o f British Columbia Press.

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both difficult and dubious. Even though the northwest coast, for instance, is often seen as a single culture area, the common patterns should not obscure the important variations between the groups. On the northern coast, the cultures o f the Haida and the Tsimshian were similar but not the same, and there were considerable differences between the Haida and the Coast Salish to the south. Both the Haida and the Tsimshian had very clearly defined social structures and matrilineal kinship systems. In both societies the local group was divided into clans, whose members were only permitted to marry men or women belonging to another one; but Haida villages were split into two clans— Eagle and Raven— while Tsimshian groups had three or even four— Eagle, Raven, Wolf, and Killer Whale. Similarly, Haida and Tsimshian art shared common characteristics, but the bold austerity o f the figures on Haida totem poles contrasted sharply with the crowded, fussy groupings on many Tsimshian poles. Among the Coast Sahsh, social divisions were not so clearly defined as they were in the northern groups. Kinship tended to be determined patrilineally, and clans did not exist. Coast Sahsh art, too, was quite different. In the eyes o f many European beholders, it was also less impressive than Haida art. There was a fundamental division between the Indians o f the coast and those who hved inland. On the coast the Indians lived in an abundant maritime environment and had evolved a complex social structure, elaborate and opulent ceremonies, and a highly stylized art form. East of the coastal mountains the natural environment was less prolific, and in order to gather the resources o f the land, the Indians had to be more mobile. Partly as a consequence o f this mobility, the social organization o f the Interior Indians was looser, and, in comparison with the coast Indians, their ritual and material culture appeared less elaborate. Given this basic division between the coast and the Interior, there was also great cultural variety among the inland groups. Those Interior Indians who were in contact with the coast absorbed some features o f the coastal cultures. The Chilcotin, for example, had a version o f the potlatch ceremony typical o f the coastal groups. In the southeast, many aspects o f the Kootenay Indian culture were similar to features o f the culture o f the plains Indians, whom they contacted during the annual buffalo hunt east o f the Rockies. While there was great cultural variety, there were a number o f aspects o f the traditional Indian way o f life that probably assisted the work o f the missionaries. Christian missionaries in other parts o f the world found it difficult to work among indigenous peoples who were constantly on the move. Frequently, they attempted to convince nomadic groups to adopt a settled, preferably agricultural, way o f life. But this change in lifestyle

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was not quite so necessary among the Indians o f the northwest coast o f British Columbia. During the summer the larger groups split up into smaller units that scattered to the various food-gathering locations, but they always spent the winter in the large plank houses o f the permanent villages, where the missionaries could work with them at one place. With summer over and the material needs o f man attended to, the winter was traditionally the period for exploring and celebrating the spiritual aspects o f life. It was the time for winter dancing and for podatching— the ritual in which the Indians gave property away to establish their prestige and position. Much o f the dancing and ceremony that frequently accompanied these rituals was designed to propitiate mythical figures. The missionaries later objected strenuously to most of these practices, but the ritual and ceremony were those o f a people accustomed to exploring the spiritual dimension; ultimately, Indian spirituality was not entirely incompatible with Christianity. The Indians paid homage to spiritual and mythical beings who were then expected to work for man, to protect him and help provide for his needs. I f the Indians decided to accept the Christian God and he proved effective, his name could simply be added to those o f their existing deities. Within most Indian cultures the connection between the spiritual and the material worlds was represented by the shaman, a man who fulfilled the functions o f both doctor and priest and called on the assistance o f the spirits to cure physical maladies. Because their roles were so similar, the shaman and the missionary came into instant conflict; but because the Indians were familiar with the functions o f the shaman, they could readily appreciate the intentions o f the missionaries. Similarly, the presence o f strong leaders in their own societies meant that the Indians were accustomed to the kind o f role that the missionaries would attempt to assume. Although Indian chiefs led through prestige and influence rather than power and authority, Indian societies in British Columbia were definitely hierarchical, and leadership was well developed. Many missionaries had strong and forceful personalities, and they tended to usurp traditional leadership roles at the same time as they built upon them. Sometimes the conversion o f an Indian leader could influence the decision o f Indians o f lower rank. CONSEQUENCES OF EUROPEAN CONTACT

I

During the fur-trading period from the 1780s to the 1850s acculturative forces changed and modified but did not disrupt the Indian cultures. The fur trade itself introduced new wealth that stimulated a flowering o f art and ceremony without upsetting basic cultural patterns. In fact, some

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Indian groups— or perhaps more accurately, some Indian leaders_ were able to exercise a great deal o f control over the fur trade. They became very wealthy and, in a society where the two were closely related, also very powerful. But while disparities in wealth and power may have increased, the Indians remained in control o f their own situation. One other effect o f contact in the fur-trading period had a bearing on later developments. As the Indians moved to be closer to the centres o f trade, larger concentrations o f population sometimes devel­ oped. And it was often among groups o f Indians who had established themselves near a trading post like Fort Simpson that the missionaries began their work. By the late 1850s, when the missionaries began arriving in appreciable numbers, the fur trade was passing, and the Indians were being affected by the disruptive pressures o f the settlement frontier. Gold miners and settlers who came to British Columbia began to utilize the resources of land, sea, and river increasingly to the exclusion o f the Indians. As a consequence the pace o f cultural change among the Indians increased rapidly. After the mainland colony was established in 1858, government land policy invariably reflected the views o f the settlers, and it had the effect o f confining the Indians on smaller and smaller reserves. These were often too small to produce a livelihood, and some Indians moved to the towns in order to benefit from the economic opportunities that they offered. But while they were cutting their ties with the old culture Indians were not made welcome by the new. Drunkenness and disease, particularly, were associated with the towns, and these evils concerned Indian elders who worried about the erosion o f the traditional cultures. It was with this environment that the missionaries began to be effective. Indeed, some historians o f Christian missions to indigenous peoples have argued that a degree o f cultural disruption is a prerequisite for missionary success; only in a situation where old ways and values are proving ineffective or are being called into question will new ones be considered.

THE MISSIONARIES AND THEIR BACKGROUND

The missionaries who came to British Columbia arrived conscious of their personal limitations but with a prodigious confidence in the power o f their God, in the efficacy o f their religion, and in the superiority of their culture. They were not just the representatives o f mid-nineteenthcentury Christianity but also o f western European culture; and they came with the firm intention o f effecting social as well as religious change among the Indians.

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They came largely as a result o f developments o f religious thought in Europe- The nineteenth century saw a new surge o f interest in missions in the Roman Catholic Church. Old orders were reorganized and again assumed a missionary role, and new orders especially devoted to missionary work were founded. Among these new orders was the Congregation o f Missionary Oblates o f M ary Immaculate, which was established in 1826 by Eugene de Mazenod. It became the major Roman Catholic missionary order in British Columbia. The Protestant missionaries espoused a form o f Christianity that was the product o f a spiritual revolution in the late eighteenth century. This revolution had given birth not only to Methodism but also to an evangelical movement within the Anglican church. In the late 1850s a resurgence o f this evangelical movement led to the formation o f new missionary societies, while older ones like the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) attracted increased support and a growing number o f recruits. These recruits were often men and women whose first conversion to an intensely felt form o f Christianity was followed by a second conversion to the missionary vocation. A vivid realization o f personal sinfulness led to a desire to be, in John W esley’s words, Bom again of the spirit. This experience o f personal rebirth led to a desire to be instrumental in the salvation o f others, to be obedient to the biblical injunction to preach the gospel to every creature, and particularly to save the perishing heathen from Satan’s grasp. The missionaries saw this task as a great opportunity. According to them, man without God was utterly evil, and only their efforts could save the unconverted from eternal damnation. As one who came to British Columbia asked rhetorically, Whatjoy can be equal to this? To have a part in the deliverance of whole nations from the power of Satan, and from ignorance, to the knowledge of the true God. They believed that all men were equal, since before God all souls were equal; to have believed otherwise would have been to invalidate their vocation. But at the same time, they also believed that only through their work could the potential equality o f native peoples become a real equality. While this deeply and sincerely felt religious motivation was para­ mount, other factors also drove these individuals to labour in isolated parts o f the world among peoples whose way o f life was so different from their own. Many were men o f humble birth who had struggled to nse above their origins. For some the decision to work as a missionary was an extension o f their drive for success in the secular world. As missionaries in foreign lands they could achieve the social respectability positions o f leadership that they had striven for at home. In addition, missionary candidates were often men o f great energy and force who

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hoped to find in the mission field a freedom o f action and a scope for their enterprise that was denied them in Europe. Some were impelled by a simple desire to live in an exotic land, or by the same love o f adventure that sent explorers to far away places. THE MISSIONARIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Franciscan friars accompanied the first Spanish explorers to the north­ west coast o f North America, but their confident expectation that large numbers would immediately accept their teachings was not realized. When the Hudson’s Bay Company developed its operations west of the Rockies in the first half o f the nineteenth century, Roman Catholic missionaries sometimes traveled with the fur brigades north from Fort Vancouver on the Columbia River. In some places these men baptized large numbers o f Indians, but few o f them were genuinely converted. In 1829, the first Protestant missionary, the Reverend Jonathan Green, came to the area and visited several locations on the northwest coast. His advice that a mission should be established in the area was apparently ignored by the society which he represented, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Even the missionaries conceded that these first contacts with the Indians were superficial. It was not until the late 1850s that missionary work was intensified and became organized enough to produce real results. Roman Catholic priests worked on Vancouver Island following its establishment as a British colony in 1849. Then, in 1858, the Oblates of Mary Immaculate established a centre for their operations at Esquimalt, and in the same year the Sisters o f Saint Ann arrived in Victoria to begin their work. In the previous year William Duncan had arrived, the first and the most famous o f the Church Missionary Society’s representatives to come to British Columbia. And in 1859, the Society for the Propa­ gation o f the Gospel in Foreign Parts, another Church o f England agency, sent its first missionaries to the area. Also in 1859, Methodist missionaries from Upper Canada arrived to begin their work on the west coast. During the 1860s and 1870s the missionaries extended their operations to include most o f the Indian groups o f the coast and the southern Interior. In October 1857, Duncan left Victoria and moved to Fort Simpson to begin preaching and teaching among the Tsimshian. Five years later, he took a group o f his followers and established the model village at Metlakatla. Like many missionaries, Duncan was egocentric and obdurate, personality traits which were intensified by living for long periods in relative isolation among an alien people. He refused to accept

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ordination and to administer the sacrament o f Holy Communion to his Tsimshian villagers, and, when the Reverend William Ridley was appointed over him as the first bishop o f Caledonia, he refused to accept episcopal authority. In 1887 as a result o f this conflict he moved to Annette Island in Alaska and founded N ew Metlakatla. In spite o f personality differences, other missionaries worked with Duncan at Metlakatla before moving o ff to estabhsh their own missions among the Tsimshian. At Kincolith on the Nass River, the Reverend Robert Tomlinson founded a missionary village. He modeled the settle­ ment on Metlakatla, as did the Reverend J.B . McCullagh at Aiyansh in 1883. Work began among the Queen Charlotte Haida when the Reverend W.H. Collison established the Masset mission in 1878, and two years later a CM S mission to the Kwakiutl was started. Other Anglicans, under the auspices o f the Society for the Propagation o f the Gospel, began missions on both Vancouver Island and the lower main­ land. During the first twenty years o f their work in British Columbia, the Methodists concentrated their forces on the lower mainland and the northern coast. The first o f them limited their impact on the Indians by ministering to the European and the native populations at the same time. It was Thomas Crosby who developed the Methodist Indian mission as a separate entity. Arriving in 1862, Crosby was both young and enthu­ siastic. He began his work at Nanaimo, later moved to Chilliwack, and in 1873 estabhshed a mission at Port Simpson. Crosby’s work there led to the estabhshment o f a substantial permanent village which in many ways rivaled Metlakatla. Moving out from their centre in Esquimalt, the Oblates greatly extended the area o f their influence in the 1860s. The first mainland station had been estabhshed in 1859 when Father Charles Pandosy began work among the Okanagan Indians. Other stations were founded in the Interior at Kamloops and Williams Lake, but it was in the lower Fraser Valley that Roman Cathohc influence was strongest. In 1861 Father Leon Forquet began Saint M ary’s mission near the present site o f Mission City, and it soon became a major centre of missionary work among the Salish. Particularly in the Sechelt area, the Oblates developed a system o f model villages so that they could more effectively control practically every aspect o f the hves o f their converts. The success o f these villages can be measured partly by the fact that in 1871 the missionaries admin­ istered the sacrament o f confirmation to all o f the Sechelt Indians. The Oblates were also active on Vancouver Island, although they had their most notable failure among the resolute Kwakiutl o f Fort Rupert. This

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mission was eventually abandoned because the Indians showed no sign at that time o f giving up their traditional beliefs and accepting those of Christianity. In the last two decades o f the nineteenth century, denominations already working in British Columbia sent missionaries into new areas until they covered nearly all o f the province. Both the Anglicans and the Methodists moved up the Skeena River to minister to the Gitksan of the Hazelton area. The Roman Cathohcs also extended their influence northwards. In 1880 Father A.G. Morice arrived in British Columbia and was sent to Williams Lake. He moved to Fort Saintjames in 1885, and for nearly twenty years he was the dominant missionary personality in the northern Interior. In addition to becoming widely respected for his missionary work, Morice also became well known for his extensive and diverse writing on the development o f the Roman Catholic Church in western Canada, the history o f northern British Columbia, and the culture and language o f the Carrier Indians. In the two decades between 1880 and 1900, new denominations became active. Among the Tsimshian groups, the Salvation Army met with some success and in 1898 set up a village at Glen Vowell near the Indian village o f Kispiox. The Presbyterian Church, too, began work, particularly among the Nootka on the west coast o f Vancouver Island. Where denominational spheres o f influence coincided or overlapped rivalry sometimes led to conflict. Some missionaries even seemed to expend more o f their energy fighting the influence o f other denomi­ nations than converting the Indians. Hostility, particularly between Protestants and Roman Catholics, was not uncommon. The Church Missionary Society held that Romanised heathenism was far more difficult to deal with than the original form, and the Methodist missionary John Robson claimed that the Roman Cathohcs only effected superficial change among the Indians when they baptized them and taught them the sign o f the cross without demanding any fundamental alteration of lifestyle. Eventually, however, accommodations had to be reached, and the present distribution o f Indian churches corresponds to separate areas o f denominational influence.

MISSIONARY OBJECTIVES

There can be no doubt that the missionaries o f all the denominations, particularly in the early years, were aggressive agents o f change, both spiritual and secular, among the Indians o f British Columbia. According to the Reverend George Hills, the first bishop o f Columbia, the mission­

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ary laboured to inculcate a new set o f religious beliefs that would cleanse the Indians from the awful superstitions in which they were . . . sunk. The missionaries demanded that their converts experience an inner change of values and that they totally eradicate their indigenous religious beliefs and replace them with the tenets o f mid-nineteenth-century Chris­ tianity. With their vivid understanding o f sin and its consequences in hell, the missionaries perceived this form o f spiritual conversion as an urgent matter. But they required even more than spiritual change o f their Indian converts. Along with an inner conversion to the new religion, thoroughgoing outward changes in behaviour were called for, so that the Christian Indian would become a completely new being in every way. The missionaries saw this temporal facet o f their work as no less pressing than their spiritual responsibilities. William Duncan asserted in his first report from British Columbia that civilization apart from Christianity has no vitality; but he, and indeed most missionaries, also believed that the reverse was equally true. Accordingly, an attack on the social practices o f the Indians was to accompany the conversion o f the heathen. As Tomlinson put it, the objective o f the CM S missionaries was not only to overthrow dark spiritu­ alism and plant instead Christian truth but also to change the natives from ignorant bloodthirsty cruel savages into quiet useful subjects of our Gracious Queen. The Roman Cathohcs likewise demanded great social reforma­ tion, although, possibly as a result o f centuries o f missionary experience, they were slightly less dogmatic about it than the Protestants. There were many aspects o f the traditional Indian cultures that the missionaries objected to and therefore, particularly in the early years, sought to change. At Lytton the Reverend J.B . Good began his mission by pointing out to the Indians, who had requested his presence, all their manifold hypocrisy, uncleanness, and idleness, and many other sins and evil practices. The potlatch rittial was essential to the culture o f the coast Indians, but the missionaries saw it asfoolish, wasteful and demoralizing and perhaps the most formidable obstacle in the way o f their work. iLwas lafgely as a result o f missionary pressure that the Federal Government declared the ceremony illegal in the 1884 amendment to the Indian Act. Although the potlatch is probably the best known example, it was only one o f the many Indian practices that the missionaries tried to eradicate. When Thomas Crosby was at Nanaimo, the Indians asked him if they could continue some o f their traditional customs as long as they also attended church and sent their children to school. But Crosby would not bend. He told the Indians that they must give up all the old ways: the dance, the potlatch etc., it is all bad. Such determination was typical o f

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missionaries who wanted to teach the Indians that Christianity meant nothing less than the subversion of every evil work and no compromise. MISSIONARY TECHNIQUES

Preaching and teaching were the most important techniques used by the missionaries to achieve change. The missionaries’ first task when making contact with different groups o f Indians was to begin to com­ municate the new ideas through sermons. To this end, many o f them struggled to learn the Indian languages. Duncan had only been at Fort Simpson for a few months before he first preached to the Indians in Tsimshian. One can only imagine what garbled version o f Christian theology he conveyed to the Indians under these circumstances. But the missionaries were certainly not satisfied with the fur traders’ Chinook jargon, since they intended to have a much more fundamental and lasting influence on the minds o f the Indians. Through their schools, where they met their pupils on a day-to-day basis, the missionaries hoped to re-educate the young in particular. The school was the second most important building on the mission station, and instructing the Indians was an integral and important part of the work o f most missionaries. Pupils were taught the basics o f reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as religious knowledge and some o f the “ useful arts” o f western civilization. While they were often unsuc­ cessful, the missionaries also made efforts to inculcate habits o f “ order, discipline, and cleanliness. ” Their methods o f teaching were frequently those that had been developed in British Sunday schools. The monitorial system involved the older pupils instructing the younger ones by a question-and-answer method, and it was widely used, especially in the Protestant missions. It had two advantages for an isolated missionary: it required a limited amount o f equipment; and a minimum number of teachers could instruct the maximum number o f pupils. Its disadvantage was that it involved rote learning rather than “ education” in the broadest sense o f the word. On a larger scale, missionaries commonly set about their work by establishing separate Christian villages. There they could isolate their followers from outside influences and exercise greater control over both potential and actual converts. Within the confines o f these villages, the missionaries regulated nearly every aspect o f the lives o f their congrega­ tions. Lists o f rules were drawn up, and Indians were appointed to police them. At the same time, some missionaries also established village

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industries to provide for the Indians’ material needs. Frequently the lumber mills and workshops that the missionaries founded provided much o f the woodwork for the village churches. The Church Missionary Society’s showplace at Metlakatla was the most famous but by no means the only example o f the tightly regulated missionary village designed to effect radical and wholesale adjustments in the Indians’ way o f life. The churches that the missionaries directed the Indians to build provide a measure o f the degree o f cultural change they meant to achieve. The Indians, especially those o f the northern coast, had developed a very powerful style o f house building using the readily available cedar. But whether the churches were imposing structures like the ones at Metlakatla and Sechelt or rudimentary chapels like those at Shackan and Pinchi, their style was European rather than Indian. While they were sometimes built o f cedar, they included many features developed by European stone masons that were often unnecessarily ornate or even superfluous in wood constructions. At one time, the church at Metlakatla had a number o f crude Tsimshian wooden sculp­ tures in one o f its side chapels, but this was the exception that proves the rule. In the main, the churches expressed the missionaries’ overall intent to replace that which was Indian with that which was European. Today it is fashionable to be critical o f these early missionaries, because they were so aggressive in their efforts to modify Indian cul­ tures. Apart from the fact that these criticisms often involve an ahistoricaljudgment, whereby nineteenth-century men are condemned for not behaving according to twentieth-century precepts, it is frequently forgotten that the Indians were experiencing severe cultural disruption in the second half o f the nineteenth century as a result o f other European contact. Indeed, so disturbing were the changes facing the Indians that many settlers in British Columbia thought that there was little point in making provision for them, since they were destined, sooner or later, to duTout. The missionaries were more.optimistic. They very definitely saw a future for the Indians, although it was a future seen in terms o f the Indian closely imitating the European. For the missionaries, the possi­ bility that the Indians might become extinct as a result o f white contact only increased the urgency o f their work. They thus took the humani­ tarian view that colonization need not be a complete disaster for the indigenous people, provided the right steps were taken rapidly to save the Indians from the worst effects o f settlement. Having taken this position, the missionaries-offemacted to protect the Indians from the most destructive consequences o f the settlement

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frontier. They frequently, for example, acted as advocates for tk Indians in their disagreements with the government over the land —questiotlvMany o f the earliest petitions sent to the government ofBntish Columbia were written by missionaries and expressed Indian grievances about land policy. In 1868 when a group o f lower Fraser chiefs wrote to Governor Frederick Seymour complaining about the reduction o f their reserves, they acted in consultation with Father Paul Durieu. Later bishop o f N ew Westminster, Durieu supported their objections again in 1874, and indie same year, Father C.J. Grandidier wrote at length to the "Victoria Standard describing Indian complaints over land in the Interior The Roman Catholics were not alone in this kind o f activity, for William Duncan, along with other Protestants, also objected to the government’s treatment o f the Indians and their land. The missionaries, o f course, had an ulterior interest in the land question. I f the Indians became settled farmers, missionary work would be made easier. But the Indians could only settle if the government reserved sufficient good land for them. Ulterior motives aside, however, the missionaries were correct in their view that the Indians had to have some viable economic activity as a base i f they were to play a significant role in British Columbia society. Apart from the issues involving Indian land, one o f the social prob­ lems that most concerned the missionaries was alcohol. They wanted to keep their Indian followers away from the temptations o f ardent spirits and therefore did their best to limit the illegal activities o f whisky sellers. Even in the early years o f setdement drunkenness had become a serious matter among those Indians who had access to liquor. Prostitution and its attendant disease were further less desirable aspects o f European civili­ zation from which the missionaries tried to protect the Indians. Ironically, to the extent that they encouraged peaceful relations between Indians and Europeans, the missionaries also assisted the advance o f the settlement frontier. But there was an important distinc­ tion between the missionaries and the settlers. The impact o f the settlers on the Indians was largely destructive. Indian cultures were eroded and the settlers proposed nothing to take their place. The missionaries con­ sciously tried to eradicate many Indian customs, but they also presented an alternative. The notion that the missionaries brought only unmitigated destruc­ tion to the Indian cultures is perhaps as naive as that o f earlier missionary apologists, who had nothing but praise for every missionary activitySuch a view also fails to recognize any resilience on the part o f the

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Indians- During the first years o f missionary work in British Columbia, the native population responded in a great many ways— ranging from absolute acceptance to total rejection— to the missionaries and their message. INDIAN RESPONSES

It is clear that by the turn o f the century, when the influence o f the missionaries was probably at its peak, most o f the Indians o f British Columbia were at least nominally Christian. The census return in the annual report o f the Department o f Indian Affairs for 1900 indicates that of a total Indian population o f 24,696 in the province, 19,504 called themselves Christian. Only 2,696 were enumerated as pagan, while the religion o f another 2,900 was unknown. The Roman Catholic church had the largest number o f Indian adherents with 11,846, and the Angli­ cans and Methodists were second and third with 4,210 and 3,068 respec­ tively. The largest groups o f Indians still holding traditional beliefs were on the coast, particularly among the Nootka and to a lesser extent among the Kwakiutl, Tsimshian, and Haida. B y 1920 this pattern was little changed. O f a total Indian population o f 25,694, 21,560 were recorded as being Christian. The proportions belonging to the three leading denominations were about the same, although fewer— 1,421— were described as adhering to aboriginal beliefs. Some o f these converts undoubtedly observed only the form o f the new religion. Contemporary sceptics often claimed that the Indians merely recited the liturgy o f their church without making any great change in their way o f life. Many were probably attracted to Christianity by the novelty o f the ritual and the teaching. It has also been suggested that indigenous people who accept Christianity do so out o f a desire for the material goods to which the missionaries provided access. In some cases this may have been the dominant motivation, yet there is no reason to assume that other Indians did not approach Christianity on the level of ideas and embrace it for theological reasons. There obviously were Indians who experienced a conversion that involved absolute changes in their beliefs and in their way o f life. Certainly the missionaries, in their enthusiasm, considered that the power o f God had been demonstrated °y the raising of a large body of peoplefrom the degradations of heathenism to the position of happy contented members of civilized society. Although their numbers were always decreasing, other Indians absoutely rejected Christianity. They dismissed the religious teaching o f the

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missionaries or simply refused to give up as many o f their traditional customs as the uncompromising missionaries demanded. Resistance was particularly strong from those who had a greater investment in the continuation o f the old lifestyle. However, while older people and Indian leaders often rejected Christianity in the early years, it is not true that only slaves or people o f low rank were converted. Among some groups resistance took the form o f attempts to reassert traditional Indian culture in the face o f the missionary inroads. Duncan at Metlakatla had to face at least one revolt led by a Tsimshian shaman supported by one of the traditional chiefs. Often the result o f these tensions was to divide Indian communities into pro- and anti-missionary factions. From the beginning o f missionary work in British Columbia, the missionaries were dogmatic in their approach, but the Indians were flexible in their response. Christianity was thus absorbed by Indians who also retained many o f the old beliefs and customs. Soon after the initial missionary contacts, “ prophet” cults sprang up that were a mixture of Christian and Indian elements. Typically these movements were led by Indians who had been in contact with missionary teaching, and the Reverend Good recalled one such movement on the Fraser River in the 1870s. The Indian prophet and his followers looked forward to the day when the Europeans would be ejected from the area and all that they had taken would be restored to the Indians. Less anti-European and more permanent in its influence has been the Shaker church. Established in Washington State in the 1880s, this sect later moved to southern British Columbia where it still has some members. While most Indians today are still at least nominally Christian, the increasing tendency has been for Christianity to become integrated within Indian cultures, so that among many groups there now exists an amalgam o f Christian and traditional beliefs. Spirit dancing is still carried on, particularly among the Coast Salish, and winter dancing continues among other coastal groups. Even the shaman, whose activities were attacked so vigorously by the missionaries, still treats some illnesses. The missionaries were certainly both ethnocentric and intransigent in their denunciation o f many Indian practices, but the Indian cultures did not suddenly collapse. The fact that many o f the fine churches built by the missionaries are now derelict or in poor repair shows that they did not impose their will and their culture entirely. In the long run, the alien symbols have often been rejected or modified by Indians who have remained resistant to many o f the pressures of acculturation.

Duncan o f Metlakatla: the Victorian Origins o f a Model Indian Community jean usher

“There is a happy spot of busy life Where order reigns where hushed the din of strife, Harmonious brethren neath paternal rule, Ply their glad tasks in Metlakatla’s school, There Duncan holds supreme his peaceful throne, His power unquestioned, and their rights his own. Anvil and hammer, saw and wheel resound, And useful arts of industry abound While faith and knowledge find an altar there. " x The inspiration for such a eulogy was Metlakatla, a Christian Indian village established in 1862 not far from the mouth of the Skeena River in British Columbia. By 1876 under the direction o f William Duncan, an Anglican lay missionary, this settlement o f some nine hundred Tsimshian Indians had begun to attract marked attention both in Britain and Canada as an outstanding example o f missionary endeavour, and o f the industrial potential o f the American Indian. The Earl o f Dufferin after a vice-regal visit to Metlakatla in 1876 spoke of the “ neat Indian Maidens in Mr. Duncan’ s School at Metla­ katla, as modest and as well dressed as any clergyman’ s daughter in an English parish” and advised British Columbians that “ what you want are not resources but human beings to develop them and consume them. Raise your 30,000 Indians to the level Mr. Duncan has taught us they can be brought, and consider what an enormous amount o f vital power you will have added to your present strength.” 2 SOURCE: W .L. Morton, editor. The Shield of Achilles: Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age. Toronto and Montreal: M cClelland and Stewart, 1968, pp. 286-310. Reprinted by permission o f the author and M cClelland and Stewart, publishers.

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With its parallel rows o f neat white houses, gardens and picket fences, its school, store, street lamps, gaol, and dominated by a church reputed to be the largest west o f Chicago and north o f San Francisco, the village presented an imposing picture o f civilized life in the wilderness. The society developed within this environment was hardly less impressive, particularly when seen in contrast to the life o f the heathen Indians o f the area. Rank and class had apparently been abolished, as had liquor, potlatching and other heathen customs. Church attendance and family prayers had become the rule, whilst day schools, evening schools and Sunday schools were well attended by adults and children. Government was by a council o f elders and enforcement o f law and order was carried out by a corps o f native constables. Besides encouraging the traditional pursuits o f hunting and fishing, Duncan claimed to have introduced such trades as coopering, weaving, rope making, printing and had built a variety o f workshops and a saw mill for the Indians’ use. European clothing and cleanliness marked the appearance o f the Metlakatla Indians, who spent their leisure time in hymn singing, playing football or participating in the activities o f the village fire brigade and the Metla­ katla brass band. The introduction o f Christianity to the Tsimshian Indians o f British Columbia had meant not only were they offered new spiritual ideas and beliefs, but an entirely different kind o f life was opened for them at the Christian village o f Metlakatla. Before Duncan’s arrival at Fort Simpson in 1857, the Tsimshian had a varied and lengthy contact with European culture. From 1775 to 1825 the maritime fur trade introduced many goods and techniques to the coastal Indians with few disruptive effects.3 Similarly the North West Com­ pany, and after 1821 the Hudson’s Bay Company posts, established among the Tsimshian served mainly to give impetus to a new growth of arts, technology and social and ceremonial life.4 The Hudson’s Bay Company had had extensive experience in dealing with Indians and aimed generally by a strict but just policy to keep the peace that was necessary for successful trade relations. The trader, in most cases, had no desire to change native society. The Indians were asked only to accept that part o f white culture they desired, and on this basis reasonably harmonious relations could be maintained. But, whereas the process of cultural diffusion in the trader-native contact situation is one o f imi­ tation, the missionary attempts to inculcate his values into the native society and asks that the native accept all the values and beliefs that he offers.5 The missionary is o f necessity a reformer and likely to make a far greater impact on native societies than other Europeans. The kind of influence he exerts and the demands he makes o f prospective converts

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will be largely characterized by his own cultural background, mores and social position.6 William Duncan began his mission to the Tsimshian Indians in 1857 under the auspices o f the Church Missionary Society, the evangelical missionary society o f the Church o f England. Born in Beverley, York­ shire in 1832, the year o f the great Reform Bill, he grew up in an era o f great ferment in Enghsh society, in an age o f reform where Evangelical and Utilitarian alike were challenging old institutions, and attempting to ameliorate or change the social conditions that industrialization had produced. “ Reform— political, religious, social, artistic— was more deeply a part o f the early Victorian temperament than was the compla­ cency o f which it has been consistently and smugly accused.” 7 In later years the Church was to claim that Duncan had been no more than a far­ sighted social worker. Yet in fact he was primarily a Christian protestant missionary, but one espousing a nineteenth century Christianity, formed in the religious, humanitarian and middle class framework o f midVictorian England. Duncan’s own cultural background is found in the larger sphere o f Victorian attitudes and reform movements and in the more particular policies and ideals o f the Church Missionary Society and o f Henry Venn. Duncan himself received little formal education and like most children of working class parents was sent out to work at the age o f thirteen. For nine years he was employed by the leather firm o f Cussons in Beverley, spending seven years as an apprentice clerk and two years as a clerk and commercial traveller. A serious and earnest young man, Duncan appears to have shunned frivolous activities and to have spent most o f his time working, reading, singing in the Church choir and teaching a Sunday School class at Beverley Minster. In his late adolescence he developed close relations with his employer Mr. G. Cussons and with his minister the Reverend E. Carr. Carr conducted a weekly bible study and prayer meeting for young men, at which Duncan was a devout and regular attendant. He received particular and fond attention from Carr and it was under his influence that Duncan decided to devote part o f his life to missionary work. Duncan seems to have had no close family ties, and although from a working class background himself, derived most o f his attitudes from these middle class men with whom he was most familiar. As an ambitious young clerk too, it was understandable that he should try to pattern himself after his employer. The Victorian middle classes, the small manufacturers, retailers,

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independent businessmen, saw their society as a dynamic one where a man was judged on his abilities and where progress and advancement depended upon the exertions and skills o f the individual. The Gospel of W ork was eminently suited to their own social and economic position Samuel Smiles’ doctrine o f Self-Help embodied this middle class view o f the road to individual success and progress, but was itself directed at the working classes. Smiles, like many o f the middle class, feared the growth o f proletarian radicalism and sought to make it unnecessary by exhorting the worker to educate himself, to find a jo y in work, to persevere, to be thrifty, dutiful and o f strong character; to change himself rather than society. Smiles emphasised in his lectures to working men in Leeds the value o f discipline and drill, “ Wonderful is the magic of drill! Drill means discipline, training, education.” s Although faith in education was characteristic o f much o f Victorian thinking, Smiles was less interested in the formal education o f the schoolroom than in the industrial training o f the workshop and the moral training o f a Christian home.9 In essence, Smiles recognized the condition o f the working classes and aimed not to change society, but to elevate the mass of the proletariat to the level o f the middle class. Yet only by the elevation of the individual could the mass be raised. He fully accepted the Victorian ideal o f a free and independent labourer, and felt that the improvement o f the individual should be initiated by a personal, moral desire rather than by government pressure, “ Whatever is done for men and classes to a certain extent takes away the stimulus and the necessity o f doing for themselves.” 10 The dominance o f middle class values and mores over a large part o f Victorian society meant that Self-Help ideas were prevalent in the attitudes o f many o f the Victorian reformers. The values o f Victorian society were derived from the humanitarian tradition o f evangelical protestantism and from the economic needs of the middle class. A dominant feature o f the era was the close relation­ ship amongst religious, economic and social ideas. Samuel Smiles’ emphasis on thrift was based on the fact that individual savings were the foundation o f the nation’s accumulation o f wealth, essential to that continued economic growth and progress which so enthralled the Victo­ rians. A thrifty worker received moral accolades too, since his savings guaranteed his independence and reinforced the Victorian faith in the idea o f the free labourer. The gospel o f work, like the protestant gospel, saw idleness as a sin, “ an abrogation o f God’s will and a dangerous opportunity to move downwards to hell.” 11 Poverty too was seen as a moral failing, since by individual action the worker could improve his

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Osition and hence improve society. Failure in this social duty was a Loral offence.

-phe religious revival o f Wesley had made Victorian religion acutely ware o f the constant inner struggle with temptation and the strong aecessity for leading a disciplined Christian life. This emphasis on discipline and authority is evident in many aspects o f Victorian society and the continuous efforts o f Christians to discipline themselves in the struggle with evil led to a concern for self improvement in secular life which gave added impetus to the ready acceptance o f the doctrine o f Self-Help. The Victorian reform movements “ arose from the intense feelings of a few individuals acting on the sensibilities o f a governing class increas­ ingly accustomed to change, increasingly persuaded o f the possibility o f progress and increasingly alarmed by industrial and urban misery. . .fit] found its most energetic expression in the Evangelicals and Utilitar­ ians. ”12 The early Victorian reformers, Evangelicals like Ashley, or Utilitarians like Edwin Chadwick and Kay-Shuttleworth, saw poverty as dependent upon the indolent disposition o f the individual. Like Samuel Smiles they felt that the interests o f the individual would best be served by freeing him from the corrupting relief and making him a free and independent agent. Such was the general philosophy behind the New Poor Law which rationalised and centralized the administration o f relief. Although they recognised the need to alleviate the overcrowding and poor sanitation they found in English cities, the reformers maintained that social conditions only reflected the moral destitution o f the people. “ The absence o f any sound moral training,’ said numerous inspectors in countless reports, “ caused the intemperance, pauperism and crime which threatened English society.” 1'’ Such ideas were eminently suited to the backgrounds o f the reformers. Many Evangelicals felt that prosperity was the earthly reward for living a moral life and that poverty must thus be a reflection o f immorality. Social evils were seen as due primarily to ignorance o f religious and moral principles. The emphasis o f the reformers on the ignorance o f the population as a general cause o f social problems, meant that a corresponding stress was laid on the necessity for more universal education. Education was seen by E.C. Tufnell, a government inspector, as “ the universal remedy, ” the Panacea for all ills. Like many Victorians, the inspectors saw education as *be agent o f progress and held optimistic, rational views o f its power to mould human nature. Men such as Dr. James Kay-Shuttleworth also believed the school had a responsibility to develop a child’s skill, and

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encouraged schools to introduce their pupils to a wide variety o f subjects such as science and music. Under the influence o f Swiss educators such as de Fellenberg, the school inspectors encouraged industrial training and farming as a means o f reforming pauper children. Just as Samuel Smiles encouraged thrift to produce moral, independent workers, the school inspectors advocated gardening to teach the future workers the fore­ thought and economy that would ensure their independence. The commissioners themselves who so influenced the social life of England in these years were endowed, as so many Victorians were, with an un-ending zeal and energy. Their reports reflected the enthusiasm they felt for their work. “ Across the length and breadth o f England, assistant commissioners reported miraculous regeneration. Their com­ munications read like letters from missionaries describing the conver­ sion and rebirth o f the heathen. ” 14 Throughout the 1840s and 1850s the steady work o f the reformers resulted in sanitary and prison reform, new approaches to the treatment o f lunacy, regulation o f merchant shipping, mines, smoke and burial grounds. The initiation o f reforms owes much to the humanitarianism, paternalism and conscience o f the Evangelicals. But the extensive investigation o f conditions, the exhaustive research, writing, inspecting and interviewing that characterised the work of the inspectors was a product o f the rational, utilitarian ideas o f Chadwick and Kay-Shuttleworth. The number o f small utopian movements in the mid-nineteenth century is evidence o f the growing realization that human life and human societies were malleable and that their form and structure could be changed as desired. Historians have tended to treat these social experiments as forms o f retreat from the realities o f the world. In fact they should be considered in the context o f the general movement for reform in the early and mid-nineteenth century. The utopian reformers sought to exert an influence on society as a whole, to produce reform and change.15 They established separate communities and hoped to prove the efficiency and practicality o f their ideas in this microcosm o f society. In England the Moravian Brethren had several community settle­ ments which lasted into the nineteenth century. The unity o f the group in secular as in religious life was emphasised, and before admittance to the community, the individual signed a “ brotherly agreement” declar­ ing willingness to abide by the rules and discipline o f the community. A council o f elders was the ruling body and had general control of economic life, education and social welfare. The rules were read aloud once a year and those guilty o f disobedience were expelled from the

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settlement.16 Impressed by the Moravian groups, John Minter Morgan in the 1840s proposed a similar scheme for self-supporting villages under the auspices o f the established church. The Church o f England SelfSupporting Village Society was formed, and aimed at “ those benefits resulting in the Moravian settlements from a more intimate connection between secular and religious affairs.” 17 The economic basis o f the communities was to be mainly agricultural (like the school inspectors, Morgan encouraged gardening) with some industrial and handicraft work. A committee o f management was to direct the community affairs, and Morgan introduced a “ strongly authoritarian note, in his emphasis on ‘codes o f conduct!’ ” 18 The community as a whole was intended to be a practical demonstration o f Christian brotherhood and unity, “ wherein each labouring for all, the exertions o f each will receive their due and proper reward— wherein the weak shall be aided and supported by the strong.” 19 Although there was little implementation o f these proposals on an extensive scale, the Church o f England Self-Supporting Village Society did in fact receive wide attention in the press, and Morgan and his adherent, James Silk Buckingham, spoke at many meetings through­ out England. The Illustrated London News in 1850 commented on Morgan’s proposals for a model town, “ It reminds us o f Bridewell or some contrivance for central inspection. . . . The idea is obviously borrowed from the unsuccessful efforts o f the State to correct the people by Bridewell’s workhouses and prisons— substituting a gentler kind of control for diet, ships, dungeons and fetters . . . . Mr. Morgan does not conceal his desire to organise the “ destitute people” and the whole society in Reductions (formal villages) similar to those by which the Jesuits drilled the Indians in Paraguay.” 20 “ The 1840s was an age o f models; model villages, model apartments, model lodging houses and even model beds.” 21 Perhaps the most spec­ tacular model was the industrial town o f Saltaire, fifty miles from Duncan’s home in Beverley. Titus Salt, a former mayor o f Bradford, a woollen manufacturer and himself a hero o f Self-Help, alarmed by a serious cholera outbreak in Bradford, began in 1851 to build a model manufacturing town for his workers. Residential and industrial areas were separate, and schools, shops and a literary institute were estab­ lished. The mill itself, a huge structure with unusually large windows for light and ventilation was a model o f industrial architecture. Though moved by humanitarian ideals, concern for the health and welfare o f his workers, Salt, a Congregationalist, felt like many Victorians that the evils o f society were not all environmental. The sign across the entrance

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to the town read “ All Beer Abandon Ye that Enter Here.” As in many model communities the element o f discipline and authority was evident at Saltaire too.22 Early Victorian social work was endowed with a strong missionary zeal. Apart from the building trusts, the alleviation o f hunger and care of orphans, its main efforts were directed at the moral failings o f the individual. Drunkenness and lust were seen as the basic problems o f the working class and temperance societies and prostitution reform move­ ments were active and well supported. The Church sisterhoods were active in the 1850s in establishing homes for penitent and wayward ladies. The sisters had strong faith in education and example and hoped to change the character o f the girls by love, prayer and the example of a religious and pious life. B y work and training in laundry and domestic work they tried to prepare the women to make an honest living for themselves.23 Thus although Duncan’s role as a missionary to the heathen would lead him inevitably into attempts at social reform, his own cultural back­ ground was also one where reformers and their ideas had captured the imagination o f many people. The nature o f Victorian reform and the values which determined it were to play an important part in establishing the Christian Indian Society o f Metlakatla. There was, however, a more particular influence evident, in the formation o f Duncan’s attitudes towards the Indians and to his concep­ tion o f his task as a missionary. As an agent o f the evangelical Church Missionary Society, he was directly influenced by their ideas and prac­ tices, through personal contacts, correspondence with the secretaries of the Society and through accounts o f other missionary work in the various journals o f the Church Missionary Society. That body was dominated in these mid-Victorian decades by the energetic and vigorous ideas o f Henry Venn, whose “ Native Church” policy established the guidelines for C.M .S. missionaries until the late 1870s. Venn’ s “ Minute on the Native Pastorate and Organisation” first published in 1851, recognised that European and American missionaries could not, even in the distant future, hope to reach all the heathen o f the world. He advocated that the European missionary act purely as an evangelist, and hoped to maintain a clear distinction between the missionary who preached to the heathen and the pastor who ministered to the congregation o f native Christians.24 The role o f the missionary was to establish a self-supporting and self-governing congregation of Native Christians, and when this had been effected, the mission would have “ attained its euthanasia and the Missionary and all the Mission

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>ncy can be transferred to the regions beyond. ” 25 From the beginning missionary was to train a native pastor and helpers who would be capable o f taking eventual control o f the congregation. “ The main underlying principle which appears to have guided Mr. Venn . . . is that foreign missions to the heathen must always be treated as a transition The man who did not train up a native clergy was building on an insecure foundation and Venn warned particularly that the skills and technology possessed by the European would tend to make him indis­ pensable to his converts and this might unnecessarily prolong his work among them. “ It may be said to have been only lately discovered in the science o f missions, that when the missionary is o f another and superior race than his converts he must not attempt to be their pastor; though they will be bound to him by personal attachment, and by a sense o f benefits received from him, they will not form a vigorous, native Church, but as a general rule they will remain in a dependent condition, and make but little progress in spiritual attainments. The same congregation under competent native pastors, would become more self-reliant, and their religion would be o f a more manly, home character. ” 27 Like Samuel Smiles, Venn appeared to see an intrinsic value in encouraging Self-Help and independence among the native Christians. Converts should not become dependent on a foreign mission but should become members o f a native church as soon as possible. Nor should they be allowed to fall into the habit o f thinking that everything should be done for them. From the beginning o f the mission they should be encouraged to contribute to a native church fund and at each stage o f development o f the mission, the missionary should inculcate the values of self support, self government and self extension. Although influenced by the problems o f personnel, the climatic difficulties for Europeans in tropical climates, and the vast field o f work to be covered, Venn was also idealistically concerned that the result o f missionary endeavour should be the establishment o f national native churches. As the church in each nation assumed a national character, he hoped it would ultimately supersede the denominational distinctions introduced by foreign missionary societies, which divided the church o f Christ in Europe and America. It was important to Venn too, that this national church be an expression to some extent o f the native people themselves. Unlike Roman Catholic missions, the C.M .S. under Venn was to make Christianity indigenous and not exotic, with many centres instead o f one.28 The ’missionaries when forming a national church were enjoined to avail

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themselves o f national habits, o f Christian headmen and o f a church council. “ Let every member feel himself doubly bound to his country by this social as well as religious society.” 29 It is interesting to note that many o f Venn’ s ideas were directly influenced by Rufus Anderson, the Secretary o f the American Board o f Commissioners for Foreign Mis­ sions. Both Venn and Anderson emphasised the importance o f the work o f the Apostle Paul, whose task had been the gathering and forming of local churches, and putting the power o f self-government and organisa­ tion in the hands o f each Christian community.30 Detailed plans were laid out by the C.M .S. to guide the formation of native churches. Each district brought under missionary action would have its converts formed into companies where they could receive daily instruction in Christianity and make regular contributions towards a church fund, a system comparable in many ways to that o f the Method­ ists in England. These companies aimed at providing mutual support and encouragement for new converts. Each company was to have an elder or Christian headman, approved o f or selected by the missionary. Weekly company meetings were to be held under him and to a large extent the converts were to be dependent on these headmen for their Christian instruction. The missionary was to hold monthly meetings o f headmen at which reports would be presented on the moral and religious conditions o f companies. Subscriptions would be handed over and the headmen would receive spiritual counsel and encouragement from the mission­ ary.31 T h e first step in the organisation o f a native church w o u ld be the for­ m ation o f one o r m ore com panies into a congregation, h aving a school­ m aster or native teacher am ongst them and supported b y their own funds. Secondly, a native congregation w o u ld be form ed under an ordained native pastorate paid b y a native church fund; and the final phase w o u ld be w hen the district conferences w o u ld com e together to organise the future o f the national church.

Venn was interested, however, not only in the expansion o f Chris­ tianity but in the kind o f native Christian that was to be created. He instructed his lay agent embarking for Abeokuta in 1853 to study the resources o f the country in marketable products and to direct the attention o f the converts towards them, so that “ these parties may rise in social position and influence while they are receiving Christian instruc­ tion and thus form themselves into a self-supporting Christian Church and give practical proof that godliness hath promise o f the life that now is, as well as that which is to come.” 32 Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, writing in 1841,33 recommended not only

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that British naval force be used to blockade the slave trade, but that Christian England should invest in Africa and attempt to stimulate agri­ culture and commerce and produce an industrial class o f African. “ These Africans, protected by Britain, guided by the missionaries, and working with capital from European merchants would . . . move inland and man factories at every strategic spot living together in little colonies, little cells o f civilisation from which the light would radiate to the regions around.” 34 Venn like Buxton, his colleague and friend, wanted to find a substitute for the profits from slave trading, and also needed to make the Christian converts self-supporting. It was thus under the influence o f Venn that the Moravian ideal o f a mission station catering for education, trades, agriculture, industry and medicine besides the teaching o f Chris­ tianity became the pattern upon which many Anglican missions were founded.35 Although in the early years o f the evangehcal revival there had been little concern for secular problems, the idea o f taking the gospel and civilization to the heathen was no novelty in the history o f the C.M .S. The Reverend Samuel Marsden, a missionary in Australia and New Zealand in the early decades o f the century, continually pressed the C.M.S. to fmd employment for the Maoris. Lacking the arts o f civiliza­ tion, the Maoris were not “ so favourably circumstanced for reception of the Gospel as civilized nations are . . . since nothing can pave the way for the Gospel but civilization.” 36 He was able to persuade the C.M .S. to send not ordained men but mechanics; a carpenter, a blacksmith, a twinespinner and a man able to teach the cultivation o f sugar cane, cotton, coffee and other marketable products. An essentially practical man, Marsden himself was active in N ew South Wales in cattle-rearing, growing grain and improving the breed o f Austrahan sheep. This was the kind o f man that Venn needed for his Christian settlements in West Africa. At least as important as the ordained missionary in the life o f the Christian villages were the lay schoolmasters, carpenters, the men who taught the mechanics o f civilization which not only enabled the village to become self-supporting but elevated the Christian African above his heathen counterpart. Venn aimed to create an African middle class, though not necessarily in the image o f its Victorian counterpart. His great insistence on the learning and transcribing o f native languages, and on the toleration o f native customs and systems o f law were strongly felt throughout the C.M.S. Venn realised how difficult it was for Enghshmen to show respect for national peculiarities different from their own, yet advised the missionary to “ study the national character o f the people among

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whom you labour and show the utmost respect for national peculiaritie . . . from your first arrival in the country [it is best] . . . to study and respect the national habits and conventionalities, till it becomes a habi with you and second nature.” -” Yet he advocated no immediate or drastic changes in the form o f native societies and recommended that although the wielding o f authority in native society might seem absurd or unjust to a European that “ nevertheless they are the framework of society and till they are replaced by a more enlightened system they must be respected. 38 Missionaries, indeed, were to utilize the present struc­ ture o f the society to further their own ends. In attempting to evangelise a nation they were exhorted to follow the example o f St. Paul and to concern themselves particularly with men o f influence and the leaders of national thought.

v our ow n self, fo r all other know led ge, w ithout a kn ow led ge o f s e lf is but splendid ignorance . . . to have a good m em ory yo u must L^empcrate m both eating and drin kin g and s l ee p i ng. . . . 43 Energetic

As a true Evangelical, Venn did not concern himself only with the children o f a nation. In fact, the conversion o f the adult was o f utmost importance for the future o f a mission, for here was evidence to his neighbours that Christianity came not merely by habit or force of education. The adult was aware, too, o f the idolatry and native customs he must renounce and not only was he often also imbued with a missionary zeal himself but “ he has some idea o f the obloquy and danger to which he is exposed.” 39

industriously to m ake up fo r his w ant o f earlier education .” 44 Duncan had no doubt been a m odel em ployee, and in fact in 1854 turned d ow n C u sson s’ o ffe r o f double salary to go to London to train as a schoolmaster m the H ighbury C o llege o f the C hurch M issionary Society.

Education was to be the means to full conversion. Sunday school and religious instruction were o f course o f primary importance but the arts o f civilization must also be taught. Venn advised that the missionary was not to develop a highly educated elite, but was to attempt to build selfsupporting educational institutions by combining book learmng and industrial labour. “ The separation o f scholastic life and manual labour is a refinement o f advanced civilisation. It may be doubted whether even in this case it is desirable, but certainly it is not desirable in a mission school or according to the example o f the Apostle o f the Gentiles.” 40 Venn’s ideal native Chnstian, a man o f strong but simple faith, able to read and understand the Bible and economically self-supporting, bore a strong resemblance to the Victorian ideal o f Samuel Smiles’ independent Christian working man. Samuel Smiles would have found much to admire in William Duncan. Although Self-Help was not published until 1859, Smiles had already popularized his ideas in lectures to working men and many books for young men concentrated on similar ideals. Duncan himself was impressed by such books41 and from a Young Man’s Own Book copied out such homilies as “ Nothing is so valuable as a good stock o f information . . . Success depends on having fixed principles . . . be accustomed to study-

bC 1 ambitious, D uncan’ s “ lists o f things to learn” ranged from “ Gram m ar, d rones o f G re a t M en , N avigation, Law , A stronom y, and Farm ing to Manners and Politeness .” 43 R ecognizing that “ one o f the great lessons I 1 ve yet to learn is to be diligent and spend w ell the present m om ent,

Duncan disciplined his life strictly, allocating tw enty-seven hours a eck to religion, tw enty-seven hours to education, fifty-fo u r to business 'en titie s, ten hours fo r exercise and healthful pursuits, and allow ing fifty-four hours a w e e k fo r sleep. Y e ars later Cussons com m ented that “ besides discharging his duties to m y se lf m ost faith fu lly and effectually, he planned out his spare tim e fo r self-im provem ent and laboured m ost

Besides expanding his ow n basic education in A rithm etic, G ram m ar, History, and G eo grap h y, D uncan continued form al studies in Liturgy and C h u rch H istory. T h is was com bined w ith the practical application o f pedagogical techniques and school m anagem ent. S everal w eek s each term w ere spent in teaching at the m odel school attached to the college and students w ere m arked on their lesson plans, their use o f illustrations, their ability to keep a class attentive and w h ether exam ination of the children had been anim ated, ju d icio u s and patient.

It was at Highbury too that Duncan came into contact with the mission field, through his teachers, the missionary magazines and meet­ ings and through his fellow students. In 1856 he commented that his close fnend at the college “ Mr. Kirkham, a missionary student, leaves this month for Abeokuta, I have learnt a good deal by being here with him.” 45 Kirkham’ s impressions o f Abeokuta, a model C.M .S. mission, must have been instructive for Duncan. The natives are naturally industrious but our converts much more so: in one corner o f the yard you will see a carpenter’s shop, in another a cotton cleamng establishment and in another a printing press busy at work. In the school are about sixty children receiving a sound elementary education. I have school hours from nine to two and then from three to five they, the pupils, work at agriculture, carpentry and bookbinding. 46 The C.M .S. at this time was mainly active in West Africa. It was conditions in Africa which had influenced the ideas o f Henry Venn and

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career there. Captain James Prevost’s offer o f a free passage to missionary to the North Pacific coast meant that not only was D Un 3 unable to finish his final third year at Highbury, but that in stead^ following his friend Kirkham to a Christian village in West Afri f Duncan was expected to be the first bearer o f the gospel to the Indians^ ntish Columbia. In such a context, perhaps it is less surprising t l j wthm four years Duncan had established a Christian self-: ? h supporting industrial village among the Coast Indians. Impressed by the life and work o f Samuel Marsden, after whom he named his first convert, and like many Victorian missionaries, Duncan was convinced that civilization and Christianity were inseparable Z savage condition o f the aborigines was seen as due to the free operation ° f the power o f original sin, and it was felt civilization could only be

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The Tsimshian Indians had had a lengthy, and in some cases a close contact with white civilization. The mantime fur trade and the Hudson’s , Y Com Pany had so stimulated their desire for European artifacts that ffUdS° n hb ^ COmpakny eStabHshed a P °st at Fort Simpson in Met !k /l ne/ 8 hbounng mbes ^ v e d from their ancient home of Metlakatla to take up residence outside the gates o f the fort. Thus for twenty years the Tsimshians had been able to observe and learn the daily operations o f civilized1 life, from people whom they held in great respect yet such an example had apparently made no mark on them own hves.’ The contra5, between life in the fort and in the Indian camp struck the o ^ g missionary forcibly. “ Here in the Fort steady industr^ marks the hour from mom till night while forethought ever directs the shortest way to the desired goal: And what is more, hundreds o f Indians, in the ourse o f the year, being employed about the Fort come within these gulations, yet in theCamp the people are content with their sloth and all its tram o f evils. 48 Indeed, Duncan saw no reason for the Indians to imitate the life o f the Hudson s Bay Company for here was civilization without the gospel. ite civilization shaped the extenor o f the fort but ungodliness was the rule within. Here was the answer for those who felt that i f civilization were disseminated among the heathen, they would cast away their eathemsm and adopt the virtues o f white men. “ I think this instance alone to the contrary is sufficient to explode such an absurdity No civilization apart from Christianity has v ita lity -h o w then can it impart hfe. It is the fuel without the fire, how then can it radiate heat?

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Civilization appears to the eye and to the hand but not to the heart. It prove the m uscles but it cannot reach the hidden springs o f h fe .” 49 In Duncan’ s eyes, the godlessness o f the C o m p a n y not on ly rendered it nnable to civilize the Indians, but b y exhibiting such a poor exam ple o f Christian civilization, w as in fact lik e ly to retard his ow n civilizing and rehgious mission. T he desire to lessen the influence o f the H udson’ s B a y Company played no sm all part in D uncan’ s decision to m ove from Fort Simpson and establish a C hristian Indian V illag e at M etlakatla.

The influx o f miners into the region, almost immediately after Duncan’s establishment at Fort Simpson, made the worst aspects o f civilization available to the Indians. Liquor, disease and prostitution had a devastating effect on the native population and strongly influenced Duncan’s determination to establish a settlement where not only a greater control could be maintained over converts, but alternative forms of wealth and diversion could be offered to them. A self-supporting industrial village, ruled by Duncan and other Christian missionaries would provide the society necessary for the Christian life. “ One effect the mission must have upon the Indian will be to make them desire social improvement. How necessary therefore it is that the Mission be estab­ lished where social improvement is possible. But at Fort Simpson it is not possible.” 50 Duncan soon recognized the difficulties facing his few converts at Fort Simpson. Open to all the temptations offered by their old way o f life, they needed also to withstand the taunts and challenges o f their fellows, and scattered through the various tribes they could develop no sense o f group cohesion which might have helped them to bear their burden. As early as 1859, in reply to an old chief and his sons who had complained about drunkenness in the camp, Duncan mentioned “ the probability o f some day dividing them. The Good going away to some good land and establishing a village for themselves where they could be free from the drunkenness and the bad ways.” 51 Thus there were pragmatic and immediate reasons for wanting to ■ solate the native Christians in their own village. But as we have seen, the idea of a Christian self-supporting settlement was by no means novel and VVas m fact the mode o f operation for C.M .S. missionaries in other parts ° f the world, particularly in West Africa. The Church o f England SelfSupporting Village Society had also promulgated similar ideas in bngland, whilst the idea o f Metlakatla bore striking similarities to the cells of civilization advocated by Fowell Buxton for Africa. „ Contemporaries also saw Metlakatla as a small utopian movement. ^ any, both whites and Indians were ready to ridicule our scheme.

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They felt sure it was Utopian and could only end in failure.” 52 To the extent that it was a gathering o f converts into a communitarian society, espousing specific principles o f behaviour and attitudes and attempting to find a way to reform the Indian society as a whole, Metlakatla certainly should be considered in the context o f utopian movements of the mid-Victorian era. Lord Dufferin, hke other visitors to the settlement, had been most impressed by the secular industrial work undertaken at Metlakatla. Besides developing a large scale program o f public works and a thriving trading business, Duncan was constantly searching for new industries to establish in the village. Initially the purpose o f the industries was to offer an alternative form o f employment and means o f gaining wealth to Indians who had previously gone to Victoria and had there been exposed to the evils o f liquor and disease. It was in effect a means o f physically preserving the Indians and was a necessary concomitant o f the policy of isolation. Duncan, hke Venn, was interested in increasing the wealth o f the converts so that their capital position might be elevated over that o f their heathen counterpart. He realized that the adoption o f civilization might tend to impoverish the Indians by “ calling for an increased outlay in their expenses without augmenting their income.” 53 A Christian Indian needed to clothe, wash and house himself in a civilized manner and this demanded capital which was not generally available to the individual Indian. In the early days o f Christianity, evangelism had been the main means o f spreading the gospel, but Duncan pointed out that “ the early days can hardly be said to apply to this Mission. The people amongst whom the early Christian Churches were first established were civilized and very differently situated socially and civilly from the poor Indians. Chris­ tianity and civilization must go on together. I think and [I mean] . . . to get both fairly established at Metlakatla.” 54 He strongly advocated that the missionary should become everything to his converts. The North American Indians in particular “ are a race o f people found without means or appliances necessary for advancement to civilized life, and whose labours are hunting and who are but barely able to supply their daily needs. . . how can such a people as this i f they become Christian be expected ever to maintain their own Church and Schools unless fresh industries are introduced amongst them and markets opened to them for what they can produce.” 55 Here again is evident the strong influence of the policies o f Henry Venn. The development o f native churches neces­ sitated that the body o f Christians be self-supporting and financially

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independent o f European help. The C.M .S. reminded those engaged in new missions that “ self-support and self-govermnent are far more easily introduced when the first groups o f Converts are formed than when the Native Christians have become accustomed to the faulty system of helpless dependence and blind subordination.” 56 The sooner a congre­ gation became self-supporting in fact, the sooner the euthanasia o f the mission could be effected and the missionary be transferred to other fields. The industrial establishment at Metlakatla was also useful to Duncan in inculcating the social and moral attitudes desirable in a native Chris­ tian. Sabbath observance was strictly enforced and, like Samuel Smiles, Duncan stressed the moral value o f honest toil. The influence o f the miners was felt to be particularly pernicious for the Indians were “ being jostled by rolling stones and reckless gamblers; hence unless we can catch up and utilise their energies and bend their backs to the yoke o f steady and profitable industry, they will become at best mere hangers-on among the whites.” 57 Duncan was, in fact, creating an environment in which Victorian values o f industriousness, thrift and self-help would have relevance and could be systematically taught. Victorians concerned with the problems o f native peoples were generally convinced that cultural change necessitated economic development.58 The alliance between the Bible and the plough has been seen as the main feature o f Canadian policy from the seventeenth century,59 and there were many Victorian theorists such as Fowell Buxton who advocated this policy. But others, like Venn, saw the possibilities o f developing commercial societies, and it was under such influence, and putting to use his own mercantile talents that Duncan chose commerce as an agent o f acculturation for the Indians o f the North Pacific. Having left Fort Simpson, there were urgent practical reasons for finding a convenient method o f supplying the new settlement with trade goods. By taking control o f trade into his own hands, Duncan was able not only to satisfy this need, but to make it an integral part o f his civilizing mission. He saw that many o f the drawbacks to civilization among the Indians were traceable to the way they were treated by traders and set himself “ the task o f removing away some o f those draw­ backs . . . I saw and felt persuaded that intoxicating drink is the bane o f the Indian population and the root o f nearly all the crime amongst them. Hence I longed to set up a trade in this new settlement in which liquor should find no countenance.” 60 Not only would he be able to control the supply o f liquor, but he could also determine the type o f goods available

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to the new converts, “ ensuring a supply o f such things (many which the traders never bring) as their new habits and tastes demand.” 61 Within the store Duncan demanded quietness and courtesy and hoped to teach the Indians the just and honest business principles o f Victorian England. Besides having such an important educational function, the village store with its cheap, good quality articles, attracted groups o f Indians from surrounding tribes, who thus came into contact with Christianity and religious teachings. B y purchasing a schooner for trade and selling shares in this to the Metlakatla Indians, Duncan aimed to encourage SelfHelp and eventually enable them to move into independence. Practi­ cally speaking, the most important effect o f the trade was its financial success, which enabled Duncan to spend considerable sums o f money on “ objects conducive to the public benefit, in the erection o f public buildings and in subsidies to the people in aid o f improving their wharves and canoes.” 62 The fur trade had been long established among the coastal Indians and it was this which became the basis o f Duncan’s trade at Metlakatla. Following Venn’s advice on adaptation to native customs, Duncan also turned to the traditional pursuits o f fishing and crafts to find marketable exports. Attempts were made to export kippered, salted and smoked fish and barrels o f oolachan oil were sent to the Victoria market. The Tsimshian were reputed to be particularly skilled in the working of metals and wood and, besides exporting numbers o f curios, Duncan re­ introduced old crafts such as hat-making which might find a market locally or as curios in Victoria. Several Indians were taught coopering so that casks could be made for the export o f salt oolachan and salmon; soap making was introduced, the product being mainly for local use to stimulate habits o f cleanliness among the Metlakatlans and neighbouring tribes; and the women were encouraged to sew their own clothes and in some cases taught to spin yarn and weave blankets. Such activity aimed to encourage not only industrious habits, but taught thrift, and was to keep the Indians honestly occupied for large parts o f the day. Like the school inspectors o f England, Duncan also encouraged gardening to develop the forethought and economy that could maintain the indepen­ dence o f the individual that was so highly prized by the Victorians. On a communal basis, Duncan introduced a saw mill and in later years a salmon cannery. Both were significant in introducing a wage labour system and regular work hours into the settlement, whilst the saw mill was particularly important in providing the means to initiate an ambi­ tious building programme. Metlakatla was to be a model town which would provide the environ-

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ment necessary for Christianity and would stimulate others to follow the Metlakatla system. Religious reform in Victorian eyes was inextricably entwined with social and moral regeneration. A man’s social condition was seen as a reflection o f his moral state, which was itself dependent upon the strength o f his religion. Not only would the improvement in dwellings and physical conditions greatly facilitate the moral and reli­ gious improvements o f the Indians, but the physical appearance o f the civilized settlement would provide a significant contrast to that o f the Indian camps, and would prove a constant testimony to the effect o f Christian religious and moral teachings. In building the new village Duncan’ s main concerns, like those o f Titus Salt, were order, uniformity, health and morality. At Abeokuta, Kirkham had commented that “ the houses are built without any regard to order, nay confusion seems to be studied for you will scarcely find two houses in the same continuous line.” 63 He noted too that much o f the sickness in the settlement was caused by ill ventilated houses and unsani­ tary conditions and advised Duncan that “ your determined habits o f cleanliness would be very useful here.” 64 At Metlakatla, order and regularity were most apparent. Formal streets were constructed, and neat rows o f identical Indian houses were built according to a rational plan, determined jointly by Duncan and the new converts. In designing the basic plan for the model houses, Duncan was un­ doubtedly influenced by the many model dwellings proposed in the 1840s. Perhaps he had seen the Prince Consort’s own model apartments for the working classes at the Crystal Palace Exhibition; or perhaps he had been familiar with some o f the philanthropic building trusts in London. His aim at Metlakatla was to “ combine the accommodation necessary for the Indian as a Christian without offering impediment to his love o f hospitality and conflicting with his habits o f life.” 65Just as he had incorporated the traditional economic activities o f the Indian into the life o f the new settlement, so were the house plans adapted to the traditional needs o f the Indians. The old communal house, with the extended family living in one room, had provided an important form o f social control, and Duncan was faced with the problem o f reconciling this with his need to provide the privacy demanded by Victorian morality. The Reverend Edward Cridge noted that though “ the houses are after the European model and the habits of the people proportion­ ately improved . . . they have not forsaken the habit o f living more than one family in a house, for the sake o f fuel and company, they are beginning to build their houses with small apartments at each end and a common room in the centre and thus to reconcile the difficulties o f their

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situation with a due regard to the decencies o f life.” 66 In an al romantic manner Duncan also wanted to see the Indians surrounded"^ all the trappings o f the Victorian home. “ I wanted to see each h0 Y possessed o f a stove and have chairs and tables and a clock in it and al see the walls papered and floors well matted, etc.” 67 Education in its broadest sense was the major function o f the Metl katla settlement. As an Evangelical, Duncan was concerned with th teaching o f rehgion through the knowledge and understanding o f th word o f God. The C.M .S. desired to make Christianity indigenous, and Venn was particularly insistent on the necessity for missionaries learning and transcribing native languages. Working with the British and Foreign Bible Society the C.M .S. had encouraged the translation and publication o f the Scriptures in many languages and dialects. Duncan’s first task at Fort Simpson had been to master the Tsimshian language and to translate portions o f the prayers and the gospels. Besides being trained and sent out as a schoolmaster, the Evangelical’ s need to teach a convert to read and understand his Bible, would have perforce made formal education a major undertaking for this first missionary to the Tsimshian people. For many years a Sunday School teacher at Beverley Minster, and trained in pedagogical techniques in the model school attached to Highbury College, Duncan was an enthusiastic and conscientious teacher. His children’s day school at Metlakatla, assembled by the ringing of a school bell, and composed at times o f over a hundred children, was redolent o f the many schools organised on the Lancaster system both in England and abroad. As in the Lancaster schools children were divided into classes and taught by monitors who were themselves instructed by the master. Duncan noted I took the first class almost exclusively in the afternoon— because I employ them as teachers in the morning.” 68 The monitorial system was well adapted to the problems o f instructing large numbers, with no other help, but it also conformed to the C.M .S. aims of encouraging the development o f native teachers and evangelists. As in their English counterparts, competition was encouraged among pupils, prizes were given for advancement and the use o f slates and tickets for each child was in accordance with Lancaster’s practices.69 As a Sunday School teacher Duncan had aimed, in teaching others, to Instruct, Delight, Overcome or bend the will” and this became essen­ tially his approach to the education o f the Tsimshian. Discipline was strict and often involved corporal punishment which Duncan defended as being a very ancient mode o f correction used frequently by officers of Her Majesty’s Navy, and one not entirely obsolete in England. Reading,

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a and Scriptural knowledge formed the basis o f the curriculum, ^ c o n s c io u s effort was made, particularly in the adult evening school, bUt ^ e n the experience o f the Indian and to stimulate his curiosity about t0Uger world and to attempt to get rid o f what Duncan felt to be his a gfStltious beliefs. Systematic lectures were given on history, geogsU^hy and the physical basis o f the universe and arithmetic and composiwere also taught. The Metlakatla School however was also to inculcate the attitudes and lues desirable in native Christians. Duncan commented proudly on ± e achievements o f his first pupils. “ They can sing hymns and are learning God Save the Queen . . . they know the consequences to us o f both courses o f conduct, bad and good. They have learnt what are the proper expressions in prayer. They can count alone to 100 . . . . They have learnt how to speak in terms o f civility to their fellow men and have had several o f their ways corrected.” 70 One of the purposes in establishing Metlakatla had been to gather a community whose moral and religious training might render it safe and proper to impart secular instruction. The moral lesson o f their secular learning was most important in Duncan’ s instruction. After reading and writing lessons were over I gave them a lecture on perseverence illustrat­ ing by . . . George Stephenson the great Engineer.” 71 Like Venn, Duncan believed that it was undesirable to separate labour and learning. Industrial training in its most practical form was an integral part of a Metlakatla education. Unless the Christian Indian were taught a useful and profitable trade he would not rise in status above the heathen, nor could he in future contribute to the support o f a native Church. I f the Christian Indian were “ obliged to go back to the Indian mode of getting a living . . . [he would be] little better off than the Indian who have had no such education.” 72 So earnest was Duncan to encourage the Victorian girls and small boys were to attend the day school. Let the big boys cam their bread in daylight and come to school at night, will be my rule. Perseverence, industriousness, thrift and Self-Help were to be as impor­ tant to the Metlakatla Indian as they were to William Duncan. As in Victorian England the atmosphere o f a Christian family home was seen as vital to the education o f the Indian child. This was partly why the C.M .S. was insistent upon reaching all generations o f natives. Not only were there individual souls to be saved, but men like Venn recognised the value o f the influence o f Christian parents and saw how difficult it was to isolate one generation within a community. In the training o f native pastors, Venn recommended that traimng be given to

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the men and their wives not only in Scripture but in Christian habits For this purpose an establishment is required rather partaking of th' character o f a Christian settlement than o f a collegiate institution ” 74 Such was the settlement at Metlakatla. To further his aim o f producing moral Christian homes, Duncan, lik Samuel Crowther at Lagos and many other missionaries o f the midnineteenth century, established a boarding house for young girls at the Mission House. Hoping not only to eliminate some o f the promiscuity in the village but to train the girls in domestic pursuits and Christian habits Duncan tried to create a strict but kindly family atmosphere within the house. The Reverend A.J. Hall noted that “ there is a marked contrast between the women who were trained in the Mission house and others. The former are quite domesticated, many o f them have clean homes and they exercise a good influence throughout the village. The girls enter the Mission House when about sixteen years o f age and remain, if their conduct is good, until they are married. The training o f these girls keeps a check upon the young men who are all anxious to obtain a wife from the house and are aware that good conduct is necessary to obtain such a prize.” 75 Redolent o f the female homes o f the Anglican sisterhoods in England, this was one o f the most forceful and successful forms o f accul­ turation and one which considerably extended the personal influence and control o f the missionary. The Metlakatla system was all-embracing. Duncan’s belief that the missionary should become everything to his people meant that he was concerned with all aspects o f their life including their leisure hours. The seasonal nature o f the Tsimshian economy meant that traditionally the winter season had been devoted to medicine practices and ceremonial dances. Having eliminated these from Metlakatla, the missionary had to attempt to replace such activities with those considered more conducive to the life o f a Christian Indian. Thus, the education o f a Metlakatlan included the informal learning o f English games such as football. Duncan reported the Indians were delighted. They had never seen the game before. The village is in two wings east and west. So it was easy to get sides. lb A playground was built for the children who were also introduced to sack races, and hunt the hare. The year was punctuated with Christmas and Boxing Day feasts, whilst the Queen’ s Birthday was always celebrated with canoe races and magic lantern shows. Duncan himself was particularly interested in music, having as a boy been a noted chorister in Beverley Minster. Regular choir practices were held at Metlakatla, and the hymn singing in church was noted by visitors to be most pleasant and hearty. In the 1870s after Duncan’s return from a visit

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England, a brass band was begun at Metlakatla. It is interesting to note that the “ Brass Band” is a peculiarly British institution and one which had its origin and found its most enthusiastic reception in that north­ eastern part o f England from which Duncan came.77 As in the north o f England, where works bands and village bands flourished, the MetlaIcatla brass band was an object o f pride for the whole group, and served also to constructively utilise the time and energies o f the young men. C om m u nity life at M etlakatla as in other utopian ventures had a clearly d efined fram ew o rk and the form al law s w ere strictly enforced. Liquor, m edicine w o rk , gam bling, face painting and potlatching must be renounced b y all prospective residents. O n ce established, the n ew settler must send his children to school, attend all D ivin e services, settle all quarrels b y c ivil process, pay the village tax, build h im se lf a neat house, cultivate a garden and endeavour to b e cleanly, industrious, orderly, peaceful and honest .78

All ranks and class had been abolished and each Metlakatalan became equal in the eyes o f the law and in the sight o f God. In such a context it was almost inevitable that Duncan’ s authority would become supreme. He was, however, supported by the establishment o f a corps o f twenty uniformed native constables. With remarkable insight and perhaps influenced by Venn’s ideas on the development and civilizing o f native societies, Duncan felt that the proper persons for constables in Indian villages were the natives themselves. The results may not be satis­ factory at first but such an office is good training for the natives— tends to enlist their sympathies on the side of the law— is less expensive to the Government and ultimately will afford a better guarantee o f the pres­ ervation o f the peace than if held by white men in their midst. 79 By becoming a magistrate himself, Duncan was also able effectively to control the lawlessness and liquor trade in the area, which might have threatened the success o f Metlakatla. Although the C.M .S. itself did not generally approve o f its missionaries taking such posts, there were many and indeed distinguished precedents in English history for the combi­ nation o f the offices o f vicar and justice o f the peace. Lacking any legal training, Duncan administered the law in a common sense manner and with a firm sense o f justice. One o f the aims o f Metlakatla had been to set up the supremacy o f the law, teach loyalty to the Queen and conserve the peace o f the country, and it was in this aspect that Duncan felt the most striking progress o f the Metlakatlans was evident. “ From a great number o f lawless and hostile hordes, we have gathered out and established one o f the most lawabiding and peace loving communities in the province.” 80 So vital did he

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feel this aspect o f his work to be, that when advising an American acquaintance on the treatment o f the Alaskan natives, Duncan recom­ mended that the missionary be immediately given magisterial powers “ Let him choose a few Indian constables and be occasionally visited and supported by a ship o f war and all will go well both for the Indian and the Country too.” 81 Visitors found the internal organization o f Metlakatla particularly fascinating. The men o f the village were divided into ten companies each having two constables, a Sunday School teacher and an elected Elder, the latter forming a Native Council. Although unique in the Canadian mission scene at this time, these companies were in fact similar to the classes advocated by Henry Venn in his plans for native church organization. Sunday School work, the explaining and teaching o f Scrip­ tural texts, was carried out in the mature years o f the settlement, almost entirely by native Christian teachers within each company. The con­ stables were specifically enjoined to be responsible for the conduct of their company members, to promote their industry and improvement and to report annually to the missionary on their progress. This was very similar to the system in practice in Sierra Leone, where to develop native leadership a portion o f the Church members were entrusted to the care o f a Christian Visitor who was “ required to assist the Minister in seeking out every case o f sin, want and need and report to him.” 82 Similarly the Native Council at Metlakatla which under Duncan’s guidance administered the laws o f the settlement, may be compared to the Native Council in Lagos. The Reverend J.A . Lamb noted that the system was most useful for “ i f any member needs reproof for care­ lessness or improper behaviour or has been guilty o f conduct which requires suspension, the case comes before the meeting for united decision. Thus personal responsibility is thrown o ff me, and our people are taught to respect their own people when put in a position o f authority in the Church.” 83 And in such a manner did the Council function at Metlakatla. Historiographically, Duncan has been seen as a man with exceptional talent and insight into the problems o f handling native peoples. There can be no doubt o f his ability to understand Indian needs and society, or to lead and control the people. But he was hardly the daring innovator and social theorist that has been portrayed. Following the advice of Henry Venn to study and adapt to the native society, to utilize as much of it as was valuable, to develop leadership, independence and industrious­ ness among his converts, Duncan was moving along a well trodden path. The problems facing the Tsimshian Indians in coping with the impact of

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white civilization w e re not unique. S im ilarly the solutions proposed b y their V ictorian m issionary had their origin in the ideas o f m en w ith the me ideals, w ho had faced sim ilar problem s in other parts o f the w orld. por W ill D u ncan the cultural referen ce was alw ays London, not V ictoria or Ottawa. M etlakatla w as not in essence a response to the w ilderness or the Canadian frontier, but a system atic attem pt to establish a com m unity where V ictorian values and ideals could shape the future o f the Indians o f the N orth Pacific.

n o t es

The major primary sources for the study o f W illiam Duncan are to be found in the William Duncan Papers referred to here as W D /C and the Church Missionary Society papers, referred to here as C .M .S./A . 'W D /C 2156, Reverend G. Mason, Lo! The poor Indian: Read before the Mechanics’ Literary Institute, Victoria, Oct. 28, 1875. 2W D/C 2156, Earl o f Dufferin, Speech in Victoria B.C., Sept. 20, 1876. 3J.A. W ike, The Effect o f the Maritime Fur Trade on Northwest Coast Indian Society (Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia, 1951), 3. 'W. Duff, The Indian History of British Columbia, vol. 1: The Impact o f the White Man (Victoria: Provincial Museum o f Natural History and Anthropology, M em oir No. 5,

1964). 53SV.D. Annakin, The Missionary, A n Agent o f Cultural Diffusion (Ph.D. Thesis, O hio State University, 1940), 50. "R. Gordon Brown, “ Missions and Cultural Diffusion,” American Journal o f Sociology, L (Nov., 1944), 214.

7j.w . Dodds, The Age o f Paradox (N ew York: Rinehart and Com pany Inc., 1952), 348. "Asa Briggs, Victorian People (London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1954), 137. ’’Ibid., 139. “ Ibid. "W .E . Houghton, The Victorian Frame o f Mind (N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1957),

254,;David Roberts, The Victorian Origins o f the British Welfare State (N ew Haven: Yale University Press, i960), 88. 1 Ibid., 214. "Ibid., 221. 15A.E. Bestor Jn r., Backwoods Utopias. The Sectarian and Owenite Phases o f Communitarian Socialism in America: 1663-1829 (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1950), vii—viii. "'W .H.G. Armytage, Heavens Below: Utopian Experiments in England, 1360-1960 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 55. nlbid., 57, Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities (London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1963), 71.

Armytage,

^bid, 221.

211.

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21Briggs, Cities, 70. 'M any ol the Utopian movements o f the nineteenth century were derived to SOrn extent from the practices and writings o f Robert Owen. The fame o f N ew Lanark widespread but O wen s atheism did not endear his humanitarian ideas to the Vict0 rian middle class. The ideas o f Charles Fourier had less influence in England than ' the United States. A major aim o f the organization o f his phalanxes was to make work enjoyable and attractive. Such ideas were unlikely to find a sympathetic audience in Victorian England which saw a moral worth in toiling at unenviable tasks. -■’A .F. Young and E.T. Ashton. British Social Work in the Nineteenth Century (LondonRoudcdgc and Kogan Paul, 1956), 218. 24W . Knight. The Missionary Secretariat of Henry Venn B.D. (London: Longmans, Green and C o ., 1880). 305.

25E. Stock, A

History o f the Church Missionary Society (London: Longmans, Green and Co 1889), vol. II, 83. “ Knight, Venn, 210. 27H enry Venn to the Bishop o f Kingston, London, January 1867. Cited in Knight, Venn 216. “ Knight, Venn, 210. 29H enry Venn, On National Churches. Cited in Knight, Venn, 285. ’ ’’Rufus Anderson, Foreign Missions: Their Relations and Claims (N ew York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1869), 47ff.

’’Henry Venn, On National Churches. Second Paper, 1861. Cited in Knight, Venn, 312. 32C .M .S. C A /2L1, Final Instructions to Dr. E. Irving, London, Dec. 23, 1853; cited in J.F .A . Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria. 1841-1891. The Making o f a N ew Elite (London: Longmans, Green and Com pany Ltd., 1965), 81. ” T . F . Buxton, I he African Slave Trade and its Remedy (London: 1841). ’ 4Cited in Ajayi, Christian Missions, 7. Peter Hinchcliff, The Anglican Church in South Africa (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1963), 45. 36S.M . Johnstone, Samuel Marsden. A Pioneer o f Civilization in the South Seas (Sydney: Angus and Robertson Ltd., 1932), 71. '"H enry Venn, On Nationality: cited in Knight, Venn, 282. ’ “H enry Venn, Memoir on the Character o f the Reverend Edward Bickersteth: cited in Knight. Venn, 166. ' 'Henry Venn, Memoir on the Character o f the Reverend Edward Bickersteth, Knight, I cull, 166.

J"C .M .S. C A /L2, Instructions o f the Parent Committee to Mr. W . Kirkham, School­ master, Jan. 29, [856; cited in Ajayi, 144. ’ ’The public library at N ew Metlakatla, Alaska (Duncan’s second settlement) possessed multiple copies o f all the works o f Samuel Smiles. J2W D /C 2is7, N otebook, Apr,, 1852. 1 'W D /C 2157, N otebook, n.d. JJC .M .S./A i24, G . Cussons to the C .M .S.. B everley. Jan. 2. 1866. J5W D /C 2is4, Journal, Jan. 16, 1836. -"'W D/C2143. W . Kirkham to H ighbury Friends, Lagos. Ju ly 19, 1836. J7P. Curtin, The Image o f Africa. British Ideas and Action, 1780-1830 (Madison: University ot Wisconsin Press, 1964), 420. 4“W D /C2I34, F 'rst Report From Fort Simpson. Journal, Feb.. 1838. n lhid.

153

s/A 8 0, W illiam Duncan to the C .M .S., Metlakatla, Oct. 25, i860. iV X / D / C 2 , M ’ J o u r n a * ' J u n e 2 ’

i

859-

M S /A81, W illiam Duncan to the Hon. D . Laird, Minister o f the Interior, n.p„ May,

1875S.WD/C2154, W illiam Duncan to Mrs. W .J. Macdonald, Metlakatla, Sept. 6, 1869. ss\VD/Cai54>Journal. Statement in Reference to Metlakatla, n.p., n.d. SMJVD/C2154, The C .M .S. to W illiam Duncan, London, Sept. 8, 1876. “ WD/C2148, W illiam Duncan to the C .M .S., M etlakada, Dec. 5, 1871. 5»Curtin, Image o f Africa, 431. v'C. F G. Stanley, “ The Indian Background o f Canadian History,” Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1952, 14-21. "'WD/C2I44, W illiam Duncan to W .F. Tolm ie, Metlakatla, M ay 9, 1866. HWD/C2153, Journal, Aug. 5, 1863. “ C.M.S./A105, Rev. E. Cridge to the C .M .S., Metlakatla, Sept. 27, 1867. “ W D/C2143, W . Kirkham to H ighbury Friends, Lagos, Ju ly 19, 1856. ttWD/C2143. W . Kirkham to W illiam Duncan, Lagos, Mar. 20, 1856. “ C.M.S./A81, W illiam Duncan to the C .M .S., Metlakatla, Jan. 29, 1874. “ C.M .S./A103, Rev. E. Cridge to the C .M .S.. Metlakatla, Sept. 27, 1867. “ W D/C2155, Journal, N ov. 17, 1863. MWD/C2i55, Journal, N o v. 11, 1867. “ Joseph Lancaster, The British System o f Education (Georgetown: Joseph Mulligan, 1812), 58ff. ’"WD/C2I54, Journal, Feb. 18, 183971W D/C2I5J, Journal, Dec. 22, 1864. 72C.M.S./A8o, W illiam Duncan to the C .M .S ., Fort Simpson, M ay 14, 1861. "W D/C2155, Journal, Oct. 2, 1872. 74Henry Venn to the Bishop o f Kingston, London, Jan., 1867; cited in Knight, Venn, 218. 75C.M .S./Aio6, Rev. A.J. Hall to the C .M .S ., Metlakatla, Mar. 6, 1878. 76WD/C2I55, Journal, Dec. 26, 1864. 77John F. Russell and J.H . Elliot, The Brass Band Movement (London: J.M . Dent and Sons Ltd., 1936). The first brass band contests were held in the 1840s at Burton Constable, twelve miles from Duncan’ s home. ’ “WD/C2I58, N otebook, Laws o f Metlakatla, Oct. 15, 1862. 7i’W D /C2I49, W illiam Duncan to the Provincial Secretary. Metlakatla, Jan. 27, 1875. "'C.M .S./A81, W illiam Duncan to Hon. David Laird, Minister o f the Interior, M ay, 1875. "'W D/C2134, W illiam Duncan to Mr. N . Colyer, N ew York, Feb. 28, 1870. "2W D/C2156, Rev. J . Johnson to the C .M .S ., Sierra Leone, Apr. 15, 1869. “’W D/C2156, Rev. J.A . Lamb to the C .M .S., Lagos, Apr. 17, 1869.

Robin Fisher / Joseph Trutch

Joseph Trutch and Indian Land Policy ROBIN FISH E R

The Indians really have no right to the lands they claim, nor are they of any actual value or utility to them. . . . It seems to me, therefore, bothjust andpolitic that they should be confirmed in the possession of.such extents of land only as are sufficientfor theirprobable requirements for purposes ofcultivation andpasturage, and that the remainder of the land nowshut up in these reserves should be thrown open to pre-emption.1 They said thatfirst one chief had come, then another and another, all sayinq the same thing, and all afterwards cutting and carving their lands.2 1864 was a year o f change in the administration o f the colony o f British Columbia; James Douglas retired from the governorship and Joseph Trutch was appointed C h ief Commissioner o f Lands and Works. In the area o f Indian lands these changes in personnel were to be accompanied by a shift in policy, and the effects o f these changes were to be profound. As C h ief Factor o f the Hudson s Bay Company in Victoria and as Governor o f Vancouver Island, Douglas negotiated a series o f treaties by which the Indians o f southern Vancouver Island surrendered their land “ entirely and forever” in return for a few blankets and the reservation of certain lands for their use.3 Implicit in these treaties was the notion that the aboriginal race exercised some kind o f ownership over the land that ought to be extinguished by the colonizing power, a view that was shared by Douglas and the Colonial Office.4 B y 1858, however, Douglas had relinquished his position as C h ief Factor and could no longer dip into the stores o f the Hudson’s Bay Company for goods that would encourage the Indians to surrender their land. Dependent on other sources of S O U R C E : B C Studies, 12 (W inter 1971-1972), pp. 3-33. Reprinted by permission o f the author and B C Studies.

155

ce Douglas was unable to compensate the Indians for the alienation ^ftheir lands because the Vancouver Island House o f Assembly and the 0t 1 erial Government each argued that the provision o f funds for this lmf,C was the other’ s responsibility.5 Although the shortage o f funds *Jaced limitations on the implementation o f Indian policy, Douglas continued to defend Indian rights. He made it clear that reserves were to be' laid out in accordance with the wishes o f the Indians,6 and once reserves were established insisted that they were not to be reduced, either by the encroachment o f individual settlers or by the collective action o f the House o f Assembly.7 In retrospect at least, the Indians o f the colony were satisfied with the treatment they had received under Douglas. More than ten years after his retirement they still recalled and praised the manner in which he had 1 / dealt with them.8 In 1864 Douglas himself claimed that his reserve policy “ has been productive o f the happiest effects on the minds o f the natives.” 9 Seemingly his remark had some validity, and yet after his retirement many aspects o f Douglas’s policy were altered: and the man most responsible for the reversal was one whom Douglas had recom­ mended for the position o f C h ief Commissioner o f Lands and W orks.10 Joseph Trutch had come to British Columbia in 1859 with eight years experience behind him as a surveyor and farmer south o f the 49th 1 / parallel. His interest in the gold colony in the early years was in building roads and bridges, surveying townships and establishing farms, and in amassing a personal fortune. To him the colony was an area o f land requiring development. Consequently anything, or more importantly anyone, who stood in the way o f that development had to be moved. Moreover Trutch was very much a product o f imperial England s confidence in the superiority o f her own civilization. Other races came somewhat lower on the scale o f human existence than the English, and the North American Indian was barely part o f the scale at all. In a reference to the Indians o f Oregon Territory Trutch used revealing terminology. “ I think they are the ugliest & laziest creatures I ever saw, 1C & we shod, as soon think o f being afraid o f our dogs as o f them . . .” u The indigenous American tended towards the bestial rather than the human to Trutch; and his view was essentially unmodified by continued contact with the Indians. During the years between 1859 and 1864 he employed Indians on his public works projects in British Columbia,12 and as C h ief Commissioner o f Lands and Works he visited Indian 'Ullages in many parts o f British Columbia. Yet he continued to see the Indians as uncivilized savages. In 1872 he told the Prime Minister o f Canada that most o f the British Columbian Indians were “ utter Savages

[56

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living along the coast, frequently committing murder and robbery amongst themselves, one tribe upon another, and on white people wh go amongst them for the purpose o f trade.” 13 Trutch had stereotyped the Indians as lawless and violent, and was frequently preoccupied with the need to suppress them by a show 0f force. Douglas, on the other hand, had argued “ that they should in all respects be treated as rational beings, capable o f acting and thinking for themselves.” 14 He had been firm in dealing with Indian “ lawlessness ” but also had an appreciation o f the possible value o f the Indians as allies and avoided offending them unnecessarily. Douglas had to cope with the potentially dangerous situation that followed the influx o f miners in 1858 4 and in doing so he trod with great caution. Subordinates who also dealt circumspectly with disputes between miners and Indians were praised, while those who interfered hastily were reprimanded. Douglas’s personal capacity for settling disputes was strikingly demonstrated at Hill’s Bar in 1858. Strong words were said to each side, but he also took one o f the Indian leaders involved in the affray into the government service. Douglas wrote that the man was “ an Indian highly connected in their way, and o f great influence, resolution and energy o f character,” and he proved to be “ exceedingly useful in settling other Indian difficulties.” 15 It was an action that Trutch would have been quite incapable o f taking. Rather he enunciated the typical colonialist’s misconception that the indigenous people had no mechanism for ending hostilities,15 an attitude that would render him incapable o f using Indians to settle disputes. Violence amongst the Indians themselves was bad enough, but violence directed against Europeans was the ultimate breakdown o f the colonial situation. What was needed in such cases, thought Trutch, was a theatri­ cal demonstration o f European power. The dispatch o f warships to coastal trouble spots, for example, would produce “ a salutary impres­ sion” on the Indians.17 Douglas wanted the law to operate “ with the least possible effect on the character and temper o f the Indians,” 18 while 1/ Trutch insisted that English law must be enforced at whatever cost.” 19 Douglas most often referred to the “ Native Indians,” but Trutch seldom called them anything other than savages,” and was skeptical about their capacity for improvement. After twenty years on the northwest coast, and even a visit to Metlakatla, he was to remark that “ I have not yet met with a single Indian o f pure blood whom I consider to have attained even the most glimmering perception o f the Christian creed.” 20 The reason for this situation, according to Trutch, was that the idiosyncrasy o f the Indians in this country appears to incapacitate

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from appreciating any abstract idea, nor do their languages contain works by which such a conception could be expressed.” 21 There is ^ evid en ce that Trutch was particularly fluent in any o f the Indian J10 guages, or that he had made any study o f Indian religion, poetry or p Llt then stereotypes are seldom based on concrete evidence; they are more often than not the product o f ignorance. It was these views regarding colonial development and the total inferiority o f the Indian that governed Trutch’s attitude to the question of Indian land. His attitudes coalesced to produce something o f an obsession with the idea that the Indians were standing in the way o f the development o f the colony by Europeans. The absolute superiority o f \ English culture implied an obligation to colonize new areas. Therefore, to men like Trutch, the Indians had to be relieved o f as much land as possible, so that it could be “ properly” and “ efficiently” used by ' Europeans. For Trutch British Columbia’ s future lay in agriculture. The colony’s development had to be fostered by “ large and liberal” land ^ grants to settlers,22 and Indian claims to land could not be allowed to hinder this development. As governor, Douglas had also been an advo­ cate of colonial development through European settlement, but he had not allowed this view to override his concern for Indian rights. In contrast to Douglas who wanted to protect the Indians from the progress w of settlement, Trutch wanted to move them out of the way so that settle- v ment could progress. When Douglas recommended Trutch for the position o f C h ief Com ­ missioner o f Lands and Works it was because he thought he was an efficient surveyor and engineer, not because o f any ability Trutch might Have had to deal with Indian affairs. Perhaps Douglas thought that the governor would continue to dominate this area o f the administration o f the colony just as he had done. But, with the possible exception of Frederick Seymour, subsequent governors were neither as interested nor . as competent to deal with the Indians. Unlike C h ief Factor Douglas, Seymour took over the administration o f British Columbia as a careerist governor, his most recent post having been Governor o f British Hon­ duras. He lacked no confidence in his own ability to deal with native races, however. Early in his governorship o f British Columbia he gained local popularity and praise from 14 Downing Street for his dealing with die Chilcotin Indians responsible for the killings at Bute Inlet in 1864. Praise for his firm handling o f this affair seems to have upset his judgment somewhat, and he blotted his copybook at the Colonial Office by Uoting in a despatch that, in the event o f a real emergency, “ I may find

L

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myself compelled to follow in the footsteps o f the Governor o f Colo­ rado . . . and invite every white man to shoot each Indian he may meet.” 23

;

Efforts to suppress violence apart, however, Seymour’s concern for the Indians o f British Columbia was chiefly a matter o f dispensing largesse rather than protecting their interests. Soon after his arrival Seymour became aware that the Indians felt that with the departure of Douglas from official life, they had lost a protector and a friend. The new governor determined to demonstrate to the Indians that he had “ succeeded to all the powers o f my predecessor and to his solicitude for their welfare. ’ ’ 24 His method o f making this point clear was to extend an invitation to the Indians to come to Government House in N ew West­ minster and celebrate the Queen’s birthday. On the first o f several of these occasions, in 1864, a luncheon was provided at the expense of the government; but the guests were informed that the rewards “ to all good Indian Chiefs” would be greater next time.25 Accordingly Seymour requested the colony’ s agents in London to forward “ one hundred canes with silver gilt tops o f an inexpensive kind, also one hundred small and cheap English flags suitable to canoes 20 to 30 feet long.” 26 These gatherings provided the Indian leaders with an opportunity to express their opinion on matters that concerned them more acutely than free luncheons and gilt canes. On at least three occasions the Indians present at the celebration petitioned Seymour to protect their reserves.27 ’■ The first time the reply was clear. “ You shall not be disturbed in your reserves,” the Indians were told.28Three years later the reply was a little more equivocal, as the Indians were assured their reserves would not be reduced without Seymour’s personal inspection.29The actual wording of v the replies is, however, somewhat immaterial. While Seymour was making reassuring gestures at Queen’s birthday celebrations, Trutch was carrying out a reallocation o f reserves that involved a considerable 1 reduction in size, and there is no evidence that Seymour visited any of the reserves concerned. In relation to the Indians’ land, Seymour’s pro­ fessed “ solicitude for their welfare” was verbal rather than actual. The restraining hand o f Douglas had been removed, and Seymour was less concerned than his predecessor about Indian rights regarding land. Consequently Trutch was able to execute his policy o f reducing reserves. The first step in the process o f whittling down the reserves was taken towards the end o f 1865. In Ju ly o f that year Phillip Nind, Gold Commis­ sioner at Lytton, wrote to the Colonial Secretary regarding the reserves o f the Indians o f the Thompson River area. Nind claimed that “ These Indians do nothing more with their land than cultivate a few small

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patches o f potatoes here and there,” although he noted that some groups were leasing grazing land to white settlers. The main point o f his letter was that Indians were claiming “ thousands o f acres o f good arable and pasture land admirably adapted for settlement.” 30 This letter was apparently referred to Trutch for his comments. He made his views clear. He had already expressed the opinion that one o f the most impor­ tant ways in which the settler could prosper in British Columbia would be by farming to supply the mining population.31 The thought o f Indians standing in the way o f this development was abhorrent to him. I am satisfied from my own observation that the claims o f Indians over tracts o f land, on which they assume to exercise ownership, but o f which they make no real use, operate very materially to prevent settlement and cultivation, in many instances besides that to which attention has been directed by Mr. Nind, and I should advise that these claims should be as soon as practicable enquired into and defined.32

Seymour felt that it was too late in the year for a general reduction o f reserves but, forgetting his promise to the Indians, he agreed to the reallocation o f the Thompson River reserves.33 Walter Moberly, assistant surveyor-general o f the colony, was requested to inquire into the matter and on the basis o f his report34 Trutch informed the governor that the reserves were “ entirely disproportionate to the numbers or the require­ ments o f the Indian Tribes.” 35 No accurate census had been taken o f the Indians so Trutch could not know what their numbers were, and their land requirements were o f course as Trutch, and not the Indians, assessed them. But these things were relatively unimportant for, as Trutch concluded, Much o f the land in question is o f good quality, and it is very desirable, from a public point o f view, that it should be placed in possession o f white settlers as soon as practicable, so that a supply o f fresh provisions may be furnished for consumption in the Columbia River mines, and for the accommodation o f those travelling to and from the District.36

In short, the land was valuable, and therefore, even though it had been reserved for them, the Indians had to make way for settlement. By October 1866 a notice was appearing in the Government Gazette indicating that the reserves o f the Kamloops and Shuswap Indians had been redefined. The so-called “ adjustment” meant that out o f a forty mile stretch o f the Thompson River the Indians were left with three reserves, each o f between three and four square miles. The remainder o f the land hitherto reserved for them was to be thrown open for pre-emption by settlers from 1 January 1867.37

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The reallocations carried out in the Kamloops area provided a p cedent that was applied by Trutch when he effected a second series f reductions involving the Indian reserves in the lower Fraser area Th move to reduce these reserves originated in the British Columbia Legi:;6" lative Council, when John Robson moved in February 1867, that th governor be informed o f the desirability o f having the lower Fraser reserves reduced to what is necessary for the actual use o f the Natives. 38 Again it seems that Seymour referred the matter to Trutch for a report, and once again Trutch advocated reductions. His reasoning was similar to that adumbrated in the Kamloops case. The Indians were ^ holding good land that they were not using in a productive way ^ therefore it ought to be made available to settlers. Trutch then went on to discuss the methods by which the reserves might be reduced. Either they could be simply resurveyed, or the government could negotiate the relinquishing o f the lands with the Indians and render them some form o f compensation. It was here in particular that the earlier reductions of the Kamloops and Shuswap reserves provided the precedent. In these instances tracts o f land o f most unreasonable extent were claimed and held by the local tribes under circumstances nearly parallel to those now under discussion, and the reductions involved a simple resurvey of the r reserves, with no compensation given to the Indians concerned. Conse­ quently there was no need for compensation in this case either. After all, ^ wrote Trutch, The Indians really have no right to the lands they claim, nor are they o f any actual value or utility to them; and I cannot see why they should either retain V these lands to the prejudice o f the general interests o f the Colony, or be allowed to make a market o f them to Government or to individuals .39

Having denied the Indians any right to hold even land that had been reserved for them, and therefore to compensation for land that they v were relieved of, Trutch initiated the policy o f “ adjustment.” Again he had the approval o f Seymour.40 It is difficult to discover the precise extent o f these reductions, although there can be little doubt that they involved a considerable area. The report o f one o f the surveyors who marked out the reserves notes that the new boundaries would throw open 40,000 acres for settlement.41 The notion that Indian reserves were not to be violated by Europeans was not the only policy that was transformed after the departure of Douglas. He had also favoured the idea o f Indians leasing reserve land / and benefiting from the income,42 but part o f Trutch’s rationale for ' reallocation was to prevent the Indians from receiving rent from the

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ttlers. The reductions were therefore designed to leave them with no f d to spare for leasing out to European farmers. Another option that v as open to the Indians under Douglas was to pre-empt land,43 but in this was virtually denied them. A Land Ordinance o f that year 1 evented Indians from pre-empting land without the written permis- V sion of the governor,44 and there was only a single subsequent case o f an V" Indian pre-empting land under this condition.45 O f all the changes in official p olicy perhaps the m ost im portant, and certainly the one that can m ost clearly be attributed to T rutch, w as the redefining o f reserves. B u t T ru tch was not on ly responsible fo r changing Douglas’ s policy, he also m isrepresented the nature o f that p olicy, V Trutch m ade a series o f inaccurate statements about earlier p olicy in an attempt to validate, or rather provid e an excuse for, his ow n actions.

I

If there was any possibility at all after 1864 that the Fort Victoria treaties could provide a precedent for resuming the purchase o f Indian lands in British Columbia the notion certainly did not enter Trutch’s mind. On the contrary, he explicitly demed that the treaties signed by , Douglas provided such a precedent. He claimed that the payments made under these treaties were “ for the purpose of securing friendly relations between those Indians and the settlement o f Victoria, then in its infancy; and certainly not in acknowledgement o f any general title ot the Indians to the land they occupy.” 46 Such was not the view o f those who had signed the treaties. Douglas clearly considered that he was purchasing Indian land,47 and the Indians themselves, although they had yet to comprehend European notions o f land ownership, knew that the paper they were signing involved more than a declaration o f friendship. It is comparatively easy to demonstrate that Trutch misinterpreted the nature of the treaties signed on Vancouver Island. In these cases we have as evidence a document that is still held to be legally binding in the courts of British Columbia.48 Throughout the rest of British Columbia no treaties were signed,49 making it difficult for the historian to determine the exact nature o f Douglas’ s policy, and much easier for men like Trutch to change the rules o f the game. Nowhere in North America have Europeans ever lacked pretexts for taking land, and Trutch was certainly not short o f one. In carrying out his policy o f reduction his tactic was to claim that those responsible for marking out the original reserves had either exceeded or misunderstood their instructions. William C o x marked out most o f the interior reserves, while on the lower Fraser they were laid out by William .VIc(loll. Questions about lhe former’s adherence to Douglas’ s instructions were first raised by Moberly when Trutch requested him to report on the interior reserves in

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1865. It appeared to Moberly “ quite out o f the question that Governor Sir James Douglas could have given Mr. C o x instructions to make such extensive reservations.” 50 The remark gave Trutch just the kind of pretext he needed. It seems that the Indians may have altered the boundaries o f reserves by moving the stakes after C ox had laid them out,51 but that is not to say that he exceeded his instructions in the first place. In fact there are at least two specifically documented instances of Trutch reducing reserves in the interior that Douglas had been satisfied with. In 1861 C ox reported that he had laid out a reserve at the north end of Okanagan Lake. In accordance with his instructions the Indians had selected the location and pointed out where they wanted the boundary stakes to be placed. A marginal note in pencil, initialled by Douglas, gives no indication that he was dissatisfied with the report.52 The following year C ox reported that he had laid out a reserve on the Bonaparte River, again adhering to the wishes o f the Indians.53 Douglas’s reply was that the reserves were satisfactory;54 yet Trutch instructed Peter O ’Reilly to reallocate the reserve in 1868.55 These reductions in the interior involved an implicit denial o f Douglas’s policy. In the case o f the lower Fraser reserves Trutch went further. Here there was a definite falsification o f the record. Trutch began his report on these reserves by statfng that Douglas had never followed an estab­ lished system regarding the reservation o f Indian lands. He then claimed that those reserves that had been laid out were established on the basis of verbal instructions only: “ there are no written records on this subject in the correspondence on record in this office.” 56 The claim is, o f course, quite untrue. There are numerous letters from Douglas containing instructions on marking out reserves in the files o f the Lands and Works Department. It would have taken very little effort on Trutch’s part to have found letters o f instruction to both C o x57 and M cColl,58 and with a little more work he might even have found the letter in which Douglas reprimanded his predecessor, Moody, for not laying out reserves in 1/ accordance with the wishes o f the Indians.59 Douglas’s frequent repeti­ tion o f this instruction makes it difficult to believe that Trutch was unaware o f its existence: and the only other possible explanation for his remark is that he was attempting to distort the record. Trutch was not alone in his effort to fabricate a pretext for reducing Indian reserves. W .A.G. Young, the Colonial Secretary, also had a hand in it. In his letter to Trutch conveying the governor’s approval for the “ defining” o f reserves, Young also noted that “ There is good reason to believe that Mr. M cColl very greatly misunderstood the instructions conveyed to him.” 60 Young continued,

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The instructions given in Mr. Brew ’s letter o f the 6th o f April, 1864, are very simple, viz:— to mark out as reserves any ground which had been cleared and tilled for years by the Indians; and should the ground so circumstanced not be equal to ten acres for each fam ily — each adult m ale being considered the head o f a family— the reserve was to be enlarged to that extent.61

Yet when one compares Young’ s description o f these instructions with Brew’s actual letter, it is immediately apparent that he has neglected to include a crucial section. That “ Mr. M cColl will mark out with corner posts whatsoever land the Indians claim as theirs . . ,” 62 is also part o f t h e ^ instruction. For some reason M cColl claimed that the order to include all the land the Indians wanted had been given to him verbally by Douglas,63 thus making it easy for Young to claim that he had misin­ terpreted an unwritten instruction.64 Probably Douglas did give addi­ tional verbal directions, but the written ones are quite clear on the point that the Indians were to have whatever land they demanded. Young had access to numerous letters in which Douglas had over and over again repeated his instructions. One o f the letters, conveying Douglas’s orders to Moody, was even signed by Young;65 as was another in which the governor expresses his satisfaction with C ox’ s allocation o f the Bona­ parte River reserve.66 The probability o f additional verbal orders is no excuse for Young to distort the written record, and certainly no excuse for Trutch to assert that there were no written directions on the subject. Nevertheless, armed with a letter in which Young, representing Seymour, had “ validated” his views, Trutch went on a tour o f the lower Fraser area with the express purpose o f repudiating the reserves defined by McColl. “ I took occasion at each village, to inform the Indians that McColl had no authority for laying o ff the excessive amounts o f land included by him in these reserves.” 67 B y saying that M cColl had no authority to lay out their reserves, Trutch was misleading the Indians. It would have been o f little consolation to them to learn that what they thought was a firm decision was to be revoked because the Europeans had decided to change the rules. But Trutch knew very well that M cColl did have the authority to allocate reserves in accordance with the wishes of the Indians. Having misled the Indians regarding past European policy, Trutch then proceeded to mislead the Europeans regarding present Indian attitudes. He informed the governor that there would be no difficulty in reducing the reserves “ with the full concurrence o f the Indians them- \/ selves.” 68 The numerous complaints by Indians o f the lower Fraser and other areas indicates that their real attitude was somewhat different from that which Trutch described. One o f the many petitions on the question

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i n d i a n -e u r o p f .a n r e l a t i o n s

forwarded to Seymour demonstrates that the Indians saw with con siderable clarity what was happening, and they by no means liked wh"' they saw. Governor Douglas did send some years ago his men amongst us to measure on Reserve and although they gave us only a small patch of land in comparison to what they allowed to a white man our neighbour, we were resigned to our Some days ago came new white men who told us that by order of their Chief they have to curtail our small reservation, and so they did to our greater griefnot only they shortened our land but by their new paper they set aside our best land, some of our gardens, and gave us in place, some hilly and sandy land where it is next to impossible to raise any potatoes: our hearts were full of prief day and night. . . ,69 The petitioners went on to express their confident belief that such a measure could not have been approved by the representative o f the Queen who was “ so gracious and so well disposed towards her children o f the forest. 70 Their confidence in Seymour was misplaced. When he began the reductions in the lower Fraser Trutch said that in carrying out the policy “ firmness and discretion are equally essential to effect the desired result* to convince the Indians that the Government intend only to deal fairly with them and the whites.” 71 The Indians, however, were a good deal more sophisticated than a man with Trutch’s attitudes could appreciate. They were dissatisfied with the way in which their land was taken from them, and they knew very well that they were ' not being treated on anything like an equal basis with the Europeans. A good measure o f Trutch’s idea o f fairness was his suggestion (incor­ porated in the 1865 Land Ordinance) that a European, in addition to a , pre-emption o f 160 acres, be allowed to purchase 480 acres,72 while he was requiring that an Indian family exist on ten acres. This was the kind o f inequality that even an “ uncivilized savage” could appreciate. Undoubtedly Trutch was mindful o f the comparative shortage o f good agricultural land in British Columbia. Yet while this fact o f geography may provide a reason for his ten-acre policy it does not provide a justification. Ten acres was not only insufficient for many Indian families to subsist on, it also failed to take into account the differences in the economic life o f the various Indian groups. Trutch’s notion that Indian reserves be reallocated on the basis o f ten V acres per family involved another distortion o f Douglas’s policy. Douglas had included in his directions to those laying out reserves in

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• sh Columbia the provision that if the area demanded by the Indians ^Mnot equal ten acres per family then the reserve was to be enlarged to l! 'extent.73 Instead o f using ten acres as a minimum as Douglas had 1 3t ded, Trutch used it as a maximum figure. When instructing t O’Reilly to reallocate the Bonaparte reserve, for example, Trutch wrote h t “ as a general rule it is considered that an allotment o f about 10 acres ' /good land should be made to each family in the tribe.” 74 Such was ° ever the intention o f Douglas. His opinion was clear enough in his "instructions at the time, but he outlined it with even greater clarity some ' ears later. “ It was . . . never intended that they should be restricted or Limited to the possession o f 10 acres o f land, on the contrary, we were . prepared, if such had been their wish to have made for their use much more extensive grants.” 75 The letter containing this statement was written in 1874 by Douglas in response to a request for information by I W. Powell, the Provincial Commissioner o f Indian Affairs. Powell had asked Douglas if, during his administration, there had been any parti­ cular acreage used as a basis for establishing Indian reserves. Douglas answered the specific question, and also commented more generally that, The principle followed in all cases, was to leave the extent and selection of the land, entirely optional with the Indians who were immediately interested in the V reserve; the surveying officers having instructions to meet their wishes in every particular___ This was done with the object of securing to each community their natural or acquired rights; of removing all cause for complaint on the grounds of unjust deprivation. . . .7/ Macdonald, Trutch pontificated that “ our Indians are sufficiently satis­ fied.” 120 Indian complaints about treatment over land began when Trutch started whittling away the reserves, and during the years o f his lieutenantgovernorship they were feeling the situation more acutely. They were learning to understand the value o f their land and at the same time “ They know that they are rapidly being hemmed in upon their limited reserves, v and that their domain is fast diminishing. ” 121 Indians were also begin­ ning to realize what white ownership o f the land meant. When Europeans V owned land they fenced in the grass, and tended to bring trespassers before their courts. Areas cultivated by Indians, however, were not V always similarly protected, either in the courts or from white encroach­ ment. Indians who brought cases o f their cultivated areas being trampled by Europeans’ cattle before the courts failed to secure convictions,122 whereas Indian defendants in similar cases were found guilty .123 In other

A

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instances white settlers were granted pre-emption certificates for areas of land that included potato patches belonging to Indians.124 N o doubt f/ the Indians concerned in such cases would have been intrigued with Trutch’s claim that they were equal with Europeans before the law.125 The discontent produced by such factors as these can be directly attributed to Trutch’ s reduction policy. In a letter to Ottawa Powell wrote that the Indians were highly satisfied with things under Douglas, But since that time his successors have, from time to time, at the request o f the white settlers, who in some localities were envious o f the fine tracts given to the Indians, cut them down or reserved other lands not so valuable as those originally laid aside for them. In this way they have become generally dis- v contented. . . .126

Naturally Trutch would not have explained Indian discontent in terms o f the inadequacies o f his own policies, but he was undoubtedly aware that it existed. I f he could not discern it for himself others were informing him o f the situation. Powell wrote to him describing some o f the injustices that had occurred and urging their settlement as a matter of paramount importance.127 Settlers were also informing Trutch o f instances o f Indian dissatisfaction. He was told that the Chilcotin Indians, for example, were continuing their hostility to the intrusion o f Europeans, maintaining that the land was theirs, and objecting to white men living on it.128 This particular letter was forwarded by Trutch to the Secretary o f State for the Provinces, although accompanied by some rather odd remarks. He said that the Chilcotins apparently thought that the Europeans were going to appropriate their land without any consi­ deration rendered in compensation, and that they would be confined to certain limited reserves.129 Clearly the Chilcotin Indians had accurately assessed what had happened to the Indians and their lands in the rest o f the province and did not want it to happen to them. Yet in his letter to Ottawa Trutch describes this concern as a “ misapprehension.” 130 The Chilcotins feared that the result o f Trutch’s land policy would be to confine them in the future, but for the Indians o f the lower Fraser it had already happened. A petition from a group o f Indian leaders clearly indicates the kind o f pressure Europeans were exerting on their lands and the apparent absence o f any protection o f their interests. Many o f [our people] have given up the cultivation o f land, because our gardens have not been protected against the encroachments o f the whites. Some o f our best men have been deprived o f the land they had broken and cultivated with long and hard labour, a white man enclosing it in his claim, and no compen­ sation given. Some o f our most enterprising men have lost part o f their cattle,

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because white men have taken the place where those cattle were grazing, and no other place left but the thickly timbered land, where they die fast. Some o f our people are obliged to cut rushes along the bank o f the river with knives during the winter to feed their cattle. We are now obliged to clear heavy timbered land, all prairies having been taken from us by white men.131

Unlike the Chilcotins these were Indians who had attempted to adopt the white man’ s ways. “ We are not a lazy and roaming-about people, as we used to be,” they told the Indian Commissioner. It was their strong contention, however, that Trutch’s policies had left them with insuffi­ cient land to support themselves.132 In spite o f all such expressions of discontent, Trutch was still blandly assuring Macdonald that the Indians were satisfied, and, in spite o f all valid Indian grievances, advocating no change in policy.133 Trutch sounds like the archetypal colonialist, protesting that “ the natives are happy” while the revolution is battering down the walls. Also C like the archetypal colonialist, this claim rests uneasily with his constant demands for sufficient military force to keep the Indians in subjection.134 The revolt never came in British Columbia, but in the year after Trutch’s retirement from the lieutenant-governorship the Indians o f the interior were on the verge o f rebellion. In these areas where Trutch first carried out his reduction programme, discontent had been steadily mounting, v / The Indians were becoming so wary o f government officials that the bands o f Nicola and Okanagan Lakes refused to accept presents from Powell “ lest, by doing so, they should be thought to waive their claim for v/ compensation for the injustice done them in relation to the Land Grants.” 135 Powell’s opinion was that “ I f there has not been an Indian war, it is not because there has been no injustice to the Indians, but / b ecause the Indians have not been sufficiently united.” 136 The voice of experience, however, spoke reassuringly from Victoria. An Indian out­ break in the interior is “ highly improbable,” opined Trutch.137 In fact the situation had reached the boiling point. A desperate tele­ gram was sent to Ottawa from the Reserve Commissioners claiming that / an outbreak was imminent.138 The freedom from Indian disturbances, particularly in comparison with the United States, was a major piece of evidence that Trutch had advanced to demonstrate the benevolence of Indian policy in British Columbia.139 Now, not only did a revolt seem likely, but the Indians were talking o f linking up with the resistance of J C h ief Joseph south o f the border.140 In the event the Indian Commis­ sioners were able to cool the situation off, but there was no doubt in the minds o f Canadian authorities that British Columbia’s policy, as insti-

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tuted by Trutch, was responsible for the very dangerous situation. It is obvious, said the Minister o f the Interior, “ that the discontent o f the Indians is wholly due to the policy which has been pursued towards them by the local authorities. ” He even went so far as to say that in the event o f an Indian war “ the people o f Canada generally would not sustain a policy towards the Indians o f that Province which is, in my opinion, not only unwise and unjust, but also illegal.” 141 In spite ofTrutch’s efforts to distort the situation the threat o f an Indian outbreak had finally, although probably too late, awakened the federal government to a realization o f just how unsatisfactory his policies were. Another historian, writing about Trutch’ s lieutenant-governorship, has commented that he paid special attention to Indian affairs. John Saywell goes on to claim that Trutch laboured “ to get the Federal Government to adopt an intelligent and consistent Indian policy.” 142 This essay has tried to show that he was really attempting to convince the federal government to continue those policies he had originated before union. Neither the policies, nor his advocacy o f them, was consistent or intelligent. The reserves laid out under his direction were notable not only for the smallness, but also the variety, o f their size.143 His defence o f his actions sometimes contained incredible inconsistencies. He could argue in one letter that present policy should be maintained because the Indians were incapable o f understanding a different system.144 Yet in another, the fact that they realized that there was a different policy east of the Rockies was advanced as a cause for discontent.145 The increasing Indian dissatisfaction during the period would also seem to be a good reason for not describing Trutch’s policies as intelligent. What, then, is Saywell’s judgement based on? “ An elaborate memo­ randum that he [Trutch] prepared on the subject was cited as late as 1920 as the sole authoritative pronouncement on Indian affairs.” 146 The “ elaborate memorandum” was Trutch’ s letter to Macdonald which is misleading on a number o f points.147 This letter is cited as the “ sole authoritative pronouncement on Indian affairs” in a memorandum by Sirjoseph Pope to Duncan C. Scott; hardly a reliable source, even if only for the reason that the judgement is nonsensical.148 There are many comments on Indian policy in British Columbia that are equally as authoritative as Trutch’s letter. Saywell provides no evidence that he has made any thorough examination o f Indian affairs in British Columbia, but bases his conclusion on one contemporary letter and one subsequent comment. He admits that Indian policy is important and yet apparently has canvassed no other opinions besides Trutch’s on the matter; and as an adjudicator on his own policy Trutch is somewhat less than reliable.

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In reality Trutch’s views and actions left British Columbia, not only with growing Indian discontent, but with a legacy o f litigation that in the long run was to cost the province more than extinguishing Indian title and laying out reasonable reserves would have done. In most areas of Canada the Indian land question has been tied up in a neat European legal package called a treaty. In British Columbia by 1876, largely thanks to the influence o f Trutch, it was still in the category o f unfinished business. N O TES 'Trutch, Report on the Low er Fraser Indian Reserves, 28 August 1867, Joseph Trutch, Papers, Manuscripts and Typescripts, Special Collections. University o f British Columbia Library (SC). (Hereafter cited as Report.) Also in British Columbia, Papers Connected with the Indian L w d Question, 1850-1875, Victoria, 1875, pp. 41-43. (Hereafter cited as B.C . Papers.) 2Rcserve Commissioners to Superintendent General o f Indian Affairs, 23 February 1877, Canada Indian Reserve Commission, Correspondence, Memorandums, etc., 18771878, Provincial Archives of British Colum bia (PABC). 'Hudson s Bay Com pany Land O ffice Victoria, Register of Land Purchases from Indians. 1850-1839, P A B C . An analysis o f these Treaties in relation to what is known about Songhee ethnography has been written by W ilson Duff, “ The Fort Victoria Treaties,” BC. Studies, no. 3, Fall 1969, passim. ■ •Carnarvon to Douglas, 11 April 1859, B.C. Papers, p. 18. 5The Daily British Colonist, 18 June i860. Newcastle to Douglas, 19 O ctober 1861, B.C. Papers, p. 20. •’M oody to C ox, 6 March 1861, Good to M oody, 5 March 1861, Parsons toTurnball, 1 May 1861, Douglas to M oody, 27 April 1863, B .C . Papers, pp. 21, 22, and 27. ’ Douglas to Lytton, 9 February 1859, B.C. Papers, p. 15. Douglas to Helmcken, j February 1859, Vancouver Island House o f Assembly, Correspondence Book, A ugus t l2 ,1856 toJuly 6, 1851), Archives of British Columbia Memoir no. IV, Victoria. 1918, p. 47. "Lenihan to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 7 N ovem ber 1875, Report of the Deputy Superintendent of Indian A ffairs for 1875, [Ottawa, 1876], p. 54. (Hereafter cited as Report on Indian Affairs.) ’•Minutes o f the M eeting o f the Legislative Council, 21 January 1864, British Columbia. Journal o f the Legislative Council o f British Columbia, N ew Westminster, 1864, p. 2. "'Douglas to Newcastle, 14 September 1863, British Columbia, G overnor’s Despatches to the Colonial O ffice, 1858-1871, vol. Ill, SC . (Hereafter cited as Governor’s Des­ patches.) "T rutch to Charlotte Trutch, 23 June 1850, Trutch. Papers, folder Al.b. l2Trutch, Diaries 1859-1864, passim, P A B C . "T rutch to Macdonald, 14 October 1872, Sir John A. Macdonald, Papers, vol. 278, Public Archives o f Canada. "D o u glas to Lytton, 14 March 1859, G overnor’s Despatches, vol. I. Also in B.C. Papers, p. 17. "D o u glas to Stanley, I5june 1858, Great Britain, Papers Relating to British Columbia, Part I, Cm d. 2476, p. 16.

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'‘’British Columbia, Report ami Journal by the Honourable C hief Commissioner o f Lands and Works, of the Proceedings in Connection with the Visit o f His Excellency the Late Governor Seymour to the North West Coast, in His Majesty’s Ship Sparrowhawk, Victoria, 1869, p. 1. It would appear that even the twentieth century historian is not immune from this kind o f nonsense. See M orris Zaslow, “ The Missionary as a Social Reformer: the Case o f W illiam Duncan,” Journal o f the Church Historical Society, vol. VIII, no. 3, September 1966, pp. 54 and 63. •Trutch to the Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 16 N ovem ber 1871, British Colum bia Lieutenant-Governor, Despatches to Ottawa, 14 August 1871 to 26 Ju ly 1876, PA BC . '“Douglas to Colonel Hawkins, 1 Ju ly 1861, Vancouver Island Governor, Correspon­ dence Outward, 27 M ay 1859 to 9 January 1864, Private O fficial Letter Book, P A B C . '''British Columbia, Report and Journal, p. 3. 3Trutch to Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 26 September 1871, B.C. Papers, p. 101. 2lIbid. 22Letter signed “ British Colum bian,” The Victoria Gazette, 16 January i860. A letter to his brother indicates that the one in the Gazette was written by Trutch under a nom-deplume. Trutch to John Trutch, 20 January i860, Trutch, Papers, folder Al.f. 2'Seymour to Cardw ell, 4 O ctober 1864, Governor’s Despatches, vol. IV. 24Seymour to Cardw ell, 31 August 1864, G overnor’s Despatches, vol. IV. 25Enclosurc in Seymour to Cardw ell, 31 August 1864, Great Britain, Colonial O ffice Correspondence with British Colum bia Governors, C O .60/19, University o f British Columbia Library. 2hSeymour to Cardw ell, 23 September 1864, G overnor’ s Despatches, vol. IV. 27Enclosures in Seymour to Cardw ell, 31 August 1864 and 7 June 1865, Colonial O ffice Correspondence with British Colum bia Governors, C O .60/19 and 21, also Seymour to Carnarvon, 19 February 1867, Governor’s Despatches, vol. V. 2*Enclosure in Seymour to Cardw ell, 31 August 1864, Colonial O ffice Correspondence with British Columbia Governors, C O .60/19. ^Seymour to Carnarvon, 19 February 1867, G overnor’s Despatches, vol. V. '"Nind to Colonial Secretary, 17 Ju ly 1865, British Columbia Colonial Secretary, C o rre­ spondence Regarding Indian Reserves 1861-1865. 1868-1869, and 1874-1877, PA BC . Also in B.C. Papers, p. 29. ''Letter by a British Columbian, Victoria Gazette, 16 January i860. 'Trutch to Colonial Secretary, 20 September 1865, British Columbia Lands and W orks Department, Correspondence Outward, 8 September 1865 to 11 Ju ly 1871, to Governor and Colonial Secretary, vol. 8a, P A B C . Also in B.C. Papers, p. 30. "Good to Trutch, 26 September 1865, British Columbia Colonial Secretary, Outward Correspondence to Lands and W orks Department, P A B C . Also in B.C. Papers, pp. 30-31"M oberly to Trutch, 22 December 1865, W . M oberly, Letters 1859-1868, Colonial Correspondence (C C ), file 1145, P A B C . Also in B.C. Papers, p. 33. 'Trutch to acting Colonial Secretary, 17 January 1866, Lands and W orks Department, Correspondence Outward, Vol. 8a. Also in B.C. Papers, pp. 32-33. 'hIbid. '7British Columbia Government Gazette, 6 October 1866. There is no indication o f how far back from the river the original reserves went. '"Minutes o f the meeting o f the Legislative Council, n February 1867, British Columbia, Journal o f the Legislative Council, p. 16. 'Trutch, Report, 28 August 1867.

l8o

INDIAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Robin Fisher / Joseph Trutch

■"’Young to Trutch, ft N ovem ber 1867, Colonial Secretary, Outward Corrcsponde Lands and W orks Department. Also in B.C. Papers, p. 45. u ’a 'to J ,Pearse to Trutch, 21 O ctober 1868, B.C. Papers, p. 53. 42Douglas to Helmcken, 5 February 1859, Vancouver Island House o f Assembly r pondence Book, p. 47. * 0rres~ ■■’Young to M oody, 18 Jun e and 2 Ju ly 1862, British Columbia Colonial Secret Outward Correspondence to Lands and W orks Department. ^ “ British Columbia, Appendix to the Revised Statutes o f British Columbia, 1871; Contai • Certain Repealed Colonial Laws Useful for Reference, Imperial Statutes Affecting BripL Columbia Proclamations etc., Victoria, [1871], pp. 93-94. Report o f the Government of British Colum bia on the subject o f Indian Reserves August 1875, B.C. Papers, appendix, p. 4. ■ "Trutch, Memorandum on a letter treating o f conditions o f the Indians in Vancouver Island, addressed to the Secretary o f the Aboriginies Protection Society, by Mr W illiam Sebright Green, enclosure in M usgrave to Granville, 29 January 1870, B C Papers, appendix, pp. 10-13. (Hereafter cited as Memorandum.) "D o u glas to Newcastle, 25 March 1861, B.C . Papers, p. 19. ■ "British Colum bia Court o f Appeal, Regina v. White and Bob, Western Weekly Reports Calgary, 1964, vol. LII, pp. 193-94 and passim. ■ "With the exception o f Treaty number 8, initially made by the Federal Government in 1899, and extended in 1900 to include the Beavers, and in 1910 to include the Slaves, both groups occupying the northeastern corner o f the Province. Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, Ottawa, 1912, vol. Ill, pp. 290-300. W ilson D uff, The Indian History o f British Columbia, vol. I, the Impact o f the White Man, Victoria, 1964, pp. 70-71. ’ “M oberly to Trutch, 22 Decem ber 1865, M oberly, Letters, C C , file 1145b. Also in B.C. Papers, p. 33. ’ 'Trutch to acting Colonial Secretary, 17 January 1866, Lands and W orks Department, Correspondence Outward, vol. 8a. Also in B.C. Papers, p. 32. ’ -C ox to Colonial Secretary, 4 ju ly 1861, W illiam C o x, Letters 1860-1868, C C file 176, PA BC . 5'C o x to Colonial Secretary, 25 O ctober 1862, C o x, Letters, C C , file 377. '■ Young to C o x, 14 N ovem ber 1862, British Colum bia Colonial Secretary, Outward Correspondence. Trutch to O Reilly, 5 August 1868, Lands and W orks Department, Correspondence Outward, vol. 11. ’ "Trutch, Report, 28 August 1867. ’ ’ Good to M oody, 4 and 6 March 1861, British Columbia Colonial Secretary, Outward Correspondence to Lands and W orks Department. ’ “B rew to M cC oll, 6 April 1864, W illiam M cC oll, Letters 1860-1865, C C PA BC .

file 1030,

’ ’ Douglas to M oody, 27 April 1863, British Colum bia Colonial Secretary, Outward Correspondence to Lands and W orks Department. Also in B.C. Papers, p. 27. " ’Young to Trutch, 6 N ovem ber 1867, British Colum bia Colonial Secretaiy, Outward Correspondence to Lands and W orks Department. Also in B C Papers p as 61Ibid1 r ^ “ B rew to M cC oll, 6 April 1864, M cC oll, Letters, C C , file 1030. Also in B .C . Papers, p. 43Italics mine. "’M cC oll to Brew , 16 M ay 1864, M cC oll, U tters, C C , file 1030. Also in B .C . Papers, p. 43“ Young to Trutch, 6 N ovem ber 1867, British Colum bia Colonial Secretary, O utw ard

18 1

despondence to Lands and W orks Department. Also in B.C . Papers, p. 45. to Moody, 11 M ay 1863, B.C. Papers, p. 28.

1

wYoung w C o x ’ 14 N ovem ber ,862' Bntish Colum bia Colom al Secretary, Outward Correspondence. _ u,ch to Young, 19 N ovem ber 1867, B.C. Papers, p. 46tip'ntion from lower Fraser Chiefs, enclosure m D urieu to Seymour, 6 Decem ber 1868, pr P Durieu, U tters 1869-1874, C C , file 503, P A B C . m/bid.

uTrutch, Report, 28 August 1867.

uphyllis Mikklesen, “ Land Settlement Policy on the Mainland o f Bntish Columbia, 1R58—,874,” M .A. Thesis, University o f British Columbia, 1950, p. 100. Bntish Colum ­ bia Appendix to the Revised Statutes, p. 87. iifirew to M cC oll, 6 April 1864, M cC oll, U tters, C C , file 1030. Also in B.C. Papers, p. 43■ ■ Trutch to O ’ Reilly, 5 August 1868, Lands and W orks Department, Outward Corres­ pondence, vol. 11. , _ , ■’Douglas to Pow ell. 14 O ctober 1874, Sir Jam es Douglas, Correspondence Outward, 1874, P A B C . . . 7„,bid. Douglas added the “ This letter may be regarded and treated as an official communication. 77See Indian-Eskimo Association o f Canada, Native Rights in Canada, Toronto, [1970J, pp. 8-9. Duff, “ The Fort Victoria Treaties,” pp. 27-51. W ilson D u ff (ed.). Histories, Territories, and Laws of the Kitwancool, Victoria, 1959, p. 35- V .E . Garfield and P.S. Wingert, The Tsimshian Indians and their Arts, Seattle and London, n.d., p. 14- W ayne Suttles, “ Post Contact Culture Change among the Lummi Indians, The British Columbia Historical Quarterly, vol. X V III, nos. 1 and 2, January-Apnl, 1954. P- 34’’Douglas to Newcastle, 25 March 1861, B.C. Papers, p. 19. 79Trutch, Report, 28 August 1867. mThe British Columbian, 21 M ay 1864. 9lThe British Columbian, 2 December 1865. *2Ibid. 8377ie Daily British Colonist, 21 March 1862. MThe Daily British Colonist, 8 March 1861. 8577ie Daily British Colonist, 19 M ay 1869. ^Resolution by the Honourable M r. R.T. Smith, 3 M ay 1864, British Columbia Journal of the Legislative Council, p. 41. 87Vine Deloria Jn r., Custer Died for Your Sins, an Indian Manifesto, N ew York, 1970, p. 55. 88G.E. Shankel, “ The Development o f Indian Policy in British Columbia, Ph.D. thesis, University o f Washington, 1945, p. 89. 12 August 1871. %The Daily British Colonist, 12 February 1869.

8Weekly Manitoban,

91Trutch, Memorandum, p. 10. ^Trutch, Memorandum, p. 11. 9'A motion for the protection o f the Indians during the change o f government was lost 20 to 1, and another advocating the extension o f Canadian Indian policy to the Province was withdrawn. British Colum bia Legislative Council, Debate on the Subject of Confed­ eration with Canada, Reprinted from the Government Gazette Extraordinary o f March, 1870,

()4 Victoria, [1870], pp. 146-47Bntish Columbia Legislative Council, Debate on Confederation, pp. i 57“ 59-

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“ Another student o f the subject has come to the same conclusion on the basis o f the similarity between clause 13 and Trutch’s memorandum o f 1870. Robert E. Cail, “ Disposal o f C row n Lands in British Colum bia,” M .A. Thesis, Univeristy o f British Columbia, 1956, p. 327. “ Report o f the Government o f British Colum bia on the Subject o f Indian Reserves, 17 August 1875, B.C. Papers, appendix, p. 1. ’ ’ M emo o f Laird, 2 N ovem ber 1874, B .C . Papers, p. 152. "B ish o p o f Colum bia to Secretary o f State for the Colonies, 27 M ay 1971, B.C. Papers, pp. 97- 98’ ‘T rutch to Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 26 Sept. 1871, B .C . Papers, p. 99. '""Trutch to Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 26 Sept. [871, B.C. Papers, p. 100. ""D ou glas to Helmckcn, 5 February 1859. Vancouver Island House o f Assembly, Corre­ spondence Book, p. 47. io2pOWell to Provincial Secretary, 4 February 1873, B .C . Papers, p. 112. ""A sh to Powell, 5 February 1873, B.C . Papers, p. 112. 104Ash to Powell, 26 February 1873, B.C. Papers, p. 113. 105Trutch to Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 26 September 1871, B.C. Papers, p. 100. " ’"Trutch to Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 26 September 1871, B.C. Papers, p. 101.

wibid. '""Trutch to Macdonald, 14 O ctober 1872, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. tmlbid. ""T ru tch to Laird, 30 January 1874, Trutch, Correspondence with the Department o f the Interior Regarding Board o f Indian Commissioners for British Columbia, 1874, PA BC . "'L a ird to Trutch, 8 Ju ly 1874, Trutch, Correspondence Regarding Board o f Indian Commissioners. '"S p eech o f Dufferin, 20 September 1876, George Stewart, Canada Under the Adminis­ tration o f Earl Dufferin, Toronto, 1878, pp. 492-93. '"M ills to Sproat, 3 August 1877, Canada Indian Reserve Commission, Correspondence. '"T ru tch to Macdonald, 14 October 1872, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. '"R e p o rt o f the Government o f British Colum bia on the Subject o f Indian Reserves, 17 August 1875, B.C. Papers, appendix, p. 9. ' " ’Powell to Beaven, 31 Ju ly 1874, B.C. Papers, p. 134. " 7See B .C . Papers, pp. 134-35. ""B e av en to Powell, 10 August 1874, B.C. Papers, p. 135. ""P o w ell to Superintendent General o f Indian Affairs, 4 February 1875, Report on Indian Affairs for 1874, p. 64. ' “ Trutch to Macdonald, 14 O ctober 1872. Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. "'L en ih an to Superintendent General o f Indian Affairs, 7 N ovem ber 1875, Report on Indian Affairs for 1875, p. 53. ,22The British Columbian, 9 Julyo864. '"P o w e ll to Attorney-General, 12 January 1874, B .C . Papers, p. 126. 124Powell to Trutch, 21 Jun e 1873, B.C. Papers, p. 116. '"T ru tch , Memorandum, p. 10. ' “ Powell to Superintendent General o f Indian Affairs, 4 February 1875, Report on Indian Affairs for 1874, pp. 63-64. 127Powell to Trutch, 21 June 1873, B .C . Papers, p. 116. 128Riske and M cIntyre to Trutch, 6 June 1872, Chilcotin, Correspondence etc. Relating to the District and the Natives, 1872, P A B C .

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"T ru tch to Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 24 June 1872, British Columbia Lieutenant-Governor, Despatches to Ottawa, 14 August 1871 to 26 Ju ly 1876, PA BC . o°Ibid. "'Petition o f Chiefs o f Douglas Portage, o f Low er Fraser, and o f the other tribes on the seashore o f the mainland to Bute Inlet, 14 Ju ly 1874, B.C. Papers, p. 137. 1 »lbid. 1'-'Trutch to Macdonald, 14 O ctober 1872, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. " ‘ Trutch to Macdonald, 16 Ju ly 1871, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. ■“ Memo o f Laird, 2 N ovem ber 1874, B.C . Papers, p. 153.

|“ M " ’ Ash to Powell, 30 January 1874, B .C . Papers, p. 127. " “Telegram o f Sproat and Anderson to the Minister o f the Interior, 13 Ju ly 1877, Canada Indian Reserve Commission, Correspondence. " “Trutch to Secretary o f State for the Provinces, 26 September 1871, B.C. Papers, p. 99. "T elegram o f Sproat and Anderson to the Minister o f the Interior, 13 Ju ly 1877, Canada Indian Reserve Commission, Correspondence. Speech o fM ills, 1 April 1885, Canada, Official Report o f the Debates o f the House o f Commons of the Dominion o f Canada, Ottawa, 1885, vol. X V III, p. 886. C ail, pp. 369-70. "'M ills to Sproat, 3 August 1877, Canada Indian Reserve Commission, Correspondence. " ’John Tupper Saywell, “ Sir Joseph Trutch: British Colum bia’s First LieutenantGovernor,” The British Columbia Historical Quarterly, vol. X IX , nos. 1 and 2, JanuaryApril 1955, pp. 85-86. " ’Petition o f the Chiefs o f Douglas Portage, o f Low er Fraser, and o f the other tribes on the seashore o f the mainland to Bute Inlet, 14 Ju ly 1874, B.C. Papers, p. 137. '"Trutch to Macdonald, 30 January 1873, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. '"Trutch to Macdonald, 16 Ju ly 1872, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. " ‘ Saywell, “ Sir Joseph Trutch,” p. 86. " ’Trutch to Macdonald, 14 O ctober 1872, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278. " “Memorandum by Sir Joseph Pope, 1920, attached to Trutch to Macdonald, 14 October 1872, Macdonald Papers, vol. 278.

Native Rights in Canada: British Columbia P E T E R C U M M IN G & N E IL M IC K E N B E R G

I D IS C O V E R Y A N D

SETTLEM EN T

The precise date o f the first British discovery o f what is now British Columbia remains in doubt. The adventurer, Sir Francis Drake, travelled up the Pacific coast o f North America in 1579, but there is uncertainty regarding the northerly extent o f his voyage. It was not until 1778 that actual contact by the British with the natives o f the northwest coast was established. Captain James Cook took shelter at Resolution Cove in Nootka Sound on March 29,1778 to repair his ships. While there, he took the opportunity to trade with the Indians and as a result o f the reports by his expedition and the value and quality o f furs in the Nootka area, regularized trading soon developed. At this time, Spain had also been active in exploring the Pacific coasts and was making territorial claims in the same areas as the British. In 1789, when Spanish warships seized both a British trading ship and the British post on Vancouver Island, war nearly ensued; however, the “ Nootka Affair” was peacefully settled in 1790 with the signing o f the Nootka Convention. B y the articles o f this treaty, Spain made reparations to the British for seizing the vessel in question and returned all territories to Britain. From this point on, British sovereignty was established over Vancouver Island and some surrounding areas. In the following years, many explorers, including Alexander Macken­ zie, Simon Fraser and David Thompson, pioneered the overland routes to the Pacific coasts by rivers which today bear their names. As a result of S O U R C E : Peter A. Cumraing and N eil H. M ickcnbcrg. N ative Rights in Canada, and cd. Toronto: The lndian-Eskimo Association o f Canada. 1972, pp. 71-93. Reprinted by permission of the authors and the Canada Association in Support o f Native Peoples.

i

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their explorations, the North West Company, the major fur-trading competitor o f the Hudson’s Bay Company, became rooted on the coast. The intense rivalry between the two companies continued until 1821 when they merged under the older name o f the Hudson’ s Bay Company and thus stretched the operations o f their trading empire from the eastern shores o f Hudson Bay to the Pacific.1 Although colonization had been attempted in the early decades o f the 19th century by the Puget Sound Agricultural Company, a subsidiary o f the Hudson’ s Bay Company, it was not until after the middle o f the century that substantial settlement was achieved. The Hudson’s Bay Company had received the exclusive licence to trade with the Indians in the trans-mountain area in 1821, and in 1849 the Company’s jurisdiction was extended to include the colony o f Vancouver Island. In addition to receiving the exclusive right to trade with the Indians, the Company also was given proprietary rights to Vancouver Island in return for a nominal rent and a promise to establish “ a settlement or settlements o f resident colonists, emigrants from Our United Kingdom o f Great Britain And Ireland, or from other Our Dominions. . . .” 2 Richard Blanshard, an affluent English lawyer, was sent as Governor but upon his finding that there were virtually no colonists to govern, he quickly became disillusioned and tendered his resignation. He was replaced in 1851 byjam es Douglas, the C h ief Factor o f the Hudson’s Bay Company. Douglas subsequently became a strong figure in the history o f British Columbia and developed the province’s early Indian policies. 11 E A R L Y IN D IA N

R E L A T IO N S

In anticipation o f increased settlement around Fort Victoria on Van­ couver Island, Governor_Douglas initiated, the policy o f purchasing outright the Indian title to land. As the “ native Indian population have distinct ideas about property in landT’ 5 he felt the purchase o f Indian lands was essential to avoid conflicts. However, this policy was not consistently followed and proved later to be a source o f contention between the Indians and whites. The purchases for which records are available were made only on Vancouver Island and were restricted to areas surrounding Fort Vic­ toria.4 The limited area covered by these treaties was due, in part, to the scarcity o f funds with which to purchase lands and to the fact that treaties were made only when actual settlement was planned.5 The texts of the various land cessions are nearly identical, with the land being

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British Columbia

Peter Cumming & Neil Mickenberg

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surrendered to James Douglas, “ entirely and forever.” in return for a payment in pounds sterling. In addition, it was agreed that: The condition o f or understanding o f this sale is this, that our village sites and enclosed fields are to be kept for our own use, for the use o f our children, and for those who may follow after us; and the land shall be properly surveyed hereafter. It is understood, however, that the land itself, with these small exceptions, becomes the entire property o f the white people for ever; it is also understood that we are at liberty to hunt over the unoccupied lands, and to carry on our fisheries as formerly.6

The number o f colonists on the west coast at this time remained quite small in comparison to the number o f Indians, and fears o f raids were constant. The Haida tribes to the north occasionally sent raiding parties down the coast as far as Puget Sound, and Governor Douglas was often confronted by marauding Indians from neighbouring tribes.7 One histo­ rian has commented that Douglas’ policy towards the Indians was “ probably humane but was certainly injudicious, since on many occa­ sions it meant that when an Indian committed an offence either he or his chief was bribed by blankets or other gifts to keep them in good humour. There was no effective force to impose punishment, but the resultant good relations compared very favourably with the wars on the American side o f the border.” 8 By 1858, colonization on the west coast was changing rapidly. The gold msh had attracted thousands to California, many o f whom, upon hearing the continual rumours o f gold to the north, began to filter into the British Columbia mainland. Since Douglas was the Governor o f Vancouver Island, he had no power or control over any activities on the mainland, except for trade relations with the Indians. Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, Secretary o f State for the Colonies, realizing the need to maintain order in the mining camps, gave Douglas the necessary authority to assert law and order among the gold miners until such time as the Imperial Govern­ ment was able to provide a permanent government.9 On November 19, 1858, the British territorial possessions on the mainland became the new colony o f British Columbia. Douglas, upon resigning his duties with the Hudson’s Bay Company, was appointed Governor o f both British Columbia and the separate colony o f Vancouver Island. On the main­ land, Governor Douglas was the sole law-making authority in the early years and his stern hand proved effective in maintaining peace and order during the hectic days o f the gold rush. In the late fifties and early sixties when the gold rush was at its peak, there was much bitter strife between the Indians and the miners;

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however, in the end, the superior numbers and armaments o f the mine crushed all Indian resistance.10 It was noted in a letter o f 1858 by th^ Aborigines Protective Society to the Secretary o f State that, since th Indians were aware o f their rights, it was incumbent upon the Imperial Government to provide every protection for the Indians and their land* The Society stated: The Indians, being a strikingly acute and intelligent race of men, are keenl sensitive in regard their own rights as the aborigines of the country, and are equally alive to the value of the gold discoveries. As, therefore, the Indians possess an intelligent knowledge of their own rights and appear to be determined to maintain them by all means in their power, there can be no doubt that it is essential to the preservation of peace in British Columbia that the natives should not only be protected againt wanton outrages on the part of the white population, but that the English Government should be prepared to deal with their claims in a broad spirit ofjustice and liberality. It is certain that the Indians regard their rights as natives as giving them a greater title to enjoy the riches of the country than can possibly be possessed either by the English Government or by foreign adventurers.11 Moreover, another observer commented that Indians in the Fraser River area demanded payment for the gold taken and for the ground used by the miners in working their claims.12 There appears to be no evidence to what extent the Indians were, i f at all, compensated for their land by any o f the miners during the gold rush. In the colony o f Vancouver Island much o f the Indian lands had not been purchased by the Government. Gilbert Sproat, an early settler in the Alberm district, an area which had remained unpurchased, re­ counted an interesting meeting with the chiefs o f the Nootka tribe on the issue o f land. Apparently Sproat had purchased land in the area from the government and sailed into Barclay Sound in i860 with two armed vessels to take possession. He met with the Chiefs o f the Nootkas and explained that the tribe would have to move its encampment as he had bought all the surrounding land from the Queen o f England and wished to occupy their village site. The C h ief replied that the lands belonged to the Indians although they would be willing to sell it. Sproat then paid the C h ief about twenty pounds in goods “ for the sake o f peace.” 13 In a further conversation with the Chief, Mr. Sproat recorded the Indian attitude towards the influx o f the white man: “ We see your ships, and hear things that make our hearts grow faint. They say that more King-George-men will soon be here, and will take our land, our firewood, our fishing grounds; that we shall be placed on a little spot, and shall

have

18 9

to do everything according to the fancies o f the King-George-men.

“ Do y °u believe all this?” I asked. “ We want your information,” said the speaker. “ T h en ,” an sw ere d I, “ it is true that m o re K in g -G e o rg e -m e n (as th ey c all the

£ glish) are com in g: th e y w ill soon b e h ere; b u t yo u r land w ill b e b o u g h t at a

&1“ \Vc do not wish to sell our land nor our water; let your friends stay in their wn country.” To which I rejoined: “ M y great chief, the high chief o f the Kingreorge-men, seeing that you do not work your land, orders that you shall sell it. It is of no use to you. The trees you do not need; you will fish and hunt as you do n0W and collect firewood, planks for your houses, and cedar for your canoes. The white man will give you work, and buy your fish and oil. “ Ah, but we don’t care to do as the white men wish.” “ Whether or not,” said I, “ the white men will come. All your people know that they are your superiors; they make the things which you value. You cannot make muskets, blankets, or bread. The white men will teach your children to read printing, and to be like themselves.” “ We do not want the white man. He steals what we have. We wish to live as

The Indians, however, were not to live as they were. White settlement steadily increased. Although some compensation was given to the Indians in the Alberni area, the settlers recogmzed that they had forcibly taken possession o f the Indians lands. W e often talked, Mr. Sproat recounts, about our right as strangers to take possession o f the district. The right of bona fide purchase we had, for I had bought the land from the Government, and had purchased it a second time from the natives. Nevertheless, as the Indians disclaimed all knowledge o f the colonial authorities at Victoria, and had sold the country to us, perhaps, under the fear o f loaded cannon pointed towards the village, it was evident, that we had taken forcible possession o f the district.

Ill C O L O N IA L

P O L IC Y T O W A R D S T H E

IN D IA N S

Throughout this period, Governor Douglas indicated the need to deal fairly with the Indians’ claims. In his inaugural address to the Legislative Assembly o f the colony ofVancouver Island in 1856, after referring to the uneasiness in the colony caused by marauding bands o f Indians, he stated: “ I shall nevertheless, continue to conciliate the good will o f the native Indian tribes by treating them with justice and forebearance and by rigidly protecting their civil and agrarian rights. lf’ Concern for Indian affairs was echoed by the Secretary o f State for the Colonies who

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counselled Douglas to deal fairly and promptly with the Indians’ claims. Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, in 1858, wrote to Douglas: I have to enjoin you to consider the best and most humane means o f dealing with the Native Indians. The feelings o f this country would be strongly opposed to the adoption o f any arbitrary or oppressive measures towards them. At this distance, and with the imperfect means o f knowledge which I possess, I am reluctant to offer, as yet, any suggestion as to the prevention o f affrays between the Indians and the immigrants. This question is o f so local a character that it must be solved by your knowledge and experience, and I commit it to you, in the full persuasion that you will pay every regard to the interests o f the Natives which an enlightened humanity can suggest. Let me not omit to observe, that it should be an invariable condition, in all bargains or treaties with natives for the cessions o f lands possessed by them, that subsistence should be supplied to them in some other shape. . . , 17

In a more emphatic statement o f the necessity o f recognizing and properly extinguishing aboriginal rights on the west coast, the Secretary o f State, Lord Newcastle, wrote to Douglas in 1859: Proofs are unhappily still too frequent o f the neglect which Indians experience when the white man obtains possession o f their country, and their claims to consideration are forgotten at the moment when equity most demands that the hand o f the protector should be extended to help them. In the case o f the Indians o f Vancouver Island and British Columbia, Her Majesty’s Government earnestly wish that when the advancing requirements o f colonization press upon lands occupied by members o f that race, measures o f liberality andjustice may be adopted for compensating them for the surrender o f the territory which they have been taught to regard as their ow n.18

Douglas tried as best he could to maintain fair and just practices toward the Indians, but, as experience in other colonies had shown, settlers would often take up lands without permission or try to secure title by purchasing the land directly from the Indians. Douglas attempted to curb these practices and outhned his actions in a despatch to the Home Government: Attempts have been made by persons residing at this place to secure those lands for their own advantage by direct purchase from the Indians, and it being desirable and necessary to put a stop to such proceedings, I instructed the Crown Solicitor to insert a public notice in the Victoria Gazette to the effect that the land in question was the property o f the Crown, and for that reason the Indians themselves were incapable o f conveying a legal title to the same, and that any person holding such land would be summarily ejected.19

Until i860, there was no pressing need for further treaties with the Indians due to the exceedingly slow pace o f settlement. In the ensuing

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years the influx o f settlers quickly created renewed pressures for land free fom Indian title. An editorial in the Victoria Gazette o f April 13, i860, though recognizing a need to extinguish Indian title, clearly saw the procedure as nothing more than a pragmatic political gesture rather than a strict legal necessity. The editorial stated in part: However much the title may be disputed, it is and has been usual to subsidize the Indian upon taking possession of his patrimony, and thus while denying a right dejure, admitting it defacto. The system o f giving presents for purchase o f or in exchange for lands, is attended with the happiest results. B y it the friendship o f the Indian is gained, he is convinced o f our honour, justice, and integrity, and his confidence is at once acquired. The injurious effects o f non-extinguishment of title in other districts is shown by the fact o f Chemainis settlers having been obliged to leave that part o f the country. T o suppress a serious broil and bring the offenders to justice would cost more than the sum required to extinguish the title and gain the confidence o f the native. Economy invites the Indian title to be extinguished, custom calls for it. . . . W e ask the Executive at once to extinguish the title to the land in the Chemainis district. . . . D o it now, for it can be done at small cost. But let priests and missionaries once gain the ear o f the Indian then farewell to so easy and so inexpensive an arrangement.20

The costs o f making such settlements proved to be beyond the funds o f the colonial government.21 The Legislative Assembly o f Vancouver Island issued several petitions in 1861 requesting the Home Government to assist in paying for the extinguishment o f Indian title. In addition to noting the immediacy o f the need to acquire lands free from Indian title for the incoming settlers, the Assembly made the interesting comment that “ the House o f Assembly respectfully considers that the extinction of the aboriginal title is obligatory on the Imperial Government.” 22 In another petition the suggestion was made by the Assembly that, if they received the three thousand pounds which they had requested, it would be repaid out o f the revenue o f the sale o f the lands.23 The substance o f the Assembly’s requests was communicated to Lord Newcastle, Secretary o f State for the Colonies, by Governor Douglas in a letter o f March, 1861: As the Indian native population o f Vancouver Island have distinct ideas o f property in land, and mutually recognize their several exclusive possessory rights in certain districts, they would not fail to regard the occupation o f such portions o f the Colony by white settlers, unless with the full consent o f the proprietary tribes, as national wrongs; and the sense o f injury might produce a feeling o f irritation against the settlers, and perhaps disaffection to the Govern­ ment that would endanger the peace o f the country. . . .

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3. Knowing their feelings on that subject, I made it a practice up to the year ifj to purchase the native rights in the land, in every case, prior to the settlement59!any District; but since that time in consequence o f the termination o f tL Hudson s Bay Company s Charter, and the want of funds, it has not been in mypow * to continue it. Your Grace must, indeed, be well aware that I have, since then ]-, ^ the utmost difficulty in raising money enough to defray the most indispensahl wants o f Government.24 e

vailing policies o f the Imperial Government in regard to aboriginal Populations, for it was during this time that much of the groundwork for f °ture treaty-making procedures in Canada was being set in Ontario by William Robinson.33 Douglas fully realized the benefits to be gained by treating fairly with the Indians, for, as he stated in one despatch to the Home Government;

The latter portion o f this extract is interesting in that it indicates that the extinguishment o f native rights was continued up to the year 1859. There would, therefore, appear to be more agreements with the Indians than are indicated from the records o f treaties on Vancouver Island.25 None­ theless, Lord Newcastle in his reply, though recognizing the great importance o f extinguishing aboriginal rights, stated that it was a purely colonial matter which should not burden the British taxpayer. His letter stated:

As friends and allies the native races are capable o f rendering the most valuable a s s i s t a n c e to the Colony, while their enmity would entail on the settlers a neater amount o f wretchedness and physical suffering, and more seriously ^tard the growth and material development o f the Colony,' than any other calamity to which, in the ordinary course o f events, it would be exposed.34

I am fully sensible o f the great importance o f purchasing without loss o f time the native title to the soil o f Vancouver Island; but the acquisition o f the title is a purely colonial interest, and the Legislature must not entertain any expectation that the British taxpayer will be burthened to supply the funds or British credit pledged for the purpose. I would eamesdy recommend therefore to the House o f Assembly, that they should enable you to procure the requisite means, but if they should not think proper to do so, Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake to supply the money requisite for an object which, whilst it is essential to the interests o f the people o f Vancouver Island, is at the same time purely Colonial in its character, and trifling in the charge that it would entail.26

As a result o f the failure to obtain funds from the British Government, sums to be used for extinguishing native rights were included in both the 1861 and 1864 budget estimates o f the colony although the Legislative Assembly refused to ratify them.27 In 1865 and 1866 sums were actually voted for this purpose although they were never used.28 The governors who succeeded James Douglas after his retirement in 1864, in the estimation o f one authority,29 were almost totally ignorant o f Indian affairs.30 Moreover, the Indians themselves were dissatisfied with the treatment they were receiving. Two massacres occurred shortly after Douglas retirement which the mainland newspaper, the British Colum­ bian, attributed to the lack o f Indian policy,31 while the Island newspaper, the British Colonist, saw the cause as white encroachment on Indian lands.32 During Douglas’ term as Governor, he had followed closely the

Thus, when reserves were set aside for the Indians, title remained vested in the Crown with the lands inalienable by the Indians and white settlers unable to directly purchase the land. Moreover, having been given a free hand by the Imperial authorities to deal with the Indians, he indicated in another despatch that “ the course I propose to adopt with respect to the disposal and management o f Indian reserves at Victoria; . . . is to lease the land, and to apply all the proceeds arising therefrom for the exclusive benefit o f the Indians.” 35 Following the retirement o f Douglas, Indian policy in British Colum­ bia and the colony o f Vancouver Island changed drastically. With the appointment o f Sir Joseph Trutch to the post o f C h ief Commissioner of Lands and Works, along with other new members o f the colomal administration there was a shift in the basic policy, in the words o f one commentator, to the idea that the Indian was an obstruction to settle­ ment and progress.” 36 Indeed, in a report on Indian claims to certain lands which had been laid out as reserves for them on Douglas instruc­ tions, Trutch commented: The Indians have really no right to the lands they claim, nor are they o f any actual value or utility to them, and I cannot see why they should either retain these lands to the prejudice o f the general interests o f the Colony, or to be allowed to make a market o f them either to the Government or to Individuals.

The change in policy was to create much bitterness among the Indians and create many problems for the Federal Government in their efforts to deal with the Indians after British Columbia joined Confederation. By 1871, the political barriers to confederation with Canada had been solved and on Ju ly 20, 1871, British Columbia became a province o f the

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Dominion o f Canada. While the question o f Indian lands did receiv attention from the drafters o f the Terms o f Union,38 “ [a]t no time ^ British Columbia history,” one observer has noted, “ was Indian polic” so ill-defined as it was at the time that the colony became a part o f th Dominion o f Canada, and o f all the features o f Indian policy, that on land was perhaps the most obscure and unsatisfactory.” 39 B y Clause 13 o f the Terms o f Union,40 the Indians were made wards of the Federal Government with lands reserved for them being held in trust by that Government. The Clause states: The charge of the Indians, and the trusteeship and management o f the lands reserved for their use and benefit, shall be assumed by the Dominion Govern­ ment, and a policy as liberal as that hitherto pursued by the Brirish Columbia Government shall be continued by the Dominion Government after the Union. To carry out such a policy, tracts o f land o f such extent as it has hitherto been the practice o f the British Columbia Government to appropriate for that purpose, shall from time to time be conveyed by the Local Government to the Dominion Government in trust for the use and benefit o f the Indians on application o f the Dominion Government; and in case o f disagreement between the two Governments respecting the quantity o f such tracts o f land to be so granted, the matter shall be referred for the decision o f the Secretary o f State for the Colonies.41

G.E. Shankel, in an unpublished doctoral thesis, The Development of Indian Policy in British Columbia,42 has criticized the inclusion o f the Clause. He argues: Where did this clause originate? Certainly the British Columbia Legislature would not have permitted the perpetuation o f so gnm a joke. Similar words were proposed to be inserted during the passage o f the clause through the Local Legislature, but they evoked only ridicule. Certainly no such words could have been incorporated in the terms sent to Ottawa, first because it had been such a chronic subject o f complaint in British Columbia that the reserves were already too large, and secondly, because the absence o f anything having the slightest claim to be called an Indian policy had been one o f the stock grie vances o f the past.43

Nonetheless, the British Columbia government, in the ensuing years, was to argue in the face o f all claims put forth by the Indians for the recognition o f their rights, that the Indians had been liberally and fairly treated and had no outstanding claims in British Columbia.44 This argument was asserted especially in regard to the question o f reserve allotments.

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IV RESERV E

P O L IC Y

Vf/bile in office, Governor Douglas ruled by proclamation on the ainland, and prior to 1861 issued instructions requiring that all Indian reserves be distinctly marked out. The only method established for determining the reserves was that they were to be defined as “ severally ointed out by the Indians themselves.” 45 This haphazard approach wrought both confusion among those directed to fulfill the instructions, and inconsistency in the amounts o f land allotted to the Indians. At another point, Douglas instructed that reserves were to be delineated as the Indians indicated, subject only to the decision o f the District Magis­ trate as to the extent o f the lands claimed. Instructions to one surveyor stated: You will take an early opportunity o f staking and marking out in the District you are now stationed, all Indian villages, bunal places, reserves, etc., as they may be pointed out to you by the Indians themselves, subject, however, to the decision o f the District Magistrate as to the extent o f the land so claimed by them. Make sketches o f the locality and give dimensions o f the claim, sending them to this office after acquainting the Magistrate o f what you have done. Be very careful to satisfy the Indians so long as their claims are reasonable, and do not mark out any disputed lands between whites and Indians before the matter is settled by the Magistrate, who is requested to give you every assistance.46

From the available documentation on the subject, the amount o f land allowed the Indians is unclear. It seems that Governor Douglas intended to be generous in the laying out o f reserves, although in subsequent years, the precise nature o f his policy became a matter o f deep contro­ versy. Apparently, he conceived o f reserves, at one point, as a place for the elderly and infirm. He also expected that Indians would pre-empt lands in the same way as did the settlers.47 On this basis then, the amount of land to be set aside for reserves would, o f course, be small and the surveyors appear to have adopted the practice o f allotting ten acres per family, as opposed to the 160 acres allotted on the prairies.48 In 1874, Douglas wrote to an inquiry into the question of land reserves in British Columbia suggesting that although ten acres per family was often allotted to Indians, it had never been his explicit policy to limit them to that amount. He stated: To this enquiry I may briefly rejoin that in laying out Indian reserves no specific number o f acres was insisted upon. The principle followed in all cases was to leave the extent and selection o f the lands entirely optional with the Indians

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who were immediately interested in the reserves; the surveying officers havin instruction to meet their wishes in every particular. . . . This was done with th^ object o f securing their natural or acquired rights. . . . It was never intended that they should he limited or restricted to a possession o f ten acres o f land on the contrary, we were prepared, if such had been their wish, to have made'for their use more extensive grants. These latter reserves were necessarily laid out on a large scale, commensurate with the wants o f these tribes.49

Nevertheless, Douglas’ successors in office were much more stringent with their allotments and no more than ten acres was allowed per family Indeed,^one report states that Sir Jospeh Trutch “ deliberately misin­ formed” 50 the Home authorities by telling them that Douglas had never intended “ excessive amounts ofland,” 51 meaning more than ten acres, to be allowed for Indian reserves. A more recent analysis o f the Indian land question in British Columbia has concluded: It is obvious that the new colonial administration had three basic criteria in carrying out their duties— a fixed conception o f the Indian’s needs and his hmited use o f the land which determined the quantity and locations o f the reserves in relation to expanding settlements. The new policy was developed prior to the entrance o f British Columbia into Confederation, and it led to a complete denial o f the Indian title, even before the Terms o f Union had been ratified by British Columbia.52

Following 1871, the British Columbia government found itself in constant disagreement with the Federal Government as to the size of reserves. The province suggested that ten acres per family would be sufficient, arguing that this would be a continuation o f the policy set during the colonial period,53 while the Federal Government argued in favour o f the more liberal allotment o f 80 acres. Accord was reached at a compromise o f 20 acres, although the consensus collapsed when the province insisted that this should apply only to future reserves and not those already in existence.54 In a further attempt to settle the many questions surrounding the reserve issue, a three-man commission was established in 1873. G.M. Sproat, from the Alberni district, was the first chairman and became the sole commissioner in 1878. Although the commission operated until 1910, it failed to fulfill its original goal o f settling the reserve issue. A memorandum55 prepared at about this time by David Laird, Federal Mimster o f the Interior, is instructive o f the attitudes o f the Indians and the approaches o f the various governments regarding Indian claims. Stating that the present state o f the Indian Land question in our Territory West o f the Rocky Mountains, is most unsatisfactory, and that

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■ is the occasion, not only o f great discontent among the aboriginal 1 ibeS but also o f serious alarm to the white settlers,” 50 the memorandum oes on to describe the approach o f British Columbia in these terms: The policy heretofore pursued by the Local Government o f British Columbia toward the red men in that Province, and the recently expressed views o f that Government in the correspondence herewith submitted, fall far short o f the estimate entertained by the Dominion Government o f the reasonable claims o f the Indians. . . . When the framers o f the Terms o f admission o f British Columbia into the Union inserted this provision, requiring the Dominion Government to pursue a policy as liberal towards the Indians as that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia Government, they could hardly have been aware o f the marked contrast between the Indian policies which had, up to that time, prevailed in Canada and British Columbia respectively. Whereas in British Columbia, ten acres ofland was the maximum allowance for a family o f five persons, in old Canada the minimum allowance for such a family was eighty acres; and a similar contrast obtained in regard to grants for education and all other matters connected with Indians under the respective Governments. Read by this light, the insertion o f a clause guaranteeing the aborigines o f British Columbia the continuance by the Dominion Government of the liberal policy heretofore pursued by the Local Government, seems little short o f a mockery o f their claims.57

The document goes on to suggest a fear o f a general Indian uprising on the west coast “ with all its horrors” and concludes in part that: The policy foreshadowed in the provisions o f the 13th Clause o f the British Columbia Terms o f Union is plainly altogether inadequate to satisfy the fair and reasonable demands o f the Indians. To satisfy these demands, and to secure the good-will o f the natives, the Dominion and Local Governments must look beyond the terms o f that agree­ ment, and be governed in their conduct towards the aborigines by the justice o f their claims, and by the necessities o f the case.58

Eventually a Royal Commission, the McKenna-McBride Commis­ sion, was appointed in 1913. This Commission, consisting o f five members, was charged with the task o f adjusting the acreage o f Indian reserve lands. The resulting report recommended a decrease in the size ° f existing reserves by over 47,000 acres and the conveyance o f approxi­ mately 87,000 acres o f other lands to the Indians.59 The report was accepted by both governments in 1924 when Parliament passed legis­ lation enabling the Governor-General-in-Council to accept the report

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and carry out the agreements with the British Columbia government. The Indians, who had appeared before the Commission to present their case, realized the limited nature o f its terms o f reference and refused to accept the report, insisting that the whole issue o f aboriginal rights in British Columbia and the reserve lands question be put before the Privy Council. A statement prepared by an Indian agent on behalf of the Indians describes their reaction to the Commission’s findings: The Indians see nothing o f real value for them in the work o f the Royal Commission. Their crying needs have not been met. The Commissioners did not fix up their hunting rights, fishing rights, and land rights, nor did they deal with the matter o f reserves in a satisfactory manner. Their dealing with reserves has been a kind o f manipulation to suit the whites, and not the Indians. All they have done is to recommend that about 47,000 acres o f generally speaking good lands be taken from the Indians, and about 80,000 acres o f generally speaking poor lands, be given in their place. A lot o f the land recommended to be taken from the reserves has been coveted by whites for a number o f years. Most o f the 80.000 acres additional lands is to be provided by the Province, but it seems that the Indians are really paying for these lands. Fifty percent o f the value o f the 47.000 acres to be taken from the Indians is to go to the Province, and it seems this amount will come to more than the value o f the land the Province is to give the Indians. The Province loses nothing, the Dominion loses nothing, and the Indians are the losers. They get fifty percent on the 47,000 acres, but, as the 47.000 acres is much more valuable land than the 80,000 they are actually losers by the work o f the Commission.60

V THE

ST A T U S O F A B O R IG IN A L

R IG H T S

IN

B R IT IS H

C O L U M B IA

The setting aside o f reserve lands in British Columbia occurred during a period o f considerable agitation by the Indian tribes o f that province for recognition o f their aboriginal rights. Prior to 1870, no­ where else in Canada had there been such a strong and consistent history o f native land claims so cogently articulated by the Indian population. The continuing disagreement between province and Dominion on the issue, however, served only to complicate, confuse, and delay the recog­ nition o f the just claims o f the Indians. In the post-1871 period, the Federal Government took a strong posi­ tion in favour o f the recognition and proper extinguishment o f native rights. The province, however, was adamant in its refusal to recognize the problem and at times refused even to discuss the matter. The attitude o f the province can be seen in a statement by Sir Joseph Trutch, the first Lieutenant-Governor o f British Columbia, who argued that the policies

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pursued in other parts o f Canada would not work in British Columbia. “ If you now commence to buy out Indian title to the lands o f B .C .,” he stated in 1872, “ you would go back o f all that has been done here for 30 years past and would be equitably bound to compensate the tribes who inhabited the districts now settled [and] farmed by white people equally with those in the more remote and uncultivated portions. Our Indians are sufficiently satisfied . . . .” 61 The injustice o f the LieutenantGovernor’s view was almost equal to his misunderstanding o f the attitude o f the Indians who continued to press for the legal recognition of their claims. Undaunted by either the Indians’ pressure or by the Federal Govern­ ment’s position, British Columbia proceeded in 1874 to pass “ An Act to amend and consolidate the laws affecting Crown Lands in British Columbia” 62 which failed to recognize in any way, any rights o f Indians in public lands. In one of the early instances where the Federal Govern­ ment exercised the extraordinary power o f disallowance over provincial legislation, the British Columbia Crown Lands Act was declared null and void in March, 1875. In his Report, the Federal Justice Minister, the Honourable T. Fournier, found that since the act made no “ reservation of lands in favour o f the Indians or Indian tribes o f British Columbia; nor are the latter thereby accorded any rights or privileges in respect to lands, or reserves, or settlements,” 63 it was contrary to the historical development o f relations with the Indians o f Canada. The Report clearly recognizes the existence o f valid Indian claims in British Columbia. It states: . . . with one slight exception as to land in Vancouver Island surrendered to the Hudson Bay Company, which makes the absence o f others the more remark­ able, no surrender o f lands in that province has ever been obtained from the Indian tribes inhabiting it, and that any reservations which have been made, have been arbitrary on the part o f the government, and without the assent o f the Indians themselves, and though the policy o f obtaining surrenders at this lapse of time and under the altered circumstances o f the province, may be question­ able, yet the undersigned feels it is his duty to assert such legal or equitable claim as may be found to exist on the part o f the Indians. There is not a shadow o f doubt, that from the earliest times, England has always felt it imperative to meet the Indians in council, and to obtain surrenders o f tracts o f Canada, as from time to time such were required for the purposes o f settlement.64

The report proceeds to quote the relevant portions o f the Proclamation of 1763 and discusses the extent to which it has been followed in Canada.

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“ It is sufficient,” the Justice Minister notes, “ for the present purposes, to ascertain the policy o f England in respect to the acquisition o f the Indian territorial rights, and how entirely that policy has been followed to the present time, except in the instance o f British Columbia.” 65 In con­ clusion, the report provides a clear exposition o f the Federal Govern­ ment’ s attitude: Considering, then, these several features o f the case, that no surrender or cession o f their territorial rights, whether the same be o f a legal or equitable nature, has been forever executed by the Indian tribes o f the province— that they alledge that the reservations o f land made by the Government for their use, have been arbitrarily so made, and are totally inadequate to their support and requirements, and without their assent— that they are not averse to hostilities in order to enforce rights which it is impossible to deny them, and that the Act under consideration not only ignores those rights, but expressly prohibits the Indians from enjoying the rights o f recording or pre-empting lands, except by consent o f the Lieutenant-Governor;— the undersigned feels that he cannot do otherwise than advise that the Act in question is objectionable, as tending to deal with lands which are assumed to be the absolute property o f the province, an assumption which completely ignores, as applicable to the Indians of British Columbia, the honour and good faith with which the Crown has, in all other cases, since its sovereignty of the territories in North America, dealt with their various Indian tribes,66

The province proceeded to amend the Act, and after consultations with the Dominion Government regarding the question o f selection and allotment o f reserves, the Act came into effect.67 The issue o f aboriginal title and the allotment o f reserves, although not completely ignored, was, for the most part, avoided by British Columbia. The need to deal fairly and equitably with the Indians in respect of their claims was again emphasized in 1876 by the Earl o f Dufferin, Governor-General o f Canada. On a visit to British Columbia, His Excellency gave a lengthy speech dealing extensively with many issues, among which was Indian rights. He stated: From my first arrival in Canada, I have been very much pre-occupied with the condition o f the Indian population in this Province. You must remember that the Indian population are not represented in Parliament, and consequently that the Governor-General is bound to watch over their welfare with especial solici­ tude. Now, we must all admit that the condition o f the Indian question in British Columbia is not satisfactory. Most unfortunately, as I think, there has been an initial error ever since Sir James Douglas quitted office in the Government of British Columbia neglecting to recognise what is known as the Indian title. In Canada this has always been done; no Government, whether provincial or central, has failed to acknowledge that the original title to the land existed in the Indian tribes and

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communities that hunted or w andered over them. B efo re w e touch an acre w e make a treaty with the chiefs representing the hands w e are dealing with, and h a rin g agreed upon an d p a id the stipulated price, oftentim es arrived at after a g reat deal o f haggling and difficulty, w e enter into possession, hut not u ntil then do w e consider that w e are entitled to

The result has been that in Canada our Indians are contented, well affected to the white man, and amenable to the laws and Government. At this very moment the Lieutenant-Governor o f Manitoba has gone on a distant expedition in order to make a treaty with the tribes to the northward o f the Saskatchewan. Last year he made two treaties with the Chippewas and Crees; next year it has been arranged that he should make a treaty with the Blackfeet, and when this is done the British Crown will have acquired a title to every acre that lies between Lake Superior and the top o f the Rocky Mountains. But in British Columbia— except in a few cases where under the jurisdiction o f the Hudson Bay Company or under the auspices o f Sir James Douglas, a similar practice has been adopted— the Provincial Government has always assumed that the fee simple in, as well as sovereignty over the land, resided in the Queen. Acting upon this principle, they have granted extensive grazing leases, and otherwise so dealt with various sections o f the country as greatly to restrict or interfere with the prescriptive rights o f the Queen’s Indian subjects. As a consequence there has come to exist an unsatisfactory feeling amongst the Indian population. Intimations o f this reached me at Ottawa two or three years ago, and since I have come into the Province my misgivings on the subject have been confirmed. N ow I consider that our Indian fellow-subjects are entitled to exactly the same civil rights under the law as are possessed by the white population and that i f an Indian can prove a prescriptive right o f way to a fishing station, or a right o f any other kind, that that right should no more be ignored than i f it was the case o f a white man.68

deal with an acre.

Shankel, in his analysis o f Indian policy, has noted that there perhaps were other reasons why Indian title had become a popular subject for the Federal Government. He comments: The Governor-General was perhaps the mouthpiece o f a conviction regarding land title never far beneath the surface in the thinking o f the Dominion Govern­ ment. In a letter from Mills (Ministry o f the Interior) to Powell (Indian Super­ intendent in British Columbia) August, 1877, Mills declared that in the event o f an Indian War the land question would be taken entirely out o f the hands o f the local government until the Indian title had been extinguished by proper com­ pensation. The Dominion Government expressed itself as having no desire to raise the question o f land title and its extinguishment, ifit could be avoided, but it would have no hesitation in requiring such a measure to prevent an Indian War.69

Three days after the Governor-General’s speech, G.M . Sproat, the chairman o f the Commission appointed to deal with the problem o f the

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Indian reserves, issued a memorandum stating that the fundament 1 question facing the Commission was whether Canada proposed appiying the principle o f full Indian title to the land. He asked that th Commission be instructed immediately so that they might make treati 6 for the cession o f the land. The British Columbia government, however had no desire to have the Commission’s terms o f reference extended to include an inquiry into land title and tried to have it disbanded. At this point, Sproat became the sole Commissioner and after some negotia­ tions, British Columbia declared it would not accept Sproat’s decision as final, but promised not to interfere with his work except in extreme cases. On this tenuous basis the Commission carried on.70 The Indian tribes on the west coast continued their own pressures for both the recognition o f their rights and proper compensation for their lands. One o f the most publicized events in which the Indians were involved occurred in 1906. Several chiefs o f the Squamish tribe drew up a petition stating that the title to their land had never been extinguished A deputation o f these chiefs then took the petition to London and during a meeting with King Edward VII presented their grievances to him. They were politely told, however, to present their claims to the Canadian Government and i f they then received no satisfaction, their complaints would be dealt with further.71 Another group o f Indians in the Nass River area, having obtained a legal opinion on the situation pertaining to title to their traditionally occupied lands, requested an order from A. W. Vowell, the Indian Superintendent, prohibiting further settlement until the matter was decided in court.72 In 1910, an Indian group managed to gam a promise o f assistance from Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier who stated that the “ only way to settle this question that you have agitated for years is by a decision o f the Judicial Committee, and I will take steps to help you.” 73 While the results o f these attempts had little effect in gaining concrete action in respect to the natives claims, they did manage to keep the issue constantly before the public and the various levels o f government. Indeed, in 1910, the Deputy Minister o f Justice o f the Federal Govern­ ment and legal counsel for British Columbia attempted to settle the problem by the preparation o f ten questions which were to be referred to the Supreme Court o f Canada and ultimately the Judicial Committee o f the Privy Council.74 The provincial government, however, balked at the first three questions, which dealt exclusively with Indian title, and refused to continue with the reference. Thus, a possible solution to the Indian title problem was again frustrated by the province’s failure to co­ operate.

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The prom ises from the Federal G o vern m en t that they w o uld take a case to the courts w hen one should arise w ere given further im petus tCSt n when a group o f N ish ga Indians presented a petition requesting m osnition o f aboriginal title to the P riv y C o u n cil w hich w as referred ^ t h e G overn m en t o f C anada. In response to a question in the H ouse o f mroons in 1917, the H onourable W .J. Roche, Superintendent G en eral ^ I n d ia n A ffairs, explained what w as to be done in response to the r

petition: .

to n , an O rd e r in C o u n c il w a s passed p ro v id in g that i f the Indians w o u ld bide b y the d ecisio n o f an im p artial trib un al as to reserves, the fu ll q u estio n o f

the Indian title w o u ld b e subm itted to the P r iv y C o u n c il, th ro u gh the o rd in ary course. T h is im p artial trib un al w as to ascertain , w ith re gard to each b an d o f Indians in the p ro v in c e , w h e th e r the area o f its re se rv e w as large en ou gh fo r the band or not In case the reserve w a s fo u n d to be too sm all, the B ritish C o lu m b ia G overn m ent p ro m ised to increase its area b y the ad dition o f p ro vin c ial lands; and i f the reserv e w a s fo u n d to b e la rg e r than n e cessary fo r the band, the area was to be cu t d o w n a cco rd in g ly. . . .75

Though the tw o governm ents had agreed to this procedure, the Indians objected to a com m itm ent in advance to surrender their title to lands without a clear p rio r decision on the issue o f aboriginal title and therefore refused to pursue the m atter. T h e y continued pressure to get a case dealing w ith aboriginal rights b efo re the P riv y C o u n cil but w ere again blocked b y the opposition o f the B ritish C o lu m b ia governm ent. The m atter w as partially resolved in 1927 w h en the H ouse o f C o m ­ mons appointed a special com m ittee to inquire into the claim s o f the Allied Indian T rib e s o f B ritish C o lu m b ia to set forth in their petition submitted to Parliam ent in Ju n e 1926. 76 S everal tribes o f British Colum bia Indians had form ed a society o f A llied T rib e s in 1916 to better present their case to the public and the governm ent. In a petition they had prepared in 1919 they had dem anded reserve lands o f 160 acres per family w ith additional grazing and tim ber lands i f the farm lands could not be fu lly utilized. T h e y also asked fo r a clarification o f their w ater rights. T h e riparian rights on existing reserves adjacent to tidal w aters had been assured them, but the ow nership o f the foreshores rem ained vested in the province. H ence, a full adjustm ent o f their rights in regard to hunting, fishing, and w ater w as requested. In addition, they de­ manded m onetary com pensation fo r the loss o f their lands to white settlement, as w ell as education and m edical ca re .77 T h e ir petition ol 1926 was couched in sim ilar terms although special em phasis w as given the aboriginal rights question.

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In its Report, the special committee was o f the unanimous opin, that the Indians ofBritish Columbia had failed to establish any claims ” lands based on aboriginal rights. The Report concludes: Having given full and careful consideration to all that was adduced before y0Ur committee, it is the unanimous opinion o f the members thereof, that the petitioners have not established any claim to the lands o f British Columbia based on aboriginal or other title, and that the position taken by the government in 1911 afforded the Indians full opportunity to put their claim to the test. As they have declined to do so, it is the further opinion o f your committee that the matter should now be regarded as finally closed.78

The committee advised that a sum o f $100,000 be extended annually in British Columbia for technical education, hospitals, medical attendance agricultural promotion, and irrigation. This sum was to compensate the Indians for not receiving treaty payments similar to those given the Indians o f the prairies. The payments were to be solely for the purposes set out, as the committee was opposed to any per capita annuity pay­ ments.79 Although the committee had stated that the issue o f aboriginal rights in British Columbia was finally closed, and Shankel at the time of his research on Indian policy in the 1940s had asserted that some o f the natives considered the matter as finally settled,80 the idea o f a test case on the subject never completely died. As late as 1959 the Reverend Peter Kelly, an Indian leader and member o f the Haida band, m testimony before a joint hearing o f the Senate and House o f Commons on Indian Affairs, stated: But, gentlemen, so long as that title question is not dealt with, every Indian in British Columbia feels that he has been tricked, and he never will be satisfied. I want to say to this committee, in all seriousness, that you will do a good service to the country if you, in some way see to it that this is dealt with. Let us say that it be dealt with by the Supreme Court o f Canada. That is as far as we can go now. We used to go to the Privy Council, but that is not possible now. Once again, I want to say this: if that is done, it would show the good faith o f the government and it will convince the Indians o f British Columbia today that the government is anxious to do what is considered just and fair for the Indians o fB .C . I f the case is lost, that would be settled once and for all: i f we win, then you will have to deal with us. That is the history o f that.81

In recent years the question o f the aboriginal nghts o f British Colum­ bia Indians has been raised before the courts. In one o f these cases, Regina v. White and Bob,62 decided in 1964, two members o f the Nanaimo B a n d o f Indians, who had been found to have the carcasses o f six deer in their

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ession out o f season, were charged and convicted under the British Columbia Game Act.83 On appeal, the defendants were granted a trial ? ° n0vo as a result o f which they were acquitted. On a further appeal by he Crown to the British Columbia Court o f Appeal, the lower court’ s t 6 Ulttal was upheld by a three to two decision. The opinion o f Mr. Tstice Norris o f that Court provides a well-organized and reasoned exposition o f the nature o f aboriginal rights. His first basic conclusion is that aboriginal rights have been recognized to exist from time immemo­ rial on new territories which had been conquered by European nations.84 As a result o f this, Britain’s right o f sovereignty over British Columbia and Vancouver Island gave the British crown a substantial and para­ mount estate— a proprietary estate in the territory, the tenure o f the Indians being a personal and usufructuary right (the aboriginal nght) dependent on the good will o f the sovereign. ” 85These rights, Mr. Justice Norris continues, were confirmed by both the Proclamation o f 1763 and by the treaty which had been entered into by the Nanaimo Indians and Governor Douglas.86 Moreover, upon an examination o f the relevant correspondence between the colonial administrations and the Home authorities, it is clear, he states, that aboriginal rights had been recog­ nized by both governments before Confederation.87 Since these rights could only be extinguished by a surrender to the British crown before Confederation, and to the Federal Government after Confederation, and since by virtue o f the Terms o f Union, aboriginal rights had been recognized to exist by both levels o f government then [tjhese rights have never been surrendered or extinguished. 88 In addition, the abori­ ginal rights are 'an interest other than that o f the Province under s. 109 of the British North America Act which is applicable to British Colum­ bia by virtue o f the Terms o f Union.89 Hence these rights did not pass to the province and could not be extinguished by the province.90 The second major court case arose through legal action commenced by the Nishga Indians o f British Columbia, seeking a declaration that their aboriginal rights had not been extinguished. The case o f Calder v. Attorney-General91 reached the British Columbia Court o f Appeal in May, 1970 and is presently pending appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The pronouncement o f the Court o f Appeal with respect to the law of aboriginal rights, that the aboriginal rights o f the Nishga Indians have been extinguished, merits closer analysis at this point. It was the opinion o f the court that aboriginal title can be extinguished by any means convenient to the sovereign and that this was in fact ace courts.12 In implementing covenants and seeking regulated condicodes as vital aids that helped to support property values, but tenement Uons on the fringes o f their property holdings, developers fulfilled the managers chafed at what they deemed civic oppression.8 Preferring l°gic of the market as they sought to comply with middle class taste. In quick sales, promoters o f many instant suburban tracts, that flourished Edition to market place indications o f home-buyer preferences, there during the boom years before World War I, had little interest in land use Was a specific forum for a mutual shaping o f attitudes, namely the ratecontrols. However, there were some subdivision developers interested ^ ^ ^ ^ ’aycrs association. The character o f an association varied considerably, in controls. As one realtor said, “ the strongest point that any real estate politan government; they initiated reports on the benefits o f a regional water supply; and they pressed for a city-manager system o f govern­ ment.4 The same interest in cautious innovation provided an opportune moment for evaluating town planning. Thus, between 1918 and 1925, a series o f businessmen’s luncheons and an array o f special civic commit­ tees built up a momentum that resulted in Vancouver becoming the first major Canadian city with comprehensive zoning.5 Edmonton, Saska­ toon, Toronto, and Saint John, as well as many smaller communities, studied the Vancouver zoning by-law as a model. Official enquiries came from San Antonio, Spokane and San Francisco. Vancouver itself built upon American experience by hiring Harland Bartholomew and Associates,6 and in a general fashion, these events relate Vancouver to the rest o f the continent. However, the present analysis o f a specific theme— regulation o f land use— presents Vancouver’s experience as an illustration o f a one-sided mingling o f real estate interests and planning concepts common to other cities.

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but a general form did predominate. On one extreme stood the Vancou­ ver Property Owners’ Association, known after 1919 as the Associated Property Owners o f Vancouver. Under its original title, it marched to the tune o f three powerful corporations: the Vancouver Land and Improvement Company, the British Columbia Land and Investment Agency, and the Canadian Pacific Railway.13 In later years, it repre­ sented many realty interests and claimed to be a non-political fact­ finding agency. In truth, it was non-partisan but very political. On the other end o f the scale, the South Hastings Ratepayers Association on occasion represented concerns closer to those held by workingmen.14 Both, however, were greatly outnumbered by conservative middle class groups unabashedly staffed by realtors and typically serving as vehicles for real estate interests. Letters to the City Clerk’ s Office presenting ratepayers’ petitions often were typed on realtors’ stationery.15 The Eburne Ratepayers Association, active between 1908 and 1910, and the Kitsilano Improvement Association illustrate the realty activities undertaken by these pressure groups. In the first instance, they concen­ trated on securing services. Eburne, a distant suburban community, had a running confrontation with the British Columbia Electric Company and its streetcar department.16 The Kitsilano group started its objective as “ concerted action to get sewers, tram service, and opening up of streets.” 17 Even in the nascent stage o f these residential areas, a defensive mentality found expression through the associations. The Eburne group took the following position during its active years: “ This Association after taking into account all the objects that are required to promote the best interests o f this locality from a business, residential or property owners point o f view do place itself on record as being opposed to the sale o f intoxicating liquors. ” 18 They wanted none o f the rowdy behavior associated with licensed hotels. In late 1911, the Kitsilano ratepayers joined other associations from wards 3, 4, 5, and 6 in requesting that the building inspector prevent erection o f Chinese laundries “ in the midst of a quiet respectable residential neighbourhood.” 19 The exercise o f informal zoning— a process which grew out of prejudice, the concerns o f realtors and ratepayer associations, and which rested on public safety codes and licensing procedures— merits descnp" tion. Tenements and cabins in Chinatown became, by mutual consent ot the Police Commission, Mayor and most aldermen, the locale for the seaport’s houses o f ill-fame. Better they stay in one area than disperse. Drugs, prostitution, poverty, and Orientals clustered on the same streetsIt was only natural that to the clerks, managers, and professionals wh° flocked toward the security, status, and greenery o f the suburbs, the

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Chinatown blight was pathogenic. Its first symptom came in the guise of Chinese laundry. Those suburban petitions, which called for the building inspector to refuse laundry permits in suburbs, ultimately prompted a by-law restricting their location on the pretext that dirty laundry presented a health problem. The health threat only seemed to applyto die suburbs. Public safety provided a fictitious cover for another occasional segregating device, the fire zone. Fire zones had been derived from a real concern with fire protection, but they had additional implica­ tions. When a non-Asiatic business applied to Vancouver’s building inspector to permit an exemption from the regulations o f fire limit number 3, a favorable decision followed. After all, admitted the inspec­ tor, the fire zone was established to deter the type o f buildings “ which it was contemplated that Chinamen would erect. ’ ’ The restriction had kept them out; the belief that Chinatown would expand in the direction o f this area was “ a prediction which was not fulfilled.” 21 N ow the standard could be adjusted. It is useful to recall, in comparison, that one element in New York’s move toward land controls was pressure from the Fifth Avenue Association to prevent expansion o f the Jewish garment lofts.22 Support for segregated land use did not entirely stem from racial prejudice. Individuals in all classes sensed economic threats due to uncontrolled use o f neighboring property. However, if the victim lacked community influence, remedial action did not necessarily spring forth. The case o f Martha Donaghy foreshadowed the inequity o f zoning which protected interests with clout, but not others. Martha’s boarding house had brought her “ in the neighborhood o f four hundred dollars a year.” When a stable located behind her establishment, she noted a change. “ Those whom I had, went away and I could not get respectable people to stay or even engage a room. People would sniff, ask about the stable smell, go away and not come back.” Unfortunately, the city only accepted part o f her claim that the stable harmed “ health, morality, and property values.” 23 The latter alone could be demonstrated and on this occasion the civic authorities refused to accept a public safety argument >n favor o f the complainant. It was one thing to control the location o f Chinese laundries, quite another to tamper with a stable belonging to the promoters o f a downtown gentlemen’s club. The list o f threats to property values grew as Vancouver matured and fhe expectations o f home-buyers became more discriminating. A boom town could tolerate random features and a certain mingling o f peoples, kut not an established city with middle class aspirations for order and status. Furthermore, after World War I, new commercial and light lr>dustrial activities which were deemed objectionable, began to crop up

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in the suburbs; gasoline stations being considered a pervasive threat. Still, racial prejudice which had found expression in violence and provincial legislation directed against Orientals remained a feature of Vancouver in the twenties.25 Apartment houses, which some apprehen­ sive homeowners felt would cater to European immigrants, encroached on suburban Kitsilano. Since an Italian contractor had purchased land for apartment construction, owners o f nearby lots were “ afraid that if these buildings are permitted, we shall have in our midst a colony o f Italians or other undesirable people.” 26 In one instance, the long-standing antiOriental sentiment combined with a protest against a new economic activity— auto cartage: “ . . . the whole neighborhood around my client’s property is greatly deteriorating, for example, one house at one comer has been sold to some Japanese and there are now three famdies living in it. They have a number o f express autos which they take out early in the morning, creating a great deal o f noise.” 27 Individually and through ratepayers associations, homeowners and developers demanded protection. In some instances, they turned to the traditional expedient o f appeals to the building inspector or medical health officer, but planning was increasingly recognized as a more complete remedy. The civic pressure groups which represented prop­ erty owners consequently] oined more idealistic individuals in lobbying for a British Columbia town planning act and a Vancouver plan. Con­ vinced o f the practical advantages o f planning, the Board o f Trade’s Civic Bureau passed a motion as early as January 1918, calling for a town planning act in the name o f “ proper living conditions, greater industrial efficiency, and more economical methods o f land use.” 28 From that point until passage o f a town planning act in December 1925, the Board o f Trade sent letters and delegations to the provincial government.29The Associated Property Owners and Vancouver Real Estate Exchange (V.R.E.E.) worked in concert with the Board o f Trade’s endeavors. Indeed, the V.R.E.E. was appointed at a March 1920 meeting o f the region’s municipal governments, the Associated Property Owners, Central Ratepayers Association, Civic Bureau o f the Board o f Trade, and several service groups to impress upon the provincial government “ the undoubted industrial and other advantages o f town-planning.’ 3 The property industry’s relatively new and positive interest in regulating land use to enhance and protect property value actually overturned earlier apprehension. In 1912, at the peak o f a real estate boom, a journalist who prepared a series o f articles on the need for planning suburban development practically lost his position “ owing to the ire he aroused among the real estate men who were very extensive adver-

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nserS ” 31 A shift from hostility to endorsement was a certain clue— something was afoot. Real estate interests, seeing the advantage o f capturing planning, not only advocated planning but were careful to lace members on the key committees and commissions. The pattern o f real estate participation in planning immediately extended to several British Columbia municipalities. The Secretary o f the North Vancouver planning Commission was the President o f North Vancouver Realty. The Chairman o f Victoria’s Zoning Committee worked for Pemberton and Son, Real Estate, Financial and Insurance Agents.32 In February 1925, Vancouver established its Town Planning Committee. After passage o f the Town Planning Act in December 1925, the Committee was superseded by a Commission. Both bodies included real estate interests, but they also had representation from the Vancouver branch o f the Town Plan­ ning Institute o f Canada.33 The latter group approached land controls with some idealism. Indeed, the local planning zealots occasionally took the newly appointed Commission in directions which forced the prop­ erty industry to go beyond its internal influence on the Commission and to mount a counter lobby.

TH E

P L A N N E R S, I9 2 O -19 3 O

Real estate interests and the local architects and engineers in the Town Planning Institute were not the sole participants in Vancouver’s adoption of land use controls. Planners o f international renown arrived with different approaches to shaping cities. In the twenties, the young plan­ ning profession included men with assorted training and ideological commitments. Two distinct trends— personified by Thomas Adams and Harland Bartholomew— found their way into Vancouver. Adams, a product o f the British town planning and garden city movement, had campaigned across Canada for provincial town planning acts during his tenure as the town planning adviser to the Canadian Conservation Com­ mission. After the December 6,1917 destruction o f a section o f Halifax, in a munitions explosion, he received his first major opportunity to create something tangible. He reshaped the old district by insisting on expropriation powers in the name o f community benefit.34 During one ° f several visits to Vancouver, Adams presented a speech espousing his planning principles. They were not at all in harmony with the aims o f the property industry. Asserting that town planning gave “ stability to real estate values” — a welcome statement— he proceeded to recommend that the municipality retain “ half o f the increased value o f any property reason o f benefits accruing to such property” due to planning

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improvements in the neighborhood. Adams also proposed that there should be “ power to acquire land compulsorily without cumbersome process o f arbitration; and to acquire land in excess o f the amount needed to widen a street. . . and to re-sell such land after the improve­ ment is made.” Finally, he recommended that authority be granted to “ rectify or alter existing subdivisions.” 35 Significantly, the latter notion inspired a half-hearted follow-up. J{ suburb registered in the Hastings townsite district was reviewed on several occasions between 1921 and 1927 with the intention o f replacing the existing grid layout and substituting a curving street plan following the contours o f a hillside location. In keeping with the accent on planning’s practical benefits, proponents o f a revised design claimed it would increase the number o f lots and raise their value. However, the reason for the acceptance o f intervention owed much if not everything to the fact that the property in question did not belong to a private developer. It was public land, owned by the Province. Even then, the scheme collapsed. A few comer lots on the original grid survey had been sold and owners opposed alteration believing that the existing layout gave their lots a better view o f the mountains than would any revision.36 In sum, Adams’ radical suggestions left no imprint on the Vancouver planning process. Something o f an idealist and a conscientious civil servant, Adams’ style and outlook contrasted with that o f Harland Bartholomew. Adams zealously worked for town planning acts across Canada. He undertook this as a mission. However, when the Vancouver Town Planning Com­ mission sought an adviser to draft a master plan and zoning by-law, they turned to a businessman. Hired in 1926, Harland Bartholomew approached planning as a consulting professional. The dapper resident of St. Louis symbolized both the urban vitality and the materialism o f the twenties. Dashing about the continent in pursuit o f commissions, with an itinerary prepared one year in advance and arranging well publicized visits to urban centers, Bartholomew was an aggressive man o f affairs. His crisp correspondence with Vancouver conveyed an icy professional confidence, almost a distant omniscience with a keen interest in every detail o f his company’s fees and expense accounts. His fieldmen col­ lected information and drafted plans according to “ universal” land use formulas, while Bartholomew moved on to other cities arranging future contracts.37 On his few brief visits to Vancouver, he mixed easily with the business community and dabbled in the high risk stocks on the Vancouver Stock Exchange.38 Adams had offered the paternalism of garden-city-style social reform; Bartholomew brought deportment

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ropriate in a business culture. He appreciated better than Adams that lanners needed to be politic. Commenting on Adams’ early draft for a British Columbia town planning act, Bartholomew wrote that “ too ^uch regulation . . . is usually susceptible to general criticism, I am a very strong believer in the promotion and execution o f city plans through the education o f the public.” 39 Drifting away from the reform goals o f securing sanitary housing for working men and strong civic planning powers to achieve social goals, concerns o f activists in the early town planning movement, Bartholo­ mew and Associates did have a commitment to rational, even allegedly scientific, formulas o f efficient land use. The firm adhered, for example, to a ratio o f commercial to residential space in residential areas, main­ taining that it facilitated convenient shopping. Opposition was irksome. Some challenges were human, irrational, and penetrating enough to embarrass “ scientific” planning. One opponent o f the commercial/ residential ratio answered the convenience argument “ saying that his mother and father lived in an area in Toronto where for three miles there were no stores and they were delighted to live under these condi­ tions.” 40 The suggestion that some people did not care to be near commercial establishments reduced planning to a matter o f taste— the planner’s versus that o f the individual’s. That bothered Bartholomew. Other objections flowed from influential backers who could force fundamental concessions. Paradoxically, strong challenges were soon thrown at Bartholomew from those pressure groups which had endorsed “ town planning” at the end of the war and through the early twenties. The relatively open and searching attitude o f the business community and property industry had receded virtually in proportion to the return o f good times. B y 19261929, when Bartholomew and Associates arrived, “ things were on the move.” In 1920, the economy and the movement o f property had long been depressed; six years later commerce and population growth had rebounded. With a vital economy, there resumed conversion o f prop­ erty from single-family residential use into apartments; commercial and industrial sites were expanded as well. Attempts by the Vancouver Town Planning Commission and Bartholomew to inaugurate an interim zoning by-law and to fashion a definitive zoning by-law came at the very moment o f major transitions. The outcry from the property industry was immediate and, at times, chaotic. In addition to the altered economic climate, another consideration helps to explain the volte face. Not until there had been contact with planners did the business community fully appreciate all that planning implied. The very act o f seriously looking

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into the future o f property opened up uncertainty and stimulated public discussions that inevitably led to anxiety and bickering. At this stage, bargaining and the power o f special interests were to become established as essential elements in the zoning procedures.41 TH E

B A R G A IN IN G

PRO CESS,

I925-I945

Controversies about zoning designations in the West End and Kitsilano districts illustrate the nature o f interests which had been stirred up. The history o f property and development in the West End commenced in 1885 when owners o f property in the townsite to the east induced the Canadian Pacific Railway (C.P.R.) to select their community as the western terminal for the transcontinental. As part o f the arrangement, the property owners granted parcels o f land in the unsettled West End to the railway company which promoted the lots as a high-status residential development. The shrewd land department o f the C.P.R., after it had disposed o f its West End lots, opened up huge landholdings to the south. The key promotional tactic consisted o f laying out a new exclusive area— Shaughnessy Heights. B y 1910, a transformation o f the West End was well under way with older homes being disposed o f in favor of relocation in Shaughnessy Heights. Changes in the West End slowed after the economic collapse o f 1913, but they resumed in the 1920s with homes being carved up for boarding houses or torn down for apartment buildings.42 In the midst o f the renewed shift, the Vancouver Town Planning Commission announced that apartment construction in the West End would be frozen, claiming that apartment blocks would detract from a bucolic entrance to Stanley Park. This was one o f several episodes where the Commission took a hard line approach because o f a commitment to aesthetic planning ideals. However, the majority o f land owners favored conversion. Some wanted out at a profit in order to resettle in a more fashionable area; a few widows wished to dispose o f large family homes and felt that apartment development presented just the opportunity for realizing a sound price; a number o f realtors, needless to say, already had assembled property for local and eastern investors eager to erect apart­ ment buildings.43 A few petitions supported the freeze, but a cross-check using assessment rolls verified that “ a clear majority” o f bona fide land owners favored no zoning controls.44 What is more, the politically influential had an interest in encouraging West End apartment construc­ tion. Member o f Parliament H.H. Stevens held lots for speculation as did Sir Charles Tupper, son o f a former Prime Minister o f Canada.45 Individual property owners, realtors, and developers disputed the

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interim-zoning designations in the West End and the Associated Property Owners supported the complaints. The A.P.O. had kept a wary eye on all features o f the permanent zoning document as it evolved. Represent­ ing major business and realty concerns and overlapping in membership with the Vancouver Real Estate Exchange, the organization was a major conservative force in civic affairs, scrutinizing civic expenditures and attacking proposals to extend the municipal franchise to tenants.46 The A.P- 0 - s president in 1929, when the finishing touches were being put on Bartholomew’s master plan, was a former regional manager o f the Hudson’s Bay Company. A mortgage broker served as treasurer. Direc­ tors included the vice president o f Yorkshire and Pacific Securities, the senior partner o f MacGregor, Creery and Farmer Real Estate, the president o f H.A. Roberts Real Estate, the president o f Griffith and Lea Real Estate, and an assortment o f contractors, accountants, and barris­ ters. Just as it once had campaigned for a town planning act, the A.P.O. supported the concept o f zoning. What kept the A.P.O. interested were reassuring responses to inquiries made in other cities. From the city planning engineer o f Los Angeles came confirmation in 1928 that zoning “ had a great effect in stabilizing property values.” 47 Nonetheless, the A.P.O. did not swing behind zoning with naive enthusiasm. The time had arrived for a hard struggle to capture planning to serve realty interests and the A.P.O. was the prime force in that campaign, a fact recognized by civic authorities. Thus all drafts o f the zoning by-law were sent to the A.P.O. in advance o f their presentation to City Council. Elected civic officials fell into line whenever the A.P.O. indicated displeasure with some portion o f the drafts presented by the Town Planning Commission. The A.P.O. knew where and how to argue its case and apply pressure. Their standard tactic was to claim that a certain measure would have, in their expert opinion, an adverse reaction on property assessments and hence on tax revenue.48 With the A.P.O. involved, the realty campaign succeeded in the West End where areas in dispute ultimately were zoned to permit apartments. Something o f a repetition o f these events occurred in the mid-1950s when a controversial rezoning permitted high rises in the scenic West End. The West End controversy o f the twenties galvanized members o f the property industry. Too many had committed themselves to the land conversion process in this area to allow meddling by an earnest element m the Town Planning Commission. The situation in suburban Kitsilano Presented a contrast as it demonstrated how in certain circumstances the Property industry could break into factions, though it continued to be

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influential. A relatively new suburban area, bordered on the east by the factories, warehouses, and tenements o f Fairview and on the west by the prosperous residential community o f Point Grey, it had attracted tre­ mendous speculative and construction activity. Due to its ambiguous location, the expectations o f interested parties were not homogeneous. Some entrepreneurs specialized in apartment blocks; others concen­ trated on new homes. The character o f the area had not yet been established so that neither the planners nor the pressure groups could assert clear opinions. Instead, the planning process opened itself to an avalanche o f petitions from individual parties, each argument inflated with the sweet rhetoric o f community welfare. An apartment contractor accented the need for decent high density housing. One property holder who favored apartment construction even claimed that Vancouver’s warm chmate would attract wealthy tourists and “ persons in poor health.” Thus, provision should be made for accommodations hke “ scores o f seaside cities in England.” 49 From a major contractor of single-family dwellings came a familiar argument that apartments would shatter the serenity and community cohesion.50 The final zoning by-law reflected the clash o f realty interests rather than any certain principles of land use or any precise guidance from the A.P.O. Points o f friction during the framing o f a zomng by-law did not always involve residential property. Shipping and industrial interests complained that the planners had failed to provide sufficient districts for their expansion.51 The A.P.O. took up their cause and, in case anyone had missed the message about the short life o f City Beautiful, made this statement: W e are all in fa v o r o f a b ea u tifu l city, bu t this en viab le po sitio n cannot, in our o p in ion , b e attained w ith o u t the w e a lth in tro d u ced b y the develo p m en t 0 su fficien t industries in the C i t y to m ain tain it. M o st o f the large industries that m ay b e in d u ced to establish th em selves in V a n c o u v e r w o u ld , no doubt, do so w ith a v ie w o f m an u factu rin g fo r exp o rt, h en ce the m a jo rity o f these concerns w o u ld re q u ire w a te r fro n tage fo r lo ad in g fre ig h te rs.52

It was not that the A.P.O. represented manufacturers, rather ij calculated that aesthetics might impede waterfront development an slow the growth of tax assessments. With many o f the A.P.O. s members involved in property development and others holding downtown com mercial property, the organization had a strong motive for keeping assessments risings. A slow-down struck at booster claims o f city grow1 and implied a heavier tax burden for property owners. Rising assess

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inents were central to the property industry even more than to homeowners because the latter could fight against rising taxes by moving against civic expenditures on servicing speculative tracts. In this instance as in others, A.P.O. protests reached the Town Planning Commission which in turn recommended that Bartholomew and Associates “ take cognizance o f the requirements o f some o f the larger industries” and sketch in modifications; Bartholomew complied.53 In each o f the above episodes the shape o f zoning reflected an assort­ ment o f pressures. There was diversity, hut the range o f participants was actually quite limited. Beyond the obvious significance o f the A.P.O., there was the fact that tenants, small businessmen, and employees were not generally involved. Public hearings brought out “ concerned citizens” — usually carrying the protest o f a group with a profound economic interest. The scuttling o f rigid controls began with the demise o f Adams’ recommendations and appeared in alterations to the planning map before passing o f the zoning by-law. There was also the failure to support a measure hke the principle o f official plan lines. To prepare for the street-widening program outlined by Bartholomew, the Town Plan­ ning Commission proposed an imposition o f lines beyond which no construction could be undertaken. Later, if the unobstructed strip was required for street widening, it could be expropriated readily with no compensation. The Commission argued that the road improvement’s impact on the remaining portion o f a lot would be favorable and the increased land value would itself provide adequate compensation. As with the West End controversy, the Commission had staked a firm position on a planning objective. The Vancouver Real Estate Exchange rejected the Commission’s evaluation, arguing that an encumbrance hke a property line would discourage the turnover o f land and retard construction. To make the affected property more attractive, the V.R.E.E. recommended that “ the owner affected shall be entitled to receive compensation when he has erected a building in conformity with the new building line.” 54 The Board o f Trade joined the protest and a year-long furor threatened to hold up City Council’s adoption o f Bartholomew’s master plan. In December 1930, a joint meeting o f representatives from City Council, the Town Planning Commission, the V R-E.E„ the A.P.O. and the Board o f Trade, worked out a statement which acknowledged the “ right o f claim for compensation.” 55 What­ ever one might think o f the issues involved— strong cases can be made or both sides— the manner o f resolution was indicative o f an undemo-

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cratic strain in North American urban affairs. An important question embracing the public interest, the public purse, and property rights had been resolved by an appointed Commission meeting with special interest groups.56 From 1930 to 1933, the Annual Reports of the Town Planning Commission recorded protests against an easy granting o f zoning alterations.57 Several Commission members retained a commitment to the integrity o f a zoning man. The property industry responded by by-passing the Town Planning Commission, using the Zoning By-law Board o f Appeal, and by going directly to City Council. Under sustained political pressure and adverse publicity, the Commission’s concern about too much flexibility soon withered. The Annual Report, 1934, as if to mark recantation, printed a favorable reference to an anti-zoning pamphlet prepared by a real estate agent on behalf o f the Los Angeles Chamber o f Commerce and entitled Zoned into Oblivion. Concurrently, the Vancouver Zoning By­ law Board o f Appeal announced that it had begun to relax its provi­ sions.58 A full explanation followed in the Annual Report, 1933. The present period of economic distress is reflected in the number of applica­ tions requesting changes in the zoning classification from a residential or apartment district to a commercial district. The tendency on the part of owners to endeavor to secure immediate gain by having their property zoned as a business district is much the same as in the past four or five years . . . . The Zoning By-law Board of Appeal has been able . . . to give a considerable amount of relief during these times by the relaxations of the provisions of the Zoning By-laws, within its powers, without amendments having to be made in the By-law.59 The significance o f the reversal was all too apparent to the Town Planning Institute’s member on the Town Planning Commission. Arthur G. Smith resigned early in 1934 “ depressed by the idea that we were, as a Commission, not accomplishing as much as we might have done.” The new appointee, E.G. Baynes, had been “ a pioneer budding contractor.” w It is apparent from the economic argument advanced in 1935 that pressure group activity was vital to, but not the sole basis for, a relaxation o f zoning. Depression circumstances, after all, seemed to call for extra­ ordinary measures. The exceptional situations were frequent and altered some o f the features o f the zoning map. From depression, Vancouver shifted into a wartime boom complete with jerry-built characteristics common to other North American cities having military personnel and war industries. Requirements for wartime housing were answered in part by a special federal government order permitting conversion of

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single-family homes into boarding and apartment houses.61 In 1944, a concerned alderman described what this meant in terms o f the original concept o f zoning, alleging that the Appeals Board had “ practically nullified the operation o f the By-law” : The large map I have in my office is studded with hundreds of pins with heads of different colours indicating where duplex dwellings have been permitted in single-family dwelling zones . . . Some of the pins on this map are so close together that they are almost on top of one another . . . . We do not like to see the nice districts slipping into what might be termed depressed areas; we do not like to see our home districts being exploited, mostly by newcomers, by having certain houses in them used for commercial purposes . . . . We feel definitely that the members of the Zoning By-law Board of Appeal have not stood up to their responsibilities.62 Peace brought forth a new rationale for departures from zoning by-laws. “ Commercial and industrial interests were looking forward to their post-war activities” and they felt restricted by the existing by-laws.63 C O N C L U S IO N S

•

Given perpetual bargaining and concessions to economic circum­ stances, the impact o f a zoning map on a city is bound to be less than dramatic. A question raised by planning historian and early critic o f zoning, John Reps, is most appropriate. Reps, writing in 1955, wondered whether the discretionary powers o f Boards o f Zoning Appeals consti­ tuted a “ safety valve or leak in the boiler.” 64 Reps and others, without benefit o f internal correspondence which so clearly indicates a real estate connection in the formulation o f land use controls, concluded from published reports that appeal boards had been “ generous with their special favors.” 65 Moreover, the original zoning map itself was hardly a document calculated to mould new spatial arrangements. Suburban covenants, the price o f land, topography, and the location o f industries and railways had sorted out basic land use traits which the zoning by-laws confirmed. Truly formative planning implied an active role for planning idealists and professionals. These individuals, however, had little to do with the ultimate application o f land use controls. Adams was shunned. The A.P.O. scotched the aims o f planners on the Town Planning Commission. Bartholomew, the adroit businessman closing one o f nearly one hundred contracts, had mastered compromise. Thus zoning with bargaining— planning’s pale imitation— was what Vancouver settled upon and it showed no capacity to affect major natural land use determinants like the ones described by the Grandview Chamber of Commerce.

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The land-selling activities of the C.P.R., the erecting of the new university buildings, loan company policy, the construction programs of the B.C. Electric, the B.C. Telephone Company and of the city itself in providing adequate services for the rapidly shifting population has decided for all time the section to be most favored for residential purposes. The process has been a cumulative one. The shift of population made the Burrard Street Bridge necessary, traffic adjustments followed, and these in turn were followed by business and private enterprise. . . in the less-favored districts deterioration was permitted to make very considerable inroads. . . .And we say further that the Town Planning Commission has acquiesced in all this or, to regard the matter in its most favorable light, merely remained aloof.66 On the other hand, zoning did reinforce the tendency toward single­ family dwelling neighborhoods.67 All together, Vancouver’ s experience with land use controls, at least up to the end o f the Second World War, supports a view o f urban affairs which maintains that socio-economic forces— exogenous pressures as well as internal power relationships— overpowered the goals o f reformers or experts who aspired to shape the city. A disillusioned supporter o f town planning who wrote despairingly to the Vancouver Town Planning Commission about “ the impossibility o f ideal town planning under the capitalist regime” had raised a funda­ mental issue.68 Could substantial urban planning, assuming that it was desirable, have been applied in a community which respected property rights and had influential pressure groups dedicated to their defense? Indeed, the historical perspective does introduce an unsettling evalua­ tion as to where professional planners and idealists have fitted into civic affairs. Even before Reps noted problems, political scientist Robert Walker warned o f difficulties that confronted planners, but he remained an optimist trusting the political system. “ With time,” he wrote, “ we can expect to see planners providing more effective leadership in making planning an effective function o f government.” 69 To make planning work, the politician “ must be sold in the first instance.” 70 This line of reasoning and the belief that planners could effect changes by entering the administrative apparatus and honing political skills take as their premise the belief that urban affairs are rooted in an open political process, that able marshaling o f information and access to the politicians are intrinsic to success at City Hall. The historical record should intro­ duce doubts. In Vancouver, and surely elsewhere in advanced capitalist societies, businessmen have defined the instruments o f land use control and directed their outcome. Whatever the divergent intellectual or legal traditions in American and Canadian urban planning, the economic

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imperatives in both countries have presented similar and over-ruling considerations. In light o f this, a conclusion that extends beyond an historical sketch is in order. I f planners deem certain objectives as desirable, then one recommendation is to consider how planning aims affect the property industry and how economic inducements built into a scheme might buy support from the property industry. This piecemeal approach that “ sups with the devil” is likely to become bogged down in pressure group negotiations where the resources and influence o f the property industry are particularly effective. That is one lesson o f the Vancouver experi­ ence. Another approach is activist urban planning, meaning the promo­ tion of social goals and disclosure about the key features o f the property industry. Whatever the emphasis, both tactical and activist planning require knowledge about financial institutions, the many elements o f the real estate profession, and the use by both o f law and government. In some small way, the Vancouver civic records may assist urbanists in arriving at generalizations about the private and public institutions that frame land use decisions. NOTES 'Peter Goheen, Victorian Toronto, 1850-igoo, The University o f Chicago Department o f Geography Research Paper N o. 127, Chicago: Department o f Geography, University o f Chicago, 1970; Kathleen N eils Conzen, “ Patterns o f Residence in Early M il­ waukee,” in Leo F. Schnore (ed.). The N ew Urban History: Quantitative Explorations by American Historians. Princeton University Press, 1975; Peter O. M uller, “ The Evolu­ tion o f American Suburbs: A Geographical Interpretation,” Urbanism Past and Present, Summer, 1977. ^Walter G. Hardwick, Vancouver. Don M ills: Collier-M acm illan, 1974, pp. 27-30; Hardwick and J . Lewis Robinson, British Columbia: One Hundred Years o f Geographical Change. Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1973, pp. 23-28; 52-55. 'City ofV an couver Archives, RG 2-A i C ity C lerk ’ s Correspondence, volume 50, W .E. Payne, Secretary, Vancouver Planning and Beautification Association to M ayor and Members o f Council, April 20, 1914; Vancouver C ity Beautiful Association to Chairman o f Finance Committee, September 25,1914; W .E. Payne to M ayor, January 29, 1914. W .E. Payne was later to serve as the secretary o f the Vancouver Board o f Trade. ,The activities o f the business community are well recorded in C ity o f Vancouver Archive M SS 300, Board o f Trade Council Minutes. Other material appears in the C ity C le rk ’s Correspondence. Sec, for example, RG 2-A1, volume 82, W .E. Payne, Secretary, Vancouver Board o f Trade to C ity C lerk, Jun e 30, 1921; volume 102, Charles W oodward, W oodward’s Limited (department stores) to C ity C lerk, Sep­ tember 3, 1924; W oodward to Mayor, August 26, 1924. O n the property industry’s attitude toward the Single Tax, sec RG3, M ayor’s correspondence, File on Com m it­

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tee on Taxation, Minutes o f Meeting, N ovem ber, 1920. O n support for a city manager, see RG 2-A1, volume 97, “ A ,” Associated Property O wners to M ayor and Council, N ovem ber 16, 1923. 5M SS 300, Board o f Trade Council Minutes, December 3,1918; January 28,1919; June 26, 1919; December 4, 1924; N ovem ber 5, 1925. For Vancouver’s pioneering effort in planning see the excellent architectural guide to Vancouver, Harold Kalman and John Roaf, Exploring Vancouver. Vancouver: University o f British Columbia, 1974. P- 114. 6For correspondence with other municipalities see RG 9-A 1, C ity Planning Department, volume 29, File on Tow n Planning Queries, 1925-1946. W ery little has been written about land development and covenants in urban Canada. See John C . W eaver, “ From Land Assembly to Social Maturity. The Suburban Life of W estdale (Hamilton), Ontario, 19 11-19 51,” Histoire sociale, vol. X I (no. 22), Novem­ ber, 1978. Also see M ichael Doucet, “ Building the Victorian C ity: The Process of Land Development in Hamilton, Ontario, 1784-1881” (unpublished Dissertation, University o f Toronto, 1977). For a legal history o f covenants o f various types in the United States see N orm al W illiams, Jr ., “ Planning Laws and Democratic Living. Law and Contemporary Problems, volume 20, Spring, 1955, PP- 336—338. 8One o f the most persistent opponents o f health and fire regulations was W .H . Gallagher o f Gallagher Real Estate. He alleged that the C ity had no right to meddle in relations between him self and his tenants. R G 2-A 1, volume 79, Medical Health O fficer file, “ Re Notices Served on M r. Gallagher During the Past Six Months,” March 15, 1920; Gallagher was consistent; he opposed zoning. RG 9-A 1, volume 20, Public Hearings, Petitions on Zoning M ap o f Vancouver, 1926-28, “ Notes o f a Public Hearing N ovem ber 30, 1928.” RG2, volume 80, M H O , Gallagher to Medical Health Office, March 12, 1920. 9R G 9 -A i , volume 32, Zoning Committee file, 1930-35, M r. J .C . McPherson quoted in “ N otes on M eeting o f Zoning Committee Held 8th March, 1933, Re** B ill to Amend Shaughnessy Heights Building Restriction Act, 1922,” p. 4. '"The role o f real estate developers in urban Canada is being developed as part o f the author’ s study o f urban Canada, 1890-1930. Joh n C . W eaver and J . Martin Lawlor, “ The Shaping o f a Suburb: W estdale, Hamilton, 1910-1950,” paper presented to the Ontario Association o f Ontario Geographers, O ctober 23,1976. For an early study on the issue see Halbwachs, Les expropriations et le prix des terrains a Paris. Paris: 1909. "Jo h n C . W eaver, “ From Land Assembly to Social M aturity,” pp. 421, 431; Canada Law Reports: The Supreme and Exchequer Courts o f Canada, Part 1. Ottawa: King’s Printer, pp. 64-80. 12The use o f licensing and public safety powers to enforce land use regulations under the existing city charter was assessed by the C ity Solicitor in 1921. R G 2-A 1, volume 86, Provincial Government file, E .F. Jones, C ity Solicitor, to C ity C lerk, August 21, 1921. ' 'R G 2 -A i , volume 17, clipping from Vancouver Province, April 26, 1901; Vancouver Property O wners’ Association to M ayor and Aldermen, M ay 4, 1901. u R G 2-A i , volume 51, South Hastings Improvement Association to M ayor and Council. September 3, 1914. ,5Sec for example RG 2-A1, volume 40, A. H ill, Secretary, Hastings Resident and Ratepayers Association to M ayor and Council, February 7, 1912. The letterhead was Hill, W all and Company, Real Estate Brokers. RG 2-A1, volume 56, W .H . Burley, Secretary, W ard Seven Ratepayers Association to Vancouver C ity Council, April 8, 1915. The letterhead announced that B urley was a real estate and mortgage broker. ^Additional Manuscript Collections, M S 64, Ebum e Ratepayers Association, Minute-

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book, December 17, 1907 to December 28, 1910; February 5, 1908; M ay 29, 1908; August 24, 1908; Ju ly 11, 1910. This association, too, had real estate interests involved and they pressed forward with a publicity booklet on the Eburne townsite. ,7RG2-A i , volume 26, George M. Endacott, Secretary-Treasurer, Kitsilano Improve­ ment Association, to M ayor and Council, September 21, 1909. ,8Eburne Minutebook, December 28, 1910. ,,yRG2-Ai, volume 24, The Central Executive Ratepayers Association to the M ayor and Aldermen, April 11, 1910; volume 30, Building Inspector’s O ffice to Mayor, November 4, 1911. aThis policy was fully exposed and defended in the newspapers when a moral reform movement attacked the city’ s police department for condoning prostitution. See Vancouver Sun and Vancouver Daily Province, Novem ber and December, 1912. 21 For the use o f a laundry by-law and the public health argument, see RG 2-A1, volume 35, F.T. Underhill, M H O , to C ity C lerk, Ju ly 26, 1911. For fire zone, see RG2-A1, volume 77, Building Inspector file. Building Inspector to Chairman and Members o f the Building Committee, January 3, 1920. 22S.J. Makielski, Jr ., The Politics o f Zoning: The N ew York Experience. N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1966, pp. 11-13. 2'RG2-A i , volume 26, Martha Donaghy to M ayor and Council, February 3,19 10; Martha Donaghy to Building Inspector, January 24, 1910; C ity Solicitor to Donaghy, January 28, 1910. 24RG9-A i , volume 106, Petitions, A .E. Craddock, Secretary, Associated Property Owners o f Vancouver, August 7, 1925; A .F. Fagan, Secretary, Fairview and Kitsilano Improvement and Ratepayers’ Association, Ju ly 25, 1925. 25For a b rie f account, see Stephen M. Beckow, Keeping British Columbia White in Canada’s Visual History Series I. Ottawa: National Museum o f Man, 1974. The legal question o f excluding Orientals from trade and commerce by denying licences is thoroughly discussed in Patricia E. Roy, “ Protecting their Pocketbooks and Preserving their Race: W hite Merchants and Oriental Com petition,” in A.R. M cCorm ack and Ian Macpherson (eds.), Cities in the West. Ottawa: National Museum o f Man, 1975. Unlike licences, however, covenants were based in the laws o f equity and were not on the same weak legal footing as exclusion by denial o f civic licences. 2hRG9-Ai, volume 106, Petitions file, Robert W etmore Hannington, Assistant Regional Counsel, Canadian National Railways, to M ayor and Council, Ju ly 21, 1925. 27RG9-A i , volume 21, Protests 1928 file, E.J. Grant, Barrister, to C ity Clerk, N ovem ber I, 1928. 28MSS 300, Board o f Trade, volume 96, Minutes o f C ivic Bureau, January 28, 1918. 2VMSS 300, Board o f Trade, Council Minutes, December 4, 1924; N ovem ber 5, 1925. '"RG2-A1, volume 81, file “ V ,” G eoffrey L. Edwards, Secretary, The Vancouver Real Estate Exchange, to M ayor and Council, March 16, 1920; March 23, 1920. ’'RG 9-A i , volume 22, Publicity, 1926-1928, J. Alexander W alker, “ History o f Town Planning in Vancouver,” p. 4. ,2RG9-A i , volume 29, Town Planning Queries, 1925-1940, H .C . Holmes, Chairman, Zoning Committee o f the Victoria C ity Council, to j. Alexander W alker, September 18, 1926. Holmes’ letterhead was Pemberton and Son, Real Estate, Financial and Insurance Agents. "RG9-A1, volume 22, Publicity, 1926-1928, J . Alexander W alker, “ History o f Town Planning in Vancouver,” pp. 10 -12; Report o f Town Planning Commission, 1925, February 17, 1926.

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'JJoh n C . W eaver, “ The Reconstruction o f the Richmond District, H alifax: A Canadian Episode in Town Planning and Public Housing,” Plan Canada, Journal o f the Town Planning Institute o f Canada, vol. 16, no. 1, March 1976. ” R G 2 -A i , volume 81, Tow n Planning file, Thomas Adams, “ Town Planning Legisla­ tion for British Colum bia,” not dated but it is likely that Adams delivered the address in the summer o f 1918. MSS 300, Board of Trade, volume 96, Minutes o f Civic Bureau, June 26, 1918; Ju ly 15, 1918. “ R G 2-A 1, volume 107, file “ T ,” Petition from the Town Planning and Zoning Commission to T .D . Pattullo, Minister o f Lands, O ctober 14, 1923; Report o f SubCommittee Regarding Layout o f Area North o f Hastings Street between Rupert Street and Boundary Road, August 1925. RG 9-A 1, volume 8, C ity Council ofVancouvcr file, J . Alexander W alker, Secretary to Tow n Planning Commission, to Mayor and Council, M ay, 1926. RG 9-A 1, volume 20, Planning, 1926-1928. Horace L. Sey­ mour, Resident Engineer for Harland Bartholomew, to Bartholomew, September 21, 1927. The letter describes a public meeting with the property owners. "Bartholom ew ’ s system o f operating as well as his fee structure is described in the following four page letter. RG 9-A 1, volume 5, Harland Bartholomew, [926, Bartholomew to J . Alexander W alker, Secretary o f Tow n Planning Commission, June 22, 1926. ' “R G 9 -A i , volume 5, Harland Bartholomew, 1929, Earl O. M ills (Bartholomew’ s zoning expert) to J . Alexander W alker, April 15,19 29 ; Bartholomew to W alker, December 26, 1929. '''R G 9-A i . volume 5, Harland Bartholomew, 1926, Bartholomew to Arthur Smith, Chairman. Town Planning Commission, August 9, 1926. 4i,R G 9 -A i . volume 5, Harland Bartholomew, 1927, Horace P. Seymour, Resident Engineer for Harland Bartholomew and Associates, to Harland Bartholomew, July 28, 1927. JIDiscussions o f this bargaining feature in other cities are to be found in the following studies: Richard Babcock, The Zoning Game. Madison: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1966; S.J. M akiclski, Jr., The Politics o f Zoning: The N ew York Experience. N ew York: Colum bia University Press, 1966; Bernard H. Siegen, Land Use Without Zoning. Toronto: D .C . Heath, 1972. J2I am indebted to N orbcrt M acDonald o f the University o f British Columbia for the details o f the scheming. Professor M acDonald is completing a study o f the C.P.R . and early Vancouver. Also see Daniel W ood, “ The W est End, in Chuck Davis, Marilyn Sacks, and Daniel W ood (cds.) The Vancouver Book. Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, 197^■ "RG9-A1, volume 22, Public Hearings, Petitions, Concerning Zoning Map; RG9-A1. volume 21, Protests, Proposed Interim Zoning Map o f Vancouver and on Act Respecting Town Planning, 1928. 44R G 9 -A i , volume 8, C ity Council o f Vancouver, 1925-1928, Arthur Smith, Chairman, Tow n Planning Commission, to C ity C lerk, December 31, 1926. 45R G 2-A i. volume 106, Zoning By-law , 1927, “ List o f Subscribers to Memorials tiled with the C ity C lerk .” The list gave the description o f properties held by each — . . — . . . . , 1 . — - nd subscriber. Information read like a Who's Wh0 in Vancouver real estate, politics am business. 4,’R G 2-A i. volume 97. File “ A ,” M eeting o f the Executive Committee o f the Associ ated Property Owners o f Vancouver, N ovem ber 16, 1923. 47R G 2-A i , volume 122, Zoning By-law , George H. Herrold, C ity Planning Engineer

447

Los Angeles, to the Associated Property Owners o f Vancouver, October 16, 1928. 4#RG9-Ai . volume 23, Publicity, 1928-1935, M ayor W .H . M alkin to W .E . Bland, Chair­ man, Zoning Committee, Town Planning Commission, January 23, 1929. 49RG9-A1, volume 22, Public Hearings, Petitions, Zoning M ap, 1926-1928, J.S . Matthews to Arthur Smith, Chairman, Town Planning Commission, January 24,1927. The same J.S. Matthews had the peculiar notion that Vancouver required a C ity Archive; he was its founder.

5HRG9-A1, volume 22, Public Hearings on Zoning M ap o f Vancouver, 1926-1928, John Falconer Johnston to M ayor and Aldermen, January 29, 1927. 51RG9-A1, volume 21, Protests, 1928, M .Y . Aivazoff, President, N ew Method C o al and Supplies, to Chairman, Town Planning Commission, Ju ly 26, 1928. -«RG9-Ai, volume 2, Associated Property O wners, 1926-1930, H .R. Brown, SecretaryManager, Associated Property Owners o f Vancouver, to W .E. Payne, Secretary, Vancouver Board o f Trade, December 3, 1928. C o p y sent to Town Planning Commission. “ RG9-A1, volume 5, Harland Bartholomew, 1929, J. Alexander W alker, Resident Engineer, T ow n Planning Commission, to W illiam D. Hudson (Bartholomew’ s transportation and industrial sites expert), February 1, 1929. 54RG9-A i , volume 6, Building Lines, Secretary Tow n Planning Commission to M ayor and Council, Decem ber 31, 1929; Frank Hoole, Secretary, Vancouver Real Estate Exchange, to J . Alexander W alker, February 22, 1930 enclosing a resolution passed, February 14, 1930. 55Ihid., J. Alexander W alker to Bartholomew, N ovem ber 13, 1929. M SS 300, Board o f Trade, volume 97, Minutes o f C ivic Bureau, N ovem ber 4, 1930; December 16, 1930. “ Concerning the general comment about decision-making in urban affairs see Samuel P. Hays, “ The Politics o f Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly, vol. LV, October, 1964. The Canadian experience is outlined in John C . W eaver, “ Elitism and the Corporate Ideal: Businessmen and Boosters in Canadian C ivic Reform , 1890-1920,” Cities in the West. Ottawa: National Museum o f Man, 1975. The corporate and non-partisan nature o f Vancouver civic politics is briefly discussed in Hardwick, Vancouver; op. cit., pp. 30-31. For the membership o f Planning Commissions across the United States, see Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution,” Law and Contemporary Problems, sj vo1- xx. Spring, 1955, pp. 336-338. RG9-A1, volume 8, Annual Reports o f the Town Planning Commission to the C ity Council, 1929-1931; Reports to the C ity Council, 1933-1935. Annual Report, 1934, pp. 5-6. RG9-A1, volume 8, Reports to the C ity Council, 1933-1935, Annual Report, 1935, p. 6. RG9-A1, volume 20, Personnel, Arthur Smith to J.A . W alker, February 3, 1934; t ^ ndated M emo on personnel, volume 20, Personnel, 1925-1930. RG9-A1, volume 8, Reports to the C ity Council, Charles T. Hamilton, Chairman, Town Planning Commision, Annual Report, 1943. The report refers to W T P T B O rder 200.

^RGg-Au, v o l u m e

14,

L e g i s l a t i o n a n d A m e n d m e n t s t o T o w n P la n n i n g A c t ,

1931-1950,

Aide «rman H .L. C o rey to Honourable R.L. Maitland, Attorney-General o f British °^umbia, Decem ber 27, 1944. 9_Ai, v o l u m e 8, C h a r l e s T . H a m i l t o n , Annual Report, 1943, p. 2.

0

1

n R e p s, “ D is c r e t io n a r y P o w e r o f th e B o a r d o f Z o n in g A p p e a ls ,”

Law and Contem-

448

URBAN G R O W T H

porary Problems,

v o l . x x , S p r in g , 19 5 5 , p . 2 8 1. T h i s w a s o n e o f t h e R e p s ’ e a r lie s t

c r it ic is m s . A l s o s e e R e p s , “ R e q u i e m f o r Z o n i n g , ”

Planning 1964.

C h i c a g o : A m e r ic a n

S o c i e t y o f P l a n n in g O f f i c i a l s . 65F o r th e q u o t a t io n s e e R e p s , “ D i s c r e t i o n a r y P o w e r , ”

op. cit.,

p . 2 9 7 . A s i m il a r a t t a c k an d

c a l l f o r r e v i s i o n a p p e a r e d in W i l l i a m W c i s m a n t e l , “ A d m i n i s t r a t i v e D i s c r e t i o n in Z o n in g ,”

Harvard Law Review,

J a n u a r y 19 6 9 .

66R G - 9 - A i , v o l u m e 13, G r a n d v i e w , G r a n d v i e w C h a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e t o j . A l e x a n d e r W a lk e r , M a r c h 2 7 ,19 3 6 . T h e le t te r p re se n ts a s u p e rb , th o u g h v e r y s u b je c t iv e , a cco u n t o f u r b a n la n d u se c h a n g e s. 67H a r d w i c k ,

Vancouver, op. cit.,

p. 27;

D cryck

H o ld s w o r th ,

“ H o u se and

H o m e in

V a n c o u v e r : I m a g e s o f W e s t C o a s t U r b a n i s m , 1 8 8 6 - 1 9 2 9 ,” in G i l b e r t A . S t e l t e r and A l a n F . J . A r t i b i s e ( e d s .) ,

The Canadian City.

T o r o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d a n d S t e w a r t , 1977,

p . 2 0 5 . A d e f e n s e o f r e s id e n t ia l p r o t e c t i o n b y z o n in g a p p e a r s in “ Z o n i n g : W h a t ’ s the G o o d o f It?”

A S P O Newsletter,

v o l . x x x , J u l y - A u g u s t 19 6 4 .

hHR G 9 - A i , v o l u m e 13, G r a n d v i e w f i l e , A l f r e d B u c k l e y t o J . A l e x a n d e r W a l k e r , S e c r e ­ t a r y , T o w n P la n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n , F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 19 3 6 . B u c k l e y , a n E n g l is h m a n w ith a F a b ia n

s o c ia l is t b a c k g r o u n d , w a s a s s o c ia t e d w i t h

th e B r itis h

C o l u m b i a s o c ia lis t

f,,,R o b e r t A . W a l k e r , “ T h e I m p l e m e n t a t io n o f P l a n n in g M e a s u r e s , ”

Journal of the Ameri­

m o v e m e n t.

can Institute o f Planners, 7i)Ibid., p . 12 3.

v o l . x v i , S u m m e r , 1 9 5 0 , p . 12 5 .

Industrial Conflict and the Labour Movement

Labour Radicalism and the Western Industrial Frontier: 1897-1919* DAVID J A Y B E R C U S O N

The rapid growth o f the Canadian west from the mid-i890s to the start o f World War I was based upon the arrival and settlement o f millions o f immigrants. [Throughout this essay the term is applied generally to all those who migrated to the frontier including central and eastern Canadians.] The agricultural frontier attracted prospective farmers from every corner o f the globe and their settlement saga has held the attention of every generation o f Canadians. The frontier has been called a great leveller which broke down class distinctions because men were equal, free and far from the traditional bonds and constraints o f civilization.1 On the frontier every ‘Jack’ was as good as his master. But the settlement of the agricultural frontier was only part o f the total picture o f western development. An urban-industrial and a hinterland-extractive frontier was being opened at the same time which underwent spectacular pro­ ductive expansion and attracted many thousands o f pioneer workers. Most o f these men had gone to the frontier pushed by the same ambitions and seeking the same opportunities as other immigrants. But once in western Canada most entered into closed and polarized communities and were forced to work in dangerous or unrewarding occupations. For these men there was little upward mobility, little opportunity for improvement. They were not free and were not as good as their masters. The pioneer workers had come a long way to improve themselves. Most lost the inhibitions and inertia which usually characterized those who stayed behind. They were ready to work hard and live frugally, to sacrifice, to do what was necessary to win the rewards they had come to seek.2 But their way was usually blocked, their efforts thwarted not S O U R C E : C a n a d ia n H is to ric a l R e v ie w , L V I I I , 2 ( J u n e 19 7 7 ) , 1 5 4 —75 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m is ­ sio n o f t h e a u t h o r a n d th e U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o P r e s s .

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ation o f Labor, and District 18 o f the United Mine Workers passed because o f their failures but by a system. They usually faced a big resolutions advocating worker control o f industry, the formation o f difference between what they had sought and what could be achieved. syndicalist-oriented unions, and general strikes to achieve political Some immigrants came from such poverty and desperation that anything change. The workers pointedly expressed sympathy and support for was an improvement and they were satisfied. But most eventually Russian and German revolutionaries.6 These three gatherings were decided to break out o f the closed systems which bound them or, i f they prelude to the now famous Western Labour Conference held in March could not break out, to smash them. The system thus lost its claim to their hearts and minds and labour radicalism emerged. 1919 at Calgary and to the emergence o f the One Big Union.7 In each case large and representative bodies o f western workers declared that W ere western workers really more radical than those in central their unions must be instruments for social change. This was the essence Canada and the maritime provinces? The answer depends upon the of western labour radicalism. definition o f radicalism because major, prolonged, and violent strikes, as There were, to be sure, radicals in central Canada and the maritimes. well as political insurgency, can be found in all regions o f Canada during this period.3 The dictionary is precise: Radicalism is ‘the quality or state The coal miners o f Cape Breton were susceptible to radical ideas, o f being radical’ while radical is ‘ favoring fundamental or extreme particularly after 1917 when the Provincial Workmen’s Association change; specifically, favoring such change o f the social structure; very [PWA] was disbanded. In 1919 there was some experimentation with general strikes on a hmited scale and some scattered sympathy for the leftist.’ Militancy is ‘ the state or quality o f being militant’ while militant One Big Union idea.8 But, for the most part, Nova Scotia miners is ‘ ready and willing to fight; warlike; combative.’4 These definitions responded to the exigencies o f militancy, not political radicalism. Syndi­ allow the conclusion that up to 1919 western workers were more radical calism, with its rejection o f electoral politics, went against the grain o f a than those o f other regions though they were, perhaps, no more militant. group o f workers ‘content to remain within the rules.’9 When the Nova Their radicalism emerged in several ways, which involved efforts to Scotia Independent Labour party was formed in 1919, it advocated effect radical change. For example, the Socialist Party o f Canada, which traditional progressive reform such as the initiative, referendum, recall, called for the elimination o f capitalism and its replacement by the and proportional representation.10 J.B . McLachlan, a radical Scottish dictatorship o f the proletariat, had its headquarters in Vancouver, the miner who led the drive to destroy the PWA in the coal fields, tried to bulk o f its membership in the west, and, after 1914, the official endorlead District 26 o f the United Mine Workers into the Red International sation o f District 18 o f the United Mine Workers o f America. Major of Labor Unions in the early twenties.11 He was personally popular but Socialist party supporters could be found in the leading ranks o f western stood outside the mainstream and his views alienated others and even­ unions— George Armstrong, Robert B. Russell, Richard Johns in Wintually undermined his own support.12 There was a tradition o f indepen­ nipeg, Joseph Sanbrooke in Regina, Joseph Knight and Carl Berg in dent political activism amongst island miners but it tended towards Edmonton, William Pritchard, Jack Kavanagh, Victor Midgley, A.S. Wells in Vancouver. Support for other left-wing socialist parties, such as labour-oriented reform, not socialist or marxist radicalism. Outside the coal fields even this tradition was almost non-existent. the Social Democratic party, was also centred primarily in western Canada. Though union members in other parts o f the country engaged In a 1966 article, and later in his history o f the IWW, Melvyn Dubofsky sought to explain labour radicalism in the American west in independent political action, only in the west was their politics so definitely and unmistakably Marxian. Radical industrial unionism and particularly amongst miners. He asserted that rapid industrialization, the syndicalism also flourished in the west. The Industrial Workers o f the introduction o f technological innovations, ethnic homogeneity o f the World [IW W], the United Brotherhood o f Railway Employees, the 'Workforce, and other factors created class polarization in the mining American Labour Union, and the One Big Union all attained varying mdustry. Polarization led to class war which, in turn, led to the develop­ degrees o f success in western Canada but almost none in Ontario, ment o f class ideology. Dubofsky did not agree with the idea that Western American radicalism was ‘the response o f pioneer individualists Quebec, or the maritimes. The west’s attraction to these forms of to frontier conditions.’ 13 unionism was also reflected in its experiments with general strikes.5 The validity o f this argument is something which American labour Western radicalism reached the peak o f its influence in 1919. Conven­ ^^ ^^^^m storians are more competent to judge but its applicability to Canada tions o f the British Columbia Federation o f Labor, the Alberta Feder­

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should be seriously questioned. There was certainly rapid industriali­ zation in the Canadian west but there was no technological revolution in mining because most coal and hardrock mining began after the major technological changes in the western United States had occurred. Americans were mining for metals on a large scale in the 1870s and when Canadian hardrock mining did begin in the 1890s it was initially financed and directed largely by Americans who generally applied what they had already learned.14 Most western Canadian coal mines were too small to benefit from the major advances o f the day and mechanization was not widespread prior to 1919. The ethnic homogeneity pointed to by Dubofsky did not exist in western Canada. In the Kootenay region, for example, 34 per cent o f the male population in 1911 were Canadian, 24 per cent British, 25 per cent European, 10 per cent American, and 4 per cent Asian.15 In Vancouver 28 per cent were Canadian, 33 per cent British, 9 per cent European, 7 per cent Asian, and 9 per cent American. If Dubofsky’s ideas are to be applied to the Canadian west, they will have to be significantly altered because the opening o f the western Canadian mining frontier and the settlement, growth, and industriali­ zation o f western Canadian cities occurred at least two decades later than in the United States. Paul Phillips has put forward arguments rooted in Canadian experi­ ence. He asserted that the character o f western labour developed in response to the nature o f the resource-based economy.16 The National Policy o f tariff protection to manufacturers raised the costs o f primary production, encouraged investment in commerce and transportation but provided ‘ little or no scope for industrial expansion in the west . . . Employers developed ‘a short-term rather than a long-term view toward labour issues’ and were not greatly interested in ‘developing a perma­ nent and peaceful relation with the labour force.’ Phillips believed these factors, combined with regional isolation, created ‘greater insecurity of employment and wages . . .’ primarily because ‘ frontier employers . . ■ wanted to shift as much o f the entrepreneurial risk onto the employees as possible.’ In this way the resource-based economic structure o f the region created ‘ a very much more militant and class-conscious type of union.’ I f Phillips’ thesis is to hold it must apply to the miners because they were clearly the vanguard o f radicalism. The National Policy may have forced an inordinate concentration on resource extraction on the west and pressured employers into ‘short-term’ attitudes but resource extrac­ tion was also significant in Nova Scotia which, in this period, produced more coal than Alberta and British Columbia combined.17 The mine

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workforce in Nova Scotia in 1910 was slightly more than 17,000 out o f a total labour force ofjust over 173,000. This was a far larger proportion o f the workforce than in either Alberta or British Columbia or even the two together.18 The miners o f Nova Scotia should have been under the same constraints and difficulties as those o f the west because if the National Policy put difficulties in the path o f western resource extrac­ tion industries, it also created problems for maritime resource extraction industries. Indeed, Nova Scotia coal operators, even the giant Dominion Coal (and British Empire Steel and Coal which succeeded it), could not compete in the lucrative markets o f Ontario against Pennsylvania and West Virginia coal because o f insufficient tariff protection.19 I f the National Policy was responsible for labour radicalism in western Canada, why not Nova Scotia? Nova Scotia miners were often very militant but prior to 1919 showed little radicalism. The capital structure o f mining in western Canada was actually far from being unsophisticated or ‘ frontier-like.’ Andy den Otter observed that ‘although Alberta’s coal deposits were vast, mining ventures did not realize quick, high returns but required very careful planning and large scale, long-term financing.’ Thus the federal government granted Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt large tracts o f land to subsidize his combined railway and coal mining operations in the Coal Banks (Lethbridge) area and enabled him to attract the British investment capital needed for expansion in the 1890s.20 Investors such as Barings and Glyn and Company, the Grand Trunk Railroad, the Industrial and General Trust, and other like concerns could hardly have held short-term, quick return, expectations. Similarly, railway companies such as the CPR could not have acted the role o f ‘ frontier employers’ in their ownership of, or investment in, large mining properties. Canadian Pacific took over F. Augustus Heinze’s smelter at Trail (and the railways and land grants that went with them) in 1898.21 This was the beginning o f Consolidated Mining and Smelting (Cominco), which combined Heinze’s operations with large Canadian Pacific investments and acquired valuable properties such as the Sullivan mine at Kimberly, British Columbia.22 Cominco soon became the largest employer o f miners and smeltermen ln the region and was clearly intended to be a long-term capital venture. The Crows Nest Pass Coal Company, with a capitalization in 1911 o f $3.5 trillion, had an agreement with the Canadian Pacific, concluded in 1897, t° provide coal for smelting and other purposes.23 This mining concern earned large profits24 selling coal and coke to smelters in the west Kootenay and Boundary region/ and was typical o f many mines in the area.

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The mineral economy o f the British Columbia interior quickly developed a complex inter-related structure. Coal mines supplied coal and coke to the smelters while hardrock mines supplied ores.25 As long as the smelters operated profits were made. The smelter concerns may have had to sell their products in an unprotected world market but there were few uncertainties associated with this phenomenon in the period under examination. The mines in the region were prosperous and went through phenomenal growth up to the end o f World War I. New smelters were opened, rail lines laid, mines dug, and camps, towns, and cities expanded.26 The key to the region’s success was the low cost of extraction and the high grades o f ore. Even world depressions had little impact in the region’ s hot house economic atmosphere. One observer commented: ‘During the past summer [1897] the rapid decline in the value o f silver, that proved so disastrous to other silver countries, had little effect on our silver mines, other than to check investment, as the ores were usually o f such high grade, as to leave, even at the lowest price, a good margin o f profit.’ 27 What was true o f silver was also true of copper. The size o f the deposits and the heavily mechanized nature o f the industry, combined with cheap railway charges, kept profits high. Another observer claimed that ‘nowhere on the continent can smelting be carried on more cheaply given fair railroad rates and fuel at a reason­ able cost.’ 28 Both conditions existed and business boomed except for a brief period just after the turn o f the century. Some o f the mine owners blamed the downturn on restrictive mining legislation and labour agitators (there was a major strike at Rossland that year) but the British 'Columbia Mining Record, leading journal o f the industry, attributed the condition to swindling, mismanagement, and over-taxation.29 Stagna­ tion there was— for a few years— but the factor which most often closed down the smelters and caused a back-up o f ore and production cuts in the hardrock mines was strikes in the coal fields supplying fuel to the area.30 The collieries o f Vancouver Island do not easily fit a general picture of struggling and uncertain resource extractors. The largest operator was the Dunsmuir family who sold out to Canadian Collieries in 1910. The Dunsmuirs enjoyed steady markets in the United States at the turn o f the century and were able to sell as much as 75 per cent o f their production in San Francisco. This was true for all the collieries on the island.31 During these years 30 to 40 per cent o f the coal consumed in California was mined in British Columbia— the largest amount from any one source.32 Profits to the Dunsmuirs from coal were enhanced by land grants and subsidies acquired from the British Columbia government to build the

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gsquimalt and Nanaimo Railway.33 When the Dunsmuirs sold out to a syndicate headed by Sir William Mackenzie, co-owner o f the Canadian Northern Railway, the new company, Canadian Collieries (Dunsmuir) Limited, was capitalized at $15 million.34 Mackenzie’ s interest in coal was not confined to Canadian Collieries. He and Sir Donald Mann, his partner in the Canadian Northern, provided half the capital to develop the Nordegg Field in Alberta through Mackenzie, Mann and Company Limited. The other half o f the money came from the German Develop­ ment Company, which was sole owner o f the Brazeau Collieries in the same area.35 These mines, like many that were opened in western Canada, were ‘steam’ coal operations which sold everything they could produce to the railways. The greatest market problem facing most o f these mines prior to World War I was the increased use, particularly in California but also in Canadian coastal areas, o f California fuel oil to replace coal.36 This problem was, however, seriously aggravated by the serious production cuts in the island collieries resulting from the 1913 coal strike.37 Up to this point island coal production showed a slow but steady increase.38 The mining industry may not have been protected by National Policy tariffs but it was frequently given generous subsidies by provincial and federal governments. It also had little trouble attracting capital from Britain and the1 United States as well as major Canadian companies such as Canadian Pacific. Some o f the region’s most intransigent employers were the largest. Canadian Collieries and Granby Consolidated Mining and Smelting were probably the most hard nosed operators in western Canada and yet were large, heavily capitalized, and secure. Their attitude to industrial relations may have been short-sighted but could hardly have been prompted by insecurity. They shifted risks to their! workers because they, like most employers, wanted to and, unlike some employers, were able to. The National Policy had little to do with it. The argument could be made that the National Policy was the culprit behind most labour problems in the area because it had produced a resource-based economy in the west and such economies are riddled with labour problems. This is clearly so simplified that it explains nothing. Industry in the west was primarily resource-based because that Was where the resources were (and still are). In this period there had been no appreciable industry established in urban areas but the west was still very young and industrial output was expanding at tremendous rates.39 It is an interesting but fruitless exercise to speculate if, in this period, the economy would have been resource-based anyway or /

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whether the National Policy was already suppressing the growth of secondary industry. The key problem here is whether western manu­ facturing had yet reached the point where it was large enough to be restricted by the National Policy. So far, there is no answer to the question. What about the ‘domestic’ coal operators— those smaller mines producing coal for heating purposes? These mines in the east Kootenays and Alberta had more limited markets.40 They could not compete with Pennsylvania anthracite in Winnipeg or points east because American coal, though usually slightly higher in price, was better quality.41 They were also unable to compete in the coastal trade, in Canada or the United States, and had no entry to the northern California market. The prairies, northern Idaho, and eastern Washington were their domain. These operators sold in a less certain market than the steam coal producers or the Vancouver Island collieries and their uncertainty was at \ / least partly due to the absence o f sufficient tariff protection. However, they were the most reasonable for their employees to deal with and were less reluctant to sign agreements recognizing unions.42 Perhaps the very uncertainty o f their markets prompted them to avoid serious labour troubles, unlike a powerful giant such as Canadian Collieries. Phillips asserts that western employers tended to take short-run, commercial views o f their relations with their workers primarily because they purchased capital goods in a high-priced, protected market and sold their raw materials in unprotected world markets,43 like the praine grain farmers. But the parallel was superficial in reality whatever it may be in theory. Perhaps Phillips has explained why there were some uncertainties amongst western resource extraction employers at certain times, but even this tells little. There was no necessary connection between these uncertainties (when they did occur) and the rise o f labour radicalism. There is, in fact, no real evidence that mine owners or smelter operators, with large capital investments in their enterprises, acted any differently from industrial capitalists anywhere. Conversely, there is no evidence that manufacturers in central Canada, when faced with the inevitable uncertainties o f business, acted any differently from the resource extractors. Unions were fought and demands resisted by most business­ men when the cost o f the struggle fell within economically acceptable limits. Unions were tolerated and their demands considered when the cost o f resisting was greater than the price o f capitulation. When mine owners in the Crowsnest Pass area faced a strong union (organized before the scattered operators had a chance to unite against it) in the reality o f a limited labour supply and uncertain markets, they chose to

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deal with their workers. But the large operators o f Vancouver Island, •tj, a ready surplus o f Chinese labour, assured markets, and facing a / struggling union, dug in their heels. The men who worked the mines o f western Canada were mostly immigrants- This is in sharp contrast to the mine workforce in Canada’s other major mining area— Nova Scotia. The 1911 federal census revealed that almost three-quarters o f the mine employees in Nova Scotia were Canadian born compared to 12 per cent in Alberta and 16 per cent in British Columbia mine workers.44 This picture is reflected in the male population o f two Nova Scotia coal counties, Cumberland and Inver­ ness. Eighty-one per cent o f Cumberland men and 92 per cent o f Inverness men were Nova Scotia born. In British Columbia 22 per cent of the men in Nanaimo District and 11 per cent in Kootenay District were native to the province. Conversely, only 19 per cent o f Cumberland and 8 per cent o f Inverness men were immigrants, while immigrants accounted for 78 per cent o f the males o f Nanaimo District and 89 per cent in Kootenay District. The western mines and mining communities were almost exactly opposite in composition to the mines and mining communities o f the east. In addition, as Donald MacGillivray has pointed out, the strong presence o f the Roman Catholic church in Cape X Breton, with its belief in an organic, structured society, was important. Conservative religious traditions added to the influence o f conservative metropolitan centres such as Halifax and Antigonish. His picture is one of an ‘essentially conservative community’ with a ‘thread o f radi­ calism.’45 The pioneer immigrant nature o f western mining society is reflected in other statistics. In the two Nova Scotia counties the ratio o f men to women was 1.04:1. In Nanaimo District the ratio was 1.7:1 and in Kootenay District 1.9:1. The average age o f mine employees in the west was higher than in Nova Scotia. Eighty per cent o f British Columbia mine employees were between twenty-five and sixty-four years o f age, while 70 per cent o f Alberta and 65 per cent o f Nova Scotia mine employees were in the same range. Literacy rates were also higher in the western mining regions for Canadian- and British-born miners. A composite emerges: in Nova Scotia young men born in the mining communities, or living in towns or on farms close by, went into the collieries at the earliest opportunity. They had travelled little, were younger, and less educated than western miners. They probably worked for the company their fathers had served before them and had few expectations about improving their immediate environment. In western

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& THE

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Austria to make their fortune. Perhaps they simply sought more cash to send back to the village. Troper and Harney have pointed to a crisis in rural village life in late nineteenth-century Europe as a factor causing young men to seek opportunities elsewhere46 and many were clearly refugees from economic hardship.47 The British and Americans who came to the mining communities were usually skilled miners as were some Canadians from Nova Scotia.48 The vast majority o f European miners had been peasants and had no experience in mining. One result was that better paying jobs— miners in the hardrock mining industry, contract miners in the coal fields— usually went to Anglo-Saxons while the lower paying positions— muckers (ore loaders) in hardrock mining and ‘day men’ in the collieries — were taken up by the Europeans.49 Contract mining was an especially skilled occupation in the coal fields since a miner had to know the best way to work a seam, shoring and bucking, safety techniques, coal quality, and other factors in order to earn an above standard wage. In hardrock mining the use o f machinery such as air drills rendered many old skills unnecessary but certain semi-skilled procedures and techniques were still required for the use o f air drills, blasting, and other jobs. The urban workforce was also mostly immigrant during this period. The composition o f western cities contrasted sharply with those o f the east jnd more closely reflected the ethnic and demographic profile o f the western mining regions. The 1911 census showed that only slightly more than 12 per cent o f Vancouver men and 18 per cent o f the women were British Columbians.50 In Halifax about 88 per cent o f the men and 89 per cent o f the women were born in Nova Scotia. Hamilton, one o f the country’s most heavily industrialized cities, contained a larger pro­ portion o f immigrants than Halifax— about 41 per cent o f the men and 33 per cent o f the women (primarily from the British Isles), but most o f the population was born in Ontario. Calgary closely matched Vancouver in that 90 per cent o f the men and 84 per cent o f the women were immigrants, most from Great Britain but with a very large number of Canadians. Here, about 12 per cent o f the men and 14 per cent o f the women were from the United States and approximately 12 per cent of the men and 8 per cent o f the women were from Europe. Though Winnipeg was the oldest, largest, and most industrialized western city its profile closely followed the other western urban areas. Seventy-nine per cent o f the men and 73 per cent o f the women were immigrants. The British were the largest group— 32 per cent o f the men, 26 per cent o f the women— followed by Canadians and Europeans. The ratio o f men to women was also disproportionately high in the two most western cities,

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r e f l e c t i n g ^ e ir frontier character: 1.5:1 in Vancouver, 1.6:1 in Calgary. In Winnipeg the ratio was 1.2:1. The ratios were more normal in the east: 1 1:1 in Hamilton, 1:1 in Halifax. Immigrants responded differently to the industrial frontier. Those who came from deplorable conditions o f poverty, powerlessness, and oppression sometimes found the new cities and mining communities o f the west considerably better than whatever they had left behind. Most of the Italians in British Columbia were from southern Italy, an area o f grinding rural poverty.51 They probably felt a distinct improvement in their situation simply because o f the steady wages. Many never intended to remain in Canada and only stayed as long as necessary to earn cash to bring home. Donald Avery has called them sojourners.52 They consti­ tuted a conservative element: in the radical and tumultuous environ­ ment o f the Kootenay country, Trail, with a heavy Italian immigrant population, was an island o f labour tranquility.53 Managers welcomed Italians to the mining communities because o f their excellent (or infamous?) reputation as strikebreakers.54 The Chinese were in much the same position. They too found Canada to be a heaven compared to what they had left. It is impossible to tell whether their strikebreaking activities resulted from exclusion from unions by white workers or vice versa but their conservative temper and exclusiveness mirrored the attitudes o f many Italians. At the other end o f the scale were the British, Canadians, and Americans who had been reared in liberal democratic societies, were ' used to a democratic franchise, and might well have been involved in trade union or radical activities. These workers enjoyed an additional advantage over Europeans since they knew English and were familiar with the methods and mores o f the political system. They were usually the most radical in their response to hardships and inequities and always provided the leadership for the socialist and syndicalist movements that vied for the allegiance o f western workers. When the Social Democratic party was formed in 1911 a large majority o f its membership was European but every one o f its public leaders was Anglo-Saxon.55 British and American workers brought well-developed traditions o f frade unionism and radicalism to western Canada. The British labour movement had been undergoing continuous change, growth, and 'ncreased militancy and radicalism since the London dock strike o f 1889. Amalgamation and industrial unionism vied with socialism, syndicalism, arid anarchism as theories and ideas were adopted, discarded, re_examined and adopted again. Leaders such as Keir Hardie, Tom ^ ann, James Connolly, and other worker-philosophers kept British

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labour in ideological turmoil.56 The British labour movement, from which thousands o f western workers had graduated, was in constant search for new directions and more effective means o f bringing the organized power o f the workers to bear. Much the same sort o f thing was happening in the United States, particularly the western mining states which sent the bulk o f the American hardrock miners to the British Columbia interior. These men had no use for the business unionism and conservative moderation of Samuel Gompers and formed radical industrial unions such as the Western Federation o f Miners and the United Brotherhood o f Railway Employees. They founded the American Labor Union to challenge the AFL and supported socialist and syndicalist causes.57 These British and American workers drew on a rich heritage o f trade unionism and radicalism developed in industrial and/or urban contexts. When they found themselves closed in by their adopted society, their unions beset upon by courts and governments, their employers using police, spies, dismissals, evictions from company towns, and alliances with governments against most efforts to organize, they responded with all the fury o f the militancy and the radicalism they brought with them. The new societies o f the western mining camps were totally polarized as were the economic regions in which mining was carried out. Company towns were a feature o f the region because most o f the coal and ore deposits were far from normal settlement areas. It was not possible for miners to live in Lethbridge or Victoria and work in the collieries nearby, even when they were close. The company camps grew immediately adjacent to the collieries and the miners were forced to spend most o f their lives in these controlled towns. The company town could be a wretched place, with stinking outhouses, no fresh water supply, dilapidated shacks, and cold, damp bunkhouses. There may have been no medical facilities, no schools, bad food, lice-ridden blankets, and frequent attacks o f typhoid.58 O r a company town could have been the epitome o f paternalism. Nordegg, in the Coal Branch area of Alberta, was planned as ‘a modem and pretty town’ with the best equipped hospital west o f Edmonton, bathrooms in the larger cottages, a poolroom, a miners club, and several company stores.59 Martin Nor­ degg, who laid out the town, decided to paint the miners’ cottages in different pastel shades.60 In the British Columbia interior the Granby Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company offered cottages with electric lights, running water, and sanitary facilities. Their town had a recreation hall, meeting hall, tennis court, reading room, baseba diamond, and moving pictures.61 All the towns and camps scattere

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throughout Alberta and British Columbia had one thing in common— they were closed societies, highly polarized, which isolated the workers and made them as dependent on each other above the ground as they were below. In Nordegg, for example, it was not long before company officials and their families occupied the cottages on the heights and refused to mix with the miners.62 In the Granby camp the velvet glove concealed a company policy o f ejecting ‘agitators.’63 On Vancouver Island the Dunsmuirs’ favourite tactic for dealing with labour unrest was to eject miners from the company towns.64There was never any question about who owned and controlled. The miners faced this reality every time they went to the company store, used company scrip (which was still circulating in Nordegg as late as 1915), or availed themselves o f any company facility. The polarization o f the camps was enhanced by the newness o f the society on the mining frontiers. The only important social institutions were the companies and the unions. That which the company did not provide the union did. The unions built their own halls, which served as the major recreation area for the men— a place where they could bitch and drink away from company ears. The union provided compensation, helped with legal fees in suits brought by accident victims, or provided burial funds. In the B C interior the only hospital for miles was apt to be owned and fmanced by the union as was the case in Sandon.65 The unions, whether the Western Federation o f Miners or the United Mine Workers, were organized on the basis o f a lodge for each colliery, mine, or smelter. The lodge was, therefore, locally organized and supported. The men were the local and the local was the men— identification was -— complete. When the United Mine Workers fought wage reductions in Alberta and the Crowsnest Pass in the years 1924-5, the miners who disagreed with this policy did not leave their unions, they withdrew their locals and established ‘home locals’66 which survived to be reunited in a rejuvenated District 18 in the early 1930s. Mining society was raw. There was no established tradition o f servi­ tude or corporate paternalism handed from generation to generation , such as existed in many Nova Scotia coal communities. In most companyowned towns and camps the presence o f church and other moderating s°cial institutions was weak while the class structure o f the community reflected its totally mine-oriented existence. There were miners and their families and the managers. There were no teachers, clerks, ruerchants, priests, salesmen, artisans, doctors, or other professionals. And if there were they too were company employees. Mining was the °uly industry and the entire social and economic structure o f the region

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depended upon the labour o f the miners or the smeltermen. In southern Alberta mining communities were often located near agricultural dis­ tricts but this did not lessen the polarity o f the camps because the professional miners resented the farmers who came looking for work after the harvest, found employment in the mine, and undercut the earnings o f the permanent miners.67 Some mining towns— Rossland and Sandon in the British Columbia interior, Drumheller in south central Alberta— were open communities not under direct company control. A handful o f tailors, drygoods merchants, tobacconists, hoteliers, barmen, and preachers set up shop to service the miners’ needs. Well-stocked bars in small frame hotels and enterprising prostitutes provided ‘recrea­ tion’68 as did miners’ day parades and, in the hardrock country, July Fourth celebrations. Relay races, rock drilling contests, and union band concerts drew large crowds and eager participants. These towns offered more individual freedom— the men could come and go i f they were single and debt-free— and more class diversity than closed company camps. But they were always isolated, by miles o f open prairie or by the high mountains and thick forests o f the rainy Kootenays. And though not owned, they were dominated by the mining companies whose managers formed a close bond with the handful o f local independent businessmen. Costs to the miners in these towns were high— for room, board, or recreation69— and the everpresent closeness and isolation helped make them pressure-cookers o f discontent. The polarization o f these communities was also reflected in the limited opportunities for improvement available to the workers. Day men (paid a flat daily wage) might become contract miners (paid by the amount o f coal dug, graded as suitable and weighed at the pit head) but this was as far as they could go. In the hardrock mines a mucker might become a miner, an even less important promotion than that from day man to contract miner in the coal fields. Working conditions were uniformly poor. Death rates in western coal mines were more than twice those o f Nova Scotia (see Table I). The v/ mines were newer than those in Nova Scotia and the men and their managers had less expertise in how to extract the mineral.70 It was not discovered until after several major disasters, in which hundreds of miners were killed, that the coal o f the east Kootenay region was fifteen N/ times more gaseous and therefore much more likely to cause explosions than comparably-graded bituminous in Pennsylvania.71 In the hardrock mines heat, unstable explosives, faulty machinery, unguarded shafts, flooded sumps, cave-ins, and mining related diseases took a constant toll \ o f lives.72 Here conditions were about the same as those o f the American hardrock mines.

465

TAB LE I Fatalities Per Million Tons o f Coal Mined Over One Decade 1907

1908

1909

BC

13.96

8.53

ALTA

10.35

NS

5.61

5.96 6.09

US

na

5.97

1910

1911

1912

1913

1914

1915

1916

A vg

23.75

8.92

7.30

54.68

26.36 5.24

12.92

4.13

10.5 6.50

11.26

20.08

9.25 6.09

9.39

4.14

4.30

12.15

5.82

5.05

5.18

4.46

5.95

4.72

5.74

3.99

5.26

5.73

5.62

5.35

4.53

4.89

4.78

4.27

3.77

4.99

SO U RC ES: N ova Scotia, Annual Report on M in es 1940 (Halifax 1941), 114; ibid. (1944), 186; Alberta, Annual Report o f the Department o f Public Works o f Alberta igi6 (Edmonton 1917), no; British Columbia, Annual Report of the Bureau of M in es tgio (Victoria 1911), 230; ibid. (1920), 358-

When conditions in mining camps and in the mines themselves were intolerable, there were few places to escape. The skilled miners were tied to their occupations (if not to the company store) and faced lower wages as unskilled workers in cities or as agricultural labour. American hardrock miners could always migrate back across the border, and many appear to have done so, but mines there were just as dangerous and the communities just as polarized as in Canada. Those miners with families had little mobility to begin with. The unskilled single miners did have options, but very restricted ones. Southern Alberta coal mines were located near agricultural areas and even those not so near were a short train ride away. But agricultural labour, when available, was twenty-four hour a day work at low wages. Farmers gained unsavoury reputations amongst migratory agricultural workers from both sides o f the border because o f the treatment meted out to their employees. Added to this was competition from small farmers needing additional cash73 and immigrants who wanted to learn homesteading before filing on a piece o f their own land.74 Every fall thousands o f men were brought west by the railways to help bring in the harvest. Even if work was available under decent circumstances it would rarely be steady since farms were still small and extra labour require­ ments were seasonal. For the single miners o f the B C interior or Vancouver Island, however, even this was not an option. The other escapes were railway construction work and migration to the cities. Railway construction workers— navvies or ‘bunkhousemen’ were just above slaves in the general scheme o f things. Under the direction o f brutish foremen, navvies worked from dawn past dusk clearing rights o f way, laying track, hauling rock and gravel. The work Vvas gruelling and the pay negligible. The food was usually bad— though a charge was always deducted for it, the sleeping conditions fit for ammals: bunks rigged up in old box cars with almost no heat, proper ventilation, or space to move. Sanitary facilities were nonexistent. The

466

/

V

1/

INDUSTRIAL CO N FLICT & THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

workers on these construction jobs were closely watched to assure that ‘agitators’ would not get close to them.75 It was a wise policy. When the IW W managed to get a foothold in the construction camps in the Fraser River canyon in 1912 two long strikes o f navvies, one on the GrandTrunk Pacific, the other on the Canadian Northern, gave these wretched men an opportunity to protest their deplorably bad working and living conditions.76 The cities offered the greatest chance to escape. Here, at least, there was recreation, companionship, freedom to roam about, and, during this period, usually plentiful work. But if the city offered good opportunities for advancement and the chance to forge a decent life for the skilled worker, it offered barely enough to get by for the unskilled. Urban slums blighted the new cities o f the west and in times o f depression, when there was no work to be had, primitive and patchwork welfare schemes offered little hope.77 In truth, western cities were also closed and polarized societies for many thousands o f industrial workers. Every western city had an ‘across the tracks.’ In Calgary there were tent towns in Hillhurst or near the Centre Street Bridge. In Edmonton frame shacks were thrown up along the Grand Trunk Pacific main line, near the Calder Yards, or east o f Mill Creek. In Vancouver tenements scarred the urban landscape along the waterfront to the southeast of Stanley Park. In Winnipeg there were the tenements and broken down hovels o f the ‘North End’ where overcrowding, lack o f sanitary facil­ ities, and a near absence o f fresh water created one o f the highest infant mortality and death rates per thousand persons on the continent.78 For the unskilled these slums were a dead end. The skilled fared better. They built modest homes in Calgary’s Mount Pleasant or Winnipeg’s Ward 4 near the Point Douglas Yards. Many eventually went into business on their own and started printing shops, contracting firms, and other small enterprises. A few became successful in politics. The skilled workers quickly formed themselves into an aristocracy o f labour, their exclusive and conservative craft unions presiding over respectable Trades and Labor Councils. For the unskilled there were no unions since the crafts would not stoop to attempting mass organization. They had no political voice because o f restrictive franchises. Many o f the Europeans sought out ethnic-based sociahst clubs and in Winnipeg Jew s and Ukrainians organized vigorous and active left-wing parties79 but they had no real power. This was a common frustration which affected both the skilled and the unskilled: the cities o f western Canada were tightly controlled by commercial elites who ran them like closed corporations.80Winnipeg

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467

offers the best although certainly not the only example and this was reflected in the restricted franchise, based upon property qualification. In 1906, when Winnipeg contained over 100,000 persons, only 7784 were listed as municipal voters.81 This situation was particularly hard for workers. The city government was reluctant to spend money to improve facilities in the North End. It provided little impetus for the privately owned but municipally chartered street railway system to operate adequate services in workingclass areas. It was not receptive to requests for improved health and building bylaws or minimum wage schedules from the local labour movement. The imbalance o f electoral power also assured the election to office o f men such as Thomas Russell Deacon who, in the midst o f the depression o f 1913—15, opposed giving his policemen a day’s rest in seven and told his city’s unemployed to ‘hit the trail’ but struggled hard to obtain a municipal vote for property-owning corporations.82 Men hke Deacon were representative o f and supported by a commercial elite which constantly stymied and frustrated the working people’s attempts to make their jobs safer, their homes more secure, their lives better. Nevertheless, the cities were clearly the best places to be on the industrial frontier, especially for skilled workers. They could find the jobs and build the homes and families they had come to the west for. Unless and until they were thwarted in their own drives for improve­ ment they remained moderate, though reform minded. The unskilled were better off in the cities but just barely. They were still powerless, living in bad conditions, earning low wages, and living in fear o f unemployment. The cities were significantly different from the mining^ communities in that they offered some middle ground between polarized extremes. Here there were churches, religious and social clubs, and libraries.83 Here, also, there appeared to be a middle class— clerks, salesmen, priests, professionals— lacking in the mining com­ munities. The mix was not as volatile, the chances for improvement better, the edges not so rough. Perhaps this is why radicalism took longer to dominate the cities. All western workers were not radicals. Those who were did not become radical at once. The coal miners o f Vancouver Island, the Crowsnest Pass, and Alberta and the hardrock miners o f the British Columbia interior were the vanguard o f radicalism in the west, founding nurturing it, and lending its spirit o f revolt to other western workers. These miners early rejected reformism and swung behind marxist political organizations, particularly the Sociahst Party o f Canada. They also provided the most fertile ground in the west for doctrines o f radical

468

INDUSTRIAL CO N FLICT & THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

industrial unionism and syndicalism and were amongst the strongest supporters o f the Industrial Workers o f the World. The miners formed a large and cohesive group in British Columbia and they quickly over­ whelmed, dominated, and greatly influenced the urban crafts and railroad lodges. Radicals were more influential in Vancouver prior to 1914 than other western urban centres. In Alberta the urban crafts formed the Alberta Federation o f Labor partly to offset the radical influence o f the coal miners who dominated the labour movement in the south,84 but by 1/ 1918 the miners had become undisputed masters o f the provincial labour movement. Radicalism, therefore, emerged first and was strongest in the |/ highly polarized and closed mining communities. In these camps workers with a common employer and common interests were grouped into a single community. Their struggle with their bosses did not begin with the morning whistle and end when the shift was over because the entire area was controlled by their employer and they were forced to cope with the company on a twenty-four hour basis. Since they were grouped into one place a little radical propaganda went a long way. The situation in the cities was, as we have seen, different and radi­ calism took much longer to dominate, even though it was always present. Prior to the war urban workers were ready to defend the rights o f groups such as the IW W but, for the most part, refused to endorse their aims. Urban workers even elected radicals to important positions, particularly in Vancouver, but would not support radical objectives. Though a socialist such as R.P. Pettipiece was editor o f the B.C. Federationist, a moderate such as W .R. Trotter (a trades congress organizer), was a regular contributor. In part this was the result of indecisiveness and ideological uncertainty. Christian Sivertz, socialist and a leader o f the British Columbia Federation o f Labor, demonstrated this lack o f clarity when he wrote that a general strike (contemplated to support the Vancouver Island coal miners in 1913) would make employers aware that such a weapon existed and they would then be ‘more amenable to reasonable consideration o f the demands o f orga­ nized labor.’85 This one radical leader only supported a general strike to force the bosses to be more reasonable. Clearly the pressures o f polari­ zation and limited opportunities were not yet great enough or had not yet been perceived by enough workers to have thoroughly radicalized the Vancouver labour movement. Radical strength existed in that radicals had achieved important positions, but there was no concerted radical purpose. In the other major urban centres— Calgary, Edmonton, and Winnipeg— radicals played second fiddle to men such as Alex Ross, Alfred Farmilo, and Arthur W. Puttee. All this changed after 1914.

David Ja y Bercuson

469

The emergence o f radicalism as the dominant factor in the urban labour movement was primarily due to the war. The domestic industrial and political situation convinced many urban workers that opportunity / and mobility were illusions. Inflation and manpower shortages prompted moves to increase organization, union recognition, and higher wages but these drives were usually stymied by court injunctions, federal'/ orders in council, and the indifference or hostility o f the Imperial Munitions Board. Many otherwise economic and industrial issues, such as higher wages for railway shopcraft workers, became politicized as y worker hostility towards the war itselfbecame the major issue. Western urban labour turned increasingly against the war and, conversely, more supportive o f radical alternatives.86 Urban labour leaders were also immigrants and now reacted in a fashion similar to their brothers in the mines. B y September 1918 the urban-industrial and the extractivehinterland labour movement was united behind radical leadership. Western labour radicalism was born when immigrant industrial pioneers entered into the closed, polarized societies o f the mining communities and the western cities. Once settled there was little chance for improvement. Many o f these individuals could not accept their change in status from free immigrants, some o f them from a rural back­ ground, to regulated and enclosed industrial workers.87 In Nova Scotia and in central Canada, by contrast, radicalism was slow to develop. Its signs were not apparent in Nova Scotia until sixty years after mining began in earnest and at least two generations had worked in the mines. Young men growing up in the closed communities o f the Nova Scotia coal towns knew little else and expected little better. They too would go down in the mines and would live in the company towns as did their fathers before them. I f not, they would themselves emigrate. In central Canadian cities radicalism was never a dominant factor though it was always present. But in the west most workers did expect better. Those who had worked the land in Europe, who had survived the mining wars of the American frontier, who escaped the turbulence, insecurity, restrictiveness, and polarization o f British society, or the falling wages and lower productivity o f the Welsh coal fields, had come to the Canadian frontier for a new start and better opportunities. But they soon found themselves victims o f a new oppression. This was the frontier; but / the mining communities were pockets o f industrial feudalism denying the opportunity o f the frontier to those who sought it while the cities were only slightly better. This deep frustration provided fertile soil for the socialists and syndicalists who offered radical change and abolition o f wage slavery. ’ The freedom which was sought, but not found, could be

47°

INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & THE LABOUR M O V E M E N T

found yet in the commonwealth o f toil. It became apparent to those with little patience that the traditional methods o f business unionism— organization, negotiation, strike, arbitration, and so on— won no battles. Even the few victories that were achieved changed little; perhaps a slightly higher wage or shorter hours, but the company town, the slum, the whole polarized and closed environment continued to exist. In one sense the entire labour system in the west was a closed environment. Thus the one apparent hope— the unions— offered little real hope. For many who sought improvement the only answer lay with those who attacked the basic structure o f the system that held immigrant workers in thrall: the political socialists who preached the dictatorship of the proletariat and scorned reformism; the syndicalists who advocated use o f the trade unions as instruments for radical change; the radical industrial unionists who advocated general strikes to overcome the combined power o f employers and state. These solutions offered hope to men who refused to wait for gradual, evolutionary improvement. Far from becoming a leveler, the Canadian industrial frontier was the chief stimulus to the development o f class consciousness and radical workingclass attitudes in the Canadian west.

N O TES *1 am grateful to Ramsay C ook, D avid M cGinnis, and Ian Fuge for their helpful comments and suggestions. 'The classic statement is ‘The Significance o f the Frontier in American History' in Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (N ew Y o rk 1920). A Canadian discussion is included in M .S. Cross, ed., The Frontier Thesis in the Canadas: The Dehate on the Impact of the Canadian Environment (Toronto 1970), 104-25. 2Some immigrant attitudes can be found in H. Palmer, ed., Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism (Toronto 1975), 82-111. A good account o f a Ukrainian pioneer worker is A .B . W oywitka, ‘ Recollections o f a Union M an,’ Alberta History, autumn 1975, 620. ’See S.M . Jamieson, Times o f Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict, 1900-1966 (Ottawa 1968), 62-151. ’Taken from Webster’s N ew World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition (Cleveland and N ew Y o rk 1968). ’ For examples see P. Phillips, No Power Greater (Vancouver 1967), 60, 72-3; M. Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour (Kingston 1968), 127-32; E. Taraska, ‘The Calgary C raft Union Movement, 1900-1920’ (unpublished M A thesis. University o f Calgary, 1975), 69-70; D .J. Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg (Montreal 1974), 58-65, 83. 6See British Colum bia Federation o f Labour, Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Convention (Calgary 1919), 2, 4, 5, 7; Alberta Federation o f Labor, Proceedings o f the Sixth Annual Convention (Medicine Hat 1919), 41; ‘ Sixteenth Annual Convention District 18 United Mine W orkers o f America’ (typewritten), 133.

David Ja y Bercuson

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7One B ig Union, The Origin o f the One Big Union: A Verbatim Report o f the Calgary Conference, tgtg (W innipeg nd), 10-12. *1 am grateful to E.R. Forbes for bringing these events to my attention. Sec his ‘The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism’ (unpub­ lished PhD thesis. Q ueen’ s University, 1975), 88-9. *D. M acGillivray, ‘ Industrial Unrest in Cape Breton 1919-1925’ (unpublished M A thesis. University o f N e w Brunswick, 1971), 35, 44. "'Ibid., 33. "H .A . Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto 1948), 334-5. l2M acGillivray, ‘ Industrial Unrest,’ 226. "M . Dubofsky, ‘The Origins o f W estern W orking Class Radicahsm, 1890-1905,’ Labor History, spring 1966, 131-54. "R .M . Longo, ed., Historical Highlights o f Canadian Mining (Toronto 1973), 21-3; M. Robin, The Rush for Spoils (Toronto 1972), 25-6. ''Canada, Census o f Canada 1911, II, 377-8 [hereafter Cenrus], “ P. Phillips, ‘The National Pohcy and the Development o f the Western Canadian Labour M ovem ent,’ in A .W . Rasporich and H .C . Klassen, eds., Prairie Perspectives 2 (Toronto 1973), 41-6 1. 17Census, V , 106-9, 118-19. '"Ibid., 10—11. ' 'F .S. Moore, The Mineral Resources of Canada (Toronto 1933), 188-92. 2IIA.A. den Otter, ‘ Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt, the Canadian Government and Alberta’s Coal,’ Historical Papers 1973, 38. 2'R. Chodos, The C P R : A Century o f Corporate Welfare (Toronto 1973), 63-5. 22J.L. M cDougall, Canadian Pacific (Montreal 1968), 143-8. 23Chodos, The C P R , 63-4. “ Public Archives o f Canada, Sir Thomas Shaughnessy Papers, Canadian Pacific Railway Letterbooks, Shaughnessy to Elias Rogers, 4 March 1903. I am grateful to Donald Avery for bringing this source to my attention. 25Ibid., Shaughnessy to W . W hyte, 27 March 1907. 2‘ H.A. Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier (Toronto 1936), 282-320, contains the best description o f the region’s growth. 27Ibid„ 280. 28Ibid., 284. 2,Robin, Spoils, 76. "This emerges constantly in Innis. See, for example, pages 284, 285, 288, 289. He notes that the 1911 Crowsnest Pass coal strike necessitated the importation o f 41,000 tons o f coke from Pennsylvania (285). "British Columbia, Annual Report o f the Minister o f Mines (for the year ending 31 December 1914) (Victoria 1915), 333 [hereafter Mines Reports]. >2Mittes Reports 1902, 1202. "Robin, Spoils, 79-80. ^Mines Reports 1915, 348. "A.A. den Otter, ‘ Railways and Alberta's C oal Problem. 1880-1960,' in A .W . Rasporich, ed.. Western Canada Past and Present (Calgary 1975), 89-90. “ C.J. McMillan, ‘Trade Unionism in District 18,1900-1925: A Case Study’ (unpublished MA thesis, University o f Alberta, 1968), 23. 17Mines Reports 1914, 329. ’"Ibid., 1915, 426.

472

INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & THE LABOUR M O V E M E N T

35Census, III, X I-X III. 4uden Otter, ‘Railways,’ 84. •"Canada, ‘ Evidence Presented to the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations, 1919’ (typewritten). Testimony o f Jesse Gough, 690-2, and C .G . Sheldon, 1003-6 [here­ after ‘Royal Commission Evidence’]. “ Jamieson, Times o f Trouble, 99, 126-32. •"Phillips, ‘ National Policy,’ especially 41-3. 4i Census, II. All these statistics were compiled from Table X V . Literacy rates were obtained from Table X X X V . •"M acGillivray, ‘ Industrial Unrest,’ 23-4. 46H. T roper and R. Harney, Immigrants (Toronto 197s), 8. “ See, for example, H. Palmer, Land o f the Second Chance (Lethbridge 1972), 29-30, 71-2, 194; W oywitka, ‘Recollections,’ 6. 48For American examples see A .R. M cCorm ack, ‘The Emergence o f the Socialist Movement in British Colum bia,’ B C Studies, spring 1974, 6; A .R . M cCorm ack, ‘The Origins and Extent o f Western Labour Radicalism: 1896-1919’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University o f W estern Ontario, 1973), 24, 104. 49D. Avery, ‘ Foreign W orkers and Labour Radicalism in the W estern Canadian Mining Industry, 1900-1919’ (paper presented to the W estern Canadian Urban History Conference, W innipeg, O ctober 1974), 4-5, 8-9. •■ "Census, II, Table X V . "P alm er, Chance, 174; J.S . W oodsworth, Strangers within our Gates (Rep. ed., Toronto 1972). 13352Avery, ‘ Foreign W orkers,’ 7, discusses this and the ‘ padrone’ system. S3I am grateful to Professor S.H. Scott for his impressions o f the role o f the immigrants in the T rail labour movement. 54Avery, ‘ Foreign W orkers,’ 8. 55Robin, Radical Politics, 104-15, tells o f the birth o f the SDP. 56H. Pelling, A History o f British Trade Unionism (London 1963), 94-100; McCormack, ‘ Em ergence,’ 6. 57V .H . Jensen, Heritage o f Conflict: Labor Relations in the Non Ferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (N ew Y o rk 1950), 6 1-2, 64-70. “ Glenbow Alberta Institute [G A I], United M ine W orkers o f America, District 18 Papers. ‘Report o f Alberta C oal M ining Industry Commission, D ec. 23,1919’ contains valuable information concerning the state o f Alberta coal towns. 5I'M . Nordegg, The Possibilities o f Canada are Truly Great (Rep. ed., Toronto 1971), 176-7. “ Ibid., 184. “ ‘ Royal Commission Evidence,’ 393-5, 405-7. “ N ordegg, Possibilities, 196- 8. 63‘Royal Commission Evidence,’ 396-7. “ Phillips, No Power, 5-9. “ University o f British Colum bia Special Collections [U B C ], By Laws and Sketch of Sandon Miners' Union Hospital (Sandon, nd). “ F.P. Karas, ‘ Labour and C oal in the Crowsnest Pass’ (unpublished M A thesis, Univer­ sity o f Calgary, 1972), 36-51, 129-33. “ G A I, United Mine W orkers o f America, District 18 Papers, ‘Special Convention held at Calgary, June 14-16, 1921’ 101-5, 108. “ Jam es G ray discusses prostitution in Drumheller in Red Lights on the Prairies (Toronto 1971). See also Provincial Archives o f British Columbia, Com inco Papers, Add. MS 15/8/3, ‘ St. Eugene Arbitration.’

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'"For Kootenay town living costs see ‘St. Eugene Arbitration,’ and Com inco Papers, Add. M S 15/9/2. ’"McMillan, 78-82, summarizes some o f the dangers and the evolution o f safety legis­ lation. ’ ’British Columbia, Special Report on Coal Mine Explosions, 1918 (Victoria 1918), 529-30. 72R.E. Lingenfelter, The Hardrock Miners (Los Angeles 1974), 12-26, tells o f conditions in American hardrock mines in the period prior to 1896. For evidence that many o f these conditions existed in British Colum bia mines see U B C , Orchard Interviews. Inter­ view ofW illiam Byers, 7-10 . Byers worked in the Phoenix and Rossland area. See also By Laws and Sketch of Sandon Miners’ Union Hospital. 73D.P. McGinnis, ‘ Labour in Transition: Occupational Structure and Economic Depen­ dency in Alberta, 1921—1951’ (paper read to the W estern Canadian Studies Con­ ference, Calgary, Alberta, March 1975), 4-6. 74This was a close to universal experience. See G. Shepherd, West o f Yesterday (Toronto 1965), 17-18, for one example. 75E. Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man (Rep. ed., Toronto 1972), 63-90. 76Jamieson, Times o f Trouble, 143-6. 77J. Taylor, ‘The Urban W est: Public W elfare and a Theory o f Urban Developm ent,’ in A.R. M cCorm ack and 1. Macpherson, eds., Cities in the West (Ottawa 1975), 298-301. ’ "A.F.J. Arbitise, Winnipeg: A Social History o f Urban Growth, 1874-1914 (Montreal 1975), 223-45. ’’ Ibid., 163-5. “ J.M .S. Careless, ‘ Aspects o f Urban Life in the West, 1870-1914,’ in A .W . Rasporich and H .C. Klassen, eds., Prairie Perspectives 2, 32-5. “’Artibise, Winnipeg, 38. ,2The Voice (Winnipeg), 9 and 16 Jan. and 9 Oct. 1914. "’Artibise, Winnipeg, 113-65. “4Taraska, ‘ C algary C raft Union M ovem ent,’ 38-40. 85B.C. Federationist, ‘ W age W orkers’ Forum,’ 12 Sept. 1913. “ See Phillips, No Power, 6 1-77; Bercuson, Confrontation, 32-77. "’This phenomenon has been explored in Herbert G. Gutman, W ork, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919,’ American Historical Review, Jun e 1973, 531- 87-

The Industrial Workers o f the World in Western Canada: 1905-1914* A. ROSS M C C O R M A C K

The development o f the Industrial Workers o f the World (IWW) in western Canada demonstrated the facility with which men and ideas moved back and forth across the forty-ninth parallel in the years before 1914. The same revolutionary industrial unionism which inspired thou­ sands o f wretched unskilled workers in the United States was carried to the western provinces by such W obbly1 luminaries as Bill Haywood, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Frank Little and Joe Hill. But more important propaganda was conducted by faceless Wobblies who agitated while they worked beside hard-rock miners, loggers, construction workers and harvesters and then moved on to take up the fight elsewhere. The IW W was able to inspire the western Canadian workers whom it organized in the same manner it did American workers because the men’s experience on either side o f the border was essentially similar. If there was nothing peculiarly Canadian about W obbly doctrine or appeal, the IW W became, nonetheless, part o f a western radical tradi­ tion. During the first two decades o f the century, workers in the Canadian West demonstrated a significant and persistent commitment to militant industrial unionism, a commitment which resulted in three campaigns against craft union hegemony in the labour movement. By 1905 the experience o f workers in British Columbia had already pro­ duced a manifestation o f militant industrial unionism. Indeed the IWW grew directly out o f the first western rebellion against “ pure and simpledom.” And Wobblies played a role in the second campaign, weak and abortive though it was. Part o f the continuum which culminated in the One Big Union, the IW W conformed to what might be regarded as the S O U R C E : Canadian Historical Association. Historical Papers, 1975,167-90. Reprinted by permission o f the author and the editor. Historical Papers.

A. Ross McCormack

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pattern o f militant industrial unionism in western Canada. Its doctrine was Marxist; its syndicalism was pragmatic; and it flourished during industrial crisis. The purpose o f this essay is to place the IW W in the continuum o f militant industrial unionism and assess its significance in the development o f that radical tradition.

1 In 1902 the American Labour Union (ALU), a radical federation committed to the industrial organization o f semi-skilled or unskilled workers, inaugurated a campaign in the Kootenays under the auspices o f its parent the Western Federation o f Miners (WFM). The ALU made its greatest gains in the mountain strongholds o f the WFM, but as the industrial crisis o f 1903 intensified, the federation moved down into the coast cities. In Vancouver and Victoria, it fired the imagination and inspired the confidence o f workers as only an organization o f the dis­ possessed can, and it became the motive force behind a spectacular, if ephemeral, rebellion against craft union domination o f the labour move­ ment.2 Like the W FM and the A LU throughout the Rocky Mountain states, BC locals were in a severely weakened condition when, in the summer of 1904, the leaders o f the miners’ union began a drive to found a new organization better able to fight aggressive western capitalism. In January, 1905 a meeting was held in Chicago which issued a call to re­ organize the American labour movement on the basis o f industrial unionism.3John Riordan, a miner from Phoenix, British Columbia who was international secretary o f the ALU, was called to Chicago to help direct the propaganda campaign for the new cause; in fact he even loaned his personal savings to finance the movement.4 In the Kootenays the W FM ’s district vice-president, James Baker, assiduously promoted industrial unionism because “ it will become the most beneficial factor to the toiling masses the world has ever known.” B C members o f the W FM and the A LU appear to have responded enthusiastically to the campaign because, like their American leaders, they believed that a stronger and more effective organization was necessary. Certainly Canadian dele­ gates to the Federation’ s 1905 convention voted overwhelmingly in favour o f the union taking part in the upcoming Chicago convention.5 The Continental Congress o f the Working Class, which convened in Chicago at the end o f June, brought together representatives from a number o f radical organizations and sects. They founded the Industrial Workers o f the World the basic purpose o f which was, in Haywood’s

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words, “ the emancipation o f the working class from the slave bondage o f capitalism.” This objective was to be achieved through the organi­ zation o f the wretched o f the world into great industrial unions which would fight on the economic field to destroy the existing order.6 Apart from reminding the convention o f the need to emphasize the inter­ national character o f the new organization, the B C delegates, Baker and Riordan, played no important role in the proceedings. But Riordan was elected to the Executive Committee and was named Assistant SecretaryTreasurer o f the IW W .7 Before 1909 the Kootenays were to be the IW W ’ s power centre, and the W FM , as it had earlier been for the ALU, would be the dynamic in the union’ s growth. Within six months o f the Chicago convention a miner from Phoenix reported that “ the principles enunciated by the IW W have found a firm, abiding place in our midst.” 8The most promi­ nent member o f the Federation associated with the IW W in the province was Fred Heslewood, a former president o f the Greenwood miners’ union. Described as “ a typical Western miner,” his experience seems to provide an explanation in microcosm for the revolutionary industrial unionism o f the Kootenays. After being blacklisted in the United States, he migrated to British Columbia, carrying with him a radicalism learned from Eugene Debs. Heslewood’ s analysis o f society was only re­ enforced by the nature o f industrial relations in the B C mining industry. By 1906, because o f his activities in the W FM , he was blacklisted throughout the region, and warrants for his arrest had been issued in “ half a dozen” camps.9 Heslewood and other leaders o f the Federation organized unskilled workers, such as civic employees, teamsters and building labourers. In some camps the W FM men were only reviving moribund ALU locals. B y the autumn o f 1907, the IW W had five functioning locals in the Kootenays, and even after the W FM left the organization, the Wobblies enjoyed support in the region.10 On the coast the IW W made only modest gains before 1909. In Victoria and Vancouver the IW W built on the foundations laid by the ALU, organizing workers who had formerly belonged to that union.11 But in the latter city members o f the tiny Socialist Labour Party (SLP), who followed Daniel DeLeon into the IWW, were initially more important to the local.12 Characteristically the DeLeonites subordinated organization to propaganda, and it was not until 1907 when Joe Etter and John H. Walsh began agitating among longshoremen, lumber handlers, teamsters and general labourers that the IW W demonstrated any vitality in Vancouver.13 During the first period o f IW W development in British Columbia,

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the organization’s ideology might best be described as incipient syndi­ calism. Industrial unionism was the means whereby the proletariat would be emancipated. All members o f the IWW, whether they were veterans o f the W FM, the ALU or the SLP, could agree that the new unionism could be created only by destroying Gomperism and all its forms. For example, a B C miner condemned time contracts as “ a snare and a delusion. . . [by which] the workman’s only weapon is taken away from him and he is left on the dung hill o f impotence.” 14 IW W propa­ gandists urged workers to subordinate political action to “ revolutionary unionism.” Heslewood believed that “ the ballot is the reflex o f the union,” and therefore members o f the IW W were obliged to “ concen­ trate our efforts to building up a great industrial organization.” 15 Neither Heslewood nor any o f his fellow workers totally rejected political action, however. This ambivalence was most obvious in the Vancouver local where the DeLeonites were influential, but in the Kootenays as well members o f the IW W maintained the old ties with the socialists. For example, they gave active support to candidates o f the Socialist Party o f Canada (SPC) in the provincial election o f 1907. Such attitudes and activities were a function o f the miners’ experience. They had elected members to the provincial legislature and those members, working with other miners’ representatives, had achieved legislation beneficial to the workers. One miner argued that, i f the IW W were to abandon political action completely, it would degenerate into “ a Hobo’ s Protective Association.” 16 In the sectarian conflicts that racked the IW W between 1906 and 1908 BC locals were aligned with the incipient syndicalists. At the 1906 convention Heslewood and Riordan helped drive the “ Reactionaries,” who were committed to political action, out o f the organization because BC members o f the IW W perceived themselves as “ revolutionists.” 17 But the B C miners now found themselves on the wrong side o f a power struggle within the W FM. At the union’s 1907 convention Heslewood took a leading role in the floor fight to save the W FM for the IWW, and he had the support o f the great majority o f B C delegates. The vote went against them, however, and the Federation withdrew from the IWW. This decision crippled the revolutionary industrial unionism o f the Kootenays. Heslewood admitted that the defection o f the W FM “ has thrown considerable cold water on the cause o f the I.W .W among the miners out west.” 18 Less consequential was the departure o f the SLP. Apparently as part o f a general pattern, feuding over tactics broke out in Vancouver between DeLeonites and industrial unionists in 1907. When a controversy invol­

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ving DeLeon developed in the United States, Heslewood, now a member o f the General Executive Board, insisted that it be excluded from the pages o f the Industrial Union Bulletin because “ the I.W.W. has no political affiliation.” Then at the 1908 convention he led the attack against the SLP. The Vancouver DeLeonites had followed their leader into the IW W in 1905, and they followed him out in 1908.19 11

In the years between 1908 and the outbreak o f the World War, the IW W in western Canada organized the same constituency as that o f western American Wobblies, unskilled, itinerant workers— loggers, harvesters, longshoremen, construction workers. They called them­ selves blanket-stiffs because they packed their blanket beds as they travelled about in search o f work. The unskilled labour market of western Canada was both regional and continental in scope. Within what one B C W obbly called the “ migratory work-shop,” a stiff might spike ties above Lake Superior in the summer, harvest the Saskatchewan wheat crop in the autumn and saw trees in British Columbia during the winter.20 Wobblies perceived these unorganized, exploited and wretched men as “ the leaven o f the revolutionary industrial union movement in the West.” 21 The IW W ’s commitment to the itinerants was based on a perceptive analysis o f their lives. The very nature of the stiffs’ existence ensured that they would have little commitment to the present order. The native born were alienated from society; the immi­ grants had never been part o f it. W obbly propaganda flattered these workers. The stiffs were told that they were the basis o f the economy and the hope o f mankind. Wobblies agitated among the unskilled across the West. They orga­ nized cooks and waiters in the Kootenays, laundrymen in Prince Rupert, “ newsies” in Saskatoon, workers on the CPR irrigation projects south of Calgary, teamsters in Victoria and street excavators in half a dozen cities.22 The IW W ’s campaign to organize the B C lumber industry began in 1907 when loggers informed Wobbly leaders that the prov­ ince’ s bush camps and saw mills would be fertile ground for revolu­ tionary industrial unionism. Many loggers were IW W sympathizers or carried the red card o f membership, and for a time Vancouver’ s Lumberworkers’ Local had the largest membership in Canada.23 Wobblies made their most impressive gains among the workers who built the Canadian Northern (CN) and the Grand Trunk Pacific (GTP), and the peak of IW W strength coincided with the railway construction boom.24

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Conditions on railway construction in British Columbia, which reflected camp hfe in general, explain why stiffs responded to the IWW’s revolutionary gospel. Life on the grade was primitive and brutal. Men frequently worked twelve long and gruelling hours in a seven day week.25 Because o f the need to do extensive blasting, rock work in the mountains was unusually dangerous and accidents and fatalities occurred with appalling frequency.26 Yet stiffs complained that they were work­ ing only for “ overalls and tobacco,” and observers agreed that they received low real incomes. In large part this condition resulted from the fact that itinerants invariably started a job indebted to the company for the costs o f transportation to the site. This indebtedness increased as a result o f board charges, various fees and extortionate prices in the company stores.27 Bunkhouses were often poorly ventilated, dirty and verminous. One stiff complained, “ most o f the bunkhouses aren’t fit, as far as I can see, for animals to live in.” Frequently sanitation was primi­ tive and unsafe. Under such conditions water supplies became contam­ inated, and typhoid fever was endemic in the camps.28 Danger, low pay and wretched living conditions reinforced the stiffs’ migratory habits and reluctance to accept regular job discipline. The result was “jumping,” a practice which disrupted construction opera­ tions. Because the power o f the contractors was virtually exclusive on the grade, they could resort to the most primitive means to discipline their workers. Foremen who drove their men with fists were not uncommon, and in some cases workers were even watched by armed guards. A journalist charged that the GTP was being built through British Columbia under “ a system that is close to peonage.” 29 An important characteristic o f the unskilled labour force was its ethnic heterogeneity. This condition was ensured by the federal government’s determination to secure large numbers o f European immigrants to meet the manpower needs o f railways and other large employers o f unskilled labour.30 Unlike craft unions, the IW W did not ignore low-status immigrant workers but rather attempted to overcome the heterogeneity that made them attractive to employers and to organize them into effective unions. A Prince Rupert Wobbly exorted, “ when the factory whistle blows it does not call us to work as Irishmen, Germans, Ameri­ cans, Russians, Greeks, Poles, Negroes or Mexicans. It calls us to work as wage-workers, regardless o f the country in which we were bom or color of our skins. W hy not get together, then . . . as wage-workers, j ust as we are compelled to do in the shop.” The IW W even advocated the orga­ nization o f Asiatics in British Columbia. This attitude reflected prag­ matism as much as it did the Wobblies’ commitment to the proletarian

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& THE

labo u r m o v em en t

solidarity o f the working class. Because “ wops” and “ bohunks” consti­ tuted such an overwhelmingly important component o f unskilled occupations, Wobblies considered it impossible to organize this sector of the western economy i f the immigrants were excluded from the union.31 Consequently the IW W circulated propaganda in at least ten different languages in western Canada, and when agitators with language skills were not available, speakers frequently had their remarks translated for immigrant audiences. There was an Italian local in Vancouver, a Swedish local in Edmonton and a Ukrainian and Polish local in Winnipeg.32 The first IW W local to conduct a strike, unsuccessfully, in western Canada was a remarkable organization; a Vancouver union o f longshoremen and lumber-handlers, it was composed o f eighteen different nationalities.33 Although employers perceived the immigrants as docile (an attitude which was a function o f Anglo-Saxon xenophobia), these workers demonstrated a marked capacity for spontaneous rebellion.34 Immi­ grants from societies which had traditions o f peasant violence, Italians for example, were probably attracted to the IW W partly by its doctrine o f direct action and the heroic and romantic image cultivated by Wobbhes. The tactics and structure o f the IW W were intended to overcome the difficulties inherent in the organization o f the itinerants. As Wobbhes worked their way back and forth across the West, they preached their revolutionary doctrine, and stiffs were exposed to IW W propaganda on the job. This tactic was formahzed in the camp-delegate system by which any W obbly could act as a full time organizer while he wandered.35 The IW W charged low initiation fees and dues and allowed universal transfer o f membership cards. These practices were designed to make it easy to join the union; “ all we ask o f one in becoming a member o f the IW W is to swear allegiance to the working class,” declared a member of the Vancouver local.36 The IWW, however, provided services o f real importance to its membership. W obbly halls functioned as mail drops, and dormitories for the itinerants. Most locals providedjob information, and Prince Rupert’s hall even functioned as an employment agency for unskilled labour. The Vancouver local appears to have furnished some medical services for stiffs passing through the city.37 Camaraderie was an important dimension o f the IW W ’s appeal, and Wobbly halls were one o f the few social centres, apart from bars and brothels, that were part of the itinerants’ experience. At the Vancouver hall workers could swap tales about life on the road, read Marxist classics or copies o f “ nearly every Socialist and revolutionary paper o f the world” in the library or listen to the regular lectures on revolutionary industrial unionism.38

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If the IW W was fighting ultimately for revolution, it never lost sight of the need to secure immediate improvements in the working condi­ tions o f its members. The organization’s official demands for itinerants in British Columbia focussed on many o f the hardships endured by these workers: exploitation by employment agents, long hours, low pay, unsanitary camps, inadequate medical services and so on. B y pressing these demands, the IW W made an appeal itinerants could easily appre­ ciate: “ the I.W .W . will take the blankets o ff your back, Mr. Blanketstiff. It will make the boss furnish the blankets. And, further, not only the blankets, but springs and mattresses; yes and as we grow stronger sheets and pillows. Just imagine yourself in camp snoozing away, tucked up between nice clean sheets, with your head resting on a feather pillow and a good mattress and springs under you.” 39 Wobbhes believed that workers would join a union which promised them immediate benefits; once members, the itinerants could be indoctrinated with revolutionary propaganda. In addition it was valuable to fight for immediate improve­ ments because each strike prepared the workers for the general strike; Bob Gosden, a prominent Prince Rupert Wobbly, called strikes “ mini­ ature revolutions.” 40 The propaganda that Wobbhes directed at unskilled workers was the peculiar American syndicalism o f the IW W , based upon a conviction in the primacy o f economic action in the class struggle and a belief in the industrial organization o f the new order.41 While this doctrine was not classical syndicalism, it did nonetheless display certain similarities with the French system.42 Wobbhes told workers that they must fight their oppressors on the job which was the basis o f capitalism and which was dependent upon their labour power. Jo e Biscay an itinerant intellectual who played a leading role in the IW W ’s drive to organize B C construc­ tion workers, declared, “ everything is founded upon the job; everything .. . comes from conditions on the job which is the environment and life of the toiling slaves. The job is the source o f civilization.” 43 To control their jobs, the workers had to be organized by industry. To Wobblies, who sought above all to achieve the solidarity o f the proletariat, craft unionism was ridiculous and perfidious. The “ American Separation o f Labour” divided the union movement into scores o f exclusive and rival organizations, instead o f uniting the workers against their common enemy. IW W agitators persistently argued that craft unionism was ‘behind the times.” Workers were obliged to model their unions on the organization o f modem industry. The industrial union, a wobbly from the Kootenays asserted, “ is the logical evolution o f working class organi­ zation and tactics in the same way that the trust is the logical evolution o f

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INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & THE LABOUR M O V E M E N T

capitalist class organization and methods.” Only unions which organized all the workers in an industry could defeat concentrated capital. We must all come into the O N E BIG U N IO N ,” a B C logger told his fellow workers, “ and whenever a fight comes on, all the battalions have got to fight. . . . I f we all go into the battle the parasites won’ t last long.” 44 The final battle would come in the general strike that would destroy capitalism. Wobblies never provided a precise definition o f the general strike, but those who agitated in western Canada appear to have antic­ ipated some general refusal to work which would “ paralyze” capitalism. A W obbly on the Canadian Northern grade told a Toronto journalist how the proletariat’ s final fight would end: “ the working men . . . might begin expropriation by taking possession o f the warehouses and means o f production, without the sanction o f the dictators . . . The farm workers might imitate the worker o f the city and seize the posses­ sions o f the great land owners.” 45 There would then evolve what a cook in a camp near Penticton called “ industrial socialism.” 46 Once again the structure o f utopia was ill-defined, but generally Wobblies envisioned a society organized on the basis o f industrial unions and directed by the workers. This syndicalist commitment to the union and the general strike necessarily resulted in a denigration o f working class political action. W obbly agitators persistently sneered at the proposition that by stuffing pieces o f paper into a box workers could inaugurate the new order. “ On the coast the sentiment [in the IWW] is strongly anti-political,” declared Biscay; “ to me the ‘ballot’ . . . is N O T a debatable question. N o more so than industrial unionism. If the latter is right, the former is entirely unnecessary.” Under Biscay’ s leadership the Vancouver local burned copies o f Haywood’ s pamphlet The General Strike because they consid­ ered it to be insufficiently critical o f political action.47 Such an excess, for which the local was condemned by the General Executive Board, does not, however, indicate any significant departure from the western American norm. Like their fellow workers south o f the forty-ninth parallel whose attitudes have been described by Dubofsky and Conlin, the Wobbhes in western Canada were essentially non­ political rather than anti-political; their syndicalism was empirical. The IW W disdained political action because the great majority o f its consti­ tuency was, what Wobblies called, constitutionally “ dead.” Either because they had not been naturalized or because they could not meet residence requirements, most itinerant workers were without the fran­ chise. After addressing three thousand strikers on the Canadian Northern, a member o f the SPC inquired how many o f the men would

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vote against capitalism; only a handful could vote.48 In addition the workers to whom the IW W directed its propaganda were deeply suspi­ cious o f government. Immigrant workers who had feared the state in Europe had their anxieties confirmed when Canadian police broke up strikes or drove them from the streets. In addition, long and bitter experience caused itinerants to reject the efficacy o f legislation passed by governments allied with capital. B C loggers and construction workers considered sanitary regulations for camps worthless because o f inade­ quate enforcement.49 To unskilled itinerant workers, excluded from the political process and suspicious o f government, the IW W ’s doctrine o f direct action made good sense.

hi

Notoriety in Canada followed hard upon the IW W ’ s stormy life in the United States. Wobblies conducted great strikes on the Canadian Northern and GTP, led the unskilled in numerous other fights, cam­ paigned for free speech and organized the unemployed. But the IW W ’s reputation in the US preceded it, and when Wobblies disrupted great national enterprises on the frontier and offended middle class sensi­ bilities by preaching revolution in the streets, they became the subject o f repression by all levels o f government. Wobblies discovered that one o f the most effective means o f orga­ nizing itinerant workers was through street meetings. While the IW W did attempt to agitate on the job, organizers always had to contend with the hostility o f employers and the mobility o f workers. But on urban skid-rows to which the itinerants periodically returned for rest and recreation, Wobblies could preach the gospel o f revolutionary industrial unionism and induct workers into the faith. Henry Frenette, who organized loggers on Vancouver Island, reported, “ nearly all the men I have spoken to have heard o f the IW W from the speakers on the streets.” 50 In addition to preserving a basic civil liberty— a liberty upon which Wobblies in Canada placed a peculiarly American construction51 —maintenance o f the right to agitate in the streets was essential for the union’s growth. Wobblies were obliged to resist any attempts by civic authorities to restrict or prohibit their open-air meetings. As a result the IWW fought to preserve its right to speak on the streets in Victoria, Nelson, Edmonton and Calgary. The most spectacular free speech fight began in Vancouver early in 1912. Winter unemployment was a normal part o f the unskilled workers’ experience. Because Vancouver’s moderate weather attracted itinerants

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from across the West, the city ordinarily had a labour surplus in the three or four months after November. But late in 1911 a slowdown in the city’s construction industry ensured that the usual surplus would become an unemployment crisis. The conventional relief mechanism o f mobility was denied the jobless because all major cities on the Pacific coast were “ teeming” with unemployed workers.52 In December Wobblies began organizing the unemployed, holding marches and street meetings to dramatize and protest against the workers’ plight.53 Alarmed by the union’s recent fights in the states to the south, the city’s administration determined that the IW W would not humiliate and intimidate Van­ couver. In January the mayor banned street meetings and prepared for trouble.54 It came on January 28 when an unemployed demonstration refused to obey a police order to disperse. With the grounds surrounded by troops in mufti, almost one hundred police, mounted and afoot, charged the crowd, injuring a number o f people. As demonstrators fled, they were pursued by police and beaten. Twenty-five demonstrators were arrested.55 Other radical organizations took up the fight for free speech in the city, but none like the IWW. A W obbly declared, “ i f they want to down free speech in Vancouver, they will have to bury us with it.” Vincent St. John condemned the civic administration and called upon Wobblies all over the continent to go to Vancouver and fight for free speech.56 In the same way that they went to Spokane, Missoula, San Diego, Aberdeen and other cities, Wobblies now marched on Vancouver. Alarmed at the prospects o f this “ horde o f ruffians” causing disturbances, immigration officials closed the border to members o f the IW W and at least one hundred and fifty Wobblies were turned back from B C ports o f entry. Others, using mountain trails, avoided border guards and made their way to Vancouver.57 There, in the face o f police harassment, the IWW fought for free speech with courage and audacity. On one occasion agitators, always introduced as “John Brown,” addressed crowds from boats moored o ff Stanley Park beaches; on another occasion they used a megaphone ten feet long and eight feet in diameter to harangue the unemployed.58 A number o f Wobblies were arrested and jailed on vagrancy charges; deportation proceedings were immediately instituted against them. The mayor, who refused to negotiate with the IWW, announced his “ cast iron determination” to rid the city o f “ alien undesirables” who were “ preaching sedition” and attempting to “ ruin’ Vancouver.59 Despite this attitude, labour’s campaign forced the admin­ istration to rescind the law, and by early spring the Wobblies were able to hold their street meetings without harassment.60

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A few weeks after the Vancouver free speech campaign ended, the IWW led the construction workers on the Canadian Northern out on strike. From the time work began along the Fraser River, camp dele­ gates, led by Jo e Biscay, had tramped along the grade organizing the stiffs. To the railway and contractors building its lines the Wobblies were “ the biggest curse to railroad construction in this western country.” From the beginning o f the organization drive, the contractors disrupted IWW meetings, encouraged provincial police officers to harass organ­ izers, and placed Pinkerton agents in the union.61 The contractors’ opposition reached a violent chmax when Biscay was beaten by pohce in a Savona bunk house and jailed for carrying a concealed weapon. Despite efforts by the companies to have him sentenced to a long prison term, Biscay was exonerated at the assizes.62 Instead o f driving the IW W from the grade, the contractors’ campaign o f intimidation only en­ couraged more Wobblies to migrate to the Canadian Northern camps during the winter. The strike that began late in March effectively stopped work on the Canadian Northern grade from Kamloops to Hope, a distance o f 300 miles. The men struck primarily to protest conditions in the camps; “ they treated us like swine,” charged a Swede. The strikers, approxi­ mately 7000 strong, were “ nearly all foreigners,” representing sixteen nationalities. Floyde Hyde, one o f the strike leaders, claimed the men realized that “ there are only two nationalities, and . . . these nations are divided by class and not by geographical lines.” 63 To keep the men in the strike zone and thus maintain solidarity, the IW W established camps at several towns along the line. One o f the more important strike camps was located at Yale. Here the IW W committee, led by Charles Nelson, a young Swede, provided food and crude accommodation for more than five hundred stiffs. When the men were not on picket duty, they spent their time listening to lectures, debating industrial unionism, and singing revolutionary songs. The songs, such as “ Where the Fraser River Flows,” were composed by W obbly bard Joe Hill who arrived in Yale shortly after the strike began. The organization o f the Yale camp prompted a reporter to describe it as “ a miniature republic run on Socialist lines.” 64 Wobblies were clearly delighted by the initial solidarity o f the Canadian Northern construction workers. Tom Whitehead, an IW W veteran who was secretary o f the Lytton committee, declared that the strike represented “ the first time in the history o f the world” that such a large number o f unskilled workers laid down their tools together. Leading members o f the IWW, such as Vincent St. John, recognized that

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the example o f the Canadian Northern strike would be important in the campaign to organize the itinerants o f the continental West. The union was determined to win. Tom Halcro, a member o f the IW W ’s General Executive Board, who was dispatched to the strike zone announced that capitalists would be taught that “ when they engage in a conflict with the I. W. W. it is not child’ s play nor healthy for well-filled pocket books and big dividends.” 65 To win the IW W recognized it must ensure that the strike was non­ violent. Despite alarmist and xenophobic newspaper accounts, there can be no doubt that the strike, as far as the men were concerned, was non­ violent. B C Provincial Police reports demonstrate this condition. Strike leaders had received explicit instructions from the IW W ’s Chicago headquarters to take no provocative action; they assured the senior provincial constable in the strike zone that “ all the I.W .W . have been instructed . . . not to give the police any trouble.” 66 The strike com­ mittees maintained strict discipline; for example, they requested that all saloons on the grade be closed and named their own police to control the men.67 It was difficult, however, for the IW W to prevent provocative acts. The federal government relaxed its immigration regulations to allow contractors to procure strike-breakers, and the provincial govern­ ment encouraged the companies to employ large numbers o f private detectives to guard them.68 Most o f the strike-breakers were Italian, and a circular in a crude southern dialect warned “ we are coming with a large force to . . . drive any scab o ff the work.” Strikers adopted the tactic of using massed pickets to intimidate the strike-breakers.69 From the beginning o f the strike the Canadian Northern and its contractors sought the aid o f the B C government in their fight against the IWW. At a meeting early in April contractors told Sir Richard McBride, the Premier, and William Bowser, the Attorney General, that Wobblies had duped the simple immigrant workers into striking as part o f the IW W ’s “ stupendous scheme for tying up the leading industries of the Pacific Coast.” 70 In addition to the companies’ campaign, the government came under popular pressure to break the strike. The citizens o f Yale demanded the IW W camp be removed from the town because they feared for their property and because the strikers were “ foreigners who do not practise the laws o f sanitation or even common decency.” 71 In Vancouver The Sun carried out a violent editorial cam­ paign against the IWW. On April 8 the paper declared “ the whole movement represents an invasion o f the most despicable scum of humanity . . . The government must show its strength and drive these people out o f the country even i f the use o f force is required to do so.” In

/

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the circumstances it was not difficult for the B C government to go to the aid o f its political railway. On April 16 the Attorney General informed the Superintendent o f Police who was in the strike zone that “ the time has now arrived to prosecute and imprison [the IWW] on every possible occassion [sic].” 72 Bowser told the officer to use the Public Health Act in the campaign. Health inspectors now began attempting to close IW W strike camps which, in fact, conformed better to sanitary regulations than did the contractors’ establishments.73 Then in the third week o f April police raids began; these followed a general pattern all along the grade. The strikers were ordered to return to work; when they refused, the police tore down the camps, closed the IW W halls and forcibly ejected the men as vagrants. Police detachments then drove the strikers along the line to ensure that they left the strike zone.74 A number o f men were arrested, and local magistrates joined in the campaign against the IWW. A New Westminster judge warned Wobblies against preaching their doctrines because Canadians “ are a free and law-abiding people, and above all will not tolerate the red flag o f anarchy.” Strikers were sentenced to terms ranging from three to twelve months on such charges as vagrancy, unlawful assembly, intimidation and conspiracy. Tom Whitehead was given six months for keeping a boarding house which did not meet the requirements o f the Public Health Act. B y June there were 250 Wobblies in B C jails.75 Immediately large numbers o f arrests began, the provincial government sought the deportation o f Wobblies because Bowser was “ anxious” to rid British Columbia o f “ these undesirables.” 76The police campaign broke the strike and destroyed the IW W organization on the Canadian Northern grade. The Canadian Northern strike was followed by another defeat on the GTP grade, and in the following months employers and government intensified the campaign against the IWW. Under this attack Wobblies began to promote and employ a tactic o f the defensive and the defeated — sabotage. What they advocated was that form o f resistance which their fellow workers south o f the border urged, essentially harassment on the job which forced employers to make concessions.77 B C Wobblies had explicitly advocated sabotage for some time.78 The tactic likely had great appeal for eastern and southern European immigrants, premodem workers, who had traditions o f machine-breaking and direct action against oppressive employers.79 Indeed during the Canadian Northern strike Wobblies warned that they were prepared to resort to sabotage, and in one case Russians and Ukrainians who were forced back to work destroyed their tools.80 It was not until after the defeats o f 1912, however,

k

that sabotage became a significant dimension o f IW W propaganda. In an article pubbshed by the Industrial Workers in 1913, Bob Gosden argued that, given the capitahsts’ offensive, Wobbhes could no longer employ conventional tactics: “ the only way is for every member o f the I.W.W. to sabotage at every conceivable opportunity.” 81 As the construction season on the GTP and the Canadian Northern opened, Wobbhes told the workers that the “ walk-out strike . . . [was] old fashioned;” they must strike on the job. IW W agitators believed the men “ understand” the concept o f sabotage and enthusiastically reported incidents in which workers wearing “ wooden shoes” disrupted construction operations. Jim Rowan, an organizer on the GTP, announced that sabotage had passed the acid test; scowmen on the Fraser, who had wrecked their boats, won increased wages.82 The Wobbhes’ last major fight for the itinerant workers o f western Canada occurred in the unemployment crisis o f 1913 and 1914. The pre­ war depression and the completion o f railway construction threw thousands o f the unskilled out o f work.83 The resentment o f men who trudged the streets in search o f a job or stood self-consciously in bread lines burned hot, and they naturally responded to a familiar revolu­ tionary gospel. In every major western city the IW W organized the unemployed. The IW W played its most important role among the jobless in Edmonton. A large proportion o f the unemployed in the city were workers from the railway construction camps where they had heard IW W propaganda. N ow Wobbhes told the stiffs that they were unem­ ployed because “ you have produced too much and have allowed it to fall into the hands o f a bunch o f parasites who do no work.” Led by Jim Rowan the IW W organized an Unemployed League late in December. The League demanded work for wages, “ regardless o f race, color or nationality,” and backed up its demands with marches and street demon­ strations.84 “ To avoid outbreaks o f lawlessness,” the civic administration expanded its relief program, instituted public works and established a camp for the unemployed. But when the Wobbhes attempted to orga­ nize the camp, the city fathers became alarmed and closed the facility.85 The IW W now urged the unemployed to use “ a little direct action.” Members o f the Unemployed League occupied one o f Edmonton’s most fashionable Methodist churches until they were given food and accom­ modation. Others ate large meals in restaurants and then refused to pay the bill.86 Edmonton’s elite was outraged by the IW W campaign as it intensified during the late winter and spring o f 1914. The city’s newspapers

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denounced the “ inflammatory” nature o f the Wobblies’ speeches and emphasized that the unemployed were mainly “ foreigners.” Citizens discussed forming vigilante groups to rid the city o f the IWW. And a divided civic administration came under pressure to call out the militia.87 In February city police and health officers raided the IW W hall and evicted two hundred jobless who had been living there. During the spring a number o f League members were jailed for vagrancy; then at the beginning o f Ju ly Rowan was arrested for murder. Although he was eventually released, he remained in prison six months. Wobbhes charged that he was kept in jail “ for being true to [his] class. ” 88 There appears to be a good deal o f substance to the contention.89

By the very nature o f its tactics and doctrine, the IW W was isolated from workers organized by the American Federation o f Labour (AFL) and the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC). This condition was substan­ tially reinforced by the nature o f the Wobbhes’ constituency, unskilled, unorganized and un-British, the itinerants never constituted a part o f the labour movement. The Winnipeg Trades Council, for example, was simply unaware o f a north-end IW W local composed o f approximately four hundred Ukrainians and Poles.90 In some cases ignorance gave way to animosity. AFL and T L C organizers took the leading role in the fight against what they perceived as the “ dual union” heresy. C .O . Young, the AFL’ s organizer in British Columbia, considered the Wobbhes “ lawless brigands,” and he did whatever he could to restrict their propaganda efforts.91 At times the crafts’ fight against industrial unionism was spontaneous and local. For example, “ A.F. o f L. slaves conducted a strenuous campaign to prevent the IW W from organizing loggers at Port Albem i.92 In the campaign to promote industrial unionism, the IW W com­ pounded the isolation and antagonism by levelling strident and hostile criticism at the AFL and TLC . Wobbhes never tired o f asserting that because craft unions divided the workers, the AFL and the T L C were allies o f the bosses. The “ bushwah” leadership had betrayed the workers. Wobbhes asserted that Samuel Gompers could not lead the working class because he was not o f that class; a member o f the Prince Rupert local charged that the AFL president hved in luxury and had a personal fortune o f five million dollars. When Gompers visited Van­ couver in 1911 Wobbhes disrupted his meeting and denounced him in what Gompers called “ the vilest language I have ever heard.” 93 In some

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INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & THE LABOUR M O V E M E N T

cases Wobblies took their fight against craft unionism directly to the rank and file. For example Paddy Daly believed that it was “ our duty” to prevent the formation o f a local o f the United Brotherhood o f Carpen­ ters in Prince Rupert, and in the northern city relations between the IW W and the craft unions were stormy.94 However, because o f their commitment to the solidarity o f the proletariat, Wobblies found it difficult to make general war on the rank and file o f AFL and TLC affiliates. Consequently, in normal times, the relationship between craft unionists and Wobblies in western cities was one o f peaceful but distant co-existence. The IW W ’s relationship with the sociahsts was more significant. In the United States the Wobblies’ precarious position in the labour move­ ment was, to an important extent, dependent upon its unstable alliance with the left wing o f the Socialist Party o f America. In Canada no such alliance existed. Because the IW W ’s syndicalism rejected political action for industrial action, the SPC made all-out war on the heresy. To a party dominated by the conviction that the revolution could only be achieved through political action, the IW W ’s advocacy o f the general strike seemed to demonstrate an ignorance o f the class struggle.95 Although they admired the courage o f the Wobblies in the crusade to organize the wretched, the sociahsts were convinced that the IW W ’s activities were essentially futile because its doctrines were unsound. After travelling with Haywood and coming to know him during the IW W leader’s western Canadian tour o f 1909, Charlie O ’Brien, a socialist MLA in Alberta, observed, “ he confuses the struggle between the buyers and sellers o f commodities with the class struggle.” Much worse, because the Wobblies were attempting to lead the working class down the wrong road, they were enemies o f the proletariat who “ should be classed with the thugs, detectives, specials and other pimps o f capitalism.” 96 The IW W repaid the SPC in kind. Members o f the IW W derided the party for its insistence that only class conscious political action could free the workers. Bill Craig o f Nelson denounced the sociahsts’ refusal to consider other tactics as “ fatalism” which would ensure the continuation o f wage slavery.97 Even more offensive was the SPC’s persistent denial o f the essential utility o f economic action through unions. One o f the sociahsts’ more extravagant attacks on unions caused a Vancouver Wobbly to exclaim, “ i f poor old Karl Marx could return he would braid his whiskers into a cat-o-nine-tails and scourge these super-scientific spittoon philosophers until every drop o f milk and water ran out o f their veins.” 98 Despite this sort o f rhetoric, and the doctrinal antagonism

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which produced it, there was a recognition by some Wobblies, parti­ cularly those in the Kootenays, that “ internecine warfare is absorbing the best o f our energies.” And there appears to have been some co­ operation between the rank and file o f the SPC and the IW W in several western cities." v Given the IW W ’s isolation it would be easy to conclude that the organization was only tangentially significant in the development o f militant industrial unionism in the Canadian West. In fact this is the conclusion that historians have reached.100 However, in the two years before 1914, the IW W ’s courageous leadership o f the construction workers and the unemployed substantially raised its stock with the labour movement, especially in British Columbia. Sociahsts and craft unionists joined the fight against government repression o f the Wobblies.101 Because o f this altered relationship, the IW W became an influence, though not the most significant one, in the second western campaign against pure and simple craft unionism. The most explicit, though least important, dimension o f the general campaign was agitation for syndicalism on the French model. This agitation was inspired by William Z. Foster who urged Wobbhes to begin “ boring from within” the AFL to convert the federation into a revolutionary organization.102 Syndicalist propaganda o f this sort circu­ lated in Winnipeg’s north-end during these years. The interest that it held for workers in the immigrant ghetto related in part to the IW W presence and to the fact that eastern European itinerants wintered there, but the anarchist tradition among Jew s and Russians undoubtedly was important as w ell.103 Foster’ s agitation within the IW W caused Nelson Wobbhes to desert the organization in 1912 and found the first local o f the Syndicalist League o f North America. The Vancouver IW W local spht on the issue, and dissidents established a local o f the League in that city as well.104 The Syndicalists urged radicals to reject political action, “ get inside the labor movement,” and employ the unions to achieve the revolution.105 More important was the advocacy o f a general strike in support o f miners in their long and violent fight against the Vancouver Island coal barons. In August, 1913 after riots occurred at Nanaimo, Ladysmith and Extension, the provincial government despatched troops to the strike zone, and a tremor o f bitter indignation passed through the B C labour

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INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & THE LABOUR M O V E M E N T

movement. In Victoria, where the IW W enjoyed comparatively good relations with the trades council, a mass meeting passed a resolution calling for a general strike unless the militia were immediately with­ drawn from the Island. The British Columbia Federation o f Labour took up the call; its president Christian Sivertz declared, “ it is well known that [the capitalists] stand in greater dread o f the general strike than any other method that the organized workers have within their means of using.” There was significant support for a general strike, but the allimportant Vancouver trades council, because o f growing unemployment and a strong SPC influence, refused to act.106 The advocacy o f a general strike continued under the auspices o f the Miners Liberation League which directed labour’s campaign to free imprisoned strikers. Wobbly influence was unusually strong in the League. It employed tactics developed by the IW W in the United States, for example parading miners’ children through the streets o f Vancouver. Bob Gosden and other Wobblies believed that “ a good dose o f direction action” prom­ ised to be the best means o f securing the release o f the strikers. And IW W influence contributed substantially to the League’s call for a general strike.107 Again because the Vancouver trades council refused to act, a province-wide walkout did not occur. The only workers to strike were stiffs on the Pacific Great Eastern grade who were organized by the IW W .108 Developing at the same time as the advocacy o f the general strike was a renewed enthusiasm for amalgamation. Led by socialists who were convinced that the organization o f modern industry demanded amal­ gamation, the British Columbia Federation o f Labour declared for industrial unionism in 1910. Then the T L C ’s 1911 convention which, because it was held in Calgary, was dominated by western delegates, passed a Vancouver resolution calling upon workers to organize by industry because craft unions had demonstrated their inability “ to successfully combat the present day aggregations o f capital.” TLC bureaucrats were unable to block the western resolution at Calgary, but the following year, when the convention was safely back in Ontario, an eastern majority returned the Congress to Gomperian orthodoxy.109 While socialist promotion had been basic to the cause before 1912, now W obbly influence became evident. In August, 1912 the Vancouver trades council unanimously passed a resolution endorsing industrial unionism and issued a circular calling upon the labour movement to adopt this form o f organization. The Vancouver council contained several influen­ tial IW W sympathizers, including Jack Kavanagh, the president.

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Wobbly doctrines, such as universal union membership, were clearly on the minds o f delegates as they voted. In response to the Vancouver circular, trades councils in Victoria, Nelson and Calgary, all centres where the IW W was influential, endorsed the principle o f industrial unionism.110 Direct IW W influence appeared prominently in the campaign for revolutionary industrial unionism within the United Mine Workers’ (UMW) District 18. The miners o f the Crow’ s Nest Pass had always lacked confidence in business unionism; they elected socialist leaders and were contemptuous o f the TLC . But because o f a long and essen­ tially unsuccessful strike in 1911 some miners became convinced that the UMW was “ obsolete.” 111 Led by Harry Elmer o f Michel, W obbly miners launched a campaign in which they advocated sabotage, denounced the political orientation o f the union’ s socialist leadership and derided the “ craft” organization o f the UM W . “ To break the chains that hold us,” declared Elmer, “ the workers o f the world must organize into one union.” 112 The campaign reached its climax at the 1912 District convention, and although the U M W ’s socialist leadership beat back the drive, they were forced to make concessions to the syndicalists.113 The IW W was not alone in promoting the growth o f militant indus­ trial unionism. Despite attacks on the IWW, the Socialist Party o f Canada played a role in the phenomenon. From the time o f the SPC’ s inception, the party had tolerated within it a small but sustained anarchosyndicalist tendency, most pronounced in the Kootenays.114 In the years before 1914 members o f the SPC like other radicals, became increasingly interested in the efficacy o f the general strike. Even the doctrinaire Vancouver leadership began to see some revolutionary value in action which mobilized masses o f workers. The party’ s willingness to recon­ sider tactics clearly resulted from the decline o f the SPC after 1910. When its political prospects were diminished by defections and defeats, the party was prepared to look to a new means whereby the proletariat could be emancipated. In addition the issue o f industrial unionism had been under discussion since 1910. B y 1912 dynamic young party members such as Bill Pritchard and Jack Kavanagh in Vancouver, Joe Knight in Edmonton and Bob Russell in Winnipeg were actively promoting indus­ trial unionism. During 1913 SPC propaganda began to advocate the creation o f a grand international union and use o f the general strike.115 But at this time members o f the SPC, even Russell for example, continued to believe that, in a state with a liberal franchise, the ballot was the better means to destroy capitalism.116

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INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & THE LABOUR M O V E M E N T

Perhaps most important in the resurgence o f militant industrial unionism in the West during these years were developments in the United Kingdom. After 1910 syndicalists, prominent among whom was Tom Mann, had an important influence in the British labour move­ ment.117 Many o f the workers who continued to emigrate to Canada from the United Kingdom up to 1914 had been exposed to this new propaganda. As a result, western workers took a great interest in the mass strikes o f dockers, transport workers and miners in Britain, and many radicals came to regard direct action as, potentially, a powerful weapon. When late in 1913 Mann toured the West preaching syndicalism, he was given an enthusiastic hearing. A Winnipeg worker observed that Mann demonstrated “ great intelligence” in his advocacy o f the new tactics and asked “ what better weapon can be found than the strike which comes down to the A .B .C . o f showing class lines in society?” 118 The impact of the movement led by Mann was most pronounced in Winnipeg where the British influence was all-important. Arthur Puttee, labourite editor o f The Voice, paid the new British militancy the supreme comphment when he observed, “ it will produce as good results as has the success of the Labor party.” 119

VI

By the beginning o f the W ar the IW W was on the decline in western Canada, its membership falling and its locals disintegrating. This collapse resulted from employer opposition, government repression and economic depression. Most important the end o f the railway building boom produced the dispersion o f the construction workers. Coinciding with the decline o f the IW W was a decline in the campaign for militant industrial unionism. Even at its height this ferment, produced by the pre­ war industrial crisis, did not represent any wide-spread or important subscription to the pragmatic syndicalism o f the Wobblies, much less to the classic European system. To most workers, the general strike was never more than an enlargement o f the strike they knew. Mass action was a means to enforce conventional union demands against unusually strong, or ruthless, opposition, not a means to restructure society. The general strike was an economic weapon, a hefty one certainly, but it was not revolutionary. In addition because the labour movement was weakened by depression and defeats, industrial unionists were unable to challenge directly craft hegemony in the West. Nonetheless the propa­ ganda persisted, and the seeds sewn by Wobblies, socialists and British syndicalists before the war would bear fruit at the end o f the war.

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NOTES *1 am indebted to the Canadian Department o f Labour for financing the research upon which this essay is based and to D avid Bcrcuson for his comments and criticism. ‘It is interesting to note that the most widely accepted explanation o f the term W obbly ascribes it to a Chinese restaurateur in C algary who mispronounced IW W as Eye W obbly W obbly. See Stewart H. H olbrook, “ W obbly T alk ,” American Mercury (Jan. 1926), p. 62. ZA. Ross M cCorm ack, “ The O rigin and Extent o f W estern Labour Radicalism: 18961919,” (unpublished Ph.D . thesis, University o f W estern Ontario, 1973), Chap. III. 3Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be A ll: A History of the Industrial Workers o f the World (Chicago, 1969), pp. 76-80. 4Miners' Magazine, April 27, 1905 and Dec. 6, 1906; Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention o f the Industrial Workers of the World, 1906, p. 132 and Official Proceedings o f the Fifteenth Annual Convention o f the Western Federation o f Miners, 1907, p. 645. sOffcial Proceedings o f the Thirteenth Annual Convention o f the Western Federation o f Miners, 1905, pp. 233-4 and 245; Miners' Magazine, March 9,1905; and Voice o f Labor, M ay, 1905. 6Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 81-7. ''Proceedings o f the First Convention o f the Industrial Workers of the World, 1905, pp. 287, 510 and 546. 8Miners’ Magazine, Feb. 15, 1906. 9Industrial Union Bulletin, Aug. 3, 1907 and Official Proceedings o f the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the Western Federation o f Miners, 1907, pp. 610-2. 10Miners’ Magazine, Feb. 15, 1906 and Industrial Union Bulletin, March 16 ,19 07; Aug. 24, 1907 and Sept. 14, 1907. "Industrial Union Bulletin, N ov. 16, 1907. 'W eekly People, Oct. 7, 1905 and Oct. 14, 1905. For the development o f the SLP in Vancouver see A. Ross M cCorm ack, “ The Emergence o f the Socialist M ovement in British Colum bia,” B C Studies, N o. 21 (Spring, 1974), pp. 7-9. 13Industrial Union Bulletin, Dec. 7, 1907. 14Weekly People, Aug. 4, 1906. 15Industrial Union Bulletin, Sept. 14, 1907 and N o v. 9, 1907. 14Official Proceedings o f the Fifteenth Annual Convention o f the Western Federation o f Miners, 1907, pp. 612 and 690; Miners’ Magazine, Aug. 9, 1906 and Aug. 23, 1906 and Industrial Union Bulletin, Ju ly 20, 1907. 17Proceedings o f the Second Annual Convention o f the Industrial Workers of the World, 1906, pp. 132-8 and 256-7. Dubofsky and Joseph R. Conlin have demonstrated that such a simplistic view does not reflect the realities o f the controversy. We Shall Be All, pp. 110-5; and Bread and Roses Too: Studies o f the Wobblies, (Westport, 1969), p. 53. 18Official Proceedings o f the Fifteenth Annual Convention o f the Western Federation o f Miners, 1907, pp. 492-5; 610-38; 641-7; 656-61; 690 -1; and 70 0 -1; and Proceedings o f Third Annual Convention: Industrial Workers o f the World: Official Report No. 8, (1907). P- 519Industrial Union Bulletin, April 20,1907; Ju n e 1,19 07; M ay 23,1908 and Oct. 10,1908 and Weekly People, March 21, 1908 and N ov. 7, 1908. a,Wayne State University, Labour History Archives, E.W . Latchem Collection, “ Some Vitally Important Background Information,” n.d., pp. 1-2. For a discussion o f the life and work o f the itinerants see A. Ross M cCorm ack, “ The Blanketstifis: Itinerant Railway Construction W orkers in Canada, 1896-1914,” N FB/N ational Museum Visual H istory Set, 1975.

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INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT & THE LABOUR M O V E M E N T

2'Industrial Union Bulletin, Feb. 27, 1909. 22Industrial Worker, Ju n e 11, 1910; Sept. 14, 1911; N ov. 23, 1911 and Ju ly 4, 1912; Solidarity, Sept. 19, 1914; and l.W .W . Strike Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1912. 23W ayne State, IW W Records, G E B Minute Book, Sept. 25,1907; Industrial Worker, May 7 ,19 10 and M ay 14,1910; and M yrtle Bergren, Tough Timber: The Loggers o f B .C .— Their Story (Toronto, 1967), pp. 21-7. MLabour Organization in Canada, 1911, p. 42 and 1914, p. 53. 25Solidarity, March 22, 1913; and Public Archives o f Canada (PAC), Frontier College Papers, MG28 I 124, Vol. 17, Graham to Fitzpatrick, Sept. 17, 1913. “ Canada, Department o f Labour, Annual Report, 1912, p. 36. 27Edmund Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man (2nd ed.; Toronto, 1972), pp. 63-75; Frontier C ollege Papers, Vol. 14, Perry to Fitzpatrick, 1912 and The Evening Empire, Aug. 24, 1912. 28B C Provincial Library, Royal Commission on Labour, 1914, Type-script Proceedings, Vol. V II, p. 53; and B C , Provincial Board o f Health, Fourteenth Annual Report (1912), pp. 12 -13; Sixteenth Annual Report (1914), p. 6 and Eighteenth Annual Report (1915), pp. 912. “ Public Archives o f British Colum bia (PA BC), B C Provincial Police Records, Superin­ tendent’s Incoming Correspondence, Tete Jaune Cache, File 21, Beyts to Campbell, Ju ly 31, 1912; and W . Lacey Am y, “ Snaring the Bohunk,” The Railroad and Current Mechanics, X V II (May, 1913), pp. 279 and 284. 30Donald A very, “ Canadian Immigration Policy and the ‘Foreign’ N avvy,” Historical Papers, 1972, pp. 135-56. 31L W. W. Strike Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1912; and Industrial Worker, Jun e 24, 1909 and Oct. 31, 1912. 32Industrial Union Bulletin, Aug. 17,19 07; and Industrial Worker, Oct. 24,1912 and N ov. 28, 1912; and The Voice o f the People, M ay 7, 1914. 33Industrial Union Bulletin, N ov. 2, 1907. 34P A C , R C M P Records, R G 18, A -i, Vol. 343-602, Primrose to Perry, Sept. 28, 1907 and Vol. 465-326, C allo w “ Crim e Report,” M ay 3, 1914. 35Solidarity, Oct. 21, 1911; W ayne State, H .E. M cGucken, “ Recollections o f a W obbly,” n.d. p. 43 and B C Royal Commission on Labour, Proceedings, Vol. V, p. 106. >6Industrial Union Bulletin, Ju ly 13, 1907. 37Industrial Worker, Aug. 12, 1909; and University o f British Colum bia, Special Collec­ tions Division, IW W Records, Local 322 Account Book. 38Industrial Union Bulletin, Dec. 7, 1907; and U B C , IW W Records, Library Catalogue. 39British Columbia Federationist, N ov. 28, 1913; and Industrial Worker, M ay 14, 1910. 40Industrial Worker, Ju n e 19,1913. 41Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 146-70; and Conlin, Bread and Roses Too, pp. 8-35. 42Philip S. Foner, History o f the Labor Movement in the United States: The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917 (N ew York, 1965), p. 159. For French Syndicalism see F.F. Ridley, Revolutionary Syndicalism in France: The Direct Action o f its Time (Cambridge, 1970) and Peter N . Stearns, Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause without Rebels (N ew Brunswick, N .J., 1971). 43Solidarity, Ju ly 22, 1911. 44Industrial Union Bulletin, March 14,1908; Industrial Worker, Sept. 23,1909; Ju ly 6 ,1911 and Dec. 7, 1911; and Solidarity, Ju ly 1, 1911; Ju ly 22, 1911 and Aug. 12, 1911. A5Industrial Worker, Jun e 8, 1911 and N o v. 2, 1911 and Agnes C . Laut, Am I M y Brothers Keeper: A Study o f British Columbia’s Labor and Oriental Problems (Toronto, 1913), p- 7-

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46B C Royal Commission on Labour, Proceedings, Vol. 5, p. 108. 47Solidarity, Ju ly 15, 1911; and Industrial Worker, Jun e 29, 1911. 48Wayne State, IW W Records, Vol. 145, File 28, Latchem, “ Y ellow Socialists and Red Communists,” n.d., p. 1. 4,Laut, Brother's Keeper, p. 16; Industrial Worker, M ay 20, 1909; and Solidarity, March 22,

1913™Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 173-4; Conlin, Bread and Roses Too, p. 74; Solidarity, Sept. 17, 1910; and Industrial Worker, Sept. 28, 1911. ^Industrial Worker, M ay 13, 1909. s2Carleton H. Parker, “ The Casual Laborer,” in The Casual Laborer and Other Essays (N ew York, 1920), p. 80; P A C , Immigration Records, RG76, Vol. 486-752149-1, M acG ill to Scott, Feb. 12,19 12; Labour Gazette, X II, p. 538; and British Columbia Federationist, Jan. 6, 1912. 5SIndustrial Worker, Jan. 25, 1912; and R G 76, Vol. 485-752149-1, M acG ill to Scott, Jan. 25, 1912. $,The Province, N o v. 2 5 ,19 11; R G 76, Vol. 486-752149-1, M acG ill to Scott, Feb. 12 ,19 12; British Columbia Federationist, Feb. 5,19 12 and P A C , Department o f National Defence Records, R G 24, Vol. 6517, H Q 363-24-1, W admore to Adjutant General, Feb. 3,1912. ssWestem Clarion, Feb. 3,19 12 ; and R G 24, Vol. 6517, H Q 363-24-1, Stewart to W admore, Feb. 5, 1912. 56Industrial Worker, Feb. 15, 1912; and The Province, Feb. 12, 1912. 57RG 76, Vol. 486-752149-1, Rodgers to Scott, Feb. 8,1912 and M acGill to Scott, Feb. 12, 1912; The Province, Feb. 2,19 12 and M cGucken, “ Recollections o f a W obbly,” pp. 402. i%lndustrial Worker, Feb. 22, 1912. yrThe Province, Jan. 30,19 12; Feb. 12 ,19 12 and Feb. 20,1912; The Sun, Feb. 14,19 12; and R G 76, Vol. 486-752149-1, M acG ill to Scott, Feb. 15,19 12. 60Industrial Worker, M arch 7, 1912. 61RG 18, A -i, Vol. 426-286, M cKenzie to Borden, April 29,1912; Solidarity, Sept. 16 ,19 11; and B C Provincial Police Records, Superintendent’s Incoming Correspondence, Yale District, File 6-2, M acN air to Cam pbell, M ay 13,19 12. (The latter collection w ill be hereafter cited B C PP -IW W .) 62Solidarity, N ov. 11,19 11. a lndustrial Worker, April 11, 1912 and M ay 30, 1912; The Sun, April 2, 1912 and Kamloops Standard, April 9, 1912. 64Industrial Worker, April 4 ,19 12 and April 18,1912; Solidarity, April 13,19 12; W ayne State, IW W Records, Vol. 24-17, M oreau to Thompson, Feb. 20, 1967 and M arch 8, 1967; The Sun, April 4, 1912; and Kamloops Standard, April 9, 1912. 65Solidarity, A pril 13,19 12 and M ay 4,19 12; and British Columbia Federationist, Ju n e 22,1912. “ 77ie Province, April 8,1912; and B C P P -IW W , File 5-1, Smith to Cam pbell, April 1,19 12. 67B C PP -IW W , File 5-1, Burr to Campbell, March 30, 1912; Industrial Worker, April 4, 1912; and Agnes C . Laut, “ Revolution Yaw ns,” Illustrated Technical World, Vol. 18 (May, 1913)- PP- 135-6. “ Avery, “ Canadian Immigration Policy,” ; and B C P P -IW W , File 5-1, Smith to Cam p­ bell, April 2, 1912. 69BCPP~IW W , File 5-1, Smith to Cam pbell, April 14,1912 and April 16,1912 and File 6-2, “ Translations o f circular in Italian language issued from the office o f the I.W .W . at Savona,” April 10, 1912 and Cam pbell to Bow ser, April 15, 1912. 70PA BC , Attorney General’ s Records, Vol. 2570-16-12, W hite to Bow ser, April 1, 1912;

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The Province, April 2, 1912; and The Kamloops Standard, April 30, 1912. 71B C P P -IW W , File 6-2, Goucher to Bow ser, April 13, 1912; and Edmonton Journal, April

13, 191272B C P P -IW W , File 6-2, Bow ser to Cam pbell, April 16, 1912. "^British Columbia Federationist, Jun e 22, 1912. 7,Industrial Worker, M ay 23, 1912 and M ay 30, 1912; and B C P P -IW W , File 5-1, Campbell to C o x, April 2i, 1912 and File 6-2, Hannay to Cam pbell, M ay 8,1912 and Dunwoody to Cam pbell, M ay 10, 1912. 75The Kamloops Standard, M ay 3, 1912; Solidarity, Jun e 15, 1912; and British Columbia Federationist, Aug. 2, 1912. 76B C Provincial Police Records, Superintendent’s Incoming Correspondence, A G Files, Cam pbell to Bow ser, April 27, 1912 and Bow ser to Cam pbell, M ay 30, 1912. 77Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 162-3; and Conlin, Bread and Roses Too, pp. 103-5. 78Industrial Worker, Ju n e 15 ,19 11; N ov. 30 ,1911 and Feb. 8,1912; and Solidarity, Ju ly 15,1911. 79Herbert G . Gutman, “ W ork, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815— 1919,” The American Flistorical Review, Vol. 78 (June, 1973), pp. 573-4. 80Industrial Worker, April 18, 1912 and Ju ly 4, 1912. s'Ibid., Ju n e 19, 1913. »2Ibid., March 13, 1913; March 27, 1913; April 17, 1913; April 24, 1913; M ay 1, 1913; M ay 15, 1913 and Ju ly 3,1913. The term sabotage was coined from sabot, a clumsy wooden shoe. “ M cCorm ack, “ W estern Labour Radicalism,” pp. 322-7. ,4Solidarity, Oct. 10, 1914; and The Voice o f the People, Feb. 5, [914. 85P A C , Laurier Papers, M G 266G, Vol. 695, Turnbull, “ Re Un-em ployed in Edmonton, 1913-14” ; Edmonton Daily Bulletin, Jan. 17, 1914; and Edmonton Capital, Jan. 16, 1914. s6The Voice o f the People, Feb. 12, 1914; Western Clarion, Feb. 28, 1914; Edmonton Daily Bulletin, Feb. 2, 1914; and Edmonton Capital, M ay 20, 1914. 97Edmonton Capital, M ay 15, 1914 and M ay 16, 1914. 88Edmonton Daily Bulletin, Feb. 5, 1914; and The Voice o f the People, Oct. 22, 1914. 89R G 18, A -i, Vol. 487-348. 90Industrial Worker, Oct. 24, 1912; and The Voice, Sept. 26, 1913. 91Industrial Union Bulletin, Aug. 17,1907; Foner, Industrial Workers o f the World, p. 231; and Industrial Worker, Ju n e 11, 1910. Solidarity, Aug. 27, 1910; and Industrial Worker, N ov. 2, 1911. n The Prince Rupert Optimist, N ov. 25,1910; and Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years o f Life and Labor (N ew York, 1925), Vol. I, pp. 424-5. 94Industrial Worker, Aug. 12, 1909; April 27, 1911 and Oct. 12, 1911. 95For the SP C see M cCorm ack, “ W estern Labour Radicalism,” Chap. IV. 96British Columbia Federationist, M ay 20, 1912; and Western Clarion, Oct. 23, 1909 and July 18, 1914. 97Industrial Worker, Ju ly 1, 1909 and Ju ly 8, 1909; and Solidarity, Dec. 16, 1911. 98Industrial Worker, Dec. 19, 1912. 99Solidarity, March 11, 1911; G eorge Hardy, Those Stormy Years (London, 1956), p. 28; W ayne State, IW W Records, Vol. 145-28, Latchem, “ Y ello w Socialists and Red Communists,” p. 82; and M cGucken, “ Recollections o f a W obbly,” p. 41. " ’"W illiam Bennett, Builders o f British Columbia (Vancouver, n.d.), p. 41; H.A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto, 1948). p. 300; and Paul Phillips, No Power Greater: A Century o f Labour in British Columbia (Vancouver, 1967), p. 46. ""P A B C , Attorney General’s Records, Vol. 6046-16-12, M cVety to Bowser, Ju ly 17,1912; and RG 18, A -i, Vol. 487-348, Gavell to Rowan, Aug. 4, 1914.

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i°2Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 223-5. t»>The Agitator, April 1, 1911. For north W innipeg anarchism see Immigration Records, Vol. 513-800111, Ashdown to O liver, April 9, 1908; and Rudolph Rocker, The London Years, trans. b y j . Leftwich (London, 1956), pp. 233-5. '0,Solidarity, Dec. 2, 1911 and M ay 23,1914; The Agitator, M ay 15,19 12 ; and The Syndicalist, Jan. 15, 1913. '05The Syndicalist, Feb. 15, 1913 and Jun e 1, 1913. 106British Columbia Federationist, Aug. 22, 1913 and Sept. 12, 1913 and U B C , Special Collections Division, Vancouver Trades and Labour Council Minutes, Sept. 4,1913. 107British Columbia Federationist, D ec. 12, 1913; Jan. 2 ,19 14 ; Jan. 16, 1914 and Feb. 13,1914; and Hardy, Those Stormy Years, pp. 51-2. 108Vancouver Trades Council Minutes, Jan. 15, 1914; and The Voice o f the People, N ov. 13, 1913. 109Phillips, No Power Greater, p. 50; and Trades and Labour Congress o f Canada, Convention Proceedings, 1911, pp. 73-4 and 1912, p. 82. ""Vancouver Trades Council Minutes, Aug. 15,19 12 and Oct. 17, 1912; Industrial Worker, Aug. 29, 1912; and British Columbia Federationist, N ov. 15, 1912 and N ov. 22, 1912. 111District Ledger, Jan. 13, 1912. n2Ibid., Feb. 10, 1912 and Feb. 24, 1912. ! 1 'Ihul., Feb. 24, 1912; M arch 3, 1912 and April 30, 1912; and Industrial Worker, March 14, 1912. '"D a n Sproul, “ The Situation in British Colum bia,” International Socialist Review, X (Feb., 1910), p. 743. Western Clarion, March 29, 1913 and Sept. 27, 1913. 116Bulletin (LAM, W innipeg), Jun e, 1914. " ’ Henry Pellmg, A History of British Trade Unionism (London, 1965), pp. I35—43ueWestern Clarion, Dec. 20, 1913. n9The Voice, March 8, 1912.

Regional Factors in Industrial Conflict: The Case o f British Columbia* STUART JA M IE SO N

There have been a number o f ambitious studies on an international scale in recent years attempting to identify and compare “ industry patterns” or “ national patterns” o f industrial conflict in different countries. Out­ standing among these have been two analytical surveys, “ The Inter­ industry Propensity to Strike,” by Kerr and Siegel, and Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict, by Ross and Hartman.1 One o f the findings in this latter study, incidentally, was that, among the fifteen countries surveyed, there has been a relatively high incidence o f strikes in Canada— second only to the United States, in fact. This paper is based on the premise that, in Canada, the individual province, or perhaps better, the region, is the most fruitful unit for studying such phenomena as industrial conflict. For regional differences in several respects are more pronounced in Canada than in most comparably industrialized countries, so that the portrayal o f behaviour patterns in terms o f national averages or configurations can lead to highly mis­ leading conclusions. British Columbia, next only to Quebec, perhaps, offers a particularly interesting area for research in this field, because it is a separate and distinct industrial complex, and has experienced patterns o f industrial conflict that differ markedly in certain important respects from other major regions o f the country. It is not my intention, however, to emphasize the unique or special features o f the labour scene in British Columbia. The field o f industrial relations in general has suffered too much already, perhaps, from a plethora o f detailed descriptive studies o f matters o f purely local scope S O U R C E : Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science, X X V III, 3 (1962), 405-16. Reprinted by permission o f the author and Canadian Political Science Association.

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and interest. What I am presenting here is a purely exploratory study, the purpose o f which is to examine and discuss various types o f situations that generate certain patterns o f industrial conflict, in the hope that the approach may be useful for similar studies in other provinces or regions. The study will be confined to only one type o f industrial conflict, namely, strikes. 2 It will attempt to portray, first, the main outlines o f the special strike pattern in British Columbia, as compared to the rest o f Canada; and, secondly, the main factors that account for this pattern. There seems to be a fairly widespread impression that British Colum­ bia is the most strike-prone province in Canada. The government o f that province has fortified the impression by passing a series o f new enact­ ments in the Legislature that impose unusually severe restrictions on unions. Official statistics gleaned from both the federal and provincial Departments o f Labour over the past decade seem to indicate thatBritish Columbia does have an unusually high incidence o f strikes. The nonagricultural paid labour force in that Province constituted about 10 per cent o f the total for Canada from 1949 to 1959 inclusive. Workers in that province, however, accounted for almost 15 per cent o f all strikes and lockouts, more than 15 per cent o f all workers participating in strikes, and more than 21 per cent o f all working days lost in strikes over the nation as a whole during this period. A simple comparison on the basis o f all paid employees, however, tends to be misleading. Strikes and lockouts, on this continent at least, are a highly institutionalized form o f overt conflict between unionized workers and employers. They are rarely undertaken by unorganized or non-union workers. A more meaningful comparison o f the propensity to strike, therefore, would be to relate strikes and lockouts to union membership, in Canada and British Columbia respectively. This modifies the picture consider­ ably. Almost one-half o f all paid workers in British Columbia belonged to unions during 1949-59, as compared to less than one-third in Canada, or the United States, as a whole. Organized labour in British Columbia accounted for about 15 per cent o f total union membership in Canada during this period. This percentage is roughly equal to British Colum­ bia’s average proportion o f all strikes and o f workers involved in strikes during this period. In general, then, unionized workers in British Columbia over the past decade have not gone on strike proportionately more frequently, nor in larger numbers, than their counterparts in the rest o f Canada. All this raises a whole new set o f questions as to why workers in British Columbia are so highly organized as compared to other parts o f

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Canada, and to the United States for that matter. Factors conducing to a high degree o f organization into unions, o f course, are likely to be important in explaining the pattern o f industrial conflict in that province. One important respect in which strikes in British Columbia have differed from the rest o f Canada is that they have been much more prolonged (and strikes in Canada, on the average, have been more prolonged than in the United States since the Second World War).3 Their average duration in B .C . during 1949-59 was 25.4 days, or almost 50 per cent longer than the Canadian average o f 18.3 days during this period. Strikes and lockouts in British Columbia, therefore, while pro­ portionately no larger or more frequent than in the rest o f the country, on the average, have been longer and more difficult to settle. Before pursuing this point further, however, it is necessary to state the obvious cliche that broad averages, over an extended period o f time, tend to hide significant details. A further analysis o f provincial labour statistics indicates that strikes in British Columbia have been heavily concentrated in certain years, and in certain industries. In 1952 and in 1959, for instance, that province, with only 15 per cent o f all union members in Canada, accounted for almost 40 per cent o f all workers involved in strikes, and 60 per cent o f all man-days o f employment lost in strikes. And, over the 1949-59 period, as may be seen from Table I below, only two industries, lumber and construction, with only 28 per cent o f all union members in British Columbia, accounted for almost one-half o f all strikes and no less than four-fifths o f all losses o f employ­ ment directly attributable to strikes, in that province. This particular pattern o f timing and location seems to indicate that strikes and lockouts in British Columbia tend to be concentrated in a few industries that are most vulnerable to cychcal fluctuations in output and employment, and that, in contrast to most other regions o f this conti­ nent, they tend to concentrate in years immediatelyfollowing periods of intense economic expansion. Strikes occur for many different reasons and are expressed in a variety o f forms. Any attempt to portray distinct patterns o f industrial conflict and to explore their causes, therefore, requires some sort o f classifi­ cation. In the Canadian, and British Columbian, contexts, with their elaborate legislative provisions governing the prevention and settlement o f industrial disputes, it would be legitimate, perhaps, to classify strikes into two broad categories: legally authorized, and other. Legally authorized “ interest” disputes and strikes arise in the course o f negotiating new or revised agreements, and in most provinces, including British Columbia, the parties involved must go through com-

Stuart Jamieson

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